Kant and religious passion.

Abstract

In short, the key point that decided Kant's fate in his fight with the romantics was his steadfast refusal to yield a place for religious passion in his moral thought. It was this subtle--often overlooked--trait that helped to stigmatize Kant's position as unemotional, unduly formalistic, and empty.

In Chapter Two, I show that a theory of moral character can be perceived in Kant's mature writings to offset the perception of Kant as the enemy-to-the-emotions. When it is seen that Kant did allow a place for feelings in the development of moral character, the defused argument reverts into a question of adequacy.

In Chapter One, I argue that Kant provided a critique of reason as a result of his silent decade (1770-1780) in which he began his lifelong struggle against the Romanticist movement. Kant lost his enlightened struggle against the passionate resistance of the (religious) romantics coincidental with the aftermath of the French revolution. As a result, the perception of Kant (portrayed by the romantics) as unfeeling, unyielding, and unsatisfying began to be disseminated.

That Kant's (dispassionate) Enlightenment movement gave way to the (passionate) Counter-Enlightenment of the Romantics might imply that Kant's moral stance was emotionally inadequate. But in order to properly evaluate Kant's position, it is necessary to first adequately understand it. I maintain that in light of the evidences I present there is a genuine need to rethink (as well as to reevaluate) the perception of Kant as unfeeling.

In Chapter Three, I approach this question of adequacy by comparing Kantian moral character (in its religious application) to religious passion. In order to appreciate the uniqueness of Kant's position, I analyze Kant's (so-called) religious side with respect to his moral principles. Having demonstrated how it is possible to perceive Kant as anti-religious (especially, from the romantic's viewpoint), I then proceed to show how and why it is that Kant so adamantly opposed religious passion. As a result of this moral opposition to religious passion, Kant is seen as unbelieving and hence unfeeling.