Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong

Robertson, Seth

Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong

dc.contributor.advisor	Snow, Nancy
dc.contributor.author	Robertson, Seth
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Montminy, Martin
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Olberding, Amy
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Zagzebski, Linda
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Showers, Carolin
dc.date.accessioned	2019-03-01T13:45:22Z
dc.date.available	2019-03-01T13:45:22Z
dc.date.issued	2019-05-10
dc.date.manuscript	2019-02-28
dc.description.abstract	I argue that an adequate theory of rightness should meet (at least) two distinct conditions: a “Consequences Condition” according to which the rightness or wrongness of some, but not all acts should be determined conclusively by the act’s outcomes on welfare, and a “Character Condition” according to which the rightness or wrongness of some, but not all acts should be influenced partially by aspects of the moral character of the person who committed the act. The combination of these two conditions is interesting because many major normative theories capture one, but not both well. In the course of making the case for the Consequences and Character Conditions, I develop and argue for a novel version of metaethical Humean Constructivism that I call “perspectival naturalism,” which I then apply in support of the Consequences and Character Conditions.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11244/317565
dc.language	en_US	en_US
dc.subject	Philosophy	en_US
dc.subject	Ethics	en_US
dc.subject	Moral Character	en_US
dc.subject	Moral Judgment	en_US
dc.thesis.degree	Ph.D.	en_US
dc.title	Character and Moral Judgment: Designing Right and Wrong	en_US
ou.group	College of Arts and Sciences::Department of Philosophy	en_US
shareok.orcid	0000-0003-3512-6060	en_US