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Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theories

dc.date.accessioned2016-01-14T19:52:39Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-30T15:33:28Z
dc.date.available2016-01-14T19:52:39Z
dc.date.available2016-03-30T15:33:28Z
dc.date.issued1981-07-01
dc.identifier.citationScott, W. J., & Grasmick, H. G. (1981). Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theories. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 17(3), 395-408. doi: 10.1177/002188638101700316en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11244/24841
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherThe Journal of Applied Behavioral Science
dc.titleDeterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theoriesen_US
dc.typeResearch Articleen_US
dc.description.peerreviewYesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewnoteshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guidelinesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/002188638101700316en_US
dc.rights.requestablefalseen_US


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