| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this dissertation is to address the intersection of two normative epistemologies, Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) and virtue epistemology (VE). While both are successful in many respects, I argue that the constraints on rational degrees of belief provided by Bayesianism are not enough. VE offers additional constraints on degrees of belief, and plays a salutary role for BCT in the form constraints from background knowledge on the more subjective aspects of Bayesianism. Chapter 1 is an introduction to my project. Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the logic and epistemology of science, Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Chapter 3 presents a recent development in cognitive science, rational analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning and bases everyday rationality in formal rationality. Chapter 4 presents historical motivations for turning to virtue epistemology. I argue that given historical considerations virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by shifting the focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of agents. Chapter 5 presents a development of a particular, reliabilist view in virtue epistemology. Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation. In this chapter I argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory, as an epistemology of science, should be embedded within virtue epistemology and that at least one familiar problem, the problem of the priors, can be ameliorated. | |
