Warning Intelligence in Nuclear Crisis Management: Avoiding Catastrophic Miscalculation

Abstract

Despite efforts to reduce nuclear weapons proliferation and the general norm against nuclear weapons use which has survived since 1945, the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia continues. The United States and the Soviet Union were involved in two nuclear crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Soviet War Scare of 1983, which came perilously close to escalating to nuclear weapons use. Strategic and tactical warning intelligence played a critical role in shaping the current situation assessments senior military and political leaders used to manage events which nearly led to a catastrophic nuclear exchange. But this raises the following questions: 1) What factors contribute to accurate situation assessments? 2) How important is quality strategic and tactical intelligence? 3) How significant is the intelligence – policymaker relationship in accurately assessing the threat? 4) What prevents senior leaders from objectively interpreting intelligence? 5) Could a “Russian War Scare of 20XX” occur in the future? This study examines the relationship between intelligence professionals and the senior political leaders they serve, and the role warning intelligence plays in helping leaders accurately assess the current situation as part of the crisis response decision making process. Using a comparative case study approach, I found intelligence quality, leadership receptivity towards intelligence, and objective interpretation of intelligence are key factors which increase the probability senior leaders will accurately assess the threat during nuclear crises.