Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking

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dc.contributor.authorDaniel Sutter
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-14T19:53:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-30T15:31:22Z
dc.date.available2016-01-14T19:53:37Z
dc.date.available2016-03-30T15:31:22Z
dc.date.issued2003-07-01
dc.description.abstractMany constitutional political economists argue that the length of time constitutions remain in effect distinguishes constitutional politics from legislative politics. The author explores the role of constitutional durability in a repeated rent-seeking game. A general interest (e.g., consumers) in the game can lobby for a constitutional prohibition that prevents the rent-seeking contest from occurring. A durable constitution can reduce expected rent-seeking expenditures if constitutional politics occurs less frequently than legislative politics, stable rights to receive rents do not exist, and the general interest has a longer time horizon than rent seekers. Under these conditions, general interest lobbying for a constitutional prohibition denies transfers to future rent seekers unable to participate in politics today.en_US
dc.description.peerreviewYesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewnoteshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guidelinesen_US
dc.identifier.citationSutter, D. (2003). Durable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seeking. Public Finance Review, 31(4), 413-428. doi: 10.1177/1091142103031004004en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1091142103031004004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11244/25354
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherPublic Finance Review
dc.rights.requestablefalseen_US
dc.subjectRent seekingen_US
dc.subjectconstitutional political economyen_US
dc.subjectrent dissipationen_US
dc.titleDurable Constitutional Rules and Rent Seekingen_US
dc.typeResearch Articleen_US

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