Order in a Chaotic Subsystem: A Comparative Analysis of Nuclear Facility Siting Using Coalition Opportunity Structures and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

Abstract

This dissertation attempts to highlight existing patterns surrounding locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) and explain how institutional features of a country influence the likelihood those LULUs become operational. Focusing on cases of nuclear facility siting from around the world, the primary empirical research question is: does variation in coalition opportunity structures influence the siting of nuclear facilities? If so, how? Using Coalition Opportunity Structures (COS) to answer this question, the dissertation also contributes to the theoretical advancement of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and its applicability to varying political systems. To this end, the primary theoretical question explored in the dissertation is: what are the mechanisms through which coalition opportunity structures influence the policy process? Using both quantitative and qualitative methodology, I test the influence of COS on three separate but interrelated elements of the siting process—coalition formation, coalition strategies, and policy change. Findings indicate that both openness of a political system and norms of consensus affect policy outcomes. Additionally, I find that opportunity structures influence the emergence of organized opposition against the project as well as the nature of the strategies adopted by policy opponents.