| dc.description.abstract | The value-free ideal for science (VFI) prohibits noncognitive values (e.g., social or religious values) from influencing the practice of science. After all, a scientist should not reject an empirical theory (e.g.) on religious grounds. But while motivated by reasonable concerns, VFI overlooks legitimate roles for noncognitive values in science.
Contra VFI, Hugh Lacey explains that noncognitive values can promote scientific aims by grounding new methodologies that may lead to novel theories and extend to new domains. Yet, Lacey agrees with one aspect of VFI: noncognitive values should not serve as grounds in the empirical evaluation of theories. This has led some critics to misidentify his view merely as an updated version of VFI.
I argue that views of the kind Lacey endorses, which I call Dialectical Empiricism (DE), deserve further investigation. They capture what VFI gets right; but they also show that noncognitive values are essential to good science. Throughout the dissertation I explore variants of DE, demonstrating its potential and flexibility. Furthermore, I defend DE against its critics, especially those who mistake it for a version of VFI. In stark opposition to VFI, DE reveals how the illusion of value-freedom sometimes blinds us to promising alternatives to mainstream scientific approaches. I demonstrate this by applying the framework of DE to contemporary research in agricultural and nutritional science. These case studies show that noncognitive values really do influence scientific practices. And, most importantly, they demonstrate how embracing a value-laden view of science can open our eyes to promising alternative approaches that may have the potential to increase our knowledge of the world and of possibilities for human flourishing. | en_US |
