The following two claims have each captivated some of the very most penetrating intellects both in and out of philosophy, yet they are typically taken to be mutually exclusive: (1) The world exists and has its nature independently of cognition (2) Many facts obtain only relative to some conceptual scheme for ordering reality.

Most of us feel compelled to assent to the world's mind-independent existence when we consider (for example) the presence of the world as a determinate entity prior to the existence of cognizers. Many of us also find it difficult to deny that there are a multiplicity of equally viable descriptions of any part of reality (e.g. competing frames of reference, different perspectives on causal relations, different ways of individuating objects, etc.). Some of the "competing" descriptions appear to be mutually exclusive in the sense that the facts that obtain relative to the one are precluded by facts that obtain relative to the other.

In this dissertation, I argue that there exist viable versions of metaphysical realism (1) and conceptual relativity (2) that are not mutually exclusive, and that can be combined to generate a novel, consistent, and explanatorily powerful metaphysic. Along the way, I diagnose a number of confusions that have perpetuated the unfortunate presumption of the mutual exclusivity of metaphysical realism and conceptual relativity; these confusions have generated a shockingly stagnant dialectic between the proponents of each doctrine. I also expose as untenable some of the more prominent versions of realism and relativism, and I reject a number of previous attempts to reconcile metaphysical realism with conceptual relativity. Holistic Realism, as the unification of these two compelling theses, emerges from pruning away the ill-formed branches from each doctrine and integrating their core elements. At the heart of this project is the deep suspicion that neither metaphysical realism nor conceptual relativity (each having perennially attracted adherents of the very highest intellectual caliber) is likely to be eliminable from a comprehensive theory of the nature of reality.