In this dissertation I first motivate the need for the constitution relation by raising what Michael C. Rea has called the problem of material constitution and arguing that many of the so-called solutions of the problem do not in fact resolve it. I then look to recent accounts of constitution in the literature and focus on five for a thorough statement and critical appraisal: Frederick Doepke, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Lynne Rudder Baker, Samuel Levey, and Michael C. Rea. In each case I argue that the view is either incomplete, commits one to dubious entities and/or other consequences (e.g., top-down property borrowing) that are themselves unwarranted, or is incapable of accounting for paradigm cases of constitutionally related objects. Finally, I offer my own view of the constitution relation which accounts for an object's extrinsic relations as well as its intrinsic features, fully explains both the similarity and the dissimilarity among constitutionally related objects (without multiplying kinds), and is consistent with supervenience. In the end, I offer a view that is sufficiently robust to account for all constitutionally related phenomena in the world.