| dc.description.abstract | This thesis has grown out of a long-term interest in arms control and disarmament, and a desire to understand why and how arms control agreements have been reached in the past. My research into pre-World War One Anglo-German relations, dealing in particular with the great battleship race, was motivated by my desire to compare this relationship to Hans Morganthau's postulate as a test of its validity. This political realist argues that a "political settlement must precede disarmament. Without political settlement, disarmament has no chance for success." There is the immediate need to modify at least one point on Morganthau's theory in order for it to have any relevance to prewar Anglo-German relations. There was never any serious attempt made to conclude an actual naval disarmament treaty between Britain and Germany, but statesmen on both sides of the North Sea did desire some form of arms control arrangement at one time or another. For the purposes of my thesis, arms control shall be defined as the regulation of an "armaments race for the purpose of creating a measure of military stability," while disarmament is the "transformation of the international politics by eliminating its destructive and anarchical tendencies." 2 The point is that the basic difference between disarmament and arms control is one of elimination versus limitation. However, the main consideration remains: will a great power agree to limit its sovereign right to maintain armaments at a level that it considers necessary for its own security by signing an agreement with another nation that has interests and views different enough to preclude basic political understanding with the first country? Placed in these terms, "arms control" can be used in place of "disarmament," because the principle remains the same; both types of agreement require a limitation on what a state may legitimately Jo to provide for its own security. As my research progressed, it quickly became apparent that the Haldane Mission--and the negotiations that followed it during the first quarter of 1912--formed the focal point of the diplomatic relationship between Germany and Great Britain in regard to the naval and political questions during the years prior to the outbreak of the Great War. During this series of talks the fundamental policies of the two states toward each other were refined and �ocused to the highest degree achieved. The two years that followed the br0akdown in the talks, in the words of Paul Kennedy, "form virtually a diplomatic epilogue." 3 An examination of the Haldane talks provides the best means for explaining what the policies coming fron1 Berlin and London were, and why the two were unable to settle their iv outstanding differences in a manner that was mutually advantageous. In general terms the naval arms control agreement, which Great Britain considered to be the key to improving relations with Imperial Germany, was unobtainable as long as there was not a basic political agreement between the two states, as sought by Berlin. Morganthau's theory is valid so long as one realizes that both states had to consider the ~xisting naval balance legitimat~ in order for a political understanding to be reached. In other words, a nation's armaments policy is indivisible from a nation's foreign policy; to have a basic political under-standing between two or more states, each state must consider the other nation's arms policy to be compatible politically with its own. In the case of the Anglo-German battleship race and the corre~ponding political difficulties, no political understanding--and therefore no arms control agreement either--was possible. This was to remain the case because Great Britain retained the policy of the "twopower standard", which required the Royal Navy to maintain a strength equal to that of the next two most powerful navies, while Germany retained the "risk theory," as the basis for its naval policy. This theory was based on the assumption that if the German navy was powerful enough so that even if the most powerful navy in the world (The Royal Navy) attacked Germany, the attacker's fleet would be so damaged that such an attack would be irrational and therefore no such assault would be made. 4 The above is not intended to imply that naval policy was the only political matter that tended to alienate these two states from each other. The Court of St. James, both prior to and during the Haldane Mission, adamantly refused to give Germany any firm reassurances that Britain would not be a varty to any French scheme of revanche against Germany, in exchange for naval concessions from Berlin. This_ remained the case even after German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg dropped his initial demand for a pledge of absolute neutrality and adopted a position that made 0ny neutrality pledge dependent on which party in any future war was the "aggressor." This concession would have allowed Britain to come to the aid of any country that Germany attacked or provoked. On a more fundamental level it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that economic rivalry was at the root of the deteriorating relations between Germany and Britain. Although often times couched in different rhetoric, most of the important personalities of the time, as well as recent historians, have reached the same basic conclusion. Paul Kennedy stated that after the turn of the century Britain "looked upon a Germany that kept growing as an unwanted and troublesome intruder on the sanctity of the British supremacy over the commerce and oceans of the world." 5 Therefore, Britain naturally began to associate with those states not on friendly terms with Germany as a means of protecting Britain's dominance of world trade. Paul Kennedy argues that the Anglo-German quarrels were "manifestations of the relative shift in economic power of these two countries between 1860 and 1914." He concludes that the root of Anglo-German antagonism is economic; trade rivalries and British fear of German industrial growth 6 drove the two ever farther apart. Free trade made nice rhetoric until British traders began to encounter German capital interests at nearly every point on the globe. Both states needed, or at least thought that they needed, room to expand their markets and sources of raw materials in order to continue their economic growth. Whether this expansion was territorial, or commercial, was not of vital importance in the final equation. The only way for Germany and Britain to regain a measure of international friendship was for one to withdraw from the economic competition for dominance of the worlo economic system. The competitive nature of their economic systems naturally made this an impossibility. One must remember that the political questions, which will be closely examined in the pages that follow, are largely the outgrowths of the economic competition between the two nations. Many historians accept the economic determinist position then veer off looking for "devils," but they simply did not exist, at least as of April, 1912. The statesmen who sat in Berlin and London were neither diabolical war mongers, nor saints. They were often captives of systems that they neither created, nor controlled to any significant extent. A long standing misconception, which I hope my thesis will help to put an end to, is the commonly held view that Germany's Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was never willing to retreat from his demand for a pledge of absolute neutrality from Great Britain in exchange for a reduction in Germany's naval buildup. This misleading inte~pretation continues to find its way into a number of works dealing with prewar Anglo-German relations, thus making Germany's chancellor out to be one of the "devils." The earliest secondary source that I have found that makes this "absolute neutrality" mistake is Sidney B. Fay's The Origins of the World War, published in 1928, and even Paul Kennedy's recent work, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (1980), still continues to argue the same position. Other authors who subscribe to this view incltide Zar0 Steiner, Peter Padfield and Fritz Fischer. 7 Although the Haldane Mission represents only a relatively smell part of each of the works by the authors mentioned, the fact that Germany's position continues to be misinterpreted by a number of ~lfferent authors suggests that a review of what Germany's policy was toward Britain, is needed. It seems that this should proceed before more work is done on why Gern1any adopted the policies it did. We need to know what German policy was before we can have any hope of understanding why it developed the way it did. The fact that Bethmann-Hollweg was willing to accept a neutrality formula with an escape clause hinging on which party to a conflict was the "aggressor" does not necessarily mean the whole interpretation of Germany as the initiator of many of the problems between that country and England (as well as other European countries) is entirely wrong. It does suggest that as late as 1912, Germany was less aggressive and unreasonable than a number of prominent historians have been willing to acknowledge. On the other side of the story, because Germany was in fact more reasonable in its desires than the historiography of AngloGerman relations suggests, Britain was less reasonable than some historisns have posited, in what it hoped to work out with Germany. Thus it is only logical to conclude that the behavioral and motivational differences between "liberal" Britain and "conservative" Germany were not as great as many historians to date have argued. | |
