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dc.contributor.authorDemiralp, Ilhan
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-10T20:49:48Z
dc.date.available2016-10-10T20:49:48Z
dc.date.issued2011-08
dc.identifier.citationEnglish II, P. C., Demiralp, I., & Dukes, W. P. (2011). Mutual Fund Exit and Mutual Fund Fees. Journal Of Law & Economics, 54(3), 723-749.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11244/45403
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit mode and timing. The evidence presented herein is consistent with fee maximization by mutual fund sponsors or managers, increased conflicts of interest for funds charging 12b-1 fees and higher management fees, and a pecking order for mutual fund exit method. Specifically, mutual fund exits that result in decreased fee income are delayed relative to exits that do not and exit strategies that retain fee income are more likely than strategies that do not. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/658492en_US
dc.titleMutual Fund Exit and Mutual Fund Feesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.peerreviewYesen_US
ou.groupMichael F. Price College of Businessen_US


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