FAILURE IN IRAQ? AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN SUCCESS REBUILDING A POST-SADDAM IRAQ

Abstract

This thesis project examines the United States’ involvement during the second war in Iraq from 2003-2011. The question that this thesis aims to study is why the Iraq War unfolded the way it did, and to disprove the notion that Iraq was never a winnable war. In reality, this thesis will prove that specific actions taken by the United States further exacerbated the relationship between the two main sectarian groups that resulted in years of revenge killing, which eventually evolved into a civil war. These actions can be boiled down to poor management and staffing, incorrect policies in the early rebuilding stage, lacking a nationwide counterinsurgency plan, and finally failing to recognize the evolution of the conflict into a civil war. Although the United States did experience some success in their postwar efforts in Iraq during the counterinsurgency phase dubbed “The Surge”, any efforts achieved during this time was reversed when the US withdrew in 2011, which allowed Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to revert back to sectarian persecutions. It is hoped that this research will allow the American public to understand why the conflict unfolded the way it did and show the consequences that certain action or inaction can have on a conflict.