Majority Voting On Tax Shares: a Simple Life-Cycle Model

dc.contributor.authorMarilyn R. Flowers
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-14T19:53:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-30T15:32:13Z
dc.date.available2016-01-14T19:53:37Z
dc.date.available2016-03-30T15:32:13Z
dc.date.issued1981-01-01
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a simple model of majority voting on tax shares in which Abstract voters perceive the tax structure to be chosen as a permanent institution under which each voter's tax burden will be determined throughout his or her lifetime. Young voters view the choice of tax structure as a means of allocating an anticipated tax burden over the life cycle. Middle-aged and elderly voters, on the other hand, do have the option of lowering the tax burden on themselves by shifting it onto younger voters. Preferences of different groups of voters and likely majority rule outcome with respect to choice of tax structure are examined under various assumptions about lifetime income patterns and expectations about the rate of public sector growth, and of population growth.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewYesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewnoteshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guidelinesen_US
dc.identifier.citationFlowers, M. R. (1981). Majority Voting On Tax Shares: a Simple Life-Cycle Model. Public Finance Review, 9(1), 47-59. doi: 10.1177/109114218100900104en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/109114218100900104en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11244/25358
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherPublic Finance Review
dc.rights.requestablefalseen_US
dc.titleMajority Voting On Tax Shares: a Simple Life-Cycle Modelen_US
dc.typeResearch Articleen_US

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