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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CHRIST-IMAGE IN VICTORIAN LITERATURE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IN MEMORIAM

A DISSERTATION

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degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

WILLIAM RICHARD MITCHELL

Norman, Oklahoma

1969

THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CHRIST-IMAGE IN VICTORIAN LITERATURE

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IN MEMORIAM

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

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THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CHRIST-IMAGE IN VICTORIAN LITERATURE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IN MEMORIAM

CHAPTER I

ART AND RELIGION: SOME PREMISES

There is a passage in Joseph Wood Krutch's The Modern Temper which for the lover of art reads like a nightmare. Commenting on the failure of modern attempts at tragedy, he judges the reason to be that the tragic vision has been surrendered, and can only be considered a fiction by modern man. Working from the proposition that religious values have declined and are probably in the process of being finally and inevitably discredited, Krutch speculates that on the heels of the collapse comes the collapse of all cultural values as well; and when that happens, art will become what it already was tending toward, a mere record of data. For without values, no datum is any more significant than any other datum; the artist will then be utterly without any basis for selection or emphasis; every such selection or arrangement or emphasis must be merely arbitrary on the part of the artist, and must be seen as such, eventually, by his public. Then the only function left to the artist will be that of documentation.[1]

Though it may be too early to rejoice, art seems not to have followed undeviatingly that prophecy of 1929. But the knotty problem of

the nature and authority of value is still one of central importance. For however one defines value, art is certainly dependent on value in more ways than one. First, some scheme of value must be employed in the construction of art. For art requires selection from the multitude of available materials and arrangement of its detail; and it is very hard to imagine an art that would not emphasize and proportion its materials by the media and scope of their presentation as well. Even if we could have an art that presented all the detail included (or perceived) within purely random limits of space and time, and managed to avoid any emphasis at all -- and it is doubtful if even documentation could avoid manifestation of some value to this extent -- and even if we waive the argument that in such "art" inclusiveness or randomness has itself become the determining value -- there yet remains the necessity of expression, which involves the choosing of some medium over another and the choices involved in management of that medium.

Moreover, if it be granted that art by its very nature is an attempt to create or recreate experience, and if it be further granted that experience cannot be unless there is one to experience, it follows that art does not properly exist until it is (with whatever degree of success) perceived -- even if, by intent or accident, the one who perceives is only the artist himself. And in the perception of art, in the process of restructuring, value functions in the same ways as in the original structuring. It is of course evident that the choices demanded by the controlling values may be either conscious or unconscious for both the creator and the perceiver. It follows then that either real value or a convincing fiction of value must exist, if art is to be.

But the problem laid before us by Krutch's prediction reaches far beyond that basic necessity. He seems to imply that aesthetic values need the buttressing of a real or assumed religious faith, or at least of a humanistic faith grounded in a secure ontology. But it may not be immediately apparent that aesthetic value has, or need have, any essential relationship with religious or ethical value. Perhaps all value is arbitrary to the extent that human whims may direct it wherever they range; or perhaps value takes a consistent form simply because it has its source solely in the common physiological and psychological nature of men, so that by introspection and careful manipulation man might be able to discard one set of values and deliberately establish another; perhaps only that which is aesthetically gratifying can validate itself to man, and religious values survive only so long as they can appropriate for themselves aesthetic appeal; perhaps, as Mandeville suggested (and others after him), religious values and the myths and theosophies that support them are the means devised by avarice and ambition to manipulate others for profit, and owe their success to the sublimation into abstract form of the avarice and ambition of the victims themselves; or perhaps religious values are of God and all other values are of the devil. Out of theis welter of speculation, can anything be said with reasonable confidence about a relationship between religious value and aesthetic value?

One proposition seems secure enough. Whatever the source of value, whatever the truth is about its ulterior nature, both religious and aesthetic value must come to us mediately; and both must come by

way of the same medium, the human apprehension. In any given individual, they must both come by way of the particular complex of apprehending powers which is the unique possession of that individual. Moreover, in each case the human apprehension will, at least in part, formulate these values by the same presentational or representational devices -- word, symbol, rational construct, myth. The result will be a compelling urge toward unity; without yet trying to determine whether the unity that may result is due to an accurate or imperfect perception of an inherent unity, or whether it is due solely to the accident of their being both formulated by the same instruments, one may yet see that their formulations will tend to be analogous.

The question of an inherent relationship must of course depend upon how one answers the perennial gnawing question -- perhaps ultimately not capable of solution -- of the ultimate source of value. Does value have an ulterior source which the human organism apprehends, however imperfectly, or is there no "source" at all -- is value merely a process the mind engages in, one which is demonstrative of no necessary reliable tendencies?

Virtually every assertion or denial of the existence of ulterior value begins with the assumption that it is <u>possible</u> to assert or deny -- begins, that is, with the assumption that word or at least thought can adequately capture the nature of reality. No doubt there is usually a vague awareness that this is an unwarranted assumption. But as long as the mind can work with the assumption it will ignore the possible inadequacy and proceed as if it did not exist. Eventually the practice may

obscure the question of inadequacy altogether. Even attempts, such as the present one, to remark or to safeguard against that fallacy have a way of slipping into the fallacy themselves and assuming, ironically, their own adequacy--to the continual frustration and amusement of the observer.

But if value (or the conviction of the absence of value) must come by way of our own perception and understanding--and in a thousand tortuous ways this point has been belabored since Locke--it should then seem apparent that unless human understanding and even human powers of systematizing and articulating are totally adequate to their task, there must be a disparity between any existing value, if there be any such, and that value as we are in possession of it.

If man really wants to know the "truth" concerning value, and is not merely interested in some expedient that will serve as a momentary stay against confusion, this is a point he must somehow keep before him. In one respect it is an extremely discouraging notion, for it means (unless his powers are totally adequate) that he will never be able to settle down comfortably with a set of values in an absolute disregard of their adequacy, come what may. And man seems to want desperately so to settle down. But at the same time, if he really wants to know the nature of value, it should be a source of some comfort to know that the inadequacies of errant or limited systems are likely to force themselves upon the attention of an honest mind. It is when the illusory comfort of the expedient is of more importance than the pursuit of some real or supposed ultimate that the suppression of the inadequacy becomes of utmost im-

portance. That illusion is, apparently, one of the choices open to man, though when the expedient is hardened and exalted into an ultimate it has a way of taking a deadly vengeance.

If there is any ulterior source of value, then--that is, if man does not himself out of nothing alone create value--it is inevitable that the disparity exists, unless man has some adequate means of total comprehension of the source and of orienting his values to the source. The adequacy of numerous means has been urged at one time or another--of reason, revealed authoritative doctrine, the inner light, empirical examination--but the trouble with them all has been that in some extremity or other they have seemed to prove unequal to their task--that something (call it the ulterior reality to beg a point for the moment) in the existence they claim to structure has apparently refused to conform to that structure. It is of course possible that this failure, in any of these cases, is not a necessary one--that a keener attention would have explained an apparent contradiction or failure and rendered existence even in such a case manageable by the power of the construct, that power lying latent in the construct all the while. But the effect, in any case, has been that some new or partially new construct has been substituted as more and more the inadequacy has grown formidable; and generally attempts to squelch apostasy--for example, in the inquisitions--have not only failed to halt the apostasy but also failed to vindicate the existing orientation.

But quite aside from the historical evidence--which must probably remain equivocal--it seems evident that in what we can witness

in the operation of intelligence itself we can see the certainty of this inadequacy. For from the act of perception to the act of synthesis, from the raw emotional effect to the complexity of intuitive insight, every human activity is a symbolizing or an abstractive activity--all done, as it were, in translation. The "pure" experience, if it is to remain pure, must remain ineffable and in a real sense unexperienced, never carried into act or thought. What is true of rational abstraction is true also of artistic symbol-making (in a different way and to a lesser degree, perhaps); the necessity of employing a medium, or a group of media, must qualify the adequacy of the representation. Even the symbol, freed supposedly from the distortions of allegorical correspondence or reductive rational analysis, in spite of all the arguments that it is inviolate, that it has a life of its own, etc., remains inextricably involved with the limitations of its medium, whether word or oils or tone or (finally) the whole recreative resources of its maker or its recipient. The limitations which we can see with ease in orientations less complex than our own should, in effect, instruct us that the same is going to be the case with those even more comprehensive; that reductive and delimiting orientations are in fact the way the human apprehensive powers grapple with the self and the world; that the escapes from these limitations which we sometimes experience are simply cases of our vision having broken through a limiting construct, not into ultimate reality but into a more comprehensive structuring of reality or a more intimately engaging symbol of the real.

The generalization does not, then, seem to be extreme if it

be concluded that man's powers are not adequate to the total capture of an ultimate value. Nor is this hard to understand, if we posit the existence of such value. Given a source, man's casuistry may be seen as valid insofar as it corresponds to the source; denied an ulterior genesis, it becomes hard to explain. William James supposed a world with only one reflecting being, and argued that his ethical values would then be absolute. But he encountered difficulty when he pictured that being in dialogue with himself, weighing two possible values.

> In such a universe as that it would of course be absurd to raise the question of whether the solitary thinker's judgments of good and ill are true or not. Truth supposes a standard outside of the thinker to which he must conform; but here the thinker is a sort of divinity, subject to no higher judge. Let us call the supposed universe which he inhabits a moral solitude. In such a moral solitude it is clear that there can be no outward obligation, and that the only trouble the god-like thinker is liable to have will be over the consistency of his own several ideals with one another. Some of these will no doubt be more pungent and appealing than the rest, their goodness will have a profounder, more penetrating taste; they will return to haunt him with more obstinate regrets if violated. So the thinker will have to order his life with them as its chief determinants, or else remain inwardly discordant and unhappy.[2]

Or if two intelligent beings inhabited a world, the more comprehensive ethic must command allegiance from the other--as God's ethic must dominate man's. But he really does not answer satisfactorily the question of how it is that one ethic could be more comprehensive or more gratifying or more anything than another ethic, if the two clash, since he abjures the "higher judge"; the best answer he can give is a quantitative one, and the basis of his casuistry becomes "simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can. . . .awakening the least sum

of dissatisfactions," and it is an arguable point, I think, whether he has not after all made mere Quantity and Pungency his higher judge, and perhaps tried to enthrone Consistency also. But the answer can only be, it seems to me, that if one ethic makes a more valid claim it is only because something in the existence it confronts vindicates one over the other. If the ethic were to exist in total isolation and never be pressed into confrontation it could never be determined with any assurance, of course, whether it were more comprehensive or gratifying than another; but if its divinity is to remain intact it must remain in absolute isolation. If the mind could indeed both create and proportion the ulterior reality, then the ethical construct (or the aesthetic construct) could be expected to correspond to that reality, and that which was defined as value would be Value indeed. Thus it could be logically argued that if there be a God who has structured existence His ethic must be absolute so long as He made the two coextensive. But man is not God, for his power to make reality correspond to a construct is even more limited than his power to make a construct correspond to reality; and it follows that his systems of value cannot be absolute.

Since then value comes to us through a perception and an understanding not, evidently, adequate in all respects, the value we define will be valid only to a limited degree. But this limitation must not be argued into something more sweeping than it really justifies. It does not justify the conclusion that there <u>is</u> no ulterior value (unless we beg the question by defining value as only within the human

construct, and then we are forced to give some other name to the ulterior). For if there is nothing to which a value construct must relate and against which it must validate itself, there is then no reason for any construct not to be both practical and verifiable in experience. Were this the case, no construct could ever collapse. It is no good to hedge by requiring the construct to be internally consistent, since if there is no ulterior against which to cast its consistency the construct itself could never be known to be consistent or inconsistent. Its own form, however amorphous by any other conception, would by definition be form. But though the mind might of itself make a heaven or a hell, it cannot of itself create the conditions of its own existence, as Satan finds to his chagrin.

Nor is it quite accurate to say that "though there may be an ulterior truth, man can not know of it"--unless, once again, one begs the question by defining "know" in a way so limited as to exclude all approximation. For if one could indeed know of no ulterior truth in any degree, once more the conditions of his existence would correspond perfectly to his construct, always and in all respects. He would go blissfully through existence forever unaware of any disparities between his own fantasies and the exigencies of experience. But barring perhaps the totally withdrawn schizophrenic, that is not the case, from the first moment a child reaches for a beautiful dancing flame to that in which a man would if he could negate the fact of his own death.

An awareness of degree of approximation, then, must be accepted as some evidence for the existence of an ultra-human truth. For re-

lative approximation argues at least a direction. This does not mean that man progresses gloriously from orientation to ever-more-Godlike orientation; he may progress or he may not; it merely means that in any given extremity if one value is "better" than another, i. e., answers more satisfactorily the exigencies it faces, then the relativity of value must itself answer to another controlling force.

Of course, this evidence is not "final"; to say so would be to forget again the limitations of human apprehension. For one thing, the foregoing argument assumes a relationship at work in existence which is usually referred to as causality. I have no objection to its being so referred to, as long as it is understood that by that title the argument need not be consigned to the defunct eighteenth-century rationalism or some other grounds conveniently undermined. It is a common argumentative technique, to restate an argument or hypothesis in so oversimplified or dogmatic manner that the limitations its enemies have so imposed may then be produced in evidence against it. So, for instance, one encounters discreditings of Genesis based on readings as literalistically restrictive as any ever assumed by the most hide-bound fundamentalist. In the present instance I abjure the facile causality that leaps easily and conclusively from the appearance of cause to a comfortable scheme of universal order. It does seem to me that causitive relationships do exist in reality and not merely in the human mode of perception, though certainly the human perception and analysis of them will of necessity misrepresent those relationships in some degree. If this seems, after the preceding speculations, still

arbitrary, one may counter with the observation that it is extremely difficult to rid reality of innate causal relationships. Those who think they do so generally resort to semantic substitutes for causation in order to mask the dependence on what is still causation. For with the concept of cause--i. e., of the operation of ulterior reality on the limits of truth which man can observe--must go also all concept of value, relationship, and even direction. It is not just the word "cause" that is taboo, but also "since," "therefore," "nevertheless," and even "better" or "more." Of course, it is perfectly arguable that elements of reality exist in disparate isolation from one another or in what is usually called "chaos"; but if the argument is made it must be pointed out that it has negated itself or at least relegated itself to solipsism, since all argumentation subsumes the validity of affective relationships.

The fact of disparity between construct and experience seems then to establish (1) the impact of some extra-human formulation of reality and (2) the partial--but only partial--inability of human powers to comprehend that ulterior reality. Seen so, every human construct must at some point collapse, though this fact does not necessarily mean that it has no relationship at all to reality.

Where, then, do ethical-religious value and artistic value relate? They relate, I believe, in that both religion and art are, when legitimate, efforts to give form to a perceived reality; and so the values which direct their formation and those by which they are most truly judged are, at their source, alike ontological. Both

religion and art may become mere mechanical activities when the visions of reality that are their bases are not operative. Both may turn inward upon themselves and enshrine as their ultimate values some mediate good approved for the convenience or security it offers (a degenerative practice in both). Both may be perverted to petty or illegitimate ends, with consequent violence to their values. Both may pause from time to time to take stock of their motives and techniques and to re-evaluate the adequacy of their basic visions--so that what aesthetics is to art theology is to religion--and both may err in varying degrees in that analysis, as they mistake their reasons for being and as they misjudge the efficacy of their instrumentation. But both, to succeed in expression, must derive from experiential encounter with the perceived reality. And each, when most legitimately employed, is about the business of recreating its vision, both out of the joy of that recreation and out of the joy of seeing its recreation in another. That recreation, that fidelity to the vision itself, is not only its reward but also the surest means to its successful expression; both religion and art suffer measurably--and in the same way--when (and to the degree that) mere explanation or mere stimulation supplants the total experience of the vision.

I am therefore in disagreement with Morse Peckham's hypothesis of a polarity between the bases of religion and art. He explains that the basis of religion is an urge for security within an orientation, whereas the basis of art is an urge for freedom from an orientation; so that while both art and religion are concerned with orientative

patterns, they are really contradictory in impulse and will continually strive to exploit each other.[3] Now that there are such opposing drives may be granted. But I would turn the scheme crossways, and see the polarity not between the aims of religion and art but between the aims of ossified, visionless, obscurant religion or art on the one hand, and that of religion or art legitimately engaged with its vision on the other. Art can settle as comfortably and torpidly into sterile satisfaction as religion can; for every true artist legitimately in pursuit of his vision there are dozens of mediocrities no more capable of breaking through their orientative patterns than the unco' guid. On the other hand, it is a little difficult to fit Jeremiah or Jesus into the pattern Mr. Peckham proposes; and I see no more reason for accepting popular piety as the religious norm than for accepting newspaper doggerel as the literary norm. If, statistically and historically considered, religion has provided more and blacker examples of the suppression of a living engagement with reality than has art, the reason is probably that religion has had the questionable blessing of being more often and more generously supplied with political or social power which it might exploit for its mistaken vested interest, in exchange for being so exploited in return--and perhaps in addition that religion has had, in the hierarchal priesthoods and the organized church, a powerful ready means, whereas art usually has not. As for their mutual exploitation, it seems to me more accurate to say that when religion or art has been subverted to a lesser good there has occurred a simultaneous exploitation of both in the name of one or

the other. But when either has turned itself faithfully to the recreation of its vision, I think it will be found that a simultaneous enhancement has occurred.

Art and religion have drawn values from one another, however, when rarely there occurs genius with a vision adequate to hold the religious and the aesthetic life in unity--in the cases of, say, David and Aeschylus and Dante. But the manner in which these values have been drawn in such cases is instructive. It would be hard to say which value has been "exploited" in these instances, for neither seems to have been harmed by the union. Nor (with perhaps the exception of Dante) is the union one of tension between the two values, but of harmony. And aside from such powerful seer-poets--admittedly they are extremely rare--others have temporarily and partially duplicated that fusion. If the scheme here offered is valid, the reason is that when <u>either</u> activity successfully engages its perceived reality in an experience that fuses the orientative power of thought, intuition, and emotion, <u>multiple</u> living implications burst into expression, comprehensible by quite disparate limited orientations in their own modes. Thus the poet himself may suddenly perceive dimensions to his work that were hidden to him until the experience crystallized in expression. Thus (if they truly pursue an envisioned end and do not condescend to subserve some mediate value) the poem or the symphony or the life of a godly man may become in the recreation by another either aesthetically gratifying or religiously compelling, depending upon what orientative resources he brings to the experience. Perhaps it is not too much to claim that

such all-engaging experience, enlarging and even bursting the previous orientation through which it is approached, may formulate for itself in the experience of the other new modes of perceiving. If so, then in a real sense, all legitimate art is religious and all valid religious experience is aesthetically enlarging.

Such success may of course be severely qualified by a number of handicaps. The limitations of the medium, for instance, may in the hands of the master be overcome, but the novice, who may have perceived deeply, may be frustrated by either those limitations, or his own inability to make the medium his servant rather than his master, or by the two in combination. The lack of native capacity or of the requisite discipline is probably more damaging than the limitations of the medium. When we recall what Donne and Milton did with the sonnet after it had been discarded as an exhausted medium, and what Wordsworth and again Hopkins did with it after it had been discarded once more, it seems possible that intensive technical mastery of the old patterns and practice, and an imaginative inquiry into their potential, might prove quite as profitable as the frenzied pursuit of new form in our century has proved. At any rate, if this aesthetic is valid, it is certain that the capacity of the artist to call forth from his medium its utmost resources is only slightly less important than the vision itself.

Another costly handicap is the visionary limitations of the audience. The orientative set of an age may be so rigid and so well insulated by vested interests (material and otherwise) that very few are able to break through it, even though the challenge of reality is

so violent as to require a blindness almost literal to ignore. In such an extremity the artist's choice is a hard one. He can serve the vested interests, and so further secure the orientation; he can try to work with the orientation in the hope that by nursing what life is there he can burst the hull from within--in which case he runs the continual risk, even likelihood, of seeing the germ of his work and even the life of his own orientative powers strangled; he can withdraw to the cloister or the left bank and shake the dust from his shoes--in which case he all but surrenders communication, waiting in hope that by faithfully pursuing his own vision he will create a living work that sometime somebody must learn to see--holding communion with himself alone or a few like him, while he runs the risk that from a lack of external confrontation his own orientations will become eccentric and sterile. And if he lives long enough and if he has been able to keep his vision (rather than his plight) before his eyes, he may indeed see his work justified; for every shock of reality the encased orientation must endure works to reopen communication and make his work available at last.

But go or stay, one responsibility he must keep before him is that his vision must be given the most adequate formulation he can give it. If possible it must, without disintegrating, compel all the orientative resources, and each in a way consistent with the others. In fact, it is only through giving the vision a unified experiential expression that he can insure against its fragmentation. Perhaps it is from the pressure of such need--and again perhaps it is only happy historical accident that fell in neatly with that need--that the symbol

emerged, the "image," which has become the central literary resource of modern times, and to which all considerations of technique are seen to be rightfully relative. For the symbol is an attempt to get the very character of experience itself, in all its organic life; a resource the challenge of which to all apprehending powers will demand their repeated and intensive engagement, and which must not therefore be fully explicable in terms of any of them, lest it be dragged back again into the anodyne orientation, its work still not done.

If values are defined through the confrontation of orientation with an ulterior reality, the medium should be a presentation not just of that ulterior object but also of the very nature of the confrontation with the ulterior; not just the object, but also the act, fused into one whole. Thus it would present in one complex both means and end. The richest symbol, then, is one that not only engages with the ulterior reality but embodies the mode of engagement as well. Among the richest symbols, then, must be the symbolic person.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper: A Study and a Confession (New York, 1929), pp. 142-143.

[2]William James. "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," International Journal of Ethics, I (1891), pp. 335-336, 346.

[3]Morse Peckham, Beyond the Tragic Vision: The Quest for Identity in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1962), p. 43.

[4]Ibid., p. 44.

CHAPTER II

A DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM: THE SOURCE OF THE CHRIST-IMAGE

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, and even more markedly in the twentieth, there frequently appeared a literary symbol offering rich possibilities for poetry, drama, and fiction--a symbol we have come to call the Christ-figure. The earliest experimenters did not call it that; apparently they had no name for it, and they seem only half-aware of what they were doing. Neither did they have a thorough understanding of its resources. Nevertheless, the practice developed steadily toward a conscious formulation--from merely metaphorical suggestions in Shelley, Coleridge, and Carlyle to a more definite realization in Tennyson and Browning in England, Melville in America. In the latter--in The Confidence Man, for example--the practice not only became fully conscious, but also acquired some stylized patterns of expression--as can also be observed in Hardy, Conrad, and D. H. Lawrence, among others.

The practice of taking the person of Christ as a spiritual norm, or even as mythic representation of the ultimate human calling, of "the Man," to use F. D. Maurice's phrase, is not, of course, altogether new. The practice is closely analogous to the myth-making of antiquity; the suggestion of it is latent in all incarnational theology, both

Christian and other; the Gospels themselves present Jesus in terms that invite such practice--as "Son of God," "Son of Man," "the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"; it is the metaphorical ground of St. Paul's epistles; it could easily be inferred from numerous clichés of Christianity and from many of its rituals and formularies, notably from the Eucharist. Moreover, theological basis for treating the Christ as the ground of all men's beings, and the symbol of every Christian's calling, is not lacking in the post-apostolic age--though the writers in whom these suggestions appear are often considered heterodox. The idea is presented propositionally in many later religious works--in Thomas a Kempis' Imitation of Christ, for example--that man should try to shape his life in Christ's image. Yet when we look for characters in literature who are deliberately modeled on Christ, either in their personal attributes or in some analogous redemptive role, there are very few before the middle of the nineteenth century who approach what a modern reader would term a Christ-symbol. Even in Dante, which is one of the most likely places to look, Beatrice appears rather as a representation of the theological abstraction of Divine Revelation, and her setting is the heavens rather than the earth where men work out their painful problems; and the symbol for the Christ Himself is the Griffin in Purgatorio, remarkably unhuman in nature, whose role in the story is restricted to a tableau. Suggestions appear in the Renaissance and seventeenth century, through few are consistently or elaborately developed. Milton's Christ is presented in his own person. Dryden's "Mac Flecknoe," perhaps developing suggestions from Hudibras and other

satires on the Puritans, is evidently presenting Flecknoe and Shadwell reductively as parodies of John the Baptist and Christ.[1] Swift may be doing something similar in his representation of the enthusiasts in The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit. But none of these works seems to have elicited imitation of the practice or given impetus to a tradition. Literature in the eighteenth century has little to say about the Christ at all, and what is said is generally conventional, without any metaphorical extensions.

Surely the near absence of such practice for so many centuries and its relatively sudden appearance in recent times is a remarkable phenomenon, the thorough examination of which would reveal some interesting patterns in literary creation, perhaps some fundamental insights into the sources of literature, certainly some helpful understanding of the elemental relationships between religion and art. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this treatise and utterly beyond the resources of the author. Even a thorough examination of the immediate conditions that favored the appearance of a Christ-symbol in the nineteenth century would be the labor of several years. Such an examination would probably have to consider, for instance, the effect of certain technical developments in literature in the preceding era--especially that of personification, which from a rather artificial convention in most eighteenth century poetry develops into a rich symbolic resource in Blake, Coleridge and Shelley. Or again it would have to consider how the deeply subjective nature of Romantic literature--sprung it seems from dual sources, from a return to sensuous experience as aesthetically more valid than rational thought and from philosophical and psychological conceptions of man

(rather than merely social or political or historical)--leads inevitably to the poet's conception of himself as an interpreter of the universe, as a central ordering intelligence, as a prophet, in fact. Again, it would need to consider how the sense of fragmentation of life, brought on and emphasized by social and political crises, exerted a subtle pressure for a reintegrated vision of man. Such an exhaustive study would perhaps not be worth the effort merely to trace the evolution of a device; but the study might reveal also that the device itself is one of the technical expressions of an extensive aesthetic reorientation.

It is the thesis of the present study that one source of the device, and of the reorientation which I think it signifies, is the liberal theology of Germany and England during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. More specifically, it is here argued that there is at least a remarkable analogy between certain conceptions of Christ that emerge in the religious writings by the end of that period and the characters in the contemporary and subsequent literature who notably resemble the Christ. It will become evident in the course of this examination that the author believes this source to be the primary one, and that he feels the theological origins exerted major influence on those other sources of the Christ-symbol. The study will not, however, pretend to be a thorough examination of religious thought in this period, but will limit its attention to those works which can be shown likely to have found their way, directly or indirectly, into the awareness of the literary men whose work shows evidence of the emerging symbol. And even among such religious writings, those works only will be

examined which seem to have the closest relevance to the problem, and to bear the closest resemblance to the literary product. Nor will any attempt be made to give any religious writer a thorough study, or to pass judgment on the adequacy or orthodoxy of his views. Tennyson's In Memoriam will be studied as an instance of the literary practice. Such an approach admittedly lays this work open to the charge of eclecticism. Its defense must be that what is here presented is a working hypothesis rather than a final conclusion. No sweeping assertions of an all-pervasive influence are attempted. Nor is the theological position herein described represented as the only one of the age, or even as the most common one; for indeed it is neither the position of such a religious giant as Newman, nor that of the broad churchmen generally, nor that of the sects. It is, however, the common vision of a group of respected and devout (if controversial) religious leaders--practically influential much beyond the limits of the group who share or even understand their position, and intimately acquainted with one another and with the literary figures whose work is most analogous to their religious discourses.

The author began this study under the impression that it would be a relatively simple task to isolate from contemporary theology those speculations which dealt directly with the Christ and compare these findings with the literary product. It very quickly became evident, however, that in order to show the significance of the christology it would be necessary to reach beyond those limits into a number of intricately related themes. Stated as simply as possible, the religious phenomenon described in the following pages is a rediscovery that the

person of Christ is the center of the meaning of Christianity. Stated that way, the proposition seems to be a truism. But an understanding of what it meant to Coleridge, Maurice, Hare, Sterling, Thirlwall, Erskine and others of the group in which the movement culminates, an understanding of how that easy truism could be the genesis of the complex literary symbol which the Christ-figure was to become, an understanding of why that symbol took on the qualities and the form it assumed, requires nothing less than an examination of representative treatments of a variety of religious questions, ranging through almost the entire spectrum of liberal theology from the time of Spinoza to that of Essays and Reviews. For as the various theological assumptions which have stood for generations began to collapse, the religious thinkers found that they must return in each instance to reëxamine the grounds of Christianity; and these reëxaminations inevitably required to be squared with the central issue of Christian theology, the enigma of the nature of Christ. The intense interest in the person of Christ--as evidenced, for example, by the dozens of "lives of Jesus" in the early decades of the nineteenth century--was no accident: it was the logical product of the theological speculations which preceded. It would appear that any radical reëxamination of Christianity, such as that of the time of the formation of the Athanasian Creed, or that of the time of Luther, or the one presently being considered (which is the transition to our own era), must return to this enigma, if it probes deeply enough.

The reasons are not difficult to discover. If New Testament

accounts are to be credited as even approximately correct, it is evident that at its origins Christianity was hardly a creedal or legal or ritualistic religion. It began with what might be considered a "hero-worship"--except that the Hero did not seek adherents merely to His party or His person (at least claimed not to) but referred all His work and all His teaching to an authority beyond the human identification His time made of Him. Thus those who followed Him did so because of what they conceived Him to be--a Rabbi, a healer, but moreover (and <u>therein</u>) the "Son of God," "Him of whom Moses and the prophets spake," "He who was to come into this world." That every teaching, exhortation, and religious practice, all casuistry and all theology, were referred to Him, both for their authority and for their exemplification, the entire New Testament eloquently illustrates; for the early Christian, His Being was the ground for all these. Of the nature of that Being, creeds and codes can give only abstractive information at best; they are all moreover fragmentary, and even their cumulative representation is inadequate. A true Christianity would require not only the right information, i.e., right doctrine, but right attitude and right response--a "living sacrifice" of "heart, soul, and mind"--and these must be not mere isolated elements, but elements fused in a living unity. In the immediate and continual reference to the divine image the "way" must be sought. This living organic order within the Christian must derive from an adequate ground--could derive only from a revelation which would call forth the total and integral response, from a form presenting not only the object worthy to be worshiped, but also the one who worships

worthily, and a living exemplification of the right relationship between the two. If this were done, the symbol would be to the believer both God and man, and the two in living communion. The first believers saw in Christ such a revelation though perhaps they did not at first make any such analysis of what they saw; their response was experiential, immediate, and their first attempts to communicate the revelation were made in terms of what they had seen and heard. The Gospel seems earliest to have formed itself as an account of the life of Christ.

But when the Gospel came to be propagated, the inherent difficulties of communicating this vision became evident. Some reduction into statement and code became necessary, not only to explicate its meaning but also to prevent misinterpretations in terms of existing religious orientations. Hence the rapid growth of creed in the early centuries of Christianity. The vision became a religion, competing with other religions. It had to go down into the street and marketplace, and it had to ascend to Mars Hill; it had to speak in the court of Agrippa, and it had to speak to the jailer and the slave. Throughout its history, it has been the doom of Christianity--and also its virility--that in order to give itself expression it must continually reformulate itself in patterns that are necessarily reductive, in varying degrees of inadequacy. Through these formulations some glimpse of the Christ, it is hoped, may come. But the very tension between the living symbol and its deficient explications and ritual is the source of most internal strife in the church, of most divisions and heresies. As soon as some formulation crystallizes, it begins at once to feel the stress thrown

upon it by the innumerable complexities of life to which it must minister and by the unfactorable vitality of the vision from which it has sprung, between which two it must somehow be the medium. And no sooner is it reasserted that Christ is the ground of Christianity--an assertion usually shrugged off as inane until the collapse of traditional formulation makes it pressing--than the next question becomes, what is Christ? and the answers come out in doctrinal statements about incarnation and atonement, or ritualistic patterns such as baptism or the Eucharist, or philosophic systems that dissect form from essence and reason from intuition and humanity from divinity, or practical moral codes, or mere fetish worship.

This perpetual enigma is capable, of course, of varying interpretations. An unfavorable judgment would point to the abiding discrepancy as evidence of the failure of Christianity, a tragic (or farcical) failure to deliver the goods promised, a fumbling ineptitude driven always to excuse itself by an obscurantist appeal to the inexpressible. The faithful would hail it as the irrefutable evidence of the condescending love of God, who is no respecter of sophistications; who overthrows even the idols given His name; but who comes to man in whatever banality, in the dung of the stable even, and in not the likelihood but the certainty of being nailed up at last on some wooden ritual or creed, because of His faith that men will see through the form into its shaping motive and meaning. The two judgments are perhaps not mutually exclusive. But the phenomenon seems inevitable, whatever construction is put upon it.

The church has tried, of course, throughout its history, to arrest this frightening process of cyclical resolution and dissolution. Whenever, and to the extent that, it has been able to work in a stable environment, where the fluidity of life has for a time been contained, the patterns it has created have proved more or less adequate, within the limits of the needs they were originally formed to answer. To a great extent, especially in the Middle Ages, it was instrumental in securing the stability, and thereby simplifying its task. Whether this was good or bad is hopelessly moot; but one effect, which could hardly be called fortunate, was that when the environment changed, and the entrenched expression of Christianity stubbornly refused to return to the sources and be reborn into a new age, the faith found itself possessed of a dead and dying Host. No amount of embalming could smother its stench; like yesterday's manna, it gave its own insistent testimony that faith consisteth not in the abundance of forms that can be secured and preserved.

Beginnings and endings are impossible to fix in such matters; but it might be said that the stubborn and extensive heresies of the late Middle Ages, which evoked the Inquisitions of the twelfth century, were the first manifestations of that great struggle in which the phenomenon we shall study is a late phase. Let it be understood that the struggle did not, especially in its early stages, call forth universal or even general participation; that many remained blissfully unaware of the implications of what was going on; that there was no uninterrupted progress in it; that the advantage and significance of particular

campaigns remained doubtful long after they were concluded; that certain groups and individuals were able to carry on a vigorous campaign of their own and won for themselves and those who could align with them a shelter against the siege; that some of these, at all stages, even carried the fight into the enemy's camp and reclaimed at least temporarily the grounds that religious authority had lost. But if attention is limited to those who tried not merely to reassert the traditional patterns but rather to discover how they might be legitimately reasserted, how they might be made workable in a changing environment, or what new ones might better express the truth of which these were an imperfect reflection, it can be safely asserted that the main feature of the struggle was the gradual dissolution of faith in the validity of authority, under the repeated empirical assaults to which that validity was subjected. It is a process that has to run its course to an inevitable conclusion before any substantial recapitulations are possible. For such a scheme of authority as the church had erected is by premise monolithic, and once the issue had been defined as the validity of authority, there is no logical stopping-place short of the total empirical reëxamination of all authority. The campaign moved steadily from lesser points of doctrine to the entire validity of Roman ecclesiastical authority, to the validity of any ecclesiastical authority; in this is entailed a shifting of grounds to the Scriptures as sole and literal authority, a stronghold doomed almost from the outset (the terms of the defense being what they were), but surrendered slowly and defended obstinately, both by direct sally and by dogged entrenchment; a tentative encampment in "natural religion";

and in the nineteenth century a virtual surrender of both Scriptural and natural authority, in spite of the dogged defense by those who were not yet aware that they fought a losing battle, to the combined forces of scientific advancement and biblical criticism. By the late eighteenth century, the merciless empirical spirit had assaulted even the ultimate citadel of the very Christ.

Since the person of Christ--whatever that meant--had been the historical origin of Christianity, it was inevitable that researches into the early doctrines of the church should eventually find their way back to that ultimate paradoxical source. But even more important, since the very doctrines which the church had so diligently labored to formulate and secure were based upon His person, all theoretical demolition would eventually work its way down until it rediscovered what kind of foundation it was that had been laid. And what the critic and theologian thus discovered by the painstaking removal of stone after stone, the mystic and the devout practicing Christian and the sectarian sometimes perceived by simply ignoring the logical and theological and historical superstructure altogether.

But though all Christian theology and ritual and code must eventually ground itself on the Christ, and though any profound theological search carried out in Christian contexts must eventually confront the enigma of what He is, yet every attempt to answer that question will and must be an individual creation, varying according to the preoccupations one brings to the task and the capacities and instruments he employs. The form and proportion of the creation, then, are as much a part of its meaning as the propositions in which it tries to communicate explicitly;

and the form and proportion can only be understood as those preoccupations and instruments are understood. For this reason, so many religious issues debated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bear on that vision of the Christ held by those we shall study. Let us look then at some of these issues.

NOTE FOR CHAPTER II

[1]J. E. Tanner, "The Messianic Image in Mac Flecknoe," Modern Language Notes, LXXVII (1961), pp. 220-223.

CHAPTER III

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY RATIONALISTIC RELIGION

The Negative Contribution of Rationalistic Religion

From the viewpoint of the liberal religious thinker of the mid-nineteenth century, the contributions of rationalistic[1] religious speculation in the previous century were mainly negative.[2] Blunderingly, piecemeal, a bit too cavalierly, it had managed at last to undermine rather effectively the traditional mechanical supernaturalism; the old authoritarian conceptions of prophecy, miracle, and inspiration could no longer be maintained on the same grounds or in the same form by an honest mind aware of rationalistic endeavor. That rationalism had, inconsistently, traded on these conceptions in various ways, at various stages in its development, and in varying degrees did not, in the final effect, compromise this negative achievement;[3] rather the insecurity of the authoritarian orientation was the more revealed as it was brought again and again into an unstable alliance with rationalistic assumptions.[4] The fideistic argument that since rationalistic religion itself was a failure one had better (at least just as well) return to the old assumptions that had at least the authority of centuries of acceptance was, at its base, only a more telling admission of the

crippling blow rationalism had dealt to the old orientation.[5] The point that man should and must return unto the Lord (in the form of the Thirty-Nine Articles or the Athanasian Creed or the doctrine of Justification by Faith) might be admitted; but there remained the question of how one might legitimately do so.

The significance of this negative contribution can hardly be over-emphasized. The fixed and monolithic religious orientation against which rationalism was working had a number of built-in devices to insure its perpetuation. It is too pat to say that rationalism accomplished, is still in the process of accomplishing, what the Waldensians failed to accomplish by their highly personal reassertion of existential piety, and what Abelard failed to accomplish by pushing the inherent contradictions of Neo-Platonism to their logical conclusion, and what various other recalcitrants failed to accomplish in their ways. Whatever was accomplished was a cumulative achievement, and every chink in the protective hull of the system had a part in the weakening of it. But the system had numerous philosophical, doctrinal and political resources which for the time prevented these more circumscribed efforts from being fatal. Rationalism, besides the important advantage it gained from having the staggering force of the Reformation and the new science in immediate precedence, struck from within and struck at the vital parts; it began with assuming most of the notions about the nature and motives of God that were the stock-in-trade of scholasticism, the givens of orthodox theology. The eventual effect was therefore more iconoclastic, though (as we shall see) when the old notions were drawn under careful

scrutiny certain latent possibilities as well as certain evident inconsistencies were made manifest to any who would try to reshape them in a new pattern.

That rationalism was so implicated in these assumptions was simultaneously the source of another important negative contribution. In its failure to produce a satisfactory rational religion--a failure manifest not only in the inconsistencies and self-contradictions of rational system but also in the empirical evidential technique brought in for support--the need for some more satisfactory solution became known. In the words of one of the contributors to Essays and Reviews, "The career of the evidential school, its success and failure . . . have enriched the history of doctrine with a complete refutation of that method as an instrument of theological investigation."[6] Carlyle in many passages expresses a similar judgment more generally applied. "Pantheism, Pottheism, Mydoxy, Thydoxy, are nothing at all to me; a weariness the whole jargon, which I avoid speaking of, decline listening to: Live, for God's sake, with what Faith thou couldst get; leave off speaking about Faith!"[7] " . . . All theory becomes more and more confessedly inadequate, untrue, unsatisfactory, almost a kind of mockery to me!"[8] [to John Sterling] "One of the announcements you made me was as welcome as any other: that you were rather quitting Philosophy and Theology. I predict that you will quit them more and more. Not surely till the time; not till they have done for you what they needed to do. A man can do nothing but prosecute faithfully the thing that his soul points to: let no counsel or cacklement of friends

and Country Newspapers slacken him in that: these mean well, but they know not what they say! Nevertheless I will give it you as my decided prognosis (grounded on good medical pathology and auto-pathology) that the two Provinces in question are become Theorem, Brain-web and Shadow; wherein no earnest soul can find solidity for itself."[9] The rationalistic statement of religion, in other words, also displayed the limitations of rational system, as well as theological system, as an adequate ground for religious faith.[10] True, some religious thinkers of the nineteenth century persisted in the attempt to create a rational Christianity, i. e., a religion with a natural supernaturalism. Assuming (consciously or unconsciously) that reason is the only source of reliable knowledge--"reliable" and "knowledge" being themselves rationally defined--they tried to deduce from material subjected to that premise a conclusion that would transcend it.[11] Some, seeing that a supra-rational proposition deduced rationally from rational grounds is a logical impossibility,[12] simply gave up religion entirely except as an expedient for the masses, as forerunner to an avowed agnostic or atheistic humanism; they saw no third alternative to reason and superstition, with the latter of which religion had for them become identified. Others, however, aided of course by other considerations to be noted below, took the failure of rationalistic religion as evidence for a different conclusion, namely that the reasonable was only one way man "knew."

It would appear, then, that the inherent contradictions in rationalistic thought, and some of the unwelcome exclusionary resolutions of them, provided a subtle pressure for some larger synthesis that would

allow some consistent ontology without the sacrifice of some needful factor. To be sure, aside from mere dogmatic reassertion, the usual solution was merely to reduce and specialize until the strain of reconciliation was once again tolerable--to lop off the supernatural, or the objective, or the empirical, or the idealistic, or the primitive. But it is hard to nurse no extravagant hope when the extravagant is repeatedly redefined in more and more restricting terms. Consequently there were, among these solutions by delimitation, some increasingly sophisticated attempts to find new syntheses as the old ones were found wanting. This syncretic tendency must be examined more closely hereafter; here it is expedient to note the truism that a synthesis posits or effects some commonality in the two elements to be reconciled and that with the first hint of personification the synthesis becomes mediatorial. Given other necessary conditions, then, this sense of disintegration was to drive one group of religious thinkers to the mediator Christ.

As has been said, these contributions are mainly negative or at most prerequisite to religious faith. More or less confident assertions of positive contributions are of course not at all lacking in religious works of a rationalistic bent.[13] The rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, is in fact shot through with self-contradictions of various kinds--especially English rationalism. Many of these gradually manifest themselves as the era progresses, even before the advent of such catalysts as Hume and Biblical research and geological discovery--forces themselves largely the products of

rationalism and of the empirical spirit which it fostered. Positive contributions are therefore rare and short-lived; rationalistic religion is mostly an unhurried retreat.

Bases of the Inherent Contradictions of Rationalistic Ontology

That the contradictions did not appear earlier may be credited largely to the simple fact that it takes time for a new orientation to work out all its implications. Allowance must also be made for various cautionary considerations, both conscious and unconscious, both external (e.g., political or ecclesiastical or humane[14]) and internal (i.e., compromising to the argument at hand[15]). But more important--and this goes far to explain both the caution and the delay--rationalism is in fact still encumbered by, is in fact grounded in, not only the old authoritatian assumptions but also their tyrannical derivative method.

Leslie Stephen makes this point in reference to Descartes:

> Every traditional faith was to have its credentials strictly scrutinized. . . . . .
> . . . . . .
> [But] When resolving to test by his new method all existing beliefs, he did not in fact doubt that some such residuum as he sought would be discovered. He did not really expect that the provisional would have to be converted into an absolute scepticism. The method, indeed, already indicates the character of the truths which will be discovered. It is likely to disperse any doctrines articulately stated in the dogmatic form, and of which it is evident, upon inspection, that they rest upon prescription rather than reason. But it is less likely to be efficacious as against doctrines which have insinuated themselves more thoroughly, because by subtler methods.[16]

And A. W. Benn scolds him for the same failing: "But in fact you are making stray reminiscences of the catechism do duty for metaphysical arguments. You are a much more interesting writer than Aquinas, but

your logic is childish compared with his; and your neglect of Aristotle fatally revenges itself in a slovenliness of thought for which even Aristotle's predecessors would not lightly have made themselves responsible."[17]

The source of the contradictions lies deep in the origins of rationalism, and is inherent in its ontology. In essence, rationalism is supposed to be hostile to the traditional conception of an order imposed by God from outside the universe, prior to and transcending the order of reason.[18] It would therefore derive strength from the collapse of the old cosmology. In the opinion of A. W. Benn and A. O. Lovejoy, the effect of the Copernican revolution was not so much to deprive man suddenly of the flattering conception of himself as the center of the universe--since the center was exactly that pit farthest removed from God's presence[19]--as "to abolish this radical distinction between heaven and earth as applied to the visible world, and to suggest the idea of a thorough-going unity of composition in the material universe."[20] Moreover, the new conception of motion, necessitated by the new system and successfully elaborated by Galileo and Newton, struck down the assumption of spiritual power which by the attraction of love moved "the sun and all the other stars." The Ptolemaic cosmology had allowed man to picture a relationship between himself and God whereby man in the world, though "apart" from God, is being "watched over" by Him from the unmoving Empyrean. With collapse of that cosmology, man no longer knew "where" God was. These considerations clearly press for some "relocation" of God, however inimical a new conception must be to the literal under-

standing of such biblical accounts as that of the ascension. Of course, in practice men could know, intellectually, the implications of the new cosmology and yet continue to function with the same unconscious acceptance of the Ptolemaic order; even in the twentieth century most people probably still believe that the sun comes up in the morning. But as far as rational speculation went, with the coming of a conception of an open universe, of limitless space and countless worlds,[21] God could hardly any more be "seen" as ulterior to the creation; there was no ulterior; He could only be, somehow, a God within.

But the idea of an immanent God, aside from what it costs in the literal acceptance of details of Christian mythology, carries with it some implications very hard for traditional Christianity to grant. In the first place, rational systems of immanence run ever to pantheism or some variation thereon; and the cosmology of infinite space made the conclusion almost a necessity. Benn's analysis of Giordano Bruno is demonstrative of the tendency:

> Infinite space had been a postulate of early Greek thought, and had even lingered on among an isolated group in the cosmogony of Epicurus, but had been rejected by Aristotle, with whose idea of a finite spherical universe it seemed incompatible, and after the triumph of scholastic Catholicism had come to be looked on as savouring of heresy. But the whole situation was revolutionised by Copernicus. The celestial luminaries were no longer conceived as carried on a series of concentric shells, but as moving freely through space; and with the shattering of those crystalline spheres an outlook opened into the vast solitudes which lay beyond; while the forces imprisoned within their impassable walls as it were exploded, and rushed out to occupy the illimitable void. Under Aristotle's system the position assigned to matter had been something like that of the populace in an aristocratically governed Greek city-state, fit only to receive the orders and to carry out the designs

> of an enlightened ruling caste, or of the structureless mass on which the thoughts of plastic art are impressed. To Bruno, on the contrary, matter seemed more a power than a potentiality; an infinite and eternal energy, whence the living forms of visible nature were thrown up in inexhaustible profusion, and into whose bosom they were absorbed again. In his philosophy the subterranean current of mediaeval pantheism gushed up once more into the light of day, mingling its waters with the reopened springs of Platonism and with the passionate outpourings of Lucretius, which seemed less justified by the memory of what evils sacerdotal superstition had already wrought than by a prophetic vision of the woes it was yet to work. Not that Bruno was, what Lucretius had been, an uncompromising materialist of the Epicurean school. Twelve centuries of spiritualist teaching were not lightly to be forgotten, least of all when the new Greek scholarship was giving men access to the classic arguments of spiritualism in their first dramatic presentation by Plato, and in their triumphant completion by Plotinus. But the foundation of Epicurean materialism, that marvelous atomic theory which explained so much already and was to explain so much more when reorganized and reapplied by modern science, could neither be discarded nor suffered to coexist in unreconciled opposition with the idea of inextended souls as the eternal centres of life and consciousness. In this dilemma the mysterious significance assigned by Plato himself to arithmetical units suggested a link between the two; and Bruno rose to the higher synthesis of a theory in which animated monads, emanating in some undefined way from a supreme monad, were conceived with equal indefiniteness as the absolute reality of things.[22]

Spinoza's system, reconciling the Cartesian division of thought and extension in the self-evident certainty of a common cause, draws all existence within the definition of God.

> God, let us say, is the sole substance of the universe; he has infinite attributes; the soul is God, known under the attribute of thought; and matter is God, as known under the attribute of extension.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> God is the first great cause, and the knowledge of God's existence the primary axiom; all events follow from the nature of the self-existent Being. . . . Thus the universe is the incarnation of logic.[23]

Now in the words of Stephen,

> The God of the churches is separate from the universe; he must punish and reward, create and destroy, and interpose at intervals to alter the working of the established order.[24] The conception disappears equally whether the existence of God or not-God be denied. The divine power seems to become a factor which enters on both sides of every equation, and may therefore be omitted. We may place at the head of any system of reasoning the proposition A=A; but to most people it seems to be rather superfluous; and so Spinoza's universal theism seems to th' ordinary theist to be no theism at all. The God of Spinoza is pure Being; and though Spinoza retains for this abstraction the reverence due to the concrete Person of popular theology, and exhibits his doctrine as a system of ethics, the ordinary mind fails to regard his deity as an object capable of exciting emotion or guiding conduct. The doctrine is, meanwhile, the more dangerous because it points to the natural euthanasia of theology. Every theological system tends to glide into pantheism, and by exalting and widening the conception of deity to render it nugatory.[25]

And as a matter of historical fact, religious writers of the eighteenth century are generally in flight from this difficulty. "The danger in one direction of sliding into pantheism, and in another of making an historical revelation superfluous, cramps the intellects of these reasoners. The orthodox divine fears to become a mere deist, and the deist fears lest his theology should fade into pantheism."[26] To this evasion, indeed, the shallowness of their religious vision is largely owing.

Secondly, and even more inimical, rationalistic systems are hard pressed to avoid two equally unwelcome solutions to the question of freedom of will--(1) that God is arbitrary and capricious in his management of the universe or (2) that all things are determined, that neither man nor nature has freedom. The first of these alternatives is highly incompatible with the underlying rationalistic assumption of a basic orderliness in existence corresponding to the order of human

reason, as well as to the orthodox belief in the justice and goodness of God. Yet in some form it is often resorted to in order that the second alternative may be avoided, and the inherent inconsistency either ignored or obscured or boldly overridden by dogmatic assertion.[27] But the second is equally offensive; for if none can be other than they are, none can be reasonably approved or condemned in any moral act; thus in any compatible scheme of salvation God becomes once more inscrutably capricious, sending "ane to Heaven and ten to Hell,/ A' for Thy glory." But--more consistently--God is usually translated into immutable necessity; heaven and hell vanish; good and evil become human fictions.

Such is the inevitable direction of rationalism. One begins with the assumption that the universe is rational. Accompanying this belief may be explicit statements to the effect that man's reason is not adequate to comprehend this order[28]; but the admission is forthwith forgotten, for the rationalist cannot work without subsuming a correspondence between reason (even <u>logic</u>) and reality.[29] Implicitly or explicitly, it is simultaneously asserted that God <u>must</u> be rational or not God, and in spite of bows in the direction of humility, the reasoner returns to the assumption that God must therefore conform to <u>human</u> reason.[30] Once God is snared in this assumption, his traditionally ascribed attributes become the means of binding Him more helplessly. His omnipotence must not appear to man to be inconsistent[31]; His omniscience requires Him to know (and hence to realize, if He is all-powerful and not "envious"[32]) all the mathematically factorable

divisibility of any potentiality man can imagine, but not to know ways to reconcile what is irreconcilable within human conceptions[33]; His generosity and fecundity require Him to create and sustain all existence even the faulty and finally the evil, but do not allow Him to unmake or remake.[34] Indeed if one begins with the rationalistic conceptions of order and adds to them the traditionally posited attributes of God, one can consistently do nothing but play theme and variations on the atheistic dilemma, and eventually end in annihilating God.

For many generations the transcendence of God had held these conclusions at a safe distance. But as A. O. Lovejoy has shown, for example, the very genesis of the idea of plenitude gives evidence of pantheistic and deterministic tendency.[35] Plotinus, following Plato in the idea that even imperfect creations derive from the idea of the Good,[36] sees in all creation the necessary product of the will of the Absolute.[37] And in Christian speculation generally it is openly or tacitly assumed that all exists for a cause.[38] In Abelard notably the arguments are pushed forward to their necessary conclusion.[39] Bruno likewise concludes that God can leave nothing contingent.[40] Spinoza demurs in the early "Thoughts on Metaphysics" appended to his Principles of the Philosophy of Rene Descartes. Though he maintains that possibility and contingency are mere illusions of human understanding[41] and that the reconciliation of free will and God's predestination is beyond human powers,[42] he leaves the paradox unresolved. Man sees clearly that he does exercise choice, but simultaneously knows, from his concept of the nature of God, that all must depend on His decree; how these are to

be reconciled, how God could have made human will free, man cannot know.[43] Later, however, in the Ethics, he denies free will.[44] By the time of Bayle's dictionary, the internal inconsistencies in rationalism had become visible, and a skepticism had emerged[45]; the empirical process had begun to dethrone the authoritarian assumptions which fathered it. In practice, of course, almost every rationalist stops somewhere short of the final conclusions; but the pressure which these latently exert puts a greater and greater strain on traditional theology--and simultaneously on rationalism itself.

This internal stress--this simultaneous assumption and denial of pantheism and determinism--realizes itself in a number of ways, all leading to the disintegration of the world view. In effect the rationalists come up with two Gods--one still conceived as outside the universe, the creator, the mechanic, who by fiat, by the simple willing, gives all things their nature and place; the other immanent in the creation, working out His will through the realization of finite and natural forms. Lovejoy points out that this division appeared in the mediaeval conceptions of the good in direct consequence of inconsistency in conceptions of God--that the doctrine of God's attributes was at one and the same time both a concept of ultimate value and a concept of man's human objectives--and that there was a consequent inconsistency in conceptions of the way man should strive to emulate God.[46] The objective-subjective split that occurs in the philosophy of Descartes and his followers is closely analagous, and probably likewise derived from the contradictory conception of God. Where the good is considered to be

other-worldly, man's attempt to realize it will be some form and some degree of renunciation of this world as an object of value. Conversely, in the more rare instances where the good is identified with becoming, with the active force rather than the static serenity of God, the immediate impulse at least is to see the world as reflective of the good.[47] Thus throughout the history of Christian thought there were two conflicting theses--that the world was evil and should be renounced, and that the world was good, being a manifestation of the most divine attribute of God, His overflowing benevolence.[48]

When the ulterior God "disappeared" with the passing of the old cosmology, the pressure toward the identification of God with an immanent spirit of course increased; and with Descartes the tradition-honored conception of God as rational and as the ground of rationality not only was employed to verify the reality of our experience[49] but also becomes (inconsistently) the genesis of the identification of thought with reality, and body with "dead" matter. In Stephen's words, our self "is the single, indivisible, and therefore indestructible unit, which we call the soul, and from the very mode of proof it is evident that the essence of the soul is thought. Knowing the nature of the soul by direct intuition, we also know the nature of its necessary opposite--matter. For matter must be that which does not think, and, further, must be that abstraction which exists under all the varying forms of the visible world. Matter, that is, becomes almost identical with space."[50] But the equation can not be completed. Worked out to its last reduction, it should eventuate in absolute subjectivism, in a

solution where matter becomes the "not-God," evil or illusion. The logical dualism which the scheme requires is not workable: "All our reasoning is to be guaranteed by the absolute clearness of our ideas; and yet, here at the very root of the system is a fatal contradiction. The action of any being upon another must follow from their definitions; yet the definitions show that matter cannot be brought into relation to spirit, whilst all scientific knowledge rests on the mutual connection."[51]

The solutions to this difficulty take one consistent form: only as God by His Being simultaneously supports the two can they be seen as related.[52] In nothing are the rationalists more diligent than in the attempt to rid the conception of God of the anthropomorphic; yet as Stephen points out, human thought both requires the relationship between essence and matter, and is the only force by which we can really supply such a relationship: ". . . As experience presents all things as related, we must restore the broken link. The confusion between subject and object again introduces itself. The separate fragments are connected by an anthropomorphic bond. A being, like ourselves, is supposed to be working behind the facts and keeping the separate objects in relation."[53] Small wonder then that attempts to solve the Cartesian dichotomy should resort to the old anthropomorphic conception of God.

Care must be taken in this line of thought not to limit anthropomorphism to the naive supposition that God has a physical body. That notion, of course, comes in for rationalistic criticism, both serious and sarcastic. But it is far more than this that the rationalists

are trying to exorcise by their rejection of the traditional anthropomorphism. It is the conception of God in terms of any human attribute or action--God acting, inhabiting, moving, commanding, willing.[54] By Descartes' definition, strictly applied, nothing can be known except that which is not compromised by sensory formulation--which, after the successive investigations of Locke, Berkley, and Hume, comes out to be nothing at all. Therefore every attempt to know a "something not ourselves" is compromised by our reshaping it in our own image. As this fact is gradually realized, anthropomorphism moves necessarily to more and more abstract conceptions with man's attempt to rid his God of unreality, of the curse of flux and the error of human senses.[55] At the end of such a process no conception of God is possible; for ideas, reason, logic must be seen at last to be as hopelessly anthropomorphic as the bodily form whose back parts Moses saw on Sinai. All human conceptions of God must be anthropomorphic, till man can manage to be something other than man.

The conception of a deity working in total disjunction from the empirical world is impractical for many reasons. Besides the theoretical embarrassments it puts on the deity, it makes for an intolerable unreality in any theological discussion; and as for religious suasion, such an approach is uniquely ineffecacious. If God is really not to be found through any of man's compromised empirical knowledge, and can only be known in the frozen reaches of abstract thought, how can any be saved? and what appeal may be made to the masses for a moral and religious life? For many of the religious writers of the time never ceased making

the assertion that God must reveal himself in the simplest way, so that the unlearned and the inept in logic may know him. So says Locke, for instance:

> Had God intended that none but the learned scribe, the disputor, or wise of this world, should be Christians or be saved, thus religion should have been prepared for them, filled with speculations and niceties, obscure terms and abstract notions. . . . . .
> [But] . . . if the poor had the gospel preached to them, it was, without doubt, such a gospel as the poor could understand--plain and intelligible--and so it was, as we have seen, in the preachings of Christ and his apostles.[56]

It is clear from this, as from many such, how essential to the scheme of rational religion is the aid of unquestionable revelation, simple doctrine, and clear precept--articles that become the more scarce the more the rationalists keep explaining and defending them. Yet it is beyond the subtleties of logical system either to supplant them or to give them effective popular exposition. From the beginning therefore empirical method insinuates itself as an aid to system. Spinoza in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus undertakes a completely inductive and analytical examination of scripture (more out of defiance of "ridiculous mysteries" than of theological system, however[57]); Locke declares the rationale for an inductive method in The Reasonableness of Christianity: "The little satisfaction and consistency that is to be found in most of the systems of divinity I have met with, made me betake myself to the sole reading of the Scripture (to which they all appeal) for the understanding the Christian religion."[58] And Butler in the opening pages of the Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature clearly demonstrates the failure of the Cartesian method as he explains

the empirical method of his famous appeal to analogy:

> Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Descartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathematics, without sufficient data) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures, which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them, which is beyond it; and, from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.[59]

For all the pretensions of Cartesian rationalism, then, it cannot work without positing a consistent inherent relationship between thought and matter, the subjective and the objective--though embarrassed by inability to say how they can be related. That is to say, there is a veiled assumption of monism, whatever the disclaimer. That is to say (so long as teleology is operative), a God is posited whose being comprehends and unites these disparate modes. That is to say, there is posited a God whose address to the world is like man's, a center of consciousness who relates and orders and by his Will brings into conjunction what logic has severed. That is to say, an anthropomorphic God, however obscured by semantics. And while the philosophers are trying to reconcile theory and practice, empiricism (validated, despite theory, by human experience) appears as the methodological expedient, bypassing theory to put immediately into practice the underlying assumption of consistency and pattern. Every success of the method lends strength

to it, and makes more insistent the pressure of explicating its rationale.

In summary, then, the general fabric of religious thought through the rationalistic period consisted of several patterns. The self-contradictory involvement of rationalism in the very authoritarian presuppositions and derivative method which it was in the process of rejecting worked gradually to the mutual dissolution of both traditional religion and rationalism itself. The dissolution was slowed and obscured by the temporizing and shallowness and polemicism of many of the religious works, as well as by a natural lag in assumptions and methods of religious thought; and at no time, not even at the present, could the dissolution be said to be complete. The empirical method gradually gained acceptance; it fostered scientific, psychological, historical and biblical researches, at the same time drawing strength from their success. In the process the mythical structure of traditional theology became harder and harder to employ in the framing of a view of man's place in existence; in order to survive at all, the myth was required to remove itself from empirical considerations. The most marked effects were the gradual abstraction and attenuation of the anthropomorphic conception of God, and an accompanying dissociation of doctrine and ritual from reality. The failure of the myth and of the philosophic rationale of the unity and coherence of the universe caused a fragmentation--mind from sensation, thought from matter, revelation from empirical examination, the traditional ulterior God from the immanent spirit--which made itself fully manifest only over a long period extending down to the present century. In this extremity there developed a number of expedients that surrendered

the effort to integrate existence and, accepting a sort of atomism as the unexpressed rationale, settled for a partial vision--the utilitarian, the aesthetic, the political, the sacerdotal, etc.--or perhaps effected some unstable union of these, unstable because based in no comprehensive rationale that would allow the parts to retain their mutual integrity. But among these appeared a syncretic tendency which, in its specifically religious expression, is central to this study.

Implications and Effects of the Character of Rationalism

This general development was reflected in the specific religious questions of the era.[60] Not that there was an even and straightforward progression in these details any more than in the general evolution. Spinoza, for instance, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was far ahead of his age, anticipating in 1670 the biblical scholarship of more than a century later[61] as well as the consequent naturalistic interpretation of prophecy and revelation. On the other hand Davison in Discourses on Prophecy, 1825, though more advanced than his contemporaries in some ways, insisted on the literally predictive nature of prophecy and vigorously opposed the attempts to soften or naturalize embarrassing questions of biblical accuracy by the argument of accommodation.[62] Nevertheless the gradual development is clear: treatments of prophecy, miracle and inspiration tend increasingly to abandon claims of speciality, direct providential origin, and historical accuracy, and to define their validity as essential rather than literal, atemporal and qualitative rather than historical.

The early expressions of this change did not, however, realize

this essential rationale but tended rather merely to abandon some claims and some instances in order that others might be more easily retained. In other words, although very early there appeared suggestions of a metaphorical or symbolic method, the usual approach was a quantitative reduction rather than a qualitative reconstruction.

Miracles

In no instance is this more evident than in the understanding of the nature, validity, and function of miracles. The preoccupation of the rationalists with miracles was of course no accident; in the attempt to make religion conformable to reason and nature, no issue demanded more immediate attention than phenomena reputed to be outside the order of nature and beyond the grasp of reason.[63] On the face of the matter, it seems as if it should have appeared at once that given such a distinction and the rationalistic premise of an orderly universe only two possibilities exist; either miracles did not happen, or their occurrence was explicable in terms of the laws of nature. So the case was reasoned by Baden Powell from the distance of a century and a half:

> In nature and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can possibly have, any evidence of a Deity working miracles: for that, we must go out of nature and beyond reason. If we could have any such evidence from nature, it could only prove extraordinary natural effects, which would not be miracles in the old theological sense, as isolated, unrelated, and uncaused; whereas no physical fact can be conceived as unique, or without analogy and relation to others and to the whole system of natural causes.
>
> To conclude: an alleged miracle can only be regarded in one of two ways,--either (1) abstractedly as a physical event,

> and therefore to be investigated by reason and physical evidence, and referred to physical causes, possibly to known causes; but, at all events, to some higher cause or law, if at present unknown; it then ceases to be supernatural, yet still might be appealed to in support of religious truth, especially as referring to the state of knowledge and apprehensions of the parties addressed in past ages. Or (2) as connected with religious doctrine, regarded in a sacred light, asserted on the authority of inspiration. In this case, it ceases to be capable of investigation by reason, or to own its dominion.[64]
>
> . . . The Theistic argument requires to be applied with much caution; since most of those, who have adopted such theories of the divine perfections on abstract grounds, have made them the basis of a precisely opposite belief; rejecting miracles altogether . . . .[65]

To reject miracles outright, however, would have required the denial of a literal validity of scripture, and that not only by the metaphorical recasting of passages amenable to such treatment but also by the blunt rejection of passages that evidently could not be fitted to a metaphorical reading. And though that solution was to become explicit in time, the early rationalists made every effort to avoid it. Powell's second alternative besides implying something of the same rejection required extending the limits of natural law beyond the capacity of rational analysis and even the acceptance as natural what was, rationally considered, self-contradictory; and though there are frequent assertions (usually under the pressure of such an extremity) that man's reason cannot plumb the depths of nature, a real acceptance of the miraculous as recorded in scripture would have burst the rationalistic premises at the seams. The effect was that treatments of miracle ranged from the dogmatic assertion of the supernatural in bare-faced contradiction to a simultaneous assertion of the supremacy of natural order, all

down the scale of rationalizing, temporizing, and obscurantism to an outright naturalism. In most treatments various arguments from testimony or logically arranged extrapolations of the premises are offered which give the appearance of rationality and naturalness to the discussion; therefore the inherent contradictions in the posited question are masked from author and reader alike.

Writers of the earlier period generally begin by taking for granted the reliability of the scriptural account. Locke for example in The Reasonableness of Christianity is assuming the literal validity of scriptural testimony when he names miracle as one of the three methods by which it was declared that Jesus was the Messiah[66] or when he interprets Christ's reply to John the Baptist's enquiry on this point (Luke 7:22) as a citation of His miracles as adequate proof[67] or when he offers the miracles as proof that establishes the unique authority of Christianity over other religions.[68] Toland asserted that the miraculous accounts of scripture should be subjected to severe tests, but reversed the implications of his argument by identifying the mysterious as something veiled rather then inconceivable; thereby he was apparently able to assert the rationality of the miraculous, though only by denying any dependable religious knowledge.[69] The primary motive of Conyers Middleton in A Free Inquiry . . . is to discredit the Papists, and his approach to the validity of the miraculous accounts of Christian tradition is so transparently polemical as to make him useless as a serious religious thinker; but his address to the miraculous is for that very reason instructive, for it demonstrates

a rationalistic rejection of miracles compromising to his interests and an unquestioning acceptance of those recorded in scripture. Citing from Locke the proposition that the miraculous powers either ceased with Apostolic times or did not cease with the age of Constantine,[70] he declares in absence of present miracles for the former alternative.[71] By the aid of this assumption he divides the fathers into sheep and goats, dismissing those who testify of miraculous powers in their own time as credulous or enthusiastic[72]; and borrowing a trick from the opposition, he cites them against one another, disregarding for the moment their questionable authority.[73] In his treatment of "respectable" fathers, he is diligent to draw the teeth of implications of speciality: "They speak indeed in general, of certain Spiritual Gifts, as abounding among the Christians of that age: yet these cannot be reasonably . . . interpreted to mean any thing more, than the ordinary gifts and graces of the Gospel, faith, hope and charity; the love of God and of man?. . ."[74] There is here no intended rebuke of the authority of scriptural miracles; indeed Middleton asserts their authority as forcefully as his anti-Papist aims allow: "For, as far as miracles can evince the divinity of a religion, the pretensions of Christianity are confirmed by the evidence of such, as of all others on record, are the least liable to exception, and carry the clearest marks of their sincerity . . . ."[75] But the rationale here is the expediency of the argument rather than a consistency and validity of premise and deduction, as the nervous qualification of this passage suggests; the following sentence makes the motive evident: "This is the genuine ground on

which Christianity rests; the history of our Saviour's doctrine and miracles, as it is declared and comprized within the cannon of the Holy Scriptures. Whenever we go beyond this, we weaken its foundation, by endeavouring to inlarge it; and by recurring to an evidence less strong and of doubtful credit, take pains only, to render a good cause suspected, and expose it to the perpetual ridicule of the Sceptics and Freethinkers."[76] In spite of the special pleading, Middleton's argument is really a rejection of authoritarian premise altogether, in favour of an empirical naturalism:

> Let the consequences then of truth reach as far as they can; the farther they reach the better: the more errors they will detect; and the more they will dissipate of those clouds and mists, in which the crafty and interested part of mankind are apt to involve and disguise the real nature of things, from the view of their fellow creatures.[77]
>
> . . . The whole, which the wit of man can possibly discover, either of the ways or will of the Creator, must be acquired by a contrary method; not by imagining vainly within ourselves, what may be proper or improper for him to do; but by looking abroad, and contemplating, what he has actually done; and attending seriously to that revelation, which he hade [sic] of himself from the beginning, and placed continually before our eyes, in the wonderfull works, and plentifull fabric of this visible world.[78]

There lacks only the challenge of the special status of scripture to turn the whole force of Middleton's reductive technique upon the citadel of revealed religion itself. Middleton is battling the Papists, of course; if he has reservations about scriptural miracles, he is prudent enough not to voice them.

But an examination more intensive than Locke's and more disinterested than Middleton's was certain to make more critical evaluation of scriptural accounts of miracles. Tindall in Christianity

as Old as the Creation . . . suspects some post-Apostolic tampering with scripture[79] and attempts to base his argument for Christianity on grounds independent of miracles "wrought for its confirmation."[80] Butler, who comes as near to a reconciliation of the natural and the miraculous as the premises and definitions allow, attempts to validate the scriptural accounts by an appeal to the believability of their contexts:

> . . . there is nothing in the whole [Bible] history itself to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age; nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters which would raise a thought of their being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies . . . do not carry the face of fiction . . . and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly credible.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes . . . but there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> And this credibility of the common Scripture history gives some credibility to its miraculous history: especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one relation.[81]

This argument is really directed against the likelihood of a falsification of the account (through error or design), and even if granted

leaves open the question of an adequate perception or understanding of the biblical authors.[82] In other words, with all the admission of the possibility of error, the assumption of special authority is still operative.

Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, though earlier than all these works, exemplifies a much more consistent impartiality in his examination of miracle, as of other issues. He begins with the resolute excision of all externally imposed conditions, "making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down."[83] This is not quite an accurate statement, of course, as it stands; the critical method itself and the faith in human reason which is its grounds must be termed assumptions in the examination of biblical material that assumes, itself, dogmatic rather than empirical validity. But to pass over this point, what Spinoza means by this statement is quite clear and is admirably adhered to in the work--with the reservation noted below. He means that he does not intend to let doctrinal interpretations of scripture, and ecclesiastical or theological directives as to how it is to be accepted, dictate to his examination. He begins at once to remove the necessity of reading scriptural accounts of miracles literally:

> I . . . premise that the Jews never make any mention or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a spirit of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, refer all things directly to the Deity.
> . . . . . .
> Hence we must not suppose that everything is prophecy or

> revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to anyone, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context.
>
> . . . By the decrees and volitions, and consequently the providence of God, Scripture (as I will prove by Scriptural examples) means nothing but nature's order following necessarily from her eternal laws.
>
> Now, as nothing is necessarily true save only by Divine decree, it is plain that the universal laws of nature are decrees of God following from the necessity and perfection of the Divine nature. . . . if anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature--an evident absurdity.
> . . . whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal decree of God. . . .[84]

Most of the miracles to which he makes reference are signs accompanying revelation; and in the discussions of the prophecies he subjects the miraculous evidence of their validity to a relativistic hypothesis which all but reduces the signs to the product of the prophets' lively imaginations and virtually annihilates their literal specialness by showing them to have assumed a natural form:

> . . . A sign which would convince one prophet would fall far short of convincing another who was imbued with different opinions. Therefore the signs varies according to the individual prophet.[85]
>
> There was, moreover, a certain variation in the visions vouchsafed to the prophets, and in the symbols by which they expressed them, for Isaiah saw the glory of the Lord departing from the Temple in a different form from that presented to Ezekiel. Isaiah saw seraphim with six wings, Ezekiel beasts with four wings; Isaiah saw God clothed and sitting on a royal throne, Ezekiel saw Him in the likeness of a fire; each doubtless saw God under the form in which he usually imagined Him.[86]
>
> . . . Nothing is more clear in the Bible than that Joshua, and perhaps also the author who wrote his history, thought that the sun revolves round the earth. . . .[87]

> Our conclusion is in no wise impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah, Joshua, & c were prophets, they were none the less men, and as such not exempt from human shortcomings.[88]

The effect of all this is to suggest that when it was necessary for a miracle to validate prophecy the prophet forthwith imagined himself a sign. Not that one couldn't call that an act of God; one might as well call it such, in a scheme where all is the act of God.[89]

But it would appear that not even Spinoza manages to escape entirely considering some signs special and ultra-natural. In the case of Christ's divinity, Spinoza is able to grant a special nature by removing the necessity of mediate knowledge:

> We may be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He communicates to our minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundation of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God manifests Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He formerly did to Moses through the supernatural voice. In this sense the voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (i.e., wisdom more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that Christ was the way of salvation. I must at this junction declare that those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning Christ, I neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess that I do not understand them. What I have just stated I gather from Scripture, where I never read that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was revealed to the Apostles through Christ; that Christ was the Way of Life, and that the old law was given through an angel, and not immediately by God; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man speaks with his friend (i.e., by means of their two bodies) Christ communed with God mind to mind.[90]

By this reasoning he has made Christ's divinity reasonable, provided the premise of the immediate knowledge of God is granted--though the speciality tends to evanish, for it is one of degree rather than of kind. But the reference to the supernatural voice which Moses heard, if not the anthropomorphic image of God and Moses speaking face to face, comes in strangely in this context. Spinoza declares flatly in the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being against the revelation of God through miracle:

> We consider it, therefore, impossible that God should make himself known to men by means of external signs.
>
> And we consider it to be unnecessary that it should happen through any other thing than the mere essence of God and the understanding of man[91]; for, as the Understanding is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly evident from this that no thing can ever come into such close touch with the Understanding as God himself can. It is also impossible to get to know God through something else. 1. Because, in that case, such a thing would have to be better known to us than God himself . . . . 2. Because we can never attain to the knowledge of God through any other thing, the nature of which is necessarily finite, even if it were far better known to us; for how is it possible that we should infer an infinite and limitless thing from a finite and limited thing? For even if we did observe some effects or work in Nature the cause of which was unknown to us, still it would be impossible for us to conclude from this that there must be in Nature an infinite and limitless thing in order to produce this result.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> We therefore conclude, finally, that, in order to make himself known to men, God can and need use neither words, nor miracles, nor any other created thing, but only himself.[92]

Now the point here is that miracles do not reveal God's nature, and the relegating of miracle to the role of substantiating evidence in the Tractatus is at first glance consistent with this argument; but

when the subordinate argument concerning the incapacity of the finite to reveal the infinite is considered, it will be seen that all signs return to the province of nature. To retain the conception of speciality implied in the reference to the voice Moses heard would expand the definition of nature to embrace what Spinoza himself here terms the supernatural. Other comments in the Tractatus exemplify the same difficulty, as for instance this passage: " . . . All God's revelations to the prophets were made through words or appearances, or a combination of the two. These words and appearances were of two kinds: (1) real when external to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them, (2) imaginary when the imagination of the prophet was in a state which led him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them."[93] Spinoza goes on in the following pages to apply this distinction. The voice Samuel heard was imaginary, as were all visions of the prophets; the voice Moses heard was real.[94]

Three solutions of this enigma suggest themselves. (1) Spinoza really intends to define nature so comprehensively that it could just as well recover all phenomena whether they appear consistent to human observation or not. In this case the rational validity of nature vanishes, for reason must defer to the incomprehensible; and the only rationale standing behind the postulate that all phenomena are rational is the bare a priori assertion of the rationality of God. The distinction between natural and supernatural has slipped its moorings; the definitions become useless; anything goes by the name of nature. (2) Though Spinoza does not himself conceive the voice

Moses heard to be "real," he has here engaged to study scripture by its own internal testimony, whatever that may be[95]; and though by the internal evidence much can be explained in natural terms, there remain some passages that cannot. (3) In the words of Herder, the Tractatus was "merely a tract for the times"[96]--that is, a certain polemical character in the work must be allowed for. The Tractatus was published anonymously and was openly an appeal for freedom of belief and statement; it would not then be surprising if Spinoza did not wish to antagonize his opponents unnecessarily by pushing his case beyond demonstrable limits.

In any case, the Tractatus is interesting as a study of the encounter between rationalistic assumptions and miraculous accounts. The difficulty of conceiving phenomena as simultaneously natural and miraculous soon becomes evident. The option may be delayed temporarily by such explanations as Toland offers about the natural workings of the phenomena; the question merely removes to the next level of abstraction. Whatever the means, what are we to make of the occurrence itself? The real question is not whether the winds were the cause of the parting of the waters of the Red Sea, but rather what to make of that fact, if fact it be; and to this question the naturalistic explanation that the winds parted the waters tells us no more than does the statement that the parting of the waters caused the dry land to appear.

One effect, already evidenced in this naturalistic attempt itself, was a closer attention to biblical text. Spinoza's opening

statement of his method in the Tractatus[97] shows how the question was to drive the empiricist back for a closer look at the evidence and eventuate in a searching biblical criticism in time to come. Therefrom, of course, was to derive such a multiplicity of evidences of internal inconsistency and theological misreading as to make traditional conceptions of biblical authority utterly incompatible with the rationalistic orientation.

One effect of the growing sense of insecurity with special revelation was an attempt to make miracle less indispensable to Christianity. This attempt is evident in several passages cited above. The passages from Butler demonstrate his tendency to shift the burden of proof and the terms of contested issues from miracle to nature--a tendency that could be illustrated from almost any portion of his work. Let the following additional illustration suffice: "Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world; and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy."[98] Revealed religion may surpass, but may not contradict, natural religion: "Indeed, if in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly

conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover, or a precept, which the law of nature does not oblige to."[99] He bases the credibility of miracle upon natural evidence[100] and submits a reasonable argument for revelation that--be it noted--foregoes the support of miraculous proof but thereby also the embarrassment of miraculous fiction:

> . . . there is no hint or intimation in history, that [religion] was first reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.
> . . . . . .
> . . .Either . . . it came into the world by revelation, or . . . it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. . . . a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which would appear more probable, even to himself, of the early pretence to revelation, than by supposing some real original one, from whence they were copied. . . . The most ancient tradition
> . . . . . .
> is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation, prior to all consideration, of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptedly handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables.[101]

Tindall also wants to be able to cast free from the miraculous:

> Since then it appears (as I think) that the religion of the gospel is the true original religion of reason and nature. . . That it has, as such, a claim to be received independent of those miracles which were wrought for its confirmation; will be admitted by all who allow the force and obligation of natural religion. . . .[102]

Locke retains the literal validity of the miraculous, as we have seen;

but he thinks God more commonly works by natural means:

> For though it be as easy for omnipotent power to do all things by an immediate overruling will, and so make any instruments work, even contrary to their nature, in subserviency to his ends, yet his wisdom is not usually at the expense of miracles (if I may so say) but only in cases that require them for the evidencing of some revelation or mission to be from him. He does constantly (unless where the confirmation of some truth requires it otherwise) bring about his purposes by means operating according to their natures. If it were not so, the course and evidence of things would be confounded; miracles would lose their name and force; and there could be no distinction between natural and supernatural.[103]

Like God, the prophet may employ either a reasonable demonstration of his authority or an evidential miracle:

> He, that anyone would pretend to set up in this kind [as lawgiver to mankind] and have his rules pass for authentic directions, must show that either he builds his doctrine upon principles of reason, self-evident in themselves, and that he deduces all the parts of it from thence, by clear and evident demonstration, or must show his commission from heaven, that he comes with authority from God to deliver his will and commands to the world.[104]

Spinoza first shows that Christianity requires only belief in the essence of revelation, not acceptance of details: " . . . We are only bound to believe in the prophetic writings, the object and substance of the revelation; with regard to the details, every one may believe or not, as he likes."[105] Then, in a remarkable anticipation of the later liberal solution,[106] he redefines miracle as that which strikes the observer as wondrous; their miraculous appearance (which constitutes their miraculous nature) is a deference to the understanding of the masses, who "think that the power and providence of God are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary and contrary to the conception they have formed of nature. . . ."[107]; the popular

notion of miracle is an absurdity:

> . . . The laws of nature, as we have shown, extend over infinity . . . and nature workes in accordance with them in a fixed and immutable order. . . .[108]

> . . . The laws of nature are eternal decrees and volitions of God . . . .[109]

> . . . A miracle, whether in contravention to, or beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity; and, therefore, . . . what is meant in Scripture by a miracle can only be a work of nature, which surpasses, or is believed to surpass, human comprehension.[110]

In the Tractatus is explicitly set forth what the other works are more reluctant to say but imply by treatment: that the speciality of miracle is really destructive to religion as the age construed it.

> As God's existence is not self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that no power can be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them. They ought certainly so to appear to us when we infer from them God's existence, if we wish to place our conclusion beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could conceive that such ideas could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we should doubt of their truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of God's existence, and should never be able to be certain of anything. Further, we know that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to those primary ideas; wherefore if we would conceive that anything could be done in nature by any power whatsoever which would be contrary to the laws of nature, it would also be contrary to our primary ideas, and we should have either to reject it as absurd, or else to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and consequently on the existence of God, and on everything howsoever perceived. Therefore miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the laws of nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order.[111]

His successors are to be a long time matching the courage and clarity of this sadly eloquent passage. It is probably an attenuation of the old rationalistic scheme rather than an expression of a new vision

that prompts even Coleridge, for instance, to say, "The testimony of books of history (i.e. relatively of the signs and wonders, with which Christ came) is one of the stately pillars of the church: but it is not the foundation!"[112] By the end of the eighteenth century, however, a total rejection of miracle is not uncommon--in Voltaire, Paine, and Gibbon of course but also in a rising group of naturalistic theologians in Germany.[113]

In short, in an age eager to support religion by natural and reasonable demonstration, miracles became a questionable asset. Powell's incisive comment demonstrates how to a later age, still retaining the rationalistic distrust of an inconsistency with nature but not the rationalistic faith that nature can justify miracles, they have become a burden rather than an aid to faith:

> In the popular acceptation, it is clear the Gospel miracles are always objects, not evidences of faith; and when they are connected specially with doctrines, as in several of the higher mysteries of the Christian faith, the sanctity which invests the point of faith itself is extended to the external narrative in which it is embodied; the reverence due to the mystery renders the external events sacred from examination, and shields them also within the pale of the sanctuary; the miracles are merged in the doctrines with which they are connected, and associated with the declarations of spiritual things which are, as such, exempt from those criticisms to which physical statements would be necessarily amenable.[114]

For the most part the rationalists wavered between a desire to be rid of the embarrassment of miracles and a fear that when they were torn from religion they might take the entire fabric with them. The usual practice therefore is to try to see miracles as consistent somehow with a natural moral order. Of this tendency Butler's work is the

best example. We have noticed his plea by association for the acceptance of the miraculous.[115] In fairness, though, it must be said that Butler's case for the miraculous is stronger than that; he holds that there is an underlying analogy between revealed and natural religion and between both these and the workings of nature. This is a promising scheme; given different conceptions of the relationship between religion and nature, given an awareness of the evolutionary nature of revelation and the validity of myth, it would approximate the visions of Herder and Coleridge. But it is shackled by the rationalistic presuppositions. One of these is a clankily mechanical conception of revelation: "[Suppose a man convinced of the moral governance of God,] What a confirmation now . . . to find, that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had, from principles of reason, believed in; and that the publishers of the revelation proved their commission from him by making it appear, that he had instructed them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature."[116] Threat and promise serve as the check and goad of a degrading cosmic legalism: " . . . Reasonable men would not take any farther thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain, that our future interest no way depended upon our present behaviour: whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to think it does; then there is reason also for the most active thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness

in another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put in our own power."[117] He defines religious growth solely in terms of additional knowledge and the careful furbishing of a prescribed moral system--those two requisites not being very integrally related. (Their relationship rests on the questionable premise that to know the purpose of God is to acquiesce in it and to conform to it; but the gentlemanly obligation to recognize by obedience the favor of salvation is helped out by a strong appeal to self-interest.)

> . . . The office of our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world; as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real . . . there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them, will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason.[118]

Miracle, then, serves only an evidential function; under these conditions it is difficult to see how it could do anything more. It is alleged that Christ "confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of testimony,"[119] that is, of his miracles;[120] and it is granted that miracles may be the occasion to hasten the understanding of religious truth. " . . . As it is owned, the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood before the 'restitution of all things,' and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at; by the

continuance and progress of learning and of liberty. . . ."[121] But it is evident from the context that they are the occasion only; the knowledge gained from them, though it may require careful thought to work out in detail, has no essential relation to them and when once their demonstrative function is accomplished exists discrete from them.[122]

Other writers conceive the function of miracle as even more limitedly evidential. We have noted Spinoza's grudging acceptance of signs that validate prophecy and Middleton's transparent protectiveness of biblical miracles for their evidential value.[123] Such also is their place in Locke's treatise; they are one of the means by which the Messiah is identified;[124] they are His proof of divinity to John the Baptist ("His miracles, we see by his answer to John the Baptist, he thought a sufficient declaration amongst them, that he was the Messiah."[125]) and to the disciples ("And that he was the Messiah was the great truth he took pains to convince his disciples and apostles of, appearing to them after his resurrection. . . ."[126]); they are--an argument fraught with danger--the validation of Christianity over pagan religions and philosophies:

> Let it be granted (though not true) that all the moral precepts of the gospel were known by somebody or other amongst mankind before.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> I will suppose . . . gathered the moral sayings from all the sages of the world. What would this amount to toward being a steady rule, a certain transcript of the law that we are under: Did the saying of Aristippus or Confucius give it an authority? Was Zeno a law-giver to mankind? If not, what

> he or any other philosopher delivered was but a saying of his. Mankind might hearken to it or reject it as they pleased . . . . They were under no obligation; the opinion of this or that philosopher was of no authority. And if it were, you must take all he said under the same character. All his dictates must go for law, certain and true, or none of them.[127]

> [In contrast,] We have from him [Christ] a full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable to that of reason. But the truth and obligation of its precepts have their force, and are put past doubt to us, by the evidence of his mission. He was sent by God; his miracles show it; and the authority of God in his precepts cannot be questioned. Here morality has a sure standard, that revelation vouches and reason cannot gainsay or question, but both together witness to come from God, the great law-maker.[128]

And (as this last quotation shows) they establish the validity of Christ's moral precepts. Lessing, struggling to create an evolutionary hypothesis, is still clinging to the old evidential explanation even in the process of discarding miracles as error: "Whether we can still prove . . . these miracles, I put aside, as I leave on one side who the Person of Christ was. All that may have been at that time of great weight for the reception of His doctrine, but it is now no longer of the same importance for the recognition of the truth of His doctrine."[129]

How patently this interpretation fits the autocratic-benevolent-legalistic God of the rationalists is beautifully demonstrated in Locke's analysis:

> Hearing plain commands is the sure and only course to bring [the masses] to obedience and practice. The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The healing of the sick, the restoring sight to the blind by a word, the raising and being raised from the dead, are matters of fact, which they can without difficulty conceive, and that he who does such things, must do them by the assistance of a divine power. These things lie level to the ordinariest

> apprehension; he that can distinguish between sick and well, lame and sound, dead and alive, is capable of this doctrine. To one who is once persuaded that Jesus Christ was sent by God to be a King, and a Savior of those who do believe in him; all his commands become principles; there needs no other proof for the truth of what he says, but that he said it. And then there needs no more, but to read the inspired books to be instructed; all the duties of morality lie there clear, and plain, and easy to be understood.[130]

The editor of the fourth American edition of Essays and Reviews was to put the case less sympathetically:

> Christianity . . . was advocated on the ground of certain facts, which, if true, would prove God to be its Author, and belief in it obligatory on pain of damnation. [This was] a legitimate result of the then prevailing philosophy of Locke. A germ of mischief lurked in the immortal "Essay," whose fructification had so infected the intellectual atmosphere . . . so dimmed and confused the consciousness of God, that, instead of the divine Inpresence and informing Word of the old theologians, a prodigy in nature was held to be the only possible mediator between God and man, the only possible voucher and vehicle of revelation. Christianity was to be received on account of its miracles, not the miracles on account of the more commanding truth of Christianity.[131]

That reversal of priority would certainly have been surprising to Locke. But it is eloquent of the decline in the respectability of miraculous evidence at the end of a long period of naturalistic reduction-- near the beginning of which stands Locke's cautious introduction of natural evidence in support of the supernatural.

The general movement in the treatment of miracle, then, is a steady surrender of whatever seems no longer defensible. The movement proceeds inevitably in the direction of a complete naturalism; the terms of the defense being what they were, nothing else was possible. It must also be admitted by the candid observer that the motive of the defenses is usually a shameless expediency. The nineteenth-century

liberals felt these equivocations keenly, and were aware of the fact that the practice of their own age sometimes demonstrated a survival of them. So thought Pattison, for instance: "This unwholesome state of theological feeling among us [i.e., the fear of some inimical discovery in free theological investigation] is perhaps traceable in part to the falsetto of the evidential method of the last generation. We cannot justify, but we may perhaps make our predecessors bear part of the blame of, that inconsistency, which, while it professes that its religious belief rests on historical evidence, refuses to allow that evidence to be freely examined in open court."[132]

From such an address, no creative reconstruction of the conception of miracle is forthcoming; it awaits an impetus from a reconstruction of conceptions of inspiration and prophecy, and from this reconstruction borrows as last a means to reintegrate itself with a new emergent vision of Christianity. Until this means appears, however, miracle remains a liability to the more honest Christian apologists.[133]

Besides the natural human timidity in the presence of such extremity, there are I think two good reasons for this failure. First, the case of miracles is too explicit, if the term may be used. Prophecy and inspiration allow more freedom in their definition; though both terms mean something rather definite to each apologist, their significance is more often, and more easily, debated. But a miracle, in the sense in which the word almost had to be applied by apologists of the time, allows of little debate; it either occurred or it did not,

and it was either natural or supernatural; and the debate necessarily comes down to the fact of its occurrence In the words of Pattison, ". . . when we have first shown that the facts of Christianity are not incredible, the whole burden of proof is shifted to the evidence that the facts did really occur. Neither branch of the argument can claim to be religious instruction at all . . . ."[134] It is true that in this authoritarian syndrome prophecy is almost exclusively prediction and inspiration is a kind of Providential dole; but the application of prophecy, even in this restricted understanding of it, and the interpretation of revealed doctrine tend to draw attention into the meaning and value of individual prophecies and doctrines in a way that never or seldom occurs in the examination of miracle.

Preoccupation with the Evidential Function of Miracles

Second, whatever reevaluation might have taken place in the understanding of the significance of miracle is short-circuited by the hopelessly snarled involvement of the entire question of miracles in the evidential argument, which totally dominates religious speculation for most of the rationalistic period "All alike," said Pattison, "consented to test their belief by the rational evidence for it. Whether given doctrines or miracles were conformable to reason or not, was disputed between the defence and the assault; but that all doctrines were to stand or fall by that criterion, was not questioned. The principles and the priority of natural religion formed the common hypothesis on the ground of which the disputants

argued whether anything, and what, had been subsequently communicated to man in a supernatural way. The line between those who believed much and those who believed little cannot be sharply drawn."[135] As far as positive religious development goes, a more barren enterprise could hardly be imagined In the first place, the single-minded concern with evidence usurped the place of any other religious issue, thrusting even the moral code into a subordinate position.

> The essay and the sermon, the learned treatise and the philosophical disquisition, . . . no less than the theologians by profession, were all engaged upon the same task. To one book of A. Collins ("A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion," Lond. 1724) are counted no less than thirty-five answers. Dogmatic theology had ceased to exist: the exhibition of religious truth for practical purposes was confined to a few obscure writers. Every one who had anything to say on sacred subjects drilled it into an array of argument against a supposed objector. Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be "proved:" what use to make of it when it was proved was not much thought about. Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually became its substitute. The mind never advanced as far as the stage of belief: for it was unceasingly engaged in reasoning up to it. The only quality in Scripture which was dwelt upon was its "credibility." Even the "Evangelical" school, which had its origin in a reaction against the dominant Rationalism, and began in endeavors to kindle religious feeling, was obliged to succumb at last. It, too, drew out its rational "scheme of Christianity," in which the atonement was made the central point of a system, and the death of Christ was accounted for as necessary to satisfy the Divine Justice.[136]

Moreover--a point implicit in these harsh words of Pattison--this unwholesome preoccupation with evidence subverted the <u>significance</u> of religious considerations, not merely the frequency with which they were treated. In the judgment of Maurice and Erskine, at least, the slavish practice of referring every religious question or value to the

authority of another smothered out any genuine Christian growth. Even in their day, of course, for many the "all-important question" was still, as Maurice caustically defined it in a reference to the Hampden controversy, "whether it is heretical to believe principles because they are true and not because they are delivered to us . . ."[137] Erskine put the question with his usual clarity: "Do you believe that twice two are four, because Mr. Cocker or some one else has told you so, and Mr. Cocker is such a very wise man that he must be right? Or do you know that twice two are actually four, and feel much obliged to Mr. Cocker for having at first pointed it out to you?"[138] The inimical effects of evidence-hunting appear in the exegetical efforts of even the best of the rationalists. "It is plain," said Locke, "that the Gospel was written to induce men into a belief of this proposition, 'That Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah,' which if they believed, they should have life."[139] "So that all that was to be believed for justification was no more but this single proposition: that 'Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ, or the Messiah.'"[140] Thus to make the evidential formula workable[141] the significance of the Christian faith is reduced to a shibboleth. In pursuit of this idea, Locke reads the entire ministry of Christ as only an extended proof of His Messiahship. Most of The Reasonableness of Christianity is spent documenting this reading. Every utterance or act of Christ is turned to account:

> Here [John 6: 14, 15] we see our Savior keep to his usual method of preaching: he speaks to them of the kingdom of God, and does miracles, by which they might understand him to be the Messiah, whose kingdom he spake of.[142]

> . . . he sharply rebukes their [the scribes and Pharisees'] hypocrisy, vanity, pride, malice, covetousness, and ignorance, and particularly tells them, ver. 13 [of Matthew 23], "Ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men, for ye neither go in yourselves nor suffer them that are entering to go in." Whereby he plainly declares to them that the Messiah was come, and his kingdom begun; but that they refused to believe in him themselves and did all they could to hinder others from believing in him . . . .[143]

> . . . John 6: 22-69, declares to them his being sent from the Father and that those who believed in him should be raised to eternal life--but all this very much involved in a mixture of allegorical terms of eating, and of bread, bread of life, which came down from heaven, etc.--which is all comprehended and expounded in these short and plain words, ver. 47 and 54, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day." The sum of all which discourse is that he was the Messiah sent from God . . . .[144]

The evidential purpose of Christ's mission is made to explain everything. His encounter with the rich young ruler, for example, is thus interpreted:

> . . . this young man asks our Savior what he must do to be admitted effectually into the kingdon of the Messiah. The Jews believed that when the Messiah came, those of their nation that received him would not die, but that they (with those who, being dead, should then be raised again by him), should enjoy life with him. Our Savior, in answer to this demand, tells the young man that to obtain the eternal life of the kingdom of the Messiah, he must keep the commandments. And then enumerating several of the precepts of the law, the young man says he had observed these from his childhood--for which, the text tells us, Jesus loved him.[145] But our Savior, to try whether in earnest he believed him to be the Messiah and resolved to take him to be his King and to obey him as such, bids him give all he has to the poor, and come and follow him, and he should have treasure in heaven. This I look on to be the meaning of the place; this (selling all he had and giving it to the poor) not being a standing law of his kingdom, but a probationary command to this young man, <u>to try whether he truly believed him to be the Messiah</u>, and was ready to obey his commands, and

> relinquish all to follow him, when he, his Prince, required it.[146]

The employment of parable and metaphor is supposed to have been dictated by caution that His Messiahship not be declared too openly (and thus draw Him into open conflict with the Scribes and Pharisees) in order that His Ministry might be lengthy enough for the evidential fulfillment of prophecy:[147] "[The failure of the Jews to get an explicitly satisfactory admission from Jesus] gives us a clear vision of the cautious and wary conduct of our Savior, in not declaring himself in the whole course of his ministry, so much as to his disciples, much less to the multitude, or to the rulers of the Jews, in express words to be the Messiah the King; and why he kept himself always in prophetical or parabolical terms (he and his disciples preaching only the kingdom of God, i. e., of the Messiah, to be come) and left to his miracles to declare who he was--though this was the truth which he came into the world, as he says himself, John 18:37, to testify, and which his disciples were to believe."[148] Thus any spiritually creative meaning of such passages as these is choked off. Their function being solely informative and evidential, all qualities other than their explicitness (here itself compromised, incidentally) are rather pointless. Such illustration could be multiplied; Locke's work, largely exegetical as it is, offers more numerous and more marked examples of the strain of this address to the scriptures. But the same strain is present elsewhere. Even Tindal, whose work is more theoretical and whose more universalized reading of Christianity makes the evidential application both less necessary and less amenable, provides some startling examples

of what wrenchings of scripture the authoritarian syndrome often occasioned--as for example his reading of Acts 10:34-35[149]: "Till this happened, he [Peter], though filled with the holy ghost, confined salvation to the name of a person; viz. the name of Christ. There is none other name under Heaven given amongst men, whereby we must be saved."[150] Who would have guessed that God's being no respecter of persons meant that to God the person of Christ was inconsequential to salvation--especially considering the implied point of the vision, and the entire ministry of the missionaries to the Gentiles as recorded in Acts? Who indeed, but a sophistic deist attempting to found on the authority of scripture a premise inimical to its authority and amenable to his plea for a natural religion that dispenses with scriptural authority in the sense which the appeal demands. But let that pass--the point here is the straining at gnats and swallowing of camels--the simultaneous gross indiscriminateness and tweezering eclecticism--which is occasioned by the mind-set of the evidential argument.

These wretchedly inadequate readings demonstrate the inherent failings of the evidential method--and beyond that of the whole rationalistic orientation. The evidential argument is prevented by its root assumptions from any depth of insight; any real depth will destroy it by displaying its inherent contradictions. A really searching examination would show its naturalistic tendency to be destructive to its religious assumptions, as has been noted.[151] Moreover, if signs are really the way God reveals himself to man, and if nothing in their

nature except their certainty and clarity is important, the only response He calls for is unqualified and unqualitative obedience to an imposed command. Reason itself has no reasoning role to play; its function becomes only the noticing of this evidence and the reference of it to the mechan sm of unquestioning obedience. Although, then, the appeal is to reason, reason is required by the argument itself to operate at the most superficial level, that of mere recognition. It is required to be superficial for another cause, even more compelling. The terms of the evidential argument require that an adequate evidence be available to all persons. Since exalted or even clear thought is beyond many, the evidence must then appeal to the lowest common denominator of human understanding.[152] As Locke put it, "Where the hand is used to the plow and the spade, the head is seldom elevated to sublime notions or exercised in mysterious reasoning. It is well if men of that rank (to say nothing of the other sex) can comprehend plain propositions and a short reasoning about things familiar to their minds and nearly allied to their daily experience."[153] Irony of ironies--it seems that the light that lighteth every man flickers dimly in all but the wise and prudent, and the omnipotent God whose very essence is akin to the universal human attribute must not blaze too brightly in the presence of tinkers and cobblers.

Analogous Reduction in Theoretical Rationalism

Perhaps it would be well to digress briefly and observe similar effects in the more theoretical rationalists--those more

consistent reasoners who turn from empirical proof to self-evident truth.[154] For although the failure here noted is intensified by the evidential motive, it in fact extends down into the premises of rationalism which the evidential technique was called upon to vindicate. Spinoza and Kant are also convinced that, since rational religion must evidently be universally available, the requisite doctrines must make minimal demands.[155] And of course they must square with reason. See such a triumvirate of minds as Spinoza, Tindal, and Kant, in a remarkable conjunction, fumbling with the concept of Christian forgiveness--which seemed not to have been beyond the capacities of a Jewish tax-gatherer. In Spinoza's analysis Christ's exhortation to turn the other cheek is an expedient to be observed under oppression but was not intended for a well-ordered state: "In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the judge (see Lev. v.1), not for the sake of vengeance (lev. xix.17,18), but in order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All this is plainly in accordance with reason."[156] Tindal comments on Luke 11:24,27: "It is certain, I say, that such like texts have, by being interpreted literally, run men into monstrous absurdities? [sic] Nay, even the precept of forgiving injuries, not only seven, but seventy times seven, except interpreted consistently with what the light of nature dictates to be our duty, in preserving our reputation, liberty, and property; and in doing all we can in our several stations, to hinder all injury and injustice from others, as well as ourselves; would be a doctrine

attended with fatal consequences, so that the expediency, or even lawfulness of forgiving injuries, depends on such circumstances as human discretion is to judge of."[157] And Kant struggles to make forgiving love rationally acceptable in a scheme that has discredited all "inclination": "It is doubtless in this sense ['not from inclination, but from duty'] that we should understand too the passages from Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor and even our enemy. For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty--although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way--is practical, and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command."[158] Here is an eloquent example of the manner in which the Cartesian dichotomy, and the drive for intellectual security which both called it into existence and perpetuated it at such frightful cost, works itself out in practical religious applications. It is true of course that the tenor of these comments may be partly explained by reference to the political situation, the well-founded distrust of enthusiast groups, the aristocratic sociological assumptions, the static and legalistic conceptions of existence, etc.; but it is also true that these difficulties are themselves in large part reflections of the same philosophic premises. The "mind-forged manacles" of Blake's "London" may be heard in them all. In this case, at least, the impact of rationalistic premises is demonstrable, as in the last sentence of the quotation from Spinoza: "All this is plainly in accord-

ance with reason."

Legalistic and Deterministic Implications of Evidential Religion

The advantage of deriving all religious value from "reason" is that, when it is granted that the universe is rational, one has an absolute security. The cost is that all qualitative distinctions tend to vanish. For what can be securely known, when empirical evidence and the testimony of "moral feeling"[159] is suspect and must be abjured? In the old scheme the answer was "revelation"; in the rationalistic framework it must be "self-evident truth." By positing the identity of this with the nature of the universe, man can, it is reasoned, know the truth of God. In the words of Tindal, ". . . Our reason for kind, though not for degree, is of the same nature as that of God's; nay, it is our reason which makes us the image of God himself, and is the common bond which unites Heaven and Earth. . . ."[160] It is in the reasoning nature of man that kinship with God exists, and therefore what is rational is authoritative and dependable. Though terms and their values change, this concept persists. What derives from reason is secure; what comes in any other way is suspect.

Of course what that means depends on one's definition of reason. Read large enough, "reason" might comprehend all human spiritual life; but logically considered nothing in the final analysis is self-evident but tautology and reductions from it. Thus when "the universe is the incarnation of logic" (in Stephen's phrase[161]), when reason becomes diligent for security yet suspects empirical knowledge, it runs toward the

tautological exclusively. Thus "knowing" and "believing" get construed totally as propositional and analytical activity, and the insistence on security of knowledge, that is on authority, impels them to be exclusionary of all else. The religious man becomes an analytical machine whose goodness consists of the immediacy with which he can refer command to obedience. Into the hopper goes a self-evident truth or an unquestionable command; the voracious analytical rationale grinds away all qualitative distinctions that might catch up again some empirical sensuous involvement; the product emerges in an obedience pure of any self-interest or "obligation," and with all the empirical chaff winnowed out.[162]

The evidential argument merely substitutes an externally imposed command, properly certified, for the self-evident truth of the purer rationalism (as analogously empiricism substitutes the assumption of inherent consistency and validity in the nature of all things for the more cautious theoretical limitation of validity to tautological propositions). The evidencers have in fact slipped revelation back into the scheme under the supposition of its identity with self-evident truth, and then further compromised that identity by claiming for it an empirical basis.

"The idea that anything is imposed on us by Christianity to be believed just for believing's sake, so to speak," says the astute Erskine, "and without any reference to the disclosure it makes of the mind of God towards us, or to its moral bearing on our character, must have a tendency to produce either infidelity or superstition."[163] It is hard to escape

the impression that the evidential appeal is intended to produce, if not the latter, at least the same effect as that of an unreflecting fetish worship. Yet "enthusiasm," the appeal to the non-rational in religion, is almost the devil of the rationalists. Therefore neither a profound thought nor an intense emotion is available to them; "faith" becomes, when not enthusiastic and thus misguided, merely the tenacious intellectual assertion of a proposition which by its bare authority is supposed to dictate a code of practice. It is indeed the making of a proposition a fetish.[164]

From what has been said it may be gathered that evidential Christianity was severely legalistic. Behind the evidential scheme lies the Pavlovian determinism of the tabula rasa psychology, where nothing happens in the mind but what is imposed on it from without--a conception calculated to eliminate moral freedom, where religion is conceived as a purely mental function, though writers of this school inconsistently urge moral behavior as a kind of automatic result of right ideas. With the theoretical rationalists, the separation of knowledge into suspect empirical data and secure self-evident propositions, though contrary in epistemological implications to the scheme of Locke, tends likewise to divorce morality from anything but a fixed contemplation of the internal idea. Moral and religious freedom, if either of these schemes is to remain completely consistent, is all but reduced to seeing or refusing to see the authority of a proposition. (Yet the mere seeing of it is supposed to produce a moral and religious practice.) Whether the source of its authority lay in the nature of existence, as Tindal claimed; or

the revealed and evidenced scripture, as Locke asserted; or the two in harmonious analogy, as Butler argued; or the unqualified purity of the self-evident proposition, as Kant assumed, one conception was hardly questioned: its purpose was directive. The yoke might be easy and the burden light, but they must be assumed with unquestioning obedience once their authority had been seen.

Faith was another--an additional--Law, more authoritative because of later date and surer evidence, offering more blessed inducements and more fearful punishments. The difference, Locke explained, was that the latter graciously admitted of shortcomings in moral practice: " . . . The moral part of Moses' law, of the moral law (which is everywhere the same, the eternal rule of right), obliges Christians, and all men, everywhere, and is to all men the standing law of works. But Christian believers have the privilege to be under the law of faith, too, which is that law whereby God justifies a man for believing, though by his works he be not just or righteous, i. e., though he come short of perfect obedience to the law of works."[165] Whatever the differences, that the Christian faith was to compel men to act, and by the same means as law, was generally taken for granted by the rationalists. So Lessing analyzes the effect of Christ's revelation of immortality: ". . . Although, already before Him, the belief had been introduced among many nations, that bad actions have yet to be punished in that life; yet they were only such actions as were injurious to civil society, and consequently, too, had already had their punishment in civil society. To enforce an inward purity of heart in reference to another life, was

reserved for Him alone."[166]

I do not wish to malign Locke, who it seems was a godly man--and whose object in The Reasonableness of Christianity was, after all, primarily to free Christian faith from elaborate and detailed creedal requirements bound to trip up the ignorant in some point--to set a simplicity of creed in their stead.[167] Nor does he wish Christianity to be the bloodless system the evidential formula tended to make it; he wants men to trust in God with all their hearts, and keep His commandments: ". . .it is his peculiar care of mankind most eminently discovered in his promises to them, that shows his bounty and goodness, and consequently engages their hearts in love and affection to him. This oblation of a heart, fixed with dependence on and affection to him, is the most acceptable tribute we can pay him--the foundation of true devotion, and life of all religion."[168] But like all the rationalists, he has too much faith in the efficacy of reason to achieve holiness. He holds that "to acknowledge any proposition to be of divine revelation and authority, and yet to deny or disbelieve it, is to offend against this fundamental article and ground of faith: that God is true."[169] So says Butler: ". . . the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself."[170] and so Lessing: "Thus enlightened respecting the treasures which they had possessed, without knowing it, [the Jews] returned [from captivity], and became quite another people, whose first care it

was to give permanency to this illumination amongst themselves. Soon an apostacy and idolatry among them was out of the question. For it is possible to be faithless to a national deity, but never to God, after He has once been recognized."[171] Yet the Cartesian dichotomy has at least this much validity, that a proposition intellectually entertained need not and generally does not work an appropriate effect in sincerity, piety, morality, godliness, or compassion. It must be given legal authority before it can do so (or create the appearance of doing so); and of this Locke himself, like exponents of the evidential argument generally, is only too aware. Neither can the "law of faith" be efficacious without some teeth in it, in order to make benighted and recalcitrant human nature come to heel. For God has so made man that he is encouraged to seek his own happiness; and the evidence of this world often being such as to lead him rather into vice than virtue, some whopping contrary weight in the world to come must be posited to make the scales tip right again. Locke's statement is so eloquent of the effects of this legalistic scheme that it must be allowed to speak for itself at some length:

> Another great advantage received by our Savior is the great encouragement he brought to a virtuous and pious life--great enough to surmount the difficulties and obstacles that lie in the way to it, and reward the pain and hardships of those who stuck firm to their duties and suffered for the testimony of a good conscience. The portion of the righteous has been in all ages taken notice of to be pretty scanty in this world. Virtue and prosperity do not often accompany one another, and therefore virtue seldom had many followers. And it is no wonder she prevailed not much in a state where the inconveniences that attended her were visible and at hand, and the rewards doubtful and at a distance. Mankind, who are and must be allowed to pursue their happiness--nay, cannot be hindered--could not but think them-

> selves excused from a strict observation of rules which appeared so little to consist of their chief end, happiness, while they kept them from the enjoyments of this life, and they had little evidence and security of another.[172]
>
> How has this one truth changed the nature of things in the world, and given the advantage to piety over all that could tempt or deter men from it! The philosophers indeed showed the beauty of virtue; they set her off so, as drew men's eyes and approbation to her; but leaving her unendowed, very few were willing to espouse her. The generality could not refuse her their esteem and commendation, but still turned their backs on her and forsook her, as a match not for their turn. But now there being put into the scales on her side "an exceeding and immortal weight of glory," interest is come about to her, and virtue now is visibly the most enriching purchase, and by much the best bargain. That she is the perfection and excellency of our nature, that she is herself a reward and will recommend our names to future ages, is not all that can now be said of her. It is not strange that the learned heathens satisfied not many with such airy commendations. It has another relish and efficacy to persuade men: that if they live well here, they shall be happy hereafter. Open their eyes upon the endless, unspeakable joys of another life, and their hearts will find something solid and powerful to move them. The view of heaven and hell will cast a slight upon the short pleasures and pains of this present state, and give attractions and encouragements to virtue, which reason and interest and the care of ourselves cannot but allow and prefer. Upon this foundation, and upon this only, morality stands firm and will defy all competition. This makes it more than a name--a substantial good, worth all our aims and endeavors--and thus the gospel of Jesus Christ has delivered it to us.[173]

With what awe and horror the liberals of the next century contemplated this religious position we shall later see.[174] A modern reader might think that Locke was writing satire. But that the scheme he describes is common to rationalistic Christians, let some supporting evidence from Spinoza, Butler, Lessing, and Davison (respectively) demonstrate:

> Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway of nature)[175] thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take for himself as he best can,

> whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any other means. . . .
> . . . . . .
> Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he is restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.[176]

> Those persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world; as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real . . . there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them, will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason.[177]

> . . . It is one thing to conjecture, to wish, and to believe the immortality of the soul, as a philosophic speculation; quite another thing to direct the inner and outer acts by it. . . . To enforce an inward purity of heart in reference to another life, was reserved for Him alone.[178]

> [Concerning Hebrews 11:6--". . . He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him,"] But this conviction of reward and punishment is not separable from our ideas of God and all religion whatever; and still less is it separable from the act of God's own publication of his law.[179]

To which might be added a brief comment from Fielding's Tom Jones, concerning the dogma of poetic justice: ". . . As we have in our voyage through life seen so many other exceptions to it, we choose to dispute the doctrine on which it is founded, which we don't apprehend to be Christian, which we are convinced is not true, and which is indeed destructive of one of the noblest arguments that reason alone can furnish for the belief of immortality."[180] What that argument is can no doubt be made out easily from the preceding quotations; that Fielding, of all contemporary writers, should treat it seriously (as he appears to do) indicates the extent of its acceptance.

The irony involved in the employment of such an argument in order to make Christianity "reasonable" was not lost on the more enlightened of the nineteenth century. Pattison points it out in his judgment of Whately:

> [Supposedly] the evidences of religion are sufficient to convince every unprejudiced inquirer. Unbelievers are blameworthy as deaf to an argument which is so plain that they cannot but understand it, and so convincing that they cannot but be aware of its force. Under such self-imposed conditions, religious proof seems to divest itself of all that is divine, and, out of an excess of accommodation to the recipient faculty, to cease to be a transforming thought. Rationalism can object to the old sacramental system, that it degrades a spiritual influence into a physical effect. But Rationalism itself, in order to make the proof of revelation universal, is obliged to resolve religion into the moral government of God by rewards and punishments, and especially the latter.[181]

But for all insistence on the clear "obligations" and for all the inducements (negative and positive) of a hereafter, it was found very difficult to effect moral reformation by means of demonstration:

> On the rationalist hypothesis, the morality of consequences ought to produce the most salutary effects on the general behavior of mankind. This obligation of obedience, the appeal to our desire of our own welfare, was the substance of the practical teaching of the age. It was stated with great cogency of reasoning, and enforced with every variety of illustration. Put the proof at the lowest . . . it must, at least, be allowed that they showed, to the satisfaction of all prudent and thinking men, that it was <u>safer</u> to believe Christianity true than not. . . . And what was the surprising result? That, the more they demonstrated, the less people believed. As the proof of morality was elaborated and strengthened, the more it was disregarded. . . .[182]

To which criticism the evidential argument has no workable answer. It cannot admit the inefficacy of demonstration, for this admission would itself challenge the power (that is the supremacy) of the authoritative truth. Whenever that authority is challenged, rationalism begins by

reasserting the authority of its authority. Locke is arguing against complex doctrinal requirements, not against experience, but his technique reveals the basis of his system:

> To this it is likely, it will be objected by some, that to believe only that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah is but a historical, not a justifying or saving, faith.
>
> To which I answer that I allow to the makers of systems and their followers to invent and use what distinctions they please and to call things by what names they think fit. But I cannot allow to them, or to any man, an authority to make a religion for me or to alter that which God hath revealed. And if they please to call the believing that which our Savior and his apostles preached and proposed alone to be believed, an historical faith, they have their liberty. But they must have a care, how they deny it to be a justifying or saying faith, when our Savior and his apostles have declared it so to be . . . .[183]

Aside from any other possible reasons the scheme would not work very well, the roots of this difficulty, I have tried to show, are two: (1) the severing of authoritative truth, whether conceived as revelation or self-evident propositions, from the suspect empirical considerations it must reject and condemn in order to preserve its speciality; (2) the inconsistent and (as far as its survival was concerned) ill-advised attempt to smuggle in the empirical data to support the authoritative truth. Not that the career of rationalism could well be otherwise. For rationalism requires both the authority of rational process and the raw material of empirical evidence; yet each is, according to the premises, inimical to the other.[184] Even as rationalism must posit two Gods, so it must posit two correspondent springs of moral and spiritual life. Therefore, even as the conception of a God who comprehends all in His own being must reconcile the division of thought from matter, so the assertion of an

efficacious power in the logical process must bridge the gap between demonstration and moral action. But it is a bad expedient; the God of Spinoza, who somehow comprehends antimonies, and the self-validating duty of Kant, may remain theoretical and thus retire into mystery; but where propositional truth is to be translated into moral action their relationship must be above all else clear and practical. In the absence of clarity and practicality, force must be introduced to make the system work. Thus cosmic legalism (replacing the demonstrable force of an established eccliastical system) becomes the hole card that fills out a royal flush, and whoever wants to call must bet his soul.

It must be said that clear and practical relationships between proposition and moral or religious action are not very satisfactorily supplied by the rationalists.[185] Locke merely asserts the two distinct requirements of salvation--belief in the proposition that Jesus was the Messiah, and a life of obedience to the moral precepts Christianity teaches--without any attempt to find in the two any integral relationship; all that yokes them is that both are expressly and authoritatively commanded:

> . . . the other condition required in[the covenant of grace], altogether as necessary to be performed as this of believing . . . is repentance. Repentance is as absolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith, and as necessary to be performed as that.[186]

> These two, faith and repentance, i.e., believing Jesus to be the Messiah and a good life, are the indispensable conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all those who would obtain eternal life.[187]

> To one who is once persuaded that Jesus Christ was sent by God to be a King, and a Savior of those who do believe in him; all

> his commands become principles; there needs no other proof for the truth of what he says, but that he said it. And then there needs no more, but to read the inspired books to be instructed; all the duties of morality lie there clear, and plain, and easy to be understood.[188]

Tindal points out a similarity between the power of idea to realize perfection and the power of act to do the same; but the passage is more eloquent of their distinction than of their unity:

> . . . If truth in general, implies an agreement of our ideas with the things themselves, religious truth, or true religion must consist in the agreement of our ideas with those things, which are the subjects of our religious enquiry; viz., the nature of God and man: and false religion must consist in having ideas that are not agreeable to, or do not truly represent those subjects; and this agreement which we call truth in respect to theory, is what we term, in relation to action, fit, just, good or reasonable. Thus God is frequently stiled in scripture the God of truth, because his ideas of things, and the things themselves exactly correspond; and all his actions are agreeable to the relation things have to one another: and when our actions are such, we do all that is fit, just and reasonable, all that God or man can require; and from hence too it follows, that iniquity is the same in action, as falsity is in theory.[189]

And the same division is evident in Butler: ". . . The moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever . . . I apprehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment."[190]

The Self-Invalidation of Bifurcated Rationalism

The rationalists have enthroned the mind, and by doing so have raised rational process into an ontology. Thus by asserting diligently the authority of the process--that is, its identity with ultimate truth--they gain security. Rationality is posited as an absolute, and tested only by rational criteria; not surprisingly, it turns out to be totally consistent, that is, rational. The Cartesian method, by limiting the

investigation of truth to a process of logic, succeeds in proving truth logical. Not much can be done with that; there are only so many things that can be said about the proposition A=A, and all of them, to be logical, must be deductive from it. But so long as one does not leave the closed world of syllogism or tap the initial assumption of consistency, nothing else is really necessary.

But man cannot live by syllogism alone; and when the security of the self-evident truth is carried into the empirical world, what happens? Syllogisms do not allow of lateral, but only of derivative relationships. Therefore, if the authority of the rational is to be read into experience, all freedom vanishes; everything must be ranked in one hierarchical order. Qualities must be obliterated, or rather transmuted into quantities. Spinoza's scheme escapes by giving God infinite attributes, each having its own hierarchical quantitative order; that will work for God, who has the logical finality of being the first premise from which each order derives. But what has happened to man's security in such a scheme? The admitting of qualitative differences, the admitting of freedom, shatters the monolithic rational security. If he wishes to retain the security of his scheme, he must carry its logical authority into the empirical world, and determine all things by it.

Whenever the authority of reason is asserted over experience, it must make good its assertion by demonstration. It can however retain its divinity by abandoning claims over the experiential altogether. Thus the alternative to this rational legalism, if the authority of the premise would be retained, is a retreat into pure subjectivism. In

order to retain its God-like speciality, rationality must snuggle further and further into the sheer formalism of mathematical equation, renouncing whatever will not admit its sovereignty; it must descend into the horrifying nightmare of disembodied selfhood envisioned in Part I of Fichte's Vocation of Man--an inward spiral narrowing down to a self-effacing point. Tautology has assured the authority of the ulterior God, and finds that to retain His speciality it must extricate itself altogether from the experiential world.

Empiricism, though born as we have noted out of this extremity, has really posited a new rationale; for a priori it assumes (consciously or not) that the consistency posited in the pure rationalist's tautological security really underlies all existence, including the experiential. In other words it posits (in some terms) the immanent God; surrendering the special validity of pure reason (if only by carrying into the argument any phenomenal evidence), and still trying to assert the security of the identity of all existence with reason, it arrives at an equally frightening conclusion. Reasonably considered, all things by being the embodiment of reason become equally valuable; no casuistry is possible; all things mean only themselves; the meaning of no object or act can encompass the meaning of any other; since all becomes equally symbolic, no symbol is capable of transcending itself; there are no analogies, because all must be analogy; all existence breaks apart into atomism with no center, no relation. Once more the mind, in asserting the authority, must survive if at all by a despotic legalism, by simply asserting itself and attempting to put all things under its feet.

The fact that either assumption must at last have recourse to imposed authority vitiates, in the process of exhibiting the Cartesian problem, its assumption of inherent authority. There is no way for either to avoid being overthrown, when taken to their logical conclusion, except by recourse to solipsism. By trying to secure the truth the rationalists have lost it. Of course in practice what happens is some kind of equivocation. The Cartesian division being a logical only and not an experiential division, neither rational idealism nor empiricism can act alone. The practical exigencies accomplish what logical demonstration or empirical demonstration cannot; once ignore the dictatorial claims of rationality, and Dr. Johnson's famous refutation of Berkeley works quite well.

In a sense the evidential argument is such a compromise. But it invalidates itself by its pretense of rational consistency. It tries to argue the special validity of religious doctrines on the basis of natural evidence. Butler leaves an opening by positing an <u>analogy</u> between religious truth and natural phenomena, and argues from <u>probability</u>; it is all rather clumsy and contradictory, but that peek into a world of contingency, where logic does not have to reign supreme, is a glimpse of a way out. But if one asserts the supremacy of reason, reason and revelation are not identical or even compatible. One cannot (rationally) argue the identity of internally perceived truth and externally imposed (revealed) truth, consistent with nature, while simultaneously arguing that self-evident or revealed propositions are specially valid in a way that natural evidence is not. One must argue a rational monism, yet try

to hold on to a speciality that assumes either a dualism or a source beyond rationality. It cannot be done without that assertion of an overriding legal authority we have noted.

The empirical introduction of arguments from natural religion (as exemplified by, say, Tindal and Butler) had a much more far-reaching effect than merely to compromise the logic of the argument. For the illogicality involved in the supposed correlation of nature and revealed religion may be resolved two ways. Either, natural religion being true, whatever is truly special in Christianity must be accidental or erroneous, and the revelation must be reinterpreted or the form in which it was delivered must be corrected in order to make it conformable; or, revelation being inspired, natural religion must be considered to have been perverted, and where it is at odds must bow to revelation. Not that either course can be followed undeviatingly by proponents of the evidential argument; to do so would explode the correlation on which the argument is based. Moreover the contrasting premises, by mutually asserting their claims, exert a pressure to make for both a place in the scheme, though at last their inherent antagonism will dissolve the scheme as well as the premises.

But by the assumption of rational authority, when the evidential argument introduced natural evidence to support special revelation, it engaged, as Pattison pointed out, in a self-contradictory and self-annihilating argument. The consequences of the inconsistency are truly terrifying to behold. The point has been made that a religion of immanence (or any variation, such as "natural religion," that sees in nature the

revelation of God) tends to determinism. The natural order is assumed to have the approval of God; the concept of a "fall," by which traditional Christianity segregates God and the order of nature, is lost. Nothing in nature can work contrary to the will of God, for that would vitiate his omnipotence. In practice the deists (e. g., Shaftesbury) must reintroduce the "fall" in a watered-down version as bad education or "priestcraft"--a semantic or rather intellectual dodge, for what can be the cause of such a lack or perversity, when all derives from God? At the least it argues an attenuation of Divine power and goodness. When such a latently poisonous idea is made explicit by the teleological process--of which the evidential argument here examined is a heavy-handed and literalistic expression--the most embarrassing things happen to God. The deists, and deterministic schemes generally, have lost their devil, and have no longer a discrete source to which evil may be referred.

When one establishes a convincing analogy between natural and revealed religion, he has put God in an extremely vulnerable position. With the collapse, or apparent collapse, of the teleological argument for a benevolent God--an argument increasingly difficult to mount as Swift, Voltaire, Malthus undermine the optimistic premises--the analogy becomes a curse; for the logical conclusion is (where the analogy is accepted) that since natural phenomena can no longer be believed in as evident expressions of a benevolent God, the benevolent God must be a natural phenomenon; and natural religion crumbles (ultimately) into a godless naturalism or a valueless necessitarianism. There is a straight line of development from evidential religion to The City of Dreadful Night.

Had there been room in the evidential scheme for a concept of real moral freedom--that is, of contingency, growth, potentiality--the tenor and the effect might have been different. But growth is not possible in a world which is the embodiment of logic. Rationality must have security, reliable premises, self-evident truths and accurate instruments of demonstration; it is a stasis, a desert, a land where it is always afternoon. And the smug arrogance--totally unconscious, it would seem--that runs through the whole orientation is insulated by the rational demonstration it can mount. But without the humbling insight of its own limitations--an insight as rare in the attack as in the defense of rationalistic religion--the grim truth is that the teleological defense of the benevolent God must succumb to the grisly fact of moral evil; and the assumption that His benevolence demonstrates itself in nature makes Him a prey to natural evil as well. The only way such a God can survive is by taking shelter in an arbitrariness and monstrous legalism that shrinks Him below the moral and spiritual stature of man himself, and that is utterly contradictory to the gospel representation of the nature of Christ. This is the God that the insistent query about the damnation of the heathen so relentlessly drags to the light--all expediential comments about human ignorance and pride to the contrary notwithstanding. For the comments are not genuinely intended. They are supposed to put off the objections that may be made, while they shelter the very rationale of the scheme itself. Man is ignorant enough, surely; but a scheme so utterly repugnant to the highest notions of good, which are themselves argued as irrefutable proof of the higher goodness of God,

contradicts itself in so barefaced a manner that one must be as irrational to believe it as he must to disbelieve it, and one must therefore be threatened or bribed into allegiance. If one refuses to be threatened or bribed, the choice left open to an honest mind, assuming (still) the finality of logical demonstration, is to deny God or to reject the analogy--to grant that the world is malign or indifferent and life flawed with evil, but to insist that God is not like that. It is the old atheistic dilemma, turned religious; and its rational base must be pluralism. Life fragments, and man is relieved--though at what cost--of the wearying and frustrating task of trying to make it integral again. God retires to the citadel of sacerdotalism to lick his wounds, and comes no more into the brutal world of natural reality.

Prophecy

In the evidential pattern, prophecy is of course also made to verify the authority of the revealed doctrine and the revealing agent. The clear demonstration of fulfilled prophecy is conceived to be as efficacious in establishing the authority of a doctrine or command as is testimony of miracles. Indeed the early tendency to read miracle naturalistically, as for instance in the work of Toland and Clarke,[191] and specifically Tindal's assertion that the testimony of miracle does not establish the validity of doctrine,[192] seems to have driven defenders of revelation to prophecy as a more compelling evidence. A particularly lucid example of this practice is provided by the case of a certain William Whiston, who published in 1722 a work entitled An Essay toward

Restoring the True Text of the Old Testament, and for Vindicating the Citations Made Thence in the New Testament. This work argued that the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy in the New Testament offered the major evidence that Jesus was the Messiah and thus that Christianity was of divine origin. Whiston admitted, however, that there were some discrepancies between the prophecies and their fulfilment. The most notable effect of the book was that it occasioned Anthony Collins' A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion (1724). Collins pressed Whiston's argument by asserting that not only was prophecy the main evidence of Christianity, it was the only proof Christianity could muster, on the success of which Christianity must stand or fall. He then pretended to explain away the discrepancies by an allegorical reading of prophecy; but in a later work, The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered (1727), this defense is dropped and Collins proceeds to make his explicit point that prophecy is not a reliable evidence of Christianity. Collins became the center of an extensive controversy, in which his opponents took two main lines of strategy. One group admitted his argument that by the fulfilment of prophecy Christianity must be judged, but insisted that Jesus exemplified the literal fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. To Butler, for example, the fulfilment of prophecy seemed to be the touchstone by which revelation should be authenticated: "If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these, is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned,"[193] though he also thought miracles some credential.[194] Another group abandoned prophecy and returned to miracle as the evidence of Christianity.[195]

Thus prophecy, pressed into evidential service to meet the assaults of rationalism, was subjected to the same kind of naturalistic reductions as were miracles. For whether the motive was the preservation of the speciality of Christian revelation, as with Whiston, or the discrediting of that speciality, as seems to have been the intent of Collins, attackers and defenders of the traditional interpretation of prophecy joined to pare away what did not fit the terms of that conception. One frequent expression of this tendency, as in the case of miracles, was to abandon the less defensible instances in order to regroup more strongly around the more certain or more crucial evidences of prophecy fulfilled. Whiston offers an excellent example of the technique of discarding suspect prophecies or portions of prophecies that can be spared by the evidential argument. Troubled that the prophecy in Isaiah 7:14-16,[196] cited in Matthew (1:22-23) as a foretelling of the Christ,[197] is evidently referred by its context to a contemporary situation, he supposes that the first portion refers to the Messiah and the latter portion to the prophet's son.[198] Sherlock, another defender of Christian evidence against Collins, retrenched in a slightly different way by giving up the verbal infallibility of prophetic revelation. Particular prophecies are vague in their details, and an exact correspondence between the detail of the prophecy and the detail of its fulfillment may be wanting; but the general nature of the fulfillment completes and explicates the prophetic text.[199] In similar manner Butler argues that, though all the particulars might not jibe, the realization of prophecy in later events is a proof that it was intended to refer to

them.[200] He insists that the prophet need not have had an omniscient understanding of the prophecies in order for them to be authoritative.[201]

Here again Spinoza has anticipated by several decades the various kinds of reduction the concept of prophecy must suffer so long as it is caught in the evidential function. He denies to the apostles and the writers of New Testament epistles the role of prophets, since by their own admission and by the tenor of their writings it is apparent they are reasoning and arguing, not prophesying: "The Apostles everywhere reason as if they were arguing rather than prophesying. . . ."[202] "The modes of expression and discourse adopted by the Apostles in the Epistles, show very clearly that the latter were not written by revelation and Divine command, but merely by the natural powers and judgment of the authors."[203] "We therefore conclude that the Apostles were only indebted to special revelation in what they orally preached and confirmed by signs; that which they taught in speaking or writing without any confirmatory signs and wonders they taught from their natural knowledge."[204] He strikes away the assumption that the inspiration of the prophet rendered him omniscient. In a passage which suggests Locke on miracles,[205] he notes that the prophet "does not always speak by revelation, but only at rare intervals."[206] Nor are the prophets superior in wisdom, but only in virtue; and <u>thereby</u>, quite reasonably, are they better fitted to see the truth of God: ". . . the Scriptural phrases, 'The Spirit of the Lord was upon a prophet,' . . . & c., are quite clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordinary power, and devoted themselves to piety with especial constancy; that thus they

perceived the mind or thought of God. . . ."[207] They were, indeed, possessed of an unusual imaginative capacity--the imagination being the faculty through which they perceived the prophetic vision--but not of unusual intelligence,[208] and their conceptions of God and the form of their prophecies reflected their natural abilities.[209] That the "Word of the Lord" came to the prophets must be understood in light of the meanings the Jews assigned that term--all of them more or less consistent with ordinary natural phenomena:

> . . . the Word of the Lord when it has reference to anyone but God Himself, signifies that Divine law treated of in Chap. IV; in other words, religion, universal and catholic to the whole human race, as Isaiah describes it (chap. i.10), teaching that the true way of life consists, not in ceremonies, but in charity, and a true heart, and calling it indifferently God's Law and God's Word.
>
> The expression is also used metaphorically for the order of nature and destiny (which, indeed, actually depend and follow from the eternal mandate of the Divine nature), and especially . . .such. . .as were foreseen by the prophets. . . . Lastly, it is employed for the command of any prophet, in so far as he had perceived it by his peculiar faculty or prophetic gift, and not by the natural light of reason. . . .[210]

Therefore prophecy was inclusive of ordinary knowledge, which is itself of course given by God[211]; the prophets taught, then, only truths generally understandable by all, though adapted in their presentation so as to move the devotion of the people.[212] Prophecy, then, must not be understood to be in any way specially revelatory of scientific or philosophical knowledge: "Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an utter mistake."[213]

Here (as in Sherlock and Butler) is raw material aplenty for a rich new concept of prophecy; but so long as the issue is drawn solely

on grounds of the traditional concept of its authority--that such authority is evidentially established by literal and exact fulfillment of predictions--these speculations could only be considered reductive. By Butler's definition of prophecy, for example, as "events foretold, which human sagacity could not see,"[214] Spinoza has all but eviscerated biblical prophecy.

The Extremity of the Evidential Argument in the Face of Biblical Criticism

How much was felt to be at stake in the validity of prophecy and miracle is clearly revealed by the storm of protest raised by the attacks of Collins and Woolston[215]; Butler candidly admitted that "if it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these, is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned."[216] Thus there appears once more the dramatic irony of defenders of the faith committing themselves incautiously to positions that were very soon to be undermined by the inexorable advance of biblical criticism. The volleys of "evidence" discharged against the critics, though the occasions of much noise and smoke, served mostly only to identify the target for the next critical attack. Thus the more insistently the evidence was asserted the weaker it became.

For example, one assumption on which the defenders relied too confidently was that the works of the Bible could be safely credited to the persons whose names they bore. At this distance, when reasoning from authority is generally regarded with suspicion, it is a little difficult to understand the significance the age attached to the question. But in

the evidential scheme the authority of the witness, like the fulfillment of prediction and the supernatural testimony of miracle, was considered to offer proof of divine origin. The idea was so deeply ingrained in traditional religious thought that it continued to be exploited far beyond the era when its literal application could be safely made. Glances at textual irregularities that seemed to call the antiquity or authenticity of biblical material into question have never been totally lacking. Spinoza in the Tractatus explicates Aben Ezra's obscure reflection on the authorship of the Pentateuch in the latter's commentary on Deuteronomy and concludes from internal evidence that the text of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, as we have them, must have been written long after the fact.[217] Internal inconsistencies in historical accounts he conceives to render impossible any accurate computations, and to offer convincing evidence that the histories "were compiled from various writers without previous arrangement and examination."[218] He follows Aben Ezra in the supposition that Job was a translation,[219] and surmises that the first seven chapters of Daniel were drawn from the Chaldean chronicles, since they were originally written in Chaldee.[220] Collins' shrewd analysis led him to conclude that the book of Daniel was a product of the age of Antiochus Epiphanes and therefore not the product of that prophet, the alleged prophecy being really disguised history.[221] Yet Bishop Newton's Dissertations on the Prophecies, in 1754, still mustered (in the words of Stephen) "a long recapitulation of the prophecies, and the fulfillments ordinarily alleged," including a lengthy and brazen vindication of Daniel,[222] relying on the literal authenticity of the Old

Testament accounts; Davison credits the authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses without blinking, asserting that "the Pentateuch, containing the public code and solemn annals of the Jewish people, could not be put forth surreptitiously, nor in any other age than that which it bears upon the face of it; the age of Moses its author. At that time, if not before, the prophecy [therein contained] was extant."[223] The Colenso controversy, following upon his publication in 1862 of the first volume of his study of the Pentateuch and turning in part upon the authorship, will serve as evidence, if any is needed, that the difficulties involved in surrendering the traditional argument from the authority of authorship were still keenly felt, and that the argument persisted with sufficient popular and official force to pursue the Bishop of remote Natal through the last two decades of his life.[224]

How severely the conception of direct inspiration tasked the literal authenticity of scripture may be demonstrated by reference to Michaelis, who in his Introduction to the New Testament gives criteria by which works must be considered "spurious" (and therefore, of course, incapable of giving absolute assurance of their doctrines):

> 1. When doubts have been made from its first appearance in the world whether it proceeded from the author to whom it is ascribed.
> 2. When the immediate friends of the pretended author who were able to decide upon the subject have denied it to be his production.
> 3. When a long series of years has elapsed after his death, in which the book was unknown, and in which it must unavoidably have been mentioned and quoted, had it really existed.
> 4. When the style is different from that of his other writings, or, in case no other remain, different from that which might reasonably be expected.
> 5. When events are recorded which happened later than the time

of the pretended author.

6. When opinions are advanced which contradict those he is known to maintain in his other writings.[225]

The severity of such tests adequately explains the intensity of controversies over critical points, for on the turn of a phrase, however inconsequential, seemed to rest the security of the believer's salvation; pressed to its logical conclusion, verbal plenary inspiration can brook no error at all. In the words of Renan, "In a divine book everything must be true, and as two contradictories cannot both be true, it must not contain any contradiction."[226] By such standards nothing remained but to surrender piecemeal the divine writings in order to continue to assert that the remainder were divine.

Under the influence of a growing body of biblical criticism, such retreats became steadily more frequent and more desperate--even as the same effect was of course being felt on other problems where the traditional conceptions of religious authority were being pressed. An excellent example is provided by Michaelis, whose Introduction to the New Testament, first published in Germany in 1750, was translated (from its fourth edition of 1788) by Herbert Marsh in 1793 and 1801. In 1774-78, Lessing had published the infamous Woffenbutteler Fragmente of Reimarus, in which discrepancies in the gospel accounts, particularly of the ressurection, were noted and the conclusion drawn that the accounts were fraudulent. Michaelis himself published in 1783 a refutation of Reimarus in which he argued that the very discrepancies precluded the possibility of connivance at fraud--a defense pressed into frequent service in the wake of the Reimarus controversy.[227] The attack evidently troubled the

scrupulously honest Michaelis, who makes reference to it several times in the later edition of the Introduction. The effects of Reimarus are especially instructive in the following excerpt, added, as Marsh's note on the passage informs us,[228] in the later edition published after the appearance of the Fragmente:

> . . .After weighing with all that care and caution, which so important a subject requires, the arguments which may be advanced on both sides, it is perhaps adviseable to divide the question. To the epistles the inspiration is of real consequence, but with respect to the historical books these the gospels, and the acts of the apostles, we should really be no losers if we abandoned the system of inspiration, and in some respects have a real advantage. We should be no losers, if we considered the apostles in historical facts as merely human witnesses, as Christ himself has done in saying, "Ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning." And no one that attempts to convince an unbeliever of the truth of Christianity, would begin his demonstration by presupposing a doctrine which his adversary denies. . . . In these cases then we are obliged to consider the evangelists as human evidence, and it would be no detriment to the Christian cause to consider them at all times as such in matters of historical fact. We find it nowhere expressly recorded that the public transactions which the apostles knew by their own experience, and of which St. Luke informed himself by diligent inquiry, should be particular objects of divine inspiration. We should even be considerable gainers, in adjusting the harmony of the gospels, if we were permitted to suppose, that some one of the evangelists had committed an immaterial error, and that St. John has rectified some trifling mistakes in the preceding gospels. The most dangerous objections which can be made to the truth of our religion, and such as are most difficult to answer, are those drawn from the different relations of the four evangelists. The Fragments published by Lessing insist chiefly on this objection: but the whole vanishes into nothing, unless we ourselves give it that importance which it has not in itself, by assuming an unnecessary hypothesis. Let us therefore examine the question with coolness and impartiality, the only means of discovering the truth.[229]

In a later passage he suggests that since John and Matthew were actually apostles of Christ whereas Mark and Luke were not, the latter were not

necessarily divinely inspired; and by supposing their testimony of less authority, removes the conflicts in the gospels:

> If the word inspiration therefore be taken in such a sense as to include infallibility, we can scarcely believe, that St. Mark and St. Luke were inspired. The violent methods which have been used to reconcile their accounts with those of the other Evangelists, and the insuperable difficulty, which has hitherto attended the harmony of the gospels, have cast a dark shade on our religion, and the truth and simplicity of its history have been almost buried under the weight of explanations. No one has applied this objection with so much force, and so much danger to the Christian religion, as the anonymous author of the Woffenbuttel fragments published by Lessing, especially with respect to the resurrection. But the greatest part of these objections are deprived of their force, if we allow the fallibility of these two Evangelists, nor resolve to defend with obstinacy a post, that is hardly to be maintained.[230]

Thus the question of the validity and accuracy of prophetic prediction led inevitably into careful biblical examination, and this in turn unearthed so many difficulties that the entire concept of inspiration had to be reviewed. The argument from miracles might retreat into mystery and defy investigation. The argument from prophecy, however, laid itself open to attack by virtue of the opportunity for internal investigation. Prophecy vindicated provided an external evidence which the subjectivity of miraculous evidence could not match; but on the same grounds, prophecy refuted could be nothing but an exploded argument so long as its significance was seen as merely evidential.

Reductive Effect of Reading Prophecy as Evidence

As in the case of miracle, this limited reading of prophecy had the enervating effect of discouraging any more incisive understanding of prophetic literature and of segregating the doctrine revealed from its

experiential matrix. Thus the prophecy is merely a mechanical fixture validating moral command. Spinoza's reading of prophecy--his awareness of the role of imaginative creation in the prophetic vision, his sense of the relative nature of prophecy according to the environment, knowledge, and ability of the prophet, his sense of historicism that approaches an evolutionary notion--would seem to require the perception of a more nearly integral relationship between form and message; but once more the evidential requirements of clarity and authority reduce its significance to the bare moral precept, severed from insight: prophecies "contain only dogmas and commands."[231] In the words of Herder, Spinoza had "only a metaphysical sense of the poetry of the Prophets."[232] The peculiarities of form of the prophetic visions were explained only in terms of their psychological and environmental sources, not at all as having any symbolic significance of their own to convey.

Reinterpretation of Prophecy

But as the evidential argument with its corollary of verbal inspiration began to break up from the internal inconsistencies, the very failure itself seems to have compelled the apologists to search out other conceptions of prophecy better able to explain the difficulties. Some of the explanations were bizarre, and most of them had been tried in some form before; nevertheless they were the stirrings of a new concept of prophecy. Sherlock, in arguing that the prophecies are fulfilled in their general sense though not always in exact details,[233] and Sykes, who argued that "fulfillment" meant a similarity in significance rather

than the mere concurrence between details of the prediction and its alleged realization,[234] were wrestling with the strangle-hold of literal interpretation, and finally with the concept of verbal inspiration. Collins, in A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, suggested (facetiously) that the way to vindicate the "fulfillment" of Old Testament prophecy in the New was by "allegory." This is the way the Jewish doctors made the Old Testament comment on the Talmud, he claimed, citing the learned Jew Surenhusius. He gravely set down the ten methods of allegorical interpretation employed by the Jews, by means of which discrepancies of any intricacy or magnitude might be explained away.[235] "Collins's general drift is obvious," says Leslie Stephen. "The only mode, he argues, of rendering the prophecies applicable is to adopt laws of interpretation which would make any set of words compatible with any meaning."[236] Even so, some defenders of prophecy rose to the bait; Chandler, for example, in answering Collins accepts fully the allegorical method described by his opponent, even to the specific interpretations Collins had facetiously offered.[237] Not that all the faithful were willing to stoop to such trifling; Michaelis notes with distaste Semler's employment of "oeconomy," and staunchly asserts that dishonest reasoning is not justified merely because its aim is to defend scripture:

> In the beginning of the present century another term of apology for similar quotations was introduced, namely "medrash," . . . a word used in the Jewish art of criticism, and applied to cases, in which an hidden, though too often a very unnatural meaning was supposed to lie concealed. The Jews may be indulged in their idle speculations, in the vain glory of discovering their seventy senses in a single period; but that

> an upright and impartial lover of the truth, and even persons commissioned by the deity to preach it to mankind, should have recourse to such miserable artifices, is a matter inconceivable to sound reason, which must ever retain the privilege of deciding on revelation itself. Truth admits of no reprisals, and the false reasoning of an adversary affords no excuse for admitting it ourselves: for, though it is lawful in disputation to turn an opponent's own arguments against him, with a view of convincing him of error, they are inadmissable as a basis of the doctrine, which we intend to support.
>
> What ever terms be adopted to apologize for this mode of reasoning, whether we style it Oeconomy with the fathers, or medrash with the Jews, I am unable to comprehend, how a set of writings, in which arguments of this nature are admitted, can be thought to proceed from the deity, and those, who allow the principle, can reconcile falsehood with divine inspiration. All errors are proofs against the divinity of the book, which contains them; but none are so inexcusable as an author's not understanding his own writing; yet it follows from the admission of the above premises, that the deity speaking in the New Testament misunderstood the meaning of the Old. The historical mistakes of the Koran, which are used as arguments against its divine authority, would be trifles in comparison with these, or rather no arguments at all, if the author pretends not to inspiration in matters of history.[238]

Again, the need to find more convincing evidence for the predictive role of prophecy seems to have spurred a resurgence of the notion of prophecy by types. In this conception, it is not only the explicit prediction of the prophets that foretold the Christ; God had also foreshadowed His coming by sending before Him characters and institutions that gave clues of His nature and ministry by prototype. One theme of this idea, for instance, identified the Christ as the great Prophet, of whom the prophets before Him were, somehow, imperfect realizations. Butler's statement of the theme is, characteristically, prosaic and restrained: "He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: 'that Prophet that should come into the world,' to declare the divine will."[239] In a modern statement of the view, "the whole Mosaic sacrificial institution points to a future and perfect

means of atonement; David, the king after God's heart, is the type of a future and greater ruler in whom the ideal which hovered before David will be fully realized."[240] Interpretation of scripture by this kind of symbolical reading dates from earliest, even from biblical, times, though the capriciousness of the commentators, like that in the allegorical renderings to which it is similar, had all but discredited the method.[241] Therefore when Chandler saw David, Solomon, and Joshua as types of the Messiah[242] he was but hearkening to a tradition already well established.[243] Yet by the same token it was a tradition already thoroughly corrupted by being forced into an evidential function more and more difficult to carry out. Typological prophecy is of course as subject to wrenchings as "allegory," if not more so; and Chandler's arguments were hooted down by Collins, who asked whether such equivocations will "have any other effect than to make people admire, how men can with gravity offer such things as from the great God of heaven and earth."[244] Like other expedients brought in to shore up the crumbling evidential scheme, then, the effect of arguments from typical prophecy merely helped weigh down the structure. Desperate as some of them were, that effect was inevitable. Rowland Williams cites, as a ludicrous example, a work entitled Catena Aurea, "published under high auspices in [Oxford], in which the narrative of Uriah the Hittite is improved by making David represent Christ, and Uriah symbolize the Devil; so that the grievous crime which 'displeased the Lord' becomes a typical prophecy of Him who was harmless and undefiled!"[245]

Yet it was not merely the outlandish character of such applications that made typical and allegorical readings of prophecy so reductive for

the old beliefs. What Collins had demonstrated facetiously, the unintentional satire of such failures and the earnest admission of Michaelis likewise demonstrated: that the difficulties raised by these wrenchings of the claims of prophecy required a review of those claims. If the fathers had been unfaithful in little, perhaps they had been unfaithful in much. That contemporary defences resorted to the typical and allegorical methods amounted to a covert admission that the claims were questionable, and hastened the review wherever, and to the degree that, their readings were vulnerable to charges of equivocation. So long as the literal truth of all scripture is generally believed, allegorical interpretation will generally pass as merely the legitimate application of that faith; it may be called erroneous, but it will hardly be called equivocal. But start with the premise of literal accuracy of scripture, exemplified in the exact fulfilment of predictions made generations before the fact; then bring to that premise a contradiction in the evidence itself (the role of a growing body of biblical criticism); and it becomes evident that somewhere the hypothesis is awry. If the method is unduly pressed in such an extremity, it begins to be considered merely an expedient, meant to obscure or face down a difficulty all too palpable. Since the intent (conscious or unconscious) of the method has become to preserve the premise at all costs, the "allegory" loses its integrity; it is restrained from deliberate distortions only to the extent that these are inexpedient or vulnerable to disclosure.

The Hypothesis of Fraudulent Motive

It was quite logical, then, that a fraudulent motive should be assigned to those who explained away the discrepancies in such a manner. More important, when such a conclusion had been drawn, it is not surprising that the same motive should be read back into the allegorical and typical interpretations of a prior age, and eventually into the efforts of the scripture writers themselves to draw the evidence of prophesy fulfilled from events of their times. We have noted above Middleton's analogous judgment on post-Apostolic claims of miraculous powers.[246] A general distrust of the allegorical readings of the Fathers becomes more and more explicit as the age progresses.[247] When the same suspicion attaches to the writers of scripture, the effects are painful to behold. So Michaelis, struggling with the uncertainties into which critical questions have led him, reflects on their significance for the validity of scripture:

> Many are unwilling to admit that this chapter [in Joel] contains the prophecy of the communication of the Holy Ghost to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, which is expressly asserted by St. Peter in the second chapter of the Acts . . . . Now if the Apostles had really recourse to such practices, this "impius Porphyrius" [as Jerome called him] has spoken as an honest man. . . .[248]

> Were it possible to shew, that the very author of our religion, who ordered the precepts, which he taught to be required as commands of the deity, had made a wrong application of the text of the Old Testament, it would follow that he was not infallible, and that Christianity itself was false.[249]

Yet the hypothesis of fraudulent intent offers difficulties as severe as those it explains, as the progress of the Reimarus controversy exemplifies.[250] Until some more satisfactory thesis emerged, the quarrel

could only be a tiresome exchange of charge and refutation, proof and disproof; defenders of literal authenticity could not satisfactorily justify the discrepancies; attackers of the truth of scripture, though they might refute the claims of their opponents in particular instances and impugn the validity of specific passages, could not satisfactorily deny that after all discreditings there yet remained a residuum as troubling to unbelief as the discrepancies were to belief. The whole wearisome question is a hopeless maze from which there seemed no exit. How much is true? How much is untrue? Which accounts are valid? Which are forgeries? Which are inspired? Which are mere testimonies of witnesses? Which gospel has prior claim? What part, what quantity, shall be the grounds of belief?

The Quantitative Response to Problems of Criticism

For the problem was seen consistently as a quantitative one. The Bible, or at any rate portions of it, was either true or it was not; it was either divinely inspired or a merely human production. If it contains errors, the solution must be to excise those portions that were deemed erroneous and rely on the remainder. It was a solution to which the gradually developing techniques of textual and historical criticism seemed admirably fitted. And as we have seen, quantitative reductions are, throughout the progress of rationalistic religious speculation, the first and most common response to a hearty challenge, if to the person in question that challenge seems to have made good its claim--which is only to be expected, since it is the response that calls for the least

disturbing and least comprehensive reconstruction of beliefs.

But the problems of the age really involved an inherent contradiction of thesis and evidence, and no mere reduction of scope could solve it. An excellent example of the inadequacy of such an attempt is offered by the history of the speculation on the relative validity of the gospels. The fragments by Reimarus seem to have raised into prominence a question which had received some notice before but had now become pressing: what is to be made of discrepancies in the gospel accounts? The immediate answer was of course to attempt a harmony; but the candid admitted that a perfect harmony did not and could not be made to exist. Michaelis, for example, protests against the violence necessary to reconcile contradictory accounts such as those of the events of the passion.[251] In this extremity, it was supposed that some one of the evangelists provided the first account and that the others were constructed on this model. The theory could not, however, vindicate itself; nor was the problem a matter of merely deciding which was prior. Whichever of the four was assigned a prior role, there remained materials in the other accounts that were so similar as to require that their authors were familiar with another common source. Each of the four was championed by scholars of high repute.[252] Michaelis himself preferred to trust St. John (the issue of the antiquity of that gospel not yet having been so severely urged, and hence likewise that of the authorship), who of the evangelists "wrote last, who was eye-witness to almost all of the facts which he has recorded, who appears to have had an excellent memory, and paid attention to the most minute circumstances."[253] At a later time,

however, he accepted the hypothesis, worked out with great ingenuity by many hands and given definitive statement by Eichhorn,[254] that there had been an original written document, since lost, from which each evangelist had drawn but to which each had added embellishments.[255] Herder declared rather for a common oral source in the early preaching of the gospel.[256] Marsh, the translator of Michaelis, himself worked out an elaborate formula, extending previous schemes of an ur-evangel by a pattern of supposed cross-influences in the process of translation.[257] The controversy was waged learnedly in Germany for half a century without (it would appear) a satisfactory issue. But more instructive for the present purpose than the fact that no final thesis emerged is the reductive tendency taken in the excision of materials not verified by common report. This tendency is admirably summed up by Connop Thirlwall in a discussion of Eichhorn's theory of the origin of the first three gospels (from Thirlwall's introduction to his translation of Schleiermacher's A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke):

> The original Gospel is supposed to be contained in the forty-two sections which are common to the three evangelists. To extract it out of these sections, it is of course necessary to retrench all the circumstances in which the three writers vary from each other. To determine in this way the original text is certainly by no means an easy task. It is however an experiment which any person conversant with these subjects may make for himself, and though he should not possess the ingenuity and dexterity of an Eichhorn, he will still be able to define with some degree of exactness the extent of the original Gospel. Now it may safely be affirmed, that the more minutely and accurately any unprejudiced person conducts this investigation, the more he will be at a loss to conceive with what design and according to what method the common matter which he will deduce by this process could have been taken down and combined into an independent whole. For no one has yet undertaken to analyse the supposed original

> Gospel itself, and to distinguish in it the hands of different writers. . . . .the inequality of the narrative is so great, that it seems scarcely possible to assign a motive which will account for the nature of any part of it, and which is not inconsistent with the character of the rest.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Bishop Marsh himself seems to have felt, without being distinctly conscious of, the difficulty arising from this circumstance, when he speaks of the original document, in one place, as a short but well connected representation of the principal transactions of Christ, from his baptism to his death, and in another, as not a finished history, but containing only materials for a history. In fact neither of these descriptions corresponds to its real character. For not only was chronological order neglected in it, but one of the first results from the process of comparison by which it is to be extracted will be to eliminate almost all the references of time and place which connect the parts of each Gospel together, and to reduce it to a mass of fragments. Yet these fragments cannot in ordinary language be described as materials for a history.[258]

There, concisely, is the failure of quantitative reduction.

Toward a New Synthesis: Prophecy as a Case in Point

That failure is the inevitable reductio ad absurdum of the attempt to retain a concept of special revelation in contradiction to the internal evidence of the material of the revelation itself, and likewise in contradiction to the implications of the techniques employed in its defense. What was needed, of course, was a more universally applicable thesis of the nature of inspiration, and therefore a different concept of the nature of religious authority. For the difficulty, as the liberals of the coming age saw it, was that questions of authority were founded on the wrong suppositions. It was a profitable and important endeavor to identify the errors and perhaps the deliberate distortions of scripture and tradition. Yet it was folly to suppose that the meaning or

the spirit of Christianity would be discovered in this way. To try to pare the scriptures down, for instance, to some talisman which by its magical authority would preserve the faithful was to seek after a sign; and no such sign had been given. The scriptures were a vehicle for a truth too profound to be reduced to a shibboleth; that the vehicle was faulty was a consequence of the limitations of those who made it and used it, and in a real sense of those for whom it was made; but that was altogether beside the point. Its truth resided not in a quantity that could be made a fetish but in a quality that must be realized dynamically in the life of faith. For them the fumbling allegorical renderings of an ancient day took on an altogether different character. To use a figure of which the liberals make constant application, they were the husks within which the kernel of a valuable truth lay nestled.

Between the day of Collins and Michaelis and that of Hare and Maurice there had to come searching intellectual and theological revolutions--the development of a sense of historical evolution; the birth of a sense of myth; an awareness of the necessity of moral freedom; a better understanding of the inherent ambiguities in all means of representation. These developments must be reserved for later examination; the point to be made here is that without the collapse of the authoritarian view of scripture, and the evidential syndrome which accompanied it, they could hardly have appeared. Verbal infallibility of scripture is not compatible with either an evolutionary hypothesis or a mythical conception of Christianity; for it begins by assuming a stasis in the condition of human understanding of all ages on the one hand and the

utter adequacy and efficacy of language and image on the other. The contradiction itself is a reduced version of the enigma already noted in the total ontology of rationalism. The thesis of infallibility is a premise derived from the static concept of ulterior speciality (or that correspondent ideality, the interior speciality of self-validating truth); but the evidence itself, seeking its validation in the correspondence of meaning and form (rather than in their severance), is an expression of a faith in immanence, a truth abiding in the nature of things, expressing itself in varying but inherently kindred manifestations, albeit contingently and imperfectly.

Allegorical and typical readings of prophecy were, then, I believe, among the earliest manifestations of a sweeping reorientation. Within those questionable and equivocating expedients a profound insight was at work. It amounted to nothing less than a latent and crescent awareness of the ambiguous nature of symbol. There was an apparently inescapable limitation in all form, statement, figure and ritual to give final definition to meaning and value; and yet in their partial efficacy lurked the suggestion, the hope--in their correspondence almost the insistence--that they would yet yield truth if man could see rightly. These are exalted claims for such equivocal phenomena. It is hoped that the entire remainder of this treatise will lend them credence. For the moment let a quotation from Julius Hare's Mission of the Comforter present a case for their consideration:

> . . . The . . . propensity for allegorizing circumstances and details . . . may almost be called the predominant element in the exegesis of the Fathers, and . . . is very different from

> the true spiritual and symbolical mode of interpretation; inasmuch as the latter fixes upon that which is permanent and pervading, and regards the outward Creation as expressing the purposes of the One All-pervading Will, uttering itself harmoniously in all its manifestations; while the former attaches itself to that which is accidental and external and fleeting, and loses sight of the idea, while chasing the butterflies of fancy. The symbolical and spiritual mode of interpretation may be exemplified by St. John's declaration, that our Lord's promise of the rivers of living water was spoken of the Spirit, which believers in Him were to receive. Thus, the promise, as being wholly spiritual, both with regard to its condition and its blessing, is shewn to belong to all ages of the Church, and to every individual believer, and becomes a source of comfort to all: and in this sense it never has failed, and never will fail, but is fulfilled at this day in all parts of the earth, wherever a true believer in Christ is to be found. In like manner even such passages of Scripture, as were spoken primarily concerning the operations of external nature,--for instance, those cited from the Psalms,--will often admit of a spiritual application, in consequence of that harmony and correspondence, through which the natural world is in so many things the symbol of the spiritual. But to hunt for types of that which is incidental and transient is a capricious exercise of the intellect and a habit injurious to the perception of true spiritual realities; while, by restricting the words of Scripture to particular applications, it sadly impairs their power: the rivers of living water shrink into dried pools. Now this habit of mind is unfortuantely very common among the Fathers, as it was among the contemporary rhetoricians and grammarians, who exercise the same kind of transmutations upon Homer, as the Fathers are apt to exercise upon the Bible. Hence, while we owe them a grateful recognition of the services which they rendered to the Church, by their exertions, intellectual and moral, for the settling and upholding of the orthodox faith, we should beware of allowing our gratitude and reverence to delude us into following the vagaries and meanderings of their fancies.[259]

Davison's Discourses: Old Theory of Prophecy and New

Davison's Discourses on Prophecy is instructive in that it shows an uneasy alliance of the old and the new. This work was a series of twelve sermons given as the Warburton lectures for 1825.[260] Though by

that time a new concept of inspiration had long been thriving in Germany, its influence in England was as yet feeble; and though Marsh's translation of Michaelis, as well as his own "Dissertation on the Origin of Our Three First Canonical Gospels" included therein and the series of lectures he delivered and published (as Lady Margaret Professor at Cambridge) from 1809 to 1823 had roused a storm of controversy, his efforts seem only to have alarmed without having much instructed.[261] It was only the same year of the Discourses that Thirlwall published his translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on Luke; and if to the names of Marsh and Thirlwall were added those of Hare, Coleridge, Rose, and Pusey,[262] one would likely have a list of a majority of Englishmen with even moderate understanding of German theological and critical meterial in 1825.[263] Davison's work was relatively well-known; it reached its fourth edition by 1839 and six editions were published in thirty years. Although the DNB says that "in theology he was a conservative," he is perhaps quite representative of the position of the informed English clergyman in his day. Though he makes reference to biblical scholarship and evidently knows some of the work of Michaelis[264] his critical scholarship looks very slight--especially alongside that of his contemporaries Thirlwall and Hare--and he seems not to have reflected deeply on its implications. The difficulties with which he gropes, and the solutions he brings to them, are essentially those provided him by the English tradition of religious thought of the previous century.

The DNB says of the work that "it marks an advance on the view of prophecy simply as a collection of predictions, giving stress to the

moral element contained in it, and to the progressive character of its revelations." In the slightly stronger language of Williams, "the stress which he lays on the moral element of prophecy atones for his sophistry as regards the predictive."[265] These comments are a good basis for an analysis of the work.

A preliminary discourse considers "the Christian Evidences in general, and the Connection of Prophecy with the rest."[266] Here, as may be expected, is presented in a few pages a neat summary of the evidential argument. The argument is well turned, though it has lost some of its lustre since the days of the early eighteenth century; it is set forth with a skill grown wily through many difficulties, and the weaknesses of the system are translated duly into strengths. Thus it is shown that religion is proved "natural to man, and truly conformable to his constitution and character, by the fact of his embracing it under forms exceedingly perverted; so [likewise] the gift of a Revelation is shewn to be highly probable, and adapted to his expectation and sense of things, by his reception of fictitious systems of it, which in many cases have had in them everything to create a positive disbelief, excepting the one presumption, which the judgment and feeling of Nature still cling to, that the Deity can and will somewhere reveal Himself to his creatures: a propensity of belief . . . which attests either the Probability or the Fact."[267] Against the argument of the sufficiency of natural religion, he urges its failure to produce a satisfactory system, after the manner of Locke,[268] and adds that even if natural religion <u>were</u> sufficient in itself "(which is only supposed not conceeded,)" yet revelation would

remain "expedient" and "beneficial." For "where is the improbability in supposing that God should improve, by confirming, or extending in any degree, the discoveries which man may be able to make of the nature and will of God and of his own hopes and duties under the divine government?"[269] Now though this argument makes equally for "all Revelation, whether genuine or false"--a difficulty inescapable in the nature of the dispensation--yet by "the use of the proper evidence" it is possible "to ascertain directly the origin of the professed revelation, and discriminate, by decisive signatures, the True from the False."[270] He moreover cautions against an unwise overconfidence in our ability to fathom "the probable conduct of the Deity," for in such matters "sobriety, and diffidence in the determination of our judgment, will here equally become the believer and the unbeliever. For where the justice and righteousness of His administration are not interested, all our first ideas of it must be few and uncertain."[271] It is true that biblical scholarship has been disturbing to some; "but the result upon the whole has been, that their learned and successful labors have . . .made the interpretation and the evidence of prophecy . . . sufficiently accessible . . . and if much yet remains to be done in the same province of argument, enough has been done to indicate most amply by this medium of proof the truth of revelation."[272] The evidence of Christianity is an aggregate of proofs; the fact that some of them may be impugned does not really detract from the force of the evidence of the others.[273] In these guarded expressions the insecurity which evidential argument has come to feel is manifest; so also is the fatal tendency still to urge

evidence which will still be enervating. In some particulars (in the references to biblical criticism, for example) it may be that Davison feels compelled by their growing notoriety to make a virtue of necessity; but in other cases he is trying to make a virtue of much that is really detrimental to his thesis in its implications.[274]

We may expect therefore to find the predictive function of prophecy urged for its evidential value. Such is of course the case. The "constituent parts of this body of evidence" are "among other topics, the following most commonly insisted upon:--the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles; the series of Prophecies; the extraordinary Perfection and Sanctity of His moral doctrine; His own character, as expressed in His Life upon earth; the rapid and triumphant Propagation of His Religion under the special circumstances of that event; the singular adaptation of the Religion itself to the nature and condition of man, both in its forms and in its essential provisions."[275] This assemblage includes some important additions to the proofs urged by Locke--important for their inherent value, whether for their evidential value or not--which must be considered in other contexts. The bulk of the work, however, has to do with "the series of Prophecies." To be sure, Davison divides the functions of prophecy into the "moral and doctrinal" and the "predictive," but it must be remembered in all considerations of his treatment that the point of departure in that treatment is, consistently, the evidential scheme.

Much of the work, of course, is openly concerned with the accepted arguments from prediction. They are not, naturally, free from

distortions. Thus he interprets Christ's statement that Abraham rejoiced to see His day (John 8:56): "No doubt we are to understand that the patriarch beheld that day of Christ through the medium of this promise which we are now considering; perhaps in other ways; but unquestionably by this prediction that 'in his seed all nations of the earth shall be blessed.' [Genesis 12:2, 22:18]"[276] It is hard to see any reason for its being "unquestionably" so except the prior assumption that prediction is the method that must have been used and therefore (on Christ's testimony) Abraham must have seen in these words an explicit vision of the Christ. In an ingenious turn, he even argues that the lack of prophecy in the Pentateuch argues the integrity of those scriptures "because Moses would have had many opportunities to write prophecies in the ante-deluvian period had he been inclined to"[277]--the force of which is perhaps not worth the suspicions it raises by what it tells of Davison's awareness of the critical difficulties of the predictive argument. In Discourse X he attempts to establish the validity of the New Testament by showing that it predicts the future. Revelation 19:10 (". . . for the testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy") he interprets as a statement to the effect that the realization of New Testament predictions is a testimony of the divinity of Christ identical to the testimony of the Old Testament prophecies of His coming: "The prophetic spirit is an evidence of Christ, by its use, and by its donation. It is a testimony which He brought with Him and vested in His Apostles, as He had sent it forth by the Prophets before Him; a supernatural sign inherent in His religion as well as preceding and announcing Him. But this prophetic

spirit in the New Testament is eminently 'the testimony of Jesus' on another account, by its subjects of prediction."[278] To illustrate that prediction fulfilled, he spends most of Discourse X showing that the harlot in Revelation is the papacy.

Yet added to this evidential preoccupation is also a concern for the moral and doctrinal nature of prophecy. "Added to" is a deliberate term; Davison does not effect an integral relationship between the two, except that the inherent excellence of the latter is often urged as additional evidence for the validity of the system.[279] Thus if Jesus lived a good life, the purpose of His doing so seems to have been to demonstrate the authority of His doctrine; and in this argument Davison finds a citadel against the skeptic who "would he put the case that the Miracles of the New Testament are not completely authenticated; that the Prophecy is not luminous enough; the morality of the Gospel not so extraordinary as to lie clearly beyond the wisdom of man; and the personal Character of its Founder not so much above all example; the propagation of the Gospel, by such instruments, not incapable of being explained on human principles; its profound adaptation to the nature of man not unlike an accident; the sincerity and martyrdom of its first teachers, who attested the facts of it, possibly a delusion"[280] yet "he is only at the beginning of his difficulties,"[281] for he must yet explain away those qualities of God's nature pre-eminently seen in Jesus--"benevolence, long suffering, wisdom, holiness."[282] One of the firmest evidences for the validity of Christian revelation is that "the model life of its Founder, in the very description of it, is a work of so much originality and wisdom, as could be the off-

spring only of consummate powers of invention; though to speak more fairly to the case, it seems, by an intuitive evidence, as if it could never have been devised, but must have come from the life and reality of some perfect excellence of virtue, impossible to be taken from, or confounded with, the fiction of ingenuity."[283] Of the same pattern is his argument (questionable from the evidential consideration, which is its intent) concerning the relative degree of evidence in various prophecies: ". . . This change in the degree of evidence attending the several portions of prophecy, instead of arguing any defect in it, rather shews its integrity, by representing to us how truly and closely it was accommodated, in certain parts, to the known condition and circumstances of that people to whom it was immediately given; whilst others of its oracles have been of such a kind to offer a conviction to every age."[284] In these and similar cases the tendency of the presentation is to direct attention to inherent qualities almost altogether by accident, quite aside from the evidential intent from which they are urged.

In this connection, Davison provides several instructive examples of the emergence of typical and allegorical notions of prophecy from a strictly evidential concept, toward a concept of symbolic validity based in a congruence of the essential and spiritual significance of the prophecy and the fulfilment. He considers the way in which Old Testament sacrifices are related to the "second dispensation":

> . . . As to the ritual atonement, the legal cleansing, to which they served, they were ends too small to account for the whole

> fabric of that kind of worship [according to Hebrews 10:4]. The declared legal ends could not in reason be the sufficient.
>
> Might we pronounce at once these rites and sacrifices to have been instrumental as Types, or Representative Signs, they receive the explanation which they want; they become the material and sensible symbols, predictions they might be called, of their counterpart in the second dispensation. The shadows of legal lustration and atonement will correspond with the sanctification and atonement of the Christian covenant. The analogy is a just one, and the capacity to presume Types to represent the greater subject will not be denied. And the evidence of prediction might therefore be grounded upon them.[285]

He is troubled that the evidential function of such signs must remain somewhat unsure; for it seemed apparent that those contemporary with these typical signs could not foresee their eventuation in the ministry of Christ: ". . . The Sense of the Types was a latent one. It was a Sense not disclosed to the Hebrew worshiper. The determination of the question is grounded on the clearest and strongest of reasons: the testimony of the Scripture itself. When those Types are instituted, there is no discovery of their principle, nor hint of their interior signification, joined with them."[266] Yet the congruence itself, once it is fulfilled, validates the intent of God in the prophetic type: ". . . They do reflect so clear and unequivocal an image of the Gospel system, when once they are confronted with it. Their cryptic characters are illuminated, and their latent import is called forth: God's first weaker ordinance becomes the expressive symbol of His greater: the prophecy of the Type is at once interpreted, and verified, in the fulfilment."[287] "They are like the statue which had its chords wrought within, but mute, till the morning sun struck upon them. They import not only the particular nature, but the magnitude and value, of the things which they prefigured."[288]

Davison senses that there is a similarity not only in the form of the two, but also in their meaning; but he does not altogether see why. What is lacking is a rationale for their commonality. Nevertheless he has lifted a corner of the veil; and for this understanding of the validity of typical prophecy he won the approval of no less profound a religious thinker than Julius Hare.[289]

In the same way he struggles to define the relationship between Zechariah 6:10-15[290] and the messianic ministry it had been traditionally referred to; he is aware that critics of the prophecy have asserted, with telling arguments, that the passage is really intended to describe the rebuilding of Jerusalem, but while admitting that point he will not be put off. It is a "symbolical prediction, founded upon the present sense of things"[291]; nevertheless, "the kingdom of Christ is delineated in connection with and by analogy to the actual kingdom which was seen before men's eyes rising to view; in the second instance, his personal priesthood, and his Church, are delineated in connection with, and by equal analogy to, the priesthood and temple of the Hebrew Church, at the time when that priesthood was reinstated in its functions, and that temple was rebuilt."[292]

> But since the form of the prophecy is assimilated to that primary idea of the Jewish restoration, in their national increase, their priesthood and their temple, the whole principle of the prophecy meets us in the face, first in its ground of analogy, and next in its proper extent, an extent wherein it leaves the inferior subject, from which it springs, far behind. In truth, there is both reason, and sublimity, in prophecy; and we shall scarcely understand it, unless we are prepared to follow it in both. Its sublimity is, that it often soars, as here, far above the scene from which it takes

> its rise. Its reason is, that it still hovers at its point of departure (if I may borrow the phrase) for its enlarged revelation; and yet by that subject it governs its course. In this method of it, I believe that men of plain unsophisticated reason find it perfectly intelligible; and that it is only the false fastidiousness of an artificial mind which puts the scruple into our perceptions either of its consistency, or of its sense. But when we consider that this structure of prophecy, founded on a proximate visible subject, has the advantage, both in the aptitude of the representation, and in the immediate pledge, of the future truth; a sounder learning may dispose us to admit it, and that with confidence, whenever the prophetic text, or mystic vision, is impatient for the larger scope, and the conspicuous characters of the Symbols and the Fact, concur in identifying the relation.[293]

For its time and circumstance, that is an impressive, though rather confused, statement of the power of symbol to be a presentational vehicle and not merely a validating sign. Yet his discussion of Jonah shows that of the two kinds of types identified by Hare in the quotation above,[294] his concern for the evidence supplied by a literal correspondence of detail has dictated his preference for the "incidental and transient"; while it is also evident that he yet sees no essential relationship between the two.

> Jonah is in his own person a type, a prophetic sign, of Christ. The miracle of his deliverance from his three days of death in the body of the whale is the expressive image of the resurrection of Christ. Our Saviour has fixed the truth and certainty of this Type[295]; the correspondence of the miracle has fixed it; and so it must remain in its proper acceptation, with that kind of evidence which belongs to all the genuine Types of the Old Testament; viz. that of a concealed prophecy which the completion explains.[296]

> [In considering the message of Jonah,] . . . without staying to discuss whether all this be a formal Type of the genius of the Christian religion, it is plainly a real example of some of its chief properties, in the manifested efficacy of repentance, the grant of pardon, and the communication of God's mercy to the Heathen world. Consequently we have in the book of Jonah a second point of connection with the Gospel. But

> in this second article the Evangelical sense was clear. It needed not a future time to interpret it. The preservation of the Ninevites wrote the ample comment upon it.[297]

The instability of Davison's concept of prophecy--and with it, of course, of the nature of revelation--is illustrated in his treatment of progressive revelation. A cautionary concern is evident in his manner whenever the question is broached; for he is sensitive to the likelihood that it may be thought detrimental to true religion:

> . . . The Ritual of the Law begins to be discountenanced by [prophecy]; the superior value of the moral commandment to be enforced; and altogether, it bears a more spiritual, and a more instructive character, than the original law given by Moses.[298]

> Perhaps I only multiply words to express the simple important fact, viz., that in the prophets there is a more luminous, and more perfectly reasoned, rule of life and faith, than in the primary Laws; and therefore that God's moral Revelation was progressive. It is more perfect in the Prophets than in the Law; more perfect in the Gospel than in either.[299]

> Let it not be thought that this view of the prophetic Revelation derogates in the least from the proper perfection or excellence of the ancient law of God. His law at all times, no doubt, has been perfectly adapted to his purposes in giving it; to the state of the persons to whom given; and to the proper exercise and probation of their obedience. But it no more infringes upon the wisdom or holiness of the Law Giver, or the dignity of his Law, to suppose his revealed Will to be enlarged from time to time, with respect to the sense of his Law than it reflects upon his Wisdom or Truth, that His revelation in any other parts of it should be as in some confessedly it is, progressive.[300]

> . . . The remote members of revelation will be seen to compose a consistent whole, not by uniformity, but progression, every part of it silently advancing toward the spirit and perfection of the Gospel.[301]

It is difficult to see how, when "the Ritual of the Law begins to be discountenanced" by the evolutionary process, the "proper perfection or

excellence of the ancient law of God" has not been "derogated." This is not to say that a reconciliation of authority and growth is not possible on any terms; it is only to say that Davison is not quite accurate in thinking that such a reconciliation can be made without damage to the previously general notion of religious authority. That conception of authority is really much more at ease in a scheme of "fixed and immutable order."[302] These passages are another example of the fact that the concept of the order of existence is changing from a stasis, logically factorable from the ultimate Premise of the nature of God, to an organic progression, in which change and growth are the expression of an immanent life.

Christological Speculation of the Eighteenth Century

It is now possible to say something about the role of conceptions of Christ in religious thought of the eighteenth century. It has been the thesis of this study that only in the total religious environment of the age can that role be adequately understood. Studies that fall within the narrow limits of what is termed christology usually tend to define only the conscious and systematized expression of that concept, and therefore partake of all the liabilities of a procedure by category. One result of that limitation is that these works generally consider only the most abstracted questions about the nature of Christ and mainly turn over all the logical and semantic resources to consider, as a logical or semantic problem, whether and in what ways one can be three and three can be one. They very seldom push these abstractions

into the empirical world and consider whether and to what extent they really reflect the quality and direction of devotional and ethical action. Nor do they often even bring them to a meaningful statement of how men should respond to them ethically or devotionally. Furthermore (and perhaps as a consequence) they tend to approach the question with one eye ever on considerations of orthodoxy, and therefore to define christological positions according to whether and in what way they deviate. In a consideration of the impact of conceptions of Christ on literature, they must of course be weighed in determining what those conceptions are; but it cannot be assumed that doctrinal treatises on the nature of Christ adequately define those conceptions.

Eighteenth-century English speculation about Christ is usually summarily and derogatorily dismissed. Dorner, for example, in his great History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, after having spent half a dozen pages on as many English rationalists in a preceding volume, sums up the English contribution in a few sentences:

> The English mind soon turned its attention decidedly to the empirical sphere. To the present day, Locke has continued the best philosophical representative of the English mind. But this system, lacking as it does an ideal character, rather patronizes than recognizes Christianity, and considers it predominantly from the point of view of an approved means of furthering the common well-being:--the State was the central point of his interest. He does what he can to give form and fulness to freedom in the finite, but not in the absolute sphere. Finally, the Deists treated God as a means for the world, and that not for a worthy moral form thereof, but for its mere well-being. The right of free-thinking was soon fought out; but when they had secured it, they were at a loss how to make a methodical, and therefore a fruitful, use of it. The reason of Deists, which, as long as it was subjected to a degree of pressure, appeared to be completely full of lofty truths, showed itself, after having conquered on a large scale,

> to be completely poor and destitute of inner unity and strength; and its impotence was revealed by the critical examination to which the fundamental presuppositions of empiricism were subjected by David Hume. And with this the development of philosophy in Great Britain came substantially to an end.[303]

As Patrick Fairbairn explained, "It was the development of the doctrine of Christ's person which he took for the subject of his historical inquiry; and however valuable some of the works in English theological literature are, as expositions or defences of that doctrine, it can scarcely be said that the doctrine itself has received from this quarter any fresh development, or even that the controversies respecting it have taken any remarkable turn, or assumed a form elsewhere unknown."[304] In D. W. Simon's translation (of 1868) of Dorner's work an appendix was included--"Historical and Critical Review of the Controversies Respecting the Person of Christ, Which Have Been Agitated in Britain since the Middle of the Seventeenth Century to the Present Time"--in which Fairbairn tried to redress the balance. He demonstrates at length that a school of rationalists, the principal lights of which were Whiston, Whitby, Clarke and Sykes, maintained that since the Father is unbegotten and the Son is begotten and the Spirit proceeding, the Son and the Spirit must be subordinate to the Father; yet, "while they rejected the doctrine of Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and supreme dominion, they still maintained His divinity, and took it much amiss to be classed with Arians."[305] He moreover reported that said Whiston, Whitby, Clarke and Sykes were like unto rationalists generally, who considered it inconsistent with sound reason to suppose that "one undivided substance" could

be "yet three distinct persons or agents," or "each person God, and still but one God";[306] and that therein they were conducting themselves in a manner unbefitting men who owed allegiance to the Thirty-Nine Articles.[307] Moreover he claimed that "there is reason to believe that Clarke's opinions were embraced by not a few clergymen of the Church of England."[308] Moreover, the learned Dr. Waterland had patiently explained to them that "in respect to essence or substance, there is no difference between the Eternal Three; that the hypostatical distinctions have respect to modes of subsistence, or distinguishing characters, and that, consequently, the priority belonging to the Father is one of order, office, or administration. Self-existence, in the sense of necessary existence, [is] common to all alike, viewed as constituting the one eternal Godhead; only that the Father, considered as Father, being unbegotten and underived, may be regarded as having self-existence in a manner peculiarly His own. In that sense, it is,. . . simply negative and relative."[309] As to the reasonableness of the scheme, the offenders had misunderstood the rules of the game; Dr. Whitby, for instance, had held "that as by one essence or substance must be understood one numerical or individual essence, and that this is all one with individual hypostasis or real person; so that to speak of one person and of one essence was all one in his account, and three persons could be nothing else than Tritheism."[310] Whereas nothing is plainer, as Dr. Waterland pointed out in rebuttal, that one can never prove "that three real persons may not be, or are not one numerical or individual substance. In short, you do not know precisely what it is that makes one being, or one essence, or one substance."[311]

Indeed, by Fairbairn's statement of the case, the "Arians" were roundly confuted on all counts; Dr. Waterland himself set before them the task they must perform before they could make good their conception of the Trinity:

> (1) You are to prove, either that the Son is not Creator; or that there are two creators, and one of them a creature. (2.) You are to show, either that the Son is not to be worshipped at all; or that there are two objects of worship, and one of them a creature. (3.) You are to prove, either that the Son is not God; or that there are two Gods, and one of them a creature. (4.) You are to show that your hypothesis is high enough to take in all the high titles and attributes ascribed to the Son in Holy Scripture; and, at the same time, low enough to account for His increasing in wisdom and not knowing the day of judgment, His being exceeding sorrowful and troubled, crying out in His agonies, and the like. You are to make all to meet in the one Logos, or Word; or else to mend your scheme by borrowing from ours.[312]

As Fairbairn remarks, "These alternative positions, it is needless to say, were never fairly met."[313] This Fairbairn represents as being the only significant christological controversy in England in the first half of the eighteenth century, the first major document of the series having appeared in 1712 and the last around 1730; afterward came "a period of remarkable stagnation in theological literature, and general indifference to the interests of religion."[314]

Our impression may be that surely this is what Carlyle called "Theorem, Brain-web and Shadow."[315] Our purpose, however, is only to ask, what can this tell us about conceptions of Christ?

In these scholastic distinctions it is possible to define attitudes of a wider scope. Neither side in the argument can be said to be undertaking the question in order to investigate, but rather in order to

embarrass the opposing one and to vindicate a position. Without engaging in judgments, it is valuable for our study to define the significance of those positions. In plain English, the orthodox statement is interested in retaining the conception of the divinity of Christ in its traditional form, and to that end has reconstructed the argument, essentially as it was stated by Augustine.[316] The rationalists, though (expedientially) cautious about reducing the Christ to a merely human level, are interested in removing from the scheme of Christianity whatever is inconsistent with reason, in order that it will fit more comfortably with the suppositions of the age.

Of the orthodox side of the debate it need only be said that the defense is founded on arguments which, for the moment at least, had lost the myth that gave them credence. This is not to say, of course, that the myth had not been a good one, nor that it had not been the statement of an abiding truth; it is not even to say that the arguments are invalid; it is merely to recognize that the myth had synthesized scientific and ontological assumptions which in the meantime had been (it appeared) exploded or transmuted. It is, fortunately for the author, beyond the requirements of this study to examine all the difficulties with which that myth was encumbered; but by way of illustration, and to demonstrate that in general the difficulties would be reductive, let it be observed that the distinctions between "created," "begotten," and "proceeding" had been grounded in a conception of a God ulterior to the creation and infusing His creative spirit into it in these varying ways. After Copernicus and Galileo and Bruno, as we have observed above, the

ulterior God can no longer be satisfactorily imaged; or, more accurately, men become aware (to varying degrees) of the metaphorical nature of their image. With the reorientation required in order to retain the conception of an ulterior God--something, perhaps, like that necessitated in positing the square root of a negative number--there must occur one (or both) of two transliterations of the attendant images of begetting, proceeding, creating. In the presence of a faith that in their imperfect representation abides an eternal verity (as well as in the presence of an obscurantist fear that there is nothing within them at all) there may be recourse to the plea of mystery; and Dr. Waterland does indeed make such a plea.[317] In the absence of that faith, or that fear, and especially in the presence of a faith that has found a new myth of sorts, some resynthesis (and hence redefinitions of the images along other lines) will occur. The quality of that new product, of course, is another story.

It is evident that in this exchange is an example of the rationalistic tendency to reduce the Trinity to One. In this matter Fairbairn's comments do not go beyond the reasons evident in the explicit statements of the combatants themselves--that the terms of the relationship indicate a subordination; that the formula of Trinity in Unity is not "reasonable," as orthodoxy had stated that formula; and that certain passages of scripture seem to lend themselves to a theory of subordination. The first of these has to do with that wakening awareness of the contingency of image that shows itself in several places in the controversy. Pursuing the argument of the subordinate nature of Christ, Whitby picked up a careless statement of Waterland's about the Father having "communicated"

His essence to the Son, and triumphantly asserts that "the communication of the Father's essence to a person is inconceivable, because the person must be supposed to have it, to be a person."[318] Waterland parried adroitly by admitting the cavil, and qualified the expression by saying that, properly put, it was the person of Christ that was communicated. At the same time, he complained that "a fair and candid adversary should make allowance for words, and attend to the thing."[319] That distinction between word and thing is, I believe, evidence that the difficulties with which the myth was contending were forcing that contingency to the light. The debate over scriptural passages that indicate subordination may be referred to that tendency previously noted, that one effect of the questioning of the traditional scheme was to lead the controversy directly back into exegesis; and it need only be added that questions concerning the nature of Christ were as resolutely pursued through the exegetical method as any other.[320]

The second--the question of reasonableness--may be viewed as an over-simplification of the entire theoretical problem attendant on the gradual working out of the conception of immanence, rationally understood. The idea of immanence may make itself many myths, from blind necessity to fetish-worship, from naturalism to monistic idealism. In the early stages of rationalism, however, given the concurrent faith in logical deduction, the idea tends to express itself in a hierarchical rational monism. The system is almost inescapably unitarian. The tendency of the logical evidential scheme to blur qualitative distinctions, and the refusal of Whitby to distinguish between "essence" and "person" are, I

believe, of a piece; they both reflect that transmutation of quality into quantity which is the tendency of rational monism. In short there is no place in a consistent scheme drawn from these premises for two gods or three gods; they either merge indistinguishably into the Ultimate Premise, in absolute identity, or, failing that in the collapse of the premise of the unity of God, all things become gods unto themselves. The hypostatical distinctions in the Being of God, the qualitative conceptions of the Unity, which the idea of Trinity tries to express, are blurred out into one all-embracing Authority. From merely theoretical considerations, then, it is no surprise that Christ is conceived as subordinate; nor is it surprising that the christology of the rationalists could not stop with Arianism, but slid inevitably into a merely humanistic concept.

Christology Implied in Other Religious Issues

Having defined this tendency of the christology of the time, let us turn to the expression of it in the specific related religious questions we have considered above.

First, it will be noted that each of these questions tends to refer itself finally to its bearing on the nature and ministry of Christ. Not that the prosecutors of these questions usually intended that effect. Many of the writers seem altogether convinced that the case of the Christ is unique, and that whatever objections may generally by urged against miracle, prophecy, etc., they cannot be legitimately urged against Him. Besides, in many instances the sense of the collapse of traditional

beliefs, however beneficial that collapse might be thought, was qualified by an uncertainty, often by cautionary hedging or equivocation, when it came to the implications for the Christ. There can be little doubt that this cautionary predeliction is intensified by external considerations--by the humane motive that would protect the faith of the masses, by the more selfish motive of church preferment,[321] finally by the punitive legal measures designed to quiet such speculations.[322] The effect of such special pleading was, first, to slow the progress of speculation about the Christ; and the paucity of material specifically christological in the rationalistic age can be traced in part to these cautions. A concurrent effect was to restrict even further the treatment of all religious issues to superficial and peripheral elements.[323] But the final effect could only be that the object of this obscurantism should be perceived, its motives severely scrutinized, and its effects harshly redressed. Once again, then--in a pattern analogous to other obscurantist tendencies in a rationalism that simultaneously posited universal reasonableness and exalted the powers of consistent reason--the very attempts to remove the traditional doctrines about Christ from inimical speculation served at last only to make them the focus of later, more daring assaults.

All Questions Direct Attention to the Problem of Christology

There is, then, an indirect tendency in all these questions to narrow attention upon Christ. This is the tendency evident in the condemnation of "priestcraft" for having introduced spurious and fraudulent

additions to pristine Christianity.[324] As it is attempted to strike these away, the definition of Christianity becomes more and more closely limited to that which the age conceives to be intimately associated with the Christ. So Locke, returning to scripture to determine the true basis of Christianity, asserted that the only requisites were first, acceptance of the fact that Christ was indeed the Messiah, and second, observance of His code of repentance and moral reformation, which in turn rested on the authority of His unique credentials.[325] Middleton, in urging the rejection of evidence "of doubtful credit," insists that "the genuin ground on which Christianity rests" is "the history of our Saviour's doctrine and miracles, as it is declared and comprized within the cannon of the Holy Scriptures."[326] Even the proponents of a pure natural religion, who by their rejection or naturalization of the special features of Christianity would seem exceptions to the practice, generally manage to identify the essence of natural religion with the true doctrine of Christ. So for example Tindal--who it will be recalled interpreted St. Peter's observation that God is no respecter of persons to mean that God did not confine salvation to those who relied on the person of Christ[327]--who, like Butler, sees the Gospel as a republication of natural religion[328] --makes Christ validate (on the authority of Dr. Sherlock) his entire scheme:

> If the law and the prophets hang on these two great commandments, viz. The love of God and the love of our neighbor; then the doctrine of our saviour, which is the perfection of the law and the prophets, must hang on them likewise. Now, if you will allow, that the love of God, and the love of our neighbor, are fundamentals in the law of reason and nature (as undoubtedly

> they are) you must also allow, that whatever may be deduced from them by rational consequence, must be a precept of the law of nature: Whatever therefore hangs on these two commandments, must necessarily be a part of natural religion; and that all the law and the prophets do so hang; and consequently the doctrine of the gospel, which is the perfection of them, you have had our saviour's express testimony. Since then it appears (as I th_nk) that the religion of the gospel is the true original religion of reason and nature . . . will be admitted by all who allow the force and obligation of natural religion . . . .[329]

Similarly, for Butler, Christ comes to give the testimony of His miracles to the moral scheme of nature: "He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of testimony [of His miracles]."[330] In the discussion of the evidential argument above, it will perhaps have been noted how frequently that argument centered upon the Christ. We have noted, for example, how Locke renders the miracles and even the doctrines of Christ into "evidence" and explains their occurrence from an evidential motive.[331] At the same time, there seems to be an urgent sense of the necessity of making Christ and His teachings square with the assumptions of rationalism, as in the interpretation of forgiveness of Spinoza, Tindal, Kant;[332] while to the legalistic scheme of eternal reward and punishment affixed to the evidential argument, the authority of Christ's mandates is an indispensable lever. For Butler, the miracles and prophecies do indeed prove redemption by Christ, but they also show God as a judge; and His authority not only validates the salvation of man; it is also a threat.[333] The debate over prophecy, in almost every movement it took, turned on the questions of the nature and authority of Christ--as indeed it was required to do by its application, from time immemorial, to that purpose. In its evidential

function, the point of the examination of prophecy was that the predictions of the Old Testament had been specifically realized in Christ; and attacks upon that argument, quite logically, set out to show that they had not.[334] The recovery of arguments from typical and allegorical prophecy turned explicitly upon their validation of Christ--to an extent even beyond that suggested by the discussion of these phenomena above[335]--for that recovery was, initially, a desperate expedient for the nonce, brought in to supplement the decimated literal evidence; and when they began to find a defensible rationale, that rationale was the nature and ministry of Christ, a correspondence to which could be demonstrated in the essential or formal peculiarities of the prophecies. By Lessing's time, typical and allegorical prophecy, though still urged for its "proof," was being examined for its inherent meanings, and those meanings then referred to the Christ, where they were found to be clarified and enlarged--"fulfilled"--a process that would soon exalt Him into a rich symbol: "By a 'hint' I mean that which already contains any germ, out of which the, as yet, held back truth allows itself to be developed. Of this character was the inference of Christ from the naming of God 'the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.' [? a God who reveals Himself progressively through the generations of Israel?] This hint appears to me to be unquestionably capable of being worked out into a strong proof."[336] As for the progress of biblical criticism, the extracts from Michaelis and especially his reaction to the Reimarus fragments show what a central place the validity of the accounts of Christ held, second to no other consideration and comparable only to the dispute over the authorship of the

Pentateuch. It is true that accidental considerations partly explain that preoccupation--for instance, the accident of there being four accounts, besides other apocryphal ones, to be compared. Even so, it is evident the scholars recognized fully that the crux and the end of biblical research was to define as nearly as possible the role of the Christ.[337] The paucity of specifically christological material in England, therefore, is, I judge, an accident deriving primarily from two related sources: the expediency of silence, and the absence of any searching constructive ontological investigation.[338] In Germany, where these accidental discouragements were not so commanding, a reconstructive christological enquiry appeared earlier and more forcefully (though other reasons also obtained). In England, this speculation tended to work its way out through the implications of other religious issues.

The Reductive Tendencies in These Questions Infect Orthodox Christology

Secondly, in the process of referring these questions to the Christ, the commentators have laden Him with the implications of these related issues. It will be self-evident that this effect was reductive. As miracle evanishes into superstition or fraud, as the evidence of prophecy is whittled away, as biblical research begins to cast a pallor of doubt on the authenticity of the scriptures, as the speciality of Christianity melts into merely another expression of a universal natural religion and the doctrines of Christianity are pared down to the barest moral code, the authority and dignity of Christ deteriorate, and various naturalistic interpretations emerge. Some

show of speciality in the nature or mission of Christ is retained, however inconsistently; but in the same manner as with the related issues, the speciality is quantitatively reduced until it is only a fixture, preserved only as a mark of authority. Thus for example in Germany the definition of requisite Christian belief came down, finally, to the test of the resurrection: those who claimed belief in it could be called Christian, those who did not could not.[339] The humanizing of Christ which we have seen in its incipience in the subordinationism of Clarke and his colleagues progressed apace in the latter half of the century toward its logical conclusion. By 1782 Joseph Priestley, having resigned his pastoral charge, stated an outright Socinian view of Christ in his History of the Corruptions of Christianity;[340] Paine had gone further, rejecting the revelation of religion altogether for the revelation of nature.[341] In Germany before the end of the century there had already begun to appear the "lives of Christ," not only indicative of the centrality of interest but also sadly eloquent of the depths to which the denigration could go. Reimarus presented Jesus as a political opportunist (though with the laudable intent of freeing the Jews)[342]; Karl F. Bahrdt (1741-1792) and Karl Heinrich Venturini (1768-1849), among the first of the recreators of the life of Jesus in fictional form, implicated him in a plot with the Essenes to overthrow the priesthood, and to make their treatments naturalistic were obliged to treat many of the miracles and even (in the case of Bahrdt) the entire crucifixion as fraudulent though benevolent designs.[343] Among the English, the same kind of explanation appeared a half-century later in An Inquiry Concerning the Origin of

Christianity (1838) by Charles Hennell--who, incidentally, instigated George Eliot's translation of Strauss.[344]

It will be seen, then, that this reduction is not merely the result of association with other religious materials that were suffering loss of stature. The entire tendency of rationalism was working to bring Christ within a rationalistic framework, and so render beliefs about His divinity nugatory. Implicated as rationalism was in the Christian tradition, the naturalization of Christ did not frame itself at first as an outright denial of His claims; it rather attempted to enlist Him as a rationalist. In the words of Schweitzer, "For . . . the rationalistic writers He is the admirable revealer of true virtue, which is coincident with right reason. Thus each successive epoch of theology found its own thoughts in Jesus; that was, indeed, the only way in which it could make Him live."[345] Yet he was retained for reasons relatively accidental, primarily for the appearance of authority which His name lent to the scheme. As a system, rationalism could easily dispense with Christ, had not so much been required to be surrendered by association. Rationalism requires only an orderly notion of existence, with enough faith in the final authority of a rational principle to evoke obedience, and a reliable code of conduct by which that burden of obedience can be discharged. What it wants then is the doctrine, as simple as possible, and the code, reasonable in its demands and universal in its applicability. That being once given--from what source does not in itself matter much--what is required is merely a badge of authority. Now Christ provided, conveniently, that authority; but His mission being considered

as merely to declare and to validate, once this was accomplished He had, supposedly, really little to do with it all; any authoritative stamp, regardless of its nature, should do as much, if appropriately validated by external signs or by self-consistent reasonableness. Christ in His proper person, and all the doctrinal paraphernalia pertinent thereto, were really superfluous.

The Christ of the Rationalists a Symbol for Their Concept of the Relation of God and Man

At the same time, the significance of Schweitzer's comment must not be overlooked. The Christ which each age frames for itself will be the embodiment of its Christain concepts; and behind these, He will be a symbol of what that age conceives the ontological relationship between man and God to be--provided, of course, He continues to be employed as symbol at all. In the legalistic monarchial conception of rationalism He is the Figure-head who in God's name declares necessary knowledge of God and establishes by the authoritative signs of His office the necessary codes; and as the age approaches naturalism, that authority is rejected as something put upon Him by conniving men, whose yoke He was really engaged in throwing off, and He becomes merely part of the natural order, as He ought to be and indeed as He conceived Himself to be--and His role was, and is, to bring about through natural means a reformation of mankind so that all men too may live free from superstitions and other corruptions of their natural state. It is merely illustrative of this tendency that wherever the symbol

will not yield to such reconstruction the spirit of the age will try to cast it off, usually with some violence.

A necessary corollary is that the symbol so conceived will bear the imprint of the inexcellencies of the zeitgeist as well as its strengths. A telling illustration, I think, and one significant for this treatise, is the failure of the Christ of the rationalists to achieve an integral identity. As represented by them, He is the personification of the Cartesian dichotomy--or what is, I suspect, the same thing, of the transcendent God segregated from the experiential world. By Locke's account, for instance, Christ did two things: He transmitted divine doctrines, and He validated these by miracle and fulfillment of prophecy. There was something required "to be believed for justification," and something "required to be done for justification."[346] The one "sent from God and coming with visible authority from him" to man "should, as a king and lawmaker, tell them their duties and require their obedience."[347] There seems to be no sense at all of an inherent relationship between doctrine and command, between "sign" and message, between faith and conduct, between command and motive. There is no Jacob's ladder on which angels ascend and descend; there is only the chain of a quantitative order, with the links fixed.

The Reciprocal Impact of Christology Upon Rationalism

It will be noted that the foregoing paragraphs allege a paradox. It has been asserted that the treatments of Christ were reductive and tended to rationalize His divinity, tended to make

Him nugatory; at the same time, it is claimed that most of the religious issues served to direct attention to the problem of the Christ. That paradox can be explained, I believe, through an understanding of the nature of the contradictions of which rationalism was trying to rid itself. The traditional conception of the divinity of Christ, like the entire supernatural system of which it was the keystone, was a given with which rationalism began; and a revolution as sweeping as this entire theological reorientation could not restructure the whole system at once and with complete consistency. Nor was the reason merely that such a restructuring perforce took time. For at the outset rationalism was still building by the same blueprint, and still trying to use such of the old materials as could be salvaged. The need for an authority somehow more valid than the suspect empirical data was common to rationalism and the transcendent system it was trying to displace. On the one hand, then, it is necessary to see the divinity of Christ as a tradition so intricately and ubiquitously involved in all questions of order and value that it could not without extended application be removed. On the other hand--and the claim is urged as historical thesis, not as dogma--the humanizing and naturalizing of Christ proved to be more of a task than the system could easily absorb. The naturalistic patterns into which the nature and ministry of Christ were forced kept bursting at the seams; and the efforts the rationalists expended in order to make Christ fit the scheme, so that His authority might be appropriated, served also to draw attention to Him. It is instructive, for example, to watch Tindal culling the inimical details of the Gospel

accounts from what can be made to support his scheme. The role of the gospel is to free men from superstition;[348] and it is of course reason that "lights every man";[349] the law, the prophets and the gospel are all designed to guide men into the way of right reason.[350] Yet the idea of the incarnation is rejected as unreasonable,[351] and the scriptures concerning Christ's relation to the Father and the office of the Holy Spirit are shrugged off, if not ridiculed.[352]

Nor could "nature" and "reason" be continually employed to explain the Christ without something happening to the meaning of these terms. When Butler speculates that Christ's being born at Bethlehem comes about "naturally,"[353] the concept of nature is asked to encompass a phenomenon which, with essentially the same components, has been traditionally called miraculous. We have noted Spinoza's gathering of "signs" within the limits of "nature";[354] and indeed his works offer many examples of similar translation of the supernatural into the natural, with the effect it is true of reducing the speciality of the supernatural but also with the effect of infusing a more religious significance into the mundane. Thus he speaks of a spirit of Christ that inhabits all things: "I do not think it at all necessary for one's salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but as regards the eternal Son of God, that is, God's eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, one must think otherwise. For without this no one can attain to a state of bliss, because it alone shows what is true or false, good or evil."[355] And he speaks of the

two modes which are "immediate" creations of God, which, "we say, have been from all eternity," "Motion . . . is a Son, Product, or Effect created immediately by God. As regards the Understanding in the thinking thing, this, like the first, is also a Son, Product, or immediate Creation of God. . . ."[356] What is here seen in Spinoza is merely a more profound and more philosophical expression of a practice common in rationalism--the "divine" is brought down to the level of the natural and reasonable, with the intent of making it part of the pattern; but sometimes the result is rather to make the natural pregnant with the divine, until, in the words of Blake, "every thing that lives is holy."[357]

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]I am using the word to refer to "the assumption of the supremacy of reason in matters of religion," in the words of Mark Pattison, as well as to a particular group of religious thinkers. Mark Pattison, "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750," Recent Inquiries in Theology, by Eminent English Churchmen; Being "Essays and Reviews", ed. Frederic Henry Hedge, 4th American ed. (Boston, 1864), p. 283. (The 4th American edition is taken from the 2nd London edition.)

[2]See for example Frederick Maurice, The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice Chiefly Told in His Own Letters (New York, 1884), I, 289, 511, 512, 517, 518; and Pattison, pp. 288-89, 326, 357.

[3]"If we cannot have a firm apprehension and conviction of God's character and of His relation to ourselves in His Son, except in so far as we are assured that the book which contains a declaration of these eternal facts is directly and supernaturally inspired, I can see no hope of any satisfactory escape from the perplexities into which we have fallen; for on this supposition I cannot see how any indisputable evidence of such inspiration is attainable." Thomas Erskine, "The Bible in Relation to Faith," The Spiritual Order and Other Papers Selected from the Manuscripts of the Late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1876), p. 84. For fuller illustration see the discussion of miracle and prophecy below.

[4]See for instance F. D. Maurice's coupling of systematic religion and rationalism as equally and similarly failures to meet religious need in a letter quoted in John F. Porter and William J. Wolf, Toward the Recovery of Unity: The Thought of Frederick Denison Maurice (New York, 1964), p. 105.

This work is composed largely of letters by Maurice taken mostly from Frederick Maurice, Life. Since the Life is rare, I give reference to Porter and Wolf where possible, citing also the location of the passage in the Life. The passage cited in this note may be found in Life, I, 349.

[5]So judges Carlyle in a letter to Emerson: "Do you know English Puseyism? Good Heavens! in the whole circle of History is there the parallel of that,--a true worship rising at this hour of the day for Bands and the Shovel-hat? Distraction surely, incipience of the 'final deliration' enters upon the poor old English Formulism that has called

itself for some two centuries a Church. No likelier symptom of its being soon about to leave the world has come to light in my time." Charles Eliot Norton, ed., The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1834-1872 (Boston, 1883), I, 305. Again, to the same: "These poor good men [the Puseyites], merciful, zealous, with many sympathies and thoughts, there do they vehemently appeal to me, Et tu, Brute? Brother, wilt thou too insist on the breeches being old,--not ply a needle among us here?--To the naked Caliban, gigantic, for whom such breeches would not be a glove, who is stalking and groping there in search of new breeches and accoutrements, sure to get them, and to tread into nonentity whoever hinders him in the search,--they are blind as if they had no eyes. Sartorial men; ninth-parts of a man. . . . " Ibid., p. 313. Compare Maurice on the Tractarians, Porter and Wolf, p. 76; and Julius Charles Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, with Notes, ed. E. H. Plumptre, 3rd ed. (London, 1886), pp. 278, 299-300, 334.

[6]Pattison, p. 326.

[7]Norton, I, 190.

[8]Ibid., pp. 304-305.

[9]Alexander Carlyle, ed., New Letters of Thomas Carlyle (London, 1904), I, 52.

[10]" . . . Methods of argumentative proof, place the mind in an unfavorable attitude for the consideration of religious truth. It is like removing ourselves, for the purpose of examining an object, to the furthest point from which the object is visible." Pattison, pp. 290-91.

[11]"And as the principle of Religion itself has proved to be natural to man, and truly conformable to his constitution and character, by the fact of his embracing it under forms exceedingly perverted; so the gift of a Revelation is shewn to be highly probable, and adapted to his expectation and sense of things, by his reception of fictitious systems of it, which in many cases have had in them everything to create a positive disbelief, excepting the one presumption, which the judgment and feeling of Nature still cling to, that the Deity can and will somewhere reveal Himself to his creatures: a propensity of belief, which can be referred only to one or both of those two causes,--the Absolute likelihood which men have seen in the hope of a Revelation, or the traditionary impression of One actually given; a propensity therefore which attests either the Probability or the Fact." John Davison, Discourses on Prophecy: In Which Are Considered Its Structure, Use and Inspiration; Being the Substance of Twelve Sermons Preached in the Chapel at Lincoln's Inn, in the Lecture Founded by the Right Reverend William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1839), p. 2.

[12]"The statement that everything in the world is of the same colour, that there is no special supernatural or momentary revelation. impressed itself upon our minds as unanswerable. The scientific purview of a universe in which there is no appreciable trace of any free will superior to that of man became, from the first months of 1846, the immovable anchor from which we [he and Berthelot] never shifted. We shall never move from this position until we shall have encountered in nature some one specially intentional fact having its cause outside the free will of man or the spontaneous action of the animal." Ernest Renan, Recollections of My Youth, trans. C. B. Pitman (Boston, 1929), p. 298. Compare Middleton's statement, a hundred years prior: "If any one therefore should be disposed to answer or confute, what I have affirmed in this book, he must take a different method, from what my Antagonists have hitherto pursued; must not expect, to bear down facts with systems; and from the supposed integrity and piety of the Fathers, to infer the certainty of what they attest: but must refer us to instances, which tally with their testimonies, and experimentally prove the truth of them." Conyers Middleton, A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, Which Are Supposed to Have Subsisted in the Christian Church, From the Earliest Ages Through Several Successive Centuries. By Which It Is Shewn, That We Have No Sufficient Reason to Believe, Upon the Authority of the Primitive Fathers, Than Any Such Powers Were Continued to the Church, After the Days of the Apostles (London, 1749), p. xxxiv.

See also the excellent analysis by Baden Powell, quoted on pp. 54-55, below.

[13]"The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of 'a Mediator between God and man.' For we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others. . . ." Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature (New York, 1864), p. 240 (first published 1736).

[14]"Every man, as a member of the commonwealth, ought to be content with the possession of his own opinion in private, without perplexing his neighbour, or disturbing the public."

"To remove opinions fundamental in religion, is impossible, and the attempt wicked, whether those opinions be true or false; unless your avowed design be to abolish that religion altogether. So, for instance, in the famous doctrine of Christ's divinity, which has been universally received by all bodies of Christians, since the condemnation of Arianism . . . wherefore the proceedings of the Socinians are both vain and unwarrantable; because they will be never able to advance their own opinion, or meet any other success than breeding doubts and disturbances. . . . "

"I am not answerable to God for the doubts that arise in my own breast, since they are the consequence of that reason which he has planted in me, if I take care to conceal those doubts from others, if I use my best endeavours to subdue them, and if they have no influence

on the conduct of my life." Jonathan Swift, "Thoughts on Religion," The Works of the Rev. Jonathan Swift, D. D., Dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin, ed. Thomas Sheridan, rev. ed. (London, 1808), IX, 277-79.

[15]See the discussion of Conyers Middleton below, pp. 56-58.

[16]Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 3rd ed. (London, 1902), I, 22-23.

[17]Alfred William Benn, The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 1st ed. [reprinted] (New York, 1962), I, 93. (This work was first published in 1906.)

[18]See the quotation below from Spinoza's Short Treatise, p. 63.

[19]Benn, I, 81-82; see also Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 101-102.

[20]Benn, I, 82.

[21]A contribution of Bruno. Benn, I, 86-87.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Stephen, I, 31.

[24]I feel compelled to note the polemical address of both Stephen and Benn and to protest, mildly, the colored language and slanted presentation in which this address sometimes presents itself. Benn is the more guilty of the two. See especially the opening chapter of his work, "Rationalism and the Methods of Faith," near the end of which this passage occurs: "Modern theologians, no doubt, make a great show of logic, and sometimes refer with pride to their predecessors, the mediaeval schoolmen, as masters and models of the art. How far they are sincere in their professions may be ascertained, among other ways, by a comparison with the controversial methods of philosophers and men of science. The latter have their faults; they may suppress or distort facts, they may appeal to vulgar prejudices, they may impute bad motives to their opponents. But these are faults of particular individuals or of human nature in general, not of the class to which they belong; and to be found guilty of them is discreditable. With theologians they are habitual, and are neither censured nor apologised for. A high standard of truth and honour is no more expected of them than of the detective police. And that is because, like the police, they look on themselves as pitted against criminals who are not entitled to fair play. Their whole idea of honour seems to be to do the best they can for the side on which they are retained, with this difference, of course, from the ordinary English lawyer, that they are always on the side of the crown" (Benn, I, 56-7). The date of composition and the general state of religion at the time must excuse, but not win unqualified acceptance of, the tenor of their presentations.

[25]Stephen, I, 32-33. The last statement must be qualified, I think, when the "benevolence" of God (which in Neoplatonism compels Him to plenitude--see A. O. Lovejoy, pp. 62-67) is conceived as "grace"--i. e., leaves the human will a freedom by limiting itself. The reappearance of the kenosis theory in nineteenth-century theology manifests, I think, a discovery of this escape from necessitarianism. Of course, in a sense this is an "anti-theology" and in that sense leaves Stephen's assertion untouched. Insofar as theology is committed both to a rational structure and to the notions of God that deny Him the power of self-limitation, this comment of Stephen's must be adjudged accurate.

[26]Stephen, I, 33.

[27]See Benn's prosecution of Butler on this score, I, 139-149.

[28]See, e. g., the concluding paragraph of Part I of Pope's Essay on Man, which simultaneously asserts the fallibility of human reason and the certainty of the rationality of the universe. I. e., it is reasonable for man's reason to be fallible, as we know from the reasonableness of our conceptions of order and fitness.

See Tindall wavering between the assertion that no man can think other than as he does (and the consequent assertion that thus God cannot judge man's error) and the conflicting attempt to set "self-evident" notions apart from uncertain and erroneous knowledge of another kind and thus make man responsible for following the former: "Faith considered in itself can neither be a virtue, or a vice; because men can no otherwise believe than as things appear to them: nay, can there be an higher affront to God than to suppose, he requires men to judge otherwise than the faculties he has given them enable them to do?" Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation: or, The Gospel, a Republication of the Religion of Nature (London, 1730), p. 49. "[quoting, with approval, Dr. Whitby] Belief, or disbelief, can neither be a virtue, or a crime in any one, who uses the best means in his power of being informed. If a proposition is evident, we cannot avoid believing it; and where is the merit or piety of a necessary assent? If it is not evident we cannot help rejecting it, or doubting of it: And where is the crime of not performing impossibilities, or not believing what does not appear to us to be true?" Ibid., p. 50.

" . . . It would be as reasonable to suppose, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right ones in one age, and unequal in another, as to suppose, that the duties of religion should differ in one age from what they were in another; the habitudes and relations from which they flow continuing always the same." Ibid., p. 73. Compare: " . . . All men, at all times, must have had sufficient means to discover whatever God designed they should know and practice, I do not mean by this that all should have equal knowledge; but that all should have what is sufficient for the circumstances they are in." Ibid., p. 12.

"Those propositions which need no proof, we call self-evident; because by comparing the ideas, signified by the terms of such propositions, we immediately discern their agreement, or disagreement: This

is, as I said before, what we call intuitive knowledge, and is the knowledge of God himself, who sees all things by intuition. . . ." Ibid., p. 157. Compare: "Were it not for those self-evident notions, which are the foundation of all our reasonings, there could be no intellectual communication between God and man; nor, as we are framed, can God ascertain us of any truth, but by shewing its agreement with those self-evident notions, which are the tests by which we are to judge of every thing, even the being of God and natural religion; which, though not knowable by intuition, are to be demonstrated by proofs, which have, mediately or immediately, a necessary connection with our self-evident notions." Ibid., p 159.

[29]"With relation to ourselves, we cannot but know how we are to act; if we consider, that God has endowed man with such a nature, as makes him necessarily desire his own good; and therefore, may be sure, that God, who has bestowed this nature on him, could not require anything of him in prejudice of it; but on the contrary, that he should do every thing which tends to promote the good of it." Ibid., p. 21.

"Hence we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational nature, since our reason for kind, though not for degree, is of the same nature as that of God's; nay, it is our reason which makes us the image of God himself, and is the common bond which unites Heaven and Earth; the creatures and creator. . . ." Ibid., p. 27. " . . . If truth in general, implies an agreement of our ideas with the things themselves, religious truth, or true religion must consist in the agreement of our ideas with those things, which are the subjects of our religious enquiry; viz., the nature of God and man: and false religion must consist in having ideas that are not agreeable to, or do not truly represent those subjects. . . ." Ibid., p. 62. "It would be as reasonable to suppose, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right ones in one age, and unequal in another, as to suppose, that the duties of religion should differ in one age from what they were in another. . . ." Ibid., p. 73.

[30]" . . . A sincere examination . . . is all God can require . . . for the discovery of his will." Ibid., p. 10.

"If then a being infinitely happy in himself, could not command his creatures any thing for his own good; nor an all-wise being things to no end or purpose; nor an all-good being any thing but for their good: It unavoidably follows, nothing can be a part of the divine law, but what tends to promote the common interest, and mutual happiness of his rational creatures; and every thing that does so, must be a part of it." Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[31]"Shall we say, that God, who had the forming of human understanding, as well as his own laws, did not know how to adjust the one to the other?" Ibid., p. 11. "[It is a superstitious notion] that an unlimited being could appear under the limited form of a man, or other animal [or] that such a being could be confined to a small spot of earth, while another equally omnipresent was in heaven, and a third descending from thence [or] that one God could be sent on the errand of another God, after the

manner that God Mercury was by God Jupiter." Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[32]Lovejoy, p. 47.

[33]"If God will judge mankind as they are accountable, that is, as they are rational; the judgment must hold an exact proportion to the use they make of their reason. And it would be in vain to use it, if the use of it would not justify them before God; and men would be in a miserable condition indeed, if whether they used it or not, they should be alike criminal. And if God designed mankind should at all times know, what he wills them to know, believe, profess and practice; and has given them no other means for this, but the use of reason; reason, human reason, must then be that means. . . . What God requires . . . must be in itself . . . reasonable. . . . As the eye is the sole judge of what is visible; the ear of what is audible; so reason, of what is reasonable." Tindall, p. 13.

[34]" . . . Inconstancy, as it argues a defect either of wisdom or power, cannot belong to a being infinitely wise and powerful; what unerring wisdom has once instituted can have no defects; and as God is entirely free from all partiality, his laws must alike extend to all times and places." Ibid., p. 24.

[35]p. 54. Compare Benn, I, 67: "Greek thought had always been approaching [monism and pantheism]."

[36]Lovejoy, p. 45.

[37]Ibid., p. 62.

[38]Benn, I, 84.

[39]Lovejoy, pp. 70-72.

[40]Lovejoy, p. 119.

[41]Earlier Philosophical Writings, trans. Frank A. Hayes (Indianapolis, the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), p. 118.

[42]Ibid., p. 119.

[43]Ibid.

[44]David Bidney, "Introduction," Ibid., p. xxxv. Spinoza is offered in the present study as another example of the tendency of the contradiction to resolve itself in determinism, not as an influence on the English rationalists of the eighteenth century. Stephen points out that these are generally ignorant of his work (Stephen, I, 33, fn.).

[45]Benn, I, 107.

[46]Lovejoy, p. 82.

[47]Ibid., pp. 84-93.

[48]Ibid., p. 96.

[49]Benn, I, 94.

[50]Stephen, I, 25.

[51]Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[52]Ibid., p. 26.

[53]Ibid., p. 27.

[54]"The Most Wise did not choose, for no choice was necessary where no antecedent, hesitating deliberation was needed. All this sequence of thought, these plans, and these varying designs are incompatible with the most perfect nature of the eternal, immutable Spirit. They belong to that deaf and dumb eternity which the inactive God,

> . . . erst spent in lonely thought
> Til now a world He made, and not before.

on which we are already agreed. I am astonished that the great and exact thinker, Leibniz, could give way to anthropomorphisms of that sort. . . . . Leibniz is not to blame for this nonsense, except insofar as his poetic mind never, even for the most rigorous truths, disdained ornament, that is, images, similes, allegories, anthropomorphisms, and so on." Johann Gottfried Herder, God, Some Conversations, trans. Frederick H. Burkhardt (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1940), pp. 125-6. "The highest power must know itself, otherwise it is a blind force which would surely be overthrown by a thinking power and hence not be Deity." Ibid., p. 141.

" . . . There is a mathematical reason in the world. And since our senses alone prevent us from knowing and applying it everywhere in nature, this very reason by its essence tells us that if there are thinking beings who observe the world with finer senses, they nevertheless think according to exactly the same unique, necessary laws. Thus the Being which is the source of my reason and every other reason, must know the same inner laws of thought in the highest sense, and could do nothing else than make its effects into fundamental principles of existence." Ibid., p. 151.

" . . . The image of the World-Soul . . . is a human image, and if it is used prudently a great deal concerning the inherently indwelling power of God can be illustrated clearly by means of it. Nevertheless it remains an image, which, without the greatest care, immediately misleads one." Pp. 156-7.

"[God] is neither a face nor a mask, neither a legal personality, nor a distinct character who exists among others and acts beside them. Let us have done with these personalizations which always lead if not

to something false, assumed or imputed, then to something distinctive in form, figure, or differentiation from others, to position, rank, and that sort of thing, and hence carry us away from the pure conception of an entirely incomparable essence and truth. God no more portrays a 'person,' or affects personal qualities, or has a personal way of thinking which is distinct from, and in contrast to other ways, than He resembles a person. He is. None is like unto Him." P. 200.

[55]I have extrapolated from an idea of Stephen's on the effect of a growing awareness of contingency, I, 28-29. This tendency is clearly evident, I believe, in the quotations from Herder in the preceding note.

[56]John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, in The Works of John Locke: A New Edition, Corrected (London, 1823), VII, 158 [reprinted].

[57]The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (London, 1917), I, 7-8.

[58]Locke, p. 3.

[59]Butler, pp. 86-87.

[60]Compare Jowett: "Philosophical differences are in the background [of the dispute over interpretation of scripture], into which the differences about Scripture also resolve themselves. They seem to run up at last into a difference of opinion respecting revelation itself; whether given beside the human faculties or through them; whether an interruption of the laws of nature, or their perfection and fulfilment." Benjamin Jowett, "On the Interpretation of Scripture," in Recent Inquiries, p. 363.

[61]Herder, writing in 1787, noted that Spinoza had anticipated much subsequent Old Testament criticism, and had done sounder and more adequate work than his successors. Herder, p. 80.

[62]Davison, pp. 157ff.

[63]See the quotation from Jowett in footnote 60 above.

[64]Baden Powell, "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity," in Recent Inquiries, pp. 159-160. The qualification Powell here makes ("yet still might be appealed to . . .") was the fruit of a later conception of the nature of religion, involving an awareness of historicity and (in some cases) an acceptance of the relative validity of myth. In the earlier rationalism, however, there was a general consensus in the stability of religious knowledge, or even a primitivistic belief that the earliest pristine revelation had degenerated. See the quotation from Tindall, p. 73, in footnote 28 above.

[65]Powell, p. 128. The point of this passage is that if the order of the universe derives from the very nature of God, miracles are not

only superfluous, they actually become an embarrassment; so, in the last two sentences of the preceding quotation, if they are accepted as miraculous it is because they are inextricably associated with doctrine which, being accepted, wins acceptance for the medium in which it is expressed. But such irrational acceptance is at odds with rationalism.

[66]Locke, p. 32.

[67]Ibid., p. 49.

[68]Ibid., p. 143.

[69]Stephen, I, 106-109.

[70]Middleton, p. iv.

[71]Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.

[72]Ibid., pp. xxi, 30ff.

[73] e.g., Eusebius against Papias, p. 48.

[74]Ibid., p. 3.

[75]Ibid., p. xciv.

[76]Ibid., pp. xciv-xcv.

[77]Ibid., p. ix.

[78]Ibid., p. xxii.

[79]Tindall, p. 137.

[80]Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[81]Butler, pp. 294-295.

[82]Care must be taken not to require Butler himself to be limited to the arguments of the Analogy, in which he openly avows he is assuming a stance in order to address the attitudes of others. " . . . I have argued upon the principles of others, not my own; and have omitted what I think true, and of utmost importance, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe; and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe--the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever: which I apprehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment" (p. 310).

[83]Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 8.

[84]Ibid., pp. 15, 82-83.

[85]Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[86]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[87]Ibid., p. 33.

[88]Ibid., p. 34.

[89]"We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets only perceived God's revelation by the aid of the imagination, that is, by words and figures either real or imaginary. We find no other means mentioned in Scripture, and therefore must not invent any. As to the particular law of Nature by which the communications took place, I confess my ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others do, that they took place by the power of God; but this would be mere trifling, and no better than explaining some unique specimen by a transcendental term. Everything takes place by the power of God. Nature herself is the power of God under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature. It is absolute folly, therefore, to ascribe an event to the power of God when we know not its natural cause, which is the power of God." Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[90]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[91]Ms. B states the case more strongly: "This self-revelation must therefore take place solely through the essence of God and the understanding of man. . . ." Spinoza, Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, trans. and ed. A. Wolf (London, 1910), p. 141.

[92]Ibid., pp. 141-142. Italics mine.

[93]Tractatus, p. 15.

[94]Ibid., pp. 15-18.

[95]Ibid., p. 8. (Quoted above, p. 59.)

[96]Herder, p. 90.

[97]P. 8. (Quoted above, p. 59.)

[98]Butler, p. 268.

[99]Ibid., p. 212.

[100]e. g., pp. 273ff.

[101]Butler, p. 175.

[102]Tindal, pp. 73-74.

[103]Locke, pp. 84-85.

[104]Ibid., p. 142.

[105]Tractatus, pp. 40-41.

[106]Spinoza is able to anticipate in part the argument of accommodation and historicism primarily because his biblical research has led him to reject a verbal inspiration (which of course leaves no room for these solutions).

[107]Tractatus, p. 81.

[108]Ibid., p. 86.

[109]Ibid.

[110]Ibid., p. 87.

[111]Ibid., pp. 84-85.

[112]Quoted in Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross (London, 1907), II, 215n.

[113]" . . . Paulus, a theological professor at Heidelberg, . . . went through the Gospel narratives with intrepid pedantry, explaining all their marvellous incidents from the birth to the ascension of the Savior as perfectly consistent with the known laws of causation. His view seems to have held the field when Strauss took up the subject of Gospel criticism." Benn, I, 382. The following chapter will study this movement more fully.

[114]Powell, p. 161.

[115]See pp. 59-60, above.

[116]Butler, p. 201.

[117]Ibid., p. 107.

[118]Ibid., p. 206.

[119]Ibid., p. 250.

[120]Ibid., fn. The passage referred to in the note identifies the "testimony" as the miracles.

[121]Ibid., p. 228.

[122]Cf. Powell, p. 116. The relationship of sign to message, in other words, is only that set upon it by the power of God, the end of which and the meaning of which is limited to demonstrating the validity of the doctrine. What is utterly lacking from this scheme, and what must be supplied before the emergence of a meaningful symbol can take place, is a way of meaning that binds the quality of the sign with the quality of the meaning--a mending of the Cartesian division of thought from form.

[123]Pp. 61-62 and 59-60 above, respectively.

[124]Locke, p. 32.

[125]Ibid., p. 49.

[126]Ibid., p. 19.

[127]Ibid., p. 141.

[128]Ibid., p. 143.

[129]Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, "The Education of the Human Race," trans. F. W. Robertson, in The Harvard Classics, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York, 1910), XXXII, 208. Cf. Powell, pp. 130-131.

[130]Locke, pp. 146-147.

[131]Recent Inquiries, pp. xi-xii.

[132]Pattison, pp. 288-289.

[133]See above, pp. 54-56, 70.

[134]Pattison, p. 287.

[135]Ibid., p. 283.

[136]Ibid., pp. 285-286.

[137]Maurice, Life, I, 453.

[138]Quoted in Ibid., fn.

[139]Locke, p. 18.

[140]Ibid., p. 28.

[141]See below, p. 83.

[142]Locke, p. 54.

[143]Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[144]Ibid., p. 54.

[145]In an edition of Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity by George W. Ewing (Chicago, 1965), it is noted (p. 212) that in the text preceding this passage Locke seems to quote Luke 18:18-22, but is actually incorporating material from other scripture passages recording the same event. But the words "Jesus hearing this, loved him, and said unto him . . . " need not bear the interpretatation here assigned them by Locke, in any event.

[146]Ibid., pp. 119-120. Italics mine.

[147]"His kingdom was to be opened to them by degrees, as well to prepare them to receive it as to enable him to be long enough amongst them to perform what was the work of the Messiah to be done, and fulfill all those several parts of what was foretold of him in the Old Testament and we see applied to him in the New." Ibid., p. 82.

[148]Ibid., p. 80.

[149]"Then Peter opened his mouth, and said, of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: / But in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." The immediately following verses, Acts 10:36, 42 read: "The word which God sent unto the children of Israel, preaching peace by Jesus Christ: (he is Lord of all):
. . . . . .
And he commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is he which was ordained of God to be the Judge of the quick and dead." (All scripture quotations herein are from the King James Version.)

[150]Tindal, p. 248.

[151]See above, pp. 46-47, and below, pp. 100-104.

[152]Compare Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 77; and see above, p. 50.

[153]Locke, p. 157.

[154]The distinction between the empirical basis and the a priori basis, as understood by the rational idealists, is put clearly by Kant: " . . . With all . . . genuine moral laws . . . the ground of obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason; . . . every other precept based on principles of mere experience . . . can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law." H. J. Paton, trans., The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 3rd ed. (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1961), p. 57. Kant's point is that conceptions of morality and duty based on experi-

ence or nature or some other rationale "do not distinguish motives which, as such, are conceived completely a priori by reason alone and are genuinely moral, from empirical motives which understanding raises to general concepts by the mere comparison of experiences" (p. 58). See the discussion in footnote 159 below.

[155]Weldon says of Kant, "To this influence [of Pietism], as well as to his own common sense, is to be attributed his constant persuasion that no view, especially in morals, which runs counter to the plain man's convictions or is too complicated for his intelligence can in the end be satisfactory " T. D. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 55.

Spinoza's Tractatus has many expressions of a similar attitude. "[In scripture] No definitions of doctrine are given, but all the sayings and reasonings are adapted to the understanding of the masses. Although experience can give no clear knowledge of these things, nor explain the nature of God, nor how He directs and sustains all things, it can nevertheless teach and enlighten men sufficiently to impress obedience and devotion on their minds." Tractatus, p. 78.

Again: " . . . We have shown that whatsoever is necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the testimony of commentators . . . " Ibid., pp. 116-117. Compare Tindal, p. 12, quoted above, fn. 28.

[156]Tractatus, pp. 105-106.

[157]Tindal, pp. 294-295.

[158]Groundwork, p. 67.

[159]Kant's attitude toward "moral feeling" presents a knotty problem, but one particularly revealing of the enigma here discussed. Let us assemble a few excerpts from the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals:

> . . . If any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law--it must be done for the sake of the moral law. . . . (pp. 57-58.)
>
> [Philosophers who try to define duty or moral law in terms of experience or nature or some other rationale] do not distinguish motives which, as such, are conceived completely a priori by reason alone and are genuinely moral, from empirical motives which understanding raises to general concepts by the mere comparison of experiences. . . . they consider motives only as regards their relative strength . . . and construct on this basis their concept of obligation. This concept is anything but moral. . . . (pp. 58-59.)
>
> [Reason's] true function must be to produce a will which is good,

not as a means to some further end, but in itself. . . . (p. 64.)

. . . For inclination as such, whether my own or that of another, I cannot have reverence: I can at most approve, and . . . sometimes even love--that is, regard it as favourable to my own advantage. Only something which is conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an effect--something which does not serve my inclination, but outweighs it or at least leaves it entirely out of account in my choice--and therefore only bare law for its own sake, can be an object of reverence and therefore a command. Now an action from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every object of the will; so there is nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations. (pp. 68-69.)

. . . We cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to derive it from examples. Every example of it presented to me must first itself be judged by moral principles in order to decide if it is fit to serve as an original example. . . . Even the Holy One of the gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize him to be such. . . . But where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the Idea of moral perfection, which reason traces a priori and conjoins inseparably with the concept of a free will. . . . examples . . . can never entitle us to set aside their true original, which resides in reason. . . . (p. 76.)

If then there is to be . . . a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itself. . . . The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. (p. 96.)

In the Kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity.

. . . . . .

What is relative to universal human inclination and needs has a market price; what . . . accords with a certain taste . . . has a fancy price (affektionspreis); but that which constitutes the sole condition under which anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value--that is, a price--but has an intrinsic value--that is, dignity. (p. 102.)

. . . Moral feeling, this alleged special sense (however shallow be the appeal to it when men who are unable to think hope to help themselves out by feeling, even when the question is solely one of universal law, and however little feelings, differing as they naturally do from one another by an infinity of degrees, can

> supply a uniform measure of good and evil--let alone that one man by his feeling can make no valid judgements at all for others)--moral feeling still remains closer to morality and to its dignity [than personal happiness] in this respect: it does virtue the honour of ascribing to her immediately the approval and esteem in which she is held, and does not, as it were, tell her to her face that we are attached to her, not for her beauty, but only for our own advantage. (p. 110.)
>
> [Though both are mistaken] if I had to choose between the concept of moral sense and that of perfection in general (both of which at least do not undermine morality, though they are totally incompetent to support it as its foundation), I should decide for the latter: for this, since it at least withdraws the settlement of the question from sensibility and brings it before the court of pure reason, even although it there gets no decision, does still preserve unfalsified for more precise determination the indeterminate Idea (of a will good in itself). (p. 111.)

From these excerpts the main features of Kant's moral system may be abstracted. True morality is not at all a matter of effects, but only intent. It must be pure of any interest--not merely "bad" interest, but any "obligation" or "inclination." That is, it must be done only for its own sake, not because it will serve some end, however valuable, and not because it will gratify some inclination, however exalted. Only such an intent is worthy of "reverence," and all others can be worthy only of approval or love (which are really deference to "inclination").

From these considerations alone it is clear that Kant would have no patience with the definition of morality as acts or intentions shaped by the expediency of avoiding threatened punishments or seeking promised rewards. In this respect his moral vision is poles removed from the manifest rationale (and often the explicit creed) of the evidential argument generally (see below, pp. 91-95). Kant states with beautiful clarity that there is no such thing as enforced morality or enforced worship, and that man must not dignify that by the name of religion or morality which he intends to serve an ulterior end.

At the same time, Kant's exclusion of all feeling from moral motives remains, I think, unconvincing. It will be noted that the motive, subjectively considered, of true morality is reverence--"objectively the law ["bare law for its own sake"] and subjectively pure reverence." But the only visible reason for distinguishing reverence from "inclinations" in Kant's scheme is that he presumes reverence to be a purely rational function, not a sensible one; and the distinction therefore merely factors his prior definition, which remains to be scanned. Allow all the semantic refinements possible--let sensibility be distinguished from inclination, inclination from motive, motive from intent, and these from reverence--it still does not necessarily appear that reverence does not partake of the same source [in Kant's division of the sources] as other motives. To use Kant's own parable--not quite a fair trick--it does not appear, from Kant's severe distinction, that being attracted

to virtue for her beauty is essentially different from being attracted to her for our own advantage.

It will at any rate appear how much has been whittled away from the concept of morality when there can be nothing of the sensible in its motive. Let us allow Kant to beg the question that there can be a motive which is not sensible. It does not at all appear that such a motive can eventuate in any act. For a purely rational motive could, it would appear, eventuate in only rational activity; that is, in contemplation. It seems however that Kant assumes that duty can command response to sensible phenomena; the division between the two, it seems, is less a wall than a valve. Kant is not, of course, really urging a cloistered virtue; it is only the rationalistic premises and their necessary implications that give that appearance.

But let this pass, since the point of our examination can not legitimately be, by Kant's definitions, whether morality so envisioned is practical or desirable, but only whether it is thus. And here we can fairly consider only Kant's own criterion, which is that moral law must not be derived. Now the point I am trying to make throughout this analysis of rationalism is that such a statement invalidates itself, and that in so subtle a manner as to be totally invisible to the rationalist himself. If once one allows the statement to be posed in rational terms, the issue is already begged; win or lose, the rationalist still wins, by the very allowance of the terms of examination. It sounds like an obscurantist equivocation, and it is a near-impossible point to make; but the method itself is a prior premise. In the present instance, how can it be maintained that moral law must not be derived? Why, by demonstrating from the maxim, etc.

Nevertheless--to proceed in folly--let us see whether duty is derived in Kant's scheme. It must be "conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an effect"--yet it is somehow produced by reason. "Reason [traces] the Idea of moral perfection . . . a priori and conjoins [it] inseparably with the concept of a free will." What is this but saying that duty is an "inclination" of reason? that it is an "obligation" which reason lays upon us? A good will, then, is determined by the reasonable, and is not autonomous. "Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws--that is, in accordance with principles--and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will . . . the will is then a power to choose only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good." (p. 80)

The answer to this objection, of course, is that reason is supposed to be absolute and partake of the speciality of the perfect good, whereas "moral feeling" derives from sensibility, a "lesser" ground. Yet with the same advantage of priority, it would seem that moral feeling or appetite or anything else could logically mount the same argument. Thus if we made happiness the ground of morality, we would value duty only as it is done from a motive of happiness; for happiness being dictated to us by our animal nature, which is the highest good, whatever derives from other ground is suspect, etc.

Kant's ground assumption leads us back, manifestly, to the Cartesian distinction and the whole group of notions about the nature and attributes of God which are part of its genesis.

It will be noted that the translation of the effect of reason into the world of phenomena has once again assumed the mode of authoritarian directive with Kant: the ideal is for reason to determine the will and make it powerful to choose only the good.

[160]Tindal, p. 27.

[161]I, 31; quoted above, pp. 41-42.

[162]See footnote 159, above. This may be, at bottom, only a semantic issue in the work of Spinoza, whose rationality is certainly comprehensive, quantitatively considered; but in the terms of the scheme as expressed in the Short Treatise, for example, it appears (to this novice) that the way to the good is only through right construing: " . . . Since the Idea is not in the Will, but in the Understanding, and in consequence of the rule that the mode of one substance cannot pass over into the other substance, love cannot arise in the will: because to will something when there is no idea of that thing in the willing power involves self-contradiction. If you say that the Will, owing to its union with the Understanding, also becomes aware of that which the Understanding understands, and thus also loves it, one may retort to this: but since awareness is also an apprehension, it is therefore also a mode of understanding; following the above, however, this cannot be in the Will, even if its union [that of the Understanding with the Will] were like that of the soul and body. For suppose that the body is united with the soul, as the philosophers generally maintain, even so the body never feels, nor does the soul become extended." (p. 106, fn.) Spinoza generously allows the will to be considered a "substance" (though the context, and even the terms of this passage, show that he does not agree) to show that even so inclination, hence love, can only derive from Understanding. The old conception of "substance" as restated in the Cartesian dichotomy is the root of this argument; soul and body, intellect and will, are all substances. There is no mutual penetrability of substances. Hence they may be joined, but their qualities must remain discrete. Hence will cannot know, hence cannot love. Will itself, however, is construed by Spinoza in this work to be only a mode of Understanding: " . . . The Will, according to those who maintain that there is a Will, is only the activity of the understanding whereby we affirm or deny something about a thing, with regard to good or evil." (p. 110) I know not how to make all this quite consistent with the Tractatus, where Spinoza asserts that "an intellectual knowledge of God, which takes cognizance of His nature in so far as it actually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be imitated by mankind or followed as an example, has no bearing whatever on true rules of conduct, or faith, or on revealed religion; consequently . . . men may be in complete error on the subject without incurring the charge of sinfulness" (p. 180), and "if a man, by believing what is true, becomes rebellicus, his creed is impious; if by believing what

is false he becomes obedient, his creed is pious; for the true knowledge of God comes not by commandment, but by Divine gift. God has required nothing from man but a knowledge of His Divine justice and charity, and that not as necessary to scientific accuracy, but to obedience," (p. 181) except to read "Understanding" so vastly as to take in a mode of knowing that is extra-rational, that embraces in fact something not derivative from Idea--in which case (analogously to the natural-supernatural distinction considered above, pp. 63-64) all distinction evanishes, all else is but a term, a fiction posited in order to give rationality a supposed relief; or to make external command do the work of Idea in calling forth obedience, a solution that involves some difficulties to reconcile with the integrity of moral distinctions.

Kant in the Groundwork, seeking that purity of intent that alone can be good, envisions the absolute as "duty"; but duty, in order to be pure, must be freed from all "inclination" that would pollute it with a selfish interest. It may be easily seen in the quotation immediately above in the text how stringently this concept excludes compassion and love as the ground of action, though conceivably they might attend it, so long as they were incidental.

[163]Erskine, "The Spiritual Order," The Spiritual Order and Other Papers, p. 16, fn.

[164]"As poetry is not for the critics, so religion is not for the theologians. When it is stiffened into phrases, and these phrases are declared to be objects of reverence, but not of intelligence, it is on the way to become a useless encumbrance,--the rubbish of the past,--blocking the road." Pattison, p. 327.

[165]Locke, p. 15.

[166]Lessing, p. 209.

[167]Compare Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 175; and Tindal, p. 15.

[168]Locke, p. 129.

[169]Ibid., p. 156.

[170]Butler, p. 206.

[171]Lessing, p. 204.

[172]Locke, pp. 148-149.

[173]Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[174]"It is a reductio ad absurdum of common-sense philosophy, of home-baked theology, when we find that the result of the whole is, that 'it is safer to believe in a God, lest, if there should happen to be one, he might send us to hell for denying his existence" (Maurice,

Essays, p. 236). "If a religion be wanted which shall debase instead of elevating, this should be its creed" (Pattison, pp. 325-326).

[175]The parenthetical phrase would seem to be intended as explicatory rather than delimiting. There would seem, from Spinoza's usual comments, not to be a way man could not be under the sway of nature. One could include, then, under the denomination "sway of nature" punishment and reward with regard to a desired moral end. The point here is that Spinoza has written punitive government into the scheme of things as providing the only efficacious motive of human goodness.

[176]Spinoza, Tractatus, pp. 201, 204.

[177]Butler, p. 206.

[178]Lessing, p. 209.

[179]Davison, p. 125.

[180]Henry Fielding, The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling (New York, 1950), p. 691.

[181]Pattison, p. 321. Compare the opening paragraphs of Emerson's "Compensation."

[182]Pattison, p. 357. Compare Erskine: "Men are disposed to imagine that a pardon may be made conditional that will be more effectual as a stimulus to exertion. But the answer to this objection is, that Christian obedience does not consist in doing certain actions and abstaining from others, without regard to the motive from which this conduct proceeds--Christian obedience consists in holy love to God in habitual exercise. Now it is quite evident that no hope of reward could produce this kind of obedience. The heart cannot be induced to love by anything except the real or apparent lovableness of the object. A man might do or suffer much in order to obtain pardon of sin; but this is not what God requires; he requires the heart; he requires a generous disinterested love which longs to express itself in every possible act of devotedness, counting all little and vile in comparison of the worthiness of Him whom it desires to please. The obedience which God asks is the free obedience of the child, not a mercenary negotiation for deliverance from punishment. True obedience can only be rendered by a spirit which rejoices that God desires its love; both because it recognizes in the demand a father's heart, and because it feels that amidst all its failures and all its weaknesses it yet has love to give." Thomas Erskine, The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel, new ed. (Edinburgh, 1879), pp. 55-56.

[183]Locke, pp. 101-102.

[184]This line of examination is resumed below, pp. 97-104.

[185]Attempts are made to make all consistent with the pleasure motive; thus man is supposedly directed toward the will of God and consequently his own greatest pleasure by a system of poetic justice that rewards good action and punishes bad. But this scheme, though theoretically defensible in terms of the rationalistic premises of order and the traditional attributes of God, does not square very well with reality as man experienced it--a fact that rather vitiated, on its own self-evident grounds, the entire argument. Failing to vindicate the scheme in terms of the reality man knows, proponents of it must piece it out by adding to it a dimension of the unexperienced--by referring it to the primitive unsullied condition of the noble savage, or to some order to come where the errors imposed by priestcraft or bad education would be eradicated, or to the life of rational asceticism wherein one contemplated and responded to only pure reason, or (in the nominally Christian scheme) to immortality. This is only another way of saying that no satisfactory conjunction of proposition and practicality can be evinced.

[186]Locke, p. 103.

[187]Ibid., p. 105.

[188]Ibid., pp. 146-147.

[189]Tindal, pp. 62-63.

[190]Butler, p. 310. Compare Pope's Essay on Man, Epistle II:

> Two principles in human nature reign;
> Self-love, to urge, and reason, to restrain;
> Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call,
> Each works its end, to move or govern all. (ll. 53-56)
>
> Most strength the moving principle requires;
> Active its task, it prompts, impels, inspires.
> Sedate and quiet the comparing lies,
> Form'd but to check, delib'rate, and advise. (ll. 67-70)
>
> Reason the card, but passion is the gale. (l. 107)

[191]Arthur Cushman M'Giffert, Protestant Thought Before Kant (New York, 1942), pp. 201-202, 210 fn.

[192]Ibid., p. 214.

[193]Butler, p. 225.

[194]Ibid., p. 250.

[195]The information on the exchange between Whiston and Collins follows accounts in M'Giffert, pp. 216-217, and Stephen, I, 214-226. I

shall make no attempt to reproduce Stephen's tracing of the controversies over miracle and prophecy, the historical relationships as such not being essential to this study. One point raised by both Stephen and M'Giffert requires perhaps some comment; in these passages cited it is pointed out that the attacks of Collins on the evidential value of prophecy reactivated interest in the miracles as evidence, though the arguments of (notably) Middleton and Hume soon rendered miracle as totally suspect as prophecy. This account, accurate in itself so far as I can judge, should not however be taken to mean that either prophecy or miracle is quite a dead issue for the evidence-hunters of the latter half of the century; despite Collins and Hume, arguments from both prophecy and miracle persist, and in the long run it seems to be prophecy that holds out best, I believe for the reasons discussed on pp. 76-77, 115, above. Michaelis argues for the authenticity of the New Testament on the basis of fulfilment of prophecies therein. (John David Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament: Translated from the Fourth Edition of the German and Considerably Augmented with Notes Explanatory and Supplemental by Herbert Marsh [Cambridge, 1793-1801], I, chap. 2, sec. 2.) (The first edition of this work appeared in 1750, the fourth edition, thus translated, in 1788. Ibid., p. iii.) Davison's work is I believe adequate evidence that prophecy could still mount a plausible argument of the evidential type (or at least what most readers thought so) as late as the second quarter of the next century; and the work of Baron Bunsen, for example, shows that prophecy could be made to offer support of another sort for the liberal Christianity of an even later day, when miracle was still mostly considered an encumbrance. See pp. 115ff. below on Davison, and Rowland Williams, "Bunsen's Biblical Researches," Recent Inquiries, pp. 57-105.

The evidential argument from the precise fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy is, as a matter of fact, still very much alive, biblical criticism to the contrary notwithstanding; presentations of it, in much the same form as that of the medieval sermon which E. K. Chambers describes as the genesis of the mystery cycle (English Literature at the Close of the Middle Ages [Oxford, 1945], p. 6), may still be heard from the pulpit in our own day.

[196]"Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. / Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good. / For before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings."

[197]One significant factor in the evidential employment of prophecy and miracle is that the gospel writers themselves (and particularly Matthew, who for several reasons was generally considered most reliable--see below, pp. 113-4, for example) often seem to be employing them specifically for that purpose. Therefore the suspicion falling on the application of prophecy was doubly hurtful; it not only raised the question of error or corruption in the accounts, it had to

be seen as some kind of indictment of the understanding of the evangelists, if not of their integrity. From our side of that great divide in human thought, the emergence of an evolutionary sense, it is hard to realize that most religious thinkers of the rationalistic era judged, and had to judge, the productions of "the ancients" by the motives and criteria of the later age. There had not yet developed that historical sense that would perceive that the prophets and Evangelists (however inspired) would have to address their messages to the understanding of another time, and were to all appearances themselves very much the men of that time. The static way of [illegible] history will go far to explain that supposition of fraudulent intent so remarkable in the reductive treatments of scripture at the turn of the next century, and so eloquent of that sense of betrayal which gave them their energy and often their ferocity. What conclusion could be drawn, but that the biblical writers had deliberately falsified their materials and misled all subsequent ages? Such is the anguished judgment of Michaelis: "Many are unwilling to admit that this chapter [in Joel] contains the prophecy of the communication of the Holy Ghost to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, which is expressly asserted by St. Peter in the second chapter of the Acts. . . . Now if the Apostles had really recourse to such practices, this 'impius Porphyrius' [as Jerome called him] has spoken like an honest man . . . " (I, 205). "Were it possible to show, that the very author of our religion, who ordered the precepts, which he taught to be required as commands of the deity, had made a wrong application of the text of the Old Testament, it would follow that he was not infallible, and that Christianity itself was false" (I, 207). Gradually the sense of historicism was to excuse the Evangelists somewhat, though at the (at least temporary) expense of sinking their stock considerably. And even in the old ways of thought, the faithful sometimes found means to escape the severely evidential function of these texts and so find meaning in them. Thus, for instance, Sykes repudiated Collins' restrictive argument about the validity of Christianity being based on fulfilment of prediction; to him the words "that it might be fulfilled" meant that the words of the old saying were meaningful in the new context--a tack that seems to have given Collins some discomfiture. Stephen, I, 226-227.

[198]Stephen, I, 213.

[199]Ibid., pp. 225-226.

[200]Butler, p. 284.

[201]Ibid., p. 285.

[202]Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 158.

[203]Ibid., p. 159.

[204]Ibid., p. 161.

[205]See above, p. 68.

[206]Tractatus, p. 157.

[207]Ibid., p. 24.

[208]Ibid., p. 27.

[209]Ibid., pp. 25,30.

[210]Ibid., p. 19.

[211]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[212]Ibid., p. 9.

[213]Ibid., p. 27.

[214]Butler, p. 225.

[215]In the Preface to The Literal Scheme of Prophecy Considered Collins listed thirty-five works that appeared in answer to the Discourse (Stephen, I, 217). Concerning replies to Woolston, see Ibid., I, 233-244.

[216]Butler, p. 225.

[217]Spinoza, Tractatus, pp. 121-128.

[218]Ibid., p. 138.

[219]Ibid., p. 149.

[220]Ibid., p. 150.

[221]Stephen, I, 223-224.

[222]Ibid., p. 228.

[223]Davison, p. 480.

[224]"Colenso," DNB.

[225]Michaelis, I, 27.

[226]Renan, Recollections, p. 256.

[227]Interestingly, it is by a variation of the same argument that Milman professes to refute Strauss's theory of a mythic intent on the part of the gospel writers:

> Were they written with this mythic latitude by Judaizing or Helenizing Christians? If by Judaizing I should expect to find far more of Judaism, of Jewish traditions, usage, and language, as appears to have been the case in the Ebionitish gospel; if by Helenizing, the attempt to frame the myths in accordance with Jewish traditions is inconceivable.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> If discrepancies in the circumstances between narratives of the same events, or differences of arrangement in point of time, particularly among rude and inartificial writers, are to be admitted as proof of this kind of fiction, all history is mythic; even the accounts of every transaction in the daily papers, which are never found to agree precisely in the minute details, are likewise mythic. (Henry Hart Milman, The History of Christianity from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire, I [Paris, 1840], p. 63.)

The defense has as a matter of fact been retained to the present day. See Archibald M. Hunter, The Work and Words of Jesus (Philadelphia, 1950), p. 126.

[228]Michaelis, I, 378-379.

[229]Ibid., p. 75.

[230]Ibid., p. 96.

[231]Tractatus, p. 158.

[232]Herder, p. 80.

[233]Stephen, I, 225-226.

[234]Ibid., I, 226-227.

[235]"The first is reading the words with other points substituted for those generally used. The second is 'changing the letters, whether those letters be of the same organ (as the Jewish grammarians speak) or no.' The third is changing both letters and points. The fourth is adding some letters and taking away others. The fifth is transposing words and letters. The sixth is dividing one word into two. The seventh is adding other words to those that are there, 'as is manifestly done by the apostles throughout the New Testament.' The eighth is changing the order of words. The ninth is changing the order of words and adding other words. The tenth is 'changing the order of words, adding words, and retrenching words, which is a method often used by Paul.'" Stephen, I, 215.

[236]Ibid., p. 216.

[237]Ibid., pp. 222-223.

[238]Michaelis, I, 205.

[239]Butler, p. 250.

[240]"Prophecy," The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson et al., IX (1950), 275.

[241]Ibid., p. 276.

[242]Stephen, I, 22.

[243]Compare Dryden's Mac Flecknoe: "Heywood and Shirley were but Types of thee, / Thou last great Prophet of Tautology" (ll. 29-30). Tanner, p. 220.

[244]The Literal Scheme of Prophecy Considered (1727), p. 283; quoted in Stephen, I, 223.

[245]"Bunsen's Biblical Researches," Recent Inquiries, p. 76, fn.

[246]See above, p. 58.

[247]For a relatively late (and incisive) example, see Julius Hare's criticism quoted below, pp. 126-7. It must be added hastily that the generous tenor of Hare's remarks is not representative.

[248]Michaelis, I, 205.

[249]Ibid., p. 207.

[250]See above, p. 112.

[251]See above, pp. 116-117.

[252]Herbert Marsh, "Dissertation on the Origin of Our Three First Canonical Gospels," in Michaelis, III, Pt. II, 5.

[253]Michaelis, III, Pt. I, 315.

[254]Ibid., Pt. II, 37.

[255]Ibid., Pt. II, 149.

[256]Michaelis, III, Pt. II, 37.

[257]Ibid., p. 195.

[258]Connop Thirlwall, "Introduction by the Translator," in Frederick Schleiermacher, A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke, trans. Connop Thirlwall (London, 1825), pp. xxvii-xxix.

[259]Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, pp. 235-236.

[260]The date is established by the article on "Warburton," DNB.

[261]"Marsh," DNB.

[262]Relationships of Hare and Coleridge to German scholarship will be discussed below. Hugh James Rose and Edward B. Pusey were the principals in a controversy concerning the implications of German scholarship for the English Church. Pusey studied in Germany for two years from 1825 to 1827; Rose spent several months in Germany prior to the publication of his State of the Protestant Religion in Germany in 1825. In this work Rose dismissed German speculations as vulgar and pointless, and expressed confidence that the Church of England by its strength would prevent anything similar from occurring in England. Pusey, whose study of German materials had been undertaken specifically to determine how to cope with the problems that material would soon bring to England, was of the opposite opinion; antagonistic to the tendencies of German scholarship, he had nevertheless a healthy respect for it and perceived that Anglicanism was not at all prepared to withstand it. His work was An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany (1828); the "causes," interestingly, were a dead "orthodoxism." Rose replied in 1829; Pusey brought out a second publication on the subject in 1830 (DNB).

[263]"But . . . the English reader cannot be presumed to be . . . conversant with the present state of the controversy [over the origin of the first three gospels], which, since Bishop Marsh's Dissertation on this subject annexed to his translation of Michaelis and the . . . discussion occasioned by it, has been almost entirely confined to Germany . . . " (Thirlwall, p. v).

" . . . It would almost seem as if at Oxford the knowledge of German subjected a divine to the same suspicion of heterodoxy which we know was attached some centuries back to the knowledge of Greek; as if it was thought there that a German theologian is dangerous enough when he writes in Latin, but that when he argues in his own language there can be no escaping his venom" (Ibid., p. ix, fn.). Lack of familiarity in England with German scholarship, says Thirlwall, is in part explained by the fact that German scholars were writing less and less in Latin, more and more in German; and few of the English clergy knew German.

[264]Pp. 156-157 criticize Michaelis' comments on the Old Testament. I have seen no evidence that Davison knew German. The work of Michaelis here referred to (Mosaisches Recht, 6 vols.) was translated by A. Smith as Commentaries on the Laws of Moses, 4 vols. (London, 1814) ("Michaelis," The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge). Moreover, Marsh was lecturing at Cambridge on The Authority of the Old Testament in 1823 (the work was published under that title the same year); I have not consulted this work, but it seems likely that Michaelis' comments about Mosaic law might

have been purveyed by that means. (DNB)

[265]Williams, p. 75.

[266]Davison, p. 10.

[267]Ibid., p. 3.

[268]See above, pp. 73-74.

[269]Davison, p. 3.

[270]Ibid., p. 5.

[271]Ibid., p. 7.

[272]Ibid., p. 9.

[273]Ibid., pp. 23-29.

[274]Other echoes of the tendencies of the previous century survive in the Discourses. He urges that the miraculousness of the gospel establishes its validity (p. 387). Like Locke, Spinoza, and Butler, he urges the necessity of simplicity in the requisite beliefs: " . . . Nothing which in the last result wears the appearance of intricate or minute speculation, can have much to do with the principles, or use, of the Scripture Oracles, which, if they are anything, are the wisdom of God given for the faith and moral instruction of men" (p. 11). In truth the "simplicity and reasonableness" of the doctrines and evidences "are such, that if any person of a candid mind were to lay down beforehand what would be the most prevailing inducements to his belief of a Revelation, he could not, I think, easily mention any other in kind that such as we find we possess. The actual various attestations of Christianity, external and internal; its august apparatus of prophecies and miracles; the excellence of its constitution, in its laws, doctrines, and sanctions; its power in subduing the labored opposition of the world; with the glory of its Founder illuminating His Religion by the signs of Divine presence in His own person; these furnish to us whatever our most deliberate judgment would have suggested, had it been permitted to us to choose the grounds of our belief" (pp. 20-21). The legalistic scheme with its machinery of reward and punishment is openly avowed; see the discussion and quotation above, p. 93. Yet he seems aware of an inadequacy in the motive of reward: "It is true the conviction of a rule of reward and punishment is necessary to the practical support of human obedience, as the rule itself is essential to the divine law. . . . [Yet] to know and to serve him, that is religion, whether it be to a view to the present life, or to the next, and whatever inducements or encouragements He may choose to supply" (pp. 124-125). Davison also illustrates, in some of his readings, the tendency of an evidential preoccupation to blunt the perception of qualitative significance (see

above, pp. 79-85); or so at least it seems to this reader. Thus the statement of Hebrews 11:5 that whoever comes to God "must believe . . . that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him" is urged as rationale for a scheme of reward and punishment (in the passage quoted on p. 93 above).

[275]Davison, pp. 18-19.

[276]Ibid., p. 82.

[277]Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[278]Ibid., p. 427.

[279]Their relative importance in the author's eyes is defined, I think, by the proportion of their treatment. One discourse (the second) is specifically concerned with the "moral and doctrinal" aspects of prophecy; the last six are concerned with evidence of its predictive nature.

[280]Davison, p. 35.

[281]Ibid., p. 36.

[282]Ibid., p. 37.

[283]Ibid., p. 30.

[284]Ibid., p. 457.

[285]Ibid., p. 134. Italics mine.

[286]Ibid., p. 135.

[287]Ibid., p. 137.

[288]Ibid., p. 139.

[289]Hare, p. 248.

[290]"Take of them of the captivity, even of Heldai, of Tobijah, and of Jedaiah, which are come from Babylon, and come thou the same day, and go into the house of Josiah the son of Zephaniah; / Then take silver and gold, and make crowns, and set them upon the head of Joshua the son of Josedech, the high priest; / And speak unto him, saying, Thus speaketh the Lord of hosts, saying, Behold the man whose name is The BRANCH; and he shall grow up out of his place, and he shall build the temple of the Lord; / Even he shall build the temple of the Lord; and he shall bear the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne: and the counsel of peace shall be between them both. / And the crowns shall be to Helem, and to

Tobijah, and to Jedaiah, and to Hen the son of Zephaniah, for a memorial in the temple of the Lord. / And they that are far off shall come and build in the temple of the Lord, and ye shall know that the Lord of hosts hath sent me unto you. And this shall come to pass, if ye will diligently obey the voice of the Lord your God."

[291]Davison, p. 317.

[292]Ibid., pp. 316-317.

[293]Ibid., p. 318.

[294]See above, pp. 126-7.

[295]"But he answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas; / For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. / The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: because they repented at the preaching of Jonas; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here." So Matthew 12:39-41. Two other passages duplicate the material of verse 39 (Matthew 16:4 and Mark 8:12, the latter of which says only "There shall no sign be given unto this generation"). The explication of verse 40 is not given in either of these other passages.

[296]Davison, p. 275.

[297]Ibid., p. 276.

[298]Ibid., p. 43.

[299]Ibid., p. 44.

[300]Ibid., p. 45.

[301]Ibid., p. 46.

[302]Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 85. See this passage quoted at length above, p. 69.

[303]J. A. Dorner, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, trans. D. W. Simon (Edinburgh, 1866), Division II, III, 15.

[304]Patrick Fairbairn, "Historical and Critical Review of the Controversies Respecting the Person of Christ, Which Have Been Agitated in Britain since the Middle of the Seventeenth Century to the Present Time," in Dorner, p. 338.

[305]Ibid., pp. 391-392.

[306]Ibid., p. 393.

[307]Ibid., pp. 401-403.

[308]Ibid., p. 401.

[309]Ibid., p. 385.

[310]Ibid., p. 393.

[311]Quoted in Ibid., p. 394.

[312]Ibid., pp. 400-401.

[313]Ibid., p. 401.

[314]Ibid., p. 403.

[315]See above, p. 37.

[316]Dorner, III, 386-387.

[317]" . . . You can never fix any certain principle of individuation. It is for want of this that you can never assure me, that three real persons may not be, or are not one numerical or individual substance. In short, you do not know precisely what it is that makes one being, or one essence, or one substance. Here your metaphysics are plainly defective; and this it is that renders all your speculations upon that head vain and fruitless. Tell me plainly, is the divine substance present in every place, in whole or in part? Is the substance which is present here upon earth, that very individual numerical substance which is present in heaven, or is it not? Your answer to these questions may, perhaps, suggest something to you which may help you out of your difficulties relating to the Trinity; or else the sense of your inability to answer either, may teach you to be less confident in matters so much above you, and to confess your ignorance in things of this nature, as I freely do mine." From the "Answer to Dr. Whitby," in Works, II, 206, quoted in Fairbairn, p. 394.

[318]Quoted in Fairbairn, p. 385.

[319]Quoted in Fairbairn, pp. 393-394.

[320]For example, researches into the accounts of the Annunciation; see Schleiermacher, Essay on St. Luke, pp. 46-49.

[321]e. g., see Stephen, I, 217; Fairbairn, 401-402.

[322]Woolston was indicted for blasphemy in 1725 for views on the Whiston-Collins controversy expressed in "A Moderator between an Infidel and an Apostate," though the charges were subsequently dropped ("Woolston," DNB). Yet as Stephen points out, the threat of the law served mostly to force the deists "not to conceal their opinions, but to cover them with a veil of decent ambiguity" (I, 89)--an effect consistent with the argument this treatise has been urging.

[323]This effect, it will be remembered, has been referred to the evasion of inherent philosophic contradictions (above, pp. 40-43, 78-83). There is no inconsistency, I believe; for to consider the central questions of God and its subordinate parts--moral freedom, the nature of authority, immanence and transcendence--i. e., the relationship of God and the creation--is to consider, in other terms, the validity of the traditionally defined role of Christ.

[324]Cries against "priestcraft" date from the earliest days of rationalism. See Benn, I, 89, regarding Lord Herbert of Cherbury; Shaftesbury's Characteristics, Bk. I, Part III, sec. II (from An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit); Mandeville, "An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue," Fable of the Bees.

[325]See above, pp. 96-97.

[326]Middleton, pp. xciv-xcv. Quoted at greater length above, pp. 57-58.

[327]See above, p. 82.

[328]" . . . Men, if they sincerely endeavour to discover the will of God, will perceive, that there is a law of nature, or reason; which is so called, as being a law which is common, or natural, to all rational creatures; and that this law, like its author, is absolutely perfect, eternal, and unchangeable; and . . . the design of the Gospel was not to add to, or take from this law; but to free men from that load of superstition which had been mixed with it. . . . " Tindal, p. 15.

[329]Tindal, p. 73. It may be urged against the use of Tindal and his like here, that they are not serious about referring their work to Christ--they are simply throwing a sop to the orthodox, or perhaps using them satirically. Even were that so--and I am not disposed to be so ungenerous to their argument--the point I am here making still stands--that the direction of the argument is ever toward examination into the role of Christ.

[330]Butler, p. 250.

[331]See above, pp. 79-81.

[332]See above, pp. 84-85.

[333]Butler, p. 200. Also see above, pp. 91-93, and especially the quotations there from Locke, p. 182, and Lessing, p. 209.

[334]See above, pp. 104-105.

[335]I. e., pp. 115-8. Compare Butler: " . . . The Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ, in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals: of the former of which, the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter, the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy." Butler, p. 248.

[336]Lessing, p. 205.

[337]"One supreme problem emerged, as a result of critical and historical inquiry--the problem of the Person of Christ. 'The return to Christ' has become a watchword of modern theology. We are to investigate the reasons which have brought this about. The problem was present before historical methods had securely established themselves; it lay at the heart of the speculative Christologies of the great German idealists. In fact, it was their unsatisfactory treatment of the problem which caused a reaction in favour of historical research into the origins of Christianity. In this connection the name of Schleiermacher is of high importance. But the emergence of the problem was assured so soon as the historical sense was awakened, for inquiry into the origins of Christianity brings one face to face with Christ and His claim. The rise of New Testament criticism was largely due to a desire to discover the historical Jesus, and to approach Him through history, instead of through the technical definitions of theology." Vernon F. Storr, The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800-1860 (London, 1913), p. 7.

[338]Dorner, III, 15. Quoted above, pp. 140-141.

[339]So with Hess, in the analysis of Schweitzer: "Above all, we must retain the supernatural birth and the bodily resurrection, because on the former depends the sinlessness of Jesus, on the latter the certainty of the general resurrection of the dead." Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. F. C. Burkitt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 30.

[340]Dorner, III, 410.

[341]The Age of Reason, Part First, I.

[342]Schweitzer, pp. 16-20.

[343]Ibid., pp. 38-47.

[344]"Hennell," DNB. A more famous example is provided by the notes to "Queen Mab" of the youthful Shelley: "The belief in all that the Bible contains, is called Christianity. A Roman governor of Judea, at the instances of a priest-led mob, crucified a man called Jesus eighteen centuries ago. He was a man of pure life, who desired to rescue his countrymen from the tyranny of their barbarous and degrading superstitions. The common fate of all who desire to benefit mankind awaited him. The rabble, at the instigation of the priests, demanded his death, although his very judge made public acknowledgement of his innocence. Jesus was sacrificed to the honour of that God with whom he was afterwards confounded. It is of importance, therefore, to distinguish between the pretended character of this being as the Son of God and the Saviour of the world, and his real character as a man, who, for a vain attempt to reform the world, paid the forfeit of his life to that overbearing tyranny which has since so long desolated the universe in his name. Whilst the one is a hypocritical demon, who announces himself as the God of compassion and peace, even whilst he stretches forth his blood-red hand with the sword of discord to waste the earth, having confessedly devised this scheme of desolation from eternity; the other stands in the foremost list of those true heroes, who have died in the glorious martyrdom of liberty, and have braved torture, contempt, and poverty, in the cause of suffering humanity." In a later comment, he added, "Since writing this note I have some reason to suspect, that Jesus was an ambitious man, who aspired to the throne of Judea." The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley Given from His Own Editions and Other Authentic Sources . . ., ed., H. Buxton Forman, 2nd ed. (London, 1886), II, 527-528. Here, I believe, the pattern of degeneration from naturalistic explanations to those alleging fraud or opportunism is exemplified.

[345]Schweitzer, p. 4.

[346]Locke, p. 31.

[347]Ibid., p. 170.

[348]Tindal, p. 15.

[349]Ibid., p. 17.

[350]Ibid., p. 73.

[351]Without explicit reference to Christ, Tindal attacks superstitious notions that "an unlimited being could appear under the limited form of a man, or other animal" (p. 77).

[352]Likewise, he denies "that one God could be sent on the errand of another God, after the manner that God Mercury was by God Jupiter," p. 78, and "that [an unlimited] being could be confined to a small spot of earth, while another equally omnipresent was in heaven, and a third descending from thence" (Ibid.).

[353]Butler, p. 297. Compare: "The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of 'a Mediator between God and man.' For we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others, and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. And how far his invisible government be, or be not so, it is impossible to determine. . . . There is then no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a mediator between God and man . . . And the objection here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all." P. 240.

[354]See above, pp. 63-64.

[355]Short Treatise, p. 201 (quotation in the Notes of Letter LXXXIII).

[356]Ibid., p. 57.

[357]"A Song of Liberty"

CHAPTER IV

FROM RATIONALISM TO A SYMBOLIC CHRISTOLOGY

The Relationship of the Bifurcation of Rationalism to Orthodox Christology[1]

The debacle of rationalistic religion was the logical conclusion of the innate inconsistencies in its conceptions of God and man. Basic to those conceptions was the mutually exclusive distinction between the human and the divine, made explicit in the Chalcedonian Creed and perpetuated through countless scholastic explications.[2] The distinction was insulated from searching evaluation not only by reverence (and less pure concerns of orthodoxy) but also by an innate tendency in the image of substantiality toward the material. The new science and the naturalistic direction of rationalism were to make that concept even more materialistic[3] and render the difficulty of conceiving a mutual penetrability of substances even more severe. The Cartesian division of thought and matter merely turned the distinction into other terms[4]; the same mutual exclusiveness persisted, in what remained essentially the same image.[5] From the extremity of the exclusion of man from God the Mediaeval world took refuge in a sense of mystery, one might say of magic; the religious resources for reaching the ear of God were innumerable channels of intercession, not merely Christ and Mary and Mother Church but the host of saints. It was precisely this refuge which

rationalism destroyed. By making the universe reasonable, by its demand for a consistent and conscious formulation of the relationship between God and man, it served as a catalyst to dissolve the mystical bond and force the problem slowly but inexorably to the light.

The effect on Christology, as the last chapter has shown, was for all practical immediate purposes fatal. The thin line of orthodoxy between conceptions of Christ as merely human and as merely divine had been difficult enough to follow at best; the entire history of Christian heresies is one of departures to one side or the other in the attempt to find a rational consistency. With the age of rationalism the line narrowed down to illusion and vanished. It became more and more evident (to use Dorner's penetrating statement) that "the old fault of representing the divine and human as magnitudes standing in an essentially exclusive relation to each other . . . renders a true doctrine of the God-man an impossibility, and cannot allow the divine and human to interpenetrate and form one real vital unity."[6] The old dilemma imperfectly resolved by the creeds reasserted itself with a vengeance. The distinction having been made and subjected to rational review, Christ could be only altogether divine or altogether human; to conceive Him otherwise could only be to make Him a monster, and reduce His nature and His function to a mere hyphen.[7]

It has been stated above that either subjectivity or objectivity, consistently held, negates its rival, and having done so ends by destroying itself, since by eliminating an "other" against which to define itself it ceases to have any identity. This dilemma is a republication

of the problem that plagued the dichotomy of the natural and the supernatural, and its inception was, I think, the self-awareness forced by the concept of an open universe. Man, finding himself, as it seemed, alone in the universe as the sole sentient being, assumed the throne of God, as it were by default--though with many falterings, always uneasily half-expectant of His return. The result was some startling and far-reaching inversions of thought. Whereas the old duality had been between the natural and supernatural, between this world and God's world, and consequently (though in this man was not consistent) between man's fallen reason and God's infinite sure knowledge, now the dualism must be set up between man and the world. If man's pure reason was the locus of truth, the empirical facts were polluted with the unreliability of the outer world. If on the other hand the mind was merely a passive receptor, and all knowledge came from without in the data of experience, the source of error was the subjective treatment of that data. The logical treatment of the question tended to keep the two theories of knowledge as substantially discrete. That was one pattern. But it was no more than established when another duality began to assert itself, one that cut across the lines of its predecessor. It is at first surprising to see that the insistence upon external validity is the technique of both the most reactionary appeal to orthodoxy and the galloping career toward naturalism, and that, simultaneously, the withdrawal into pure subjectivism becomes the basis not only of a mystical validation of the truths of Christianity but also of the exaltation of the Ego into an all-devouring deity. The attempt to separate truth from error, authority from

contingency, the religious from the mundane, by quantitative exclusion was a failure; the old dualities reasserted themselves in each of the quantities, showing their relationship to be more intimate than the method could conceive.

Quite clearly, then, the basic problem in the reconstruction of a real Christology was the problem of the grounds on which a relationship between God and man was possible.[8] Inevitably--for philosophy was still theologically concerned--as any such relationship became conceived, it had to confront the concept of Christ (on the terms and in the form which that contemporary concept offered) and supplant or submit to or effect some synthesis with that concept. Consequently, as this chapter must show, the numerous philosophical systems that followed in the wake of rationalism had all their christological counterparts,[9] or rather components, which translated the meaning of Christ into a symbol for their concept of the relationship, rejecting or reforming whatever in the Christ was seen to be inconsistent with that concept; or in the failure of that symbol to conform, replacing it with some rival formulation, ideational or creedal or codal or symbolic. We have noted already these tendencies in eighteenth century rationalism.[10] When a way was found for men to see once more a relational pattern, the concept of a Christ could again be meaningful.

The Two Strands of Rationalism in Their Later Development: the Objective

While this new view of Christ was a-borning, however, the two patterns of rationalism were working out their systems to their conclusions. Not that they can even yet be said to have concluded; but their

inherent limitations had made themselves evident by the time the new Christology had come to maturity. The progress of these systems--objectivism and subjectivism--must be given some attention. In the first place, the forms Christology took in these progressions will show clearly the tendency of a conception of Christ to serve as incarnation of the ontology. Second, there is no way to extricate the reconstructive tendencies from the self-invalidating development of subjectivism and objectivism. Third--a corollary to the preceding--the reconstruction was to use freely the materials of the previous systems, though in a revolutionary manner.

No attempt can here be made to follow all the modes in which the faith in objectivity expressed itself. Its name was legion. The solidity of its evidence was very compelling and the fecundity of its application seemed to promise endless rewards, even if these tended often to the banal. Of this tendency were the Neo-Classical reference to the objective models of art, the work of the Ancients[11]; Bentham's infamous formula for determining the morality of an action,[12] no less than Paley's infamous proof of the watchmaker God[13]; the early Victorian faith in institutions; the Evangelical insistence on the literal accuracy of Scripture,[14] no less than the Evangelical formula of substitutionary atonement,[15] or the Evangelical disregard for the purity of the revenue solicited for its many projects,[16] certainly the tendency to define the functions of those projects in statistical and institutional terms[17]; the whole burgeoning confidence in the scientific process; environmental determinism; the Tractarian insistence on the sanctity of tradition.[18]

This is a motley assortment; among their proponents and their theories are many antagonisms, and many are qualified by some form of idealism. But they all share the attempt to rest on the validity of some purely objective standard, without which they all collapse.

Criticism as Major Locus of the Objective Assumption, and as a Study in its Vulnerability

It is in the progress of biblical criticism, and in the anguished protests against it, that the impact of objective systems upon conceptions of Christ can best be observed. The initial stages of that progress have been sketched out above, and the effects noted.[19] We have seen that it was mainly out of the evidential argument and challenges to it that biblical investigation arose, and that in almost every instance claims of evidence, prematurely and incautiously made, refuted themselves in the attempt to validate that evidence. The usual development is that the claims are quantitatively reduced in the attempt to come down to that portion of scripture which is not contaminated by error, superstition or the design of priestcraft--in other words, that which is free of subjective distortion. The thesis seems to be that if once erroneous portions are identified and struck away, the residuum must be that unquestionable, authoritative factual basis which will be the evidence on which the relationship to God must rest. As we have seen, this quantitative reduction took every conceivable form: rejection of church tradition in favor of a purely scriptural basis;[20] surrender of the Old Testament and retention of the New, and vice versa;[21] review of the canonical standing of particular books of the Bible;[22] challenge of the

authority of particular writers;[23] challenge of particular segments of books otherwise still considered inspired, on the grounds of contamination;[24] rejection of all material appearing in conflicting accounts or not validated by other accounts.[25] The amazing diligence and care, and withal the creditable honesty, with which this task was prosecuted testify to the tenacity of the faith in the objective speciality of revealed truth--and in the power of the objective method to discover and identify that special quantity.

Yet these tendencies show at once how well the career of biblical criticism illustrates the limitations and the effects of a consistent objective address to reality. If truth resides only in those bare external facts or divinely given propositions and commands, with no admixture of the subjective, such reductions as are necessary for their identification must proceed apace toward an utter nihilism. The cause is not merely that the available corpus of reliable material becomes smaller and smaller; more important, no way can be found, without the inconsistent positing of an ideal or causal relationship, to bring the factual details into meaningful relationship. In truth, then, there never <u>was</u> a thoroughly objective method; Dorner has pointed out that the evidential argument itself, by adopting the idea of necessary demonstration, had already unconsciously reinstated a subjective criterion.[26] But since it was only by degrees that the limitations of the method became evident, the application of the negative techniques of criticism proceeded confidently to define the true inspired scripture--and found, at the end, nothing it could define as such.

Reimarus noted ten palpable contradictions in the Gospel accounts, and in his inability to reconcile these, drew the conclusion that the entire story was fictitious.[27] Herder framed a hypothesis of an original oral tradition from which all four Gospels were drawn--answering thereby the critical problem raised by Reimarus by surrendering the attempt at complete harmony (and thereby the assumption of verbal inspiration), though he is forced at once, it will be noted, to piece out the objective evidence by speculation.[28] More representative reactions to Reimarus appear in the work of Bahrdt and Venturini,[29] who are among the earliest to attempt to reconstruct the life of Jesus by fictional account. In the presence of the contradictions noted by Reimarus, all the inherent difficulties of the miraculous accounts are magnified; and the thesis that there have been distortions in the accounts, whether because of misunderstanding or because of deliberate tampering, naturally appears the more acceptable as the difficulties are more strongly felt. Insofar as these rationalists, and others like them, reflect a critical thesis at all, it too amounts to supplementing the more likely facts by speculation. The extreme expression of this tendency is illustrated by Paulus, who diligently works out naturalistic theses for all the miraculous details--and in so doing is led, necessarily, from speculation to ever more tenuous speculation.[30] Besides such attempts, there were a series of devoted, painstaking scholars who sifted and resifted the evidence, still with the assumption, apparently, that the process would bring them at last the true ore of revelation. Sometimes they proceed upon the assumption of verbal inspiration, and retain or reject

in light of internal contradictions;[31] sometimes they proceed rather by a process that demonstrates the awakening of the historical sense, treating the scripture as the account of men who, though themselves fallible, have recorded the events as they understood them.[32] Sometimes these two theses seem to exist alongside one another, the argument trying to hold the two simultaneously; for it does not yet appear clearly to these men that the two theses are incompatible--the historical sense has not yet come to that level of maturity.[33] These investigations gradually establish the validity or invalidity, so defined, of various bits of evidence; but as a method that will define the true Gospel they are dismal failures. They lack a thesis comprehensive enough to explain both the validity and the invalidity. It is a fatal lack. In the first place it casts a pallor of irrelevance over the evidence itself, since it is evidence brought forth without any clear understanding of its significance. Secondly, and more to our purpose, into this vacuum slide the same old hypotheses of prior authority or historical accuracy, which were not only negatively destined at the outset but became all the more palpably so the longer they were forced to serve. But the very magnitude of the scholarly effort and the complexity and subtlety of the arguments obscured the simple fact that the working hypotheses were impossible.

In the period before Strauss, the question of which Gospel had prior claim (and therefore best right to be considered inspired, or best right to be considered historically accurate) was hotly debated.[34] All four Gospels found scholarly support, but that of John received

attention especially; among the adherents Schleiermacher was notable.[35] The assumptions of this method were soon to fall on evil days; it was one of the achievements of Strauss's Life of Jesus (1835) to show that no one of the Gospels could bear the weight of the thesis of literal inspiration as it was implied in this search for prior authority.[36] Not that the question was abandoned, but after the work of Strauss and Christian Baur, research into historical origins proceeded upon different assumptions and a better understanding of the significance of its discoveries, and the work of the Tubingen school at mid-century contributed much to the understanding of biblical materials.[37] As for the other method--that of sifting out of the supposedly contaminated biblical accounts those details of the original revelation (or the original historical truth) that remained inviolate--this method demonstrated the limitations of the objective approach even more definitely than did the search for a prior authoritative Gospel. At the outset, the ground assumption of direct revelation and the confidence of the investigators in the validity of their exclusive method led them to establish the severest terms of investigation. It will be recalled how mercilessly the "spurious" material was to be examined by Michaelis, for example.[38] As one after another the details of the Gospels fell before this diligent examination, it was more and more necessary to frame a new hypothesis that would explain the fragmentary nature of the evidence. Herder's solution was the positing of an oral tradition preceding all written accounts; but not only did this thesis seem to leave unexplained the close parallels in incident and wording among the Gospels,[39] it was altogether

too radical a departure for most men of Herder's time; it put too bluntly the question of literal inspiration, which most were not yet willing to consider; it subsumed an understanding of the limits of tradition, language, and primitive culture, which most had not yet attained to. More mechanical solutions were better entertained. These generally posited the existence of some Ur-Evangel which was supposedly an original version of one or more of the canonical Gospels.[40] (It will be noted that this thesis was at base merely a speculative variation of the search for the prior inspired Gospel, and perpetuated the assumption of an early definitive written record. It will also be noted that as this thesis was posited to supplement the critical investigations while still retaining the same assumptions, there had crept into the method, almost unnoticeably, the germ of a comparative method, the first expression of a progressive development within Christianity, that would at last supplant the authoritative assumptions, the derivative method, the mechanical conception of inspiration.) It was in the hands of Eichhorn that this way of examining the matter reached its logical ultimate development. Supposing that some Ur-Evangel must have existed, he set to work to extract from the four Gospels those portions that remained intact in the later versions. His method was essentially that described by Michaelis and pursued in all the reductive critical examinations of the Gospels: to discard whatever was contradictory or unsubstantiated in order to rest secure on what remained. But the method left him only a handful of disconnected fragments--too little material from which to reconstruct the ur-Evangel successfully, too much to write off the entire

scriptural production as a fraud or mere folklore. In his preface to his translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on Luke, Connop Thirlwall described the dilemma to which Eichhorn's work had brought criticism of the Gospels: "Now it may safely be affirmed, that the more minutely and accurately any unprejudiced person conducts this investigation, the more he will be at a loss to conceive with what design and according to what method the common matter which he will deduce by this process could have been taken down and combined into an independent whole. . . . the inequality of the narrative is so great, that it seems scarcely possible to assign a motive which will account for the nature of any part of it, and which is not inconsistent with the character of the rest."[41] By this time (1825) it is already evident to Thirlwall that the thesis of revelation by means of verbally delivered, canonically definable segments of scripture--that is to say, revelation by means of supernatural guidance external to the evangelists and apostles--is more sensibly replaced by the thesis of an inspiration working subjectively as the scripture writers give form and interpretation to what they have seen and heard:

> . . . It must be admitted, that all the hypotheses we have mentioned are equally and decidedly irreconcilable with that doctrine of inspiration once universally prevalent in the Christian church, according to which the sacred writers were merely passive organs or instruments of the Holy Spirit. This doctrine however has been so long abandoned that it would now be a waste of time to attack it. When I say it has been abandoned, I mean of course only by the learned; for undoubtedly it is still a generally received notion; and when those expressions which long usage has consecrated are used in public respecting the scriptures, they will most frequently, unless particular care be taken to qualify and restrict them, be understood in the strictest sense. Among

> theologians however this doctrine of literal inspiration has been long softened into a milder and more flexible theory. Instead of an uniform, unremitting, indiscriminate operation, the agency of the Spirit was represented as accommodating itself to circumstances, and assuming, as occasion required, two different forms. One of these was designated as the inspiration of suggestion, the other as the inspiration of superintendency . . . .[42]

Thirlwall is a bit beforehand with his analysis of the attitudes of the learned toward inspiration, at least as far as England was concerned; there were not many in England in his day with that kind of learning.[43] But his comment indicates how the difficulties of a completely objective thesis of inspiration have driven thinking men to a more subjective one. Coleridge, at least in his later development, has come to the same conclusion:

> . . . The doctrine in question petrifies at once the whole body of Holy Writ with all its harmonies and symmetrical gradations,--the flexile and the rigid,--the supporting hard and the clothing soft,--the blood which is the life,--the intelligencing nerves, and the rudely-woven, but soft and springy, cellular substance, in which all are imbedded and lightly bound together. This breathing organism, this glorious panharmonicon, which I had seen stand on its feet as a man, and with a man's voice given to it, the Doctrine in question turns at once into a colossal Memnon's head, a hollow passage for a voice, a voice that mocks the voices of many men, and speaks in their names, and yet is but one voice, and the same;--and no man uttered it, and never in a human heart was it conceived.[44]

In the end, then, the objective method finds itself inadequate to the task and is forced to readmit a subjective element.

The Objective Method in the Question of the Person of Jesus

What is true of the investigation of the Gospels is true also of speculation about Christ. We have seen that the rationalistic treat-

ments of Christ were severely reductive.[45] In these treatments the same effects were wrought by the stringent reduction of acceptable objective data as were wrought in the case of the Gospels. The method was to strike away all suspect data; but when that had been done, the fragments that remained required to be pieced out by additional "data" speculatively adduced and to be organized and interpreted by a thesis of their significance. As Schweitzer remarked of the work of Bahrdt and Venturini, "These writers were the first who, instead of contenting themselves with the simple reproduction of the successive sections of the Gospel narrative, endeavoured to grasp the inner connexion of cause and effect in the events and experiences of the life of Jesus. Since they found no such connexion indicated in the Gospels, they had to supply it for themselves."[46] Almost it seems that the more diligently the commentators attempted to avoid the speculative the more elaborate and ideal their reconstruction became; for the more stringently they excluded questionable material, the less objective data was available and the more had to be supplied by the theoretical reconstruction. Consequently these attempts to work in an objective manner were continually sliding into subjective schemes.

Reimarus, trying to reduce the account of Jesus to historical accuracy, struck away all doctrines founded upon metaphysical concepts and devoted his attention to the teachings of Jesus and to such historical details as seem not to have been imposed on the story later from a motive of supporting those doctrines. Thus the resurrection is conceived to be an invention of the disciples, and the statements of Jesus

predicting his resurrection are explained as later tamperings with the record. The result is a humanized Jesus, who shared Jewish beliefs of His day, who was a prey to human aspiration, misjudgment, dread and despair.[47] To make Christianity understandable, however, he is driven to what Schweitzer, in a generally complimentary discussion of his work, calls "a mere makeshift hypothesis," that of "[deriving] the beginnings of Christianity from an imposture."[48] More specifically, the hypothesis is that Jesus's messianic concept is a purely political one, and the imposture is the disciples' attempt to spiritualize His messianic concept when His bid for political power failed.[49] Reimarus does not, as do some of his successors, go so far as to reconstruct fictionally the means by which the "resurrection" was "staged." But he is led by his theory to liberties of interpretation of the acceptable "facts" he has thus culled out of the Gospels. Thus, for example, the disciples judiciously delayed their announcement of the resurrection for fifty days so that if the body of Jesus should be discovered where they had hidden it, it would be unrecognizable;[50] Jesus himself gave instructions that His miracles should not be spoken of "with the sole purpose of making people more eager to talk of them."[51]

Bahrdt and Venturini were alike in their frank fictionalizing of the life of Jesus and also in the general structure of that fiction: they both supposed "a secret society of which Jesus is the tool."[52] This thesis was buttressed by the speculations which the fictional approach encouraged--by "paraphernalia of dialogues of portentious length" and the "introduction of a galaxy of imaginary characters," as Schweitzer

says of the work of Bahrdt.[53] The resort to fiction itself, already incipient in Reimarus, is essentially the solution that the dilemma must force upon anyone working from the rationalists' premises. And when the story is thus fleshed out, the practice of fiction merely lends encouragement to even more radical reconstruction of the nature of Jesus--reconstruction not designed merely to fill in gaps in the narrative, but instead interpretive. Thus fictional approaches make it more likely that the Christ will be reshaped into an embodiment of the author's preoccupations. So Bahrdt represented Jesus at the age of twelve arguing with the Scribes in the temple about the impossibility of miracles.[54] It was the "secret society"--the Essenes--that first taught Jesus a hatred of priestly sacrifices and educated Him in the thought of Socrates and Plato; the death of Socrates bred in Him a desire to emulate that martyrdom.[55]

Paulus differed in that his imaginative reconstruction was more restrained in its flights, though more thorough in its application: only the miraculous birth was left intact from natural explanation, and that not wholly.[56] The same pattern, however, obtained; after the manner of his predecessors, what was taken away from the literal accuracy of the gospel accounts was replaced by speculation. In fact, Paulus, the most thoroughgoing of the rationalists, offers an even more striking example of how a negative objective technique works simultaneously to urge a positive subjective thesis. In spite of the fact that he proceeded methodically to strip away the miraculous, he insisted in the preface to his Das Leben Jesu that the measure of a believer's Chris-

tianity was not his attitude toward miracles. "The truly miraculous thing about Jesus is Himself, the purity and serene holiness of His character, which is, notwithstanding, genuinely human, and adapted to the imitation and emulation of mankind."[57] Though Paulus illustrates, in the words of Fairbairn, "the miraculous vagaries of an exegesis that must discover authentic facts, but can allow nothing supernatural in the evangelical narratives,"[58] it is nevertheless evident that here the reductive, mechanical method of rationalism has tried to lay hold of a more essential concept of Christianity.

Strauss and the Transmutation of an Objective to a Subjective Hypothesis

As the age progressed, and the rejection of components of the traditionally accepted story of Jesus grew more radical and sweeping (if not more bizarre), the need for some idealistic reconstruction became more palpable, and the reconstructions themselves became more fully idealized and more conscious of their idealism. In fact, the tracing of the objective method could well, for present purposes, be abandoned with Paulus; not that objective approaches to the gospel, and objective historical and critical investigation into the life of Jesus, ended here--rather the contrary--but rather that Paulus implicitly and Strauss explicitly demonstrated, first, that the materials of the life of Jesus did not admit of a purely objective treatment, and second, that consequently some place must be made in the believer's understanding of Jesus for subjective interpretation. Strauss, Bauer and Renan all admittedly are offering a subjective thesis to complete their objective investiga-

tions. But all these should be treated briefly in this connection, since the work of these men, especially the first, is generally thought of in terms of its negative impact in reducing to almost nothing the dependable objective data, and since their approach to the problem was to begin with the examination of objective materials, and since the particulars of their work offer valuable insights into the relationship of objective and subjective christologies.

In his "Preface" to the first German edition of his Life of Jesus, Strauss sets out in the very first sentence the positive intention of his work: "It appeared to the author of the work, . . . that it was time to substitute a new mode of considering the life of Jesus, in the place of the antiquated systems of supranaturalism and naturalism. . . The new point of view, which must take the place of the above, is the mythical."[59] Likewise, he concludes the massive work with a dissertation on "the dogmatic import of the life of Jesus," intended to reconstruct ideally what he had destroyed critically. Yet the bulk of his huge study is spent in a minute, merciless discrediting of the details of the gospel accounts. In this process neither the supernatural claims of the orthodox nor the naturalistic explanations of the rationalists are allowed to stand. The first are dismissed on the flat rejection of the possibility of miracle, and thus of any supernatural interposition upon reality: an account is to be dismissed as unhistorical "when the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws which govern the course of events."[60] The second are disposed of in a variety of ways--by the exposure of internal inconsistencies,[61] by the

unmasking of equivocating motives--but most effectively, the ground is cut from under these arguments by his methodical demonstration that the historical validity of the gospel accounts assumed in such explanations could not be assumed. The stories about Jesus have usually little, often no, factual basis; the expositors have erred in assuming the gospels to be eye-witness accounts, whereas in truth no one of them is the product of the apostles themselves. As a result neither the claim of inspiration nor that of historicity can be credited.[62] For this conclusion, the prior commentators had unwittingly prepared; Schleiermacher, for instance, had let the first three canonical gospels go as inaccurate accounts, had pointed out their errors (as in his study of Luke translated by Thirlwall), in his confidence in the historicity of John.[63] Strauss, pressing prior objections to John as summarized by Bretschneider, pointed out, as Storr says, "that this belief in the authenticity of the fourth Gospel was not based on critical grounds, but was due to the fact that the Johannine Christology had many points of affinity with the romantic spirit of the age, and the mystical pantheism of much of the current philosophy."[64] The result of these rejections was that after his exhaustive study the story of Jesus is reduced to "only a bare residuum of historical fact."[65] In Strauss, then, the reductive process of naturalistic examination has reached its logical conclusion: the old methods and assumptions are shown to be altogether bankrupt.[66] The major effect of the work was to call attention dramatically to the insecure position of present scholarship. Literal and dogmatic readings of the gospels were no longer honestly possible, at

least not until the arguments of Strauss could be dealt with.

Strauss and the Humanization of Jesus

For the present study, two other effects are more significant. First, it was necessary, on Strauss's thesis, even more so than upon that of Paulus, to think of Jesus as human rather than divine in any orthodox sense of the term. The very absurdities of the rationalists had invited a resurgence of the old supernaturalistic claims.[67] And, even though the miraculous stories were enervated by the naturalistic method, the historicity of these stories was still assumed, the stories themselves remained as part of the corpus of Christian knowledge. But now, if one accepted Strauss's thesis, the unique and supernatural qualities of Jesus were the invention of popular myth-making; the real person, supposing one could know anything definite about him at all, must be considered as another ordinary mortal, albeit one of unusually striking and appealing personality and impressive powers of persuasion and leadership.

Strauss's Understanding of Myth

Secondly, though Strauss's conception of myth is fairly incisive, and though he insists that the mythical accounts are not to be viewed as deliberate fictions (except in the case of the gospel of John), yet he tends to view these accounts as almost entirely the product of popular imaginative legend, derived from Jewish folklore, without, in their details, any reference to actual events. Thus, for example, we have the story of the changing of water into wine at Cana merely because

the Old Testament figures Moses and Elisha had supposedly performed similar, though less spectacular, miracles.[68] That such is often a defensible line of argument is not the point. The point is that Strauss has set up too marked a dichotomy between myths and fact. Strauss has in this respect his own version of the dilemma of the objective-subjective dissociation.

> . . . He overestimates the importance of the Old Testament motives in reference to the creative activity of the legend. He does not see that while in many cases he has shown clearly enough the source of the form of the narrative in question, this does not suffice to explain its origin. Doubtless, there is mythical material in the story of the feeding of the multitude. But the existence of the story is not explained by reference to the manna in the desert, or the miraculous feeding of a multitude by Elisha. The story in the Gospel has far too much individuality for that, and stands, moreover, in much too closely articulated an historical connexion. It must have as its basis some historical fact. It is not a myth, though there is myth in it. Similarly with the account of the transfiguration. The substratum of historical fact in the life of Jesus is much more extensive than Strauss is prepared to admit. Sometimes he fails to see the foundations, because he proceeds like an explorer who, in working on the ruins of an Assyrian city, should cover up the most valuable evidence with the rubbish thrown out from another portion of the excavations.[69]

In his application of his theory to the gospel accounts, then, Strauss is still, like Paulus and Michaelis and Reimarus before him, applying a mechanical device to separate out a supposed residuum of truth. That the device is a more sophisticated one, and that the residuum turns out to be quantitatively less, does not alter this fact. For all the differences, then, in Strauss's assumptions--for all his Hegelian theological scheme by which it was possible for him to assert the truth of Christianity in the face of his whole critical investigation, for all his thoroughness and consistency of method that looks so refreshingly

frank by comparison--Strauss's mode of applying his thesis is essentially that of the objective rationalists generally. Like theirs, too, are some of the consequent distortions. Schweitzer points out, for example, the violence he does to the parables, because his reading of them is prejudiced at the outset by his thesis of their legendary origin; thus, though Strauss thinks the "hard grit" of Jesus's sayings are preserved,[71] he generally rejects the parables out of hand.[72]

Strauss, Bauer and Renan: Iconoclasts through the Objective Method; Their Consequent Subjectivism

The search for literal objective detail upon which to found sure knowledge of the nature of Jesus has, in Strauss, come to an important inversion. The method of excluding questionable detail in Michaelis, for example, had as its motive the identifying of dependable material, and as its ground assumption the belief that the method would produce such results. But Strauss's ground assumption is skeptical--secure as he is in his Hegelian scheme--and his motive is to reject all that can be rejected. The objective method is pursued, but the thesis directing the examination is an ideal one.[73]

Similarly, Bruno Bauer and Ernest Renan employ criticism essentially for a negative purpose--to clear the ground for their subjective reconstructions. Bauer, working from the insight provided by Strauss, Tholuck and Neander,[74] that the gospel of John was not history but "Christian art," gradually developed the concept that the other gospel accounts likewise are literary productions. "The criticism of the Fourth Gospel compels us to recognise that a Gospel may have a

purely literary origin," explains Schweitzer in his analysis of Bauer. ". . . He felt compelled . . . to accept the idea that Mark also might be of purely literary origin."[75] In the process of his investigations he came to entertain more and more seriously the thesis that the earliest evangelist (by then conceived to be Mark) had created the entire gospel story out of the scantiest historical materials.[76] The gospel accounts were conceived to be made up of mythic embodiments of the values and practices of the Church, thrust back into supposedly historical settings and attached to Jesus in order to give them authority and a more appealing form.[77] "The question which has so much exercised the minds of men--whether Jesus was the historic Christ (= Messiah)--is answered in the sense that everything that the historical Christ is, everything that is said of Him, everything that is known of Him, belongs to the world of imagination, that is, of the imagination of the Christian community, and therefore has nothing to do with any man who belongs to the real world."[78] In his late work entitled Christ and the Caesars: How Christianity Originated from Graeco-Roman Civilization (1877) he finds the genesis of Christianity in a fusion of Stoic philosophy and a "new Roman Judaism."[80] Thus by pressing his examination of the authenticity of the gospel accounts, Bauer arrives at last at the remarkable thesis that the entire story of Christ, the entire Christian scheme, is the ideal creation of a Roman literary artist of the second century.[81]

Renan is the classic example, almost the embodiment, of a naive faith given unreservedly to the objective literalness of Christianity, only to be undermined by awakened skepticism; such a faith will

then be rejected as uncritically as it was embraced. His Recollections of my Youth set the most merciless tests of orthodoxy:

> . . . In a divine book everything must be true, and as two contradictories cannot both be true, it must not contain any contradiction. (p.256)
>
> Orthodoxy calls upon us to believe that the biblical books are the work of those to whom their titles assign them. The mildest Catholic doctrine as to inspiration will not allow one to admit that there is any marked error in the sacred text, or any contradiction in matters which do not relate either to faith or morality. (p. 257)
>
> To abandon a single dogma or reject a single tenet in the teaching of the Church, is equivalent to the negation of the Church and of Revelation. In a church founded upon divine authority, it is as much an act of heresy to deny a single point as to deny the whole. (p. 262)

Yet he retained an identification with Christianity by his "belief in the eminent personality of Jesus" which "had been my mainstay in my struggle against theology."[82] In a letter of March 1845, written shortly before his break with the Church, he asserts this belief: "I console myself by thinking of Jesus, so beautiful, so pure, so ideal in His suffering--Jesus whom I hope to love always. Even if I should ever abandon Him, that would give Him pleasure, for it would be a sacrifice made to my conscience, and God knows that it would be a costly one!"[83] He had "a keen regard for the evangelic ideal and for the character of the Founder of Christianity. The idea that in abandoning the Church I should remain faithful to Jesus got hold upon me. . . ."[84]

When he turned to the task of writing his Vie de Jesus, Renan went to the Holy Land in order to experience for himself the spirit of the place. "I have endeavored to do the same as he who, by drawing a violin bow, arranges grains of sand in natural waves on vibrating plates,"

he wrote to Berthelot from Jerusalem.[85] The reality of the setting was very gratifying to him. "This road cut in the rock, and descending from Galilee, has certainly borne the footprints of Jesus, and is certainly the place where he received from these poor bands of Galileans that triumph which cost him his life."[86] He believed that his technique had made it possible for a sense of the reality of Jesus, eroded by critical and theological treatment alike, to be recovered: "I have succeeded in giving all these events an ordered sequence which is completely lacking in the gospels. I believe that this time one will have before his eyes living beings, and not these pale, lifeless phantoms--Jesus, Mary, Peter, etc., considered as abstract beings, and only typified."[87] The technique is indicative both of his concern with the centrality of Jesus and his high valuation of the literal fact; but it is evident that he has created his own saccharine personal Jesus out of the "data" of his own reaction to the countryside of Palestine.[88]

Summary of the Objective Study of Jesus

Objective study of the nature of Jesus during the first part of the nineteenth century, then, manifested several characteristics significant for our study. First, more than any other single factor, it completed the demolition of the old authoritarian religious assumptions. In the judgment of Bruno Bauer, at least, Strauss had "removed from the path of subsequent criticism the danger and trouble of a collision with the earlier orthodox system."[89] If Bauer overstated the case--in England at least there were yet to be a number of collisions--it was evident

to the informed that new grounds must be found and new defences worked out. Long before the issues even defined themselves for most Englishmen, the way of literal infallibility of scripture was doomed. Consequently, religious materials--among them the person of Jesus--were more easily available for artistic appropriation with less risk of the artist's being charged with blasphemy. The Christ had to be humanized before he could be treated otherwise than as a sacrosanct figure of divine authority.

Secondly, we have seen that in this negative effect objective treatments themselves were weighed and found wanting. One alternative to the traditional view of scripture, in the face of this criticism, was of course skepticism--a view we have exemplified in Bruno Bauer, in order to show this outcome of the collapse of the way of objective interpretation, though the examination of Bauer has taken us beyond the historical limits of our study. But if the skeptical answer was not accepted, the other alternative must be some speculative reconstruction. We have seen the inexorable pressure of the failure of objective method toward one of these two solutions. Needless to say, it is the imaginative reconstruction of Christianity that is pertinent to this study.

Third, biblical criticism served to help keep attention focused on Jesus Himself. Other issues were of course being examined; but the historical Jesus remained through this period the main critical concern. After Strauss and the early work of F. C. Baur, the Tubingen school turned its attention more exclusively to the Pauline writings; but that development comes after the formative period for the particularly

English christology that was the direct influence upon the early manifestations of the Christ-image. The German works of significance in that formation were written before 1840.

Finally, in these objective treatments--the most inimical environment, on first glance, for such a phenomenon--there appear notable attempts to fictionalize the life of Jesus, notable precedents for the employment of the person of Jesus as a literary figure. When Bahrdt treats the Jesus in the temple as an expositor of rationalistic rejection of miracle, he is not only trying to remake the Christ in a form more meaningful to a new age; he is engaged in a rudimentary exercise in symbol-making. He has appropriated an object to which patterns of meaning and value have traditionally accrued and assigned it anew as the embodiment of a complex of meanings apparently different ("apparently" because if the symbol works at all in its new role there must be some analogy by which the two meanings are consistent). It is a meager enough achievement, but it is a beginning.

Before we turn our attention to the development of the subjective side of the old rationalism, it would be well perhaps to forestall a misunderstanding which the method here followed may have occasioned. We have chosen to deal with the objective development first for two reasons: it is a simpler pattern to understand; and the symbolic christology toward which this study is working arose more immediately from the subjective side. It is not intended, however, to represent the objective development as historically prior to the subjective. The two developments were of course operating simultaneously and qualifying each

other in the process. Fairbairn, for example, points out that before Strauss "there were several large and bold Christologies, but no corresponding criticism of the Gospels or study of their history,"[90] though this assertion seems to make light of the achievements of the earlier critics;[91] and Schweitzer, concerned as he is with the "historical Jesus," makes much of the discomfiture Strauss's work gave to the speculative christologies of such men as Schleiermacher.[92] It is quite legitimate, then, to consider the critical development as a later corrective to the more subjective treatments that took their impetus from German idealism, as well as vice versa. For the present study, the moot question of historical priority is not crucial.

Subjective (Ideal) Themes: Kant

The subtle ins and outs of German idealism need not, fortunately, be examined in this study. It will be necessary only to remark some obvious tendencies of this philosophic movement and then go at once to their manifestation in christology. The most essential point is the truism that the major tendency of this idealism is severely subjective, seeking to ground itself in the human consciousness rather than in objective data.[93]

The source of this tendency, ultimately, is the traditional faith of rationalism in the special validity of human reason as partaking of the very reason of God, evident in Descartes and much earlier. It is hoped that this point has been sufficiently treated in the preceding chapter. It may be argued that the main development of eighteenth century thought had been rather the empirical; but the strain of pure

rationalism, the reference of validity to self-evident truth, never quite disappeared, and when Hume clarified the limitations of empiricism by showing its inevitable collapse into skepticism, the subjective solution was again resorted to in earnest. That the reassertion of this high rationalism was made in Kant's stentorian voice is of tremendous significance for th direction and strength of subsequent idealism.

Of course it is reassertion with a difference. As though warned off by Hume,[94] Kant strives to make his system secure by divorcing the ulterior reality, the thing in itself, from the mind's formulation of it; no correspondence between the formulation which the mental categories of time, space and causation make of the object and the object itself can be asserted,[95] to say nothing of the Creator and Moral Governor supposedly behind that ulterior reality.[96] But such qualification of the Cartesian reliance upon the validity of reason does not, in Kant's system, dethrone reason; rather the opposite, it makes of subjective knowledge the sole reality available to man. Nor is his extension of that knowledge through reference to the practical reason really a threat to the supremacy of the subjective apprehension of reality. For though he attempts to make of the practical reason a means to the absolute, it is still conceived as a subjective vehicle[97]; and where reality is severely factored into the subjective and the objective, there is still no means to the thing-in-itself. The subjective direction of subsequent philosophy is the result.[98]

It is evident what a narrow course must be charted, under such presuppositions, between solipsism and skepticism. Just as the earlier rationalism had to assume the identity in kind, the difference only in

degree, between man's reason and God's reason, in order to rely on the validity of its "necessary demonstrations," so at last in Kant's system the way of solipsism is avoided only by the assertion of the universality of the mental categories. Here, then, is the other side of the rationalist's dilemma. Just as a pure objectivism runs to mere atomism, where no relationship can be posited between the objects (because to do so is to reintroduce the subjective synthesizing of that data), and therefore annihilates knowledge, so a pure subjectivism has no objective check on its own constitutive power, and the mind is left the creator and master of existence. And just as objectivism must evade its problem by the assumption of some relational bond, of a consistent operation of that bond, and of some means by which the objective materials translate themselves into knowledge--an assumption unsupportable under the premises of objectivism--so subjectivism can avoid the anarchy of solipsism only by the assumption of some check on the absolute power of mind--an assumption not derivable from the premises of subjectivism. Kant's assumption of the universality of the categories is such an expedient. It cannot be demonstrated without reference to empirical data.[99] Though he is more cautious in his refusal to take Descartes' ontological leap, the assumption is still essentially the Cartesian one--that the mind of man partakes of an ultimate and stable reality.[100] It is finally only incidental to this problem that the ultimate is seen as the human universal instead of God.

The issue does not become pressing in Kant primarily because he is working out an epistemology and therefore (it would appear) need

not push his system into an ontology. Though of the thing-in-itself nothing may be known, of the workings of the mind it can be said that certain categories are operative.[101] But the pressure for an ontological extension is tremendous, the more so because the extension is in fact implied in the initial assumptions.[102] Kant's followers could not leave the question in such a form; they proceeded to ground the epistemology in an ontology. The unknowable thing-in-itself remained a challenge to the certainty of knowledge, and must somehow be brought within the system.[103]

Fichte

Fichte's solution was to proceed from the fact of the finite ego to the assertion of an infinite Ego of which it partakes.[104] The finite ego does not in fact create in an unlimited way; that creation must instead be the activity of an infinite Counterpart.[105] Now, if existence is considered as the product of the activity of this Ego,[106] a realizing out of itself its own nature by objectifying itself in phenomena, then phenomena must be consistent with the Ego.[107] Thus, by the circuitous route of the infinite Ego, the finite ego has access to phenomena and knows their validity.[108] The assertion of an identity (in some sense of the word) between the finite ego and the infinite Ego is the keystone of this arch.[109] It is not only required in order to validate man's experience of phenomena; it prevents the subjective reality from becoming merely arbitrary (i.e., it is the check upon solipsism).

Distinction between Intellect and "Self" as Bases of Idealism

We may pause to note in passing that it will make a great deal of difference in the consequences of this system whether the Ego is conceived as intellect or as something more comprehensive. In this important distinction it is very difficult to set one writer under one category, another under the other. For instance, whatever the assertions, any philosophy that is systematically developed is evidently at base intellectual. The structure of the system will naturally correspond to the process of reason.[110] And if the base assumption is the identity of knowing and being, the epistemological process itself will inevitably rise to an ontology (as it does in Hegel) and incline to the assumption that propositional statement developed by rational system is the highest expression of reality. Art in such an instance necessarily assumes a subordinate place, for it can only be seen as a confusion and reduction of the truth. On the other hand, as intellect comes to be seen as only one mode of knowing, and a (supposedly) more comprehensive "self" is seen as that identity of man that corresponds to the identity of God, the artistic creation, evoking not only an intellectual but also a feeling response, may assert itself as a more satisfactory language of reality and begin to supplant system. But the presence of both these assumptions can be marked in post-Kantian thought and even in Kant himself.[111] In the present study, it will be attempted to examine the latter assumption as a separate phenomenon, the mark of a major departure from rationalism, whereas the former will be treated

as a late development of the earlier rationalism. Setting aside the latter for the moment, then, what consequences derive from considering the Ego as essentially intellect?

Characteristics of the Intellectual Form

In the first place, there will be a perpetuation of the Cartesian distrust of the material, though with a difference. Though, as with Spinoza, the material is now once more elevated to a manifestation of the infinite, its reality is derived, so to speak, from the Ego. The significance of objective reality is only this, that it is the limited and ephemeral image of the idea. Its function is exemplary; it adds nothing to the nature of the Ego (or ego) itself, but merely shows the constituents of the Ego to Itself, as it were. It gives form to the idea; but the form is seen not as essential, but only incidental, to the meaning. Reference to the discussion in the preceding chapter concerning the role of prophecy and miracle as merely validating doctrine will demonstrate the coherence in this line of rationalism. The role of phenomena is now no longer merely mechanical--not merely the authoritative stamp, as it were, of the Monarch; it has advanced to a more necessary and indigenous status; but it is still conceived to be merely the means by which the intellectual significance is observed.

At the same time, the significance of this advancement must not be lost sight of. What has been achieved is a recovery of meaning in phenomena. Since all phenomena are derived from the Infinite, and are in fact the very objectification of the thought of the Infinite, no phenomena are meaningless; they are the purveyors of the mind of God,

could man but get through the outward form to that inner essence. It is now at least no longer admissable to approach existence with "single vision and Newton's sleep."

The most significant effect of this intellectual basis, then, is the priority which idea takes over the form which embodies it. For if the idea is the reality, and the form which embodies it is an incidental (though necessary) means, it becomes evident that the form will always be less than a total manifestation of the idea, and will never succeed (in its partiality and its subordinate dignity) in giving expression to the essence, the idea itself. It remains the useful sign of that essence only. If one may oversimplify slightly, the object in such a case may serve allegorically or metaphorically (where allegory and metaphor are conceived to be mental creations only) but not symbolically; perhaps more accurately, if it is conceived as symbol it is as "assigned" symbol rather than "natural" symbol. The source of the analogy between the subjective idea and the object is the subjective idea not mere illusion. The activity of the Ego (or ego) must everywhere provide and sustain the significance of the object; the object has no "dignity" (to borrow a term from an analogous employment in Kant), no essential nature that abides regardless of the mind's truest assessment of it. In the consistent application of this system, the meaning assigned by the ego or Ego to an object might with equal validity be assigned any other object, or any other meaning might with equal validity be assigned the initial object. Again, this is simply to say that

if the solipsistic tendency of this subjectivism were ever fully to realize itself, the authority of the ego to assign meaning and value would become absolute. In practice, of course, some restraint must be imposed--for experience will not allow the mind to rest in solipsism very long--and the ego required to conform to universality or necessity or the superior assignments of meaning by the infinite Ego.

The attitude of this school of thinkers toward the form which the idea assumes can perhaps be no better illustrated than by a brief examination of a characteristic figure of speech, so commonly employed by these writers as to become proverbial with them. The truth comes to us, according to this figure, like the kernel of the nut; it is surrounded by an unpalatable and only incidental hull, the function of which is to preserve the kernel and which is to be cracked, shucked off, and discarded. Kant says of historical faith, for example, that it "will itself cease and pass over into a pure religious faith equally obvious to the whole world. To this end we ought even now to labor industriously, by way of continuously setting free the pure religion from its present shell, which as yet cannot be spared."[114] Herder complains of the followers of Leibniz that "since they did not separate the kernel from its husk, Leibnizianism meant to them what, for Leibniz himself, was only poetical ornament or accommodation."[115] Schleiermacher, hoping to overthrow a fixed concept of religion among the cultured, says to them concerning this prejudice, "If anyone says it is wrong and beside the mark, and if he point out something else in religion not hollow, but having a kernel of excellent quality and extraction, you must first hear and judge before you venture further to despise."[116]

"Why," he scolds, "have you not penetrated deeper to find the kernel of this shell?"[117] Coleridge, with a notable alteration of the figure, remarks of Kant that "for those who could not pierce through this symbolic husk, his writings were not intended."[118] Even the latter-day commentators on the works of this period have picked up the figure and employed it freely, from frequent exposure and from the figure's evident appropriateness as a shorthand of the idealistic assumptions. Burkhardt notes that Herder "accuses Kant of having two reasons, and finds the kernel of his errors to be in the recurrent dualism of phenomena and noumena, sense and reason."[119] Dorner remarks that a philosophy so earnest as that of Kant could not regard Christianity "as mere superstition, or as an empty spiritless husk."[120] Again, he paraphrases De Wette: "History has only value so far as it is the husk and shell of the eternal idea; and this material may calmly be left over to the decomposing or negative influence of the understanding, which . . .may and must strip off from Christianity its glittering, miraculous husk . . . ."[121] As time goes on, and the meaning of experience becomes represented as less exclusively ideational, there is a growing awareness of correspondence between form and content, a growing sense that the function of the husk is not merely incidental. In Coleridge's term, the husk becomes more "symbolic." "They and they only can acquire the philosophic imagination, the sacred power of self-intuition, who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, that the wings of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar; those only, who feel in their own spirits the same instinct, which impels the

chrysalis of the horned fly to leave room in its involucrum for antennae yet to come."[122] But in the earlier employment of the figure, and particularly in the work of those writers of more systematic tendency, the general practice is to conceive the embodying form as valueless or even detrimental. Indeed, one has no difficulty finding explicit statements to that effect. So Kant lists among the requirements of the true church "Its modality, the unchangeableness of its constitution, yet with the reservation that incidental regulations, concerning merely its administration, may be changed according to time and circumstances; to this end, however, it must already contain within itself a priori (in the idea of its purpose) settled principles. Thus [it operates] under primordial laws, once [for all] laid down, as it were out of a book of laws, for guidance; not under arbitrary symbols which, since they lack authenticity, are fortuitous, exposed to contradiction, and changeable."[123] Similarly, the representation the Christian ethic makes of the distinction between moral evil and moral good as a distinction between hell and heaven "is figurative, and, as such, disturbing," though "philosophically correct in meaning."[124]

For if no single incidental form can ever adequately express the idea, but merely serve to remind the ego of a truth already inherent in the ego itself, it follows that the true religion is really that inner, self-evident ideal which every man immediately possesses. The religions of man have been only so many imperfect, partial, temporary objectifyings of that ideal. "Contingent facts of history can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason," says Lessing.[125] Christianity

thus necessarily loses its special validity, except by virtue of a basically inconsistent assertion that its form is "nearer" the essence of the ideal than are other religions. So in Lessing's Nathan der Weise, for example, the parable of the three rings essays to show that this ideal religion may be validly embodied in any of the three great religions.

The Problem of Anthropomorphism: A Case in the Nature of Idealist Symbol

As to God Himself, writers of this tendency are extremely studious to avoid the error of anthropomorphism. Certainly the infinite could not be realized in so reductive a representation. This scorn of the anthropomorphic is, on one side, animated by the rationalistic hatred of superstition and priestcraft, and disgust with the simple-minded victims of such degeneracy--and thus is a direct inheritance from the age of Toland, an inheritance the idealist shares quite amicably with the objective rationalist. At the same time, it will at once be seen how precisely this attitude toward anthropomorphism falls in with the qualities of idealism set out above.

The issue of anthropomorphism brings into clear focus the supposition that in the idea man has access to a quantity that does not partake of the limitations of the particular and ephemeral, which characterize all historical religions. The attempt to escape anthropomorphic conceptions of God is precisely the attempt to escape the contamination of the idea by all that man considers limited and imperfect in himself. It will therefore be a problem to which this form of sub-

jectivism turns itself most diligently; and from the nature of the problem, one that will most frequently and most disturbingly challenge the thesis of the special validity of the ideal. Herder provides an instructive example. He is apt to be short-tempered about this failing in others. Leibniz is half-excused from giving way to anthropomorphisms in his Theodicy because it was a popular work, and "you know how a popular mode of presentation often leads astray."[126] "Leibniz is not to blame for this nonsense, except insofar as his poetic mind never, even for the most rigorous truths, disdained ornament, that is, images, similes, allegories, anthropomorphisms, and so on."[127] The case here referred to was Leibniz's description of God brooding for eternities over the creation of the world. ". . . Imagine to yourself this long, long time in the eternity of the inactive God!"[128] Other offenders are often scored more heavily: "In order to explain the activity of God, Leibniz once used the expression, 'fulgurations' which was based on the beautiful image of the sun's rays. In Kastner you can read how absurdly the image was subsequently taken up. Thus when we speak of God, let us rather use no images! This is our first commandment in philosophy as well as in Mosaic law."[129] Herder knows quite well what he would put in the place of such images--the fact that "there is a mathematical reason in the world."[130] ". . .A philosopher who gives up or denies his reason, can indeed have no proof of God. Q. E. D. But as soon as he recognizes it and makes clear to himself what reason is, then in the idea of reason itself he is given proof of God, that is, of an essential necessity in the relation of truths. My friend, I make free to say

that this is the only essential proof of God, (and there cannot be several which are essential) recurring in all proofs, but which nowhere appears so exact and pure as in the laws of our reason."[131] Yet it is commonly objected to Herder--and examples are easily come by[132]that he lapses easily into figurative and poetic language where he should be explicit and systematic--a tendency he himself is not unaware of: "We, too, Philolaus, in our discussion have often had to use the name of God as a mere symbol."[133] There are a number of instances where his attempts to avoid the anthropomorphic seem to bring him face to face with the bewildering realization that human ideas of God cannot help being in some degree anthropomorphic. He stumbles over one such difficulty in his critique of Lessing's On the Doctrine of Spinoza in the fourth Conversation:

> . . . My desire was aroused to know how Lessing conjured up "the spirit which pervaded Spinoza himself," and made it his own. And just here, I must admit, my desire was in vain. Lessing hears of an intelligent, personal cause of the world and is overjoyed in his way, that he will now hear something entirely new. Lessing's reason could never doubt of God's reason. His curiosity was thus directed to the personal cause of the world, and about that, naturally, he could learn nothing new. The expression "person" even when used by theologians who do not set it in contrast with the world, but only take it to be a distinction in the nature of God, is, as you yourself say, merely anthropomorphic. Thus, philosophically nothing could be settled on this point.[134]

In the interim before the second edition, however, he apparently felt some difficulty with the distinction between the intelligent and the personal, and therefore the second edition substitutes for this passage a lengthy revision. The word person, he explains, means "the peculiar nature of a character in general by which it is distinguished from

another."[135] Such a word could not be properly employed in reference to God:

> He is neither a face nor a mask, neither a legal personality, nor a distinct character who exists among others and acts beside them. . . Let us have done with these personalizations which always lead if not to something false, assumed or imputed, then to something distinctive in form, figure, or differentiation from others, to position, rank, and that sort of thing, and hence carry us away from the pure conception of an entirely incomparable essence and truth. God no more portrays a "person," or affects personal qualities, or has a personal way of thinking [italics mine] which is distinct from, and in contrast to other ways, than He resembles a person. He is. None is like unto Him.
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> THEOPHRON: But does not "the highest intelligence" demand the term "person," in that "unity of self-consciousness" would involve "personality"?
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> PHILOLAUS: I do not see why. On the contrary, "personality" always remains a strange and superficial term for this conception. . . . The most intimate consciousness of self forgets the appearance of person . . . so completely, that one as it were drives it out of one's self in pronouncing a word of judgment on personal appearance.[136]

Fichte, too, comes in his later development to see that the intellectual formulation is limited:

> Thou art best known to the child-like, devoted, simple mind. . . .The inquisitive understanding, which has heard of Thee, but seen Thee not, would teach us thy nature; and as Thy image, shows us a monstrous and incongruous shape, which the sagacious laugh at, and the wise and good abhor. I hide my face before Thee, and lay my hand upon my mouth. How Thou art, and seemest to Thine own being, I can never know. . . . That which I conceive, becomes finite through my very conception of it; and this can never, even by endless exaltation, rise into the Infinite. Thou differest from men, not in degree but in nature. In every stage of their advancement they think of Thee as a greater man, and still a greater; but never as God--the Infinite,--whom no measure can mete. . . . In the Idea of person there are imperfections, limitations:--how can I clothe Thee with it without these?[137]

In other words, in the examination of the question of anthropomorphism the intellect itself is gradually surrendered to the realm of phenomena,

though the intellectual assumption at the core of this philosophy fights stubbornly to maintain its place. If the examination is continued in intellectualistic terms, the effect must be a further and further retreat into abstraction, until finally not even the abstract idea itself but merely the process of abstraction is identified with the ineffable Name; and (in the subjective version of that same phenomenon we have noted in objectivism) the mind reasons itself out of the divine prerogative and idealism converts itself into materialistic determinism. Dialectical materialism becomes the saviour of mankind.

The Self-Effacing Nature of Intellectually Based Idealism, Exemplified in the Concept of Revelation

This denigration of the objective by which the subjective asserts its authority has, then, the predictable inevitable effect, at first glance paradoxical, of destroying the ideal itself. An interesting study in point, which will simultaneously throw light on the effect of the tendency on christology, is the means by which intellectual idealism treats the question of revelation. The orthodox conception of revelation had been, of course, that it was something objectively given, and the earlier rationalists and deists had continued to consider it such. The idea of an initial fall of man had rendered it essential that the saving revelation come from without and restore man to the state of perfect reasonableness. Now the idea of the fall is at base contradictory to the assumptions of rationalism, however the two modes of thinking are often held in conjunction; for the reason in man that is partaker of the divine nature (or of the universal human ideal) can not

be conceived as maimed in such a way without its authority being questioned. And if man has not fallen--or, to put the thesis in the terms of idealism, if there exists inherent in every man the ideal of perfection already--not only is an external revelation unnecessary, but to give it a validity higher than that of innate reason is to decline from pure religion into an idolatry. What, then, is to be done with the claims of revelation, with the fact of the history of Christianity?

Lessing worked out the amazing reconciliation of progressive revelation, which, when made a thesis of history, had such far-reaching and radical effects as to make it the great divide of modern thought. The idea is pivotal in the development that extends from Lessing and Herder through Hegel to Feuerback, Marx and Engels. It provided simultaneously the theoretical and historical rationale for the organic conception of the universe to which the idea of immanence had been pressing since the Copernican revolution. In religion it broke the tyranny of static systematic thought--for good or for bad. It is mainly responsible for an emergence of a new concept of the role of myth. And, in the immediate case at hand, it appeared to justify the assertion of the supremacy of the kernel which is idea over the accidental form which is husk.

The gist of this thesis is set out in clear popular form in The Education of the Human Race. Lessing bows briefly in the direction of the idea of a fall, as it had been adapted by an earlier rationalism, but mostly by way of concession; it is evident the doctrine of a fall is not conceived as necessary. Even if God had originally given to every

man a personal immediate revelation (the rationalists Eden), he says, the inevitable consequence was that "as soon as the Human Reason, left to itself, began to elaborate it, it broke up the one Immeasurable into many Measurables, and gave a note or sign of mark to every one of these parts." The result was "polytheism and idolatry,"[138] a condition which might as easily be assumed, and by later commentators was assumed, as a starting-place for human religious development. From this condition, he says--following biblical history closely--God led man through a series of revelations, varying the mode of revelation as the human race developed. The whole history of the human race is described by analogy to the growth of one person, who advances from infancy to maturity by means of these progressive modes of education. At first God teaches by rule only, leading His pupil always however to a fuller understanding of the precept to which the rule gives expression. At a given stage in man's maturity, in the fullness of time, "a Better Instructor must come and tear the exhausted Primer from the child's hands. CHRIST came!"[139] He was the "first certain practical Teacher of the immortality of the soul,"[140] and his role was to bring to man doctrines and commands heretofore imperfectly conceived "to enforce an inward purity of heart in reference to another life."[141] But this is not the ultimate stage: there will come "the time of the perfecting, when man . . . will do the Right because it <u>is</u> right, not because arbitrary rewards are annexed thereto. . . . It will assuredly come! the time of a new eternal Gospel, which is promised us in the Primer of the New Testament itself!"[142]

Thus the accidental historical form of religion, useful for

its time, is nevertheless only means to an end, and is discarded once the idea has been shucked out of it. Doctrines themselves are formulations of the same sort: the idea of trinity is useful in that it communicates the idea "that God cannot possibly be One in the sense in which finite things are one, that even His unity must be a transcendental unity, which does not exclude a sort of plurality";[143] the doctrine of the atonement may well mean "that God, in spite of that original incapacity of man, chose rather to give him moral laws, and forgive him all transgressions in consideration of His Son, i.e., in consideration of the self-existent total of all His own perfections, compared with which, and in which, all imperfections of the individual disappear, than not to give him those laws, and then to exclude him from all moral blessedness, which cannot be conceived of without moral laws."[144]

Thus all the objects of Christianity are transmuted into ideas, and the development of the intellectual apprehension of God is the end of religion. It would seem that the role of form has been totally subjected to that of idea, and that intellectual idealism has been reconciled with Christianity at the expense only of the surrender of the naive notion of the absolute validity of its embodying forms.

Yet it is not difficult to see here already the incipient collapse of idealistic religion, in the form in which it is here conceived. The difficulties are tremendous, and work themselves out inexorably in the subsequent development to eventuate in Feuerbach, Marx and Comte.

In the first place, idealism conceived as a system is static by nature and must inevitably be broken by the concept of evolution.

If the special validity of revelation must bow to a relativistic reinterpretation, the special finality of reasoned theses must also bow. One may say, begging the analogy of the representative child undergoing this progressive education, that the mature idea is already present in the infant precept; but if the idea held at any given moment must succumb to a later idea, albeit that something consistent inheres in both, then the idea itself, the intellectual formulation, must be seen as mere husk also. How many layers of shell must be removed til one comes down to the kernel? and what can that kernel be? The inevitable consequence of the renunciation of form as nugatory must be, as was noted in the discussion of anthropomorphism above, that essence likewise vanishes. What is left, if even that can at last be retained, is the mere formal process itself. The notion that God Himself is changing, growing, coming into consciousness, is the apotheosis of this process, eloquent of the collapse of the divinity of idea.

Lessing's work itself already gives evidence of the uneasiness of this reconciliation of static idea and the process of change. "Education gives to Man nothing which he might not educe out of himself; it gives him that which he might educe out of himself, only quicker and more easily. In the same way too, Revelation [i.e., progressive revelation] gives nothing to the human species, which the human reason left to itself might not attain; only it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things earlier."[145] Yet it is the nature of the Human Reason, that even if it were given the conception of the One God, it would inevitably break up the one Immeasurable into many

Measurables. It is not, then, in the finality of the expression of the idea that the essential factor lies, but in the maturity of the mind that receives it? If all that the process is working toward is the final realization of the idea which, once clearly seen, reason will recognize as i nately validated, how could the mind once enlightened ever decline from the pure idea? The point here is not to bedevil Lessing with his concession to the idea of a fall--for we have conceded that idea to be unessential to his thesis--but to show that the innate antagonism between stable idea and the evolutionary process has not been apprehended.

An analogous difficulty appears in a different context in Hegel. There has begun already that odd reversal by which intellectualism attempted to comprehend and absorb the objective, and which finally broke the authority of idealism. For though Hegel rests his whole system upon the idea of evolving consciousness as a process, the logical nature of his system delivers it again into a static intellectualism, into the "resolution of all life into conceptual relations and processes of thought.[146] "He regards the movement of the universe as the life of God," says Storr; "God is immanent in the processes of nature and history. The Absolute . . . having objectified or externalised itself in the world of the finite, is in process of returning to itself in the consciousness of man."[147] But this concept of history encounters difficulties, on the face of it at least, in its confrontation with the speciality of Jesus. Storr's analysis of the difficulty is just: "If the Absolute is process, if all finite being

seen as mere reflection. Idealism has turned itself inside out and become materialism. Ironically, the concept of the dialectical process itself, the "general laws" of Marx and Engels, which they posited in the place of idealism, is a logical and systematic construct, and is therefore, despite appearances, as much a static intellectual system as the idealism which it thinks it has overthrown--but which actually is still bone and flesh of its own assumptions.

The Christology of Intellectually Based Idealism

The christological speculations of the intellectualists follow predictable lines. As some of the quotations cited above suggest, they were much more interested in the ideas inherent in Christianity than in anything formalistic and positive. As the rationalists of an earlier age had rejected the miraculous and prophetic, so these rejected all religious form except as exemplary of the inner reality. The task of religion is to reject the mere outward trappings as rapidly as the growth of human maturity will allow. Among the incidental trappings so surrendered are of course all characteristics of Jesus, all historical or legendary details of His life, all doctrinal claims of His divinity, His sinlessness, His place in the Trinity, etc., except insofar as these may be translated into idea.

In the question of whether Jesus was human or divine, the basic judgment of this form of religion must adhere to the former. If He were divine (supposing the essential distinction between the human and the divine), He must necessarily appear as an external object, and hence

is the progressive manifestation of God, how can there be at any one point in the process a manifestation complete in character, and possessed of the finality and uniqueness which Christianity attributes to the Incarnation? . . . . The hypothesis of a progressive incarnation of God in humanity fails to do justice to the peculiar character which, as Christianity claims, belongs to the Incarnation of Christ."[148] As Strauss saw, a consistent thesis of historical development as the essence of religion would have to set the perfect embodiment of the idea at the end of the development, not somewhere short of the end.[149] The thesis requires, in other words, the iron necessity of the process, and the historical Jesus must be dethroned that He may find His place in the development. In Storr's judgment, Hegel skirted the problem and made the historical Jesus fit more easily into his system by insisting that His importance lay in the doctrines he taught rather than in His person[150]; and we have the anomaly of a system that insists on the primacy of the act of incarnation as the clue to existence equivocating on the validity of the incarnation itself.

Second, the process described by Lessing is evidently a transformation of religion into pure idea, that is into philosophy. The residuum to be discovered by the washing away of inaccurate portions is not now, as with the biblical critics, some parts of the gospel story that will be divinely efficacious, but the pure idea which is hidden within the entire story but no part of which the story perfectly discloses. In this line of development, consciousness is salvation and

any narrative or poetic or ritualistic formulation is the darkness which man must flee. The end product, then, is the obliteration of all religion when the idea shall have shucked off at last all the limitations of form. But the process does not stop with the transformation of religion into philosophy; systematic philosophy itself must at last fall. So Engels interprets the contribution of Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and himself:

> . . . With Hegel philosophy comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he comprehended its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and on the other hand, because, even if unconsciously, he showed us the way out of the labyrinth of "systems" to real positive knowledge of the world.
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> [In Hegel's system] thinking and its thought-product, the idea, is here the primary, nature the derived element, which only exists at all by the condescension of the idea. . . . With one blow [Feuerbach] . . . placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy.
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> Feuerbach himself never contrives to escape from the realm of abstraction--for which he has a deadly hatred--into that of living reality. . . . But the step which Feuerbach did not take nevertheless had to be taken. The cult of abstract man which formed the kernel of Feuerbach's new religion had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development.
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> This ideological reversal had to be done away with. . . . [In the work of Marx and Engels] dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion--both of the external world and of human thought--two sets of laws which are identical in substance . . . . Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed upon its feet again.[151]

At the end of this reductive process, then, the ideal is deprived of all forms, is translated into mere process, and is finally seen as the law of necessity which inheres in the material, of which the idea is now

can have no authority over the subject which is the reality man must honor. He must, then, to be venerated by man, be altogether at one with man, and his meaning and doctrines must conform to that intellectual apprehension. Jesus as identical with subject becomes merely the apotheosis of the human ego in its ultimate form; Jesus as object becomes merely exemplary manifestation of that subject. But it is at once evident that this conception sets Him below the individual human ego; for the historical particularities that distinguish Him at all from the ideal conceived by the ego itself are merely incidental, and the result is that He ceases to have any validity other than that which the ideal of the ego assigns Him. As the treatment of His role in Lessing's Education of the Human Race makes clear, His example is merely a stage in the evolution of human religious consciousness, and the result of that evolution is that man will attain to the pure idea and His example will become unnecessary.

Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone makes clear how the distrust of anything external to the subjective authority itself has operated to lower the role of Jesus to this plane. All that is miraculous in Christianity must be done away; for if one accepts the validity of miracle, "it bespeaks a culpable degree of moral unbelief not to acknowledge as completely authoritative the commands of duty--commands primordially engraved upon the heart of man through reason--unless they are in addition accredited through miracles . . . . One would have to assume that mere faith in, and repetition of, things incomprehensible (which any one can do without thereby being or ever be-

coming a better man) is a way, and indeed the only way, of pleasing God--an assertion to be combatted with might and main. . . [Thus the person of Jesus may remain for us, if we like, a mystery; we] indeed may honor the trappings [Hulle] which have served to bring into public currency a doctrine whose authenticity rests upon a record indelibly registered in every soul and which stands in need of no miracle. But it is essential that . . . we do not make it a tenet of religion that the knowing, believing, and profession . . . can render ourselves well-pleasing to God."[152] For the true meaning of the nature of Jesus is within us: "We need, therefore, no empirical example to make the idea of a person morally well-pleasing to God our archetype; this idea as an archetype is already present in our reason. Moreover, if anyone . . . require, as credentials requisite to belief, that this individual [Jesus] should have performed miracles . . . he . . . thereby confesses to his own moral unbelief, that is, to his lack of faith in virtue. . . . For only a faith in the practical validity of that idea which lies in our reason has moral worth. . . [We might indeed see in Jesus]

> as perfect an example of a man well-pleasing to God as one can expect to find in external experience (for be it remembered that the archetype of such a person is to be sought nowhere but in our own reason), . . . [but] even then we should have no cause for supposing him other than a man naturally begotten . . . . This is not, to be sure, absolutely to deny that he might be a man supernaturally begotten. But to suppose the latter can in no way benefit us . . . . And the presence of this archetype in the human soul is in itself sufficiently incomprehensible without our adding to its supernatural origin the assumption that it is hypostasized in a particular individual. The elevation of such a holy person above all the frailties of human nature would rather, so far as we can see, hinder the adoption of the idea of such a person for our imitation. For let the nature of this individual . . . be regarded as superhuman . . .

> such a divine person could no longer be held up as an example. . . .[153]

It is extremely important that Jesus remain only example; if He becomes more, the purity of our own moral judgments with reference to Him becomes sullied. To be sure, says Kant--and here he is on the verge of undercutting the special validity of reason itself, and of passing over into the symbolic conception that admits the phenomenal in conception as necessary to all idea--

> It is indeed a limitation of human reason, and one which is ever inseparable from it, that we can conceive of no considerable moral worth in the actions of a personal being without representing that person, or his manifestation, in human guise. This is not to assert that such worth is in itself . . . so conditioned, but merely that we must always resort to some analogy to natural existences to render supersensible qualities intelligible to ourselves. . . . The Scriptures too accommodate themselves to this mode of representation [of God in John 3:16] . . . though we cannot indeed rationally conceive how an all-sufficient Being could sacrifice a part of what belongs to His state of bliss or rob Himself of a possession. Such is the schematism of analogy, with which (as a means of explanation) we cannot dispense. But to transform it into a schematism of objective determination (for the extension of our knowledge) is anthropomorphism, which has, from the moral point of view (in religion), most injurious consequences.[154]

So Kant has broken the old objective, mechanical concept of the nature of Jesus. But the exclusiveness he posits between man and God has in consequence of this subjective rendering of Jesus shut Him out from the divine: for "between the relation of a schema to its concept and the relation of this same schema of a concept to the objective fact itself there is no analogy, but rather a mighty chasm, the overleaping of which . . . leads at once to anthropomorphism."[155] This redefinition of Jesus in terms of the subjective idea has, then, the consequence inevitable when these two ideas come into conjunction--

the mutually exclusive nature of God and man, and the assertion of the ultimate validity of human reason--religion becomes an adjunct to humanism, a mere method of philosophy. As Dorner says, "because [Kant] is unable to find a place for the historical Christ, seeing that in his eyes the ideal of reason alone has validity, the entire wealth of ideas, which the Church recognised in its Christ, was turned over to the ideal. Around this ideal were clustered all the dignity and adornments which pious faith ascribes to Christ, as a symbolical, deeply significant decoration. All the momenta of the life of Christ are treated as beautiful investitures of the moral idea . . . ."[156] Jesus is only the example by which our own reason interprets itself.

The result is that mankind (in its ultimate realization of itself) assumes the role of Christ; in Dorner's interpretation, "faith in the Son is only faith in oneself, . . . humanity, so far as it is moral, is the well-beloved Son of God."[157] In Kant's idealistic inversion of traditional Christianity,

> Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete moral perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a divine decree and the end of creation. With such perfection as the prime condition, happiness is the direct consequence, according to the will of the Supreme Being. Man so conceived, alone pleasing to God, "is in Him through eternity"; the idea of him proceeds from God's very being; hence he is no created thing but His only-begotten Son, "the Word (the Fiat!) through which all other things are, and without which nothing is in existence that is made" (since for him, that is, for rational existence in the world, so far as he may be regarded in the light of his moral destiny, all things were made).[158]

The implications of this displacement of Jesus by the human ego will be worked out in subsequent thought through long, tortuous ways, which for

present purposes need not be followed out in detail. It will be instructive, however, to note how well Kant has anticipated both Strauss and Feuerbach in this early volume. For Strauss, to whom the questionable historical basis of Christianity had (characteristically) so little essential connection with the significant ideas of the religion, completed Kant in one way by casting off the details of the Gospel story to assert, in their place, his intellectualized interpretations:

> This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as the subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures--God become man. . . . It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to Heaven . . . . This alone is the absolute sense of Christology: that it is annexed to the person and history of one individual, is a necessary result of the historical form which Christology has taken.[159]

And Feuerbach--carrying to the ultimate conclusion the tendency of subjectivism to validate its conception of God by reference to the innate self-consciousness, of which the Christ becomes merely the external example--strikes off at last the transcendental assumptions that the subjective hypotheses in reality try to deny, and makes of God and Christ alike mere shadows of the human self-awareness cast upon a void--not, indeed, a merely arbitrary image, but one that "expresses the necessity of the imagination, the necessity of affirming the imagination as a divine power. The Son is the reflected splendour of the imagination, the image dearest to the heart; but for the very reason that he is only an object of the imagination, he is only the nature of the

imagination made objective."[160]

Implications of This Christology for Literary Appropriation

We may now consider the impact of such a christology, if we may call it a christology, upon the literary appropriation of religious materials, and especially of Christ. In the first place it is evident that the barren, unreflecting veneration of those materials, common to both the shallow rationalistic Christianity and the old orthodoxy, was broken. In that pattern the meaning of these objects was merely their authority, and the result was that no metaphorical function could be assigned to them. It was at least now possible to perceive these objects as being exemplary of real ideas, and thus to appropriate them for art or philosophy. In Dorner's analysis, Kant "saw clearly that mind neither can nor may be bound by anything holding a purely external relation to it: if the history of Jesus be merely a series of events that has once happened, and be not informed by an eternal idea which comes to light therein, it is a purely external, isolated thing, to constitute which a dogma binding for faith, life, thought, is something totally inappropriate to mind. If a history is to be binding on the mind, it can only be so in virtue of the idea which has historically manifested itself therein."[161]

Yet the function of the object in such a scheme could be only exemplary; and that means that any literary appropriation of Jesus must be only allegorical. The subjective interpretation has achieved total freedom from the specific nature of the object, freedom to make it mean

what the subject wills, except that the human universal in Kant or the essential nature of humanity in Feuerbach prevents a complete arbitrariness and grounds the meaning of the object in the necessary nature of the subject itself. The need for an asymetrical basis, dictated by the very nature of system itself, makes a real analogy impossible; for analogy requires the assumption of correspondence, of a mutual "dignity" of objective reality and subjective apprehension that is yet not merely exclusive, but has a relational basis. It is clear that logical system cannot tolerate such mutual dignity, for it is of necessity heirarchical. The qualitative distinctions of objects, and the qualitative discrepancy between object and apprehension, the attributes that make possible a simultaneous sameness and difference, relation and uniqueness, are either ignored or wrenched into a propositional pattern that will provide them a common intellectual denominator.

But there is a far more significant implication for our study. Though the identification is so far conceived as merely intellectual, Christ has now become the objective example of the ideal which is the end and essence of every man's being. He thus becomes the common point of reference for all men (though the reference is only to an example of what is already within them); every man, in his ideal essence, is Christ, and Christ is every man.

Doctrinally, this concept expresses itself in two ways, both of which assume ultimate importance in this mode of Christianity and are paramount in the speculations of the English writers we will study.

(1) The central significance of the doctrine of incarnation

will supplant and even transform the doctrine of atonement. In Storr's words, "Attention was focussed upon the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation as being the supreme example of that union of human and divine which idealism was concerned to prove."[162] By contrast, the doctrine of substitutionary atonement, as traditionally held, will immediately disclose its antagonism to a subjective scheme such as is here sketched. In Anselm's representative analysis, Jesus was the sacrifice in our stead, there being no way the law could be adequately satisfied by the sacrifice of ourselves. Kant clearly enunciates this antagonism: ". . . This debt can never be discharged by another person, so far as we can judge according to the justice of our human reason. For this is no transmissible liability which can be made over to another like a financial indebtedness (where it is all one to the creditor whether the debtor himself pays the debt or whether some one else pays it for him); rather is it the most personal of all debts, namely a debt of sins, which only the culprit can bear and which no innocent person can assume even though he be magnanimous enough to wish to take it upon himself for the sake of another."[163] In the place of this substitutionary satisfaction, Kant "interprets the Church's doctrine of the Atonement, as once for all made by Christ, on the lines of Protestant mysticism, treating it as a continual ethical process in the heart of the religious man--an interpretation, the germs of which may be traced to the Apostle Paul."[164] What really happens in the atonement, Kant explains, is an essential transformation, a "coming forth from the corrupted into the good disposition," wherein man undertakes sacrifice and struggle "in

the disposition of the Son of God, that is, merely for the sake of the good, though really they are due as punishments to another, namely to the old man (for the old man is indeed morally another)."[165]

> And this moral disposition which in all its purity (like unto the purity of th Son of God) the man has made his own--or, (if we personify this idea) this Son of God, Himself--bears as vicarious substitute the guilt of sin for him, and indeed for all who believe (practically) in Him; as savior He renders satisfaction to supreme justice by His sufferings and death; and as advocate He makes it possible for men to hope to appear before their judge as justified. Only it must be remembered that (in this mode of representation) the suffering which the new man, in becoming dead to the old, must accept throughout life is pictured as a death endured once for all by the representative of mankind.[166]

But is is only pictured so; for it is evident that man has become his own means of expiation by taking on the role of the Christ for himself. In other words, by his becoming himself the Incarnation, atonement is made. Fichte also made the Incarnation "the supreme illustration of the eternal truth of the unity of the divine and the human"[167]; Schelling makes the same assumption, with the significant adaptation that "Incarnation was a perpetual process; God becomes man in every individual born into the world."[168] In Hegel, incarnation is "the mode of the Absolute's self-expression,"[169] so that existence itself is in the process of becoming Christ.

(2) There will be an inevitable tendency toward universalism. If the essence of Christianity is not some objective speciality but the ideal inherent in every man, then it is clear that in reality the heathen must be in possession of that essence as much as those who identify themselves as Christian. The difference--which may however be asserted

as a significant difference--is that in some cases the ideal has not become conscious of itself. That difference poses some radical difficulties for the assumptions of subjectivism, as our discussion of progressive revelation has hinted; in brief, it will work at last to make the function of the exemplary object much more essential than that of mere husk. But for the old concept of exclusiveness the damage is done, and the contemporary speculations on the relativity of all ancient myths lend a confirmation--until on the strength of this universalistic implication in christocentric religion, Erskine[170] hopes for the eventual redemption of all mankind.

True Symbol Requires a Relational Assumption, Beyond the Power of the Rational to Demonstrate Finally

It must at once appear that such a transformation of Christ will be beautifully consistent with, and contributory to, His employment as a literary resource. What must be added to make Him a symbol is that He must be accorded an objective validity, not merely one assigned by the intellect or even the entire intuitional and emotional apprehensive powers, but one nevertheless not severed from the human essence (after the manner of the old orthodoxy). Philosophically and psychologically considered, this means that the object must recover a validity and significance in itself, not merely one assigned it by the subject, though the subjective apprehension retains its validity meanwhile.

And here the resources of system break down. It can indeed be convincingly argued that no systematic construct of such a symmetrical nature can be made. And yet the certain self-annihilation of both

subjective and objective schemes leaves no alternative, it would appear, but to admit that these are *modes* of reality, with inherent limitations; if no system can validate itself, the alternative to nihilism is the admission of approximation as the human condition, with the insistence that approximation is neither all nor nothing, neither helpless ignorance nor authoritative certainty. If they be accepted as *modes*, the effect will be the search for a way of addressing the nature of reality that attempts the employment of *both* in some relational pattern-the most comprehensive of which, it would seem, is the symbol which assumes a matrix of analogy. Granted, such a way may be illusion; if one requires a systematic demonstration, it has been already admitted that none will be forthcoming, by the nature of the case; but to require a systematic demonstration is to beg the question with the rationalists. It is, after all, a matter of faith--where faith means not a blind leap, and not the endorsement of a proposition, but a trust in the approximate validity of the reality as experienced. It is, perhaps, better ground than the bewailers of the epistemological dilemma would grant. Be that as it may, it certainly *seemed* so to the thinkers of that era who attempted (with predictable lack of total success) to construct such a symmetrical system, where the reality is most closely approximated in the *fusion* of subject and object, a fusion in which however the dignity of each is maintained. As system failed to answer to their demands, these thinkers turned with increasing frequency to the symbolic object--to the language of art--in an attempt to make clearer and richer their apprehension of reality, to recover the qualitative meaning so essential to

their vision and so difficult to urge in mere abstract proposition or mere data; and they were of course roundly faulted by the systematic thinkers for the effort, and often dismissed as fuzzy or "poetic." The point of this chapter, so far, has been to demonstrate that the collapse of rationalism pressed for such a recourse, whatever its validity, and made the symbolic conception of Christ an inevitable consequence.

The Character of Relational Ontology

Some pertinent aspects of that symbolic idealism must be examined briefly. And first it will be appropriate to examine its concept of God. Fichte's concept of the Absolute Ego, one-sidedly subjective, left objective reality in an insecure relationship to God; for if it could be kept from resolution into idea altogether, it remained an anomaly in an essentially intellectualistic existence. Yet Fichte himself opened up another way of conceiving the relationship. God as He exists in Himself can never be known by man; man cannot even think Him as an idea. For God is a Being in perfect unity, and the very process of conception itself requires the positing of a subject and an object.[171] God as pure subject, then, to which nothing is opposed, is not accessible to human thought. In his later development, consequently, Fichte goes beyond the subjective as the necessary ground of experience and sees the Absolute as subject and object in identity, beyond the reach of concept.[172] But though God as He is in Himself is incomprehensible, consciousness does perceive God as He manifests Him-

self in the world; even as the ego must posit a non-ego against which to realize itself,[173] God must manifest Himself in human life through which He progressively is working out His self-realization.[174] The difficulty here is that if consciousness is not something that can be posited of God Himself, it is very difficult to assert human consciousness as an expression of God; for human consciousness becomes the locus of the non-being which is posited by Being in order to realize itself.[175] It will be seen that the pressures here are that the objective must also be assumed as having a reality in God, and existence no longer conceived as mere occasion for consciousness, if one continues to assert a consonance between God and man.

Such a return to dualism, of course, is foreign to the tendency of idealism. Therefore Schelling strains all resources to ground both subjective and objective reality in God. He follows Fichte in asserting that God as He is "in eternity" is not the locus of all things, for they would then be deprived of all freedom and immanence would be only "a dead conceptual inclusion of things in God." Yet there can be nothing separate from God. This apparently hopeless contradiction "can only be solved by things having their basis in that within God which is not <u>God Himself</u>, i. e. in that which is the basis of his existence,"[176] that is, by the condescension of God into a plurality, a particularity, which is the only way He could enter the existence that man and nature partake of and know of. God in His essence is static, ever the same; God in His manifestation appears as <u>becoming</u>.[177] "This is the only correct dualism," says Schelling, "namely a dualism which at the same time admits a unity."[178]

The Absolute in itself, then, is in Schelling's system the perfect "indifference"[179] of subject and object, beyond the reach of conceptual apprehension, because the process of reason is necessarily the discrimination of differences.[180] Nature is the "basis of [God's] existence," "in God, inseparable from him, to be sure, but nevertheless distinguishable from him."[181]

The renewed interest in Spinoza that appears in Herder, Schelling and Schleiermacher is in part contributory to, in part the result of, this development, but altogether consistent with it. Schleiermacher praises him in contrast to that one-sided idealism of his contemporaries. "Offer with me reverently a tribute to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza. The high World-Spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his beginning and his end; the Universe was his only and his everlasting love. In holy innocence and in deep humility he beheld himself mirrored in the eternal world, and perceived how he also was its most worthy mirror. He was full of religion, full of the Holy Spirit."[182] It is, of course, a Spinoza freed from his static rationalism, a Spinoza touched by "a dynamic conception of nature," "vitalized and severed from abstractness."[183]

From its conception of God, it is evident that this later idealism retained a good many of the intellectualistic assumptions; but it became increasingly aware of the necessity to effect a unity of subject and object, idealism and realism, to anwer to this unity in God. "Idealism is the soul of philosophy," goes Schelling's famous statement; "realism is its body; only the two together constitute a living whole."[184] Likewise Schleiermacher predicts ruin for the idealism of his day "if it [does]

not again sink itself in this unity, if the humility of religion [does] not suggest to its pride another realism than that which it so boldly and with such perfect right, subordinates to itself."[185]

From this transcendent reconciliation of the subject and object it was a natural consequence that human consciousness was seen to be engaged in a similar reconciliation.[186] This application was called for by the typical idealist assumption of the relation of the divine to the worldly as antecedent and consequent, and pressed by the alternative traditional dualism that makes of man and God alternately subject and object, depending on the point of view. Thus the idealistic assumption of a common nature in God and man was perpetuated, with the significant alteration that the commonality was now not merely in the human intellect but rather the whole of man as in some way the image of God. "God can only reveal himself in creatures who resemble him," says Schelling.[187]

Yet they are not altogether alike. For one thing, "divine imagination, which is the cause of the differentiation of the world's beings, is unlike human imagination and never gives to its creations a merely ideal reality. The products of divine imagination must be independent beings. . . . "[188] And in order to be independent, that is, capable of acting in freedom, they must be differentiated, hence particular and partial, whereas God is wholeness. Good and evil, which are a unity in God,[189] are in man in strife. "For if God, as spirit, is the indivisible unity of the two principles, and this same unity is actual only in man's spirit, then if it were just as indissoluble in him as in God, man could not be distinguished from God at all; he would disappear

in God and there would be no revelation and no stirring of love."[190] "Therefore that unity which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble in man--and this constitutes the possibility of good and evil."[191] But man is not to be content with this state. The discrepancy between man's condition and that of God is to set up a yearning, an "everlasting longing," the stirring of the God in man to return to the unity of the Absolute.[192]

The image Schelling employs to make clear this conception of man is worth some attention, for it will not only help clarify that conception but also show how the place of the Incarnation comes to take such vital significance in the implications of that concept. Schelling seems to have acquired the image from Franz Baader;[193] and whether by Schelling's purveying (which seems likely) or by coincidence of minds of similar bent working on similar materials, the image appears so frequently in the English exponents of the christocentric theology as to become a tradition--in Erskine, Hare, and Maurice--and finds its way into at least one poem of Tennyson.[194] In this image, the will of God and the desired will of man are seen as an ordering force at the center of a circle, which being at the center maintains a stable and ordered relationship to the periphery, in a natural repose. But "self-will may seek to be, as a particular will, that which it is only in its identity with the universal will. It may seek to be at the periphery that which it is only insofar as it remains at the center. . . ."[195] Thus evil is defined as "this very exaltation of self-will."

> Will, which deserts its supernatural status in order to make itself as general will also particular and creature will, at

> one and the same time, strives to reverse the relation of the principles, to exalt the basis above the cause, and to use that spirit which it received only for the center, outside the center and against the creature, which leads to disorganization within itself and outside itself. Man's will may be regarded as a nexus of living forces; as long as it abides in its unity with the universal will these forces remain in their divine measure and balance. But hardly does self-will move from the center which is its station, than the nexus of forces is also dissolved; in its place a merely particular will rules which can no longer unite the forces among themselves as before, but must therefore strive to form or compose a special and peculiar life out of the now separate forces, an insurgent host of desires and passions. . . .[196]

It is evident, then, that "all radical cure consists in the reestablishment of the relation of the periphery to the center. . . ."[197] That man will certainly depart from this center follows from the condition of his creation as a particular differentiation which will strive to assert itself:

> Intrinsically the combination in man of the universal will with a particular will seems to be a contradiction; their union seems difficult if not impossible. The terror of life drives man out of the center in which he was created; for being the lucid and pure essence of all will this is consuming fire for each particular will; in order to be able to live in it man must mortify all egotism, which almost makes necessary the attempt to leave it and to enter the periphery in order to seek peace for his selfhood there. Thence comes the general necessity of sin and death as the real mortification of egotism, through which all human will must pass as through a fire in order to be purified.[198]

Yet there will be the "primal longing" to return, "for even he who has moved out of the center retains the feeling that he has been all things when in and with God."[199]

To assist in this reordering, "light appears in personal and human form, and comes as mediator in order to reestablish the relationship between creation and God on the highest level. For only personality

can make whole what is personal. . . . the living Word enters as a firm and enduring center in battle against chaos. . . ."[200] The right condition for man, then, is one of congruence with God's nature, and the role of the Word[201] is to identify that center and so orient both the individual soul and the entire creation.

This striving to regain the center is of course an activity that engages the whole being, not merely the intellect. (That emphasis, indeed, was already hinted in Kant and Fichte, though obscured by the rationalistic presuppositions.) For the longing is a longing to return to that unity which is in God. It will be easily seen that a certain tendency to anti-intellectualism will be inevitable (though not in the obscurantist sense--rather as a denial of the assumption of intellectual system to be the sole recourse to reality)--partly in reaction to the one-sided subjectivity of predecessors, but also for an inherent reason. For consciousness, which requires the factoring of unity into the subjective and the objective, is itself the means of differentiation by which God goes out from Himself into existence. The effect of reason on the primal unity of man is "the separation of forces, which is the only way in which reason can unfold and develop the unity which had necessarily but unconsciously existed within nature, as in a seed."[202] Thus the birth of consciousness is the coming of a disunity, the severance of the particular from the universal, the intention of which however is "that identity may become evident to itself" and long to return to that center which is its home. Consciousness is a necessary antecedent to the longing; but the essentially religious activity is "real

self-positing, . . . a primal and basic willing which makes itself into something and is the basis and foundation of all essence."[203] At this center the disunion is resolved--human freedom and divine necessity are congruent: "True freedom is in accord with a holy necessity, of a sort which we feel in essential knowledge when heart and spirit, bound only by their own law, freely affirm that which is necessary. If evil consists in strife between the two principles, then the good can only consist in their complete accord."[204] But such a synthesis is made in "essential knowledge" affirmed by "heart and spirit." Reflection is, by contrast, the source of division between the real and the ideal,[205] and the basis of that true system of the world is not the mere subjective but an "organizing principle" at work in existence and coming to gradual self-realization in the human ego.[206] Thus, though Schelling retains the term "reason" for the means by which man knows God and nature, he is enlarging the term to include all this "essential knowledge," to include in fact the whole person:

> . . .The concept of indifference is, to be sure, the only possible concept of the Absolute. But if this concept is now taken abstractly, the whole is distorted and one may then infer that this system sets aside the personality of the Supreme Being. . . . In this they are quite right, since they regard those abstract systems in which all personality is entirely impossible, as the only ones in accordance with reason. This is presumably also the cause of their ascribing the same view to everyone who does not despise science and reason. We, on the contrary, are of the opinion that a clear, reasonable insight must be possible particularly into the supreme conceptions, since only thereby can they become truly ours, enter into us and be eternally founded. . . . A system which contradicts the most sacred sentiments and feelings and moral consciousness can . . . never be called a system of reason, but rather of unreason. On the contrary, a system in which reason fulfilled itself, would have to unite all the demands of the spirit as

> of the heart, of the most conscientious feeling as of the strictest understanding. . . . however highly we place reason, we still do not believe . . . that anyone can through pure reason become virtuous or a hero or any kind of great man. . . . Only in personality is there life; and all personality rests on a dark foundation which must, to be sure, also be the foundation of knowledge.[207]

Schleiermacher agrees with the cultured despisers of religion in their disgust at systems of theology. "What are all these systems, considered in themselves, but the handiwork of the calculating understanding, wherein only by mutual limitation each part holds its place?"[208] The "plastic spirit of high contemplation," that more essential knowledge, "is too fleeting and too free for those rigid forms . . . ."[209] But indeed this kind of knowledge is not the knowledge of religion. "The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. . . . Yet religion is not knowledge and science, either of the world or of God. Without being knowledge, it recognizes knowledge and science. In itself it is an affection, a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God being seen in it and it in God."[210] In the conceptual realm, Spirit and Nature, subject and object, are distinct, but only because conception cannot transcend these distinctions; in reality, they are at one in God.[211] Yet the self can intuit, through feeling, its participation in the divine totality.[212] Thus not conceptions of God and immortality, but "only what in either is feeling and immediate consciousness, can belong to religion."[213] For "the universal existence

of all finite things in the Infinite lives immediately in us,"[214] and thereby we are led to "postulate and seek a world" and come at last "from detail and part to the All and the Whole. Hence sense for the Infinite and the immediate life of the finite in us as it is in the Infinite, are one and the same."[215] Thus that high contemplation "is to be taken in the widest sense, not as speculation proper, but as all movement of the spirit withdrawn from outward activity."[216] Mere analysis is deadening to this religious apprehension of reality; "this explaining knows nothing of this living acquisition, of this illuminating truth, of the true spirit of discovery in childlike intuition."[217]

In the place of analysis, which is in its essence discriminative and thus dividing,[218] Schleiermacher offers his "piety," "something which truly fuses" the theoretical and practical, and which "cannot be formed simply by bringing the two together, but must be an original unity."[219] In religious faith these two are "united and so indissolubly bound together than one cannot be thought of without the other."[220] "The dominion of the mere notion, . . . the mechanical erections of your systems . . . the vain juggling with analytical formulas, . . . whether categorical or hypothetical," in these "life will not be fettered. . . . If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness which is derived, for ever apart."[221] "The true nature of religion is [not] idea . . . , but immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world."[222]

The Appropriation of Symbol as Vehicle for Relational Ontology

It is not surprising, then, to see this form of idealism gravitating toward aesthetics. It is in aesthetic intuition that Schelling, in the third part of his system of transcendental idealism, discovers the means of apprehending reality in which the real and the ideal are fused in a definite representation.[223] In the object of art there is the meeting of the artist's conscious intention and his unconscious, immediate apprehension of the reality he presents; in the experience of art the expectation of the subjective is answered and gratified in the objective reality of the object itself. The work of art validates on both sides the unity man seeks; it is the finite actualization of that Absolute "indifference."[224] Since in this realization of the true unity, this sense of identity, the object, the artist, and the perceiver all find their internal reconciliation (as well as their commonality with one another as all expressions of the Absolute), they have found their truth and their beauty; thus beauty is truth, truth beauty.[225] Thus as the philosopher strives to seize and represent eternal verity in abstract form, the artist does so in symbolic form; for "the symbol represents neither the universal as such nor the particular as such, but both in unity,"[226] as Copleston says in his interpretation.

Similarly, Schleiermacher designates imagination "not . . . anything subordinate or confused, but the highest and most original faculty in man."[227] Though there is a difference between science, religion and art, there is a unity which is of their essence; and the

comprehensive response (rather than mere analysis) to the Infinite by which the "holy, rejected Spinoza" showed himself its "most worthy mirror" was also the spirit of Novalis, whose "whole contemplation of the world was forthwith a great poem."[228] Art and religion are "kindred beings" with "inner affinity," which however at his time, Schleiermacher felt, were painfully severed, to the hurt of each. In a better day "the two sources of perception and feeling of the Infinite streamed forth magnificently. . . . At present, they are troubled by the loss of simplicity and the ruinous influence of a conceited and false insight."[229] But "the sense for art has never approached . . . religion without covering [it] with new beauty and holiness and sweetly mitigating [its] original narrowness"[230]; and there were signs, as he thought in 1799, of a new and rich interfusion of the two. God Himself is the great Artist; "the greatest work of art has for its material humanity itself, and the Deity directly fashions it."[231]

Analogy and the Nature of Symbol

There has come, then--if not with total clarity at least with gratifying richness--that assertion of analogy for which we have been waiting. All things, all men, partake of a unity; yet each thing, each man has also a differentiating particularity. It is the birth of awareness of approximation, the symptom of rationalism's loss of confidence in the absoluteness of its tools and methods, the coming of a sense of the inevitability of myth. Man has not yet arrived, all knowledge and all nature are in a state of becoming, all is yearning to come to that

unity which is everywhere latent, nowhere totally realized; and that unity is the unity of God.

As language and idea struggled to give statement to this paradox, they began to pull away (for good or for bad) from that precision and systematic pattern which they had previously denoted. The idea of "identity" of man and God, man and nature, God and nature, forced the abandonment of a merely mathematical concept of identity in favor of what may for want of a more explicit term be called analogy. Most markedly is this transformation evident in Schelling. In the words of one commentator, "Schelling's method throughout his life was to take apparently contradictory terms and ideas and to show that they could be distinguished and differentiated without being viewed as conflicting. His passion for making distinctions was equalled, or perhaps exceeded, by the passion to reconcile them, to find unity amidst diversity."[232] Thus he laments

> the general misunderstanding of the law of identity or of the meaning of the copula in judgment. It can readily be made comprehensible to a child that in no possible proposition, which is generally mistaken to declare the identity of subject and predicate, the equivalence of the two or even their immediate connection is affirmed. . . . If, for example, the proposition is advanced that the Perfect is the Imperfect, it signifies: the Imperfect exists not by means of those attributes in and through which it is imperfect, but by means of the perfection which it contains. But for our contemporaries it has this significance: Perfection and Imperfection are equivalent, everything is one and the same, the worst and the best, folly and wisdom. Or take the proposition: the Good is the Evil--by which is meant: Evil has no power to exist in itself; that which is real in it, considered in itself, is good. This statement is held to mean: the eternal difference between right and wrong, between virtue and sin, is being denied, and from the point of view of logic they are the same. . . . Such misunderstandings, if they are not intentional, imply a degree of dialectical immaturity which

> Greek philosophy transcended almost in its first beginnings and make the recommendation of a thorough course in logic an urgent duty. The profound logic of the ancients distinguished subject and predicate as the antecedent and the consequent . . . and thus expressed the real meaning of the law of identity. Even a tautological statement, if it is not to be altogether meaningless, retains this relationship.[233]

If, then, mathematical precision is lost in such a dilemma, it is because the relationship between reality and language, for that matter between things and their true being, is not that of mathematical identity: "For the eternal spirit pronounces unity, or the Word, in nature. But the (real) Word, pronounced, exists only in the unity of light and darkness (vowel and consonant). Now these two principles do indeed exist in all things, but without complete consonance because of the inadequacy of that which has been raised from the depths.[234]

For the present study, the major consequence of this innovation is the exaltation of symbol to primary place as a means of human awareness. For now the object itself is seen as involved in meaning, not only as a necessary vehicle, but as integral with the meaning it enfolds--so that the mere intellectualized statement of that meaning is seen as reduction and distortion, a murdering to dissect. Necessarily the presentational object, which will engage not only the intellect but also the intuitional and affective powers, is now seen as a more effective, more totally satisfactory, expression of the real than pure idea. This is not to imply that the idea is not valid, but only that there has come the recognition that it cannot survive, much less be practical or meaningful, in isolation. "That systematic treatment of religious conceptions is best," says Schleiermacher, "which, on the one side, does

not take the conception and the idea for original and constitutive, and on the other, that the living mobility of the letter be secured, that it may not die and the spirit be drawn to death with it."[235] Again, "We would at all times ascribe a high degree of worth to the letter in all earnest things, in so far as it is not separate from the spirit and dead. The immediate life in the great unities is too closely shut to be entered by the letter. . . . But the letter is the indispensable selecting discretion, without which we could only vibrate giddily between the individual and the great classes."[236]

Perhaps the most notable instance of this recovery of the validity of form is seen in the frank readmission of the person of God, contrary (in part) to the skittish rejection of anthropomorphism in their contemporaries. Schleiermacher is uneasy about conceiving God as person. He is still sympathetic to "the speculative impulse to annihilate anthropomorphism in the conception of the Highest Being, an impulse most clearly expressed in the writings of the profoundest Christian teachers."[237]

> . . . It is an almost absolute necessity for the highest stage of piety to acquire the conception of a personal God, and on the other [side] he will recognize the essential imperfection in the conception of a personality of the Highest Being, nay, how hazardous it is, if it is not most carefully kept pure. The conception is necessary whenever one would interpret to himself or to others immediate religious emotions, or whenever the heart has immediate intercourse with the Highest Being. . . . . As it is so difficult to think of a personality as truly infinite and incapable of suffering, a great distinction should be drawn between a personal God and a living God. The latter idea alone distinguishes from materialistic pantheism and atheistic blind necessity. Within that limit any further wavering in respect of personality must be left to the representative imagination and the dialectic conscience, and where the pious sense exists, they will guard each other.[238]

Schelling, however, frankly assumes the personality of God as the explanation of existence. When God from His unthinkable unity posited Himself in an otherness, the consequence was the emergence of the reality we know. In this division within the divine Being, which "must be posited . . . if we wish to pass from essence to existence,"[239] God cannot make Himself object without simultaneously becoming subject.[240] Defining personality as "the connection of an autonomous being with a basis which is independent of it, in such a way namely that these two completely interpenetrate one another and are but one being," he asserts God to be "the highest personality by reason of the connection of the ideal principle within him to the independent basis (independent relative to the ideal principle)--since the basis and the existent entity in him necessarily unite to become one absolute existence. . . . The first beginning of creation is the longing of the One to give birth to itself, or the will of the depths. The second is the will of love through which the Word is pronounced in nature and through which God first makes himself personal."[241] God, then, as He is <u>manifested</u> (though not as He is in essence), is person, and all existence partakes in personality; by this Word was everything made that was made. "All existence must be conditioned in order that it may be actual, that is, personal, existence. God's existence, too, could not be personal if it were not conditioned, except that he has the conditioning factor <u>within</u> himself and not outside himself."[242]

This conception leads everywhere to a search for the organic in objects, systems, ideas. These have, though caught in their particular differentiations, a secret identity of meaning and pattern which he

who seeks sensitively will discover.[243] So Schleiermacher laments the lack of organic unity in the theology of his time; it was "a mere body of doctrines, held together by no living bonds."[244] This attitude is to be taken into account in an understanding of his insistence that Christian speculation begin with the facts of religious experience on the one hand and on the other with the conception of the Christian religion as a historical occurrence.[245]

Symbolic Christology

With such prominence given to the presentational symbol, with such freedom of analogical vision, with the sense of unity of God and man and such centrality given to the personal, the appearance of a virile symbolic christology is almost inevitable. The emphasis on the Incarnation noted in Kant will be extended, but the historical Jesus will be respected as well as the theological Christ.[246] Yet His uniqueness will be that of the archetype rather than that of the special and ultra-human creation. "Each man has not in himself the right key for understanding all men," says Schleiermacher. "To almost everyone much is so alien that he can only acknowledge it when he finds it in a form more akin to himself. . . . But this feeling will be purest when all human limits are seen in Him from whom all limitation was banished. Hence there is here no derogation from the higher mediatorship of the Redeemer."[247] Again, ". . .When Christ with His whole efficacy is shown [one] he must acknowledge Him, who has become historically the centre of all mediation, the true Founder of redemption and reconciliation."[248] But

> It was not by an original divine impulse common to Him and to [the disciples] that the kingdom of God was founded. . . .it was not thus that Peter, as their representative, recognized Him as the profoundest and mightiest. Originally, the emotion was in Him alone; in them there was only the capacity for having it awakened. What is here said, therefore, entirely agrees with the representation of Christ; indeed, his relation to His disciples suggested it. Had not Christ set out from the view that every living utterance, however individual, can only awake its response in another in a universal way and that complete attachment to the individuality of another is always a free act, He could not have set His disciples on such a footing of equality [with Himself] as to call them brethren and friends.[249]

Indeed, Schleiermacher has endeavored diligently, as Dorner says, "to secure both the uniqueness and specific dignity of Christ and His brotherhood with men."[250] He is the man per se, who dawns anew in the consciousness of every believer and toward whom the spirit and consciousness of all humanity eternally draws.[251] He cannot be explained as a product of his historical circumstances, but "was brought forth out of the universal source of spiritual life, by a creative, divine act."[252] But "He could not be an universal example, if He were an example to the one more, to the others less, and if He did not stand in the like symmetrical relation to all the original diversities of individuals."[253]

To Schelling, the revelation of God "in personal and human form" was altogether necessary "to reestablish the relationship between creation and God on the highest level. For only personality can make whole what is personal, and God must become Man in order that man may be brought back to God."[254] Awakened by this aid to the "primal longing," man's "inner voice of his own better self . . . never ceases to urge him to accomplish this transmutation . . . ."[255] But men also participate

in this mediation, having become the ministers of reconciliation. "Man is the beginning of the new covenant through whom, as mediator, since he himself is connected with God, God (the last division being attained) also accepts nature and takes it to him. Man is thus the redeemer of nature towards whom all its archetypes strive."[256] In his later development especially Schelling turned more and more to the search of mythologies for historical justification of the self-revelation of God to man; for he felt (in a thesis paralleled by F. D. Maurice's Religions of the World) that the revelation explicit in Christianity is implicit and less fully realized in other mythologies, as their essential reality.[257]

This examination of symbolic idealism and its corresponding christology has been designedly sketchy. No attempt has been made to examine these systems in full; indeed this writer is not adequate to such an undertaking. A thorough treatment may be found in Dorner's History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Division II, Vol. 3, pp. 71-260 (and--much less fully--in the works cited by Storr and Pfleiderer), where not only are the peculiarities of this theology more elaborately described but also their adequacy as doctrine is weighed. But this present study has aimed only to show how these conceptions of Christ are grounded in an analogical view of existence which is inherently consistent with a symbolic aesthetic and how, in such a case, the person of Christ assumes centrality not only as theological but also as aesthetic symbol. Attention has been limited to Schelling and Schleiermacher for two main reasons (other than that of convenience)--first, they seem to be representative and generally con-

sistent exponents of the theology; and second, they are undoubtedly the best known of their type in England among the writers we must study in the following chapters. But it must not be supposed that they are the only exponents of the new christology, which numbered among its adherents--each with particular variations--Hamann, Herder (in part), Oetinger, Baader, Novalis, Göschel and Conradi,[258] to name the most notable, as well as later writers beyond the period in question. And while general familiarity with any of these cannot be claimed, even for our select Englishmen, Julius Hare at least was quite familiar with them all, and indeed with every significant quirk and turn of German theology. Nor are certain details of the system, particularly essential to the symbolic employment of Christ in literature, quite so fully elaborated, it would seem, in Germany as they are in the English development, though the major theses of the latter have herein all been anticipated.

The sense of the coming of a new day, often expressed in terms of eschatology, which appears in Romantic literature so frequently, has been often remarked and generally accounted for in political terms--as a consequence of the expectations raised by the French and American revolutions, especially. Without denying that influence, this writer would also point to the theological revolution here sketched out. If man is essentially one with Christ, and if He is working out His purpose of redemption through His expression in this world, why should man not expect the millennium? In France, wrote the young Renan, "Jesus Christ is nowhere to be found. I have been inclined to think that He would come to us from Germany . . . ."[259] The coming of Christ, though not what it

had been conceived in traditional Christianity, is here more than mere metaphor.

> The stone is rolled away,
> Mankind is arisen:
> With thee we all now stay
> And feel no bonds or prison.
> Before thy golden cup
> The keenest pangs desist
> When earth and life yield up
> To the last Eucharist.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Have cheer! life steps at last
> Into eternity;
> By inner fire made vast,
> We are changed utterly.
> The star-world melts, dissolving
> To golden living wine,
> Which we shall drink, resolving
> To stars that clearly shine.
>
> Love is now set free
> And parting is no more.
> Full like an endless sea,
> Life surges without shore.
> One Night of rapture, one
> Eternal poem, whence
> Our universal sun
> Is God's own countenance.[260]

So sang Novalis, poet, theologian, friend of Schleiermacher and Goethe; and again, in "Christendom or Europe," he said,

> . . . The time of resurrection has come. . . . Out of the annihilation of all that is positive [religion] raises its glorious head as a new creator of worlds . . . . . All these things are still only intimations, incoherent and raw, but to the historical eye they give evidence of a universal individuality, a new history, a new mankind, the sweetest embrace of a young and surprised Church and a loving God, and the fervent reception of a new Messiah within its thousand members. Who does not, with sweet shame, feel himself pregnant? The newborn child will be the image of his father, a new Golden Age, with dark and infinite eyes, an Age prophetic, wonder-working, miraculously healing, comforting, and kindling

> eternal life--a great Age of reconciliation, a Saviour who, like a good spirit, is at home among men . . . .[261]

It this is yet not quite the realization of the Christ-symbol, it is, I believe, soil from which it can grow.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Anyone at all familiar with Dorner's magnificent History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ will soon recognize how much of the argument of this and the following chapter is owing to him, specifically to Division Second, Volume III. I will try to make careful reference throughout to specific borrowings, but I wish to acknowledge here a general debt, for without his help much of the development discussed in these chapters would have remained for me all but unfathomable. I feel the less apologetic about leaning so heavily on his work in that he was contemporary with the period in which this study will culminate and won the enthusiastic praise of a figure so representative of the group we shall study as Baron Bunsen (Maurice, Life, I, 289). I have also drawn heavily on Otto Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant and Its Progress in Great Britain Since 1825, trans. J. Frederick Smith, 3rd. ed. (London, 1909) and to a lesser extent on Storr, on Schweitzer, on A. M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology (New York, 1911), and on Heinrich Weinel and Alban S. Widgery, Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After (Edinburgh, 1914).

[2]Dorner, III, 4.

[3]See the discussion of the Whitby-Waterland controversy above, pp. 145-147.

[4]Dorner, III, 7.

[5]". . . Since the Idea is not in the Will, but in the Understanding, and in consequence of the rule that the mode of one substance cannot pass over into the other substance, love cannot arise in the will: because to will something when there is no idea of that thing in the willing power involves self-contradiction. If you say that the Will, owing to its union with the Understanding, also becomes aware of that which the Understanding understands, and thus also loves it, one may retort to this: but since awareness is also an apprehension, it is therefore also a mode of understanding; following the above, however, this cannot be in the Will, even if its union [that of the Understanding with the Will] were like that of the soul and body. For suppose that the body is united with the soul,

as the philosophers generally maintain, even so the body never feels, nor does the soul become extended" (Spinoza, Short Treatise, p. 106 n.).

[6]Dorner, III, 4.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Or--not to beg the question of historical priority--a concept of the relationship between God and man must await a new understanding of the nature of Christ. My limited study of this phenomenon has not been sufficient to determine unequivocally which influence was prior; but it seems to me that the latter mentioned influence was gathering head from historical and critical study of the scriptures while the former was implying itself more and more clearly in philosophic idealism.

[9]Dorner, III, 214.

[10]See above, pp. 154-155.

[11]". . . The difficulty of finding, even in particulars, the standard of taste, is not so great as it is represented. . . . Aristotle and Plato and Epicurus and Descartes, may successively yield to each other; but Terence and Vergil maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men" (Hume, Of the Standard of Taste). See Pope, Essay on Criticism, I, 118-140. It is not here maintained, of course, that this is the only tenet of Neo-Classicism or one universally adopted.

[12]See An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. IV, sec. v.

[13]"In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer that for anything I know to the contrary it had lain there forever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for anything I know the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive--what we could not discover in the stone--that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose . . . .

"This mechanism being observed--it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood--the inference we think is

inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker--that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who completely comprehended its construction and designed its use" (William Paley, Natural Theology [Selections], ed. Frederick Ferre [Indianapolis, 1963], pp. 3-4.

[14]L. E. Elliott-Binns, The Early Evangelicals: A Religious and Social Study (London, 1953), pp. 180-181, 386. See the description of Evangelical reaction to Herbert Marsh (whose Dissertation on the Origin and Composition of the Three First Gospels appended to his translation of Michaelis, cited above, offended the pious) in Ford K. Brown, Fathers of the Victorians: The Age of Wilberforce (Cambridge, Eng., 1961), pp. 308-311. For the toll which unbending Evangelical literalness took on the faiths of the century, see Robert Hamilton Moore, Victorian Religious Liberalism Reflected in Autobiography (diss. University of Illinois, 1948).

[15]Elliott-Binns, The Early Evangelicals, p. 389.

[16]"In the Climbing Boy Society the truly religious and the religious, led by Wilberforce, joined hands with liberals, radicals and philosophers, as a later Evangelical leader the Earl of Shaftesbury was still doing after fifty years to achieve the Society's stated aim" (Brown, p. 341). Support for the Evangelical charities came from sources widely differing from, sometimes in ways antagonistic to, the Evangelicals. See Brown, pp. 56, 332, 351-360.

[17]See the amazing list of Evangelical charities in Brown, pp. 327-340. See also pp. 238-250, 317.

[18]"Both in [Newman's] Anglican and Romanist phases the essence of his criticism of Protestants is that they 'make something within them their standard'" (H. N. Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry: Vol. IV: 1830-1880: Christianity and Romanticism in the Victorian Era [New York, 1957], p. 14.

[19]pp. 109-114, 121-124.

[20]This emphasis is so widely identified with the origins of Protestantism as to need no documentation. The simplistic distinction that Catholicism rests on the authority of the Church and Protestantism on that of the Bible is of course awry, though it is a distinction so frequently employed as to make it a useful aid in interpretation once its limitations are seen. In the present context, all that is asserted is that in the general reductive process that strove to come down to the "residuum" the resort to scripture was an early and common method of cleaning away the supposed distortions of "priestcraft." See Middleton, pp. xciv-xcv, quoted above, pp. 57-58.

[21]Strauss remarks, for example, that Eichhorn, reacting to Reimarus' discrediting of Moses as an imposter, considered the Old Testament records "the production of an infant and unscientific age," and explained the Old Testament miracles naturalistically; but that he "was more reserved in his application of this mode of interpretation to the New Testament," limiting the naturalistic interpretations to a few narratives in Acts (The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George Eliot, 5th ed. [London, 1906], p. 48). "As Eichhorn recognized a genuine mythus only on the very threshold of the Old Testament history, and thought himself obliged to explain all that followed in a natural manner; as, some time later, other portions of the Old Testament were allowed to be mythical, whilst nothing of the kind might be suspected in the New; so, when the mythus was once admitted into the New Testament, it was here again long detained at the threshold, namely, the history of the infancy of Jesus, ever/ farther advance being contested" (Ibid., p. 63).

See, by way of contrast, the interesting argument of Michaelis that we have the testimony of Christ and the Apostles that they believed in the Old Testament but no comparable testimony of the status of the New Testament (I, 77).

[22]". . . Should we entertain a doubt of the inspriation of St. Mark, and St. Luke, their gospels still might form a part of the public service, especially as St. John himself is said to have recommended them, as well as that of St. Matthew." Michaelis, I, 72. See all that chapter (Chapter 3), which distinguishes carefully "canonical," "apocryphal," and "spurious" works. Especially interesting are the examinations of Mark and Luke. See the succeeding footnote.

[23]"It cannot be concluded from these premises alone [Hebraisms and Syriaisms in the New Testament] that the sacred books of the New Testament were written by those particular persons to whom they are ascribed, but only that they were composed either by native Jews, or by person who by continual intercourse with that nation had insensitively adopted the Jewish style" (Michaelis, I, 47).

"I must confess, that I am unable to find a satisfactory proof of their inspiration [those New Testament writers who were not Apostles], and the more I investigate the subject, and the oftener I compare their writings with the writings of St. Matthew and St. John, the greater are my doubts . . . . I am strongly inclined to the negative" (Ibid., I, 87).

"Could therefore anyone demonstrate that St. Luke wrote without inspiration and simply as a careful historian according to the plan, which he proposes in his preface, I should still read his gospel, and the Acts of the Apostles with the same attention as at present: and we should have the particular advantages of being freed from difficulties, which are almost insurmountable. The chief historical objections which are drawn from profane authors have respect to St. Luke: and if we can resolve to abandon the inspiration of his writings, as well as those of St. Mark, we shall essentially serve the cause of our religion, and disarm our adversaries at once, by the depriving them of that

pretext, to deny the truth of Christianity, which they derive from contradictions not wholly to be removed" (Ibid., III, 97). Marsh, the English translator, compares this comment to that of Soame Jenyn's View of the Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion (Ibid., III, 388).

[24]"St. Matthew and St. John were, it is true, Apostles; but shall we therefore conclude that they were inspired in matters of history? The passage which I quoted in the chapter on inspiration from John 14: 26, 'The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.', contains a promise of assistance from the Holy Ghost, and of the infallibility arising from that assistance, merely in respect to the speeches and discourses of Christ, which form the primary source of our religious faith and knowledge: but it contains no promise, at least none in direct and positive terms, of any supernatural aid in the recording of facts, which they had either seen themselves, or heard from others. To speak the truth, I do not believe that the Evangelists were divinely inspired in matters of history. . ." (Ibid., III, 27). "The contradictions observable in the four gospels, even such as may be shewn to be real, are of very different degrees of importance, which ought to be particularly noted, though they have hitherto engaged but seldom the attention of the harmonists.

"In the first place, if a contradiction exists between the twelve last verses of St. Mark's gospel and the other gospels, it is of no importance whatsoever, and effects not even the question of divine inspiration: for that these twelve verses proceeded from the hand of St. Mark is more than anyone can prove" (Ibid., III, 29).

[25]"The original Gospel is supposed [by Eichhorn] to be contained in the forty-two sections which are common to the three evangelists. To extract it out of these sections, it is of course necessary to retrench all the circumstances in which the three writers vary from each other" (Thirlwall, p. xxvii).

[26]Dorner, III, 22-26.

[27]Michaelis, III, 5-6; Weinel and Widgery, p. 43.

[28]Marsh, Dissertation, in Michaelis, III, part 2, p. 37.

[29]Summaries of the work of Bahrdt and Venturini may be found in Schweitzer, pp. 38-47.

[30]"The execution of this task by Dr. Paulus himself was such that we do not know whether to wonder most at his learning and ingenuity or his ineptitude and want of taste. He turns the finest of the Gospel narratives, the blossoms of the noblest religious poetry, by his 'natural' interpretation, into the most trivial,

commonplace incidents, without any deeper meaning or religious significance. Indeed, in not a few places he is even guilty of an absolute meanness in his interpretations, almost on a par with the notorious theories of a 'priestly fraud.' Thus the narrative of the supernatural birth of Jesus is reduced to a deception cunningly practised upon the Virgin Mary. The occurrence at Christ's baptism was that the clouds just then accidentally opened and a flying dove appeared in the blue sky. The devil that tempted him in the wilderness was an agent provacateur sent out by the Pharisees. The plan of Jesus was essentially the political one of restoring the temporal splendour of the Israelitish theocracy and placing himself as the Messiah-king at its head . . ." (Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 212).

[31]"That [Paulus's] interpretation of the Gospels, which everywhere retains the husk and surrenders the religious kernel, was countenanced even by orthodox theologians in many instances, and accepted, at any rate partially, by Schleiermacher too in his lectures on the 'Life of Jesus,' can only be accounted for by remembering the difficult position of the theologians of that time, whose general culture made a naive belief in the reality of actual miracles impossible, while their historical criticism was still fettered by the supposition that at least one or the other of the Gospels came direct from an eye-witness and had therefore to claim an historical character for all its narratives" (Ibid., pp. 212-213). See fn. 24 above for an example of internal contradictions and the effect of the concept of direct inspiration in such an instance. In the same passage, Michaelis rejects the first two chapters of Matthew on similar grounds, that is, those of contamination, and excuses contradictions between Matthew and John by saying that even if "real" they prove only "that the apostles were not inspired in historical matters."

[32]"The reason why apparent contradictions are unavoidable in the deposition of several eye-witnesses to the same transaction is easy to be assigned. They do not all observe every minute circumstance of the transaction, but one pays particular attention to one circumstance, another to another circumstance: this occasions a variation in accounts, which it is sometimes difficult to reconcile. This happened likewise to the Evangelists . . ." (Michaelis, III, 6). See also Ibid., I, 75, quoted above, p. 113.

[33]"After weighing with all that care and caution, which so important a subject requires, the arguments which may be advanced on both sides, it is perhaps adviseable to devide the question. To the epistles inspiration is of real consequence, but with respect to the historical books these the gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles, we should really be no losers if we abandoned the system of inspiration, and in some respects have a real advantage" (Ibid., III, 6).

"Had the deity inspired not a single book of the New Testament, but left the Apostles, and Evangelists without any other aid, than

that of natural abilities but to commit what they knew to writing, admitting their works to be authentic, and possessed of a sufficient degree of credibility, the Christian religion would still remain the true one. The miracles, under which it is confirmed, would equally demonstrate its truth, even if the person who attested them were not inspired, but simply human witnesses; and their divine authority is never presupposed when we discuss the question of miracles, but merely their credibility as human evidence. If the miracles are true, which the Evangelists relate, the doctrine of Christ recorded in the Bible are the infallible oracles of God: and, even if we admit the Apostles to be mistaken in certain not essential circumstance, yet as the main points of the religion, which Christ commissioned them to preach, are so frequently repeated, their epistles would as well instruct us in the tentements of the Christian system as the works of Maclauran and the philosophy of Newton. It is possible therefore to doubt, and even deny the inspiration of the New Testament, and yet be fully persuaded of the truth of the Christian religion: and many really entertain these sentiment either publicly, or in private, to whom we should render great injustice, if we ranked them in the class of unbelievers" (Ibid., p. 72). Marsh notes concerning this passage, "Here our author makes a distinction, which is at present very generally received, between the divine origin of the Christian doctrine, and the divine origin of the writings, in which that doctrine is recorded" (Ibid., p. 378).

"The ordinary opinion [of the nature of inspiration] seems to be one compounded, perhaps in varying proportions, of both. The rational and orthodox medium . . . appears to be thought to consist in this: it recedes on the one hand from the ancient doctrine of verbal, or, as it has been called, organic inspiration, by rejecting all unnecessary exertions of supernatural influence; so that the evangelists may be believed to have written whatever fell within their own experience, or was communicated to them by inspired witnesses, without the aid of the Holy Spirit, and only under his guardianship and protection; on the other hand it shrinks from the boldness of the modern theories, by maintaining that whatever was not known to the sacred historians by one or other of those ways was directly revealed to them from above. Those who insist on this middle line seem to think, that although their view of the subject may leave some difficulties in our Gospels unexplained, it has at all events the advantage, in point of piety and orthodoxy, over the theories which suppose every part of our Gospels to have been derived by different processes from human sources. This superiority however, if we examine the foundation on which it rests, appears very questionable" (Thirlwall, pp. xiii-xiv). Compare Pfleiderer's introduction to Strauss, pp. ix-x.

[34]See above, pp. 122-123.

[35]"Herder, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, all agreed with Luther that the fourth was the golden Gospel, the very temple and pillar of the truth" (Fairbairn, The Place of Christ, p. 231).

[36]Pfleiderer, "Introduction" to Strauss, pp. x-xii.

[37]"Strauss's Life of Jesus . . . introduced the new era of New Testament research . . ." (Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 252). See, also, Pfleiderer, "Introduction" to Strauss, p. xiv, and Schweitzer, passim.

[38]See above, pp. 111-112.

[39]Marsh, Dissertation, in Michaelis, III, part 2, 37 ff., with reference to Herder's Christliche Schriften, vol. III (Riga, 1797), pp. 303-416.

[40]Marsh, pp. 19-35.

[41]Thirlwall, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

[42]Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

[43]"English theology was isolated [in the period before Essays and Reviews]. On the Continent, and particularly in Germany, an intellectual revolution had already taken place, but the majority of English theologians were utterly ignorant of what happened abroad, and, what is far worse, did not care to know. They entrenched themselves in their fortress of tradition, and had the anguish of seeing the outworks carried one by one" (Storr, pp. 4-5). The reception of Thirlwall's translation of Schleiermacher's Luke is indicative, perhaps, of how the matter really stood, and suggests that Thirlwall was farther ahead of his age than he realized. Maurice wrote in a letter to Miss C. Fox, Feb. 25, 1848, concerning her proposed translation of some sermons of Schleiermacher (at which time, incidentally, only Thirlwall's work had presented the German theologian to the English in translation): "There is one consideration in reference to the wisdom of publishing these sermons at the present moment which I would submit to you, rather as a help to assist in forming your own opinion, than because I see my way clearly to express one myself. The Bishop of St. David's very injudiciously translated, about twenty years ago, Schleiermacher's book on St. Luke--the one of all, perhaps, which he ever wrote the most likely to offend religious people in England, and so mislead them as to his real character and objects. In consequence of the rumor that Thirlwall would be made archbishop, all the most revolting passages in this treatise (concerning the Transfiguration, and other events recorded in the Gospel) have been carefully hunted out and paraded in the newspapers as exhibiting the deep-seated rationalism and blasphemous temper of a man whom an English bishop has delighted to honour. Any one who brings Schleiermacher forward while these passages are freshly recollected must therefore expect not only some hard names--which it is easy to bear--but may also hinder the good words from producing their right effect. At the same time, this may be just the time to attempt the removal of a partial and (practically) untrue impression of a wise and righteous man, whose life was really spent in the effort to deliver his countrymen from the chains which he is supposed to have industriously forged for them" (Life, I, 453-454).

[44]"Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit" in Works, V, 591.

[45]See above, pp. 152-155.

[46]Schweitzer, p. 38.

[47]Ibid., pp. 16-21.

[48]Ibid., p. 23.

[49]Ibid., pp. 21-24.

[50]Ibid., p. 21.

[51]Ibid., p. 19.

[52]Ibid., p. 38.

[53]Ibid., p. 39.

[54]Ibid., p. 40. Natural explanations of miracles are of course the common undertaking of all these rationalists.

[55]Ibid.

[56]He "regards the conception as an act of the self-consciousness of the mother" (Ibid., p. 51).

[57]Quoted (in translation) in Ibid., p. 51.

[58]Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 231.

[59]Strauss, p. xxix.

[60]Ibid., p. 88. ". . . The initial assumption which governs the whole of Strauss's inquiry is that miracle is impossible. A history of Jesus, therefore, can contain no supernatural element. In the first chapter of the Life Strauss sketches the various attempts which had been made before his time to write the story of Christ's career. He finds them all unsatisfactory, because, in greater or less degree they had all sought to retain the supernatural. Even if they rejected the recorded miracles of Jesus, and refused to treat the Resurrection and Ascension as historical occurrences, they still postulated a supernatural element in the Person of Christ, investing His consciousness with a unique character which required for its explanation a special creative act of God. But for Strauss the supernatural was impossible, because religion was a historical development" (Storr, p. 221).

[61]Pfleiderer, "Introduction," Strauss, pp. xi-xii.

[62]According to Strauss, in Schweitzer's summary, "The Synoptic discourses, like the Johannine, are composite structures, created by later tradition out of sayings which originally belonged to different times and circumstances, arranged under certain leading ideas so as to form connected discourses" (Schweitzer, p. 89). Cf. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 214.

[63]Schweitzer, p. 87; Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 210.

[64]Storr, p. 220. "The narrative of John, say they (reasoning in a circle), being that of an eye-witness, must be at once supposed the true one, and this conclusion is sometimes rested for greater security on the false premise, that the more circumstantial and dramatic narrator is the more accurate reporter--the eye-witness" (Strauss, p. 407).

[65]Storr, p. 227.

[66]"Strauss was hated, because the spirit of the time was unable to look upon its own portrait, which he held up before it in faithful, clearly drawn lines. The spirit of this age resists with all its power the proof of its ignorance on a matter about which it has long thought itself certain." F. C. Baur, quoted in Pfleiderer, "Introduction" to Strauss, p.

[67]Schweitzer, p. 81.

[68]Storr, pp. 223-224.

[69]Schweitzer, p. 84. Cf. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ, pp. 240-241.

[70]"He starts out from the assumption that they have mutually influenced one another, and that those which may possibly be genuine have only been preserved in a secondary form. In the parable of the marriage supper of the king's son, for example, he confidently assumes that the conduct of the invited guests, who finally ill-treated and slew the messengers, and the question why the guest is not wearing a wedding-garment are secondary features" (Schweitzer, p. 90).

[71]Ibid., p. 89.

[72]Schweitzer, p. 90.

[73]Strauss explains that he has an advantage in his investigation that others with "superior erudition" do not have--"the internal liberation of the feelings and intellect from certain religious and dogmatical presuppositions; and this the author early attained by means of philosophical studies. . . . the essence of the Christian faith is perfectly independent of his criticism. The supernatural birth of Christ, his miracles, his resurrection and ascension, remain

eternal truths, whatever doubts may be cast on their reality as historical facts. . ." (p. xxx). See Schweitzer, p. 84; Weinel and Widgery, pp. 87-89.

[74]Schweitzer, p. 139.

[75]Ibid., p. 140.

[76]Ibid., pp. 145-148.

[77]Ibid., pp. 145-146.

[78]Ibid., p. 156.

[79]Ibid., p. 157.

[80]Ibid., p. 158.

[81]Weinel and Widgery, pp. 89-90.

[82]Ernest Renan, Recollections of My Youth, trans. C. B. Pitman (Boston, 1929), p. 274.

[83]Ibid., p. 270.

[84]Ibid., p. 273.

[85]Ernest Renan, Renan's Letters from the Holy Land: The Correspondence of Ernest Renan with M. Berthelot while Gathering Material in Italy and the Orient for "The Life of Jesus," trans. Lorenzo O'Rourke (New York, 1904), pp. 176-7.

[86]Ibid., p. 173.

[87]Ibid., p. 176.

[88]Schweitzer, p. 181; Weinel and Widgery, pp. 157-158.

[89]Schweitzer, p. 140.

[90]Fairbairn, The Place of Christ, p. 232.

[91]"While Schleiermacher had in 1821 in Berlin begun to lecture on the Life of Jesus . . ., yet the only published works were Hase's "Handbuch" and Paulus' "Leben Jesu." Ibid., p. 231.

[92]Schweitzer, pp. 60, 62.

[93]"[The period] advanced so far in its self-confidence as to refuse altogether to recognize anything objective as authoritative, save such as it was necessarily led to the recognition of by thought itself." Dorner, III, 31.

[94]Cf. Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 7--"This timidity, which hesitated to leap, with the aid of the idea of causality, the confines of the phenomena of consciousness, and to lay hold of things-in-themselves, was a legacy from the skepticism of Hume, from which Kant was unable completely to free himself . . . ."

[95]". . . Kant taught the dependence of the act of cognition on the material supplied in experience in space and time, and the impossibility of knowing the reality (das Ding an sich) lying behind these facts of experience." Ibid., p. 5.

[96]Ibid., pp. 11, 13-14; Fairbairn, The Place of Christ, p. 205.

[97]The distinction between "pure reason" and "practical reason" is a knotty problem, at least for this novice. One common reading seems to be that these are distinct faculties in the human mind, severed, in Kant's presentation of them, in a radical manner. So with Storr: "Ultimate reality lay beyond the grasp of human intelligence. It appeared as if theology was a futile endeavour to know the unknowable, and as if skepticism was the only possible creed. But what Kant took away with one hand he tried to restore with the other. He fell back upon the implications of the moral consciousness. Morality demanded God and immortality. . . . Kant, then, appeared to sunder man into two, and to proclaim a divorce between the speculative and practical sides of his being, between knowledge and faith" (Storr, pp. 206-207). Yet Kant asserts that "if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law shows it to be, it is only one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes" (Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck [Indianapolis, 1956], p. 125). Kant's decision not to entitle that work Critique of Pure Practical Reason, says the translator here cited, "has led superficial readers and not an insignificant number of philosophical thinkers into believing that Kant established a dichotomy between 'pure' and 'practical' reason. But . . . Kant is trying to show that pure reason can be practical . . ." (Ibid., p. xii). The equivocation (real or apparent) derives, I judge, from the attempt to remove from the function of reason any empirical content, whereas practice necessitates the consideration of the empirical. The irritation with which Herder (who refers to Kant as "the great divider") accuses Kant of having two definitions of reason is at least understandable (F. H. Burkhardt, "Introduction" to God, Some Converstaions, p. 39).

[98]Not, however, because it rests in the severance from the objective, but because it builds on Kant's establishment of the subjective validity to a validation of the objective. See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Part 1: Fichte to Hegel (Garden City, New York, 1965), pp. 17-19.

[99]Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 10.

[100]"The objective appeared to him to stand in so extreme and abstract an antagonism to the subjective, that it was impossible for justice to be done to both, and that the subject looked upon every species of objectivity, even though entirely impregnated by the moral idea, or the personal manifestation thereof [?], as a power hostile to, and restrictive of, its own freedom" (Dorner, III, 43).

[101]Copleston, p. 17.

[102]"For the purpose of achieving this [a priori] proof [of the existence of the categorical imperative] . . . is of the utmost importance to take warning that we should not dream for a moment of trying to derive the reality of this principle from the special characteristics of human nature. For duty has to be a practical, unconditioned necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom alone an imperative can apply at all), and only because of this can it also be a law for all human wills. Whatever, on the other hand, is derived from the special predisposition of humanity, from some special bent peculiar to human reason, and not holding necessarily for the will of every rational being [? i. e., for the will of God also]--all this can indeed supply a personal maxim, but not a law. . . ." (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 92-93). "It was, therefore, not the desertion of Kant's philosophy, but simply the true and necessary carrying out of its speculative principle and most characteristic position, when his successors rejected this sceptical [sic] limitation of our knowledge, and credited thought with the power of theoretically conceiving Being, as well as of practically moulding it" (Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 7). "Later idealism . . . broke down the barrier between man and God which Kant had left, and boldly proclaimed that knowledge of ultimate reality was possible because the divine reason was operative in human reason. . . . [It claimed that] it was only making explicit what was already implicit in the Kantian system" (Storr, p. 207).

[103]Copleston, pp. 17-18

[104]Ibid., p. 19.

[105]Ibid., p. 23; Storr, p. 208. "That Eternal Will is thus assuredly the Creator of the World, in the only way in which He can be so, and in the only way in which it needs creation:--in the finite reason" (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Vocation of Man, trans. William Smith [La Salle, Illinois, 1965], p. 157).

[106]Copleston, pp. 23-24.

[107]Ibid., p. 19.

[108]" . . . If reality is the unified process by which absolute thought or reason manifests itself, it is intelligible And it is intelligible by the human mind, provided that this mind can be regarded as the vehicle, as it were, of absolute thought reflecting on itself

If with the elimination of the thing-in-itself the world becomes the self-manifestation of thought or reason, the Kantian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori loses its absolute character" (Copleston, pp. 21, 22). See Fichte, pp. 104-5, 150-157.

[109]". . . Fichte made possible the growth of an absolute idealism, the final comsummation of which was the doctrine that all existence, nature, history, the human mind, was a mode of, or moment in, the one universal life of the Absolute" (Storr, p. 210).

[110]Cf. Copleston, p. 24.

[111]Pfleiderer, pp. 11-14.

[112]"If Nature is the expression and manifestation of thought or reason in its movement towards a goal, the process of Nature must be teleological in character" (Copleston, p. 22).

[113]Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 102.

[114]Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York, 1960), p. 126n.

[115]Herder, God, Some Conversations, p. 199.

[116]Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (New York, 1958), p. 14.

[117]Ibid., p. 15.

[118]Biographia Literaria, I, 100.

[119]Frederick H. Burkhardt, "Herder's Development and the Place of the Conversations in It," in Herder, God, Some Conversations, p. 39.

[120]Dorner, III, 30-31.

[121]Ibid., p. 53.

[122]Biographia Literaria, I, 167.

[123]Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 93.

[124]Ibid., p. 53.

[125]quoted in Theodore M. Greene, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion," in Kant, Religions Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. xx.

[126]Herder, God, Some Conversations, p. 126.

[127]Ibid.

[128]Ibid.

[129]Ibid., p. 156.

[130]Ibid., p. 151.

[131]Ibid.

[132]"If the existence of everything rests upon an inherent necessity of His highest wisdom and goodness, He cannot laboriously support anything. Everything supports itself as a sphere rests upon its center of gravity; for all existence is grounded in His own eternal essence, in His power, wisdom, and goodness. You have, indeed, warned us against images, Theophron, but is it really intolerable to think of the root as supporting the tree? It would die and be no root if it did not have to support that beautiful creation, the trunk, with its branches, twigs, blossoms and fruit. So God, the eternal root of the immeasurable tree of life which is entwined throughout the universe, He, the infinite source of existence, that greatest gift which only He could give . . ." (Ibid., p. 168). Cf. Burkhardt, "Herder's Development": "Where he is most himself, as in the last conversation, he is least exact in his expression, and more inclined to picturesque and emotional ways of stating his case" (p. 40). Herder accused Jacobi's concept of God as extra-mundane of being anthropomorphic (Burkhardt, p. 32); Jacobi in turn claimed that Herder's Conversations had translated Spinoza's concept of God into anthropomorphism (Burkhardt, p. 56).

[133]Herder, God, Some Conversations, p. 147.

[134]Ibid., p. 138.

[135]Ibid., p. 200.

[136]Ibid., pp. 200-201. My attention was called to this revision by Burkhardt's comment, pp. 51-52.

[137]Fichte, p. 159.

[138]Lessing, The Education of the Human Race, p. 196.

[139]Ibid., p. 207.

[140]Ibid., p. 208.

[141]Ibid., p. 209.

[142]Ibid., p. 214.

[143]Ibid., p. 211.

[144]Ibid., p. 212.

[145]Ibid., p. 195.

[146]Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 73.

[147]Storr, p. 213.

[148]Ibid., p. 215.

[149]Ibid., p. 221.

[150]Ibid., p. 2 5.

[151]Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1941), pp. 15, 18, 40-41, 44, respectively.

[152]Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 79-80.

[153]Ibid., pp. 56-7.

[154]Ibid., p. 58fn.

[155]Ibid., p. 59; cf. Dorner, III, 44.

[156]Dorner, III, 48.

[157]Ibid., p. 38.

[158]Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 54.

[159]Strauss, p. 780.

[160]Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York, 1957), p. 75.

[161]Dorner, III, 40.

[162]Storr, p. 209. Storr is speaking here of a post-Kantian development, but the following discussion will show that the emphasis was already present in Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.

[163]Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 66.

[164]Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 16.

[165]Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 68.

[166]Ibid., p. 69.

[167]Storr, p. 210.

[168]Ibid., p. 211.

[169]*Ibid.*, p. 215.

[170]William Hanna, ed., *Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen from 1800 till1840* (New York, 1877), p. 353. On changing concepts of myth, see James Donald Kissane, *The Poetry of Tennyson in Relation to Nineteenth-Century Attitudes Toward Mythology* (diss. Johns Hopkins University, 1956).

[171]Copleston, p. 104.

[172]*Ibid.*, p. 1 5; Dorner, III, 99.

[173]Copleston, p. 75.

[174]*Ibid.*, p. 111.

[175]*Ibid.*, pp. 115-117.

[176]Friedrich W. J. Schelling, *Of Human Freedom*, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago, 1936), p. 33.

[177]Copleston, p. 155; Pfleiderer, p. 66; Dorner, III, 101.

[178]Schelling, p. 33, fn.

[179]i. e., neagation of differences.

[180]Copleston, pp. 136, 155.

[181]Schelling, p. 32.

[182]Schleiermacher, p. 40.

[183]Schelling, p. 22.

[184]*Ibid.*, p. 30.

[185]Schleiermacher, p. 40.

[186]Or--not to beg the question against Feuerbach--the transcendant Being is the extrapolation of a transformed concept of man. See Copleston, p. 163, on Schelling in this regard.

[187]Schelling, p. 19.

[188]*Ibid.*, p. 20.

[189]"The positive is always the whole or unity; that which is contrasted with it is division of the whole, discord, ataxia of forces. The identical elements which existed in the unified whole are in the divided whole; the matter in both is the same--from this aspect

evil is no more limited or worse than good; but the formal aspect of the two is totally different and it is this very form which comes from the essence or positive factor itself." Schelling, p. 46. On the identity of good and evil, see also below, p.269, where is quoted Schelling, p. 13.

[190]Schelling, p. 50.

[191]Ibid., p. 39.

[192]Ibid., pp. 33-37.

[193]Ibid., pp. 42-43, fn; cf. Dorner, III, 86.

[194]The Palace of Art, ll. 15-16, 245-248, 253-256; see also In Memoriam, XXXIII, stanza 1.

[195]Schelling, p. 40.

[196]Ibid., p. 41.

[197]Ibid., p. 42.

[198]Ibid., p. 59.

[199]Ibid., p. 69. Compare Schleiermacher, p. 13; contrast, however, pp. 123-124.

[200]Schelling, pp. 57-58.

[201]"No doubt he has also at the back of his mind the Christian doctrine of the Word; but the description of the eternal Idea as a second Absolute is more akin to the Plotinian theory of Nous than to the Christian doctrine of the second Person of the Trinity." Copleston, p. 158. Though the identification of Christ with the center is not here forcibly stated, there seems to me no doubt that reference is meant to be made; at any rate, the case is much clearer in the English expression of the image, as will be noted below.

[202]Schelling, p. 36.

[203]Ibid., p. 63.

[204]Ibid., p. 70.

[205]Copleston, p. 133.

[206]Ibid., p. 141.

[207]Schelling, pp. 93-94. Schelling goes on to say, however, that "only reason can bring forth what is contained in these depths, hidden

and merely potential, and elevate it to actuality" (pp. 95-96). Dorner notes that Novalis, though inclining to the extreme subjective with Fichte, manages to attain to an objectivity by conceiving the subjective to be the whole of man, not merely reason (Dorner, III, 89). Compare Matthew Arnold's poem, "Written in Butler's Sermons" (my attention was drawn to this poem by Storr's citing it to illustrate Schleiermacher's concept of feeling, p. 248).

[208]Schleiermacher, p. 15.

[209]Ibid., p. 1..

[210]Ibid., p. 36.

[211]Copleston, pp. 185-186.

[212]Ibid., p. 186. "When Schleiermacher makes feeling the root of religion," says Storr, "it is important to remember that he means by feeling something far richer than sensation, and something more than merely one element among others in human nature. . . . Religious feeling is a sense for Deity, a consciousness of God mediated through the emotions" (pp. 247-248).

[213]Schleiermacher, p. 93.

[214]Ibid., p. 103.

[215]Ibid.

[216]Ibid.

[217]Ibid., p. 127.

[218]Ibid., pp. 27, 39.

[219]Ibid., p. 29.

[220]Ibid., p. 32.

[221]Ibid., p. 40.

[222]Ibid., p. 101.

[223]Copleston, p. 149.

[224]Ibid., pp. 149-150.

[225]Ibid., p. 152.

[226]Ibid.



[227]Schleiermacher, p. 98.

[228]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[229]Ibid., p. 140.

[230]Ibid., p. 139.

[231]Ibid., p. 142.

[232]James Gutmann, "Introduction," Schelling, p. xxix.

[233]Schelling, pp. 13-14.

[234]Ibid., p. 39.

[235]Schleiermacher, p. 109; cf. Storr, p. 239.

[236]Ibid., p. 144.

[237]Ibid., p. 23. See Dorner, III, 210.

[238]Schleiermacher, p. 116; on Schleiermacher's notion that only in personal form are ideas effective see Dorner, III, 202.

[239]Quoted in Copleston, p. 163.

[240]Copleston, p. 163.

[241]Schelling, p. 74.

[242]Ibid., p. 79.

[243]Compare Balzac, The Quest of the Absolute.

[244]Storr, p. 240.

[245]Ibid., pp. 238, 240.

[246]See Storr, p. 238, on Schleiermacher.

[247]Schleiermacher, p. 113.

[248]Ibid., p. 248.

[249]Ibid., p. 143. Schleiermacher early held that a more perfect religion would supplant Christianity, but later changed to the idea of a continuous development within Christianity. See Pfleiderer, p. 54.

[250]Dorner, III, 194.

[251]Ibid., p. 175.

[252]Ibid., p. 182.

[253]Ibid., p. 181.

[254]Schelling, p. 57. "In a certain sense. . .Schelling . . . [converted] the whole of philosophy and theology into christology. . . ." (Dorner, III, 117).

[255]Ibid., p. 67.

[256]Ibid., p. 9..

[257]Copleston, pp. 170-173; Dorner, III, 105. In his early Method of Academic Study Schelling tended still to treat Christ after the manner of Kant, making the idea of Christhood the kernel and the historical form the shell (Dorner, III, 105-109).

[258]Hamann attempted to escape literalness in language and doctrine while retaining the historical fact of the Incarnation, which he interpreted as a universal expression of God's nature: "The mustard-seed of anthorpomorphosis and apotheosis, hidden in the heart and mouth of all religions, appears [in Christ] in the magnitude of a tree of knowledge and of life in the midst of the garden; all the philosophical contradictions . . . are resolved by the document which teaches us that the Word became flesh" (quoted in Dorner, III, 74). Oetinger saw the Logos as the source of all self-knoweledge, and like Schelling grounded both the ideal and the real in their reconciliation in God; man has within himself the center of his own freedom as a consequence of God's communication of His nature to him (Ibid., pp. 75-77). He paralleled Schelling in his conception of the aseity of God and the mutual interpenetrability of finite and infinite (Ibid., pp. 78-79). In Christ is found in an indissoluble fusion the life which in man is dissoluble, by which excellence He is able to be man's Mediator (Ibid., p. 80). Indeed, "this redeemer bears in Himself the concentration of the entire universe corresponding to all the emblems, and He is the image of the invisible Father in a visible form" (Ibid., p. 81). Baader saw Christ as the manifestation of man's true nature; "The manifestation of the archetypal form of man is the climax and centre, the vehicle and perfecter of the cosmic ideas" (Ibid., p. 86). Though God reveals Himself to every man by an inner manifestation, when man stifles that revelation through his own sinfulness it can only be awakened by the Person of Christ; for faith makes us participators in His personality (Ibid., p. 87). Novalis struggled to reconcile the universal expression of God's nature in all creation with the speciality of Christ as revelation of God: "However incompatible with each other the two may seem, their combination may be effected, if we make the monotheistic mediator the mediator of the middle world of Pantheism, and deem the latter to be as it were concentred in Him; so that both, though each in a different way, render each other necessary" (quoted in Ibid., p. 93). Goschel saw Christ as the essence of humanity; His personality is the basis of the personality of every man and of the

race as a whole. Yet the realization of this fact occurs only as He becomes individual personal form; for thus the primal man becomes historical and so identifies with the particularized creation (Ibid., p. 170).

[259]from a letter to Cognat, August 14, 1845, in Renan, Recollections of My Youth, p. 338.

[260]from the fifth Hymn; Friedrich Philipp von Hardenberg (Novalis), Hymns to the Night and Other Selected Writings, trans. Charles E. Passage (Indianapolis, 1960), pp. 12-13.

[261]"Christendom or Europe," in Ibid., pp. 55-58.

CHAPTER V

SYMBOLIC CHRISTOLOGY IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, 1820-1850

The object of this study is to clarify a conception of Christ that appeared in English religious thought during the first thirty years of the Victorian era, in order that its figurative employment in Victorian literature may be more accurately understood. In pursuit of this end the writer has made a detour through the German development, in the belief that it was pertinent to the English counterpart--first, that it was influential,[1] and second, that it presented the phenomenon with greater clarity, because its metaphysical correlative was more articulately presented, more fully worked out.

Rationalistic Tendencies in England

In English religious thought of the first half of the century, neither the subjective nor the objective strains of rationalism achieved the clarity or consistency of the German development. In England forces working against such a subjectivism as appears in the early Fichte were simply overpowering--the strength of the empirical school,[2] the absence of English idealist thinkers of the stature of Kant and Herder and Fichte, the caution and superficiality of religious thought generally, the lit-

eralness and the energy of the Evangelical solution, the tyranny of the establishment and of its subscriptions and forms. Perhaps the nearest approach to such a subjectivism in theoretical form appears in the early Coleridge (the Coleridge of Biographia Literaria, and even more of The Friend),[3] but even there the reality of the objective is not denied; and at any rate the position there suggested and echoed in "Dejection" was temporary with Coleridge, as I. A. Richards pointed out so long ago.[4] Even in the concept of the "coalescence of the Subject and Object" it has already, in effect, been transcended; Schelling has become, at least for the moment, the point of reference.[5] Other expressions of a pure subjectivism are not common. Blake's two little tracts, "There Is No Natural Religion" and "All Religions Are One," show that to him the very limitations of the Lockean assumptions necessitate a positive metaphysic based on the inner experience; but Blake apparently does not figure in later religious thought of this era, nor is his subjectivism rationalistic. Shelley's vision is basically Platonic rather than Fichtean, though Barrell has pointed to Queen Mab as evidence that for the young Shelley physical reality derived from the order of mind.[6] But perhaps the tendency to subjectivism, so far as it pertains to religion, is best illustrated by the Quakers and Unitarians as Maurice describes them in The Kingdom of Christ. Noting similarities to the German idealistic christology (he seems to have in mind Kant primarily),[7] Maurice pointed out that with the Quakers, mystics, and Unitarians alike, the rejection of the merely external elements of religion in favor of the internal manifestation had often led them into the idealistic dilemma--that the content of the religious insight tends to evanish when so deprived of

form--and therefore into arbitrary and ineffectual formulations, seized in the extremity which such a vacuum brings:

> The Quaker and the Mystic . . . habitually contemplate a divine presence in the heart; they associate that presence, very probably, with the life of our Lord; but if they do, . . . they affix an import to His acts and words which is different from their obvious import.
>
> It should, I think, be distinctly understood by them at first--for they must arrive at the discovery sooner or later--that they cannot hope to connect [a propitiatory atonement] with, or to reduce it under, any of the ideas which belong properly to mysticism. . . . The Divine Word is the only real subject of their meditation; a vague gulf of being beyond they may awfully think of, but they dare not speak of it in the forms of human language, or bring it within the region of personality. . . .[8]
>
> I receive [the mystical] as a satisfactory explanation of the practical conditions under which every man acts; conditions which must remain true, whatever other truth there may be involved in them. The only question is, whether this doctrine, respecting the Divine Word, can set aside, or make unnecessary, the distinct formal belief of a primary, absolute, originant Will? . . . The mystical doctrine may explain the position and circumstances of man; but these very circumstances, if the doctrine be true, imply a theology, . . . the very thing which mysticism wants.[9]
>
> . . . [T]he more thoughtful disciples of Unitarianism began to be struck with another strange contradiction between the principles on which it rested and the system in which they are embodied. . . . to a man who really cherished. . . the thought, "God is a universal Father . . . . and yet, according to those doctrines which I hold, He is not, and cannot be, a Father. The word means nothing. It is a lazy inappropriate synonym of Maker, for it is the very glory of my creed . . . to deny that there is any human bond between man and God . . . any capacity of receiving impulses from God."[10]

The objective side of rationalism is, by contrast, the dominant strain in England, expressing itself in utilitarianism on the one hand, in the machinery of the establishment and the formulas of the Evangelicals on the other. But the productive expressions are, for the most part, non-religious; the secure grip of tradition and the Church's nu-

merous devices for discouragement of free inquiry kept this objectivism, when religious, severely limited. Of course, the objective assumptions, since they began with a concept of the literal authority of the scriptures, were forced into confrontation with the questions of criticism, as soon as these assumptions became active at all. In Germany, as we have seen, the greater freedom had made for a steady progression through the phases of critical scholarship to eventuate in either skeptical renunciation of Christianity or a more subjective concept of inspiration which broke the literalism of the old assumptions. But in England the entrenched literalism slowed the stream of criticism to a trickle, and the monolithic nature of religious authority, which staked everything on Bishop Usher's chronology and the Thirty-nine Articles, made the outcome of any critical enlightenment almost inevitably the skeptical resolution rather than the symbolic one.

The rise of biblical criticism in England has been adequately traced by James Robert Thrane[11] and need keep us but a moment. In spite of individual achievements, the English contribution to criticism followed the German afar off. Marsh, the translator of Michaelis, remained a solitary and embattled giant, until Connop Thirlwall, a student at Cambridge during Marsh's tenure as Lady Margaret Professor, published the ill-fated translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on Luke in 1825.[12] The Rose-Pusey controversy seems to have done less to circulate the scholarship of the Germans than to make them bugbears for the clergy. Davison's rather timid and eclectic scholarship has been mentioned above.[13] Charles Hennell, he who set George Eliot at work on Strauss, wrote his Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity in

1838, which after a stumbling manner took the question about as far as Bahrdt and Venturini and hardly so far as Paulus; but his work had little impact. Strauss is known mostly by reputation only until after the Eliot translation in 1845, though in 1844 John Relly Beard published a collection of ineffectual refutations of Das Leben Jesu entitled Voices of the Church. Henry Hart Milman's History of the Jews (1829) and History of Christianity, timid by comparison to Strauss's work, seem to have caused considerably more stir in their day than German criticism as such.[14] There is no doubt that knowledge of criticism was growing gradually throughout the period, especially after 1840; but the uproar that met Essays and Reviews in 1860 is indicative of the general insularity of English religious thought even that late; and in 1863 W. R. Greg could still assert that Colenso's work of that year brought an awareness of biblical criticism "for the first time home to the vast majority of British ministers of the Gospel"[15]--though, as Matthew Arnold said, Colenso added nothing to criticism that had not been common knowledge among the informed half a century earlier.[16]

After the first three decades of the century, there were a growing number of skeptics who, having begun with the assumptions of a literal objectivism, worked through that phase to a negative conclusion--sometimes with the aid of Strauss or other Continental scholars--and turned for relief to the humanism that merely appropriates Christianity as an involved metaphor.[17] That story has been frequently told and need not be repeated here. Examples may be limited to George Eliot, weeping at her daily discipline of the translation of Strauss's Life of Jesus, and arriving at last, by her admission, at an identification with the

position of Feuerbach (whose Essence of Christianity she also translated); or Francis W. Newman, brother of the Cardinal, who from his literalistic Evangelicalism slowly and painfully surrendered piecemeal the authority of the scriptures--whose personal history, as he tells it in Phases of Faith, is a capsule edition of the entire movement of rationalism, emerging at last in the negation of not only all positive religious elements, including characteristically the divinity of Jesus, but also the entire intellectual dimension of religion, and an utter reliance on religious feeling in their stead;[18] or Thomas Arnold, who without surrendering the establishment moved steadily and sanely toward an ethical idealism, by a process that would not be called demythologizing. Not to belabor the point, the objective development in England, insofar as it addressed itself to the question of Jesus at all, followed the same line as the German: the gradual erosion of portions of scripture from that which could be defined as inspired;[19] the introduction of speculations to piece out what remained, the basic thesis of objective validity still being held, or posited, meanwhile;[20] and as the objective assumptions became less tenable, a conversion to subjectivism of some stamp or to mere atheism.[21]

The Symbolic Theology to Be Here Studied Distinguished from Other Orientations

Significant as the objective development is for the history of British religious thought in the nineteenth century, not all religious thinkers chose to define their faith, or their lack of it, strictly in terms of the scientific or historical accuracy of scripture or the lit-

eralness and finality of the creeds. Among others, a number of these arrive at a christology somewhat like that of Schleiermacher, Oetinger, Baader and Göschel, though with characteristic British disregard for neat system in favor of practical moral value and challenging personal ideal.

It is difficult to characterize these men because one tends to bring to the attempt a set of categories which they did not accept and which, mistakenly it may be, they felt were invalid as measures of men, Christianity, or God. The present study will make an attempt to state their case in their own terms and on their own grounds and so abjures, for instance, H. N. Fairchild's opposition of "romantic religion" to Christianity[22] or Morse Peckham's polarities of artistic and religious impulses.[23] In preface to the task, it may be helpful to insist that when so examined they can be distinguished from several categories to which they, or others like them, or their ideas, have sometimes been relegated. They are essentially distinct from the Evangelical, pietist, or sectarian strains; they are building on a different ontological ground which though seldom made explicit may be inferred by careful examination. They are the harder to distinguish from such groups because they readily appropriate terms and phrases common to the Evangelicals or the sects, but with different implications. Likewise, they must be distinguished from the "broad church" movement, if by that slippery term is meant the attempt to draw all species of Christians into one fold by the demolition of theology--a kind of ecumenicity by mutual apostasy--if it is defined as a movement which, embarrassed by the naive assumptions that characterized the Christianity of the past,

is attempting to salvage, as graciously as possible, from the debacle of religion the moral and humanistic theses which have been developed along the way. As a matter of fact, the men with whom we are here concerned, while often contemptuous of systematic dogmatizing, are profoundly tenacious of their theology--if "theology" is the word to describe that which serves them as a locus. It is an irony worth some reflection that F. D. Maurice, for instance, has been often classed as a broad churchman,[24] in spite of his own protest and that of his son.[25] That such a distinction has not been seen more universally is due in part, no doubt, to mere association--as, in the instance of Maurice, his central place in the Christian Socialist Movement. But it is probably also due to their refusal to align with customary doctrinal interpretations or categorical definitions, their studied care to avoid system, their insistence upon the place of individual existential response. Such tendencies were very confusing to the contemporary mind; these men appeared to be alternately, or simultaneously, asserting and denying Christianity, accepting the creeds and repudiating them, equivocating on the most basic Christian tenets, and must be therefore, as Gigadibs judges of Blougram, either knaves or fools. The confusion was intensified in the presence of such men as Hare and Maurice and Trench, who were supposed to be good Establishment men, or Campbell, Irving, A. J. Scott, and Erskine, who were supposed to be good Kirk men. Then as later, the categorizing method was frustrated in the attempt to account for them.[26] And in all candor, it is easier to say what they were not than to explain what they were. Nevertheless, with the background here accumulated, sketchy and imprecise as

it has been, hopefully there may emerge a common essential vision if we start from their terms and make sensible allowance for their individual variations.

The Coalescence of Subject and Object: Coleridge

First, it is important to see that they are attempting to escape the inherent limitations of either the objective or the subjective taken alone as basis for the definition of reality. Whether one may indeed consistently address reality except by choosing one or the other basis is not the issue; rightly or wrongly, these men felt that the categories of subjective and objective were mental categories only, distinctions set up by the understanding to factor the unity of experience, useful so long as their reductive nature was remembered, but pernicious when established as ontologies or set in a false mutually exclusive either-or. Not in every instance has the case been put in such terms; not all these men have the capacity of Coleridge to define the issue so clearly and many do not approach it in philosophical terms. Often the position implies itself in a simultaneous condemnation of religious egoism on the one hand and bibliolatry on the other, or of other manifestations of narrow objective or subjective orientations.

For the elucidation of this theme, Coleridge must of course be the point of reference. Not only has he spoken most explicitly, but also his position has been the subject of much study, and the issue is at least familiar to students of Coleridge.[27] Moreover, his struggles to express this synthesis and his applications of it to religious matters were instrumental in clarifying the problems for others in the group--notably for Maurice, Hare and Sterling.

Coleridge's early discipleship to the associationist scheme of David Hartley had given him first-hand experience with the shortcomings of merely objective systems. In a speech of 1795, which he mentions in The Friend, he demonstrated his acquiescence in Hartley's system while yet already qualifying it in a manner indicative that the inherent limitations would soon make themselves felt: "That vice is the effect of error and the offspring of surrounding circumstances, the object therefore of condolence not of anger, is a proposition easily understood, and as easily demonstrated. But to make it spread from the understanding to the affections, to call it into action, not only in the great exertions of patriotism, but in the daily and hourly occurrences of social life, requires the most watchful attentions of the most energetic mind. It is not enough that we have once swallowed these truths:--we must feed on them, as insects on a leaf, till the whole heart be colored by their qualities, and show its food in every the minutest fibre."[28] For he is soon to realize the insurmountable difficulties, psychological and philosophical, in the Hartleyan hypothesis "that the will, and, with the will, all acts of thought and attention are parts and products of this blind mechanism, instead of being distinct powers, whose function it is to controul, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association. . . . In Hartley's scheme, the soul is present only to be pinched or stroked [i. e., worked upon by physiological impulse communicated directly from external stimuli]. . . . It involves all the difficulties . . . of intercommunion between substances that have no one property in common. . . ."[29] He understood how thoroughly the arguments of Hume had overthrown the Lockean premises: ". . . it may be said, that by the

sensations from the objects A and M, the nerves have acquired a disposition to the vibrations a and m, and therefore a need only be repeated in order to re-produce m. Now we will grant, for a moment, the possibility of such a disposition in a material nerve, which yet seems scarcely less absurd than to say, that a weather-cock had acquired a habit of turning to the east, from the wind having been so long in that quarter: for if it be replied, that we must take in the circumstance of life, what then becomes of the mechanical philosophy?"[30] Such a failure had definite consequences for religious belief. Boulger has noted that Coleridge credited Priestly's application of Hartley's principle to religion with demonstrating to him the poverty of the system.[31] "The solution of phaenomena can never be derived from phaenomena," he said in The Friend: "Upon this ground the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews (c. xi.) is not less philosophical than eloquent."[32] But even without Priestly or the author of Hebrews, he could hardly have missed for long the insight that in such a failure the entire utilitarian morality and the entire method of prudential religion, as urged by Paley and the Evangelicals alike, were hopelessly implicated. A good portion of The Friend and Aids to Reflection is given to making this point.

> I am fully aware, that what I am writing . . . will expose me to the censure of some, as bewildering myself and readers with metaphysics. . . . And truly, if I had exerted by subtlety and invention in persuading myself and others that we are but living machines, and that, as one of the late followers of Hobbes and Hartley has expressed the system, the assassin and his dagger are equally fit objects of moral esteem and abhorrence; or if with a writer of wider influence and higher authority [Paley?], I had reduced all virtue to a selfish prudence eked out by superstition,--for, assuredly, a creed which takes its central point in conscious selfishness . . . can have but a distant relationship to that religion, which places its essence in

> loving our neighbor as ourselves, and God above all,--I know not, by what arguments I could repel the sarcasm.[33]

Certain it is that Coleridge was vehement in his attacks upon mere objectivism;[34] and he communicated that attitude to his disciples. "He taught me," said John Sterling, "that an empirical philosophy is none."[35]

In the period extending from The Friend through Biographia Literaria, Coleridge turned to a subjective ground. For present purposes it is not necessary either to presume or deny Coleridge's indebtedness to the Germans, but at any rate the assumptions of Kant, Fichte and Schelling are clearly evident in his work of this period. This passage from The Friend, for instance, clearly expresses both Kant's idealism and his insistence on the human universal: "This again is the mystery and dignity of our human nature, that we can not give up our reason, without giving up at the same time our individual personality. For that must appear to each man to be his reason which produces in him the highest sense of certainty; and yet it is not reason, except so far as it is of universal validity and obligatory on all mankind."[36] And another will show the tendency, common to idealism in its rational form, to ground the moral imperative in intellection, or to make it an adjunct thereto:

> God created man in his own image. To be the image of his own eternity created he man! Of eternity and self-existence what other likeness is possible, but immortality and moral self-determination? In addition to sensation, perception, and practical judgment--instinctive or acquirable--concerning the notices furnished by the organs of perception, all which in kind at least, the dog possesses in common with his master; in addition to these, God gave us reason, and with reason he gave us reflective self-consciousness; gave us principles, distinguished from the maxims and generalizations of outward experience by their absolute and essential universality and necessity; and above all, by superadding to reason the mysterious faculty

> of free-will and consequent personal amenability, he gave us conscience--that law of conscience, which in the power, and as the indwelling word, of a holy and omnipotent legislator commands us--from among the numerous ideas mathematical and philosophical, which the reason by the necessity of its own excellence creates for itself,--unconditionally commands us to attribute reality, and actual existence, to those ideas and to those only, without which the conscience itself would be baseless and contradictory, to the ideas of soul, free-will, of immortality, and of God. To God, as the reality of the conscience and the source of all obligation; to free-will, as the power of the human being to maintain the obedience which God through the conscience has commanded, against all the might of nature; and to the immortality of the soul, as a state in which the weal and woe of man shall be proportioned to his moral worth. With this faith all nature, "all the mighty world / Of eye and ear" presents itself to us, now as the aggregated material of duty, and now as a vision of the Most High revealing to us the mode, and time, and particular instance of applying and realizing that universal rule, pre-established in the heart of our reason.[37]

Yet even at this period there appears a distrust of one-sided subjectivism:

> I should have no objection to define reason with Jacobi, and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the universal, the eternal, and the necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the soul, eternal truth, &c., are the objects of reason; but they are themselves reason. We name God the Supreme Reason; and Milton says,--"whence the soul / Reason receives, and reason is her being." Whatever is conscious self-knowledge is reason: and in this sense it may be safely defined the organ of the supersensuous; even as the understanding wherever it does not possess or use the reason, as its inward eye, may be defined the conception of the sensuous. . . .[38]

The main point of that passage is that there must be an identity between the reason and its object--an insight Coleridge has gained in his rejection of the mechanical associationism, with all its "difficulties . . . of intercommunion between substances that have no one property in common." But to that point he has added the emphasis, especially in the appropriation of Milton, that this identity must de-

rive from without the mind itself--that the mind cannot of itself make a heaven or hell. By the time of the Biographia Literaria, at the latest, he has rejected the merely ideational conception of ulterior reality: "The hypothesis of an external world exactly correspondent to those images or modifications of our own being, which alone, (according to this system), we actually behold, is as thorough idealism as Berkeley's, inasmuch as it equally, (perhaps, in a more perfect degree,) removes reality and immediateness of perception, and places us in a dream world of phantoms and spectres, the inexplicable swarm and equivocal generation of motions in our own brains."[39] "The mere reflective faculty [partakes] of DEATH,"[40] he has decided; and though the immediate context of that judgment presents it as a comment on the claims of the "heart" to equal those of the "head," the larger passage in which it is found makes the corollary application against the finality of the merely intellectual definition of reality--as in his criticism of the "crude egoismus" of Fichte.[41] Simultaneously there appears the insistence that mere knowledge is inadequate for perception of religious truth, and the distinction between understanding and a higher reason begins to be urged.

Coleridge himself, very early, warned that "this distinction . . . remaining obscure, all else [in his work] will be so as a system, however clear the component paragraphs may be, taken separately."[42] Many of the attempts to elucidate the distinction have begun with the assumptions of the rationalists--I mean, with the assumption that any valid address to reality must be capable of explication by rational process--and have therefore found Coleridge self-contradictory or fuzzy

or mystical when his distinction fails to make itself "rational" on such terms.[43] Sometimes the problem has been complicated by their reading Coleridge's "sources" into his own work in such a way as to encumber his own original formulation with their presuppositions;[44] sometimes the full sense of his comments has been lost by the attempt to treat his theories in limited application to philosophical or psychological or aesthetic questions, in a careless--it would seem even willful--disregard of their religious premises, and hence of their ontological ground as Coleridge assumed it.[45] Moreover, there can be little doubt that Coleridge himself contributed to the problem; he was reluctant to dismiss the possibility of a systematic elucidation of a vision which he simultaneously claimed to be beyond the capacities of mere system, and he was, for much of his life, feeling carefully and uncertainly for the final implications of his ideas.

The basic difficulty in Coleridge's concept of reason is the meaning of the "coalescence of subject and object." In the reference to Jacobi, cited from The Friend above, for instance, the identity of reason and the objects of reason is the main point. When reason sees aright, the subjective image and the objective reality focus into one, or "coalesce." Coleridge's work sometimes leaves the impression--Coleridge himself may at times have held--that the coalescence itself is an achievement by intellectual fiat; but the recollection of his insistence upon the ground identity should, I think, correct the impression. Reason experiences the coalescence, it does not create it; or rather, it creates only the human perception of the identity. This coalescence can only be experienced by the higher reason; the under-

standing alone, unable to grasp it, can merely distort it into a contradiction in logic. If the distinction can be translated into the terms of the present study, the understanding is that restrictedly mental process which calculates validity, whether inductively or deductively. "Higher reason" (Coleridge's adjective is added, I think, primarily to secure a distinction from understanding), in the words of Boulger, is "an attempt to fuse the intellectual, volitional, and emotional elements in religious experience into one harmonious whole."[46]

Three major implications of that definition must be examined. First, such a concept of man's "reason" comprehends and transcends the attempt to ground man's religious nature in the "heart" or the "head"--that is, sets at nought the supposed polarity between the pietist and the rationalist addresses to religion. It is not to say that there is no such distinction possible as that between feeling and thought, but that this distinction is part of a <u>method</u> of the understanding, and that the distinction, once made, cannot, without compromise to the nature of experience itself, be supposed endemic in the experience. This sense of the integral nature of experience is, of course, very difficult to retain; once the attempt is made to explain it or even to contemplate it, the understanding must bring its categories into play. So, interpreting Coleridge's comment on "Justification by Faith" in <u>Aids to Reflection</u> that "surely, the more rational inference would be, that the faith, which is to save the whole man, must have its roots and justifying grounds in the very depths of our being," Boulger explains that "very depths means, of course, the moral, emotional, and intellectual nature of man."[47] But care must be taken to extricate

from this analysis the suggestion that the moral and the volitional and the intellectual are component parts which when added together make up the organic unity of "our being." The reason is "one harmonious whole"; by "very depths" Coleridge means, or comes to mean, that out of these three we make, like Browning's Abt Vogler, "not a fourth . . . but a star."

Secondly, by this concept of the higher reason, Coleridge has managed to escape, for good or for bad, the inherent self-eradicating tendencies of pure rationalism. If the faculties, taken separately or assumed to be separate, share a common limitation--if no one of them can make a final statement of the ultimate reality--they must be seen rather as vehicles by which that ultimate reality is translated into terms of knowledge. This is not to say they are not valid, unless the word is used in an absolute sense; it is merely to recognize their categorical, and therefore necessarily reductive, nature. He is particularly explicit in the rejection of the finality of the merely logical and associative faculties--what he terms the Understanding. With certain precautions, it may be said that where the ideal rationalists put self-evident truth and the empiricists put sensory data as the quantity of human knowledge that is of the order of reality, Coleridge put the organic unity of experience--a way of experiencing reality, rather than an exclusively valid portion of experience. The result is that the assertions of finality which objective and subjective systems tend to make, from the security of their static initial assumptions, are eschewed; the adequacy of such assertions is illusion, their comfort specious and essentially idolatrous, indeed blasphemous.

The question remains, of course, whether Coleridge really managed to escape subjectivism satisfactorily. Among others, John Henry Newman, insisting upon the necessity of objective forms, judged that he had not.[48] But if the present study is to be true to its premises, the question must not be posed in terms of a prior assumption of an exclusive either-or set up between the subjective and the objective. Boulger notices Coleridge's relative disregard of the details of historical Christianity.[49] Certainly there is latent in the method of Coleridge the tendency noted in Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,[50] to use the external details of scripture and tradition as mere forms of expression of the subjective idea. But he is aware of the tendency, and cautions against it. The property of "spirit," he insists, is

> to improve, enliven, actuate some other thing, not constitute a thing in its own name. The enthusiast may find one exception to this where the material itself is called spirit. And when he calls to mind, how this spirit acts when taken alone by the unhappy persons who in their first exultation will boast that it is meat, drink, fire, and clothing to them, all in one--when he reflects, that its properties are to inflame, intoxicate, madden, with exhaustion, lethargy, and atrophy for the sequels;--well for him, if in some lucid interval he should fairly put the question to his own mind, how far this is analogous to his own case, and whether the exception does not confirm the rule. The letter without the spirit killeth; but does it follow, that the spirit is to kill the letter? To kill that which it is its appropriate office to enliven?[51]

In further qualification of Boulger's point, some weight must be given to Coleridge's extensive and respectful employment of biblical material, as for example throughout the first pages of the Statesman's Manual--always imaginative, to be sure, yet never with that dismissal of the form as mere "Hülle" characteristic of German idealistic readings. With his conception of inspiration, as it is explicated in Confessions

of an Inquiring Spirit for example, the assumption of an inherent flawlessness in the details of biblical account, as of church tradition, would have been, of course, inconsistent.

But--to generalize--it would appear that what preserves Coleridge from the idealists' distortions is his faith in the essential identity of subject and object. If this faith raises the fallible human instrument to a plane that seems dangerous to Newman, at the same time it assumes that the external object must have an integrity which the subjective appropriation must not wrench. If Coleridge's own well-battered distinction can clarify, the object must serve not as mere allegory ("a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language"--thus capable of being assigned whatever value the subject wills to assign) but as symbol.[52] For Coleridge's concept of this identity is an attempt to refuse the tyranny of either component. Logic or empirical demonstration requires secure premises or secure evidence, and must ground itself in the purity of its objective or subjective address. But Coleridge is insistent upon finding a place in his basic address for both, and claims to do so by conceiving them both as modes of a real, and therefore correspondent to one another.[53] That correspondence discloses itself when the identity is experienced in the coalescence. When coalescence occurs, man himself participates in that identity, being both subject and object--the distinction, however, being in a sense lost in the identity.[54]

In the third place, once having seen the specific limitation of demonstration in matters of religion--not its inadequacy of method

merely, but the distortion wrought upon life itself in the first place and the impossibility of a real moral or religious choice in such a scheme in the second--Coleridge is faced with the same difficulty that confronted Schelling. If logic and demonstration, if the rational as it had been defined, is not an adequate vehicle for religious reality, what is? It was inevitable that Coleridge would come to the symbol as a more comprehensive vehicle for reality. It not only calls into engagement "the whole soul of man"; it subsumes an immanent real, and it admits at the outset its own imperfect nature (which makes the real not derivative of, but the origin of, the symbol, ontologically speaking).

"An IDEA, in the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a symbol; and, except in geometry, all symbols of necessity involve an apparent contradiction," he says.[55] That is, in order for a concept to have a basis in the real, the representation man makes of that real must be recognized as flawed. If it were conceived to be an absolute duplication of that real, or to determine altogether the meaning of the real, then the real cannot be more valid than the process of knowledge itself and--as the career of rationalism shows--must invalidate itself by its own premises. For an idea to be an idea in the highest sense, then, requires an awareness of the symbol's limits. Coleridge's concept of symbol begins with a faith that the real stands behind and validates the symbol.[56] At the same time, the symbol validates the real, in quite a different way; it is a vehicle for the real, a means by which the real can interpret itself, translate itself into phenomena, and only by means of such a

vehicle can it become experience for man at all. The "apparent contradiction," therefore, is that the symbol both is and is not a valid representation of the real; or to put the contradiction another way, the real validates the symbol while yet the symbol validates the real.[57] All knowledge must begin with the faith that "the object which [we behold or present to ourselves] is the real and very object"[58]; yet all valid knowledge perceives an approximation in the perception. As he explains concerning Wordworth's "Intimations" ode, it "was intended for such readers only as had been accustomed to watch the flux and reflux of their inmost nature, to venture at times into the twilight realms of consciousness, and to feel a deep interest in modes of inmost being, to which they know that the attributes of time and space are inapplicable and alien, but which yet can not be conveyed save in symbols of time and space."[59] Man works with existence, of necessity, in symbols; yet he only works validly with existence who simultaneously perceives the limitation of his perception and yet retains a faith in the reality of that which he perceives.

The central significance of Coleridge's concept of the organic quality of human "reason" can hardly be over-emphasized. It is the key to all his mature utterances that have to do with the relationship of knowing and being, and is ignored only at the peril of a gross misrepresentation of his ideas. Yet even this concept of the higher reason is not the tap-root of his thought. Numerous analogies to this organic unity offer themselves and force us to seek their common ground in a more universal idea. The very passage last cited from the

Statesman's Manual concerning allegory and symbol, for instance, herein appropriated as a clue for an epistemological distinction, and so generally and correctly applied as a literary distinction, is in context a religious distinction. All these employments, in fact, require for their sense an application of the principle of "multeity in unity"[50]--the assumption of there being an organic cohesiveness and a mutual interpretation of meaning in the component qualities; and indeed, at a more comprehensive remove, the relation of such categories as the psychological, the literary, or the religious presents, itself, a problem in "multeity in unity," which moveth altogether if it move at all. The assumption of there being a ground unity in all existence is, I believe, Coleridge's basic faith, which informs all the specific applications and moreover their own relationship to one another as well. It would be superfluous to belabor this obvious point--Coleridge himself having given so many clear statements of its central importance--were the danger of misunderstanding not so great, so inherent in the analytical process, and so manifest in various treatments of Coleridge as to be almost overwhelming.

If the logician persists in calling this faith a "major premise," he does so over the howling protest of all that has been said so far, and let him not proceed to demonstrate that a rational monism requires all things to be equally meaningless. I can make no answer except to petition him to return to Chapter One and begin again. The problem is essentially that which Schelling attempted to explicate in his discussion of identity in Of Human Freedom. If Coleridge has little more success than Schelling in rendering the idea logical, he

has in the stead of logic provided a host of illustrations of the principle embodying itself in numberless "symbols"--from the concept of the beautiful in the Principles of Genial Criticism to the concept of life in Hints Towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life.

That this faith is essentially a religious one will, I think, be obvious, provided the category "religion" not be confused with the reality it is striving to represent. In such a sense, at least, it can be insisted that Coleridge is first and last a religious thinker. Such a transcendent employment of the term may be objected to, but the objection must be addressed to Coleridge and not merely to the present study. For Coleridge makes the transition easily from artistic[61] or psychological[62] or political[63] or scientific[64] enquiry to a religious reference.[65]

For the concept of a common order of existence in the subject and the object, the assertion of there being "one life within us and abroad," is a translation into psychological, scientific, or artistic terms of a new theology. No longer are God and man, or God and his creation, or man and nature, or the natural and the supernatural, to be defined as ultimately exclusive entities, variously conceived as subjects or objects, depending upon the perspective assumed. For though subject and object are real categories, their reality is relative to the individuated consciousness. The valid address to reality therefore is not merely to stand only on the subjective and categorize all external reality in terms of it, nor yet merely to assume the reality of the objective and discredit

whatever subjective interpretation extrapolates beyond the objective fact; but rather to seek in their communion, their coalescence, the most valid index to reality, which not only shows the validity of both subject and object, but also clarifies their roles as modes of the reality. In religious terms, this means that the ultimate religious reality rests in a communion between God and man, wherein the grace of God and the response in freedom of man meet. In the ultimate reality, it is neither true that God in His static omnipotence and omniscience tyrannizes over helpless man by forcing him into predestined patterns, nor that man in proud self-assertion makes a God which is merely the apotheosis of his own nature and must therefore merely authenticate and canonize the dicta of the human will. In the first scheme, man has no freedom and therefore no moral nature; in the latter, he has no ground and therefore has only an arbitrary meaning. In the first scheme, God has no morally real other to which He may relate in love; in the latter, He has no identity of His own. If there can be conceived such categories as man and God at all, except for these self-invalidating conceptions, they must somehow exist in a relationship that will give each an integrity, a dignity of its own, yet will not sever one from the other in an exclusive way. Though no logical scheme may present the relationship definitively, it may perhaps be presented legitimately in an image--such an image as that of father and son.[66]

Julius Hare

It was this restatement of the relationship between God and man which so excited the religious thinkers who claimed discipleship to

Coleridge. Some of them--Hare, Maurice, Sterling (in his early development)--seem to have worked through the theoretical rationale; others, like Edward Irving and R. C. Trench, ran more immediately to its practical implications. In the work of the former men, restatements of the basic ontology often appear, generally in more explicit and limited form than in Coleridge. So Hare sees the "great problem of our age . . . of all ages" as the reconciliation of "faith with knowledge, philosophy with religion, the subjective world of human speculation with the objective world in which God has manifested Himself by a twofold Revelation, outwardly to our senses and spiritually to our spirits. Nay, this is only the intellectual side of the problem, though not merely intellectual, inasmuch as in the higher regions of thought the wings of the intellect flag and droop, unless a moral power nerve and sustain them. For what is the great moral problem of mankind . . . but to strive after a like atonement?"[67] and again:

> Were we wise, we should discern that the intellectual, the natural, and the moral world are three concentric spheres in God's world, and that it is a robbery of God to cut off any one of them from Him, and give it up to the Prince of Darkness.[68]

> Every genuine act of Faith is the act of the whole man, not of his Understanding alone, not of his Affections alone, not of his Will alone, but of all three in their eternal aboriginal unity. It proceeds from the inmost depths of the soul, from beyond that firmament of Consciousness, whereby the waters under the firmament are divided from the waters above the firmament. It is the act of that living principle, which constitutes each man's individual, continuous, immortal personality.[69]

> The difficulties which have often been felt, and which have occasioned interminable controversies, concerning the priority of the outward or the inward act, might be lessened if we were to meditate on the facts presented to us by all the operations of life; how in all there is a combination of two coordinate elements; how, for instance, in perception there is a reciprocal action of the object and the percipient, which must be coinstantaneous, admitting of no priority, no exclusive causation, on one side or the other; although even here a like controversy has started up, and one psychological school ascribes all primary causative power to the objects of knowledge, another to th mind that knows. At the same time both the object of knowledge and the subject imply a prior Cause, whereby they have been set in this state of reciprocal action, whereby the perceiver has been endowed with his power of perceiving, and the object has been fitted for acting upon his perceptions.[70]

He has worked out, perhaps even more clearly than Coleridge, the difficulties of a self-invalidating subjectivism:

> In a logical vacuum indeed I may dream that it can stand alone: and then it will compass itself about with a huge zero, an all-absorbing negation, summing up everything out of itself, as Fichte did, in the most audacious word ever coined by man, Nicht-ich, or Not-I. His system, a work of prodigious energy and logical power, was the philosophical counterpart to the political edifice which was set up at the same time in France: and its main fallacy was the very same, the confounding of the particular subjective mind with the eternal, universal mind of the Allwise,--the fancy that, as God pours all truth out of Himself, man may in like manner draw all truth out of himself,--and the forgetting that, beside I and Not-I, there is also a Thou in the world, our relations to whom, in their manifold varieties, are the source of all our affections, and of all our duties.[71]

> I know not by what image to express the inanimateness of a bare intellectual belief: for in the outward world there is nothing, not a dead leaf, not a straw, not even a grain of dust, which is not connected with the rest of the universe by manifold bonds of action: there is nothing in the outward world so torpid, so insulated, as a conviction of the Understanding lying amid the lumber of a paralysed Intellect.[72]

He perceptively appropriates Coleridge's concept of the Understanding in noting the self-destructive effect of elevating one mode to an

ultimate: ". . . When the calculating, expediential Understanding has superseded the Conscience and the Reason, the Senses soon rush out from their dens, and sweep away everything before them. If there be nothing brighter than the reflected light of the moon, the wild beasts will not keep in their lair. And when that moon, after having reacht a moment of apparent glory, by looking full at the sun, fancies it may turn away from the sun, and still have light in itself, it straightway begins to wane, and ere long goes out altogether, leaving its worshipers in the darkness, which they had vainly dreamt it would enlighten."[73] The analogous failure of objectivism is also clear to him: "Unable to understand organic unity and growth, [Bentham] lookt upon a hyphen as the one bond of union."[74] "A fact," he says again, "is merely the outward form and sign of a truth, its visible image and body; and . . . of itself and by itself, it can no more be a truth, than a body by itself is a man . . . ."[75] Many passages are brilliantly explicit about the religious origin of this organic unity, and the perception of it:

> Every idea, when brought down into the region of the empirical understanding, and contemplated under the relations of time and space, involves a union of opposites, which are bound together and harmonized in it: or rather, being one and simple in its own primordial fulness, it splits, when it enters into the prismatic atmosphere of human nature. Thus too is it with Christianity, from whatever point of view we regard it. If we look at it historically, it is at once unchangeable and changeable, at once constant and progressive. Were it not unchangeable and constant, it could not be the manifestation of Him who is the same yesterday, today, and for ever. Were it not changeable and progressive, it would not be suited to him with whom today is never like yesterday, nor tomorrow like today. Therefore it is both at once; one in its essence and changeless, as coming from God; manifold and variable in its workings, as designed to pervade and hallow every phase and element in man's being,

> his thoughts, his words, his deeds, his imagination, his reason, his affections, his duties. For it is not an outward form: it is not merely a law, manifesting itself by its own light, cast like a sky around man, and guiding him by its polar constellations: its light comes down to him, and dwells with him, and enters into him, and, mingling with and strengthening his productive powers, issues forth again in blossoms and fruits. Accordingly, as these powers are various, so must the blossoms and fruits be that spring from them. . . . each picks out certain portions of the truth, such as are most congenial to the temper of his own heart and mind. Nor is he wrong in doing so: for the aim of Ch: istianity is not to stifle the germs of individual character and to bring down all mankind to a dead level. On the contrary, it fosters and developes the central principle of individuality in every man, and overlay it; as we may observe from the very first in the strongly markt characters of Peter and James and John and Paul.[76]

Here, of course, are numerous Coleridgean ideas identified above--the faith in the ground unity from which modal perceptions derive, and in which they are reconciled; the concept of moral freedom and individual dignity, of personal pluralism, which yet does not usurp the dignity of God; the appropriation of the organic metaphor to clarify this relationship; and the clear reference of this organic unity to a religious origin and significance. Coleridgean, also, is his reference of all disciplines of human science to a religious ground, by means of this organic concept of existence:

> All knowledge, of whatsoever kind, must have a two-fold groundwork of faith,--one subjectively, in our own faculties, and the laws which govern them,--the other objectively, in the matter submitted to our observations. We must believe in the being who knows, and in that which is known: knowledge is the copula of these two acts. Even Scepticism [sic] must have the former. Its misfortune and blunder is, that it will keep standing on one leg, and so can never get a firm footing. We must stand on both, before we can walk, although the former act is often the more difficult.[77]

> Nature is mighty. Art is mighty. Artifice is weak. For Nature is the work of a mightier power than man. Art is the work of man, under the guidance and inspiration of a mightier power. Artifice is the work of mere man, in the imbecility of his mimic understanding.[78]

> In the study of poetry, as in yet higher studies, it is often necessary that we would believe, before we can understand: and through the energy, patience, and perseverance, which Faith alone can inspire, do we mount to the understanding of what we have already believed in.[79]

> He who merely takes a string of propositions from former writers, and busies himself in drawing fresh inferences from them, may be a skilful logician or psychologer, but has no claim to the high title of a philosopher. For in this too does philosophy resemble poetry, that it is not a bare act of the intellect, but requires the energy of the whole man, of his moral nature and will and affections, no less than of his understanding. It is the ideal pole, to which poetry is the real antithesis: and it bears the same relation to science, as poetry does to history.[80]

John Sterling

The work of John Sterling, as it is preserved by Hare's edition, presents many uncertainties, questionings, and inconsistencies--a fact that must always be recalled when generalizations about his position are made. In 1829, he credited Niebuhr (surely called to his attention by Hare and Thirlwall's translation) with "the first help I had in getting out of the slough of Benthamism."[81] By many of his ideas, as well as by his own testimony,[82] a significant influence of Coleridge is evidenced; yet the impact of more systematic German thought on the one side, and the denigration of Coleridge's "moonshine" by his revered Carlyle on the other, seem to have effected major qualifications of his Coleridgean vision. From his Cambridge days,

Maurice and Hare were in continual dialogue with Sterling; though he was never a merely passive disciple and became less so, the esteem in which he held them both and the close personal ties seem to have helped recommend their ideas to him. Among other German rationalists, Strauss and Hegel seem to have had a great impact; and his experience with the Germans seems to have turned him increasingly to a rationalistic address.[83] That tendency was latent in Sterling from the earliest days, however. It was perhaps some new self-understanding of this tendency, as well as the real occasion of poor health, that truncated his clerical career after a few months as Hare's curate. In the later years of his brief life Hare and Maurice, particularly the latter, were deeply distressed by what they felt to be an apostasy in Sterling;[84] for Sterling seemed to move further and further from their integrative vision, and especially from their perception of the details of Christian myth as the ultimate, hence uniquely valid, embodiments of it. Carlyle protests the prominent place Hare gives to the philosophical and theological problem in the latter's memoir of Sterling.[85] Carlyle had a just complaint; but certainly the issue was central, and Hare's presentation of it clarifies whereas Carlyle's confuses. When minimal changes in emphasis are made to allow for Hare's painful disappointment, his summary is helpful and valid: "The representation of his life is unsatisfactory, because the problem of his life was incomplete. That problem, as has been truly observed to me by one of his chief

friends, was the same as the great problem of our age. In fact, it was the same with the great problem of all ages, to reconcile faith with knowledge, philosophy with religion, the subjective. . . with the objective. . . ."[86] Analyses of Sterling's thought, then, are apt to vary according to where the sample is taken; but the problem which concerned him most was certainly the problem which concerned Coleridge.

There is a strong subjective tendency in Sterling, which makes him more tolerant of purely speculative endeavor than Maurice, for example, was likely to be. Hare--uneasy, like Maurice,[87] with such a tolerance, distrusting the Understanding like Coleridge but more consistently--felt that Sterling's inactivity from poor health and the consequent divorce of thought from experience were largely responsible.[88] Sterling does indeed often lament the aberrations the Understanding is heir to--that "of the few who have risen into distinct self-consciousness, a large . . . proportion have made shipwreck of all practical principle, and have dreamt themselves away again into mere word-gamblers and shadow-fighters."[89] And he cautions about the tyranny of abstractions:

> Many have shown us man in general, and have done this better or worse, according to their several shares of manhood. But the mischief of such delineations is, that man in general is after all a fiction; for man exists only in particular. The essential forms and germs of our whole nature are stored indeed in every individual; and as the reason gradually awakens to the music of experience, a corresponding image becomes present to it of man as a single ideal being. But this image is always to some extent imperfect, and yet has a tendency to allure and even imprison our attention within itself, and to shut out any entrances, or, if we may use the word, ingrowths, of further knowledge.[90]

He laments that experience of religious awe "has always been subsequently analysed into dogma, and stifled and petrified in authoritative, not intuitive symbols."[91] But he is much more concerned with the dangers of the objective assumption.

> The reductio ad absurdum, the triumphant sarcasm of the follower of Locke, commonly amounts to this, that the asserted truth of the visionary enthusiast cannot be stated in terms of the sensations, and their images and associated results, without manifest self-contradiction, and that therefore it is a mere lunacy. But this is only a ridiculous conclusion from a statement, which is essential to the very case of the transcendentalist. For it is his allegation, that there is such a truth as cannot be conveyed, except in language which must appear an inane jargon to all who resolve existence into a nothing but.[92]

> To found an argument for the value of Christianity on external evidence, and not on the condition of man, and the pure idea of God, is to hold up a candle before our eyes that we may better see the stars. It may dazzle, but cannot assist us.[93]

Though he has appropriated Coleridge's redefinition of reason, and consistently speaks of reason as grounded in the whole man, in application his "reason" often seems to be much more intellectualistic and rational than the more comprehensive personal response this concept would seem to require. This is increasingly true after about 1839, when his first encounter with Strauss, his acquaintance with F. W. Newman, and increasing familiarity with Carlyle may have collaborated to cast doubts on his old assumptions and send him in this direction. In reaction to the objectivism of Sewell, for instance, he complains: "Imagine a man pretending to survey the world, and all its wisest men, and to reconstruct his age, and writing down, as he does in his Ethics, that external historical testimony of God's revealed will is the only true basis of moral science. As if all

science is not within, and all morality! and as if anything external could be the basis of anything within!"[94] Though the tenor of this objection is consistent with Coleridge, Hare and Maurice, the exclusive severing of "without" from "within" here assumed is not to be found in the mature Hare or Maurice, nor is any such implied derogation of objective data. Similar in implication is Sterling's reaction to Strauss's thesis of Das Leben Jesu, where he accepts, and for Strauss's reasons, the stability of Christian "verities" though they shed entirely the husk of historical details:

> According to my conviction, this searching and comprehensive criticism leaves the ideas of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the offices of the Spirit, precisely where they were. If indeed it be maintained that there is no power . . . inherent in man's reasonable constitution, of discovering divine verities, and that they must therefore be added by mere verbal accretion from without, it is plain enough that the doubt thrown on the historical authority of the New Testament would remove all certain ground for religious doctrine. But as long as this . . . is not taught, I cannot see how the questioning . . . the miracles of the Saviour at all involves the necessity for denying him to have been spiritually the Son of God, and historically the Jewish Messiah; and it obviously no way interferes with the doctrine that the Divine Being is essentially Triune. . . .[95]

Hare is prompt to differ, and his objection will clarify the relation of Sterling to the movement we are studying: ". . . Even if the total incompatibility of Strauss's critical views with the reception of the great doctrines just spoken of were not manifest. . . . the same criticism, which eats away all the facts of Christianity, must, by an inevitable consequence, undermine, and in course of time swallow up all its essential doctrines, which are inextricably interwoven with its facts, and of which we cannot recognise the reality and necessity except in connexion therewith."[96] It seems that in such statements as these from Sterling there is a basic inconsistency with his general ap-

propriations from Coleridge, an inconsistency which he did not fully work out, as Hare noted.

If this were not inconsistency--if there were no more to Sterling than such an idealism as is here expressed--he would have little value for the present theme. Most of his utterances, however, assume a more comprehensive definition of reason. From Coleridge, he says, he learned "that Faith is the highest Reason, that all criticism, whether of literature, laws, or manners, is blind, without the power of discerning the organic unity of the object."[97] Again, he feels that "the law of the Will must be found in the Reason, that is, in our power of immediate intuition as to the ends of our being and the foundations of our constitution."[98] He believes that

> the more man is man, the more his whole nature is unfolded in all its parts, the more clear it becomes that there is a system and meaning, a balance and proportion of his powers, which cannot be violated without disturbance and a sense of guilt; but, analysed to its last elements, I think it may be shewn that our nature is a complex of two powers, or a double operation of one; and that these poles of humanity are Feeling and Knowledge. To develope each of these to its utmost limits, till at last it shall fill the whole sphere of existence, and to keep the equipoise of the two, seems to me to be the proper function of the Will; and that it may be proved that our instincts, affections, and circumstances work toward this purpose, till they issue in a self-consciousness which is its own evidence of the truth.[99]

And what is perhaps his clearest statement of his concept of reason, from a review of three works on Montaigne in the Westminster Review of 1837, might have been written by Coleridge--or Hare, or (with allowance for style) Maurice or Erskine: ". . . Reason in its highest being, [is] the power which beholds and converses with supersensual and universal realities. These, apprehended by the intellect, are

philosophic truths, or first principles,--embraced, reverenced, and obeyed by the will, are laws of duty,--relied on and worshipped by the heart, are objects of religion,--and embodied in beautiful symbols, are the deified forms of the imagination, and haunt and spiritualize the highest poetry. Now this manifold but one power . . . is nothing less or other than the spirit or life of man in its loftiest energy. . . ."[100]

Such comments give evidence of a grounding of the reason in the whole self; they do not, of course, necessarily exhibit a faith in the identity of subject and object, of the essence of man and nature and God. Sterling's sensitivity to the epistemological problem makes it very hard for him to hold on to this faith in identity:

> . . . speculations, the least apparently human, are in reality based on some portion or other of man, and on this alone; those as to reptiles, which may well concern man, himself a worm; those as to the earth we tread on, we being ourselves but dust and clay; those as to the air and stars, for what else are we but a breath, and our lives but sparks of fire in a vault of darkness? Nor can it be said that this is a fantastic abuse of metaphor. On this subject nothing properly is metaphor; for all analogies, even the wildest combinations twisted together by the fancy, have their one root in the unity of our consciousness. And in all we seek to know, our aim is only to discover what there is in the thing, corresponding to somewhat in ourselves. Thus we discern it; thus we master it, make it our own, truly know it. That in an object which answers to, or dovetails with ourselves, is what we really mean by the object. And manifestly so; for if there be aught in it which meets and assimilates with nothing in us, of that something, that algebraic x never to be discovered, we cannot speak, or think or dream. Not only do we not know it, but we never can know it.[101]

Thus Sterling often falls into another of the problems we have associated with the rationalist. In his reaction against the objective, and the consequent attempt to ground ethics and philosophy in the na-

ture of man alone, he often ignores the question of an ontological ground and explains the presence of a moral urge from the workings of the human psyche alone. Such an attempt is exemplified in a long letter to Hare in which he sketches his conception of the source of the moral imperative. The sense of moral sanction, the feeling of approval or blame within us which is the moving force of the will, is an impulse directed toward the "preservation and good of the being." Its object is "simply existence," though "existence is interesting to us in proportion as it rises from nothingness to the full capacity of feeling and intelligence, with the Will as its arbiter."[102] There is, to be sure, an objective reference that gives this urge its moral point. We are in intercourse with other beings, whose needs and sufferings "establish claims for them, which it is a point of duty [italics mine] to take into account."[103] Finally, on such principles one may argue that "the most perfect moral state is that in which our feelings and intelligence are most directed to the only perfect moral Being, and habitually regard all things with reference to Him."[104] The similarity to Kant's universal is clear, and reflects the lack in the system--a genuinely moral motive, which is here referred, after the manner of rationalism generally, to duty and to self-interest.

But Sterling can not rest content with such a scheme. Commenting on Samuel Johnson's moral torment, he concludes that "The mere moral element, the conscience, was in him nobly, but also fearfully predominant. By earnest longing to fulfil the moral law did no man, from Adam to the Baptist, from Paul to Luther, ever yet find peace on earth. Those incapable of self-devouring emotion and brooding melan-

choly may easily find in rules of duty a safeguard against any such wrong-doing, as would produce consequences very painful to them; but a fervid and meditative spirit carries conscience with it as a divine curse, if this be not transfigured and glorified into the revelation of a good higher than all laws of duty."[105] How can it be so "transfigured and glorified"? First of all, by an awareness of man's fellowship with all of existence, by an awareness of the organic unity that makes all existence cohere. The world must be seen as "not a heap of unconnected parts and fragments, but that which has a oneness, and is essentially inseparable. Let any one look into himself, and he will find all that he knows lying before his understanding. . . . there are [no images] too unconnected for the oneness of the mind to combine them into one. . . . For there is a oneness in our consciousness and in all the objects with which it deals."[106] This is the insight which makes life significant to us. "We should go mad and rot in preternatural idleness, if we had not the task of gradually finding ourselves expressed in the universe, and the universe impressed upon ourselves, and of more and more realizing this correspondence outwardly by action, whence arts, and trades, and journeys, and ships, and harvests,--and inwardly by thought and love, from which arise religions, poetry, sciences, all heroism and goodness."[107] And the lack of this insight is what narrows and distorts objective and subjective systems:

> It is certain that men with whom this enterprise of logical construction and deduction has been the great task of life, have seldom been open to a sufficient course of outward and inward experience, not to undervalue all but the scanty set of facts on which they base their scheme. Nay more, inasmuch as those facts have not been looked at by the light of analogies from many others, there are sides even of them which the theory takes no account of. Thus it never can exhaust, that is, adequately interpret, even the things which it counts worthy of notice.

> The man, fancying his brain the sunny mirror of the universe, lives in fact in a small sham world, where there is at best a spark of light amid thick shadows that wear hardly a semblance of realities.
>
> Further still, as he who has devoted himself exclusively or chiefly to the formation and arrangement of definitions, is likely to have been led thereto by a preponderance of the merely ratiocinative faculty, and a deficiency of the nobler and more substantial powers, these, and their correlatives in objects, are not what he is apt to seek for or acknowledge anywhere. His theory is likely to leave out whatever is deepest and most essential in the universe. Now all things being linked together and interfused, in the lowest things there must be some power or capacity corresponding to something above it, and by which it is ultimately related to the highest of all. But this is precisely what the too narrow and mechanical inquirer cannot comprehend. Therefore even the lowest and most lifeless forms of things, which correspond best to his own stiff and angular faculty of reasoning, are as to their true meaning and most important relations, altogether beyond his ken.[108]

But even beyond this insight there must be a sense of calling to live fully in that fellowship. It is this sense of calling that duty alone can never supply. Those who bear duty as a burden have substituted law for a personal God, and "A law must be obeyed at whatever cost of reluctance, and has no tendency to make obedience easy. It is only a person that can be loved; and with love comes [sic] life and hope."[109] The "good higher than all the laws of duty" is an acquiescence in the fellowship, expressing itself not in a sense of compulsion but in love, reverence, and self-denial willingly assumed. Therefore is Christianity uniquely valid: ". . . The universal and eternal truth of the Gospel is that view of the relations of men to God, and to each other, which presents itself as true to the heart, conscience, and reason, when purified by Christian influence; which influences are obtained by the meditation on, and sympathy with, the life and mind of Christ recorded in Scripture, and by the teaching and example of other believers

in Him. On this view, Christian truth is that, and only that, doctrine which commends itself to the minds of all who share in the spirit of Christ; which spirit may be briefly described as a prevailing temper of reverential and affectionate self-denial."[110] The spirit of Christ, the "prevailing temper of reverential and affectionate self-denial," has as its purpose not merely the evoking of deference to authority, nor even merely the response of awe, but rather that reordering of man's nature whereby his "identity" with existence is made possible--where all things are made new because he is a new creature. In its essence, Christianity is "not . . . an arbitrary puzzle, but . . . a necessary mystery, that is, a truth dark to the careless and unprepared eye, but luminous and the light of all things to the spirit purifed by the love of God, and by entire self-sacrifice,--as a truth founded in the nature of man, claimed by his noblest wants, manifested by the full harmony of all his powers, and by their triumph over inward and outward disturbances and desolations, completely realized in the Saviour, and attainable for all by the heartfelt recognition of it in him. . . ."[111] If one understands that, he may recover logic as a valid means of knowledge;[112] and even self-knowledge and self-love, so fraught with the danger of spiritual ruin, become acts of reverence:

> The habit of contemplating the particular monad, self, for its own sake, is a mere self-seeking, which divides us from other beings. Self-intuition and self-interpretation, when the self is regarded as a product of higher forces, similar to the other, and especially to the human, products of the same, is indispensable to all true knowledge of man and men, and even of all other things, in that chief sense in which their essence is a reality analogous to us. The exploring of myself in this higher view is not a nourishing, but a

> correcting, of vanity. Self is thus resolved into a result, an exponent, of laws, which it depends on, not commands,--is valued for the sake of that which is above it,--is dis-individualized, unisolated, rather universalized and idealized.[113]

Arthur Henry Hallam

Arthur Henry Hallam makes a direct application of the principle of interaction of subject and object in explicating the moral basis of personal relationships. In "On Sympathy" he worked out his own psychological theory, making full use of Hartlean associationism but finding also a subjective rationale for the objective effects. Thus the self desires the perpetuation of pleasure; when it becomes aware of the disjunction between past and present and future, it desires to fuse them all in a unity, because of the displeasure arising from the interruption of the association of pleasurable experiences. By the same token, when the self is first aware of the fact of another self, another subject, it can only be by an objectifying of its own feelings as subject; and the desire to close again this disjunction of itself, as it were, gives rise to sympathy. From this primary sympathy all virtues and moral sense derive.[114] The similarity to Schelling's yearning of the periphery for the center is obvious. The "Essay on the Philosophical Writings of Cicero" extends the principle of sympathy into the basis for all moral community.[115]

Such being the case, he insists, only the representation of God in human terms can ever engage man's love and work for virtue. "How then can he love a Spirit, to whose happiness he bears no relation, and whose perfections, since they are vast, must be vague, embodied in no action, concentrated upon no point of time? The thing is im-

possible, and has never been. Without the Gospel, nature exhibits a want of harmony between our intrinsic constitution, and the system in which it is placed."[116] It is false to credit actions to "reflection" or "feeling" as though each, and in a different manner, were the source of action; all action springs from feeling immediately. But only when feeling is also referred to reflection may there be choice among actions; those who do not reflect on impulses "debar themselves from their power of election, and voluntarily act as slaves."[117] In "the eternal harmony of things, as it subsists in the creative idea of the Almighty, the two separate worlds of intellect and emotion conspire to the same end, the possible perfection of human nature"; we may trust, then--says Hallam, identifying the ideal harmony with the ultimate state of the soul--"their perfect coincidence in some future condition of being"; and he credits to Coleridge the insight that, analogously, the conformity of Christian revelations to the human character must "afford a pledge of this ultimate union."[118]

Man's moral growth takes place, then in two phenomena. First there is the growth from identity as subject only into the capacity for sympathy--the objectifying of oneself as subject to find an objective identity in another, with a consequent yearning for the reconciliation. Second, there is the objectifying of feeling into reflection, which however can not remain merely reflective if it would realize itself in act. In both instances the drive for reintegration is the force that reconciles these antagonisms. In the nature of God the unity is secure; in Him man's faulty reason and likewise faulty feeling are both perfected.[119] Moreover, if "God is love," we may think of Christ as an objectifying

of God's nature, analogous to the process of sympathy in man: "He [Christ] is God, not in that highest sense . . . but as the object of that Infinite Being's love, the necessary completion of his being, the reproduction of Him, without which His nature could not have been fulfilled, because He is love."[120]

Perhaps little more is to be gained by multiplying examples of the basic ontological assumptions of our group of writers. Further illustration might be drawn from Maurice, Erskine, Campbell, or others. In most of these instances, however, the ground assumptions are seldom made explicit in systematic formulations; they must be seen embedded in their specific applications. The subsequent discussions will provide adequate evidence for inferring that such assumptions subsist.

Implications of this Ontology

Since our task is to clarify a rather complex orientation, which, by its nature and the media in which it expressed itself, is difficult to define, we must proceed by a detailed examination of several relevant issues and abstract from these the evidence needed. Lest the process should obscure the central concerns--for coherence will be something of a problem--it will be well to note the implications of the ontological position that worked itself out in these issues.

It is evident, then, that the drive in this ontology is for reintegration. Some solution must be worked out whereby both the components--neither of which could make good an ontology by itself--may find a reconciliation. The pressure for reconciliation may be read in a hundred different manifestations, which claim let a few excerpts

from Hare's Guesses at Truth illustrate:

> For the full expansion of the intellect. . . , its various faculties, however opposite, should grow and be trained up side by side, should twine their arms together, and strengthen each other by love-wrestles. . . . A poet for instance should have much of the philosopher in him; not indeed thrusting itself forward at the surface,--this would only make a monster of his work, like the Siamese twins, neither one thing, nor two,--but latent within: the spindle should be out of sight; but the web should be spun by the Fates. A philosopher on the other hand should have much of the poet in him. A historian cannot be great, without combining the elements of the two minds. A statesman ought to unite those of all the three. A great religious teacher . . . needs the statesman's practical power of dealing with men and things, as well as the historian's insight into their growth and purpose: he needs the philosopher's ideas, impregnated and impersonated by the imagination of the poet.[121]

> At present England is the country, where that depth and inwardness of thought which seems to belong to the Germanic mind, has assumed the distinct, outward, positive form of the Roman. An intermixture of the same elements has also taken place in France, but with a very different result. In the English character, as in our language, the Teutonic or spiritual element has fortunately been predominant; and so the two factors, have coalesced without detriment; while in France, where the Roman or formal element gained the upper hand, the consequence has been, that they have almost neutralized and destroyed each other.[122]

> . . . The French are the very people for that mode of life and doctrine. . . which aims at reconciling opposites by a mechanical, or at the utmost by a chemical, instead of an organical union. It is only in the latter, when acting together under the sway of a constraining higher principle, that powers which, if left to themselves, thwart and battle against each other, can be made to bring forth peace and its fruits. According to the modern theory however, the best way of producing a new being is not by the marriage of the man and woman, but by taking half of each, and tying them one to the other. The result, it is true, will not have much life in it: but what does that matter? It is manufactured in a moment: the whole work goes on before the eyes of the world: and the new creature is fullsized from the first.[123]

> A sort of English has been prevalent during the last hundred years, in which the sentences have a meaning, but the words have little or none. As in a middling landscape the general outlines may be correct, and the forms distinguishable, while

> the details are hazy . . . so here the abstract proposition designed to be exprest is so; but hardly a word is used for which half a dozen synonyms might not have stood equally well. . . . This may be called Scotch English. . . .
>
> Opposite to this, and almost the converse of it, is Irish English; in which every word taken by itself means, or is meant to mean something; but he who looks for any meaning in a sentence, might as well look for a green field in St. Gileses [sic]. . . .
>
> What then is English English? It is the combination of the two; not that vulgar combination in which they would neutralize, but that in which they strengthen and give effect to each other. . . . [124]

> [The business of education] is to <u>educe</u>, or bring out, that which is within, not merely, or mainly, to <u>instruct</u>, or impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the ministration of others; and hence Instruction must ever be a chief element of Education.[125]

> The word <u>encyclopedia</u> implies the unity and circularity of knowledge,--that it has one common central principle, which is at once constitutive and regulative: for there can be no circle without a centre; and it is by an act emanating from the centre that the circle must be constructed.[126]

> The name Eclectic is often misused nowadays, by being applied to such as will not surrender their reason and conscience to the yoke of a dogmatical system, anathematizing everything beyond its pale,--to those who, recognizing the infinite fulness and plastic life of Truth, delight to trace it out under all its manifestations. . . . This however is mere ignorance and confusion. The Eclectic is a person who picks out certain divers systems of philosophy, and strings or patches them together, without troubling himself much about their organic unity or coherence.[127]

Now the problem is, by what means can these be reintegrated? We have already noted a tendency to adopt--in the failure of logical system, mere data, and mere emotion--the symbol as a presentational medium that gives place to all these components, resists being captured by any one, and combines them in a real relational pattern. The first of these desiderata may be credited simply to the failure of the univocal ontologies, and the evident need to recognize the partial validity of

all. The second is a recognition of the danger inherent in human impatience with ambiguity and insecurity and the consequent pressure to return to some illusory expedient ("idolatry," Hare calls it).[128] The third--most interesting for our purposes--is the positive one of the three, sprung from many sources, some of which have become obvious in the preceding chapters. Needing (because man himself is conscious of himself as an integer) some means of reintegrating experience, and not finding it in systematic or empirical solutions, the Romantic age comes up with what I think is its own epistemological invention--to draw within one moment of encounter the object itself and the human response to it, and simply let the encounter itself--the interchange between subject and object, thought and feeling, detail and unity, motive and effect--[129] emanate meaning,[130] refusing to let it be dissected by any meddling limited mode. This necessitates, or seems to, a faith that there is a common ground--one life within us and abroad, half created and half perceived--and that it is not merely external or accidental either to man or to nature, but is the true principle of the integrity between them.[131] The faith, then, is this same faith in existence, and when it is expressed in symbolical form there will be an evident tendency to give it a form which enunciates this ground unity most clearly. The most obvious form, particularly when the most basic nature of man is supposed to be congruent if not identical with it, will be <u>life itself</u>.[132] And the organic metaphor becomes the chief resource, the main epistemological medium. Employment of it by these apologists is as pervasive as it is in the Romantic poets, and may be observed by perusal of almost any ex-

cerpt quoted in this chapter--and so need not be substantiated here.

I daresay that somewhere in the thousands of explications of Romanticism someone has said that when the theological problem of the rationalists worked itself out to the problem of the person of Christ, the personalistic solution gave rise to the organic metaphor. I will not try to make such a claim--I do not know whether it is valid or not--but I think it is clear that what happened in christology is precisely what happened in the romantic phenomenon of the organic metaphor.[133] When system, criticism, and pietism are unable to give an adequate statement to the nature of Jesus[134]--which was yet an inescapable enigma, given the religious preoccupation--and when there is a pressure toward the organic symbol as a means of reconciling disparate entities--particularly when the disparate entities were man and God, doctrine and precept, natural and supernatural, spirit and form--what more sensible, more effective, than simply to say, after all argument, "Behold the man"?[135] If, as Coleridge asserted, religion had to do with reconciliation of subject and object,[136] what could Christianity be but christocentric? In Erskine's words, "Christ <u>is</u> himself both object and subject in Christianity. He both shows forth the Father's loving purpose . . . and he lives by the faith which rests on that purpose." And this Christ will be not a mere allegory, a skeleton of doctrines stretched over with a skin of miracles and precepts, but a symbol in Coleridge's sense--participant in the reality He enunciates, form and spirit wedded in a living union.

From this brief survey, then, we will proceed with two insistent cautions: first, that these assumptions must be tenaciously remembered,

for the moment they are forgotten the religious and artistic extrapolations from them will lapse into an entirely different frame of reference and be misunderstood; and second, that the remembrance of these assumptions is difficult in any theoretical discussion, and will require constant vigilance.

The Impact of this Orientation on Religious Thought

Space will not allow an examination of the innumerable ways in which this basic reinterpretation--this basing of the real in the communion of subject and object, a communion man must come to know, if adequately, through identification into that coalescence in his whole being--permeated the religious thought of these men. In brief, that permeation was complete. The most basic and generally accepted tenets were reexamined in light of this major reorientation, not, in most instances, to be rejected flatly, but rather to be rethought, reinterpreted, realigned and transmuted. These men found themselves newly defined, and consequently all things became new. There were profound redefinitions of subject, object, man, nature, God, righteousness, reason, faith, grace, eternality, salvation. The effect for a study of their thought is a bewildering complexity of inter-related themes, any one of which offers dangers of oversimplification. A startling consistency between their religious visions seems to offer the hope of a clear and easy abstraction. But not so; the synthetic nature of their process of examining reality, the multitudinous implications of their faith in a ground unity in existence, their own uncertainty in the extremity of trying to give clear statement to paradoxes that language

itself crumpled under, and their consequent frequent recourse to analogy--these make every theme involved in every other. Everything qualifies everything; as in Emerson's "Each and All," "All are needed by each one; / Nothing is fair or good alone." Our need is to clarify their conception of Christ. Our dilemma is that hardly a comment they make is irrelevant to that conception. We must be content to note briefly a few significant general points before characterizing the christology specifically.

The Relationship of God and Man

One important implication is the reinterpretation of orthodox specifically the relationship of God to man. In the old dualistic scheme, man and God are substantially discrete, with Christ (in spite of precautionary assertions of his humanity) of course on the divine side, "being of one substance with the Father." As Dorner's analysis has been cited to show, given the image of substantiality so conceived, the bringing together of the human and divine nature can only be in terms of dictatorial authority of one over the other. The same assumption persists in the opposing of soul and body, sacred and profane, temporal and eternal. Descartes merely extended and complicated the problem, but essentially perpetuated the same assumption, in relocating the dualism. Much of the difficulty of subsequent philosophy and theology can be traced to the unobserved persistence of the image of substantiality--of reality conceived spatially. Was God "without" or "within"? For any attempt to put God and man together became a problem in relocation. To place Him "without" was to leave the universe mere

dead matter, machine-like, totally determined because devoid of life and will. To place him "within" was to leave existence without an overall pattern, when pattern was conceived only in terms of the disposition of authority: to run almost inevitably into a form of pantheism that left all components equally participant in deity and equally significant; hence existence was fragmented and chaotic. So attempts to bring existence into a rational frame began by assuming the dualism, only to proceed to rank the two factors within a single hierarchical scale, logic requiring derivative linear relationships. For it seems evident that if the only way to bring God and man together is by "relocation" the substantial uniqueness of one or the other must be done away. To use Fairchild's distinction, either God makes man or man makes God. That is, assuming that authority in existence must be seen as some kind of territorial prerogative, the ultimate question was whether God or man owned the universe, the other being interloper or creature really slave to the master, though attempting to assert squatter's rights. Either way, truth is the definition of the true cosmic pecking-order. One way to understand the new relational ontology is to see it as an attempt to escape the limitations of the substance image--to find a "place" that is both "here" and "there."[137]

But the assumption of a "ground" (re-enter the spatial image) of identity between subject and object, the conception that reality lay in the communion of the two, meant that the relationship between God and his creation was, rightly, one of communion.[138] Positing man's freedom to deny that communion[139] (though the denial of it was,

in one sense, to set up an illusion as reality), this concept placed the dualism anew in the two ultimate choices open to man--to live in a joyful acquiescence in that communion, in hope of its ultimate (re-enter the temporal image) perfection, or to reject the communion and try to build a reality on the spurious security of "man-ground" or "God-ground." For that security is illusion; for all its apparent logical finality, which logic itself will finally overthrow, it is a misconception of the human condition. By this failure both of the authoritarian schemes the traditional dualism kept lapsing into--call them Ebionism and Gnosticism, to choose one pair of names by which the abiding problem has defined itself--are condemned.[140] Both are really rejections of the calling to live by faith[141]--which is conceived by this group of men as the willing acceptance with heart, mind, and will of the life of communion with God.[142] Religion itself could be the most blasphemous flight from that communion.[143] Evil is grounded in man's refusal to live in such a communion[144]--a little more accurately, the great human failure, of which all moral lapses and all defections from right worship, right perception, right casuistry, were manifestations and consequences,[145] was not to desire to be at one with his Father. It is, finally, a failure to be man, since to be man is to center oneself in the motive he holds in common with God.[146] Similarly, God himself is--not at error, to be sure, since His love toward man is a constant--but incomplete until man responds as the objective manifestation of the great Subject.[147]

The Christian life, so conceived, is in its essence a creative response to the calling toward a more fully realized communion.

Quantitatively considered, of course, man can not at all approach the life of God. His failure there is the failure of an attempt to compile enough virtuous acts or devotional exercises to add up to the infinite nature of God. In another sense, man cannot approach the quality of God's life, since God is the perfect realization of what man impurely and inaptly and without diligence strives to realize in his own life. Yet there is a sense in which the true life of man is at one with the life of God, if the meaning of Christianity is that man is called to respond in love as God proffers in love. In the fact of response itself is the correlative of the fact of the proffering; there, in the congruence of motive and will, man and God are at one. No one can be persuaded to such a response by logical argument; the motive cannot be communicated, except by the process of personal empathy, identification, with one who has made the same commitment. No subjective self-magnification nor self-immolation can call that motive into being, but only the objective realization of an inherent motive to sonship which one cannot however even know is in him until it finds its adequate correlative as object.[148] But, contrarily, no objective form can work this transformation, can clarify the meaning of a man to himself, that has not a ground of identity with the subject.[149] Only as a man sees that he both <u>is</u> and <u>is not</u> Christ can he be set in the way of sonship.[150]

Practically considered, this relationship in communion means that man is to live in a spirit of love and trust. He must abandon that conception of life, traditionally considered religious, wherein

he attempts to curry favors or win a special justification. He must likewise abandon the false security of necessary demonstrations; for could God be mastered so, man's own self-assertion, secured by his sense of having met the religious definition, would simply rise above it and become tyrant over it.[151] The life of communion itself, lamentably, might be undertaken with an intent to justify the soul, or as the initiation exercise one must undergo in order to have the prestige and privilege of an elite group; but if so, the creative Christian calling has been subverted. It has returned to a scheme of legalism, all the more capable of atrocity and the more enslaving because the more sophisticated. And once more, in trying to save one's life so, he loses it. For the believer has (perhaps unwittingly) allowed to re-enter the concept of God as tyrant, the concept of life as a static legal or logical game. The same failure, precisely, is at work in the misreading of Christian freedom as license--where the rules of the game are simply inverted. Against all such defection from the calling to be "perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect" man must pit all his resources for genuine engagement with the freedom his Father has given him--not to sell himself into a slavery again but to choose consciously and fervently the way in which he can be a son of his Father. Thus only can the camel go through the needle's eye, by abandoning claims to justification by having met a set of conditions. Man can not justify himself, either by works of "charity" or by rigid obedience to moral schemes or by blind subscription to a set of propositions. All these activities, good

perhaps, were wrong in the ultimate sense if they did not spring out of a loving response to love.[152] For God was not to be considered as, most essentially, one who enforced rules and laid down requirements, the meeting of which entitled man to be loved and favored; rather God was one who loved and favored, and set up law to guide man into recognition of that love, where he might in freedom make his own existential response to that love and so bring it into fulfilment.[153] Love could not exist upon compulsion, but only in freedom; yet it could not be given by man, try as he might, until he had experienced love from another.[154] The object of love could then find within himself the subjective reality of love. (The point here is not the quibble of which must be prior, the external impulse of love or the subjective response of love; but rather, that both are necessary for the communion of love, which is the coalescence of subject and object.)

Moreover, this communion of love must be experiential in the fullest sense of the word. The love that was revealed could not be conceived merely as intellectual bent or necessary disposition (since, appealing to the Understanding only, it would find its subjective counterpart only in a mental process); nor could it be envisioned as merely a disposition of good nature (since the subjective response, once again, would not be from the whole man).[155] If the participation by man in the communion were only partial, that would mean that it was an act of tyranny he exercised over himself. Only the response of the whole man could be an act in freedom, and only so could it be an act of love. What God wants,

then, is this state of at-one-ment between Himself and man; and as consequence, what God proffers man is His own love as grace, assuring man of acceptance; and also (which is inseparable from that proffering) a guidance, a law, a help through the teachings of his revelation of Himself, so that man by response to these may at last take on his true, intended nature.[156] But that desire of God cannot be enforced, either by ontological schemes of necessity[157] or by bribes and threats; for such an enforced response is the exact opposite of what is desired. Hence God himself is not able to bring man into that communion when man does not elect it in freedom.

The State of Salvation

Salvation in such a reading of Christianity will be far removed from traditional conceptions. It is especially to be distinguished from the popular notion of salvation as attaining to the right of a never-ending bliss as opposed to a never-ending torment. The prudential motive operative in such a conception, and appealed to unashamedly by all the followers of Paley, by Evangelicals most blatantly but also by High Church, sectarian, and Catholic practice, was at its root a defection from the Christian calling and a cheapening of the Gospel's presentation of the state of blessedness.[158] Believing this, the men we are considering often found themselves in a position neither "religious" nor "irreligious" and frustratingly unable to communicate with people who kept insisting they must be one or the other. The problem as it related to the nature of salvation, for example, can be illustrated by their redefinition of "eternal life." Coleridge, Hare, Erskine and others are at work on this

redefinition from the 1820's on; but the case is best illustrated by Maurice, for there it occasioned a rather spectacular confrontation that eventuated in Maurice's removal from King's College. For Maurice, as for these others, [159] eternal life was the life lived in organic unity with the life of God. As such, it was not to be thought of as merely quantitatively unending. Neither assertions nor denials, indeed no speculations in terms of duration are justified. Such speculations do not comprehend the insight that time and place were being employed as symbols of a real which indeed we could not conceive except in terms of such symbols. The very attempts to escape these categories were doomed to be merely verbal negations or hyperboles--eternal, unending, everlasting, infinite, etc.--and yet such attempts were to be taken to mean that the eternal defined time, not time eternity. At the same time, this eternal was not conceived as being exclusively dissociate from time--it being just the gospel, that the eternal had met the world of time and place in those terms, absorbing and inhabiting them as symbols of itself--that, as Blake's "Proberbs of Hell" put it, "The works of eternity are in love with the works of time." In a letter to F. J. A. Hort of Nov. 23, 1849, Maurice set out his own reconstruction of eternal life, eternal reward, eternal punishment--a reconstruction he was to expand in the Theological Essays:

> The starting point of the Gospel, as I read it, is the absolute love of God; the reward of the Gospel is the knowledge of that love. . . . A rebel state of will, at war with God, is the highest, completest misery. . . . We suppose they do not mean that eternal life is the knowledge of God, but only that those who obtain that knowledge or that life will retain it through eternity. . . . Our Lord has been training us by His beautiful, blessed teaching to see eternity as

> something altogether out of time, to connect it with Him who is, and was, and is to come. He has been teaching me that I have a spirit which cannot rest in time, which must strive after the living, the permanent, the eternal, after God himself. . . . How dare I then depart from His own definition. How dare I impute my own low meaning of "eternal" to Him, and read myself into His words, when He is raising me to another meaning infinitely more accordant with the witness of my conscience. . . .[160]

It is probably superfluous at this point to say that the eternal life was not merely, nor as first principle, the moral life, though morality was (God being good) the fruit of that eternal life, the natural and organic manifestation of that eternal life.[161] In such a way the abhorrence of moralistic schemes of Christianity must be read--not as rejections of morality, not as attempts by negative means to exalt creed, not as priority of "believing" over "doing," "faith" over "works"[162]--but rather as the sad recognition that such schemes, alone, are attempts to grow fruit from a lifeless vine.[163] The clearest statement of this point is perhaps Erskine's little treatise "The Spiritual Order," written it would appear in objection to Renan's treatment of Christ. Renan, he says, "knew nothing of Christianity but its beautiful morality and its miraculous pretensions. The first he could and did admire. . . . The last appeared to him simply a manifestation of the ignorance and prejudice of the period."[164] But in Jesus' "self-preaching" and "visionary personal pretensions," as Renan put it, lay the dynamic reconciliation of obedience and love, of the moral command and the motive that was to animate it, without which the kind of morality preached by Christianity was not possible. "The preceptive teaching of the Sermon on the Mount cannot be obeyed by mere effort, however sincere and however earnest, because it requires

something more than the repression of evil actions and the performance of good actions. . . it requires inward humility, inward purity, inward love of God and of men, even of our enemies."[165] Yet this rightness of heart can only come through the experience of and dependence on "self-sacrificing love on the part of God, . . . the only sufficient ground of that absolute trust which lies at the root of the Christian character; and I believe that it is only in the history of Jesus, taken in connection with these supernatural claims [to be the Son of God], that this self-sacrificing love is fully declared. . . ."[166] In such a sense Hallam quotes approvingly,

> Talk of morality! Thou bleeding Lamb.
> The true morality is love to Thee.[167]

Similarly, salvation is not to be thought of as the negation of God's justice. To conceive the purpose of God and hence the nature of man's hope as a kind of abdication of his righteousness on God's part, a neglecting or desisting of the abhorrence of sin, was particularly appalling to these men.[168] Rather, to respond to God's love in like love caused the same abhorrence in man toward his own sin and that of mankind, as God felt toward that sin[169]--and for the same reason, that it blighted man's intended fulfilment in his communion with God, and, as a vicious counter to God's love and righteousness, wounded and frustrated his fellow man and hindered his fulfilment as well. Man began his pilgrimage with the acknowledgement of God's judgment upon him as right; and man and God were then co-laborers in the task of his growing into fulness of the stature of Christ. In the desire that God should decline from His abhorrence of sin lies the ultimate subversion of that Christian motive,

for it places the preservation of the sinful nature above the calling to Christhood. Moreover, it once again misreads the motive of God, first in conceiving his justice as penal rather than redemptive, and thus, second, by mistrusting His love toward man. This is a hard doctrine, not understandable or possible to embrace without recourse to that ground trust in God's revelation of his loving motive toward man.[170] Below we will undertake a further examination of the objections these men held toward the traditional concept of substitutionary atonement, which will help to clarify this present point.

The Universalist Tendency of This Orientation

It will be easily seen that such a concept of salvation will tend likewise to deny limited concepts of election--at least the kind of limitation set up by the Calvinistic tradition or that formulistic exclusiveness so ingrained in both Catholic and Evangelical tradition. There is perhaps no question on which these men, particularly Erskine[171] and (following his lead) Campbell and Maurice, so agonized. For the concept here sketched out of God's intent toward men makes it crucial that the calling be extended to all men, not merely those blessed by historical accident or cultural advantage; and the christology added another inherent rationale to the same effect, as will be seen. Yet to the traditional way of thinking, at least, to open so wide the gates of paradise was to detract dangerously from the special efficacy of historical Christianity, and hence to surrender all argument from authority. It may be argued that no adequate answer to this difficulty is found in the work of our

apologists; but in the full statement of their position, and given their basic faith, the charge looks much less devastating than first appears. To the objection that historical Christianity must be considered the uniquely correct revelation whereas all other religions are consequently erroneous, the response is to abandon the exclusive categorizations and assume the inherent truth in all religions, only adequately embodied however in the meaning of the person of Jesus. It will be at once recognized that the germ of this idea was present in the "natural religion" of deism, and that Butler had attempted a similar reconciliation. Deism, however, had made its arguments by pointing our similarities of precept and allowed (or denied) to Christianity a speciality in its "positive" demands--special intellectual or devotional requirements set up as added duties, which were to lend, supposedly, a morally more effective reverence for these precepts. These men, by contrast, conceiving of religion as a way man defined his place in existence, saw the common validity in the efficacy of these religions to show man this place truly and to inspire him to an acceptance of it. Seen so, the various religions become modes of presenting this reality, each with some elucidation of it, all however partial in their revelations and in the manner of presentation of them and (because of their partial nature being not perceived or admitted) subject to capture by essentially irreligious constructions. The special validity of Christianity consists in its power to resist such limitation--in spite of the historical distortions men have wrought on it by not attending its essential meaning, it has found (i. e., been given) the

ultimate form for the revelation, and therefore its presentation of the ultimate meaning of all the insights the other religions imperfectly embody fulfills them all. Such is the thesis of Maurice's Religions of the World, for example, and R. C. Trench's Christ the Desire of All Nations.[172] God's intent toward man has been omnipresent, then, and has in all religions accommodated itself to the condition of the adherents; not that God rests content in such limitation, nor that man should, but that grace, to be grace, must be relative to where man is. And may be met in response by man there--though if genuinely met will call man out from that limitation and set him on his way. The more efficacious revelation of Christianity proper is not to be conceived, then, as a legal device by which most of the world and all of it before a certain historical event may be consigned to damnation, in order that we the blessed may be safely consigned to an opposite blessed state; but as a further challenge, a higher accommodation, that comes not to destroy but to fulfill.

To the similar objection that by their "universalism" these men have eroded the speciality of Christianity, in that nobody's being denied election makes nobody capable of the special blessing and therefore renders the term meaningless--to this objection they sometimes address themselves, but (it would appear) without much success in communication or persuasion. Where Irving, Campbell, A. J. Scott, Erskine and Maurice have failed, it is almost presumption to make the attempt. But first, it may be answered that the objection is only crucial, only meaningful, in a legalistic context. Why is the question being asked? Why is it necessary to have goats in

order that sheep may be called sheep? Because in a legalistic scheme, where the motive is self-justification, there must be the kind of dualism that allows a secure dissociation, and some must be conceived as occupying that position in order for the dissociation to be felt as real. The effects of the exclusive concept of the relationship of God and man may be observed here. So much for the main point--and it is the main point, not to be detracted from by the second. For, secondly, it is not true, even in a legalistic sense, that the universalism of Erskine and Maurice and their colleagues brings all, automatically, into a state of salvation. Rather salvation turns upon the response of man in confrontation with religious reality--universally proffered, absolute in the fact and nature of its challenge but relative in the form it subjectively assumes, relative to powers and environment; calling for Godwardness by empathetic identification into the role of Christ, but leaving each in freedom to create the good according to the media he has at hand.[173] But that response may be rejection; a man may refuse to be.[174] The universalism of Maurice and Erskine and Campbell turns out to be, in its own way, exclusive--though no intent of exclusiveness could be legitimately inferred from that fact. Rather it excludes simply because it puts the distinction precisely in man's choice--the only place it can be put that does not deprive man of responsible creative morality.[175]

The Nature of Atonement

But perhaps there is no issue on which these men found themselves so radically at odds with their time, or one on which they had more difficulty

communicating, or one more enlightening for an understanding of their essential position, than their quarrel with the traditional concept of substitutionary atonement. It is hardly possible to see their position clearly without reference to the concept of atonement they would put in its place, and that reference would bring us immediately into christology as such; but first, let us go negatively at the issue and define what in the traditional concept they objected against. The traditional concept of substitution, drawn primarily from metaphors for salvation in the New Testament, conceived the sufferings and death of Jesus as a punishment exacted, a debt paid to the justice of God. Man's sin being infinite, an infinite reprisal must be taken, under the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Man found himself, then, under the burden of Adam's sin and his own, charged with crimes against God for which not even his life, perhaps not even his eternal destiny, was adequate forfeit: "charged with a debt he never did contract, and could not answer," as Fitzgerald's Rubaiyat put the case. But in this hopeless extremity, God himself had worked out the legal difficulties: like the officer in Kafka's "In the Penal Colony," he put himself on the cross in man's place, executed himself in the person of His Son (through the convenient medium of Judas and the Jews), in order that the infinite justice and holiness of God might not have to be compromised. In the early years of Christianity the debt was considered as owed to the devil; but the horror of God's paying the life of His Son to such a creditor forced a re-interpretation, and it was then conceived to be the justice of God that was satisfied by the payment.

It is superfluous to point out how deeply this view of the meaning of Jesus' passion was, and is, ingrained in Christianity. It will be observed that the scheme is logically supported by, and logically supports, the view of the substantially discrete natures of God and man; and the heresies which have been spun off from various wrestlings with the doctrine reflect, in turn, the difficulties of that dualism.

The objections of the group here being studied to this scheme are manifold, but they fall generally under three heads. (1) The concept is basically legalistic, and pulls Christianity back into that travesty of Judaism, that barren formula, which by the blood of goats and rams hopes magically to maneuver, escape--not satisfy--the feared wrath of the god. The distinction is that which in 1831 John McLeod Campbell tried to make to the Scottish Kirk in his trial for heterodoxy on the point of universal pardon. "The pardon of sin may be understood to mean either an act of indemnity to the sinner, giving him security from all the consequences of having sinned against God, irrespective of any condition as to moral character; or as the act of God in receiving back to the bosom of His love the returning sinner; or thirdly, as the removing the judicial barrier which guilt interposes between the sinner and God; so making the fact of being a sinner no hindrance to his coming to God, as to a reconciled Father."[176] The doctrine in question conceived of pardon in the first sense; the Kirk, who held this concept, judged Campbell's universalism to mean that all were so pardoned. But in that sense, Campbell considered pardon "not the portion of all, but, in fact, . . . not the portion of any."[177] Years later, his belabored <u>The Nature of the Atonement and its Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life</u> elucidated in great

detail how such a mechanical concept of pardon subverted the real meaning of the atonement. He explained, for instance, the distinction between imputed and imparted righteousness:

> . . .The choice being offered, on the one hand, to partake in this divine righteousness, or, on the other, either to have it imputed to us, and on account of such imputation, to have a title to any supposed rewards of righteousness, or to have these rewards without such imputation transferred to us, there could be no hesitation what choice to make. . . .
>
> I may be reminded, that the reward of righteousness, thus placed in contrast with the divine righteousness itself . . . includes spiritual benefits. . .; and that this in effect is a participation in the mind and life of Christ, and might be spoken of as substantially righteousness imparted, . . . and although this is a complication altogether foreign to the simplicity that is in Christ, I thankfully recognise the degree to which the elements of righteousness . . . may be the objects of spiritual desire . . . .
>
> But a righteousness imparted as that to which a right has been conferred by a righteousness imputed . . . the testimony of God, that God has given to us eternal life . . . never could suggest. Its natural effect is to turn the mind away, . . from the direct contemplation of eternal life as the salvation given in Christ.[178]

Erskine explains more simply in <u>The Brazen Serpent</u> (published the year of Campbell's trial) the failure of a concept of the atonement as merely penal:

> But it is not possible that any degree of mere suffering under a penalty, can at all tend to remove God's disapprobation against the sinner who had incurred it, much less is it possible, that it should be a reason of showing favour to the sinner who had endured it. Sufferings sustained, not in the spirit of love, but in the spirit of murmuring, or fear, or hatred, are continually adding to the guilt, instead of exhausting the penalty. Were a man to suffer without either evil feelings or good, he could not even in that way exhaust a just penalty, for even then he would be breaking the law which requires a <u>positive</u> obedience; but assuredly, we never could suppose him in such a way acquiring any claim to favour and approbation.[179]

So that: "It is not something merely on the <u>outside</u> of the man, like a pardon, which will fit him to meet that day--it must be something

inside, something which enters into his inmost heart, and produces there a character conformed to the will of God."[180]

(2) The doctrine misconceives and misrepresents the nature of God and his motive toward man. As early as 1821[181] Erskine was beginning to doubt that the concept of pardon as commutation was scriptural. He became convinced that the doctrine as popularly held was a travesty, since it put an unrighteous character upon God: "I am aware that the doctrine of expiation through the vicarious death of Christ is sacred and precious to the hearts of many, nevertheless I am compelled to regard it as a human invention opposed to the true character of God. Christianity reveals God as a Father whose purpose is to train His children into a participation of the spirit and character of His Son. The 'justification' therefore or vindication of His dealings towards us is not the assurance that the claims of justice have been satisfied before He shows mercy, but in the discovery of this gracious purpose in those dealings, and in their fitness to accomplish it."[182] God's purpose is man's righteousness, not merely man's acquittal; but the accepted concept of pardon, rather, simply sets up a condition for man to meet, and makes his trial against this condition a mere end in itself, and makes God merely a vindictive supervisor of this trial.

> . . . I ask whether God has not a purpose to serve by all this trial beyond that of merely testing us? And if He has, ought not the whole process to take its name from that purpose rather than from the means by which it is attained?
>
> . . .Is He not saying to us, I have created you to be My Children. . .and I have given you capacities conformable to this high calling. . . .
>
> No education can go on without trial; but we are tried that we may be educated, not educated that we may be tried.

> It is manifest that these two views of human life are in principle opposed to each other, and lead to opposing conceptions of the character of God and of the relation in which we stand to Him.
>
> If therefore I come to the conclusion that I am here simply on trial, if I regard God as One who is keeping, as it were, a debtor and creditor account with me, and who will deal with me according to that account, I may in word call Him Father and in word ascribe love to Him, but I cannot really regard Him as a Father, nor trust in His love, nor feel myself safe in His hands.
>
> This idea of probation corresponds exactly to the idea of Law which occupies so large a space in the epistles of St. Paul, and which is by him contrasted with the idea of Gospel. It narrows our conception of all we have to look for from God to strict impartiality; so that any hope of a favourable judgment from Him must necessarily rest on the estimate we form of our own obedience--our own conformity to the standard of the law.[183]

At best, as Campbell more mildly put the problem, the doctrine of election as propounded by Jonathan Edwards, say, made inconsistent the claim of Christianity, of Jesus, to reveal God to man--since an arbitrary act, or one we are not allowed to see as more than arbitrary, could never reveal character.[184]

(3) As a consequence, then, Christianity based on such a concept of pardon and such an understanding of God becomes the occasion for the exact opposite of the effects it claims--is captured by ungodly motives, by self-righteousness and spite toward the outsider (which may mask itself as zeal or pity), by fear and insecurity toward God that enervates trust.

> . . . So long as the idea of probation is retained, it robs even the Gospel of its healing virtue, suggesting, as it does, that this revelation brings no unconditional blessing but only varies the form of our trial,--the final answer being now suspended, not indeed on perfect obedience, but on the answer to the question, Are you a believer? thus forcing us to seek our confidence, not in the Father's forgiving love revealed in the gift of His Son, but in our performance of the task of believing; an undefinable task which no man, whilst thus contemplating it, ever knows whether he has accomplished or not.

> [This view] almost necessitates a self-justifying spirit, and . . . suggests the wish that the standard of righteousness were lowered. Then again, it tends to make us more occupied with the consequences of sin than with its moral evil--with the thought how we may escape punishment, rather than with the hope of becoming righteous. Hence also the life and death of Christ have come to be regarded rather as a propitiation to Divine justice through which mercy may be extended to the guilty, than as a manifestation of that righteousness which God desires to see in us, and of His own righteous love, which, whilst it never ceases to condemn our sin, can never cease to seek our deliverance from sin.
>
> We may conclude then that the conception of our relation to God, as interpreted by the idea of probation, is actually opposed to the spirit of Christianity. . . .[185]

Similarly, Trench complains that this legalistic concept of atonement causes the Incarnation to be "considered in the main as a makeshift for bringing God in contact with man"[186] and "when the Incarnation is thus slighted, it follows of necessity, that man as man is thought meanly of . . . ."[187] Maurice feels that when such a man-made scheme of reconciliation supplants the true one, so that the granting of salvation may be regulated by man's conditions, "all superstitions, all Moloch cruelties, will reproduce themselves; and you will try your natural incantations against them in vain."[188]

Against the legalism of this scheme, against the emphasis on ritual or subscription as the implement of exclusivism, nothing less is required than another vision of the purpose of God and the nature of Christianity. God's motive being man's redemption, his righteousness, and not merely his acquittal, and man's part being a trust and love which reformed the heart by empathetic identification into the nature of God, the basic need was clearly the fullest possible revelation of the nature of God compatible with man's capacity to experience that revelation.[189] Nor should that revelation be forwarded by means of

threat, and so clouded by an appeal to impure motive. The ground truth, the point of reference for Christianity must be that God loves His creation, not that He sent His Son into the world to condemn the world. God was, according to Christ, a Father; He was Lawgiver only in that context, with the purpose of leading man in sonship.[190]

It follows then that the meaning of Christ's revelation was that salvation had been not only universally extended but actually given, so far as God's act in the communion extended. "There can be no greater delusion," says Erskine, "than to regard the forgiving love, as a future thing, as an object of hope--for thus the key to our whole provision of life and strength is thrown away. Faith in the forgiving love of God, as already bestowed on us in Christ Jesus, is the only key to our provision. And if this love is not our's [sic] now, how are we to get it? The bible [sic] does not tell us how; the whole bible rests on the ground of a love already bestowed. It was forgiving love that gave the bible."[191] Salvation must indeed be particular, but particular claims to salvation could only be grounded in the universality of God's love, though the fact of that universality alone was the basis of salvation, consummated for man in his own response in love. But "the free, undeserved, and general love of God to the world, to the sinful family of Adam, is the true ground on which each individual of our race must rest. I know no other and see no other in the Bible. The particular love is manifested in revealing to each individual the knowledge of the general love; but it is not on the particular revelation that a man can or ought to rest--it is on the general love thus revealed to him."[192]

The Centrality of the Incarnation and the Organic Relationship of Incarnation and Atonement

Further, this meant that if the atonement was to be seen as more than merely a judicial device, it would have to be interpreted in the light of the nature and meaning of the Incarnation. If atonement meant a genuine reconciliation of God and man and not merely a forensic one, it had to rest utterly on the revelation of God in the Incarnation; not because (or not only because) it was thus authoritative, but because only so could it be educative toward that high calling of man which it was the purpose of the phenomenon of Jesus to enunciate and effect.[193]

But the meaning of the Incarnation did not stop with the revelation of the nature of God. It showed also the nature of man in the state of fulfilled communion. It showed man atoned--that is, made at one with God--in the person of Jesus.[194] To understand this rightly, as more than mere theological formula, we will need to remember the religious application of that ground ontology, that the real lay in the coalescence of subject and object. Christ is indeed the objective realization of God as subject; in objectifying the Father's love and showing that love back to the Father, He fulfills the being of God, and so is the completion of the unity of God. But He is also the object of man the subject, as He shows man the true self he is; and again He is man as subject, identifying into the human role and evidencing that identification in His life, suffering and passion. Christ as object becomes the symbol by which both God and man are defined. Christ as subject becomes the love of God expressed to man and the love of man

expressed to God.[195] He is thus the ultimate reconciliation, the comprehensive symbol of the real in creation, and of the limited and erratic confronted with and converted to the real. It is easy to lose hold of how completely this view of the Incarnation reconstructed religious beliefs for these men; but to lose hold means, for the student of literature say, to misread Tennyson and Browning, I think, as apologists for traditional, Paleyesque Evangelicalism.

It may help to secure the distinction from traditional patterns and still add to a clarification of the new concept of atonement, to consider what this understanding of Christ does to the idea of Jesus as sacrifice, as Lamb of God. It is natural and traditional to take that title to mean, the one the spilling of whose blood perfectly appeased the wrath of God, and bought off His condemnation of sin. Coleridge attempted, in Aids to Reflection, to soften the legalistic consequences of this definition of Jesus by explaining that "sacrifice" was merely one of the biblical metaphors for the function of Jesus. Maurice objects that Jesus was indeed sacrifice in the fullest sense of the term. It may be noted in passing that the difference here is primarily semantic; Coleridge's position and that of Maurice, so far as they understand the function of Jesus, are essentially the same. But Maurice finds in the concept of Jesus as sacrifice an idea centrally significant, biblically based in obvious New Testament likenings of Christ to the Old Testament sacrifices, particularly to the Passover lamb. But how can the Lamb's taking away the sins of the world be anything but appeasement of wrath? How can its function be organic to the believer, not merely the magical interposition of some-

thing external to him?

Why, by reviewing the time-honored concept of the nature and function of sacrifice in light of the Incarnation, that is in light of the redefined motive of God. If the death of Jesus was the perfect sacrifice--that is, sacrifice in the ultimate manifestation of its meaning--it was surely erroneous to put upon His death the limited definition of sacrifice abstracted from the pitiable, purblind attempts to approximate it; rather the meaning of His sacrifice ought to clarify those attempts. It is "the sacrifice which contains in itself the fulness of that idea to which other sacrifices were but dimly and variably pointing, and after which their offerers were more or less consciously craving."[196]

That idea is certainly not the mere appeasing of God's wrath, but, as Maurice explains elsewhere, "that each man might offer himself to God as a reasonable, holy, accepted sacrifice."[197] The point of sacrifice, when rightly offered, is to bring a gift to God:

> But gift to God! What is, what can be a gift to Him! That which we can buy with our gold, that which we can seize with our hands, that which we can bring to an altar, that which we can solemnly offer there, is surely no gift to Him. Even to a heathen deity I suppose it was felt that such could be no gifts; that they could only pass for such by a strong effort of the symbolizing imagination. And much more must the same have been felt when the object of worship was the Unseen Jehovah. And yet the symbolization was necessary, unavoidable. As the bended knee to the energy of prayer, so were the material gift and its oblation to that surrender of the worshipper to the infinitely holy Will that he worshipped, which is sacrifice. But it is a sacrifice which man fails to render.[198]

What the heathen was trying to do, what the Jew of the Old Testament was trying to do, what all imperfect Christians are trying to do, insofar as these offer sacrifice properly named at all, is really to

give themselves--though they may not understand their act as such.[199] But since they conceived God as tyrant, or at best one who could be maneuvered by the gift, the true motive of sacrifice was subverted so long as the motive of God was so imperfectly understood. Nor could an ultimate sacrifice be conceived except in terms of destruction of one's life--which however, under extreme compulsion, was not stopped short of. Moreover the object of sacrifice could only rightly be termed sacrifice insofar as it could stand as symbol of the self that they were attempting to give. And since only man himself is an adequate symbol of man, the blood of goats could not serve, nor even the blood of Isaac.

> At last comes One in whom the matter of the oblation and the form are united; Whose gift is the inward essential sacrifice; Who said, Lo! I come to do Thy Will. And He does it perfectly. The gift of His own Will and of His own Being to the Will of His Father is entire and flawless. There is no point at which the offerer pauses. The self-surrender stays not till the very life has been offered. The obedience is carried on until it becomes an obedience unto death. Short of that point, the sacrifice would not have been complete; there would have been something kept back. But all is complete; nothing is kept back; all faith in and all love to the Eternal Father, all sympathy with the brethren, receive their full expression in the sacrifice which began with the utterance, Lo! I come! and was consummated when Jesus bows His head and gave up the ghost. In gazing on that, we are gazing on the Only Gift ever offered to God which, for its own sake, God could regard with complacency; in which, for its own sake, God could take delight.[200]

It was the gift of Himself that pleased God, not the magnitude of a punishment exacted.[201]

Indeed, to this insight concerning the nature of sacrifice an understanding of the nature of Jesus' suffering must be owing, not to the penal scheme. The suffering of Christ is God's suffering--not because, in mechanical theological argument, Christ is merely asserted

to be of divine authority and then this doctrine is argued as a logical consequence; but if we once accept in faith that God loves man, as the life and teachings of Jesus assert, no other readings of that suffering are consistent with that assigned motive; the suffering, viewed as God's suffering, becomes the ultimate correlative of that motive in confrontation with the fact of man's sin, in participation in the human condition. In this sense it is expiatory, propitiatory.[202] Through the obscurities of Campbell's prose, this doctrine labors to express itself:

> The entrance of sin has been the entrance of sorrow,--not to the sinful only, and as the punishment of sin, but also to the holy and the loving, and as what holiness and love must feel in the presence of sin. That such suffering as the suffering of Christ should have existed in the universe of God in connexion with innocence and holiness, moral and spiritual perfection, must, indeed, be felt to suggest a solemn question, and one which must receive an answer, if we are to be in a condition to glorify God in contemplating that suffering. The answer that it was penal, is precluded by the nature of the suffering itself. Yet, that it was for sin is also implied in that very nature, and for the sin of others than the sufferer, for He was without sin; therefore was it vicarious, expiatory, an atonement,--an atonement for sin as distinguished from the punishment of sin.
>
> And with this distinction, how much light enters the mind! We are now able to realize that the suffering we contemplate is divine, while it is human; and that God is revealed in it and not merely in connexion with it; God's righteousness and condemnation of sin, being in the suffering, and not merely what demands it,--God's love also being in the suffering, and not merely what submits to it. Christ's suffering being thus to us a form which the divine life in Christ took in connexion with the circumstances in which He was placed, and not a penal infliction, coming on Him as from without, such words as "He made His soul an offering for sin"--"He put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself,"--"By Himself He purged our sins," grow full of light; and the connexion between what He is who makes atonement, and the atonement which He makes, reveals itself in a far other way than as men have spoken of the divinity of the Saviour regarding it either as a strength to endure infinite penal suffering, or a dignity to give adequacy of value to any measure of penal

> suffering however small. Not in these ways, but in a far other way, is the person of Christ brought before us now as fixing attention upon the divine mind in humanity as that which alone could suffer, and which did suffer sufferings of a nature and virtue to purge our sins.[203]

Where, then, does this leave man? In what sense is the suffering human suffering? What does the gift of Jesus to God effect for men, if it cannot be simply held fictionally to have been our gift? It must be in Jesus' being essentially and organically identified with true human nature, and in that nature realizing the will of God. This is the point Sterling was struggling to clarify when, objecting to substitutionary atonement, he yet hoped the doctrine might be meaningful once it was comprehended in terms of the "headship" of Christ.[204] This is what Edward Irving maintained so tenaciously against the Scottish Kirk, that only as Jesus was conceived in human terms, "tempted in all parts even as we are," could our salvation be asserted (not because only so could we be sure of legal inclusion, but because only so could His life be the symbol ours was striving to realize).[205] The further implications of this assumption of a ground identity in Christ for all men must be considered shortly; that it is essential to the process of the atonement as here described is obvious. It is necessary that Jesus identify essentially, not merely formally, into the human condition; else He could be no ground for our being, He could never be to us the objective manifestation of our true nature. The imperative He presents to our natures would be not an invitation to hope we might offer up an offering in righteousness, but "a cruel mockery."[206] Just as, to use Sterling's presentation of the epistemological problem, we can never know anything in existence except as there is an identity between it

and ourselves, analagously we can never participate in His perfect sacrifice to the Father if He is not at one with us--not in mere external, accidental nature but in the very essence of what we are.

But given that identity, the nature of the atonement becomes clear. In Christ we behold ourselves in right communion with the Father; and from our profound experience of ourselves in that relation, we draw the form, the motive, the hope and the very life that reorients the self to its true center, if we choose the light rather than the darkness. Nor is this magic, but the natural organic response of life to light and sustenance, expressed in its ultimate function. The idea, when more than mere formula, might seem blasphemous to those fearful of the sanctity of Jesus' uniqueness (since they secure that uniqueness by "substantial" exclusiveness from the human condition); but for these men, the atonement of Christ makes men sons of God. Let this be supported by Campbell's description of the way atonement effects men's salvation:

> These elements of our Lord's consciousness as the rays of the light of the life that was in Him, have that relation to us and our state, that, shining in us in faith, they necessarily reproduce themselves in us, that is, according to the measure of our faith; man and God, sin and holiness becoming to us in the light of Christ what that light reveals them to be, and the confession of sin and the choice of holiness, self-despair and trust in God, springing up in us: a confession of sin in unison with Christ's confession of our sins, a trust in God quickened by the faith of His trust in the Father on our behalf and laying hold on that in the Father's heart on which His intercession laid hold. The atonement thus through faith reproduces its own elements in us, we being raised to the fellowship of that to which Christ descended in working out our salvation.[207]

It is not hard to see why this idea, in the various expressions it received from these apologists, appalled the Kirk and the Establish-

ment. Starting with the assumption of exclusiveness, and building on that their concept of atonement and eternal reward, they could read this idea only one of two ways--either man had usurped the role of God, or God (at least Christ) had been dethroned and ensnared in the hopeless swinehood of mere humanism. Here is a paradigm of failure of communication between static system and dynamism.

But if, in this instance for example, belief in the humanity of Christ was thought to be degrading to Him, Campbell protested rather that

> I know that such thoughts of the relation of the human to the divine may be so entertained as to lower our conceptions of God, rather than to raise our conceptions of that to which God calls man; but that the latter, and not the former, ought to be their operation, is unquestionable. So of the atonement as now represented, if it has been a form which the eternal life took in Christ, a form determined by the nature of that life and the circumstances in which it was developed, it follows, that in the measure in which we partake in that eternal life, we shall partake in the atonement, and have it reproduced in us: though not with the same personal consciousness as in the Saviour, who, as I have said, came down in saving us to that to which in being saved we are raised. But so to conceive is surely not to have our conceptions of the atonement lowered, but only our conceptions of Christianity exalted.[208]

Trench asserts that "it is only man as fallen man, as separated by a wilful act of his own from God, to whom . . . shame and dishonour belong. In his first perfection, in the truth of his nature, he is the glory of God, the image of the Son, as the Son is the image of the Father, declaring the Son as the Son declared the Father. . . ."[209] But if one thought this definition of atonement mere sentimentalizing of the severity of Christianity so that its rigors might be escaped, he little understood the real demands one must assume in taking up his cross. Not only the life and joy of Christ, but its concomitant

(so long as man were imperfect), his suffering and death and sorrow, was to be man's portion. So Erskine explains what it means, in this view, that Jesus died "for" us:

> But although Christ's work is not substitutionary or, in the ordinary sense of the word, vicarious, still it is work done for man in a sense applicable to the work of no other human being. He does nothing instead of us--nothing, that is, to save us from doing it; he does things for us that we also may in him have power to do them. He did not die to save us from dying, but that we might, in the power of an endless life, die with him, that we might by partaking in his death--by surrendering our life as he did into the hand of the Father in loving confidence--be also partakers of his resurrection. . . . by his example giving guidance and encouragement to every child of man. And further, he did this not as an individual but as the Head of the race; thereby lifting all humanity along with himself up from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.[210]

The Impact of This Christology Demonstrated in Problems of Prophecy and Miracle

To think of Christ as the essence, the meaning, of every religious quest has some startling ramifications in terms of the old problems of prophecy and miracle. I shall not even try to unsnarl the question of priority here--how much the new understanding of Christ served as key to these problems, or how much the patient labor at these problems served to build a gestalt of the new concept of Christ; I do not think a simple or one-sided answer to the question would be forthcoming. For present purposes, it is more profitable to look at the nature of the pattern than to debate priorities. Briefly, the new concept of prophecy may be summarized as follows. We have seen how in Davidson's work the concept of prophecy as verbal prediction was changing to embrace two other components: the typological

prophecy, as ancient as biblical times, was being reintroduced to strengthen the case for prediction; and some of the prophecies were beginning to be seen as having a moral significance as well as a predictive one. What happened with the men we are now considering was, approximately, that typological prophecy and the "moral" (educative) nature of prophecy were seen, first, as having an organic relationship to one another, and second, as being the primary significance of prophecy. If we begin by considering the revelation in Christ as the ultimate expression toward which Old Testament revelations were tending, of which they were dim and partial images, and if to that idea we bring the new symbolic and organic definition of Christ's nature, as the objective manifestation of a ground unity in all existence and especially in man, we may adequately reconstruct their concept. For these insights mean, that Christhood is the state to which all true manhood aspires, and the men of old times who diligently sought the meaning of man's relationship to God must naturally have anticipated, in some ways and degrees, the ultimate manifestation in Christ.[211] This is the reason the prophecies, both verbal and typological, have whatever "predictive" validity they have: because they have tapped an ultimate truth, which, simply because it is ultimate, must manifest itself again when men once more seek with the same reverence, diligence and care, and respond from the freedom that hard-gained truth brings them. So that to the casually religious "He was wounded for our transgressions" may seem magically predictive, and to the casually irreligious not predictive at all; but he who knows experientially the nature and function of Christ perceives the prophecy's appropriateness and accepts its revelation as a signif-

icant commentary on the Word; and to him the question of magic is largely irrelevant, even idolatrous. At the same time, he does not rudely castigate the more limited perception, but tries to evoke a more thorough and careful and honest study of it, secure in the faith that the virility of the revelation can make even these bones live. The implications are obvious. Prophecy is a human name for a fact innate in existence. Its purpose is not to provide evidence for a demonstration, nor yet precisely to foretell events (though it may do both), but to yield from its inner life ever clearer and fuller analogy for the whole meaning and purpose of God, fully realized in Christ. This means, in turn, that it is relative in its form to time, place, and circumstance; so it must be read in organic relationships.[212] Yet it is one fact, tending to one expression, the Christ; and when this is denied, whenever a statement or incarnation of it claims ultimacy rather than witnessing to the nature of the source from which it sprang, the result is anarchy and degradation of its meaning; not only is the revelation of the Christ not communicated, but the rebel revelation, cut off from the source of life, becomes an incarnation of the way of death.[213] By contrast, the person of Christ, taken as key to all prophecy, gathered up in one life the "fulfillment"--the realized essential meaning--of all that was reaching toward that ultimacy, whether Jewish, heathen, or modern. In such a sense was prophecy fulfilled in Him.[214]

Similarly, in the face of the question of the miraculous, these apologists hold a position hard to define in terms of the traditional view. The religious had tended to take miracles as facts, employing them evidentially and later having to defend them on the same ground.

The attackers had generally assumed the same issue, since it provided them an excellent field position. The rationalists of the school of Paulus had tried to treat miracles objectively as history or false history or history salted with erroneous fact and perverse distortion. Now arises a group of men, too aware of criticism to hold to the literalistic tradition, too aware of the narrowness of rationalistic criticism to pursue the critical questions with the rationalists' assumptions, not particularly in need of "evidence" with which to argue the authority of Christianity. At the same time, they are men who have learned from Coleridge and Carlyle and the Germans the concept of symbol, have come to see not merely language but all patterns of human thought and action as symbol-making; particularly, from Strauss and O. Müller and especially from Niebuhr, perhaps equally from Thirlwall and Grote in their histories of Greece and from Hare in his presentation of the classics,[215] they have become aware of the nature and function of myth as a means for setting forth meaning in a form relative to cultural circumstance.[216] Consequently their address to miracle is largely to ignore the question of accuracy of detail, to leave the account relatively untouched by rationalistic questions; but assuming it to have had some reference to actual events, significant to engage the attention of the biblical writers, they grant the accounts the initial faith that infers an intent at communication. They are much more concerned with what is to be communicated; and here their concept of revelation as requiring the active engagement of a subjective response and an objective presentation gives them an approach to miracle which made it, like prophecy, not an evidence but

an insight to the Christ.[217] Whatever the factual details of the miracles, which were shrouded in mystery like the facts of ancient legend and so could never be determined conclusively,[218] the meaning of the miracles of Jesus, taken in context of his life and teachings, was available to any who would proceed with this initial faith. A miracle is an emblem of ultimate truth, therefore awesome and wondrous; a miracle is a poem of the creation, trying to give expression in a restricting medium to the intent and life that beat in the heart of the organism.[219]

It is hard to document, but my impression from their work is that the abundant yield they draw from this inductive approach lends confidence to their "faith in miracle" in the traditional sense of the terms. But with impressively few exceptions, they hold their explications of miracle firmly in the same syndrome from which these were derived; they refuse to employ the miraculous as argumentative device and they do not descend much into polemics about the "believability" of details. Yet they are meticulous students of the text given, in precisely the sense that one laboring to read a poem must give meticulous attention to the poet's technique, and for the same reasons.[220] By way of addendum, I would argue that this approach is significantly different from what is generally meant when the Victorians are accused of using the materials of scripture as mere occasion for subjective flights; or at least these men would believe it different, and would reject the charge with horror. I am not saying the Victorians are not rightly so accused; I merely wish to bring to the question an alternative possibility. For present purposes, the significant point is that the person of Christ has, in this instance also, become the interpretive symbol, which yet in turn is further enriched by such use.

It will be apparent that the symbol of Christ, so employed, might be called on to explicate the role, motive, or personality of numerous Old Testament characters. The practice was not altogether new, since from biblical times (e. g., throughout the gospel of Matthew) implied or explicit claims of identity between Jesus and the patriarchs were forwarded; the opening verses of John's gospel and Jesus' statement that "before Abraham was, I am" have encouraged such identifications throughout the history of Christianity. But, at least in the main line of tradition, these identifications had been turned to rather ulterior account; the patriarchs were predictive types of Jesus, it was urged, and the wonderable similarities were evidence of His authority. Moreover the need to preserve His substantial uniqueness, and the special category (really neither human nor divine) into which He was thus placed would have made any such essential identification as will be found in Erskine's work, for example, unthinkable. Likewise, the rationalistic tradition had been able to point up parallels between Christian precept or doctrine and other teachings. So Erskine's bald assertion that Christ was the author of the Psalms[221] would no doubt momentarily startle the traditional, but they might end by finding it only a slightly irregular statement of the common idea that David was a predictive type of the true King of the Jews and the true Shepherd. And Maurice's description of Aeschylus as a "thoroughly orthodox Christian" might be acceptable to the deistic Christians, or even the deists--though the former might find it a denigration of Christianity, the latter of Aeschylus. I think, however, the two statements are referrable to a common ground, and that both rest on the essential identity of Christ with all men, as Maurice and Erskine both found

that identity asserted in the incarnation and atonement. They have come out, once again, with the concept of Jesus as Logos; but in the process of rediscovery they have found it to mean that all men, all creation is to be grounded in the person of Jesus as the prototype and essence of creation,[222] not merely as the external authoritative representative of God, thrust by miraculous imposition upon the creation. The Old Testament prophets were Christ, in adumbration; their spirits were His spirit.

Christ as the Universal Symbol

In the same way, Christ is in every man, except him of a "reprobate mind," that is (as Erskine glosses the passage), the man who "does not make the true judgment. . . does not choose or like to retain in his knowledge, the truth concerning the manner of God's love to man."[223] The word that "is very nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart," "This is just Christ, the incarnate word in thee, the hope of glory, and the power of holiness."[224] His is not a role He plays in mere abstracted eternality; it is a role of Sonship, requiring its realization in the act of ultimate self-giving in order to be fulfilled. Thus it is a prototype realized in time as well as eternity, in the act of responsive love as well as in (as the expression of) His eternal status. Therefore is it to be trusted that we partake of the divine--the claim he makes for Himself is "a claim on behalf of every human being to be the child of God,"[225] for He is the "root and type and mould of our being."[226]

> In his Epistle to the Colossians the apostle sums up the gospel which he was commissioned to preach in these words, "Christ in you the hope of glory," and as we meditate on them we may discover that they not only contain a full gospel to man but in some sense, with reverence be it

> spoken, a gospel to God also, the indwelling presence of the Son in every man being to the Father's heart the hope of glory for every man.[227]

> Thus is Christ's trust the pattern of man's righteousness, not slavishly to copy but livingly to reproduce by the indwelling of his Spirit.[228]

> If we can really identify with Jesus of Nazareth that light within us which is ever calling us upward out of sin into righteousness we shall feel that he is our true Head and Representative on whom the Father always looks with perfect complacency, seeing in him the fulfilment of that which He desires to see in each one of us.[229]

> As he believed himself and all mankind to be included in Christ as their Head . . . he saw them standing in the same environment of grace that ever surrounded him [Christ].
>
> This I believe is the true meaning of the apostolical benediction with which St. Paul concludes his epistles. "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all," not the grace bestowed by Christ but the grace in which Christ himself stands, and of which the apostle elsewhere specifies the composing elements,--"the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit." By this interpretation we escape that infringement of the hierarchical order in the latter passage . . . .[230]

> Christ is the true law, being the personification of the righteous will of God which is ever seeking to reproduce itself in the hearts of all men, and actually accomplishing its object in so far as the love which gave Christ is apprehended.[231]

Moreover, if "eternal life" was the life lived in fulfilled communion with God, the life of Christ becomes the presentation of that spiritual condition. Quite obviously, Christ is not only the symbol of that principle of life from which all men sprang; He is also the symbol of that ultimate reconciliation, that realization of the true nature, to which man and nature are called. Christ as Alpha explicates the ground of man's being; Christ as Omega realizes what man is to become; and the two are one.[232]

This religious vision, then, as even so spotty an examination of its expression must have made evident, is christocentric in the most pervasive and basic sense. Every issue, every practice, comes down at last to what He was. It is safe to say, I think, that every quarrel with the traditionalists, every examination of accepted doctrine or practice, every complaint about the fetters of system or the barrenness of mere argument, take their origin, their animus, and their direction from a faith that in the person of Jesus, dynamically explicated in His life, acts, teachings and death, is a profundity of meaning, organic and creative in its nature, able to clarify and direct every religious encounter--and that this organic strength must not be belied, obscured, or confined, must not be captured by any lesser value, even if, in the judgment of religious men, Christianity itself seems to require such qualifications to survive. For that assumption is born of the spirit of fear, not of a sound mind. By Him are all things valid that are valid; and without Him is not anything valid that is valid. Ritual, doctrine, and theological system "have their day and cease to be"; "they are but broken lights" of the "Strong Son of God, Immortal Love."

We have anticipated the theological rationale for this centrality of the Incarnation, but it may help to state it once in summary. Briefly, then: what man tends to see as discrete in the factoring of his Understanding is, in reality, one organic whole insofar as it is real at all. God is not ultimately severed from His creation, but exists in communion with it. The person and life of Jesus were intended to enunciate and realize this relationship, so that man might perceive it and, from the

freedom of total selfhood, participate joyfully in it. The meaning of this is, that all existence, except that which denies its own depths, is yearning toward God, striving to realize in itself what Christ alone in the historical instance of Jesus perfectly embodied, the motive of self-giving to the Father in love and the striving to be at one in its nature with Him. We are all Christ, "though in the germ." And since the reconciliation of the creation to God is the one motive, the one ideal truth, which all science, art, history and religion are trying to enunciate, the accomplished objectification of the Christ in Jesus provides the basic vision that makes all these meaningful, and is the ultimate symbol, the key, of that meaning.[233] The Christ has become for these apologists nothing less than the symbol for the ground unity in existence--on which all communion of man and God, all human fellowship, all possibility of real relations between man and things, all hope of reintegration of the fragmented self,[234] all analogy and all perception of analogy must rest.[235] This symbol works by the engaging of the total human capacity for apprehension, not merely the intellect; so that of course it is a travesty of this vision to claim that the propositions or dogma of Christianity achieve any such universal applicability--though if they are genuinely extrapolated from the gospel in Christ himself, not merely perversions, they are as applicable as the propositional reduction of truth can be. But it is not the systems of Christianity but the whole being of Christ who is the way, truth, and life. The epistemology operative here assumes that though proposition and system, as well as emotional reaction, are valid modes of knowledge (within the limitations of mode), the ultimate means of apprehending reality is the symbol which reconciles these modes;

and the richest symbol is that into which the whole being finds the fullest empathetic identification, that is, man, and ultimately, the Man.[236]

We have, then, a definitive symbol for the ground of being in all men, and thereby for that in all institutions, all human endeavor and history, which leads every man and the race as a whole on to the ultimate calling of the realized communion with God. There is an evident risk that this symbol will blur out in indistinction or break up into a myriad of disjointed particulars--i. e., that it may disintegrate into its subjective or objective components once again. Without trying to minimize the risk, which is after all endemic in any apprehension of reality, one might note, first, that the two risks are the same--the failure of an organic coherence in the perception of existence, a coherence the faith in which is inherent in this vision. That is to say, in terms of these presuppositions, the failure of the symbol to remain symbol. An organism, after all, does not merely grow at random; nor do its components cease to relate to one another, however many they may be, so long as the organism is an organism. But second, the fact of the risk itself may make palpable the importance of the Incarnation--the necessity of keeping a fixed reference to the person of Jesus, the ultimate paradigm, without whose eternal life every branch of the vine will die.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]Though for the general religious development the German influence was not substantial nor intimate--though most religious thinkers were content to be insular--though "influence" is not the major concern of this study--and though such argument for German influence as is herein implied is urged from internal similarities primarily, the question of direct German influence is worth passing consideration. There is abundant evidence that for a small group of English religious thinkers that influence was significant--not limited to the destructive impact of criticism (though this seems to be the case with many of their better known colleagues, like Milman, Pusey and Rose) but extending also to constructive idealistic theology. It can hardly be mere coincidence that the same group are the most diligent in the reconstruction of a christocentric theology in England, and that this theology is closely similar to that German counterpart described above, the major component of which is a symbolic christology of the nature we have seen. A number of these men, indeed, openly acknowledge their debt to the Germans. No attempt will be made, in this note, to mark the outer limits of this circle, which included men not figuring prominently in the argument of this study; on the other hand, it seems that none of the British thinkers of this persuasion remain quite untouched by the German influence. Some are directly indebted; to others the formative ideas come through the major purveyors--who may be tentatively identified as Coleridge, Hare, Thirlwell, Maurice and Bunsen.

One might begin with the childhood of Julius Hare (1795-1855). The precocious boy lived in Wiemar during 1804 and 1805, where with the aid of his elder brother he quickly became proficient in German (F. D. Maurice, "Essay on Archdeacon Hare's Position in the Church with Reference to the Parties that Divide It," in Julius Charles Hare, The Victory of Faith, ed. E. H. Plumptre [London, 1874], p. xxviii). He had already read widely in German literature when he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1812 (DNB). In 1814 he was joined there by Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875), who had been his schoolfellow at Charterhouse (DNB). During this time Herbert Marsh, the translator of Michaelis, was delivering and publishing his lectures as Lady Margaret Professor (the most active period of his professorship was from 1807 to 1819), through which the findings of German criticism were purveyed to such as had ears to hear (DNB). When Hare became a fellow in 1818 he was undoubtedly already one of the most widely informed students of German thought in England. To his aunt Lady Jones, who was so concerned about his dangerous studies that she expressed a desire that his German books were burned, he wrote that the Germans had enabled him "to believe in Christianity with a much

more implicit and intelligent faith" (Maurice, "Essay on Hare," p. xxx). In 1822 he was offered the classical lectureship at Trinity by Whewell, which post he held until 1832, when he was succeeded by Thirwall (DNB).

Thirlwall, also named fellow in 1818, went in the latter part of that year to the continent, where in the winter of 1818-19 he first met Christian Bunsen at Rome and visited in his home weekly (Ralph Albert Dornfield Owen, Christian Bunsen and Liberal English Theology [diss. University of Wisconsin, 1924], p. 16). The urbane and knowledgeable Bunsen was thoroughly read in German religious writings; he had been a student of Niebuhr, and he had read the essay on Luke by Schleiermacher (whom he knew and valued) as early as 1818 (Ibid.) and may have directed Thirlwall to that work the latter was soon to translate. He seems also to have aided Thirlwall, by personal counsel, to rationalize his acceptance of orders (Ibid., p. 18). In 1824 Thirlwall was translating tales by Tieck and had begun the translation of Schleiermacher's Luke, which he published in 1825 (DNB). Any doubt of his familiarity by this date with German scholarship may be erased by perusal of his masterful "Introduction" to this translation. In 1827 he took up duties at Cambridge, after having studied law. The same year he was ordained deacon; in 1828 he was ordained priest (DNB). His intimate friendship with Hare is attested by their close collaboration during these and ensuing years. Hare had aided him with the introduction and translation of the Essay on Luke (Storr, p. 187); in 1828 they published the first volume of their translation of Niebuhr's History of Rome; and when it was attacked as damaging to sound faith (Quarterly Review, 1828) Hare published a vindication of Niebuhr (Cambridge, 1829) to which Thirlwall added a postscript. In 1831 they again collaborated to launch a journal entitled The Philological Museum, which barely survived Hare's departure from Cambridge (DNB). From that date the two men were necessarily less intimately attached, but the firm friendship and mutual respect continued; not content with the dedication of his History of Greece to Hare in Volume One (1835), Thirlwall affixed a second dedication to the eighth (the last) volume at its publication in 1844.

Hare had been ordained in 1826; in 1832 he left Cambridge to take the parish at Hurstmonceaux. He found time however for a visit to Europe where in that same year he met Schelling, whom he thought "now that Goethe and Niebuhr are gone, without a rival the first man of the age" (quoted in Thomas R. Lounsbury, The Life and Times of Tennyson [New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962], p. 67), and Bunsen, to whom he dedicated a sermon preached at the English chapel at Rome (James H. Rigg, Modern Anglican Theology: Chapters on Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, and Jowett, and on the Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement [London, n. d. (1857)], p. 175). Thus began a close and extended association. In February of 1842, for instance, Hare, Carlyle, Maurice and Thomas Arnold met in London at Bunsen's luncheon in honor of King Frederick William IV (Owen, p. 51), and in the autumn of that same year Bunsen moved to Hurstmonceaux to assist Hare in the completion of certain scholarly projects of Arnold--also a devotee of Bunsen--who had died in June (Ibid., p. 52).

Thirlwall departed abruptly from Cambridge on 26 May, 1834, five days after the publication of his Letter on the Admission of Dissenters to Academical Degrees, which by its plea for liberality offended the powers and brought its author dismissal from his post--a story to be duplicated for others several times in the following decades (DNS). From this incident Thirlwall proceeded to parochial work at Kirby Underdale the next year, and to the Bishopric of St. David's in 1840 (DNB).

It was to Trinity College under such an influence that F. D. Maurice (1805-1872) and John Sterling (1806-1844) came in 1823, where Hare had been for just a year as lecturer. There also came R. C. Trench in 1825, Charles and Alfred Tennyson in 1828, and Arthur Henry Hallam in 1829. The names here assembled all the world will recognize as members of the famous Apostles. Upon this group Thirlwall and Hare, the latter especially, were a strong influence (Lounsbury, pp. 67-68). Many of the ties formed between the tutors and their students became more complex and intimate as the years went by. Sterling and Maurice quickly became Hare's favorite pupils (Maurice, Life, I, 52). It is true that Maurice stated, in his memoir to Hare affixed as preface to Hare's Victory of Faith, that in Hare's lectures on the classics students heard little about Schleiermacher and that he did not speak with Hare much on theological subjects ("Essay on Hare," pp. xxiii-xxiv). But Hare certainly introduced Maurice and Sterling to German thought, as the letters of both men testify (Porter and Wolf, p. 7; John Sterling, Essays and Tales, ed. Julius Charles Hare, [London, 1848], I, xxviii-xxx). Maurice's impact on the Apostles was chiefly to turn the attention of the group more frequently and intensively upon theological issues (Charles Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson [New York, 1949], p. 69); it is impossible that two of the most prominent and incisive students of German religious thought of that day, on such intimate terms with their pupils, could not have contributed heavily to this dialogue. Were all other evidence lacking, there would remain the collection of aphorisms entitled Guesses at Truth by Two Brothers (Julius and Augustus Hare) published in its first form in 1827, which is laden with ideas identical with those of the great Germans of Hare's reading, if not directly derived from them or bearing always their names; and many if not all of the Apostles must have looked into this work.

The relationships between Hare and Maurice in especial were very close and steadily grew more so. Hare contributed several pieces to the Athenaeum during the period it was edited by Maurice and Sterling (Maurice, Life, I, 96-97). When Maurice decided to go up to Oxford to complete his degree (he had left Cambridge without a degree because he scrupled to subscribe to the Articles at that time), he wrote to ask Hare to recommend him (Ibid., I, 99-100; Porter and Wolf, p. 52). By 1837 Maurice, Sterling, Sterling's wife and her sister Anna Barton were visiting Hare at Hurstmonceaux, and Sterling was apparently trying to further a romance between his sister-in-law and Maurice--a romance which soon eventuated in marriage (Maurice, Life, I, 227). Sterling seems also to have been much interested in the relationship between Hare and Maurice's sister Esther, who were married

in 1844 shortly before Sterling's death (Ibid., I, 380; Porter and Wolf, p. 111). After the death of Maurice's first wife in 1845--she had contracted tuberculosis from attending Sterling in his last illness--Maurice married Hare's half-sister Georgiana, and so Maurice and Hare were doubly related.

Correspondence between Hare and Maurice is steady during this period and afterward. Hare called Maurice the greatest mind since Plato (Porter and Wolf, p. 5). Maurice on the other hand always deferred to Hare's voluminous knowledge. He urged Hare to translate a piece by Schelling (a preface to Bekker's German translation of Cousin's Nouveaux Fragments Philosophiques) which he thought answered the rationalists incontrovertably on their own terms (Life, I, 289). When a friend sought his advice about translating Schleiermacher, he directed her to Hare, "the best critic I know." (Ibid., p. 453).

Hare's learning was indeed profound and extensive. In an attempt to make the English clergy more aware of the resources of scholarship, he added exegetical notes to the series of sermons entitled The Mission of the Comforter; these notes give some evidence of his range. At the end of one of the notes--a sixty-page catalog of commentaries on a single verse of scripture--he apologetically explains that he has "merely cited certain of the most eminent divines at divers periods . . . . To have done more would have been inconsistent with the nature of a note, and would have required the elaborate and well digested studies preparatory to an independent work" (Julius Charles Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, with Notes, ed. E. H. Plumptre, 3rd ed. [London: Macmillan and Company, 1892 (reprint of the 1886 ed.)], p. 273). Arthur Stanley, also related to Hare by marriage, testified to the extent and nature of his knowledge in a memoir (Quarterly Review, CXCIII [July, 1855]) reprinted as a preface to The Mission of the Comforter:

"At the time of his death [his library] had reached the number of more than twelve thousand volumes; and it must be further remembered that these volumes were of no ordinary kind. Of all libraries which it has been our lot to traverse, we never saw one equal to this in the combined excellence of quantity and quality; none in which there were so few worthless, so many valuable works. Its original basis was classical and philological; but in later years the historical, philosophical, and theological elements outgrew all the rest. The peculiarity which distinguished the collection probably from any other, private or public, in the kingdom, was the preponderance of German literature. No work, no pamphlet of any note, in the teeming catalogs of German booksellers escaped his notice; and with his knowledge of the subjects and of the probable elucidation which they would receive from this or that quarter, they formed themselves in natural and harmonious groups around what already existed, so as to give to the library both the appearance and reality, not of a mere accumulation of parts, but of an organic and self-multiplying whole. And what perhaps was yet more remarkable was the manner in which the center of this whole was himself. Without a catalog, without assistance, he knew where every book was to be found, for what it was valuable, what relation it bore to the rest. The library was like a magnificient tree

which he had himself planted, of which he had nurtured the growth, which spread its branches far and wide over his dwelling, and in the shade of which he delighted, even if he was prevented for the moment from gathering its fruits or pruning its luxuriant foliage. . . . His acquaintance with German literature extended to its minutest details. . . . But it was especially in theology that this branch of his learning made itself felt. . . . Whatever he wrote or thought was colored through and through with German research and German speculation. Schleiermacher and Nitsch, Daub and Lucke were as familiar in his mouth as Tilltoson . . . He quoted them without apology; he used them without reserve. You could no more be ignorant of their presence in his writings than of their books in his library." (pp. 102-103, 116-117)

Against such learning Maurice (ever the soul of humility) might well protest his own inadequacies; but Maurice's knowledge of German writings must not be judged merely by his own statements. He declares himself unequal to the translation of Schelling and refuses to judge the accuracy of the translation of Schleiermacher; he writes that he is trying, with indifferent success, to read some German fairy tales into English translation for his children (Life, I, 444). Yet, by some method at least, he had come to a considerable knowledge of German materials--no doubt much of it by way of Hare. He dares to differ with Hare on the significance of Neander (which he could have read, however, in Rose's translation) (Life, I, 249). He comments on the place of Schleiermacher's Luke in the total work of that author (Ibid., I, 453-454). He met Bunsen in 1840 and visited him at Berne (Ibid., I, 286-287); thereafter they met a number of times on intimate terms (e.g., see Life, I, 539; Porter and Wolf, p. 116). Maurice aided Bunsen considerably in the launching of the project to establish a chapel in Jerusalem (Life, I, 327; Porter and Wolf, p. 101) and the two of them collaborated on a liturgy for Palestine (Owen, p. 52). Bunsen thought both Maurice and his wife well informed about German materials (Ibid., p. 45). By the time he wrote his first great theological treatise, The Kingdom of Christ (1837), he was well acquainted with the commentary that German idealistic thought had made upon religious issues, as that work clearly shows (see, for instance, in the Everyman Edition, vol. I, pp. 150-153).

John Sterling also managed considerable excursion into German writings during his brief and painful life. How early this interest began it is difficult to discover; but in 1829 he wrote to Hare of his indebtedness to Niebuhr (undoubtedly reference to Hare and Thirlwall's translation). By 1835 at least he was busy among the Germans, and his letters and articles from this time on made frequent and incisive comments upon their work (Essays and Tales, I, xxviii-xxx, lx-lxv, 385-420). Strauss had a considerable and disturbing impact upon him, according to Hare (Ibid., pp. cxxxiii, cxxxv-cxxxix). In 1842 he undertook a review of Sarah Austin's translations from the Germans for the Foreign Quarterly Review (Ibid., 385-420). In 1843 he was following the Schelling-Hegel debate with interest, and believed the Hegelians to have refuted Schelling satisfactorily (Ibid., ccx).

The fascinating soul-drama that centered in the tragic life of John Sterling involved, in the most intimate way, Hare, Maurice and Carlyle, as well as the little group of sympathizers with the Spanish revolutionaries (of whom Sterling was the organizer and leader, and which included Tennyson, Hallam and Trench) (see Carlyle, Life of John Sterling). The recounting of his life story is little to the present purpose; an adequate picture of it may be formed by reading, as complementary studies, Carlyle's Life of John Sterling and Hare's "Sketch of the Author's Life," which prefaced Hare's edition of Sterling's Essays and Tales. It is however to the purpose to insist on the intellectual intimacy of this group; for it would appear that there was hardly a significant idea that Sterling encountered which did not touch simultaneously all his close friends, and many of these ideas became the center of controversy between (generally) Hare and Maurice on one side, Carlyle on the other. Though Hare and Carlyle were named as joint literary executors for Sterling, it is evident they did not agree on many important points concerning his life. Hare's "Sketch" is moreover weighted with a subdued criticism of Carlyle's influence on Sterling--baleful, as Hare and Maurice felt--and Carlyle's Life is in part an answer in kind. Maurice, who seems to have been rather vocal in his criticism of Carlyle in this connection (while all the time frankly admiring Carlyle's genius), chided himself severely the rest of his life for what he later judged to be a harsh attitude toward Sterling--his early and intimate friend and his kinsman (Life, I, 345, 348, 420). Of the principles of these controversies it will be appropriate to speak in the study to follow.

There remains to say something of another powerful force that brought Maurice, Sterling and Hare into a common intellectual dimension--that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Julius Hare and his brother Augustus were among Coleridge's earliest and most ardent admirers (William S. Knickerbocker, Creative Oxford: Its Influence in Victorian Literature [Syracuse, 1925], p. 84). Maurice, in describing that indebtedness, is careful to insist against the charge that Hare is of Coleridge's "school"--a typical Mauricean care--but speaks definitely of the relationship: "He always professed the most profound gratitude to Coleridge. . . ." ("Essay on Hare" in Victory of Faith, p. xix). ". . .Unshaken attachment. . .Julius Hare felt for Coleridge while he was in the world, and after he had left it. . . . He thankfully acknowledged him as a theological teacher" (Ibid., p. xxxviii). "When that help had been given, he was bound to unceasing gratitude; but he was not bound to take Coleridge as pope--he was bound to reject him and every man in that capacity. As a philological critic, even as a commentator upon scripture, he did not esteem him very highly; from many of his conclusions on divinity, as on other subjects, he entirely dissented. But he owed it to him, probably more than to any other man, that he was able to trace the path which connects human learning with divine, the faith of one age with the faith of another, the sense of man's grandeur with the sense of his pettiness and sinfulness" (Ibid., p. xlii). Let Hare's dedication of The Mission of the Comforter serve as additional evidence: "To the honoured memory of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the Christian Philosopher, who through dark and winding paths of speculation was led to the light, in order that others by his guidance might reach that light, without passing through the darkness, these sermons on the work of the spirit are dedicated with deep thankfulness and

reverence by one of the many pupils whom his writings have helped to discern the sacred concord and unity of human and divine truth."

Sterling's indebtedness to Coleridge is attested on every hand--lamented, for example, throughout Carlyle's Life of Sterling, where the famous description of the addle-headed philosopher at Highgate provides leitmotif for the entire work. "To Coleridge," he wrote to Hare in 1836, "I owe education. He taught me to believe that an empirical philosophy is none, that Faith is the highest Reason, that all criticism, whether of literature, laws, or manners, is blind, without the power of discerning the organic unity of the object" (Essays and Tales, I, xv). "When an opportunity occurred," said Hare, "he sought out the old man in his oracular shrine at Highgate, and often saw him in the last years of his life; and he was one of the two disciples who attended his funeral, my own duties rendering it impossible for me to make a third" (Ibid., p. xv). He read Aids to Reflection "again and again" (Ibid., p. xlvi), and read Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit in the manuscript, of which he made his own transcript (Ibid., p. cxxix).

Maurice seems never to have visited Coleridge at Highgate (Life, I, 176; Porter and Wolf, pp. 70-71). Perhaps it was his extreme shyness; perhaps it was an uneasiness about the Coleridgean "tetrads" and such paraphernalia that gave him pause. On the latter point he commented many times. At one time he criticized Coleridge for an inadequate respect for facts (Life, I, 204, 250). Again, he wrote of Coleridge's Shakespearean criticism, "What I object to in Coleridge generally as a critic is his tendency to abstraction; his acquired incapacity for looking straight at a man, and his passion for conceiving him under some forms and conditions which, if they belong, as I readily admit they do, to a higher logic than the ordinary one, are for that very reason apt to deceive more and to put themselves forth as adequate substitutes for life and humanity" (Life, I, 510; Porter and Wolf, p. 132). Yet none of the group was more vocal in open admission of indebtedness. The "Essay on Hare" is almost explicitly a point-by-point refutation of Carlyle's portrait of Coleridge in the Life of John Sterling. He writes to his son, in an autobiographical letter of 1871, of Coleridge's early and extensive influence (Life, I, 176; Porter and Wolf, p. 70). An excerpt from the dedication of The Kingdom of Christ (to Derwent Coleridge) may make the nature of that influence clearer: "The power of perceiving that by the very law of the Reason the knowledge of God must be given to it; that the moment it attempts to create its Maker, it denies itself; the conviction that the most opposite notion of Unity to that which Unitarianism dreams of is necessary, if the demands of the reason are to be satisfied--I must acknowledge, that I received from him, if I would not prove myself ungrateful to the highest Teacher, who might certainly have chosen another instrument for communicating His mercies, but who has been pleased in very many cases, as I know, to make use of this one." (F. D. Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ: or, Hints on the Principles, Ordinances, and Constitution of the Catholic Church, in Letters to a Member of the Society of Friends, [London, n.d.], p. 12).

The complex question of the nature and extent of German influence upon Coleridge need not be opened here, except to remind the reader that however dependently or independently arrived at, the characteristic Coleridgean ideas are consistent with the German speculations; they thus served to complement and interpret these speculations where the two appeared in conjunction or to further the same effects where more

intimate knowledge of the Germans was wanting. But for the most part the students of Coleridge we have been considering seemed to take his association with the Germans for granted. In 1837 Sterling was wondering about his similarity to Schleiermacher (Essays and Tales, I, xcviii), and in 1842 he stated flatly, "Coleridge is the genial interpreter of the lore, now of Kant, and now of Schelling" (Ibid., I, 385). Maurice, in the dedication to The Kingdom of Christ, seems to deny Coleridge's discipleship to Schelling; but he is insisting upon Coleridge's originality and denying the merely systematic to be the essence of his work, rather than denying any similarities between the Englishman and the German (p. 6). Julius Hare's comment in Guesses at Truth seems to catch the judgment of the Cambridge group generally: "Though Coleridge, as he himself says of Warburton, is often hindered from seeing the thoughts of others by 'the mist-working swarm,' or rather by the radiant flood of his own,--though often, like the sun, when looking at the planets, he only beholds his own image in the objects of his gaze, and often, when his eye darts on a cloud, will turn it into a rainbow,--yet he had a livelier perception, than any other Englishman, of the two cardinal ideas of all criticism,--that every work of genius is at once an organic whole in itself, and the part and member of a living, organic universe, of that poetical world in which the spirit of man manifests itself by successive avatars. These, the two main ideas which have been brought to light and unfolded by the philosophical criticism of Germany since the days of Winckelmann and Lessing, he united with that moral, political, and practical discernment, which are [sic] the highest endowments of the English mind. . . ." (Julius Charles Hare and Augustus William Hare, Guesses at Truth by Two Brothers, new ed. [London, 1874], pp. 190-191).

Richard Chenevix Trench (1807-1886)--he to whom Tennyson dedicated "The Palace of Art"--came to Trinity in October of 1825, graduated in 1829, and later returned to take the M. A. (1833) and B. D. (1850). His Cambridge career thus bridges the age of Sterling and Maurice with that of Tennyson and Hallam. The influence of the first two, and particularly Maurice, seems to have been strong; he was undoubtedly one of those mentioned by Hallam in a letter to Gladstone in June 1830: "I do not myself know Maurice, but I know well many whom he has known, and whom he has moulded like a second nature, and these, too, men eminent for intellectual powers, to whom the presence of a commanding spirit would, in all other cases, be a signal rather for rivalry than reverential acknowledgement. The effect which he has produced on the minds of many at Cambridge by the single creation of that Society of the Apostles (for the spirit, though not the form, was created by him) is far greater than I can dare to calculate, and will be felt, both directly and indirectly, in the age that is upon us" (Maurice, Life, I, 110; John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone [London, 1903], I, 54). As we have seen, Trench knew Sterling well enough to be a part of the Torrijos scheme. In 1835, Maurice was writing to Acland, who was then abroad, asking him to "fulfil a kind promise you made me when you were over here, of introducing my friend Trench who is now at Havre to Mr. Bunsen. I think he would be pleased with him. I know few like-minded and fewer like-hearted" (Ibid., I, 171). In 1836, Maurice was asked to be godfather to Trench's child (as he was for Tennyson's also in 1852) (Life,

I, 192; Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir by His Son [London, 1897], I, 359). Maurice and Trench corresponded regularly all their adult lives.

Arthur Henry Hallam's association with the Apostles is general knowledge. His letter to Gladstone quoted above (written at age nineteen) speaks something of his evaluation of Maurice. Hallam Tennyson mentions, offhand, that for Thirlwall "Hallam and my father had a profound affection" (Memoir, I, 107). He knew Coleridge's work, not only the poetry but The Friend and Aids to Reflection, which are cited in his writings (Eleanor Dustin Mattes, The Religious Influences Upon Tennyson's "In Memoriam" [dissertation, Yale University, 1945], p. 48). As for the Germans themselves, his work shows little enough direct use of them; but at least one essay, though lamenting the ill effects of their critical philosophy, shows that Hallam is aware of the direction and effect of German thought ("The Influence of Italian Upon English Literature," in The Writings of Arthur Hallam, ed. by T. H. Vail Motter [New York, 1943], pp. 232-233).

A note on the ties of these English religious thinkers with German thought would not be complete without specific attention to Christian Bunsen (1791-1860). When Barthold Niebuhr was Prussian minister to the Vatican (1816-1823), Bunsen was secretary to the mission; he succeeded Niebuhr in 1823, serving until 1838; and after a short residence in Germany and a brief ministry in Berne, he went as Prussian minister to London (1842-1854). Well grounded in German theology, he touched the lives of nearly all the British writers herein considered, often at crucial times in their religious development. He met Thirlwall in 1818; Hare in 1832; Trench in 1835; Maurice in 1839. At Rome he also met Henry Crab Robinson, Wordsworth, Scott, Thomas Arnold, Gladstone, and Richard Monckton Milnes, among others; in Switzerland, Stanley; in London, Macauley, Carlyle, the elder Hallam, Pusey and Newman (Owen, pp. 9, 16, 26, 44, 51). He was the subject of one of the articles in Essays and Reviews (Rowland Williams, "Bunsen's Biblical Researches"). His significant published work is late to exert, itself, any direct influence on the movement herein described (Hippolytus and His Age, 1852; God in History, 1855); but his intimacy with so many of these men and their common respect and love for him testify that he was an exponent of their mutual vision and a significant purveyor of the best German religious thought.

There remains to draw into this circle the Scottish "school," the prominent members of which were Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, John McLeod Campbell, and Edward Irving. Of these the evident and acknowledged leader was Erskine--a man widely known and revered in his own day, but whose influence our century seems almost completely to have overlooked. A layman, a barrister, he retired from practice upon inheriting his estate from his elder brother and thereafter devoted himself to an active benevolence and a thoughtful, intimate study of scripture. By his own admission, the formative influence upon his life was William Law: "I remember well the satisfaction I felt on first reading the works of William Law. I felt as if I had found a great treasure, for I perceived that he regarded Christianity, not as

a system of doctrines imposed on us by God, of which we could know nothing except from the Scriptures, but as the eternally true and natural religion to which all our spiritual faculties are adapted, and the intrinsic truth and certainty of which, though we could not have discovered it for ourselves, yet when revealed we can so apprehend, as to hold it on account of that intrinsic truth, and not any outward authority whatsoever" ("The True Idea of 'Natural Religion,'" in The Spiritual Order and Other Papers Selected from the Manuscripts of the Late Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, 2nd ed. [Edinburgh, 1876], p. 258). Nevertheless he made two important excursions into Europe (1822, 1827-28), where he met and admired Tholuck, began the mastery of German, and formed a close friendship with Bunsen (William Hanna, ed., Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen from 1800 till 1840 [New York, 1877], pp. 41-42, 105 ff.). It is at least a notable coincidence that on the latter journey he began the composition of the work which most characteristically states his theological position, The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel (John Tulloch, Movements of Religious Thought in Britain During the Nineteenth Century [New York, 1885], p. 140). That position was certainly already formed, in its main points, from Law and even more from his own original thought; but the comparison of this work and its successor (The Brazen Serpent, 1831) with his earlier Essay on Faith shows a marked transition, particularly in the all-important concept of the symbolic function of Christ. German influence upon Erskine is not here much insisted upon, but his essential agreement with them is insistently maintained and must, I hope, appear from the following study.

Erskine made the acquaintance of A. J. Scott, Campbell, and Irving about 1826, several years prior to the Kirk's revoking of their licenses (1831, 1832); he seems, if not the source of their dangerous ideas, at least to have reinforced those tendencies that brought them into conflict with tradition. Campbell's sin was to think of salvation as already offered to everyone, not merely the "elect" as conceived by a narrow Calvinism (Tulloch, pp. 148-149), an idea evidently influenced by Erskine's hope for universal salvation (see Letters of Erskine, pp. 92, 105-6, 346). Campbell's most significant work, The Nature of the Atonement, is evidently, as Tulloch notes (p. 142), the expansion of Erskine's ideas in The Brazen Serpent. Edward Irving, famous as Carlyle's early friend and early rival for the hand of Jane Welsh, is best remembered (thanks in part to Carlyle's "Life of Edward Irving") as the founder of the Irvingites, as an oddity hopelessly identified with the speaking in tongues; but this was not his main significance in the eyes of his contemporaries Maurice and Erskine, who saw the glossolalia as aberration (Letters of Erskine, pp. 109, 205, 216; Maurice, Life, I, 107, 497, 518). Nor was this the occasion of the censure from the Kirk, though the embarrassment attendant may have added to the motive. Besides exhibiting the same dangerous universalistic tendencies, he insisted that the Incarnation was only meaningful if Christ had indeed become man, partaking of man's fallen nature and thus capable of sin, "tempted in all parts like as we are." This thesis was developed in a tract of 1830, "The Orthodox and Catholic Doctrine of Our Lord's Human Nature," which occasioned the specific charges of heresy (DNB). Campbell did not deny the sinlessness of Jesus, as he was popularly conceived to do, but nevertheless

such a conception of the Incarnation was thought too humbling to His divinity, and Irving met the fate of Campbell and A. J. Scott before him.

The most fruitful influence of Erskine, however, was that upon Maurice. Though the two men did not meet until 1838 (Hugh Walker, The Literature of the Victorian Era [Cambridge, 1913], p. 92), Maurice read Erskine's works as early as 1830 and apparently read The Brazen Serpent almost as soon as it appeared (Maurice, Life, I, 108, 117, 121; Porter and Wolf, p. 75). This reading came at a propitious time, immediately after Maurice's entering Oxford, and had an immediate, pervasive, and permanent influence. "The peculiarities of his system may be true or not," he wrote to his sister early in 1831, "but I am certain a light has fallen through him on the Scriptures, which I hope I shall never lose, and the chief tendency I feel he has awaked in my mind is to search them more and more" (Life, I, 121). In an autobiographical letter to his son in 1871, he speaks of that influence again: "More and more I was led to ask myself what a Gospel to mankind must be; whether it must not have some other ground than the fall of Adam and the sinful nature of man. I had [been] helped much in finding an answer to this question by your dear old friend Mr. Erskine's books--I did not then know him personally--and by the sermons of Mr. Campbell" (Life, I, 183; Porter and Wolf, p. 76). By 1840 they were corresponding freely, and had become close friends. For example, Maurice was at Linlathen in September, 1847 (Life, I, 443), and in June, 1849 it was Erskine who confirmed to Maurice the disturbing rumor that Carlyle was intending to write a life of Sterling (Life, I, 548). In 1867, again at Linlathen, he was reading Erskine's "Thoughts on . . . Romans" in manuscript, with respect (Life, II, 572; Porter and Wolf, pp. 231-232). Thus, early and late, Maurice continued to acknowledge his indebtedness to Erskine. As he explained to Erskine concerning the dedication of The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament (1852), "I wished to tell others how much I believe they, as well as I, owe to your books; how they seem to me to mark a crisis in the theological movements of this time" (Life, II, 150; Porter and Wolf, p. 164).

Other evidences of the impact of Erskine, Campbell and Irving on the Trinity group are not lacking. Maurice, though aware of Irving's shortcomings, praises his insights into the organic unity of scripture (Life, I, 107, 497). Hallam's letter to Tennyson of July 26, 1831 (Memoir, I, 88) speaks highly of Erskine's Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel (a copy of which he sent to Emily Tennyson as a birthday gift in 1832), and he may well have read The Brazen Serpent, which appeared that year.

Throughout this note I have tried to show, not that the christological vision of this group derived in any historically provable fashion from the Germans, but that the "nurture" of German thought, as Maurice termed it, fed and strengthened that vision even when it did not directly call it into life. One to another, they voiced and reiterated that theme, and it came back to them clarified, amplified, interpreted, through a pervasive common address to reality. Had their spiritual affinities been weaker, or the insights less freely shared, had these not been reinforced by various recourses to the theological

and philosophical origins, the effect might have died at the first intellectual remove. But as it was, there is a harmony in these men, with all their differences, of which the Germans are the pedal tone.

I can not forbear observing that in such a case one ought not reject too hastily the thesis that there exists a basic relationship between Tennyson, for instance, and the Germans. Fairchild, for example, seems to me to have disposed of the issue rather cavalierly (Religious Trends in English Poetry, IV, 121-122). There are more ways to come to the essence of this vision than by the reading of Kant and Hegel; and there is more o what Fairchild and others indiscriminately term "Broad Church" and "transcendental idealism" than is dreamt of in this categorical method.

[2]See Fairbairn The Place of Christ, p. 204.

[3]See below, p. 312.

[4]I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960), p. 50.

[5]See Shawcross, "Introduction," Biographia Literaria, I, lxix-lxxii, where it is convincingly argued that Coleridge turned away from Schelling's concept of indifference in Transcendental Idealism because it must lead to "the merely intellectual apprehension of a bare abstraction" (p. lxxii). This reading is of course validated by Coleridge's own comments, as Shawcross notes, and is accepted by Richards and other subsequent commentators. My only qualification would be to add that I have dealt in the preceding chapter with the Schelling of Of Human Freedom, who is, I think, much closer to the mature Coleridge than is Schelling conceived of in this consensus. See above, pp. 257-264.

[6]Joseph Barrell, Shelley and the Thought of His Time: A Study in the History of Ideas (New Haven, 1947), pp. 68-71.

[7]Of the Germans, he says: "Did not [their] observations prove that the affections--the seat of these consciousnesses--are the proper and appointed organs of religious belief? And may it not be, that all religion--so far as it acts from without--is simply an orderly cultivation of these affections; educing them, and enabling them to perceive those objects and that character which must correspond to their wants, and which are fitted to give them a living and permanent form? Every one must perceive how much there was in the circumstances of the age to suggest the thought, that this is the all-comprehending, all-satisfying idea of Christianity. . . . It was no strange contradiction upon this hypothesis to believe, that the all-perfect Being should manifest himself to men in one of their own nature; that was evidently the form in which alone he could present himself as an object to their affections, and in which the affections witnessed that they needed he should present himself. . . . I do not believe that the history of the progress of this doctrine in [Germany], will prove that they were wrong. If indeed it be asked whether it has been found in practice, that those

who embraced this scheme could abide in it, however elaborated and fenced it may have been by the art of a clear logical understanding, sustaining a devout and honest heart, I imagine the answer would be, No. Those who have taken up this theory have been compelled either to advance or to retreat. . . . in following out the plan of discriminating between that which men must receive as congenial to their inward feelings and wants, and that which belongs only to outward form and history, it has been found that the recognition of a personal object has evaporated altogether. Our Lord's life does but embody certain great ideas and principles, which have been at work in men's hearts at all times; which probably did exhibit themselves very remarkably in Him, and may have seemed to His affectionate, credulous, or interested disciples, to exhibit themselves in Him as they never did or could in any other; but which can be contemplated by us apart from the accidental form which they assumed in that or in any age, as principles appertaining to our general humanity. Such is one result of this method--a result, it will be seen, as directly in opposition as any that can well be conceived the feelings and intentions of its originator [?Kant in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone], and which yet has seemed to be merely a natural deduction from it" (F. D. Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, I, 150-152).

[8]Ibid., pp. 85, 88.

[9]Ibid., p. 100.

[10]Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[11]James Robert Thrane, The Rise of Higher Criticism in England, 1800-1870 (diss. Columbia University, 1956).

[12]See above, pp. 206-7, and note.

[13]pp. 126-138.

[14]Benn, I, 321.

[15]W. R. Greg, "Truth Versus Edification," Westminster Review, LXXIX (April, 1863), 267.

[16]"The Bishop and the Philosopher," in Lectures and Essays in Criticism, ed. R. H. Super (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 49.

[17]See Robert Hamilton Moore, Victorian Religious Liberalism Reflected in Autobiography (diss. University of Illinois, 1948).

[18]Francis William Newman, Phases of Faith: or, Passages from the History of My Creed (London, 1907). (First printed 1850)

[19]The factors mentioned above make this an infrequent solution, however. Belief in the authority of Scripture is generally set up in a monolithic way, the authority conceived of as absolute and unerring (see William Hale White, The Early Life of Mark Rutherford by Himself [London,

1913], as cited in Robert Hamilton Moore, p. 60). Consequently the first concessions are apt to carry away the whole. See, for example, Annie Wood Besant, Annie Besant: An Autobiography (New York, 1902), p. 131, as cited in R. H. Moore, p. 100. Compare F. W. Newman: ". . . In my view, at that time, the materials of the Bible were in theory divisible into two portions. Concerning the one (which I called natural religion) it not only was not presumptuous, but it was absolutely essential, to form an independent judgment; for this was the real basis of all faith. Concerning the other (which I called revealed religion), our bus ness was not to criticise the message, but to examine the credentials of the messenger; and, after the most unbiased possible examination of these, then if they proved sound, to receive his communication reverently and unquestioningly" (p. 31). (Compare Coleridge's analysis in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.)

[20]Of this type, Charles Hennell is perhaps the most striking example, filling out such details of the gospel accounts with speculation of a crucifixion plot, after the manner of Bahrdt, Venturini and Paulus. Milman also, in both the History of the Jews and the History of Christianity, shows similar tendencies, though more aware of the general admixture of limiting human fallibility. See Henry Hart Milman, The History of Christianity, I, 11-14.

[21]See Robert Hamilton Moore, passim.

[22]As merely one of many expressions of his position, see Religious Trends in English Poetry, Volume III: 1780-1830: Romantic Faith (New York, 1949), p. 11.

[23]Peckham, pp. 43-44.

[24]Even so perceptive and sympathetic a contemporary as Frederic Harrison makes this association, though he does qualify the ascription, in speaking of "the broad-Churchmen of the school of F. D. Maurice and Jowett" (from Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill, and Other Literary Estimates, p. 10, as quoted in Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry, Volume IV: 1830-1880: Christianity and Romanticism in the Victorian Era [New York, 1957], p. 103). Tulloch, while admitting Maurice's disclaimer of membership in Whately's school, yet insists on the relationship: "He was, beyond all doubt, right in this. Mr. Maurice's great deficiency as a theologian, as we shall have occasion to point out, is just his deficiency in certain critical qualities that belong to Whately and others, and gave an historic breadth to many of their conclusions. But the name 'Broad Church' has also come to denote a species of universalism--or breadth of doctrinal sentiment--which was not only not at variance with Mr. Maurice's standpoint, but may be held characteristic of men to whom it is commonly applied" (John Tulloch, Movements of Religious Thought in Britain During the Nineteenth Century [New York, 1885], p. 260).

[25]"Every hope I had for human culture, for the reconciliation of op-

posing schools, for blessings to mankind, was based on theology. What sympathy, then could I have with the Liberal party which was emphatically antitheological, which was ready to tolerate all opinions in theology, only because people could know nothing about it and because other studies were much better pursued without reference to it? . . . They are called Broad Churchmen now, and delight to be called so. But their breadth seems to me to be narrowness. They include all kinds of opinions. But what message have they for the people who do not live upon opinions or care for opinions?

"Are they children of God, or must they now and forever be children of the devil? The Broad Churchman gives no answer. To me life is a burden unless I can find one. All these parties . . . contain men at whose feet I am not worthy to sit. I have longed for sympathy with them all. But God has ordered it otherwise" (Life, I, 183-184; Porter and Wolf, pp. 76-77).

[26]Of this difficulty Porter and Wolf have written in the introduction to their work, p. 5. Indicative of the depth of the problem is James H. Rigg's Modern Anglican Theology: Chapters on Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, and Jowett and on the Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement (London, 1857), of which more below. The work is written with the avowed and pervasive purpose of discrediting the pernicious effect of this company of religious writers. With a good grasp of many of the ideas of these men, Rigg is simply unable to understand the basic christocentric position of their work, or conceive anything more generous of their "obscurity" than a deliberate equivocation. The same difficulty, though not the same animus, appears in the chapter on theology in Hugh Walker's The Literature of the Victorian Era (Cambridge, Eng., 1913): "Maurice, like many another, having put his hand to the plough, looked back. He built upon reason, but he feared to trust his foundation to the full. He thought he had learned from Coleridge what Carlyle contemptuously calls 'the sublime secret of believing by "the reason" what "the understanding" had been obliged to fling out as incredible.' Hence that amazing torturing of the Thirty-Nine Articles; hence that reconciliation of the Bible with science which Huxley failed to understand. Maurice was 'German' enough to see that eighteenth century orthodoxy and eighteenth century scepticism [sic] were alike incomplete; but he was not 'German' enough boldly to cut his cable and sail into any sea of thought whither his logic would carry him. . . . Maurice's mind was wrapped in fog" (pp. 101-102). (Perhaps it is not fair to rail at Walker for classing Campbell and Erskine with the Evangelicals; but the grouping obscures more than it clarifies.) Writing in 1914, Weinel and Widgery lament that Maurice's "transcendental theological ideas" have helped to turn English theological students away from the historical Jesus "for help in social problems" (p. 222). Tulloch, in 1885, had understood the christology more clearly; but he mistook the nature of Maurice's essentially symbolic method: "There never was a more mistaken idea of any man than that which associated Maurice with a negative or half-believing theology. He was the most positive if not the most definite of thinkers. He was essentially affirmative, starting from Christ as the great af-

firmation both of thought and life. Man only finds himself in Christ, only finds his brother there; the true life of the individual, of the family, of the nation, of the Church, all come from the same center and rest on it. The Catholic creeds witness to this divine reality in all its comprehensive meaning; He can see nothing in them but this glorious witness. Their very negations become glorified in the light of this faith. The Scriptures everywhere speak with the same voice. Scholar and thinker as he was, no man was ever less of a purely historical critic. He saw everywhere a reflection of his favorite ideas. . . . Maurice's theology was therefore profoundly dogmatic. It was wise, generous, in a sense universal, but it took its rise in positive principles of the absolute kind. He is often accused of haziness and uncertainty. His idea of God was supposed by Dr. Candlish to vanish in the mere mist of 'Charity' which left no room for the Moral Governance of the universe. There is a certain ground for this assertion when we examine the details of his theological system, but no theological system could rest more on certain great propositions which were, as we have said, of the nature of facts rather than propositions to Maurice himself. They were realistic in the highest degree like the general idea of Platonism. He supposed himself to have a far greater regard for facts than Coleridge; but his very facts were realized abstractions rather than objective certainties" (pp. 276-277). This is very perceptive; but the fatal categories persist, and beg the assertion with which the passage closes.

[27]Some important passages in Coleridge pertinent to this thesis are these: The Friend, in Works, II, 106-107, 144-145, 401, 424n., 449-450, 457, 459-460, 465n., 469-470; Biographia Literaria, I, 173-178; I, 182; II, 8; Aids to Reflection, in Works, I, 150-151, 206, 210-212, 217-219n.; Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, in Works, V, 621-622. Good general discussions of the problem are Chapter Three of I. A. Richards' Coleridge on Imagination and Chapter Three of Boulger's Coleridge as Religious Thinker; see also Fairchild, Religious Trends, III, 301-327.

[28]Works, II, 307.

[29]Biographia Literaria, I, 81.

[30]Ibid., I, 75; cf. Ibid., II, 222.

[31]James D. Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker (New Haven, 1961), pp. 13-14.

[32]Works, II, 452.

[33]Ibid., p. 102. Cf. Boulger, pp. 21-35.

[34]Examples may be limited to the treatment of Hartley in Biographia Literaria, I, 75ff., and to the criticism of bibliolatry in The Statesman's Manual and Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, passim.

[35]Essays and Tales, I, 15.

[36]Works, II, 94. Cf. Aids to Reflection, Works, I, 160.

[37]Works, II, 106. Cf., however, Biographia Literaria, I, 190n.; II, 112.

[38]The Friend, Works, II, 144-145.

[39]Biographia Literaria, I, 92.

[40]Ibid., p. 98.

[41]Ibid., p. 101.

[42]The Friend, Works, II, 142.

[43]See, for example, Benn, I, 262-263. See Boulger's critique of Wellek and Fairchild, pp. 81-84.

[44]Boulger makes this point in reference to the question of German influence, pp. 76-80.

[45]It seems to me, for instance, that Richards' great study distorts even as it clarifies, by treating Coleridge's concept of imagination almost totally without reference to religious considerations--which is certainly not the way Coleridge treated it. Richards of course makes this quite clear. "He mixed with his philosophy too many things which did not belong to it. . . . he could not help adding into and developing again out of this relevant psychology a huge ill-assorted fabric of philosophic and theological beliefs which is not, I think, a relevant part of it. . . . But the critical theories can be obtained from the psychology without initial complication with the philosophical matter" (pp. 10-11). This policy was followed even to the point of excising from quotations from Coleridge many theological considerations which quite clearly were intended by their author to be pervasive qualifications. Not that the treatment is therefore illegitimate; but when the ground assumptions differ so radically, will not such treatment rewrite its subject document in essential regards? So that what one has is not so much "Coleridge on Imagination" as "A Theory of Imagination Abstracted from Coleridge."

[46]Boulger, p. 92.

[47]Ibid., p. 60.

[48]"The Prospects of the Anglican Church," quoted in Boulger, p. 54; see Boulger's treatment of Newman and Coleridge, pp. 50-55.

[49]Boulger, p. 175.

[50]See above, pp.

[51]Aids to Reflection, Works, I, 202-203.

[52]Statesman's Manual, Works, I, 437.

[53]Biographia Literaria, I, 179.

[54]Ibid., I, 185.

[55]Ibid., I, 100.

[56]Ibid., I, 183; Aids to Reflection, Works, I, 163.

[57]See Biographia Literaria, I, 178, 185, 188.

[58]Ibid., I, 179.

[59]Ibid., II, 120.

[60]On the Principles of Genial Criticism, Essay Third.

[61]The Friend, Works, II, 413.

[62]Ibid., p. 465 and note.

[63]Statesman's Manual, Works, I, 439-440.

[64]Ibid., p. 450; Biographia Literaria, II, 207-208.

[65]The Friend, Works, II, 406; Statesman's Manual, Works, I, 450.

[66]See Aids to Reflection, Works, I, 185n.

[67]Sterling, I, ccxxi. "Atonement" means "at-one-ment" or reconciliation here, not the Evangelical or orthodox substitution. See below, pp.

[68]Guesses at Truth, p. 63.

[69]The Victory of Faith, pp. 45-46.

[70]The Mission of the Comforter, p. 297.

[71]Guesses at Truth, p. 135.

[72]The Victory of Faith, p. 42.

[73]Guesses at Truth, p. 80.

[74]Ibid., p. 149. Compare: "The common notion of the Ideal, as exemplified more especially in the Painting of the last century, degrades

it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an ideal, you must get rid of everything individual about it. Whereas the true ideal is the individual, purified and potentiated, the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded and animated and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre.

"This blunder however ran cheek by jowl with another, much like a pair of mules dragging the mind of man to the palace of the Omnipotent Nonentity. For the purport of the Essay on the Human Understanding, like that of its unacknowledged parent, and that of the numerous fry which sprang from it, was just the same, to maintain that we have no ideas, or what amounts to the same thing, that our ideas are nothing more than abstractions, defecated by divers processes of the Understanding. Thus flame, for instance, is an abstraction from coal, a rose from a clod of earth, life from food, thought from sense, God from the world, which itself is only a prior abstraction from Chaos" (Ibid., p. 448).

[75]Ibid., p. 269. Cf. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, II. 39.

[76]Guesses at Truth, pp. 310-311. Compare: ". . . [with Descartes] Consciousness was asserted to be the ground of all existence; and an attempt was made to expand the proposition, that Thought involves Being, into a complete system of philosophy. Hence by various steps men mounted to the denial of all reality; until at the apex of the pyramid Self took its stand, as its own self-existent world, its own creative god. Meanwhile, as the natural counterpart of this exhausted idealism, the materialist equally denied all moral realities, and made out that the apparitions of all such things are nothing else than a fantasmagoria played off by the magic-lantern of self-interest. Thus each way the absolute necessity of Faith has been enforced; without which the Intellect either worships itself, or dashes to atoms on the rocks of the Senses" (The Victory of Faith, p. 80).

[77]Guesses at Truth, p. 518.

[78]Ibid., p. 203.

[79]Ibid., p. 192.

[80]Ibid., p. 325.

[81]Sterling, I, xxix.

[82]Ibid., I, xv.

[83]Hare's comment may be added as a caution: "Not that he had ever had leisure to study and become familiar with Hegel, and the other masters of German philosophy. But, through his early intercourse with Coleridge and others, he had been prepared to welcome them, and to sympathize with them; and being thus prepared, their logic, their great

powers of analysis and construction, the comprehensiveness of their views of nature and of man, their conscientiousness in examining all details, and their determination to dig down to the principles of all things, delighted and almost dazzled him." Ibid., I, cxxxvi. Sterling was not "familiar" with the Germans in Hare's way of familarity; but his work reflects more than a novice's acquaintance.

[84]Maurice wrote in a letter to Trench, Oct. 11, 1939: "You will perhaps have read Sterling's article on Carlyle. If you have, I need not tell you how much pain it has caused me. . . . the fear and strangeness of seeing a friend go back to a stage which he fancied that he had passed through long ago (without even knowing that it is the same) . . ." (Maurice, Life, I, 276).

[85]Thomas Carlyle, The Life of John Sterling, ed. Henry Duff Trail, in The Works of Thomas Carlyle (London: 1897), pp. 2-5.

[86]Sterling, I, ccxxi.

[87]"What I object to in Coleridge generally as a critic is his tendency to abstraction; his acquired incapacity for looking straight at a man, and his passion for conceiving him under some forms and conditions which, if they belong, as I readily admit they do, to a higher logic than the ordinary one, are for that very reason apt to deceive more and to put themselves forth as adequate substitutes for life and humanity" (Maurice, Life, I, 510-511; Porter and Wolf, p. 132).

[88]"For while Truth is ever circular," Hare explains in reference to this point, "and bends its course round its invisible centre, Speculation flies off at every point in a tangent, and, if left to follow its own impulses, loses itself in a notional vacuity. Thus in manifold ways are we taught that our Lord's saying is the declaration of a universal law: to know truth, of whatsoever kind, we must do it." Sterling, I, cxxviii.

[89]Ibid., I, lxxxix-xc.

[90]Ibid., I, 153.

[91]Ibid., I, 375.

[92]Ibid., II, 173.

[93]Ibid., II, 121.

[94]Ibid., I, clviii.

[95]Ibid., I, cxxxix.

[96]Ibid., I, cxxxix-cxl.

[97]Ibid., I, xv.

[98]Ibid., I, lxvii.

[99]Ibid., I, lxviii.

[100]Ibid., I, 171.

[101]Ibid., I, 137.

[102]Ibid., I, lxviii.

[103]Ibid., I, lxix.

[104]Ibid., I, lxix-lxx.

[105]Ibid., I, 319.

[106]Ibid., I, 481.

[107]Ibid., I, 138-139.

[108]Ibid., I, 277-278.

[109]Ibid., II, 103.

[110]Ibid., I, clix-clx.

[111]Ibid., I, 177-178.

[112]"The syllogistic scheme, though as certain as the Rule of Three, is no more than this any substitute for the higher logic by which we decide on the premisses we are to reason from. This great and primal science is, precisely on account of its depth and compass, far more difficult to bring within any systematic limits. The knowledge of it is the aim of the highest speculation. The noblest moral effort strives to realize it in the being, and not merely to embrace it in the intelligence. Its realities are the vital germs within all true poetic images. And these primitive verities are as much more wonderful and beautiful than the logical forms by which we connect them with our experience, as the starry Heavens are sublime in comparison with the brazen tubes and glass lenses of the astronomer.

"But this view of the dignity and sanctity of those seminal principles of things and of knowledge, which the technical, drudging logician is apt to overlook, seems no way inconsistent with a belief in the use of logic, as a clear exposition of the rules by which mankind instinctively and universally reason from their experience, whatever that experience may be." Ibid., I, 342.

[113]Ibid., I, 327.

[114]Hallam, pp. 133-142.

[115]Ibid., pp. 157-158. No claim is hereby made for an immediate influence on Hallam by Schelling or Coleridge, though Coleridge is mentioned with respect by Hallam, and the latter could hardly have escaped the Coleridgean legacy at Cambridge. See the note to page 301 above. T. H. Vail Motter is of course correct in tracing Hallam's theory of the love of God revealed in the love of man back to Dante (Hallam, p. 116); but the theological basis for love elaborated in the Theodicaea Novissima (which Motter notes) seems to me to owe much to Coleridge, Hare, and the Apostles, and perhaps to Erskine, whose Unconditional Freeness of The Gospel Hallam had read only months before the composition of his work. See note 236 below.

[116]Hallam, p. 161.

[117]Ibid., p. 169.

[118]Ibid., p. 170.

[119]Ibid., p. 212.

[120]Ibid., p. 204.

[121]Hare, Guesses at Truth, pp. 251-252.

[122]Ibid., p. 74.

[123]Ibid., p. 76.

[124]Ibid., pp. 229-230.

[125]Ibid., p. 396.

[126]Ibid., p. 449.

[127]Ibid., p. 464.

[128]Cf. Trench: "No doubt there is a temptation to . . . a religion which shall consist in the contemplating of great and ennobling ideas. . . . We feel that we can deal with them as we like; they exert no constraining power upon us; we are their masters, and not they ours. . . . Beware of so subtle a temptation. . . . " (Richard Chenevix Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, or The Unconscious Prophecies of Heathendom: Being the Hulsean Lectures for the Year MDCCCXLVI [Cambridge, Eng., 1846], p. 23).

[129]"Beauty . . . arises from the conjoint and reciprocal action of the beholder and the object. . . ." (Hare, Guesses at Truth, pp. 385-386).

[130]Cf. Erskine: "The abstract idea of God's character has [little] influence on our minds; because the invisible infinity of his essence adds incalculably to the natural vagueness and inefficiency of such impressions. It was therefore the part of a wise and benevolent Being to embody his attributes in a train of palpable and intelligible action, which might carry a distinct and influential appeal to our capacities and feelings" (Thomas Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion, 3rd American ed. from the 5th Edinburgh ed. [Andover, 1860], p. 52).

[131]"All method supposes a union of several things to a common end, either by disposition, as in the works of man; or by convergence, as in the operations and products of nature. . . . In a self-conscious and thence reflecting being, no instinct can exist without engendering the belief of an object corresponding to it, either present or future, real or capable of being realized; much less the instinct, in which humanity itself is grounded;--that by which, in every act of conscious perception, we at once identify our being with that of the world without us, and yet place ourselves in contradistinction to that world. Least of all can this mysterious pre-disposition exist without evolving a belief that the productive power, which in nature acts as nature, is essentially one (that is, of one kind) with the intelligence, which is in the human mind above nature; however disfigured this belief may become by accidental forms or accompaniments, and though like heat in the thawing of ice, it may appear only in its effects" (Coleridge, The Friend, in Works, II, 449-450). Cf. Hare: "[In Descartes] Consciousness was asserted to be the ground of all existence; and an attempt was made to explain the proposition, that Thought involves Being, into a complete system of philosophy. Hence by various steps men mounted to the denial of all reality; until at the apex of the pyramid Self took its stand, as its own self-existent world, its own creative god. Meanwhile, as the natural counterpart of this exhausted idealism, the materialist equally denied all moral realities, and made out that the apparitions of all such things are nothing else than a fantasmagoria played off by the magic-lantern of self-interest. Thus each way the absolute necessity of Faith has been enforced; without which the Intellect either worships itself, or dashes to atoms on the rocks of the Senses" (The Victory of Faith, p. 80).

[132]"Whatever we do or know that in kind is different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith and trust in itself. This, its first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being. Implicite, it is the copula--it contains the possibility--of every position, to which there exists any correspondence in reality" (Coleridge, The Statesman's Manual, in Works, I, 430).

"Undoubtedly the true poet addresses himself, in all his conceptions, to the common nature of us all. Art is a lofty tree, and may shoot up far beyond our grasp, but its roots are in daily life and experience. Every bosom contains the elements of those complex emotions which the artist feels, ... For very many . . . it has become

morally impossible to attain the author's point of vision . . . ; but it is never physically impossible, because nature has placed in every man the simple elements, of which art is the sublimation" (Hallam, "On Some of the Characteristics of Modern Poetry, and on the Lyrical Poems of Alfred Tennyson," in Writings, pp. 187-188).

"It may be asked, How can an individual Christian constitute a church? can a single stone constitute a temple? But an individual Christian stands in a different position to a church from that in which a single stone stands to a temple. The single stone contains nothing of the architectural harmony and beauty of the temple, whilst the individual Christian contains in a measure all that is in the church. An individual Christian is to a church that which the first shoot of an acorn is to a full-grown oak. He has in him, in a measure, the love and the knowledge, and the watchfulness and the zeal of the pastor and elder, and prophet and evangelist. In this respect the comparison of natural and dead things, spiritual and living things, falls short of a true resemblance" (Erskine, Letters, p. 399).

"So long, indeed, as we regard God's revelation of Himself in Christ, as a revelation merely of certain moral truths, it may be startling to find ought that is therein, anticipated in any other quarter. But when we more rightly contemplate it as the manifesting of life, that the Life was manifested, and dwelt among us, then we feel that they who gave, and could give, precepts and maxims only . . . yet gave not that which for man is the gift of gifts and blessing of blessings. And this is the true way in which to contemplate it. That which differences Christianity from all other religions is not its theory of morals. . . . But its difference is, that it is life and power, that it transforms, that it transfigures, that it makes new creatures. . . ." (R. C. Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, pp. 15-16).

133" . . . Our treasures are treasured in a person, and are therefore inexhaustible. . . ." (Ibid., p. 124).

"We say that the divine ideas which had wandered up and down the world, till oftentimes they had well nigh forgotten themselves and their own origin, did at length clothe themselves in flesh and blood; they became incarnate with the Incarnation of the Son of God. In his life and person the idea and the fact at length kissed each other, and were henceforward wedded forevermore" (Ibid., p. 20).

". . . Nothing pleases much or long . . . which has not form, in the highest sense of the word. . . . If the effects are to be deep and strong, this idea must be a great one . . . which shall reach far down to the dark foundations out of sight upon which reposes this awful being of ours" (Richard Chenevix Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture for Unfolding the Spiritual Life of Men, revised 2nd ed. [New York, 1866], p. 24).

"That which is to teach us to live, is itself life--not precepts, not rules alone, but these clothing themselves in the flesh and blood of action and of suffering. A system of faith and duty, however intricate, one might come to the end of at last. One might possess thor-

oughly a Summa Theologiae, however massive and piled up. . . . But life stretches out on every side, and on every side loses itself in the infinite. . . . How much more HE, whom we are bidden above all to consider. . . . We might study out a system; but how can we ever study out a person?" (Ibid., p. 90).

"The truth, and that which is the vehicle of the truth, . . . should be . . . as soul and body, not as kernel and husk. . . . The outward covering is not to fall off and perish, but to become glorified, being pierced and penetrated by the spirit that is within. Man is body and soul, and, being so, the truth has for him need of a body and soul likewise. . . . our attempts to disengage ourselves wholly from sensuous images must always in the end prove unsuccessful. It will be only a changing of our images, and that for the worst; a giving up of living realities which truly stir the heart, and a getting of dead metaphysical abstractions in their room. . . . There is a natural delight in this manner of teaching, appealing, as it does, not to the understanding only, but to the feelings, to the imagination; calling the whole man, with all his powers and faculties, into pleasurable activity: and things thus learned with delight are those longest remembered" (R. C. Trench, Notes on the Parables of Our Lord [Philadelphia, 1878], pp. 24-26). Note the similarity to Coleridge's comment on the function of the poet: "The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity" (Biographia Literaria, II, 12).

[134]"Such men as Strauss and Feuerbach do not seem to me exactly in the light in which they once did; but rather as appointed or permitted destroyers of philosophical and religious systems, that in the utter atheism of men's hearts they may be driven to tears and prayers for a Prince and Deliverer who will be the very same they had fancied they had rid the world of" (Porter and Wolf, p. 104; Life, I, 349).

[135]"The perfect spirituality of God's character I found I had no idea of, though from habit I might bend my knees to Him and use all the phrases which expressed it. Hence the necessity of that perfect spirituality being embodied to me in a human form; hence the necessity of being able to contemplate Him, in whom and through whom only I could contemplate God. . . ." (Porter and Wolf, pp. 50-51; Life, I, 95).

"Again, if 'the glory which excelleth' of that which we have in Christ is, that it is not shadow but substance, not anticipation but possession--not the idea, but the fact, or rather the fact and the idea in one, how are we letting go our most precious gains, when we at all let go, or when we even slight our historic faith, resting on and finding its object in the person of the Saviour! What a miserable exchange, to give up this, and to accept the largest, the most vaunted theories. . . ." (Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, pp. 21-22).

[136]Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit, in Works, V, 621 (and elsewhere).

[137]"The spiritual life knows neither time nor space; and it is by living in it that we escape in some measure from the bondage of time and space. It is not by the exercise of imagination or the intelligence that we can get this liberty, of which Carlyle speaks so interestingly in one of the concluding chapters of Sartor; but only by living in the spiritual life, the life of the conscience, the life of God. . . ." (Erskine, Letters, p. 306).

"You [Mahometans] set up the idea of absoluteness against the idea of relationship; whereas each is involved in the other and depends upon the other; and therefore you make it impossible for the Islamite nations to have any feeling of a humanity, to be anything but slaves" (Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, pp. 280-1).

[138]". . . The connection between the Christian faith and character . . . is not the connection which subsists between the fir and the ship in which it is inserted as a mast, but the connection which subsists between the fir and its root before it is cut down. And this constitutes the closeness of the union which subsists between Christ and His people; His work of love received by faith becomes the principle and root of spiritual life within them. This principle is not subject to the influence or condemnation of sin, it is the immortal tie which binds the Father of spirits to all His family throughout the universe" (Erskine, Letters, p. 25).

"Evidently such a revelation . . . is in the highest reason to be looked for; and whatever its form may be, it must in its substance be supernatural, being a revelation of God; and yet it ought not to be considered preternatural, being only the coming forth of a higher nature" (Erskine, "The Divine Son," in The Spiritual Order, p. 29). Erskine is still making use of the substantial image, but is insisting that Christ is the higher nature of man, which is at one with the nature of God.

"There is a goodness in trust, as there is a goodness in trustworthiness; there is a goodness in receiving, as there is a goodness in giving; there is a goodness in obeying rightly, as there is a goodness in ruling rightly. Most assuredly these are both forms of goodness, but shall we say that they both exist in God? . . . . there may be a goodness which has not its source in God. . . . there can be no goodness of which God is not the proper fountain. And if so, we must admit that for every active form of goodness in God there is a corresponding recipient form; consequently that there must be in the divine nature distinct personalities representing these two forms, otherwise there could be no possibility either of their exercise or of their manifestation in Himself apart from the creature."

. . . . . .

"I am aware that the answer to this suggestion will be that we make a God after our own image, and then reason on our own creation. But if we were intended to know God and to live in relations with Him (and that we are, the history of the race, as well as each man's consciousness, abundantly testifies), it is impossible to arrive otherwise at any idea whatever of God. The only goodness and the only intelligence that we can conceive of are human goodness and intelligence, and we are obliged

just to expand these into infinity when we would form to ourselves an idea of God. . . . there must be, as it were, two hemispheres in the Divine nature,--. . . Father and Son. Unity is not singleness but rather completeness, and love can only, by minds like ours, be considered complete when it has sympathy.

"This idea of God as comprehending both the active and the passive of all goodness, distinguished by the personalities of Father and Son but united in one common Spirit, seems to me to be the perfect conception of love and of blessedness in love. . . " Ibid., pp. 34-37).

[139]"I believe that the first step is made by God towards all men, but that they may and do accept or refuse according to something in themselves,--a personal choice which belongs to the very essence of their natures" (Erskine, Letters, p. 319).

[140]"The protestant does the same thing with regard to the doctrines of religion that the Papist does with regard to religion throughout. He relieves himself from the personal obligation of apprehending their truth in the light of his own conscience; he looks to the Bible as the Papist looks to the church, and he adopts whatever doctrines he thinks that he finds there, without feeling the obligation of personally seeing their truth in the light of his own conscience, before he is really entitled to call himself a believer of them. He thus substitutes outward authority, in the place of the light which is life, although he condemns the Papist for doing that very thing" (Erskine, The Doctrine of Election, quoted in Letters, pp. 405-406).

"Indeed the setting forth of this twofold manifestation of Christianity, in its constancy and in its progressiveness, is the great business of its historian. For such a history precious hints are to be found in the Letters recently publisht on the Kingdom of Christ, one of the wisest and noblest works that our Church has produced since the Ecclesiastical Polity. Whereas the common run of Church-historians are wont to disregard one of the two elements; either caring solely for that which is permanent in Christianity, without attending to its progressiveness; or else degrading it into a mere human invention, which man is to mould and fashion according to the dictates of his own mind" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 313).

[141]". . . Many men will admit the abstract idea of a God of infinite holiness and goodness; and will even take delight in exercising their reason or their taste in speculating on the subject of his being and attributes; yet these same persons will shrink with dislike and alarm from the living energy which this abstract idea assumes in the Bible. It is there no longer a harmless generality. It is a living Being, asserting one spiritual character and one class of principles in harmony with his own, disapproving and condemning every other, and casting the weight of omnipotence into his scale, to prove the vanity of all resistance. Those who feel oppressed by the vigilance and strictness of this ever-present witness, without being convinced of the importance of his friendship, are glad to retreat and to shroud themselves under

the vagueness of an abstract idea. But in truth they do not believe nor love this abstract idea of God, else they would also believe and love the living character which corresponds to it. The real conviction of the truth of the abstract idea would necessarily contain in it the conviction of the corresponding fact" (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, pp. 54-55).

142" . . . Our faith is, in truth, the Amen of our individual spirits to that deep, multiform, all-embracing, harmonious Amen of humanity, in the person of the Son of God, to the mind and heart of the Father in relation to man,--the divine wrath and the divine mercy, which is the atonement" (Campbell, p. 194).

143"Yes! Religion against God. This is the heresy of our age, as Irving said long ago,--how often have I blessed him for the words,--and this is leading to the last and most terrific form of infidelity" (Maurice, Life, I, 518).

" . . . We have been dosing our people with religion when what they want is not this but the Living God. . . . a stone for bread, systems for realities . . . " (Porter and Wolf, p. 106; Life, I, 369).

"It seems to me that many are satisfied with an ordinance, not because they meet God in it, but just because they are convinced that it is of God's appointment. Thus, they will be satisfied to sit under a pastor who, they believe, is ordained of God, and they will receive his instruction and submit themselves to his authority quite in a different way from what they would do with regard to another teacher. They take his instruction for granted; whereas they would only feel themselves justified in submitting to the counsel of the other in so far as they had the inward testimony that such was His mind and will. And in this way the ordinance of God evidently has the effect, not of drawing them into closer spiritual fellowship with God, but of making them rest satisfied with something short of this; in other words, the ordinance thus received has the effect of dispensing with the necessity of direct contact with God personally, and with the inward witness of His Spirit in their hearts, to everything coming as from Him, before they can admit it. I feel that this is the way of death. It is not the living way, Christ Jesus. . . . Jesus is the true ordinance, because in Him we meet the Father in spirit; and if we don't meet the Father in Him, He says that we have not really come to Him; look at [John 6] verses 14, 36, 44, 45" (Erskine, Letters, pp. 221-222).

144" . . . In our modern systems of our religion the relation between the Creator and the creature is too much lost sight of, and merged in the particular doctrines. . . . There can be no doubt that a great deal of the Christianity of our day is of this spurious kind or at least has a mixture of it. And there are times in which God, by his dealings with us, sends a fearful conviction of its unreality into the heart. He brings a genuine reality, such as death, and sets it before us, and makes us feel how mere notions melt into nothing at its presence. . . . The living personality of God must . . . animate and fill out our systems of Christian doctrine--otherwise they only lend a fatal security to the sleep of the soul" (Erskine, The Unconditional Freeness of the

Gospel, pp. 19-20).

145". . . Outward things are always separate and stubborn and loth to coalesce, while all spiritual things by an eternal harmony and concord unite into one and blend into an image and likeness of the Father of Spirits. . . ." (Hare, The Victory of Faith, p. 178).

146". . . Indeed, the veil is one and the same that separates man from God, and that separates man from man" (Campbell, p. 176).

"What God is in that He is love is what God wills us to be. His choice for us He desires may be our choice for ourselves. . . . the inner aspects of our relation to the kingdom of God, to which as God's offspring we belong, are, God's favour as our life, oneness of mind with God, as the condition of that favour, help of God and strengthening of His Spirit as our felt need, in order to being in that condition; while the aspects of our spirits in the measure in which we are occupying aright our place in the kingdom of God, are faith, hope and love:--'faith' as the fellowship of the mind of the Son towards the Father in the life of Sonship which is being quickened in us;--'hope' in God according to the words 'If children then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Jesus Christ;'--and 'love,' faith and hope resulting in our dwelling in love, being dwelling in God" (Ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii).

"In the Bible, the Christian doctrines are always stated in this connection. They stand as indications of the character of God, and as the exciting motives of a corresponding character in man. Forming thus the connecting link between the character of the Creator and the creature, they possess a majesty which it is impossible to despise, and exhibit a form of consistency and truth which it is difficult to disbelieve" (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, p. 62).

"The principle by which the creature knows the Creator is not intellect, it is something much higher and much deeper. It is, I believe, nothing else than the spirit of God in man that knows God" (Erskine, Letters, 268).

"Adieu, dearest; take care of yourself, take courage, and sink deep into your own soul and you will there find comfort: deep in our Souls is God" (Thomas Carlyle, Letters to His Wife, ed. Trudy Bliss [Cambridge, Mass., 1953], p. 141).

"This idea, the idea of God, is, beyond all question or comparison, the one great seminal principle; inasmuch as it combines and comprehends all the faculties of our nature, converging in it as their common centre,--brings the reason to sanction the aspirations of the imagination,--impregnates law with the vitality and attractiveness of the affections,--and establishes the natural, legitimate subordination of the body to the will, and of both to the vis logica or reason, by involving the necessary and entire dependence of the created on the Creator" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 144). (This passage is by Julius Hare's brother Augustus.)

147". . . Justice . . . must desire that the sinner should cease to be . . . unrighteous,--should become righteous: righteousness in God craving for righteousness in man, with a craving which the realisation

of righteousness in man alone can satisfy" (Campbell, pp. 25-26).

"For that the atonement really contemplated the realizing of these longings, and should be seen by us in its relation to these longings, this is what is not understood when the legal perfection of Christ's righteousness is thus abstracted from the law of the spirit of life of sonship in Christ Jesus, which took outward form in that righteousness, and from the revelation of the Father, which in being perfect sonship, it presents to faith" (Ibid., p. 62).

"Christianity, though a divine revelation did not profess to reveal--and did not in point of fact reveal--anything which has not a response in man's spiritual intelligence, and of the truth of which his reason and conscience cannot judge; so that we are never left entirely dependent on external authority for any of its statements. These statements refer to relations in which we actually stand to God and to the spiritual world. It does not make the relations, it only calls our attention to them; we are created in them, they enter into the very substance of our spiritual organization, so that there must be a consciousness of them within us, dormant and torpid perhaps, but capable of being awakened and quickened by the proper application" (Erskine, "The Divine Son," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 30-31).

"If an earthly father desired to have his son's co-operation in some matter involving his own character, and had taken pains to explain to him the principles on which he had undertaken it, would he not feel disappointed were the son to say, 'You need not explain your motives and the reasonableness of your conduct, your bare authority is sufficient for me'? I have supposed that the father wished his son's sympathy as well as his co-operation, and as he could not give sympathy without understanding his father's motives, would he not be actually frustrating his father's whole purpose by this misplaced obsequiousness?" (Erskine, "The Bible in Relation to Faith," in The Spiritual Order, p. 86).

148". . . A living love, the opposite of selfishness--is the only power which can enable me to be inwardly what I feel I ought to be, and to give free and spontaneous submission to all the demands of my conscience; yet love is a power which I cannot create or command within myself, which must come to me, if at all, from some outward source" (Erskine, The Spiritual Order, p. 18).

". . . He has so constituted me that the conscious recognition of this dependence is absolutely necessary to the rightness of all my moral and spiritual doings, . . . a great reality through the recognition of which I am brought into the conscious and continual apprehension of that love of God from which all my love must be derived" (Ibid., p. 19).

149". . . Man cannot form a conception of any qualities, beyond those of which he finds the stamp in his own consciousness" (Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, p. 83).

150". . . That fuller light of truth . . . at once reveals . . . a

gulf as left between them and Christ by the simple fact of an atonement external to their own being, and that gulf as done away with in the actual nearness of Christ to their spirits,--His presence in them as their true life. For they now understand the teaching of the Father, and His drawing of us to the Son, as what is in the Spirit, and not in the Scriptures only, and as what directs us to Christ, as He is present in our inner being, there where the sap of the vine passes into the branch--a present life to be welcomed or rejected--the ingrafted, inbreathed word, which is able to save our souls" (Campbell, p. 311).

151"When [doctr ıes] are separated from him and His omnipotence,--they become mere syllogisms or emblazonments. They can take their place in the dark shadow of the atheism of the heart as well as the syllogisms or emblazonments of any other science" (Erskine, The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel, p. 21).

"There is not in the world a more hateful thing, than to see the Gospel of Jesus Christ converted into a piece of ambitious scholarship. . . . We are required to give our belief to the Gospel, for a farther end. Our belief is not to terminate in itself" (Thomas Erskine, An Essay on Faith [Philadelphia, 1823], p. 125).

"They appear as detached propositions, indicating no moral cause, and pointing to no moral effect. They do not look to God, on the one hand, as their source; nor to man, on the other, as the object of their moral urgency. They appear like links severed from the chain to which they belonged; and thus they lose all that evidence which arises from their consistency, and all that dignity which is connected with their high design" (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, p. 63).

"To dogmatize about God is to assume that man does not receive the knowledge of God from Him, but imputes the forms of his own intellect to Him" (Porter and Wolf, pp. 221-222; Life, II, 495).

152". . . The very form and character of the Bible show that it is intended to be used rather as an instrument of education than to be quoted as an authority, and that it is given, not that we should be satisfied with a knowledge of its words as if its authority were an ultimate ground of belief, but in order that through it we may become acquainted with God Himself and with our own actual relations with Him as a living Being. So long as our faith in God rests solely on our belief that the Bible is inspired we have no real faith in Him at all. We do not know Him, we only know the Bible's account of Him" (Erskine, "The Bible in Relation to Faith," in The Spiritual Order, p. 87).

"Whilst we labour, having constant communion with God in our labour, so that it is not we that work, but the Spirit in us, our labour is profitable indeed and blessed indeed; but when we do things for God instead of doing them by the Spirit of God, it is a different matter. There is a risk of substituting activity in working for the life of faith; there is the risk of seething the kid in its mother's milk--. . . another form of the very flesh which is offered up" (Erskine, Letters, p. 384).

153"But the root of that constitution of things is the fatherliness

of the Father of our spirits: nothing, therefore, could truly honour that constitution which did not do due honour to that fatherliness in which it has its root; while that fatherliness being duly honoured, the law must of necessity have been therein honoured, and with the highest honour" (Campbell, p. 177). Cf. Erskine, The Spiritual Order, pp. 58-61, quoted below, p. 366.

[154]Cf. Erskine, The Spiritual Order, p. 18, quoted above, footnote 148.

[155]"The imagination and the feelings have each their truths, as well as the reason. The absorption of the three, so as to concentrate them in the same point, is one of the universalities requisite in a true religion" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 185). (This passage is composed by Augustus Hare.)

". . . This is a quality of all divine truths, and an attestation of their divine power, that their operation is not single, but manifold,--that they branch out on every side,--that they are the centres of numberless concentric circles, which may pass through very different regions of thought, but which all, if they preserve their relation to their centre, receive their constitutive principle from thence" (Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, p. 213). With these passages from Hare cf. The Victory of Faith, pp. 45-46, quoted above, p. 325.

". . . Reflection may bring up conceptions of many feelings, good, bad, and indifferent, so that the mind may choose; but those who act from the impulse of one predominant passion without allowing the intervention of any conceptive state, debar themselves from their power of election, and voluntarily act as slaves" (Hallam, p. 169).

"Now divine truth, we may feel sure, is always consistent with itself, although, according to the form which ideas ever put on, when they are brought down into the region of the reflective understanding, it will perpetually appear to involve contradictions" (Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, p. 290). Cf. the discussion of Coleridge above, p. 321.

[156]See Hallam's "A Farewell to the South," ll. 514-527, in Writings, p. 22, where the revelation of God is described as so generous that it seems to be as joyous to God to reveal Himself as it is for man to see the revelation--". . . His visiting seems to bless / Scarce more than it is blessed. . . ." (ll. 523-524).

[157]"How often do we meet in books of Christian evidence the attempt made to substitute a logical or mathematical proof of our most holy Faith for a moral one; to ascend to that proof by steps which can no more be denied than the successive steps in a problem in geometry, and so to drive an adversary into a corner from whence there shall be no escape. But there is always an escape for those that in heart and will are alienated from the truth. At some stage or other of the process they will successfully break away, or even if they are brought to the end, they remain not with us long. And we may thank God that it

is so; for it is part of the glory of the Truth that it leads in procession no chained, no unwilling captives--none that do not rejoice in their captivity, and share in the triumph which they adorn. It is not therefore that arguments which address themselves to lower parts of man's being than the highest, are to be rejected--but only their insufficiency acknowledged; that they of themselves will never introduce any to the inner sanctuary of the Faith; but can only lead him up to the doors" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, p. 14).

[158]"He who looks upon religion as an antidote, may soon grow to deem it an anodyne: and then he will not have far to sink, before he takes to swallowing it as an opiate, or, it may be, to swilling it as a dram" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 262).

[159]"I speak of eternal life--that life which was with the Father before the world was, and which is manifested in the Son--of his own acquaintance with which as a life lived in humanity, through his acquaintance with Him in whom it was manifested, the apostle John speaks with such fulness of expression in the beginning of his first epistle. I do not speak of an unknown future blessedness, in a future state of being, of which conscience can understand nothing; but I speak of a life which in itself is one and the same here and hereafter,--however it may be developed in us hereafter beyond its development here" (Campbell, p. 12).

"My dear brother, it appears to me clear from Scripture that the blessing which God holds out to man through the work of redemption is a real and substantial restoration to the image of God, which is to be effected by man becoming the habitation of God through the spirit. . . ." (Erskine, Letters, p. 289).

"But there is a hope purer than any memory; there is a future better than any past; the accomplished purpose of God will be a glorious thing--man become the habitation of God through the Spirit. . . ." (Ibid., p. 357).

"The joys of heaven are described in Scripture to consist in a resemblance to God, or in a cheerful and sympathizing submission to his will; and as man naturally follows the impulse of his own propensities, without reference to the will of God, it is evident that a radical change of principles is necessary, in order to capacitate him for that happiness.

"Christianity thus anticipates the discoveries of death. It removes the veil which hides God from our sight. . . ." (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, p. 28).

Erskine believes in "heaven," it is evident; but he has identified it with the ultimate realization of God's nature in man; he has made it a qualitative realization, and the question of temporality or spatially conceived other-place is shoved aside, or rather accepted as a manifestation of the necessarily metaphorical nature of human concepts. Compare Tennyson's disappointment about the Revised Version's translation of "everlasting" (Memoir, I, 322).

[160]Porter and Wolf p. 145; Life, II, 16-17.

In the fall of 1851 the heterodoxy of Maurice's beliefs on

this and other matters was charged, in the wake of the Theological Essays and Politics for the People. For instance, Croker of the Quarterly Review admitted his surprise that a person who could author such heterodoxy should occupy a chair of Divinity in King's College. The correspondence between Maurice and his principal, Dr. Jelf, may be reviewed in the Life of Maurice, II, 72ff. Notable among the issues was the nature of eternal life, Maurice objecting that "infidel notions" gained "immense strength from the notion that the Scriptures refer to a future world, and not to the present," and he felt "obliged to discredit all fantastic neo-logical notions of the Bible and to p esent it as the authentic declaration of God's mind and will to His creatures" (Life, II, 83-84). Dr. Jelf, like the board that heard Maurice's case, remained of the accepted opinion of the nature of eternal life, however, and Maurice was removed.

[161]Campbell says of the two great commandments that "obedience to the second commandment must flow out of obedience to the first" (p. 231).

[162]"So a Christian action means simply the Christian principle carried into effect in a particular instance, and the practice of this strengthens the principle. . . . the connection between the Christian faith and character is not arbitrary but necessary. . . ." (Erskine, Letters, pp. 24-25).

[163]"In this answer Jesus recognised the difficulty which Nicodemus felt; but he did not remove it; for he only told him that it was quite true, that as he then was, it was absolutely impossible for him to do those things which he had been trying to do; that those things were the actings of a principle of life altogether different from that which he had at present, and that, until he had that life, which was a life from above, all efforts to do them must, in the nature of things, be as vain as the efforts of one kind of tree to bring forth the fruit of another kind of tree" (Erskine, The Brazen Serpent; or, Life Coming Through Death [Edinburgh, 1831], p. 4).

[164]Erskine, The Spiritual Order, pp. 7-8.

[165]Ibid., p. 17. "In morals, an action does not mean an effect simply, but a principle carried into exercise" (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, p. 32). Cf. Coleridge, The Friend, Works, II, 296.

[166]Erskine, The Spiritual Order, p. 9. "If [moral intelligences] are created to be good, and if there is no goodness but of God, surely their goodness must be that of the Son. . . a filial will entering into and adopting the purpose of the Father; and their capacity of goodness must consist in the indwelling of the Son, whose presence in them both confers on them his own filial relation to the Father and communicates to them the character of his own goodness. Thus we see how Christian morality rises out of and is dependent on Christian theology; and how those precepts which direct the doing of the most

ordinary actions of humanity have, according to the Christian theory, their root in these claims of Jesus" (Erskine, "The Divine Son," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 39-40).

[167]Hallam, Writings, p. 275fn.

[168]"To the moral and thinking being it cannot but appear strange that God should pardon him because he believes something. It gives such an unintelligible and unedifying idea of the divine character--an idea which never can impress the mind with holy feelings or affections or desires" (Erskine, The Unconditional Freeness, p. 78).

[169]"As soon as he discovers that the purpose of God in giving him a law is to train him into a participation of His own righteousness and blessedness, that very moment the Law becomes Gospel and his Judge becomes his Father. The revelation of this purpose then is the Gospel, and it is virtually made to every man, for the light in his conscience which condemns his sin ought to be understood as 'the goodness of God leading him to repentance'" (Erskine, "The Purpose of God," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 67-68).

[170]". . .Forgiveness in its deepest sense does not mean deliverance from a penalty or the reversal of a sentence, it means the continuance of a fatherly purpose of final good, even through the infliction of the penalty and the execution of the sentence.

"Jesus is set forth, suffering death as the penalty of sin in unswerving filial trust, as a manifestation to us of that righteousness which God desires to see in us. . . . In the truest theology forgiveness (taken in the sense of remission of penalty) is never considered as an ultimate blessing, but only as a means to an end. That end is righteousness" (Erskine, "Thoughts on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 140-1).

"And so a fellowship in Christ's sufferings is not a grief because Christ suffered, it is not a grieving that Christ grieved so much on our account; no, it is having the same grief, and this no man can possibly have until he has in him that very living spirit, which grieved in Jesus" (Erskine, The Brazen Serpent, pp. 158-159).

[171]". . .I have a hope (which I would not willingly think contrary to the revelation of mercy) of the ultimate salvation of all. I trust that He who came to bruise the serpent's head will not cease his work of compassion until he has expelled the fatal poison from every individual of our race. I humbly think that the promise bears this wide interpretation. You think not, I know. Well, the Judge of all the earth will do right" (Erskine, Letters, p. 92).

"I spoke to her of God's love to us as the only thing that could lead us to love Him; she then spoke of the condition of men after death, and of the numbers who died at a distance from God, and asked me what I thought of this as regarding the love of God to man. I then told her frankly what I hoped for all men. She told me that she herself sometimes entertained that hope, but that she could not find it in the

Bible, yet she thought there could be no real gospel without it. I think so too--the unending love of God. . . ." (Ibid., p. 346).

"My belief in the continuation of the process of spiritual education beyond this life relieves me at all events from the agonising thought that twenty-six years of negligence are to fix the eternal condition of the soul for good or evil. I cannot read the passage contained in the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, verses 30-33, without wondering that any should think that the Bible decidedly teaches that doctrine. . . ." (Ibid., p. 353).

Arranged in chronological order, these statements of Erskine demonstrate his growing faith in universal redemption. Perhaps the DNB is justified in taking note of this universalism as his major importance. But I feel that its relationship to his total theology must be perceived before it can be understood. It will be evident already, and will become more so, that this tendency is inherent in the christology. Whether it has to be, I am not equal to calculate. Below we will note Hallam struggling mightily to reconcile this tendency with the necessarily exclusive Calvinistic doctrine of election.

[172]"All religions,--for absolute Pantheism is none,--must of necessity be anthropomorphic. The idea of God must be adapted to the capacities of the human imagination, Christianity differs from all other Religions in this, that its anthropomorphism is theopneustic" (Guesses at Truth, p. 209).

"Many learned men, Grotius, for instance, and Wetstein, have taken pains to illustrate the New Testament by quoting all the passages they could collect from the writers of classical antiquity, expressing sentiments in any way analogous to the doctrines and precepts of the Gospel. This some persons regard as a disparagement. . . But surely it is no disparagement to the wisdom of God, or to the dignity of Reason, that the development of Reason should be preceded by corresponding instincts, and that something analogous to it should be found even in inferior animals. It is no disparagement to the sun, that he should be preceded by the dawn. On the contrary, this is his glory. . . . Therefore, instead of shrinking from the notion that anything at all similar to any of the doctrines of Christianity may be found in heathen forms of religion, let us seek out all such resemblances diligently, giving thanks to God that He has never left Himself wholly without a witness" (Ibid., pp. 436-437). Compare this with Tennyson's appropriation of evolutionary theory to Christianity, as in In Memoriam and "The Dawn," for example.

". . .The inward spiritual principles are ever involved and implied in the Law of Moses. Nay, those very commandments, which our Lord declares to be the sum of the Law and of the Prophets, had already been proclaimed in the Wilderness" (Hare, The Victory of Faith, p. 178).

". . .These dreams of the world, so far from helping to persuade us that all which we hold is a dream likewise, are rather exactly that which ought to have preceded the world's awaking: . . .these parhelions do not proclaim everything else to be an optical illusion,

but announce, and witness for, a sun that is travelling into sight. . . ." (Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 3). Note that Trench has apparently borrowed the image from Hare.

"The Indian religions . . . are not without their elements of an obscured truth--and in this mainly, that they declare it to be most worthy of God to reveal Himself as man--that this is the only true revelation of Him, that an incarnation is the fittest outcoming of the glory of God. But, not to urge that what they have to tell. . . are only dreams of men. . .they do not concentrate and gather up this revelation of God in one incarnation, but lose and scatter it through unnumbered. For while one incarnation is precious, a thousand are worth nothing; they become mere transient points of contact between God and man, momentary docetic apparitions of the divine under human forms" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, p. 123).

"However ignorant the authors of the sacred books may have been of natural science, and however tinctured by the peculiarities of their age and country, still, in all that they say, they hold forth the conception of a God loving righteousness and hating wickedness, and seeking to induce men to do the same. I cannot regard this as accidental. Greeks and Romans, Egyptians, Persians and Hindoos had exercised their minds in the search after God with very questionable success; whilst this despised unphilosophical tribe seem from the first to have possessed this knowledge, not as a secret confined to the learned class but as the common inheritance of the nation. . . ." (Erskine, "The Bible in Relation to Faith," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 94-95).

But compare: "I believe that [justification by faith] is special neither to Judaism nor to Christianity, that it is in fact no peculiar doctrine, separable from others, but rather the intelligible sum and substance of all doctrine, and that the value of the special revelations of Christianity really consists in the illustration and corroboration which they give to it. For no one can doubt that faith or filial trust in God. . . is the right condition of mind for spiritual beings. . .that such faith is their righteousness.

"Such an assurance as this I would call true natural religion, and I would even say that this naturalness is the test by which the truth of any revelation, claiming to be from God, must in the last resort be judged" (Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, p. 132). The two statements are not contradictory in Erskine's terms.

173"The idea of the oneness of Holy Scripture is incomplete and imperfect, till it pass into the higher idea of its unity; till we acknowledge that it is not sameness which reigns there; that, besides being one, it is also many; that as in the human body we, having many members, are one body, not otherwise is it with Scripture" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, pp. 39-40).

"How inevitable was it that He, the Sun of the spiritual heaven, should find no single mirror large enough to take in all his beams--should only be adequately presented to the world, when many from many sides did, under the direct teachings of God's Spirit, undertake to set him forth [in the scriptures]" (Ibid., p. 46).

"The common notion of the Ideal, as exemplified more especially in the Painting of the last century, degrades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an ideal, you must get rid of everything individual about it. Whereas the true ideal is the individual, purified and potentiated, the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded and animated and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 448).

[174]"That pardon may be freely obtained through Christ, is the very thing which we are called on to believe, and in believing this we come to the actual possession of it. The act of amnesty is antecedent to our belief, and independent of it--it remains firm and good, though we scout it and reject it; but by so doing, we exclude ourselves from its operation" (Erskine, An Essay on Faith, pp. 137-138).

[175]"I maintain that guilt in man always supposed power--that there could be no guilt unless there existed the power of doing or abstaining. I admit that no man ever believes or obeys except by divine teaching and divine support. But I affirm that no man in the ordinary exercise of his faculties lies under any natural incapacity of believing truth, or obeying what is just and reasonable, or, if he does lie under any such natural incapacity, that it is impossible to suppose that any guilt can attach to him in consequence of unbelief or disobedience" (Erskine, Letters, p. 48).

[176]"The Whole Proceedings in the Case of the Rev. John M'Leod Campbell," pp. 32ff., quoted in Erskine, Letters, pp. 133-134.

[177]Ibid.

[178]Campbell, pp. 133-134. The next sentence must be a compliment to Maurice, the work coming so closely on the heels of Maurice's expulsion: ". . .This root error will always tend to develop itself in reducing the meaning of the words, 'eternal life,' to the conception of an unproved future endless blessedness that awaits us as those who trust in Christ's merits, not a spiritual state into which we enter in receiving the knowledge of God in Christ."

[179]Erskine, The Brazen Serpent, pp. 41-42.

[180]Ibid., p. 131. Cf. Letters, p. 289; The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel, pp. 55-56.

[181]Letters, pp. 33-34.

[182]"Thoughts on. . .Romans,' in The Spiritual Order, p. 151.

[183]"The Purpose of God," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 58-61.

[184]Campbell, p. 55.

[185]"The Purpose of God," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 63-64.

[186]Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 63.

[187]Ibid., p. 64.

[188]Maurice, Life, II, 262.

[189]"The object of Christianity is to bring the character of man into harmony with that of God. To this end, it is evidently necessary that a just idea of the Divine character should be formed, the works of creation, the arrangements of providence, and the testimony of conscience, are, if thoroughly weighed, sufficient to give this idea. But men are in general so much occupied by the works, that they forget their great author; and their characters are so opposed to his, that they turn away their eyes from the contemplation of that purity which condemns them" (Erskine, Remarks on the Internal Evidence, p. 35).

[190]"It must ever be remembered, that, while the Gospel recognises the law, and honours the law, it raises us above the law; while, as to the very point of these two characters of God, viz., the Lawgiver and the Father, we know that it is only by the revelation of the Father that God succeeds in realizing the will of the Lawgiver in men" (Campbell, p. 62).

[191]The Brazen Serpent, p. 122.

[192]Erskine, Letters, p. 141.

[193]"No suffering of a penalty due to sin either by ourselves or by another in our place can put sin away, for sin is a spiritual thing and can only be put away by return to righteousness; and, as sin has also a strictly individual character, it is only by becoming righteous ourselves, and not by another being so in our stead, that sin in us can be truly put away" (Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, p. 153).

"The sense of sin creates distrust, and therefore God, to overcome this distrust, has in the gospel shown us the eternal foundation of all trust, by opening up to us the mystery of His own nature of Father and Son, and by revealing to us that we are created in the Son, who is thus the root and type and mould of our being, and also the assured pledge of the Father's relation to us, and of His purpose for us" (Erskine, "Forgiveness," in The Spiritual Order, p. 240).

[194]See James H. Rigg, Modern Anglican Theology, for a full polemic against the concept of atonement embraced by these men. Rigg's extended study, originally published in 1857, is as thorough and perceptive as such a work could be that began with his preoccupations and antagonisms. But with much to offer by way of insight into their beliefs, and with the advantage of careful and extensive reading of their works, Rigg is

unable to overcome his antipathy sufficiently to be candid in his treatment of them.

Primarily, he is irritated at their universalism, which he perceptively (but without granting them any biblical or Christian rationale) ascribes to Platonism (or, as he says of Maurice, "Neo-Platonic Realism"). As the work progresses, he becomes increasingly polemical in his defense of the traditional system, and particularly of the concept of substitutionary atonement. He makes no reference to Erskine or Campbell, but he is fully aware that with Hare and Maurice "atonement" means "at-one-ment," and that other terms have been similarly reinterpreted. Exasperated at what he considers their deliberate attempts to obscure their heterodoxy by such means, and so plant the seeds of their dangerous doctrines unobserved and unhindered, he descends to fight the issue on grounds of etymology and to condemn by association (e.g., Hare, on whom he tends to be more gentle, is chided for his friendship with the dangerous Bunsen, p. 219fn.). His major hue and cry is that they would fain destroy the temple--that their generosity of grace will undermine Christianity, legitimately so called. Not trying to answer their theology on its own grounds, he generally assumes the absolute identity of the traditional substitutionary, legalistic syndrome with the Gospel and contents himself with pointing out where these men have departed from it. However, to this work I owe a number of insights I have developed, from a different perspective, in the present study. Rigg may be read as corrective by those who feel the present study is too sympathetic; but all are hereby warned that Rigg is prone to bend facts and slant interpretations if the method will glorify God. The work was extremely popular in its day (the first edition sold out in eighteen months) and no doubt helped short-circuit any constructive effect these men might have had on the last third of the century.

[195]"Christ <u>is</u> himself both object and subject in Christianity. He both shows forth the Father's loving purpose which is the ground of all faith, and he lives by the faith which rests on that purpose. He is thus both the gospel itself, and in him is shown forth that righteousness by faith which is its most precious product. Thus whilst he is the <u>object</u> of faith as the Revealer of the Father, he is also the exerciser of faith as the Truster in the Father" (Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in <u>The Spiritual Order</u>, p. 136).

"Christ, as God, is the same yesterday, today, and for ever: as Man, He grew in wisdom and in stature, and in favour with God and man" (Hare, <u>The Victory of Faith</u>, p. 73).

"But Christ as perfect God, shews us what God is; as perfect Man, shews what man ought to be; as at once perfect God and perfect Man shews us how God and man may be at one" (<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 198).

[196]Francis Garden, "The Atonement as a Fact and as a Theory," in <u>Tracts for Priests and People by Various Writers</u>, p. 135. Garden acknowledges his indebtedness to Campbell, p. 145fn.

[197]Maurice, <u>Religions of the World</u>, p. 195.

[198]Garden, p. 139.

[199]". . .The way of sacrifice. . .was to be a type and sign of the slaying and offering up of the carnal will, the carnal nature, to God" (Hare, The Victory of Faith, p. 182).

". . .We see beneath all evil, beneath the universe itself, that eternal and original union of the Father and the Son. . .which was never fully manifested till the Only Begotten by the eternal Spirit offered Himself to God. The revelation of that primal unity is the revelation of the ground on which all things stand. . . . It is the revelation of that perfect harmony to which we look forward when all things are gathered up in Christ. . .when the law of sacrifice shall be the acknowledged law of all creation" (The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. 194, quoted in Porter and Wolf, p. 27).

[200]Garden, pp. 139-140.

[201]"In other words, sacrifice and burnt-offering God was weary of--those shadows of the true; and Christ came to give the substance; and his actual pouring out of his soul to death was the outer embodiment of the inward truth, that this yeilding of his will to his Father's reached to the uttermost, did not shrink from or stop short of the last and most searching proof to which it was put" (Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 72). Cf. Campbell, pp. 104-105.

[202]"This was the propitiatory act; and God set forth His Son, in this act, as a manifestation of the righteousness which He desires to see in man. The righteous character of the act made it a propitiation; and as God desires to see righteousness in all men He in fact desires to see that propitiation in all men."

"Thus then the faith of Jesus himself witnesses to the trustworthiness of the Father. He both manifests his Father's righteousness, and declares the righteousness of all who have the faith he himself had."

"By following out this train of thought I believe we shall arrive at the true sense in which Jesus is set forth as a propitiation. If we receive the idea that he is the organic Head of the race, and that everything which he did is in its principle to be reproduced in us; and if we further consider that, having subjected himself to all our conditions of weakness and suffering and death, he waged his successful war against our spiritual enemies simply in the might of filial trust, we can understand how the Father, looking upon him as he thus fulfilled all righteousness, should be well pleased. He saw in him the reflection of His own loving desire for the salvation of all men; He saw him also as their Head sending forth spiritual impulses through the whole body, inviting and enabling all the members to yield themselves to His Spirit;--He saw and was well pleased" (Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 158-160).

[203]Campbell, pp. 121-122.

[204]Sterling, I, lxxv. Cf. Erskine, of Romans 6: 12-19: ". . .The idea of Headship really explains and fulfils all that is supposed to be

contained in the doctrine of substitution, even in the estimation of those who hold it most strongly" ("Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, p. 182).

[205]Cf. Hallam: "All the other bonds that had fastened down the Spirit of the Universe to our narrow round of earth, were as nothing to this golden chain of suffering and self-sacrifice, which at once riveted the heart of man to one, who, like himself, was acquainted with grief" ("On Some of the Characteristics of Modern Poetry, and on the Lyrical Poems of Alfred Tennyson," in Writings, p. 272).

[206]Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, p. 138.

[207]Campbell, p. 278.

[208]Ibid., pp. 282-283.

[209]Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 64.

[210]Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 154-155.

[211]"But this unity of Scripture, where is it? . . . the story of the knitting anew the broken relations between the Lord God and the race of man; of the bringing the First-begotten [NB] into the world, for the gathering together all the scattered and the sundered in Him;. . . . It is the story of the divine relations of men, of the divine life which, in consequences of those still subsisting relations, was struggling to the birth with more or less successful issues in every faithful man; which came perfectly to the birth in the One, even in Him in whom those relations were constituted at the first, and perfectly sealed at the last" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, pp. 26-27).

"To the early Jewish Church God spoke by means of types. By types He foreshewed the atonement which was one day to be accomplisht. (Hare, The Victory of Faith, p. 185).

"As the Law had foreshewn the atonement by types, the Prophets declared it by words. In them we find. . . the more distinct and definite announcement of Him who was to overcome the world. . . ." (Ibid., pp. 185-186).

"The reason why [Heber] denies that this Grace bore any part in Christ's promise, is, that this is not peculiar to the Christian dispensation, but had been vouchsafed already to the Jews, and even, in a certain measure, to Heathens. Yet the whole order of nature is for the dawn to precede the sunrise. The light of the sun is seen, before the sun himself appears; and yet the rising of the sun may truly be called a new, distinct, epochal act" (Hare, The Mission of the Comforter, p. 266).

"The idea of prophecy even under the Old Testament is not confined to the announcement of the future; nor is this its essential element. . . . This however is less brought forward here as the main point, which is

rather the declaration of what is hidden in men's hearts, and admonitions, exhortations, and warnings connected therewith" (Ibid., pp. 335-336).

"And thus the prophetic history of sufferings contained in the 53d chapter of Isaiah, though in one sense exclusively applicable to Jesus as the great atoning sacrifice, yet is in another, but perfectly true sense, applicable also to all those who receive the spirit of Christ into them. This may startle at first sight, but any one who sees the true character of our Lord's sufferings, and understands them to have been not a vicarious infliction, but the grieving of his holy love over the sins and sorrows of a nature which he had actually assumed, and of which he was actually the head, and the persecution which such a love would necessarily draw on itself from the unholy enmity of the world, will perceive that, whilst the world continues wicked, the spirit of Jesus in a man, must suffer as Jesus did" (Erskine, The Brazen Serpent, pp. 170-171fn).

212". . .Prophecy did never run before that actual development, which alone would enable it to speak a language which men should understand. It did not paint upon air; but ever claimed forms of the present in which to array its promise of the future. Thus we have no mention of Christ the Prophet till a great Prophet had actually arisen, till Moses could say, 'The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet like unto me'" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, p. 73). Note the similarity to Spinoza's Tractatus.

213"If the invisible be denied, or (which is equivalent) considered invisible from the defect of the senses and not in its own nature, the sciences even of observation and experiment lose their essential copula. The component parts can never be reduced into an harmonious whole, but must owe their systematic arrangement to the accidents of an ever-shifting perspective. Much more then must this apply to the moral world disjoined from religion. Instead of morality, we can at best have only a scheme of prudence. . . . By celestial observations alone can even terrestial charts be constructed scientifically" (Coleridge, The Friend, in Works, II, 402).

"I think that there is a risk sometimes of losing hold of the great principle and kernel of prophecy, through occupation with its details; although the opposite evil has certainly been the prevalent one in our days. . . . What I meant by the details. . .is. . .when the prophecy is more considered than the thing prophesied, as when the sign is more considered than the thing signified." (Erskine, Letters, p. 201).

". . .evidently Pusey and Newman equally--or the first rather more than the second--look not to the Christ ascended into the heavens that He may fill all things as the bond of communion, but to some kind of descent into the elements. What that is must always be a subject of debate; it can never by [be] a pledge of fellowship. Curiously enough, Newman defends Mariolatry because we want the idea of an ascended humanity as well as of a descended Godhead. A remarkable testimony to that which we do indeed want, the belief that He that descended is the same that ascended" (Porter and Wolf, p. 227; Life, II, 517).

214". . .So many passages of the Old Testament are applied to Christ in the New Testament, which, taken in their original place, seem to refer to a subject much less exalted. And the reason of the application of them to Christ is this; that whereas all prophecy is addressed to the hopes of the good, and to the fears of the evil, so the perfect fulfilment of it, that is, the perfect satisfying of these hopes, and the perfect realizing those fears, is to be found only in the perfect triumph of good, and the perfect destruction of evil; of both which we have the pledge in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and in his exaltation to the right hand of God, thence to come at the end of the world to judge the quick and the dead. So that if we would fully satisfy the highest sense of all prophecy, if we would give it its entire fulfilment, we must seek for it necessarily in Him in whom all the promises of God, as St. Paul says, are found to be true. . . ." Thomas Arnold, Sermons Chiefly on the Interpretation of Scripture, 2nd ed. (London, 1845), pp. 19-20.

". . .Parabolic persons. . .men whose actions and whose sufferings obtain a new significance, inasmuch as they were in these drawing lines, though often quite unaware. . ., which Another. . .should hereafter fill up. . . ." (Trench, Notes on the Parables, p. 27).

". . .The Church, informed and quickened by the Spirit of God, more and more discovers what in Holy Scripture is given her; but it is not this, that she unfolds by an independent power any thing farther therefrom. She has always possessed what she now possesses of doctrine and truth, only now with the same distinctness of consciousness. . . . all this which she has laboriously won, she possessed before implicitly though not explicitly. . . ." (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, pp. 76-77).

"Who more convinced that I am . . . that the Law and the Prophets speak throughout of Christ? That all the intermediate applications and realizations of the words are but types and repetitions--translations, as it were, from the language of letters and articulate sounds into the language of events and symbolical persons?" (Coleridge, "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," in Works, V, 589).

215"In the history of literature we find examples without number, how, on eating of the Tree of Knowledge, we are banisht from the Tree of Life" (Hare, Guesses at Truth, p. 386).

216On the growing awareness of myth and the place of these men in that phenomenon see James Donald Kissane, The Poetry of Tennyson in Relation to Nineteenth-Century Attitudes toward Mythology (diss. Johns Hopkins University, 1956).

217"Is it not that implication of doctrine in the miracle and of miracle in the doctrine, which is the bridge of communication between the senses and the soul;--that predisposing warmth which renders the understanding susceptible of the specific impression from the historic, and from all other outward, seals of testimony? Is not this the one infallible criterion of miracles, by which a man can know whether they be of God?" (Coleridge, The Friend, in Works, II, 394).

[218]"For even if it should be admitted that the causes assigned by Paulus were capable of producing the effects ascribed to them, still they are merely matter of conjecture; and therefore, though they may be more comprehensible than a supernatural cause, have at least no greater historical certainty" (Thirlwall, "Introduction" to Schleiermacher, Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke, p. cxlviii).

[219]"The miracles, as well as the sacrifices, are never final things; they do not terminate in themselves; they are signs of the kingdom. They are signs of that of which righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost are the reality" (Erskine, Letters, p. 196).

[220]So Trench explains how the correct interpretation of parable may be arrived at: ". . .When it explains all the phenomena, and not merely some; . . .it is good evidence that we have discovered the right interpretation of a parable, if it leaves none of the main circumstances unexplained." Compare Coleridge on the organic nature of the poem, one "the parts of which mutually support and explain each other; all in their proportion harmonizing with, and supporting the purpose and known influences of metrical arrangement" (Biographia Literaria, II, 10; Trench, Notes on the Parables, p. 37).

[221]Letters, p. 274; The Brazen Serpent, pp. 87, 106, 170-171.

[222]Porter and Wolf, pp. 27, 53-54; Hare, The Victory of Faith, p. 106; Coleridge, The Friend in Works, II, 288; Erskine, The Brazen Serpent, pp. 96, 125, 139, 156, 227.

[223]The Brazen Serpent, p. 111fn.

[224]Ibid., p. 112.

[225]Erskine, The Spiritual Order, p. 46.

[226]Erskine, The Spiritual Order, p. 240.

[227]Erskine, "Thoughts on. . .Romans," in The Spiritual Order, pp. 161-162.

[228]Ibid., p. 163.

[229]Ibid., p. 164.

[230]Ibid., p. 172.

[231]Ibid., p. 192.

[232]"For this is a part of the glory of Christ. . .that He alone stands at the absolute centre of humanity, the one completely harmonious man, unfolding all which was in that humanity equally upon all sides, fully upon all sides--the only one in whom the real and ideal met, and were absolutely at one" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, p. 50).

233"In like manner the parables are a calling of attention to the spiritual facts which underlie all processes of nature, all institutions of human society, and which, though unseen, are the true ground and support of all. Christ moved in the midst of what seemed to the eye of sense an old and worn-out world, and it evidently became new at his touch; for it told to man now the inmost secrets of His being. He found that it answered with strange and marvellous correspondence to another world within him,--that it helped to the birth great thoughts of his heart, which before were helplessly struggling to be born,--that of these two worlds without him and within each threw a light and a glory on the other. For on this rests the possibility of a real teaching by parables, such as, resting upon a substantial ground, shall not be a mere building on the air, or painting upon a cloud,--on this, namely, that the world around us is a divine world, that it is God's world, the world of the same God who is leading us into spiritual truth. . . ." (Trench, Notes on the Parables, p. 20).

". . .Where there are no workings, conscious or unconscious, to the great end of the manifestation of the Son of God in the flesh,--conscious as in Israel, unconscious, as in Greece,--where neither those nor these are found, there history does not and cannot exist. For history, if it be not the merest toy, the idlest pastime of our vacant hours, is the record of the onward march of humanity towards an end. Where there is no belief in such an end, and therefore no advance toward it, no stirrings of a divine Word in a people's bosom, where not as yet the beast's heart has been taken away, and a man's heart given, there history cannot be said to be" (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, p. 31).

"For indeed this which is peculiar to our Christian faith, namely, that in it at length, and in it only, a real meeting-place between heaven and earth has been established in the person of Jesus of Nazareth--that the divine was born into the human, and so, not by transient and external contact, but in very deed, heaven came down to earth, and the earth was lifted up into heaven, God became a man, and man God--this, which is the peculiar prerogative and glory of our Christian faith, is yet not so peculiarly ours, but that every religion has, in some shape or other, made pretension to the same" (Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 47).

". . .The whole events of time are just one condemnation on account of sin, and he who does not see the love of God, and the Christ of God, in them, does not see life, but the condemnation abideth in him in its own unmitigated character. Yet that love is in the whole course of events, whether we see it or shut our eyes against it. In all of them there is a kindness of God leading men to Himself" (Erskine, Letters, p. 145).

234"But this moral need, what is it? It is the sense that we are sundered and scattered each from God, each from his fellow-man, each from himself. . . . Then we shall see in this Word that it is the very history which we require--that altogether, nothing but that--the history of the restoring the defaced image of God, the re-construction of a ruined but Godlike race, in the image of God's own son. . . ." (Trench, The Fitness of Holy Scripture, pp. 37-38).

[235]"God is in all that He does and in all that He makes or sustains, and God is Love. Therefore, in truth, every event in providence, and every work of creation, is full of holy love, because they are full of God. The fall of man, the corruption of his nature, consists in his blindness to this element of love which pervades and fills all things. He sees the things, but he does not see love in them, and that love is truly their character and essence, because it is the character and essence of Him who is their cause and their fountain" (Erskine, Letters, p. 271).

"[The glory of Christianity] lies, not in its having relation to nothing which went before itself, but rather in its having relation to every thing, in its being the middle point to which all lines, some consciously, more unconsciously, were tending, and in which all centered at last" (Trench, Christ the Desire of All Nations, p. 4).

[236]Hallam's Theodicaea Novissima, while not altogether consistent with this christology, enunciates certain themes of it. Christ is the object of the love of God, "the motive which drew God from eternity into time," (Writings, p. 203) and is the "necessary completion of his being, the reproduction of Him, without which His nature could not have been fulfilled, because He is love." (Ibid., p. 204). In Christ's death, "the crowning act of his faith in God," he manifested that nature fully; "God beheld his perfect Son . . . and the First Great Problem of the Eternal Nature was solved" (p. 211). He explains the function of the atonement after the manner of Erskine in The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel and The Brazen Serpent, developing the concept of empathy he had enunciated in "On Sympathy": ". . .The tendency of love is towards a union so intimate, as virtually to amount to identification; when then by affection towards Christ we have become blended with his being, the beams of Eternal Love falling, as ever, on the one beloved object will include us in him . . . and so shall we be one with Christ and through Christ with God" (p. 210).

Hallam shows here, as T. H. Vail Motter has noted (and Henry Hallam before him--see Tennyson and His Friends, ed. Hallam Tennyson [London, 1911], p. 457), the impact of Jonathan Edwards. Striving to find a place in the love of God for the fact of evil and the damnation of the lost, Hallam builds his justification of God upon the love He held for Christ. Holding firmly to the omnipotence of God, insisting that the damnation of many must have been part of the divine plan, Hallam sees the sacrifice of the lost as necessary for that love to be fulfilled--certainly a remarkable variation, or rather inversion, of the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. Here is repeated the pattern we have noted in rationalistic schemes, to begin with definitions of God in static superlatives and proceed by arguments from necessity--a pattern of inescapable determinism, God himself being the first captive. This disquisition takes up the first two-thirds of Hallam's little treatise. But in the last part he turns to a "different and less important" topic, the manner of the atonement, as described herein. But the inclusive nature of this atonement puts a palpable strain on the exclusivism, and its organic nature on the static system, of the prior discourse. Hallam is aware of the problem; he asserts the atonement to be "universal, in so far as it left no obstacle between

man and God, but man's own will"; but he undercuts that assertion by making the will subject to God's election (pp. 210-211). Coleridge had taken the same course in Aids to Reflection. In this dilemma, while insisting that Christ's sacrifice was the perfect expression of God's own love, Hallam simultaneously tries to make Christ's "intentions and affections . . . equally directed to all" (p. 211) but because of the necessity inherent in God's higher love for Him He could win salvation only "for as many as the Father gave him" (p. 208). It is a brave attempt, but it seems to me Hallam is unable to reconcile Edwards and Erskine. In his father's words, "His hypothesis . . . on the origin of evil, resolves itself at last into an unproved assumption of its necessity" (quoted in Hallam Tennyson, ed., Tennyson and His Friends). (T. H. Vail Motter believes Hallam has drawn from Channing, which may well be. The similarity to Erskine is notable, however.)

CHAPTER VI

IN MEMORIAM: A CASE IN POINT

The title of Tennyson's great poem tells us that it is about Arthur Henry Hallam; the first lines tell us it is about Christ. The major problem in reading the work is the relationship between these two subjects. On this center[1], I believe, turn all the concerns of the poem--the painful paradox of a promising life cut short; the enigma of sorrow; the inter-relationship and yet antagonism of faith and knowledge, the interdependence of doubt and faith; the place of man in nature; the relationship of science and religion; the meaning of evolution and progress; the question of immortality and that of the nature of immortality; the antagonism and yet the mutual dependence of the universal and the individual; the nature and significance of fame; the domestic scenes and images that culminate in the marriage hymn; the function of symbol and the function of statement in human experience and in art. Some of these themes may be resolved in their own terms, without reference to that question as their matrix; but even these, so resolved, are stripped of much of their significance. Others remain, it seems to me, hopelessly confused, in the neglect of such a reference.

That the poem is in some sense about Christ may be questioned, but cannot at last be denied. The work, in the form it finally took, opens

with an invocation and closes with a hymn. It is permeated with allusions, explicit and implied, to "the Life indeed." The poem is structured around the Christmases[2], and the whole work prophesies that "the time draws near the birth of Christ." After the analysis of Clyde L. de Ryals, there can be little doubt--whether or not one agrees with all of his conclusions--that Tennyson intends some close analogy between Hallam and Jesus. If some portion of Ryals' extensive documentation remains equivocal, much on the contrary is not to be refused; and there are numerous other evidences that he has not cited, which might be brought forth to establish his case. If doubt yet remains, we have the word of the poet himself, as recorded by Hallam Tennyson in the Memoirs.[3] I hope to show, in the ensuing discussion, that not only are the subjects Hallam and Christ undoubtedly related, but moreover this relationship is organic in the poem and, rightly seen, provides a structure and coherence not adequately noted in previous analyses.

Much of our problem with In Memoriam has been occasioned by unwillingness to come to the work on its own terms. In the general reaction against Victorian religiosity, the typical response to a poem so unapologetic about its religious concerns has been, when generous, a subdued embarrassment that a man with evident poetic powers should so misapply them. The embarrassment and irritation seem often to have directed the reading of the poem. Analysis has often come down to the question of whether Tennyson's faith as the poem supposedly set it forth was defensible or not--whether one could really, after all, accept the hope for immortality which seemed to

be Tennyson's main motive in the poem. Needless to say, the faith was often judged "a poor thing," and Tennyson himself, for offering it, was scored or sneered at or pitied or called an equivocator.

All this may turn out to be, at last, legitimate exercise of the critical faculty. But surely judgments of such sort, favorable or unfavorable, are better attempted only after an open and careful encounter with the poem's own premises. It seems to be particularly difficult to grant the Victorians that kind of poetic faith. We are quite willing to grant to Aeschylus his assumption that Zeus in his harsh grace leads man to wisdom through suffering, though we do not worship Zeus or believe he exists or perhaps even believe that there is such a thing as wisdom. The artistic question is, what can the poet make of these assumptions? What can he create that rings true, given his myth? But the myth by which Tennyson works we have difficulty granting--perhaps because we are still specially related to it, either in uneasy acceptance or in somewhat uneasy rejection. For I suppose if we were not uneasy about it, we would address it much as we do that of Aeschylus.[4]

But our second, and more severe, difficulty has been our misconstruction of that myth even in our attempts to grant it. The misconstruction, too, may be in part the product of our embarrassment; perhaps the myth we are self-consciously trying to accept or reject or ignore we assume to be approximate to that of the poem. The long preamble to this present discussion has been an attempt to make another reconstruction of Tennyson's ground myth possible. If it should prove erroneous in some respects, or lead after all to another misconstruction,

it may at least perform the service of requiring a reexamination of what we construe his assumptions to be. There are probably several ways to evoke such reexamination; the present study will proceed by redefining what might be called the christology of the poem, in the belief that if we know what Christ is (root and all, and all in all) we will know what God and Hallam is.

This central question--so I conceive it--is not merely a thematic one. It has to do intimately with the structure and development of the poem. It is the secret of the poem's coherence.[5] It provides the ground metaphor that gives life and point to many individual images and to patterns of images. Once that metaphor is defined, much that has been treated as straightforward preachment, as prosaic statement, will appear as metaphorically based. If such is the case, several reassessments will need to be made. The process of extracting certain segments of In Memoriam to proof-text Tennyson's attitudes toward science, nature, immortality, progress, etc. will have to be chastened, if the poem is an organic whole rather than a collection of dissociated comments. Much complaint about Tennyson's prosy and "ruminative" style will perhaps be embarrassed in the presence of a complex, but sustained and exact, imagery, not clearly seen before. We may find that much of the prosiness is attributable to prosaic expectations: that when the doors of perception are cleansed, "every thought breaks out a rose."

The thesis to be presently examined, then, is that there is a christology assumed in the poem closely resembling that explicated in the preceding chapter. It seems to me not to have been adequately

defined, much less granted to the poem, in previous readings. Whether or not the critic subscribed to Christianity, whether he came to the poem to damn or approve, the theological and especially christological assumptions were not essentially Tennyson's. With few exceptions, the traditional exclusive dualism is assumed, between the divine and the human, between thi: world and God's world. God and man are therefore set in an ontological polarity.[6] The main features of the assumed christology are consequent. Christ's role is expiatory, in the substitutionary sense of "ransom theology": He is the bridge of access and escape: He will win for the faithful a reprieve from doubt, despair, eternal oblivion or torment--and, incidentally and only as condition of the reprieve, from sin. His power to win the reprieve rests on the special favor He can employ with the Judge, witnessed by His unique credentials. Of primary import, then, are the credentials, the badges of identity, not the nature of the advocate or of His plea (which, if these are considered at all, are considered as further credentials to the authority of His demand for reprieve or treated as merely incidental). When this christology is applied to In Memoriam, not surprisingly it is objected that Tennyson's poem is equivocal on the point of whether Hallam or Christ is the instrument of salvation. The equivocation must then, assumedly, be resolved one way or the other. One way insists that Tennyson has really been loyal to the traditional Christianity with the scheme of atonement and redemption here described--though perhaps he has been too bold at points in making Hallam its latter-day prophet, and perhaps there are some potentially dangerous taints of modernism in his attempts to gather some secular virtues into the scheme. The other sees

Tennyson's Christ shrunk (for all the fustian) into the merely human Hallam, which is to say that he has betrayed the uniqueness of the historical Jesus and that of the theological Christ by displacement or confusion.

The first of these readings seems the less satisfactory. Whatever the experience of the poem means, the role of Hallam is not merely to point the poet back to an unexamined trust in the traditional scheme. The experience of Hallam himself, as the poem represents it, lends little support to the thesis that "doubt is devil-born." There are a few wistful, nostalgic glances backward at any "early Heaven, . . . happy views," and the frank assertion that such unsophisticated and uncritical trust is a valid communion with God for those who can accept it purely. For them, the form is "flesh and blood/ To which [they link] a truth divine." But the way of the poet's soul has taken him elsewhere. When mind and soul no longer make one music, when old forms die, it is no good to deny the fact. The poem is full of challenges to easy answers, to faith founded consciously on fiction. A reading of the poem that sees these objections as merely weighed against traditional faith and found wanting must dispose of so many challenges from the poem itself, that in the end it requires Tennyson to be spiritually dishonest--requires all the challenges to be merely his straw men, set up to be demolished by a quasi-mystical demonstration that in spite of all appearance, man has only to "feel" the validity of the old trust in his heart.[7] The poem will not bear out such a reading. If this is the "faith" T. S. Eliot was talking about,[8] it is indeed "a poor thing," when compared to its doubt.[9]

More satisfactory is a second reading, represented most notably by H. N. Fairchild and Clyde de Ryals. One way or another, this reading notes that Tennyson's faith in Christianity and in immortality is closely implicated in his trust in Hallam. In brief, the reading offered by this group is that Hallam has become the immediate object of Tennyson's faith. Fairchild, for instance, says of CXXIX that "These lines suggest a tendency to confuse Hallam with the Second Person of the Trinity,"[10] and thinks that for Tennyson "Jesus was never a reproach and a crisis and a judgment, but simply a model of human conduct not very clearly distinguishable from Arthur Hallam; the personification of human love, not its divine source; 'the Christ that is to be' as the culmination of the progressive development of mankind, the dimly-conceived Omega but not the Alpha."[11] "Hallam takes the place of Christ," Benziger says flatly.[12] Ryals makes the same point, at length: "In 'In Memoriam' Tennyson substitutes a symbolic and transformed Hallam for the figure of Christ. . . . Arthur Henry Hallam becomes . . . the saviour to whom the speaker looks for rescue from his doubt and despair."[13]

In many of its details this reading is very close to the conclusions of the present study. The analysis of these men manages to account rather well for a good many of the objections to the first reading. Yet a minute examination of the poem shows much to challenge this hypothesis, as all these critics are aware. Like the rationalists confronted with the dilemma of miracles, these commentators generally account for the discrepancies by supposing either fuzzy thinking or fraudulent intent on Tennyson's part. The "prologue and other more explicitly Christian

passages are in one sense almost extraneous to the core of the poem," Benziger explains.[14] Fairchild represents Tennyson's appropriation of traditional Christian language and image as an expedient, "especially valuable as a bulwark against 'the faithless coldness of the times,'"[15] for "Ethical principles needed the support of communal religious emotion."[16] Ryals, less generous, explains that "he did not wish to confront his ideas head on. Instead, he wished to keep his religious belief under the cover of accepted Christian forms. . . ."[17]

Now it is quite possible to account for these difficulties by charging Tennyson with either a deliberate or an unconscious equivocation. It makes an interesting story that, at the last, Tennyson's courage failed him--that he simply could not bear to surrender the security of orthodox forms and traditional expectations,[18] and that he remembered the dilemma his own defection from Christianity would present to the poor sheep for whom he inadvertently found himself the shepherd.[19] So, we are to suppose, Tennyson hedged and obscured his own uncertainties and dishonestly misrepresented the conclusions that would have to be drawn from the incipient humanism of his Hallam-worship. Thus the orthodox assertions of faith, for example that of the prologue, need not be taken seriously.

But perhaps one should begin by taking the prologue seriously, without, however, too much haste to suppose that Tennyson is merely endorsing traditional views. It seems sensible to assume that Tennyson intended it to be taken seriously; he gave it signal importance not only by setting it in the most prominent place but also by openly representing it as the summation of the attitude of the whole poem, as

well as of its themes. One might therefore conclude, until examination proves otherwise, that if the prologue addresses Christ reverently, Tennyson means the poem to be reverential toward Christ, as Tennyson understands Him: that so far from substituting the worship of Hallam for the worship of Christ, the poem asserts that love and reverence for Christ is the very dynamic that validates and fulfills love for Hallam:

> I trust he lives in thee, and there
> I find him worthier to be loved.

Nor do the more explicit references to the historical Jesus throughout the poem display any contradiction of that reverence:

> Rise, happy morn, rise, holy morn,
> Draw forth the cheerful day from night:
> O Father, touch the east, and light
> The light that shone when Hope was born. (XXX)
>
> Then one deep love doth supersede
> All other, when her ardent gaze
> Roves from the living brother's face
> And rests upon the Life indeed.
>
> All subtle thought, all curious fears,
> Borne down by gladness so complete,
> She bows, she bathes the Saviour's feet
> With costly spikenard and with tears. (XXXII)
>
> Tho' truths in manhood darkly join,
> Deep-seated in our mystic frame,
> We yield all blessing to the name
> Of Him that made them current coin;
> . . . . . .
> And so the Word had breath, and wrought
> With human hands the creed of creeds
> In loveliness of perfect deeds,
> More strong than all poetic thought . . . . (XXXVI)
>
> . . . the sinless years
> That breathed beneath the Syrian blue . . . . (LII)
>
> And He that died in Holy Land
> Would reach us out the shining hand. . . . (LXXXIV)

Love is and was my Lord and King
  And in his presence I attend
  To hear the tidings of my friend,
Which every hour his courtiers bring.

Love is and was my King and Lord,
  And will be . . . . (CXXVI)

(For surely, when this section and the preceding one, CXXV, are set in light of the opening apostrophe--"Strong Son of God, Immortal Love"--it must be clear that here Love means the Christ.[20] If the issue should seem in doubt to anyone, let him compare the relationship set up between Hallam and Christ in the lines from the prologue quoted above with the relationship set out in the courtly image of CXXVI.)

Let these passages stand as preliminary evidence against Tennyson's irreverence toward Christ--an irreverence insinuated frequently, and even explicitly charged, in the readings of Fairchild, Masterman, and Ryals. If the interpretation of these passages is accepted, the question comes down to two particulars: that he has appropriated the scheme of Christianity, consciously or unconsciously, for ulterior motives; and that he treats Hallam in terms and with deference these men think properly reserved for Christ alone.

The present study is not concerned, directly, with a defense of Tennyson against these charges. They will remain moot issues, simply because they involve, at last, judgments beyond the scope of analysis. But they can, and must, be considered insofar as they reflect upon the statement and artistry of the poem proper. In this regard, they mean, respectively, that the religious pretensions of the poem are mere excresence--ornaments to glorify Hallam, or apotheosis of Tennyson's all-too-human need, or "empty chaff well meant for grain," or flat

artistic dishonesty; and that there is a thematic confusion, if not equivocation, in the function of the person of Hallam in the poem, and a concomitant impurity in the symbolic patterns. In these terms, the charges can be referred to an examination of the poem itself. And both of them turn upon the christology.

Whether or not a poet is reverent toward Christ may not be a legitimate artistic question at all; but whether the work as a whole is consistent with its parts, and whether the parts are consistent with one another, surely must be, in any definition of art that is not merely arbitrary. In the present instance, it will be profitable to stop for a moment and ponder the nature of the inconsistency with which In Memoriam is here charged. It will be immediately seen that if the concept of Christ Tennyson brought to the poem is that which his critics have customarily defined for him, then In Memoriam is and must be inconsistent. Tennyson would have set up for himself an impossible contradiction. He is required, first, to preserve the person of Jesus essentially unique from all men; second, to write an elegiac poem honoring the admittedly human Arthur Henry Hallam in terms of the Christ; and third, not to be irreverent. He is thus caught in an insoluble contradiction, required to resolve the exclusive dualism from which all the traditional heresies spring.

But let us see if the contradiction will not resolve itself under different definitions. The poet trusts that Hallam lives in Christ, says the prologue, and if one would understand how reverence for Hallam can be reverence for Christ, that idea will have to be grasped.[21] The preceding chapter has attempted to explicate the vision that, given the

ground identity of Christ with all men and the reorientation to one's true being that is supposed to be effected by empathetic identification into Christ's nature, men are Christ, sons of God. At the same time, however, they are sons in Christ's nature. To be a son of God apart from the nature of sonship asserted in Him is a contradiction in terms. He is the light that lights every man; He is the vine, they are the branches. Therefore they have life. But they are partakers of His life--branches, not parasites. By this christology, the Christ-image asserts the Christ, rather than displaces Him. It is assumed that a man can be a child of God without being a blasphemer.

By contrast, a christology that rejects the essential identification of Christ and man can not sustain a Christ-image in that sense. If one begins with an absolute exclusion of man from God, the efficacy of salvation depends utterly on the preservation of the essential and substantial uniqueness of Christ, as the Scottish Kirk well knew when they tried Campbell, Scott and Irving. Certain signs of his human role may be allowed; the role remains "role," however, and the signs are to be taken as metaphors for divine generosity toward man, rather than as assertion of oneness in nature with him. If any mere human character would be Christ-image in such a theology, it must be by mere reminder of Christ's unique, official function, by imitation of the external signs of His role; or, perhaps, by a parody of that role, which describes, with whatever theological implications, a human usurpation of His function.

The prologue sets forth a christology in rather explicit terms.[22] Christ is the Alpha by whom were all things made, without whom was not

anything made that was made[23]--not merely those things man, in his categorical limitations, calls good or fortunate, but those he mistakenly conceives as his curse:

> Thine are these orbs of light and shade;
> Thou madest Life in man and brute;
> Thou madest Death . . . .

Man sees his existence in static terms of light and shadow, life and death.[24] This is the way his categorical understanding deals with the reality he is placed in. Yet if he fully understood that Love was the ground of all existence, of light and shadow, life and death, he would know that what he calls shadow is to become light and what he calls death is to become life. The light has come into the darkness, and the darkness can not put it out.[25] Or--more prosaically--Love, the motive of God toward His creation, has embodied itself in Christ and so invaded sorrow, illusion, and decay; and there, like light in darkness, He will remake all contingencies into His image. His foot is on the skull which He has made. The very darkness itself is light--as Browning's Abt Vogler was to put it, "is silence implying sound"; as Emily Brontë had put it in "No Coward Soul Is Mine,"

> There is not room for Death,
> Nor atom that his might could render void;
> Thou--Thou art Being and Breath,
> And what Thou art may never be destroyed.

(Of course Tennyson's assertion doesn't make it so. It isn't intended to. Behind the assertion stands the entire experience the poem records, or constructs--an experiential encounter with that asserted truth, or, as Tennyson put it, "the way of a soul." The poet is not framing a demonstration but summarizing the experience of the

poem.[26] That he who comes to God must believe that He is, is not so much a premise as a discovery.[27])

The prologue clearly asserts Christ as the ground of the creation, not merely the end of creation--ignoring theories of bungling or fraudulent intent, which need not be resorted to until the poem gives cause. The assertion must shortly be tested against the whole poem, but for the moment let it be referred to one quatrain of the prologue:

> Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day and cease to be:
> They are but broken lights of thee,
> And thou, O Lord, are more than they.

"Systems" has evidently a double sense: it carries on the cosmological image of "orbs of light and shade" and points forward to the "vain worlds" where perhaps the reference to "music" borrows from the Ptolemaic harmony of the spheres; it also evidently means systems of philosophy and theology, in the immediate context of the discussion of knowledge. To call them "broken lights" of Christ is, surely, not merely to insist that both the natural order and the man-constructed order of knowledge must have their ground in Christ, but also to define their relationship to that ground. They are the form, the individuation, the bands of the spectrum,[28] the gracious accommodations of the truth of Christ to eyes and minds that cannot bear the white radiance of eternity. Tennyson must have Shelley in mind,[29] as well as numerous biblical allusions to Christ as the Light, though the immediate source is probably Augustus Hare's image in Guesses at Truth: "I fear there is a moment of broken lights in the intellectual day of civilized countries, when among the manifold refractions of Knowledge, Wisdom is almost lost sight of" (p. 2).

(There are a number of snarled theological questions that naturally arise here, which need not be attempted--Tennyson himself did not attempt them in any forthright way. He does not try to account for the origin of evil; he simply accepts evil as a fact, though the theology would seem to require it to be grounded in human rebellion alone. Similarly accepted is man's free will: "Our wills are ours, we know not how"; perhaps the concept of a contingent, evolving universe provides a rationale, if not a justification, for the assertion, for if all contingencies are yearning toward Christhood, the "one far-off divine event/ To which the whole creation moves," that eschatology explains how and why man is "to make them thine." At any rate, as in Coleridge, the theology and experience of the poem require the assumption of man's free will.[30])

Whether or not Tennyson's total theology is consistent in all particulars, the concept of Christ set out in the prologue could hardly assert more totally that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . . All things were made by him. . . . In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness. . . ." Fairchild's complaint that Tennyson's Christ is a "dimly-conceived Omega but not the Alpha" must discount the prologue somehow. To be sure, Tennyson's Alpha is not quite Fairchild's. It is rather the Logos[31] of Maurice and Erskine. If God is not abstracted from His creation--I would say, if He is immanent, except that when the image is translated into spatial mythology it makes God look "smaller" than the creation--if God informs the creation in order to reconcile it to Himself in Christ, it seems clear

that the same existence which is its life and essence and meaning and origin will also be its "ultimate" life, essence, meaning, destiny. It is because Christ is the Alpha that He can be the Omega, the "model of human conduct. . . personification of human love. . .culmination of the progressive development of mankind," in the words of Fairchild's charge. Were there no white radiance of eternity, the broken lights would not exist. Though, as XXIV puts the case,

> The very source and fount of Day
> Is dash'd with wandering isles of night,

it is the light, and not the darkness, that makes these visible and gives them their glory; and the poet is not to "fret . . . like an idle girl / That life is dash'd with flecks of sin" (LII). The cloud that "topples round the dreary west" itself is "a looming bastion fringed with fire" (XV), though the protagonist at that stage does not know what that means. Man needs the darkness, because he is weak, though his choice must be, must become, the light rather than the darkness; but it is the graciousness of Light that all darkness should be suffused with light, even to crown with a "solemn gladness" the "purple brows of Olivet" (XXXI), even to "kindle" the "gloom" of the yew (XXXIX). Hallam himself, in his dark night of the soul, found that

> Power was with him in the night,
> Which makes the darkness and the light,
> And dwells not in the light alone,
>
> But in the darkness and the cloud. . . . (XCVI)[32]

All things are Christ's, then; but the reader must not hurry from that assertion to a scheme of static determinism. Though all things derive their being from Him, yet in the existence they know they are in a process of becoming. These vain worlds, these orbs of light and

shade, are learning to bear His light. Everyone knows that In Memoriam is, among other things, an attempt to Christianize the scientific theory of evolution. It is probably critical heresy to suggest that the emphasis ought to be reversed. Historically, an evolutionary theology seems to have preceded, perhaps to have suggested, the scientific thesis. Perhaps In Memoriam records a religious apprehension of an evolutionary challenge toward Christhood, which is then applied to scientific knowledge and societal patterns.[33] At any rate--and this is all that is here urged--the evolutionary insight is not merely appendage to In Memoriam, worked out between LV and the last quatrain of the poem. It is pervasive throughout.[34] And it is clearly enunciated, in theological not merely scientific terms, in the prologue. The cosmos is not yet; these orbs of light and shade are to become His light. Knowledge is not yet; it is of things we see, in a world flecked with darkness. Man is not yet; he is petty and foolish; he either conceives God as tyrant, and thus fears Him and worships from a motive of fear, or, having found his fear unrealized and concluding in his heart that there is no God, mocks the bugbear he had made in his own image. The poet himself is not yet; he had defined both sin and worth in terms of the merely relative, he had misconstrued grief; and now he would grow in wisdom by the nurture of the Christ who is wise indeed. In all these things, Christ is victorious, His foot is on the skull; but His victory must be understood in the apocalyptic sense which the allusion carries:[35]

> Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith, All things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which

> did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. (1 Cor. 15: 24-28)[36]

(If just this much of the coherence of the total poem is grasped, it should go far to reconcile many of the apparent contradictions. Everyone cautions that In Memoriam is progressive in its insights and then proceeds to quote one part against another, or singles out a given comment about sorrow or immortality or nature or art and represents it as Tennyson's dogma.[37] Yet I do not see how Tennyson could have made it clearer, that the individual poems are to be read as dramatic utterances at a given stage in "the way of a soul," and until the ultimate stage is perceived the prior stages can not assume their true perspective. In particular, the vision of Christ that finally emerges interprets the adumbrations of that vision.[38])

The ontology of the prologue, then, must be understood by recourse to the Logos as source and end of existence. The epistemology must also be understood by such a reference. If "our little systems" are "broken lights" of Christ, and He is "more than they," any adequate method of knowing must take that into account. That our systems "have their day and cease to be" is not so much a condemnation of those particular systems as a caution about the limits of system. System is valid, within its nature and function. It is a construct of the categorical understanding, designed to make the white radiance of eternity apprehensible to human eyes. But its method is to dissect the light, the eternal harmony, which is the wisdom the last quatrain speaks of, into bands of the spectrum, tones of the chord. Since to see its own limitations requires a perspective from beyond its own mode, it

naturally supposes that by measuring the bands of the spectrum more precisely it is about the business of defining light. It cannot by such means perceive that the whole is more than--qualitatively other than--the sum of the parts.[39]

But even as the components of knowledge do not add up to wisdom, even so the mere mutual and simultaneous response to component modes of human apprehension do not add up to the Way. There is a principle of interdependence that must be found--an organic bond. This issue has been examined in the preceding chapters in discussions of the validity of symbol. Nature itself offers many analogs for this bond, but their bond serves a more limited and primitive series of modes. For whatever reason, man at his present stage finds these disparate modes at war with one another and is not able to draw them into harmony by his own powers. The truths "darkly join, / Deep-seated in our mystic frame" (XXXVI) but we cannot, at the level of knowledge of phenomena, "all command the strings; / The glory of the sum of things / Will flash along the chords and go" (LXXXVIII). I think an awareness of this need is voiced in the prayer for "reverence" in the prologue--a consciousness of the necessity for reference to an image of the true Light in order to understand light, in order that "mind and soul, according well, / May make one music, as before." The problem is, how may they accord well? This epistemology would make answer, by reorientation to the one in whom was the life that was the light of men.

The common reading of Tennyson's comments about the way of faith seems to be that he grounds his trust in feeling rather than intellect, the need of the heart, the mystic experience.[40] There are of course good

reasons for reading his work so, especially if the individual poems usually taken as points of reference are read in isolation. Nevertheless, I think this analysis is awry, and the matter is of such importance that we must turn aside briefly and attempt to refute the reading.

Such passages as Sections CXIV and CXXIV--and there are a number of similar comments--seem to many people to mean that Tennyson mistrusted the intellect and such intellectual activities as science,[41] as hurtful to religion. Does not LIII say

> Hold thou the good: define it well:
> For fear divine Philosophy
> Should push beyond her mark, and be
> Procuress to the Lords of Hell?

But to read these passages as anti-intellectual is only possible if one defines intellect in terms of that absolute faith characteristic of the rationalist, and it entails all the difficulties sketched out in Chapters III and IV. Rather, these should be referred to that definition of religious experience as the fusion of all man's ways of knowing described above. Tennyson's anti-intellectualism is the anti-intellectualism of Coleridge and Hare; it amounts, at the last, to a rejection of the absolute claims of the rational, to an awareness that intellect must find a ground beyond itself if it would not finally reason itself out of existence. Once more, the present argument is not that the Coleridgean definition of reason is right and the rationalists' wrong; but rather that the poem presupposes the comprehensive definition of Reason in its deference to Wisdom. Roughly, Tennyson's Wisdom in equivalent to Coleridge's Reason, Tennyson's Knowledge to Coleridge's Understanding.[42] By such presuppositions, the very judgment

that the poem is anti-intellectual would itself be seen as a product of the fallacious either-or, the pernicious dissociation of sensibility--a mere creature of the categorical understanding.

Many passages in the poem contradict the thesis that Tennyson is against reason. The prologue begins with the simple assertion that knowledge alone cannot find out God, for man has not seen the face of God at any time, and knowledge is of "things we see." Tennyson surely has in mind Hebrews 11:3--"Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."[43] The application in the prologue may recall Coleridge's identical reading of that scripture in The Friend. The objective reality, which furnishes the material for all knowledge, shows effects--phenomena--which, though indices of the real and derivative of the word of God, require a mind informed by the motive of God to read their meaning aright. Phenomena of nature, like language, "half reveal / And half conceal the Soul within" (V). Nevertheless, no castigation of knowledge is meant;[44] knowledge is accepted on trust as a gift from Christ, a beam of the Light that is transforming the darkness. Our way toward God requires more knowledge, not the obscuring of knowledge; "let it grow."[45] It is petulance to reject the part because it is not the whole; when qualified with reverence--that is, with a conception of God great enough to provide us the insight that knowledge alone cannot encompass Him[46]--it will be found "That all, as in some piece of art, / Is toil cooperant to an end" (CXXVIII). The revered Hallam himself "would not make his judgment blind, / He faced the spectres of the mind / And laid them" (XCVI)--not by flight into "feeling" but by

The critic clearness of an eye,
That saw thro' all the Muses' walk;

Seraphic intellect and force
To seize and throw the doubts of man;
Impassion'd logic, which outran
The hearer in its fiery course. (CIX)

In summary, Wisdom comes not to destroy Knowledge, but to fulfil.

Nor can it be argued, from the other direction, that Tennyson grounded the hope of the poem in "the heart," whatever nods of deference he makes toward reason. The use generally made of Tennyson's "I have felt" in CXXIV has been too simplistic;[47] he does not intend to ground religion in mere feeling. Even CXXIV taken alone does not allow such an interpretation; it is not the "blind clamour" that validated faith, but the hands that reached through nature out of darkness, moulding men.[48] It is the witness of the transformation, the experience of the transformation, which gives validation, not the human wish. No mere cry can do it; if the Father were not near, and responsive to human need, the cry of the infant would be a useless cry. What the passage does say about the role of feeling in faith is quite clearly what Coleridge had said in Biographia Literaria about the mystics who kept the claims of the heart open against those of the head.[49]

The instance of the trance-like communion recorded in XCV provides a more complex problem, which can hardly be treated adequately in this digression. For the moment, let it suffice to argue that the trance is not simply an experience of abstraction from sensible reality. The details of the setting are more than usually precise, for one thing;[50] and it is out of the objective instrument, the letters themselves, that the dead man touched the poet from the past. If "mystical" is taken to mean disjuncture

from conscious perception of reality, the trance proper may be mystical, like the flight of the poet's soul to meet the coming ship in XII. But its genesis is not in the blinding of the mind to phenomena, but rather a totally sensitive immersion in phenomena with a full consciousness of their noumenal relations.[51] Furthermore, the trance is not an isolated encounter, though it is a culmination;[52] in terms of the poem's ontology, and in light of the experience the whole poem records, it is comprehensible and even inevitable.

After the manner of Coleridge, Hare, Maurice and Erskine, then, Tennyson denies to rationality or indeed to any one mode of knowing a claim to be the ultimate measure of all things.[53] The ultimate measure is the Christ; reason and feeling alike derive their validity as modes of that ultimate fusion. But there is more to the epistemological assumption. Mere reverence for the Source of life and light does not make one participant in the life and light. Here the epistemology must have help from the ontology in which it is based. It is in faith that man has a life that is of Life, that he finds the power to appropriate the gift of life. No "proof" can sustain him here; "we have but faith." Yet that faith is the dynamic by which the Life may be appealed to. In that faith, rightly reordered, as the jarring lyre begins to make true music, man sees the source of all things manifest in all things. Phenomena alone validate nothing. Phenomena seen in the eye of faith, that knows a common essence in itself and nature and the Life that is their source, are validated in the experience of communion of life with Life.[54] That is the testimony of Section XCV, and of the poem taken as a whole. Man has intimations of the truth in

his own experience, sees intimations in nature, that lead him to think that life is not meaningless, that urge him to assert the validity of life; yet he can not do so until he is given the gestalt, as it were, by the Word in flesh. Then the response in trust finds validation in the experience of communion. If, as logic, this is circular, then the validation simply shows that there are limits to the method of logic.

We are, in fact, thrown back continually from fragmentary identifications of the source of hope to the whole experience the poem chronicles.[55] The question of the validity of hope asserted in CXXIV, for instance, must be the question whether the hands of the Father really do--really did in the poet's case--reach out of darkness through nature to mould men. If the transformation did not really occur for the poet, if there is not in the experience of men with darkness a manifestation of the light, then the whole assertion of the poem collapses as illusion; but it is not possible to determine whether it so collapses by seizing on an isolated dramatic utterance.

In brief, the poem is not a theological argument.[56] It does not start with a proposition and build upon it. He is not content with an argument about what man is justified in feeling and thinking:

> If these brief lays, of Sorrow born,
> Were taken to be such as closed
> Grave doubts and answers here proposed,
> Then these were such as men might scorn. (XLVIII)

The "care" of Sorrow "is not to part and prove" (XLVIII). What he wants, what alone will comfort, is an experiential participation in the sense of Life and Love, and it must not be mere illusion or mere schema. This is not merely hunger for reunion with Hallam, though Hallam is the occasion for the quest, of course; the deepest animus of In Memoriam is a

God-hunger which no mere carrion comfort or empty chaff or petty cobwebs will gratify. Gratification must come in the total involvement of trust, not mere proof; only by having found validated in our own experience the hope that deeds and love are purified by the co-labor of the creature and Creator may we

> lift from out of dust
> A voice as unto him that hears,
> . . . . . .
> . . . . . and trust
> . . . . . .
> The truths that never can be proved
> Until we close with all we loved,
> And all we flow from, soul in soul. (CXXXI)

What the poem attempts is to begin in the experience of darkness and watch for the transformation of the dawn. Whether the light the poet sees is the true Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world or a merely man-made glimmer in vacant darkness is finally a matter of faith; but we may try to see how well the christology here described interprets the experience, to gauge whether the career of the protagonist is consistent and convincing.

It will help to begin by looking at the naturalistic dimension of that experience, to see what Tennyson makes of the testimony of the experience of sorrow in itself without the specific aid of the Incarnation as light upon that experience. If he is really appropriating the christology here set out, there should be a quality in that experience which is attempting to rise to assertion, which however only becomes manifest in the Incarnation.

We may examine that question by looking at the first thirty-six sections in some detail, which will provide something resembling a

controlled experiment. Section XXXVI, which pays deference to the Christ--"We yield all blessing to the name of Him"--will provide a point of reference. The section asserts an identity between the truths "deep-seated in our mystic frame" and those Jesus revealed. If an identity between them can be explained by a coherent development in the sections that recede it, we may, I think, assume that Tennyson has justified a poetic faith in the ground of analogy the christology provides. For until the Lazarus episode there has been little specifically Christian, little opportunity to set up Christian connotations for the experience of sorrow. To that point there is absolutely nothing that requires or even invites an identification of Hallam with Jesus, scarcely a few conventional terms anyone might use of a dead friend: one ironical (if conscious) allusion in VII, which we will note below; mention of the "kneeling hamlet" and the "chalice of the grapes of God" in X; reference to Hallam as "sacred dust" in XXI; and some puzzling capitalization. Though set, evidently, in a Christian culture, the experience recorded contains nothing before the rather desperate Christmas song that would not be equally at home in a pagan setting or adequately accounted for by the traditions of pastoral elegy. Let us try to see, then, how Tennyson can make the assertion of Section XXXVI.

The question of what the human response to sorrow should be is opened in Section I and directly treated in the following sections. The philosophy that man can grow through calamity is granted, but gives no comfort for the immediate experience of sorrow. Grief must have its hour; to deny it expression is not only to belie experience but to kill

the love which is the source of its poignancy.[57] The "far-off interest" is not to be purchased at such a rate.

Already Tennyson has enunciated the paradox of love-in-grief, and already the response to life which escapes pain by dulling experience is rejected. Darkness is established as the image of loss, but there is a "gloss" to th· darkness.

The yew, rooted in the grisly fact of death, stands as the image of a primordial grief, against which the petty human business and even cyclical changes of nature are ineffectual gestures of hope. For the yew there is no "glow" or "bloom." But in a daring assertion, Tennyson draws from the image the value of "stubborn hardihood."[58] For all the apparent enmity to hope in the inescapable reality of death and grief, the stubborn assertion of this reality is a necessary component in any admissable hope. Like Browning's Abt Vogler, Tennyson attempts to ground his structure on the nether springs.

The last stanza of Section II initiates a practice central to the poem's method, which without much strain may be called the fusion of subject and object. Again and again we shall see the poet absorbing values from the images he confronts and simultaneously imparting his own to them, until the effect is a literal fusion of identity. For the most part, this fusion will take place between the poet and Hallam, and between Hallam and the Christ as the poet perceives the two in relation; but natural objects are also participants, and it is primarily by this fusion that Hallam is "mixt with God and Nature." Some rationale of analogy is necessarily at work in this practice, overtly or covertly; for the

all-encompassing range of the practice in In Memoriam, only a rationale of the scope of the Logos, as we have described it, seems adequate; though no such universality is asserted, or required, in II.

Section III introduces sorrow as a "cruel fellowship," setting up the theme of the human (and natural, eventually cosmic) communion of grief, picked up again in VI and intermittently throughout the poem. The connotations of "Priestess" may be almost totally ironic, but at any rate "sweet and bitter" explicitly adopts the ambivalent value which Section I established. The experience with the yew takes to the level of nature the dilemma I presented; III exalts it to the cosmic level. A genuine acquiescence in grief may be costly indeed. The flight into negation may take from love and existence their meaning as well as their pain; but to clasp the fact of loss as a "natural good," as the yew clasps the flesh and bones of the dead, may cost everything. The dilemma is left unresolved, unless perhaps "lying" has begged the question. The last stanza of III extends the image of darkness to blindness, an important recurring minor image.

Sections IV and V state the dilemma in other relations. In the first the images of night and dawn, which are to play such an important role in the poem, are established--bearing obvious and traditional oppositions of despair and hope, sadness and joy, but also the added sense of surrender and assertion of will. The last lines of Section IV tie the concern of this section back into the presentation of the problem in I and III; the way of the night and the way of the day are seen as alternative responses to sorrow.

In addition IV opens an issue V considers more directly--the contrast between the deep self and the conscious surface. The "deep

vase of chilling tears / That grief hath shaken into frost" enunciates this study in a rich image. As the cold in a vase of still water just at the point of freezing would be held in suspension, and so would not be evident to the observer until "shaken into frost,"[59] so the "nameless trouble," the "something lost" is suspended just below the level of crystalizing into definition. The poet vacillates between the need to give this burden its true painful expression, as in the third stanza of IV, and the need to numb the pain, to "wrap me o'er . . . against the cold" through the superficial "mechanic exercise." Both sides of this ambivalence must be seen before the statement of V can be weighed rightly. The decision to numb the pain is not the final choice of the poet, as many explicit passages are to show; even in defining the superficiality, the poet has begun to probe more deeply into the "Soul" that words and Nature imperfectly express.

Section VI returns to the theme of the fellowship of sorrow, rejecting the empty chaff, the illusion, that others' grief makes grief a mere commonplace. The poet recognizes the cost of this solution, for this "dull narcotic" not only numbs pain, but sensitivity and love as well. The section proceeds, rather, to a precise, circumstantial assertion of the pain of sorrow.

These first sections are, in summary, a masterful piece of exposition, in which the ambiguous problem of sorrow is defined, the poet's ambivalence toward it is expressed, and several images in which it is to be examined are established.

The subsequent sections down through XIX are an almost uninterrupted cry of pain and love, except for momentary reflections in XIII and XVI.

Their major value to the poem is to crystalize the response of love and grief in order to provide the experiential catalyst for the problem of sorrow. For though the poet advertises them lightly as "sad, mechanic exercise" and protests at intervals through the first half[60] of In Memoriam that his expressions of sorrow and his attempts to interpret his experience are superficial, it becomes increasingly evident that even these attempts to give limited statement to his grief, informed and motivated as they are by love, gradually bring the "deep relations" into clearer view.

The images established in the first six sections accrue significance through the next sections, and others are added. Notable among these is that of the hand, introduced and specifically referred to Hallam in VII, X, XIII, and XIV, later to be extended so dramatically. Sections VI, VIII, and XIII give early examples of the domestic scenes used for illustration throughout the poem.[61] Section VII probably gives also the first identifiable allusion to the Christ-image Hallam is to assume, in a bitter echo of the angel's message[62] at the empty tomb (Matthew 28:6, et al.); but the sense carries fairly well without the allusion.

The ambiguity of sorrow is further explicated in these sections, with contrasting studies in calm (XI) and storm (XV), the painful reality of grief and preoccupation with loss (XII) and the sense of unreality (XIII, XIV).[63] Section XVI is the first of a number of attempts to reconcile these ambiguities. Here is the first tentative expression of the faith that in the "deep self" these contradictions are resolved--that the calm and storm are but the varying forms assumed by a single nature; but the solution to the paradox is questioned, as

perhaps illusion born of shock, of a disoriented fancy. The problem of the ambiguity of sorrow has raised the question of whether sorrow springs from a real source or is merely the impression of meaningless circumstance; and the decision whether to "embrace her" or "crush her" is seen to rest on the ontological issue of whether there is a real as the ground of phenomena, or none. We are down to the issue of faith--whether to act in the faith that life is meaningful or in the faithless assumption that all that exists is "a hollow form with empty hands" (III), and as in the confusion of delirium, "mingles all without a plan" (XVI).

But as a matter of fact, the poet has already, in natural uncalculating response, acted in "faith" that his sorrow has meaning.[64] The love that so deeply informs his grief has discovered itself in gestures of love, care and sympathy. Foolish as they may seem, they therefore all the more clearly mirror the deep need of the heart, and thus the fact of love that is the source of the need. These are figuratively represented in VIII in the apparently pointless gesture of offering the "poor flower of poesy," as well as in the dove who circles "moaning in the air" (XII), the "idle dreams" of X, the prayer of blessing on the ship (XVII).

The comfort of XVIII is tentative enough. The "idle dreams" and "home-bred fancies" (X) have been honored, and bring at least a ritual form to love and grief. "'Tis well; 'tis something . . . . 'Tis little." But whatever folly it may be by any other measure, it provides a means by which the deep self of sorrow can find some expression. Significantly, it is a form that fuses the love and the grief, the comfort and the pain.

Hereafter the question posed in the last stanza of III seems to have found its answer, though the decision to "embrace" sorrow must be worked out through painful phases yet. The "deep vase of chilling tears" and the "dead lake / That holds the shadow of a lark / Hung in the shadow of a heaven" are accepted as a reality; so XIX speaks of "my deepest grief" as "filled with tears that cannot fall," and XX of the "tears that at their fountain freeze," but with a growing acquiescence that the "deep relations" should be "the same" (LXXVIII).

With the choice to embrace sorrow and thus to assert love even at the cost of grief, there comes a gradually increasing ability to look directly at the sorrow itself. If we ignore the prologue, the nature of the poet's grief is not very specific in the opening sections. Only in IV do we first hear of a vague "something. . .lost"; in VI the lost friend is merely "him"; only with IX do we hear his name. In Sections IX-XVIII, this growing consciousness of sorrow is paralleled by the return of the dead man to the poet--a return anticipated and longed for,[65] though sorrowed in. It is a "dark freight" the ship brings, but the poet's blessing, "like a line of light, / Is on the waters day and night, . . .like a beacon." Section XXII begins the first excursion into the past,[66] to bring the dead man more and more into the experience of the poem, though these remembrances are generalized still (only late in the poem do the circumstantial details of the past come out explicitly, as increasingly the pain of remembrance is transmuted into love and joy).[67] Concomitantly the poem begins to give suggestions of empathetic identification between the poet and the dead, a practice we have noted in connection with the yew in Section II. Section XI takes the calm

of nature as medium for the poet's "calm despair" and the "dead calm in that noble breast." Section XVIII tells of the poet's desire to breathe his own failing life into Hallam's body, an incremented restatement of the desire to plant the neglected "flower of poesy" on his tomb (VIII). This reassertion of empathy gathers strength in Sections XXII-XXV. Here the poet remembers the intimacy of past associations--the "fair companionship" (XXII)--and the terms by which that companionship is described both assert the essential identity of the poet with Hallam and, in the rationale of that analogy, explicate the method of empathetic transformation the poem so relies upon:

> When each by turn was guide to each,
> And Fancy light from Fancy caught
> And Thought leapt out to wed with Thought
> Ere Thought could wed itself with Speech. (XXIII)

And this communion is presented as the dynamic of joyful life: it is mutual involvement in the burdens of life that is identified with the way of Life and Love (XXV), where "mighty Love" is, I think, more than mere conventional personification.

It is this assertion that the wish of XXVI is grounded in. The poet has weighed that illusory comfort that would evade pain by denying Love, and found it vacant chaff. Fickle tongues may abjure the way of human empathy, to play at a mockery of living and loving; but for him the words have no meaning in that illusory sense, so winsome was the encounter with Life and Love he experienced in fellowship with Hallam. He winds the dreary way because he longs to prove the eternality of Love--the reality of Love, eternality in Maurice's sense, as well as the merely temporal sense; but if "God" sees that there is no such dimension in Life and Love, then he would die at once, in order not to

be contemptuous of his own deep self, which would thus be proved "a hollow form."

The next section further clarifies this assertion. It is a reassertion and a strengthening of the insight of the last lines of Section I, and the parallel in wording clearly provides coherence. It is an unequivocal embracing of sorrow, a choice for the ambiguous value of life over the sterile painlessness of negation. There is not yet, of course, any way for him to assert any redemptive quality in sorrow itself; it is still a "cruel fellowship," the epitome of the human curse. But he has elected to endure the pain of sorrow for the sake of the joy of love. The impulse of self-giving he felt at the grave of his friend was the forerunner of this enunciation; it was, in fact, a presentation in concrete experience of what he is now generalizing in propositional terms. It is significant, I think, that the impulse of self-giving and the embodiments of the election of sorrow in the rituals for the dead have preceded and crystalized this assertion. Consciousness follows the act itself afar off, but comes at last, albeit imperfectly and belatedly, to add its own validation and unique contribution. In the light of that relationship, the third stanza of XXXVI is assuredly to gain significance; for the power of the deeds of Christ to articulate meaning from dimly-perceived human impulse is parallel to the power of the act of compassion to articulate the assertion of life in the natural, "pre-Christian" life.

The Christmas sections are an even richer statement of the choice, and simultaneously a further <u>enactment</u> of the choice that will also bring its meaning to more conscious definition in time. They also show another

quality of the dynamic of spiritual growth--the capacity of conscious articulation to make possible even more vital assertions from the "depths of our being." Attention to this phenomenon as it is employed throughout In Memoriam will clarify further the argument about Tennyson's respect for intellect. When mind and soul accord, mind helps soul even as soul helps mind. Th assertion of the Christmas sections is of that sort; the act of faith, the "impetuous" song, is informed by the growing consciousness enunciated in the preceding sections.

At this stage the assertion should be clear, but since prior isolated readings may have already established other values for the Christmas sections, they should be explicated briefly in light of the analysis conducted so far. I suspect the line "The time draws near the birth of Christ" is a reflexive comment on the pattern of the poem itself, as well as literal setting for the Christmas episode; the poem is drawing very nigh to the point where it "gives birth" to Christ, and the human experience of sorrow itself is fast approaching the level where a Christian acquiescence in life can be made ("He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him"--Hebrews 11:6, KJ). But perhaps that is pressing. At any rate, the experience relates closely to the preceding insight, "'Tis better to have loved and lost." "How dare we," says XXIX, and the sense is clear: how dare we reopen old associations of love, joy, fellowship in the presence of so much pain? And indeed the risk is keen. The false gaiety is mere mockery in the presence of the "Shadow"--Hallam, of course,[68] but also Death,[69] as employed in Sections XXII-XXVI. But the risk is the risk of love, and validates itself in

the experience itself. By embracing Death they are able to assert love. By losing their life they find the experience of life, whereas the attempt to guard it jealously from the risk would have been an assertion of the power of death, a choice of the darkness rather than the light. The song itself should not be isolated as a credo for the protagonist, certainly not at that stage.[70] "Impetuously we sang," says the poet--a little superfluously, one might say, since there had certainly been little enough in the poem to that point to warrant any such credo, and the desperation of the gesture seems apparent enough. The poem provides many wrestlings with the problem in later sections, and the closing invocation of XXX is surely a frank admission that the dawn is not yet. The defiant announcement that the dead enjoy a higher existence is really neither argument nor doctrine subscribed, but simply the most forceful and yearning form of prayer the protagonist can give--that is, another expression of love from the deep self.

Reference to "when Hope was born" provides the associational link to XXXI, and the poem itself is ready for the birth of Christ. The prayer with which XXX closes is an almost explicit "E'en so, come, Lord Jesus." The sun seems to work throughout the poem as an image for Christ, a value it of course traditionally bears; and the dawn, throughout the poem, becomes a clearer and clearer image for a new manifestation of Christhood. "Hope" in XXX is clearly to be taken as a synecdoche for Christ, like Love and Life. It is less clearly so in XXII. Once more, I think, Tennyson is taking a natural image and exalting it to another dimension by redefining it in the Christ, a thesis the development here to culminate would seem to support.

The Lazarus passage will serve to crystalize the relationship between the natural order and the Incarnation. It will also bring us back to the question of Tennyson's reverence for Christ. It will remain to examine, presently, his treatment of Hallam in terms of the Christ.

I believe the Lazarus passage follows a practice we have already seen in the poem, of providing an experiential base the implications of which are then examined more closely in the following sections. If so, the place of Christ in these sections is central for understanding the problem we have been pursuing, and must prove consistent with the explication of it in XXXVI. But I believe, further, that Tennyson is establishing a parallel between Mary's grief and his own, between Lazarus and Hallam.[71] The proximity of XXXI to the poet's own most poignant encounter with grief recorded so far would certainly suggest it. If so, the relationship described between Lazarus and the Christ, and Mary's own perception of it, are especially interesting; for they will suggest that what Lazarus does for Mary, Hallam does for Tennyson.

> Then one deep love doth supersede
> All other, when her ardent gaze
> Roves from the living brother's face,
> And rests upon the Life indeed.
>
> All subtle thought, all curious fears,
> Borne down by gladness so complete,
> She bows, she bathes the Saviour's feet
> With costly spikenard and with tears. (XXXII)

The opening quatrain of XXXVI is applicable as a straightforward explication of this action of Mary's. The legitimate question is not, which is right, human truth or Christ's truth? or, what is the basis of faith, human and natural insight or revelation? or, which should

man love, his brother or God? or--ad absurdum--who is alive, Lazarus or Jesus? Mary's love for Lazarus is not merely self-contained and self-sustaining, nor is her love and joy in Christ the less because of Lazarus. As the poet reminds himself in LXIII, love of lower beings need be no detraction from higher loves. In fact, XXXII is quite explicit on the point: "Thrice blest . . ./ Whose loves in higher loves endure."

That this reference of love and joy from Lazarus to "the Life indeed" is central to this passage may be supported several ways. It might be shown, for example, that Tennyson's use of the biblical material from which the story is taken is not merely superficial, but involves thematic implications that go to the very heart of the poem. When Jesus is called "the Life indeed," surely we are to recall the words of Jesus to Martha before the tomb of Lazarus:[72]

> Martha saith unto Him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day. Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. (John 11:24-26)

Tennyson's apocryphal analysis of Mary's deference to Jesus is surely an interpretation of that scripture. It is a recognition that the life of the raised Lazarus is a life in Christ, as verse 26 of the scripture says. Other dimensions of Tennyson's allusion must presently be considered in another context, but for the moment let it be further noted, that the entire context of the Lazarus story as recorded in John's gospel is called into these stanzas by Tennyson's mention of Olivet and of the spikenard and tears. For Olivet (not mentioned in John 11 and 12, incidentally) is the scene of Jesus' apocalyptic prophecy of false Christs,

wars and rumors of wars, which are "the beginning of sorrows" (Matthew 24:3 ff.; Mark 13:3 ff.); the scene from which the triumphal entry began (Matthew 21:1 ff.; Luke 19: 29 ff.); the scene of the Gethsemane commitment and of the betrayal (Matthew 26:30 ff.; Mark 14:26 ff.; Luke 22:39 ff; John 18:1 ff.); and the scene of the ascension (Acts 1: 12). According to John, the raising of Lazarus was the incident that occasioned the plot to kill Jesus (John 11:46-50). The annointing with spikenard, which Tennyson has pulled from another context to fuse it more closely with the Lazarus story,[73] is, by the words of Jesus, done "against the day of my burying" (John 12:7). When all these associations are gathered into the account of Mary's act of homage, surely we are to conclude that Lazarus' death and resurrection, along with the sorrow, joy, and hope, find their meaning only in the death and resurrection of Jesus. And not merely because it was the unique power of Jesus that raised him; the nature of Jesus' sorrow and joy, defeat and victory, is the meaning of Lazarus' resurrection; Mary's love for the Master enlivens her love for Lazarus. The solemn gladness that "crowned the purple brows of Olivet" is not merely a gladness that Lazarus is alive, but gladness at a manifestation of "the Life indeed."[74]

If so, perhaps the unanswered question of XXXI is less important to the poet than Mattes and Ryals think.[75] The question is surely included in the "subtle thought" and "curious fears" which are made irrelevant for Mary by her gladness (XXXII).[76] The poet is to take up those thoughts and fears at more length; but the immediate context turns instead to examine the implications of the insight that "loves in higher love endure" for those who perceive life to be from Life and

love to be from Love. Section XXXIII notes the harmony of a life that keeps continual reference to the type of eternal life, further explicating the blessedness described in the last stanzas of XXXII. But to the thesis that life and love should have ground beyond their immediate form XXXIII adds the qualifying corrolary that nevertheless the principle must have form by which to define itself if it would find expression in the daily business of a world of sin. When the thesis and its corrolary are taken in relation, it will be seen that to hold them true requires an assertion of the validity of symbol, some faith in the interrelationship of Life and form. If the life of the sister is melodious, it is because the Life Indeed both enlivens the form as its ground of being and is made manifest thus through the form.

It is in the presence of this rationale that Sections XXXIV and XXXV should be read. The argument sketched out in the first two stanzas of XXXIV speaks not merely of man's hope for immortality[77] (though of course that is the superficial topic), but also, and most basically, of the relationship of the Logos to the created form. If the Life indeed is not the source of all life, and if moreover He has not loved the creation wherein He has manifested His own nature, then life is meaningless. It is made merely for destruction; "all that is" means only dust and ashes; at its very core, at the "depths of being" earth is "darkness"--a figure by this point in the poem laden with connotations of vacancy,[78] meaninglessness, unredeemable sorrow and evil. It is a very narrow understanding of this theme that thinks this entire issue to be raised solely that some rationale for

"immortality" can be found. The issue at bottom is whether life means at all, whether life *is*--finally what *is* means.[79] If, in the words of Browning's Ben Ezra, "All that is, at all, / Lasts ever," then of course immortality in some sense is a consequence for whatever *is*.[80] Tennyson knows quite well that this cannot be offered as a *demonstration*, as proof, and indeed has warned all comers of that fact in the prologue, and throughout the poem. Insofar as XXXV has to do with logical structure at all, it is only a *negative* demonstration: if life is really mastered by time, circumstance and futility, there can be no Life, in the sense we have used the term, from which life came. There may be a "God" of sorts, but it is not a God that cares for his creation and purposes in and through his creation;[81] and for such a God, the poet at least "would not stay." But the issue is simply not open for logical examination. Faced with the necessity of inferring causes from effects, source from form, man must at last rest in a faith, whatever conclusion he draws about cause or source. But faith is not therefore blind, though it sees "darkly." Love does not see itself as Death; if it could only see itself so, it would become merely predatory or lethargic. The evidence, at last, is the assertion the whole being can make of its own existence; not only "I have felt," but also "I cannot think the thing farewell," "I see, in part, / That all, as in some piece of art, / Is toil cooperant to an end," and perhaps most important, "I cannot understand; I love."

Section XXXIII is another part of the poem sometimes cited to support the "anti-intellectualism" of the work. Again, the misunderstanding

derives from conceiving Tennyson's organic and comprehensive epistemology in terms of the static and categorical.[82] Appropriating the circle image we first noted in Schelling (no thesis of influence need be inferred), Tennyson brilliantly sketches the apparent freedom but real disintegration of an ontology based solely on the subjective. The criticism voiced here is not that reason has no place in religion, but that reason which has so forgotten its modal function counts itself "ripe" when it is really immature, and thus, misjudging its strength, falls prey to human sinfulness which will always rise to take dominion over the chaos.[83] It is a reason that thinks of man as wholly brain, "magnetic mockeries" (CXX). The comparative strength of the "sister" is not in her lack of the power of reason, but in the "melody" of her life--where faith, form, act and will are "cooperant to an end"--the strength of a living violet as against that of a dead oak. Even a flower in a crannied wall can manifest life; but a life cut off from the sustenance of life, though all its beautiful system is in perfect order, what is it? The difficulty of a self-sustaining reason is the same as that of a self-sustaining love; both need reference to a "higher."

The insight of these sections once gained, it is a bold yet natural step to the assertion of XXXVI. The truths which Jesus made "current coin" are not extraneous to man; they are very nigh, in his heart and in his mouth. But they are "deep-seated in our mystic frame," where they "darkly join." "Deep in our Souls is God," Carlyle had said, and Coleridge too referred man's faith to the "very depths of our being." At that level, truths exist in organic harmony. But they

are darkly joined. In the natural life there is no fragmentation of the organic reality:

> Wild bird, whose warble, liquid sweet,
> Rings Eden thro' the budded quicks,
> O tell me where the senses mix,
> O tell me where the passions meet,
>
> Whence radiate: fierce extremes employ
> Thy spirits in the darkening leaf,
> And in the midmost heart of grief
> Thy passion clasps a secret joy. (LXXXVIII)

But it is a secret joy, sung in an Eden we have lost; nature cannot tell what she knows, does not indeed know in man's sense.[84] Man has the blessing and the curse of the categorical understanding. How may this dilemma be resolved? How may the deep-seated, harmonious truth and the fragmented understanding be reconciled? Even in "closest words" (i. e., the most precise discriminations of intellection), the quality of the understanding is the same.[85] Only when the Word has breath, and thus presents rather than represents the truth, can it be made available to man's apprehension, and so Knowledge be redeemed in Wisdom. And quite evidently, if this were not so, only the wise and prudent could know God's truth; it could never have "entered in at lowly doors." Man would have been faced with the task of ascending to Heaven by power of an intellect that transcended its own definition, or descending into the depths of nature to raise the Truth to new life.[86] But the efficacy of the Incarnation is that it provides a relative image to every degree of intellectual power, every form of human activity, and every pitch of human misery.[87] Thus in all these contingencies the Incarnation rather leads on to a new integration:

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
   But more of reverence in us dwell;
   That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before,

But vaster.

Not the return to the blind integration of nature--for man, or at least the poet, "was born to other things" (CXX)--but the new life defined in Christ is man's calling. There reason will be "ripe," "ransomed," as it is in Hallam's advanced state (LXI).

The assertion XXXVI is making about the significance of the Incarnation can easily be grasped by attention to Tennyson's description of the method by which the "truth embodied in a tale" effects its communication. Surely he cannot mean that merely because Jesus wrought miracles and performed the sacrifice required by a cosmic legalism man therefore has authority for belief in resurrection. It is the quality of the life[88] of Jesus, not the authority of His station, that is the emphasis of the passage:

And so the Word had breath, and wrought
   With human hands the creed of creeds
   In loveliness of perfect deeds,
More strong than all poetic thought;

Which he may read that binds the sheaf,
   Or builds the house, or digs the grave,
   And those wild eyes that watch the wave
In roarings round the coral reef.

The message so plain that he who runs may read is that the essential function of life is compassion and graciousness, which speaks from the "loveliness of perfect deeds"--that the essential meaning of life is love even as the love of God is manifested in the Son. This is the "creed of creeds," the accomplished fusion of motive, will, and act, life bearing flower and fruit, of which every abstraction is a broken

light. This is no mere sign of authority welded to dogma by a bond of duty so inexorable as to bear down all freedom under its weight; it is the natural bond of motive and fruition, love and compassion making itself a real[89] in visible and tangible phenomena--the Word assuming breath, in Tennyson's incisive adaptation of John 1:14,[90] articulating itself. There can be little doubt that In Memoriam accepts the validity of the Resurrection; but it is all-important to recognize that in Tennyson's exposition of the Christian hope the Resurrection is not simply a marvellous sign given as the badge of authority, but the totally consistent ultimate manifestation of the same eternal life that was articulate in all that Jesus was and did.

But the coherence of the poem requires that this function of Jesus validate itself in the instance of the protagonist's experience of sorrow. Well for the Gadarene demoniac, that he perceives the manifestation of compassion even in watching "the wave / In roarings round the coral reef." But what of the poet?

The discovery the poet had made in the previously recorded experience was that sorrow is a paradox, in which is fused, in some inextricable bond, the contraries of love and grief, life and death. The protagonist does not well understand the paradox. True, he has won from his encounter an assertion of life in the presence of sorrow, a choice of being rather than of negation. But it is a desperate choice, an "impetuous" assertion.

But in the presence of the Christ the assertion begins to assume a positive meaning. In terms of the ultimate manifestation of the Resurrection, the eternality (essential reality) of the life of Love is

overmasteringly asserted. The same assertion was latent in the entire life and deeds of Jesus, however, for such as had eyes to see; and the identical assertion the poet had been making in desperation, was there made in "loveliness of perfect deeds."

The "Man of Sorrows, and acquainted with grief" stands as validation of the poet's faith in love. He has defined sorrow in His own nature and thus embodied the paradox. The allusions, as the study above has tried to show, are an attempt to point to the figure of Christ as definition of the meaning of Sorrow at its depth, where the superficial manifestations of joy and grief coalesce. Thus the raising of Lazarus, occasion for joy, was also occasion for grief, since it involved Jesus' sacrifice of self; and Mary herself, like the poet, has emulated Jesus' own resolution of love and grief, joy and sorrow, life and death, in her annointing of His feet with "costly spikenard" and "tears."

It may be objected that XXXVI and its immediate context show no conclusive evidence that the protagonist is aware of a Christian validation of his impulse of love, his acceptance of sorrow. Perhaps not. Perhaps the Lazarus episode has only a narrow reference to the express prayer for "Hope" in XXX, which perhaps can be narrowly defined as hope for immortality (also narrowly defined). Perhaps all the opening stanza of XXXVI means is that Jesus gave men the hope of rising from the dead if they would merely subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles. Surely, however, it requires a high concession to coincidence, that all the accompanying details here cited are merely incidental to Tennyson's explicit statement about "immortality."

Yet it is conceded that the protagonist is not fully conscious of what he has discovered. These sections are dramatic utterance at a given

stage in the way of his soul; they lie in fertile ground, however, like the seed of the sower. At the moment, their comfort has barely germinated; he "loiters on," with "weary steps," as XXXVIII says; in terms of XXXIX, the gloom of the yew is merely "kindled at the tips, / And passes into gloom again." Urania, of course, is not convinced, and dismisses the muse of sorrow rather contemptuously. As Tennyson is to say in CXII, "High wisdom holds my wisdom less" for its faith in the validation of eternal truth by human embodiment of the traits of Christ rather than in the "narrower perfectness" of creed or reasoned system. By then, the poet has confidence to assert the Christhood of Hallam against the "lesser lords of doom." In XXXVII he is much less certain; he is almost abashed by the scoff at the insight of XXXVI, but takes refuge in the "doubtful gleam of solace" that his songs of love, his "poor flower poesy," may in some way comfort the spirit of Hallam. By LXXVII he has resolved that in spite of the limitations of his "mortal lullabies" his "darken'd ways / Shall ring with music all the same," for "to utter love [is] more sweet than praise."

But perhaps a more convincing demonstration that these sections are intended to crystalize and transmute the experience of sorrow can be mounted by examining the image of these lines in XXXI:

> A solemn gladness even crown'd
> The purple brows of Olivet.

The image is an evident allusion to the passion of Christ, secured by several associations--those noted previously, and the obvious likeness to the crowning of Jesus with the crown of thorns. As he has done so many times throughout the poem, Tennyson has found in the traditional Christian image new dimensions of meaning, here catching the paradoxical

values of glory and shame, pain and joy, life and death, and employing them to enunciate the analogous ambiguities of the Lazarus story. But this passage also functions to make explicit a gradually emerging pattern in the previous sections:

> . . . the victor Hours . . . scorn
> . . . . . and boast,
> "Behold the man that loved and lost
> But all he was is overworn." (I)

Here there are subtle but unmistakable appropriations of details of the passion:

> And when they had platted a crown of thorns, they put it upon His head, and a reed in His right hand: and they bowed the knee before Him, and mocked Him, saying, Hail, King of the Jews! (Matthew 27:29; cf. Mark 15:17-19)

> Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple robe. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold the man! (John 19:5)

> Likewise also the chief priests mocking said among themselves with the scribes, He saved others; himself He cannot save. (Mark 15:31; cf. Luke 23:35)

The crown image is perhaps suggested in the tempestuous day of XV in the "looming bastion fringed with fire," a day that may be intended to suggest the dark hours of the crucifixion. Again, the Christmas ritual appropriates the same image:

> Yet go, and while the holly boughs
> Entwine the cold baptismal font,
> Make one wreath more for Use and Wont,
> . . . . . .
> . . . . . They too will die. (XXIX)

After the definition of the image in XXXI, it becomes totally explicit, until there can be little doubt of the protagonist's own apprehension of its meaning. The crown of thorns means that the curse of sorrow is man's glory: in wearing it with compassion for the race, he reenacts

and perpetuates the ministry of Christ. In Section LXIX, the poet, drawing insight it would seem from Hallam's own act of propitiation in sharing his sorrow, in a symbolic dream defines his own role in these terms. The setting is the Waste Land,[91] representing here no doubt not only Tennyson's own lamentably un-Christlike era but also, more generally, the sorrowing human condition, cut off from the source of its life and grown sterile in its unfaith. The quest of the poet is to assume the crown of thorns and wear them "like a civic crown," enduring the scoffs and raillery reminiscent of Christ's own humiliation,[92] that through his public act of propitiation men might see once more the redemptive efficacy of sorrow. But the angel of the night[93] "reach'd the glory of a hand, / That seem'd to touch it into leaf," thereby validating the act of compassion and symbolically restoring life to barrenness. The obvious doctrinal implication is that if man will but orient himself to the life of Jesus, the source of life, he will find that the dry bones of Christianity will rise up and live; nature too will be redeemed in man's Christlike compassion; the desert will rejoice, and blossom like the rose (cf. CXV, CXXII).[94] Tennyson is probably appropriating Revelation 2:10: "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life"--with a rich irony in the suggestion of "faithful unto death" that restates and exalts the paradox of sorrow. Appropriately, Hallam is always represented crowned with "good" or "glory" (LXXXIV, XCI, XCVII).[95]

If the words of the angel are "hard to understand" in LXIX, the poet has discovered their explicit meaning by the end of the poem. In CXVIII, his summary statement of the calling of man to emulate the Christ

in Godwardness, and thereby participate in the redemption of the creation ("for the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God"--Romans 8:19), appropriates not only evolutionary science but the image of the crown of thorns:

> The herald of a higher race,
> And of himself in higher place,
> If so he type this work of time
>
> Within himself, from more to more;
> Or, crown'd with attributes of woe
> Like glories, move his course. . . .

What has been done here with the image of the crown of thorns might be duplicated with a number of other patterns of imagery. There seems to be, for example, an involved set of metaphors based on the death, burial, and resurrection, perhaps providing a skeleton for the whole work, with the Christmases marking the stages[96] of the evolution, almost certainly enunciated in overture in Sections I-VIII:

> . . . the victor Hours. . . boast (I)
>
> And gazing on thee, sullen tree. . . (II)
>
> O Sorrow . . . Priestess in the vaults of Death (III)
>
> To Sleep I give my powers away
> . . . . . .
> With morning wakes the will . . . . (IV)
>
> He is not here . . . .
> . . . . . .
> . . .breaks the blank day (VII)
>
> I go to plant it on his tomb . . . . (VIII)

(For compare the relationship between the poet and Mary, Hallam and Lazarus, discussed above, in light of Matthew 28:1 et al.) In this pattern, the entire range of images about the "hand" that is to be

"touched" may represent Tennyson as the doubting Thomas to Hallam as the Christ (Cf. John 20:25-29). There are others which, if not so closely associated with the immediate context of Section XXXVI, yet take their definition from direct reference to stories of Jesus. One group is based on the parable of the tares. There are a number of references to chaf and grain that are apparently based in John's prophecy of Jesus in Matthew 3:12, with simultaneous reference to the parable of the sower. (Perhaps Fairchild has overlooked the function of these suggestions when he argues that Tennyson's Christ is not the Christ of judgment. The difference from other treatments of Christ as judge is, rather, that with Tennyson the blessing and the judgment of Christ are more frequently represented in terms of this world, befitting the theology we have sketched, where time is a manifestation of eternity rather than exactly its opposite; moreover, as in Dante, the blessing and the judgment seem to be one and the same, a purifying fire to the Godward, a torment to the froward. Nevertheless, Tennyson's concept of judgment does not altogether lack an eschatological dimension, even in the traditional sense; it is just that, like Campbell and Trench, he divides the wheat and the chaff in a different manner from the traditional way.[97])

It remains to speak of Hallam's place in regard to these preoccupations. The point of the preceding argument, so far as it relates to Hallam, is that long before the identification of Hallam with Christ becomes explicit in the poem, the function of the redemptive Christ has been clearly enunciated, and His significance firmly established. Ryals speaks of Hallam as the saviour, the instrument of the poet's salvation.[98] That

is of course right. It must be added, however, that Hallam serves that function in Christ, rather than in the place of Christ. Tennyson has said so explicitly in both the prologue and the conclusion; the theology the poem assumes, which is to ground all existence in the Logos and define its meaning in terms of the Godward challenge of Christhood, requires this to be so; the images of the entire poem support the thesis, since not only those relating to Hallam explicitly but those relating to nature and the poet as well are, for the most part, based on the Christ of scripture. That Fairchild, Ryals, et al. have seen the Christ only in Hallam[99] is due to their going to the poem with a more docetic conception of the Christ than Tennyson is employing. The Christ of Tennyson is in much closer touch with this world and its suffering humanity, is much more closely identified with them--and that includes Hallam, preeminently, but also the poet himself, as Sections LXIX and CIII show. One cannot quarrel with their assumptions about Christ, except to insist that such a concept begs the question against the theology of "one God, one law, one element"--and, in addition, may distort the poem because it misconceives its themes and imagery.

And first, it is valuable to see that Hallam's nature as a manifestation of Christhood is only gradually revealed throughout the poem. Perhaps, as Ryals suggests, the representation of Hallam as the Christ comes out "rather surreptitiously and confusedly" because Tennyson did not want to be explicit. It seems to me a better explanation is provided by considering the gradual revelation as the natural expression of the protagonist's growing awareness. Such a hypothesis requires each

section to be read as a dramatic utterance by the protagonist at that stage; read so, they form a coherent pattern.

The protagonist does not at first see Hallam as a manifestation of the Christ. We have noted that the first third of the poem is almost completely free from suggestions that Hallam is to be seen in such terms; and those that do appear are deeply buried in the implications, in contrast to the more explicit representations later in the poem.

Even as phenomena both conceal and reveal the soul that is their meaning (V), so the brief life of Hallam was ambiguous in its statement of the essence of life. Seen with eyes not yet opened, his meaning is not clear. Had he lived to ripen into productive public service, the statement would have been more detailed (LXXIII, LXXV, LXXXIV). Instead, he has been prematurely touched with frost; death has defined him within narrower limits (LXXIII, last stanza; LXXXI). But the quantitative judgments the world makes are awry; the world does not understand what the most fundamental meaning of life is (LXXV). Not duration, not even achievement, but the quality of life is the true measure of man, even if it were but as a grain of mustard.

As the embracing of sorrow leads the poet deeper and deeper into the nature of his experience, into the essence of the communion with Hallam, into the meaning of his own life and that of his friend, as he takes sorrow to him as "no casual mistress, but a wife" (LIX), the love that has defined them both, defined their communion, defined even the poet's sorrow, gradually asserts its absolute reality as the life for which these are form. Temporality has no power to obliterate it;

his trust from the first enunciation of the theme was that "no lapse of moons can canker Love" (XXVI); the power of life innate in love overrides death itself, so that the "sudden frost" of death is "sudden gain" to give "all ripeness to the grain" (LXXXI); it is a lie, it is tares sown among the wheat by the enemy, that self-interest can assuage the loss of loved ones, that those who genuinely love--or at least the poet--would give an "iron welcome" should they return (XC); and it is from the certainty of his own experience of love, therefore, that the poet can assert that their communion

> masters Time indeed, and is
> Eternal, separate from fears:
> The all-assuming months and years
> Can take no part away from this. (LXXXV)

But this statement is only the "topmost froth of thought" (LII); such utterances are very inadequate presentation of the reality he has found. Sorrow has driven him deeper into self than expression can make manifest (XX). "Short swallow-flights of song" are all sorrow can make explicit, until the soul can grow to the stature of its own sorrow (XLVIII). Nor is the poet (nor the reader) to be impatient with this failure, nor with the tempests of circumstance that play havoc with superficial insights; let art, nature, and learning penetrate as they can, the essence is deeper than that, and the beginning of wisdom is to know that "all fancied hopes and fears" are but a bent staff in a pool. The encounter with sorrow has discovered to him how very deeply the source of being lies:

> Beneath all fancied hopes and fears,
> Ay me, the sorrow deepens down

to the very bases of life (XLIX).[100]

But if the meaning of sorrow is indeed enunciated in the Christ, it is not really surprising that, as sorrow for Hallam plumbs these depths, these experiences and eventually even Hallam and the protagonist himself should begin to be articulated in terms of the Christ. If the way of growth is through the simultaneous, integral response of knowledge and faith, thought and feeling, subject and object, to that which is their common source, a more profound perception of Hallam will bring a more articulate statement of his Christhood.

This line of our investigation may be clarified by a close look at Section LXXIV. The present reading allows--requires--this section to be taken more at face value than Ryals would permit.[101] He thinks the last stanza to be a coy refusal to make Hallam's Christhood explicit; it is timid, it is cryptic. But the protagonist says directly, "there is more than I <u>can</u> see" (italics mine); and surely that is a forthright dramatic utterance. The likeness is coming out, as the first stanza says. Hallam's "kindred" with the "great of old" is beautifully ambiguous; it works as mere metaphor, quite independent of any reference to a Christ-image, though it is quite consistent, in this concept of the essential Christhood of mankind, with his kinship to Christ. Read in the latter sense, the word "kindred" becomes, in fact, a richer and more precise image. Moreover, the last two lines, if read in such a reference, quite explicitly tell why the protagonist is hesitant to give expression to what he <u>can</u> perceive. It is not the unearned apotheosis of Hallam that constitutes the blasphemy, but the consciousness of the troublesome fact that "Death has made / His darkness beautiful with thee." That is, if Hallam is Christ, what shall we make of the apparent conquest of Hallam by death? The protagonist

does not yet fully understand the identification, as he says.

In brief, the function of Hallam is to embody in his own life a manifestation of the Christhood which is the deepest meaning of man and indeed of all existence. It is the Christ who gives essential meaning to Hallam, as Hallam gives phenomenal expression of Christ; the soul of Hallam (that essence which he is, and which defines Hallam the phenomenal) partakes of Christ. The protagonist will find, more and more, as he looks at the life and person of Hallam, a beauty which the Christ will validate and interpret, even as Hallam in turn will bear "immortal fruit" drawn from the resources of the vine of which he is branch.

But moreover as the protagonist gives ever more faithful attention to Hallam's true nature and thus to the Life indeed which is his source, he will also see more deeply into himself; for the love to which he has given his loyalty is a manifestation of the Love that is Strong Son of God, and his own life takes its definition from the same source. Thus the empathetic identification between the protagonist and Hallam is possible because at the essence of their natures they are both identified in Christ. Moreover their mutual identification clarifies both of their natures and makes the Love their source more explicit, as "each by turns [is] guide to each" (XXIII) as in their earthly communion.

The importance of the empathetic identification of the protagonist and Hallam has been hinted above, and something of its rationale suggested. The importance of the theme could hardly be overstated. On the superficial level of the poem, it is the desire for reunion with Hallam which motivates the protagonist throughout the poem, for which he yearns and

prays, and which we are told he somehow at last gains. But in terms of what the poem's deeper theme asserts, it is perhaps even more crucial. We are not to conclude, I think, that because the poet finally was able to experience a "mystical" reunion he therefore can trust, albeit still darkly, in some ultimate reunion of which this was the foreshadowing. There is a sense in which that is true, and no denial of the importance of Section XCV is intended. But the emphasis needs to be redressed; there are many explicit adumbrations of that communion, the meaning of which must be taken into account to understand XCV rightly, and XCV is not quite the most confident assertion the poet can finally make. As CXXII asserts, the loved Hallam was with him, all unrecognized, even in the moment the prayer of Section L was voiced; and the experience of XCV is mentioned only once (CXXII) in later sections of the poem. So it is not merely a hearkening back to one glorious moment that Section CXXX offers as a basis for the assertion that "I shall not lose thee tho' I die." In short, the experience of communion takes many expressions in the poem; the presence of Hallam is virtually a constant, to which the awareness of the protagonist at times, and in degrees, rises, as XCIV explains. It will be found that as the protagonist plumbs more deeply his own sorrow, his consciousness of Hallam's presence becomes ever more certain, his union with him more tangible, and this communion ever more consciously and fully defined in terms of Christhood.[102]

This mutual identity of self in other is indeed the very bond between life and death, the key to the meaning of both life and death. In life itself, where

each by turns was guide to each,
And Fancy light from Fancy caught,
And Thought leapt out to wed with Thought,
Ere Thought could wed itself with Speech (XXIII),

life became Life because the daily burden was glorified by Love:

I loved the weight I had to bear,
Because it needed help of Love.

Nor could I weary, heart or limb,
When mighty Love would cleave in twain
The lading of a single pain,
And part it, giving half to him. (XXV)

Obviously Tennyson is appropriating Galatians 6:2--"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ"--but whole harmonies echo from the allusion--as, for instance, probably Isaiah 53:4, "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows." Given the unerring sensitivity to biblical material Tennyson consistently displays in the allusions of In Memoriam, it is impossible that he is not suggesting a definition of Hallam's role in that of the Christ. The use of "Love" in the context both supports that reading and interprets the sense in which Hallam "fulfils the law of Christ."

When this passage is read against Section LXVIII, the suggestion becomes doubly strong. The sections from XL to LXV have been an extended wrestling with the fact of separation. There were first a series of hypothetical examinations of how they two might be related anew. These are all transparently conjectural and tentative, and blunder first into the uneasy coyness of XLVIII, then into the slough of despond of LIV-LVI. From the depths of LVII he can only reassert his love--first as a claim (LXI, LXIII), then as a sacrifice (LXII, LXIV), and resolve his grief through these "painful phases" in the "nobler leave" (LVIII) of LXV: "Sweet soul, do with me as thou wilt."[103]

Thus in a carefully incremented echo of XXXVIII (where "in the songs I love to sing / A doubtful gleam of solace lives"), he returns at last to the "solace"--that the comfort of love remembered still eases his own heart, and since love is a communion, perhaps his own still comforts Hallam. For love must have love; it cannot live in isolation; it is an "equal-poise · control" (LXXXV) that finds subject answered in object, "self-balanced on a lightsome wing" (LXV). This resolution is not, be it noted, an argument about hope; it is only articulate of hope at all after, and as consequence of, the commitment of love.[104] In LXVIII sleep ("Death's twin-brother") brings again the image of the deceased, where Tennyson employs the figure of the burden assumed in propitiation, undoubtedly founded on XXV. Out of the tomb of the protagonist's own unconscious, the spirit of Hallam has risen to resume the task which was his in life. Once again, the poet walks "as ere I walk'd forlorn" and finds again that (as in XXV) the burden has been "transferred" to Hallam.

Ryals is surely correct in reading this section as one of those that present Hallam in terms of the Christ. The transference is surely a statement of the propitiatory act. Again, however, it is necessary to ask in what sense the act is propitiatory--that is, to ask what kind of function is here assumed, if it is defined in terms of Christ. Briefly, Hallam's role is not to take the protagonist's suffering out of the world, but to identify into the role of sorrow and through suffering with the poet make the suffering an act of fellowship and, at last, communal joy. Indeed, the dream first presents the sharing as an act of empathy by the protagonist for Hallam--

I find a trouble in thine eye,
Which makes me sad I know not why--

before the nature of that "troubling" is defined. The redemptive act is not to negate suffering, but to impregnate it, to redefine it in love and empathy and thus (by degrees) transmute it into joy.[105] It is probably belaboring the obvious to recall here the concept of Christ as redemptive sacrifice described in the preceding chapter and to point out how clearly that soteriology explicates the act of Hallam.

Here again Tennyson has employed the technique noted above--of presenting an experiential problem (which has, however, been prepared for in prior insight and prior acts of trust), which only in later stages of the poem will find its thematic explication, as the protagonist finds the means to raise the subliminal insight to conscious understanding. Tennyson is thus establishing patterns of coherence in the poem that will provide the artistic, psychological and theological rationales for the growth of the protagonist's trust. So Section LXXX will state in more conscious and reasoned terms the effects recorded in this dream experience. So when the resolution of LXV had been achieved, the protagonist found it had become the means of his own awareness of grace; in the midst of his own doubts and fears the presence of Hallam was sustaining him unseen; and now in his own advanced spiritual state the presence will become more tangible to him (LXVIII, LXX, LXXI, etc.).

Surely some reference to the process and effects of the empathetic identification must be made if the coherence between LXVIII and LXIX is to be seen.[106] The latter poem in itself is not difficult to understand, but how it may be related to its context is not at once evident.

But surely here too the fellowship of Hallam and the protagonist--defined by the allusion to the "burden," as noted above, in terms of the redemptive role of Christ--has achieved such a fusion of identities that the protagonist himself is becoming transformed into the nature of the man of sorrows. It is not really a disjuncture that he should at this point take up his cross. In the immediately preceding sections, the ransomed Hallam, whose worth has exalted him above the lowly plane of the protagonist (LX-LXV), is yet found laboring at the condescending work of grace--though the one to whom his gracious ministry came was not aware of that, until his own response in kind crystalized the insight for him. If the effect of this grace is not only to comfort but to remake its communicant in a truer image, then the natural function of the protagonist is to assume the same labor in the world of suffering fellowmen.[107] Nor has this theme been intruded on the poem; it is really essential to the fulfilment of Hallam's transformation in the glory of Christ for him to yield such fruit. Moreover, the theme of sorrow as a universal human fellowship has been early enunciated and carefully developed; Sections III, VI, VIII, XIII, XX have all set it forth quite explicitly.[108] Section LXXIII explains directly (as do several later sections) what Hallam's redemptive role would have been, had he lived. But in the place of Hallam's direct ministry, the poet is to find his own service assuming the practical tasks of transforming human grief and need into joy.

> Nor mine the sweetness or the skill,
> But mine the love that will not tire,
> And, born of love, the vague desire
> That spurs an imitative will. (CX)

Section LXIX shows, then, the working of the leaven in the lump. The hollow people of the waste land by their ridicule show themselves exponents of the same rejection of the life vibrant in sorrow, the rejection to which the poet was tempted in the early sections of the poem (e. g., III) and to which he in part succumbed in the immediately preceding sections. For them too April is the cruelest month; and only in the compassionate condescension of the protagonist can they be shown how to fall to the earth and die and so not abide alone. Once more, it is the emulation of the Christ, through Hallam's own love as Eucharist, that gives the form and meaning to this grace.[109]

It is perhaps not necessary to belabor the fact of the empathetic identification; it is explicit many times in the later sections, as for instance in LXXXV:

> Whatever way my days decline,
> I felt and feel, tho' left alone,
> His being working in mine own,
> The footsteps of his life in mine,

or the prayer of CXXII:

> be with me now,
> And enter in at breast and brow,
> Till all my blood, a fuller wave,
>
> Be quicken'd with a livelier breath . . . .

And as Ryals' documentation so exhaustively shows, these passages quite frequently--almost always--are freighted with biblical allusions that define the function of Hallam in terms of that of Christ. In each instance, however, the qualification needs to be insisted on, that Hallam is not displacing but rather manifesting the Christ. Far from being a mere academic point, that qualification will augment or reconstruct the readings of many of these sections.

So for example the second Christmas finds the protagonist reflecting upon, trying to understand, the sense of change:

> O sorrow, then can sorrow wane?
> O grief, can grief be changed to less?
>
> O last regret, regret can die! (LXXVIII)

An inversion has occurred in his feelings. The reality he had found in the experience of sorrow seems itself to be slipping. But he knows that the "deep relations" are "mixt with all this mystic frame," with self where "truths in manhood darkly join, / Deep-seated" (XXXVI). The protagonist has apparently not worked out the paradox at this time. Yet the transformation both manifests the Christhood of Hallam and is explicated by it. This is not the mere fatigue of former love; this is rather reaping in joy where one sowed in mourning. The allusions bear out such a reading. The last of these quoted lines is a direct borrowing from Dante's Vita Nuova. The former two are surely appropriations of a well-known passage in I Corinthians 15: 53-57:

> For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality . . . . then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?. . . thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

So that Tennyson's lines might be paraphrased, "O sorrow, where is thy sting? / O grief, where is thy victory?" The irony of the appropriation is that the poet voices this expression with inverse connotations, with a sense of loss; but the triumph of the allusion lies immediately under the surface and requires only further articulation to burst into joy. As is so frequently his practice in In Memoriam, Tennyson has, by this means, traced in the present experience an

implication which will later rise to definition; the poet will come at last to assert explicitly,

> my regret
> Becomes an April violet
> And buds and blossoms like the rest (CXV)

and finally, "Regret is dead, but love is more" (epilogue). The point, for present purposes, is that the transformation is a phenomenal and human expression of the immortal Love.

Again, Ryals is certainly right in seeing the atonement of Christ credited to Hallam in LXXX. It must be added, that the atonement here described is of the quality explicated by Campbell, Maurice and Erskine, not that so vehemently asserted by Rigg, the Kirk, or the authoritative, objective formulas of the Establishment or the Evangelicals. And that makes all the difference. Once more Tennyson appropriates the pattern of allusions noted previously, as Hallam "bears the burthen of the weeks." And though the term "credit" on the first glance suggests substitutionary atonement in the traditional sense, with overtones of ransom theology and what Campbell termed "imputed righteousness," the context clearly explains the "influence" as "example" that will transform through reorientation of character. The exemplary grief of Hallam, like that of the Gethsemane experience of Jesus, is

> A grief as deep as life or thought,
> But stay'd in peace with God and man.

"Credit," then, must mean worth, that "sets free" by the redefinition of the protagonist in the perfect peace of trust in God.[110] (Compare the use of "credit" in Section LXXI.)[111]

The same distinction enlightens the argument of Section LXXXV, where in a long monologue the protagonist summarizes the effects of his

pilgrimage to that point. It is significant that from this point onward in the poem there is very little that bespeaks anything but peace of soul: only the surprisingly bitter XCVIII (softened, however, at the end by remembrance of Hallam's own praise of Vienna); the recurrence of the anniversary of Hallam's death in XCI (but compare its tone, ..nd especially that of the concluding stanza, with LXXII); the analogous sorrow at leaving his old home (C-CIV); and some echoes of former pain, as in CVII, CXVI, and CXXII, which are however being obviously modulated into acquiescence. Section LXXXV therefore marks a partial triumph[112]--not a final one, but at least an attempt at explanation

> whether trust in things above
> Be dimm'd of sorrow, or sustain'd;
> And whether love for him have drain'd
> My capabilities of love.

He has experienced, he says, "His being working in mine own, / The footsteps of his life in mine."

> And so my passion hath not swerved
> To works of weakness, but I find
> An image comforting the mind,
> And in my grief a strength reserved.

It is easy enough to read these terms as mere cant, as traditional piousness, which is either meaningless or blasphemous; but they take on a different color if the christology herein explicated is once granted. It is empathetic communion with Hallam, and through Hallam with the Christ, that has formed the divine image in the mind; and it is the strength derived from this communion that has kept him obedient to the heavenly vision, as he explains in terms echoing Paul's apologia before Agrippa.

The communion experience of XCV clearly appropriates the theme of fusion of identities, and, I think, asserts that in this fusion, the soul of each having come upon the essence of itself, finds itself in the presence of "that which is." These lines are, surely, closely modeled on Paradisio, Canto XXXIII (cf., e.g., ll. 121-122, 140-145, especially). Perhaps it is not justified to explicate Tennyson by Dante, in spite of the poem's manifold evident allusions to him and in spite of Hallam's own preoccupation with Dante and praise for him. But Dante sees the circle that is Christ with the image of man comprehended in it (ll. 127-131); and in his striving to see therein the manner in which the human conformed to the divine, he found himself illumined by grace and at one in desire and will with the Love that moves all existence (ll. 140-145). Whether or not Tennyson is drawing a parallel to the Paradisio--and it is hard to see how he could have been unaware of the similarity--Dante's analysis is as clear a summary of the present reading of the relationship of Hallam to the Christ as I can give. Outside the circle that is God who is Light, all things, which are there perfect, are defective, says Dante (ll. 103-105); and Hallam, who "lives in God" (epilogue), who is in Christ and there "worthier to be loved" (prologue), who triumphs "in conclusive bliss, / And that serene result of all" (LXXXV)--a result which is surely the "one far-off divine event / To which the whole creation moves" (epilogue)--is represented, I would urge, as one imperfect creation made perfect by redefinition in the Immortal Love that "moves the Sun and all the other stars"--is himself the Hesper-Phosphor among those stars so moved.

In interpreting the third Christmas sections, Ryals evidently believes that the protagonist's rejection of an "ancient form / Thro' which the spirit breathes no more" (CV) for "the Christ that is to be" (CVI) heralds Hallam's succession to the throne of Christ.[113] But surely the "ancient form" here named is, more explicitly, the traditional trappings of Yule, the "mask and mime" of CV, the "Use and Wont" of XXIX. In the immediate context of the statement of the rejection it is made clear what that rejection concerns:

> But let no footstep beat the floor,
> Nor bowl of wassail mantle warm;
> For who would keep an ancient form
> Thro' which the spirit breathes no more?

Similarly in XXIX "Use and Wont" are represented there by the holly, that "guard[s] the portals of the house." The point is that holly and ivy, fetishes to invite good spirits and exorcise evil spirits, are survivals of pagan custom, survivals merely by virtue of their antiquity; "they too will die." It is not necessary or even consistent to read into Section CV a rejection of Christianity as such, and certainly not of the nature and station of Christ. And relieved of that necessity, we need not find in this broken "bond of dying use" anything inconsistent with the reverence of the prologue, or of the later sections of the poem. Of course the function of change is to break the tyranny of old definition, to allow growth; but Tennyson's christology can easily absorb, in fact requires, that breaking. It is only the superficial that "suffer[s] shock" (CXXXI); the "living will" whose source is the wellspring of living water (John 4:10-14) shall endure, shall manifest its life immortal in the Christ that is to be. So with Hesper-Phosphor: "Thy place is changed; Thou art the same" (CXXI).

Section CIII provides a rather bizarre allegory, with the unfortunate image of the "transmogrified" Hallam, to use Ryals' term. The sense of the passage, however, is quite consistent with the total scheme. It celebrates an end and a beginning: on the story level, the removal from the childhood home to "new unhallowed ground" (CIV); on the psychological level, a removal from the "regret for buried time" to "life re-orient out of dust"; on the thematic level, from the last vestiges of doubt and distrust to a faith grounded in acquiescence[114] that all must change, as both cataclysm and personal transformation are seen as part of the dynamic of the Godward evolution of all created things.[115]

The section also brings to its culminating statement the important subsidiary theme of the nature and validity of art, and the christology figures importantly in the culmination. As noted above, Tennyson's early references to his art in the poem are deprecatory; but as he comes to see his work as a means to give voice to his love, he becomes less and less apologetic. Thus the early apologies about his art should not be taken for the poem's final statement.[116] From thinking his songs "half a sin" in V, he comes to defend them as natural and involuntary expression in XXI, the lulling, brooding, and murmuring of comfort in XXXVII, "short swallow-flights of song, that dip / Their wings in tears and skim away" in XLVIII,[117] until in LII "the Spirit of true love" urges him to "blame not thou thy plaintive song." Even as early as XXXVIII he had thought that perhaps they might be a ministry of love to the dead; LXIX records, among other things, the willing assumption of the role of minister to general human grief; and though LXXV falters

momentarily in the growing confidence, LXXVII, having weighed the doubtful likelihood of any public praise or lasting fame, gives these over in the final commitment to what the poet has come to see as the true motive of his song--to make the "darken'd ways . . . ring with music," "to breathe my loss . . . to utter love." And from there on we get no more nervous disclaimers for the art of the poem. In Section CIII, he vindicates his art; his Muses have been granted entrance to the kingdom because they are validated in the service of love. Nor have they merely survived; they are redeemed, glorified, "lordlier than before."[118] The "poor flower poesy" has thrived, waxed, borne immortal fruit, because the spirit of true love has been the Life on which it drew. The final line of CXV and the final stanza of CXXII assert a claim to genuine poetic achievement.[119] As he explains in CXXV, the force of Life, Love, and Hope was at work in even the "bitter notes"; the crown of thorns needed but the touch of Love and Hope to make it a wreath:

> And if the song were full of care,
> He breathed the spirit of the song;
> And if the words were sweet and strong
> He set his royal signet there;
>
> Abiding with me till I sail
> To seek thee on the mystic deeps . . . .

(with obvious direct allusion to the allegory of CIII). Section CXXVIII will finally assert the analogy between art and the entire purpose of the creation.

Tennyson has here enunciated the aesthetic urged on him so long before by Hallam and Trench and the other Apostles. That aesthetic seems to be generally conceived as, and lamented for, a moralism that

subverted the claims of art.[120] Perhaps the judgment as to whether there has been a subversion must rest in a deeper examination of the nature of art; but it is no mere moralism that the Apostles envisioned and Tennyson adopted. It has appropriated the myth and the symbolic method of their christological vision, and thus has the structure and the resources of ar aesthetic--is not merely precept and exhortation. It is organic and dynamic; its source is the Life indeed, and its process is the actualization of the Christ that is to be; without these it cannot blossom or bear. That is why the soul in "The Palace of Art" comes on corpses at mid-day.[121]

The aesthetic may be explicated somewhat by reference of Hallam's response to the Muses--"Enter likewise ye / And go with us"--to two parables set adjacent to one another in Matthew 25: 14-46.[122] The parallels are not here so exact as to justify an insistence on the presence of particular allusion, but the reference is at least probable, and the sense is consistent enough to provide at least a trial interpretation. In the first of these parables, the faithful servants who have employed their talents for the Master's gain are rewarded with a "Well done, thou good and faithful servant . . . enter thou into the joy of thy lord" (vs. 21, 23). In the second, those who have ministered out of genuine love to the hungry, thirsty, naked, sick and imprisoned are invited, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom . . . . Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me" (vs. 34, 40). If Tennyson is alluding to these passages, the christology herein urged is probably being employed to define the assertion of identity of Christ

and man in verse 40; and if so, it is not only man, but the godly works of man, that partake of Christ; for a good tree bringeth forth good fruit.

But whether or not Tennyson had these parables in mind, clearly the immediate allusion is to Revelation 14: 13-14:

> And I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth:[123] Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them.
>
> And I looked, and behold a white cloud, and upon the cloud one sat like unto the Son of man . . . .

The works of the godly man, like the man himself, find their vindication in the eyes of God as they take reference to the nature of Christ. Perhaps the personification of the work of the poet in the Muses, like the personification of the "works" in the passage from Revelation, is meant to secure the implication that art is organic in nature and source, and like all the truths that darkly join in our mystic frame, needs definition in the archetypal work of Christ to give it self-realization.

The implication of analogy in the last lines of CXXVIII cannot be granted to Tennyson without occasioning a sweeping reexamination of the whole poem's statement about the nature of art. Thus art, like life and love, would become meaningless unless at the core it derives from a spirit and practice consistent with that of the artistry of God, who by the Word, the Light, made all things that were made. Without some reconciliation of "calm despair and wild unrest" in the "deep self," the poet's experience is that of a

> delirious man
> Whose fancy fuses old and new
> And flashes into false and true
> And mingles all without a plan. (XVI)

Similarly, when he asserts that unless life partakes of eternal Life "earth is darkness at the core," he likens the meaninglessness of existence without such an insight to artistic creation without a controling motive:[124]

> This round of green, this orb of flame,
> Fantastic beauty; such as lurks
> In some wild Poet, when he works
> Without a conscience or an aim. (XXXIV)

In fact, most of the images of the poem can be related to the theme of the nature of art, and consistently imply that nature to be defined in the spirit of Christ. The crown of thorns transformed into a wreath in LXIX, for instance, has obvious implications for such a claim; the images of fruition consistently invite such application, as in CXV and CXXII. Clearly the poet himself, like his envisioned Hallam, is striving to transform the experience of sorrow into joy by reference to the archetype of that transformation. At the risk of reiteration, it should be stressed that the poet's art is vindicated in CIII, not merely because it has set itself a moral task, but because all is "toil cooperant to an end" consistent with the Alpha and Omega of creation.

In short, Tennyson is employing the aesthetic he has gained from the christology enunciated by his friends to give both meaning and form to every major theme of In Memoriam. So pervasive is this idea that the poem might almost stand as the correlative for the christological vision of this group, almost without qualification. The place of Hallam is central, but by no means unique, as a personification of this vision.

It is extremely tempting to push these conclusions beyond their demonstrable applications, and resolve them in Pope's exhortation:

"Cease then, nor order imperfection name." However, it has not herein been established that In Memoriam is a poem to be set beside the Divine Comedy or even Paradise Lost. I have neither courage nor inclination nor commission to fling that gauntlet in the face of the hosts who have damned the poem with faint praise, though it does seem to me that there is more to Tennyson than has been granted. But I hope to have accomplished at least this much--to have urged for In Memoriam the right of any responsible piece of literature, the right to be examined on its own terms. The generations have not been kind to the poem; they have obtusely praised and obtusely condemned, directed by their own prejudices and preoccupations. The general Victorian readers may be excused for that; perhaps the poem would have been less great if they had not treated it so, at least in its impact on the needs of men. But the critics should know a different ethic. To what shall we liken his critics of these generations? They have piped unto Tennyson, and he has not danced; they have mourned, and he has not wept. But there are gratifying signs, in the scholarship of recent days, of a better temper and a better perspective. Perhaps In Memoriam is bestirring itself for a resurrection.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]I do not, of course, mean that other mythic structures (such as the Adonis myth) are not employed in the poem, but that these have been transmuted into the Christian myth, which is the point of reference, even as Trench, Maurice, Hare and others saw the nature of Christ as ultimate reference for pagan mythology. On the other hand, such a reading could probably not be put upon "Oenone" or "Tithonus." But perhaps Robinson's analysis of such late poems as "Akbar's Dream" and "The Ancient Sage," which sets them in a context of "Universal Religion," might be redressed somewhat (Edna Moore Robinson, Tennyson's Use of the Bible [Baltimore, 1917], pp. 106-107).

[2]Clyde de L. Ryals thinks this structure argues "something deeper than the contrast between extreme joy and sorrow" (Theme and Symbol in Tennyson's Poems to 1850 [Philadelphia, 1964], p. 256).

[3]Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir by His Son (London, 1897), I, 325.

[4]Cf. John D. Rosenberg, "The Two Kingdoms of In Memoriam," JEGP, LVIII (1959), 231-232.

[5]To treat the poem as having an organic nature, a thematic coherence throughout, is not only to run counter by implication to a mass of Tennyson scholarship that treats the sections as separate lyrics, only vaguely related, but also to reject a more explicit critical tradition, typically enunciated by T. S. Eliot: that the poem has "only the unity and continuity of a diary, the concentrated diary of a man confessing himself" ("In Memoriam," Essays Ancient and Modern, in Critical Essays on the Poetry of Tennyson, ed. John Killham [London, 1960], p. 212). As early as an 1850 review, Charles Kingsley judged that no "conscious or organic method" "runs throughout the book" (Fraser's Magazine, XLII [September, 1850], 245-255, quoted in J. D. Jump, ed., Tennyson: The Critical Heritage [London, 1967], p. 183). For a summary of other contemporary judgments, pro and con, see Edgar Finley Shannon, Jr., Tennyson and The Reviewers . . . (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 147. Bradley discussed the poem's organization from the question of chronology, almost exclusively (A. C. Bradley, A Commentary on Tennyson's 'In Memoriam,' 3rd ed. rev. [London, 1929], pp. 20-35). Walker claimed the poem had "an irreversible progress from the state of a mind crushed . . . by . . . sorrow, to a state when regret is dead," but felt "it is

at least difficult to demonstrate this order" and felt the pattern to be based on accidental associations in the poet's own mind (Hugh Walker, The Greater Victorian Poets [London, 1895], p. 86). At the turn of the century the common judgment seems to have been that of Alden, "that In Memoriam is far from being a single, continuously progressive composition. . . . Unity of a certain sort it clearly possesses. . . . Tennyson may be said to have circled about his great sorrow and the problem of sorrow. . . ." (Raymond MacDonald Alden, Alfred Tennyson: How to Know Him [Indianapolis, 1917], pp. 328-329). Cf. Jerome Buckley, Tennyson: The Growth of a Poet (Boston, 1965), p. 108. Baum gives an eight-page synopsis to demonstrate its "miscellaneousness and discontinuity" (p. 106), and ends by concluding "we are not justified in looking for unity of tone or plan" (Paul F. Baum, Tennyson Sixty Years After [London, 1963], p. 115). Eleanor Bustin Mattes, in attempting to date the sections, represents them as being responses directed at particular influences at various times between Hallam's death and the publication of In Memoriam and therefore, evidently, not directed by any coherent conception. In one passage she credits Tennyson with the intent of a coherence, but she apparently feels the intention was not realized (In Memoriam: The Way of a Soul. A Study of Some Influences That Shaped Tennyson's Poem [New York, 1951], pp. xii-xv). Ryals seems in essential agreement in From the Great Deep (Athens, Ohio, 1967), pp. 29,36. Nevertheless attempts to define a pattern persist. See Martin J. Svaglic, "A Framework for Tennyson's In Memoriam," JEGP, LXI (1962), 810-825; and a number of studies of the pattern of the elegy in the poem--e. g., Joseph Sendry, "In Memoriam and Lycidas," PMLA, LXXXII (1967), 437-443; and Buckley, Tennyson, pp. 115-116.

The question is significant for the present study in that it calls in question any attempt to find an organic structure in the work. The issue might be avoided by the insistence that whatever the history of the composition, or the intent of the poet, any work of art presented as an entity may be better understood by treating it as an organic whole, to see how it will bear such examination. Yet in the present case no such recourse is required. The fact that the work underwent extensive and prolonged revision and rearrangement is enough, alone, to invite the assumption that Tennyson intended to achieve an organic coherence in the poem. And to be sure, it would be a little amazing, in a work which Tennyson had in hand more than sixteen years, to find it without an organic coherence, when among its concluding remarks it describes a work of art as something in which "all" is "toil cooperant to an end" (CXXVIII). To this evidence may be added explicit statements by Tennyson himself to that effect, though to be sure some of them are confusing. His statement in the Memoir (I, 304) that "I did not write them with any view of weaving them into a whole . . . until I found that I had written so many" (italics mine) is not necessarily a contradiction to his assertions that the poem had a unity. As example of these might be cited a letter of October 1877 to Count Saladine Saladini Pilastri of Cesena, who had translated some of In Memoriam: "I thank you for your . . . translating some of the poems. . . . You are doubtless aware that though in the form of distinct po-

ems it is a consecutive whole" ("'In Memoriam' After Fifty Years," Edinburgh Review, CCIII [1906], 307).

Valerie Pitt has urged masterfully, against Eliot's description of the poem, that the customary manner of Tennyson's composition, as well as the known details of the poem's revision, argues a deliberate and careful structuring (Tennyson Laureate [London, 1962], pp. 88-101, 277-280).

In the case of the present thesis, it is interesting to note that Section LXXXV, one of the earliest composed, makes use of allusions that seem to link Hallam to the Christ. (See the study of this passage below.) Not that such slender evidence shows Tennyson in possession of a scheme to make Hallam a "Christ-image" from the outset of the composition of In Memoriam; but it does show, I think, a proclivity to work in such terms, and more than a suggestion that the idea of treating Hallam as the Christ was there from the earliest stages of the work. It seems to me that the idea was easily available from Hallam's own work, from Coleridge, from Carlyle's frequent metaphorical practice, from the ideas of Hare and Sterling and Maurice and Trench and Erskine.

As copied in Heath's "Commonplace Book" sometime prior to 1835, Stanzas 11 and 13 (in which the allusions occur) originally stood next to each other and were identical in wording to the present form (Mary Joan Ellmann, "Tennyson: Revision of In Memoriam, Section 85," Modern Language Notes, LXV [1950], 23-25).

[6]See, e. g., C. F. G. Masterman, Tennyson as Religious Teacher, 2nd ed. (London, 1910, pp. 197-206). There is also a frequent assumption of corresponding polarity between "religious" and "moral" concerns that has been read upon the poem. So Ryals in Theme and Symbol judges the poem "moral rather than religious" (pp. 228-229).

[7]See note 40 below for critical attitudes about the role of feeling in Tennyson's faith.

[8]"In Memoriam," in Killham, p. 212.

[9]The best examples are perhaps the early laudatory reviews; see the survey of American reception in John Olin Eidson, Tennyson in America: His Reputation and Influence from 1827 to 1858 (Athens, Georgia, 1943), pp. 77-86. (Even then, however, a writer in the Court Journal suspected Tennyson did "not always seek his consolation at one sufficing source" [quoted in Shannon, p. 150].) Not all those who think Tennyson's position essentially the traditional one are among those who applaud the traditional. Hugh I'Anson Fausset, Tennyson: A Modern Portrait (New York, 1923), summarized his position as "emotional preference for the faith of his fathers" (p. 158), though making no reference to Christ explicitly; cf. Shannon, p. 149. Horton thought the basis of Tennyson's faith was love widening "from the personal and particular to the general and the universal . . . not inappropriately called God. . . ." (Robert F. Horton, Alfred Tennyson: A Saintly Life [London, 1900], p. 17); but Horton was convinced Tennyson was an orthodox Christian (pp. 20-33). Arthur Turnbull, Life and Writings of Alfred Lord Tennyson (London, 1915),

pp. 84, 90-94, believed that Tennyson by accepting Hallam as "the type of true manhood . . . reasoned himself back into a belief in the divinity of the Founder of Christianity and the Divine Government of the World" (p. 90). The "churchly ideal" (p. 92) in Tennyson he thought to be an intellectualized concept of the perfectibility of man: "In Tennyson's day the poet had to navigate between the Old Theology and the New, between Agnosticism and Science and Humanism and the piety of the Oxford Movement, and find an optimistic conclusion or egress out of the impasse created by the block of their combined contradictions. This Tennyson does by postulating . . . a new glimpse of guiding truth called 'The Christ that is To Be' . . . ." (p. 93). But Turnbull's thesis is left rather vague.

Most criticisms of Tennyson in the early decades of the twentieth century reversed the values of the Victorians in praising Tennyson for his doubt and decrying his faith--though their concept of what that faith was remained about the same.

[10]Hoxie N. Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry: Volume IV: 1830-1880: Christianity and Romanticism in the Victorian Era (New York, 1957), p. 115.

[11]Ibid., p. 121.

[12]James Benziger, Images of Eternity: Studies in the Poetry of Religious Vision from Wordsworth to T. S. Eliot (Carbondale, Illinois, 1964), p. 152.

[13]Ryals, Theme and Symbol, pp. 205-206; cf. From the Great Deep, p. 72. Cf. Elton Edward Smith, The Two Voices: A Tennyson Study (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1964), p. 97: "Of [Christ's] redemptive work, not a word; but much as a type of the higher, nobler manhood, of which also Arthur Hallam is a type, so much so that Arthur and the Christ figure merge to become not only the second Person of the Trinity, but in the pantheistic passage (CXXX) the third Person, as well." Cf. also pp. 110-111. Smith is supported by the conclusions of the present study, as far as the relationship between Hallam and the Christ goes, except that he seems to be working without a concept of the dynamic by which the "merger" takes place and does not attempt to study its function in the structure of the poem; moreover, the comments about Christ's redemptive work, pantheism, and the Trinity indicate to me that he is working with a schematic theological definition of Christ; and perhaps his interpretation is not distinguishable from Fairchild's in this regard.

The question of the place of Christ in the poem has often evoked judgments that provide informative background for this thesis; and some of these have treated the question in terms of Hallam, though few have dared the "cliché" of Christ-image, as Ryals calls it. Masterman thought Tennyson "looked for the ideal man in man and never found the Christ; Browning and Maurice took the real man as he is, and derived from him the need of a Christ" (p. 210). He thought the failure of Tennyson's concept of the restitution of all things derived precisely from his failure to see in Christ the way of restitution, but only "the energetic

striving of the Will, unsupported from without" (p. 211). Charles Tennyson, though judging the prologue to reflect Johannine and Pauline reference to Christ, thinks the entire work emphasizes the humanity of Christ ("Tennyson's Religion" in Six Tennyson Essays [London, 1954], pp. 81-94); of Hallam's relation to Christ he does not treat, except as a type of the end of human evolution and in general terms of the relation of human personality to a personal nature in God (pp. 92, 109, 115). Harrison thought In Memoriam "exquisitely graceful restatements of the current theology of the broad-churchman of the school of F. D. Maurice and Jowett--a combination of Maurice's somewhat illogical piety with Jowett's philosophy of mystification" (Frederic Harrison, Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill and Other Literary Estimates [New York, 1900], p. 10). Cf. Harold Nicolson, Tennyson: Aspects of His Life, Character and Poetry (London, 1925), p. 72. Sonn, not making the claim for Hallam as savior, reads the mystic union of XCV as essentially self-discovery rather than union with God (Carl Robinson Sonn, "Poetic Vision and Religious Certainty in Tennyson's Earlier Poetry," Modern Philology, LVII [1959], 91-92). Buckley judges the poem is "seldom specifically Christian" (Tennyson, p. 127); George O. Marshall agrees (A Tennyson Handbook [New York, 1963], p. 123). Luce thought Tennyson's "views of the human and the divine nature of Christ . . . variable and comprehensive . . . [having a] tendency to compromise" (Morton Luce, A Handbook to the Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson [London, 1897], p. 19). He thought the line "the churches have killed their Christ" in Maud displayed a "more personal" view than the expression "the Christ that is to be"; but both literal and metaphorical readings may attach to either expression. Luce seems to feel the former to be more acceptable because he can shelter it under reference to Hebrews 6:6, which he cites. Svaglic says that "the reflection on Hallam (107-14) as a prefiguration of the great man of the future may be said to parallel those on Christ" (p. 822).

The opening line of the prologue has become something of a test. In spite of Tennyson's own reference of the passage to the Gospel of John, and what seems an evident enough allusion to John 1:1-10 in an entire complex of images throughout the prologue, the apostrophe has been referred to the Platonic ideal, God rather than Christ, and universal human love, as well as to the Christ variously understood. "Immortal Love is addressed as the Son, or revelation, of God," said Bradley (p. 80). Charles Tennyson argues that the opening line is consistent with biblical references to Christ, though he thinks the second stanza more easily referrable to God than to Jesus ("Tennyson's Religion," pp. 92-93); on the latter point, see the discussion of the prologue in this study. Eliot thought the first line had only a "hazy connection" with the Incarnation ("In Memoriam" in Killham, p. 212); Pitt, echoing Sidgwick, disposed of the "Love" of the prologue as mere love of Hallam, "identified by . . . semantic sleight-of-hand . . . with the 'love' of Christianity which is an attribute and a name of God" (p. 115). Van Dyke, on the other hand, accepted the identification of "Love" with Christ, pointing out that Milton too had called the Son of God "Immortal Love" (Henry Van Dyke, The Poetry of Tennyson, 10th ed. [New York, 1904], p. 106). Ryals in Theme and Symbol (p.

253) thinks Tennyson is equating love with Christ, and referring to Christ in the prologue; but he goes on to insist that Tennyson's love is nearer to Plato's *eros* and the Stoic Universal Reason than to the New Testament *agape*.

Stopford A. Brooke, *Tennyson, His Art and Relation to Modern Life* (New York, 1894), thought that whether the opening line referred to Jesus was "left vague" (p. 20). Brooke is aware of a dimension of Tennyson's faith that has escaped the formal and propositional to a more open and developing Christianity. He said of the last line of CVI, "In that line the idea of Christ and his Gospel in mankind is given an infinite extension. We may give the phrase fifty meanings, and we shall not exhaust it. . . ." (p. 20; cf. Bradley, pp. 60-61). Yet in another context he spoke of it merely as referring to "the Christ who comes again" (p. 218). Brooke described Jesus as conceiving man "unbrokenly connected with the Eternal God as a child is with a father" and said flatly, "This was Tennyson's position" (p. 24). He thought Tennyson to agree with Maurice in the latter's "main faiths," which he identified as "ever-working immanence of God in man and in the universe as Will and Love . . . necessary brotherhood of man . . . if all were in God, the necessary evolution (if the vital union between God and man existed) of the human race into perfect love and righteousness, and the necessary continuance on the same hypothesis of each man's personal consciousness in a life to be . . ." (p. 17). But Brooke assigns neither to Maurice nor Tennyson a concept of the person of Jesus as the symbolic union of self and God, and hence does not see the coherence of these "faiths" with the role of Hallam in the poem. Instead of examining the impact of these concepts of Christ on the poem, he presents the work as bolster of traditional beliefs, and loses himself in the question of Tennyson's orthodoxy and the acceptability of his hope for immortality (pp. 18-20).

Similarly, Strong sees the growth of faith in *In Memoriam* based in a love which "from being a power within, becomes a Lord and King without, and at last identifies itself with that 'Strong Son of God, Immortal Love'. . ." (Augustus Hopkins Strong, *The Great Poets and Their Theology* [Philadelphia, 1899], p. 476). But how it becomes so is not explained, and the place of Hallam in the problem is not studied. Strong's summary analysis of Tennyson's theology shows, however, that he had the resources at hand to work out the problem of the poem in much the same way as the present study has done, had he really set himself to resolving the paradoxes in terms of the poem itself: it is clear, he thinks, that Tennyson ". . . regards man as an emanation from God, yet for that very reason responsible and free; that he worships Christ as the manifested God who has become incarnate to take man's sin away; that nature is but the symbol and partial expression of God, while Christ is the divine Word, intelligible and complete; that God's method, both in nature and in grace, is that of evolution, though the process admits the hearing and the answering of prayer and the communion of the finite spirit with its infinite Creator; that the Christ of God is imparting himself to human hearts and is displacing the brute inheritance by the power of love; that this love in man, being derived from God and connecting

the soul with God, is immortal; and that the persistence of love is the rational ground for confidence in the ultimate triumph of good in the universe" (p. 520).

See also an important recent survey of the question of the nature of Tennyson's faith by Eugene R. August, "Tennyson and Teilhard: The Faith of In Memoriam," PMLA, LXXXIV (1969), 217-226. Had this work been available to me at the time, most of the material cited in this note I might have studied with better command.

[14]Benziger, p. 152. Cf. Eliot, Killham, p. 212; Smith, who speaks of analyses like that of Genung as revealing "the preconceived bias that Tennyson was a religious teacher and In Memoriam a poem of Christian hope and faith" (p. 87); Fausset, who similarly judges that questions of doctrine are "only incidental" to the work (p. 158); and G. Robert Stange, "Tennyson's Mythology: A Study of Demeter and Persephone," in Killham, p. 138.

[15]Fairchild, IV, 119.

[16]Ibid., p. 120.

[17]Theme and Symbol, p. 206. Compare Mattes, pp. 90-98, where it is asserted that the religious position of the prologue is at variance with the rest of the poem, and particularly with the epilogue; Svaglic, p. 821 fn.; Masterman, who thinks Tennyson "accepted Christianity because it taught the doctrine of Immortality, a belief which he held to be vital to the continued existence of all that is best in mankind" (p. 205).

[18]See Mattes, A Study of Some Influences, p. xiii.

[19]There is of course considerable reason to this conclusion, particularly if one isolates lines or stanzas or reads "Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt" ("The Ancient Sage") back into In Memoriam, or takes Tennyson's comment that the poem is "too hopeful" in its broadest sense. But to link Tennyson, or at least In Memoriam, with a tradition of fideism, as Smith does in The Two Voices (pp. 98-102), though granting him a kind of nervousness in his equivocations that suggests a distinction from the true fideist, is simply to dismiss without a hearing the supposed rationale of Tennyson's faith--which I will try to show is not simply the apotheosis of a psychic need.

[20]Cf. K. W. Gransden, Tennyson's 'In Memoriam' (London, 1964), p. 58; Ryals, "The 'Heavenly Friend': The 'New Mythus' of In Memoriam," The Personalist, XLIII (1962), 396; but contrast Svaglic, p. 822, and Benziger, p. 150. August provides an excellent summary of the question, pp. 223-224.

[21]An exactly analogous problem is presented by Section XCV, where Tennyson in 1878 changed "His living soul" to "The living soul" and "mine in his" to "mine in this" (Carlisle Moore, "Faith, Doubt, and

Mystical Experience in In Memoriam," Victorian Studies, VII [1963], p. 164)--perhaps in some desperation that his vision of how Hallam "rested in Thee" could not be understood. The change has occasioned some critical exasperation: see Rosenberg, p. 234 n.; Baum, pp. 307-308; and Carlisle Moore's defense of the reading that Hallam is "merged in the Deity" against them, pp. 165-166. Charles Tennyson explains the substitution as the result of a waning of Tennyson's certainty that the communion was really with Hallam ("Tennyson's Religion," p. 88); cf. Benziger, p. 151.

Again, the issue recurs in readings of Section CXXXI, as for example that of Ryals, Theme and Symbol, pp. 259-260. Drawing from the Memoir (I, 319) on Tennyson's definition of "living will" as "free-will," he reads the invocation as evidence of a substitution of the subjective self for God. That may be, but not in terms of the poem, not as Tennyson sees the case. To say with Ryals that "this is the will to believe in spite of all 'proof' to the contrary" (1) wrenches the sense of "prove," which means try utterly, put to the last test (as in Malachi 3:10), not a certification by logic; (2) misapplies the point of Tennyson's statement, since not to be able to prove a thing is not equivalent to rejecting proof to the contrary (nothing is said of any proof to the contrary, and by Tennyson's premises there could not be any --see Bradley, pp. 65-66, and Memoir, I, 311); (3) ignores the existence and place of "one who with us works" (see Bradley, p. 236; cf. John 5:17); and (4) misses the allusion to John 4:14: "The water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life [italics mine]" (cf. Robinson, p. 15; see Buckley's comment on the image of water in the poem, Tennyson, p. 113). Gatty is nearer the case when he says of Tennyson's definition of the "living will" as "free will in man," "which is Christ, the source of all life and strength" (Alfred Gatty, A Key to Lord Tennyson's 'In Memoriam,' 4th ed. [London, 1900], p. 141).

[22]Some of the details of the following analysis of the prologue--though not, I think, its tenor or emphasis--have been anticipated by Luce, pp. 295-297.

[23]Robinson, p. 15; Van Dyke, p. 406; Charles Tennyson, "Tennyson's Religion," pp. 92-93.

[24]Sidgwick wrote in his letter in the Memoir, I, 304, that the whole poem gave statement to the "whole truth" that "assurance and doubt must alternate in the moral world . . . somewhat as night and day alternate in the physical world" whereas the prologue gave rather the "last word" that was "too completely triumphant [to be consistent in effect with the whole poem]." The present analysis grants Sidgwick's distinction (which is not by him felt to be a criticism, apparently), but sees this alternating represented as a dynamic of grace--dramatically presented in the poem proper, explicated in the prologue.

[25]Robinson, p. 15.

[26]Cf. John F. Genung, Tennyson's 'In Memoriam': Its Purpose and Its Structure: A Study (Boston, 1883), pp. 37-39.

[27]Contrast Steane, p. 82.

[28]Bradley (p. 82) calls attention to a similar employment of the same image in Will Waterproof, and to Memoir, I, 169, where Christ is called the "purest light of God."

[29]Bradley, p. 82; Alden, p. 297.

[30]See Memoir, I, 316-319; Solomon F. Gingerich's extended discussion of Tennyson's conception of free will in Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning: A Study in Human Freedom (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1911), pp. 113-156; and Charles Tennyson, "Tennyson's Religion," pp. 90, 109.

[31]I am sure this is confusing for the person who sees a dichotomy between the Logos and Jesus; for the center of Maurice's and especially Erskine's Christianity is "the Man" Jesus, whereas "Logos" suggests, in some frames of reference, primarily a philosophic premise. It is necessary to see that for them this dichotomy is a categorical invention of the Understanding--as it is, I think for the Coleridge of Aids to Reflection and the Tennyson of In Memoriam.

A number of readings of In Memoriam have made the poem theistic only, though often appropriating without acknowledgment Christian dimensions of theism in the interpretation. Sometimes these readings come (by such means) to a relatively consistent analysis of the poem's religious position; but without the Christ as point of reference these readings logically return, ultimately, to rationalistic or pantheistic schemes--and Maurice's analysis of the Unitarians in The Kingdom of Christ serves, I think, as a sensible explication for the tendency. The tenuousness of the poem's assertions, in such readings, is only too palpable, and makes conclusions like those of Ryals and Fairchild virtually inevitable so long as a merely theistic premise is assumed. For we are faced at last with the rationalistic Christian's problem, not only in the religion but in the art of the poem, a problem which may be summed up in the words of Pilate: "What shall I do then with Jesus which is called the Christ?" As happens in the case of the rationalists, Jesus (and Hallam) thus become, in the poem, merely the occasion for the issue of faith in God, reminder only of a solution already inherent in the theistic premises, and therefore nugatory. So Brooke interprets Section XXXVI of In Memoriam that Tennyson "considered Jesus to be the great proclaimer of . . . truths," an essentially rationalistic interpretation; compare the study of XXXVI below. Again, consider Cooke's summary of the poem's religious statement: "The personality of God and man's immortality are cognate beliefs, and are mutually sustained. The two stand or fall together, and they affirm each other with a force which no logic can break. When we state the one we necessarily state the other, for they are as the two sides of the same shield. If God is a personal being, pure, just, and good, the immortality of man follows as day-

light the rising of the sun. It is on this ground that Tennyson rests his own faith . . ." (George Willis Cooke, Poets and Problems [Boston, 1901], p. 159). Cf. William Samuel Lilly, Studies in Religion and Literature [London, 1904], pp. 43-52; and Strong, pp. 486-502 (yet Strong, like Brooke, thought Tennyson "more Christian than theist" [Brooke, p. 20; Strong, pp. 511, 520]). A parallel recent reading is that of Rosenberg, p. 240: "[God's] creation, one element, resolves under one law the antithesis of life and death, darkness and light, destruction and rebirth." Right as far as they go, these are arches without the keystone of Christ, to appropriate Hare's image. My point, of course, is not that this is an inadequate religious vision but that it is not quite what In Memoriam offers--or rather, it is a rationalistic reconstruction of what the poem offers. This interpretation, and the logical conclusion to which it leads, must either read the prologue as extraneous to the poem or make Christ, as Cooke does, "the infinite spirit of love" (p. 164), and must make light of (or translate) statements of Tennyson about the absolute necessity of Jesus to Christianity (e. g., Memoir, I, 326).

A misunderstanding of Maurice compounds the problem for those who take seriously Tennyson's description of him as "the truest Christian he knew in the world" (Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, II, 162, n.) Thus Cooke links Tennyson to the Broad Church tendency to "a sympathetic recognition of the divergence of human opinions" (p. 163); cf. Fairchild, IV, 105. Like Mill, Harrison, and other contemporaries, Brooke seems to understand Maurice's system fairly well except for the centrality of his christology and its nature and function (see note 13 above). Perhaps that may have something to do with Harrison's judgment of Maurice as "of a flabby, inconclusive order of mind" ("Tennyson: A New Estimate," North American Review, CLXXVI [1903], 862; cf. Genung, p. 50). On the general problem of the misunderstanding of Maurice, see note 26 to Chapter V, above.

Pitt, though likewise thinking Maurice "not given to sharp analysis" (p. 231), though seeing his main assertion that "Divine Being, the Eternal and Immutable, underlies and sustains the phenomenal and the transient" as being made "in a confused, shifting and never quite definite manner" (p. 236), gives him a much more sympathetic hearing and concludes that Tennyson's beliefs were consistent with and complementary to Maurice's (pp. 231-236). But Maurice's christology is still being considered primarily in a doctrinal analysis--in Platonic terms--not essentially different from, though more urbane than, the analysis of Rigg; and Maurice's reconciliation of "historical" and "natural" revelation is described in terms that would be more accurately applied to Butler's Analogy (p. 234), reminiscent of Newman's interpretation of Erskine in Tract 73. Though Pitt grants the possibility of an influence of Maurice on Tennyson as early as 1847 and 1848, when Tennyson was a member of Maurice's congregation (p. 235), and though he feels, like Mattes, that Maurice probably turned the direction of certain sections of In Memoriam toward a more orthodox Christianity (p. 234), yet Pitt's analysis of In Memoriam traces no impact of Maurice's conception of Christ, and indeed judges Tennyson's deference to the "Strong Son of God, Immortal Love" to be "semantic

sleight-of-hand" (p. 115), and the Lazarus section to be about "the need for and the value of revelation as a guarantee of known truth" (p. 94). Just how Hallam is to be "connected with" this rather confused "Maurician" vision of Tennyson's Pitt does not say, but it would appear he believed Tennyson himself to be rather fuzzy about the whole affair (see, e. g., p. 115).

[32]See Robinson's reference of this passage to the wrestling of Jacob with the angel in the night (Genesis 32:24-29), p. 22.

[33]Mattes argues that Lyell's Principles of Geology (1837) had engaged Tennyson's attention by a shock of contradiction to an earlier "Wordsworthian" faith that nature testifies to immortality (pp. 57-58). But surely, as the poem now stands, Sections LV-LVI are presented as dramatic utterances at one stage which lead on to "a nobler leave," as I shall attempt to demonstrate below. This does not necessarily invalidate Mattes' thesis, though it alters the emphasis considerably, as it does all readings of the poem that take these sections as the poem's final vision of nature. Still, surely Tennyson had encountered this problem prior to his reading of Lyell, if indeed he ever held the Wordsworthian beliefs as simply as Mattes proposes (see p. 39 of Mattes), as George Reuben Potter demonstrated so convincingly long ago ("Tennyson and the Biological Theory of Mutability of Species," Philological Quarterly, XVI [1937], 321-343). See Pitt, pp. 102-103; Young, p. 115 and n. Except for specific geological and biological data, Section CXVIII might in fact be adequately glossed by Lessing's Education of the Human Race.

J. B. Steane in Tennyson (London, 1966), pp. 83-84, argues that Tennyson (and Darwin) may logically Christianize the Darwinian theory by seeing man as growing into the image of God, but this is directly contrary to the Genesis account with which it cannot be reconciled. The analogy of this argument to Fairchild's comments about Tennyson's Christ being an Omega but not an Alpha is evident. Not to debate Genesis here, the point is irrelevant because Tennyson did not, nobody closely influenced by the Apostles could, take scriptural material in that pre-Coleridgean sense. Even Sections LV and LVI do not put the issue on such a basis. Tennyson's contemporaries missed his point, as they had missed Coleridge's, because they clung so blindly and tenaciously to the security (or accepted so facilely the collapse) of literalistic bibliclatry.

As to the theological basis of Tennyson's evolutionary scheme (and this is not to deny the influence of scientific materials), Cooke, for one, saw clearly that in the epilogue "he is not thinking of an evolution such as that described by Darwin and Spencer, but of one arising from a spiritual cause and a directive purpose" (p. 154)--a purpose which might, and supposedly did and would, however, realize itself in biological phenomena as elsewhere. Cf. Gransden, p. 23.

[34]Contrast Baum, p. 113. Van Dyke pointed out (not too adeptly) that the image of man rising step by step on his dead self in Section I is like that of the poet "upon the great world's altar-stairs / That slope thro' darkness up to God' (LV). Van Dyke said "catch a

glimpse of those vast altar-stairs" (p. 250)--a telling instance of how an other-worldly Christianity has so often intruded itself upon Tennyson's fusion of the temporal and eternal (continuum from man's perspective; identity, i. e., eternality, from God's. See Section XXVI, l. 10; The Princess, III, as cited in Bradley, p. 106).

[35]Cf. Van Dyke's reference of the epilogue to this scripture, p. 273. Awareness of this issue--that the ultimate realization is a "far-off" event--should qualify comments about Tennyson's easy faith in progress (e. g., Ryals, From the Great Deep, pp. 95-96). It must be further remembered that Tennyson's vision is conditionally stated: "If so he type within himself . . ." (CXVIII).

[36]All scriptures quoted are from the King James Version.

[37]Even Pitt, having insisted that Tennyson had a carefully wrought structure in the work, still echoes the critical commonplace that the prologue is an "after-thought" not really consistent with the whole work (p. 115).

[38]See above, note 5.

[39]"From his earliest to his latest work Tennyson considers the coexistence of contraries in . . . complementary relationships, in a harmony which yet conserves their opposition" (Allan Danzig, "The Contraries: A Central Concept in Tennyson's Poetry," PMLA, LXXII [1962], 579). Danzig feels, however, that In Memoriam "ultimately rejects a final reconciliation of the contraries" (p. 585).

[40]Walker, pp. 324-325; Strong, p. 484; Cooke, pp. 118-120 (but contrast p. 164); Van Dyke, pp. 103-105; Davidson, p. 113 (but see below, this note); Robertson, Frederick W., Analysis of Mr. Tennyson's 'In Memoriam,' 15th ed. (London, 1901), comments on sections 124 and 131 (not paginated); Gingerich, pp. 159-160; Stephen Allen Grant, "The Mystical Implications of In Memoriam," Studies in English Literature, II (1962), 481-495; Lore Metzger, "The Eternal Process: Some Parallels Between Goethe's Faust and Tennyson's In Memoriam," Victorian Poetry, I (1963), 190; Steane, p. 80; Gransden, p. 49; Michael A. Davis, ed., In Memoriam, by Alfred Tennyson (London, 1964), p. xl; Bella Kussy Milmed, "In Memoriam a Century Later," Antioch Review, X (1950), 471-492; Moore, passim; Fairchild, IV, 114; Ryals, "The 'Heavenly Friend,'" p. 390; Smith, p. 53; Buckley, Tennyson, p. 18, and The Victorian Temper: A Study in Literary Culture (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 89-90; Graham Hough, "The Natural Theology of In Memoriam," Review of English Studies, XXIII (1947), 253-255.

An interesting contrast is afforded by Thomas Davidson, Prolegomena to 'In Memoriam' (Boston, 1889), pp. 15-25, where "faith" is defined as consciousness of oneness with the Infinite and identified with the Kantian "pure reason," justice is made the form by which this faith is known, assent to its propositions (for it works by propositions) made, however, dependent on moral experience, and so the whole

scheme is delivered over into rationalism again. The security of self-evident categorical forms is appropriated, but inconsistently moral assent made to derive from experience. Thus Davidson has asserted both halves of the traditional dichotomy without however reconciling them. See p. 56: "Reason and Understanding, are not 'at strife;' they only speak two different languages, and treat of two different worlds." The reconciliation is to be achieved in reunion with the Infinite, even as man knew the Infinite before consciousness of himself as separate identity. The great deep from which he came and to which he goes is thus at one with pure reason. This static and other-worldly and propositional faith is supposed to be what In Memoriam offers.

Curiously, Baum also seems to present Tennyson's effort as if it were undertaken as "a matter for argument and logical demonstration" (p. 131).

[41]Ryals, "The 'Heavenly Friend,'" p. 390.

[42]Bradley cites "G. A. C." [?] to compare Section CXXVII to The Friend (Bradley, p. 233). Turnbull suggests that Tennyson "belonged to the Broad Church school" which he would have derived from Coleridge and Erskine, though he gives few particulars of likeness and these are very general (pp. 184-185) so that it is hard to see whether he sees the likeness between Tennyson and these men or between him and the school. Charles Tennyson suggests a precedent in Kant ("Tennyson's Religion," p. 92n.). Mattes thinks the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle slight and temporary, though she seems to think of this influence as "transcendentalist" rather than "religious." A different conception of Coleridge's position is assumed in the present study and accounts in part for a different conclusion about the similarities of Tennyson and Coleridge. Gransden, p. 11, likens Tennyson's synthesizing vision to the Coleridgean; Hough thinks Coleridge's thought influenced him (p. 254). Pitt notices similarity in their poetic method (p. 69); Ryals in Theme and Symbol approaches the early poems generally as concerned with the problem of the separation of objective from subjective, fact from value (pp. 25-27). In his analysis of In Memoriam he identifies "knowledge" with facts but thinks "wisdom" "stems from feeling rather than seeing" (p. 250).

I suspect the immediate point of reference for Tennyson's "knowledge" and "wisdom" is Hare as purveyor of Coleridge, and the ultimate one the Bible. Compare, for instance, Ecclesiastes 9:10 with the last stanza of CVIII.

[43]Van Dyke, p. 406, and Robinson, pp. 18, 21, cite Romans 8:24.

[44]Cf. Gransden, p. 27; Buckley, The Victorian Temper, p. 84.

[45]Cf. August, p. 221.

[46]Cf. Gransden, p. 19.

[47]E. g., Steane, p. 81; Smith, p. 109. Bradley denied feeling alone to be the basis of Tennyson's faith (pp. 60-61).

[48]Behind the rhapsodic utterance of Van Dyke, and the accompanying explanation that Tennyson's way is "emotional" and "subjective," he may really be trying to say this: "The deathless fire that God has kindled in the breast burns toward that heaven which is its source and home, and the swift answer of immortal love leaps out to solve the mystery of the grave" (p. 104).

[49]In a typical reading of Section CXXIV, Mattes represents Carlyle, Hare and Coleridge (and Tennyson) as valuing the feelings as surer religious guide than intellect (p. 69). Though there is some truth in that, it presumes the dichotomy Hare and Coleridge, Tennyson I think, Carlyle perhaps, were trying to invalidate. My argument for Coleridge has been made; the citation from Hare's Victory of Faith Mattes employs requires stripping it of all context to ignore the qualification that it is only the fragmented psyche's Understanding that is so denigrated therein.

[50]Cf. Gransden, pp. 34-35. Van Dyke (p. 407) refers this passage to Isaiah 28:13: "But the word of the Lord was unto them precept upon precept; line upon line, line upon line; here a little, and there a little. . . ." If Tennyson is using this scripture in this manner, however, there are a number of problems in the interpretation; for Isaiah is there demonstrating how "the priest and the prophet have erred through wine, and through strong drink are out of the way" (v. 7).

[51]" . . . Opening of the heart toward the unseen world is possible only by opening the heart correspondingly toward this world" (Genung, p. 152). The ease with which one associates the term "mystical" with the obliteration of objective reality is illustrated by Solomon F. Gingerich's reading of this section: "He felt a sudden mystic transformation coming on, the light of sense went out [italics mine] . . ." (p. 137). But the passage does not say that. The frequent quotations of Tennyson's description of his trances in the Memoir have similarly stressed the abstraction. But Tennyson says it derives "as it were, out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality" so that it "fade[s] away into the boundless being . . . the loss of personality (if so it were) [italics mine] seeming no extinction but the only true life."

[52]See Arthur J. Carr, "Tennyson as a Modern Poet," in Killham, pp. 57-58; Moore, p. 162; and see below, pp. 491-492.

[53]Cf. W. David Shaw, "The Transcendental Problem in Tennyson's Poetry of Debate," Philological Quarterly, XLVI (1967), 92-94, for a description of Tennyson's presentational medium that makes for a similar argument, though with no reference to a "Logos" as such. Shaw's point was foreshadowed (not very explicitly) by Genung, p. 35, where the "disguise" of "Lycidas" and "Adonais" is contrasted to In Memoriam's "unfigurative expression" of "real issues."

[54]Cf. Gransden, p. 19, on Section CXXIV. Bradley makes the same point about the limits of phenomena, without, apparently, taking the Incarnation as point of reference whereby the power of faith to give meaning to reality may be understood (pp. 55-66).

[55]Cf. Carlisle Moore, p. 167, and August, pp. 225-226.

[56]Cf. Van Dyke, p. 143; Genung, p. 77. My point is not quite to say, in the words of Carr, that the "theme of the poem" is not "seriously philosophical" (p. 53), but that its method is not that of the treatise, and that it makes its assertions in terms of the experience it records.

[57]Cf. Steane, p. 77; Genung, pp. 69-70; Gatty, pp. 2-3.

[58]For surely "stubborn hardihood" is not pejorative. Gransden seems not to have weighed the importance of the desire for "hardihood" in his reading of this section--that the poet desires to die (p. 52). Marvel Shmiefsky, "In Memoriam: Its Seasonal Imagery Reconsidered," Studies in English Literature, VII (1967), 731-732, similarly reads the longing of the poet as a perverse desire not to be rejuvenated. Cf. Davidson, p. 28, and Elizabeth Chapman, A Companion to 'In Memoriam' (London, 1901), p. 2, for identical interpretations.

[59]Cf. Gatty, p. 6.

[60]Cf. Genung, pp. 74-76; and E. D. H. Johnson, The Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry: Sources of the Poetic Imagination in Tennyson, Browning, and Arnold (Princeton, 1952), pp. 17-21. See below, pp. 503-507, and notes thereto.

[61]Mattes, pp. 53-54.

[62]Rosenberg, p. 230. Cf. Ryals, "The 'Heavenly Friend,'" p. 385, where it is spoken of as the language of the Apostles.

[63]Cf. Gatty, p. 18.

[64]Cf. E. D. H. Johnson, "In Memoriam: The Way of the Poet," Victorian Studies, II (1958), 140.

[65]Cf. Jack L. Kendall, "A Neglected Theme in Tennyson's In Memoriam," Modern Language Notes, LXXVI (1961), p. 416, where it is noted that "the return of the ship with Hallam's body defines in an appropriately shadowy way the form of his deepest desire."

[66]Bradley, p. 103.

[67]Cf. Gransden, pp. 48-49.

[68]Cf. Gatty, p. 33; Bradley, p. 109.

[69]But contrast Bradley, p. 109.

[70]Bradley calls it "an hour of exaltation" (p. 32). Brooke speaks of it as "the first prophecy in the poem of the resurrection of the soul from the sorrow of loss. . ." (p. 216). Baum (p. 108) calls it "the first ray of hope, the first groping statement of immortality." Cf. Genung, p. 37, that "it is the result of an earnest inquiry into life and experience,--the first in a series of results which add themselves until the whole world, temporal and eternal, is included in the answer." Yes, but there has been little "inquiry" on the point so far in the poem; and any certainty it has is either conventional merely, or reflected back upon it from later sections of the poem. It seems to me these readings have missed the point of the Christmas experience somewhat. Perhaps the fervent plea with which XXX closes gives the appearance of pious resignation. But the image itself seems to say that the person sitting in darkness has not seen the light of Hope. Cf. Kendall, pp. 416-417, that "he has eschewed, though not irreverently, accepted forms of spiritual comfort."

I suspect "gamboled" in l. 6 is intended to hearken back to the image of the dance of death in Section I, l. 12.

[71]Cf. Robinson, p. 33. Svaglic sets up the equation differently: "Mary had Christ's presence (31-32) as believers have in their 'faith thro' form.' But what Christ's presence was for Mary, that of Hallam, 'The man I held as half-divine,' as he had described him in 14, had long been for Tennyson . . ." (pp. 815-816).

[72]Bradley, p. 112; Van Dyke, p. 407; Robinson, p. 16. If not mere coincidence, it is totally consistent with the implied christology of In Memoriam that Tennyson should use this term to represent the ultimate stage of the evolution of man in "The Progress of Spring."

[73]The annointing scene is not, in John's account, immediately associated with the account of the raising of Lazarus in John 11, but occurs in John 12; the point is mere cavil, to qualify Robinson's comment that Tennyson is working with "one passage at a time" (p. 32); for the point she is making--that Tennyson's adaptation of scriptural material in this instance is simple and literal--is relatively valid. However, I have tried to show in several places in this study that his use of scripture in In Memoriam is not always so simple and literal; and perhaps the poem does not fit as smoothly into the "Period of Simplicity" as Robinson suggests (pp. 24-25). Even here, references to Olivet and the crown of thorns complicate the pattern, as I try to show. The whole issue of Tennyson's use of biblical material needs restudy. Robinson really did little careful hunting, drawing mostly on Van Dyke. A judicious and sensitive reference to a concordance would provide dozens of allusions not cited; and those cited are not thought about much.

[74]I can not agree with Mattes (p. 46) that Tennyson's comfort is not much drawn from the New Testament. There are extensive passages

of the poem that build on allusions from the Bible, especially the parables of Jesus, prophecies of Amos, Isaiah, and Hosea, the Revelation, and passages from the epistles: Hebrews 11, I Corinthians 13, and I John especially. Contrast Mattes' reading of Section XXXVI on p. 39. A judgment similar to that of Mattes is found in Theme and Symbol, p. 222.

[75]Mattes, p. 36; Ryals, Theme and Symbol, p. 219. The question is real, however, and stands as poignant qualification of the account. Brooke is too sanguine to speak as he does of "those lovely verses about Lazarus and Mary (xxxi, ii) in which the hope of the life to come and the peace of love begin to dawn upon his heart" (p. 220). See Svaglic, p. 815.

[76]Cf. Chapman, p. 16; Genung, pp. 124-125; Davis, p. xxx.

[77]The usual reading, as e. g. Davis, p. xxxi.

[78]Compare the image of the "hollow dark" in "In Deep and Solemn Dreams," in the Unpublished Early Poems.

[79]Cf. Robert Preyer, "Tennyson as an Oracular Poet," Modern Philology, LV (1958), 247; Genung, p. 36; Pitt, pp. 105-110.

[80]Cf. Bradley, p. 54.

[81]Cf. Masterman, pp. 30-32; Bradley, p. 115n.

[82]No attempt here is made to do battle with such judgments as Auden's famous quip, or Scaife's comment that Tennyson's conclusions "are not remarkable for originality, independence, or precision" and that he is "a second-rate and cowardly philosopher, a compromising and uncertain thinker" (C. H. O. Scaife, The Poetry of Alfred Tennyson: An Essay in Appreciation [London, 1930], p. 56). I do feel that judgment should be reviewed in terms of Tennyson's premises. See August for an able recent defense of his power and originality.

[83]Masterman sometimes seems to represent Tennyson as a subjective idealist after the manner of Fichte (e. g., pp. 22-23). I am dismayed whenever I find my thesis at odds with Masterman, who seems to be in close touch with Tennyson's mind; but Masterman has tried to read Tennyson without reference to the centrality of the Incarnation, a reading with which I must differ. In the present case, the result is to see Tennyson as constructing a humanistic scheme that puts reality in the self--thus he judged that Tennyson "looked for the ideal man in man and never found the Christ" (p. 210). Cf. Davidson, pp. 15-25; Ryals, From the Great Deep, p. 197.

[84]"Life and nature are a continuum extending uninterruptedly towards a spiritual climax; yet at some point the 'lower' material world passes over into the 'higher' spiritual world" (Carr, p. 57).

[85]I am at odds here with Davidson, who in a rationalistic reading of the poem explains, rather like Locke, that the Christian "mythus," though not needed to make the "truths in manhood known to the powerful mind," is "suited to those minds which are incapable of such subtle questioning" (p. 39). Bradley says, similarly, "We owe thanks none the less" [italics mine] (p. 116). Cf. Gatty, p. 40; Baum, p. 108. Perhaps Section XXXIII did leave open the possibility of the truth's being available to the rationalist addressed there; but I judge rather that "truth in closest words" fails not only for the simple, but wherever mere knowledge is (cf. I Corinthians 13:8). Compare Buckley's explanation of Tennyson's reticence to explicate his metaphors: "He wished his verse to communicate poetically or not at all" (Tennyson, p. 74).

[86]Cf. Section CVIII, ll. 7-12; and Van Dyke's (p. 408) and Robinson's (p. 22) reference of these lines to Romans 10:6-8.

[87]" . . . He maintained that the religion of a people could never be founded on mere moral philosophy: and that it could only come home to them in the simple, noble thoughts and facts of a Scripture like ours" (Memoir, I, 308).

[88]Cf. Van Dyke, p. 142.

[89]As noted above Brooke misses this dimension of the passage. For him, this passage shows that Tennyson "considered Jesus to be the great proclaimer of these truths,--the one who concentrated into Himself the religious truths which before Him had been in man, reformed them in His own thought, and issued them with new power and charged with new love, to claim the belief of man" (p. 18).

[90]Van Dyke, p. 407; Robinson, p. 15.

[91]See Robinson, p. 16.

[92]Cf. Gatty, p. 74.

[93]The "angel of the night" is sometimes identified with Hallam, as in Ryals, Theme and Symbol, p. 216; but the identification is not established in the passage, and seems debatable.

[94]As with Section III's "waste places" and the "desert dust" of LVI, the desert evidently suggests the meaninglessness of existence, life from which has evanished the sense of eternal life. The blighted land's reflection of the spiritual death of its people is of course the traditional waste land theme. But in addition to that frame of reference, Tennyson is evidently appropriating the metaphors of Isaiah 35 (as in the last line of Section CXXII), scripture traditionally read as figuring the coming of the Messiah in terms of the rejuvenation of barrenness. Compare the wedding of John 4:14 and Exodus 17:6 in Section CXXXI. I take the sense of this pattern to be that nature is redeemed in the coming Christhood to which all goes. Thus the statement of LVI

is not the final comment the poem makes on nature; but just as human sorrow parallels natural and cosmic sorrow (Sections II-III), so human redemption parallels natural and cosmic redemption (Sections CXXI-CXXVIII). Cf. the Bishop of Ripon, "Talk on Some Religious Questions," in Tennyson and His Friends, ed. Hallam Tennyson (London, 1911), p. 303. If so, Mattes' charge that "Section 130 rests on the quite different premise [from that of 123 and 124] that nature and God are essentially one" (p. 75) is robbed of its force, provided it is qualified with the insistence that nature, like man, is becoming one with God in realizing its essence.

Compare Trench: " . . . The parables are a calling of attention to the spiritual facts which underlie all processes of nature, all institutions of human society, and which, though unseen, are the true ground and support of all. Christ moved in the midst of what seemed to the eye of sense an old and worn-out world, and it evidently became new at his touch; for it told to man now the inmost secrets of His being. . . . Nature, in its present state, like man himself, contains but a true prophecy of its coming glory; it 'groaneth and travaileth;' it cannot tell out all its secrets [compare the last stanza of Section LXXXVIII]; it has a presentiment of something, which it is not yet, but hereafter shall be. . . . It does not give always a clear witness, nor speak out in distinct accents, of God's truth and love. Of these it is oftentimes an inadequate expression--yea, sometimes seems not to declare them at all, but rather in volcano and in earthquake, in ravenous beasts and in poisonous herbs, to tell of strife, and disharmony, and all the woful [sic] consequences of the Fall. But one day it will be otherwise; one day it will be translucent with the divine idea which it embodies, and which even now, despite these dark spots, shines through it so wondrously. For no doubt the end and the consummation will be, not the abolition of this nature, but the glorifying of it; that which is now nature (natura) always, as the word expresses, striving and struggling to the birth, will then be indeed born" (Notes on the Parables, pp. 20-21).

[95]Gransden, p. 40, has anticipated some of the details of this reading.

[96]Cf. Ryals, "The 'Heavenly Friend,'" p. 385. Genung (pp. 93-94) described the three cycles in terms of "past, present and future."

[97]So even Masterman, for all his penetration, is at one with these judgments that Tennyson had no sense of the reality of evil, expressed no judgment on evil (e. g., p. 199). But surely it is the expectations derived from the traditional dualism, rather than the granting to Tennyson his own argument, that sees him so. " . . . Nowhere [is there] this unique realisation of sin as a taint of personality, and as a crime against God" (p. 200). The charge is analogous to Rigg's against Maurice, and derives from the same preconception. If Tennyson seems to consider sin "not as in reality and altogether evil" (Ibid.), it is, I think, because he conceives of sin as, in essence, an inversion of reality. If the pedal tone of reality is the love of God for his

creation, all that shuts love out or distorts it from true grace is a sin against God; inasmuch as we have done it unto the least, we have done it unto Him. What this criticism of Tennyson comes down to, at last, is that he will not set up a Manichean duality of gods, a god of light and a god of darkness.

[98]Theme and Symbol, p. 206.

[99]Cf. Elizabeth Hillman Waterston, "Symbolism in Tennyson's Minor Poems," in Killham, p. 117, where it is argued that a closer symbolic reference to Christ would have clarified the message of the poem, and where Tennyson's neglect of such a symbol is interpreted as either the result of an uncertainty in his own faith, or an avoidance of a symbol which had become confused in the minds and emotions of his audience.

[100]I find myself at odds with Robert Preyer, "Alfred Tennyson: The Poetry and Politics of Conservative Vision," Victorian Studies, IX (1966), 336-337, in his reading of this section, that looking too deeply into self was invitation to spiritual paralysis, and must object mildly to his linking the last stanza here with the first of the succeeding section as though the thought were continuous. Preyer's reading of The Palace of Art in the same manner seems more acceptable, though it is not so much a probing of the depths of self as the loveless isolation from mankind that brings ruin to that soul.

My own judgment is that, taken as a whole, In Memoriam asserts that the probing of the experience of sorrow (which is a probing of the self, though not merely that, but of self in confrontation with an objective fact) has led rather to the experience of a real underlying both self and external reality. A comment of Kingsley's in an 1850 review may clarify: "Within the unseen world which underlies and explains this mere time-shadow, which men call Reality and Fact, he had been going down into the depths, and ascending into the heights, led, like Dante of old, by the guiding of a mighty spirit" (quoted in Jump, p. 184).

[101]Theme and Symbol, p. 224.

[102]Stephen Allen Grant, in "The Mystical Implications of In Memoriam," Studies in English Literature, II (1962), 481-495, argues convincingly the centrality of the mystical communion as the basis of Tennyson's faith, and explains by that means Tennyson's extra-rational approach (p. 486), his sense of "a Unity of all existence in God" (p. 488), his sense that "the division of creation into ever-changing matter and ever-passing moments of time is merely an illusion" (p. 491; Cf. Ryals, From the Great Deep, p. 199). As is evident, the present study coincides with Grant in these particulars. It differs, however, (1) in seeing the mystic state in In Memoriam as ultimate penetration of objective reality rather than abstraction from it, as occurring in the Coleridgean fusion of subject and object; (2) in seeing Christhood as the ground and means of the mystic experience, whereas Grant makes no mention of this dimension of the poem at all; and (3) urging

that it is through the medium of personhood that this mystic experience is possible, and that it frankly asserts the unity of God and the real basis of self, rather than "a non-personal image of God" (p. 488) (though Grant's dissociation of Tennyson's mystically apprehended God from the crude anthropomorphism of traditional Christianity is well taken, provided the assertions of Sections XXXIII and XXXVI are remembered to qualify the distinction). Without these additions, the mysticism described by Grant is hardly to be made consistent with Tennyson's insistence that Christianity would collapse without the person of Christ (Memoir, I, 326), unless it is granted that his mystic vision is not really Christian by his own definition--which makes for insuperable problems with In Memoriam itself. In the light of these qualifications, Grant's concurrence in the common reading that Tennyson, "sensitive to criticism and adept at judging the temper of his audience, obviously understood that his personal convictions must be suppressed" (p. 488) needs, I think, to be reviewed. It seems to me that Tennyson has been very forthright in presenting the range and implications of the protagonist's experience.

Carlisle Moore gives an excellent defense of the mystical experience as central to Tennyson's resolution by comparing it with the "conversion" experience. But the question of the dynamic of the conversion, its soteriology, remains largely unexamined, and Moore seems to leave Hallam, or the mere mystic capacity itself, Tennyson's "savior" (pp. 162, 164-166).

[103]Cf. Kendall's discussion of the theme of renunciation, especially p. 417.

[104]Perhaps this may serve as the "repentance" Ryals finds lacking as prelude to Section LXXIII (Theme and Symbol · p. 230).

[105]This reading therefore differs from that in E. D. H. Johnson, The Alien Vision, p. 25, that the "trouble" of Hallam, which has its origin only in the protagonist's mind, prevents the consummation of their communion. True, the trouble frustrates communion, but only as prerequisite--only in the sense that there must be a sowing in sorrow before there can be a reaping in joy; and the testimony of the whole poem shows that Hallam participates in the sorrow (see, e. g., CXXII, stanza 1; CXXV; CXXXI, stanza 2).

[106]Gransden, p. 40, poses the problem of coherence.

[107]"A determined social dedication," says Buckley (The Victorian Temper, p. 88). But this is not a mere moral activism.

[108]The argument that "loss is common to the race" (VI) is not irrelevant, as Gransden says it is (p. 49). But Gransden's point is that the argument does not make the protagonist's sorrow "less."

[109]E. D. H. Johnson, The Alien Vision, p. 25, notes that this dream seems more compelling than that of LXVIII as testimony (? about the sig-

nificance of dream as means of communion with Hallam and imaginative encounter with reality) and judges the reason to be that it takes orthodox Christianity as its point of reference. But I think the real reason, if there is such a distinction, is that in LXIX the identification with Christ complements and interprets the identification with Hallam in LXVIII.

[110]"Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace, whose mind is stayed on thee: because he trusteth in thee" (Isaiah 26:3).

[111]See Bradley, p. 171.

[112]Cf. Bradley, pp. 28-30.

[113]Ryals, Theme and Symbol, p. 257; cf. Davidson (p. 97), Svaglic (p. 825), and Carr (pp. 58-59), though Carr gives a less specific conclusion.

[114]Without the acquiescence, the statement that "all is well" of CXXVII is merely desperate. That it has been so frequently seen so points up how the ground of that acquiescence has been misunderstood.

[115]The "growth" of Hallam (and the poet) is probably referrable to CXIV, where Hallam "grewest not alone in power / And knowledge, but . . . in reverence and in charity"; and I would explain both passages by reference to Christ, who grew "in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man" (Luke 2:52), even as the Christians should all come "unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" (Ephesians 4:13). Shmiefsky refers the passage in CXIV to Hallam's praise of Tennyson as "enlarger of our modes of knowledge and power," which seems likely, but is not inconsistent with the present reading; and the whole problem of "growth" as an image for evolving mankind must be referred, for its clearest apprehension, to these biblical parallels.

[116]Fausset, for example, seems to take them so (pp. 159-160). Cf. Luce, p. 284, and Sonn, pp. 92-93. Buckley points out that the apologies were in part conventional (Tennyson, p. 109). Shmiefsky, as noted, makes a significant correction of this reading. Genung noted long ago that the concept of his versifying as "sad, mechanic exercise" was only a temporary position (p. 67). Cf. Pitt: " . . . The shaping of In Memoriam from 'short swallow flights of song, to a sustained and serious comment. . . . " (Pitt, p. 9; cf. p. 89).

[117]As Mustard shows, this is probably intended to contrast with claims for Homer and Milton and is perhaps not so denigratory as it at first appears (Wilfred P. Mustard, Classical Echoes in Tennyson [New York, 1904], p. 149).

[118]But see Ryals, Theme and Symbol, p. 244, for a different emphasis (i. e., the redirection of the poet's artistic effort)--not necessarily conflicting with this reading.

[119]See Shmiefsky's reading of the poet's assertion of self-confidence in terms of the violet image, pp. 737-738.

[120]See Nicolson, p. 82; Steane, p. 30, who differs with Nicolson, but does not contest Nicolson's concept of the ethic of the Apostles (see also pp. 41-42); and Betty Miller, "Camelot at Cambridge," Twentieth Century, CLXIII (1958), 146. See Ryals, Theme and Symbol, pp. 54-55, where, though Maurice is quoted as saying the poet interprets nature's mysteries "not by narrowing them into the grasp of the Understanding, but by connecting each of them with the feeling which catches and images the whole scheme and working of the world," this aesthetic is interpreted to mean that "it is the duty of poetry to guide and teach" (p. 54; italics mine).

[121]Cf. Sonn, p. 86.

[122]Cf. Ryals, Theme and Symbol, p. 245, that Tennyson's diction in these lines is that of the King James Bible.

[123]That this voyage of the protagonist is a "death" is evident from the echo in Section CXXV, quoted above.

[124]"Motive"--that is, perception of the reality of his work as it is grounded in, at one with, "that which is"--not merely submission to an authority, as according to the reading of Sonn (p. 92). The point is that art, like all existence, is valid only in the communion of self and "that which is." Compare the epilogue: "That we may lift from out of dust / A voice as unto him that hears, / . . . To one that with us works. . . ."

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