Charles Hartshorne's global argument for God's existence :

Abstract

The idea of combining several arguments for theism--a cumulative case--is not original with Hartshorne. However, few philosophers have self-consciously employed this strategy. This is unfortunate insofar as it makes the case for theism seem weaker than it is.

The major weakness in Hartshorne's position is the claim that empirical evidence is irrelevant to the question of God's existence. Conceptual and empirical issues often overlap. This is not, however, inconsistent with Hartshorne's belief that God's existence is not an empirical question. Empirical considerations may cause a revision in the concept of deity but can never prove the existence or nonexistence of God. Thus, the blurring of conceptual and empirical questions is not fatal to the global argument. The existence of the dipolar God can still be affirmed as more reasonable than any currently available alternatives, be they theistic or nontheistic.

The global argument is a genuine example of a cumulative case since none of the proofs it involves, taken individually, is capable of establishing the existence of God. However, when considered as elements of one cumulative argument, the case for theism is substantially strenthened.

The emphasis in current literature on Hartshorne's version of the ontological argument obscures the fact that Hartshorne's case for theism rests on a group of interrelated arguments. Hartshorne explicitly denies that the ontological argument, by itself, is sufficient to justify belief in God. The dissertation examines Hartshorne's "global argument" for God's existence.

Hartshorne's cumulative case, the global argument, has always been an integral part of his philosophy. The global argument is novel in its approach to the theistic question because, (1) it employs the concept of a dipolar God and, (2) all of the proofs are a priori.