OU - Faculty and Staff Publications

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Browsing OU - Faculty and Staff Publications by College/Department "College of Arts and Sciences::Department of Philosophy"

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    Against the Proposed New UNP Project Plan
    (2019-09-06) Ellis, Stephen
    There are basically three things wrong with the UNP TIF: 1) It has failed to deliver on the high-end, regional-draw retail which it promised. 2) It diverts tax income from higher priority uses. 3) Expenditures in the TIF create a competitive disadvantage for non-TIF areas of Norman. The proposed new project plan for the UNP TIF only partly addresses the tax diversion issue; it exacerbates the other problems. All of this has distributive justice implication.
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    Causal Powers, Hume’s Early German Critics, and Kant’s Response to Hume
    (2013) Chance, Brian
    Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the Disciple of Pure Reason suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such a refutation, and (3) that none of Hume’s early German critics provided responses to this account that would have satisfied Kant. Watkins’ reading of Kant’s account of causation is thus more compatible with traditional views about Kant’s relationship to Hume than Watkins believes.
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    Locke, Kant, and Synthetic A Priori Cognition
    (2015) Chance, Brian
    This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s justification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justification for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own justification for his claim is quite different from what many commentators have thought it was (or should have been).