This thesis tests the proposition that the Liberal International Order does not treat all norms equally, but rather values neoliberalism over others. I test this hypothesis through four case studies of Latin American populists post-1990: Fujimori and Bolsonaro (right-wing populists) and Correa and Chávez (left-wing populists). Right-wing populists are generally more neoliberal than left-wing populists. Populists were chosen to isolate the influence of other norm violations, as these four cases are all guilty of violating liberal democratic norms like press freedom and free and fair elections. I examine each of these cases to determine how international organizations respond to liberal norm violations, either with condemnation or sanctions. First, I find that left-wing populists are supportive of LIO norms minus neoliberalism. Fujimori is also supportive of LIO norms, while Bolsonaro is critical of global governance and multilateralism. I detect no noticeable pattern between the responses to left and right-wing populists. In fact, the leader most supportive of the LIO (Fujimori) was the most harshly punished for norm violations during his 2002 autogolpe. This suggests that the post-1990 global order does not emulate Cold War patterns of pro-neoliberal interventionism, but rather prioritizes democratic order. This could be possible due to the increasingly multipolar world and/or global contestations over neoliberalism.