Good, the bad and the excellent: An exploration of moral exemplarism theory

Abstract

Dr. Linda Zagzebski's virtue theory, Exemplarist Moral Theory, proposes that through the emotion of admiration we seek moral exemplars who we then emulate and become virtuous ourselves. It is those whom we have admiration for upon reflection that we consider to be exemplars. However, admiration is an emotion and thus is susceptible to cultural forces and other problems. My hypothesis is that if admiration is a tool that allows us to detect moral goodness, then there needs to be a natural orientation to the good that human beings naturally have. I use Thomas Aquinas moral anthropology and Philippa Foot's naturalized virtue ethics to give this claim a theoretical background. I then use this theoretical background to make arguments that will hopefully vindicate the emotion of admiration and also Zagzebski's moral theory. My research gives an overview of Zagzebski's theory, then brings up some problems with the faculty of admiration. Next, I outline Aquinas's and Foot's virtue ethics before finally applying their theories to the problems I brought up previously.