Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorZagzebski, Linda,en_US
dc.contributor.authorBrown, Stephen R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-16T12:19:07Z
dc.date.available2013-08-16T12:19:07Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11244/655
dc.description.abstractIn Chapter 5, I place NVE is the space of contemporary virtue theories and also contrast it with eudaimonistic or welfare-based ethics and with evolutionary ethics. NVE is a good-based virtue theory, but it is neither a kind of eudaimonism nor an evolutionary ethics. Considerations of evolution lead us to certain criticisms of ethical theories like NVE. Contra the critics, I show NVE's compatibility with neo-Darwinism. I then suggest further research.en_US
dc.description.abstractI defend a neo-Aristotelian ethical theory I call "naturalized virtue ethics, " or NVE. This is a naturalistic, teleological theory. Human beings are a species of social animal for whom there is a characteristic form of life. An individual human being may be evaluated as a good or bad specimen according to how well that individual realizes the human form of life. To be a good human being, one must possess those traits of character that reliably enable one to achieve the ends of creatures like us.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Chapter 3, I further explicate NVE and show how several of the standard virtues are justified by the lights of NVE. I also show the further applications of the theory to issues of distributive justice and law. These examples provide tests of the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of NVE, a test the theory passes.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Chapter 1, I present reasons for why we should prefer ethical naturalism.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Chapter 4, I consider the charge that ethical naturalism commits some one or other egregious metaethical mistake. This sort of mistake has been associated variously with the fact/value gap, the is/ought gap, and the naturalistic fallacy. I discuss these issues in their general form and relative to NVE, showing that there are no problems here for NVE.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Chapter 2, I discuss what to many is still a contentious issue: natural teleology. NVE is teleological. Teleology, both in ethics and in science, has often been looked upon with suspicion. I argue that the teleology operative in NVE is natural, or naturalizable. NVE is on a metaphysically sound foundation.en_US
dc.format.extentv, 190 leaves ;en_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy.en_US
dc.subjectVirtue.en_US
dc.titleNaturalized virtue ethics.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.thesis.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.thesis.degreeDisciplineDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.noteSource: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3323.en_US
dc.noteAdviser: Linda Zagzebski.en_US
ou.identifier(UMI)AAI3107295en_US
ou.groupCollege of Arts and Sciences::Department of Philosophy


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record