Strategic arms limitations :
| dc.contributor.author | Patton, Thomas, | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-16T12:28:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-08-16T12:28:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1981 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | The focus of this research is twofold: (1) to evaluate selected factors affecting progress in arms control, and (2) to analyze the proposed deployment of the mobile land-based ICBM concept in conjunction with a low altitude air defense system. In this regard, three major factors are emphasized: theories of deterrence, the concept of "technology creep", and models of the decision making and negotiation processes. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation is in an applied policy analysis format. The approach is based on a model derived by White, et al. (1978). This model has been used for a variety of research purposes and with modification it fit the particular substantive aspects of arms control to be considered. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Strategic arms limitations are not intermittent elements but integral aspects of foreign policy and national security. Recognition of the increasing role of arms control in foreign policy is depicted by the number of arms control agreements that have transpired since 1959. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | The research indicates that the strategic weapon system selection processes are unstructured with no set rules that may be applied from instance to the next. Technology creep has the greatest potential for impacting the strategic arms process. These advancements occur at a more rapid pace than do political solutions to the problems they create. The negotiation process is an extension of the key decision makers and progress in negotiation is impacted by that relationship. The concept of deterrence does not impact the weapon system selection process but deterrence impacts arms control. When the deterrent value of a weapon system is diminished or over come by technology new and better weapons must be deployed. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | It is concluded that the U.S. defensive triad be retained. There is merit in the argument that diversity of weapons systems complicates the adversaries attack planning. Retaining redundant systems insures that there will be surviving weapons capable of accomplishing the deterrent mission. The MX ICBM was determined to be the proper system to retain this deterrence and 200 of these systems should be deployed in the horizontal basing mode. The low altitude air defense system should be deployed concurrently with MX. Survivability of MX will be enhanced by the ABM system to the point that a preemptive first strike would not be profitable. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | vii, 259 leaves : | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11244/4940 | |
| dc.note | Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 42-11, Section: A, page: 4920. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political Science, General. | en_US |
| dc.thesis.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
| dc.thesis.degreeDiscipline | Department of Political Science | en_US |
| dc.title | Strategic arms limitations : | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
| ou.group | College of Arts and Sciences::Department of Political Science | |
| ou.identifier | (UMI)AAI8209438 | en_US |
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