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KANT AND RELIGIOUS PASSION

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¶ Now, let me ask you something: what can one expect from man, considering he's such a strange creature? You can shower upon him all earthly blessings, drown him in happiness so that there'll be nothing to be seen but the bubbles rising to the surface of his bliss, give him such economic security that he won't have anything to do but sleep, nibble at cakes, and worry about keeping world history flowing--and even then, out of sheer spite and ingratitude, man will play a dirty trick on you. He'll even risk his cake for the sake of the most glaring stupidity, for the most economically unsound nonsense, just to inject into all the soundness and sense surrounding him some of his own disastrous, lethal fancies. What he wants to preserve is precisely his noxious fancies and vulgar trivialities, if only to assure himself that men are still men (as if that were so important) and not piano keys simply responding to the laws of nature. Man is somehow averse to the idea of being unable to desire unless this desire happens to figure on his timetable at that moment.

But even if man was nothing but a piano key, even if this could be demonstrated to him mathematically--even then, he wouldn't come to his senses but would pull some trick out of sheer ingratitude, just to make his point. And if he didn't have them on hand, he would devise the means of destruction, chaos, and all kinds of suffering to get his way. For instance, he'd swear loud enough for the whole world to hear--swearing is man's prerogative, setting him apart from the other animals--and maybe his swearing alone would get him what he wanted, that is, it'd prove to him that he's a man and not a piano key.

Now you may say that this too can be calculated in advance and entered on the timetable--chaos, swearing, and all--and that the very possibility of such a calculation would prevent it, so that sanity would prevail. Oh no! In that case man would go insane on purpose, just to be immune from reason.

I believe this is so and I'm prepared to vouch for it, because it seems to me that the meaning of man's life consists in proving to himself every minute that he's a man and not a piano key. And man will keep proving it and paying for it with his own skin; he will turn into a troglodyte if need be. And, since this is so, I cannot help rejoicing that things are still the way they are and that, for the time being, nobody knows worth a damn what determines our desires.

(F. Dostoevsky, Notes From Underground)

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ABSTRACT

In Chapter One, I argue that Kant provided a *critique* of reason as a result of his silent decade (1770-1780) in which he began his lifelong struggle against the Romanticist movement. Kant lost his enlightened struggle against the passionate resistance of the (religious) romantics coincidental with the aftermath of the French revolution. As a result, the perception of Kant (portrayed by the romantics) as unfeeling, unyielding, and unsatisfying began to be disseminated.

In Chapter Two, I show that a theory of moral character can be perceived in Kant's *mature* writings to offset the perception of Kant as the *enemy-to-the-emotions*. When it is seen that Kant did allow a place for feelings in the development of moral character, the defused argument reverts into a question of adequacy.

In Chapter Three, I approach this question of adequacy by comparing Kantian moral character (in its *religious* application) to religious passion. In order to appreciate the uniqueness of Kant's position, I analyze Kant's (so-called) *religious* side with respect to his *moral* principles. Having demonstrated how it is possible to perceive Kant as anti-

religious (especially, from the romantic's viewpoint), I then proceed to show how and why it is that Kant so adamantly opposed religious passion. As a result of this *moral* opposition to religious passion, Kant is seen as *unbelieving* and hence *unfeeling*.

That Kant's (dispassionate) Enlightenment movement gave way to the (passionate) Counter-Enlightenment of the Romantics might imply that Kant's moral stance was *emotionally* inadequate. But in order to properly evaluate Kant's position, it is necessary to first adequately understand it. I maintain that in light of the evidences I present there is a genuine need to rethink (as well as to reevaluate) the perception of Kant as *unfeeling*.

In short, the key point that decided Kant's fate in his fight with the romantics was his steadfast refusal to yield a place for religious passion in his moral thought. It was this subtle--often overlooked--trait that helped to stigmatize Kant's position as *unemotional*, unduly formalistic, and empty.

ABBREVIATIONS

(of Kant's writings as commonly cited in this work):

Anthropology: Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Mary Gregor (1974). Another translation referred to is that by Victor Lyle Dowdell (1978).

"Beginning": "Speculative Beginning of Human History" (1786). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983).

Conflict: Conflict of the Faculties (1798). Unless otherwise stated the assumed translation in use will be that by Mary Gregor (1979). Another translation referred to is that by Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

Correspondence. Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99. Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Arnulf Zweig (1967).

first Critique: Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787, 1790). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Norman Kemp Smith (1933). Other translations referred to are those by: (1) John Miller Dow Meiklejohn (1855); (2) Friedrich Max Müller (1881); and (3) Wolfgang Schwarz (1982).

second Critique: Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Lewis White Beck (1956). Another translation referred to is that by Mary Gregor (in Practical Philosophy, 1996).

third Critique: Critique of Judgment (1790). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Werner S. Pluhar (1987). Other translations referred to are those by: (1) J.H. Bernard (1951); and (2) James Creed Meredith (1952).

Dreams: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed

translation in use will be that by John Manolesco (in Dreams of a Spirit Seer by Immanuel Kant and Other Related Writings, 1969). Another translation referred to is that by David Walford in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 (1992).

Education: Lectures on Education (1803). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Edward Franklin Buchner (in The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant, 1908). Other translations referred to are those by: (1) Annette Churton (1899) (in Lectures on Education, 1960; and (2) Robert Louden (pending publication).

"End": "The End of All Things" (1794). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983). Another translation referred to is that by Allen Wood (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

"Enlightenment": "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983). Other translations ("What is Enlightenment?") also referred to are those by: 1) Lewis White Beck (in On History: Immanuel Kant, 1963); and 2) Mary Gregor (in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, 1996).

Ethics: Lectures on Ethics (1775-1780). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Louis Infield (1930, 1978).

Existence: The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by David Walford (in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, 1992).

Feeling: Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1763). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by John T. Goldthwait (1960, 1981).

Groundwork: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Herbert James Paton (1964). Another translation also referred to is that by Mary Gregor (in Practical Philosophy, 1996).

Heavens: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by William Hastie (1900).

"History": "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" (1784). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983).

Inaugural: On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World [Inaugural Dissertation] (1770). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by David Walford (in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, 1992).

"Lie": "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy" (1797). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Mary Gregor (in Practical Philosophy, 1996). Two other translations referred to are: 1) by Lewis White Beck ("On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives" as reprinted in Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1994); and 2) by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott ("On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Benevolent Motives" in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on The Theory of Ethics, 1873, 1909; sixth ed.).

Logic: Lectures on Logic (1755-1798). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by J. Michael Young (1992).

Morals: Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Mary Gregor (with Introduction by Mary Gregor, 1991). Two other editions of Gregor's translation referred to are: one, with the Introduction by Roger J. Sullivan (1996); the other, in Practical Philosophy (1996).

"Negatives": "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy" (1763). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by David Walford (in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, 1992).

Opus: Opus Postumum (1804). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen (1993).

"Orient": "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?" (1786). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Allen Wood (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

"Peace": "To Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Sketch" (1795). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983). Another translation referred to is that by Mary Gregor (in Practical Philosophy, 1996).

Progress?: What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made In Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? (1791). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Ted Humphrey (1983).

Prolegomena: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by James W. Ellington (1977).

Religion: Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (1960). Another translation (Religion within the boundaries of mere reason) also referred to is that by George di Giovanni (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

"Theodicies": "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies" (1791). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Michel Despland (in Kant: On History and Religion, 1973). Another translation ("On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy") also referred to is that by George di Giovanni (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

Theology: Lectures on Philosophical Theology (1783-1784). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Gertrude Clark and Allen Wood (1978). Another translation (Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion) also referred to is the revised translation by Allen Wood (in Religion and Rational Theology, 1996).

"Theory": "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use" (1793). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays, 1983). Another translation referred to is that by Mary Gregor (in Practical Philosophy, 1996).

"Tone": "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy" (1796). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation will be that by Peter Fenves (in Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida, ed. Peter Fenves, 1993).

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For Kant, the true strength of virtue is demonstrated by "a *tranquil mind* with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice."[1] Perhaps this preference (for a dispassionate tranquillity) above all others led Kant into that inevitable confrontation with his arch rivals--the romanticists, a confrontation that threatened ultimately to catapult Kantianism into oblivion.

As we shall see, Kant's initial contact with (some of) the ringleaders of the Romantic circle--e.g., Hamann (the father of the *Sturm und Drang*/'Storm and Stress' principles of Romanticism), Herder, and Fichte--was not at all hostile or unfriendly. Indeed, some of these leaders were pupils of his; others, his ardent followers. What follows therefore is the bitter-sweet story of a relationship of *good-will* gone sour. It is for this purpose (among others), I contend, that Kant wrote his three pivotal *Critiques*: to attempt to steer his (deemed) lost comrades back into the fold of *enlightened* thinking.[2]

By the time Kant wrote even his first Critique (1781), he was already aware of the fixed lines drawn on the battlefield, lines that would separate his vision of a thorough and systematic reason from the lofty carefree mannerisms of romantic thinking. Kant had hoped to turn the tide of this *fanaticism* (or, *Schwärmerei*, as he called it[3]), thereby saving Germany (and the world) from these perceived dangers, as he indicates in his first Critique: "the spirit of thoroughness is not extinct in Germany, but has only been temporarily overshadowed by the prevalence of a pretentiously free manner of thinking" (Bxlii-Bxliii).

Kant maintains that the boundaries separating the various spheres of science and knowledge should not be allowed "to trespass upon one another's territory," but should be kept within their proper domain (Ibid., Bviii-Bix). To this end, he compares reason itself to an island surrounded by the misty illusions of fanaticism (Ibid., A235-236/B294-295). The only way, Kant argues, that we can become free from the *dogmatic delusion* of romanticism that lures us with *an imagined felicity* is through the *sobriety of a critique*, a new method of thought ("namely, that we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them") (Ibid., A395; Bxviii). Kant compares this revolutionary way of thinking to that of Copernicus in that "objects must conform to our knowledge" and not vice versa. As Copernicus "made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest" in his daring argument that

the earth revolved around the sun; so--Kant emphasizes--"the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition" (Ibid., Bxvi-Bxvii).

In so aligning his *new method* of critical thinking with the scientific theories of a Copernicus or a Galileo, Kant hopes to salvage some sort of security to the *architectonic* (or systemization) of reason itself, a certainty which he feels is being undermined by "the rashness and presumption of those who so far misconstrue the true vocation of reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true insight and knowledge cease."[4] To better understand the import Kant gives to human feelings, it may be helpful to first see *how* and (to some extent) *why* Kant began his quiet revolution (in favor of *mental* tranquillity).

A. Kant's Dispassionate Enlightenment

Karl Popper makes the interesting claim that when Kant died on the 12 February 1804 and was buried sixteen days later 'like a king,' the bells that tolled in that interim "carried an echo of the American and French revolutions--of the ideas of 1776 and 1789."[5] That Kant was a revolutionary is an interesting but still a moot point. What exactly Kant accomplished, however, is even more controversial.

On the one hand, philosophers such as David Zoolalian maintain that there are at least two Immanuel Kants: the

traditional Kant "of the Locke, Berkeley, Hume chain" (as taught in the schools); and the revolutionary Kant who is not the personification of bourgeois Liberal thinking.[6] Lewis White Beck, on the other hand, flatly contradicts this latter claim, stating that Kant's Copernican and Rousseauistic revolutions did not revolutionize science or morals but were historically conservative. Beck does concede that Kant's earlier *revolutions* provided new *foundations* "for the science and the moral ideals already current"; but claims that only Kant's *aesthetic* revolution was genuinely noteworthy--in that it prepared the way for the artistic developments in German romanticism.[7]

Popper is not as sure as Beck: indeed, he opposes the praise Beck would give to Kant for (supposedly) founding the Romantic School contending that this appropriation of credit from Kant continues today "only after Kant's death, when he could no longer protest" (as he did in his 'Open Letter' to Fichte in 1799). Popper continues by pointing out that Kant consistently warned "against Romanticism, sentimental enthusiasm and *Schwärmerei*" but apparently to little avail (in academia).[8] That Kant was a revolutionary is clear (Popper argues) in Kant's Religion as the following passage indicates (which Popper himself translates):

> Much as my words may startle you, you must not condemn me for saying: every man creates his God. From the moral point of view...you even *have* to create your God, in order to worship in Him your creator. For in whatever way...the Deity should be made known to you, and

> even...if He should reveal Himself to you: it is you...who must judge whether you are permitted [by your conscience] to believe in Him, and to worship Him.[9]

Although this dispute among scholars regarding the merits of Kant's (controversial) revolution is ongoing to this day, my own view is that Kant's contribution to humanity was indeed revolutionary *in principle* in that virtually every philosopher since Kant has had to determine (or define) his relation to Kant. It is true that Kant lived a simple sincere life, but it was, arguably, not without its satisfying pleasures. For despite his arduous work ethic, Kant enjoyed his social life, his long daily walks, and his long afternoon dinners (usually spanning three hours) spent with at least three friends.[10]

The Romantics could conceivably counter, however, that despite Kant's *sincerity*, he was *sincerely* deceived. For there is more to life than to live cloistered in one's room writing dozens of academic tracts and treatises pertaining to a world of ideas devoid of passion and the exuberance of emotion. Hegel, in particular, epitomized this ideal of romanticism in his statement that "nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion."[11] In so implicating Kant as 'an enemy-to-the-emotions,' the romantics did not (in my view) properly apprehend his precise position. Kant plainly speaks against *monkish virtue* and *monkish ascetics*, arguing that "we ought to enjoy the good things of life."[12]

The main disagreement here is simply that Kant was not as sure as Hegel (and the rest of the romantics) that the *basis*

for our moral decisions need 'make room' for the passions. Admittedly, he was *initially* influenced by the moral sentiment theories of Edmund Burke and Adam Smith, as well as by those of the *moral sense* philosophers (e.g., Shaftsbury and Hutcheson). In time (during the 1750s and 1760s), however, Kant began to change his earlier (partial) acceptance of views portrayed by Hume and other romanticists to the extent that he saw reason must not be *the slave* to the passions but must be primary over the passions.[13] For "no man is sane when swayed by passion," Kant admonishes: One must avoid giving way to passion, in particular, to that 'most ungody of all passions,' religious fervor. Religion, therefore, must be grounded in reason, Kant concludes, and so begins his quest to convince (and even to *convert*) the bright minds of his peers to this *dispassionate enlightenment*.[14]

Hamann (The *Stürmer und Dränger*) and *The Prussian Hume*

Perhaps one of the earliest negative examples of this fanaticism of *religious zeal* that Kant grew to abhor (besides his childhood exposure in the Collegium, of course) is evident in his futile attempt to restore his friend Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88) from its beguiling influence. Hamann as the 'wizard (or Magus) of the North' embraced orthodox Christianity in "an intensely fundamentalist and emotional" conversion. Kant and Hamann's (potential) brother-in-law Johann Christoph Berens (1729-92) went to visit him (in

Königsberg) to attempt to *convert* him to the sanity of 'rational deism' but to no avail.[15]

In a letter to Kant (27 July 1759), Hamann mocks Kant's efforts to try to change his mind. He states that reason is "not given to you to make you wise but to make you aware of your folly." To justify his newly founded orthodox faith in 'the living word' (or *verbalism*) of God, Hamann quotes Hume as a 'Saul among the prophets' and one who rightly said:

> The Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by *Faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.[16]

Kant's response to Hamann's (perceived) jibber-jabber of a new conversion to Christ is simply that Hamann should attempt to communicate his further ideas "if possible, in the language of men." "For I, poor earthling that I am," adds Kant, "have not been properly trained to understand the divine language of Intuitive Reason" (Ibid., 7). Without doubt, Kant was being sarcastic as he realized that there was no way he could reason with Hamann, and hence concluded that this *Schwärmerei* was indeed a great evil.

The 'Magician of the North,' on the other hand, was not through with Kant. Not only does Hamann insinuate that Kant--the 'little *magister*'--aspired to become a 'little Socrates,'

he claims that Kant wished to become a second Newton; hence, 'a warden of philosophy' (as Newton was warden of the Royal mint).[17] Hamann sees Kant as merely an agnostic who speaks of 'the *idea* of God' but who has no greater faith than that of the devils of whom Scripture states that they believe in (*more* than the mere idea of) God and likewise *tremble* (cf. James 2:19). For Hamann, Kant is not the paragon of believers but a 'Prussian Hume,' one who neither acknowledges the need for a priest in his own life nor in his doctrine. Indeed, Hamann perceives Kant's 'making of Gods' as indicative of an underlying *unbelief* Kant disguises with soothing words of reason; for "lies," says Hamann, "are the mother tongue of our reason and wit."[18] As if to further prove his point, Hamann commences the writing of a Metacritique contra Kant but dies (in 1788) before completing it.[19] The torch of an anti-Kantian resistance is thereby passed onto Herder.[20]

Herder (The *Schwärmer*) and *The Duke*

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) as Kant's most promising and brilliant pupil (1762-64) breaks with his *master*--deemed *the Duke* of philosophers--and decides to pursue a religious career under Hamann's wing.[21] Despite Kant's repeated efforts to win back Herder from Hamann's mystical influence, Herder prefers the emotionalism of *Schwärmerei* to Kant's emphasis on the architectonic of reason. Indeed, Herder eventually completes Hamann's Metacritique (although he alters

it significantly to suit his own viewpoints) which he entitles--Understanding and Reason: A Metacritique of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1799). Herder argues against Kant's dualism both in his use of language (as sensuous and intellectual) and in his division between reason and the understanding. Even Herder's (supposed) praise of Kant as one devoid of 'the slightest trace of arrogance' is a mere ploy to turn this (disguised) praise against Kantians whom Herder saw as arrogant, even despotic dogmatists.[22]

The Duke (as can well be imagined) was not impressed and decided (in that same year, 1799) to counterstrike the (perceived) romantic position via an 'open letter' which condemned Fichtean philosophy as having nothing in common with his own.[23] Besides ensuring Fichte's (almost) immediate expulsion from the academic circles, the Duke's brief '*open* letter' symbolized the *open* (and mounting) tension between Kant and his disenchanted disciples. For instance, Fichte (who once referred to his allegiance to Kant as a veritable *conversion*) now turns on *the Duke* with apparent rage. Perhaps as a result of his dismissal from the University of Jena, Fichte declares Kantianism to be 'total nonsense' without a Fichtean interpolation. He even goes so far as to say that Kant (who has "no more than three-quarters of a mind") not only conducts himself as a prostitute, but has never been that conversant with his own philosophy that he could possibly know it himself or even understand it.[24]. Thereafter, Fichte joins

in the front ranks of the Romantic movement to attempt to undermine and eventually (to) overthrow Kantianism.

Not unlike Hamann, Herder--the Apostle of Humanity--is not through with Kant either. Angered at Kant's poor review of Herder's *Ideen* (Ideas), Herder determines to *crush* or even *annihilate* Kant's 'idol of reason.' To this end, Herder attempts to match and thereby counter some of Kant's key works. To Kant's first Critique, Herder counterposes a Metacritique of *The Critique of Pure Reason*; to Kant's third Critique, Herder presents his Kalligone; and to Kant's "Peace," Herder offers his own work 'with the same title.'[25] Herder does not need to counterpose Kant's second Critique (1788), however, as his colleague (of the German Romantic circle) Schleiermacher provides a detailed criticism of that Critique with his treatise, On the Highest Good (1789).[26]

Kant, it seems, is waging a (losing) war on all fronts. Even his last remaining 'friends of the Enlightenment'--C.G. Schütz, J.S. Beck, Salomon Maimon, and K.L. Reinhold--appear to have been caught up with the sensationalism of the Romantic movement, and engage in highly charged emotional disputes regarding Kant's *critical* philosophy. Kant no doubt sees the handwriting on the wall, for he soon declines to even respond to the rising tide of fiery criticisms against his moral position. He complains that he cannot (even) understand their *irrational* suppositions. As if in a bad dream, Kant notes--in his sunset years--not only that there are 'no [true] friends'

but that he has reached the beginning of the end in more ways than one.[27]

Dreams and Kant

One of the best descriptions of the nature of romanticism is that given by T.M Knox:

> The Romantic mind is scornful of sharp boundary lines between realms of thought and life. It deliberately confounds poetry with philosophy or both with prophecy, imagination with reality, actor with spectator, the divine with the human, the ideal with the real, life with dream. The Romanticist believes in the unity underlying all these zones and divisions. Fusing science and religion, psychology and physics, mind and matter, he anticipates a universal science which would happily comprise them all. Some Romanticists tried to compass this end by a poetical interpretation of nature. Others adapted ethics to physics, or religion to poetry.[28]

And perhaps one of the best examples of Kant's own writings as they relate to romanticism is his Dreams (1766). Having been influenced by the reading of Rousseau's Emile in 1762, Kant began to entertain the notion of a (possible) superiority of feeling over reason. By 1764, however, Kant wrote in his essay "On the Diseases of the Mind" that "our dream experiences [*sic*] while they last appear as real and vivid as real facts of experience." But if such dreams, or *hallucinations* (including religious visions), are taken to be real experiences by persons fully awake and of sound mind, Kant adds, then it is useless "to try and fight these hallucinations with arguments of reason":

> [F]or the representations are as real as if caused by genuine sensations; and generally speaking, things felt and experienced have a far greater weight when it comes to persuasion than mere arguments of reason. Consequently, no person who happens to be under the spell of such hallucinations can be induced to doubt the reality of his imaginary visions by the help of explanations derived from reasoning.[29]

By 1764, it appears that Kant's *critical philosophy* has begun to take form. Its initial undeveloped stage is apparent in what some commentators have seen as Kant's ambivalence regarding the nature of the soul (in Dreams, 1766), later developed (in his Inaugural, 1770) into his (still controversial) noumenon-phenomenon distinction. Undoubtedly, Kant's choice of the term *dreams* (for his 1766 treatise) was not intended to be a flattering one. With the one *stone* of his treatise, Kant had hoped to kill both *birds*: (1) the *dreams* (or spiritual visions) of Emanuel Swedenborg, the 'Northern Plato' (1688-1772); and (2) those dreams of metaphysical visionaries (such as Hamann and the budding *Sturm und Drang* movement). But Kant's *stone* may just as well have been thrown into a beehive, for the *Schwärmerei* (literally, 'swarming of bees') of the Romantic circle only increases.

Kant's treatise on Dreams has been viewed as 'a personal vendetta' against Swedenborg, partly because 'the Swede' had refused to reply (for over a year) to Kant's highly publicized letter to him (regarding the *visions* this 'prophet without honor' has had since 1745). Kant had paid a pretty penny to buy all eight volumes of the Great Swede's *Arcana Coelestia*

('Celestial Mysteries,' 1749-56) and spent a period of at least three years (1763-66) reading this *sheer nonsense* (as he would later term it) in order to properly address the Swede's reports of *illuminations* from the spirit world.[30]

Swedenborg (who knew nine languages, was versatile in almost forty skilful avocations, and as an accomplished scientist and privileged aristocrat belonged to the world-renowned Royal Academy of Sciences) was widely deemed to have snubbed this *little* Prussian lecturer from the (notoriously poor) lower middle class. Kant was (understandably) deeply humiliated and even incensed. In a series of abuses evidenced throughout his Dreams, he tries to belittle this *Schwärmer* as the 'worst of all fanatics and dreamers' and declares his visions to be "mere concoctions of a diseased brain."[31]

Privately, in a letter (08 April 1766) to his *mentor*, Moses Mendelssohn, Kant admits that he could not conceal his "repugnance, and even a little hatred, toward the inflated arrogance of whole volumes of what are passed off nowadays as insights." Kant adds, however, that his tone ('between jest and earnest,' as Mendelssohn disapprovingly called it) was 'actually quite honest' because his mind remained "in a state of conflict on this matter." Although Kant concedes to have been *charmed* by these 'spirit reports,' he maintains that Swedenborg was deluded, and expresses to Mendelssohn the need for a new revival in metaphysics: one that would seek to resolve "whether it is intrinsically possible to determine

these powers of spiritual substances by means of a priori rational judgments."[32]

Kant's efforts to grasp the nature of this *spirit world* were therefore not in vain. From the pages of his Dreams (of 1766) to Kant's doctrine of the noumenon-phenomenon distinction as first expressed in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), the key to Kant's 'metaphysical metamorphosis' soon becomes apparent: it is subsequently articulated (in 1781) as *Ding an sich* (or 'thing-in-itself'). Although some commentators today still prefer to think of Kant as 'a secret believer,' I hold that he seriously attempted to discard this 'mystic baggage' of the 1760s by the time he was inaugurated as Professor *ordinaire* (in 1770).[33]

That Kant continues to be *charmed* by these 'spirit reports,' however, is evident even as late as his first Critique (1781) in which he borrows Swedenborg's concept of a *rational psychology* and attempts to subject it to the demands of a *critical* philosophy.[34] But (in my view--as further developed in this work) Kant's fascination with Swedenborg and the spirit world did not convince him of--let alone convert him to--the (supposed) veracity of these *charming* claims.

From Kant's early venture into Swedenborg's reports of 'spirit visits' to the subsequent culmination (in 1781) of his budding critical thought (as separate though, arguably, not *entirely* distinct from that of the empiricists), we can see that in this interim Kant had acquired a belief in something

other than 'what is' (or 'what merely *appears* to be')--a belief in 'what *ought to be*' (even if unverifiable), i.e., a belief in *things-in-themselves*.[35] This belief was (ironically) *possible* because of Kant's doctrine of 'the possible' (or '*possible* experience') as a *third thing* outside (1) the laws of experience, and (2) custom-bred habits and beliefs.[36] Though earlier influenced by Hume and the empirical method of (scientific) thinking, Kant--now armed with the perceived truth couched in his Inaugural (that there is more to the *possibility* of morality than the mere phenomena of 'moral sense' theory)--attempts to break free from this 'stupor of thought' (or *dogmatic slumber*) of the 1750s and 1760s.

Promoted to Professor of Logic and Metaphysics (in 1770), Kant endeavors to unite the best features of both disciplines into one veritable logician's dream: a metaphysical system of morality based primarily on reason. In order to accomplish this *dispassionate enlightenment*, however, Kant would have to decide what to do with 'feelings and inclinations' (which he sharply distinguishes from 'the emotions and passions').[37]

Determining the basis for morality

Contrary to the perceived view (widely instigated by certain romantics who, arguably, had 'a bone to pick' with *the Duke*), I maintain that Kant does not base his system of morality on reason *alone*. As late as 1797, Kant refers to *certain moral endowments* which lie *at the basis* of morality:

"They are *moral feeling, conscience, love* of one's neighbor, and *respect* for oneself (*self-esteem*)."[38] The spectre of human emotions and passions is one, however, that dogs Kant throughout his architectonic of reason and the moral law. Although Kant holds that the standard of moral perfection must be 'exact, invariable, and absolute,' it is my contention (as developed in Ch. II) that Kant does *make room* for feelings.[39]

But Kant's *idea* of a rationally established basis for morality is slow in coming. He continually struggles throughout this *silent decade* (1770-1781) to not only find a way to establish the moral law upon an essentially rational foundation, but to determine the proper role of human *feeling* within this carefully structured *organ* of reason.[40] In response to the claims of the *moral sense* theorists, Kant had written his Feeling (1763), which laid the groundwork (so to speak) for his future role of *moral* feelings, in particular, that of *reverence* for the (moral) law. (As I demonstrate in Ch.II,) respect (as a moral feeling) is more than mere love (as a sensual feeling). Indeed, respect (both for the moral law *and* for one's fellow) is a vital part of developing genuine *moral* character.

Kant maintains (in his second Critique) that respect (for another person) is a tribute: for if one genuinely has respect for another, he cannot help *feeling* it inwardly--even if he outwardly withholds it. In this sense, Kant says, respect is "far from being a feeling of pleasure" simply because one

"only reluctantly gives way to it" (80). To have respect for the moral law does not mean that one should (or even could) eliminate all other feelings. Kant insists that respect applies *only* to 'persons' and not to either things or even 'a supreme being' (for both are "free from all sensibility") (Ibid., 79). What this subsequent (1788) view of respect *as a feeling* entails is that Kant apparently never loses sight of the *human* in his theory of *human* personality or (as I develop it in Ch. II) of *moral* character.[41]

In short, although I agree that Kant does not yield a *primary* place for feelings in the development of moral character, I do not maintain that he intended a strictly formal (or emotionless) system of morality.[42] Kant's approach in his treatment of both religion and ethics is to perform (what I call) 'a Galileo.'[43] That is, as Galileo is reputed to have said that 'the earth does not move around the sun (but yet it moves),' so Kant says that the formation of moral character is not (primarily) based on feelings (but yet moral feelings lie at the basis of moral character). Kant says that morality is not based on religion (but yet we need *religion*--at least, in the most *basic* form encapsulated in the Ideals of Reason). Kant says that we need to believe in God to ensure *the reality* of morality (but yet we need only the *idea* of a God created by our own reason to satisfy that requirement).

Hence, we can see that Kant is using a keen sense of irony in developing his unique system of ethics from that

fertile ground originally provided by Rousseau, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and others; but yet it is his *own* (and hence 'unique') sense of ethics which he finally cultivates.[44] For as Kant believes that one must work for what one wants to have, he also maintains that one must *think* for what he wants to know. And to think *critically* means to think for oneself, to think without leaning upon the judgments of others in formulating one's own 'final verdict'; that is, to reason independently (of biased or emotionally persuaded opinions). In so emphasizing the need to *Sapere Aude!* ('to dare to think'), Kant ironically has been portrayed as unfeeling.[45]

In my view (as expanded in the remainder of this work), such critics have been unduly dismissive of Kant's claims to disinterested duty. A disinterested or even a dispassionate sense of duty is not the same thing as an uninterested sense of duty (or duty without *any* feelings). To have a genuine disinterested sense of duty, one would have to be well-disciplined. But that necessity does not entail that one must eliminate all feeling thereby--simply, that one keeps one's feelings (especially, in the form of passions) from gaining the upper hand. For it is in this sense that the basis of morality is not (to be) an emotional one, but *primarily* rational.

B. Moral Character v. Religious Passion

From an historical perspective, perhaps the closest proximity Kant's thought could approach to the Romanticist position is in his (republican) views regarding political revolutions. Although Kant's sympathy for the American Revolution (1776) is well-known, his views regarding the *political* aspect of the French Revolution have generally been distorted. For Kant, *Eclairissement* is not *Aufklärung*: the French Enlightenment simply did not share the same goals, methods, and ideals as did the German one. That is, Kant's *French connection* (via Rousseau and Voltaire) to the French revolution is not necessarily an extension of his (German) Enlightenment position.[46]

Although Kant could sympathize with Rousseau (in The Social Contract, 1762) that "man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," and although he agrees with the principles of the French Revolution (over-simplified as: *Liberté! Fraternité! Egalité!*), he maintains that (*from the political* perspective) a change in a defective constitution could be carried out "only through *reform* by the sovereign itself, but not by the people, and therefore not by *revolution.*"[47] Kant's position is remarkably similar then to Edmund Burke's in Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in which Burke stresses the need for an 'orderly' revolution.[48]

But the Romantics choose to overlook Kant's *juridical* views on the French Revolution and instead focus on Kant's 'last word' on the subject in which Kant apparently not only

endorses the French Revolution as that 'of a gifted people,' but claims it demonstrates the "moral tendency of the human race."[49] By the early 1790s, however, religious German romantics (e.g., Friedrich Schlegel) came to despise this monstrous 'Gospel of Liberty' issued by Robespierre and its 'antireligious religion.' For the German Romantic circle, the three R's of a progressive line of emancipation (Reformation to Revolution to Romanticism) do not apply in this case.[50]

Kant's proposal then to wrap--as it were--a *moral* cloak over the perceived godlessness of a Robespierre and his irreligious inciters is perceived to be an indication that he is not in touch with the grass roots of genuine *religious* experience. Even worse, the suspicion grows (among the German circle of romantics) that Kant's (rather limited) vision of an *idea of God* is indicative of the inadequacy of Kantianism *as a whole*. The sentiment soon spreads that Kant's moral thought in effect blocks the *free* expression of the *religious* will to find its way to God in that it denies both: (1) a free rein to the (expansion of the) emotions, and (2) access to an understanding of one's own inner sanctum--the 'heart of hearts.'

The Duke and his dukedom are doomed. With the gory end of the French Revolution, the glory of Kant's brave moral world also wanes. For it is deemed to be unduly formalistic, unemotional, and unfulfilling by his victorious rivals--the Romantics.

An Introduction (to an interpretation)

As we have seen, Kant eventually loses his enlightened struggle against the rambunctious Romantics chiefly because he refuses: (1) to change his moral stance (e.g., as reflected in his limited concept of an *idea of God*); and (2) to widen the scope of his principles (in particular, to 'make room' for the passions).[51] Before we join the Romantic bandwagon in debunking Kantianism as empty, thereby defrocking Kant of any moral authority, I think it behooves us to first (thoroughly) investigate Kant's own position (which I explore in the following two Chapters).

That Kant's views on God and the Ideals of Reason are so cautiously (and subtly) argued leaves the impression on the minds of the Romantics that Kant does not truly believe in a *living* God, a vibrant, active and personal God who participates and is integrated (via prayers, rituals, worship services, et cetera) into the routine of people's daily lives. Indeed, such a concept of a God or a religion, for Kant, would be distasteful (as was the Pietism of his early childhood). A *genie-in-the-bottle* religion with a fairy-tale Godfather who can forgive sins without the need to satisfy justice is simply unacceptable to Kant.

But as the concept of God 'belongs to morals,' and as Kant does not think it necessary that one should have to declare one's religion, Kant seeks to develop a rational system of morality that could meet with a universal

standard.[52] His solution is to keep God 'intelligible'--that is, *within* the moral world of one's own thoughts. To achieve this goal, it would be necessary but *to think* the 'idea of God.'

In finding Kant's view of God as one tied to an 'idea of God,' the Romantics perceived a similarity (and in time even a connection) between Kant's unsatisfying religious outlook and his unfulfilling ethical stance. They deemed Kant to be unduly formalistic and found him 'wanting.' But--in my view--the balance (or scales) used to so judge him does (do) not properly take into consideration Kant's moral character theory. This theory (which I formulate in Ch. II from Kant's own works) takes into consideration both moral reason and moral feeling in the development of (Kantian) moral character. My aim is to correct the misapprehension regarding Kant's moral system as an 'enemy-to-the-emotions.'

In opposing (religious) passion, Kant is seen as opposing both the concept of religion and that of the emotions. This perception of Kant is a distortion: As I argue (in this treatise), Kant's opposition is neither to the *principle* of religion per se nor to the *principle* of feelings, but to the (perceived) dangerous effects of being 'drunk with passion' to the extent that one thereby negatively alters (or overrides) the effectiveness of one's own rational sense of clear judgment.

It could be argued contra Kant that the pristine

Christian Church was originally led by Apostles who were perceived to be *drunk* in that they were (believed to be) imbued with the Holy Ghost.[53] Admittedly, Kant would have difficulty accepting this sort of behavior--as part of moral character--for that would entail a (spiritual) force above and beyond the capability of mortal reason. In that sense, it could be said *the Duke*'s moral vision is perhaps a bit too elegant for 'holy rollers,' spiritual visionaries, and the like. And it is, therefore, in that perception of Kant that I have developed (as well as discovered--in Ch. III) his *religious* philosophy as essentially a moral one. To invert Schopenhauer's well-known tale of the man who follows an unknown beauty at a masquerade in order to acquaint himself with her: so Kant at the end of his quest (for the pure religion) discovers that the *beauty* behind that mask is his own *wife* (i.e., his own *moral* law).[54]

In this thesis, I have developed a (limited) defense of Kant in that I have assumed (as the platform for argument) that it is *possible* to oppose (religious) passion and still maintain a healthy balance of reason and feeling in the development of moral character. I have also *assumed* (as a given) that it is *possible* to develop a Kantian sense of moral character without the *fundamental* need of a (traditional) religion in that process. To delve deeper into the feasibility (or impossiblity) of these *given* assumptions is simply beyond the scope (and intent) of this treatise. Whether I have

succeeded in defending Kant from the stock charge of moral insensitivity (previously promulgated) by his opponents of the Romantic circle is one thing; whether Kant's moral thought can be correctly construed to reflect an *essential* role for moral feeling is quite another. Although my focus in this work is on the latter, I maintain that (with the success of the latter) the former is thereby mitigated.

1. Morals, 209.

2. Although I have chosen only a few of the leaders of the Romantic circle for the purposes of this present work, I think that the few that I have chosen--Hamann, Herder, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and (with reservations) Hegel--are an adequate representation. Stuckenberg in The Life of Immanuel Kant points out that: "If the three most eminent names of Eastern Prussia, during the second half of [the] last [18th] century, were required, few, if any, would hesitate to mention Kant, Herder, and Hamann" (381). Accordingly, I have placed my emphasis on these three noteworthy men.

Other noteworthy men of the German Romantic circle that I have not included are:

a) Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832);
b) Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819);
c) Novalis (alias, Friedrich Leopold) (1772-1801);
d) Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805);
e) Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829); and
f) Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854).

Notables from the *Aufklärung* (or 'Enlightenment') camp that I have not included (partly because most of them were deceased by the time the Romantic era come into full swing in the late 1780s and throughout the 1790s) are:

a) Christian August Crusius (1712-1775);
b) Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777);
c) Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781);
d) Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786);
e) Karl Leonard Reinhold (1758-1823);
f) Johann Schultz (alias, 'Schulze') (1739-1805);
g) Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807);
h) Christian Thomasius (1655-1728); and
i) Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

3. The German word *Schwärmerei* (originally derived from the sense of seeming confusion seen in '*swarms* of buzzing bees') is used in this treatise to denote the sentimentalism, or (even) emotional fanaticism, which Kant perceives in the German Romantic circle. Zweig translates *Schwärmerei* in Kant's Correspondence to also mean 'romantic twaddle' (221). Perhaps the best overall explanation of what Kant intends by *Schwärmerei* is that given (at length) by Kant himself in a letter to L.E. Borowski (6-22 March 1790), of which I quote (in part):

> The more well-to-do and fashionable people, claiming their insights at least equal if not superior to the insights of those who have troubled to pursue the thorny path of thorough investigation, are content with indices

and summaries, skimming the cream off the sciences. These people would like to obscure the obvious difference between loquacious ignorance and thorough science, and this is easiest to do by snatching up incomprehensible things that are no more than airy possibilities and presenting them as facts that the serious natural scientist is supposed to explain...They find it hard to learn everything the natural scientist knows, so they take the easier road, attempting to dissolve the inequality between them and him by showing that there are matters about which neither of them knows what to say, matters of which the unscientific man is therefore free to judge in any way whatsoever, since the scientist cannot correct him. This is where the mania [of *Schwärmerei*] begins, and where it spreads to ordinary people as well.

I see only one antidote for this disease: thoroughness must be substituted for dilettantism in education. (159-161; 160)

4. Ibid., Bxxxvii-Bxxxviii; A474/B502; A832/B860; A470/B498.

5. Sir Karl Popper, "Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher of the Enlightenment/ A lecture to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Kant's death [1984]," In Search of a Better World, 1992: 126-139; 126.

With respect to Kant's fame, Prof. Wald in his funeral oration affirmed that "Kant had effected a greater revolution in metaphysics than Newton had accomplished in physics" (Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant, 391).

Susan Shell in The Embodiment of Reason (1996) notes that Kant's fame has not waned, for currently newly-weds in Königsberg (now, Kaliningrad) go directly to Kant's burial site to pose for photographs--instead of Marx's statue (314). Marx himself had referred to Kant's philosophy as "A German theory of the French Revolution" (as quoted by Gulyga in Immanuel Kant, 223).

6. D. Zoolalian, Kant's Theory of Human Nature, 32.

7. Beck, "What Have We Learned from Kant?," Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood, 17-30; 26.

David L. Norton appears to agree (to some extent) with Beck's assessment stating that Kant's third Critique was "historically a bridge between the Enlightenment and Romanticism" (Imagination, Understanding and the Virtue of Liberality, 1996: 6.

8. Popper, "Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher of the Enlightenment," In Search of a Better World, 127.

9. Popper's translation (of Religion, 157n.), "Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher of the Enlightenment," In Search of a Better World, 133, 136n.22.

George di Giovanni's translation of this passage (1996) is somewhat different:

> Although it certainly sounds questionable, it is in no way reprehensible to say that every human being *makes a God* for himself, indeed, he must make one according to moral concepts...in order to honor in him *the one who made him*. For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him by somebody else, and described as God, indeed, even if such a being might appear to him in person (if this is possible), a human being must yet confront this representation with his ideal first, in order to judge whether he is authorized to hold and revere this being as Divinity. (Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 189n.)

10. Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant, 161; Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 150-154, 123. Apropos of Kant's dining etiquette, see: 1) Anthropology, 143-147; and 2) Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 150-151.

11. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (1832), as quoted in The Great Thoughts, ed. G. Seldes, 178.

12. Ethics, 172. Morals, 273.

Stuckenberg paints a rather different picture of Kant than (the one) the Romantics might have one believe:

> The world has learned to know Kant as a toilsome student and a great metaphysician; what wonder, then, if it has regarded him as an ideal German professor who buries himself in his study, and disregards the world and its affairs, society and its attractions? Such a picture of the Königsberg philosopher is purely imaginary. Instead of being a hermit whose study was his cell, and whose sole companions were his books and his thoughts, we find that his interests, like his reading, were extensive and varied, that he was very sociable, was frequently in company, and exerted a powerful social influence. (The Life Of Immanuel Kant, 153)

Kant does encourage, however, *ethical gymnastics* which consist "only in combating natural impulses sufficiently to be able to master them when a situation comes up in which they threaten morality" (Morals, 274).

13. The quote in full (from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739) is as follows: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other

office than to serve and obey them" (II.iii.3).

14. Ethics, 146-147, 88.

15. Correspondence, 6-7, 35n., 40-42.
Kant first met Hamann in 1756 (in Königsberg). Both philosophers (who were instrumental in promoting diametrically opposed movements) lived only a few miles from each other. (Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 41).
For a full account of this visit to Hamann (by Kant and Berens), see: Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 22-24.

16. Ibid., 42. See, Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. X, concluding paragraph.
Although Hamann's use of Hume's quote was (ironically) to insulate himself against the sharp criticisms of reason, his reference to Hume is now deemed the first (official) introduction Kant had to the 'Attic philosopher' (see, F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 24). N.K. Smith in his Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" points out, however, that Hume's Essays (including the Enquiries) appeared in Sulzer's German translation in 1754-56 ("Introduction," xxviii; xxviii-n.2). It is possible, therefore, that Kant had read Hume prior to Hamann's correspondence (but scholars are not agreed on this point).
Beiser also adds that Hamann's reference to Rousseau--in a subsequent letter, of December 1759--"laid the ground for Kant's later reception of Rousseau" (Fate of Reason, 33).

17. Gulyga's Kant, 42. (Kant was five feet, two and a half inches tall, hence the 'little' appellation by Hamann.)
Kant did not think of himself as 'a second Newton,' although he did attribute that title to Rousseau (see, Susan Shell, The Embodiment of Reason, 81-84; Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 40-41).

18. Correspondence, 41. Stuckenberg, Life of Immanuel Kant, 267-270. F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 24-32.
Lewis White Beck in "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant" (Essays on Hume and Kant) states that: "In a letter written in 1781, Hamann said of Kant: 'He certainly deserves the title, 'a Prussian Hume.'" (111; as cited from *Hamann Briefwechsel*, ed. Henkel, IV, 293)
On the subject of Kant's *unbelief*, see, my M.A. Thesis: Unbelief in Kant and Fichte.

19. For additional sources on Hamann, see:

a) W.M. Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann: Philosophy and Faith, 1966;
b) Isaiah Berlin, The Magus of the North: J.G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism, 1993;

c) Terence J. German, Hamann on Language and Religion, 1981;
d) Johann Georg Hamann, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, trans. James C. O'Flaherty, 1967;
e) James C. O'Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann, 1979;
f) James C. O'Flaherty, Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann, 1952; and
g) Ronald Smith, J.G. Hamann 1730-1788, 1960.

20. Sylvia Nebel in The Concept of the Role of Reason in Hamann and Herder's Writings attempts to explain the role of the opposition Hamann and Herder held against Kant:

> They [Hamann and Herder] criticized the view that reason is superior to other human faculties and that it is absolute. They also attacked the analytical method by which these conclusions are reached because it destroys the essential unity of all the human powers. (110-111)

Nebel adds that Hamann criticizes Kant for separating *pure reason* from language, because--according to Hamann--reason cannot develop without *revelation*, i.e., 'divine language.' Herder further criticizes Kant for discussing reason "as an entity and not as a process." This process of thought, for Herder, "takes place as part of a unity of all human powers, physical and mental": "Language, both inner and outer, is essential to this activity" (11-113).

21. L.W. Beck points out that Kant was customarily accosted as *der galante Magister*, 'a gallant master' (or a 'spruce dresser'), owing to his tendency to dress in an elegant style *à la mode francaise*. I find the appellation of *Duke* (in English) to be a rather fitting 'shorthand' for *der galante Magister* (especially in this context in which Kant is deemed to have been *the master*, as it were, of Herder and Fichte); and so I have decided to use it, as well. (See, Beck, Early German Philosophy, 431, 437; Cf. Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 55)

22. Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, 41n.

23. As Gulyga describes Kant's perception of Herder (in Immanuel Kant):

> Herder's style also made an unfavorable impression on Kant: it was emotional, occasionally bombastic, bereft of clarity and the power of proof. Instead of logical precision and strength the reader finds only vague, ambiguous illusions. (129)

For a brief survey of the effect of Kant's open letter on Fichte, see: 1) Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant, 411-

418; and 2) my M.A. thesis, Unbelief in Kant and Fichte, 77-89.

24. Correspondence, "Introduction," 29. Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 239-240.

Daniel Breazeale in his translation Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (1988) states that:

> Fichte's first intellectual revolution was his conversion to Kantianism; the second involved a fundamental and thoroughgoing revision of his adopted Kantian perspective. (54)

Fichte describes his *conversion* in letters to friends:

> I have been living in a new world ever since reading the Critique of Practical Reason...The influence that this [Kantian] philosophy, especially its moral part...has upon one's entire way of thinking is unbelievable--as is the revolution that it has occasioned in my way of thinking in particular...I now believe wholeheartedly in human freedom and realize full well that duty, virtue, and morality are all possible only if freedom is presupposed. (Ibid., 357, 360)

25. Gulyga's Immanuel Kant, 133; see also: p.125 in which Herder accuses Kant of plagiarism. (Kant had published his "Idea" in November of 1784 which Herder thought greatly resembled his own "Ideas of a Philosophy of the History of Mankind" released in May of that year).

For a more thorough treatment on Herder's viewpoints, see:

a) Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder, 1976;
b) Robert Clark, Jr., Herder: His Life and Thought, 1955;
c) A. Gilles, Herder, 1945;
d) Johann Gottfried Herder, Against Pure Reason, trans. Marcia Bunge, 1993;
e) Wulf Koepke, Johann Gottfried Herder, 1987;
f) Wulf Koepke, ed., Johann Gottfried Herder: Innovator Through the Ages, 1982;
g) Michael Morton, The Critical Turn: Studies in Kant, Herder, Wittgenstein, and Contemporary Theory, 1993;
h) Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., Herder Today, 1990;
i) H.B. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science, 1970; and
j) Robert Norton, Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment, 1991.

26. Although Schleiermacher had first 'learned how to think' through Kant and had praised Kant as having brought back "reason from the desert wastes of metaphysics into its true appointed sphere," he is now determined to prove Kant wrong. (See, Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 15-19)

27. As to Salomon Maimon's (1754-1800) position, Beiser in The Fate of Reason comments that: "It is still an unsolved question whether Maimon wanted to destroy Kant or to save him" (287; cf. Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 234-240). I have found that the similar doubt (although in varying degrees) may be raised against almost all of Kant's (so-called) *friends* during the last decade of his life. Kant himself spoke of this feeling (of betrayal) in his 'open letter' to Fichte, and was known for his favorite saying: "Dear friends, there is no friend!" (Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 52; cf. Ethics, 202-203ff.; Stuckenberg, Life of Immanuel Kant, 192-193).

In seeking happiness amid all these *emotional* disputes, Kant concludes (with Voltaire) that sometimes the best course of action (besides a 'disdainful silence') is simply to go and cultivate one's garden (Correspondence, 161; Dreams, 98). For a further discussion of Kant's polemics with his contemporaries, see: H. Saner, "Part 2: Kant as Polemicist," Kant's Political Thought, 1973: 69-213.

28. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M. Knox, "Introduction," 15.

29. Kant, "On the Diseases of the Mind" (1764) cited in Dreams, 163.

30. For a commentary on Kant's Dreams, see: 1) Susan Shell, "Ch. 5: Dreams of a Spirit Seer," Embodiment of Reason, 1996: 106-132; 2) Kant, Dreams, trans. John Manolesco, "Introduction," 13-31; and 3) Keith Ward, "Ch. 3: The Dreams of Metaphysics," The Development of Kant's Views of Ethics, 1972: 34-51.

31. Dreams, "Introduction," 15.

32. Correspondence, 54-57.

33. Dreams, "Introduction," 22, 20.

In my opinion, a course or classroom study on Kant's first Critique could (and should) include Kant's presentation of the noumenal-phenomenal distinction in his Inaugural.

34. First Critique, A381-395.

Although Kant admits that 'a doctrine of the soul' would secure the critical thinking against 'the danger of materialism,' he makes it clear that 'out-of-body' experiences (as objects that "detach themselves as it were from the soul

and appear to hover outside it") are a 'deceptive property.' For this *transcendental dualism* (i.e., Swedenborg's *rational psychology*) is a deliberate misrepresentation that presupposes an 'objective reality'; moreover, it is but a *crude dualism*, Kant adds, which alleges a communion between two kinds of substances (the thinking and the extended) and mistakenly treats the extended "as existing by themselves." The extended substances, Kant says, "are really nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject." Kant does concede, however, that it is "equally impossible for anyone to bring any valid dogmatic objection against" this *imaginary science*, as this "gap in our knowledge can never be filled." (Ibid.)

Regarding Kant's reference to 'the Swede,' compare Kant's comment that there are "three usual systems devised on these lines [of rational psychology]...: that of *physical influence*, that of predetermined *harmony*, and that of *supernatural intervention*" (A390) with Hugo Odhner's reference to 'the Swede': "In his *Rational Psychology* he [Swedenborg] again notes the three theories to which dualism can resort--Physical Influx, Preestablished Harmony, and Occasional Causes." ("Christian Wolff and Swedenborg," 248)

35. W.H. Werkmeister makes the interesting claim that Kant merely borrowed the phrase 'thing-in-itself' from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's (1714-62) *Metaphysica* (1739), the textbook from which Kant taught:

> Let us remember that in the scholastic tradition of metaphysics--of which Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* is a representative example with which Kant was thoroughly familiar--the idea of *res per se* was a common conception. Kant's term *Ding an sich* is, in effect, but a translation of the Latin term. But it is significant that the Latin *res per se* consistently appears in phrases such as *res per se considerata* and *res per se spectata*--that is, "things considered in themselves" and "things viewed in themselves." *Res per se* and *Ding an sich* are thus but abridgments of the original phrases--abridgments which, nevertheless, retain at least implicitly the sense of the extended original. ("What Did Kant Say And What Has He Been Made to Say?," Interpreting Kant, ed. Molte S. Gram, 1982: 142)

36. First Critique, A765-766/B793-794; see also: B19-20.

37. As Kant explains this sharp distinction in his Ethics:

> With regard to the guidance of the mind in respect of the emotions and passions, we must distinguish these from feelings and inclinations. A man can have feeling and inclination for something without having emotion and passion...These duties and the dignity of humanity demand

that man should have no passion or emotion, but though this is the principle it is open to question whether man can really achieve so much. (146)

38. Morals, 200-201.

39. Ethics, 74. As Kant further explains:

> The law in itself must be pure and holy; for the reason that it must be a model, a pattern, a standard, and as such it must be exact and precise, or it could not be a basis of judgment (66).

That Kant does *make room* for (moral) feelings is explored in Ch. II.

40. First Critique, Bxxxvii-Bxxxix, Bxliv.

41. Kant argues that a person "as belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world" (second Critique, 89). In reading between the lines, I interpret Kant to mean that human feelings are (merely) subject to the moral law to the extent that one's physical self is guided by one's *personality*. In other words, feelings--though held in check by the laws of the *intelligible* (or moral) world--are not eradicated thereby. (See also: 90, 166; Morals, 255)

42. Given that Kant states "the depths of the human heart are unfathomable" (Morals, 241), that feeling "can never become objective" (Prolegomena, 43), and that if he had to choose between moral sense and perfection (in general), he "should decide for the latter" (Groundwork, 111), one would think Kant sought merely non-material principles of morality. But to so (prematurely) conclude is to overlook Kant's insistence that reason "requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage of insight to another" ("Idea," 30). In the next sentence, we see that Kant is speaking of the *complete* use of *all* of one's *natural* capacities. My contention is that Kant did not intend in speaking of *all* one's 'natural capacities' to exclude one's feelings.

For further discussion along these lines see:

1) Paul Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, 1938: 44-59; 87-88; 169-174);
2) A.E. Teale, "Chs. 3 & 4: The Emotional Basis of Morality; The Essential Basis of Morality," Kantian Ethics, 1951: 33-84;
3) Keith Ward, "Ch. 2: The Doctrine of Moral Feeling," The Development of Kant's View of Ethics, 1972: 21-33; also, "Appendix: Schilpp's *Kant's Pre-Critical*

Ethics," 175-177;
4) W.H. Werkmeister, Kant's Silent Decade, 1979; and
5) H.-J. de Vleeschauwer, The Development of Kantian Thought, 1962.

43. Kant was an admirer of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and owned a number of his books (Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, 500). Kant spoke of his own 'Age of Enlightenment' as not a very *enlightened* age ("Enlightenment," 44). That is, he lived (as Gulyga puts it): "in a divided world where attitudes, manners and injunctions forced one to say 'yes' when the voice of conscience shouted 'no'" (Immanuel Kant, 185).

Kant saw that behind the suppression of man's freedom rested the frightful spectre of 'The Church' with all its trappings of power and dominion. It is this sort of dominance (over reason) that Kant abhorred in the (so-called) 'ethics' of his day which he refers to as 'an amazing medley' consisting of moral feeling here and *the fear of God* there (Groundwork, 77). It is for this reason that I tend to think of Kant in the 'spirit of Galileo,' as one who dared to stand up to the restrictions imposed on man's (otherwise) *free-thinking* reason.

Whether it can be substantiated that Galileo said "*Eppur si muove*" ('But it does move') is not critical here; the point is that such an attitude also typified Kant's own (in my view). After all, Kant's own works were placed on the Catholic Index of forbidden books (for example, Existence, 1763); and his Religion (1793) was banned from publication (see, Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 49). Hence, Kant was not unaware of the similar pressures that Galileo worked under in daring to (openly) follow the Copernican theory (that the earth *moves* around the sun). And it is in following Galileo's example that I also think Kant *chose* to compare the methodology of his first Critique to that of Copernicus, thereby disclosing his camp of choice: moral reason over religious rhetoric.

For an update on the Vatican's recent apology (31 October 1992) for having condemned Galileo to indefinite imprisonment in 1633 (after a humiliating abjuration) because he insisted that the earth revolved around the sun, see:

1) Peter Hebblethwaite, "Sorry about that Galileo, but it wasn't the church's fault"; and
2) M. Sharratt, Galileo: Decisive Innovator, 1994: 214-222.

44. For a sense of Kant's irony, see: Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 92, 135, 183-87.

Apropos of the 'intellectual environment' common in Kant's day, see: G. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, 1964.

45. Kant refers to *Sapere Aude!* in his "Enlightenment," 41, 47n.3.

46. Sandra Den Otter in British Idealism and Social Explanation (1996) denotes this perception of Kant as a sympathizer to the *political* nature of the French Revolution:

> At the end of the eighteenth century the reception of Kant's writings was caught up in the highly charged political issue of his reputed endorsement of the republican sentiments embodied in the French Revolution, and some English readers identified Kant with Paine and Cobbett. (13)

Heinrich Heine in "Kant and Deism" (Kant's Prolegomena, ed. Paul Carus) even puts Kant's (supposed) sympathies with the French Revolution to jest and compares Kant to Maximilian Robespierre, stating that Kant 'far surpassed' him in terrorism as "the arch-destroyer in the realm of thought" (269).

47. Morals, 133.

48. Printed in Burke, On Taste/On the Sublime and Beautiful/ Reflections on the French Revolution/ A Letter to a Noble Lord, 1909: 151-397.

For a further treatment of Kant's view on revolutions, see:

1) Sidney Axinn, "Kant, Authority, and the French Revolution";
2) L.W. Beck, "Kant and the Right of Rebellion";
3) Peter Nicholson, "Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign";
4) Hans, Reiss, "Kant and the Right of Rebellion";
5) Thomas Seebohm, "Kant's Theory of Revolution."

49. Conflict, 153-157.

In a partial defense of Kant, I think it should be pointed out that Kant acknowledged that should this (French) Revolution miscarry:

> it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a sensible man, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second time, would never resolve to make the experiment at such cost. (Ibid., 153)

In endorsing this Revolution, Kant did not intend to endorse the bloody 'Reign of Terror' that ensued. He spoke of the revolution as *the experiment* in which 'a universal yet disinterested sympathy' among players is publicly revealed in 'this game of great revolutions.' France, it appeared to Kant

(at the time), was engaged in an humanitarian revolution similar to that in the Americas of 1776.

This social experiment then was (at least, in principle) beneficial to the newly emerging 'middleclass,' or so Kant (may well have) thought. For what constitutes the *moral character* of the French Revolution (Kant explains) is the *moral* predisposition that "not only permits people to hope for progress toward the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is sufficient at present" (Ibid.).

Kant's persistence in the belief that even "a people comprised of devils" could successfully govern themselves ("if only they possess understanding"), no doubt determined his downfall ("Peace," 124). For, arguably, it was this persistent belief in the *moral* goodness of the French Revolution that--through widespread misunderstanding--helped to dissipate Kant's own *moral* revolution.

50. Ernst Behler, "Early Romanticism and The French Revolution," German Romantic Literary Theory, 1993: 54-77; 63, 58, 56.

51. Kant makes it clear that the *proper* way to speak of 'God' is to speak "with regard to the Idea we ourselves make of such a Being" (Morals, 276).

With respect to the passions, the closest Kant ever comes to (appear to) approve of them is in his Conflict in which he speaks of the (positive) *enthusiasm* of the participants in the French Revolution, as "the passionate participation in the good" (155). Kant immediately adds a caveat, however, stating that even this *genuine* enthusiasm is "not to be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves censure." (Ibid.)

52. Second Critique, 145. Ethics, 115; see also: 88, 235, in which Kant states that religious truth should rely on 'reasoned argument.'

53. The Apostles were considered to be 'full of new wine' on the day of Pentecost. (Acts 2:1-13; KJV)

54. Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 147.

CHAPTER II

KANT AND MORAL CHARACTER

In this Chapter, I will argue for a possible theory of *moral character* in Kant wherein moral reason and moral feeling are fused together within the maxim of one's moral will. The purpose of this preparatory step (towards the argument in Chapter Three) is to attempt to defend Kant against the stock complaint that his moral thought is without *feeling* and hence inadequate.

Before I begin to explain the role of moral reason for Kant, I think it is helpful to understand why Kant chose to write his *Critiques* in the manner in which he did. I say that Kant *chose* to write his Critiques (especially the first Critique) in this manner simply because it is clear from Kant's pre-critical writings (especially, his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer in 1766) that Kant could write in a lucid and highly readable style. Why then did he so *choose* to follow the older Prussian style of expression for which he has been criticized even to this day?[1]

Heinrich Heine's "Kant and Deism" yields a clue in this

matter. According to Heine, Kant "feared that science might lose something of its dignity by expressing itself in light, attractive, and agreeable tones"--such as those of the Romantics.[2] Kant therefore wrote his first Critique "in such a colourless, dry, packing-paper style," Heine continues, because he "wished to separate himself from the popular philosophers of his time, who aimed at the most citizen-like clearness." The key target for Kant's "heavy, buckram style," Heine implies, were the (religious) romantics who appealed to the *Schwärmerei* of genius in their writings.[3] Primarily for this reason, Kant was "mistrustful of genius" maintaining that "genius had no business with scientific thought."[4]

Although the *old guard* philosophers were Kant's most vocal enemies in the early 1780s (for whom, as well, Kant wrote his Critiques in his 'courtly and frigid official dialect'[5]), his decisive enemies proved to be the *friendly* romantics.[6] (As seen in Chapter One,) Romantics--as Fichte--who initially embraced Kant's thought (but finding it restrictive turned against it) proved to be Kant's undoing. Kant articulates this (internal) danger to Kantianism in his famous *open letter* to Fichte (07 August 1799) in which he states:

> There is an Italian proverb: May God protect us from our friends, and we shall watch out for out enemies ourselves. There are friends who mean well by us but who are doltish in choosing the means for promoting our ends. But there are also treacherous friends, deceitful, bent on our destruction while speaking the language of good will (..."who think one thing and say another"), and one

cannot be too cautious about such men and the snares they have set.[7]

Having established that Kant deliberately wrote his Critiques on reason in a style to offset that of the Romantics (as well as to appease the old guard professors in the Prussia of his day), I would now like to present a brief (albeit, detailed) overview of Kant's moral thought. As I hope to elucidate, Kant's underlying aim throughout his Critiques is ironically similar (perhaps, identical) to his choice of writing style.[8] That is, via a critique of reason, Kant had hoped to effectively neutralize the sensational zeal of the Romantics (which Kant saw as emotional 'fanaticism' or *Schwärmerei*[9]), and so achieve the key goal of his Enlightenment movement.[10]

A. Moral Reason in Kant's Morality

Before I comment specifically on Kant's *moral* (or *practical*) reason, it might be helpful to attempt to describe its relation to *theoretical* reason--as a preamble.[11] In following Francis Bacon's analogy of 'a stern judge,' Kant likewise depicts reason as "an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he himself has formulated."[12]

Admittedly, Kant's formulation of reason as *a judge* (who is expected to be *emotionally* neutral or unbiased, of course)

is an attempt to keep the romanticist tendency (to appeal to one's emotions) at bay.[13] To this end, Kant also refers to reason itself as *an island* separated from the (emotional) oceans of illusion *ipso facto*.[14] Notwithstanding this demarcation between reason and (emotional) illusions, Kant concedes that it is the 'proud pretensions of reason' to nonetheless strive "to extend its domain beyond all limits of experience."[15] In this sense, reason is sometimes thought in (or confused with) romanticist notions of what is *real*.[16] To remedy this problem, reason itself must be made 'pure' from the influences of mere opinion (as *based upon* the emotions).[17] Kant reveals this prejudice in favor of a rational perfection over *sentiment* (i.e., as in 'moral *sense*' or the '*feeling* after' what is moral) in his Groundwork as follows: "Yet if I had to choose between the concept of moral sense, and that of perfection in general..., I should decide for the latter" (111).

That reason should be *pure* is not a quality restricted to theoretical reason alone. Kant holds that practical reason can and even should be *pure* (as much as possible) in order to fulfil the demands of reason.[18] The importance of this *purity* in reason is emphasized by Kant in the comparison he makes to the *purity* of virtue itself.[19] The point in being virtuous, Kant argues, rests solely on the *purity* of the moral principle, that is, insofar as one purifies the incentive in one's (moral) actions.[20] Hence, Kant concludes, "morality must

have more power over the human heart the more *purely* it is presented." To dilute the purity of this incentive with personal fancies or feelings of one's own happiness would hinder the positive influence of the moral law on the human heart.[21] What Kant is bluntly stating therefore is that although we may tend not to face *the facts* of reality (according to the proud pretensions of reason), we need to become *practical* (as we mature in reason) and recognize the *fact of reason* itself (via the moral law).[22]

This *fact of reason*, however, is not applicable to pure theoretical reason, but to pure *practical* reason. For theoretical reason is insufficient to solve the 'most weighty problems' of the three ideas of: God, freedom, and immortality. After all, the reality of these *ideas* is given "only with reference to the practice of the moral law." It is this *moral interest* therefore that 'turns the scale' and yields the primacy of reason to the *practical* sphere (as the *stepmother* to reason itself).[23] For these *ideas* become the *ideals* (of reason) only in the *practical* application (of reason).[24]

In order to more fully understand the primacy of practical reason, it may be helpful to realize that for Kant reason is not a plane, but a sphere--albeit a *peculiar sphere* in that "it is in itself not only a theoretical but a practical faculty." As such, it is not limited to 'natural conditions' but indeed is justified "in extending the order of

ends, and therewith our own existence, beyond the limits of experience and of life."[25] But it is only through the *practical* application of reason that such an extension of reason into the realm of a *moral faith* is even possible, Kant insists.[26] What this means, in other words, is that practical reason--as reason in its moral application--has primacy over theoretical (or speculative[27]) reason chiefly because the fulfillment of the desire of reason to reach its own *conclusion* can only be met in the moral (or, *practical*) arena.[28] Perhaps the best example Kant provides in this regard is the concept of *hope* which, Kant claims, is "at once practical and theoretical." He adds that it is in this concept that "the practical serves only as a clue that leads us to the answer to the theoretical question, and when this is followed out, to the speculative question."[29] In the *practical* application of reason, then, reason (as a sphere) comes full circle and so *completes* its quest.[30]

1. The Definition of moral reason

As we have seen earlier in this Chapter, Kant refers to *natural philosophy* (i.e., scientific reasoning) as reason in its theoretical (or speculative) application.[31] And as we shall see in Chapter Three, Kant treats *natural religion* as if it were reason in its religious application.

Accordingly, Kant refers to his *moral philosophy* as reason in its practical application; hence, the tendency to

use *moral* reason and *practical* reason interchangeably.[32] Moral laws are simply practical laws 'which are absolutely necessary,' Kant says. For if theoretical knowledge is 'knowledge of *what is,*' practical knowledge is therefore 'knowledge of *what ought to be.*'[33] In this sense of what *ought to be,* Kant intends the sense of *the possible.* That is, if he can successfully argue that we *ought to do* 'X' (as based on the nature of things), Kant can therefore conclude that it is *possible* to do 'X' for it is not *reasonable* to command something which cannot be done.[34] In order to fulfil or complete this sense of the desires of reason (to perfect itself), the practical use of reason is essential. For only in its *practical* employment can pure reason *postulate* the 'ideals of reason' which constitute (for Kant) the nucleus of morality.[35]

Within (the sense of a) *moral* postulation, Kant plans the *blueprint* of his moral theory. To begin with, Kant proposes that although reason itself cannot generate a concept, all knowledge from reason arises from concepts, and relates to *possible* intuition.[36] It is in this *possibility* (of intuition) that Kant builds his case. For if "all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas" (as Kant says), then the way to secure a *moral* basis (for *moral* knowledge) would have to be via (the *moral* postulation of) *ideas.*[37] That is, as the "*estimation* of morality, in regard to its purity and consequences, is

effected in accordance with *ideas*," the '*ideals* of reason' need to be postulated whereby "reason connects with the moral law, which [itself] is a mere *idea*."[38]

Thus, our knowledge is really widened, Kant claims, by pure *practical* reason via these *ideals* of reason (as the 'archetypes' of the *ideas* of God, freedom, and immortality) insofar as they are united "by means of the moral law and merely in relation to it."[39] To summarize, then, pure reason contains in its practical (moral) employment principles of the *possibility of experience* and it is in that practical (moral) employment that these principles have 'objective reality.'[40]

To assist in better understanding how Kant intends to *prove* his (moral) position via the postulation of these ideals, let us briefly consider the example of *the idea of God*. Kant argues that the *moral* laws justify us in postulating this 'idea of God' but "only from a practical point of view." Although it may (at first glance) appear that Kant is arguing for the *actual* existence of an *actual* God, when he states "this existence [of God] must be *postulated*," a more careful analysis into his position tells a different tale.

It is '*theological* ethics' (not *moral* ethics), Kant clarifies, that *presupposes* the existence of God (without reference to a moral basis). Kant's postulation of this *idea of God* is not a presupposition but a (*moral*) *conviction* based upon *moral* laws.[41] For we can have no concept of God whatsoever, Kant claims, except as a '*special* object'--"an

object *in idea* and not in reality"--simply because what we are thinking is "a being *in idea* only."[42]

Having said that, Kant does not intend that this *idea of God* should be a *mere* ideal or even a *mere* idea (of the regulative principle of reason). To conclude thereby would not enlarge our knowledge beyond that of speculative reason. Moral reason consists of *something more* than mere logical possibility: it consist of *real* possibility. For *to know* something means to be able to 'prove its possibility' (either through an actual experience or *a priori* via reason). And this *knowledge* is made clear to us--Kant concludes--by the *fact of reason* itself.[43]

The Fact of Reason

That reason teaches us from the nature of moral actions themselves to "hold sacred the moral law" is a *fact of reason,* Kant claims. For the consciousness of the moral law "forces itself upon us" proclaiming itself as 'originating law' (i.e., the *sole fact of pure reason*).[44] Notwithstanding that reason does not beg here but *commands,* Kant maintains that it does not have *dictatorial authority* as "its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens."[45] In so saying, Kant is assuming the moral (practical) application of reason. For no *principle of neutrality* could exist in putting an end to the conflict of reason with itself should moral reason be excluded.[46]

Indeed, to so exclude moral reason would suggest 'a mischievous and malevolent disposition' so typical of "the boastfulness of those who argue dogmatically, and who refuse to allow their claims to be moderated by any criticism," Kant asserts (Ibid.). Reason can never refuse to submit to criticism and censorship, for even *the facts of reason* need to be subjected to examination and (if necessary) to blame. According to Kant, there are three steps involved in this *censorship of reason*: 1) the dogmatic; 2) the skeptical; and 3) the fully matured judgment. In the last (third) step, the *criticism* of reason (and not the mere *censorship* of its *present bounds*) takes place. In the *criticism* of reason, all its necessary limits are spelled out according to *principles* (and not mere conjectures).[47]

Related to *facts of reason* are *matters of fact* which are "objects of concepts whose objective reality can be proved": either by experience (from testimony) or by pure reason (theoretical or practical). As the reality of the 'idea of freedom' *can be established*--Kant claims--through practical laws of pure reason, this rational *idea* can have an object that is a *matter of fact*--albeit it is the only *idea of pure reason* that can do so (all others--including the *idea* of God--being merely *matters of faith*).[48]

The '*practical* power' of the ideals of reason, moreover, helps to form the basis of the (possible) perfection of our *moral* actions. Through this practical (moral) reason we are

empowered to act *morally*, i.e., freely, for moral (practical) reason *acts freely* and is based upon freedom.[49] To further define *moral reason* then is to attempt to define its (underlying) essence--the nature of moral *freedom* itself.

Freedom and Freewill

According to Kant, there are two general types of freedom (positive and negative), as well as two standpoints from which to view freedom (the intelligible and the sensible), along with two (corresponding) types of causality. Morality first reveals the concept of freedom to us, Kant says, simply because it is only through the moral law that we can recognize *the fact* that we are free.[50] Freedom--as the autonomy of pure practical reason--is *negative* in its independence from "all material of the [moral] law (i.e., as desired object)." It is *positive* in its legislation or determination of choice "by the mere form of giving universal law."[51]

Kant believes that freedom and nature (and their two respective causes) can co-exist "without any conflict, in the same actions, according as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their sensible cause." That is, it is not necessarily the case that every effect in the world must arise either from nature or from freedom. It is possible that both can be found in one and the same event, albeit in different relations; hence, Kant's view of phenomena and noumena.[52]

The key point to consider, for Kant, is whether it is

possible to view appearances (or phenomena[53]) as mere representations. If we grant that phenomena are *things in themselves* (or noumena) then "freedom cannot be upheld." But if we grant that "appearances are not taken for more than they actually are," then they must *necessarily* have grounds which are neither appearances, nor determined by empirical laws.[54] Such a cause, Kant holds, will not be subordinate to another cause which would determine it in time--according to the law of nature. Instead, it would have the power to begin a state *spontaneously*; that is, it would be *completely* free (in the sense of a *pure transcendental idea*[55]). This type of freedom would neither contain anything borrowed from experience, nor refer to an object determined or given in any experience.

Although practical freedom relates to the world of experience, it is nevertheless based on this *transcendental idea* (of freedom) in that it thereby permits the will to be independent of the coercion caused via sensuous impulses. To deny this *transcendental* freedom would eliminate all *practical* freedom[56] (as the concept of *ought* which is essential to practical reason would likewise be denied[57]). Kant's intention, it should be remembered, is not to establish the *reality* of transcendental freedom (as if it would contain the cause of phenomena), nor even to prove its *possibility*. Instead, he maintains that he is treating transcendental freedom only as a transcendental *idea*, by which he means that reason is led thereby *to think* it can *spontaneously* begin

events in the phenomenal world. All that Kant claims he is concerned to show in this regard is that "causality through freedom is at least *not incompatible with* nature."[58] To put it succinctly, we should be able to *think* freedom, at least, even if we may not *know* or understand it.[59]

For those of us who acknowledge the moral law as binding, however, moral (practical) freedom is not only *possible*--it is actual.[60] Moreover, *the fact* of practical freedom can be proved by the experience of *freewill* (that is, a "will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented by reason"). This human *freewill* sets mankind apart from that of the animals in that we have the power, Kant says, to overcome our sensuous desires (if we so choose) by the use of our reason.[61]

The wise and proper exercise of this *freewill*, however, is another matter. For few have succeeded in throwing off the *shackles* of rules, formulas, and other mechanical aids to reason (that deter the cultivation of mind)--Kant observes--even though to do so is "only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch."[62] In so delineating this general lack of (moral) faith among the populace, Kant has set the stage for the next development of his moral thought: the (moral) necessity to deny (theoretical) knowledge in order to make room for (the *leap* of) *faith*.[63]

2. Moral Faith within Moral Reason

As implied above, Kant holds that all is not lost as to the confirmation of *moral* certainty, even though the certainty of pure theoretical knowledge must be denied. Indeed, Kant appears to affirm this view towards the end of his first Critique, as follows: "For although we have to surrender the language of *knowledge*, we still have sufficient ground to employ, in the presence of the most exacting reason, the quite legitimate language of a firm *faith*" (A745-B773).[64]

For Kant *faith* is a rational faith, commonly referred to as *moral* faith.[65] Kant holds this moral faith to be the only saving faith being superior to religious, historical, ecclesiastical, messianic, fetish, or any other type of faith.[66] Moral faith is superior, Kant says, simply because the other types of faith (related to religion) tend to involve a mystical (or magical) quality whereby one is absolved from moral responsibility simply *in the exercise* of faith (e.g., in the scripture that God "hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth"). To so (irresponsibly) expiate one's failings, Kant concludes, would be the death of human reason.[67]

Kant does not see *faith* as a principle or quality based solely on human emotion, but as one founded upon the sure footing of practical reason. In this sense, his concept is that of 'a leopard without spots' in that Kant has purified faith of its customary identity to religious rituals and blind (transcendent) trust (i.e., its *spots*).[68] Kant maintains that

as 'intuitions without concepts are blind,' so (moral) faith cannot be transcendent but transcendental.[69] That is, moral faith must be linked in some way to the limits of *possible* experience. For if we were to leap beyond the limits of experience, Kant asks, "what sort of a concept could we obtain by this procedure?"[70]

In response, Kant concludes that there cannot be any reliable explanation of inner experience unless we first assume outer experience: for "no one is in a position to decide what an unknown object may or may not be able to do."[71] To claim that one can by faith (as an 'inner illumination') soar above all possible experience solely on the 'wings of mere ideas' is unsatisfactory. As Kant puts it: "Through concepts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to the discovery of new objects and supernatural beings; and it is useless to appeal to experience, which in all cases yields only appearances." To meet Kant's 'moderate demand' it would be necessary to satisfactorily answer the question: "how we can so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of extending our knowledge entirely *a priori*, and of carrying it into a realm where no experience is possible to us"?[72] In response, Kant reveals the key to understanding his concept of moral faith.

Admitting that transcendental questions warrant only transcendental answers (that is, "answers exclusively based on concepts that are *a priori*, without the least empirical

admixture"), Kant states that to locate a satisfactory result via purely speculative reason is not possible. The solution appears to be through *practical grounds* whereby the problem (e.g., the existence of God) can thus be reinterpreted as a *synthetic a priori* issue and not one accountable only to theoretical reason and *immanent principles* (i.e., "principles applicable only to objects of empirical knowledge, to appearances"). That extension of our knowledge beyond the limits of experience ("namely, to the existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience") is 'obviously synthetic,' Kant underscores (for "all existential propositions are synthetic"). And as synthetic a priori knowledge is possible "only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience," Kant's key defense then would be to explain the concept of *possibility* (in 'possible experience') in such a way that *synthetic a priori* knowledge (e.g., the idea of the existence of God) could be validated.[73] And this is what Kant proceeds to do.

The possibility of things through *a priori* concepts, for Kant, cannot be established merely from such concepts *alone*, but "only when the concepts are viewed as formal and objective conditions of experience in general."[74] As Kant attempts to clarify:

> We can, indeed, prior to experience itself, know and characterize the possibility of things, merely by reference to the formal conditions under which in

> experience anything whatsoever is determined as object, and therefore can do so completely *a priori*. But, even so, this is possible only in relation to experience and within its limits.[75]

In speaking of *possibility* "only in relation to experience and within its limits," Kant is referring to *real* possibility which he distinguishes from *mere* possibility. Real possibility supplies content to the concept; whereas, mere possibility involves a concept that precedes perception. Having stated this difference, Kant adds that it is possible nonetheless to know the existence of something prior to its perception (that is, in an *a priori* manner) as for example to know of the existence of a magnetic force (which we cannot see) through the perception of attracted iron filings. Through a series of possible perceptions (via the analogies[76]), we are able to deduce this 'thing in question' from related actual perceptions.[77]

For the purposes of *objective reality*, however, "the real contains no more than the merely possible" in that the *objective reality of a concept* refers to "the possibility of such an object as is thought through the concept." Objective reality then applies to *possible* things. For example, a "hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers."[78] Kant is not saying, however, that the possible is the actual. Indeed, *the possible* conforms to the formal conditions of experience (i.e., of intuition and of concepts); whereas *the actual* conforms to the material

conditions of experience (i.e., sensation).[79]

In short, knowledge of synthetic a priori propositions cannot advance via mere concepts, but through the possibility of experience *as a knowledge*. In this *possibility* all objects (to have objective reality) must be capable of being grasped by us *a priori* in order to anticipate experience.[80] For it is in this *possibility* that the surety of a moral faith rests, the surety that is demonstrated by the *ideals* of (moral) reason.

Why a moral faith?

The question arises that if Kant wished to substantiate his claim (as contained in the three ideals of reason: God, freedom, and immortality) as an issue of *moral certainty* and thus one related to epistemology, why then did he raise this spectre of a (moral) *faith*, a concept long associated with *religious* convictions? To begin with, Kant is clear that *moral belief* "must in all points conform to the moral law," a trait which is not necessarily synonymous with *religious* belief. Although reason may have failed in surpassing the limits of all experience, Kant holds that it is possible through *moral* faith to *rationally* believe in the ideals of reason. As is customary with Kant, he is cautious to point out that one cannot say, for instance, that he *knows* there is a God for that conviction is not allocated to the realm of logic but of morality and "rests on subjective grounds (of the moral

sentiment)." Indeed, such a believer--Kant insists--"must not even say, '*It is* morally certain that there is a God, etc.,' but 'I *am* morally certain, etc.'"[81]

Indeed, that this moral certainty is *based* on the assumption of moral sentiments troubles Kant to the extent that he even points out that such an assumption may be questionable (Ibid.). No doubt part of the reason Kant is so troubled is that he has seen what the romanticist movement (as initiated by Hamann) has aspired to do: to "misconstrue the true vocation of reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true insight and knowledge cease." The danger in so connecting moral certainty with moral sentiments therefore is that--unless we strictly adhere to the precepts of the moral law through a *moral* faith--our "intellectual *presuppositions* and *faith* on behalf of our practical interest" could not receive the dignity and title of a *rational* insight.[82] Although Kant admits moral certainty does share support in its foundations with *moral* sentiment, he is not willing to yield to *sentiment* more than a partial basis for this *moral* certainty. After all, this *sentiment* Kant refers to is a *moral* sentiment and one subject to the dictates prescribed by the *moral* law.[83]

Despite Kant's use of the term *faith,* (in my interpretation) he does not share the prevailing view (of his day) of a (Christian) faith as one that "implies a belief in the divine attributes."[84] Instead, Kant likens God to "a

teacher, [conceived] in the ideal" who furthers the essential ends of human reason. Although this *ideal teacher* "nowhere exists," Kant says, he alone must be called philosopher, for "the idea of his legislation is to be found in that reason with which every human being is endowed."[85] The moral faith that we are to exercise in the belief of this *ideal teacher* "does not presuppose the existence of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being." For to attempt to realize the ideal in an example (i.e., in the field of appearance) is an impractical romantic notion.[86] Ideals can be represented as the stars in the sky which may inspire us to loftier heights; but it is as absurd, Kant would say, to attempt to bring these *ideals* down to earth (and to personalize them, as *examples*) as it is to attempt to pull down the stars from the sky. Moral faith, for Kant, relates to the *ideals* of reason, not to a faith in a personalized Christ, nor to the several *faiths* of Christianity which differ from each other.

Perhaps the best reason for Kant to devise his concept of a moral *faith* is to counter the tendency for certain individual Churches (i.e., faiths) to condemn as unbelievers those who do not confess (as a religious principle) the moral lack that the God of these individually *chosen* Churches (purportedly) supplies. The motive of such religionists "to consign to eternal damnation" all who are do not share in these self-same "means of justification" (which *means*, Kant

says, are "unknown to reason in a natural way") is to make a divine service of such beliefs and confessions in order to earn the favor of heaven without the need for 'a good life-conduct.' Such behavior constitutes *religious illusion*.[87] And it is this sort of illusion (as based chiefly upon sensationalism, or *Schwärmerei*) that Kant perceives in the (German) romantics of his day.

Moral Faith and the Romantics

If the romantics were to sum up Kant's view of moral faith, they likely would concede that it is in this particular (or *peculiar*) concept that his 'smile of reason' approximates that of a Cheshire cat. That is (in exaggerating this 'smile of reason,' as it were), Kant attempts to make *moral faith* his be-all and end-all in the extension of reason (beyond its limits) into the realm of faith, a realm commonly understood as a 'matter of the heart.'[88] Kant, it seems, wants to have a faith that is both genuine *and* rational (to 'have his cake and eat it too').

That Kant is seen to be out of his league in the area of (Christian) *faith*, and even worse, that he appears to have confused (or even distorted) the integrity of the concept of faith with that of rationalism is borne out by the criticisms of the romantics. For example, Schleiermacher--Kant's contemporary (who arguably "fully shares the Romantic world view")--rebels against Kant's tendency to identify faith (via

Willkür, one of Kant's two-standpoints of the will[89]) with the (higher) intellect and to minimize its connection to desire.[90] Hans Eichner captures this sentiment the romantics held against Kant in his description of their criticism against Kant's 'idea of freedom':

> Kant's idea of freedom was that you were unfree when you did what you wanted to do, because then you were subject to psychological causation; and you were free when you did what you didn't want to do, when you obeyed the moral law imposed by your own reason. To make matters worse, reason was the same in everybody; and consequently you were free only when you were least original.[91]

This suspicion the romantics held that Kant really did not have a theory of *freedom* whereby one was able to *freely* express himself (to include 'poetic license,' the trademark of romanticism) was carried over into their view of Kant's concept of *moral faith*.

For the romantics, Kant's *faith* was not a truly Christian one but--contrary to Kant's own claim--actually made room for (an extension of) reason and (moral) knowledge leaving little or no room for *faith* (as commonly understood). As Thandeka points out: "Schleiermacher believed that Kant, by relying on speculative reason to delineate consciousness, mistakenly filled in the place in knowledge he had originally cleared for faith."[92] This view, however, is not restricted only to the German romantics living in Kant's era. Walter Klass in his doctoral dissertation Faith and Reason in Kant's Philosophy argues (that):

> [T]hat measure of epistemological synthesis which Kant accomplished between faith and reason was possible not so much by denying knowledge, as by denying faith, i.e., faith in a meaning deeper than Kant held...[T]herefore we must point out that...[Kant] lost the distinctive end which interests the Christian philosopher. Kant's real accomplishment should be expressed thus: I have found it necessary to *drain faith* in order to make room for reason.[93]

Given then that Kant does not accommodate his concept of moral faith with the faith typical of religion (in that his concept lacks the identifying *marks* of religious faith--faith in religious rituals, religious practices, religious laws, and even *basic* religious beliefs[94]), what possible defense could Kant make against the above-stated criticism?[95]

In defense of Kant, I would say that he used his concept of a moral faith in order to attempt to attain the equal footing that (especially, the Christian) religion has in its art (or power) to persuade (or convert) would-be believers to believe in justification by faith *alone* (which for Kant means *gratuitously*). To counter this popular religious advantage (supported and even promoted to some extent by German romantics as Hamann, Herder, and Schleiermacher), Kant hoped to lure these (otherwise) *bright* minds attracted (like moths) to the *magic lanterns* of romanticism back into the fold of (pure practical) reason--via the 'bait' of *moral* faith *alone* (i.e., separated from a mere *religious* faith).[96]

Moral faith then is Kant's link between following the moral law (as one's duty) and having a meaningful relation to that moral law (as wilful intent or motivation). Examined more

closely, the gist of the criticism against Kant swings as a pendulum between the one extreme of labeling his concept of moral faith as an oxymoron (in that it has nothing to do with genuine *faith*) to the other extreme of viewing Kant's moral faith as acceptable only if necessarily preceded by an act of faith itself. That is, Kant's moral faith can be seen as little more than exercising faith in a faith *similar* to religious faith (via the *similar* process of 'blindly' assuming belief or acceptance) but purified of the *religious* element.[97]

At the bottom of this criticism then is the essential belief that not only does Kant's *moral faith* lack emotion, *faith* itself is a concept of the heart, not of the head. This debate is ongoing and continues until this day, as Bruce Hauptli points out in his recent book The Reasonableness of Reason (1995) in which he states: "Indeed, a faith founded on reason (or rational argument) is no true faith."[98] Admittedly, Kant's concept of *moral faith* is perhaps the weakest link in his proposed new moral order.[99]

But in fairness to Kant, I think it is necessary to point out that his use of reason (including the extension of that use of reason into the realm of faith) is intended to conform to the image of a judge who makes impartial decisions. To claim, therefore, that Kant's view of moral faith lacks *all* emotion is to miss the point of his entire investigation into the nature of reason and morality. The question should be raised, I think, that if we were to bind the hands of reason,

so to speak, in order to allow the emotions (including the passions) to have full sway, what would be accomplished thereby? That is, would not such an act tend to favor the private prejudices of a hidden (personal) agenda? To step into the clear light of day, I should think a reasoned balance is necessary: one's emotions may serve as drives as long as reason guides. That Kant's theory of a moral character attains to this end (of a reasoned balance) is what I hope to demonstrate (in the remainder of this chapter) .

Perhaps the best defense for Kant's (juridical) position then is the *via negativa*; that is, to see the dangers (as Kant portrays them) in allowing one's emotions full sway in the exercise of one's imaginative powers.

3. Imagination within Moral Reason[100]

For Kant, imagination is not imaginary; that is, it is not simply visionary, but inventive.[101] Consistent with his belief that syntactics without semantics is empty, Kant insists that even the imagination requires minimally the presupposition of outer experience, and the possibility of each specific experience referred to.[102] For when we imagine, Kant says, we always imagine *something* (whether it is present or not). That is, to avoid a product of the imagination which no one can explain, there must always be *the possiblity* of the object.[103]

In his definition of the *imagination* as "the faculty of

representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*," Kant appears to limit the role of imagination to but one of (sensible) intuition, specifically, as the mediator between sensibility and the understanding.[104] In so describing the imagination as a necessary ingredient of perception, Kant elevates it to such an extent that he flatly states there can be no knowledge without imagination.[105] The following difficulty arises, however: if the imagination (as presented thus far) is merely a subset of sensibility (in addition to *sense*) and can only imitate sense-data but cannot interpret it (that role being left to the understanding), how then can the imagination actually mediate between sensibility (which is intuitive) and the understanding (which is discursive)?[106]

To solve this dilemma, Kant expounds upon the duality of imagination, as reproductive and productive. Imagination, as reproductive, is unconsciously and entirely subject to empirical laws and so does not contribute to a priori knowledge. But, as productive, imagination acts spontaneously and so becomes determinative and not merely determinable in that it can *apprehend* sense-data. That is, it is able to assist consciousness in determining sensibility a priori in respect of its form.[107]

Although the imagination works on passive sensibility to make it active for the understanding, the imagination itself is not conscious but only apprehends and presents objects to

the understanding *as they appear.* It is the task of the understanding to represent objects *as they are.*[108] Kant refers to this action of the understanding on the sensibility via the productive imagination as the 'transcendental synthesis of the imagination.' Productive imagination then pertains to transcendental philosophy, and is the 'power of exhibiting an object originally' (i.e., prior to experience); whereas reproductive imagination pertains to (the physical science of) *psychology* (as "a power of exhibiting an object in a derivative way, by bringing back to mind an empirical intuition we have previously had"). In other words, the imagination either *invents* (as productive) or *recalls* (as reproductive).[109]

The *moral* sense of imagination becomes apparent in Kant's insistence that the imagination must not be allowed to supersede or overturn reason itself.[110] To keep the (productive) imagination in check, as it were, Kant sets *judgment* to not only mediate between reason and the understanding, but to eliminate the errors of the imagination by adapting the imagination to the understanding.[111] Imagination then works as a clutch between the senses and the faculties of the understanding to transcendentally put the machine of experience into gear; judgment acts alternately as the brake and accelerator; whereas reason--in the driver's seat--*consciously* operates all of the above.[112]

The dangers of imagination

Kant describes the power of the imagination as "a blind but indispensable function" of the understanding "without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious."[113] For the strength of the imagination often gives us the illusion that what is only in our mind is what we think and feel to be outside us. This improper union of the subjective and objective grounds of judgment permits the power of the imagination to delude us.[114]

As the gatekeeper to the understanding, the imagination--when unrestrained by reason--can lead one into a veritable hall of mirrors.[115] After all, imagination is crucial to knowledge simply because it is crucial to perception. For Kant, perception is not like eye-glasses but more like the eyes themselves. To perceive what we imagine to be real is not identical to imagining what we perceive to be real. Perception itself cannot be in error--says Kant--unless we allow the 'play of imagination' upon the senses to guide us in place of the principles of reason and the concepts of the understanding. We may mistake imagination for perception but we cannot mistake perception for imagination, for "in the absence of perception no power of imagination can invent and produce" the reality of 'that something' in space.[116] One sure way to be free from this 'lure of the imagination' is through the 'sobriety of a critique' whereby the role of the

understanding (to accurately bring the synthesis provided by the imagination *to concepts*) is kept intact.[117]

The freedom of the imagination consists in the fact that it need not interpret what it perceives into concepts for it schematizes without concepts.[118] But to say that the imagination is free and that it is lawful *of itself* (i.e., that it acts autonomously) is a contradiction, Kant states, as only the understanding can give the law.[119] A *free lawfulness* of the understanding (as a 'purposiveness without a purpose') would be a lawfulness without a law, "a subjective harmony of the imagination with the understanding without an objective harmony."[120]

To avoid reducing the imagination to *the fancy* (of a mere dream), therefore, it is necessary for the imagination "to proceed according to a determinate law" as when it apprehends, for example, the event of a ship moving downstream. In the synthesis of this apprehension, the imagination then needs to be subject to *time* (i.e., the a priori form of *inner sense*[121]) in order to properly determine the order of the sequence of events.[122] To return to the example of the 'ship moving downstream': "it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up," Kant argues, for the law of causality cannot be (reasonably) ignored.[123]

As with the concept of the relation of cause and effect, Kant insists that our apprehension of appearance is always

successive. And because 'all appearances are in time,' our apprehension of appearance is always changing as well.[124] But because we cannot perceive time *in itself*, nor can we be assured that the imagination *in itself* would present the proper chronological order of events, there must needs be an interdependence among sense, imagination and the understanding in accurately apprehending appearance. Having said that, Kant then concludes: "Experience itself...is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alterations, to the law of causality"; moreover, *appearances* themselves (as objects of experience) are possible only in conformity with this law of causality.[125] The imagination then in order to properly fulfil its role in *apprehending* sense-data and presenting it to the understanding would have to be subject to laws, in particular, the law of causality in order to avoid becoming whimsical and fanciful.[126]

Although Kant admits that the imagination (as a 'productive cognitive power') can create another nature out of the material that 'actual nature gives it,' he is careful to point out that the imagination "must get the *material* for its images from the *senses*."[127] That is, the imagination--to fall within the scope of moral reason--can create only out of the *given*.[128]

It is this power of originality as constituted in the imagination, Kant admits, "which does not obey laws slavishly

but strives to create out of itself" (as in the case of the fine arts) that can annihilate imagination itself "by capricious activity" and turn it into 'common foolishness' or a 'nervous disorder.' Perhaps with the romantics in mind, Kant forewarns that "when imagination escapes the rule of reason and even tries to subjugate it, man leaves the estate (the sphere) of mankind and descends into the sphere of madness and phantoms."[129]

Romantic Imagination and *Exaltation*

Contra Kant, the German romantics did not feel that imagination should be strictly limited to the laws of the understanding, but that poetic license should give way to *exalt* one's feelings.[130] In this regard, Kant's notion of a *productive* imagination was seminal for German romantics, such as Fichte, who--in building upon Kant's (perceived) *limited* notion--gave the imagination an even greater significance for the human sciences than for the natural sciences.[131]

Although Kant is consistent and clear in delineating the dangers of a free and lawless imagination, he is not opposed to the 'feeling of pleasure' that imagination can bring. This feeling of pleasure is aroused, Kant claims, when the imagination (as the power of a priori intuitions) is brought into harmony with the understanding (as the power of concepts). Indeed, this unity itself between imagination and understanding yields a state of *lawfulness*.[132]

To violate this lawlike state and to hold that one can intuit knowledge (via a lawless imagination) is an illusion typical of 'superstitious religion.'[133] Quite likely bearing the religious romantics in mind, Kant explains how religious intellectuals claim to achieve 'philosophical exaltation,' which Kant also refers to as *mysticism.* On the one hand, it is 'the mother of illusion,' says Kant, to allow experience alone to be the source of all truth with respect to the moral laws (for "nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what *ought to be done* from what *is done*").[134]

On the other hand--Kant continues--it is a 'delusion of perceptions' as well to hold (with Plato) in the "divine intuitions of all possible objects, that is, of the Ideas." Kant then outlines the three steps whereby these (believed-to-be) *exalted* human beings (as the romantics) "raise themselves above humanity": 1) they hold (with Plato) that all a priori knowledge originates from the recollection of 'onetime intuitions'; 2) they hold that they "have an intuition of everything now in God, which makes all research into synthetic a priori knowledge unnecessary" as they can simply "read this knowledge in God"; and 3) they hold that they must mingle with 'spiritual natures' in order via reflection to become better acquainted with 'those Ideas.'

In this highest level of exaltation, Kant states, these *exalted* ones believe themselves to be in God and to feel or intuit in him their own existence. Having implicitly targeted

the romantics in their wild abandon (in Kant's eyes) of a lawlike imagination, Kant wryly concludes that the cause of their *exaltation* is not only the "lack of a critique of reason" (which Kant's *former* followers, now romantics, have rejected) but their claim to "a secret intuition of the supersensible."[135] To so intuit, for Kant, is a capacity beyond that of mortal man: it is a capacity set only for 'he who *knows* the human heart.'[136] For, as we shall see, it is only in this context--that of *moral* feeling--that the emotions of the heart can properly relate to Kant's 'critique of (moral) reason.' And it is to this context that we now turn.

B. Moral Feeling in Kant's Morality

Before we see how it is possible for *moral feeling* to relate to moral reason (via Kant's theory of moral character), it would be helpful of course to try to understand what Kant intended by this concept. To begin with, Kant does not think it especially important to know all the content of concepts in philosophy. He favors instead the need to properly know how to philosophize, to develop a methodology of critical thinking. For Kant, the philosopher is not one subject to emotional displays of passion but one "who appears to exhibit self-control under the guidance of reason, however limited his knowledge may be."[137]

That our knowledge may be limited and that we may not be

able to fully define concepts as we would like (e.g., that of emotion or feeling) does not entail that we cannot use these concepts before we properly define them. In fact, Kant insists that if it were necessary to define a concept before we use it, "all philosophy would be in a pitiable plight."[138] Bearing the above-conditions in mind, Kant does attempt--however inadequately--to define what he means by *moral feeling*.

1. Definition of Moral Feeling

Kant defines *moral feeling* as "the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty." But inner sense can be affected not simply by a *moral* feeling, Kant points out: it can also be affected by a *sensibly dependent* feeling. The difference is that the sensibly dependent feeling precedes the representation of the *moral* law; whereas, the moral feeling follows upon it.[139]

In so creating this distinction within the concept of *feeling* in general, Kant no doubt believes he has skirted the thorny issue of attempting to account for an emotional (or sensibly-dependent) concept of feeling within the core of moral motivation. That is, although Kant (as I argue) does not deny a role for *emotions* (as sensibly-dependent feelings) within the concept of a moral character, he allows only *moral* feelings to play a role (albeit secondary to practical reason)

in the *decisive* development of that (moral) character.[140] Put simply, moral character can be *based* upon moral reason and (secondarily) on moral feeling but cannot be based at all upon human emotions (as defined above).[141]

Kant describes in greater detail what he intends by *moral feeling*, as follows:

> It is inappropriate to call this feeling a moral *sense*, for by the word "sense" is usually understood a theoretical capacity for perception directed toward an object, whereas moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which yields no knowledge. No man is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in susceptibility to it he would be morally dead...But we no more have a special *sense* for what is (morally) good and evil than for *truth*, although people often speak in this fashion. We have, rather, a *suspectibility* on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason (and its law), and this is what we call moral feeling.[142]

In the above-passage, we can see that for Kant 'feelings are not knowledge'[143] but 'something merely subjective.'[144] Consistent with an earlier description of Kant's concept of *moral faith* as 'a leopard without spots,' I think his concept of moral feeling is similarly unique in that it does not follow the popular way of understanding feelings--i.e., as (sensuously dependent) emotions. He does attempt to describe how this moral feeling is not a physical (or sensuous) one in his explanation of its role as (genuine) *moral sense* (i.e., not to be confused with the *moral sense* theory of Hutcheson et al.) whereby it can relate to the will (or *Willkür*--i.e., free choice), as follows:

> Certainly the will must have *motives;* but these are not particular pre-established ends that are objects to which we relate through the physical feelings; instead, they are nothing but the unconditioned law itself, and the will's receptivity itself subject to it as to an unconditioned constraint is called the *moral sense.* Thus, this [moral] feeling is not the cause but the effect of the determination of the will, and we would not have any perception of this feeling whatsoever if that constraint did not precede it.[145]

It appears then that the function of moral feeling--acting as (Kantian) *moral sense*--relates intrinsically with that of moral motivation, albeit this role of moral feeling is not restricted to but *motivation.*[146] It can include as well: "notions of inner law, universal affection, felt dependence on the universal will, a felt need to act on what one knows is right, susceptibility to be moved by pure practical reason, respect for the law, and true contentment."[147] Nevertheless we must always 'be on guard' in order that we do not confuse (the ground of) moral feelings with (that of) physical feelings, as Kant further explains:

> The moral disposition is necessarily connected with a consciousness of the determination of the will directly by a law. Now the consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always a ground for satisfaction in the resulting action but...the determination of the will directly by reason alone is the ground of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure practical determination of the faculty of desire, not a sensuous one. Since this determination produces the same inward effect, i.e., an impulse to activity, as does a feeling of agreeableness which is expected from the desired action, we see that what we ourselves do may easily be looked upon as something which we merely passively feel...But we must, nevertheless, be on guard against degrading and deforming the real and authentic incentive, the law itself, by awarding spurious praise to the moral ground of determination as incentive as though it were based on

feelings of particular joys...for these joys are only its consequences.[148]

What this detailed explanation by Kant boils down to is that in order for practical reason to become "a truly higher faculty of desire" it must relate to the *emotions* (i.e., feelings that have an empirical source of knowledge) without presupposing any emotions in determining the will ("by the mere form of the practical rule").[149] To put it another way, (moral) feelings can interrelate with the emotions at the sensory level, while maintaining the link with *moral sense* (in the course of moral motivation) in that moral feelings are grounded upon the moral principles of practical reason.[150]

Kant believes that it is necessary for practical reason to achieve this 'higher faculty of desire' in order to overcome the *disingenuousness* of human nature caused by the *duplicity* of emotions. This "disposition to conceal our real sentiments" and so to represent ourselves as 'better than we are' is initially necessary to assume "at least the *outward bearing* of what we know to be good," says Kant. But when 'true principles' have consequently been developed as good habits, "this duplicity must be more and more earnestly combated; otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good sentiments."[151]

In so stating the need to check this duplicity of emotions, Kant has added that *good sentiments* (as based upon practical principles) need to grow in the development of moral

character. He further stresses that it is necessary to have the capacity and will to share in others' feelings in order for *humanity*--as free and sympathetic--to properly develop. Although Kant reduces the powers of the understanding (or 'soul') to: 1) cognitive power, 2) feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and 3) the power of desire (i.e., will), he emphasizes that this (sympathetic) humanity must be based upon practical reason (and not mere sentiments).[152]

It may be necessary to point out that Kant is not disparaging (all concepts of) emotions or sentiments but instead is applying a higher or more elevated interpretation and use for (some of) them (in grounding them upon moral principles) in order that they may become *good sentiments* approaching that of *moral feeling*. To cite one case in point, Kant refers to *love* as "a matter of *feeling*, not of willing" in one part of his Morals; but in a subsequent passage and in the context of 'love of man' (or philanthropy) he states that "love is not to be understood as *feeling*" but as *active benevolence*.[153]

What this means in brief is that Kant does not hold that it is only from the heart that one can speak to the heart. He maintains that in order to have this 'heart-to-heart' communiqué one must use the principles of practical reason.[154] In his wish to involve *the feelings* in this moral process, however, Kant has formulated an entirely new interpretation from an old (and familiar) concept in his

treatment of *moral* feeling.[155] To better understand the way(s) in which Kant implements this concept, it may be helpful to see what he means by *moral feeling* with regards to (the concepts of) happiness, forgiveness, and respect.

2. The Role of Happiness

Perhaps the broadest way to show that Kant was not opposed to the proper development of feelings in moral character is in his depiction of the role of happiness in ethics. As I read Kant, emotions and feelings are not to be eliminated from the human condition; but their control over us is to be held in check by the proper use of our reason.[156] Emotions then can be used (or controlled) by us in attaining our rational ends; and so can prove useful. In this regard, I would like to first define what Kant means by *happiness*, and then offer my response to the romanticist complaint that his definition appears to be rather *sobering*.

Kant's definition of *happiness*

Kant defines *happiness* as "the satisfaction of all our desires, *extensively*, in respect of the manifoldness, *intensively*, in respect of their degree, and *protensively*, in respect of their duration."[157]

In expounding upon this definition, Kant states that there are two laws that relate to happiness: 1) the practical or pragmatic law (as a rule of prudence); and 2) the moral law

(of morality). The pragmatic law, based upon empirical principles, is derived from the motive of happiness in that via experience it teaches us how we may satisfy certain desires. The moral law, based upon 'mere ideas of pure reason,' is known *a priori* and is not concerned with the natural means of satisfying our desires. Instead, the moral law (if it exists at all, Kant says[158]) "considers only the freedom of a rational being in general, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonise with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with principles." In short, the pragmatic law tells us *what to do* to achieve happiness; the moral law, *how we must behave* to deserve it (Ibid.).

In answer to his own question, "If I so behave as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness?," Kant states that it is *only in the idea* of pure reason that morality is inseparably bound up with happiness "inasmuch as freedom, partly inspired and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness." If rational beings would act under these principles as exempt from *the desires* (i.e., "all the hindrances to morality"), they would become the authors of 'a system of self-rewarding morality.' But such a system of *enduring well-being* of oneself and others is possible (*only as an idea*, Kant insists) if *everyone* does what he ought to do (that is, "that all the actions of rational beings take place just as if they had

proceeded from a supreme will that comprehends in itself, or under itself, all private wills").[159]

Reason alone cannot ensure the necessary connection of 'the hope of happiness' with this "necessary endeavor to render the self worthy of happiness." The concept of a *Supreme Reason* (as a wise Author and Ruler) in the intelligible (or moral) world must be assumed in order to make *purposive unity* possible.[160] Otherwise, the commands, threats and promises of the moral laws could not be carried out and would consequently be regarded as "empty figments of the brain." For, according to Kant, happiness could not constitute a system unless it is "distributed in exact proportion to morality," that is, to worthiness to be happy. The *idea* of this *ideal of the supreme good*, moreover, is "the cause of all happiness in the world," says Kant, but only if we assume--as well--that the moral world is "a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense."[161]

A world wherein happiness *alone* constitutes its supreme good (insofar as it relates to our worthiness to be happy, that is, our moral conduct) would be possible, Kant says, only if we view the moral world as *the world of grace*. For mere rational beings as we are (saddled by emotions and subject to the pragmatic law), however, not only is happiness by itself far from being the complete good, morality by itself (with the *mere* worthiness to be happy) is also incomplete. To make the good complete then it is necessary not only to avoid conduct

which would make one unworthy of happiness, but to *be able to hope* that one "will participate in happiness" while complying with the moral law.[162] Put simply, the upright man needs to be *conscious* of his righteousness in order to be (truly) happy.[163]

Having said that, Kant emphasizes that morality itself is not a 'doctrine of happiness' or an instruction book on how to acquire happiness. Morality concerns only the rational side of happiness (i.e., how to be worthy of happiness) and not the means of acquiring it (i.e, how to be happy). Ethics is called 'a doctrine of happiness,' Kant points out, because the *hope* of one day participating in happiness first arises with religion (in that it "inevitably leads to *the concept* of a sole, all-perfect, and rational primordial being").[164] Hence, Kant holds that the road to happiness begins with religion, leads to the Ideals of Reason, and ends with the moral law.

Happiness and *sour duty*[165]

If the happiness of all mankind is the supreme end, and if the *highest good* is 'to bring the kingdom of God to us,' the question arises: How is this feat to be accomplished?[166] Kant responds that if we first make it a duty to promote the highest good as the object of our will, we can best promote it ('with all our strength') by presupposing its possibility as well as its conditions (i.e., the three ideals of reason: God,

freedom and immortality).[167] Because this *duty* would be based upon the moral law, these three postulates (named-above) would have to be *moral* (or practical) postulates in order that the command of reason (which is "not based on inclination") would be able to justify them (Ibid.). One cannot but sense a circularity in Kant's reasoning at this point--even though it can be argued he is *merely* consistent.

In (a partial) defense of Kant, I might point out that Kant appears to believe: 1) that if the greatest possible human freedom were allowed (in accordance with the moral law, of course), the greatest happiness would follow *of itself;* and 2) that (moral) freedom can be achieved *only* in the moral or intelligible world within the laws prescribed by the ideas of reason.[168] Granted the above-premises, it would appear that the *greatest* (quality of) happiness is achievable only within (or under) the parameters of the moral law. Kant does allow room for *natural inclinations*, however, for he considers them good *in themselves;* but he does encourage that they be *tamed* and "brought into harmony in a wholeness" in order for happiness to be achieved.[169]

In reply, the romantics (such as Schleiermacher and Herder) might claim that Kant's notion of duty is too *sour* for any genuine or enduring happiness. After all, Kant does define *duty* as "constraint to an end adopted reluctantly." And Kant does state that one cannot have a duty (i.e., be under obligation) to promote even one's own happiness "with all his

powers" as that would contradict the *reluctant* nature of duty itself. At best, one can say that he has a duty towards the natural welfare and moral well-being of *others*.[170]

But Schleiermacher goes further and claims that Kant's conjunction of virtue with happiness is not a necessary one, nor a viable one. Schleiermacher adds that not only is there no demonstration for this (supposed) *necessary* conjunction, Kant's concept of *happiness* is not a concept of pure reason and hence remains "without the slightest interconnection with anything else." In stating his disgust for Kant's concept of happiness (as one of distasteful duty), Schleiermacher minces no words:

> It is like stagnant water from which one customarily draws, as one chooses, only for the most common use and not always in the cleanest vessels. We gladly leave it to those whose thirst for it is great enough to direct this foul water over into the pure streams of reason with which it will never merge to form a whole. As for us, we take not the smallest pleasure in this dilution.[171]

Not to be undone, Herder claims that Kant's idea of a history that "sacrifices the happiness of individuals to the progress of the species" is "an arrogant usurpation, in the name of a spurious 'humanity,' of the right of each to follow the dictates of his own heart." Herder maintains that each person must determine his *content* for himself because each is "conditioned to enjoy happiness in a different way."[172]

In a second round of defense for Kant, I would point out that Kant refers to two distinct types of happiness: the *moral*

("which consists in satisfaction with one's person and one's own moral conduct, and so with what one *does*") and the *natural* ("which consists in satisfaction with what nature bestows, and so with what one *enjoys* as a gift from without"). Kant claims that moral happiness is a kind of feeling that pertains to *perfection*; whereas, only experience can bring us the joys of natural happiness.[173] In this regard, the claim that Kant's concept of (natural) happiness is not a pure concept of pure reason is valid: Kant himself does not deny it. But that Kant *necessarily* conjoins happiness with morality is not that clear-cut. To quote this (still) controversial sentence in Kant:

> But not only since I am justified in thinking of my existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible world but also since I have in the moral law a pure intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensuous world), it is not impossible that the morality of intention should have a necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world; but this relation is indirect, mediated by an intelligible Author of nature.[174]

Kant adds that this "combination [of God, morality, and happiness], however, can occur only contingently in a system of nature which is merely the object of the senses and as such is not sufficient to the highest good."[175]

Although I would not purport to have resolved this long-standing difficulty in Kant, I would like to point out that granted his two earlier premises: 1) that one (morally) exists as a noumenon in the intelligible world, and 2) that one's

causality in the sensuous world has a 'pure intellectual determining ground' in the moral law; it is at least *possible* (which I think is all that Kant claims 'as *proof*') that the (moral) happiness caused by a morally good intent should likewise be communicated (or received) as a conscious (and even sensuous) 'contentment with oneself.'[176] Kant does add, however, that it is not *necessary* to live happily but it is *necessary* to live honorably.[177]

That this *contentment* (and I would add '*moral* contentment') is essential (or at least *helpful*) toward the fulfillment of one's duty, Kant explains--as follows:

> [A] heart which is happy in the *performance* of its duty (not merely complacent in the *recognition* thereof) is a mark of genuineness in the virtuous disposition--of genuineness even in *piety*, which does not consist in the self-inflicted torment of a repentant sinner...but rather in the firm resolve to do better in the future. This resolve, then, encouraged by good progress, must needs beget a joyous frame of mind, without which man is never certain of having really *attained a love* for the good, i.e., of having incorporated it into his maxim.[178]

Again, as I read Kant, I would hold that the above-passage argues (rather convincingly) that Kant does provide a place for *happiness* (even *moral* happiness) within his ethics--although not *necessarily* so. Indeed, Kant clearly states that *true morality* is "not merely that we should be happy, but that we should make ourselves happy," for in being the *originator and builder* of our own happiness we can achieve the *greatest happiness*.[179]

In reply to the romanticists' hue and cry of *sour duty*,

however, perhaps Kant's own (detailed) explanation (as to what he intended by *duty*) may suffice:

> I readily concede that no man can with certainty be conscious of *having performed* his duty altogether unselfishly. For this is a matter of inner experience, and such an awareness of one's state of mind would involve an absolutely clear representation of everything pertaining to those notions and considerations that imagination, habit, and inclination conjoin to the concept of duty. This is too much to ask for...Perhaps there has never been a man who has altogether unselfishly (without admixture of other incentives) performed his acknowledged and revered duty; perhaps no one will ever succeed in doing so, even with the greatest effort. But everyone is capable of rigorous self-examination and can perceive himself becoming conscious not just of the absence of such contributing motives [for happiness], but even more of self-denial regarding many motives that conflict with the idea of duty and thus with the maxim of striving toward that purity [in one's concept of duty]. And that is sufficient for the observation of his duty.[180]

As I read Kant in the above-passage, I daresay I do not see the sort of 'stagnant water' that Schleiermacher refers to; albeit, I will concede that Kant wrote the above-passage four years *after* Schleiermacher so critiqued him. Quite likely, then the 'rhapsodic' influence of the romantics moved Kant to pen the words he did (at least in his own defense).[181] But as we shall shortly see, even Kant's final efforts to *sweeten* (as it were) the sour edge of his concept of duty may not help him in that of forgiveness.[182]

3. The Role of Forgiveness

It seems that if all the romanticists (past and present) can agree on one key weakness in Kant's theory of *moral*

feeling it is in his concept of forgiveness. As we have seen in Chapter I, Hamann not only believes that Kant has no concept of forgiveness, he maintains that Kant has lost *the faith* altogether (or at least *the feeling* 'after faith' that proper faith requires) and should more aptly be called 'the Prussian Hume.' What appears to have irked these romantics to debunk Kant's view of forgiveness is Kant's (perceived) sense of detachment to the human condition. Indeed, Herder in building upon Hamaan's Metacritique on Kant goes so far as to state that there is no such thing as *the* reason (only *reasoning*) and hence Kant's first Critique is "a linguistic monstrosity, an unparalleled word jugglery."[183]

As co-leader (with Hamaan) of the *Sturm und Drang* (Storm and Stress) movement, Goethe condemned as well this "neutral, detached, objective observation" (as exemplified by Kant) as "a partial, unnatural use of human faculties."[184] It would appear then that Kant's view of forgiveness--though based on reason--is unreasonable, according to these romantics.[185]

In (a partial) defense of Kant and as an exposition on Kant's concept of forgiveness, I would like to refer to Kant's *three divine moral attributes*: holiness, mercy, and justice. According to Kant, people habitually turn to mercy in order to avoid measuring up to the other two attributes. But which is worse, man (though a 'servile knave') would rather become a *favorite* of heaven; and so tends to *mingle* the respective spheres of holiness and justice with mercy in order to satisfy

himself 'with some color of truth' by applying *solely* to divine *grace*. To Kant, this behavior is a mockery of the process of forgiveness, to which he adds that as the idea of God is an 'idea of a triune personality' (i.e., of three distinct relations of God to man) so likewise these three *moral attributes* should be separated in decision-making.[186]

Holiness and forgiveness

Kant acknowledges that the (moral) law states: "Be ye holy (in the conduct of your lives) even as your Father in heaven is holy." In order for man's moral constitution to accord with this 'impossible execution,' Kant says, a 'change of heart' via a moral *disposition* must be possible "because duty requires it." This moral disposition (supersensible in its origin) arises from a *holy principle* (as *the seed* or 'highest maxim' from which all goodness is to be developed), and can be called *our Comforter* (to encourage constancy).[187]

Although we can never achieve the goal of *holiness* while mortal, Kant believes, we can maintain a state of *moral happiness* as a constant 'seeking for the kingdom of God,' "the reality and *constancy* of a disposition which ever progresses in goodness (and never falls away from it)." Despite this *improved* disposition whereby one becomes a *new man* by *grace* (i.e., 'moral receptivity'), Kant insists that this 'becoming dead to the old (man)' is only a *becoming* (i.e., "becoming a man well-pleasing to God").[188] Only a *complete* change of

heart could allow us "to [even] think of the [kind of] absolution" that would be necessary to *utterly* discharge this *radical*, or moral, evil which lies in our disposition, and which we can "by no possibility wipe out." For no expiations can supply the lack of this 'change of heart' if it is absent, "even those appealing to the ideal of the vicarious Son of God," as we can *never* reach the goal of perfection.[189]

Having received such a rebuke from Kant as to the nigh impossibility of being *forgiven* of our imperfections, one may well wonder what is there to rejoice about in this 'new disposition'?[190] Kant--ever the meticulous thinker--points out that here (upon the earth) this *new man* (though subject to *infinite guilt*) can become '*morally* another' in the eyes of a divine or *future* judge (i.e., "his own awakening conscience") in that the identity of the *old man* has been sacrificed (i.e., via 'the crucifying of the flesh').

In so radically improving his moral disposition, this new man has "reasonable grounds for *hope*," Kant says, in that he may *press on* with ever-increasing strength and courage for future advances by repeatedly observing his own recent progress. In this continual examination of one's disposition throughout one's life, Kant believes that this *new man* would *of his own accord* "not be able to let a previously recognized disposition [of the *old man*] take the place of action." Hence, at life's close, the *new man* would successfully pass the verdict of the 'judge who cannot be bribed' (i.e., his own

inner reason). Such a plan, Kant concludes, need not "forfeit needlessly too much of the enjoyment of life" and is vastly superior to *death-bed repentances* drawn from 'a store of excuses.'[191]

Mercy and forgiveness

A death-bed repentance (i.e., a repentance which *first* manifests itself as one approaches death), for Kant, has 'no moral worth' because repentance to be genuine must be *practical* in that it endeavors to remedy the injustice(s) caused.[192] But such attempts to thwart what Kant calls *true repentance* (i.e., "a firm determination to live a better life") is typical with those who attempt to mix (moral) mercy with (divine) forgiveness. For they continually cry out "Lord, Lord"--Kant says--but fail to do the (moral) things required of them.[193]

Mercy for Kant means that one should place his *hope* in a 'benevolent ruler' even though he "cannot hope that punishment of his vices will be remitted." But to elicit prayers on behalf of a guilty party in order to 'coerce God into forgiving them' would bring the law into contempt: for prayer cannot "bring about exemption from punishment." "Were God to forgive vice," Kant says, "He might also tolerate it and exempt it from punishment." A benevolent judge then is *unthinkable*: a ruler can be benevolent, but "a judge must be just."[194]

The thought so commonly entertained by those persons who espouse a romantic notion of forgiveness "that God must do everything for them or else pardon all their sins" is countered by Kant's claim that we *cannot hope* to be relieved of the consequences of our acts nor of 'moral demands.' The *right course*, Kant says (in the last sentence of his Religion) is "not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace" (190). Although we cannot know (nor need to know, Kant adds) *how* the idea of God can make good our imperfections, we can nevertheless *hope* that it will be done. For it is *in this hope* that (moral) mercy lies.[195]

Justice and forgiveness[196]

Kant maintains that "if justice goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth" for the principle of punishment is a categorical imperative. As the "best equalizer before public justice is *death*," there cannot be any substitution for one who has committed murder: he must *die*. To sentence a known murderer to death, Kant points out, does not deal too severely, nor wrongfully, with the accused. To think otherwise is "all sophistry and juristic trickery." For it is *pure reason* within one that subjects him or her ("as one capable of crime") to the penal law. Private individuals do not *dictate* capital punishment; the courts of *public* justice do.[197]

In considering Kant's concept of justice from the extreme

view of capital punishment (notwithstanding the fact that he admits it is *slippery* to either lessen or remit punishment), he does permit a *clemency* of sorts.[198] Although the categorical imperative of penal justice remains (i.e., a life for a life), this *knot* can be undone--(as in the case of death by a duel) Kant says--if the legislation itself allows the *blood guilt* (of the murdered victim) to cling to it (as in a barbarous society) and so becomes *an injustice* itself (in that it fails to fulfil the justice "arising from the people"). Punishment is not given to the guilty because they will *it*, Kant explains, but because they will a *punishable action*.[199]

One may escape justice through an unjust court or legislation, Kant is saying, but one cannot escape the consequences of one's actions. For the punishment must not only suit the crime, it must accompany it as a natural consequence of having committed the crime. To forgive the perpetrator of unjust acts without *due penalty* (i.e., according to the nature, depth, and scope of the crimes committed) is to deny due justice *both* to the perpetrator and to the law. Mercy does not *season justice*, Kant argues, when punishments are waived merely on the grounds that it is 'human to err' and (supposedly) *divine* to forgive.[200] Duty to justice cannot be blatantly overridden without impunity by the *mere* impulse to forgive (i.e., based upon a feeling alone).[201] The first law of heaven--for Kant--is not love, but obedience (to the moral law).[202] For full justice to be

observed, however, the law should not simply be upheld: it must be revered.[203]

4. The Role of Respect for the Moral Law

If Kant's Achilles' heel (in the realm of *moral feeling*) is his concept of *forgiveness*, the diamond in his diadem is undoubtedly *reverence* for the (moral) law. This feeling of respect for duty (to the moral law), Kant says, is "the sole genuine moral feeling" and the "only way of representing" morality in order to advance the moral cultivation of our *will* (i.e., our 'moral cast of mind'); and hence to acquire *moral character*.[204]

A person of good morals is not necessarily the same thing as a morally good person. The former can act merely *according to duty* (i.e., legally) whereas the latter (to be *morally* good) would have to act *from duty* (i.e., from respect for the law). Although Kant points out that we may compare our feeling of duty (to the moral law) on par with our *reverence* towards the idea of God as 'a holy lawgiver' (and the author of the moral law), our reverence to the law--Kant insists--"can take no other than the moral form."[205]

That is, to cultivate *truest reverence*, we cannot have deep respect for the moral law *because* we *fear* God as an omnipotent and omniscient just judge. To (attempt to) do so, Kant argues, would carry "a very strong tincture of compulsion and forced submission" which is contrary to the *spirit* of

ethics (for ethics by definition consists of a voluntary compliance without external constraints). Although Kant claims "God looks to the *bowed heart,* not the *bowed knee*"--he insists that we must not confuse reverence for the law with fear of God. Reverence for the (internal) moral law, after all, "springs forth from the disposition of the heart," that is, on a *moral* plane.[206] It is impelled--not compelled--from within, for "instead of constraint from without, *inner* freedom comes into play."[207]

But why does Kant use the word *reverence* or (a deep) *respect* and not simply a 'moral feeling' in describing the moral attitude (or feeling) towards the moral law?[208] The key reason, I think, is that Kant wanted to show that *solely* this motive (of *reverence*) for the moral law (above all other *moral* feelings) can give moral worth to an action. Kant realized that we have that *dear self* ("which is always turning up") whenever self-denial is required (e.g., in the development of moral character). As we cannot begin with self-seeking ends in developing our code of ethics, we need to refer to the full consideration of (what is) our duty in order to determine the ends "we *ought* to set ourselves" (i.e., via *maxims*--as personal subjective principles--grounded upon morally objective ones).[209]

In so doing, we experience a type of *pain* which Kant compares to the *good* pain of a 'surgical operation.' Put simply, this pain of moral feeling is the *reluctant* respect

("though not always obedience") we 'feel' towards our duty (to the moral law). Kant likens it to the sense of awe one experiences gazing before 'the starry heavens above.' He claims that in so 'checking selfishness' (i.e., lowering our 'pretensions of moral self-esteem') this *pain* awakens an intellectual appreciation for the moral law, which due to its sublime dignity should properly be called *reverence* (or at least *respect*).[210]

Respect as a motive

In carefully pointing out that this *practical* or moral feeling of respect is not a *feeling* per se, Kant stipulates that it is "the sole and undoubted moral incentive." Because we cannot see how the moral law can be binding, and because the moral law "contains precepts but no motives," the role of respect for the moral law *as motive* is crucial. The extent of this respect for the moral law is earned in degrees, however, for "self-mastery depends on the strength of our moral feeling." As the 'executive authority of moral feeling' provides (or enlivens) the motive of respect for the moral law, the self-cultivation of this respect through a 'habit of desire and aversion' is imperative (as one's duty).[211]

In stating, however, that when we act "in conformity with duty *from* duty" we go beyond the 'law of duty for actions' and so make "the law itself also the incentive," Kant appears to contradict himself.[212] I have just stated (above) that Kant

clearly acknowledges that the law by itself *contains no motives*. How then can he say that it now does?[213]

One way out of this dilemma for Kant, I think, is to consider his statement "that the law be also my incentive to such actions" (as 'shorthand') to mean that *the consciousness of* the law is itself also the incentive. Broken down one step further, 'the consciousness of the law' could be understood to mean the consciousness *of duty* to the law. This consciousness of one's duty then is identical to respect for the law (which subjectively is called *moral feeling*) for it is the consciousness of this duty that is the incentive to actions.[214] As Kant summarily puts it:

> The moral disposition is necessarily connected with a consciousness of the determination of the will directly by a law...Respect as the consciousness of the direct constraint of the will through the law is hardly analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of desire it produces exactly the same effect, but from different sources. But only through this mode of conception can one achieve what is sought, namely, that actions be done not merely according to duty (as a consequence of pleasant feelings) but from duty, which must be the true goal of all moral cultivation.[215]

In harmony with this *true goal* and in order to ensure "the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction under the name of happiness" for mankind, Kant thinks that the present conduct of man needs to be improved. This conflict between the *moral disposition* and inclinations can be gradually won through a moral strength of mind. But as it stands, Kant emphasizes, without 'a vivid idea of the dignity of law' "most

actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty." What this failure would mean then is that man's conduct would eventually become "mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures." To avoid the nonexistence of this moral worth of actions, Kant underscores the need to develop a *disinterested respect*. For it is "only when this respect has become active and dominating," Kant concludes, that there can be *a truly moral character*.[216]

C. Moral Character (as Reason and Feeling)

Kant states that when the *free will* (as 'practical reason') incorporates moral feeling into its maxim, the resultant property is *good character*. He argues that "reason should have a power of *infusing a feeling of pleasure* or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty"; and furthermore that we have "an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them."[217] "Natural inclinations, *considered in themselves*, are *good*," Kant says, for *sensuous motives* do have a valid function, namely, "that of overcoming greater sensuous obstacles so that understanding *can* again bear rule."[218] Hence, reason and feeling *can* work together in a harmonious theory of moral character for Kant. Precisely *how* both reason

and feeling can work towards this development of moral character in Kant is the subject I will presently attempt to demonstrate.[219]

How moral *reason* relates to moral conduct

From the rational end, the rule of conduct begins with *ideas* (such as the idea of virtue, or of friendship) which, fostered as beliefs, culminate in actions. Considerations as to what is desirable in the long run (that is, "what is good and useful") are based on reason, or more specifically, on the *ideals* which reason provides. According to Kant, these *ideals* "have *practical* power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain *actions*," for the philosophy of morals deals with *ideals* (i.e., with what *ought to be*).[220] The 'idea of humanity' therefore is "man as he ought to be," "his personality independent of physical attributes."[221] Although man cannot be *purely* virtuous and so fulfil this expectation (to be 'independent' of his inclinations), the value of these ideals should not be discounted. As Kant explains:

> As the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal in such a case serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed.[222]

To better understand what Kant means by this rational

process of character-building, let us consider two examples: firstly, that of the *idea* of God; secondly, of the *idea* of friendship. As to the *idea of God,* Kant states that "this Idea proceeds directly from our own reason" and that we create it ourselves so that it may serve "as the incentive in our conduct." Although "we do not have before us, in this Idea, a given being to whom we would be under obligation" (Kant admits), we owe it to ourselves (as our duty) to apply this Idea to the moral law "where it is of the greatest moral fruitfulness."[223] In the second instance, the *idea of friendship,* Kant's point is perhaps a bit more clear. Friendship is an idea (and a 'very necessary' one) in ethics, Kant points out, " because it is not derived from experience" but is chosen on moral grounds.[224]

To measure the varied *affectionate inclinations* of humanity we would require an *idea,* as Kant further explains:

> The maximum reciprocity of love is friendship, and friendship is an Idea because it is the measure by which we can determine reciprocal love. The greatest love I can have for another is to love him as myself. I cannot love another more than I love myself. But if I am to love him as I love myself I must be sure that he will love me as he loves himself, in which case he restores to me that with which I part and I come back to myself again. This Idea of friendship enables us to measure friendship and to see the extent to which it is defective. (Ibid.)

We see then that for Kant *ideas* (such as *virtue* and "human wisdom in its complete purity") ultimately point to humanity itself as *a dignity* (or 'personality'). For as has been noted, it is *in this ideal* (e.g., of humanity) that we have 'the

conduct of the divine man within us' and whereby we are under obligation to morally acknowledge "the dignity of humanity in every other man."[225] But this dignity or respect towards others is not the product of (pure) reason alone.

How moral *feeling* relates to moral conduct

From the perspective of feeling, human conduct--even for an *unmitigated blackguard*--begins with the 'wish to be good.' "It is upon the basis of this moral feeling," Kant says, "that we can build a system of virtue." But this basis of moral feeling is not the *primary factor*: it must relate to (or link up with) the 'pure concept of morality' in order to (jointly) achieve strength of character. In other words, "If a man's concept of morality is pure, he can build up virtue upon it; he can stir up his moral feeling and take the first steps towards morality."[226]

If one disciplines himself, he can cultivate his moral feeling and so gradually acquire a *habit of desire and aversion* with regards to what is (morally) good and bad. This *habit* is not a natural one but one that "takes the place of nature." For through habit an action is made easy "until at last it becomes a necessity." To acquire this habit of doing good (from duty), Kant says, increases one's merit (in that through the force of habit one will ultimately do one's duty *as if* 'from love and inclination'). Only in *feeling* disgust for a vice or immoral act, however, can we be said to have

moral feeling. As Kant maintains: for the "understanding sees that a thing is disgusting and is hostile to it, but it cannot be disgusted" (only sensibility can). If then our sensibility is disgusted with what the mind perceives as disgusting, we have *moral feeling*. Without moral feeling, Kant stresses: "It is quite impossible to make any man feel disgust at vice" especially when his sensibility is *dulled*.[227]

In sum, moral feeling relates to human conduct in that it shares (with moral reason) the basis for developing moral character. Although one begins *primarily* "by complete abstinence from everything that discourages his inclination to goodness," the value of moral feelings is at least *secondary* to this 'positive achievement of morality,' which--though difficult--is not outside our reach.[228]

1. Kant and Moral Character

Kant holds the worth of character to be infinite. To say one 'has character' is to say that he has *moral* character, for strength of character is synonymous with *virtue* (i.e., the moral perfection of man via the 'conquest of inclinations').[229] A glimpse of what Kant intends by character can be seen in his description of *the character of a perfect friend*: "Uprightness of disposition, sincerity, trustworthiness, conduct devoid of all falsehood and spite, and a sweet, cheerful and happy temper." Kant admits that to find such an *ideal* friend is akin to finding *black swans*, but

he does point out that as these 'black swans' exist (albeit rarely), so do these *merely moral* friendships.[230]

Kant's theory of moral character then is not 'a pie in the sky when you die,' but rather a here-on-the-earth approach to moral practice. Indeed, he visualizes a time ('many centuries' from now) in which the highest possible perfection of human nature will be reached, a time in which the authority of *conscience within us* would rule *this* planet as 'the kingdom of God on earth.'[231]

This *pious wish,* as Kant calls it, can be adopted as our duty (i.e., as a maxim) in that we can work incessantly towards its realization "even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either." For at the very least one could *hope* to realize "the consciousness of his tried character." Even if one has nothing but *good will* left, (Kant maintains that) he can still develop good character for one's good will is 'good without qualification' and hence would "still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself."[232]

Kant maintains that this good will conjoined with a *genuine* respect for the moral law is the basis for good moral character. False laws which proceed from the *theory of moral probability,* however, are but "empty wishes and romantic ideas." Our worth as humans is the foundation of all other duties, for we do have a duty to love others and to respect

their rights. To turn to moral egoism (as *toadies* do) is to heed our 'inner advocate' (that *dear self*) who would twist the facts and have us compare ourselves to each other instead of to the standard of the moral law.[233]

For man's moral growth, Kant insists, does not begin merely in the improvement of one's actions or practices but in the transforming of his *will* (i.e., 'his cast of mind') and in the grounding of a (moral) character. Only through a revolution in this *disposition* (or 'cast of mind') can a man be reborn with 'a change of heart'; but one's 'sensuous nature' ("which places obstacles in the way of the former") can be reformed only gradually. Kant emphasizes that the best one can perform--regardless of his virtue--is "still his simple duty." For to cultivate one's 'predisposition to goodness' requires more than *mere* religious feelings (e.g., listening, reading or singing in Church)--Kant cautions. It requires this gradual transformation into *a cast of mind* whereby "*duty*, for its own sake, begins to have a noticeable importance" in people's hearts.[234] In sum (as Kant explains):

> But this improvement becomes actual only if man systematically sets to work, lays deep in his heart firm basic principles squaring with well-understood concepts, erects thereupon dispositions measurable to the differing weights of the duties connected with these principles, strengthens and secures them against the onslaughts of the desires, and thus, as it were, *builds up* a new man as a *temple of God*.[235]

Unless we are arrogant in that we claim to be always in the right (and hence have a partial judge), the judge within

us--Kant says--is just. For even a rogue can have moral feeling and would like to be virtuous. Yet if we are not careful, Kant warns, we can lose that moral feeling and with it our own good conscience.[236]

Moral Conscience

Kant defines *conscience* as "an instinct, an involuntary and irresistible impulse in our nature, which compels us to pass a judgment with the force of a law upon our actions." A man who "accuses and judges himself in conscience," Kant says, is actually a 'doubled self' ("a dual personality in himself"). For, on the one hand, he stands (before the tribunal of conscience) as the 'accused'; on the other, as the 'judge' (i.e., the representative of divine justice). Conscience as this 'scrutinizer of hearts,' this 'inner judge of all free actions,' can be thought of as "the subjective principle of being accountable" *as if* to *a holy Being* (i.e., "morally lawgiving reason") which is "distinct from us yet present in our inmost being." We cannot deceive conscience, nor escape it--Kant insists--for it is "always with us."[237]

A cultivated mind is not necessarily followed by a cultivated conscience. As conscience *needs no guide*, anyone (illiterate or otherwise) can have but a *semblance of conscience* through the continued repetition of immoral acts. The fault of an immoral action, Kant says, is not due to the understanding, nor to conscience, but to the motive of the

will. The will (or 'heart') is depraved "if the sensibility overpowers the motive force of the understanding" and the man then becomes *a rebel* who dismisses *at will* 'the accusations of conscience.'[238]

Kant explains the initial step whereby one can (eventually) become this *rebel* to conscience, as follows: "Before the act the conscience has power enough to dissuade a man from committing the act, during the act it is stronger, and it is strongest of all after the act." For instance, in the case of passion, one's conscience must be weakened before the *act* to such an extent that the "presence of an unsatisfied inclination" becomes strong enough to withstand the threats of conscience. But once the inclination has been satisfied, one feels too weak to resist conscience, and conscience regains its strength in that it overcomes the man with 'a feeling of disgust' for his immoral act. Conscience becomes its strongest, however, when remorse follows the completion of this *passionate* act.[239]

But conscience can be weakened by one's perseverance in immoral acts (of passion), Kant warns, so that it loses all its authority. In the end, this 'inner court' would cease to accuse and function and so become *incomplete*. The feeling of disgust (which typically is enlivened by *moral feeling*) would cease, thereby dulling one's conscience.[240]

Kant points out that (aside from the passionate habits of immoral acts) one can torment one's conscience into disuse

through the subtle sophistications of *casuistry* ("a kind of dialectic of conscience"). In overburdening one's conscience with "many matters of negligible importance" (such as, whether it is right to lie on April Fool's day), one produces a *micrological* conscience. Conscience, after all, should not be *melancholy*: it should "not lord it over us like a tyrant," as in the case of those who seek *needlessly* for 'evidences of evil' in their own or another's conduct.[241]

2. Kant's *bloodless formalism*

The charge of *bloodless formalism* (also translated as *empty* or *vacuous* formalism) against Kant was emphatically made by the romanticist Hegel in his Philosophy of Right (1821) in which he states the following sentence:

> However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned self-determination of the will as the root of duty, and to the way in which knowledge of the will, thanks to Kant's philosophy, has won its firm foundation and starting-point for the first time owing to the thought of its infinite autonomy, still to adhere to the exclusively moral position, without making the transition to the conception of ethics, is to reduce this gain to an empty formalism, and the science of morals to the preaching of duty for duty's sake.[242]

Hegel continues to criticize Kant by saying that Kant's philosophy consists of *the laziness of thought* that "finds a too easy mode of evasion in the 'ought to be.'"[243] In his highly critical summary of Kant's critical philosophy, Hegel remarks:

> A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things...We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed ...Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to...[T]he examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as...not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.[244]

In the (above) criticisms of Kant's philosophy as *empty formalism,* Hegel--the 'Knight of the Holy Ghost,' as Wallace calls him--has equated Kant's thought to the *abstract,* which for Hegel means the *untrue.*[245] Referring to Kant's *thing-by-itself* as a 'thing in the *abstract,*' Hegel states that it is but *the empty substratum* of predicates of relation.[246] Knox claims that Hegel was "less than fair to Kant" in the accusations that "while reason could say what truth is in general, it could not provide a test of the truth of any given statement of fact." In Knox's words:

> The burden of Hegel's criticism is that although Kant was right to emphasize the pure unconditioned self-determination of the will as the root of duty, he could not extract from his formulae any doctrine of determinate duties. Thus he had to throw away all he had gained in superseding eudaemonism by reducing ethics to an empty formalism and the preaching of duty for duty's sake.[247]

Ping-cheung Lo in "A Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged 'Empty Formalism' of Kantian Ethics" not only differs in opinion with Hegel (regarding the *empty preaching,* as he translates the charge) but claims that Hegel's view of

Kantianism as 'duty for duty's sake' is based on a *careless* misinterpretation. According to Lo,

> Kant never says anything like "performing a duty for duty's own sake" in the *Groundwork*. In chap. 1 he only reiterates that we should perform an action from (the sense of) duty... As a matter of fact, in the first chapter of the *Groundwork*, Kant is talking about the motive of performing a duty, whereas Hegel misinterprets it to mean the end in view of which a duty is performed. (196n.)

Lo adds that to claim Kant is speaking of a "Duty in the abstract" as being "not a duty *to* anyone" is a mistake: "Duty for the sake of humanity is a duty to everyone!" (Ibid.). Allen Wood acquiesces on this point adding (in "The Emptiness of the Moral Will") that it is not Kant's view that we are morally required to "act *solely* from duty": "Instead, his view is that it is our duty to strive to make the thought of duty the sufficient motive of our will, and that we may fulfill this duty even if this striving is not perfectly successful" (456).

In addition to the aforementioned defense of Kant, Sally S. Sedgwick has devoted her entire Ph.D. Thesis, Formalism in Kant's Ethics, to responding to Hegel's charge. She summarizes Hegel's charge of *empty formalism* into three key points:

> [F]irst, Hegel charges that the critical program is itself grounded in dogmatic metaphysical assumptions about the nature and limits of human knowledge; second, Kant's orientation is taken to in effect raise subjectivity to the status of an absolute, in so far as all reality is encountered merely formally--*by way of* the necessary forms of thought--and so is considered in itself 'nothing' (*outside* subjectivity); and finally,

> Hegel characterizes the outcome of this position in terms of the destruction of all possibility of objectivity in ethics.[248]

Sedgwick maintains that Hegel's complaint against Kant is due to an inadequate knowledge (as well as understanding) of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative.[249] In the third *formula* (of the End in Itself), Sedgwick says it becomes clear how it is that the moral law can command us *unconditionally*. If Kant is trying to learn how to swim *prior* to entering the water (as Hegel claims), then Hegel's blunder would be even greater, as one diving into a pool that has been *emptied*. Hegel misses *the boat*, in other words, for he did not see Kant's *actual* position (as Sedgwick puts it) that:

> the fitness of any given maxim to become a universal law depends on its being *willed unconditionally*, which in turn means that it must arise as an expression of respect for what it is about the humanity in ourselves and in others which is wholly worthy as an end in itself: our possible autonomy.
>
> So Kant's categorical imperative is not intended to be invoked as a justification of whatever principle I wish to impose; nor, because of the context that it *does* have, *could* it be legitimately invoked in such a way.[250]

Although this debate could continue indefinitely with Hegelian scholars responding tit-for-tat to each complaint so raised, I think the key point to consider is Hegel's assertion in his Philosophy of History (1832) that:

> We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion...Passion is regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to have no passions.[251]

It is this controversy--the debate between reason and the emotions--that continues even to this day. For as Miguel De Unamuno once said: "The most tragic problem of philosophy is to reconcile intellectual necessities with the necessities of the heart and will. For it is on this rock that every philosophy...breaks to pieces."[252] Whether we agree with De Unamuno or not, this controversy between the advocates of romanticism and those of reason persists along with the perception that Kant's position is unyielding. In short, perhaps the only middle-ground that these two (ever-) opposing camps can share is that expressed by the romantic Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805):

> The speculative philosophy, if it ever could claim me, has frightened me away with its *empty formulae*; I have found no living fountain and no nourishment on this bleak plain. But the deep and fundamental thoughts of the Ideal philosophy remain an everlasting treasure, and for their sake alone one must deem himself fortunate to have lived at this time...After all, we are both Idealists, and would be ashamed to allow it to be said that things form us and not we things.[253]

To play devil's advocate for Hegel and the romantics, I could say that there is some truth to Hegel's claim of a *bloodless* formalism. Kant himself says as much in the first Critique in which he refers to the outcome of the dialectic of reason as *quite bloodless* (A747/B775). But this partial truth may be but *a half-truth* if it can be shown that Kant's thought (however 'bloodless') is not (purely) *formalistic*. For in complaining that they cannot fathom Kant's (supposedly *pure*)

formalism, the romantics may be raising so much dust that (to paraphrase Berkeley) it is no wonder they cannot *see*.[254]

The underlying issue then is not whether Kant's (supposed) formalism is *bloodless* but whether it is--in the strict sense--*purely* formal. I have argued (earlier in this Chapter) that as Kant has not subscribed to the (*purely*) formal ideas of Plato, his thought is not strictly formal. Indeed, Kant holds Plato to have 'soared too high' in creating a system of philosophy that could not relate to mortal man. Kant, then, intended his system of reason to be fit not for *divine understanding* but for *human* purposes.[255] If Hegel et al. are right, Kant's sense of harmony and unity of human reason and of the human community is a mere uniformity, a smoothly integrated 'comradeship of worms.'[256]

But I would contend (perhaps 'to put Hegel on his head') that the reverse is true: it is from this genuine spark of mutual respect that human dignity can be de-formalized, that is, made *less* formal (in its adherence to Platonic or romantic ideals) and *more* humane (in its attempt to encourage the 'common person' to *use* his *own* reason in thinking *for himself*). In so formulating *human* ideals of reason, Kant is seen (by the romantics) as being formalistic to a fault. In direct opposition to that claim, I have presented (throughout this work and particularly in this Chapter) an interpretation of Kant's stance as anything but a purely formal one--based upon Kant's *own* words.[257]

The point which I wish to underscore is that there is *ample* evidence in Kant's *own writings* to show that his moral thought is not confined to the narrow channels of *pure* formalism. To claim that Kant's view of people helping people (as one *based upon* mutual respect and dignity) is a case of 'the blind leading the blind' in ethical judgments is more than an unfair interpolation of the Kantian text. It is a misapprehension of one of Kant's most basic premises (to establish the humanity of mankind upon *the human* quality of *human* dignity), a case of mixing 'apples with oranges,' of confusing formal ethical principles with a philosophy of *pure* formalism.[258]

Kant's vision for mankind is not in 'Plato's heaven' (nor in Hegel's for that matter). Kant has asked his readers "for the patience and impartiality of a judge"; yet all too often I find he has been judged in a kangaroo court, a court where whim and fancy appear to rule and where the rules of reason gather dust.[259] This all-too-prevalent misunderstanding (not to mention, lack of appreciation) of Kant's philosophical mission is quite possibly due to a mere skimming through his works. For, as Kant says, "the danger is not that of being refuted, but of not being understood." And it no doubt goes without saying that Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood of all philosophers--at least, by the romantics.[260]

3. An Unyielding Kant seen as Unfeeling

Perhaps the most controversial of Kant's writings with respect to the *bloodless formalism* complaint of the romantics is his short response to the French politician Benjamin Constant, entitled, "On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy" (1797). In this article, Kant defined a lie as "an intentionally untrue declaration to another" and added that (contra what jurists or lawyers say) "it always harms another, even if not another individual, nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusable."[261] Moreover, Kant adds, one who tells a lie is responsible for its consequences (even before a civil court) because "truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties to be grounded on contract." To be truthful then is "a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences."[262]

For Kant, to make a declaration *public* is equivalent to swearing under oath in a court of law. Indeed, Kant insists that it should not be necessary to swear by oaths, as a man *ought to be* as true as his word.[263] But Kant is not naive: he recognizes that no one is *truly* candid. If all men were good, however, people could be candid "but as things are they cannot be."[264] Indeed, people in polite circles of society at times simply cannot be *punctiliously truthful,* as Kant explains:

But if we were to be at all times punctiliously truthful

> we might become victims of the wickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness. If all men were well-intentioned it would not only be a duty not to lie, but no one would do so because there would be no point in it. But as men are malicious, it cannot be denied that to be punctiliously truthful is often dangerous. (Ibid., 228)

At this point, it would seem that Kant is endorsing *a white lie* (i.e., a lie "enforced upon us by necessity"; Ibid.). One would think given Constant's query to Kant (i.e., Would it be "a crime to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge in our house"?) that Kant would agree: 'to deceive a deceiver is no deceit.'[265] No doubt Kant was aware of the social custom (still prevalent today) in various parts of Europe (including France) to state an *untruth* to an inquiring visitor (especially, a stranger) at the door whether so-and-so were home. And as Kant admits that 'not every untruth is a lie,' the casual reader may understandably be puzzled (or even bemused) as to Kant's candid reply that 'a lie is a lie' for not only is a lie 'always evil' (in the *formal* sense), there are "no lies which may not be the source of evil."[266]

Before I offer a few thoughts in defense of Kant's rather maligned stance (as a perceived 'prudish *purist*'), I would like to point out that Kant did believe certain *white lies* can be justified: "The forcing of a statement from me under conditions which convince me that improper use would be made of it is the only case in which I can be justified in telling a white lie." And again Kant says: "If a man tries to extort

the truth from us and we cannot tell it him and at the same time do not wish to lie, we are justified in resorting to equivocation in order to reduce him to silence and to put a stop to his questionings."[267] In the example given above, we could respond then to the murderer's question (whether so-and-so is in) with a question of our own: "And if not, what is that to you?". To do so would not be *a lie* (in the Kantian sense) but as we (deliberately) have not directly answered the question, it would be an *equivocation*.

To press the issue even further, Kant does permit one (in exceptional cases) to 'make a false statement'--as a deliberate *untruth*, as he elucidates:

> I may make a false statement when my purpose is to hide from another what is in my mind and when the latter can assume that such is my purpose, his own purpose being to make a wrong use of the truth. Thus, for instance, if my enemy takes me by the throat and asks where I keep my money, I need not tell him the truth, because he will abuse it; and my untruth is not a lie because the thief knows full well that I will not, if I can help it, tell him the truth and that he has no right to demand it of me. (Ibid., 227)

The issue appears to be an open-and-shut case: Kant permits white lies, equivocation, and even the telling of untruths under exceptional circumstances. Hence (it would appear), he would likewise agree to Monsieur Constant's example that "to tell the truth is a duty, but only to one who has a right to the truth."[268] But Kant does not so comply.

This (longstanding) misunderstanding has arisen, I think, due to a rather technical oversight. What Kant is saying is

that 'a lie is a lie.' That is, once we have determined that a given pronouncement is an outright bald-faced *lie* (in the full Kantian sense of the term), then we cannot wiggle out of our obligation to be truthful, and attempt to remedy the situation (as it were) by calling it 'justifiable.' For--next to suicide--a lie (to Kant) is the greatest violation of man's duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own person)."[269] Liars are held in general contempt, Kant says, because they destroy fellowship. They also are not worthy of happiness, but instead harm themselves immensely in that they not only violate their duty to themselves (as well as to others), they annihilate their own dignity as persons.[270]

As Constant's example of the murderer at one's door reduced the options of a true-life scenario to but one: 'the necessity to *publicly* lie,' Kant was obliged to stick to his principles, namely, that of the categorical imperative. For the essential though underlying issue (so presented by Constant) was not the necessity of saving one's friend but instead the concept of duty and right with respect to *truthfulness*. Kant rightly recognized this shift in Constant's position, and responded accordingly. What is unfortunate, of course, is that casual readers in this brief passage have deemed Kant to be saying categorically that all untruths are lies and hence no exceptions are to be made. Kant instead distinguishes between lying in the juridical context (i.e.,

the intrinsic nature of 'duty and right' that Constant refers to) and lying in the context of virtue.

In this latter sense, Kant admits a certain *prudent reserve* is necessary, although silence--he says--can be 'a treacherous ally': "If all men were good there would be no need for any of us to be reserved; but since they are not, we have to keep the shutters down."[271] In a down-to-earth sense, Kant could well have responded to the murderer at his door with deception but without (the necessity of) *lying,* as he explains:

> It is possible to deceive without making any statement whatever. I can make believe, make a demonstration from which others will draw the conclusion I want, though they have no right to expect that my action will express my real mind. In that case I have not lied to them, because I had not undertaken to express my mind. (Ibid., 226)

In the former sense (that of lying in the juridical context), Kant's position is unwavering, as he consistently sticks to his principles. And for a philosopher--like Kant--consistency is his 'greatest obligation,' for "an honest man cannot tell a lie."[272] In that sense, telling *a lie* involves a 'moral imperative,' as Kant explains:

> Take, for example: 'Thou shalt not lie.' This is no problematic imperative, for in that case it would mean, 'If it harm thee to lie, then do not lie.' But the imperative commands simply and categorically: 'Thou shalt not lie'; and it does so unconditionally, or under an objective and necessary condition. It is characteristic of the moral imperative that it does not determine an end, and the action is not governed by an end, but flows from the free will and has no regard to ends. The dictates of moral imperatives are absolute and regardless

of the end.[273]

It does not matter then *from the juridical viewpoint* what the end or object of lying is all about. Whether one tells a lie for a fortune or for philanthropy, it cannot justify the means.[274] A 'lie is a lie,' Kant says, and that's that. Hence, Kant's unyielding stance is seen as unfeeling.

In my viewpoint, I think Kant was keenly aware of the dangers of *inner lies* as well as external ones (in that the former tends to send out many *ripples* that are consequently expressed in the latter: akin to the reaction caused by a pebble tossed into a quiet pond).[275] Although Kant never read Shakespeare (to my knowledge), I think the sincerity of his moral logic has best been described by Polonius in Hamlet: "This above all, to thine own self be true,/ And it must follow as the night the day/ Thou canst not then be false to any man."[276]

For the question could be asked, however, apropos of Kant's insistence that one must not *lie*, whether Kant himself was lying at the time he wrote that reply. That is, on what basis do we know (or at least *believe*) that Kant was telling the truth when he said 'he would not lie' should a murderer come to his door? This question should not be dismissed, I think, without careful consideration respecting the repercussions of lying. We believe that Kant was telling the truth simply because we do not know of any instance whereby he knowingly *lied*. If Kant had said that it would be *morally*

acceptable *to lie* (in the Kantian sense), what would be the (furthest) extent of that concession? We simply cannot know, as a lie is the handle that fits every other vice.[277] But one thing we can know: that as Kant remained true to his word, the sincerity of his moral thought has persisted even to this day despite the continual cries of *bloodless formalism*.[278]

1. See, for example, Brand Blanshard's essay On Philosophical Style in which he singles out Kant's writing technique as an example of especially *bad* writing (1-2, 34). Kant does admit, however, that he cannot regard himself as possessing "a talent for lucid exposition" (first Critique, Bxliii).

2. That Kant disdained this (romanticist) tendency to invent new fashionable ways of saying the same *old* thing is made clear in his second Critique, in which he says:

> To make up new words for accepted concepts when the language does not lack expressions for them is a childish effort to distinguish one's self [*sic*] not by new and true thoughts but by new patches on old clothes. (11)

In the first Critique, Kant implies the similar condemnation in his description of *the aim* of 'those' (romantics) who reject the procedure of his critique of reason as none other "than to shake off the fetters of *science* altogether, and thus to change work into play, certainty into opinion, philosophy into philodoxy" (Bxxxvii).

For example, see J.N. Findlay's comment (on Hegel as romanticist) in which he states:

> Hegel is saying [in §32] what has since been expressed by saying that in a new language-game expressions may be given new senses and rules of usage, and that one must not be surprised if expressions which functioned well in old language-games have no function in the new one. (Hegel's Logic, "Foreword" by J.N. Findlay, x; 52)

3. Kant himself in a letter to Christian Garve (07 August 1783) admits that his writing style lacks popular appeal due to his 'innovations of language' and 'impenetrable obscurity' as contrasted with that of the romantics. Kant defends himself, however, by stating that such a criticism:

> can in fact be made of every philosophical writing, if it is not to conceal [as the Romantics do] what is probably nonsense under a haze of apparent cleverness. But such popularity cannot be attempted in studies of high abstraction.

With an obvious allusion to the writing style of the Romantics, Kant then proceeds to challenge philosophers to "show the possibility of a priori concepts of things in general" (Kant's 'deduction') "in an easier, more popular fashion." In attempting to do so, Kant continues, such a person will not only "experience the great difficulties that are to be found in this field of speculation," s/he will "never deduce the categories from any other source" than what Kant himself had already indicated. (Correspondence, 101,

101n.)

Kant does admit, however, that "the extremely rare merit of a truly *philosophical popularity*" can follow the successful grounding of a moral philosophy (Groundwork, 77). Indeed, Kant at one point even states that we need men of '*true* popularity' (first Critique, Bxliv).

4. Heinrich Heine, "Kant and Deism," trans. by John Snodgrass (1882) from Heine's Religion and Philosophy in Germany and reprinted in Kant's Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Paul Carus, 264-278. Citations are from p.270.

5. H. Heine, "Kant and Deism," 270.

6. As A. Zweig states: "Kant's most vocal enemies, at this time [early 1780s], were not political figures but the old guard philosophy professors who defended Leibniz and Wolff" ("Introduction," in Correspondence, 17).

In a letter to K.L. Reinhold (28 December 1787) and in referring to his second Critique, Kant states: "This little book will sufficiently resolve the many contradictions that the followers of the old guard philosophy imagine they see in my [first] *Critique*" (Ibid., 127). Apparently, Kant was concerned how 'the old guard' professors would interpret his philosophy and had written in a style he thought would be agreeable to their tastes.

7. Correspondence, 254.

8. It may be interesting to note that Hamann, Kant's first real opponent of the Romanticist debate, upon hearing that Kant claimed he could not understand the Latin translation of his first Critique, wryly added that: "It serves the author right to experience the difficulty of his readers." (Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant, 1882; 463n.115)

9. Slavoj Zizek in The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) defines Kant's use of the term *Schwärmerei* (or 'fanciful fanaticism') in a way I think Kant would have approved as: "an insane visionary delusion that we can immediately see or grasp what lies beyond all bounds of sensibility" (204).

10. In a (recently discovered) letter by Kant to Prince Aleksandr von Beloselsky (written prior to January 1795), Kant summarizes his own approach to philosophy, as follows:

> The realm of the understanding is, in general, the faculty of thought, the realm of perception is the mere faculty of the senses.
>
> The first of these realms consists of three spheres. The first sphere is the sphere of the understanding, or the faculty to understand, to construct concepts, and to

work up perceptions and sense data. The second is the sphere of judgment, or of the faculty to apply these concepts to specific instances (*in concreto*), i.e., to bring into harmony with the rules of thought that which is actually constituted by the common sense (le bon sens). The third sphere is the sphere of reason, or the faculty of deducing particulars from universals, i.e., the faculty of judging according to principles.

When these three faculties of thought of the first realm are applied by analogy to the highest regulatory agency, i.e., reason, which serves to truly perfect man, and when they are integrated into a system, whose aim is the attainment of wisdom, we have before us *the sphere of philosophy*. (Gulyga, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Thought, 1987: 263-265)

For a brief summary of Kant's moral position, see Don Becker's "Kant's moral and political philosophy" (esp. Part I) in The Age of German Idealism, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, 1993: 68-102.

11. Kant differentiates between theoretical and practical reason in his first Critique, as follows:

> Now if reason is to be a factor in these sciences, something in them must be known *a priori* and this knowledge may be related to its object in one or other of two ways, either as merely *determining* it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere) or as also *making it actual*. The former is *theoretical*, the latter *practical* knowledge of reason. (Bix)

How it is possible (and necessary) for reason to be 'practical' is argued in the second Critique in (and of) which Kant says: "This *Critique* concerns itself only with whether and how reason can be practical, i.e., how it can directly determine the will" (47). See also, Ethics, 1-4.

12. First Critique, Bxiii; Axxi.
As to Bacon's analogy, Antonio Pérez-Ramos states (in his article, "Bacon's legacy"):

> Bacon's program is perhaps nowhere better depicted than in the forensic image of the stern judge who dictates his questions in order to extract manipulative directions with regard to his sole practical interests. (The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Markku Peltonen, 1996: 330)

That Kant admired Bacon can be noted by his dedicatory quotation on page one of the first Critique (which is translated by Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, 87). As Gulyga adds:

Kant's "guiding star was not Plato, nor Aristotle, nor his favorite Rousseau, or [*sic*] Hume, but the materialist and empiricist Bacon" (Ibid., 88).

13. Even though Hume is seen as a *romanticist* (albeit one whom Kant greatly respected), Kant considers him to be a *celebrated* skeptic par excellence. Nonetheless, Kant opposes Hume's position (on causality) on the grounds that should we thus submit to *blind chance*, "all use of reason ceases" (second Critique, 53, 58).

That Kant greatly admired Hume can be seen in his following remark:

> Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all the sceptics, and beyond all question is without rival in respect of the influence which the sceptical procedure can exercise in awakening reason to a thorough self-examination. (first Critique, A764/B792; Cf. A760/B788; A769/B797)

That Hume was *a romanticist* is argued by Oliver A. Johnson in The Mind of David Hume (1995) in which he says (of Hume): "For earlier than most others he challenged the sometimes too facile optimism of the Age of Reason, to become one of the first prophets of romanticism" (334).

14. First Critique, A235-236/B294-295; A395-396.

15. Ibid., A462/B490.

16. Anthony Kenny alludes to this connection between rationalism and romanticism in his article "Descartes to Kant" in which he states that Kant's "description of the island of insight surrounded by the icy, foggy ocean of illusion recalls the work of the great romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840)" (in Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy, ed. Anthony Kenny, 1994: 182).

17. As Kant explains in his first Critique:

> What pure reason judges assertorically, must (like everything that reason knows) be necessary; otherwise nothing at all is asserted. Accordingly, pure reason does not, in point of fact, contain any opinions whatsoever. (A781/B809, A775/B803)

In the third Critique, Kant further explains that:

> to form an opinion *a priori* is absurd in itself and the straight road to mere chimeras. Either, then, our proposition is certain *a priori* or it contains nothing for belief. (trans. J.H. Bernard, 1951: 319)

This view of reason is consistent granted we accept Kant's definition of reason, as follows:

> For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of *a priori* knowledge. Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely *a priori*. (first Critique, A11/B24)

18. As Kant reveals in the second Critique:

> But if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law shows it to be, it is only one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes. (125, 43ff.)

19. Having made the comparison, however, Kant admits that 'this virtue' can never be perfect:

> The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the unending progress of its maxims toward this model and of the constancy of the finite rational being in making continuous progress. This is virtue, and, as a naturally acquired faculty, it can never be perfect. (second Critique, 33)

20. Kant is referring to virtue here as 'an idea.' (first Critique, A569/B597. See also, second Critique, 132n.)

21. Second Critique, 160.

22. As Kant succinctly puts it in his second Critique:

> Moreover, the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which it has been followed exactly. (48)

23. Ibid., 152, 143, 150.

24. An *idea*, for Kant, is "a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience" (first Critique, A327/B383). Kant distinguishes between 'idea' and 'ideal' in that *ideas* "contain a certain completeness to which no possible empirical knowledge ever attains" whereas the *ideal* is even more removed from objective reality than the 'idea': "By the *ideal* I understand the idea, not merely *in concreto*, but *in individuo*, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even *determined by the idea alone*" (Ibid., A567-568/B595-596; A574/B602).

Kant, however, adds that *the ideal* (as in 'the idea of God') is "not an assertion of an existence necessary in itself" (Ibid., A619/B647). It is, as he says, merely determined by the idea *alone*. Notwithstanding, it is not *merely* 'an idea' in the sense of being 'superfluous and void,' Kant maintains, as these *ideals* "supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it" (Ibid., A328-329/B384-386; A569/B597).

In his Ethics, Kant provides what is perhaps the best clarification of this distinction:

> Let us take this opportunity to define the significance of the terms 'an Idea' and 'an Ideal.' We require a standard for measuring degree. The standard may be either natural or arbitrary, according as the quantity is or is not determined by means of concepts a priori. What then is the determinate standard by means of which we measure quantities which are determined a priori? The standard in such cases is the upper limit, the maximum possible. Where this standard is employed as a measure of lesser quantities, it is an Idea; when it is used as a pattern, it is an Ideal. (202)

25. First Critique, B425.

Kant defines *sphere* as "the multiplicity which is contained in any one judgment" (Ibid., B112).

Kant further speaks of *the peculiarity* of his transcendental philosophy in that:

> it deals with concepts which have to relate to objects a priori, and the objective validity of which cannot therefore be demonstrated a posteriori, since that would mean the complete ignoring of their peculiar dignity. (Ibid., A135-136/B174-175)

26. Kant does argue that even if we were to take 'the long step' from speculation to the supersensuous without 'a practical purpose,' we could not complete our knowledge as "there always remains an infinite unfilled chasm between that limit and what we know" (second Critique, 56).

27. Kant explains the difference between *theoretical* and *speculative* uses of reason (in obtaining 'knowledge'), as follows:

> Theoretical knowledge is *speculative* if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from *the knowledge of nature*, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience. (first Critique, A634/B662)

28. Kant explains the primacy of practical reason, as follows:

> Thus in the combination of pure speculative with pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter has the primacy provided that this combination is not contingent and arbitrary but a priori, based on reason itself and thus necessary. Without this subordination, a conflict of reason with itself would arise...Nor could we reverse this order and expect practical reason to submit to speculative reason, because every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use. (2nd Critique, 126)

See also Kant's second Critique in which he asks (and then explains) the following question: "How, then, is the practical use of pure reason to be reconciled with its theoretical use"? (52ff.)

As to reason seeking its own *conclusion* (which Kant refers to as 'the principle peculiar to reason in general'), Kant further defines this *peculiarity* as the desire "to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion." (first Critique, A307/B364)

29. First Critique, A805/B833. Apropos of *hope*, see: Ethics, 6, 53-54, 77, 84, 92, 95-96, 107.

For a further discussion on Kant's concept of hope, see Jacqueline Marina's Ph.D. dissertation entitled Moral Hope: Kant and the Problem of Rational Religion.

30. Kant defines *completeness* as "clearness and sufficiency of characteristics" (first Critique, A728n./B756n.).

Kant argues that it is '*peculiarly* distinctive of reason' to seek to fulfil its own systematisation, that is, "to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle." This 'unity of reason' is the "criterion of the truth" of its own rules (as supplied by the 'very nature of things' via Okham's razor), the truth of which "we have no choice at all" but to decide in its favor. (Ibid., A645/B673; A647/B675; A845/B873; A652/B680; A587/B615; emphasis added).

This need for *completion* Kant also refers to as 'something else (X)' or 'the unknown = X' and (attempts to) define it as: "the complete experience of the object" (Ibid., A8n., A9/B13). Kant also refers to his noumena as "an unknown something," adding that "the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined." (Ibid., A256/B312; A576/B604; emphasis added)

31. See, Groundwork, 55.

32. Ibid., A807/B835.

33. Ibid., A633-634/B661-662.
Kant further distinguishes this difference between theoretical and practical knowledge, as follows:

> On this definition, the theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know *a priori* (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that by which it is known *a priori* what ought to happen. (Ibid., A633/B661))

34. Second Critique, 149, 163.
See also Religion in which Kant argues that 'ought implies can':

> For despite the fall, the injunction that we *ought* to become better men resounds unabatedly in our souls; hence this must be within our power, even though what *we* are able to do is in itself inadequate and though we thereby only render ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us inscrutable, assistance. (40)

35. As Kant explains it: "reason has, in respect of its practical employment, the right to postulate what in the field of mere speculation it can have no kind of right to assume without sufficient proof" (first Critique, A776/B804).
Charles Larmore summarizes Kant's argument "that practical reason is the source of obligations unconditionally binding upon all" as follows:

1. To act rationally, one must act for what one believes to be good reasons.
2. One must then also believe that all other rational agents would agree that they are good reasons. Even in the case of instrumental reasoning, where one believes a certain action is the reasonable way to satisfy some given interest, one must also believe that all rational agents would agree that it is reasonable, given that interest (which they may or may not share).
3. If the rationality of some action must be an object of agreement among all rational agents, it seems impossible for it to depend essentially upon normative beliefs (that is, accepted norms of thought and action) that some rational agents may share, but others not.
4. The rationality of the action must instead be ascertainable from a position of completely detached reflection, in which one stands back from all one's present norms of thought and action except the commitment to reason itself, in order to appraise the merits of the action.

5. Thus, rational action is such that all rational agents must unconditionally acknowledge its rationality, whatever their other normative beliefs might be. Of course, they need not therefore have good reason to perform the action, since its rationality, which they must recognize, may consist in its best satisfying some interest that they may not share. But the hypothetical imperative ("Given goal G, do action A"), which in this case enjoins the action, implies a categorical imperative ("Either do A, or abandon G"). And the rationality of this latter unconditional demand, so it is concluded, must derive from the very nature of practical reason. (The Morals of Modernity, 1996: 36-37, 47-48)

36. Ibid., A409/B435; A837/B805; A713/B741; A719/B747.

37. Ibid., A702/B730.

38. Ibid., A812/B840.
The observance of the laws of morality, Kant states, are effected by *maxims* which he defines as "practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that is, subjective principles." Kant adds: "It is necessary that the whole course of our life be subject to moral maxims; but it is impossible that this should happen unless *reason connects with the moral law*" (Ibid.).

39. Second Critique, 138.
Kant explains the contrast between *idea* and *ideal*, as follows: "As the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal in such a case serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy." (first Critique, A569-570 /B597-598; A578/B606)

40. First Critique, A807-808/B835-836.
Kant adds that the reality of even the 'systematic unity of ends' is based merely upon a *postulate* (of a supreme original good). (Ibid., A807/B836; A814/B842)

41. Ibid., A634/B662; A634n./B662n.
Kant distinguishes *conviction* from 'mere *persuasion*,' as follows:

> The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is *conviction* or mere *persuasion* is therefore external, namely, the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason. (Ibid., A820/B848; A822/B850; emphasis added)

42. Ibid., A675/B703; A697-698/B725-726.

I discuss this concept (of the *idea of God*) at length in Ch. III.

43. First Critique, A641/B669; A675/B703; Bxxvii-n.; A601-602/B629-630; A760/B788.

Kant defines 'facts of reason' as "all unsuccessful dogmatic attempts of reason" (Ibid., A764/B792; cf. A760/B788).

Objects of '*mere* ideas,' on the other hand, have no theoretical cognition in that they "cannot be exhibited at all in any *possible* experience" (third Critique, §91; 467).

Kant further explains the difference between *logical* and *real* possibility (with respect to the 'idea of God'--as a *mere* 'hypothesis') in his third Critique in which he states:

> All I have to waive if I make a hypothesis is [the claim that I am] cognizing actuality...But we would be making *a completely baseless presupposition if we assumed that a supersensible being*, as determined in terms of certain concepts, *is possible*...hence the only criterion we have left for this being's *possibility* is the mere principle of contradiction (which however can prove only *the possibility of conceiving* the object, not *the possibility of the conceived* object itself). (Ibid., §91; 359; 359n.72; emphasis added).

44. First Critique, A819/B847. Second Critique, 31.

45. Ibid., A653/B681; A738-739/B766-767.

46. Ibid., A756-757/B784-785.

47. Ibid., A738-739/B766-767; A760-761/B788-789.

Kant makes clear that a principle is not a theorem "because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed" (Ibid., A737/B765).

Having so outlined the need for reason to be criticized as well as to be critical, Kant praises the work of skeptics (e.g., Hume) as 'taskmasters' who constrain "the dogmatic reasoner to develop a sound critique of the understanding and reason." (Ibid., A769/B797; A764/B792)

48. Third Critique, §91; 361-362.

49. First Critique, A569/B597; A553/B581; A314-315.

50. Second Critique, 29-30.

51. Ibid., 33-34, 29.
In speaking of reason as acting completely freely, Kant expounds upon the need for freedom to be *positive* and not merely negative, as follows:

> *This freedom* ought not, therefore, to be conceived only negatively as independence from empirical conditions. The faculty of reason, so regarded, would cease to be a cause of appearances. It *must also be described in positive terms*, as the power of originating a series of events. (first Critique, A553-555/B581-583; emphasis added)

52. First Critique, A541/B569; A536/B537.
As Kant further clarifies:

> Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle *intelligible*...[T]he *causality* of this being can be regarded from two points of view. Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*. We should therefore have to form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of the faculty of such a subject, and to regard both as referring to the one and the same effect. (Ibid., A538/B566)

In approximating what Kant perhaps intended by phenomena and noumena in light of his apparent two-standpoint theory, I have found his analogy of 'the rainbow' quite helpful. As Kant describes it: "The rainbow in a sunny shower may be called a mere appearance, and the rain the thing in itself." Kant explains that he intends this 'viewing objects from two different points of view' to mean:

> on the one hand, in connection with experience, as objects of the senses and of the understanding, and on the other hand, for the isolated reason that strives to transcend all limits of experience, as objects which are thought merely. (Ibid., A45/B63; Bxix-n.)

Kant further describes this noumenon as that 'something which underlies the outer appearance' and yet may at the same time be 'the subject of our thoughts.' (Ibid., A358)

53. Kant distinguishes between *appearance* and *phenomena* in that appearance consists of the 'undetermined object of an empirical intuition' (*empirical* in that it relates to the object through sensation); whereas phenomena consist of appearances 'thought as objects according to the unity of the categories' (first Critique, A20/B34; A249n.). The *mere form* of appearances, Kant says, is "all that sensibility can supply

a priori" (Ibid., A22/B36). For appearances (unlike phenomena) "cannot exist outside us--they exist only in our sensibility"; but as *possible* experiences, they can lie a priori in the understanding (Ibid., A127).

54. First Critique, A537/B565.
As Kant attempts to explain:

> While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearance as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature. (Ibid., A537/B565)

55. By *transcendental*, Kant intends: "the knowledge that these representations are not of empirical origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate a priori to objects of experience" (Ibid., A56/B81).
For a detailed exposé on Kant's use of the word *transcendental*, see Wolfgang Schwarz's "Glossary" in Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Wolfgang Schwarz (1982) 273-281.
See, as well, Howard Caygill's articles on the *transcendental* in A Kant Dictionary (1995) 399-402.

56. First Critique, A534/B562. Terence Irwin summarizes Kant's argument here (in "Morality and Personality: Kant and Green," Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood), as follows:

1. If phenomenal determinism is true for all events, every event is necessitated by past phenomenal events;
2. If the will is practically free, some choices are not necessitated by past phenomenal events:
   a) If the will is practically free, some choices are not necessitated by past sensuous impulses;
   b) If choices are phenomenally determined, then they are necessitated by past sensuous impulses;

---

3. Hence if phenomenal determinism is true for all events, the will is not practically free. (36-37)

57. Ibid., A533-534/B561-562.
Kant attempts to explain the 'intelligible' origin of the causality of *the ought* applicable to practical freedom (and evident from imperatives), as follows:

> '*Ought*' expresses a kind of necessity and of connections

> with grounds which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is, what has been, or what will be. We cannot say that anything in nature *ought to be* other than what in all these time-relations it actually is. When we have the course of nature alone in view, '*ought*' has no meaning whatsoever. It is just as absurd to ask what ought to happen in the natural world as to ask what properties a circle ought to have...This '*ought*' expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept...No matter how many natural grounds or how many sensuous impulses may impel me to *will*, they can never rise to the '*ought*,' but only to a willing which, while very far from being necessary, is always conditioned. (Ibid., A547-548/B575-576; See also: A534/B562)

In expounding the *practical* rule that 'one ought absolutely to act in a certain way,' Kant states not only that the *pure will* (as independent of empirical conditions) is determined by the mere form of the moral law but that the ground of this determination is to be regarded as 'the supreme condition of all maxims.' As if acknowledging the difficulty of his (odd) position, Kant then admits that this "thing is strange enough and has no parallel in the remainder of practical knowledge." (second Critique, 31)

58. First Critique, A557-558/B585-586.

59. As Kant puts it in his first Critique:

> But though I cannot *know*, I can yet *think* freedom; that is to say, the representation of it is at least not self-contradictory...
>
> Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be *understood*, but only that it should not contradict itself, and so should at least allow of being thought, and that as thus thought it should place no obstacle in the way of a free act (viewed in another relation) likewise conforming to the mechanism of nature. The doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature may each, therefore, make good its position. (Bxxviii-Bxxix)

60. Second Critique, 49.

Kant adds that theoretical reason has to at least assume the possibility of moral freedom in that the "moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature." (Ibid., 49, 4, 6n., 50, 67)

61. First Critique, A801-802/B829-830.

Kant differentiates *practical* and *transcendental* freedom as follows:

> While we thus through experience know *practical* freedom to be one of the causes in nature, namely, to be a causality of reason in the determination of the will, *transcendental* freedom demands the independence of this reason--in respect of its causality, in beginning a series of appearances--from all determining causes of the sensible world. (Ibid., A803/B831)

62. "Enlightenment," 41.

63. First Critique, Bxxx.

64. Kant argues that this *moral faith* is superior to historical faith via its *moral* application to *practical* knowledge, as follows:

> There exists meanwhile a practical knowledge which, while resting solely upon reason and requiring no historical doctrine, lies as close to every man, even the most simple, as though it were engraved upon his heart--...to wit, the law of morality. (Religion, 169)

65. Second Critique, 130-131.

66. Religion, 119, 102-103, 127n., 151-152, 168.
In referring to *religious* faith in this instance, I am not referring to Kant's notion of a *pure religious faith* that is "concerned only with what constitutes the essence of reverence for God, namely obedience, ensuing from the moral disposition, to all duties as His commands" (Ibid., 96, 94.). Instead, I am referring to the commonly understood definition of that term--as a faith in the *religious* practices (or creeds) of a given religion. For as Kant himself states: "the Christian faith is a religious faith...it is not in itself a *free faith*...Were it a pure rational faith it would have to be thought of as a free faith" (Ibid., 152).

67. Religion, 111; cf. Romans 9:18; Deut. 2:30; KJV.

68. In describing Kant's version of *faith* as 'a leopard without spots' I do not mean to imply that no leopard can be without spots. For example, snow leopards are well-known to be 'spotless' during the winter season. I am instead referring to the biblical injunction (still used in everyday language today): 'Can the leopard change his spots?' (cf. Jeremiah 13:23; KJV) whereby a sense of the abnormal is implied. It is in this sense that I maintain that Kant's concept of faith is not to be understood in the typical (religious) use of the term. Instead, for Kant: "Morality, the holiness of man and his eternal happiness on the condition of morality, is the sole object of spiritual trust" (Ethics, 96).

69. First Critique, A51/B75.

In expounding upon his concept of *transcendental illusion* (an illusion which Kant claims cannot be prevented any more "than the astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger at its rising"), Kant points out that *transcendental* and *transcendent* are not interchangeable terms. Although *transcendental* involves an extension (of knowledge) beyond the limits of experience, *transcendent* is a principle "which takes away these limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them." (Ibid., A295-297/B352-354)

70. Ibid., A637/B665.

Kant's insistence that transcendental concepts--as that of moral faith--be linked to *possible* experience is consistent with his basic view that "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience" (Ibid., B1). For, Kant continues, "if we eliminate from our experiences everything which belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and certain judgments derived from them, which must have arisen completely *a priori*, independently of experience" (Ibid., A2). That is, 'thoughts without content are empty,' as Kant further explains: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought"; and again: "The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise." (Ibid., A51/B75)

71. As Kant holds that it is an *a priori* law of nature that 'nothing happens through blind chance,' so it follows that "no necessity in nature is blind, but always a conditioned and therefore intelligible necessity." This criterion of necessity lies completely in the 'law of possible experience,' by which Kant intends "the law that everything which happens is determined *a priori* through its cause in the [field of] appearance." To put it more simply, "inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience." (Ibid., A226-A228/B275-B280; A392)

72. Ibid., A638-639/B666-667.

73. Ibid., A637-A640/B665-B668; A598/B626.

Although Kant readily admits defeat in any attempt to *prove* the existence of God before speculative reason, it is interesting to note that he insists such an invalidity of human reason by the same token suffices "to prove the invalidity of all counter-assertions" (Ibid., A641/B669).

74. Ibid., A223/B270-271.

75. Ibid., A224/B272.

76. Briefly stated, the three analogies of experience are: 1) "In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished" (Ibid., A182/B224); 2) "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (Ibid., A189/B232); and 3) "All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity [i.e., mutual interaction]" (Ibid., A211/B256).

In summing up the three analogies, Kant states:

> Taken together, the analogies thus declare that all appearances lie, and must lie, in *one* nature, because without this *a priori* unity no unity of experience, and therefore no determination of objects in it, would be possible. (Ibid., A216/B263)

77. Ibid., A225-226/B272-273.

78. Ibid., A220-221/B268; A599/B627.

79. Ibid., A218/B265.

For a *possible* experience to become *actual*, Kant says, it must be able to be determined by the succession of time, for the principle of sufficient reason (which cannot be proven but must be assumed) is the ground of *possible* experience (i.e., "of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of their relation in the order of time"). (Ibid., A200-201/B245-246; A218/B265; see also: A31/B283-284; A234/B286)

80. Ibid., A217/B264.

81. Ibid., A828-829/B856-857.

82. Ibid., A470/B498.

83. See, for instance, Kant's second Critique in which he refers to the faith of pure practical reason as 'a voluntary decision of our judgment' that is not itself commanded but "springs from the moral disposition itself" (151).

84. In Ethics, Kant explicitly states: "But to enable us to do our duty it does not matter what notions we have of God provided only they are a sufficient ground for pure morality." If we choose to fulfil our morality in *religion* (i.e., the combination of ethics and theology), then--Kant insists--this *moral theology* "must contain one thing, the condition of moral perfection" (79). Kant further clarifies the distinction between his own doctrine of the *Christian ideal* and that of *the Christians*, as follows:

> The Christian ideal is that of holiness and its pattern is Christ. Christ is also merely an ideal, a

standard of moral perfection which is holy by divine aid. This ideal ought not to be confused with those who call themselves Christians. (Ibid., 9)

See, also: An Elementary Course of Biblical Theology, trans. from the work of Professors Storr and Flatt by S.S. Schmucker, 2nd ed. (1836) 583. (The theology as expounded by Storr and Flatt is generally considered to be the popularly accepted version of Christian Protestant theology in Prussia during the latter part of Kant's lifetime.)

See, as well, my Ch.III in which I argue (as the devil's advocate for the romantics) that Kant was not a Christian.

85. First Critique, A839/B867.

86. Ibid., A578/B606; A570/B598.

87. Religion, 158-160, 98-100.

88. Compare, for instance, Don Wiebe's conclusion that for Kant *faith* is "not outside the realm of reason, but is rather one aspect of reason" ["The Ambiguous Revolution: Kant on the Nature of Faith," 522]

89. For a fuller explanation of Kant's concept of *will* (as it relates to moral conduct), see section 'C' in this Chapter.

90. See Richard Couter's "Introduction" in Friedrich Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Couter, (1996) xxv-xxvi.

91. Hans Eichner, "The Genesis of German Romanticism," 221; as quoted in Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Couter, (1996) "Introduction," xxvi.

92. Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 1995: 19. (For some inexplicable reason, the author's name appears *only as* 'Thandeka' even on the book-title page.)

93. Walter K. Klass, Faith and Reason in Kant's Philosophy (1939) 469-470.

94. By *basic religious beliefs*, I intend the fundamental tenets of Christianity, in particular: a bodily resurrection from an actual death, genuine forgiveness via Christ's atonement, and implicit faith in divine communication via personal prayer. All of these beliefs are refuted by Kant as unreasonable (see, my Ch. III; as well: Ch. II.3 "The Role of Forgiveness," specifically 'Mercy and Forgiveness').

95. For a further exploration of this question, see: 1) Allen Wood, "The Immorality of Moral Faith," Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Conference, G. Funke and Th. M. Seebohm, eds., (1989) 418-437; and 2) Don Wiebe, "The Ambiguous Revolution: Kant and the Nature of Faith."

96. In a letter to J.H. Jacobi (30 August 1789), Kant criticizes Herder's concept of God (as a product of religious zeal) judging it to be based on *insincerity*, which concept he explains, as:

> a property of mind that is especially characteristic of this artist [Herder] in delusions (which, like magic lanterns, make marvellous images appear for a moment but soon vanish forever, though they leave behind in the minds of the uninformed a conviction that something unusual must be behind it all, something, however, that they cannot catch hold of). (Correspondence, 158)

97. For example, Fichte argues that he is merely extending (the natural consequences of) Kant's own philosophy in stating that faith must precede reason. That is, Fichte believes Kant's view of faith (in reason) itself is an act of faith, and hence that faith is the *ultimate* basis of all moral certainty--not logic, or reason. Kant, of course, repudiated all such claims in his famous *open letter* to Fichte in 1799. (See, my M.A. thesis Unbelief in Kant and Fichte, 82, 94-96, 144-146, 152.) In Fichte's *Werke* (i.420), he states: "I have said it before, and say it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That means: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite independent of the Kantian exposition"; Fichte further states (in Fichte's *Werke*, i.248, ii.478):

> My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness of finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force existing independently of them, and completely opposed to them--on which as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But it asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is merely *felt*, but not *cognized*, by finite beings. (As quoted by William Wallace in his translation of Hegel's Logic, "Notes and Illustrations," 315)

See, also, Karl Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (1966) in which he states: "the fundamentalist rationalist attitude results from an...act of faith--from faith in reason" (230-231); and again: "our choice between rationalism and fideism is not a choice between reason and faith but, rather, between the faith of the critical rationalist and that of the fideist" (17).

98. Bruce W. Hauptli, Reasonableness of Reason: Explaining Rationality Naturalistically (1995) 217.

Hauptli is here defending Pascal's point of view that faith is a matter of the heart, not of the head, as he more fully explains:

> Pascal...does not try to provide a rational argument against rational argument, and he does not attempt to provide a rational argument for a commitment to his chosen faith (a commitment that he recommends in place of the pervasive commitment to rationality which he claims is all too prevalent). Indeed, a faith founded on reason (or rational argument) is no true faith. Pascal insists that faith must involve commitment in the absence of reasons: "faith is different from proof...faith is in the heart, and makes us not say *scio* but *credo*"...Instead of providing *reasons* for his faith (or reasons for rejecting rationality), Pascal utilizes skeptical arguments, his wager argument, and all his religious fervor and rhetorical skills. (Ibid., 217)

99. Susan Neiman in her fine summation of Kant's concept of faith (Ch. 4, "The Structure of Faith," The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant, 1994: 145-184) states that:

> Nothing in Kant's work exhibits his conception of reason so clearly and so problematically as does the notion of rational faith...Most readers, however, have viewed those arguments [the nature of the justification of faith] as the weakest ones in his entire philosophy (145).

In addition, there is the alternate view of Christian apologetists who tend to see Kant's moral faith not as a moral faith but as an argument for a religious faith. Although some credence can be argued for this viewpoint in that Kant tends to borrow religious terms (albeit altering their original meaning to suit his purpose) as for example in his definition of *pure rational faith* as "belief in what we are yet to regard as a holy mystery" (Religion, 129), I remain unconvinced that Kant's heart of hearts was set on religion and not on morality alone. (I explore and defend this opposing viewpoint in the next Chapter.)

For a dissenting view (i.e., contra my own conclusions), see the following articles by Stephen Palmquist in this regard: 1) "Faith As Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection"; 2) "Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's God"; and 3) "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?"

Two Ph.D. dissertations that also tend to view Kant's concept of faith as favorable or conducive to Christianity include: 1) Gordon E. Michaelson, Jr., The Historical Dimensions of a Rational Faith: The Relation Between History and Religion in Kant's Philosophy (1976); and 2) Jacqueline

Marina, Moral Hope: Kant and the Problem of Rational Religion (1993).

100. The following treatment of Kant's concept of *the imagination* is more akin to a cursory outline compared to works presently extant on the subject. My intention is to merely touch upon the key points of this concept as they pertain to my work. For a more complete (and thorough) discussion, see the following books on the subject:

1) Sarah L. Gibbons, Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgment and Experience, 1994;
2) Bernard Freydberg, Imagination and Depth in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1994;
3) Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the *Critique of Judgment*, 1990; and
4) Wayne Waxman, Kant's Model of the Mind: A New Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism, 1991.

In addition to the above, the following selections may prove helpful:

a) Ch. III, "Form, Imagination, and Understanding," in The Notion of Form in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Theodore Edward Uehling, Jr. (1971) 35-73;
b) J. Michael Young, "Kant's View of Imagination";
c) Eva Schaper, "Kant on Imagination";
d) W. Sellars, "The Role of Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience," in H.W. Johnstone, Jr. (ed.), Categories: A Colloquium (1978) 231-45;
e) Donald W. Crawford, "Kant's Theory of Creative Imagination," Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (1982) 151-178;
f) R. Sundara Rajan, "Critique and Imagination";
g) Milton C. Nahm, "Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating Another Nature...,'" Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, ed. Lewis White Beck (1972) 442-450;
h) Hannah Arendt, "Imagination," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (1982) 79-85;
i) Richard E. Aquila, "Matter, Form, and Imaginative Association in Sensory Intuition," New Essays on Kant, ed. Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen (1987) 73-105;
j) Mark Johnson, "Kant's Account of Imagination," The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (1987) 147-172;
k) Martin Heidegger, "Section Three: The Laying of the Foundations of Metaphysics in its Basic Originality," Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,

trans. James S. Churchill (1962) 131-209;

l) Jeffrey Liss, "Kant's Transcendental Object and the Two Senses of the Noumenon: A Problem in Imagination";

m) Rudolf Makkreel, "Imagination and Temporality in Kant's Theory of the Sublime";

n) E.J. Furlong, "Imagination in Kant," Imagination (1961) 114-120;

o) Harry Blocker, "Kant's Theory of the Relation of Imagination and Understanding in Aesthetic Judgements [*sic*] of Taste"; and

p) Jane Kneller, "Kant's Immature Immagination," Modern Engendering: Critical Feminist Readings in Modern Western Philosophy, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On (1994) 141-153.

101. First Critique, A769-770/B797-798.

102. Ibid., Bxli-n.; B275-277; B148; A220/B267; A155/B194; B275-278; B277n.

Mary Warnock in Imagination and Time (1994) comments on the inner and outer connection to imagination, as follows:

> The invisible 'I,' the 'I' who perceives, is fitted out *a priori* with the imagination (as well as the necessary categories of the understanding) which allows me to interpret the world of nature. If there is no 'I' there is no inner world. But then there is no outer world either. The two must stand in contrast to each other; if one exists, so does the other. Though the world of nature, according to Kant, is still the world 'as it appears,' we can claim to know it, and to understand it according to laws applicable to it by every rational creature. (14)

103. First Critique, B151; A570/B598; A769-770/B797-798.

It may be of interest to note that Kant refers to the *imaginary focus* as a 'mere idea' which "lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience" (Ibid., A644/B672). This *focus imaginarius*, or *fancy*, is an aspect of (lawless) imagination that Kant would have us avoid (Ibid., A222-223/B269-270).

104. Ibid., B151; B146; B149; A124.

105. Ibid., A119-120; A78/B103.

In another passage, Kant explains the vital role imagination plays with respect to knowledge, as follows:

> A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul [understanding]... The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the

mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience. Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains in recognition...certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge...Upon them [these grounds of the recognition of the manifold] is based not only all formal unity in the [transcendental] synthesis of imagination, but also, thanks to that synthesis, all its empirical employment ...in connection with the appearances. For only by means of these fundamental concepts can appearance belong to knowledge or even to our consciousness, and so to ourselves. (Ibid., A124-125)

The role of the imagination has been acclaimed as Kant's 'greatest discovery' in the first Critique. See, Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (1982) 80.

106. First Critique, A67-68/B92-93; A123.

107. Ibid., B152; A156/B195; A201-202/B246-247; A97-102.
Third Critique, §30: 142.
With regard to *spontaneity*, Kant states:

Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the *apprehension* of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their *reproduction* in imagination, and their *recognition* in a concept. (First Critique, A97)

108. First Critique, A123-125; A258/B313.

109. Ibid., B151-152. Anthropology, §28: 44-45.
By *psychology*, Kant intends "only the rational knowledge of it" (first Critique, A846/B874).

110. Ibid., A395; B294-295.
See, as well: 1) Philip J. Rossi, "Moral Interest and Moral Imagination in Kant"; and 2) Carl J. Posy, "Autonomy, Omniscience and the Ethical Imagination: From Theoretical to Practical Philosophy in Kant," Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (1989) 106-134.
With respect to the supremacy of reason over the passions in the concept of the imagination, see Mary Warnock's "Imagination: Hume and Kant" in Imagination (1976), 13-71. Regarding Hume's view in which he argues for a close

connection between imagination and feelings, see, as well: 1) Mary Banwart, Hume's Imagination (1994); and 2) Wayne Waxman, (Ch. 2) "Imagination and the vivacity of ideas," Hume's Theory of Consciousness (1994) 58-84.

111. Third Critique, "Introduction," 31; §50: 188.

112. I am grateful to (the late) Eva Schaper for (part of) this analogy in "Kant's Schematism Reconsidered," 279.

To see how judgment works with the understanding and reason to make possible--for example--the transition from "the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom," see third Critique, "Introduction," 37.

113. First Critique, A78/B103. In this passage, I have changed the word 'soul' to 'understanding,' for as Martin Heidegger points out:

> Indeed, even the passage in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* wherein Kant first introduced the imagination as an "indispensable function of the soul" [A78], he later modified, although only in the author's copy, in a way which is highly significant [cf. *Nachträge*, XLI]. In place of "function of the soul," he substituted "function of the understanding." (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1962: 168)

S.C. Daniel in "The Nature and Function of Imagination in Hume and Kant" comments on the *blind* function of Kant's concept of the imagination: "imagination *per se* is blind in the sense of being empty of content, but its synthetic and supplementative activities are not blind as they are performed according to certain rules" (96, notes).

114. Anthropology, 53. First Critique, A294.

115. The notion of the imagination as a *gatekeeper* is borrowed from Timothy J. Lukes' account of Kant's imagination in The Flight Into Inwardness (1985), 71-72.

116. First Critique, A373-376.

117. Ibid., A395; A78/B103.

118. Third Critique, §35: 151.

119. Ibid., §22: 91; §50: 188. cf. Morals, 1991: 125.

Kant does, however, appear to understand this tendency to see *the freedom* of the imagination as unrestricted in his admission that "it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit" (first Critique, A317/B374).

120. Ibid., §22: 92.

121. First Critique, A138/B178; A33-34/B49-50; A99.
For a better understanding how time relates to imagination, see, Michael Woods, "Kant's Transcendental Schematism."
Lorne Falkenstein in Kant's Intuitionism (1995) has a rather thorough treatment of this subject (time), esp. his Ch. 11: "Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the subjectivity of Time" (334-355).

122. Third Critique, §22: 92. First Critique, A222/B269; A201-202/B246-247; A189-193/B232-238.

123. First Critique, A192/B237.
In responding to Hume's claim that *only* 'custom-bred habits arising from experience and its laws' could teach us, for example, that sunlight melts wax yet hardens clay, Kant states:

> [W]e are nevertheless able, in relation to a third thing, namely, *possible* experience, to know the law of its connection with other things, and to do so in an *a priori* manner. If, therefore, wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know *a priori* that *something* must have preceded, ([that something being] for instance [in this case] the heat of the sun), upon which the melting has followed according to a fixed law...Hume was therefore in error in inferring from the contingency of our determination *in accordance with the law* the contingency of the *law* itself. (first Critique, A765-766/B793-794)

Kant concludes that Hume confounds *a principle of affinity* ("which has its seat in the understanding and affirms necessary connection") with *a rule of association* ("which exists only in the imitative faculty of imagination, and which can exhibit only contingent, not objective, connections") (Ibid., A766-767/B794-795).
Robert Paul Wolff in "A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction" (in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, 1967) presents an eight-step argument to show how Kant refutes Hume's claim that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect (i.e., the law of causality). (130-132)

124. Ibid., A189-190/B234-235; A182-183/B224-226.

125. Ibid., A189/B233-234.

126. Second Critique, 53.

127. Third Critique, §49: 182. Anthropology, §28: 45.

128. Kant describes his concept of the *given*, as follows:

> That an object be given (if this expression be taken, not as referring to some merely mediate process, but as signifying immediate presentation in intuition), means simply that the representation through which the object is thought relates to actual or possible experience. (first Critique, A155-156/B194-195)

129. See, Kant's (recently discovered) letter (published 03 January 1795) to Prince Alexandr von Beloselsky, in Gulyga's Immanuel Kant: His Life and Thought, 264-266.

Kant states (as a truism) that everyone will readily admit that imagination requires discipline (First Critique, A710/B738). This danger (in failing to properly discipline one's imagination) is further expounded by Kant in his Ethics:

> If he [man] surrenders authority over himself, his imagination has free play; he cannot discipline himself, but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy and they sway his judgment...Our sensibility is a kind of rabble without law or rule; it requires guidance even if it is not rebellious. (140)

130. It is a testament to the strength of the romanticist movement that the concept of imagination today naturally tends to emphasize the uninhibited expression of emotions. See, 1) Jeremy Walker, "Imagination and the Passions"; and 2) John Kekes, "Feeling and Imagination in Metaphysics."

131. With respect to the relationship of Kant's theory of (productive) imagination to that of the German romantics, see, Alfredo Ferrarin, "Kant's Productive Imagination in its Historical Context," Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Vol. II, ed. Hoke Robinson (1995) 119-124.

As to Fichte's concept of imagination, see: 1) Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Fichte's Dialectical Imagination," Fichte: Historical Contexts/Contemporary Controversies, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (1994) 7-16; 2) T.P. Hohler, Imagination and Reflection: Intersubjectivity [in] Fichte's *Grundlage* of 1794 (1982); and 3) John Sallis, Spacings--of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel (1987).

132. Third Critique, "Introduction," 30.

Two articles commenting on this 'feeling of pleasure' in Kant's concept of the imagination include: 1) Christel Fricke, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly" (792-802); and 2) Salim Kemal, "Feeling and Judgment: Ethics and Aesthetics" (803-809); both articles located in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, 1995 (vol. I,

part 2).

Mark Kipperman holds that Kant has redeemed "the Enlightenment's fascination with natural lawfulness" in his concept of the power of the imagination. (Beyond Enchantment: German Idealism and English Romantic Poetry, 1986: 52)

133. Kant defines *illusion* as "treating the *subjective* condition of thinking as being knowledge of the *object*" (first Critique, A396).

134. Ibid., A318-319/B375.

135. Kant, "On Philosophical Exaltation (1780s)," (Reflection #6051-6053) in Raising the Tone of Philosophy, ed. Peter Fenves (1993) 104-105.

Richard Kearney in The Wake of Imagination: Ideas of Creativity in Western Culture (1988) presents a historical summary of Kant's concept of imagination interrelating it with the romantic viewpoint as well (see, Ch. 4, "The Transcendental Imagination," 155-195).

Edward S. Casey in his comparison of the romantic and Kantian view of imagination appears to agree with Kant in condemning the romantics, as the following passage indicates: "to impute psychic hegemony to imagination, as so many Romantics attempted to do, is to fail to be faithful to the phenomenon; it is to substitute delirium for description." Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (1976), 177.

136. Morals, 236 (§15). No doubt, Kant is here referring to I Samuel 16:7 (which reads, in part: "the LORD seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the LORD looketh on the heart"; KJV).

Kant's use of the term *heart* is not to be taken in the traditional sense (i.e., the seat of emotions or feelings), for as Kant explains:

> God, however, does not look upon the action, but upon the heart. The heart is the principle of moral disposition, and it is moral goodness which God demands. It is this which is worthy of reward...To love God is to do as He commands with a willing heart. (Ethics, 36)

Despite Kant's claim that no mortal, after all, understands (i.e., *knows*) the human heart, there still is the tendency to see Kant's view of human imagination as inadequate (especially when compared to that of the romantics). For example, James Engell states "Kant shows no deep interest in the emotive or passionate side of imagination" in The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (1981) 137.

Nathan L. Tierney, as well, judges Kant's theory of imagination to be inadequate in that it does not properly relate to 'feelings' (in Ch. 3, "Kant's General Theory of the

Imagination," Imagination and Ethical Ideals, 1994: 31-42).

137. In Ethics, Kant stipulates that one "forswears all rational grounds" once one appeals (but) to feelings (38); hence, the importance in keeping one's emotions in check.

As to his definition of *philosophy*, Kant states:

> [P]hilosophy can never be learned, save only in historical fashion; as regards what concerns reason, we can at most learn to *philosophise*.
>
> *Philosophy* is the system of all philosophical knowledge...Thus regarded, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists *in concreto*, but to which, by many different paths, we endeavor to approximate, until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at last been discovered ...Till then we cannot learn philosophy; for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognise it? We can only learn to philosophise, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at philosophy, always, however, reserving the right of reason to investigate, to confirm, or to reject these principles in their very sources. (first Critique, A837-838/B865-866)

Ibid., A840/B868. See, as well, Lewis White Beck's "Kant's Theory of Definition" in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (1967) 23-36.

138. Ibid., A731n./B759n.; A674/B702; A621/B649.

Perhaps the best example of a concept that defies (full) definition (besides Kant's own instance of 'juridical *right*') is the *concept of God*, as Kant explains:

> [T]he concept of God is an Idea which we must regard as the limiting concept of reason, and as the totality of all derivative concepts. To this concept I seek to attribute all properties, provided that they are not contradictory. To define this Idea is beyond us. (Ethics, 85)

139. Morals, 1991: 201.

140. I say that Kant attempts to *skirt* this issue of emotions because he is convinced that the "depths of the human heart are unfathomable":

> Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfil his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses contributing

to it that look to one's advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice? (Morals, 241)

My position is similar (in part) to Lewis White Beck's in his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason in which he states that "moral feeling has a place in Kant's ethics" despite the fact that the general trend and perception of Kant's thought "appeared to be an elimination of all feeling from morality" (223). I differ significantly from Beck, I think, in that I allow for a *fundamental* role of *moral feeling* in the development of a Kantian *moral character*.

141. Of course, Kant does allow a definition for *feeling* in general, as the "capacity for taking pleasure or displeasure in a representation" (Morals, 40), but my chief concern here is that of *moral* feeling.

In stating that *moral* character is (secondarily) based on *moral* feelings, I believe I can still maintain consistency to Kant's claim that "no moral principle can be based on any feeling whatsoever" (Ibid., 182) in that *moral* feelings do not have *primary* influence on moral character. For Kant does say that even *pleasure* if it is preceded by the (moral) law in order to be felt is "in the *moral order*" (Morals, 183).

It is important to note, however, that I am not saying that moral *principle* is based on moral feeling. Moral feeling (as "sensibility in harmony with the impulsive force of the understanding") cannot judge between good and evil, nor can the understanding *per se* (for "we cannot feel the goodness of an action"). But the understanding opposes an *evil action* (i.e., one that runs counter to the established rules) on the *impulsive ground* of moral feeling. For moral feeling (as "the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment") helps to move sensibility to conform with *morality* (as "the universal *form* of the understanding") by creating a *disgust* for vice. In this way (I argue), Kant's theory of moral *character* is fundamentally affected by moral feeling. (Ethics, 44-46, 139; cf. Ibid., 69; I develop this concept in Ch.II.§C.1)

142. Ibid., 201-202.

As to what he means by the phrase being *morally dead*, Kant states that many people have "only a semblance of conscience which they imagine is conscience itself." He continues:

> He who has no immediate loathing for what is morally wicked, and finds no pleasure in what is morally good, has no moral feeling, and such a man has no conscience...but only a semblance of it. (Ethics, 130; 129-135; see also: H.J. Paton, "Conscience and Kant," Kant-Studien 70 (1979) 239-51)

Kant is here criticizing the use of the term *moral sense* as employed by the British moral sense philosophers such as Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Kames in which beauty and moral qualities were seen as "distinct properties of objects which were perceived by a moral sense" (Feeling, "Translator's Introduction," 30). See also: Ethics, 12, 117.

But Kant was not without influence from British philosophers. In his third Critique, Kant appears to have adopted Edmund Burke's notion of the sublime (in Burke's Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, 1757) as a feeling of fear "which grips one in the presence of some mighty object, but then turns to delight when one learns that he is not in actual danger" (Feeling, "Translator's Introduction," 34-37).

For a brief (but rather thorough) background to the British moral sense movement (in relation to Kant) see, Paul Guyer, "Ch. 2: The Dialectic of disinterestedness: I. Eighteenth-century aesthetics," Kant and the experience of freedom: Essays on aesthetics and morality (1993) 48-93.

143. Religion, 129. First Critique, A802n./B830n.

Kant explains why feeling cannot be knowledge, as follows:

> A knowledge of laws, and of their morality can scarcely be derived from any sort of feeling...Feeling is private to every individual and cannot be demanded of others [even] when the law, from which and according to which this feeling arises, is known in advance; therefore one cannot urge it as a touchstone for the genuineness of a revelation, for it teaches absolutely nothing, but is merely the way in which the subject is affected as regards pleasure or displeasure--and on this basis can be established no knowledge whatever. (Religion, 104-105)

144. As Kant holds feelings to be subjective for human beings, he considers *intellectual feeling* as self-contradictory: for *intellectual intuition*--if it were to exist--would have to belong to something super-human, such as a "primordial being" (second Critique, 121; first Critique, B72).

In view of the above, I hold that both Pluhar (1987:32) and Meredith (1952:33) have most likely mistranslated the passage in Kant's third Critique whereby they translate Kant as stating that some aesthetic judgments can arise from *an intellectual feeling* in that they relate to the *sublime*. Bernard's translation (1951:29) as *spiritual feeling* (in lieu of intellectual feeling) creates less confusion and avoids the otherwise obvious conclusion that Kant would have knowingly contradicted himself.

145. "Theory," 67.

How *moral feeling* can be cultivated in its relation to the moral will (as *Willkür*) is explained by John R. Silber in his Ph.D. Thesis entitled The Highest Good as the Unity of Form and Content in Kant's Ethics (1955) 388-424.

It is important to bear in mind that Kant's use of the term *moral sense* in this context should not be confused with Kant's own earlier criticism (in Feeling, 30) wherein he differs from Francis Hutcheson's view of *moral sense* as the ground of morality (cf. Groundwork, 110n.). As Kant sees it, a *feeling* for beauty, not a *sense* for beauty, is more accurate of the human condition. Cf. Morals in which Kant states: "It is true that moral sense is often misused in a visionary way, as if (like Socrates' daimon) it could precede reason or even dispense with reason's judgment" (192; cf. 40-41).

For an exposé on this former view of *moral sense*, see Gordon Treash's "Kant and Moral Sensing: 1765" in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, Vol.II, Part I, (1995) 125-132.

146. As Kant attempts to explain this interplay between *moral feeling* (as *moral sense*), and the dutiful obedience to the moral law (as its own incentive):

> Man has a duty to carry the cultivation of his *will* up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the *law* becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection. Since it is a feeling of the effect that the lawgiving will within man exercises on his capacity to act in accordance with his will, it is called *moral feeling*, a special *sense* (*sensus moralis*), as it were. (Morals, 191-192)

147. This citation is taken from a summary of Margaret Dell Jewett's 'The Role of Moral Feeling' in her Ph.D. Thesis entitled: The Role of Moral Feeling in Kantian Ethics (1986), 217.

Josefine Charlotte Nauchkhoff in her Ph.D. Thesis entitled, The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant (1994), goes further than Jewett's collective summary (of the characteristics of moral feeling) in that she places *moral feeling* as a subset to (what she calls) *duty-feelings*. Besides moral feelings, duty-feelings include: conscience, love of man, and self-respect (69). Moreover, besides *duty-feelings* (which are "feelings which we need in order to recognize duty at all"), Nauchkoff recognizes two additional types of feelings in Kant's ethics: 1) *dignity-feelings* ("feelings which help us shape a conception of ourselves which is in harmony with the dignity of our humanity"); and 2) *helping-feelings* ("feelings which help us

carry out our duties toward others by shaping loving and respectful attitudes towards them, including feelings which make virtue and its outward manifestations aesthetically appealing" (68).

For the purposes of this thesis, however, I will (briefly) focus solely on the concepts of happiness, forgiveness, and respect as they relate to *moral* feeling (in order to contradistinguish Kant's concept of feeling from that of the German romantics). Other works, such as those cited above, deal more exclusively (and comprehensively) with all the various aspects of Kant's concept of feeling in general.

148. Second Critique, 121.

149. First Critique, A15/B29. Second Critique, 23, 18.

Ironically, it is because Kant insists on this necessary connection of the feelings (as *emotions*) with an empirical source that he is criticized by such philosophers as Max Scheler (1874-1928), as Philip Blosser argues in Ch.4 ("Moral Feeling and the Perception of Values") of his book entitled, Scheler's Critique of Kant's Ethics (1995) 99-124. According to Blosser, Scheler insists that besides *sensible* feelings, there are vital, psychic, and spiritual feelings (whose goals are not necessarily the realization of pleasure). (110)

150. Kant implies this dual quality of moral feeling in the second Critique wherein he speaks of "the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility" and "its necessary influence on it, i.e., [via] the moral feeling which is known a priori" (93). He argues instead that it is a mistake to consider the *moral feeling* as "the guage of our moral judgments: it should be regarded rather as the *subjective* effect exercised on our will by the law and having its objective ground in reason alone" (Groundwork, 128).

Philip Blosser in his article "A Problem in Kant's Theory of Moral Feeling" argues that Kant suggests his moral feeling is noumenal and yet phenomenal which creates a problem: for it cannot be both. For a similar viewpoint and one that is (as well) sympathetic to a Max Scheler's critique of Kantian ethics, see, Lloyd Sciban's M.A. Thesis The Role of Feelings in Kant's Theory of the Human Will (1990).

In response (to Blosser and Sciban) and as a (partial) defense of Kant, I would add that--for Kant--morality cannot be based "on any pathological principle, neither on a physical nor yet on a moral feeling." The ground of morality is independent of all inclination in that it is *intellectual*. An 'inclination to morality' as *an intellectual inclination* is a contradiction in terms:

> for a feeling for objects of the understanding is in itself an absurdity, so that a moral feeling resulting from an intellectual inclination is also an absurdity and

is, therefore, impossible. A feeling cannot be regarded as something ideal; it cannot belong both to our intellectual and to our sensuous nature; and even if it were possible for us to feel morality, it would still not be possible to establish a system of rules on this principle. (Ethics, 37-38)

151. First Critique, A747-748/B775-776.
Michael Joseph Seidler in his Ph.D. Thesis entitled The Role of Stoicism in Kant's Moral Philosophy (1981) suggests that emotions and inclinations both hinder and help Kant's ethics (405-411). See also: eds. S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, 1996.

152. Morals, 1991: 250. Third Critique, 16, 10.
For further discussion on Kant's concept of the feeling of sympathy in humanity, see: 1) Marcia Baron, "Sympathy and Coldness: Kant on the Stoic and the Sage" (vol.I; Part 2: 691-703); and 2) Nancy Sherman, "Kant on Sentimentalism and Stoic Apathy: Comments on Marcia Baron" (Vol. I; Part 2: 705-711); both articles of which are located in the Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995.

153. Morals, 203, 244-245.

154. In this instance, I am using *heart* in the traditional sense as the seat of emotions or feelings (as opposed to Kant's sense of a willing moral disposition).

155. For a more in-depth look at Kant's concept of feeling, the following articles (or books) may prove illuminating:

1) Michael J. Seidler, "Kant and the Stoics on the Emotional Life";
2) Lawrence M. Hinman, "On the Purity of our Moral Motives: A Critique of Kant's Account of the Emotions and Acting for the Sake of Duty";
3) Robin May Schott, "Kant's Treatment of Sensibility," in Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm (1988) 101-114;
4) Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Humanity";
5) Andrew Cutrofello, "The White Wall above Me and the Black Hole within Me: Kant's Care of the Self," Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and the Problem of Resistance (1994) 48-63;
6) A.T. Nuyen, "Sense, Passions and Morals in Hume and Kant";
7) Barrie Falk, "The Communicability of Feeling," Pleasure, Preference, and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. Eva Schaper (1983) 57-85;

8) Robert B. Louden, "Kant's Virtue Ethics";
9) Henry A. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Humanism";
10) Andrews Reath, "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination";
11) Hud Hudson, "Wille, Willkür, and the Imputability of Immoral Actions";
12) A. Murray MacBeath, "Kant on Moral Feeling";
13) Hardy E. Jones, Kant's Principle of Personality;
14) David Edward Zoolalian, Kant's Theory of Human Nature;
15) Michael Richard Neville, Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure;
16) Paul Guyer, "Ch. 10: Duty and Inclination," Kant and the Experience of Freedom (1993) 335-393;
17) Mary A. McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic (1987); esp. Ch. 3: "Pleasure; and
18) Amihud Gilead, "The Submission of our Sensuous Nature to the Moral Law in the Second *Critique*."

156. John Goldthwait argues in his "Translator's Introduction" to Kant's Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (cited as Observations by Goldthwait) for a need to read Kant's Feeling (Observations) to dispel the notion that Kant's moral thought was unfeeling:

> The charge is often made that Kant's formalistic ethic, hinging upon the rationally grounded Categorical Imperative, is heedless of the role of human feeling, indicating that its author was insensitive to the true nature of moral experience. A reading of the *Observations*, however, quickly refutes the accusation of insensitivity in the author, and suggests that a complete understanding of Kantian formalistic ethics takes feeling into account. (38)

157. First Critique, A806/B834.
In the Groundwork, Kant adds that "in this Idea of happiness all inclinations are combined into a sum total." He adds, however, that should one wish to further his happiness "not from inclination, but from duty," in doing so his conduct would have *real moral worth* (67).

158. Kant states in answer to his own inquiry ("if there is such a [moral] law") that he is justified in this assumption in that he can appeal "to the moral judgment of every man, in so far as he makes the effort to think such a law clearly" (Ibid., A806-807/B834-835).

159. Ibid., A809-810/B837-838.

160. In Morals, Kant explains that as it is "not always within

our power to provide ourselves with happiness," it follows that "our happiness always remains a wish that cannot become a hope, unless some other power is added." As stated in the text, Kant holds this 'other power' to be the idea of God as the Ideal of reason. He adds an interesting dimension to this concept of *happiness* by stating that if we do not make ourselves unworthy of happiness, we have the *hope* "to *share* in happiness" (270-271). The implication is that happiness is most successfully achieved in a group setting via social harmony and not in isolated or mere individualistic instances; that is, as *moral* ascetics and not *monkish* ones (cf. Ibid., 273-274; Ethics, 172).

161. Ibid. In explaining how our conduct in the sensible world is carried into the moral world, Kant adds:

> In a supreme good [i.e., the postulate of God as *a supreme original good*], thus conceived, self-subsistent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, establishes, maintains, and completes the universal order of things, according to the most perfect design--an order which in the world of sense is in large part concealed from us. (Ibid., A814/B842)

For a further discussion on why it is morally necessary to assume the idea of God's existence as *a highest original good*, see: second Critique, 130.

In Ethics, Kant argues that ethics (in order to be more than a *mere* idea) needs to be represented by a belief in the idea of God as a *holy, benevolent, and righteous* Being (who can see whether "our dispositions are moral and pure"). In so acknowledging "our moral need of God," we imbue morality "with vigour, beauty, and reality" giving (the obligation of) morality a motive. In this sense, Kant says, religion and morality go hand-in-hand for a belief of God is "deeply ingrained in our moral feeling," without which we simply could not be moral. After all, it is *in this idea* of a God who maintains moral precepts that all moral precepts obtain their meaning. (80-82)

162. Ibid., A812-814/B840-842. Third Critique, 340-341. Second Critique, 117-119.

163. As Kant succinctly puts it in the second Critique: "A man, if he is virtuous, will certainly not enjoy life without being conscious of his righteousness in each action" (120). (See, also, Ethics, 54, 84)

Being *conscious* of one's own righteousness should not be mistaken to mean that one should be 'self-righteous' or arrogant--as Kant is at pains to clarify:

> Be a man ever so virtuous, there are in him promptings of evil, and he must constantly contend with these. Every man must guard against moral self-conceit, against believing himself morally good and having a favourable opinion of himself. This feeling of moral self-sufficiency is self-deception; it is an incurable hallucination. It arises from working over and over the moral law until it has been made to fit our inclinations and convenience. (Ethics, 246)

164. Second Critique, 134-135. Morals, 270, 42. First Critique, A814/B842.

Although Kant uses the term *religion* in this context and appears to be endorsing a *religious* slant to his ethics, he is not--in my estimate--referring to the religions (and their practices) of his day or to the concept of religion as it is commonly understood (see, Ch.III). To quote but one of many instances in which Kant emphasizes the ends of morality *over* those of religion:

> But as man is sensuous and the religious appeal to his senses has its uses, it can be said that man can have no pure religion. The basis of religion and the ideal to be aimed at must, however, be the pure Idea and there must be a strong background of morality. (Ethics, 102)

165. Although Hegel initially used the term *sour duty* (in "Sweet and sour duty") as a criticism of Kant's sense of duty (i.e., in that it benefited oneself only indirectly), I am not restricting my use of this term merely to that specific instance. I am instead widening the sense of *sour duty* to include the general malaise or discontent romanticists (like Hegel) felt towards it.

In his Morals, Kant does refer to *duty* as: 'a constraint' (190), an 'often bitter duty' (183), and a relation to 'sweet and bitter merit' (195); hence, Hegel's complaint of Kant's *sour duty* as the "undigested lump of sour virtue in the stomach" (as Lewis White Beck notes in his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 229, 229n.54; see also: 120n., 135n.).

166. First Critique, A851/B879. Second Critique, 135.

Kant adds that when the "highest possible perfection of human nature" is realized, the kingdom of God would likewise be realized *on earth* (Ethics, 253).

167. Cf. John R. Silber's comments in this regard, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," 478.

Second Critique, 148, 137.

168. First Critique, A316/B373.

That the expressions 'moral world' and 'intelligible world' are used interchangeably by Kant, see, first Critique, A809/B837.

169. As Kant states in his Religion:

> Natural inclinations, *considered in themselves*, are good, that is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy. Rather, let them be tamed and instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness. (51; Cf. Morals, 274)

170. Morals, 190-193, 196-198.
In so playing 'the devil's advocate' (for the romantics) in this paragraph, I have not told the whole story. Kant does argue that our worth as human beings is 'the foundation of all other duties':

> Our duties towards ourselves constitute the supreme condition and the principle of all morality; for moral worth is the worth of the person as such...We may have lost everything else, and yet still retain our inherent worth. Only if our worth as human beings is intact can we perform our other duties; for it is the foundation stone of all other duties. (Ethics, 121)

It is amazing to me that Hegel and other romanticists have (apparently) chosen to overlook this passage in their evaluation of Kant's sense of duty and have instead labelled it *sour* in that (in their view) it does not properly address the duties *to oneself* as primary. (see, Hegel's "Sweet and sour duty" referred to by L.W. Beck in his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 229n.54).

171. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On the Highest Good (1789), (1992) 25-31.

172. As cited (and referred to) by Susan Meld Shell, "IV. Appendix: Kant and Herder on Nature and Freedom," The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community, (1996) 183-189; cited: 188-189.

173. Morals, 192, 43.

174. Second Critique, 119.

175. Ibid. Kant further adds (in his Morals) that "our happiness always remains a wish that cannot become a hope, unless some other power is added" (270; Cf. Ethics, 53, 77, 84, 92, 95-96).

176. As Kant elaborates in Morals:

> [T]here is a subjective principle of ethical *reward*, that is, a susceptibility to being rewarded in accordance with laws of virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself (which can be merely negative) and that is celebrated in the saying that, through consciousness of this pleasure, virtue is its own reward. (195)

177. As he states in his Ethics:

> The pragmatic ground of impulse to live is happiness. Can I then take my own life because I cannot live happily? No! It is not necessary that whilst I live I should live happily; but it is necessary that so long as I live I should live honourably. (152; for Kant's extended view on suicide, see: 119-121, 147-157; as well: 1) Michael J. Seidler, "Kant and the Stoics on Suicide"; and 2) David Novak, Suicide and Morality in Plato, Aquinas and Kant.

Ironically, Kant points out that "those who labour for their happiness are more liable to commit suicide; having tasted the refinements of pleasure, and being deprived of them, they give way to grief, sorrow, and melancholy" (Ethics, 154).

Kant does point out, however, that although happiness is not *objectively* necessary, there is a sense in which it is *subjectively* so:

> We do not say to a man: 'In so far as you would be happy you must do so and so'; but since every one wishes to be happy, all must observe what is presupposed by all. It is a subjective and not an objective necessary condition. It would be objective if we were to say: 'You ought to be happy'; but what we do say is: 'Because you want to be happy, you must do this and that.' (Ibid., 5)

178. Religion, 19n.

179. Ethics, 252, 174-175.

Lewis White Beck in his "Foreword to the Torchbook Edition" of Kant's Ethics (1963) adds:

> [I]n these *Lectures* [on Ethics] do we see what Kant never forgot, but what he expected his readers to remember even when he was talking of other things--viz., that the good life is more than mechanical obedience to the categorical imperative, that right action requires more than right thinking, and that man is more than a thinking machine. (xii)

180. "Theory," 68.

181. I use the word 'rhapsodic' deliberately, as Schleiermacher refers to his criticisms of Kant as "not a history but a rhapsody" (On the Highest Good, trans. Froese, 31).

A rather scholarly and (I think, *highly*) negative view of Kant's concept of happiness is that given by Heinz W. Cassirer (1903-1979) eldest son of the world-famed neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), "Chapter 2: A Study in Kant's Ethical Teaching," Grace and Law (1971, 1988) 50-86.

182. In speaking of 'helping Kant,' I am referring to Kant's lifelong efforts to counter the tendencies of the Romantic movement to draw 'converts' away from Kantianism.

To better understand Kant's concept of happiness, it may prove useful to gauge it between Kant's concept of suicide and that of enthusiasm (via Kant's personal identity to his example of the phlegmatic man; see: Anthropology, 155-157; Ethics, 198-199). That is, the sobering quality so often complained about in Kant's view of happiness could be more clearly seen (and perhaps appreciated, if not accepted) against the dark and light contrasts of Kant's views of the extreme lack of happiness (i.e., suicide) and the extreme (but positive) exuberance of life (i.e., enthusiasm: not to be confused with *Schwärmerei*).

A few (additional) key references that provide a more comprehensive treatment of Kant's concept of happiness include:

1) John Beversluis, The Connection Between Duty and Happiness in Kant's Moral Philosophy (1956);
2) Curtis Harold Peters, Immanuel Kant on Hope (1975);
3) Victoria S. Wike, Kant: on Happiness in Ethics (1994);
4) Andrews Reath, Morality and the Course of Nature: Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good (1984); and
5) Hardy E. Jones, "Ch. 6: Perfection and Happiness," Kant's Principle of Personality, (1971) 104-126.

183. Robert T. Clark, Jr., Herder: His Life and Thought (1955), 399. See, as well, "Ch. XII: Campaign Against Kant."

Eugene E. Reed argues, however, that Herder did not read Kant's first Critique *carefully* in "'Savages' in the *Ideen*? The Herder-Kant Quarrel," 499. (See, also: Megumi Sakabe, "Freedom as a Regulative Principle: On Some Aspects of the Kant-Herder Controversy on the Philosophy of History," Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Y. Yovel, 1989: 183-195.)

184. Anthony Storr, Feet of Clay: Saints, Sinners, and Madmen: A Study of Gurus, (1996), 73-74.

185. In our day, John R. Silber is well-known for his opinion that Kant has a 'futile resolution' of the problem of

forgiveness, stating that Kant's view of freedom *shatters* on this problem. In apparent agreement with Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard, Silber speculates that if there is indeed no absolute freedom (of which Kant speaks), "there can be no forgiveness"; for forgiveness would then become 'a moral outrage,' "a violation of the moral law." (Religion, "Introduction," cxxxi-cxxxiv)

For a reasoned retort to Silber's criticisms, see, Mark Lawrence Fuehrer, The Development of Kant's Moral Theology (in the *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*) (1974) 128-130, 146-148.

186. Religion, 188-189.

187. Religion, 60-61, 65. Matthew 5:48; Leviticus 11:44; I Peter I:16.

188. Robert S. Corrington in Nature's Self (1996) comments rather disparagingly on Kant's concept of *grace*:

> Put in simple terms, there is no role for grace in Kant's understanding of the moral self. He does make a surprising move that continues to vex scholars in which he invokes an intelligible (or noumenal) self that lies outside of time and that provides the 'how' through the evil or good will, for moral transformation. The irony is that Kant is compelled to bring in religious language, like that of "radical conversion," when talking about the inner heart of ethics. Yet he consistently refuses to draw the conclusion that moral transformation is impossible outside of grace. (134)

Corrington then adds this rather interesting twist to Kant's concept of grace:

> This gift [of grace] cannot be seen if the self confines its self image [*sic*] to the Kantian realm of autonomous reason. Such a self-grounding reason can only see its own face reflected back...Strange as it may sound, the alienated self may even fear natural grace because it is a threat to its self-delusion that it is self-sustaining. (136)

189. Religion, 61-62, 66, 69-71. Matthew 6:33; Luke 12:31.

In further explicating what is meant by the law 'be ye holy,' Kant states:

> It is not good to talk of imitating God. God tells us to be holy, not meaning that we ought to imitate Him, but that we ought to strive to approximate to the unattainable ideal of holiness. We cannot imitate what is specifically different from us; but we can be obedient

and compliant. Our archetype is not a pattern which we must reproduce, but a rule to which we should conform. (Ethics, 98)

With regards to becoming perfect, Kant adds:

[N]o one who has the law explained to him in its absolute purity can be so foolish as to imagine that it is within his powers fully to comply with it...Though our actions are all very imperfect, and though we can never hope that they will attain to the standard of the moral law, yet they may approach even nearer and nearer to it. (Ibid., 128-129)

Regarding the role of the atonement (or 'vicarious sacrifice') in Kant's thought, see, Mark Fuehrer's The Development of Kant's Moral Theology (in the *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, 1974. See, as well: 1) Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (1992); and 2) Edward F. Mooney, "Kant and Inwardness," Selves in Discord and Resolve, (1996) 47-53.

190. Walter K. Klass in his Ph.D. Thesis, Faith and Reason in Kant's Philosophy (1939), finds Kant's concept of forgiveness simply unacceptable, as he explains:

I hold that Kant's lack of appreciation for the Christian experience of forgiveness lies at the root of his failure to find a place for theological morality, and leads him to misinterpret even the New Testament as in essential harmony with his denial (243-244).

Klass later adds that "the voice of human reason simply is not the voice of God" (352), for Kant claims that "in our own reason we have a Führer, before whom every enigmatic knee must bow, and every heart confess" (351). Klass maintains that the "Christian vision is richer" than that of Kant's 'new man' (467; 348-348; 343-344; 470, 473).

191. Religion, 66-72.

192. Ethics, 130-132, 46-47.
As Kant even more emphatically describes his view of *death-bed repentance* in the Religion:

[T]o administer a sort of opium to the conscience is an offense both against the man himself and against those who survive him, and is wholly contrary to the purpose for which such an aid to conscience at life's close can be considered necessary. (72n.)

193. As Kant states in his Ethics: "The only remorse which is

of use is that inner remorse over our sins which results in a firm determination to live a better life: that is true repentance." (245)

Kant somewhat sarcastically describes this behavior of those who cry 'Lord, Lord,' as follows:

> To this end man busies himself with every conceivable formality, designed to indicate how greatly he *respects* the divine commands, in order that it may not be necessary for him to *obey* them; and, that his idle wishes may serve also to make good the disobedience of these commands, he cries: "Lord, Lord," so as not to have to "do the will of his heavenly Father." (Religion, 189; cf. Matthew 7:21: "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven."; KJV)

194. Ethics, 107, 110. As to Kant's concept of *hope*, see: Ibid., 6, 53-54, 84 107.

Although Kant says *the spirit* of prayer (i.e., "the resolution to good life-conduct") should be with us 'without ceasing,' he is referring to but the (inward 'heartfelt') *wish* of prayer. As to the *form* of prayer (i.e., prayer verbalized), he appears to have a rather dim view. Indeed, Kant states that *complete sincerity* cannot be found in verbal prayer and that it is something one should be ashamed of:

> But why? It is because a man caught talking aloud to himself is suspected for the moment of having a slight attack of madness; and thus do we also judge a man (and not altogether unjustly) when we find him, all alone, in an occupation or attitude which can properly belong only to one who sees some one else before him. (Religion, 183, 183n.)

The point that Kant wishes to impress is that one's disposition can be improved by the *spirit* of prayer "by means of [but] the *idea of God*", but not by verbal prayer simply because verbal prayer "tries to work *upon* [an actual] God" in that the man so praying "supposes this Supreme Being to be present in person" which--to Kant--is absurd. (Ibid., 183n.; Ethics, 98-103)

Furthermore, Kant insists that prayer is merely 'a means to an end' and so "cannot be regarded as a peculiar service of God and intrinsically good." To *pray in faith* simply means to pray "for something we may reasonably hope that God will grant" (i.e., *spiritual objects*), not for *temporal goods* (e.g., length of life) or *material benefits*. In general, Kant deems prayer to be *unnecessary*, a 'presumptuous act,' and 'an act of distrust in God' because it seems to imply "distrust in God's knowledge of what is good for us." (Ethics, 101-102, 98)

195. Ethics 107-108. See, also: 53, 77, 84, 92, 95-96.

196. For a background to Kant's concept of justice, see:

1) Allen D. Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice (1993);
2) Howard Williams, "Ch. 3: The Metaphysics of Justice," Kant's Political Philosophy (1983) 52-76;
3) Onora O'Neill, "The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity," in Neil MacCormick and Zenon Bankowski, eds., Enlightenment and Revolution (1989) 297-312;
4) Otfried Höffe, "Kant's Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law," Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Y. Yovel; and
5) S.M. Brown, "Has Kant a Philosophy of Law?".

197. Morals, 141-144.
Kant defines (public) *justice* in Morals, as follows:

> A rightful condition is that relation of men among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to *enjoy* his rights, and the formal condition under which this is possible in accordance with the Idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice. (120)

In Ethics, Kant provides the following *moral* view of justice:

> Justice (*Recht*), in the sense of legal competence, is the conformity of actions to the rules of Law, in so far as these actions are not in opposition to the rule of the will; it is the moral practicality of an action, provided that the action is not in opposition to the laws of morality. (34)

198. For a (rather) concise treatment of how hope and happiness relate to Kant's view of punishment, see, Sidney Axinn's "Kant's Analysis of Hope" in *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz* I.2: 8-9 (4-8 April 1981) 623-633.

199. Morals, 142-145. For an explanation of *blood-guilt*, see, Ibid., 278.
Kant further emphasizes the need for this 'justice of punishment' (i.e., as the need for the guilty to be punished) in his Ethics:

> In judging actions I must pay no heed to the infirmity of human nature. The law in us must be holy, and the sentence of this law must be just, which means that the penalties of the law must be applied to the actions of men with all exactness. (67)

He adds in his Morals: "One who commits a sin is punished through it and in the same way" (169n.). Kant's sense of 'equal justice' with regard to punishment (as 'a tooth for a tooth') also disallows a punishment *greater* than the crime. For these *disgraceful punishments*, Kant says, dishonor humanity itself (e.g., "quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears"). (Ibid., 255)

200. Ibid., 168-169, 277-279.
The phrase 'mercy seasons justice' is taken from Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice (IV,i, line 195) in which Portia states (in part):

> The quality of mercy is not strained;/ ...It is twice blest;/ It blesseth him that gives and him that takes./ 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest.../ It is an attribute to God himself,/ And earthly power doth then show likest God's/ When mercy seasons justice.../ Though justice be thy plea, consider this:/ That in the course of justice none of us/ Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy,/ And that same prayer doth teach us all to render/ The deeds of mercy. [cited in William Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. Alfred Harbage (1969) 236]

Although Kant (presumably) was not familiar with Shakespeare's works, Herder certainly was. Indeed, as Wulf Koepke notes (in Johann Gottfried Herder), Johann Georg Hamann (1730-87) taught Herder English "by reading Shakespeare's plays" (2). In his brief article "Shakespeare" (1773), Herder praises Shakespeare as the master of illusion and equates this *gift* to the quality of ancient Greek dramatists declaring Shakespeare to be "Sophocles's brother" (Johann Gottfried Herder, Against Pure Reason, 1993: 146-158).

201. Speaking of the various *misinterpretations* of Kant, Lewis White Beck comments:

> [P]erhaps none is more obviously wrong or more widely accepted than the accusation that Kant represents something vaguely called "Prussian philosophy," in which blind obedience to law is so esteemed as an absolute virtue that neither political nor moral freedom is allowed to be more than a name. The accusation is too ridiculous to deserve serious consideration on its own merits and should be refuted only because of its widespread acceptance. But the refutation is easy:...It forgets that all moral discipline is, for Kant, self-discipline...It forgets that Kant taught that all just government is self-government. (A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 201-202)

Notwithstanding Beck's *caveat,* I find (to play devil's advocate for the romantics) that Kant's personification of *punishment* bears a striking similarity (even if a caricature) to that portrayed by Inspector Javert in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables in that punishment "does not let the criminal out of its sight as he strides proudly before it; rather, it keeps limping after him until it catches him" (Morals, 278).

Compare, as well, Kant's concept of (the duty to) justice to Javert's (futile) attempt to understand why the convict he pursued for so many years (Jean Valjean) should *forgive* him:

> A convict was his benefactor! But also why had he permitted this man to let him live? He had...the right to be killed. He should have availed himself of that right...
>
> His supreme anguish was the loss of all certainty. He felt that he was uprooted...There was in him a revelation of feeling entirely distinct from the declarations of the law, his only standard hitherto...An entire new world appeared to his soul...the possibility of a tear in the eye of the law, a mysterious justice according to God going counter to justice according to men...He asked himself: "This convict, this desperate man, whom I have pursued even to persecution, and who has had me beneath his feet, and could have avenged himself, and who ought to have done so as well for his revenge as for his security, in granting me life, in sparing me, what has he done? His duty? No. Something more. And I, in sparing him in my turn, what have I done? My duty? No. Something more. There is then something more than duty." Here he was startled; his balances were disturbed. [Not able to accept this *revelation of feeling,* Inspector Javert then commits suicide.] (trans. Charles E. Wilbour, 1931: 1108-1109)

202. Having said that, I do not mean to imply that Kant denigrates the value of love; simply that obedience comes first. For Kant, (human) love is "good-will, affection, promoting the happiness of others and finding joy in their happiness," not at all the absence (of the worth or value) of feeling (Ethics, 163). Indeed, Kant states that the incentive of duty "cannot be counted on to any great degree unless the command is accompanied by love" ("End," 101). For love--especially, as charity--is "still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish" (Morals, 251).

We honor God, however, by doing *his* will, that is, by our acts (of obedience) (Ethics, 112). For *the moralist* should seek to cultivate--not "kindliness of heart and temper"--but "good-will from principles," as Kant further explains:

> Love is good-will from inclination; but there can also be

> good-will on principle...Doing good from love springs from the heart; doing good from obligation springs rather from principles of the understanding. Thus a man may act kindly towards his wife from love, but if his inclination has evaporated he ought to do so from obligation. (Ibid., 192-193)

203. Admittedly, it is not my intent to deal extensively with Kant's concept of punishment (as that would detract from the focus of this dissertation). For a less cursory treatment, see:

1) Samuel Fleischacker, "Kant's Theory of Punishment";
2) J. Angelo Corlett, "Foundations of a Kantian Theory of Punishment";
3) Tom Sorell, "Aggravated Murder and Capital Punishment";
4) Ottfried Höffe, "Retalitory Punishment as a Categorical Imperative";
5) Alan W. Norrie, "Chapter III: Purifying Juridical Individualism: Kantian Retributivism," Law, Ideology, and Punishment (1991) 39-63;
6) Annette C. Baier, "Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant"; and
7) Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?".

204. Second Critique, 88, 83-84; Morals, 191-192; Religion, 23.

205. Religion, 25-26; Ethics, 73; second Critique, 156; Morals, 42, 46, 51; Ethics, 97.

206. Third Critique, 377; Ethics, 47, 52, 72; Morals, 211; Ethics, 62, 115; Groundwork, 77-78; Ethics, 97; Morals, 196.

207. Morals, 226; Ethics, 28; Morals, 199.
Although Kant holds that the ground of impulse in ethics is *ethical* (in that it does not concern *external* constraints), Kant is not saying that ethics 'excludes coercive laws and coerced actions': "it includes them, but examines them from the point of view not of compulsion but of inner quality," i.e., disposition (Ethics, 71; Morals, 187).
H.J. Paton adds in The Categorical Imperative (1948):

> On Kant's view we feel reverence because we recognise that the law is binding upon our wills. The great error of the moral sense school is to suppose that the law is binding because we feel reverence. (65)

208. H.J. Paton states that he translated the German word *Achtung* as reverence (and not mere 'respect') in order to

capture the sublime feeling Kant gave to this concept (in the context of his writings). Paton further points out that this concept has degrees, for Kant himself translates it (in Morals) by the Latin word *reverentia*, expressly distinguishing it from *Respekt* in that it includes the additional element of fear. Paton argues that this concept of *reverence* to the moral law demonstrates that it is a mistake "to regard Kant's attitude to morality as cold and heartless" (Ibid., 63-64).

Mary Gregor translates (*awe* in place of *reverence* in) the passage Paton refers to (above) as: "Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge" (Morals, 233). In Gregor's new translation of the Groundwork, she translates *Achtung* as (merely) 'respect' (see, Practical Philosophy, 1996).

As an aside, John E. Atwell has an interesting interpretation of Kant's concept of respect (for the moral law) viewing it as "two quite different things: passive respect and active respect." He explains:

> Passive respect for the moral law is the feeling of being obligated to do or forgo some action; it is the acknowledgement or consciousness of being subject to the demands of morality. Active respect for the moral law is (or would be) the performance, or the forbearance, of an action solely because it is recognized as obligatory, or wrong, in virtue of the moral law. (Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought, 1986: 140)

209. Groundwork 107, 75; Morals, 188.

210. Second Critique, 63, 75-77, 89, 166, 81-82; Groundwork, 103.

In defending his dignified role for this unique moral feeling (i.e., "the only one which we can know completely a priori"), Kant states that *reverence* accompanies morality "when she is presented in her purity, and she becomes the object of supreme approbation and supreme desire." He then compares morality to the taste of pure wine, stating that: "If we are to appreciate it, we must keep it pure and free from admixtures which are only in the way" (second Critique, 76, 81, 93; Ethics, 76-77).

For a rather thorough treatment of Kant's view of *the sublime*, see: Jean-Francois Lyotard's Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, esp. Ch. 9: "The Communication of Sublime Feeling" (224-239).

Apropos of the pain of this *reverence*, Kant also refers to conscience as an 'inner pain' (Ethics, 69). As to virtue, he states: "It is, for instance, false that virtue brings with it many pleasures in this life. A virtuous disposition is just as likely to increase the pain of this life" (Ibid., 75). Kant defines *virtue* as:

> the moral strength of a *man's* will in fulfilling his *duty*, a moral *constraint* through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority *executing* the law. (Morals, 206)

M.G.J. Beets calls Kant's concept of respect an 'ingenious argument' which he summarizes, as follows:

> 1. The moral law determines the will objectively and directly;
> 2. Freedom restricts all inclinations (including the appreciation of self) to compliance with the moral law;
> 3) This restriction is the cause of a negative sensation, affecting mainly acts of the subject determined by its subjective incentives; it causes humility;
> 4) The negative sensation (humility) is the effect of an evaluation of one's subjective incentives against the supreme purity of the moral law and as such it engenders a positive feeling (respect for the moral law). (Reality and Freedom: Reflections on Kant's Moral Philosophy, 64)

211. Second Critique, 83, 78-81; Groundwork, 118; Ethics, 139; Morals, 195-196.

212. Morals, 195.

213. Bernard Williams appears to have 'a bone (of contention)' to pick with Kant on this point of 'duty from duty,' as exemplified in his article "Ethics and the Fabric of the World" (in Morality and Objectivity, ed. Ted Honderich, 1985: 206-207); as well in his book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) in which Williams states that "the purest Kantian view locates the importance of morality in the importance of moral motivation itself...This view was relentlessly and correctly attacked by Hegel" (184).

In (an admittedly limited, as well as antedated) *response* to Williams, I think H.H. Schroeder's point should not be overlooked:

> Kant does not say that respect for the moral law is the only motive to good conduct; he says that it is the only *moral* motive. We must remember that Kant uses the word "moral" in his own distinctive and peculiar way. A "moral" motive is one that will always secure conduct in conformity with the moral law, not merely occasionally or under favorable circumstances. ("Some Common Misinterpretations of the Kantian Ethics," 431)

Barbara Herman's "Integrity and Impartiality" anticipates

Williams' "criticism of the Kantian view of the emotions" (234) rather effectively. Onora S. O'Neill also responds to Williams in "Agency and Anthropology in Kant's *Groundwork*" in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. Y. Yovel). (With regard to Kant's sense of *duty*, see: Barbara Herman, "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty.")

214. Morals, 195, 256, 181n.

215. Second Critique, 121-122. Kant adds that the "consciousness of free submission of the will to the law, combined with an inevitable constraint imposed only by our own reason on all inclinations, is respect for the law" (Ibid., 83). Reverence, after all, is "merely consciousness of the *subordination* of my will to a law without the mediation of external influences of my senses" (Groundwork, 69n.).

Kant defines *the will* as the "capacity for desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason." He adds:

> The will is therefore the capacity for desire considered not so much in relation to action (as the capacity for choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice to action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine the capacity for choice, it is instead practical reason itself. (Morals, 42; Cf. second Critique, 125)

216. Second Critique, 152-153.

Victor J. Seidler argues that it was Rousseau's idea of the nature of man that "deeply influenced Kant" to the point that Kant wished to develop a respect for human nature by bringing man back to a sense of himself, back to the truly *human* level (in Kant, Respect, and Injustice, 1986: 16-20).

For a concise treatment of Kant's concept of respect for the moral law, see: Andrews Reath's "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination."

217. Morals, 42; Religion, 23; Groundwork, 128; Morals, 251.

With regards to the will as 'practical reason,' see, W.H. Walsh, "Kant's Concept of Practical Reason," Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner (1974) 189-212.

This attempt (as expressed by Kant) to understand the interrelationship of feeling to reason within human conduct has regained vivid interest in recent years. For example, world-famed neurologist Antonio R. Damasio in his book Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994) argues that in "the abyssal separation between body and soul" that Descartes advocated, Descartes forgot human emotions (248-252). According to Damasio, there are three main

varieties of feelings: 1) feelings of basic universal emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust); 2) feelings of subtle universal emotions, as 'tuned by experience' (euphoria, ecstasy, melancholy, wistfulness, panic, shyness, etc.); and 3) background feelings which originate in background body states as opposed to emotional states (the feeling of life itself, the sense of being) (149-151).

Other works on this topic include:

1) Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (1995);
2) O.H. Green, The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory (1992);
3) Patricia S. Greenspan, Emotions & Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (1988);
4) Ralph D. Ellis, Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain (1995);
5) Michael Tye, "Ch.4: The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences," Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995: 93-131);
6) Carol Magai and Susan H. McFadden, The Role ofEmotions in Social and Personality Development (1995);
7) Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (1996);
8) Brian Parkinson, Ideas and Realities of Emotion (1995);
9) Emotions in Asian Thought, eds. Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames (1995);
10) Robert C. Solomon, A Passion for Justice (1990);
11) What Is an Emotion?, eds. Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (1984);
12) Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of self-assessment (1985); and
13) Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions as Judgments."

218. Religion, 51; Ethics, 76.

219. Robert B. Louden in "Kant's Virtue Ethics" states:

> [T]he enemy-of-the-emotions reading of Kant favoured by so many is a gross misunderstanding. Kant's position is clear: pure practical reason needs to be always 'in charge' of the emotions in a truly virtuous life...But an integral part of moral discipline or what Kant calls 'ethical gymnastic' is training the emotions so that they work with rather than against reason. (488)

See, also, Edward Caird's The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant in which he speaks of a 'new determination' of the emotions in Kant "by which they become the ends of reason" (Vol. 2: 366). In addition, Caird's Ch. 4 "Moral Feeling" (Vol.2: 256-267) may prove helpful.

220. Contrary to the (denigrating) comments from Kant's critics regarding his 'love of the *moral* ideal,' I find that his views are not entirely out-moded. For example, J.L.H. Thomas in his prize-winning essay, "The Schoolman's Advocate: In Defense of the Academic Pursuit of Philosophy," comments: "A moral ideal is to be striven after, otherwise it is not moral; but it would not be an ideal if it did not lie beyond the attainment of men, including philosophers" (493).

221. First Critique, A569/B597; second Critique, 132n.; Ethics, 202; first Critique, A802/B830; A840/B868; A633/B661; Morals, 268, 65.

222. First Critique, A569/B597.

223. Morals, 238. In the first Critique, Kant emphasizes that the object of this ideal of reason (i.e., the *idea of God*) is *not* to be taken "as signifying the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but of an *idea to concepts*" (A578-579/B606-607).

224. Ethics, 202.

225. First Critique, A569/B597; Morals, 255.
With regard to Kant's concept of *respect for persons*, see:

1) Hardy E. Jones, "Ch. 7: Human Dignity," Kant's Principle of Personality, (1971: 127-151);
2) Barbara Herman, "Ch. 3: Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons," The Practice of Moral Judgment (1993: 45-72); and
3) Robin Barrow, "Ch. 7: Kant and Respect for Persons," Moral Philosophy for Education (1975: 119-130).

226. Ethics, 246-247.
On the harmony of the motive of duty with one's inclinations, H.J. Paton comments:

> When Kant says that in a morally good action the motive of duty must *always* be present *at the same time* as maxims and so as inclinations, it is remarkable that he should be interpreted as saying that it must *never* be present at the same time as inclinations. It is true of course that in some cases maxims have to be rejected because they are incompatible with duty. Nevertheless when they are not rejected they are present along with the motive of duty. There is no inconsistency in saying this and yet in holding that only in so far as the motive of duty is by itself sufficient to determine our action are we entitled to attribute to the action *moral* worth. ("Appendix: Inclinations, Happiness, and Moral Worth," The

Categorical Imperative, 1948; 56)

227. Ethics, 138-140, 64, 195, 45-46. See also, 130, 134-135, 69.

228. Ibid., 247.

229. Second Critique, 133; Anthropology, 157-160; Ethics, 246.
To say that a man has character, Kant says, is not simply 'paying him a great tribute'; it is a rare thing indeed and one that inspires admiration and respect. Kant adds:

> But if we say that he has character simply, then we mean the property of will by which he binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason. (Anthropology, 157)

230. Ethics, 207; Morals, 263, 261.
See, H.J. Paton, "Kant on Friendship."

231. Ethics, 253.
For additional sources on Kant's view of *moral character*, see:

1) Jean P. Rumsey, Kant's Theory of Character (1985);
2) Roger J. Sullivan, "Ch. 8: Moral Character," An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (1994) 130-148;
3) Rex P. Stevens, Kant On Moral Practice: A Study of Moral Success and Failure (1981);
4) Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct" (1985);
5) Ralf Meerbote, "Ch. 8: Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions," Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, eds. William L. Harper and Ralf Meerbote (1984) 138-163;
6) David Edward Zoolalian, Kant's Theory of Human Nature (1982); and
7) Nathan Rotenstreich, "Ch. 4: Character and Duty," Practice and Realization: Studies in Kant's Moral Philosophy (1979) 77-99.

232. Morals, 160-161; second Critique, 127-128; Groundwork, 61, 62.
Peter Vincent Corea in his Ph.D. Thesis, Will and its Freedom in the Thought of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant lists twenty-one shades of meaning for *the will* in Kant's moral thought (315-316).
For additional sources regarding Kant's concept of *good will* (to include 'free will'), see:

1) Hud Hudson, "Ch. 5: Kant's Theory of Free Will,"

Kant's Compatibilism, 1994: 148-182;
2) W. Michael Hoffman, "Ch. 4: Kant's Theory of Moral Willing," Kant's Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry, 1979: 70-84;
3) Bernard Carnois, "Ch. 4: The Self-Positing of Freedom: The Autonomy of the Will," The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom, 1987: 45-82;
4) Henry E. Allison, "Ch. 9: Autonomy and spontaneity in Kant's conception of the self," Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Freedom (1996: 129-142);
5) Leslie A. Mulholland, "Ch. 1: Kant and Teleological Ethics: The Concept of Goodness," Kant's System of Rights (1990: 29-45);
6) Leslie A. Mulholland, "Ch. 4: The End in itself: Autonomy and Freedom," Kant's System of Rights (1990: 102-139);
7) Patrick Riley, "Ch. 2: Good Will," Kant's Political Philosophy, 1983: 18-36; and
8) Gary Hochberg, Kant: Moral Legislation and Two Senses of "Will".

233. Ethics, 136-137, 121; Morals, 243-244; "Peace," 138-139; Ethics, 137.

Apropos of '*genuine* respect' for the moral law, Kant says that one *lies* if he flatters himself (that) he inwardly *reveres* the moral law "though the only incentive he feels is fear of punishment" (Morals, 226).

Kant defines *toadies* as "people who praise others in company in the hope of gain." He maintains that nature has made us 'judges of our neighbours' so that in this 'court of social justice' *toadies* and their ilk could be judged by their peers and punished. Kant adds that as this punishment is "outside the scope of the established legal authority" the punishment should not include violence to the accused: ostracism is sufficient. (Ethics, 230)

234. Religion, 43-44, 184n.

235. Ibid., 186n.

236. Ethics, 237, 135; Morals, 231, 257; Ethics, 67, 197.

Kant claims that *true humility* is to compare oneself to the standard of the moral law (and not to others). As no one can be *truly* virtuous--for to attain that 'highest stage of morality' he would have to be 'quite free' from the influence of any incentive (other than that of duty)--we should learn to be tolerant (as 'a universal human duty'), to turn *a blind eye* to faults (so as to maintain mutual respect), and to have sympathy for others. Humanity, after all, is a habit of living in harmony with others--Kant says--not in spying upon people so as to point out their faults. (Morals, 231, 188; Ethics,

234, 232, 198)

An intriguing discussion of the fallibility of conscience can be found in Jonathan Bennett's "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn."

237. Ethics, 69; Morals, 234n., 234-235; Ethics, 133.

In comparing *conscience* to 'a judge,' Kant remarks:

> Conscience is an instinct to judge with legal authority according to moral laws; it pronounces a judicial verdict, and, like a judge who can only punish or acquit but cannot reward, so also our conscience either acquits or declares us guilty and deserving of punishment. The judgment has validity if it is felt and enforced. (Ethics, 131)

238. Ethics, 133; Religion, 173; Ethics, 130, 45, 131.

To 'plead the excuse of an erring conscience,' Kant remarks, would set a precedent (or slippery slope) in that responsibility or accountability for virtually any act could thus be shifted (Ethics, 133; cf. Morals, 202, 142). As conscience is an instinct (and not a faculty), it does not *judge* per se between right and wrong actions; instead, it passes judgment upon itself. In that sense, conscience simply cannot err: for it is the understanding, or even more precisely--reason, that judges the morality of our actions. As Kant explains:

> The understanding, not conscience, judges whether an action is really right or wrong. Nor is it absolutely necessary to know, concerning all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. But concerning the act which *I* propose to perform I must not only judge and form an opinion, but I must be *sure* that it is not wrong; and this requirement is a postulate of conscience... Conscience does not pass judgment upon actions as cases which fall under the law...Rather, reason here judges itself, as to whether it has really undertaken that appraisal of actions (as to whether they are right or wrong) with all diligence, and it calls the man himself to witness *for* or *against* himself whether this diligent appraisal did or did not take place. (Religion, 174; see also, Ethics, 69)

239. Ethics, 133-134.

Kant's disgust at *passion* (especially, *religious* passion) and his association with it to immoral or improper acts is apparent in the following passage:

> No man is sane when swayed by passion; his inclination is blind and cannot be in keeping with the dignity of mankind. We must, therefore, altogether avoid giving way

to passion...The most ungodly of all passions is that of religious fervor, because it makes a man think that under the cloak of piety he can do all manner of things. (Ethics, 146-147)

It may be of interest to note that Daniel Goleman in Emotional Intelligence (1995) holds the similar view to Kant, in stating: "For better or worse, intelligence can come to nothing when the emotions hold sway" (4).

240. Ethics, 134; Morals, 233; Ethics, 46.

241. Religion, 174; Ethics, 134.
See, as well: 1) H.J. Paton, "Conscience and Kant"; and 2) eds. J. Keenan and T. Shannon, The Context of Casuistry, 1995.

242. Cited from The Philosophy of Right trans. T.M. Knox (1952: 89-90) in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (1994) 132.
Although the usual reference to Hegel's *bloodless formalism* charge is the one I have cited (from his Philosophy of Right), Hegel's disenchantment with Kant began more than two decades earlier in his 1798 essay, "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" (as Allen Wood refers to in "The Emptiness of the Moral Will," 457-458).

243. Hegel, Hegel's Logic, trans. W. Wallace, 88, §55.
Hegel used the phrase (in the preface to his Philosophy of Right): "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only after the falling of the dusk." He intended it for Kant' sense of 'ought,' for the owl represents the wisdom of philosophy. Hegel meant: (that) "philosophy understands reality only after the event. It cannot prescribe how the world ought to be." (Peter Singer, "Owl of Minerva," Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, 1995: 638)

244. Hegel, Hegel's Logic, trans. William Wallace, 1975: 14, §10.

245. William Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of his Logic (1894), 112, 359.

246. Hegel's Logic, trans. Wallace, §124, 180-181. Cf. §141, 200. Hegel tends to call Kant's *thing-in-itself* as a 'thing-*by*-itself' for no apparent reason except possibly as a form of ridicule.
It may be of interest to note that Schopenhauer (in his *Student Notebooks* 1811-1818) had initially deemed Kant's *thing-in-itself* to be 'self-contradictory' stating that Kant's 'fundamental mistake' was that "he did not enunciate and acknowledge the proposition: 'No object without a subject' which Berkeley had laid down to his immortal credit."

(Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes, Vol. II: Critical Debates (18-9-1818), trans. E.F.J. Payne, 1985; 462-463, 462n., 463n.).

Subsequently (in the Berlin Manuscripts 1818-1830), Hegel writes that he discovered the way to cut Kant's 'Gordian knot' of the *thing-in-itself*: simply to allow that our "most direct and immediate consciousness" would be enabled to recognize this *essence-in-itself* as will, which (will) would be "only the most immediate manifestation of the *thing-in-itself*." (Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes, Vol.III: Berlin Manuscripts (1818-1830), trans. E.F.J. Payne, 1989; 715-716).

As to Kant's relationship to Berkeley (which Schopenhauer alludes to), see:

1) Gale Dana Justin, Kant and Berkeley;
2) James Donald Stuart, Kant's Refutation of Berkeley's Idealism;
3) Frederick McConnell, Experience and Idealism as Treated by Berkeley, Kant, and James Ward;
4) Samuel Medary Dick, The Principle of Synthetic Unity in Berkeley and Kant;
5) George John Mattey, The Idealism of Kant and Berkeley; and
6) John Yolton, "Ch. 7: Kant's Combination of Idealism and Realism," Perception & Reality: A History from Descartes to Kant, 1996.

247. "Hegel's Attitude to Kant's Ethics," 7, 8.

As Knox refers indirectly to Kant's famous four examples of allegedly immoral (*maxims*, or) 'motives to action' (in his Groundwork, 89-91: suicide, false promises, pleasure-seeking, and nonintervention), one interesting defense of Kant's position is that presented by Minerva San Juan (in On Being Moved By Reasons: The Superiority of Kant's Internalism: virtually all of this dissertation is devoted to defending Kant's position vis-à-vis the 'four examples').

248. Sally Sedgewick, Formalism in Kant's Ethics, 46-47.

Some other works that have also risen to Kant's defense contra the *bloodless formalism* complaint include:

1) Thomas Michael Powers, Formalism in Kant's Ethics (1994);
2) Allen W. Wood, "The Emptiness of the Moral Will";
3) Ping-cheung Lo, "A Critical Reevaluation of the Alleged 'Empty Formalism' of Kantian Ethics";
4) T.M. Knox, "Hegel's Attitude to Kant's Ethics";
5) John R. Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics";
6) Minerva San Juan, On Being Moved By Reasons: The Superiority of Kant's Internalism, 1991.

249. Kant has five formulations of the categorical imperative listed in his Groundwork (88-102):

1) the formula of **universal law** ('Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,' 88);
2) of the **Law of Nature** ('Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature,' 89);
3) of **the End in Itself** ('Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as means, but always at the same time as an end,' 96);
4) of **Autonomy** ('the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law,' 98); and
5) of **the Kingdom of Ends** ('For rational beings all stand under the *law* that each of them should treat himself and others, *never merely as a means*, but always *at the same time as an end in himself*,' 101).

250. Sedgwick, Formalism in Kant's Ethics, 161-162.

251. Hegel as quoted in The Great Thoughts, ed. George Seldes (1985), 178.

The tension between Hegelian and Kantian scholars is well-known. To give but one recent instance (regarding the *empty formalism* debate): Wood's symbolical gesture of 'throwing down his glove' is implicit in his remark (in "The Emptiness of the Moral Will") that "Hegel's emptiness charge is something of an embarrassment to any self-respecting Hegelian" (454). True to form the Hegelian camp responded via Mark Tunick's article "Are There Natural Rights?--Hegel's Break with Kant" (see, in particular, n.11). See also: Joseph Margolis, Life Without Principles, 1996: 175-178.

252. Ibid., 426 (from Unamuno's Tragic Sense of Life, 1913).

253. Schiller, in his last letter to W. von Humboldt (02 April 1805) as cited by Friedrich Paulsen in Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine (as Paulsen's 'dedication'). See also: Robert E. Norton, "Ch. 6: Kant and Schiller: The Apotheosis of the Beautiful Soul," The Beautiful Soul, 1995: 210-245.

254. I find (Bishop) George Berkeley's quote especially noteworthy in this regard, and so quote it in full:

> Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. (Principles of Human Knowledge, "Introduction," #3; cited

in Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence, ed. C.M. Turbayne, 5)

255. First Critique, A568-569/B596-597; A5/B9; A313-319/B370-375.

A point that many who are critical of Kant's doctrine of *ideals* consistently tend to overlook is that which he makes in his first Critique (that): "the nature of *the ideal of reason*...must always rest on *determinate* concepts" (A570/B598; emphasis added). As can be noted, Kant's concept of ideals is not a *mere* 'soaring into the clouds,' as all-too-many critics still suppose. For Kant clearly states the importance of our 'material self' in his Morals: "[C]ultivating the *powers of the body* (gymnastics in the strict sense) is looking after the *basic stuff* (the matter) in man, without which he could not realize his ends" (240).

256. Contrary to Hegel and the romanticist position, Jeffrie Murphy states in Kant: The Philosophy of Right:

> When Kant speaks of harmony here, he does not mean uniformity. His ideal moral world is not one in which everyone would have the *same* purposes. Rather his view is that the ideal moral world would be one in which each man would have the liberty to realise *all* of his purposes in so far as these purposes are compatible with like liberty for all (93).

Continuing as the defense for Kant, H.B. Acton in Kant's Moral Philosophy adds:

> The moral law is not a means of providing for everyone the pleasures that each would like for himself--this, in the words of the nineteenth-century neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, would be like establishing a mere 'comradeship of worms' in which all their movements were smoothly integrated (41).

257. As Gulyga puts it in Immanuel Kant:

> Kant speaks a lot about form, but he is thinking of a form related to content; for him there is no empty, content-free form. Kant is not a formalist (this last point is very important for a correct understanding of his philosophy of art). (96; cf.: 175, 140, 192)

See also: 1) Harry Gensler, Formal Ethics, 1996; and 2) David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 1996.

258. As Kant states in his Morals:

> Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be

> used merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by himself)...It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used, and so over all *things*. But...neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as men, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other man. (255; cf. 250)

To be even more specific, Kant clarifies what he intends by this 'dignity of humanity within us' as follows:

> Be no man's lackey. Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights. Contract no debt for which you cannot give full security. Do not accept favors you could do without...Kneeling down or prostrating oneself on the ground, even to show your veneration for heavenly objects, is contrary to the dignity of humanity. (231-232)

See also: Harry J. Gensler, Formal Ethics (1996).

259. First Critique, Axxi; Bxlii-xliii.
Kant adds this admonition (to his would-be *judges*):

> To deny that the service which the Critique renders is *positive* in character, would thus be like saying that the police are of no positive benefit, inasmuch as their main business is merely to prevent the violence of which citizens stand in mutual fear, in order that each may pursue his vocation in peace and security. (Bxxv)

Rex P. Stevens makes the interesting point (in Kant on Moral Practice) that those who wish Kantian moral philosophy to "fall neatly into the current meta-ethical taxonomies, and be cooperatively respondent to a fashionable list of questions" are imposing a *kind of taxonomical formalism* on Kant's moral thought that is "far worse than the formalism with which Kant is charged" (44n.). Joseph Margolis adds (in Life Without Principles, 1996): "I should also say that, although they deplore Kant's formalism, [Karl-Otto] Apel and [Jürgen] Habermas seem to me to be every bit as formalist as Kant" (177).

260. First Critique, Bxliii.
As George di Giovanni states in Between Kant and Hegel: "Few philosophers were as badly misunderstood by their contemporaries as Kant was" (3).
Two noteworthy articles which attempt to correct some of these misinterpretation of Kant are: 1) H.H. Schroeder, "Some Common Misinterpretations of the Kantian Ethics"; and 2) W.H.

Werkmeister, "What Did Kant Say and What Has He Been Made to Say?," Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke S. Gram, 1982: 133-145.

261. "Lies," 612.

262. "Lie," 613.
Mary Gregor adds in the "Introduction" to her translation of Kant's "Lie":

> Kant later distinguished between "what is only formally wrong and what is also materially wrong," a distinction that "has many applications in the doctrine of right." In general, people do not wrong one another by doing what would make civil society impossible, but they nevertheless do wrong "in the highest degree" by making the concept of right inapplicable, and with it the concept of a right as distinguished from force. Relying on this distinction, Kant argues that lying is always wrong in the context of right, as distinguished from virtue. (606)

263. As Kant points out in his Religion:

> But it is clearly evident that the wise Teacher who here says that whatever goes beyond Yea, Yea, and Nay, Nay, in the asseveration of truth comes of evil [Matthew 5:33-37], had in view the bad effect which oaths bring in their train--namely, that the greater importance attached to them almost sanctions the common lie. (147n., 147)

264. Ethics, 224, 225.

265. "Lie," 611. Herbert Herring, Essentials of Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, 1993: 107.
Herring points out that (in consultation with his wife who calls Kant's position "unrealistic sophistry") he concludes that Kant's position (in "Lies") is "extremely ignorant (or purposely ignoring) of the crooked ways and vagaries of our socio-political world" (115, 116).

266. Morals, 227. Ethics, 228, 229.

267. Ethics, 228, 229.

268. "Lies," 611.

269. Morals, 225; Ethics, 119.
In speaking of a lie *in the full Kantian sense of the term*, I am referring to Kant's argument (in the first Critique) regarding the *malicious lie* which Kant says is "a voluntary action" (A554-555/B582-583). To be 'forced' to lie, for Kant--on this interpretation--cannot be *a lie*, as it does

not permit a voluntary action. (Admittedly, it is this difficulty in determining whether one was *forced* or in some sense *obliged* 'to *tell* a lie' that becomes the sticky issue, if not a slippery slope, in concluding whether one therefore *lied*.)

Although Kant does acknowledge 'Cato's suicide' as honorable to some extent and the one and only exception the world can and has so offered, he still insists that "suicide is in no circumstances permissible." (Ethics, 149, 151)

270. Ethics, 224; Morals, 270; Ethics, 118; Morals, 225.

Kant holds that the proper remedy to cure children who tend to tell lies is not to punish them (for they would only become more 'Jesuitical' in their inventiveness). Instead, they should be *shamed* for their lies. (Ethics, 46)

271. Ethics, 224-225.

In explaining man's *unsocial sociability*, Kant says:

> Man is a being meant for society (though he is also an unsociable one), and in cultivating the social state he feels strongly the need to *reveal* himself to others ...But on the other hand, hemmed in and cautioned by fear of the misuse others may make of his disclosing his thoughts, he finds himself constrained *to lock up* in himself a good part of his judgments. (Morals, 263; cf. "History," 31-32)

272. Second Critique, 23; Ethics, 28.

273. Ethics, 5.

274. Ethics, 44.

275. Morals, 225-226.

276. Hamlet, I.iii.78-80, as cited in Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. Alfred Harbage, 1969; 939.

277. It is for this reason, Kant implies, that 'the author of all evil' (in the Bible) is not only called a liar, but is singled out as 'the Father of lies,' *lies* being the source (or common denominator) of all evil. (Morals, 227)

278. For additional views and comments on "Lies," see:

1) Robert Benton, "Political Expediency and Lying: Kant vs. Benjamin Constant";
2) Jules Vuillman, "On Lying: Kant and Benjamin Constant";
3) H.J. Paton, "An Alleged Right to Lie: A Problem in Kantian Ethics";

4) Christine M. Korsgaard, "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil";
5) Sally Sedgwick, "On Lying and the Role of Content in Kant's Ethics";
6) Michael K. Green, "Kant and Moral Self-Deception";
7) George C. Kerner, "Ch.7: Rule-and Act-deontology," Three Philosophical Moralists: Mill, Kant, Sartre (1990) 108-117;
8) Mike W. Martin, "Ch.3: Inner Hypocrisy," Self-Deception and Morality (1986) 39-43; and
9) Sissela Bok, "Kant's Arguments in Support of the Maxim 'Do What Is Right Though the World Should Perish,'" Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, eds. David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi (1988) 191-212.

CHAPTER III

KANT AND RELIGIOUS PASSION

In Chapter One, an overview was presented demonstrating a few of the crucial historical and philosophical differences between Kant's Enlightenment movement and that of the Romantics (the Counter-Enlightenment). The pivotal point remains the primacy of reason as opposed to the primacy of feeling. The key issue in that primacy debate is Kant's opposition to passion--in particular, religious passion. In this present discussion, we will first examine Kant's viewpoints on religion to better understand how and why it is that Kant so detested religious passion.

In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how it is possible to view a theory of moral character in Kant's moral thought drawing upon his later (more mature) writings. In this theory, moral character in Kant is presented as the fusion of moral reason with moral feeling within the maxim of one's moral will. (As can easily be noted, the emphasis is on Kant's 'moral' interpretation as opposed to a religious one, for instance.) The adequacy of a theory of moral character in Kant (and in

Kant's day), I propose, can be more clearly seen in comparison and contrast with the leading alternative: submitting one's will and reasoning powers to the religious sentiment of the Counter-Enlightenment revolution. And it is to this debate that I now turn.

A. What is Kant's 'Religion'?

If Kant held that 'duty has no sweethearts,'[1] it is certainly consistent that he should hold that religion have none either. In examining the nature of Kant's religion, I will attempt to ascertain the motive behind his (so-called) religious writings. To begin with, I will discuss Kant's own definition of religion with respect to the 'religious' nature of religion itself.

1. Kant's definition of 'Religion'

If Mark Twain had read Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, he possibly would have described it as 'a flurry of definitions related to religion, the sum total of which has little to do with any *real* religion.'[2] Before proceeding into Kant's 'flurry of definitions,' I would like to point out the recent trend (in this decade) to rethink Kant's relation to religion.

Broadly stated, there are two conflicting views of Kant and religion: 1) to interpret Kant's (supposedly) late

interest in religion (in the 1790s) as nothing more than a mere appendage to his critical thought[3]; and--conversely--2) to interpret Kant's moral thought as something more than a *mere* adjunct to the moral life in that Kant did not wish to reduce religion to morality (which *reduction* would permit morality to reign supreme).[4] My somewhat unusual approach to this current controversy in rethinking Kant's approach to religion is akin to Kant's typical method of argumentation, namely, that of antinomies.[5]

I see Kant's mission in establishing his critical philosophy (in the three critiques) as the basis from which he had hoped to set religion straight by replacing its central trust on the (supposed) divinity of Christ (or any other religious leader) with that of pure practical reason. Kant, I maintain (contra Stephen Palmquist et al.), was not interested in establishing a new mysticism in Christianity (via pure reason),[6] nor was he seriously interested in (merely) reforming the religious nature central to religion. His overriding desire (esp. in the 1790s) was to (attempt to) stem the rising tide of sensationalism (or *Schwärmerei*) as exemplified in the German Romanticist movement. This stubborn persistence by Kant to remain a true son of the Enlightenment to the bitter end provoked the Romantics--in my view--to caricature him as an 'enemy to the emotions.'

That is, religious promoters--as exemplified by certain German romantics, such as Hamann, Herder, and Schleiermacher--

encouraged the populace to *feel* religion, rather than to *think* religion.[7] Kant's aim, I contend, was to neutralize the passion of these religionists via his 'third (critical) way' which he purported was neither (unduly) dogmatic nor empirical.[8] He desired that the populace would at least begin to use their own reason despite the fact their cultural milieu was locked within a religious context. In this sense, Kant saw that despite the attempts of the populace to 'think for themselves,' they would tend to retain the view of (true) religion as comprising but *ceremonies*.[9]

Although Kant himself refused to attend Church and deprecated allegiance to its creeds and rituals both by example and by his writings, he recognized the need to tolerate the religiosity of religion for society at large. Kant's personal belief in non-violent resistance and his tendency to avoid the bi-polar position of antinomies (via a 'third way'[10]) shaped Kant's view that morality for 'the common' person could be fulfilled only through the church as the essential vehicle for social change.[11] Hence, in order to achieve fulfillment morality (for the populace) would inevitably lead to religion. Once these religious appendages served their purpose in preparing (even) 'the common man' for membership in a (truly) ethical community of moral persons, they could be discarded as scaffolding is removed when a building project is completed.[12]

To reiterate, Kant's key point in his Religion--and one

which has led to conflicting viewpoints--is that the common man needs religion as a social vehicle (via the Church and its creeds) in order to be able to fulfil the higher (moral) purpose of morality (i.e., an ethical community).[13] (After all, moral imperatives are possible only if and when moral individuals voluntarily accept them--as imperatives--i.e., *as if* they were 'divine commands.') In so respecting the role of religion in the evolution of moral character, Kant has undoubtedly shown gratitude to his early religious roots--in particular, to his mother's deeply Pietist character.[14] As we shall see, however, Kant's view on religion is, arguably, not Pietist, nor Lutheran, nor Protestant, nor even Christian.

In his pamphlet "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies (1791)," Kant praises Job (of the Old Testament) in that "he did not base his morality on his faith but his faith on his morality." Kant then adds: "this kind of faith is not found in a religion that cultivates self-interest and seeks favours, but in a religion of good behavior."[15] For Kant, this simple statement: 'a religion of good behavior' captures the moral worth of religion. In expounding upon his definition of the essence of all religion as "the performance of all human duties as divine commands,"[16] Kant states:

> when they [the populace] fulfil their duties to men (themselves and others) they are, by these very acts performing God's commands and are therefore in all their actions and abstentions, so far as these concern morality, *perpetually in the service of God.*[17]

As if for emphasis, Kant adds that "it is absolutely impossible to serve God more directly in any other way" (Ibid.). We see, then, that Kant's view of religion is a predominantly social one.[18] That is, our duty is "not of men toward men, but of the human race toward itself": "the promotion of the highest as a *social* good." A lone individual (however moral, Kant maintains) cannot achieve this highest moral good, for it requires "a union of such individuals."[19]

But there is another sense (besides the social factor) whereby "morality leads ineluctably to religion"[20]: through Kant's moral postulates, in particular--the idea of God.[21] For, according to Kant, "religion is nothing but the application of theology to morality, that is, to a good disposition and a course of conduct well-pleasing to the highest being."[22] A difficulty in understanding this role of *the idea of God* in Kant's 'religion' can easily arise once we forget that Kant considers but the *idea* of God as essential for theology (but not for religion).[23] Attempts to clarify Kant's distinction between theology and religion can be found: in his Religion, that "for its own sake morality does not need religion at all" (3); in his Opus Postumum, that "to have religion, the concept of God is not required (still less the postulate: 'There is a God')" (248); and in his first Critique, "the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from them" (A636/B664).

The question whether Kant's 'religion' is therefore truly *religious* (i.e., adhering to a divine source) is still controversial to this day.[24] At the crux of this controversy is the difficulty in understanding Kant's use of *the idea of God* with respect to our 'divine commands.' Two pertinent quotes from Kant may prove enlightening. In his third Critique, Kant argues that moral teleology leads us to a 'determinate *concept*' of the supreme cause, thereby making a theology possible. But this 'supreme cause' is cause of the world only "according to *moral* laws." Nevertheless, this limited concept of the *supreme cause* suffices for our moral final purpose. Kant continues:

> Thus moral teleology *alone* can provide us with the concept of a *single* author of the world suitable for a theology.
>
> In this way theology also leads directly to *religion*, as the *cognition of our duties as divine commands*; for the cognition of our duty, and of the final purpose reason enjoins on us in this duty, is what was first able to produce a determinate concept of God, so that in its very origin this concept is inseparable from our obligation to that being.[25]

Kant further explains the role of this *idea of God* with respect to our 'divine commands' as follows:

> This is not to say that man is entitled, **through the** Idea to which his conscience unavoidably guides him, to *assume* that such a Supreme Being *actually exists* outside himself--still less that he is *bound* by his conscience to do so. For the Idea is not given to him *objectively*, by theoretical reason, but only *subjectively*, by practical reason, putting itself under obligation to act in keeping with this Idea; and through using practical reason, but *only in following out the analogy* with a lawgiver for all rational beings in the world, men are merely pointed in

> the direction of thinking of conscientiousness (which is also called *religio* [Latin for 'religion']) as accountability to a holy Being (morally lawgiving reason) distinct from us yet present in our inmost being, and of submitting to the will of this Being, as the rule of justice. The concept of religion is here for man only "a principle of estimating all his duties as divine commands."[26]

In light of the limited nature of this *idea of God*, the natural response is: Why have a theology at all? Kant claims that we need it only for a *subjective aim*: "for religion, i.e., for the practical--specifically, the moral--use of reason."[27] After all, it is reason that advances to theology, and it is reason that (via its moral principles) "was first able to give rise to the concept of God."[28] This rational approach to religion was certainly not novel. For instance, David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1751) states that should we distrust human reason, we would not have any other principle "to lead us into religion."[29]

Nor is Kant's use of natural religion as opposed to revealed religion unique. William Law in his book The Case of Reason or Natural Religion fairly and fully Stated (1774) defines *natural* religion as reason (or 'internal revelation') and *revealed* religion as pertaining to things that cannot be examined or explained according to the nature of things.[30] Not surprisingly, then, Kant defines *natural* religion as a religion in which we first know what our duty is before we accept it as a 'divine command'; whereas, *revealed* religion follows the reverse order: we first know the 'divine command'

in order to recognize it as our duty. Only the natural religion, however, can be universally shared. Nevertheless, it is possible to have a natural religion complimented by an aspect of the revealed religion in that this natural religion can be discovered (objectively) merely through the use of one's reason, yet not (subjectively) cover or share a wide population.[31]

Nevertheless, it is *only through reason* that thought can "add revelation to the concept of a *religion*," for universal human reason must be recognized and respected as "the supremely commanding principle in a natural religion, and [in] the revealed doctrine, upon which a church is founded."[32] If a religion is to be universal, Kant insists, it must "always be founded upon reason alone" for there is only one true religion which is truly moral.[33] Without reason, no religion is possible. Furthermore, Kant continues, any religion that opposes reason will not endure in the long run: that is, only as members of a religious denomination reduce their 'pious observances' can they feel "somewhat ennobled and more enlightened" and so progress "a little nearer to pure moral religion."[34] Natural religion, then, is the foundation of all religion, producing the best possible support for all moral principles.[35] So argues Kant.

In short, we see that for Kant nothing that does not consist of living a morally good life is essential to religion, for religion--as Kant envisions it--is "the kind of

faith that locates the *essence* of all divine worship in man's morality."[36] In retrospect, perhaps those of a 'Mark Twain' bent (referred to earlier) are right after all: that despite the 'flurry of definitions' Kant's religion is no *real* religion. Moreover, the following doubt persists: perhaps Kant never seriously intended to implement a *new* religion (of pure practical) reason, except as a spoof on the 'religious' influence of religion itself--in particular, that of Christianity. Perhaps Kant's (secret) underlying motive in writing this flurry of details (as an attempt to define or clarify religion) was but a 'smokescreen' for Kant to publicly correct the errors he perceived in (the Christian) religion--errors which Kant had witnessed since childhood and which he now believed might be corrected via his critical moral thought. To better understand what may lie behind Kant's 'smile of reason' (in so presenting religion), let us briefly examine what Kant himself thought of the religions in Königsberg.

2. Did Kant Follow the Religion of his Day?

Although there are different forms of religion, of which Christianity is the "most adequate," Kant insists that there is but one religion.[37] Because this one true religion is hidden *within* and pertains to moral dispositions, Kant explains, it is more accurate to say that Jews, Muslims, Christians, Catholics and Lutherans, etc. belong to several

kinds of faith than to say they belong to any one religion.[38] If any of these 'faiths' (or *cults*) should attempt to be united with the true religion, they might succeed in the short term, Kant admits; but "like oil and water, they must needs separate from one another, and the purely moral (the religion of reason) be allowed to float on top."[39] Kant's religion, it seems, is neither Protestant nor Catholic: it remains to be seen whether it is Christian, or even a religion.

The 'S' Rules

In proceeding with this examination of Kant's views contra Protestantism, Catholicism, and even Christianity, I think it would be useful to implement three of Kant's own '(heuristic) rules' in these matters.[40] These 'Kantian' rules can be used to clarify Kant's own dogma (in defense of Kant), as it might be reasonably interpreted by a Kantian judge presiding over Kant. The first rule and one that I will use with respect to Kant's Protestant, Catholic, or (other) sectarian views is found in his first Critique: "no one ought to be accused of denying what he only does not venture to assert."[41] For obvious reasons, I will refer to this rule as the *shy* rule.

The remaining two rules I will use to help clarify Kant's position with respect to Christianity in two ways: 1) Christianity as a religion (whereby Kant criticizes Christianity); and 2) Christianity as *an example of* religion

(whereby Kant praises Christianity). The second rule (to be used in the former sense) is as follows: "while one should never speak anything but the truth, it is not, therefore, one's duty to speak the whole truth in public."[42] I will refer to this rule as the *silent* rule. Lastly, the third rule (to be used in the latter sense) is as follows: "One cannot guarantee that everything one says to one's self or to others is *true* (for one can err) but one can and must always guarantee that what one says is *sincere*, for of this everybody can be immediately certain."[43] I will refer to this rule as the *sincere* rule.

With respect to the *shy* rule, the question arises whether Kant was indeed a 'believing Protestant' or a 'believing Catholic'; and if not, whether he adhered to any of the (other) religious sects of his day. I say that this question arises simply because Kant has long been assumed to be a Protestant, or more specifically a Pietist Protestant of the Lutheran tradition. Even in Kant's day one of his followers, Dr. H. Jung Stilling exclaimed that Kant's philosophy would "effect a far greater, a more general, and a more blessed revolution than Luther's Reformation."[44] Little wonder that even today Kant is still perceived as 'a Protestant.'[45] For example, Charles Taylor is even more specific, stating that "the influence of Augustinian thinking on Kant is at times overpowering, via its Protestant and Pietist formulations."[46]

Contra Taylor's view of Kant, Allen Wood maintains that

this frequent characterization of Kant as 'the philosopher of protestantism' is "particularly harmful and misleading" as Kant would not have willingly accepted it. Opposing Taylor's view of an Augustinian influence on Kant, Wood states:

> There was certainly little love lost between Kant and Orthodox Lutheranism of his own time. But even more important, Kant's thought clearly has little in common with the narrowly biblical religion of Luther, Calvin and Zwingli, and has even less in common with their Augustinianism and their deprecation of human reason.[47]

Indeed, Wood insists: "To characterize Kant as a *protestant* philosopher is to imprison his thought in the sectarian squabbles which he detested above all else in matters of religion." He then adds that Kant's thought was more in keeping with 'the spirit of Erasmus' than that of Luther or Calvin.[48] The implications of such a view are that Kant was closer to Catholicism (via Erasmus) than to Protestantism (via Luther). To possibly clarify some of these controversies, I will implement the *shy* rule to see what Kant himself has to say: if Kant shows no (fundamental) disfavor with Protestantism, for example, then the "Kant as Protestant" tag will have to stay. That is, according to the *shy* rule, if Kant 'ventures to assert' fundamental disfavor with Protestantism, then he *can be* (reasonably) 'accused of denying' Protestantism in his moral thought.

The first exhibit of evidence is the following:

> If a church which claims that its ecclesiastical faith is universally binding is called a catholic church,

> and if that which protests against such claims on the part of others (even though oftentimes it would gladly advance similar claims itself, if it could) is called a protestant church, an alert observer will come upon many laudable examples of protestant Catholics and on the other hand, still more examples, and offensive ones, of arch-catholic Protestants.[49]

From this remark, we can see that Kant is poking fun at the tendency for Catholics to claim *their* faith (alone) is *universally binding* without taking into consideration that there are laudable "protestant Catholics" and vice versa. Kant's added remark that certain Protestants have *offensive* examples and that they would make the *similar claims* as the Catholic Church (if they but could) does show a darker side to his irony. Little wonder, then, that Wood and Galbraith make the claim that Kant would choose Erasmus over Luther. Yet these friendly jibes by Kant are simply not sufficient to remove the Protestant label from him.

As the second exhibit for evidence, I would present the following:

> Even when (as in a Protestant church) these officials do not appear in hierarchical splendor as spiritual officers clothed with external power--even when, indeed, they protest verbally against all this--they yet actually wish to feel themselves regarded as the only chosen interpreters of a Holy Scripture, having robbed pure rational religion of its merited office (that of being at all times Scripture's highest interpreter) and having commanded that Scriptural learning be used solely in the interest of the churchly faith. They transform, in this way, the service of the church (*ministerium*) into a domination of its members (*imperium*) although, in order to conceal this usurpation, they make use of the modest title of the former.[50]

I think we need go no further. This piece of evidence quite clearly singles out the "Protestant Church" as "having robbed pure rational religion of its merited office," an assertion ventured by Kant which reveals that he fundamentally disfavors protestantism. The verdict, I submit, is in: according to the *shy* rule, Kant *can* reasonably be accused of denying Protestantism in his 'pure rational religion.' He is, arguably, not a 'believing Protestant.'[51]

The additional view that he favored Catholicism more than Protestantism does not entail that he was a Catholic. Not only has no commentator ever made such a claim, there can be no evidence to substantiate it in my view: at least, there has not been any in the examination of Kant's writings to date.[52] That Kant was partial to a mystic faith as Swedenborgianism (as purportedly reflected in his work Dreams of a Spirit Seer, 1766) falls under a similar line of reasoning.[53] The last remaining possibility of an allegiance by Kant to a religious faith is that oft-referred-to line that Kant in his sunset years thanked his mother for his *Pietist* upbringing. The insinuation is that Kant was trained by his mother to become *a Pietist* (at least, *at heart*).[54] For this reason, I think a clarification is in order.

As to the assumption that Kant's parents inculcated an *allegiance to Pietism* in their son, Kant's own account is significantly different. Speaking of his parents as 'models of moral propriety,' Kant states that they gave him "a training

which, *in a moral point of view*, could not have been better and for which, at every remembrance of them, I am moved with the most grateful emotions." In describing Pietism, Kant does not speak of his own personal views on the subject but refers to the benefits of Pietism in the lives of his parents. "In a word," says Kant, "even the mere observer was involuntarily inspired with respect."[55] It seems that Kant's sympathy was not for Pietism but *for his mother* (Anna Regina Dorothea, née Reuter), as Willibald Klinke illustrates in Kant for Everyman:

> Throughout his life, Kant thought of his mother... Whenever he spoke of her it was with emotion, and his eyes glistened... "I shall never forget my mother," he once remarked to his friend [Reinhold Bernhard] Jachmann, "for she planted and tended *the first seeds of good* in me. She opened my heart to the impressions of nature; she awakened and widened my ideas, and her teachings have had an enduring, healing influence on my life."
>
> She seems to have bestowed her mother-love particularly freely upon this son, of whose receptiveness she was well aware. She frequently accompanied her little Immanuel out into the country and drew his attention to the objects and phenomena of nature; she even talked to him, within the limits of her own knowledge, about the structure of the heavens.[56]

Moreover, in his last published book on religion, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), Kant makes his view of the Pietist faith rather clear, I think, in the following scathing condemnation:

> But it was not for contempt for piety that made "Pietist" a sect name (and a certain contempt is always connected with such a name); it was rather the Pietists' fantastic and--despite all their show of humility--proud claim to be marked out as supernaturally favored children of heaven, even though their conduct, as far as we can see, is not the least bit better than that of the people they

call children of the world.[57]

In the above references (and indeed in all the other references that I have been able to read concerning Kant and his supposed Pietist upbringing) there is no indication that Kant was trained by his mother to become a devout Pietist.[58] Indeed, as we shall see, there is sufficient doubt as to whether Kant even "remained a believing Christian."[59]

Kant as 'a believing Christian'

With respect to the *silent* rule ('unnecessary to publicly speak all the truth') and Kant's criticisms of Christianity, an additional formulation of that rule (by Kant) may be considered, as follows: "Although I am absolutely convinced of many things that I shall never have the courage to say, I shall never say anything that I do not believe."[60] I shall refer to this formulation of the *silent* rule as the rule of *(silent) sophistry* or simply the *sly* rule. These 'Kantian' rules will be vital, I think, in determining whether Kant can reasonably be described as 'a *believing* Christian' as opposed to being merely a moralist.

The *silent* rules are necessary to help determine whether Kant was 'a believing Christian,' because one could deny being a sectarian and yet make room for the Christian faith. The *shy* rule can be applied to determine whether one is a sectarian but should not be applied to determine whether one is 'a *believing* Christian' for at least three reasons. The first

reason involves the difficulty of separating 'mere sectarians' (as *mere* churchgoers) from non-Christian 'sectarians' as Muslims. If but the *shy* rule were applied to determine whether Muslims (or other traditionally non-Christian faiths) are 'believing Christians,' the result could be comical to say the least. For if the *shy* rule were applied in evaluating whether one is 'a believing Christian,' Muslims--who 'believe in Christ' (albeit, as but a moral teacher) and who do not attend (Christian) sectarian churches--could not be denied the title *Christians* simply because they 'do not venture to assert' that they are *Christians*.

The second reason why the *shy* rule cannot be applied in this determination is what I call the *shame* principle. That is, if one is ashamed (which is a form of 'shyness') of being identified with Christ, that person cannot be called 'a believing Christian.' For the scriptures plainly state: "*Whosoever therefore shall be ashamed of me [Christ]* and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation; of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father."[61] Under the *shy* rule, 'bashful believers' (who are ashamed of Christ) could be considered 'Christians,' even though they 'do not venture to assert' themselves as Christians.

The third reason for declining the *shy* rule with respect to '*believers* in Christ' involves the distinction between *following 'a belief'* in Christ (via Churchgoing) and *following*

Christ 'as a believer.' For it is possible for one to (externally) follow a sectarian faith (via the 'lip-service' of ceremonies) without truly 'believing' in it (internally).[62] Hence, the separation is made between the Christian religion (the Church, or '*the body* of Christ')' and the religion *of Christ* (*the* Christ, or '*the person* of Christ').' But then what does it mean to '(truly) believe in Christ'? That is, what would constitute the minimally necessary *faith* for the *true* believer?

The Triune Faith

Ipso facto, 'a believing Christian' is one who 'believes in' (i.e., follows) Christ *as Christ,* literally, the 'Anointed One.' Whereas a sectarian would be able to remain a sectarian (for all external purposes) by 'hiding his light under a bushel,' the *believing* Christian cannot.[63] To be a *believing* Christian does not entail simply being a sectarian in the sense that 'a horse of a different color' is still 'a horse.' It is an entirely different order of phenomenon. Although there are (even presently) thousands of different *Christian* churches who all profess to 'follow Christ,' I believe it is possible to understand what it means to be 'a believing Christian' in at least the minimal sense, that is, by sheer virtue of the definition of the phrase itself (without 'spiritualizing scripture'--as it is sometimes referred to--by imposing a moral or sectarian twist to what is plainly and

flatly stated).

To straightforwardly 'believe in Christ' (without alluding to the baggage of an entire 'Christology' as a set of moral or sectarian suppositions) can be reduced, minimally--I contend--to but three key concepts. Simply stated, the believing Christian holds Christ: 1) as *central* (as Lord); 2) as *crucified* (as Savior); and 3) as *Christ* (as God). As has already been mentioned, the above 'triune faith' in Christ (as I call it) is only what can be considered *minimally* of the relationship a believer in Christ has towards Christ. No sectarian or moral super-impositions need be made as to the myriad details whereby one (supposedly) lives more fully (or abundantly) in Christ via Churchgoing or even abiding by a code of moral ethics.

All that is intended by this (minimal) *triune faith* in Christ is that a reasonably introduced 'measuring rod' may be applied to help determine whether persons (religious or philosophical) 'x, y or z' are '(truly) believing Christians.' A sectarian, or even a moral, faith is not required: simply a straightforward understanding of the plain words stated in scripture.

Briefly stated, then, that Christ is *central* (as Lord) in a true believer's life is exemplified in Christ's command (to the 'would-be' Christian) to *follow* him.[64] That Christ is *crucified* (as Savior) in the believer's life is exemplified by Christ's atonement (whereby it is possible for the believer to

be *saved*, or made free, from the bondage of wrongdoing).[65] And, finally, that Christ is *the Christ* (as God) in the believer's life is exemplified by Christ's resurrection (whereby it is possible for the believer's body to be *resurrected*, which by definition means 'brought back to life from death *never* to die anymore').[66] Having stated the minimal *triune* faith required for a professed believer to truly believe in Christ, let us now examine Kant's position in this regard.

Christianity as a religion (A)

To facilitate this decision-process, I will approach Kant's criticisms of Christianity from two perspectives: 1) Kant's view of Christ as Sovereign (i.e., as compared to the triune faith); and 2) Kant's reply to his Sovereign's request to desist from distorting the basic tenets of Christianity. I will apply the *sly* rule to the former perspective; and, the *silent* rule to the latter one.

In the first perspective, Kant sees Christ as a moral Teacher par excellence.[67] The (supposed) divinity or lordship of Christ (what Kant calls "messianic faith") is emphatically denied by Kant.[68] Christ for the Christian is not to be thought of as Divinity but as a mere 'ideal of humanity,'[69] a standard that Kant thinks would do honor to Christian theologians as well as the Christian populace.[70] Indeed, whether Christ actually existed or not is wholly non-essential

for Kant, as Kant's system of ethics would not be altered thereby. Christ is not to be the center in the life of the (Kantian) Christian; instead, pure practical reason is to become this center.[71] Although Christ has no divine status, nor direct authority, in the personal life of the (Kantian) Christian, Kant has provided a place for the 'idea of God.' For man is an animal, according to Kant, who "has need of a master." He (mankind) requires a *master* who will "force him to obey a universally valid will, whereby everyone can be free."[72] Kant further explains this principle, as follows: "reason in its legislation uses *the Idea of God,* which is derived from morality itself, to give morality influence on man's will to fulfil all his duties."[73] This *master* or *idea of God* is not and cannot be Christ as Kant clearly does not consider Christ to be divine (as has been demonstrated). Hence, we see that Kant did not believe in Christ as *central* to his life, that is, as *Lord.*

That the Christ of the Bible atoned for the sins of all mankind, as all Christians believe (in one way or another), Kant flatly rejects: "no thoughtful person can bring himself to believe this."[74] (Hence, Kant clearly refused to believe in a Christ *crucified* on his behalf.) After all, the bible itself is but a moral guide, or as Kant subtly states it: "the Bible deserves to be kept, put to moral use, and assigned to religion as its guide *just as if it is a divine revelation.*"[75] In describing his view of the bible '*as if* the bible were

divine,' Kant admits (albeit only as 'sophistry') that he does not consider the bible to be divine--he only pretends it to be so. And it is in this 'pretence' or 'play-acting' towards the (supposed) sanctity of scripture that Kant first discloses the nature of his desire to alter (or to 'impose upon') the simple plain sense of scripture.[76] Consistent with his chief loyalty (to further the goals of the Enlightenment), Kant apparently ignores the biblical injunction not to alter the words (and hence the meaning) of scripture by addition or omission.[77] To quote but one of numerous examples, Kant alters both the words and the sense of the biblical scripture--"Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you"--to say: "Seek first the kingdom *of pure practical reason* and its righteousness, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you *of itself*."[78] But Kant is not concerned that the plagues and punishments promised in the bible to those who so tamper with its (unique) truths will fall upon him. After all, it is only by *his own* practical reason (via his conscience) that he can be judged.[79]

In keeping with Kant's 'just as if' view of Christ and the bible, the young Hegel penned an essay entitled The Life of Jesus (1795), which commentators note "follows the example of Kant."[80] Indeed, the whole of Kant's criticism against the Christianity of his day can be summed up in the words that Hegel 'makes' Jesus say:

Jesus told them [the *religious* leaders]: "When you regard

> your ecclesiastical statutes and positive precepts as the highest law given to mankind, you fail to recognize man's dignity and his capacity to derive from his own self the concept of divinity and the comprehension of the divine will. Whoever does not honor this capacity within himself does not revere the Deity. That which a human being is able to call his self, that which transcends death and destruction and will determine its own just deserts, is capable of governing itself. It makes itself known as reason; when it legislates, it does not depend on anything beyond itself; nor can it delegate a different standard of judgment to any other authority in heaven or on earth.[81]

What is interesting is that Kant did not elect to do what Hegel and others did: to blatantly rewrite the 'bible story' and to condemn those who did not conform to its (new) interpretation. Notwithstanding that Kant held that "there is no human interpreter of the Scriptures authorized by God" and that the "people want to be led, that is (as demagogues say), they want to be duped," Kant refused to say more than he believed to be true.[82] He did not, it appears, wish to distance himself anymore than he deemed necessary from those 'duped' sectarians who felt it was their *religious* duty to attend Church and partake of the sacraments, ordinances, and creeds thereof.[83]

Kant's moral re-interpretation of scriptural prophecy entailed that a great restoration (to which Luther also looked) would surely occur. Kant looked at this prophesied *restoration* as a time in which the division of sects would disappear among *enlightened* Catholics and Protestants, who "while holding to their own dogmas, could thus look upon each other as brothers in faith, while expecting and striving

toward this end."[84]

It is *in* this new interpretation of scripture that Kant has committed, in my judgment, an act of sophistry. He states, on the one hand, that scripture cannot interpret scripture; but--on the other hand--a moral reinterpretation must be imposed upon it: alias, his view of 'the restoration of all things.'[85] Adamantly stating that only our own (i.e., human) reason suffices to interpret scripture, Kant then slyly introduces the notion that it is "God who speaks" through our own morally practical reason "as an infallible interpreter of his words in the scriptures."[86]

We cannot rest too securely on the concept of this (Kantian) 'God who speaks' as other than '*a manner* of speaking,' however, for Kant also refers to *instinct* as "that voice of God that all animals obey."[87] It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that Kant is not referring to an actual God (or voice thereof) who actually speaks to our reason.[88] His (somewhat sly) purpose for introducing language such as 'a God who speaks to us' is a lot more subtle than that.[89] Indeed, it (at least) borders on sophistry. True to the *sly* rule, Kant--it appears--is convinced that only *man's* own reason is supreme in judging all matters (including scripture), but he does not consistently stick to that theme.[90] One senses that he is still trying to 'win over converts' from sectarianism and so uses accommodating language to lure them into his way of thinking. Hence, Nietzsche's

condemnation of Kant as "an underhanded Christian" may be well-deserved--if Kant is in fact 'a *believing* Christian.'[91] But as we shall shortly see, Nietzsche's condemnation may have been a bit too hasty.

That Kant did not believe in Christ as the Chosen Messiah foretold in biblical scripture and hence did not even profess Christ as his personal Savior and Master has already been established. In addition to debunking the evangelical message of Christ's atonement (as *genuine* forgiveness of sins[92]), Kant directly states that what the Apostle Paul proclaims as the (literal) *resurrection* of Christ is simply not true, from a logical point of view. As Kant pointedly puts it: "So the apostle's conclusion: 'If Christ had not risen' (if his body had not come to life), 'neither would we rise again' (we would not continue to live after death) is not valid."[93] Kant openly denies Christ as *the* Christ in that he denies any belief in the actual resurrection of a *tangible* body.[94]

Although it is *possible*, according to the *sly* rule, that Kant privately (or secretly) believed in Jesus *as Christ* (or as Lord and Savior), the *external* evidence so presented (i.e., Kant's own words) contradicts that claim. For even if we were to bend over backwards, so to speak, and employ the *shy* rule in defense of Kant as "a believing Christian," we can see that Kant ventures to assert views that clearly oppose (and directly deny) even the simplest, most minimal view of 'a (truly) believing Christian' (namely, that of the triune

faith). Hence, even the *shy* rule cannot defend Kant against the denial that he is 'a believing Christian.' I rest my case, therefore, that based on Kant's own statements which contradict belief in Christ--*as the Christ*, the Savior and Lord of all 'Christians'--and based on both the *sly* and (even) the *shy* rules, Kant is not 'a *believing* Christian."

In response, I suppose, Kantians--who are sympathetic to a 'Christian' reading of Kant--might claim that I have created a 'straw man' (via the triune faith argument) simply to show how it is possible to view Kant as merely a moralist (e.g., as distinguished from one who truly believes *in* Christ). To be *perfectly* (or at least *especially*) fair, therefore, Kant's *own* defense against the charge (made by Kant's Sovereign King, Friedrich Wilhelm II) that he distorted basic tenets of both the bible and of Christianity can be brought 'before the bench' (so to speak) for a closer examination. At the risk of tipping the scales in favor of Kant (i.e., of tainting 'the scales of judgment' with partiality), I will not enter the *triune-faith* concept as evidence against Kant in *this* proceeding (as agreed). Having said that, however, does not entail that I need limit my cross-examination to but Kant's *moral* interpretation of scripture.

Christianity as a religion (B)

In this second perspective of Kant's criticisms against Christianity, we will examine two key points of the 'Royal

Order' together with Kant's replies. As promised, I will implement the *silent* rule in defense of Kant (i.e., 'that one need not tell all the truth in public').

In order to facilitate the nature of the accusations made against Kant by the office of Kant's Sovereign--the Prussian King--I think it would be useful to quote those accusations, as follows:

> Our most high person has long observed with great displeasure how you misuse your philosophy to distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity; how you have done this particularly in your book *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, as well as in other shorter treatises. We expected better things of you, as you yourself must realize how irresponsibly you have acted against your duty as a teacher of youth and against our paternal purpose, which you know very well. We demand..and expect that in the future, to avoid our highest disfavor, you will be guilty of no such fault, but rather, in keeping with your duty, apply your authority and your talents to the progressive realization of our paternal purpose. Failing this, you must expect unpleasant measures for your continuing obstinacy.[95]

Of the six points Kant makes in reply, I think it suffices to examine but two: namely (in Kant's own words), 1) "I am not guilty of depreciating Christianity in that book [i.e., Religion)"; and 2) "My true respect for Christianity is demonstrated by my extolling the Bible as the best available guide for the grounding and support of a truly moral state religion."[96]

Point #1: In challenging his accusers "to point out a single case" in which he depreciated Christianity, Kant

hastens to add that his moral interpretation of scripture does not constitute 'depreciation.' He even adds that this 'practical use' of interpreting scripture "*must* be urged on us openly" consistent with the task for which he wrote his Religion: "in order to determine how religion may be inculcated most clearly *and forcefully* into the hearts of men."[97]

In evaluating Kant's defense in this regard, it is important to note that Kant is not arguing that he is a Christian--merely that he is 'not guilty' of *depreciating* the Christian religion. Under the *silent* rule, Kant is not required to state all the truth regarding his position on this subject. Hence, it is possible that *publicly* Kant may appear to exonerate himself from the (Rosicrusian) court of the Prussian King. King Wilhelm II (it could be argued) however, was not interested in a tit-for-tat academic argument with Kant regarding Kant's view on religion, but merely that Kant would agree to become silent on this subject.[98] In a revised version of the actual letter Kant sent to his King (as revised by Kant in his Conflict of the Faculties), Kant argues that because he makes "no appraisal of Christianity," he cannot be "guilty of disparaging it." Kant then argues that his practice to "cite some biblical texts to corroborate certain purely rational teachings in religion" is an acceptable practice, having been used by Johann David Michaelis [1717-91], a Professor of Theology in Goettingen.[99]

It is also insightful to note that Kant has shifted his position from *adamantly asserting* the correctness of interpreting the bible *morally* (in his original letter to the King, dated 12 Oct. 1794) to a *cautious defense* of that same position (in his *revised* version published in The Conflict of the Faculties, 1798). Whereas Kant had challenged the King to find even one single case in which he depreciated Christianity, he now refers to his 'moral interpretation of scripture' as "the only possible occasion" for the King's disfavor.[100] I think it is clear that Kant implemented his *silent* rule in the official version (in which he did not feel obliged to tell *all* the truth) but now in the *revised* version indicates a little more of that truth. And that truth, arguably, is that Kant did indeed make an appraisal of the Christian religion (contrary to his public statement) in that he appraised it (negatively) via his *moral* interpretation.[101]

Point #2: Kant argues that he has 'extolled the bible' and hence has demonstrated 'true respect for Christianity.' My difficulty in accepting this statement at face-value is that Kant hastens to add a number of riders to the way in which he (supposedly) *extolled* the bible. For Kant claims that he has 'extolled the bible' with the following conditions: a) that "the holy, *practical [i.e., moral]* content" of the bible "will always remain as the inner and essential part of religion"; and b) that the bible is "the best available guide for the grounding and support of a truly moral state religion."[102] As

can be carefully noted, however, Kant has extolled *only* those parts of the bible that are applicable (and useful) towards his 'truly *moral* state religion.' That is, he extols the bible *only insofar as it agrees* (in *moral* reinterpretation) with his *moral* order. The point has been established (throughout the earlier portion of this chapter), I think, that Kant has (critically) *appraised* Christianity in that he *depreciated* its religiosity, its customs, creeds, ordinances and even its multitude of diverse churches.

In short, we can see that via the *silent* rule Kant does (or is allowed to) 'save face' in front of the royal court and his peers (of the Enlightenment) and in that sense should not be *publicly* brought to task. After all, he did state 'the truth' (as he *sincerely* believed it) even though it was not, arguably--the whole truth. Is it not possible, however, to be (truly) *sincere* and yet deceived? It is to this question (of *sincerity*) that we now turn in order to more fully examine to what extent Kant's moral thought is or is not *religious*.

3. Was Kant a 'Religionist'?

In this section in which we examine Kant's view of 'Christianity *as an example* of religion" (whereby Kant praises Christianity), we need to ask ourselves what is intended by the term *religion*. That is, the question ultimately comes down to asking whether Kant's (or any other philosopher's) merely *moral* definition of 'religion' is adequate (or complete) as a

definition for the 'religiosity of religious experience'; or whether a *historical* definition of religion is--in the *final* analysis (via the test of time)--the definition of choice? Put another way, the question to be addressed is: which definition (the Kantian *moral* one or the traditionally *historic* one) best suits 'the facts' of the human experience in *religion*?

Consistent with Kant's view of mankind's need for a *master*, I will consider the 'religionist' as *a believer* who chooses to subject himself or herself to a 'greater-than-thou' authority, that is, an authority perceived as *preferable* (by the *believer*) over the mere *human* element.[103] This submission to a higher authority may (though not *necessarily*) override one's own individual powers of reasoning (as by *divine* will, for example). Having said that, I think Kant's doctrine of *the idea of God* will no doubt require close scrutiny. At bottom--in achieving a more complete analysis thereby and in examining whether Kant's *moral* reinterpretation of Christianity constitutes a *genuine* religion--is the highly controversial query: What is *religious* about Kant's view of (Christianity *as an example* of) religion apart from Kant's own *moral* thought?

That Kant deprecated the traditional view of Christianity as a religion in denouncing the need for *religious* rituals, *religious* customs, and *religious* laws has already been established. Kant even goes so far as to decry the Apostle Paul's contributions to 'Christian dogma' by stating that Paul not only failed to promote but in fact hindered "the real end

of religious teaching--the development of morally better men."[104] It is to this 'real end' that Kant singles out Christianity *as an example* of the sort of religion he would prefer to promote. In praise of the Christian religion in this regard, Kant (as was stated earlier in this chapter) not only sees Christianity as 'the *most* adequate' example of religion, and in fact the very *idea* of religion; he goes so far as to say that the Christian religion *alone* is 'moral.'[105]

With such highly idealistic notions of the (possible) purity of the Christian faith, it is little wonder that enthusiasts praised Kant in the following terms: 1) "God spake: Let there be light; and there came--the Kantian philosophy" (Fernow); 2) Kant is "the second Messiah" (Prof. von Baggasen); 3) the Kantian philosophy "will bring back the religion of Jesus to its original purity" (Stilling); 4) "on reading Kant one feels like stepping into a lighted room" (Goethe); 5) Kant is not a mere "light of the world" but "a whole solar system in one" (Jean Paul Richter); 6) if Christ had heard Kant, he probably would have said "*That* is what I meant to teach" (Kiesewetter); and 7) in a century, Kant will have "the reputation of Jesus Christ" (Reinhold).[106]

Perhaps the clearest reason (amid the enthusiasm) for so praising Kant (as on par with Christ) can be see in Reinhold's evaluation of the situation: "Kant's book on Religion has given me the indescribable comfort of being able to call myself openly, and with a good conscience, a Christian."[107]

And, perhaps, it is for a similar reason that many Kantian commentators today insist that it is *mistaken* to interpret Kant in other than a Christian light.[108]

That is, if (as Kant states) Christianity's objective is "*to promote love* of the concern for observing one's duty" and if there is no true love without respect, then perhaps these sympathizers (towards a *Christian* interpretation of Kant) feel that without this *Christian* flavor to Kant, Christianity could not *promote* this love. Simply put, Christianity could not properly promote this love (as defined above), insofar as intellectuals lacked respect for the Christian religion (in that they perceived it to be without the blessing of *reason*).[109] For in so understanding Kant's moral thought to be a *respectable* way to interpret the Christian faith, even intellectuals (especially those 'of little faith'[110]) could freely fulfil the injunction to 'promote (this dutiful) love' *with a good conscience*. To respect Kant's interpretation of Christianity--as *Christian*--it seems, can be perceived as bringing respect to the Christian religion. Nonetheless, the doubt persists: Was Kant's (new) interpretation of Christianity (truly) Christian?[111]

In considering (once again) in what way Kant's religion is *religious*, we are led to the conclusion that the key difference between Kant's *moral* thought, per se, and his (supposedly) *religious* thought is the introduction of the Ideals of Reason--in particular, his concept of 'the idea of

God.' As promised, I will introduce Kant's *sincere* rule in defense of his (supposedly) *religious* view of God (namely, that even if what is professed to be true is in fact untrue, that one *sincerely* believes the 'untruth' *as if* it were true *must* be guaranteed). Accordingly, we will compare Kant's 'God' to that of the Bible, as well as that of the philosophers; and then closely examine what Kant actually intended by his doctrine 'the *idea* of God.'

Count Leo Tolstoy admired Kant because he perceived him to separate the 'religion of Christ' from the 'Christian religion'[112] in that (Tolstoy thought) Kant followed Christ's example and not that of institutionalized Christianity.[113] Although Tolstoy (mistakenly) believed Kant to be a worshipper of Christ (like himself), his political motto--'Resist not evil'--oddly resembles Kant's own views.[114] Like Tolstoy, many commentators who have a *Christian* interpretation of Kant believe that Kant's *religion* is compatible with that of the Bible, that is, of 'the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' (as Pascal might say).

But as we have already seen, Kant disparages any adherence to the Old Testament as well as to Church rituals interpreted from the New Testament.[115] And has already been shown, Kant does not view 'forgiveness of sins' as even possible through an atonement, and certainly not through a *free* act of grace.[116] Such beliefs as that of the God of Abraham and Isaac telling Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac,

Kant sees *as absurd as* the (supposedly, literal) 'miracle' of Christ's resurrection (as was earlier discussed).[117] In short, we see that although the tendency to interpret Kant's views on religion as consistent with the traditional 'God of the Bible' still persists to this day, Kant *sincerely* disparages such a notion, according to his own words.[118]

As to a belief in the 'god of the philosophers,' that is, in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine, we can likewise see in short order that Kant's views do not coincide. To proceed in reverse sequence, the supposition that Kant's views were Augustinian has already been shown to be inaccurate (earlier in this chapter); that they were Aristotelian is also denied by Kant scholars, who even insist that "Kant was not familiar with Aristotle's philosophy"[119]; and that they were Platonic is denied even more emphatically by Kant himself. In his first Critique, Kant states (what he considers to be) the key underlying defect in Plato's thought:

> The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. *It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses*, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance--meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion.[120]

As has been shown, Kant holds that Plato's key assumption is unduly *formalistic* in that Plato 'leaves the world of the

senses' via his Theory of Forms. Although Kant does admit that *an ideal* would be considered in Plato's view as "an idea of the divine understanding," he does not connect his own 'idea of God' with that of Plato's divine Form.[121] As we have seen, therefore, Kant's 'god' is not that of the philosophers.

Kant's *Idea of God*

Ralph Walker in his pivotal work, Kant, encapsulates Kant's view of God in the following two sentences:

> Kant thinks, we have a need to employ regulatively the ideas of the world as a totality and of God as its creator, and we are perfectly entitled to do so; but we cannot claim knowledge about such things, for they are not objects of possible experience. (We cannot claim practical knowledge of them either; pure practical reason does not require belief in a creator, but only in a God who helps to bring about the Highest Good.)[122]

The confusion can easily arise as to whether or not Kant's thought reflects a belief in an actual God, or only in *the idea* of God. That is, does Kant *qua* philosopher simply believe that we are not justified (from a theoretical point of reason) in believing in an *actual* God; or does his theory of *the idea* of God suggest that (aside from the epistemological issue) there simply cannot be such 'a thing' as an *actual* God (who exists here-and-now *within* our phenomenal world)? As I shall attempt to show shortly, Kant's position appears to be the latter concept.

Before I plunge into a number of quotes from Kant's own works that may help to explicate Kant's view of God--as an

ideal of reason--I should like to relate (what I consider to be) a rather useful analogy to Kant's 'idea of God.' In Viktor Frankl's (true) account of his private experiences in a Nazi concentration camp, he relates how (in the bottom of his despair) his *wife's image* clung to his mind *as if* she were present--living and breathing--before him. He states that whether she was *actually alive* or not ceased to be important: the fact of her 'image' before his mind gave him a refuge from his deplorable emptiness, preserving both his sanity and his will to live.[123]

In a similar--though not identical--way, I would add, Kant's *idea* of God (as an inspiring *Ideal*) *can* apply.[124] For Kant, it is not necessary to know whether God *actually* does exist: what is vital is that the moral person *sincerely* believes in this 'idea of God' *as if* God did in fact exist.[125] Although Kant may appear to be mincing words, or worse, to be proposing a *noble lie* (e.g., to knowingly propagate 'a lie' as to God's supposed existence in order to preserve a greater *moral* good), he is not proposing that we *merely* pretend there is a God.[126] That would be a *religious* postulate. Kant, instead, insists that his 'idea of God' forms a *moral* postulate whereby it *must necessarily* be presupposed in order to validate morality itself. For without this 'idea of God,' morality itself would lose its "springs of purpose and action" and the moral laws would become "empty figments of the brain."[127] As Kant explains:

> But our morality has need of *the idea* of God to give it emphasis. Thus it should not make us more learned, but better, wiser, and more upright. For if there is a supreme being who can and will make us happy, and if there is another life, then our moral dispositions will thereby receive more strength and nourishment, and our moral conduct will be made firmer.[128]

It is for this reason that metaphysics must continue to be the handmaid of theology, and the bulwark for religion.[129] Yet as Kant is quick to add: "But one does not rightly know 'whether this handmaid carries the torch before her gracious lady or bears her train behind her.'"[130] And we can see the truth behind this 'jest,' in that by the time Kant had written his second Critique (1788), he had already demoted the 'idea of God' to secondary importance behind his 'idea of freedom.'[131] To all appearances, then, this 'handmaid' now 'carries the torch.'

Kant is careful, however, to avoid what he calls *lazy reason*, the use of reason "to say that something is [simply] due to God's omnipotence." For it is not the correct use of reason, says Kant, to "posit God as the ground of everything."[132] Indeed, as he attempts to clarify in his first Critique:

> But it is evident that in this way of representing the principle as involving *the idea* of a supreme Author, I do not base the principle upon the existence and upon the knowledge of such a being, *but upon its idea only*, and that I do not really derive anything from this being, but only from *the idea* of it. (A701/B729)

Kant does, however, offer his *moral argument* (chiefly, in the

second Critique) to demonstrate how it is possible to conceive of God--within the intelligible (or *moral*) standpoint.[133] Lewis White Beck presents Kant's 'moral argument' in the following manner:

1. Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will.
2. Man's will is not the cause of nature and does not bring nature into complete harmony with the principles of his will.
3. There is, therefore, no ground in the moral law (or in nature) for expecting a necessary connection between morality and happiness of men.
4. But such a connection, in the concept of the *summum bonum* [the 'highest good'], is postulated in the command that we ought to see the *summum bonum*.
5. The highest good must, therefore, be possible.
6. Therefore, a cause adequate to it must be postulated.
7. Such a cause must be the Author of nature, acting through understanding and will. Such a being is God.[134]

Mary-Barbara Zeldin, on the other hand, broadens her interpretation of Kant's 'moral argument' to include the concept of the *fact of reason*[135] and presents a slightly different version (than Beck's):

1) The moral law is a fact for all rational beings.
2) It commands categorically to finite rational beings.
3) It commands us
   a) to promote the *summum bonum* (highest complete good); or
   b) to achieve the *summum bonum*.
4) We cannot logically be commanded [to do] what is logically or really impossible.
5) The promotion or achievement of the *summum bonum* is logically and really possible only if the *summum bonum* is logically and really possible.
6) The *summum bonum* is really possible, for the understanding of a finite rational being, only if God exists.
7) Hence, if a) we are to do our duty and thus promote the *summum bonum*; or b) we are to do our duty and

achieve the *summum bonum*, we must postulate that God exists.

8) Since we are categorically commanded to do our duty, the postulate is necessary: the belief in the existence of God is a necessary belief of a finite rational being, i.e., it is a belief of his practical reason or a necessary moral belief.[136]

In considering the above 'arguments for the existence of God,' it is important to remember that Kant's *moral argument* is *not* a proof for the existence of God. It is simply a statement detailing how it is possible to conceive of (at least, *the idea of*) the existence of God as *morally* necessary. To put it plainly, despite these 'moral arguments *for the existence* of God,' Kant does not think it is *necessary* to presuppose more than the *idea* of God. The practical (or *assertorical*) faith, says Kant, "needs merely *the idea of God*." "Indeed," Kant continues, "the *minimum* of knowledge (it is possible *there may be* a God) must suffice, subjectively, for whatever can be made the duty of every man."[137]

For Kant, then, it is crucial that we not think it necessary to *actually* prove or discover the *actual* existence of an *actual* God for ourselves. Not only would that be impossible (according to the limits of reason itself), it would be counterproductive. As Kant carefully argues:

> Hence our faith is not scientific knowledge, and thank heaven it is not! For God's wisdom is apparent in the very fact that we do not *know* that God exists, but should *believe* that God exists. *For suppose we could attain to scientific knowledge of God's existence,* through our experience or in some other way (even if the possibility of this knowledge cannot immediately be thought). And suppose further that we could really reach as much

> certainty through this knowledge as we do in intuition. *Then in this case, all our morality would break down.* In his every action, man would represent God to himself as a rewarder or avenger. This image would force itself involuntarily on his soul, and his hope for reward and fear of punishment would take the place of moral motives. Man would be virtuous out of sensuous impulses.[138]

Although no one can boast that she or he *knows* there is a God, Kant says, no one can *know* the opposite either.[139] For even if Nietzsche is correct in his assertion that 'God is dead,'[140] Kant would reply that the *fear* of the (potential) existence of a God could serve as a 'negative belief,' that is, as "a powerful check upon the outbreak of evil sentiments."[141] Hence, in a mode indicative of 'Pascal's Wager,'[142] Kant wants to say that we cannot lose in placing our chips, so to speak, in favor of a positive belief (via moral faith) in the *idea* of God--*as if* God did in fact exist.

In evaluating Kant's doctrine of *the idea of God,*' we can hardly doubt that Kant is *sincere*. And in agreeing with Kant that no one can *know* whether God actually exists (although we are entitled, even obliged, to *morally* assume that existence), we are nevertheless aware of the possibility of believing *a lie*. According to the *sincere* rule, however, in defense of Kant--*sincerity* is of utmost importance here. Otherwise, the *moral* purity of this *moral* postulate would be forfeited, along with the relevance and usefulness of such a concept. Although Kant admits that we will not tend to "remain satisfied" with the *mere idea* of God as a regulative principle of reason, he can offer little further support than to remind us that

together with the moral law, "the Kingdom of God is within," a reference not only to scripture but to Kant's own 'intelligible world.'[143]

4. Kant's Motive in his *Religious* Works

If certain Kant scholars wish to see Kant as a 'closet theologian' (as has been already suggested), then perhaps it is time to take Kant out of his (supposed) 'theological closet.' Allen Wood--who began the (Anglo-American) tradition of viewing Kant's philosophy in a *religious* light--has recently begun to rethink Kant's religion. In revealing 'a crack' in Kant's view of *theism,* Wood admits that (contrary to Kant's own claims) Kant is "accurately described *as a deist*."[144] Wood justifies his newly revised position by stating that "Kant's definition of 'deism,' however, is idiosyncratic, less a reflection of common seventeenth and eighteenth-century usage than a device to deflect reproach from Kant's own heterodox religious views."[145] It seems that if Kant's projected use of a *newly* defined term does not meet the test of time (now more than two centuries later), then it is permissible--according to (my reading of) Wood--to *correct* our interpretation of Kant's views in that regard.

Following that lead, therefore, I should like to sum up my own interpretation of Kant's *religion* based upon Kant's own words as well as the *historically* evolved definition of that term--religion. That is, as the test of time (or history) has

shown, Kant's religion--as a *religion*--has not fared any better than Plato's theory of The Republic--as a political reality. Despite the fact that Kant attempted to distance himself from Plato's Republic by calling it a "mere phantom of the brain," there is a striking resemblance--in (lack of) practicality--between the two theories.[146] As Plato, arguably, wrote his Republic without intending it to be a realistic *proof* of a genuinely feasible way of life for Athenians but merely as a *spoof* (or affront) to the Spartan influence in Athenian Greek life; so likewise, it can be argued, Kant did not intend his Religion as an everyday lifestyle for Prussian society, but as a *spoof* (or affront) to the Romanticist influence in German life. That is--as I argue, Kant had wished to check the tendency among promising intellectuals to rely on (or trust) traditional *religious* methodology which placed passion *before* persuasion, faith *before* reason, feeling *before* thinking. Kant wished to show (especially to the Romanticists) that passion and feeling have their place: behind reason.

Although some Kant scholars have claimed that Kant founded a (new) religion of 'Moral Theology,' my personal view is that Kantianism is not a religion: it is a morality.[147] Religion--as Kant perceived it to be in his day--was not acceptable to Kant in lieu of morality.[148] Indeed, Kant attempted to carefully and cautiously build a case, especially via his book Religion to show why *religion* (as we know it)

needs not only to be based upon morality, but to gradually be replaced by it from the inside out (i.e., beginning with *the new core* of religion: pure practical reason permeating from the center eventually to its entirety).[149] For despite Kant's patience in tolerating the 'restoration' of *enlightened* sectarians to come together into one religion of pure reason, Kant's ultimate goal was to eliminate all the trappings of religiosity in religion (as representative of *religion* itself) thereby eliminating *religion* as it is commonly understood.[150] In other words, Kant's Religion, I maintain, was intended as a *Trojan horse* presented especially to the (religious) Romanticists of Kant's day in yet another life-long effort to curb the advance of *Schwärmerei*, or 'fanaticism' (as Kant perceived religious *passion* to be).

B. What is 'Religious Passion' for Kant?

Granted (from the foregoing) that Kant's belief in religion was but a 'nominal' belief (i.e., in name only)--as I hold--what more probable motive could Kant have in culminating his mature works with an analysis of *religion* (within the limits of reason alone) than that of attempting to curb the passion of (religious) Romantics? For now that we have concluded that Kant determined not simply to *reform* the religious practices of his day but to (eventually) *replace* them with (pure practical) reason from within, the questions

to be examined are not simply *whether* Kant pursued this course of action (i.e., to attempt to curb *religious* passion), but *what* was his desired outcome in his lifelong struggle with the Romantics? Before we approach these questions, however, we need to understand what Kant quite likely intended by *religious* passion.

1. Definition of Religious Passion

It should be borne in mind that although Kant 'respected' religion as to its *form,* he opposed the practices of religion (in his day) because he perceived the subjugation of one's reason to *religious* passion to be not simply improper but harmful.[151] Indeed, as Kant points out in his first Critique (in 1781), to abandon the "guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from *the idea* of the Supreme Being" is not only fanatical and impious; it perverts and frustrates "the ultimate ends of reason."[152]

Before we examine the textual 'proofs' necessary to demonstrate whether or not Kant was opposed to *religious* passion, allow me to summarize (in a sentence) the key elements in that concept. *Passion,* for Kant, is chiefly perceived as an anti-rational *intellectual* position invariably accompanied by emotions (usually of a religious nature, typically promoted as the inspiration of 'genius') that lack the support of reason, and hence of morality, as well. This

(negative) view of passion is not to be confused with *religious feeling*, however, as Kant attempts to clarify:

> The admiration for [the] beauty [of nature], as well as the emotion aroused by the so diverse purposes of nature, that a meditative mind is able to feel even before it has a clear conception of an intelligent author of the world, have something about them similar to a *religious* feeling.[153]

As this passage indicates, a *religious* feeling is not viewed in the negative way that passion is. Indeed, Kant divides 'passion' into two categories: 1) *ardent* passions (of natural inclination); and 2) *cold* passions (acquired by human culture).[154]

As I will attempt to show, these two types of passion share a common ground: namely, that of *religious* passion. One may picture the spheres (of influence) of these two types of passion as the circles (or spheres) of a (three-dimensional) Venn diagram which intersect, the *common* partition (as the center or *heart* of passion) being *religious* passion, per se. Although each of these types of passion can be distinguished from the other, (I will attempt to show that) Kant viewed 'passion' as being *essentially* religious in nature (that is, once one scratches the surface--so to speak--of these two types of passion, one finds the trademarks of *religious zeal*).

Briefly stated, then, there are three senses of passion: 1) *cold* passion, which is actively and intellectually opposed to reason (as counter-Enlightenment); 2) *ardent* passion, which is accompanied by (usually strong) emotions (e.g., adoration)

that are not supported by reason (e.g., mysticism) and that therefore cause us to lose control over our reasoning powers *as primary*; and 3) *religious* passion proper, which tends to have a hidden (religious) agenda outside the domain of reason. An example of this hidden agenda is the scholastic attempt to offer dogmatic proofs--as *divinely inspired* or approved--to show that God actually exists and that as a consequence, believers can achieve heavenly bliss and perfect freedom, by mere faith *in God--or in his representatives*).

2. Kant's Opposition to *Religious* Passion

In answer to the earlier query whether Kant was opposed to *religious* passion, I will presently show how Kant could conceivably arrive at these three aspects of passion. In so presenting that exposé, I will address as well the final query, as to how it is that the two divisions of passion (Kant speaks of) actually point towards one common ground--that of *religious* passion.

Cold Passion

When Kant speaks of *cold* passion (as intellectually opposed to reason), he states that it is "an evil without exception."[155] Perhaps with the fiery temperament of *religious* Romantics in mind, Kant explains how it is that passion can become *evil*:

A *[cold] passion* is a sensible *desire* that has become a

> lasting inclination (e.g., *hatred*, as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up to it *permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it* and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (*as something premeditated*) into its maxim. And the evil is then *properly* evil, that is, a true *vice*.[156]

Indeed, *cold* passion "can co-exist even with [intellectually] subtle reasoning," Kant affirms.[157] For in speaking of the genius of Herder--as one of the Romantics,[158] Kant makes it clear that it is the *religious* element in their cold passion that he abhors:

> The adepts of genius, who must lay claim to genius and can only count on the approval of people of genius, are those who cannot communicate but must count for comprehension only upon a communal, sympathetic inspiration...*The artifice consists of scraps [Brocken] of science and learning sewn together* with the prestige of an original spirit, criticism of others, and *a deeply hidden religious sense*, to give the laundry [*Gewäsche*] dignity.[159]

Similar to Herder's 'scraps of science and learning sewn together,' Kant describes the subtle sophistication of *casuistry* as "neither a science nor a part of a science," but as a doctrine that is "woven into ethics in a fragmentary way."[160]

That Kant abhorred the cold passion of the romantics (whom he designates as *Schwärmer*, or 'enthusiasts'), especially that of Herder, can be made clear in the following quotes: 1) "Herder corrupts minds because he gives them encouragement to make universal judgments using merely

empirical reason without any thorough consideration of principles"; 2) these *enthusiasts* "want to intuit all aspects at once. Everything mystical is welcome to them; they see unheard-of things in enthusiastic writings or best of all in ancient texts"; 3) this religious *fanaticism* "exceeds all limits of the maxims of reason"; 4) the imagination has to be disciplined; otherwise, one risks "losing track of the actual by crediting the unreal"; and 5) by imagining something in the object, the enthusiast comes to believe he can find all his phantoms in the Bible: "It is not that they [the enthusiasts] learn these things in the Bible so much as they read them into it."[161]

Kant's outrage at this tendency for (religious) *enthusiasts* to persist in this deliberate opposition to 'reason' can be seen in the following quote:

> But if we regard certain judgments and insights as issuing directly from inner sense (without the mediation of understanding), and regard inner sense as laying down the law on its own, and sensations as judgments, we fall into sheer fanaticism, which is closely related to derangement of the senses.[162]

The problem with (cold) passion, says Kant, is that it makes it "difficult or impossible for us to determine our power of choice through principles."[163] Partly in despair, Kant reckons cold passion to be as incurable "as cancerous sores," for it is an inclination "that the subject's reason can subdue only with difficulty or not at all." Ironically, in refusing to be corrected and in shunning the *rule of principle*, Kant

points out, (cold) passion has resisted its only means of being *healed.*[164] It should be clear, I think, that not only is Kant adamantly opposed to *cold* passion; he has identified it with the religious tendencies of the romanticist movement.

Ardent Passion

Although ardent passions are (in theory) attempts to gain freedom by doing whatever we well please, Kant states that this (so-called) *freedom* to go anywhere will lead to nowhere--unless it is disciplined via a concrete goal. To have ardent passions, Kant argues, is akin to being in chains, for not only does this type of passion do "the greatest damage to freedom," it abolishes freedom altogether.[165]

Kant's description of '(religious) adoration' as 'a sinking mood' that annihilates people "in their own eyes" is an apt example of how ardent passion can cause one to lose control, and hence one's freedom.[166] For Kant, this 'playing of emotions' expressed by religious devotion is unacceptable as it causes one to lose control and to become enslaved to ardent passions. As Kant puts it: "One should never be beside oneself, but rather in possession of oneself."[167]

Because (ardent) passions are inclinations of delusion for honor, power, and possession and because they exemplify envy, ingratitude, and malice, we should take care--Kant admonishes--that our inclinations do not develop into passion.[168] For it is mystical (religious) fanaticism of this

sort that has become the disease of Christianity. *True* Enlightenment is distinct from this need to *ardently* seek revelations as if they were necessary to religion.[169]

As with cold passion, then, ardent passion does have a religious dimension. And it is to both the religious dimension and the nature of passion itself that Kant--as has been seen--opposes passion. To understand more clearly why Kant so adamantly opposes this *religious* element in passion, let us examine the nature of *religious* passion itself.

Religious Passion

Religious passion, for Kant, is cunning and hidden "like a stream that burrows ever deeper in its bed."[170] No philosopher can accept that Providence has wisely implanted (religious) passion as incentives in order to accomplish 'great things,' Kant says, for "wisdom admits no passion." Furthermore, Providence simply did not will that our inclinations must become passions.[171] To believe that (*It* did) is to believe in religious passion, the purpose of which (Kant states) is merely "to manipulate all orthodox believers about like children, no matter how sourly they react."[172]

Kant saw that religion from the start was "part of the dangers involved in *Schwärmerei* ['religious passion']."[173] For these enthusiasts were continually trying to be the 'favorites of heaven' presuming that they could have "a fancied occult *intercourse* with God."[174] Service to God, for

Kant, did not consist of "mere feelings."[175] The purpose of the Enlightenment was to advance reason, not to promote via religious passion an "occult symbolism."[176] Religious passion could never be *sublime*, Kant argues, simply because to be (truly) sublime, it would have to "rise above certain obstacles of sensibility by means of *moral* principles," which would be--by definition--the antithesis of *passion*.[177]

Having said that, we should not confuse *religious* passion with *genuine* enthusiasm. Enthusiasm accompanies the 'idea of the good' as an *affect* (specifically, as '*the* effect') of this idea. 'Genuine enthusiasm,' Kant says, "always moves only toward what is ideal and, indeed, to what is purely moral, such as the concept of right, and it cannot be grafted onto self-interest."[178] We have seen, therefore, that Kant opposes religious passion because it does not adhere to the 'rule of principle' and because its (hidden) agenda is in actuality the antithesis of reason itself. There can hardly be a greater threat to the human condition, for Kant.

Kant's Opposition

In understanding the concept of moral character in Kant (in Chapter Two), we saw that human nature tended to exceed its proper limitations both as to moral reason and as to moral feeling. In religious jargon, that amounts to *sin*. Accordingly, we can see the similar relation of *religious* passion to Kant's philosophy as a whole. For example, if we

consider *sin* in its literal sense to mean 'missing the target (as in overstepping or transgressing the law),' then with respect to theoretical reason, the tendency for it to 'miss (i.e., overstep) the mark' (or exceed its own boundaries) leads to *illusions*.[179] The proposed solution is to understand and accept the limits of theoretical reason, and to look for morality in *practical* reason, not in theoretical--that is, to 'deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.'[180]

As we also saw in Chapter Two, the tendency for moral feelings to '(miss or) go beyond the mark' leads to (a negative sense of) enthusiasm and a loss of respect (which in turn affects the quality of love). The proposed solution is to recognize and understand the *imagination* as different and separate in function from *fancy*. In so doing, we would be able to maintain the discipline needed to ensure our dedication to our *duty*. In this present Chapter, we have seen that the tendency for morality (as practical reason) to '(miss or) go beyond its mark' as it is blended with religion (in its denial of knowledge in making room for faith) leads to *religious* passion. The proposed solution is to permit (or tolerate) *moral* principles (as the *good* 'moral seed' within one's character) in order to (eventually) establish reason in place of (the weeds of) *religious* rituals and traditions (which are currently the hallmarks used to identify the essence of any given religion).

In short, we can see that there is a place for reason,

morality, moral feeling, and even 'religion' (within limitations[181]) in Kant's philosophy but there is absolutely no place provided for *religious passion*. On the contrary, Kant consistently points to religious passion as instances of what *not* to do--as a moralist.

3. An Unbelieving Kant seen as Unfeeling

As we have seen in Chapter One (the background), Kant dedicated his life and his writings to attempt to curb (what he deemed to be) the *insidious* tendencies of the (early) German *Sturm und Drang* and (later) Romanticist movements to place *religious* passion before *reasoned* persuasion. Although Kant initially believed that such 'a mad course' (as he called it) would burn itself out (as a *bright meteorite*), he was grieved at its dogged persistence.[182] It did not help matters either to watch his own disciples (Hamann, Herder, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and even Reinhold) become the key instigators and proponents of the (religious) romanticist movement.

To many Kant scholars, the defection of Kantians to the opposing team may not seem to be a significant factor in Kant's thought, as Kant--admittedly--continued this struggle (as much as possible) in private. But as I have already ventured to suggest (in Chapter One), perhaps the religious tendencies we see in Kant's writings as early as his Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766) were not motivated to propose a new 'moral theology,' so much as they were an attempt to counter-

balance the ever-rising tide of *Schwärmerei*.

The Inversion of the 'S' Rules

In turning the tables against Kant, his former students and followers could now apply an inversion of the 'S' rules in defense of *religious passion*. In that *passion* is not subject to the rules of reason, an inversion of the *shy* rule could then be applied. The romantics could argue, therefore, that as Kant 'did not venture' to emotionally extol Christianity, 'he can be accused of having denied' the emotions of that faith; and hence--having denied its 'essence'--to have denied that faith altogether.

In fact, the Christian faith (as the romantics argue) is an *emotionally based* belief-system--the inverse of Kant's. As Noah Porter explains in Kant's Ethics: A Critical Exposition:

> *Emotion in all its forms is the very soul of the Christian system.* Feeling is the consummate flower of Christian virtue in all its varied hues of tenderness and sympathy. In the theory of Kant sensibility has no place, except a place of weakness and inferiority. It never is recognized as capable of being strengthened and hardened by the will, while in the Christian system if emotion be wanting, whether in its severer or its gentler forms, its absence is considered a sign of special defect.[183]

This (persistent) view of Kant as devoid of feeling can be seen in the inversion of the *silent* and *shy* rules: that as Kant did not consider it to be a duty to *enthusiastically* follow the gamut or *whole* meaning of Christianity (via a public display of rituals and religiosity), he cannot be

considered loyal to the Christian faith, but is seen as an enemy-to-the-emotions, specifically *in the experience* of being a Christian.

And finally--the romantics could argue--the *sincere* rule could be inverted as well: as Kant prefers *sincerity* over the *emotional* testimony of an unconditioned God (who *actually* exists), Kant's thought is not only lackluster (as to its writing style), it is empty and unfulfilling to the (perceived-to-be) genuine human experience (of the Christian faith). But the rejoinder can be made in this regard that Kant does 'make room' for *testimony*, albeit not necessarily in the wide sense of 'a personal avowal of faith.' He states that 'the *testimony* of Scripture' connected with the teachings of 'pure sermons' (developed from 'natural moral predisposition') can serve as "examples in which the truth of reason's practical principles is made more perceptible."[184] It seems, then, that to (virtually) every criticism the opposition can hurl against Kant and his moral view on things, an answer in defence of Kant's (admittedly) *peculiar* position can be mustered. For if (as Pascal puts it) 'the heart has reasons, reason knows not of,' Kant could reply that '(moral) reason too has a heartbeat, the heart knows not of.'[185]

In summary, I have tried to show that (the) Kant 'perceived-as-*unbelieving*' becomes (the) Kant 'perceived-as-*unfeeling*' in the following ten steps:

Kant as unbelieving

1) Kant criticizes religion by applying his critical philosophy to it;[186]
2) Kant argues that when reason is applied to religion, religion increases in respectability;[187]
3) Kant proposes to replace the religious center based on mere faith in God and in his word with pure practical reason;[188]
4) In so doing, Kant is seen to be not as religious as is sometimes supposed;
5) Kant plainly lacks a genuinely *religious* identity in that he neither aligns himself nor his moral thought with *the essence* of religion, i.e., its traditions, laws, creeds, ordinances, etc.;
6) Kant (both in his writings and by his personal example) speaks against the public display of religiosity, especially when driven or fuelled by religious passion;

Kant as unfeeling

7) Kant is not enthusiastic (certainly not passionate) in support of (the practice of) *religion* (and its public religiosity--as expressed via rituals, oaths, and the like) *per se*;
8) Kant is (perceived to be) opposed to religious passion, as displayed or exemplified by mystics, geniuses (so-called), self-appointed religious leaders (or priests);
9) (But) Kant is even more opposed to (the religious passion of) romanticists who glibly and vaguely romanticize the *pure moral* teachings of scripture (as Kant perceives those teachings to be);

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10) In sum, Kant is seen (esp. by the romanticists) as *unbelieving* in that he does not (even attempt to) 'feel' the essence of faith itself; and hence is judged to be *unemotional*.

In so outlining the summary of steps whereby it is possible to see how the romantics tended to view Kant, I should point out that this summary does not purport to be a (definitive) proof that the romantics so viewed Kant or that they could not view Kant in any other way. I am merely pointing out that in light of the historical data and Kant's own (arguably) *anti-romanticist* position, it is likely that

the romantics in viewing Kant as *unbelieving* felt justified, thereby, in 'painting' him to be *unfeeling*, as well.

4. Conclusion

How then are we to resolve this tension between Kant as the rational moralist and his would-be-followers-turned-romantics of the (fiercely) *religious* persuasion? One currently popular solution is simply to wave aside any intimations that Kant's thought was *seriously* shaped by religion. The other, is to claim the direct opposite: that Kant's thought was *seriously* shaped by religion.

The view which I have tried to present is somewhere in between: (that) although Kant took religion seriously and was *convinced* he knew how to 'set religionists straight' (regarding the form of their beliefs), he was never (truly) *converted* to following any particular religion--unless we include, of course, the supremacy of his own moral thought. The argument can be advanced that if Kant's *idea of God* does not presuppose an *actually* (real) God, then it would be consistent to say that Kant's 'religion' does not presuppose itself as *actually* 'real' either (except, possibly, in the vague sense of a *corpus mysticum*[189]).

Although I am (perhaps, incorrigibly) a loyal adherent of the 'Samuel Clemens' persuasion (I referred to earlier in this Chapter) in that I insist I do not see any *religious* garb on Kant's 'religion' (nor any new *clothes* on the proverbial

Emperor), I will admit to this one partiality: that if Kant had to write *only* one book, I believe it would have been his Religion. For no solitary book that Kant wrote could have distanced himself more from his arch-rivals--the Romanticists.[190]

The stock charge that Kant was unemotional, I do not hold to be accurate. For, as we have seen, Kant was not against *moral* feeling, or *religious* feeling, or (religious) testimonies, or natural human desires. In no way did Kant deny or suppress the development or the expression of such *emotions*--so long as they did not (overstep or) 'go beyond the (reasonable) mark.' He demonstrated that he could be tolerant of variant religious and moral beliefs--so long as these beliefs were motivated by *sincerity*. For if Kant's life-work stood for anything, it stood as a bulwark against the hypocrisy of those who claimed to be *favored* of heaven (or of the gods), but whose actions proved inconsistent with their promises. That Kant was in fact *sincere* cannot be doubted. That he was sincerely deceived is still being debated. For Kant may (morally) convince a following, but--it appears--he cannot (religiously) convert anyone. Nonetheless, underneath his *religious* sheepskin, Kant--I maintain--remains a genuine *moralist*.

In short, even if there is no definitive answer to the question as to the extent of Kant's role contra the religious romantics, the important task *for philosophers* is (at least)

to try to better understand the question.[191] In light of the foregoing arguments, there is a genuine need to rethink Kant and his message to humanity by more closely examining Kant's own (possible) motives in dedicating his life (outside the classroom) to his writings. That Kant reserved his 'final word' in his later (more mature writings) to explicitly *religious* themes is crucial to this understanding.

It is my argument that as Kant provided a *critical* basis for analyzing the nature of reason in his three Critiques, he intended to extend this similar (though not identical) *criticism* to the nature of religion. Kant's motive in so deflating 'the bubble' of (mainly, religious) *enthusiasts*, I argue, is at root his moral opposition to *religious passion*. In so doing (and despite all his efforts to defend the role of reverence, moral feeling, and the development of moral character in 'making room for faith'), Kant's position has become (inaccurately) depicted as unemotional, formalistic, and empty.

1. An anonymous Russian proverb.

2. Perhaps a closer 'Mark Twainian' view of Kant's religion could be made of Twain's comment that:

> It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those *three unspeakably precious* things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them. (Following the Equator, 1897: heading of ch.20, as cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 1980: 554, no.7; emphasis added)

If Kant's *three unspeakably precious* ideals of reason (God, freedom, and immortality) could be presented as representative of Kant's religion, then--Twain could conceivably add--Kant had the prudence never *to practice* any real religion (as this chapter emphatically bears out).

3. See, for example, Alfred Weber's History of Philosophy (1896), trans. Frank Thilly (1904), in which Weber states: "It is true, Kant's theology is merely an appendix to his ethics, and is not to be taken very seriously" (466).

4. See, for example, Roger J. Sullivan's Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (1989), in which he flatly states:

> Notwithstanding the harshness with which Kant criticizes theological religion and historical forms and practices of the church, it would be a mistake to conclude either that he reduced religion to morality or that he held religion to be merely an adjunct to the moral life. (273)

5. In stating that Kant tended to argue in the methodology of 'antinomies,' I do not mean to say that Kant restricted his line of argumentation to but the *specific* (examples of) antinomies in his first Critique. Instead, my point is that Kant tended to reason in such a way that he would consider how two apparently opposing views could both be acceptable (to different schools of logic or debate) and yet contradict each other. His proposal (which is evident throughout his writings, I argue) is to consistently choose the *third way*, the critical path, whereby the most favorable resolution can be reached.

Having said that, I think it should be made clear that Kant does not necessarily *resolve* the various conflicting views he so portrays throughout his writings: he typically *dissolves* them. His approach can perhaps be best compared to that of a maiden ardently pursued by two opposing and contentious suitors: And just as the young damsel would seek a peaceful solution in a *third* (non-competitive) suitor--or so the story goes--Kant seeks to "play the part of the peaceable onlooker," to witness the *bloodless* outcome of reason's 'dialectical debate' "from the safe seat of the critic."

(first Critique, A747/B775; Cf. A850/B878 in which Kant says "we shall always return to metaphysics as to a beloved one with whom we have had a quarrel.")

In a letter to Christian Garve (21 Sept. 1789), Kant states that he "must protest" against the growing perception that he was awakened from his 'dogmatic slumber' by a desire to investigate *religious* dogmas (e.g., existence of God). What first aroused him, he protested, were the antimonies (of pure reason). (Correspondence, 252).

See also: Correspondence in which Kant states that the role of the synthetic a priori reasoning is to resolve the antinomies; but the key to understanding that role is to adopt the two standpoint position, i.e., to view things as appearances *and* as 'things-in-themselves.' (156; 144, 103, 103n.)

6. See, Stephen R. Palmquist's dissertation entitled, Kant's System of Perspectives and Its Theological Implications (1987) in which he argues (in Ch. XII) "that the Critical System as a whole was intended to pave the way for a Critical mysticism" (short Abstract).

7. As Kant puts it in his Conflict of the Faculties (1798):

> But the biblical theologian as such cannot and need not prove that God Himself spoke through the Bible, since that is a matter of history and belongs to the philosophy faculty. [Treating it] as a matter of faith, he will therefore base it --even for the scholar--on a certain (indemonstrable and inexplicable) *feeling* that the Bible is divine. (35)

8. In his first Critique, Kant states: "As regards those who adopt a *scientific* method, they have the choice of proceeding either *dogmatically* or *sceptically*...The *critical* path is still open." (A856/B884)

9. In the last page of his Religion, Kant concedes that 'the common man' conceives the 'whole of religion' as mere 'ceremonies' (189).

10. Kant makes references to a *third* factor, *third* thing, or *third* step in various places of his first Critique: A472/B500; A259/B315; A157/B196; A138/B177; A761/B789; A766/B794.

11. My use of the term *church* is not to be confused with Kant's reference to the *true* Church (whether visible or invisible), nor to the 'form of a Church' (see, Religion, 92-93). For the time-being, I am simply employing Kant's loose definition of *church* as "a congregation under authorities" (Ibid., 92). For, as Kant puts it: "It is also possible that the union of men into one religion cannot feasibly be brought

about or made abiding without a holy book and an ecclesiastical faith based upon it." (Ibid., 123)

12. As Kant states in the Religion:

> [I]n the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, "so that God may be all in all." The integuments within which the embryo first developed into a human being must be laid aside when he is to come into the light of the day. The leading-string of holy tradition with its appendages of statutes and observances, which in its time did good service, become bit by bit dispensable, yea, finally, when man enters upon his adolescence, it becomes a fetter. (112)

In a letter to J.C. Lavater (28 April 1775), Kant--in referring to the worship "that religious fanaticism always demands" as *scaffolding*--admonishes: "when this true religious structure has been built so that it can maintain itself in the world--then the scaffolding must be taken down." (in Correspondence, 80)

13. Allen Wood in Kant's Moral Religion (1970) acknowledges that "Kant often uses the term *religion* in a loose and everyday sense to refer to particular **social** institutions and beliefs that we commonly distinguish as 'religious'" (187; emphasis added). In speaking of Kant's 'moral community of men,' Wood adds that "in a fuller sense, men are to *become* a 'people of God' by their own realization, in practice, of their **social** end" (191; emphasis added). See Religion, in which Kant speaks of the "moral need for social union" (89), and of an ethical commonwealth, as "a people under divine commands, *i.e., as a people of God*, and indeed *under laws of virtue*" (Religion, 91).

14. Kant scholars wishing to impress a view of Kant as *religious* continually point to the fact that Kant was raised by a Pietist mother and had a rigorous childhood education in a *religious* college. My response is that this *religious* slant to Kant as a (supposed) 'religionist' is as convincing as the fact that Kant became *religious* because he was born on St. Immanuel's day ('Immanuel' meaning 'God with us'). Kant's mother died (at age forty) early in Kant's life (when he was thirteen). Little wonder that his memory of her and her (brief) influence in his life should be so fond.

As to the influence of pietism outside Kant's home, I think Theodore Greene aptly describes it, as follows:

> [I]n the Collegium, he [Kant] came upon a pietism whose zeal fostered a spirit of hypocrisy. When young and active boys are expected unanimously and daily to give evidence of great religious fervor, they are bound to do so without observing strict proportion to the emotion actually felt...This whole experience in the Collegium was for him a painful one, for he was sensitive by nature, and the remark he is said to have made in later life, that "fear and trembling overcame him whenever he recalled those days of youthful slavery," may well be authentic. Certain it is that he acquired a lasting abhorrence of all religious emotion and would have nothing to do with prayer or the singing of hymns the rest of his life. ("The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's *Religion*" in Religion, xxviii)

15. As translated by Michel Despland in his book Kant: on History and Religion (1973), 293.

16. Religion, 100, 142, 79. In his first Critique (1781), Kant explains that we regard these commands "as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them" (A819/B847).

17. Religion, 94. In further clarifying this *divine* nature of our duties, Kant states that it is when we view all our duties *collectively* that "we must at the same time look upon [them] as divine commands" (Ibid, 140). That these *divine commands* are not actually *divine* commands but are to be treated *as if* they were *divine*, Kant makes clear in the following passage:

> [T]he *duty of religion*, the duty "of recognizing all our duties *as* divine commands"...is not consciousness of a duty *to God*. For this Idea [of God] proceeds entirely from our own reason and we ourselves make it...Hence we do not have before us, in this Idea [of God], a given being to whom we would be under obligation; for in that case its reality would first have to be shown (disclosed) through experience. Rather, it is a duty of man to himself to apply this Idea, which presents itself unavoidably to reason, to the moral law in him...In this (practical) sense it can therefore be said that to have religion is a duty of man to himself. (Morals, 238; see also: 275-276, 279, 235).

18. Allen Wood acquiesces that Kant's philosophy of religion is "part of his [Kant's] social philosophy" being "derived from the *social* character of man's highest end" (Kant's Moral Religion, 191).

19. Religion, 89; emphasis added. This argument for the need of 'a society' to further educate the individual is consistently made in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784)" in which Kant uses the analogy of a forest:

> It is just as with trees in a forest, which need each other, for in seeking to take the air and sunlight from the others, each obtains a beautiful, straight shape, while those that grow in freedom and separate from one another branch out randomly, and are stunted, bent, and twisted. ("Peace," 33)

20. Religion, 5, 7n.

21. Third Critique, §91; 367. In Kant's first Critique (second edition, 1787), he states that insight into the three ideas of metaphysics (God, freedom, and immortality) "would render *theology* and *morals*, and through the union of these two, likewise *religion*...entirely and exclusively dependent on the faculty of speculative reason" (B395n.).

22. Theology, 26.

23. Kant also defines theology as "the sum of certain teachings regarded as divine revelations" to contrast with 'religion' as "the sum of all our duties regarded as divine commands." He claims that the distinction between religion and morality is merely a 'formal' one: "that reason in its legislation uses the Idea of God, which is derived from morality itself, to give morality influence on man's will to fulfil all his duties." See, Kant, Conflict (1798), 61.

24. See, for example, Thomas Auxter's Kant's Moral Teleology (1982), in which he states regarding this "ongoing controversy over whether Kant's moral theory requires a *religious* commitment":

> Commentators have tended to read such passages [the moral argument for the existence of God in Kant's third Critique] as a basis for a Kantian notion of religious conviction or as a religious intrusion into a moral system that otherwise makes fairly good sense. The effect of this tendency is that Kant's moral teleology is either subsumed under his otherworldly doctrine of the highest good or dismissed altogether. In neither case is it taken seriously as an element of his critical moral theory.
>
> The argument of this book is that Kant's moral teleology is central to his practical philosophy. (9)

25. Third Critique, §91; 376.

26. Morals, 234-235. In referring to this duty of religion as a "duty with regard to God," Kant corrects himself by adding that this duty *to* God is "properly speaking, with regard to the Idea we ourselves make of such a Being." For 'all duties *as* divine commands' expresses "only the relation of reason to the *Idea* of God which reason makes for itself; and this does not yet make a duty of religion into a duty *to* God, as a Being existing outside our Idea." (Ibid., 275-276; cf. 279)

27. Critique of Judgment (1790), §91; 377.

28. Ibid., §91; 336.

29. The Natural History of Religion ed. A. Wayne Colver and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ed. John V. Price (1976), 157-158.

30. Third edition: 104, 11.

31. Religion, 142-144.

32. Religion, 144, 152.

33. Religion, 103, 98, 95.

34. Religion, 163, 9, 161.

35. Theology, 26.

36. Conflict (1787), 87.

37. Kant, Conflict of the Faculties (1798), trans. Mary Gregor (1979), 61. In his Religion (1793), Kant adds that "of all the public religions which have ever existed, the Christian alone is moral" (47).

38. Religion, 98-99.

39. Religion, 11-12.

40. These 'rules of thumb' are not specified by Kant as such, but are *Kantian* in that they are derived from Kant's own original works. (Cf. 'heuristic fictions' in first Critique, A771; B799)

41. B661.

42. Kant for Everyman, Willibald Klinke, 1952: 69. This remark by Kant was discovered posthumously in a note Kant had appended to (a copy of) his reply to King Friedrich Wilhelm's (*privately* delivered) royal order (of 12 Oct. 1794) whereby Kant was to desist 'distorting' the basic tenets of

Christianity. The full quote is as follows:

> Recantation and denial of an inner conviction is despicable; but in a case like the present it is the duty of a subject to remain silent; and while one should never speak anything but the truth, it is not, therefore, one's duty to speak the whole truth in public.

Other ways of translating this 'second rule' (as I call it) are, as follows: 1) "although everything one says must be true, it is not therefore also [one's] duty to proclaim all of the truth" (Immanuel Kant: His Life and Thought, Arsenij Gulyga, 1987: 213); and 2) "if all one says must be true, it is not for that reason also a duty to speak openly all truth." (The Life of Immanuel Kant, J.H.W. Stuckenberg, 1882: 469)

43. "Theodicies," 294.

Kant defines 'sincerity,' as: "that *everything said* be said with truthfulness" (Religion, trans. George Di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, 1996: 206n.). Although this definition may be inadequate in that it does not involve inner beliefs, I think Kant was thinking of *sincerity* in the sense of *public* utterances only (at least in this instance) as he contrasts this definition of *sincerity* with the tendency for religions in striving for converts *to make a believer* of someone "who does not understand even what he professes as holy." It is this *lack* of sincerity, Kant concludes, that produces these *inward [religious] hypocrites*. (Ibid.)

44. Life of Immanuel Kant, J.H.W. Stuckenberg (1882), 421.

45. See, From Kant to Nietzsche, Jules De Gaultier, trans. Gerald M. Spring (1961), in which De Gaultier not only calls Kant "a Protestant" but adds that Kant is "so imbued with Protestant dogma that he will unhesitatingly maintain its formula against an evidence which he himself has displayed" (41).

46. Sources of the Self (1989), 366. D.W. Hamlyn adds in Being a Philosopher (1992) that Kant's ethics "with its emphasis on duty" is "often seen as very Protestant in character" (90).

47. Kant's Moral Religion (1970), Allen Wood, 197n. With regard to Augustine's (scholastic) influence on Kant, Johann Eduard Erdmann states in A History of Philosophy that Kant's course is "just the opposite of that followed by the Church Fathers, who drew from the Bible the eternal truth, and that by the Scholastics, who made truths of reason out of dogmas" (Vol. II: 422).

48. Ibid., 197n.-198. As to Wood's reference to Erasmus, Elizabeth C. Galbraith has written a provocative dissertation entitled, Was Kant a Closet Theologian? (1992), in which she argues that Kant was closer (in at least eleven ways) to Erasmus than to Luther.

49. Religion, 100.

50. Religion, 153.

51. My Chair, Kenneth Merrill, has offered the following alternate interpretation of this passage:

> Kant may have intended something like this: If even Protestant officials arrogate to themselves (unjustifiably) the unique power of interpreting scripture, then *a fortiori* Roman Catholic officials do so.

Although I would agree that this interpretation is the 'apparent' sense that Kant wished to convey, I would add that there is another, perhaps deeper, message that Kant is conveying--between the lines. In a wider context (beyond this short passage), one can see--I argue--that Kant's attitude towards the Protestant Church is not a positive one. Indeed, I would say (as I have said) that it is *overall* not only unfavorable, it is *fundamentally* in opposition to it.

52. Indeed, Kant apparently had no great love for the Pope (as the representative of Catholicism) as the following comment reveals:

> For history tells...how both Christian portions of the world [East and West] became overrun by barbarians, just as plants and animals, near death from some disease, attract destructive insects to complete their dissolution; how, in the West, the spiritual head ruled over and disciplined kings like children by means of the magic wand of his threatened excommunication, and incited them to depopulating foreign wars in another portion of the world (the Crusades), to the waging of war with one another, to the rebellion of subjects against those in authority over them, and to bloodthirsty hatred against their otherwise-minded colleagues in one and the same universal Christendom so-called. (Religion, 121-122; see also: Morals, 137, 173)

53. John Manolesco in his translation and commentary of Dreams of a Spirit Seer By Immanuel Kant and Other Related Writings (1969) states that "Kant himself was fascinated by Swedenborg" (168). This 'fascination' in my view, however, does not imply any sense of religious allegiance by Kant in itself. Indeed,

even in the Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), Kant states that "human reason was not meant to try and part the highest clouds in heaven or lift from our eyes the curtains in order to reveal to us the secrets of the other world" (98). In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn shortly thereafter (08 April 1766), Kant states with (apparent) reference to Swedenborg's books: "I am convinced that the method chosen by these authors is utterly wrong. Knowledge will not advance because of such books; on the contrary, they can only encourage a wave of erroneous and false thinking" (156). He then refers specifically to Swedenborg's 'dreams' as "merely an illusion" (158).

Towards the end of his life, Kant indicates a definite repudiation of both Swedenborg and mysticism itself in the following statement: "the sole means of avoiding mysticism (such as Swedenborg's) is for philosophy to be on the lookout for a moral meaning in scriptural texts and even to impose it on them" (Conflict, 81).

54. Roger J. Sullivan points out in Kant's Moral Theory that "Kant began his long philosophical journey as a young student at the University of Königsberg, facing profound tensions between his Pietistic faith in God and his Enlightenment faith in reason" (274; 6-7).

John R. Silber shares this view as expressed in "Kant and the Mythic Roots of Morality" in which Silber states that Kant's 'religious fervor' came

> from the emotionally and mythically rich pietism of his parental home and from the religious training of the Collegium Fridericianum...The refined stem of Kant's rational ethics had been grafted onto the hardy emotional root of Christianity (in Foundations of Ethics, ed. Leroy S. Rouner, 1983: 21).

This assumption that Kant was Pietistic in his youth, I find, is all too common and, arguably, not well-researched, nor carefully thought through: it is simply assumed.

55. The Life of Immanuel Kant, J.H.W. Stuckenberg (1882), 9-10. See also:

1) Robert Norton, "Ch.2: Beauty of Soul: Pietism and the Ideal of Moral Perfection," The Beautiful Soul, 1995: 55-99;
2) Koppel S. Pinson, Pietism as a Factor in the Rise of German Nationalism, 1934; and
3) F. Ernest Stoeffler, German Pietism during the Eighteenth Century, 1973.

56. Trans. Michael Bullock (1952), 16.

57. Conflict, 103n.

58. Even in his twilight years, Kant never referred to the Pietist (or any other sectarian) faith in conversation with any of his siblings. In his last (of very few letters) to his only surviving (but impoverished) brother, Johann Heinrich (1735-1800), Kant states that he is financially taking care of their (impoverished) two surviving sisters [Elizabeth (1727-96) and Barbara (1731-1807)] and their five children "so that there has been no neglect of *the duty of gratitude that we owe to our common parents* for the education they gave us" ("Kant's Letter to his Brother [26 Jan. 1792]" in Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Paul Carus, 3rd Ed.; 1912: 286; emphasis added).

When Kant's brother preceded him in death in 1800, Kant *dutifully* took full financial responsibility for his brother's widow and their four children--in addition to Barbara (his last surviving sister) and the six orphaned children of his then deceased sister, Elizabeth, of course. That *duty* Kant, no doubt, saw as his '*moral* duty'--not the result of *a Pietist* (or any other sectarian) doctrine (see, Correspondence, 185, 237).

59. Charles Taylor states that "Kant remained a believing Christian" in his Sources of the Self (1989), 366.

60. Kant's commitment to his dear friend Moses Mendelssohn, in a letter dated 08 April 1766 (Correspondence, 54). (I refer to Mendelssohn as Kant's *dear* friend, not only because Kant greatly admired Mendelssohn throughout his life--which is well-known--but because Kant made a point to attend Mendelssohn's funeral despite the fact that Kant dreaded funeral dirges and had refused to attend a religious service for virtually all his adult life prior to Mendelssohn's passing in 1786.)

Kant's theory of *reticence* is also explained in a letter to a certain (suicidal) Maria von Herbert, as follows: "since everyone fears that to reveal himself completely would make him despised by others... What the honest but reticent man says is true *but not the whole truth*" (Ibid., 188-189).

61. Mark 8:38 (KJV; emphasis added). I think it can be safely concluded from this pointed statement by Christ that no person can call himself or herself 'a believing Christian' who is ashamed of being identified with Christ (or his *word*).

Regarding the necessity to 'speak up' and 'wear the garment' of an unabashed Christian, see as well: Mt. 22:11-14.

62. Consider, for example, Laurence Peter's remark that "going to church doesn't make you a Christian, any more than going to a garage makes you a car" (Peter's Quotations, Laurence J. Peter, 86).

63. That 'a believing Christian' simply cannot hide his or her light under a bushel is made clear in Christ's 'sermon on the mount' in which he states to his 'would-be' followers: "Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works" (Matthew 5:14-16; KJV). See also Kant's reference to "the inner light ('under a bushel')" in Religion, 189.

64. See, John 12:26 in which Jesus states: "If any man serve me, let him *follow me*" (King James Version); and again in John 10:26-27: "But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they *follow me*" (KJV; emphasis added). As these brief quotes indicate, belief in Christ is equated to 'following Christ' as if Christ were the believer's 'lord' or 'Shepherd.' That this 'following Christ' is not the mere 'physical following' of herd instinct (in the sense of merely belonging to a Church) is made clear in Mark 8:34: "And when he [Christ] had called the people unto him with his disciples also, he said unto them, Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and *follow me*" (KJV).

In Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, Nicholas Wolterstorff claims that to be an *authentic* Christian, is "to be fundamentally committed to being a Christ-follower" (67). I differ, however, with Wolterstorff in his additional requirement that to be a Christian "is also, of course, to belong to a certain community" (Ibid.). For the purposes of this work, I am considering *only* the barest or most minimal definition of *Christian* possible. (See, also: Hendrik Hart's pamphlet, "Critical Reflections on Wolterstorff's Reason Within the Bounds of Religion," available from the King's College Library in Edmonton, Alberta.)

65. See, for example, Romans 6:6, which states: "Knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him [Christ], that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin" (KJV). Speaking of the 'atonement' of Christ, Paul continues: "But God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us...And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement" (Romans 5:8,11; cf. John 3:16-17; KJV).

66. The account of 'Doubting Thomas' toward his risen Lord is applicable here. Thomas, an Apostle of Christ, doubted the testimony of his colleagues that Christ (who was dead for three days) was now alive. Eight days after he emphatically stated: "Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and

thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe," Christ appeared to Thomas, saying: "Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side: and be not faithless, but believing." Thomas's response was simply: "My Lord *and my God.*" (John 20:24-28; emphasis added).

As this account indicates, the resurrected body of Christ was tangible (although it arguably did not consist of 'flesh *and* blood,' as Paul states in I Cor. 15:50) for the 'doubting' Thomas had to *physically* touch the resurrected Christ *before* he would believe. That Thomas added a new dimension to his relationship with Christ (as Lord) to that of "God" is made clear in his phrase "my Lord *and* my God."

Also, the claim that Christ did not really die before being resurrected cannot justifiably be made here (if we are to believe the scriptures) as Paul points out (in Romans 6:9): "Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead *dieth no more;* death hath no more dominion over him" (KJV). Hence, near-death experiences (NDEs) do not qualify as a 'resurrection.' Even the raising of Lazarus from the dead (after four days; John 11:17,39) is not referred to anywhere in scripture as 'a resurrection': It was at best (what we might call) a mere 'resuscitation' for Lazarus certainly died (again, *and permanently*) in due course. In order for Jesus to be *the (resurrected) Christ* he can die 'no more,' as the scriptures plainly stipulate.

67. That Kant considers Christ as a *Teacher* (akin to the Muslim faith) and that he essentially denies Christ's role as *Savior* can be seen in the following quote:

> The Teacher of the Gospel [Christ] announced himself to be an ambassador from heaven. As one worthy of such a mission, he declared that servile belief (taking the form of confessions and practices on days of divine worship) is essentially vain and that moral faith, which alone renders men holy "as their Father in Heaven is holy" and which proves its genuineness by a good course of life, is the only saving faith. (Religion, 119)

68. According to Kant, if Christianity were to be understood "as belief in a messiah," it would then become "merely a sect of messianic faith" in that it would be distinguished from the belief in "a Mosaic-messianic faith" (in the narrower sense) by the question (John the Baptist asked of Christ): "Are you he who was to come [i.e., the Messiah], or shall we look for another?" (Luke 7:19). Kant plainly repudiates any belief in Christ as the 'Promised Messiah' as on par with the belief in Abraham being told by God to sacrifice his son, Isaac--a belief, Kant says, that "religion does not require us to believe" as a fact, and which must not be allowed to obtrude on "natural human reason." (Conflict, 85, 119n.-120).

69. In continuing his description of Christ as a *Teacher*, Kant thinks to honor Christ immeasurably by referring to him as *the ideal of humanity* (in lieu of the scriptural description of Christ as "*my beloved Son in whom I am well-pleased*"; Mt. 3:17; KJV) in the following quote:

> He [Christ] left behind him, by word of mouth, his last will (as in a testament); and, trusting in the power of the memory of his merit, teaching, and example, he was able to say that "he (the ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God) would still be with his disciples, even to the end of the world." (Conflict, 120)

For if we were to consider Christ "as the Divinity 'dwelling incarnate' in a real man and working as a second nature in him," we could "draw nothing practical from this mystery," says Kant. It is better, Kant continues, to consider this "doctrine that one person of the Godhead became man" as but "the Idea of humanity in its full moral perfection." (Ibid., 67)

70. See, Conflict, 79.

71. As Kant puts it rather directly in his Religion: the Kingdom of God is not 'Messianic' (i.e., in need of a Christ, or Messiah; John 1:41) but *moral* (i.e., "knowable through unassisted reason"). (127n.)

72. "History," 33.

73. Conflict, 61.

74. Religion, 107.

75. Conflict, 66.

76. Kant is consistent in his desire to reinterpret the bible in a *moral* light. He clearly endorses that the bible be interpreted in a "practical way, according to rational concepts" and that a "moral meaning in scriptural texts" be imposed upon them. According to Kant, it is only via *pure practical reason* that the teachings of Christianity can be "present in the hearts of men." (Conflict, 67, 81, 95)

77. For example, indicating what would happen to the hapless soul who should alter the words of the Book of Revelation, the writer of that book states:

> For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: And if any man shall take away from

the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book. (Revelation 22:18-19; KJV)

78. Matthew 6:33 (KJV). "Peace," 133.

79. As Kant states in Morals: "Consciousness of an *internal court* in man ('before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another') is *conscience*" (1991: 233). In Religion, Kant defines 'conscience' as "the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment *upon itself*" (174).

80. Gulyga in his Immanuel Kant (1987) comments:

> [A] young, unknown *magister* of theology, Wilhelm Hegel, under the influence of Kant writes The Life of Jesus: a biography of a great moralist shorn of any supernatural miracles. Hegel opposes the teachings of Jesus to the teachings of Moses: the living word is set against the dead dogma, the New Testament against the Old; in all of this Hegel follows Kant's example. (194)

H.B. Acton in his introductory article entitled, "Hegel," in Hegel: Selections (ed. M.J. Inwood, 1989) adds the interesting insight (that): "In the 'Life of Jesus' it almost seems as if Hegel had decided to rewrite the Gospels in the form of a Kantian manifesto. He began by claiming that God is pure reason." (5)

81. G.W.F. Hegel, Three Essays 1793-1795: The Tübingen Essay, Berne Fragments, The Life of Jesus, trans. Peter Fuss and John Dobbins (1984), 118.

82. Conflict, 37, 51.

83. As Kant bluntly explains:

> For the people naturally adhere most to doctrines which demand the least self-exertion and the least use of their reason...in theology, for example, the doctrine that they can be saved merely by an implicit faith, without having to examine (or even really know) what they are supposed to believe, or that their performance of certain prescribed rites will itself wash away their transgressions. (Conflict, 51)

84. Conflict, 93, 95.
Kant also likened this "gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith to the universal religion of reason" as a seed "which is self-developing, and in due time self-fertilizing, the whole, which one day is to illumine and to

rule the world" (Religion, 113).

85. That the bible cannot be interpreted in its own terms (letting 'scripture interpret itself'--e.g., via a common-sense reading of cross-references) but only by moral reason, Kant is emphatic stating that this is the only way to avoid 'Illuminism' (whereby "everyone has his private, inner revelations"). (Conflict, 81.)

The 'restoration of all things' is referred to in Acts 3:20-21, which states:

> And he shall send Jesus Christ which before was preached unto you: whom the heavens must receive until the times of restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began. (KJV)

The implication here is that Christ shall no longer be *received* (or remain) in the heavens once this *restoration* occurs. Kant (who dethroned Christ from any possible divine role) makes no reference to that obvious implication, an implication which would appear to contradict Kant's own position.

86. Conflict, 123.

87. "Peace," 50.

88. Kant argues that for the same reasons we can **think** of '*the* cause of the world,' we are *justified* in representing *this idea* of God:

> in terms of a certain subtle anthropomorphism (without which we could not **think** anything whatsoever in regard to it), namely, as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to these. (first Critique, A700/B728)

But Kant emphasizes at the same time that this *God* is "only as object in *idea* and not in reality": "For it is always *an idea only*, which does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world" (first Critique, A697/B725).

89. Indeed, Kant refers to *a certain subtle anthropomorphism* which he claims is (justifiably) necessary in representing it in our *idea* of God "as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to these." Kant justifies the use of this *subtle* anthropomorphism on the grounds that without it "we could not think anything whatsoever" regarding this *idea* of God (first Critique, A700/B728).

Another instance in which Kant 'borrows' *religious* language in order to bring home his (moral) point is his definition of the *Holy Ghost* (as the 'Judge of men') who "speaks to our conscience according to the holy law which we know" (Religion, 131n.).

90. Kant states that "we never ripen with respect to reason except through our own efforts (which we can make only when we are free)" (Religion, 176n.). This ambiguity in Kant's position with regard to man's (total) independence in reasoning (i.e., as separate from *divine* reason), and Kant's insistence that we need (at least) an *idea* of God to 'guide' us, can be clarified by the following analogy: (that) to found a 'moral people of God' is akin to framing "something perfectly straight" from 'crooked wood.' Kant explains that although the consummation of this task belongs to God alone, man must proceed "as though everything depended on him [i.e., man]" (Religion, 92).

91. Friedrich Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idols (74g, 484e) as quoted by Allen Wood in Kant's Moral Religion (1970), 197n.

92. As Kant puts it: "A direct revelation from God embodied in the comforting statement '*Your sins are forgiven you*' would be a supersensible experience, and this is impossible" (Conflict, 83). For, as Mary Gregor adds in her "Translator's Introduction": "Confronted, for example, with a scriptural text such as '*he who believes and is baptized will be saved,*' the philosopher must argue that it cannot be taken literally since the literal meaning is contrary to morality" (Ibid., xix).

93. Conflict, 69.

94. Ibid., 67, 69. See also Religion, 119n.

95. Conflict, 11.

96. Correspondence, 218-219.

97. Correspondence, 218-219; emphasis added.

98. Indeed, as Kant chose to close his 'unchangeable, candid confession' to the King, he promises to "abstain entirely" from all public lectures and (public) publications "on religious subjects" (Correspondence, 219-220). Despite his '*unchangeable*, candid confession' to the King, Kant 'changes' his strategy after the death of the King and renews (public) publications 'on religious subjects.' Kant's subtlety is detected in his reasoning: that he made his promise but to the King, as a person, and not to his office--to desist from publishing his religious viewpoint. Kant so excuses himself by

stating that it was for this reason he referred to himself as "*Your Majesty*'s loyal subject" and again as "*Your Royal Majesty*'s most submissive and obedient subject" (Ibid.). One cannot but smile at Kant's sophistry.

99. Conflict, 15, 216n.6.

100. Ibid., 15.

101. Kant attempted to further clarify his strictly *rational* interpretation of religion by explaining why he gave his book the title he did:

> My purpose in formulating this title [Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason] was to prevent a misinterpretation to the effect that the treatise deals with religion *from* mere reason (without revelation). That would be claiming too much, since reason's teachings could still come from men who are supernaturally inspired. The title indicates that I intended, rather, to set forth as a coherent whole everything in the Bible--the text of the religion believed to be revealed--that can *also* be recognized *by mere reason*. (Conflict, 11)

In addition to Mary Gregor's alternate translation of the title of Kant's Religion as that 'within the limits of *mere* reason' (as noted above), George di Giovanni's new translation of Kant's Religion translates it as: Religion Within the Boundaries of *Mere* Reason (Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, 1996; emphasis added).

Either way, I contend, it is not the 'mere' title that determines whether or not Kant *intended* to treat or to critique *only* that part of religion 'recognized by mere reason'; the contents of the book tell quite a different story. In this case, the cliché holds true: we should not judge (or excuse) a book by its title (or 'mere' intent).

102. Conflict, 219.

103. This point was covered earlier in this chapter. See "History," 33; and Conflict, 61.

104. As an example, Kant singles out Paul's doctrine of predestination, which doctrine (Kant says) Paul carried over from the dogmas of the "Mosaic-Messianic Scriptures" (i.e., the Pentateuch, or Five Books of Moses in the Old Testament). (Conflict, 121)

105. Conflict, 61, 77. Religion, 47.

106. Edward L. Schaub in "The Legacy of Kant" in Immanuel Kant: Papers read at Northwestern University on the Bicentenary of Kant's Birth (1925), 13-14. See, also: The Life of Immanuel Kant, J.H.W. Stuckenberg (1882), 376.

107. The Life of Immanuel Kant, Stuckenberg (1882), 375.

108. Roger J. Sullivan in Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (1989) typifies this defense of Kant--as a *Christian*--in the following quote:

> For some time it has been common for commentators and Kantian scholars either to ignore Kant's fundamentally religious orientation or to reject it as an unfortunate aberration. But in his moral writings Kant again and again insists that the moral law itself requires us to believe in God. This may not be the familiar God of the Gospels, but it is the God of traditional Christian apologetics--a living, holy, omnipotent, and caring Person. (274)

This *old school* view of Kant's God as 'the God of *traditional* Christian apologetics' is also shared by such notable Kant scholars as Michel Despland, John R. Silber and (more recently) Stephen R. Palmquist (who espouses a more *mystical* interpretation, however).

I hesitate to add *the* 'guru of Kant's religion,' Allen Wood, to this list chiefly because he has shown a significant shift in position (in my estimate) when he began to *rethink* Kant's (theistic) religion in his noteworthy article "Kant's Deism" (1991). Even more recently, in his "Introduction" to the new translation of Kant's Religion (Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology (1996), Wood admits that "Kant's account of the Christian faith and the church" was "largely a negative one," but hastens to add--in defense of Kant--that Kant "did not pretend to know what eventual shape religious life ought to take" (xxiv). Wood's current view of Kant's *religion* appears to be a far cry from the confident assertion (made by Christian apologists) that Kant's philosophy is *certainly* religious both as to its nature and its intent.

109. "Peace," 102.

For a (fairly) recent discussion of this debate (regarding the role of *Christian philosophers*, as Alvin Plantinga calls them, and their influence in the interpretation of philosophy) see D.Z. Phillips's "Advice to Philosophers who are Christians" in his Wittgenstein and Religion, 1993: 220-236.

110. Cf. Matthew 14:31.

111. Yirmiahu Yovel in Kant and the Philosophy of History (1980) appears to agree with me (at least in part) as to whether Kant's *true* (underlying) motives (in dressing his argument in biblical language) were truly *Christian*, as the following excerpt indicates:

> Kant...wishes to exploit his audience's deep-rooted respect for the Bible and divert it to serve his own philosophical interests...For him the Bible is only a psychological and educational auxiliary, theoretically to be discarded at the end of the process (214-215).

112. In a letter to J.C. Lavater (28 April 1775), Kant states the following:

> I distinguish the *teachings of Christ* from the *report* we have of those teachings. In order that the former may be seen in their purity, I seek above all to separate out the moral teachings from all the dogmas of the New Testament. These moral teachings are certainly the fundamental doctrine of the Gospels, and the remainder can only serve as an auxiliary to them. (Correspondence, 80)

Theodore Greene in "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's *Religion*" comments that both Lessing and Kant "interpreted the 'religion of Christ,' as distinguished from the 'Christian religion,' in thoroughly moral terms" (Religion, xxii). Greene adds that Lessing wrote a fragment entitled *The Religion of Christ and the Christian Religion* in which Lessing argues that 'the religion of Christ' is "the true religion of the Gospels"; 'the Christian religion,' on the other hand--Lessing continues--is "that religion which holds Christ to be more than a man, i.e., an object of worship" (Ibid., xxii-n.2).

113. Tolstoy was so enthralled by Kant's Second Critique that he inscribed the full quote of Kant's 'starry heavens above' and 'moral law within' as a dedication in his work, entitled Life (The Complete Works of Lyof N. Tolstoi: What is to be Done? Life, vol.4, 1927: 286). A. Gulyga states in Immanuel Kant: His Life and Thought: "In Tolstoy's waning years [Kant's] *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* became one of his favorite books" (277).

114. In "Peace," Kant argues against the 'right to revolt' even against "a so-called tyrant" but envisages instead an end to war via the joint-establishment among nations of "a league of a special sort" (136, 115-116). See Religion in which Kant refers to 'a league of nations' as "a republic of federated free nations" (29n.).

Tolstoy claims he was converted to Christ (as opposed to

'the Christian religion') while he contemplated Christ's injunction: 'resist not evil' (Matthew 5:39). Tolstoy's conversion apparently had direct influence (in later years) on Mahatma Ghandi who--upon reading Tolstoy's The Kingdom of God is Within You, as well as "A Letter to a Hindu" (and in written correspondence with him)--decided to adopt a similar political strategy. (Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You (1894), trans. Constance Garnett, 1984: "Forward by Martin Green," v, ix-xi. See, also: Tolstoy and Gandhi, Men of Peace: A Biography, Martin Green, 1983.)

Perhaps it is partly due to this link (from Kant to Tolstoy to Ghandi) that even to this day Kantian philosophy continues to be highly praised throughout the Universities of India, as Arindam Chakrabarti alludes to (in "Kant in India"):

> The *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* have been absolutely central to the Philosophy curricula all over India for at least the past 125 years...While Plato, Aristotle, the modern philosophers--empiricists and rationalists--were taught seriously, the best teachers of each philosophy faculty were assigned to teach Kant (1281). (Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, Vol. I, Part 3: Sections 3M-5; 1995: 1281-1286)

See, also: K.M.P. Verman, Kant & The Gita, 1980.

115. Kant states that "Judaism is really not a religion at all," but a political organization with "a theocracy as its basis" (Religion, 116). As to *religious* (Church) rituals, Kant refers to them as 'pious playthings' stating simply that "whatever be substituted for the moral service of God, it is all one and all equal in value"--implying, of course, that it has *no* (real) value (Religion, 161).

116. As Kant explains:

> [M]an flatters himself by believing either that God can make him eternally happy (through remission of sins) without his having to become a better man, or else, if this seems to him impossible, that God can certainly make him a better man without his having to do anything more than to ask for it (Religion, 47).

117. Kant states that the concept of God ordering a father [Abraham] to slaughter his perfectly innocent son [Isaac]--like a sheep--"flatly contradicts morality" (Religion, 81-82, 175). (For an opposing view, see Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling.)

118. Kant sees 'biblical faith' (as well as *fetish faith* and *illusory faith*) as distinct and separate from the *moral* faith he seeks to promote, which faith Kant perceives to be "suited even to the commonest human capacities" (Religion, 168, 181-188, 189).

119. Experience and its Systematization: Studies in Kant, Nathan Rotenstreich (1972), 46; see also, entire ch. 3.

Jacques Maritain in Moral Philosophy puts it even more emphatically:

> Kantian ethics is the irreconcilable enemy of Aristotelian eudemonism, because, in a much more general and more profound way, it is the irreconcilable enemy of Hellenic moral thought, and of the dependence of morality on happiness and on the sovereign good envisaged by the Greeks. (113)

See, Robert B. Louden's "Did Aristotle and Kant Produce Moral 'Theories'?" (ch. 6) in Louden's Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation (1992), 99-124. See, as well: Thomas Auxter's Kant's Moral Teleology (1982), Ch. 2 ("Aristotle and the Problem of Teleology"). In addition, Henry S. Richardson's Ph.D. dissertation, Rational Deliberation of Ends (Harvard, 1986), involves an in-depth look at both Aristotle and Kant.

120. A5; B8-9. Kant also compares his concept of ideas to Plato's in A313-A319; B370-B375. George Schrader in "The Philosophy of Existence" argues that Kant differs from Plato in two key respects: "(1) he grounds the ideal possibility in the human will, and (2) he interprets it as a dynamic principle rather than a static form" (The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World," ed. Charles W. Hendel, 1957: 41).

For an in-depth study of comparison between Kant and Plato, see T.K. Seung's Kant's Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy, 1994.

121. First Critique, A568-571; B596-B599.

122. In The Arguments of the Philosophers series, 1978: 140.

123. As Frankl puts it rather dramatically:

> But my mind clung to my wife's image, imagining it with an uncanny acuteness. I heard her answering me, saw her smile, her frank and encouraging look. Real or not, her look was then more luminous than the sun which was beginning to rise...A thought crossed my mind: I didn't know if she were still alive. I knew only one thing--which I have learned well by now: Love goes far beyond the physical person of the beloved. It finds its deepest

> meaning in his spiritual being, his inner self. *Whether or not he is actually present, whether or not he is still alive at all, ceases somehow to be of importance.* [Frankl's wife was in fact deceased at the time] (Man's Search for Meaning, Viktor E. Frankl, 1984; 48-50)

124. My Chair, Ken Merrill, points out an important difference between these two cases:

> Frankl's wife was indubitably real and alive at some time in the past; for Kant, we never have any comparable certainty about God. The image of Frankl's wife was rooted in *real memory*--unlike the idea of God.

Professor Merrill's point is well-taken; hence, the difficulty in using analogies or similes in making comparisons. Although I (philosophically) agree that *an idea* of God cannot be realistically compared to that of *the idea* of any mortal being, I think the fact that Frankl was inspired by the *mere idea* of his wife (as something *far beyond the physical person*, as Frankl puts it) bears a remarkable *similarity* to what (I think) Kant tried to do with his *idea* of God--as an uplifting enlivening *Ideal*.

125. Although Kant states that undoubtedly we may "assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world" and that "we not only may, but *must*, do so," he justifies this "assumption of a supreme intelligence" (*though in the idea alone*) as one that can "always benefit reason and can never injure it" (first Critique, A697/B725; A687/B715).

Kant explains how it is that this "ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a *regulative principle* of reason" (Ibid., A619/B647), as follows:

> it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, to aid us in securing the highest possible systematic unity, by means of the idea of the purposive causality of the supreme cause of the world--as if this being, as supreme intelligence, acting in accordance with a supremely wise purpose, were the cause of all things. (Ibid., A688/B716)

See, as well, H. Vaihinger's treatment of Kant's *as if* philosophy in The Philosophy of 'As if', Part III.A: "Kant's use of the 'as if' method" (271-318) wherein Vaihinger claims that "in the Kantian sense, in the sense of the Critical Philosophy, the expression, 'I believe in God,' means simply that 'I act *as if* a God really existed'" (305-306).

126. Although I am employing the use of the term *noble lie* as I believe Plato in his Republic (414c) held it to be, the use of the term by Loyal Rue would define Kant's position as that

of the *noble lie* (as Rue explains):

> The noble-lie option dares to think it is possible to construct a vision of things as they "really are" that will disclose to us our common nature, and that such a vision may winch us toward unity without sacrificing our diversity. This option dares to speak of nonoptional values that it is in the interests of all humans to serve, and that by our service will effect adaptive change.
>
> Why is such a noble venture into mythmaking admitted to be a lie? I call it a lie because I have been persuaded by the postmodern critique that there are no accessible objective foundations for absolute values, that every take on ultimate realities can be shown to be contingent and caricatured, that there is no "God's eye" point of view from which anything at all can be shown to matter (By the Grace of Guile, 1994: 283).

John Sallis in Being and Logos (1996) explains how Plato's *noble lie* can be considered to be 'a lie' (375-377), notwithstanding the fact that certain translators refuse to so acquiesce. For example, Cornford in his Republic of Plato (1945) translates *noble lie* as: 'a single bold flight of invention' or 'convenient fictions' (106); Grube in his Plato's Republic (1974), however, appears to be more accommodating with his translation of 'noble fiction' or 'necessary untruths' (82).

127. First Critique, A813/B841; A811/B839.

128. Theology, 24.

129. "Peace," 126. First Critique, A849/B877.

130. "Peace," 126.

131.Kant in his second Critique states the following:

> The concept of freedom...is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and gain, with it and through it, stability and objective reality (3).

132. Theology, 25.

133. See, second Critique, 128-130.

134. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis White Beck, 1960: 274.

It is important to point out, however, that although Kant speaks of *God* as *the God of nature*, he does not intend to say that this God is *the cause of the world* in the sense of *the Creator*. Admittedly, Kant's description of God as "a being which is the cause (and consequently the author) of nature" lends itself to the notion that this God is *the Creator*. If we continue that selfsame sentence, however, we will see that Kant added the crucial qualifier that this *author* (as God) is the cause of nature through understanding and will (second Critique, 130). Earlier in the same passage, Kant explains that this "existence [of God] is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature" (Ibid., 129). Kant further describes how *distinct* this *God* is from nature in the following sentence:

> This supreme cause [God], however, must contain the ground of the agreement of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings but with the idea of this law so far as they make it the supreme ground of determination of the will (Ibid., 129).

In Lectures on Philosophical Theology, Kant is even more precise as to what he intended in the above 'moral argument' in his description of *God* as "like the moral law itself, thought of as personified" (114, 28-29).

135. Although Kant refers to the *facts of reason* in his first Critique (A760/B788), he spells out what he intends by the term in his second Critique, as follows:

> This Analytic proves that pure reason can be practical...This it does through *a fact* wherein pure reason shows itself actually to be practical. This *fact* is autonomy in the principle of morality by which reason determines the will to action. (43)

136. "Belief As a Requirement of Pure Reason: The Primacy of Kant's Moral Argument and its Relation to the Speculative Arguments," 105. This argument is also repeated by Zeldin in Freedom and the Critical Undertaking, 1980: 72-73ff.

The main difficulty I have with Zeldin's interpretation of Kant's moral argument is in her treatment of the phrase 'God exists' in the last three steps of her argument (nos. 6-8). If we look at step six, we can see that there is a connection (or relationship) between the existence of God and "the understanding of a finite rational being." This 'understanding,' I contend, is related to but the 'world of ideas'; and hence in speaking of 'the existence of God,' it would be more accurate (in Kant's overview of the concept) to speak of '*the idea of* the existence of God.' The latter part

of Zeldin's 'step six' which states "only if God exists" could be (more accurately) restated as: 'only if (at least) *the idea of* God exists as an ideal.' Likewise, 'steps seven and eight' could contain the qualifier that the phrase 'God exists' is intended to mean 'that *the idea of* God exists as a necessary ideal for morality.' (See also my M.A. Thesis, Unbelief in Kant and Fichte, University of Utah, 1993: 37-39.)

137. Religion, 142n; emphasis added.

138. Theology, 123.

139. As Kant expounds (in his first Critique):

> I do not at all share the opinion...that we may hope sometime to discover conclusive demonstrations...that there is a God, and that there is a future life. On the contrary, I am certain that this will never happen. For whence will reason obtain ground for such synthetic assertions, which do not relate to objects of experience and their inner possibility. But it is also apodeictically certain that there will never be anyone who will be able to assert the *opposite* with the least show [of proof], much less, dogmatically. (A741-742/B769-770)

140. (Friedrich Wilhelm) Nietzsche (1844-1900) is perhaps best known for his following statement: "God is dead: but considering the state the species Man is in, there will perhaps be caves, for ages yet, in which his shadow will be shown" (*Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* [The Gay Science], III, 108; Quoted in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd Edition, 1980: 363).

Henri Lichtenberger in The Gospel of Superman adds this interesting comment:

> Nietzsche did not separate his life from his thought, and *lived* his atheism as he had formerly *lived* his Christianity. Urged on by this all-powerful instinct of intellectual sincerity, he demolished, stone by stone, the whole edifice of the old world founded upon the belief in God...and he formulated with an ever-glowing clearness his personal and individual reply to the problem of the sense of life: "*All Gods are dead: now we will that the Superman shall live*" [*Zarathustra*, The Bestowing Virtue, 3]. By losing his God, Nietzsche had discovered himself. (24-25)

141. First Critique, A829/B857.

142. To (admittedly) oversimplify Pascal's detailed *wager*, I will quote but the following by (Blaise) Pascal (1620-1662):

> Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist. (Blaise Pascal: Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer, 1966: 151; see, the complete 'wager': 150-152)

143. First Critique, A675/B703. cf. Luke 17:21; Religion, 126.

144. Roger J. Sullivan in Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (1989) states the following comment regarding Allen Wood's contribution to a *religious* interpretation of Kant:

> When Wood's book [Kant's Moral Religion] was published in 1970, he stood virtually alone within Anglo-American tradition in insisting that the Critical philosophy itself is "a *religious* outlook" (380).

Wood, "Kant's Deism" in Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed. P. Rossi and M. Wreen (1991), 12.

145. Ibid., "Kant's Deism," 1.

146. Theology, 21. In the first Critique, Kant adds: "The *Republic* of Plato has become proverbial as a striking example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker" (A316/B372).

Kant also adds that Rousseau's proposal for a universal cosmopolitan nation has likewise been ridiculed "as a pedantically childish academic idea." Kant then suggests that his own proposal is for what *ought to be*, as opposed to what *will be*. ("Theory," 89)

147. For example, Herbert Herring in Essentials of Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (1993) states the following:

> In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, chapter *The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason*, Kant states unmistakenly that the idea of God belongs neither to physics nor to metaphysics, but to ethics; with this he becomes the founder of Moral Theology, i.e., a theology of reason (*theologia rationalis*) as against a theology of revelation (*theologia revelata*). (65)

148. Indeed, Kant was not alone in his wish to purge religion, as the following quote from Voltaire reflects the mood in Europe (in 1768) prior to Kant's Religion (1793):

> Religion must clearly be purged: the whole of Europe is crying out for it...It is time that men who are so enlightened to [*sic*] stop being slaves of the blind. I laugh every time I see an academy of science forced to defer to the decision of a congregation of the Holy Office.
>
> Theology has only served to subvert minds, and sometimes states. ("The ABC" in Voltaire: Political Writings, trans. David Williams, 1994: 147)

149. Kant compares this *gradual transition* whereby 'the universal religion of reason' replaces all traditional religion (or 'ecclesiastical faith') as the growth of a seed, which seed--Kant says--will one day "rule the world" (Religion, 113). Cf. Daniel 2:44.

150. Kant alludes to this *goal* in mind when he states the following:

> I have placed the main point of enlightenment--the escape of men from their self-incurred tutelage--in matters of religion because our rulers have no interest in playing the guardian with respect to the arts and sciences. (Kant, Conflict, xxxiv--n.9)

151. Although our conscience should be offended at the thought of prostrating ourselves before idols, Kant says, we should not mock 'our weaker brethren' who merely tend to imitate or mimic others. As Kant further explains:

> Religion is too important a subject for ridicule. A judge trying a man for his life will not scoff at him: it is an important matter, the man's life is at stake and ridicule is out of place. So it is always with religion: whatever may be its particular absurdities in detail, it is no matter for ridicule; the devotees of any particular religion attach great importance to it...and if they indulge in absurdities they are to be pitied rather than ridiculed (Ethics, 88, 112).

Kant's advice in this passage is consistent with his view of 'the restoration of all things' (mentioned earlier) whereby *enlightened* sectarians should treat each other with respect in order that they may eventually become one *religion* (of pure reason).

152. A819/B847.

153. Third Critique, 377n.

154. Anthropology, 135.
With respect to Kant's *cold passions* one may make an interesting comparison to Hume's *calm passions* (A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk.2, Part 1.1, 2nd ed., ed. P.H. Nidditch, 1978: 276). See:

1) J.Immerwahr, "Hume on Tranquillizing the Passions," David Hume: Critical Assessments, ed. Stanley Tweyman, Vol.4, 1995: 332-351;
2) L.E. Loeb, "Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the *Treatise*," Ibid., 100-109;
3) the sections on "Passions" and "Sympathy," Ibid., 225-484;
4) P.S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's "Treatise", 1966;
5) Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's *Treatise*, 1991; and
6) Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 1960: Part III, Chs. 7 and 8 (on the passions).

155. Anthropology, 134.

156. Morals, 1991; 208; emphasis added.
Kant adds in his third Critique that [cold] passions are "persistent and deliberate" and hence lead to 'hatred' and not mere 'anger' (132n.).

157. Anthropology, 133.

158. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Kant's most favored pupil became the mastermind (with Goethe) of the *Sturm und Drang* ('Storm and Stress') movement of the 1770s and was regarded as "the chief architect of the German rebellion against Enlightenment thinking" (Johann Gottfried Herder, Wulf Koepke, 1987; "Preface").

159. Kant, Reflection #896, trans. John Zammito, in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 43; emphasis added.

160. Morals, 211.

161. (1) Kant, Reflection #912, trans. J. Zammito in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 43;
(2) Ibid., Reflection #771, p.38;
(3) Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, 1978: 88;
(4) Kant, Reflection #369, #499, trans. J. Zammito in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 44;
(5) Ibid., Reflection #313, p.33.

162. Anthropology, 25.

163. Third Critique, 132n.

164. Anthropology, 133, 119, 133-134.
Kant also describes (cold) passion as an *enchantment* "that prevents reason from comparing it with the totality of all our inclinations when we are making a choice" (Ibid., 133).

165. Anthropology, 121; Third Critique, 132n.; Anthropology, 133.

166. Kant, Religion, 185.

167. Kant, Reflection #767, #335, trans. J. Zammito in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 37, 44.

168. James H. Hamby has determined that there are five steps whereby an inclination can be developed into a 'passion' in Kant's moral thought. See, his Ph.D. dissertation, Kant on Moral Anthropology, 189-193.

169. Anthropology, 137. Morals, 1991: 251-253. Lectures on Education, trans. Churton, 96. Religion, 121, 166-67.

170. Anthropology, 120. Cf. Religion in which Kant says that the root of the discord among Christian Churches "*lies hidden* in the basic principle of a despotically commanding ecclesiastical faith" (122).

171. Anthropology, 134, 138, 135.

172. Kant's letter to Hamann dated 08 April 1774 (trans. J. Zammito in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 40; cf. 37).

173. John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 36.

174. Religion, 188, 189, 183n., 162-63.

175. Religion, 186.

176. Kant, Reflection #897, trans. J. Zammito in The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 43.
Kant's third Critique is replete with references to the *sublime*. As to *the feeling* of the sublime, he says:

> [T]he feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that arises only indirectly: it is produced by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger. Hence it is an emotion, and so it seems to be

seriousness, rather than play, in the imagination's activity. Hence, too, this liking is incompatible with charms, and since the mind is not just attracted by the object but is alternately always repelled as well, the liking for the sublime contains not so much a positive pleasure as rather admiration and respect, and so should be called a negative pleasure. (§23, 98)

177. Third Critique, 132, 132n.
As to what Kant intends by *an affect*, he states:

> *Affects* and *passions* are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to *feeling* insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called *precipitate* or *rash*, and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should *get hold of* oneself. (Morals, 208)

When Kant says that enthusiam accompanies the idea of good *as an affect* of this idea, he is saying therefore that it is a hindrance to this idea in that it interferes with one's ability to clearly concentrate.

178. Kant, third Critique, 132. Kant, Conflict, 155.
Kant's view on *genuine enthusiasm* differs significantly from Hume's. See, Hume's "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm" in which Hume says:

> In a little time, the inspired person comes to regard himself as a distinguished favourite of the Divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, which is the summit of enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: Human reason, and even morality are rejected as fallacious guides: And the fanatic madman delivers himself over, blindly, and without reserve, to the supposed illapses [*sic*] of the spirit, and to inspiration from above. Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of ENTHUSIASM. (David Hume: Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen, 1994: 47)

179. See Kant's *island of reason* analogy in the first Critique, A235-236/B294-295; also, A396.
The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (ed. George A. Buttrick) provides an insightful account of the etymology of *sin* (as used in the Bible). As a *formal* word 'indicating a deviation from what is good and right,' *sin* has a double-sense: it not only means 'to miss' or 'to fail'; it also indicates something more than 'mere failure or mistake'--a 'wilful disobedience' in that one oversteps or transgresses "the word, command, law, or covenant of Yahweh." ("Sin, Sinners," Vol. 4, 361)
In this sense of 'overstepping' the law as well as in

'missing the target' do I therefore intend the phrase "to go beyond the mark." That is, one *sins*--in the Kantian sense--in that one fails to stay *within* the proper bounds or limits of reason alone.

180. Ibid., Bxxx.

181. I included 'religion' in quote marks to refer to the tendency of certain parties to place a blanket of *religion* over all philosophies. For instance, Boyd K. Packer in "What Every Freshman Should Know" states the following:

> There is a crying need for *the identification of atheism for what it is, and that is, a religion*--albeit a negative one, nevertheless it is a religious expression. It is the one extreme end of the spectrum of thought concerning the causation of things. (The Ensign Magazine, September 1973)

If *atheism* could (or should) be identified as 'a religion,' then under those 'limitations' (or lack thereof) I suppose Kantianism, together with (Nietzsche's) nihilism or (Marx's) communism, would be a religion as well.

182. John Zammito with a reference to Roy Pascal's The German *Sturm und Drang* (1953: 31) states: "The *Sturm und Drang* was, as far as Kant could tell, continuing along its mad course" (J. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 1992: 41).

In (part of) Zammito's translation of Kant's Reflection #775, Kant says (with respect to *Schwärmer*, or 'enthusiasts' like Herder): "If they [the enthusiasts] were to condescend to join the ranks of cold scholars, they would play a very menial role. But now they can flash like meteors" (Ibid., 38-39).

183.(1886): 225.

184. Conflict, 127.

I am grateful to my Chair, Ken Merrill, for pointing out Kant's 'narrow sense' of testimony, as (in Prof. Merrill's words) "a source of evidence (the quasi-legal meaning of the term)" and not necessarily as "a personal avowal of faith." Indeed, as Kant clarifies, the authority of reason ("of its precepts *as commands*") is not based on a *testimony of experience* (Morals, 44).

For an interesting treatment of this concept (of testimony), see: C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, 1992.

185. That Kant admits his position to be *peculiar* can be traced throughout his first Critique: for example, A845/B873.

Pascal's oft-quoted phrase in full is as follows:

> It is the heart that feels God, not reason: that is what faith is. God felt by the heart, not by reason. The heart has its reasons which reason itself does not know: we know that through countless things. (Blaise Pascal: *Pensées* and other Writings, trans. Honor Levi, 1995: 157-158)

Kant, in reply, could conceivably use his concept of a "Ruler who *knows the hearts* of men" as (I call it) 'the heartbeat of reason.' (Cf. I Samuel 16:7)

186. As Kant intimates (as early as 1781) in his first Critique:

> Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination. (Axi-n.)

187. Religion, 161n., 124n., 150.

188. Religion, 163, 123, 93, 96, 99.

189. Kant states the following regarding the *objective reality* of a *moral* world:

> The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition (we are quite unable to think any such object), but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment, that is, as a *corpus mysticum* of the rational beings in it, so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other (first Critique, A808/B836).

Stephen R. Palmquist in his Ph.D. dissertation, Kant's System of Perspectives and its Theological Implications (Oxford University, 1987) interprets this statement by Kant to mean that (despite Kant's abhorrence of 'mysticism' *in general*) Kant's moral philosophy constitutes a form of *religious* 'mysticism' (328ff.).

Although I do not agree with Palmquist (on this point), I grant that such a reading into Kant is certainly possible. One should, however, try to avoid the temptation to blend Kant's *moral* thought with the *religious* view that all cohesiveness to law is fundamentally *religious* in nature. I do

not say that Palmquist (a noted Kant scholar) espouses such a view but prominent pillars in society do. For example, Supreme Justice Dallin H. Oaks states (in "Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility"):

> Law helps to give society its cohesive structure, but it is religion that gives life and emotional attachment to that structure...The emotion that ties us to the law is our belief in its "inherent and ultimate rightness," a belief fostered most effectively by religion (197). (Perspectives in Mormon Ethics: Personal, Social, Legal and Medical, ed. Donald G. Hill, Jr., 1983: 193-204.)

Again, as I say, such a view (as noted above) is a possible interpretation of Kant but the suspicion should be raised, I think, in superficially connecting Kant's moral thought with a *religious* agenda, especially when a wide in-depth view of Kant (as I argue) betrays an entirely different 'set of rules.'

190. For example, Goethe--the senior mastermind behind the *Sturm und Drang* movement (as the precursor to that of the Romanticists)--was so enraged upon reading Kant's Religion that he stated Kant had at long last slobbered all over his 'beard.' Priests, upon reading Kant's Religion, changed the names of their dogs to "Kant" (see, Kant, William Wallace, 1911: 82).

Even Kant's own brother--John Henry (a Lutheran pastor)--who had read Kant's writings with interest (and even attended Kant's lectures) stopped reading Kant altogether when Kant published his Religion (Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant, 1882: 11).

191. I can appreciate that it can be difficult for traditional views on Kant to *fundamentally* change simply due to a new perspective in interpreting Kant. I am reminded of Locke's account of 'an upstart novelist' overturning in an instant the views that have been traditionally taught for decades. Locke calls this action 'an insufferable thing' to disrobe all one's "old opinions and pretences to knowledge and learning which with hard study" one has all his time been laboring for--to be turned out "stark-naked in quest afresh of new notions" (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch, 1975: 714).

My (rather modest) intention has been simply to help scholars to *rethink* Kant's position with respect to religion and religious passion. Should certain scholars choose to *disrobe* their (previously held) opinion as a result, surely that decision is their own.

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APPENDIX

A CHRONOLOGY OF KANT'S WORKS[1]

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[1]This "Chronology of Kant's Works" has been compiled from the information presented in the following works:

1) Kant, Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, trans. R. Meerbote and D. Walford (1992), "Guide to Abbreviations," xxiii-xxviii;
2) Arsenij Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, (1987), "Chronology," 279-282;
3) Kant, Religion, "Dates," cxliii-cxlv.;
4) John D. Simons, "Immanuel Kant," rpt. in German Writers in the Age of Goethe, vol. 94), ed. J. Hardin and C. E. Schweitzer (1990), 106-109;
5) A.R.C. Duncan, "Writings by Kant referred to by de Vleeschauwer," in The Development of Kantian Thought, Herman-J. de Vleeschauwer, 1962: xii-xvi);
6) Four Neglected Essays by Immanuel Kant: John Richardson's 1798-99 translations, ed. Stephen Palmquist (1994); "Appendix IV: Exhaustive Bibliography of English Translations of Kant," 104-118; and
7) H. Caygill, "Kant's Published Writings," A Kant Dictionary, 1995: 418-427.

Kant's Precritical Works (1746-1770)[2]

1746 ·"Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces" (Published in 1749)

1754 June
·"Investigation of the Question Whether the Earth in its Rotation on its Axis by which it produces the Change of Day and Night has Undergone any Alteration since the Earliest Times of its Origin"

August
·"The Question Whether the Earth is Aging Considered from a Physicalist Point of View"

1755 March
·"Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire Universe, treated in accordance with Newtonian Principles"

17 April
·"Concise Outline of Some Reflections on Fire" [Kant's Master's Thesis]

27 September
·"New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition"
·Beginning of Lectures on Logic [1755-1798]

1756 January to April
·"Concerning the Causes of the Terrestrial Convulsions on the Occasion of the Disaster which Afflicted the Western Countries of Europe Towards the End of Last Year [1755]"
·"History and Natural Description of the Most Remarkable Occurrences Associated with the

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[2]This period is called Kant's "Precritical Works" not only because it preceded the publication of Kant's well-known three Critiques, but because Kant himself referred to it as a period of "dogmatic slumber," as A. Gulyga in Immanuel Kant points out:

> Many years later Kant would call his condition during the *magister* period [1755-1770] "a dogmatic slumber." He forbade the use of his earlier works, and as for the tractate on optimism, he wished all the extant copies to be destroyed. (37)

[Lisbon] Earthquake, which at the End of 1755 Shook a Large Part of the World"

- "Further Observation on the Terrestrial Convulsions which have been Observed for Some Time"

10 April

- "The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of which *Sample I* Contains the Physical Monadology"
- "New Remarks Towards an Elucidation of the Theory of Winds"

1757 Spring

- "Outline and Announcement of a Course of Lectures on Physical Geography, Together with an Appendix of an Inquiry into the Question of Whether the West Winds in our Regions are Humid Because They have Traversed a Great Sea"
- Beginning of Lectures on Physical Geography [1757-1796]

1758 Spring

- "New Theory of Motion and Rest and its Consequences for the Primary Grounds of Natural Science"

1759 October

- "Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism"

1760 June

- "Thoughts on the Premature Demise of Herr Johann Friedrich von Funk, in an Epistle to his Mother"

1762

- "The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures"

December

- "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God"

1763

- "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy" [Kant's reply to Leibniz's views on mathematics]
- [in preparation:] "Concerning the Certainty and Uncertainty of Knowledge in General" [published posthumously]
- "Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals" [Prize Essay of the Berlin Academy, published in 1764]

1764

- "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime"

27 February
- "Essay on the Maladies of the Mind"

23 March
- Review of Silberschlag's Essay on the Fireball of 1762

1765
- "Announcement of the Organization of his Lectures in the Winter Semester 1765-1766"

1766
- "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer [Emanuel Swedenborg] Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics"

1768
- "Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Regions in Space"

Kant's Critical Works (1770-1804)

1770 21 August
- "Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World" [Kant's Inaugural Dissertation]

1771
- "Review of Moscati's Book: Concerning the Essential Physical Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Human Beings"

1772 21 February
- Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, concerning plans for The Critique of Pure Reason

1775
- "On the Different Races of Humankind"
- Beginning of Lectures on Ethics [1775-1780]

1776-77
- "[Two] Essays Concerning the Philanthropic Academy"

1776
- Beginning of Lectures on Pedagogy [1776-1787]

1777
- "Concerning Sensory Illusion and Poetic Fiction" [Reflection #1525; published posthumously] [A Latin address in response to Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld]

1780s
- "On Philosophical Exaltations" [Reflections #6050-6053; published posthumously]

1781 May
- The Critique of Pure Reason

1782 ·"A Notice of Lambert's Correspondence"
·"Information on Physicians"

1783 ·"Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics which will be able to Present Itself as a Science"
·"Concerning Schultz's Attempt at an Introduction to Ethics for all Men without Distinction of Religion" [Kant's review of Gottlob Ernst Schulz's (1761-1833) Introduction to the Science of Morality]
·Beginning of Lectures on Philosophical Theology [1783-1784] [published posthumously]

1784 November
·"Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View"
December
·"Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?"

1785 January and November
·Kant's reviews on Johann Gottfried von Herder's Ideas Concerning the Philosophy of the History of Mankind
March
·"About the Volcanoes on the Moon"
April
·Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
·"On the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books"
November
·"On the Determination of the Concept of the Human Race"

1786 January
·"The Conjectural Beginning of Human History"
18 April
·"Review of Gottlieb Hufeland's Attempt at a Principle of Natural Right
October
·"What is Orientation in Thinking?"
·"On Mendelssohn's Morning Hours"
·"On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body" [Reflection #1526, published posthumously] [Rectoral Address]

1787 ·Second Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason
28, 31 December
·Two letters to Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), outlining Kant's tripartite schema of his

philosophical system to culminate in a Critique of Judgment

1788 January
- "Concerning the Employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy"

Spring
- The Critique of Practical Reason

1790
- The Critique of Judgment
- Third edition of The Critique of Pure Reason
- "On Philosophy in General" (First Introduction to The Critique of Judgment)
- "On a Discovery, According to which an All Modern Critique of Pure Reason is alleged to be made Superfluous by an Earlier Critique"
- "On Inner Sense" ("On Sentimentality and it Remedy" [published posthumously]

1791 September
- "On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy"
- [Concerning the Prize question posed by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin for the year 1791:] What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? [published posthumously in May 1804]

1792 April
- "About Radical Evil"

1793 Fall
- Religion Within the Bounds of Unaided Reason

September
- "On the Common Saying: It May Be Correct in Theory But It Does Not Work in Practice"

1794 May
- "On the Influence of the Moon on the Weather"

June
- "The End of All Things"

1795
- "Towards Eternal Peace" ["Perpetual Peace"]
- "On a Newly Raging Spirit of Domination in Philosophy" [published posthumously]

1796
- Kant's response to Sömmerring's On the Organ of

the Soul
- "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy"
- "Settlement of a Mathematical Controversy: which is based on a Misunderstanding"

1797
- The Metaphysics of Morals

July
- "An Announcement of the Forthcoming Treaty of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy"

September
- "On a supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy"

1798
- "On the Making of Books"

Fall
- The Conflict of the Faculties
- Anthropology From a Pragmatic Standpoint

1799 07 August
- Kant's "Open Letter" contra Fichte

1800
- "Preface to Jachmann's 'Examination of the Kantian Philosophy of Religion with Regard to Its Alleged Similarity to Pure Mysticism'"
- Kant's "Afterword" to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian Dictionary

September
- Logic: A Handbook to Lectures

1802
- Lectures on Physical Geography

1803
- On Pedagogy: The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant

1804 May
- On Developments in Metaphysics Since Leibniz and Wolff [Kant's competition thesis of 1791: published posthumously]
- Lectures on Ethics [1775-1780] [published posthumously]
- Lectures on Philosophical Theology [1783-1784] [published posthumously in 1817]
- Lectures on Metaphysics [published posthumously in 1821]
- *Opus Postumum [1790-1803]* [As the title suggests, this work is a posthumous compilation of Kant's last writings. Reiche's edition of 1882-84 was considered incomplete and

inadequate; and that of Erich Adickes' in 1920 became quite controversial mainly due to his commentary of this material. The complete text of the *Opus Postumum* was not available for independent study until the Academy Edition in 1936, which was later edited by Buchenau and Lehmann (1936-1938). It was not until 1992 that this important work was translated into English--by Ekhart Förster and Michael Rosen.]

·The collection of papers and notes that Kant did not intend for publication are referred to as the *Nachlass*. They are generally comprised of: (1) Kant's marginal notes written either as corrections on Kant's own works, or on the textbooks Kant used in his lectures; and (2) Kant's *reflections* [*Reflexionen*] which vary from a short phrase to a detailed argument. *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* will eventually include these writings by Kant (in English translation) in their volume (to be entitled): Notes and Fragments.