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TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY, RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION, AND DISSOCIATION: ADDRESSING ALLPORT'S PARADOX OF RELIGION AND RACISM

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

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To Delaina, Keaton, and Kayden – I wish I could adequately describe how much I love you. You have sacrificed more than you should to allow me the opportunity to complete this huge task. Together, we did it; the dissertation is done! Now, let's play.

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Abstract

This dissertation addresses the paradoxical relationship between religion and racism. Specifically, this study combines elements of terror management theory (TMT) and the dissociation model to examine the potential impact of intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, indiscriminate, and low religiosity on questions of race and death anxiety. Past research provides conflicting evidence concerning the ability of intrinsic religiosity to reduce racial tendencies. The negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice has been questioned in light of social desirability concerns. The dissociation model suggests social desirability does not necessarily indicate lack of genuine concern for prejudice reduction. Measuring compunction (guilt/shame) in light of a participant's self-reported violation of non-prejudiced beliefs (*should* , *would, and discrepancy scores*) provides a means to examine the degree to which non-prejudiced values are actually held. Likewise, self-reported discrepancies represent violations of a person's cultural worldview and, according to TMT, result in increased death anxiety. Using a series of correlations, ANOVA's and ANCOVA's this dissertation found support for central elements of TMT. Increased discrepancy scores were found to be positively correlated with death anxiety. Discrepancy scores were also found to be negatively correlated with social desirability. Results also suggest intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity function similarly in relation to racism.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

In a 1963 question and answer session following his speech to Western Michigan University, Martin Luther King observed:

> I must admit that I have gone through those moments when I was greatly disappointed with the church and what it has done in this period of social change. We must face the fact that in America, the church is still the most segregated major institution… At 11:00 on Sunday morning when we stand and sing and Christ has no east or west, we stand at the most segregated hour in this nation. This is tragic (King, 1963, p. 22).

As the "moral guardian of the community", King believed the church had the responsibility to, "preach brotherhood and make it a reality within its own body" (1963, p. 11). It was not just the church of King's time that struggled to meet this responsibility; the conflict continues to play out to the present day across the broader scope of Judeo Christian tradition.

Universal compassion is a defining element of Judeo, Christian, and Muslim faiths. "Love your neighbor as yourself" is contained in Jewish scripture (Lev. 19:18) and echoed in Christian scripture (Mt. 19:19; Mk. 12:31; Lk. 10:27). The Koran calls followers to be "kind to your parents, relatives, orphans, the destitute, your near and distant neighbors" (Sura 4:16). Despite such calls, prejudice remains a great challenge. Jewish scripture contains the story of Jonah, an ethnocentric, prejudiced prophet who refuses to travel to the city of Nineveh even complaining to his God, "I knew that you are a gracious and compassionate God, slow to anger and abounding in

love, a God who relents from sending calamity" (Jon. 4:2, NIV). Christian scripture reveals the struggle of early Christian communities wrestling with the issue of prejudice. The well-known parable of the Good Samaritan reflects Jewish prejudice toward Samaritans. When asked, "Who is my neighbor" Jesus tells the story of an unnamed man robbed and left for dead. In the story, Jewish leaders (Priest and Levite) refuse to help the injured man while a Samaritan stops, helps, and provides the necessary care. When asked, "Which of these was a neighbor to the man who fell among robbers?" Jesus' questioner simply responds, "the one who showed mercy". The same religious, cultural, and ethnic prejudice dilemma drives significant portions of such Biblical books as Acts, Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians.

The issue of prejudice continues to plague religion. What King observed pastorally, research has shown scientifically. Nine years before King's comments, Allport (1954) wrote his monumental work *The Nature of Prejudice,* containing an insightful chapter on religion and prejudice, which begins with the observation, "The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice" (p. 444). Citing Muslim and Christian missionary conflicts in Africa, Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant conflicts in Europe, and centuries of religious wars, Allport concludes: "While the creeds of the great religions are universalistic, all stressing brotherhood, the practice of these creeds is frequently divisive and brutal" (1954, p. 444).

It is on this paradox, that is, the connection between religiosity and prejudice, the present studies are focused.

Terror Management Theory

Racism and prejudice are by nature clashes of cultural worldviews. Basic assumptions of value and identity conflict and often result in derogation, rejection, and abuse of the opposing worldview. So what is it about different others that brings out prejudice and/or racist reactions?

Terror management theory (TMT: Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg & Pyszczynski et al., 1990; Rosenblatt & Greenberg et al., 1989) is a theory of human motivation that provides a broad explanatory framework for the function of worldviews and the resulting oftentimes negative effects of interactions between competing worldviews. According to TMT, the natural human drive for survival, coupled with the uniquely human cognitive ability to envision vulnerability and mortality, creates great potential for acute existential anxiety and terror. Such a powerful form of apprehension motivates humans to develop cultural worldviews in order to organize and give meaning to life, thus providing a buffer against the importunity of existential anxiety. According to TMT, living up to the standards and understandings of one's worldview allows a person to gain meaning, self-esteem, and a sense of transcendence. These in turn help buffer the potential terror caused by thoughts of death. The theory asserts failure to live up to the standards and meanings of one's cultural worldview (CWV) or doubting the worldview itself increases the potential for terror, and all the negative consequences that so often accompany it.

Mortality Salience

The psychological function of mortality underlies TMT (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg & Pyszczynski et al.1994; Rossenblatt, et al., 1989). The mortality salience (MS) hypothesis is built upon the assumption that:

> To the extent that a psychological structure provides protection against anxiety, then reminding people of the source of their anxiety should lead to an increased need for that structure and thus more positive reactions to things that support it and more negative reactions to things that threaten it. (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999, p. 835)

TMT argues that death is the underlying cause of existential anxiety and thus, reminding people of death leads to an increased need for the psychological structures—primarily in the form of one's cultural worldview and sense of self-esteem—that protect against that anxiety. Life is lived with the understanding that it will someday end; admittedly however, people do not spend every moment contemplating their own death. Still, TMT research has shown that the psychological structure works both consciously and unconsciously (Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszczynski et al., 1999), though in different ways. Greenberg et al. (1994, Study 3) found that subjects responded to reminders of their mortality differently depending on whether their response came immediately after a mortality prime (conscious awareness) or whether they completed a distraction task following the prime (nonconscious, i.e., outside of focal awareness). Participants completing a death-awareness measure immediately following the mortality prime, during what is termed

proximal terror management defense, showed lower levels of death-awareness than those completing the same measure after a brief distraction, at which point *distal* terror management defensive processes are posited to be in effect.

Pyszczynski et al. (1999) further developed the distinction between conscious, proximal reactions, and unconscious, distal reactions to mortality salience through their duel-process model. The model explains how conscious awareness of death is defended against by using proximal defenses, wherein attempts are made to remove death-related thoughts from focal attention. Proximal defense involves suppressing death-related thoughts with distractions or rationalizing the potential of death into the distant future. When mortality is out of conscious attention, residual nonconscious responses to death stimulate distal defenses, wherein individuals rely more heavily on their CWV and sense of self-esteem to provide and bolster symbolic conceptions of themselves and how they relate to the world around them.

Since people spend most of their time with something other than death within their immediate focal attention, it is the distal defensive processes that tend to govern much of everyday interactions. Distal defenses rely on CWV structure to provide meaning and explanation for what goes on in the world around us. Worldviews define reality and value in life, providing the structure and interpretive lens through which people make sense of their surroundings and the events taking place (Landau et al., 2004). Worldviews "provide a means of conceptualizing reality that allows for the possibility of equanimity in the face of human vulnerability and mortality" (Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 308).

Buffering Terror

Our cultural worldviews buffer the anxiety of death by providing a sense of both literal and symbolic immortality to those adhering to its assumed validity (Rossenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990). Symbolic immortality provides transcendence for individuals' cultural contributions by allowing their lives to be imbued with meaning and perceived significance beyond the grave, thus bestowing a sense of immortality. Through symbolic immortality individuals feel part of something greater than themselves via associations with families, nations, and ideals. When primed to think of death, individuals have shown an increased concern for key elements of their cultural values, such as status, prestige, relationships, nationalism, and the desire for offspring (Burling, 1993; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Fritsche, 2007). These cultural values provide a sense of death transcendence, allowing individuals' memory and contributions to continue long after their bodies die and their corporeal existence comes to an end.

Cultural worldviews may also provide a form of literal immortality, via religious conceptions, wherein a person literally lives on in some conscious form of afterlife e.g., heaven, reincarnation, nirvana, resurrection, etc. (Dechesne et al., 2003; Vail et al., 2010), for if there is conscious existence beyond death, then existential anxiety may be buffered, and the terror of death ameliorated. In illustration of this, Dechesne et al. (2003) found that participants provided with medical research supporting out of body afterlife experiences were less likely to seek out symbolic

forms of immortality (self-esteem striving) than participants given psychological and physiological explanations for out of body afterlife experiences.

Worldviews can only provide anxiety buffering results if individuals have and can maintain faith in their own particular CWV, and their standing within it (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Pyszczynksi, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Self-esteem is "the feeling that one is an object of primary value in a meaningful universe" (Greenberg et al., 1992, p. 913). If either of these conditions goes unmet, or is sufficiently threatened, then one is left with little to defend against the terror of death. Self-esteem may come through individuals' own evaluations of their standing within their CWV, or it may come through the feedback and validation provided by others sharing their CWV (Greenberg et al., 1992).

TMT theorist have found that bolstering a person's sense of self-esteem leads to a reduction of anxiety in the face of threat (Greenberg et al., 1992, Study 1), reduced physiological arousal when anticipating a painful shock (Greenberg et al., 1992, Study 2, & 3), and denial of a short life expectancy (Greenberg et al., 1993, Studies 1 & 2). This reduction in existential anxiety has been demonstrated in both experimentally enhanced self-esteem, and dispositionally high self-esteem conditions (Greenberg et al., 1993). Similarly, bolstering a person's CWV through social validation or evidentiary support reduces mortality salience effects (Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel & Martins, 2005). The reverse has also proven true: threatening either of these two components can increase mortality salience effects. Similarly, self-esteem threats increase death-anxiety

(Routledge, 2012) and death thought accessibility (DTA: Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008). Moreover, threatening various aspects of a person's CWV increases DTA (Schimel et al., 2008). Arnt and Greenberg (1999) found that increased self-esteem may only reduce mortality salience effects provided that particular beliefs on which that self-esteem is built (i.e., worldview standards of valued conduct) are not threatened.

Cultural Worldview Defense

Since CWVs are "essentially socially constructed fictions" (Rosenblatt et al., 1989, p. 682) dependent on social consensus, their perceived validity faces continual threat by alternative worldviews and/or conflicting information. Threats can come in a variety of forms including violations of cultural values (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), competing worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1990), violations of basic worldview components (Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999), or direct threats against the underlying foundations of a worldview (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; Schimel et al., 2007). When either component of self-esteem is threatened – validity of CWV or standing within that CWV – individuals will engage in efforts to bolster their self-esteem and CWV and/or derogate the source of the threat and their conflicting CWV.

Early TMT research showed that under MS, violators of the CWV's standards were punished more severely than in a control group (Solomon et al., 1989). The reverse proved true as well; when people are viewed as upholding cultural values,

participants under MS show greater tolerance, and increase their desire to reward them (Study 3).

Drawing on Festinger (1954), and Byrne (1971), TMT posits that interactions with similar others holding similar values and beliefs provide consensual validation of a person's CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990). When another person shares our CVW, it suggests our worldview is not the result of individual bias, but rather objective, reasonable belief in the true state of affairs. This validation increases faith in a chosen CWV, thereby increasing its buffering effectiveness against the terror of death (i.e., the existential anxiety felt when mortality is made salient). Schimel et al. (1999) did find a slight exception; their research showed MS increased the perceptions of out-group members who acted in stereotypically consistent ways compared to out-group members who may be more similar, yet acted in stereotypically inconsistent ways (also see Landau et al., 2004). Rather than disconfirming TMT's worldview defense concepts, Schimel et al. demonstrated the significant role worldviews play in organizing conceptions of reality. Since stereotypes are based on one's CWV, a person violating these assumptions may be seen as a threat to the absolute validity of that particular CWV.

TMT and Prejudice

TMT helps explain the motivational underpinnings behind prejudice in two critical ways. First, prejudice provides a way to organize information according to one's worldview (Allport, 1954; Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999). The meaning and structure provided by CWVs is critical in buffeting the terror of

mortality. Stereotypes and prejudice provide heuristic boundaries to identify ingroup and outgroup members. Schimel et al.'s (1999) work suggests the buffering effects of such organization play a vital role in one's life, even to the point that contradictory information is perceived as a threat, regardless of whether such contradictions may be deemed positive (e.g., a young black man whistling Vivaldi; Steele, 2010). Whenever mortality is made salient, people cling to their stereotypes to provide a comforting pattern of meaning, secure in its reliability to reassure and validate their psychological equanimity (Landau et al., 2004).

Secondly, TMT explains the derogation of outgroup members (prejudice) given their perceived threat to one's worldview. TMT has demonstrated such treatment as recommendation of harsher penalties against worldview violators (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), negative impressions of outgroups (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 1992) and decreased liking for people who violate stereotypical expectations (Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999).

Whenever a different worldview is encountered, it suggests a potential alternative to how one sees the world and makes meaning within it (Landau et al., 2004). If similar others tend to bolsters one's worldview, then, according to TMT, dissimilar others tend to threaten one's CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990). The very presence of a competing CWVs suggests alternative ways of viewing the world and raises potential doubts about the objectivity and reasonableness of a particular worldview, thereby decreasing effectiveness as a buffer against anxiety, and thus

generating distal terror management defense in the form of hostility towards the dissimilar others.

TMT and Religion

Within the framework of TMT, religious worldviews offer some of the strongest buffers against the terror of death. Religion's strength comes from its ability to provide meaning and structure, self-esteem, and literal forms of immortality within various cultural contexts. Religion provides answers to basic questions of origin, significance, and purpose of life (see Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; Vail et al., 2010). As mentioned, religion provides a dual view of immortality: literal and symbolic. In one's lifetime, religion provides a sense of meaning, defines life as it should be lived, and offers the security of a transcendent protector and provider. In short, religion offers "the opportunity to live a meaningful life, to feel significant and eternal" (Jonas & Fischer, 2006, p. 553). The self-esteem believers gain through their connection with their chosen deity provides a means of survival in the present world through their dependence on its ability to provide protection, along with an avenue towards the worldly and spiritual necessities one needs to survive (Greenberg & Landau, In press; Vail et al., 2010).

The ability of religion to provide such a strong buffer against death and terror has led some scholars to conclude that terror management is the primary psychological function of religion (Greenberg & Landau, In Press). This terror management function is seen by Vail et al. (2010) as the explanation as to why the earliest religious beliefs were developed and maintained in the first place. Uhlmann,

Poehlman, and Bargh (2008) even suggest humans have within them an implicit theism which serves, in part, to deal with existential anxiety.

The strong connection between religion and death awareness is demonstrated throughout the world's literature. Moreover, belief in a literal form of afterlife increases with mortality salience (Osarchuck & Tatz, 1973), as does belief in a supernatural agency (Norenazyan & Hansen, 2006), to the extent that when fundamental aspects of a person's faith are challenged, mortality thoughts become more accessible.

Religion and Racism

Given the universal claim of religions to seek the brotherhood of humanity (Allport, 1954), and the ability of religions to provide avenues toward self-esteem and immortality, it would seem religion should also provide an effective belief system for reducing prejudice. Such optimism, however, has been met with disappointingly mixed empirical evidence.

In his influential work *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) begins his chapter on religion and prejudice with this insightful observation: "The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice" (p. 444). Twelve years later, he expressed a similar conclusion, writing, "Two contrary sets of threads are woven into the fabric of all religion—the warp of brotherhood and the woof of bigotry" (Allport, 1966).

Allport's observations were grounded in a "long parade of findings" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 432) demonstrating a positive correlation between measures of

religiosity and levels of prejudice (see Allport, 1967; Batson & Ventis, 1982 for reviews). Allport's own research showed Protestant and Catholic students more likely to be racially prejudiced against Blacks than respondents who had no religious connection (Allport & Kramer, 1946). The same study revealed a correlation between strong religious influence in the home and racial prejudice. Concerned that Allport and Kramer's research contained a sampling bias among participants, Rosenblith (1949) replicated the study only to find similar results. By 1966, Allport considered it a "well-established fact in social science" (p. 447) that American churchgoers were, on average, more intolerant than non-churchgoers.

Subsequent research has continued to demonstrate the paradoxical relationship between religion and prejudice. Batson and Ventis' (1982) meta-analysis of studies conducted between 1940 and 1975 confirmed the trend. These studies utilized several measures of prejudice (racial, ethnocentric, anti-Semitic, etc), and indexes of religious involvement (church attendance, views toward religion, orthodoxy or conservative religious belief). Results showed 34 of 44 findings exhibiting positive correlations between the amount of prejudice and the amount of religious involvement, interest, or adherence. They conclude: "Among White, middle-class Christians in the United States, religion is not associated with increased love and acceptance, but with increased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry" (p. 257).

Explaining the Paradox

Allport (1954; 1966) explained the paradox within three contexts or influences: theological, sociocultural, and personal-psychological. The theological

context contains “three invitations to bigotry” (Allport, 1966, p. 449) which exist across the religious spectrum. First, the doctrine of revelation leads religions to claim absolute truths and view other religious and philosophical positions as a threat. Second, the doctrine of election establishes distinctions between the saved and unsaved, the ins and outs. “Since God is for the ins, the outs must be excluded from privileges, and in extreme cases eliminated by sword or by fire” (Allport, 1966, p. 450). The third “invitation to bigotry”, is the concept of theocracy. “No theological idea has caused so much persecution and suffering in both the old world and the new as have the various versions of theocracy” (Allport, 1960, p. 450). In a theocracy, the state is an instrument of the church, and therefore, violation of appointed monarchs and legal codes are the equivalent of violating divine rule. As a result, the state is considered divinely appointed to carry out divine judgment. Though descriptive of the past, Allport believed the theological context of prejudice was becoming less of a factor having experienced a significant relaxation. This shift is largely attributed to the first amendment of the US constitution guaranteeing religious liberty and a separation between church and state.

While the theological context was declining, Allport believed the sociocultural influence of religion was ascending (1954; 1967). Religion serves “double duty” (Allport, 1954, p. 446) when it is used to support cultural structures such as class divisions, ethnocentrism, and segregation. Since religious communities are comprised of like-minded people and religion serves as a conservative cultural force, it functions

in the same way as prejudice by providing cognitive structures through which culture is understood:

> Some, for example, are tormented by self-doubt and insecurity. Prejudice enhances their self-esteem; religion provides them a tailored security. Others are guilt-ridden; prejudice provides a scapegoat, and religion relief. Still others live in fear of failure. Prejudice provides an explanation in terms of menacing out-groups; religion promises heavenly, if not terrestrial, rewards. Thus for many individuals the functional significance of prejudice and religion is identical. One does not cause the other; rather both satisfy the same psychological needs (Allport, 1966, p. 451).

Even more significant than the theological and sociocultural influences of religion is the personal psychological function of religion in one's life (Allport, 1966). Whatever theological and sociocultural influence religion may hold, it holds only to the extent that religion functions in a person's life. It is here that Allport made one of the most significant contributions to the study of psychology and religion (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Donahue, 1985). Allport noted that religion does not function equally for everyone:

> Its functional significance may range from its crutch-like ability to bolster infantile and magical forms of thinking to its support for a guiding and comprehensive view of life that turns the individual from his self-centeredness towards genuine love for his neighbor. (Allport, 1954, pp. 451-452)

Allport's (1950) earlier research focused on two basic forms of religion: mature and immature. Immature religion was described as "impulsive self-gratification," "wish-fulfilling," "self-centered," as well as "spasmodic, segmented, and even when fanatic in intensity, it is but partially integrative of the personality" (p. 54). Mature religion was much more stable. It is, "well differentiated", "comprehensive", and "productive of consistent morality" (p. 57). Mature religion is more critical of religious concepts, open to new information, and honest with difficult questions of morality.

Allport never provided a way of empirically assessing his concept of mature and immature religion. In his 1954 work Allport labeled the distinction as "institutional" religion and "interiorized" religion (Allport, 1954, p. 453). This terminology suggested a marked difference between belonging to a church for its in-group benefits (institutional) and belonging to a church because of its basic creed of brotherhood and personalizing this creed (interiorized). By 1959 Allport came to use the terms "intrinsic" and extrinsic" to describe the way religion functions in a person's life.

As noted by Batson and Ventis (1982), this new conceptualization was far less value-laden than the terms "mature" and "immature" and the definitions of the terms was more narrow in focus. Extrinsic religiosity is utilitarian and instrumental in nature, using religion as a means to gain something else: safety, social standing, peace, and to support their chosen way of life (Allport, 1954; 1966; Allport & Ross, 1967). For extrinsics, religion is, "something for an occasional Sunday morning, for

High Holy days, or for moments of crisis" (Allport, 1966, p. 455). Intrinsic religion is of ultimate value to the individual and an end in itself. Intrinsics hold religion as a master motive for life and are other-focused. Allport and Ross (1967) summarized the distinction succinctly, writing, "The extrinsically motivated person *uses* his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated *lives* his religion" (p. 434).

Allport believed this distinction helped address the question of prejudice: "Thus we cannot speak sensibly of the relation between religion and prejudice without specifying the sort of religion we mean and the role it plays in the personal life (Allport, 1954, p. 456). Since an intrinsically religious person internalizes the teachings of his or her religious beliefs, then the brotherhood of humanity, as universally taught by religion (Allport, 1954) would be internalized and prejudice would be reduced. Extrinsically religious individuals who use religion as a means to secure safety, peace, status, and sociability and who "turn to God, but without turning away from self" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434) would not take the creed of universal brotherhood as seriously, and would instead show higher levels of prejudice.

Allport and Ross first provided empirical support for the religious orientation scale in 1967. Results verified previous findings which showed a positive correlation between religious involvement and prejudice tendencies. However, Allport and Ross also found the relationship to be curvilinear such that frequent attenders were less prejudiced than infrequent attenders, and often less prejudiced than non-attenders. As expected, extrinsics showed higher levels of prejudice and intrinsics showed lower levels of prejudice. They also found a third type of orientation labeled

"indiscriminantly proreligious". These individuals believe all forms of religion are good and endorse any and all items on the scale that were favorable to religion. For example, they might respond positively to seemingly contradictory statements, i.e., "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life" and, "Though I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 437). Indiscriminantly proreligious respondents were more prejudiced than consistent extrinsics and much more prejudiced than consistent intrinsics. Allport and Ross explained the indiscriminantly proreligious as making the same mistake positively with religion that they make negatively with stereotypes, "religion as a whole is good; a minority group as a whole is bad" (p. 442).

The intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy proposed by Allport shares characteristics with Kierkegaard's paradox of faith (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974). In *Fear and Trembling* Kierkegaard uses the story of Abraham offering his son, Isaac, to discuss the nature of authentic faith. The story represents a paradox of faith. If Abraham followed a universal ethic (worldly wisdom), then offering his son would constitute murder. If Abraham, however, believed by virtue of the absurd through which, "there could be no question of human calculation" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 46) then such an act would be labeled a sacrifice and a true expression of faith. In such case, Abraham would be a "Knight of Faith" As such, "the individual isolates himself as higher than the universal" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 65). Genuine faith allowed obedience even to the absurd against the claims of the universal ethic. Such faith led to a more joyous and fulfilling life.

Kierkegaard believed that individuals lacking genuine faith are left to express themselves according to the universal, which causes them, "to abolish his [sic] particularity in order to become the universal" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, pp. 64-65, see also Martin, Campbell & Henry, 2004). Instead of being true to one's self, such an individual is diminished into the universal, which Kierkegaard believed to be shallow and insignificant. In *Purity of the Heart is to Will One Thing* Kierkegaard wrote, "the most ruinous evasion of all is to be hidden in the crowd in an attempt to escape God's supervision of him as an individual, in an attempt to get away from hearing God's voice as an individual" (1846/1948, p. 185).

With his focus on the individual, Kierkegaard believed media and the institutionalized church of his day contributed to shallowness and stood in the way of individuals finding genuine faith, or their own individual selves (Holt, 2012). Swenson and Swenson (1955) note that Kierkegaard viewed the established church "several degrees lower than that set forth in the New Testament" (p. xix). In the absence of a true inner self, the only guide to follow is that which is received from culture (Holt, 2012; Martin et al., 2004). Instead, genuine faith was found in the self/individual. Thus, Kierkegaard wrote, "Eternity seizes each one by the strong arm of conscience, holding him as an individual" (1843/1948, p. 192).

Allport's description of intrinsic/extrinsic religion echoes Kierkegaard's contrast between the universal and the self. Allport described intrinsics as having "interiorized" religion and extrinsics as having "institutionalized" religion (Allport, 1954, p. 453). Using the story of Simon Peter and his initial reluctance as a Jewish

man to enter the house of Cornelius, a Roman centurion (Acts 10), Allport noted, "He [Peter] knew that according to his own tribal custom, 'it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another nation.'" (Allport, 1954, p. 453). Peter's tribal custom was in conflict with what he understood to be "Christ's compassion for outcasts" (Allport, 1954, p. 453). Only after Peter experienced a "change of heart" (Allport, 1954, p. 454) did he turn away from his tribal custom to follow true interiorized religion.

Allport's intrinsic/extrinsic distinction garnered considerable support early on (see Batson & Ventis, 1982; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010 for a review of studies) with results showing intrinsic religiosity negatively correlated with prejudice and extrinsic religiosity positively correlating with prejudice. Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) conducted a similar analysis using 55 studies reported between 1964 and 2008, controlling for potential publication bias, participant bias, and year of publication. Results likewise demonstrate, "greater religious identification, greater extrinsic religiosity, and greater religious fundamentalism were all positively related to racism" (p. 130).

Questioning Allport's Approach

Since its original design, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has faced challenges and further scrutiny with use of both overt and covert measures. First, Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) questioned the use of overt measures of prejudice, suggesting the negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice might be the result of social desirability instead of true reductions in prejudice. Batson et

al.'s (1978) initial findings replicated those of Allport and Ross (1967) showing a negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity on questionnaire measures of prejudice, and were significantly more negative than the correlation between extrinsic orientation and prejudice. Only intrinsic religiosity displayed a positive correlation with social desirability, though when controlled for, the decrease was statistically insignificant in questionnaire responses to prejudice. However, when social desirability was psychometrically controlled through partial correlations, the negative correlation between intrinsic religion and prejudice decreased.

The issue of social desirability has been noted by other scholars. When covert measures have been used to measure prejudice, or social desirability is taken into account, the negative correlation disappears (Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 2002; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997). Batson et al. (1978) suggest intrinsics may be more concerned to "present oneself more righteous than one actually is" (p. 38) and that "the personal transformation that Allport (1966) claimed is associated with intrinsic religion may have reached only to the hand that marks the questionnaire, not to the heart" (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 152).

A second criticism questions the bi-polar nature of Allport and Ross' (1967) Intrinsic/Extrinsic scale. In the original publication (Allport & Ross, 1967), Allport and Ross found intrinsic and extrinsic scores represented two independent dimensions but they also found some respondents were "consistently intrinsics", some were "consistently extrinsic" but that many subjects were "provokingly inconsistent" (p.

437) or "muddleheaded" (p. 439). Allport and Ross divided these inconsistencies into two categories: indiscriminantly pro-religious and indiscriminantly nonreligious (or anti-religious). High intrinsic, high extrinsic scores were labeled indiscriminantly proreligious. Those who scored low on both the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales were labeled indiscriminantly antireligious. When prejudice was measured, indiscriminant types were more prejudiced than either of the consistent types.

Batson (1976) has proposed a three-dimensional scale that conceptually corresponds to the intrinsic and extrinsic orientation which he labels religion as means and religion as end respectively. His new model includes a third dimension independent of either an extrinsic or intrinsic dimension, labeled as quest. Batson and Ventis (1982) contend that quest religiosity captures Allport's original conception of mature religion. The quest orientation:

> Concerns the degree to which the individual seeks to face religious issues such as personal mortality or meaning in life in all their complexity, yet resists clear-cut, pat answers. An individual who approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know, the final truth about such matters. Still the questions are deemed important and, however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought. (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 157)

In multiple studies, the quest orientation has proven to be a more stable form of religion. Quest correlated negatively with prejudice in both questionnaire and behavioral (i.e., choice of black or white interviewer) measures of prejudice (Batson,

Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978). Even when social desirability was controlled for psychometrically on explicit measures, the negative relationship between quest and prejudice did not diminish (Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978). Quest exhibits universal compassion, even toward those who violate its non-close-mindedness characteristic (Batson, Denton & Vollmecke, 2008).

Batson's concept of quest also captures elements of Kierkegaard's knight of faith (1843/1974). Abraham's decision to offer Isaac contradicted the universal ethic and could not be made based upon any universally accepted logic. Given this paradox between the universal and the individual, explanation and understanding remain inadequate. It is the universal that seeks answers and justification within the universal framework, and anything outside such explanation viewed as "crazy" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 84). As such, "the individual absolutely cannot make himself intelligible to anybody" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 81). Within this paradox, questions remain, and just as Batson's quest orientation suggests, such an individual "recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know" (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 157).

One significant difference between Batson's quest and Kierkegaard's knight of faith concerns the issue of certainty. Batson's quest orientation operates from a position of uncertainty and values the journey of an "open-ended, questioning approach to religion" (Batson et al., 1993). As such, the journey becomes a primary feature of the quest orientation. Batson even notes, "there may or may not be a belief in a transcendent reality" (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 150), leading Donahue (1985) to

suggest that quest may be measuring agnosticism and religious conflict. Kierkegaard, however, viewed the knight of faith as acting from an "absolute duty to God" (1843/1974, p. 91) and having "assurance that he [sic] is in the right way" (1843/1974, p. 90). The inability to "make himself intelligible to anybody" (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 81) comes, not from a lack of certainty in his duty, but from an inability to offer a universally acceptable justification. Like Abraham, the duty was unquestioned, but the understanding and explanation was lacking.

TMT and Religious Orientation

Most relevant to the current research is the relation between religious orientation and worldview defense. Some studies have measured religion in general terms without the distinction between types of religious orientations. In such studies, religious beliefs were negatively correlated with derogation of culturally threatening messages (Norenzayan, DarNimrod, Hansen, & Proulx, 2009) and a reduction in prejudice (Kastenmuller, Greitemeyer, Ai, Winter, & Fischer, 2011). Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski (2009) showed that priming mortality and religious compassion among fundamentalist – those who believe there is a single set of absolute truths - reduced preference toward military action against a threatening nation. Several studies have focused on fundamentalism as a characteristic of religious orientation (see Vail et al., 2009 for review), with fewer studies investigating concepts of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest orientations. Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that intrinsic religiosity reduced death-thought awareness, and mitigated worldview defense in cases where participants had the opportunity to affirm religious

beliefs through completion of the religious orientation scale either before the MS treatment or at the end of the experiment. They conclude that TMT benefits of religion are only available to people who show an intrinsic orientation. Their research made no mention of quest orientation. Zavala, Cichoka, Orehek, and Abdollahi (2012) found that under motility salience, intrinsic religiosity showed decreased support for aggressive counterterrorism (Study 1), decreased out-group derogation (Study 2), and that priming intrinsic concepts likewise decreased support for aggressive counterterrorism (Study 3).

Non-Religious Discrepancies

Allport's paradox has parallels outside the boundaries of religion. A lot has changed in the 20th century in regard to Civil Rights: school desegregation, voting rights, the election of the first Black President of the United States. Among many subcultures, at least, cultural norms have shifted more dramatically in favor of equal treatment, integration, and tolerance (Bobo, Charles, Krysan, & Simmons, 2009). This change has been noted by White's self-reported attitudes towards Blacks (Bobo, Charles, Krysan & Simmons 2012; Greeley & Shirley, 1971; Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985). But just how genuine is this change? When self-reported attitudes are compared with subconscious measures of prejudice (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Devine, 1989; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010) or conscious behavior (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Monteith & Voil, 1998), inconsistencies remain present between stated non-racist beliefs and actual actions.

These discrepancies are often attributed to some form of impression management strategy. In an overview of studies investigating different prejudice measures (surveys, helping behavior, aggression studies and nonverbal behavior), Crosby, Bromley and Saxe (1980) suggested the discrepancies may reflect changing social desirability effects and not real change in attitudes. Their conclusion called into question the validity of verbal reports leading them to conclude, "Whites today are, in fact, more prejudiced than they are wont to admit" (p. 557). Studies have shown that under certain conditions - personal implications (Silverman, 1974), hearing other's nonprejudiced view first (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996), hearing negative views first (Winttenbrink & Henley, 1996) – people tend to alter their responses to reflect a concern for social acceptance.

Disassociation Model

Devine (1989), however, suggests a more optimistic understanding of the conflict between stated beliefs and actions. Devine suggests the contradiction may represent the possibility for true change in a person's attitudes and beliefs. According to Devine's (1989) Dissociation Model:

> Although low-prejudiced persons have changed their beliefs concerning stereotyped group members, the stereotype has not been eliminated from the memory system. In fact, it remains a well-organized, frequently activated knowledge structure. During the change process the new pattern of ideas and behaviors must be consciously activated and serve as the bases for responses

> or the individual is likely to fall into old habits (e.g., stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like responses. (Devine, 1989, p. 16)

Since stereotypes are long held beliefs, attempts to change them take time and effort. Nonprejudiced responses are intentional, controlled processes that require conscious effort. Like breaking a bad habit, individuals must decide to change their behavior, hold to the resolution, and consciously work to defeat the habit until it is eliminated (Devine, 1989). If a person wants to hold an egalitarian view of minorities and/or out-group members, they must *consciously* work to maintain that view. If unconscious responses are activated in the midst of trying to defeat prejudice, then conscious and unconscious responses might contradict.

To measure the unconscious aspects of prejudice, researchers have used some form of the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, see also Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 2012). The IAT measures response times of participants as they react to different combinations of stimuli (i.e. images of Black or White individuals, and positive or negative words). Participants are asked to identify words as positive or negative valiance as they are placed below images of either a Black or White individual. They are also asked to identify individuals as either Black or White when the image is placed below a positive or negative valiance term. The test works from the assumption that to the extent that negative views are associated with Whites or Blacks, the pairing of contradictory concepts (positive term with black image, or negative term with White image) will cause a delay in response time as participants try to process the proper

response. Since such responses are subconscious and therefore participants are less likely to control them, the IAT provides insight into the subconscious nature of prejudice.

Holmes' (2009) research into the transparency of self-report (conscious) measures showed participants equally concerned about social implications behind different scale items and their ability to manipulate responses accordingly. However, like Monteith and Voil (1998), when social desirability was statistically controlled for, there was no significant mean difference among prejudice measures. Holmes (2009) concludes, "Changes in scores on prejudice measures may reflect both real changes in attitudes and increased social awareness (i.e., awareness of the 'right' or 'correct' socially desirable answers)" (p. 99).

The dissociation model of prejudice reduction suggests that prejudice reduction can be achieved through a change process involving three steps: (a) establishing nonprejudiced standards based on personal beliefs for how one should respond (b) internalizing these standards through a link to self-concept, viewing them as important—and committing to them, and (c) learning to inhibit automatic stereotypic responses in order to respond consistently with one's personal standards (see Devine & Monteith, 1993).

Placed within the framework of dissociation, Allport's conception of religion theoretically provides an explanation of the first two elements. First, as noted by Allport (1954), it is a universal claim of religion to advance the brotherhood of humanity. Therefore, religion establishes nonprejudiced standards that should govern

responses of religious people. Allport's intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, along with Batson's notion of quest, provides a construction of the second element of the dissociation model by measuring the level of internalization of such standards within a person's self-concept.

Compunction

One way to get at the underlying nature of any contradiction in stated beliefs and actions is through monitoring compunction. Compunction is the feeling of guilt or regret experienced when a personal value or standard has been personally violated. The concept of compunction was noted by Myrdal (1944), who spoke of an inner moral uneasiness existing in America resulting from a clash between the "American Creed" which called for a high national and Christian concept, and the reality of prejudices against persons or types of people. With echoes of Myrdal's "American Dilemma", Allport (1954) similarly spoke of the "inner conflict" that results when people "are genuinely in conflict concerning their failure to conform to the virtues they admire" (p. 328). This tension caused the average American, in Allport's view, to live in a state of conflict. Allport believed such inner conflict was more likely than not to arouse some sense of compunction.

This conflict is reflected in a review of the General Social Survey, (GSS: Bobo, Charles, Krysan & Simmons, 2009), which measures national demographics, attitudes, and special interest topics. An analysis of racial trends in the United States between 1972 and 2008 revealed both positive and negative views of prejudice. Bobo et al. (2009) found that while norms had shifted dramatically against negative

attitudes towards Blacks, strong social distance preference remained as well as negative racial stereotypes. Bobo et al. also found significant affective distance between Whites and African Americans as well as a "broad and widely shared cultural motif" (p. 41) of racial resentments. For instance, even in 2008, though Whites showed broad acceptance of integration, 1 in 4 Whites were opposed to a close family member marrying a black person (Bobo et al., 2009).

When an individual is made aware of any discrepancy between actual beliefs and real response, a feeling of dissonance results (Festinger, 1962). When introducing his theory of dissonance, Festinger used the issue of race to illustrate his point, writing, "A person may think Negroes are just as good as Whites, but would not want any living in his neighborhood" (p. 1). Compunction provides an indication of whether internalized beliefs may have been violated.

Drawing on dissonance theory, Devine and Monteith (1993) point to qualitatively different affective responses depending on the type of self-inconsistency. For example, whenever behavior and attitude conflict there will be tension and discomfort. However, when self-inconsistencies involve a person's actual self and their self-defined standards, feelings of guilt and self-contempt result. Devine and Monteith have demonstrated this in their own research showing that violations of well-internalized standards of non-prejudice lead to greater levels of guilt and self-contempt, violations of less-internalized standards lead only to a broader sense of tension and discomfort (Amodio et al., 2007; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 1993).

Allport's concept of compunction is similar to what Higgin's self-discrepancy theory (SDT) predicts will happen when an individual violates personal standards he or she feels ought to be upheld (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, and Stramman, 1985). Self-discrepancy theory maintains that incompatible beliefs lead to various levels of discomfort. The theory goes further to advance a predictive framework linking specific inconsistencies to specific forms of affect.

Self-discrepancy theory lays out three domains of the self: *actual* self, *ideal* self, and *ought* self. Each domain describes the representations of one's self based upon attributes an individual actually possess (*actual*), would like to possess (*ideal*), or ought to possess (*ought*). Along with the differing domains of self, the theory suggests two standpoints from which the self is viewed: your *own* personal standpoints and the standpoint of some significant *other*. When discrepancies exist between any of these representations, negative affect should result.

More specific to the current notion of racial compunction, when a discrepancy exists between an individual's *actual/own* self (i.e. how they actually see themselves), and their *ought/own* self (i.e. how they believe they ought to be), self-discrepancy predicts the individual will be vulnerable to agitation-related emotions (i.e., guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness) (Higgins, 1987). Therefore, according to SDT, an intrinsic would be a person who has internalized the religious sense of "ought", and any violation of religious values would represent a discrepancy between their *actual/own* and *ought/own* self. Likewise, a person who only wishes to appear intrinsic or who only holds non-prejudiced values as received from culture without

having genuinely internalized the religious sense of ought (extrinsic), would be more concerned about a discrepancy between their *actual/own* self and *ought/other* self. Such a discrepancy is predicted to result in such agitation-related emotions as fear, and feeling threatened (Higgins, 1987).

Dissonance and the resulting negative affect have proved to be a critical component in the process of reversing prejudice. Just as Festinger believed dissonance reduction to be a first motivational step in the process of resolving tension, Allport (1954) believed compunction could be a catalyst to true change: "if the dissatisfaction is great enough, he may be driven to a reorganization of beliefs and attitudes" (p. 329). Devine (1989) likewise considered compunction part of the "key to escaping prejudice" (p. 15) which serves an important role in the control and regulation of future responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993). Unless individuals feel a sense of tension between their own beliefs and actions, they will do little to affect either. When such tension exists, proactive measures are taken to relive tension and restore equilibrium and psychological equanimity.

Knowledge of Prejudice

Devine's early work (1989) showed that people claiming to hold egalitarian views toward Blacks were equally capable of displaying prejudicial tendencies. Low-prejudiced individuals are equally knowledgeable of cultural stereotypes against Blacks (Study 1), and when stereotypical concepts are primed, high- and low-prejudice respondents interpret ambiguous stereo-type related behaviors in prejudicial ways (Study 2). Similarly, when low-prejudiced participants were asked to

uncritically list positive and/or negative alternative labels for Black Americans (thus threatening their non-prejudiced identity), they listed more positive than negative stereotypes. When asked to list their own beliefs, they again listed more positive than negative thoughts.

When low-prejudiced participants were made aware of their ability to demonstrate negative-prejudice, negative affect became an issue among some. Besides Devine, other research has shown increased levels of negative affect when participants are made aware of discrepancies between personal standards and actual responses (Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996). Zuwerink et al. (1996) showed that low-prejudiced respondents with well-internalized standards of non-prejudice experienced more compunction when their sense of "should" (i.e., how the respondent believed they *ought* to respond) and "would" (how the respondent believed they might *actually* respond) conflicted. The greater a respondent's discrepancy between reported beliefs and actions, the greater their feeling of compunction. When non-prejudiced standards are internalized they become self-defining. Violation of well-internalized standards are interpreted as a personal moral failure (Zuwerink et al., 1996).

Should **and** ***Would*** **Responses**

In an effort to develop a more reliable measure of *Should-Would* discrepancy, Monteith and Voil (1998) took into account a number of personality measures (self-consciousness, social desirability, social-anxiety). Results showed respondents were

aware of self-reported discrepancies between *should* and *would* scores and that such discrepancies correlated positively with feelings of discomfort. When Self-consciousness, social desirability, and social-anxiety were controlled for, the discrepancy-affect correlation was not significantly reduced (Study 1). Discrepancy scores remained stable over a relatively short period of time indicating their potential for demonstrating actual abilities to control prejudice-response beyond possible environmental factors (Study 2). Monteith and Voil (1998) also found similar discrepancies in behavioral response when low-prejudiced individuals with high-discrepancy scores were monitored in their reaction to racial jokes (Study 3). This pattern, however, only took place when low-prejudice respondents with high discrepancy scores were highly-distracted. This corresponds to Devine's (1989) claim that prejudice reduction requires a high state of conscious focus. When low-prejudiced respondents were either not distracted or reported lower discrepancy scores, they responded in less prejudiced ways to racial jokes. Monteith and Voil (1998) conclude, "self-reported discrepancies apparently are authentic and do reflect people's proneness to engaging in prejudiced responses that violate their personal standards" (p. 911). Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) found that guilt arising from personal transgressions (prejudice) serves as a predictor of interest in prejudice-reducing behavior. When participants experienced personal guilt for showing prejudice in response to pictures, their interest in reading prejudice-reduction articles increased significantly.

Internal/External Motivations

Concern for impression-management and levels of social desirability involve external motivations when responding to prejudice. Attention must also be given to internal motivations. Studies have shown a significant difference in how people respond to prejudice based on whether their beliefs are internal to their sense of self, or external (Devine et al., 2002; Plant and Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996).

Plant and Devine's (1998) Internal and External motivation to respond without prejudice scales (IMS and EMS) identify distinct motivations to control prejudice that have demonstrated predictive validity. The difference between internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice lies in who sets the standard.

> When the motivation to respond without prejudice derives from internal standards, the self is the evaluative audience of importance (i.e., the *self* prescribes the standard). When the motivation to respond without prejudice derives from external standards, significant others constitute the important evaluative audience (i.e., *other* prescribes the standard). (Plant and Devine, 1998, p. 818)

Violations of personal standards create greater dissonance and negative affect (Devine et al., 2002; Plant and Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Drawing from reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) Plant and Devine (2001) showed that participants with low IMS, high EMS scores demonstrate greater levels of reactance. When non-prejudiced values were internalized, pressure to conform to already held beliefs created little conflict and so reactance levels were low. Whenever non-prejudiced

values were externalized, participants were more resentful than others when pressured to respond in politically correct ways (Study 1) and demonstrated heightened levels of anger/threat affect when others imposed pressure to be pro-Black, and showed a form of backlash (in attitude and behavior).

Devine et al. (2002) found further support for the IMS/EMS distinction in the work of Deci and Ryan (1985; 2000). Self-regulatory focus distinguishes between three kinds of motivation: external, interjected, and identified. *External* motivations are those that concern approval from others and reflect a low degree of self-determination. *Interjected* motivations are governed by a high concern for the approval of others and self-determination to act in a given way. *Identified* motivations are highly internalized and are a significant part of a person's self-concept. Research shows that the more internalized (i.e., self-determined and authentic) a goal or value is, the more consistency with which people respond to that goal or value (Deci & Ryan, 2000). When applied to the issue of race, Devine et al. (2002) found high correlation between Deci and Ryan's motivational distinctions and their own IMS/EMS distinction. Devine et al. found that participants with low IMS scores were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of explicit racism than participants with high IMS scores. More importantly, Devine et al. (2002) found that participants with high IMS and low EMS scores were more consistent when responding to implicit bias. Therefore, the more internalized a person's motivation to be non-prejudiced, the more consistent their response to prejudice, regardless of conscious or subconscious cues.

Undoing Prejudice

Devine and Plant (2009) showed that people internally motivated to respond without prejudice actively worked to control prejudice and showed an interest in learning to reduce it. Devine, Forscher, Austin, and Cox's (2012) longitudinal study demonstrated the possibility of long-term implicit race bias using the general concept of the dissociation model. Participants in an experimental group were given feedback and prejudice reduction strategies and reassessed throughout the course of 12 weeks. The strategies (intervention) included stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, individuation, perspective taking, and increasing opportunities for contact. When compared to a control group, Devine et al. (2012) found that implicit bias was reduced by week four and remained reduced through the end of the study. They also found participants in the experimental group increased self-reported concerns about discrimination and prejudice-relevant discrepancies. Interestingly, they did not find any measurable increase in the implicit bias ratings.

Overall, the disassociation model suggests that not all discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of racism represent a failure to live up to personal standards. Rather, such discrepancies may represent the activation of the prejudice habit that has formed over time. Whenever the conscious ability to inhibit prejudice responses is activated, signs of racism are present. However, if a person is in the process of undoing the habit, the conscious ability to suppress such prejudiced reactions leads to a discrepancy between implicit and explicit responses. Whenever

violations are perceived or made explicit, those committed to undoing the habit realize their failure to live up to their non-prejudiced goal, and compunction results.

Chapter 2: Hypotheses

The purpose of the current research is to investigate cognitive processes which may contribute to the reduction of prejudice. Each of the previous sections of Chapter 1 has described a critical element in the process of prejudice reduction. Chapter 2 will tie together TMT, Dissociation Model, and Religious orientations, and establish working hypothesis to be tested.

Terror management theory provides a motivational framework for understanding the nature of prejudice. Since CWVs are used to defend against the terror of death (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989) and self-esteem is drawn from a person's ability to live up to the standards of his or her worldview (Greenberg et al., 1992; Pyszczynski et al., 2004), any violation or challenge to a person's self-esteem or worldview leads to undermining the buffering effects of these two mechanisms (Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski et al., 2003; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 1990; Schimel et al., 2007). As demonstrated by previous research, competing CWVs present the possibility of a legitimate worldview alternative, thus potentially creating reason to question or doubt one's chosen worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004), thereby weakening its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer. Prejudice can be thought of as a heuristic way of organizing perceived realities within a person's CWV; and when defense against existential anxiety is presented, prejudice may be used to reorient and restore one's sense of self-esteem, or reestablish confidence in one's worldview (Allport, 1954; Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004; Schimel, 1999).

Devine's (1989) dissociation model provides a general explanation for the potential reduction of prejudice. Since prejudice is a form of cultural programming, it takes time to deprogram. Devine's work suggests that prejudice can be addressed and potentially reduced provided individuals make the determination to reduce it, and actively work to avoid prejudiced responses (Devine et al., 2012). To do so, there must be some guiding standard to influence their desire to be non-prejudiced (Devine et al., 2002).

Allport's (1954, 1959, 1966; Allport and Ross, 1967) early work in religious orientation suggested intrinsicality may serve as one standard by which prejudice may be reduced. Since the brotherhood of humanity is a universal claim of religion (Allport 1954, 1966) and intrinsic religiosity internalizes the teachings of one's religion (Allport and Ross, 1967), then prejudice reduction should follow. Batson's (1976; Batson et al., 1986) work suggests that the quest orientation works better to reduce prejudice given the social desirability concerns of intrinsic religiosity. If Allport and Batson are correct, then religion, to some degree, should serve as a guide for dissociation, which should be instrumental in the reduction of prejudice.

As noted previously, religion's role in the reduction of prejudice has been called into question. Some scholars have doubted the authenticity of responses to overt measures of prejudice, suggesting that social desirability masks or eliminates any potential reduction in measured prejudice among the intrinsically religious (Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 2002; Hall et al., 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer,

2010; Trimble, 1997). Still others have argued intrinsic religiosity actually increases levels of prejudice (Batson & Burris, 1994).

The present work seeks to expand the current literature in the following ways. First, no known work to date has investigated Devine's (1989) model within the broader framework of TMT. Terror management theory provides an explanatory framework for understanding various components of dissociation. Second, no known research to date has evaluated religious orientations in light of Devine's (1989) Dissociation Model. Using Devine's model, the racial implications of religious orientation can be better addressed.

Although no other work to date has attempted to investigate religious orientation through the lens of Devine's dissociation model, the suggestion has been made. After presenting a pessimistic analysis of intrinsic religion, Batson and Burris (1994), citing Devine, wrote:

> Perhaps, stimulated by their religious beliefs and role models, the intrinsically religious are in the process of being resocialized (or acculturated) away from prejudice, but the resocialization process is not complete. Like trying to break a bad habit, they slip back into their old ways when their new, unprejudicial thoughts and behaviors are not consciously activated by salient cues (cues such as being asked to complete a prejudice questionnaire or act in a way that might appear overtly prejudicial). If this impetration is correct, then increasing the salience of the antiprejudice norm of the religious community (i.e.,

> consciousness raising) may lead to reduced prejudice by the more intrinsically religious even in covert behavior, not just on questionnaires. (1994, p. 167)

Though Batson and Burris made the suggestion, they made it with doubts. They believed the potential for socialization rested on an assumption that the religious community actively taught the eschewing of prejudice and discrimination. However, rather than leading the community to truly reject racism, such teaching lead them to,

> Suspect that in many cases the intrinsic believer, attending to the practice of the religious community as well as the preaching, is being resocialized to a very different, more pharisaical norm: The truly religious can't look racist. (1994, p. 167)

Accordingly, if the religious community actively teaches against prejudice and discrimination, intrinsics will not show signs of prejudice reduction, rather they will show more concern for social desirability. This doubt, however, fails to note one important element of Allport's conception of intrinsic religion – the personal dimension (Allport, 1954; Allport and Ross, 1967). While it is true that the community aspect of religion shapes one's religious views, the intrinsic individual is not solely dependent on the community for such views. Following the notion of Kierkegaard's self (1843/1974), there is a very individual notion to genuine faith, even apart from the community. Even if the community holds such standards but does not regularly and explicitly advocate these standards, personal study and convictions might still work to embed these qualities in what Kierkegaard would refer to as the *authentic* and what Allport would consider an intrinsically oriented individual, and

what Batson would describe as quest. What happens in the community, provided the community does not actively work to undermine such values, would only compliment the intrinsic qualities.

A distinction must also be made in the use of terms. As noted previously, Allport and Ross' (1954) early research found four different categories of religious orientation: intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religious. Indiscriminantly religious respondents were those who recorded high scores on both the intrinsic and extrinsic scales, despite seemingly contradictory statements, i.e., "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life" and, "Thought I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life" (Allport & Ross, 1967). Their research demonstrated a significant difference between indiscriminantly religious respondents and the intrinsic, extrinsic respondents. However, without a distinction in terms, an intrinsic and Indiscriminant would be placed in the same category given their response to the intrinsic scale. For the purpose of this study, Allport's four categories will be used to distinguish between intrinsic (high intrinsic, low extrinsic scores), extrinsic (low intrinsic, high extrinsic), indiscriminant (high intrinsic, high extrinsic), and low-religious (low intrinsic, low extrinsic). A fifth category will include quest (low intrinsic, low extrinsic, high quest scores).

Discrepancy

According to TMT, mortality salience (MS) increases dependence on worldview structures in an effort to buffer existential threats (Greenberg et al., 1994;

Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). At the same time, MS leads individuals to bolster their worldview against outgroup members who threaten that worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 1992; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). This sets up an interesting dilemma within the dissociation model. If the dissociation model accounts for the process of breaking prejudicial habits (positive acculturation, or resocialization) and not necessarily a finished work, then to what extent will MS cause individuals to revert to their more familiar prejudices they are trying to break? Using elements of the dissociation model, MS effects can be used to investigate the influence of religiosity on prejudice reduction. Likewise, TMT can help further identify the process of breaking the prejudice tendency.

Monteith and Voil's (1998) *Should-Would* scale provides a measure of discrepancy between how a person should react to issues of prejudice verses how they would actually behave. TMT's influence on discrepancy scores between how a person believes he/she should respond and how he/she would respond provides a means to observe the degree of commitment towards the CWV, reflecting the degree to which the tendency towards prejudice has been overcome. Taken together, the *should-would* scale provides an interesting platform for investigating TMT's predictions.

According to TMT, MS heightens the need for the anxiety buffering function of one's CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). If the CWV includes an emphasis on non-prejudiced values, then this ought to be reflected by decreased *would* scores. Under normal circumstance, TMT decreases attraction to outgroups (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989), therefore, *would* scores should be

expected to increase in the MS condition relative to controls. Thus, MS should lead to increased discrepancy. However, if a person's worldview includes non-prejudiced values, then *would* scores should decrease or remain unaffected to the extent those values are made salient.

Devine and colleagues have argued that prejudice responses are based on the degree to which non-prejudiced values are internalized (Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Therefore, the higher degree of non-prejudice internalization, the greater commitment to non-prejudiced outlooks should be. Similarly, Allport argued that intrinsic religiosity represents a person who lives his/her religion whereas an extrinsic person uses his/her religion (Allport, 1967).

Research has suggested a negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & Alshire, 1974). Jonas and Fischer (2006) have shown that intrinsics display lower levels of worldview defense following MS. Similarly, Greenberg et al. (1992) demonstrated that priming tolerance under MS conditions reduced the level of intolerance among participants. However, these findings have been called into question based on the effects of social desirability (Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 2002; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997). This conflict sets up the potential for several hypotheses.

First, if intrinsic religiosity reduces prejudice, then MS will lead an intrinsic to cling to his/her religion (should-scores) by living out his/her religion, in part, by reducing prejudice (would-scores). Greenberg et al. (1992) found that individuals

who value tolerance become more tolerant after their relevant values were primed prior to MS induction. Therefore, if intrinsic religiosity is associated with increased tolerance, the following prediction is made:

H1a: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower *should* and lower *would* scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

If intrinsic religiosity is more concerned with presenting oneself as being more righteous than one actually is (Batson et al., 1978, p. 38) then mortality salience should expose the discrepancy, causing an increase in discrepancy scores. Therefore, the following prediction is made:

H1b: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower *should* and higher *would* scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

Research has consistently shown extrinsics demonstrate higher levels of prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & Alshire, 1974), especially under MS (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). Since extrinsics use their religion for safety under threat rather than centering their lives on religious concepts (Allport, 1954), extrinsics are more likely to perceive outgroups as more threatening than intrinsics. MS would therefore heighten the level of threat extrinsics perceive from the out-group race, thus increasing their discrepancy scores. Therefore, the following prediction is made:

H2: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, indiscriminant and low religiosity in the same MS condition.

Social desirability refers to the level of concern individuals place on the perceptions of others, particularly in survey settings (Crowne & Marlow 1960). Participants with high levels of social desirability are often assumed to alter their responses to survey questions to be more socially acceptable. Accounting for social desirability, Batson et al. (1978) found that decreased levels of racism disappeared for intrinsics. Since discrepancy scores are a representation of how participants self-report they *should* respond and how they actually *would* respond, social desirability could play a significant role such that participants with high social desirability might report more socially approved scores on how they both should and would respond to people of a different race. Therefore:

H3: Social desirability will be negatively correlated with discrepancy.

According to Baston and Ventis (1985), the quest orientation is characterized by an "open-ended, critical struggle with existential questions" (p. 168). Such an orientation is also marked by skepticism of absolute answers, and "flexible thinking about existential answers" (Batson & Ventis, 1985, p. 169). Quest has reflected higher levels of consistency in prejudice reduction (Batson et al., 1976; Batson et al., 1978) even when social desirability is taken into account (Batson et al., 1978; Batson & Ventis, 1985). Greenberg et al. (1992) found that liberals who value tolerance and open-mindedness decreased their disliking of dissimilar others when mortality salience was primed. Therefore:

H4: Quest discrepancy scores will be lower than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity scores in the corresponding MS condition.

Compunction

Also relevant to the present investigation, discrepancy scores provide a representation of a person's consistency between belief and action (Amodio et al., 2007; Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991) and thus represent the degree to which one lives up to worldview beliefs. Any such violations of worldview might be expected to challenge one's self-esteem, which is essential in buffering existential anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1995; Landau et al., 2004; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 1999). As such, greater discrepancy scores would correlate with greater violations. These violations, however, would be greater for those who have higher levels of worldview internalization (Devine et al., 2002).

Compunction is the negative affect associated with violations of internalized standards (Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Primarily, it is the feeling of personal guilt at the realization that one has violated his/her worldview standards, similar to Higgins' SDT notion of committing an *ought own/actual own* self-discrepancy resulting in guilt, or an *ought other/actual own* self-discrepancy resulting in shame. Research has shown that compunction increases as a result of increased discrepancy scores among people with highly internalized standards of non-prejudice, and serves as a predictor of interest in prejudice-reducing behavior (Amodio et al., 2007; Monteith & Voil, 1998).

Since MS increases the need for worldview buffering against death, then any discrepancy should represent a departure from worldview standards and a potential decrease in and need for boosting self-esteem. The greater degree of worldview

internalization, the greater the level of compunction that should result when violations occur. MS should therefore be expected to amplify such violations, creating a need to bolster worldview and/or self-esteem in order to buffer the resulting existential threats.

If intrinsic religiosity is instrumental in the reduction of prejudice, then intrinsics should feel increased compunction in the MS condition. Since extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religiosity hold religion less internally, such violations should have a significantly lesser effect on compunction.

H5a: Intrinsic religiosity will have higher compunction scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

H5b: High discrepancy scores will be associated with higher compunction scores for intrinsic religiosity than for extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same MS condition.

The quest orientation consists of an open-ended, questioning view of religion (Batson & Venis, 1982; Batson et al., 1999). Batson et al. (1999) linked such open-endedness with a higher sense of universal compassion. This pattern held even when participants evaluated a person who violated the values of open-mindedness (Batson et al., 2001). The increased compassion of quest religiosity stems from the open-endedness, which does not require certainty toward any doctrine (Vail et al., 2009). Therefore, those who hold a different worldview should potentially be viewed as less threatening. Given a commitment to universal compassion, any such violation (i.e., discrepancy) should lead to increased levels of compunction. Since such a violation

represents a direct threat to quest's self-perception, the compunction affect should be greater.

H6: When controlling for discrepancy scores, compunction scores will be greater for quest religiosity than for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same MS condition.

Death Anxiety

Discrepancy reflects the inability to live up to the should-standards defined by a particular CWV. Such violations according to TMT would represent a threat to self-esteem (Landau et al., 2004; Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995; Rosenblatt, 1989; Schimel et al., 1999). Since MS increases the need for self-esteem to buffer existential anxiety, increased discrepancy should be associated with greater death anxiety. Anxiety buffering effects associated with self-esteem bolstering, are contingent upon individuals' ability to live up to the dictates of their worldview. Therefore:

H7: Discrepancy scores will be positively correlated with death anxiety.

Similarly, Allport (1967; 1966) suggested that intrinsics should show less anxiety about death. Research provides some evidence in support of Allport's prediction by showing negative correlations between intrinsic scores and death-anxiety (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Donahue, 1985; Vail et al., 2009). Vail et al., (2009) suggested that intrinsic religiosity is an effective tool of terror management. However, if intrinsics perceive they have violated their internalized worldview, this violation should be more significant to them relative to those with less internalized

religiosity. If these discrepancies represent a violation of worldview expectations, the buffering effects the worldview should diminish, increasing an intrinsics' death anxiety.

H8: Intrinsic religiosity and high compunction scores will have higher levels of death anxiety than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religiosity with high compunction scores.

Batson's quest orientation conceptualizes a "critical struggle with existential questions" (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 169). As such, the quest orientation should lead to decreased levels of death anxiety in general, though published research has not directly addressed this issue. Indirectly, TMT would suggest the consistency of quest to show compassion towards those of differing worldviews is reflective of the strong buffering structure of the quest orientation. This suggests that, when controlling for discrepancy and compunction scores, those with quest orientations should show decreased levels of death anxiety when their mortality is made salient.

H9: Controlling for discrepancy and compunction scores quest religiosity will have lower levels of death anxiety than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity.

Research Questions

The differences in religious orientation assumes that religion operates differently from person to person. While research has shown an ability to boost religious awareness (Friedman & Rhodes, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Rothchild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), only one study to date has attempted to specifically

boost intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity but with no significant results (Carpenter and Marshall's (2009). The ability to prime relevant religious orientations allows for stronger causal claims to be established. Therefore, the following three research questions are posed:

RQ1: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on self-esteem?

RQ2: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on discrepancy scores?

RQ3: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation hav eon death anxiety?

Chapter 3: Participants and Method

The present study took place in two phases conducted an average of three days apart. A total of *N* = 387 undergraduates from a private Christian University in the Midwest completed the first phase online using Qualtrics Research Suite in exchange for course credit. Additionally, *N* = 511 participants volunteered to complete phase 1 through MTURK also using Qualtrics Research Suite for a payment of $1.50. Subsequently, *N* = 183 of the undergraduates (for course credit), and *N* = 375 MTURK participants (for a payment of $3.50) returned to complete Phase 2.

MTURK participants completed both phases online in their own setting. University participants completed Phase 1 online in their own setting and completed Phase 2 in an on-campus lab. To replicate the method predominantly used in most TMT studies, rather than computer administered, the university participants completed their MS priming materials, distractor tasks, and word stem completion tasks via paper/pencil, and these data were later manually entered into SPSS. At the beginning of Phase 2, university participants were given a randomly generated ID number via Qualtrics and asked to write the number on the first page of their survey packets. After completing the priming, distraction, and word stem tasks, university participants returned to the online survey to complete Phase 2. For both samples, Phase 1 and 2 results were linked using email addresses and MTURK worker IDs as appropriate. Once both phases were combined, email addresses and MTURK IDs were deleted from the final dataset to help assure confidentiality.

Materials and Procedure

After completing a consent form, all Phase 1 participants filled out a bank of questions made up of demographic information, measures of attitudes toward Blacks (for non-Blacks) or attitudes toward Whites (for Blacks), the Motivation to Respond without Prejudice scale, a self-esteem scale, a social desirability scale, and the Religious Orientation Scale (See Appendix A). Religious orientations were measured last to ensure responses did not affect prejudice scores. At the end of Phase 1, university participants selected a date and time to return to an on-campus lab to complete Phase 2 of the study. Each participant was contacted via email one day prior to their scheduled time to remind them of their appointment. MTURK participants completed Phase 1 and, after 3 days, were given approval to complete Phase 2, whereupon they voluntarily returned to complete Phase 2.

Phase 2 participants logged onto Qualtrics and were asked to give consent to the information describing the study. Following the consent form participants received either an intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, indiscriminate or low religiosity message and asked to indicate the degree to which the message described them using a 1 (a not like me at all) to 5 (just like me) scale.

Participants were randomly assigned to receive either the traditional MS prime or the dental pain control prime (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) in which they were asked to respond to two questions: (1) "Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death [or going to the dentist] arouses in you" and (2) "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you [as you are

at the dentist's office] and once you are physically dead" [or experience dental pain]. After receiving the MS prime/control manipulation, participants completed the PANAS scale, then read an expert from *The Growing Stone,* a brief reading used in traditional TMT research as a distractor task, and a word-stem completion as a manipulation check. University participants completed the MS prime, distraction tasks, and word-stem completion task in paper/pencil form before returning to the online portion of the survey. Participants then completed the *Should-Would-*Discrepancy scale, Compunction Affect indices, the Self-Discrepancy Affect indices and the State Shame and Guilt Scale. Finally, participants completed the Templer Death Anxiety Scale, after which they were debriefed and thanked.

Measures: Phase 1

Attitudes Toward Blacks (ATB). The ATB (White's Attitude Toward Blacks) is a 20-item scale developed by Brigham (1993) to measure racial attitudes among college students (see Appendix A). The scale consists of 10 positively worded items and 10 negatively worded items. No more than 4 of the 20 items were taken from any single factor based on a factor analyses. Factors include social distance, affective reactions, governmental policy, and personal worry. For instance, participants are asked to respond to the statement, "I get very upset when I hear a White make a prejudicial remark about Blacks". Responses are based on a seven item scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Responses were averaged together with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes toward Blacks. The ATB demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .90.

Attitudes Toward Whites (ATW). Brigham (1993) developed a companion survey to the ATB for use with Black respondents (see Appendix A). For the purpose of this study, participants indicating "Black" as their race were directed, via Qualtrics to complete the ATW in place of the ATB. The scale takes into consideration the distinctions between Black and White struggles by measuring such issues as, "Most Whites can't understand what it's like to be black" (see Appendix A). The ATW is a 20-item scale answered on a 7-point differential (1=strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The ATW demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .65.

Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice (IMS, EMS). The IMS/EMS was developed by Plant and Devine (1998) to identify whether a person's motivation to respond without prejudice is based on internal or external factors (see Appendix A). Both the IMS and EMS consist of 5 items rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) on such questions as, "I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others" (see Appendix A). The IMS demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .91 and the EMS had a Cronbach's alpha = .89.

Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice - Black (IMS-B, EMS-B). The IMS and EMS reflect the perspective of White participants. In order to utilize responses from Black participants in this study, elements of the IMS and EMS reflecting a White perspective have been reworded to reflect a Black perspective. This alteration consisted of reversing the terms "White" to "Black". For instance, where the EMS stated, "I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others", the term "Black" was changed to read "White" (see Appendix

A). The IMS-B and the EMS-B was administered in place of the IMS and EMS to participants indicating their race as "Black." The IMS-B demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .89 and the EMS demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .84.

***Social Desirability*.** Social Desirability was measured using the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960). The scale measures the need a person has to secure social and cultural approval from others. The 33-item scale is comprised of true/false questions which are scaled by dummy coding (T = 1, F = 0) responses and averaging across responses (see Appendix A). Sample questions include, "I have never intensely disliked anyone" and, "I like to gossip at times." Higher scores indicate higher levels of social desirability. The social desirability scale demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .84.

Religious Orientation (RO). Since Allport and Ross' (1967) original Religious Orientation scale, multiple changes have been suggested by scholars. Gorsuch and McPherson's (1989) 14 item I/E-Revised scale was used in this study because of its incorporation of two primary updates (see Appendix A). First, wording of the scale facilitates the measurement of intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity among adults and schoolchildren (Forsuch & Venable, 1983). Second, the scale retains items used in the original scale while suggesting three distinct factors: intrinsic, extrinsic personal (religion as a source of personal comfort) and extrinsic social (religion as a social benefit) (Kirkpatrick, 1989). A five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), was used with higher scores indicating increased levels of each subscale. Sample questions include, "I enjoy reading about my

religion" intrinsic), and "Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life" (extrinsic). Both scales showed strong reliability (intrinsic: Cronbach's alpha = .81; extrinsic: Cronbach's alpha = .84.

Quest Orientation. Quest Orientation was measured using Batson and Schoenrade's (1991) updated 11-item scale. The Quest Scale is subdivided into three factors: readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity, self-criticism and perception of religious doubt as positive, and openness to change. The scale includes such question as, "My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions" and "For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious" (See Appendix A). Responses were based on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). The Quest scale showed strong reliability, Cronbach's alpha = .84.

Using mean scores of the three religious orientation scales (intrinsic, extrinsic, quest), participants were grouped into one of five religious orientations: intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, indiscriminant, and low religiosity. The grouping was based on participants scoring above the scale mean of 3 and then grouped based on the highest mean score. If a participant scored below the scale mean of 3 on all three orientations, they were placed in the low religiosity group. If participants scored within .1 of the mean on two or more orientations, they were classified as indiscriminant.

Measures: Phase 2

Self-Esteem Measure (SE). Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), a 10-item scale using a 4-point differential format ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (see Appendix B). Sample questions include such items as, "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself", and "I certainly feel useless at times". The scale has been used in multiple TMT studies with acceptable reliability (see Greenberg, et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The Self-esteem scale showed good reliability, Cronbach's alpha = .79.

MS Prime: Traditional TMT research has used the *Projective Life Attitude Assessment* to prime thoughts of mortality (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). The prime consists of two open ended questions to which participants are asked to respond with their "gut reaction" (i.e., "Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you" and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead). A control condition replaces "death" and "dead" with "dental pain".

PANAS. The PANAS is a 20-item affect scale that measures positive and negative emotions such as "interested", "distressed", "guilty" etc. (with a 5-point scale from 1=*very slightly or not at all* to 5= *extremely applicable*) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1986; see Appendix B). The scale has been used in previous TMT research immediately following mortality salience manipulation to monitor the potential effects of the mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1992) and to act as a delay.

Word-Stem Completion. The Word-Stem Completion was used in TMT research to serve as a delay and manipulation check measuring death thought accessibility (Harmon-Jones, et al., 1997). The task consists of 25 word fragments with six potential death-related words (i.e., BUR_ _ D, for BURIED) and 19 serving as fillers (see Appendix B). The questionnaire is scored by simply adding up the number of death-related word completions.

***Should-Would* Discrepancy.** The Should-Would Discrepancy index was developed by Monteith and Voils (1998) in an effort to measure how participants believe they should respond to different racial situations and then how they would respond to racial situations. The scale also indicates "that individuals are able and willing to provide explicit reports that correspond to their actual prejudiced tendencies or lack thereof" and that such reports are "authentic and do reflect people's proneness to engaging in prejudiced responses that violate their personal standards" (Monteith & Voils, 1998, p. 911). The *should* and *would* indexes each contain 16 questions with responses ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement). Sample questions include such items as, "I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts" (*would* item) and "I should go out of my way to avoid passing a Black person on the street" (see Appendix B). Descrepency scores were then calculated by subtracting corresponding questions on the *would* scale from those on the *should* scale. The *should* scale showed a Cronbach's alpha = .93. The *would scale* had a Cronbach's alpha = .911. The discrepancy scale show a Cronbach's alpha = .69.

Should-*Would Discrepancy*– B. The *Should-Would Discrepancy* index reflects White perspectives towards Blacks. In order to include data from Black participants, the Discrepancy – B index alters the language of the original Discrepancy index to reflect Black perspectives toward Whites (see Appendix B). Alterations consisted only of exchanging the words "Black" and "White". For instance, where the original Discrepancy statement read, "I go out of my way to avoid passing a Black person on the street", the term "Black" was replaced with the term, "White"). The Discrepancy-B will be administered in place of the original Discrepancy to participants indicating their race as "Black."

Compunction. Compunction is measured using the Compunction Affect Indices (Devine, et al., 1991) as used by Monteith (1993). The scale consists of 33 affect-related words or phrases to which participants indicate the level to which each words applies to their feelings at the moment using a 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much) scale (see Appendix B). Compunction scores are based on responses to eight of the words and phrases, "angry at myself", "guilty", "annoyed at myself", "regretful", "disappointed with myself", "disgusted with myself", "shame" and "self-critical". The compunction scale showed a Cronbach's alpha = .89.

Guilt/Shame: Tagney and Dearing's (2002) State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) will be used to provide a second measure of negative affect. The scale consists of 15 short statements to which respondents express feeling "right now" using a 5-point scale. Example statements include, "I feel good about myself", "I feel proud", and "I feel worthless, powerless" (see Appendix B). The scale consists of

three subscales (Shame, Guilt, Pride) each consisting of 5 items. The State Shame and Guilt Scale demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .91.

Death Anxiety: Death anxiety was measured using Templer's (1972) 15-item scale. The scale consists of true and false questions such as, "I am very much afraid to die" and "I fear dying a painful death" (see Appendix B). The Templer scale demonstrated a Cronbach's alpha = .80.

Power Analysis

An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power to determine the number of participants needed to find a small effect size (.15) with 80% power using an ANOVA. Results showed the need for N = 540 for five groups (N = 108 per group). A similar analysis was conducted to determine the number of participants needed to find a small effect size (.15) with 80% power using an ANCOVA. Results showed the need for a sample size of 351 (N = 70 per group).

Chapter 4: Results

Prior to the main analyses, data for participants completing only Phase 1 were eliminated from the data set (university N = 209, MTURK N = 151). Whereupon those who had completed all Phase 2 response items w/o missing data were coded as such, and *t*-tests of race, gender, religious orientation and ATW/ATB were run comparing them to participants who had shown some missing responses. Subsequently, random distribution of missing data was insured by nonsignificant results on all tests.

Duration time for phase two was used to clean and filter out participants with excessively short or long duration. Phase 2 was of special concern given the use of priming and delay materials (Pyszczynski et al. 1999). Phase 2 duration was also important because data were collected using online/lab (university N = 183) and online only (MTURK, N = 375) methods. These data were examined for duration and found to range between 7 and 13647 minutes (M = 120.16, SD = 880.51, skew = 11.39, kurtosis = 144.12). Whereupon 13 outliers, all of which showed excessive scores of more than 100 minutes, were deleted leaving a reduced dataset of N = 543, with responses found to range between 7 and 82 minutes (M = 22.46, SD = 9.15, skew = 1.82, kurtosis = 7.03). Additionally, to allow enough time for priming, delay and completion of the survey, participants with duration scores below 11 minutes (N = 16) were deleted, as were participants more than three standard deviations above the mean (49.75 minutes, $N = 7$). This resulted in a dataset of N = 520 ($M = 22.33$, SD = 7.54, skew = .85, kurtosis = .44), which was deemed suitable for analysis.

Since the primary focus of the present research concerned racial attitudes toward Blacks, and black participants completed different *should,* and *would* scales, Black participants (*N = 44)* were coded so that their data could be identified within the primary dataset.

University participants consisted of *N* = 179 (84 males, 94 females, 1 missing) with a mean age of 20.47 (*SD* = 3.60) ranging from 18 to 60. The educational levels reported for university students were: freshman (40), sophomore (60), junior (26), senior (52) and one participant failing to report educational level. University participants also represented a diversity of race/ethnicity: white (134), black (16) Asian/pacific islander (11), American Indian/Alaskan Native (9), and Hispanic (7). MTURK participants consisted of *N* = 360 (193 males, 167 females) with a mean age of 34.53 (*SD* = 10.04) ranging from 18 to 60. The educational levels reported for MTURK participants were: freshman (10), sophomore (19), junior (14), senior (18), graduate student (21), college graduate (155), no college (122), and one participant failing to report educational level. MTURK participants also represented a diversity of race/ethnicity made up of white (273), black (26), Asian/pacific islander (32), Hispanic (25) and one reporting Middle Eastern descent.

As anticipated, participants taken from the private Christian university identified more prominently as Christian (*N* =172) than MTURK participants (*N* = 157*).* Likewise, the MTURK sample contained more participants describing themselves as Atheist (*N* = 78*)* or Agnostic (*N* = 95*)* compared to participants from the private Christian school, (Atheist, *N* = 1, Agnostic, *N* = 3). One University

participant reported holding eastern religious convictions and no University participants reported Muslim or Jewish convictions. The MTURK population reported Muslim (5) and Jewish (14) convictions.

Prior to testing the hypothesis analysis was conducted to determine potential differences between Black and non-Black participants on a number of variables. Independent samples *t*-tests indicated non-significant differences between Black and non-Black participants on three important variables in this study: social desirability, compunction, and death anxiety. However, independent samples *t*-tests did indicate a significant difference on discrepancy means between Black (M = -.33, SD = .75) and non-Black participants (M = .67, SD = .64), $t(518) = 9.57$, $p < .0001$. An additional t-test comparing *should* and *would* scores revealed a significant difference only for *should* scores, $t(537) = 6.941$, $p < .0001$ such that Blacks reported they should show higher levels of racism (N= 42, M = 3.03, SD 1.15) than Whites (N = 497, M = 1.94, SD = .96). The nature of this difference however, may indicate problems with the *should* and *would* measures.

As noted by Monteith and Voils (1998) a negative discrepancy score suggests the questionable scenario wherein the participants *would* act more positively toward a person of a different race than they believed they *should*. The negative mean for Black discrepancy scores therefore raises concerns. Further, this negative mean may be attributed to the nature of the questions themselves. The original discrepancy scale was designed for non-Black participants. For the purpose of this study, the terms "Black" and "White" were reversed to make the scales seemingly appropriate for

Black participants. Given the nature of the questions, this inadvertently led to some questions portraying Whites as the minority. For instance, "I support Whites in their struggle against discrimination" suggests whites are the oppressed minority. This impression was given to at least one participant who, when prompted to provide feedback to the survey before logging off, wrote, "I feel very offended as a black student participating in the study. Some of the questions made it seem like white people were the minority, not the majority and that isn't true." Given these concerns, Black participant responses were not used in the primary analysis of the hypothesis and research questions to follow.

The extant TMT research has primarily relied on a word stem completion task to indicate death thought awareness. The word stem task used in this study consisted of the same six death related words (buried, dead, grave, killed, skull, and coffin) used in other TMT research. Participants who completed the blanks to form a death related word received a score of "1" for such entries, and participants who completed the blanks with a non-death word received a score of "0" for such entries. Scores were then summed across all six death-thought words to create a "word stem score." To evaluate whether participants receiving the death prime identified more death related words than participants in the control condition, an independent-samples *t*-test was conducted with the MS/control conditions as the IV and word stem scores as the DV. Although mean scores moved in the expected direction (death = 1.85, dental = 1.75) the test was not significant, $t(478) = -.942$, $p = .35$. A similar *t*-test was performed with just the student sample for those who completed the prime,

distraction task, and word stem materials using the traditional paper/pencil method. However, results again showed scores moved in the expected direction (death = 1.86, dental, 1.82), but failed to be significant, $t(150) = -1.92$, $p = .85$.

Hypothesis Testing

H1a: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower *should* and lower *would* scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

H1b: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower *should* and higher *would* scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

H1a and H1b were tested using an independent samples *t*-test comparing intrinsic *should* scores between the two MS conditions (death, dental). No support was found for H1a or H1b. Differences in *should* scores between the death ($M = 1.89$, *SD = 1.0)* and dental ($M = 1.9$, $SD = .67$) (see Table 1) conditions were found not to be statistically significant, $t(165) = .08$, $p = .94$.

No support for H1a or H1b was found for *would* scores. An independent samples *t*-test comparing intrinsic *would* scores in the death ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.1$) and dental ($M = 2.9$, SD = .93) conditions (see Table 1) was non-significant, $t(165) = 1.07$, $p = .29$

Table 1

Should and would means for Intrinsic religiosity based on MS condition

Scale	MS Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Should	Dental	*83*	*1.90*	*.67*
	Death	*84*	*1.89*	*1.00*
Would	Dental	*83*	*2.90*	*.93*
	Death	*84*	*2.73*	*1.09*

* Means differences between dental and death conditions for both *should* and *would* scores were non-significant at $p < .05$

H2: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, indiscriminant and low-religiosity in the same MS condition.

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) examining discrepancy scores across religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity) produced no support for H2 in the death condition, $F(3, 174) = 1.04$, $p = .38$, $\eta^2 = .02$ (see Table 2).

Table 2

Discrepancy means for religiosity in death and dental conditions.

Religiosity	**MS Condition**	***N***	***M***	***SD***
Intrinsic	Death	84	.69	.72
	Dental	83	.83**	.67
Extrinsic	Death	17	.68	.65
	Dental	15	.56	.64
Quest	Death	62	.79	.69
	Dental	60	.71	.48
Indiscriminate	Death	17	.72	.81
	Dental	16	.54**	.52
Low	Death	60	.51	.51
	Dental	61	.41	.63

Note: * Denotes a significant mean difference between intrinsic and indiscriminant scores in the dental condition at $p < .01$.

A one-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference in discrepancy scores among religious orientation in the dental condition, $F(3, 171) = 5.9$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$ (See Table 3). A Bonferroni post hoc analysis showed intrinsic discrepancy means ($M = .83$, $SD = .67$) were significantly higher than low religiosity discrepancy

means (*M* = .41, *SD* = *.52), p* < .0001. The difference in discrepancy scores between intrinsic and low religiosity were in the opposite direction of the predicted means.

Table 3

F-Distribution for discrepancy means for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity.

	Sum of Squares	**df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**	**Eta-Squared**
Between Groups	6.43	3	2.14	5.89	.001	.09
Within Groups	62.15	171	.36			
Total	68.68	174				

H3: Social desirability will be negatively correlated with discrepancy.

A bivariate correlation produced support for H3 showing a statistically significant negative correlation between social desirability and discrepancy scores, $r(473) = -.153$, $p = .001$ showing an increase in social desirability is related to a decrease in discrepancy scores.

H4: Quest discrepancy scores will be lower than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity scores in the corresponding MS condition.

A two-way ANOVA comparing discrepancy scores across religious orientation and MS conditions showed a significant main effect for religiosity, $F(4, 475) = 4.61$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .04$. No main effect was found for MS condition, $F(1, 475) = .80$, $p = .37$, $\eta^2 = .002$, and no interaction effect was found, $F(4, 475) = 1.03$. $p = .39$, $\eta^2 = .01$. A Bonferroni post hoc analysis for the MS effect revealed significantly higher scores for intrinsic (*M = .76, SD = .05)* than low religiosity (*M* = .46, *SD* =

.11), p = .001. Scores for quest religiosity (M = .75, SD = .06) were also significantly higher than low religiosity low religiosity (M = .46, SD = .11), p = .004. Scores for intrinsic and quest religiosity moved opposite from the predicted mean.

H5a: Intrinsic religiosity will show higher compunction scores in the death condition than in the dental condition.

No support for H5a was found using an independent samples *t*-test comparing intrinsic compunction scores between death (M = 2.49, SD = 1.55) and dental (M = 2.6, SD = 1.5) conditions (see Table 4). Results of the *t*-test were found not to be statistically significant, $t(165) = .31$, $p = .76$.

H5b: High discrepancy scores will be associated with higher compunction scores for intrinsic religiosity than for extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same MS condition.

A dichotomous variable was created for discrepancy scores using a mean split (M = .66, SD = .65) resulting in low discrepancy (N = 258) and high discrepancy (N = 217). A two-way ANOVA showed no main effect for either MS, $F(1, 217) = .11$, p = .74, η_p^2 = .00, or religiosity, $F(4, 217) = 1.26$, p = .29, η_p^2 = .02 (see Table 4). The two-way ANOVA also failed to show a significant interaction effect, $F(4, 217)$ = 1.17, p = .33, η_p^2= .02. Therefore, no support was found for H5b.

Table 4

Compunction means for of religiosity across death and dental conditions.

Religiosity	**MS Condition**	***N***	***M***	***SD***
Intrinsic	Death	84	2.49	1.55
	Dental	83	2.56	1.50
Extrinsic	Death	17	2.24	1.38
	Dental	15	2.80	1.93
Quest	Death	62	2.65	1.36
	Dental	60	2.55	1.39
Indiscriminate	Death	17	2.53	1.56
	Dental	16	2.11	1.10
Low	Death	60	1.87	1.26
	Dental	61	2.20	1.38

* No significance found at $p < .05$.

H6: When controlling for discrepancy scores, compunction scores will be greater for quest religiosity than for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same MS condition.

A two way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) yielded no support for H6. No main effect was found for either religiosity, $F(4, 475) = 1.56$, $p = .18$, $\eta^2 = .01$, or MS, $F(1, 475) = .57$, $p = .45$, $\eta^2 = .00$. The interaction effect was likewise non-significant, $F(4, 475) = .93$, $p = .45$, $\eta^2 = .01$.

H7: Discrepancy scores will be positively correlated with death anxiety.

A bivariate correlation provided support for H7 by showing a small but significant positive correlation between discrepancy and death anxiety, $r(475) = .18$, $p < .001$ such that an increase in discrepancy led to an increase in death anxiety.

H8: Intrinsic religiosity and high compunction scores will have higher levels of death anxiety than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religiosity with high compunction scores.

A dichotomous variable was created using a median split of compunction scores to create high and low compunction scores. A two-way ANOVA using religiosity and high/low compunction yielded no significant interaction effect, $F(3, 345) = .39$, $p = .76$ (see Table 5).

Table 5

Death anxiety scores for religious orientation based on a mean split of compunction scores.

Religiosity	**Compunction**	***N***	***M***	***SD***
Intrinsic	Low	102	7.44	3.09
	High	65	8.71	3.22
Extrinsic	Low	20	7.15	4.50
	High	12	9.5	2.32
Quest	Low	67	7.52	3.82
	High	55	9.44	3.73
Indiscriminate	Low	21	8.14	3.18
	High	28	9.04	4.03
Low	Low	93	6.98	3.83
	High	28	7.45	3.96

* No significance found at $p < .05$.

H9: Controlling for discrepancy and compunction scores, quest religiosity will have lower levels of death anxiety than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and the low-religiosity.

A one-way ANCOVA yielded no support for H9. After controlling for compunction and discrepancy, no main effect was found for religiosity, $F(4, 468) = .93$, $p = .45$.

Research Questions

To investigate the potential impact on relevant religiosity primes, a variable labeled "relevance" was created with participants receiving a priming message matching their religious orientation grouping scoring "1" ($N = 351$) and participants receiving a priming message different than their religious orientation receiving a "0" ($N = 124$). As expected, an independent samples *t*-test revealed participants receiving a relevant religious orientation message showed a higher level of agreement with the message ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.15$) than participants receiving a differing religious boost ($M = 3.3$, $SD = 1.13$), $t(471) = -3.92$, $p < .0001$. Religiosity and relevance were then used as grouping variables to investigate the following research questions.

RQ1: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on self-esteem?

A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables and self-esteem scores as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant

main effect, $F(4, 475) = 1.66$, $p = .16$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Results appear to indicate that priming relevant components of religious orientation may not effect self-esteem.

RQ2: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on discrepancy scores?

A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables and discrepancy as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant interaction effect, $F(4, 475) = .48$, $p = .75$ $\eta_p^2 = .00$. Results indicate that priming relevant components of religious orientation appears to have no effect on discrepancy scores.

RQ3: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on death anxiety?

A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables and discrepancy as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant interaction effect, $F(4, 465) = .67$, $p = .61$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Results indicate that priming relevant components of religious orientation appears to have no effect on discrepancy scores.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The present research investigates what Allport (1954) considered the paradoxical role of religion as it relates to race. Using TMT as a framework for understanding why people view other races more positively or negatively, dissociation research was also used to investigate the potential affective impact of CWV violations and the resulting effects on death anxiety. By blending TMT, religious orientation and dissociation research a potentially clearer view of the paradox may emerge.

Of particular interest is the role of religiosity in racial prejudice toward Blacks. Allport and Ross (1967) found that intrinsic religiosity served to reduce prejudiced thoughts while extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low levels of religiosity contributed to racism. Batson et al. (1978) questioned Allport and Ross' (1967) findings that intrinsic religiosity led to decreased racism. Batson et al.'s (1978) work linked intrinsic religiosity to higher levels of social desirability and argued intrinsics were more concerned with the appearance of decreased racism than an actual decrease. Batson argued instead that quest religiosity was a more stable and effective religiosity in decreasing racism.

Using the mortality salience (MS) concept from TMT, discrepancy, compunction, and death anxiety provide another perspective through which religion and race can be examined. Devine (1989) argued that an individual may show a concern for social desirability issues, and may even exhibit prejudice habits. However, whenever such exhibits of prejudice are found within a person holding non-

prejudiced values, a sense of guilt or compunction results from the discrepancy. TMT suggests violations of a person's worldview decreases the buffering effects against the terror of death. Therefore, when taken together, discrepancy, compunction, and death anxiety may offer a glimpse into the degree to which non-prejudiced values are part of religiosity. These issues are addressed in the discussion of hypothesis testing.

Mortality Salience

For the present study, the impact of the TMT predicted mortality salience manipulation proved to be inconsistent. First, as noted in the results, the traditional word-stem completion task failed to demonstrate a significant difference between participants in the death (M = 1.83, SD = 1.10*)* and dental conditions (M = 1.75, SD = 1.08). As has been the case with some prior TMT research, these results may be more a function to the word-stem completion task's insensitivity as a manipulation check rather than the MS manipulation necessarily being ineffective. For the MS manipulation itself, participants in both conditions were prompted to respond to two open-ended questions with respect to their priming conditions, and results showed every participant wrote a minimum of one sentence for each response. Thus, since it is clear that all participants attended to the MS/dental primes, it is assumed the failure to show a significant difference in means on the word-stem completion task was likely due to the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check—possibly due to a number of issues, such as previous exposure to a similar task, spelling abilities, or other conditions beyond the control of this study.

In some cases, significant differences appeared between the death and dental conditions. For instance, a significant result for H2 was found in the dental condition showing intrinsics having lower discrepancy scores (M = .83, SD = .67) than low religious participants (M = .54, SD = .52). Such results were not found in the death condition.

Part of the inconsistency concerning mortality salience might also be attributable to the processes of proximal and distal defense predicted by TMT. To achieve effective distal defense, previous research suggests an ideal delay of at least 6 minutes (Burke et al., 2009). For the present study, the length of delay was only estimated secondarily based on duration times in Phase 2, with duration time of less than 11 minutes removed from the data. Even among participants with longer duration times, it was impossible to estimate the amount of time delay experienced following the MS prime given the inability to identify the length of time in any area of the study. Therefore, it is possible that participants were unable to remove death thoughts from focal awareness during subsequent portions of the study, thus remaining in proximal defense, and eliminating the potential for distal defense.

Religiosity and Race

Even with the above noted inconsistency, several interesting observations emerge from the data. The present study sought to identify potential differences between types of religiosity and reactions to questions of race. Allport's work sought a more precise understanding of religiosity which he later labeled intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Results from Allport and Ross (1967) showed intrinsic religiosity

was linked with decreased racism while extrinsic religiosity correlated with increased racism. The present research found partial replication of Allport and Ross' (1967) findings showing intrinsics were less prejudiced than extrinsics (see table). Excluding quest religiosity to replicate Allport and Ross' early work (1967), an ANOVA comparing ATB scores across religiosity groups produced significant results, $F(3, 352) = 2.94$, $p = .03$. LSD post hoc analysis revealed extrinsics ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.07$) showed lower positive attitudes toward Blacks than intrinsic ($M = 5.47$, $SD = .85$), indiscriminant ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 5.33$, $SD = .79$) and low religiosity ($M = 5.36$, $SD = 5.36$). While this study replicates the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, it failed to replicate the finding of Allport and Ross (1967) that indiscriminant religiosity was more prejudiced than intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.

Discrepancy Scores

Within the dissociation framework, discrepancy scores represent a difference between what individuals report they *should* do and what they actually *would* do. The higher the discrepancy score, the greater the violation of what participants believed they should do. Placed within a TMT framework, discrepancy scores represent violations of CWV. If an individual's CWV contains a commitment to "the brotherhood of believers" (Allport, 1954, p. 444), as in the case of religion, then failure to live up to that standard reduces self-esteem and therefore reduces the buffering effects of death anxiety.

According to TMT, MS should cause individuals to rely more on their CWV. However, in doing so, TMT also suggests they might feel threatened by different

others. Allport and Ross (1967) found that intrinsic religiosity worked toward the reduction of prejudice. If Allport is correct, the death prime would lead intrinsics to cling to their religious belief (increase *should*) and live out their religious belief (*would*). If intrinsics were more concerned with appearing less racist than with actually being less racist then the death prime should lead them to claim less racism (decreased *should* scores) but would show an increase in racist actions (increased *would*).

H1a and H1b each predicted movement of *should* and *would* scores to reveal either a genuine concern for prejudice reduction (H1: lower *should* and lower *would* scores) or a concern to appear less racist (H2: lower *should* and higher *would* scores). Though means moved in the direction of H1a, results showed no significant difference in *should* or *would* scores between the death and dental groups. Interestingly, an independent samples *t*-test showed the total discrepancy score (*should – would*) for intrinsics was lower in the death condition (M = .68, SD = .72) than in the dental condition (M = .83, SD = .67) though the result only approached significance, $t(165) = .18$, $p = .09$. A lower discrepancy score in the death condition may suggest mortality salience leads intrinsics to respond more consistently between belief and practice when it comes to prejudicial treatment of others. If such were the case, it might indicate that intrinsic religiosity has a genuine concern for prejudice reduction.

The lack of significant findings may be due to the inconsistencies between proximal and distal defense noted above such that participants remained in proximal

defense mode and therefore showed no significant difference in reaction. A second explanation is also possible. It could be that intrinsic religiosity is a reasonably stable form of religiosity such that priming death does not significantly alter what a person *should* or *would* do. If intrinsic religiosity represents the prominent role of religion in a person's life, then one might expect a level of consistency regardless of death thought awareness.

Discrepancy represents the difference between stated belief and action. If MS leads individuals to cling to their CWV, then a genuine belief in prejudice reduction would lead to a reduction in discrepancy. H2 predicted intrinsic religiosity would have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same MS condition. Results in the death condition failed to support this prediction.

As noted previously, this lack of significance between MS conditions may be due to inconsistencies in the study design such that participants did not enter proximal defense. Failure to enter proximal defense would mean participants still had death in their focal awareness and therefore employed more conscious forms of coping with death thoughts such as rationalizing away the threat of death.

Another possibility may be that on the issue of race, the CWVs of the religious and low-religiosity are similar in their anti-prejudiced view such that a death prime causes them to retain the same underlying anti-prejudice concept, but for difference reasons. A religious person and a low/non-religious person may both believe in the concept of "love your neighbor" but come to this conclusion for

different reasons. In this case, a death prime would lead them both to adhere to a similar anti-racism perspective.

Results for H2 in the dental condition did show a significant difference between intrinsic (*M = .83, SD = .67)* and low religiosity *(M = .41, SD = .52),* and approached significance between intrinsic and indiscriminant (*M* = .54, *SD* = .54), *p* = .08. Similarly, intrinsic discrepancy scores were higher than extrinsic discrepancy scores, though statistically non-significant. These findings are opposite of the hypothesized direction and warrant further examination.

While discrepancy scores failed to show a significant difference across religiosities, the two mechanisms that make up the discrepancy scores (*should* and *would*) reveal notable differences. An ANOVA using religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity) as a grouping variable and *should* scores as the dependent variable yielded a significant result, *F*(3, 174) = 5.89, *p* = .001. Moreover, Bonferroni post hoc analysis showed intrinsics reported marginally lower *should (M = 1.90, SD = .67)* scores than extrinsics (*M* = 2.53. *SD* = 1.34), p =.06, and extrinsics reported marginally higher *should* scores than indiscriminant (*M* = 1.71, *SD* = .76), p = .06.

An ANOVA using *would* scores as the dependent variable likewise revealed significant differences between religiosity, *F* (3,174) = 4.73, *p* = .005. Bonferroni post hoc analysis revealed extrinsic *would* scores (*N* = 15, *M* = 3.60, *SD* = 1.64) to be significantly higher than indiscriminant (*N* = 16, *M* = 2.39, *SD* = .88) and low religiosity (*N*= 61, *M* = 2.63, *SD* = 1.09). Additionally, while an independent samples

t-test revealed non-significant results between discrepancy scores in the death and dental conditions, it is interesting to note that discrepancy scores were higher for extrinsic, quest, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the death condition but moved in the opposite direction for intrinsics such that intrinsic discrepancy scores were lower in the death condition (see Table 2).

These findings, being opposite the predicted direction, could be due to a number of possibilities. First, higher discrepancy scores for intrinsics may support Batson and Burris' claim that intrinsic religiosity "reached only to the hand that marks the questionnaire, not to the heart" (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 152). What intrinsics say they *should* do is not what they *would* do. Instead, they treat people of differing race worse than their religious claims dictate they should. However, significant differences in *should* and *would* scores, along with the different pattern of movement between discrepancy scores in the death and dental conditions, raise the possibility of another explanation.

If intrinsics were more concerned with appearing less racist than actually being less racist (Batson & Burris, 1994) one would expect them to minimize the discrepancy between what they *should* do and what they *would* do. This does not appear to be the case since intrinsic discrepancy scores actually increased. It is also important to note that intrinsics reported statistically lower *should* and *would* scores than extrinsics. Under MS, intrinsics report that they *should* show lower levels of prejudice and that they *would* demonstrate lower levels of prejudice. This movement

may suggest that MS leads intrinsics to genuinely show less prejudice beliefs and reported actions even though the discrepancy between the two increases as noted.

That increased discrepancy scores may indicate genuine concern to reduce prejudice finds some support in the findings of H3 which predicted a negative correlation between social desirability and discrepancy. As predicted, the more concern individuals have for social appearance the more they might minimize any difference between stated beliefs and actions as demonstrated by reduced discrepancy scores.

Batson's position that intrinsics were more concerned with appearance is based, in part, on findings that intrinsics reported higher levels of social desirability than extrinsics (Batson et al., 1974). Taken together, the increased discrepancy scores for intrinsics in H2 and the negative correlation between social desirability and discrepancy in H3, suggests that intrinsic religiosity may be more than simply trying to appear less prejudiced. In fact, when Batson's concept of quest religiosity is included, an ANOVA comparing social desirability means across religiosity for this study yielded no significant difference with quest religiosity showing no significant difference in social desirability scores than intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity, $F(3, 441) = 1.89$, $p = .13$.

Since Batson et al. (1974) believed quest religiosity to be more stable and less susceptible to social desirability concerns, it was important to compare levels of discrepancy scores in light of the findings in H3. H4 predicted quest religiosity would report lower scores on discrepancy than all other religious orientations, thus

overcoming the deficiencies of intrinsic religiosity and social desirability. Results for H4 failed to show lower discrepancy scores for quest. While MS showed a non-significant effect on discrepancy scores, a significant difference was found among religiosity such that quest (M = .75, SD = .06*)* and intrinsic *(*M = .76, SD = .05*)* reported higher discrepancy scores than low religiosity (M = .46, SD = .11). As with H2, this trend is opposite of the predicted means.

Since social desirability and discrepancy scores are negatively correlated as shown in H3, increased discrepancy scores may indicate the opposite of social desirability. Instead of trying to minimize any discrepancy between belief and action, higher discrepancy scores may be a genuine acknowledgement of a failure to live up to stated beliefs. To this end, Batson's claim that quest religiosity was more stable than intrinsic religiosity was not supported in this study. Rather, intrinsic and quest religiosity function similarly in their level of consistency between stated belief and stated action when it comes to issues of race.

Compunction

Compunction is the feeling of shame and guilt that results from the acknowledgement that you have failed to do what your CWV dictates you should. Since intrinsic and quest religiosity are theoretically more central to a person's identity (Allport & Ross, 1967, Batson et al., 1974), it was predicted that violations would lead to greater levels of compunction. Consistent with previous research (Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993), results of the present study indicate a positive correlation between discrepancy scores and compunction, $r(475)$ =

.25, $p = .0001$. However, contrary to prediction, feelings of compunction appear to be experienced equally regardless of religiosity. H5a predicted intrinsics would experience higher levels of compunction in the dental condition than in the death condition. However, as discussed with the previous hypothesis, the lack of significant difference in discrepancy scores between death and dental conditions, coupled with non-significantly lower discrepancy scores in the death condition, provide a plausible explanation for the lack of significant findings for H5. That is to say, since intrinsic discrepancy scores did not increase in the death condition, one might not expect compunction scores to increase either. Failure to find support for H5a in the death condition may go back to the previously mentioned issue of proximal and distal defenses.

H5b and H6 likewise predicted intrinsics (H5b) or quests (H6) would experience higher levels of compunction than the other religiosities. No support was found for either H5b or H6. Failure to support H5b and H6 may suggest violations of any CWV leave individuals vulnerable to the emotional effects of discrepancy regardless of the nature of their worldview. Feelings of compunction appear to be determined by the level of discrepancy rather than the nature of religiosity such that a violation is a violation, regardless of what is being violated. Therefore, evidence suggests the level of dissonance experienced when stated belief and stated action differ leads to compunction regardless of the underlying nature of the CWV.

Death Anxiety

TMT posits that CWVs work to buffer the terror of death. Self-esteem derives from individuals' ability to live up to the standards of their CWV. Therefore, as long as people live up to their CWV, the terror of death will be buffered. If discrepancy scores represent an acknowledged failure to live up to the beliefs of a CWV, then increased discrepancy scores should result in increased levels of death anxiety, as predicted in H7. This was supported with the significant findings of H7 showing a positive correlation between discrepancy means and death anxiety. When self-reported non-prejudiced values are violated, the buffering effects of the CWV are diminished. A worldview only buffers death anxiety to the degree to which it is adhered.

As was the case with compunction, the impact of discrepancy on death anxiety transcends religiosity. Both H8 and H9 predicted either intrinsic religiosity (H8) or quest religiosity (H9) would experience greater levels of death anxiety than the other religiosities given that violations of the CWV are theoretically more central to a person's identity. This proved not to be the case. The lack of significant findings for H8 and H9 further suggests violations of CWV remove some degree of anxiety buffering effectiveness regardless of the nature of the CWV. No matter one's level of religious commitment, violations of any CWV decrease the buffering effects of the CWV, leaving the person more vulnerable to death anxiety. Failure to live up to any CWV results in decreased death anxiety buffering regardless of the CWV's ability to buffer the anxiety.

Research Questions

The lack of significant findings for all three research questions may be attributed to at least one of two factors. First, it may be that the strength of the primes failed to sufficiently activate the various components of one or more orientations. For instance, indiscriminants received a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic messages based on similarly high scores on two or more orientations. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) found a personal and a social dimension to extrinsic religiosity and Batson and Schoenrade's (1991) quest scale measures three elements to quest. Priming these orientations may be more complex than the priming method used in the current study.

A second possibility is that giving all participants the opportunity to indicate agreement with any religious statement, regardless of relevance to their particular orientation, allowed them to affirm their religious/non-religious identity. This explanation would be consistent with past TMT research which primed general religiosity by allowing participants to affirm general religious beliefs through a scale or statement (Friedman & Rhodes, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Rothchild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). Rather than priming a particular religiosity, the ability to affirm any orientation might actually activate the relevant religious orientation in that person. In doing so the religious components of a person's CWV would then be primed. However, since every participant received some form of religious orientation prime in the present study, this explanation does not seem testable.

Limitations

It is important to note three limitations to the present study. First, the low number of participants in the extrinsic (N = 32) and indiscriminant (N = 33) orientations may have contributed to underpowered tests of the hypothesis including these variables, particularly when these orientations were divided by MS condition. An a priori power analysis noted previously revealed a need for N = 104 per group using an ANOVA and N = 70 per group using an ANCOVA to find a small effect size with 80% power. For hypotheses in this study using ANOVA and ANCOVA procedures, the number of participants left these tests underpowered. Future studies should seek to increase the number of participants in these cells to improve statistical power.

A related limitation concerns the nature of the two populations used in this study. As expected, Christian university participants reported significantly higher levels of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity, following patterns observed by Donahue (1985). MTURK participants reported higher levels of atheism and agnosticism. Future research should focus on a more balanced population that would ideally have roughly equal numbers of individuals within each orientation—or at least a minimally sufficient number within each orientation.

A third limitation involves the TMT aspects of the current study. Two issues may have contributed to the lack of significant MS effects for some hypotheses. As noted previously, the current study did not include a mechanism to monitor the timing of MS prime and delay, potentially resulting in participants remaining in proximal

defense. Future research should include a way to control for this important element when using an online survey instrument. Although the current study sought to address this issue by using paper/pencil materials for the university students in a more controlled lab setting, using such a controlled administration of the MS manipulation for all subjects would likely ensure more reliable results across all conditions.

Future Research

The present study also lays the groundwork for future research in a number of interesting areas. First, given the correlation between discrepancy and death anxiety, future research should attempt to manipulate levels of discrepancy to investigate a more substantial causal claim. For instance, discrepancy scores could be manipulated to give participants the perception of either higher or lower levels of worldview violation. Similarly, discrepancy scores could be framed according to how others performed on the same measure. If participants believed they performed better than their colleagues then the effects of increased discrepancy might be moderated by self-monitoring cues.

A second line of research could investigate the effects of priming religious orientation. As noted in the research questions above, the ability to compare primed religious thought with non-religious thought primes could clarify whether general religious primes serve to boost religiosity or whether the prime should be more specifically tailored to the participant's orientation. Since intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity contain unique elements, religious orientation primes should be developed that more effectively tap into these elements. Since an indiscriminant

orientation is made up of a generally positive assessment of religion, the prime should focus on religion in general rather than elements of intrinsic, extrinsic, or quest religiosity.

Additionally, the difference between Black and non-Black discrepancy scores is an important area for future research. For this study Blacks reported negative discrepancy scores which resulted from increased *should* scores. Higher *should* scores would suggest Blacks believed higher levels of prejudice were appropriate toward Whites. This raises interesting questions concerning the way prejudice works between different racial subgroups. Even with the present questions raised by altering *should* and *would* measures for use among Black participants, the suggestion that portraying Whites as the oppressed minority provides justification for increased prejudice deserves further investigation. Likewise, the ability to measure the role of religiosity with Black *should* and *would* scores might offer further insight into the function of religiosity as it relates to issues of minority treatment.

Finally, future research should investigate whether racial perspectives based on religious or non-religious worldviews function differently for participants. Participants could be primed to think of race through a legal perspective or religious teachings through either reading or writing an argument against racism. Similarly, Allport's notion of a sociocultural influence wherein religion serves "double duty" (Allport, 1954, p. 446) provides a third alternative. Combining religion and national identity, as is often done in modern American culture, may provide a CWV made up of both religious and social justifications for identification and treatment of outgroups

in particular ways. It may be participants are more motivated by a religious call to "love your neighbor" than by a civil call of "justice for all". It may also be participants are equally compelled by both.

Conclusions

Despite some equivocal findings, the present study provides useful insights into the three main concepts used in the design of this research. First, correlations between discrepancy and death anxiety provide support for the underlying assumptions of TMT. Cultural worldviews are only effective at reducing death anxiety when their values are lived out in a person's life. TMT argues that self-esteem is derived from living up to the dictates of a chosen CWV. If CWVs help buffer the anxiety of death when adhered to, then failure to live up to one's CWV results in an increase in death anxiety. Discrepancy scores represent the degree to which participants self-reported their failure to follow the non-prejudiced standards of their CWV. Consistent with TMT, increased discrepancy resulted in increased death anxiety.

Second, Allport's (1954) notion of compunction and Devine's dissociation model (1986) positing compunction (guilt/shame) as a result of violating personal beliefs found support in the present study. This too lends support to TMT. If CWVs provide comfort and equanimity to life, violating CWV standards results in shame, guilt, and personal discomfort. The findings that compunction was equal across religious orientation strengthen the TMT claim that CWVs in general function to provide comfort, not just a certain few. As noted above, these feelings of

compunction are correlated with the violation of any religious orientation/CWV and are not unique to just one religious orientation. Failure to adhere to any non-prejudiced standard led to increased levels of compunction.

Finally, Batson et al.'s (1974) depiction of intrinsic religiosity as being more committed to the appearance of decreased racism than to actual decreased racism appears to be a slight over-assertion within this study. The present study did not replicate Batson's findings showing intrinsics with significantly higher means for social desirability. Rather, social desirability means were equal across religiosity. To the extent that discrepancy might represent the opposite of social desirability, intrinsics were not statistically different from quest religiosity. Similarly, Allport's claims that intrinsic religiosity is more effective at decreasing racism was found to gain only modest support in this study. The non-significant findings between intrinsics and other religiosities suggest it functions the same in regards to racism.

51 years after Dr. King's observation of Sunday morning prejudice, the prejudice issue continues to be at work in American culture, even within American religion. Despite the passage of Civil Rights legislation, the integration of education, and the election of the first Black president, American culture continues its struggle to break the prejudice habit. This study addressed the role of religion as it relates to prejudice. Future research should continue to investigate the paradoxical relationship between religion and racism as well as other cultural worldviews seeking to address prejudice.

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Appendix A: Phase 1 Materials

Demographic Measures

1. Please indicate your gender
   Male
   Female

2. Please indicate your age ____

3. Please indicate your educational level
   Freshman
   Sophomore
   Junior
   Senior
   Graduate Student
   College graduate
   No college

4. Please choose the option that most closely matches your race/ethnicity
   Black
   White
   Asian/Pacific Islander
   American Indian/Alaskan Native
   Hispanic
   Middle Eastern
   Other

5. Affiliation
   University participant
   Other
   MTURK Participant

6. Which of the following best describes your religious convictions?
   Muslim
   Jew
   Christian
   Eastern Religion
   Agnostic
   Atheist

7. How often do you participate in a religious service?

Never
Less than once a month
Once a month
2-3 times a month
Once a week
2-3 times a week
Daily

8. Which of the following statements best represents your religious experience as a child?

I grew up in a religious environment
I grew up in a semi-religious environment
I grew up in a non-religious environment

Appendix A (cont.)

Whites' Attitude Toward Black

Note: All items are scored on a 7-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

1. If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or her.
2. If I had a chance to introduce black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be pleased to do so.
3. I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. (**Rev**)
4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public place. (**Rev**)
5. I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and education as me moved in next door.
6. I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do. (**Rev**)
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the "who-am-I?" confusion which the children feel. (**Rev**)
8. I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks.
9. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.
10. It would not bother me if my new roommate was black.
11. It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. (**Rev**)
12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. (**Rev**)
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices blacks suffer at the hands of local authorities.
14. Black and white people are inherently equal.
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights. (**Rev**)
16. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation.
17. Generally, blacks are no as smart as whites. (**Rev**)
18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. (**Rev**)
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both whites and blacks.
20. Some blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.

Appendix A (cont.)

Black's Attitude Toward Whites

Note: All items are scored on a 7-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

1. Most whites feel that blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. **(Rev)**
2. I feel that black people's troubles in the past have built in them a stronger character than white people have.
3. Most whites can't be trusted to deal honestly with blacks. **(Rev)**
4. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. **(Rev)**
5. Most whites can't understand what it's like to be black. **(Rev)**
6. Some whites are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them. **(Rev)**
7. I would rather not have whites live in the same apartment building I live in. **(Rev)**
8. I would accept an invitation to a New Year's Eve Party given by a white couple in their own home.
9. It would not bother me if my new roommate was white.
10. Racial integration (of schools, business, residences, etc.) has benefitted both whites and blacks.
11. It's not right to ask Americans to accept integration if they honestly don't believe in it. **(Rev)**
12. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.
13. Most whites fear that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. **(Rev)**
14. By and large, I think blacks are better athletes than whites. **(Rev)**
15. Local city officials often pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person. **(Rev)**
16. When I see an interracial couple I feel that they are making a mistake in dating each other. **(Rev)**
17. I have as much respect for whites as I do for some blacks, but the average white person and I share little in common. **(Rev)**
18. I think that white people look more similar to each other than black people do. **(Rev)**
19. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation.

20. If a white were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or her.

Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS)

Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people. Some of the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations whereas others reflect more external-social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other.

In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the scale below.

External motivation items

1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.
2. I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.
3. If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.
4. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.
5. I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.

Internal motivation items

1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. (**Rev**)
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.

5. Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.

Note. (R) Indicates reverse coded item.

Participants rated 10 items on a scale ranging from 1 *(strongly disagree)* to 9 *(strongly agree).* When participants complete the scales, the IMS and EMS items are intermixed. The factor loadings are from an exploratory factor analysis.

Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS) (Blacks)

Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward White people. Some of the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations whereas others reflect more external-social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other.

In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the scale below.

External motivation items

1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward White people.
2. I try to hide any negative thoughts about White people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.
3. If I acted prejudiced toward White people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.
4. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward White people in order to avoid disapproval from others.
5. I try to act nonprejudiced toward White people because of pressure from others.

Internal motivation items

1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward White people because it is personally important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about White people is OK. (**Rev**)
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward White people.
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about White people is wrong.
5. Being nonprejudiced toward White people is important to my self-concept.

Note. (R) Indicates reverse coded item.

Participants rated 10 items on a scale ranging from 1 *(strongly disagree)* to 9 *(strongly agree).* When participants complete the scales, the IMS and EMS items are intermixed. The factor loadings are from an exploratory factor analysis.

Appendix A (cont.)

The Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Personal Reaction Inventory

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. (T)
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. (T)
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (F)
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. (T)
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. (F)
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F)
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. (T)
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. (T)
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it. (F),
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. (F)
11. I like to gossip at times. (F)
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. (F)
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. (T)
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. (F)
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F)
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T)
17. I always try to practice what I preach. (T)
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. (T)
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (F)
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. (T)
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (T)
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. (F)
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (F)
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. (T)
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. (T)
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T)
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. (T)
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (F)
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. (T)
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (F)
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. (T)
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. (F)
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T)

Appendix A (cont.)

Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scales

All items are scored as follows:

1= strongly disagree
2 = I tend to disagree
3 =I am not sure
4= I tend to agree
5=I strongly agree

Intrinsic

1. I enjoy reading about my religion.
2. It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (rev)
3. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.
4. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence.
5. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.
6. Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life. (rev)
7. My whole approach to life is based on my religion.
8. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are important in life (rev)

Extrinsic

1. I go to church because it helps me to make friends (Es)
2. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. (Ep)
3. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. (Ep)
4. Prayer is for peace and happiness. (Ep)
5. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. (Es)
6. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. (Es)

Appendix A (cont.)

12-Item Quest Scale

All items are scored on a 5-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

Readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity

1. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and purpose of my life.
2. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my world and in my relation to my world. (rev)
3. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
4. God wasn't very important for me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my own life.

Self-criticism and perception of religious doubt as positive.

5. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
6. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
7. I find religious doubts upsetting. (rev)
8. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.

Openness to change

9. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
10. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
11. I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years. (rev)
12. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.

Appendix B: Phase 2 Materials

Religious Orientation Feedback

Intrinsic

The role that religion plays in one's life differs from person to person. One may take the position that religion is the most important guide for how they live their life. SUh a person sees religion as the master motive to their life and tries to live their life accordingly.

Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion.

Not like me at all	1	Quite a lot like me	4
Not much like me	2	Just like me	5
Somewhat like me	3		

Extrinsic

The role that religion plays in one's life different from person to person. One may take the position that religion is one of the guides for how they live their life. Such a person sees religion as a means of gaining peace, security, and social connections in their life.

Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion.

Not like me at all	1	Quite a lot like me	4
Not much like me	2	Just like me	5
Somewhat like me	3		

Quest

The role that religion plays in one's life differs from person to person. One may take the position that religion is a search for truth in the face of life's questions. Such a person sees religion as an open-ended and changing search for truth, which may never be completely achieved.

Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion.

Not like me at all	1	Quite a lot like me	4
Not much like me	2	Just like me	5
Somewhat like me	3		

Indiscriminant

The role that religion plays in one's life differs from person to person. One may take the position that religion serves as a foundation to life while also believing there are other important things. Such a person sees religion as a guide and means to peace, security, and social connections.

Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion.

Not like me at all	1	Quite a lot like me	4
Not much like me	2	Just like me	5
Somewhat like me	3		

Non-Religious

The role that religion plays in one's life differs from person to person. One may take the position that religion does not play a significant role in how they live their life. Such a person sees religion as insignificant to their own pursuit of peace, security, social connections and meaning.

Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion.

Not like me at all	1	Quite a lot like me	4
Not much like me	2	Just like me	5
Somewhat like me	3		

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

Instructions
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement using the following responses:

Strongly Disagree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think I am no good at all.
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I certainly feel useless at times.
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Appendix B (cont.)

The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment

This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality appraisal. Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.

1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS TO <u>YOU</u> AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment

This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality appraisal. Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.

1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF GOING TO THE DENTIST AROUSES IN YOU.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS TO <u>YOU</u> AS YOU ARE AT THE DENTIST OFFICE AND ONCE YOU EXPERIENCE DENTAL PAIN.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Appendix B (cont.)

PANAS

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent each word describes your feelings at this time. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1 =Very slightly or not at all
2 =A little
3=Moderately
4 =Quite a bit
5 = Extremely\

_____ interested
_____ distressed
_____excited
_____ upset
_____strong
_____guilty
_____scared
_____ hostile
_____ enthusiastic
_____ proud
_____irritable
_____alert
_____ashamed
_____inspired
_____nervous
_____ determined
_____ attentive
_____ jittery
_____ active
_____ afraid

Growing Stone – Distractor Task

The personality portion of the survey is over. Now, we would like you to complete a few different attitude tasks. As was stated earlier, research suggests that attitudes and perceptions about even very common everyday items may be related to basic personality characteristics. To further examine this idea, we would like you to complete the opinion questionnaires on the following pages with your most natural response. Please follow the instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented. That is, do not skip around.

Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the questions below it.

The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—first on one side of the road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable, invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed down and stopped a few yards from the huts.

The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur's black face, smiling. The man signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard.

The man looked at the river below him, visible soley as a broad dark motion flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had soaked the trail

an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the black sky misty stars flickered.

How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
not at all descriptive			somewhat descriptive				very descriptive	

Word Completion Task

We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies. Please complete the following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind. Write one letter per blank. Some words may be plural. Thank you.

1. BUR _ _ D
2. PLA _ _
3. _ _ OK
4. WAT _ _
5. DE _ _
6. MU _ _
7. _ _ NG
8. B _ T _ LE
9. M_ J _ R
10. P _ _ TURE
11. FL _ W _ R
12. GRA _ _
13. K _ _GS
14. CHA _ _
15. KI _ _ ED
16. CL _ _ K
17. TAB _ _
18. W _ _ DOW
19. SK _ _ L
20. TR _ _
21. P _ P _ R
22. COFF _ _
23. _ O _ SE
24. POST _ _
25. R _ DI _

Appendix B (cont.)

Authenticity of Self-Reported Discrepancies

Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire

***Should* Instructions**. This questionnaire concerns people's reactions to Blacks. We are not interested in evaluating any single individual, so you can be sure that your answers will be kept completely anonymous. For us to learn anything from this study, we ask that you respond openly and honestly, and that you read the instructions for each part of the questionnaire very carefully.

The following items concern your beliefs about Blacks. We would like you to respond to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, regardless of whether the way you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs. Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use " 1 " to indicate strong disagreement, " 7 " to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of agreement.

Should (belief) items

1. I should go out of my way to avoid passing a Black person on the street. (14)
2. I think that Blacks and Whites should have an equal opportunity to be hired by an employer. (R) (7)
3. I believe that I should not think of Blacks in stereotypical ways. (R) (1)
4. I believe that interracial couples should be regarded the same as any other couple. (R) (11)
5. If I had a Black classmate, I should assume that he/she is just as capable of completing intellectually challenging tasks as my White classmates. (R) (9)
6. I support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination. (R) (16)
7. I should react to all supervisors the same, regardless of their race. (R) (6)
8. I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/ she is Black. (R) (5)
9. I should not feel uncomfortable about having a Black roommate. (R) (13)
10. I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of Black people. (R) (3)
11. I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to Black families. (4)
12. I do not believe that Black men typically have criminal tendencies. (R) (10)
13. I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a Black person. (R) (8)
14. I believe Black students study as hard as White students. (R) (15)
15. I believe that, even if an interracial couple wants to marry, they should not do it. (2)
16. I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotype of Blacks is wrong. (R) (12)

***Would* Instructions**. Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is consistent with our beliefs, and other times we find ourselves acting in a way that is inconsistent with our beliefs. For each item below, we are interested in your initial, gut-level reactions, which may or may not be consistent with how you believe you should react. Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use "1" to indicate strong disagreement, "7 "to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of agreement.

I -Would item
1. I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts.
2. I would not be upset if a member of my family married someone of a different race. (R)
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I were the only White person in a group of Black people.
4. I would not be troubled if a Black family moved into my neighborhood. (R)
5. On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were Black.
6. I would feel awkward having a Black supervisor.
7. If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was Black.
8. I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a Black person.
9. If I were choosing a classmate to complete a difficult in-class assignment with me, I would be more likely to choose a White than a Black classmate.
10. If I saw a Black man walking toward me on an empty street, I would feel worried about his intentions.
11. Seeing interracial couples doing things together makes me uncomfortable.
12. I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotype of Blacks.
13. I would feel uncomfortable if I was assigned a Black roommate.
14. If I were walking alone down the street and saw a Black person walking toward me, I would not consider crossing to the other side of the street. (R)
15. I would initially assume that a Black student does not take school as seriously as a White student.
16. I feel irritated when Blacks claim they've been discriminated against.

Note. (R) = reverse-scored. Numbers in parentheses following *should* items represent the corresponding *would* Item.

Appendix B (cont.)

Authenticity of Self-Reported Discrepancies (Blacks)

Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire

***Should* Instructions**. This questionnaire concerns people's reactions to Whites. We are not interested in evaluating any single individual, so you can be sure that your answers will be kept completely anonymous. For us to learn anything from this study, we ask that you respond openly and honestly, and that you read the instructions for each part of the questionnaire very carefully.

The following items concern your beliefs about Whites. We would like you to respond to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, regardless of whether the way you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs. Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use "" 1" to indicate strong disagreement, "7" to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of agreement.

Should (belief) items

1. I should go out of my way to avoid passing a White person on the street. (14)
2. I think that Whites and Blacks should have an equal opportunity to be hired by an employer. (R) (7)
3. I believe that I should not think of whites in stereotypical ways. (R) (1)
4. I believe that interracial couples should be regarded the same as any other couple. (R) (11)
5. If I had a white classmate, I should assume that he/she is just as capable of completing intellectually challenging tasks as my Black classmates. (R) (9)
6. I support Whites in their struggle against discrimination. (R) (16)
7. I should react to all supervisors the same, regardless of their race. (R) (6)
8. I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/ she is White. (R) (5)
9. I should not feel uncomfortable about having a White roommate. (R) (13)
10. I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of White people. (R) (3)
11. I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to White families. (4)
12. I do not believe that White men typically have criminal tendencies. (R) (10)
13. I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a White person. (R) (8)
14. I believe White students study as hard as Black students. (R) (15)
15. I believe that, even if an interracial couple wants to marry, they should not do it. (2)
16. I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotype of Whites is wrong. (R) (12)

***Would* Instructions**. Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is consistent with our beliefs, and other times we find ourselves acting in a way that is inconsistent with our beliefs. For each item below, we are interested in your initial, gut-level reactions, which may or may not be consistent with how you believe you should react. Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use "1" to indicate strong disagreement, "7 "to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of agreement.

I -Would item
1. I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts.
2. I would not be upset if a member of my family married someone of a different race. (R)
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I were the only Black person in a group of White people.
4. I would not be troubled if a white family moved into my neighborhood. (R)
5. On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were White.
6. I would feel awkward having a White supervisor.
7. If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was White.
8. I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a White person.
9. If I were choosing a classmate to complete a difficult in-class assignment with me, I would be more likely to choose a Black than a White classmate.
10. If I saw a White man walking toward me on an empty street, I would feel worried about his intentions.
11. Seeing interracial couples doing things together makes me uncomfortable.
12. I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotype of Whites.
13. I would feel uncomfortable if I was assigned a White roommate.
14. If I were walking alone down the street and saw a White person walking toward me, I would not consider crossing to the other side of the street. (R)
15. I would initially assume that a White student does not take school as seriously as a Black student.
16. I feel irritated when Whites claim they've been discriminated against.

Note. (R) = reverse-scored. Numbers in parentheses following *should* items represent the corresponding *would* Item.

Compunction Affect Indices

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent each word describes your feelings at this time. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1 (*does not apply at all*) to 7 (*applies very much*)

Discomfort Index

_____ Bothered

_____ Uneasy

_____ Uncomfortable

Depressed

_____ Low

_____ Sad

_____ Depressed

Negself

_____ Disappointed with myself

_____ Guilty

_____ Annoyed at myself

_____ Self-critical

Negother

_____ Irritated at others

_____ Disgusted with others

Positive

_____ Friendly

_____ Good

_____ Happy

_____ Optimistic

(Appendix B cont.)

State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS)

The following are some statements which may or may not describe how you are feeling *right now*. Please rate each statement using the 10-point scale below. Remember to rate each statement based on how you are feeling *right at this moments.*

Note feeling this at all.		**Feeling this way somewhat.**		**Feeling this way very strongly.**
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

1. I feel good about myself.
2. I want to sink into the floor and disappear.
3. I feel remorse, regret.
4. I feel worthwhile, valuable.
5. I feel small.
6. I feel tension about something I have done.
7. I feel capable, useful.
8. I feel like I am a bad person.
9. I cannot stop thinking about something bad I have done.
10. I feel proud.
11. I feel humiliated, disgraced.
12. I feel like apologizing, confessing.
13. I feel pleased about something I have done.
14. I feel worthless, powerless.
15. I feel bad about something I have done.

Appendix B (cont.)

15-Item Templer Death Anxiety Scale

Directions: After reading each of the following states, please mark "True" if the statement is true or mostly true as it pertains to you, or "False" if the statement is false or mostly false.

1. I am very much afraid to die.
2. The thought of death seldom enters my mind.
3. It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death.
4. I dread to think about having to have an operation.
5. I am not at all afraid to die.
6. I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer.
7. The thought of death never bothers me.
8. I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly.
9. I fear of dying a painful death.
10. The subject of life after death troubles me greatly.
11. I am really scared of having a heart attack.
12. I often think about how short life really is.
13. I shudder when I hear people talking about World War III.
14. The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me.
15. I feel the future holds nothing for me to fear.