Warning Intelligence in Nuclear Crisis Management:  Avoiding Catastrophic Miscalculation

Sartorius, Christopher

Warning Intelligence in Nuclear Crisis Management: Avoiding Catastrophic Miscalculation

dc.contributor.advisor	Gaddie, Ronald K.
dc.contributor.author	Sartorius, Christopher
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Barry, Colin M.
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Carlson, Deven E.
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Mendoza, Jorge L.
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Satterthwaite, Shad B.
dc.date.accessioned	2018-07-26T19:47:09Z
dc.date.available	2018-07-26T19:47:09Z
dc.date.issued	2018-07-23
dc.date.manuscript	2018-07-23
dc.description.abstract	Despite efforts to reduce nuclear weapons proliferation and the general norm against nuclear weapons use which has survived since 1945, the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia continues. The United States and the Soviet Union were involved in two nuclear crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Soviet War Scare of 1983, which came perilously close to escalating to nuclear weapons use. Strategic and tactical warning intelligence played a critical role in shaping the current situation assessments senior military and political leaders used to manage events which nearly led to a catastrophic nuclear exchange. But this raises the following questions: 1) What factors contribute to accurate situation assessments? 2) How important is quality strategic and tactical intelligence? 3) How significant is the intelligence – policymaker relationship in accurately assessing the threat? 4) What prevents senior leaders from objectively interpreting intelligence? 5) Could a “Russian War Scare of 20XX” occur in the future? This study examines the relationship between intelligence professionals and the senior political leaders they serve, and the role warning intelligence plays in helping leaders accurately assess the current situation as part of the crisis response decision making process. Using a comparative case study approach, I found intelligence quality, leadership receptivity towards intelligence, and objective interpretation of intelligence are key factors which increase the probability senior leaders will accurately assess the threat during nuclear crises.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11244/301312
dc.language	en_US	en_US
dc.subject	Warning Intellience	en_US
dc.subject	Nuclear Weapons	en_US
dc.subject	Nuclear Crisis	en_US
dc.subject	Current Situation Assessment	en_US
dc.thesis.degree	Ph.D.	en_US
dc.title	Warning Intelligence in Nuclear Crisis Management: Avoiding Catastrophic Miscalculation	en_US
ou.group	College of Arts and Sciences::Department of Political Science	en_US
shareok.nativefileaccess	restricted	en_US
shareok.orcid	0000-0001-9154-1715	en_US