According to Adam Smith, developing a moral self requires psychological distance: the ability to adopt a perspective outside of oneself, and then examine and regulate one’s feelings and behavior from that point of view. This developmental account of the self gives rise to a particular conception of virtue: a view of the ideal moral agent as one who feels keenly for others, feels little for herself, and in all cases regulates her conduct from a self-distanced point of view. According to Smith, these aspects of virtue are all related. He claims that one who feels keenly for others will be particularly well suited to acquire a high degree of self-command, and he suggests that the process of self-distanced self-evaluation can itself support the development of a virtuous character by both moderating a person’s emotional reactivity and enhancing their sensitivity to the rights and interests of others (relative to their own). Our project will rigorously test Smith’s claim that adopting a self-distanced perspective enhances one’s sensitivity to the rights and interests of others. Laboratory studies will systematically manipulate whether participants self-distance when reasoning about moral dilemmas, and examine the implications of these manipulations for moral reasoning and behavior. Field studies will complement these lab studies by examining the role that self-distancing plays in moral reasoning and behavior in daily life. Consistent with Smith’s claims, we predict that subjects who are either cued or taught to self-distance will display higher levels of empathy and more altruistic behavior.