American foreign policy toward Korea, 1945 -1950

Abstract

This study scrutinizes relations between the Korean nationalist movement and occupying foreign powers when it came to building a nation-state in the aftermath of World War II, set in the broader context of Korean history. Unlike some post-revisionist scholars, I find that the United States and Soviet Union were not "empires by invitation." Each superpower, to varying degrees, in practice faced strong resistance from Korean nationalism.

Actually, this study finds that no school of thought-be it traditionalist, revisionist, or post-revisionist-is definitive. Each approach contributes something to our understanding but none is without flaws. The traditional approach is correct to note the importance of the Cold War context but overstresses that factor and oversimplifies it. There is much merit in revisionist arguments but not in every case. Finally, postrevisionist emphasis on national interest and the balance of power in diplomacy is a helpful model but focuses too much attention on superpower relations and neglects local context.

I make several additional assertions, too. First, this study demonstrates that in the case of nation-building in Korea, diplomatic historians in America, whether traditionalist or revisionist, overly neglect the influence of key individuals in local areas and politics. Second, relations between local power bases and the superpowers were not one- dimensional in practice; power often did not flow from the top down. Third, I stress earlier experience before 1945 and long-term factors affecting Korean attitudes towards continuity and changes in U. S. policy towards their homeland, as well as short-term catalysts. Last, this study confirms that idealistic U. S. rhetoric often, if not always, was a cloak for the pursuit of self-interest. From this perspective, United States aid to Korean democratization had clear limits. Actions, simply put, fell short of words.