Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorMohebbi, Shima
dc.contributor.authorBarnett, Katherine
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-21T21:37:36Z
dc.date.available2020-04-21T21:37:36Z
dc.date.issued2020-05
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11244/324143
dc.description.abstractCritical infrastructures are governed by several sectors working together to maintain social, economic and environmental well-being. These infrastructures are interdependent and rely on a complex schedule of repair after a disruptive event. Decision makers seek to restore the infrastructure networks as quickly as possible while balancing time and resource constraints. Although many models focus on a centralized view for networks, rarely is there only one decision maker for the infrastructure networks, making decentralization a more realistic view. In decentralized decision-making paradigm, individual decision makers need to decide how to prioritize areas of the network and eventually improve the aggregated infrastructure systems resilience. Existing literature advocates cooperative management strategies to enhance infrastructure systems resilience. However, there is a dearth of quantitative studies analyzing resource allocation decisions considering both decentralized and cooperative aspects. In light of cooperative game theory, interdependent infrastructure systems can be modeled as coalitions of service providers pooling their resources to meet the global performance. This work relies on coalitional game theory to address decentralized resource allocation for interdependent water distribution and road networks. Coalitional game theory addresses the fair allocation of resources for nodes that surround an important area to the infrastructure and the need to decentralize the overall interdependent network. In particular, combining coalitional game theory with weighted graphs creates an order of repair for each node in the coalitions. Subsequently, the decision makers can pass information on to the master problem, reducing the complexity of the resource allocation problem for the interdependent networks. The proposed approach is applied to water distribution and transportation networks in the City of Tampa, FL. We compare the decentralized solutions to centralized solutions in different scenarios to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach for the city-scale networks.en_US
dc.languageen_USen_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectInterdependent infrastructuresen_US
dc.subjectNetwork optimizationen_US
dc.subjectResource allocationen_US
dc.subject.lcshInfrastructure (Economics)
dc.subject.lcshSystem design
dc.subject.lcshResource allocation
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.titleDecentralized Resource Allocation for Interdependent Infrastructure Networks Restoration: A Game Theory Approachen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberTrafalis, Theodore
dc.contributor.committeeMemberOmitaomu, Olufemi
dc.date.manuscript2020-04
dc.thesis.degreeMaster of Scienceen_US
ou.groupGallogly College of Engineering::School of Industrial and Systems Engineeringen_US
shareok.orcid0000-0002-0496-593Xen_US
shareok.nativefileaccessrestricteden_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International