Valuism: A New Theory of Knowledge

dc.contributor.advisor	Zagzebski, Linda
dc.contributor.author	Stewart, Raymond
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Riggs, Wayne
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Montminy, Martin
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Frick, William
dc.contributor.committeeMember	Ellis, Stephen
dc.date.accessioned	2021-05-06T21:18:03Z
dc.date.available	2021-05-06T21:18:03Z
dc.date.issued	2021-05-14
dc.date.manuscript	2021-04-27
dc.description.abstract	Since Plato, epistemologists have tried to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Traditionally, they have tried to answer this by defining knowledge as true belief plus some additional properties and then tried to explain why these properties are valuable. This dissertation flips this approach on its head. Rather than attempt to explain the value of knowledge in terms of the components that make belief into knowledge, I argue that value itself is what transforms belief into knowledge. It is the sole transformative component of belief. Not only does this approach solve the value problem out of hand, but it can also assist in solving the Gettier problem and can unify otherwise competing theories of knowledge.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11244/329505
dc.language	en_US	en_US
dc.subject	Philosophy, Epistemology	en_US
dc.subject	Value of Knowledge	en_US
dc.subject	Analysis of Knowledge	en_US
dc.thesis.degree	Ph.D.	en_US
dc.title	Valuism: A New Theory of Knowledge	en_US
ou.group	College of Arts and Sciences::Department of Philosophy	en_US