In recent years, the threat of international attacks on critical infrastructure networks has grown; as defined by a 1998 Presidential Decision Directive, these are networks necessary to society’s functionality and include water, power, communication, transportation, and more. Due to existing interdependencies, damage to a small area of one of the networks could have far-reaching effects on the ability to meet demand across the entire system. In similar work, common scenarios for malevolent attacks include degree- and capacity-based disruptions. However, attackers targeting a network may consider some components more desirable than others for qualitative reasons such as religious or governmental significance. Additionally, the concept of social vulnerability, which describes an area’s ability to prepare for and respond to a disruption, must be included. This should promote not only the protection of the most at-risk components but also ensure that socially vulnerable communities are given adequate resources. This work attempts to determine the allocation of defensive resources that accounts for all these factors while minimizing both costs and the unmet demand in the disrupted network.