Self-governance in Aquinas and pre-modern moral philosophy.

Abstract

I conclude the dissertation by offering an account of why Schneewind may have misunderstood Aquinas in the way he did. I contend that Schneewind fails to see the full extent of the rise of divine command theory after Aquinas, and how this change altered moral theory from self-governance-based through Aquinas to obedience-based subsequent to Aquinas.

I develop my argument by first offering interpretations of the ethical accounts of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine. I then offer a systematic and detailed interpretation of Aquinas' ethical theory focusing on the way in which his theory accounts for the basic components of self-governance. I conclude my interpretation of Aquinas by explaining the nature and role of obedience in his theory.

In this dissertation, I argue, contra J. B. Schneewind, that there is a rich Ancient and Medieval tradition up through Thomas Aquinas that prizes self-governance as a key to moral theory. Schneewind, in his The Invention of Autonomy, argues that prior to the modern period, moral theory was construed in terms of obedience. Moreover, the story of modern ethical thought is that of a gradual whittling away at the obedience-based conception of morality in favor of self-governance.