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STRUCTURE ON CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

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1964

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PERSONALITY
STRUCTURE ON CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Today, people in the field of public address or rhetoric spend a considerable amount of time attempting to describe what they do. Exactly what is the study of speech? Donald Bryant was answering this question when he concluded that the rhetorical function is "the function of adjusting ideas to people and of people to ideas."¹ Even though this answer focuses on the root of the problem, three rather vague concepts still exist: the nature of ideas, the nature of adjustment, and the more difficult nature of people. The student of rhetoric often attempts to understand this art described by Bryant by separating the components--ideas,

¹Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX, No. 4 (1953), 402.

adjustment and people--when they are, in fact, inseparable.

The study of speech is a study of the individual.

The study of speech behavior is the study of verbal responses of the individual to various stimuli.

Speech is the fundamental aspect of the whole personality. Its function is not only to communicate verbally, but is also an expression of the individual's relations to himself and to others. The more man tends toward health and self-realization, the less he will tend toward neurosis, and the more meaningful will be his verbalization.²

Barbara continues by pointing out that verbal communication between a person and his environment is the most basic means of expressing the characteristics of personality.

Since speech is recognized as the way people adapt to each other, it is surprising to find so few studies in the professional journals which attempt to understand speech behavior by investigating the relationships between the different communicating personalities.

In the history of the nature of ideas, adjustment, and people, a close relationship emerges between the sources of rhetorical theory and personality theory. Both rhetorical and personality theory often refer to Aristotle, Plato, and

²Dominick A. Barbara, Your Speech Reveals Your Personality (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1958), pp. 160-161.

other classical figures as the originators of contemporary theory. In rhetoric, when we talk of "audience analysis," we go back to the suggestion of Aristotle that we ought ". . . to understand human character and goodness . . ." ³ or Plato's advice that ". . . the man who aims to be an artistic speaker must necessarily know the soul in all its species . . ." ⁴ In view of this we should not be too surprised when we discover that Freud, greatly impressed by Plato's theory of reminiscence, ". . . wove suggestions of Plato's into his book, Beyond the Pleasure Principle," ⁵ or when Hall and Lindzey state, "A comprehensive view of the development of personality theory must surely begin with conceptions of man advanced by the great classical scholars as Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle." ⁶ Apparently, then, rhetoric and personality theory share a common heritage.

The idea of relating personality theory to rhetorical

³Aristotle, Rhetorica. Ed. Richard McKeon, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Random House, 1941), 1356^a 20.

⁴Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 61.

⁵Ernest S. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1953), p. 56.

⁶Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 2.

theory became evident during the early part of this century. Robert West typifies the rhetorical theorist's concern, during the early twenties, with the importance of examining human thought and conduct.

Speech concerns itself always with human conduct and thoughts, always with the changing or adapting of the thoughts of one person or groups of persons to those of another person or group. Before we can consider therefore, the problem of making this adaptation consciously through the means of speech, we must know a great deal about the thing we are trying to adapt; that is, we must study the principles of human thought and conduct.⁷

West concluded that "no other study is more clearly applied psychology than the study of public speaking."⁸ Some other rhetorical theorists of this era who shared West's feelings include: Winans, Woolbert, Phillips, etc.⁹ Practically all of the present texts in public speaking show evidences of the impact of psychological theory upon speech theory. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect to find areas in

⁷Robert West, Purposive Speaking (New York: Mac-Millan Co., 1924), p. 13.

⁸Ibid., p. 17.

⁹James Albert Winans, Public Speaking (New York: The Century Co., 1917); Charles Henry Woolbert, The Fundamentals of Speech: A Behavioristic Study of the Underlying Principles of Speaking and Reading (New York: Harper and Bros., 1920); Arthur Edward Phillips, Effective Speaking (Chicago: The Newton Co., 1929).

modern personality research which may contribute to the amplification and extension of rhetorical theory.

Purpose of the Study

This study will utilize precepts from both rhetoric and personality theory. From rhetoric, the fundamental concept of ethos serves as one factor. Ethos should be understood as the term in rhetoric equivalent to the psychologist's term, "source credibility." According to Hovland, the two main components of source credibility are the perceived trustworthiness and expertness of the speaker.¹⁰ From personality theory, the concept of dogmatism is another factor. The concept of dogmatism used in this study is defined by Rokeach as:

. . . a closed way of thinking which would be associated with any ideology regardless of the content, an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs and a sufferance of those with similar beliefs.¹¹

According to this view, dogmatism, or the lack of it, is more than an attitude or a trait; it is to be understood as a total belief system or as a structuring of personality.

¹⁰C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 35.

¹¹Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 4-5.

By investigating the relationships between these concepts from rhetoric and personality theory, we may be able to learn more about the communication situation. Specifically this study will attempt to learn whether the belief system of the speaker, the belief system of the audience and the relationship of these belief systems are significant factors in the persuasive situation. It will also study the effect of ethos or source credibility on different belief systems and the interaction of ethos with these belief systems.

Justification of the Study

A number of studies have investigated the characteristics of audiences; still others have sought to determine the persuasive effects of various attributes of the speaker. Many of these studies, although replicated numerous times, have produced inconclusive results. For example, Anderson and Clevenger note that "experimental findings have not yet reached the numbers and the sophistication necessary to form definitive conclusions about the operations of ethical proof."¹² Note also the contradictory findings in the

¹²Kenneth Anderson and Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "A Summary of Experimental Research in Ethos," Speech Monographs, XXX (1963), 50-78.

recency-primacy investigations.¹³

Perhaps one of the reasons for the inconclusive results lies in the emphasis or point of focus. Most investigations tend to consider groups, whether speakers or listeners, as a single entity, motivated by a few select desires, possessing similar attitudes, and ready to respond as a whole. In reality, these groups are but collections of individuals, each of them uniquely susceptible to the various means of persuasion.

It seems practical, therefore, to shift the primary focus of previous investigations which have concentrated on either speaker-centered or audience-centered research. This new focus is on the relationships existing between the personality structures of the speaker and the personality structures of the listeners. The concern, then, is with the relationships of the individual to other individuals rather than individual to a group considered as one homogeneous whole.

Approach of the Study

The rather holistic approach of this study attempts

¹³See Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, op. cit., or C. I. Hovland, Order of Presentation in Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

to unify and correlate various manifestations of speech theory and behavior. In this type of study, the attitude of the investigator, when overly concerned with methodological techniques and instruments, is sometimes contradictory to his purpose, i.e., obtaining valid results. The danger is that obsession with the reliability and methodology of the study sometimes obscures the nature of the object studied. Conclusions may be qualified, but the fact that the conclusions represent only one facet of a complex form of behavior studied in isolation is sometimes ignored. In making this criticism specific to personality theory, Gordon Allport commented:

Devotion to the microscope and to mathematics has led investigators to shun complex, patterned forms of behavior and thought, even though it is in these complex forms that personality can be said to exist at all. Bullied by the instruments of physics, many psychologists neglect the most delicate recording instrument ever devised for the relating and proper clustering of facts--namely, their minds.¹⁴

This statement might also apply to the current status of research in speech. For example, there is a tendency to study logical impact or effect apart from the emotional impact of words. When qualities, such as logic and emotion, are

¹⁴Gordon W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 9.

studied apart from their sources, the investigator tends to attribute to them an existence all their own. The more a characteristic is concentrated upon in this manner, the more it is reified or the greater becomes the separation between that quality and others which are legitimately inseparable from it.

In short, the approach in this study is a relatively holistic approach which attempts first to consider speech as an entire process and second to unify and correlate various manifestations of speech theory and behavior. In a holistic approach to the study of a persuasion situation the concept of belief systems appears to be a promising tool. This study will make use of this tool in describing the general characteristics of both the speaker and the listeners. It will also use the rhetorical notion of ethos in order to explore its effect on various types of belief systems.

Summary

Thus, this study considers speech as a unitary process. In addition to studying the significance of the structure of an individual's belief system in a persuasive situation there are perhaps a number of related questions in rhetorical theory that might be answered through this

approach. Some of these possible questions are:

1. Can psychological theories provide rhetoric with new insights into the analysis of speech behavior?
2. Can speech behavior be studied without first employing rhetorical categories which lead, at times, to the reification of those categories?
3. Does the personality have an influence upon speech behavior, and can personality be discovered through an analysis of speech behavior?
4. Is it profitable in the study of speaking to assume that the relationship between the personality of the speaker and the personality of the listener affects the nature of speech response as much as does the personality of the audience and/or the personality of the speaker?
5. Are the rhetorical concepts of style, ethos, arrangement, etc., reflections or manifestations of personality process?

In summary, the present study is wide in its scope, encompassing the categories into which the study of speaking is commonly divided. The rationale for this breadth stems from the assumption that a proper object of inquiry in speech is the entire speaker-listener relationship. Another assumption is that all the manifestations of speech behavior are significantly interrelated; to separate them destroys some of the consistency and meaningful aspects of the speech process.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

This study is concerned with the significance of ethos and belief systems in the persuasive situation. In order to study the significance of these concepts it is necessary to review some past and current thinking about ethos and belief systems. This chapter will, therefore, consider (1) the concept of ethos in ancient rhetoric, medieval rhetoric, and contemporary theory and (2) belief systems as viewed by A. H. Maslow, Erich Fromm, Adorno et al., and Milton Rokeach. After tracing the major patterns of these concepts, specific hypotheses to be tested will be formulated.

The Role of Ethos in Rhetorical Models

Ancient Rhetoric

Of Greek origin, the word ethos originally meant customs or usages, particularly those which pertained to one

group as contrasted with another. Later, the term came to mean disposition or character and gained a connotation of societally approved characteristics.¹

Sattler identified the concept of ethos in the rhetorical theory of Corax and Tisias as the function of the proem and in the topics of probability; in the Greek logographers as the adaptation of a speech to the speaker, audience and subject; and in the ad Alexandrum as a form of proof with emphasis upon adaptation of narration and arguments to the audience to enhance the probability of the argument.²

Isocrates repeatedly stressed the role of character and virtue in persuasion and the value of a good reputation:

. . . who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words.³

In the dialogue Gorgias, Plato attacked rhetoric as a false art practiced by men who lacked full understanding of the subject on which they spoke. The true philosopher,

¹William Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Northwestern University, 1941), p. 5.

²Ibid., pp. 45-48.

³Isocrates, Antidosis, trans. George Norlin (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), II, 339.

the wise, intelligent, informed seeker of the truth was held to be the ideal.⁴ In the Phaedrus Plato indicated the elements of a superior rhetoric in which good character, not the appearance of good character, would be the hallmark of the speaker. Because the true philosopher desired to advance truth, he had to know the "soul" of his auditors to make the truth maximally persuasive.⁵

Summarizing ethos prior to Aristotle, Sattler noted that much emphasis was placed upon the "appearance" of good character and the special value of ethos in a proem, with some emphasis upon the importance of the "moral" speaker and the direct or indirect application of ethos as a mode of proof.⁶

Aristotle recognized that persuasion consisted of three parts, which he called ethos, logos, and pathos. He felt that ethos had great importance in persuasion:

It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective

⁴Plato, pp. 95-206.

⁵Ibid., pp. 7-71.

⁶Sattler, pp. 328-329.

means of persuasion he possesses.⁷

Writers before Aristotle had implied the existence of such a power of persuasion but none had positively identified it. Aristotle was the first to analyze the constituents of ethos.

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character--the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.⁸

Aristotle further explained what he meant by these components of ethos by discussing Liberality, Justice, Courage, Temperance, Wisdom, Magnanimity, Magnificence, Prudence, and Gentleness.

In summary, Aristotle viewed artistic ethos as that element of proof which resulted from impressions of the speaker derived from a variety of sources during the speech, and, more particularly, those impressions relating to judgments of the character, intelligence, or good will of the speaker. Prior impressions of the speaker were recognized but not classified within the Aristotelian system of rhetorical proofs.

Cicero and Quintilian generally preserved the Aristotelian view of ethos, although particular emphases of

⁷Rhetorica, 1356^a 10.

⁸Ibid., 1378^a 6.

their own were added. Cicero did not place as much emphasis upon ethos as Aristotle did. He employed the concept largely under the term "character," and treated ethos as a way of winning the favor of the audience.⁹ He also emphasized reputation as a factor of ethos.¹⁰

Both Quintilian and Cicero stressed the importance of adaptation to audience and occasion by the speaker in relation to ethos and emphasized the doctrine of decorum or appropriateness as a factor in evincing ethos. In contrast to Aristotle, Quintilian gives less attention to ethos as a function of invention and more to the value of prior reputation.¹¹

Medieval Rhetoric

During the medieval period, from approximately the fourth through the fourteenth century, such rhetorical theory as existed was largely preserved and presented by the clergy with special adaptation to homiletics as in Book IV of De Doctrina Christiana by St. Augustine. Ethos was frequently

⁹Irving J. Lee, "Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, VI (1939), 67.

¹⁰Sattler, pp. 166-167.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 165-169.

held to be established through decorum in style and delivery.¹²

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a comparatively full redevelopment of the classical tradition of ethos. The works of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle were widely cited in this period, normally with approbation. Whately, concerned primarily with preaching, believed that morality and virtue must be the basis for sound speaking.¹³ Blair specifically urged the young speaker not to speak on both sides of an issue, even for practice, for this might harm his reputation and thus his future.¹⁴ Campbell placed emphasis upon "sympathy" which he defined as "the opinion entertained of him [the speaker] by the hearers, or the character which he bears with them."¹⁵ Sympathy, according to Campbell, may be lessened several ways, chiefly by these two: by a low opinion of his intellectual abilities and by a bad opinion of his morals.

¹²Ibid., pp. 190-191.

¹³Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (New York: Sheldon and Co., 1846), p. 21.

¹⁴Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Philadelphia: James Kay and Brother, 1829), p. 287.

¹⁵George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: William Tegg and Co., 1859), pp. 96-97.

The Elocution Movement was developing rapidly during this era, particularly in America. While this tradition was a powerful one, it did not affect the theory of ethos except indirectly, by ignoring it in all applications except character portrayal.

Writers in the homiletical tradition frequently viewed the preacher as an "inspired individual" and thus gave less emphasis to techniques to develop ethos.

In summary, from Quintilian to the twentieth century, ethos lost a place in models of the rhetorical process; then, despite individual variations and excepting writers in the homiletical tradition, it regained a place in rhetoric as extensive as that which it held in ancient rhetorical systems.

Contemporary Theory

Among contemporary writers, we note a striking parallel between the classical concept of ethos and the modern concept of the speaker's personality as viewed by Oliver.¹⁶ Aristotle conceived the speaker's personality as having three parts: (1) character, (2) intelligence, and (3) good will. Oliver also notes three parts: (1) reputation, (2)

¹⁶Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of the Persuasive Speech (New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1942), p. 94.

general knowledge, and (3) the speaker's feelings toward himself, his audience, and his subject.¹⁷ When all of these factors are combined in the public speaker and are presented to an audience through a speaker, personality or ethos is at work.

Considerable research in ethos or source credibility has now been done. Many studies have concerned themselves with segments of the overall problem, especially in the area of the source's influence on the attitude shift toward a concept. Typical of such studies have been those in "prestige suggestion"¹⁸ or "source credibility."¹⁹ Most of these studies have demonstrated that the perception of the source may have a significant effect on the opinions and attitudes of the recipients. Thus, when the source is held to be one of high credibility, subjects tend to change their judgments of the concepts in the direction of the source's assertion. Conversely, when the source is held to be one of low esteem or credibility there seems to be less effect in modifying

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸S. E. Asch, "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige and Imitation in Social Psychology," Psychological Review, LV (1948), 250-276.

¹⁹Hovland, Janis, and Kelley.

the recipients' "attitude" than was experienced with a source of high credibility.

Previous research studies of source credibility fall into two rather clear divisions. These are defined by Anderson and Clevenger as Extrinsic and Intrinsic Ethos.²⁰ Intrinsic credibility [ethos] is a change in the "image" of the communicator that takes place while the communicator is speaking. This type of credibility was studied by Wayne N. Thompson.²¹ He found that a group of college students raised their opinion of Thomas E. Dewey after hearing a campaign speech.

Extrinsic credibility is that attitude toward the message source which exists before the presentation of the message. This investigation will attempt to manipulate two components of this extrinsic credibility, i.e., trustworthiness and expertness so that one source will be considered highly-credible while the other is highly un-credible. Howland points out that these are important variables.

In summary, the research evidence indicates that the reactions to a communication are significantly

²⁰Anderson and Clevenger, 50-78.

²¹Wayne N. Thompson, "A Study of the Attitude of College Students Toward Thomas E. Dewey Before and After Hearing Him Speak," Speech Monographs, XVI (1949), 125-134.

affected by cues as to the communicator's intentions, expertness, and trustworthiness

From the results, it is not possible to disentangle the effect of the two main components of credibility--trustworthiness and expertness--but it appears that both are important variables.²²

From the above review, it is obvious that ethos [credibility] has played an important part in studies of persuasion. In view of the importance of ethos, this study attempts to analyze the effect of varying degrees of credibility and the persuasive relationship between ethos and belief systems.

Belief Systems

Another dimension of this study is the belief system or personality structure of the audience. "Personality" seems to be one of those words like "truth" and "socialism" that means all things to all men. Its usage defies definition. Cicero was among the first to employ the term persona (a Latin equivalent), and even in his time it possessed at least four meanings: (1) as one appears to others (but not as he really is); (2) the part someone (e.g., a philosopher) plays in life; (3) the assemblage of personal qualities that fit a man for his work; and (4) distinction and dignity (as

²²Hovland, p. 35.

in style of writing).²³

Allport, in the most extensive treatment of the term in psychological literature, lists fifty current definitions for the words "person" and "personality." He summarizes the problem in the preface of his book.

Personality is one of the most abstract words in our language, and like any abstract word suffering from excessive use, its connotative significance is very broad, its denotative significance negligible. Scarcely any word is more versatile.²⁴

In this study, the term "personality" is used to indicate the "tone" of the study. No attempt is made to be definitive about the term itself.

Influences on Personality Theory

Hall and Lindzey point to four major sources of influence on personality theory.²⁵ Initially they cite the contribution of Freud, Jung, and others of the psychoanalytic or clinical approach. The contributions of these men did "more to determine the nature of personality theory than any

²³Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 26.

²⁴Ibid., p. 25.

²⁵Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 1-27.

other single factor."²⁶ The influence of the psychoanalytic school is evidenced in most of the texts treating the concept of "dogmatism" in their reliance upon Freud's notions of dominance and dependence. It should be noted, however, that this dependence is not without some dilution. Rokeach, for example, often refers to the Freudian disciple as an example of a dogmatic or "closed-minded" individual, and Fromm devotes a large portion of his work to the differentiation between Freud's and his own theories. It appears that psychoanalysis' main contribution to personality theory is in the recognition and identification of central behavior "patterns" through clinical observation. This "phenomenological" approach might be compared to Aristotle's observing and identifying ethos, logos, and pathos and then, to a great extent, leaving to others the task of finding out how these factors actually function in practice. This does not mean that the theories of Freud and Aristotle were not functional. But the theories were both phenomenological and lacked the "scientific" objectivity now popular in both speech and psychology.

The second area of influence upon personality theory rises out of the Gestalt tradition exemplified by the works

²⁶Ibid.

of Koffka, Kohler, and others. The impact of this school led to the rejection of segmented or analytical approaches to the study of personality.

The final two areas of influence are experimental psychology and psychometric methods, both of which have led researchers to check and objectify the existing theoretical concepts of personality, stiffen the requirements of empirical research and shift the emphasis of research to individual differences.

The central pattern of current personality theory emerges from the four areas mentioned. Deriving much of his understanding from the concepts of psychoanalysis, the contemporary psychologist in the area of personality is attempting to investigate the individual as a whole organism with the most scientific, objective means at his disposal. In this effort, there have been many different paths of research undertaken. One of the most interesting of these current studies is the investigation of "authoritarianism."

The Study of Authoritarianism

In the development of the theory of authoritarianism, there are at least four important theoretical works. The first is Maslow's "The Authoritarian Character

Structure";²⁷ second, Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom;²⁸ third, the extensive studies on the "Authoritarian Personality" by Adorno, et al.;²⁹ and last, The Open and Closed Mind by Milton Rokeach. The purpose of this section is to discuss some major points of these works that are relevant to the present study.

The Authoritarian Character Structure. One of the most comprehensive descriptions of the personality factors involved in authoritarianism can be found in Maslow's "The Authoritarian Character Structure." Maslow describes some twenty characteristics of the authoritarian character which he observed in five years of clinical studies. Some of the more important of these are: (1) a world view which portrays human beings as selfish, stupid, or evil and the world as generally threatening; (2) a "tendency toward hierarchy," so seeing others as either superior or inferior to oneself; (3) the "generalization of superiority and inferiority,"

²⁷A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," Journal of Social Psychology, XVIII (1943), 401-411.

²⁸Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1941).

²⁹T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

in other words, the superior is superior in all things and the inferior is inferior in everything; (4) the authoritarian individual is hostile and possesses prejudices about groups without much selectivity; (5) he possesses a single measure of values, such as wealth, power, etc.; (6) he identifies kindness with weakness; (7) he has a tendency to "use" people; and (8) he suffers considerably from guilt feelings and complexes. These characteristics are fairly typical of descriptions by other investigators as well.

It should be noted that the concept of authoritarianism outlined by Maslow is primarily structural; that is, it describes a basic personality skeleton which may be filled out with a wide variety of specific substance or content. For example, to designate a person as a political conservative or a socialist does not indicate in any way the degree of authoritarianism present in his personality structure. If this concept is accurate, then just knowing specific attitudes may not indicate the presence of authoritarianism characteristics.

Escape from Freedom. Erich Fromm's thesis is that to explain the success of totalitarian governments solely by citing cunning and force, inexperience in democracy, economic determinism, or the madness of rulers is fallacious and

dangerous. The reasons he cites for the enslavement of people lie, instead, in the individual's inability to deal with "freedom" successfully. Where Freud concerns himself with the image of the individual struggling with frustrations of his "instinctual needs," Fromm raises the conflict between the individual and his cultural environment as the primary psychological problem.

Although there are certain needs, such as hunger, thirst, sex, which are common to man, those drives which make for the differences in men's characters, like love and hatred, the lust for power and the yearning for submission, the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure and the fear of it, are all products of the social process.³⁰

Central in Fromm's analysis is his description of "mechanisms of escape." The three mechanisms discussed are "authoritarianism," "destructiveness," and "automaton conformity." Only "authoritarianism" will be dealt with here since the latter two concepts are not of direct concern.

Authoritarianism is described as "the tendency to give up the independence of one's own individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking."³¹ This particular mechanism manifests

³⁰Fromm, p. 12.

³¹Ibid., p. 171.

itself in the "striving for submission and domination" by the individual or his "masochistic" and "sadistic" tendencies. This involves feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, and insignificance. This is the neurotic personality indulging in the self-torture of self-accusation, compulsive behavior, self-punishment, cruelty toward others, desire for power, and the desire to dominate and be dominated. In other words it reflects the individual's effort to get rid of "the burden of freedom" by piling it onto the shoulders of someone else, stronger and wiser than himself.

Fromm draws an essential distinction between two types of authority. One kind, "rational authority," is a state of superiority-inferiority in which both participants have a common goal of equalization or betterment for all concerned. The other type of authority is "inhibiting authority"; wherein the superior's goal is the exploitation of the subordinate. In the former case the gap of authority between participants narrows. In the latter, the gap widens. The teacher-student relationship is used as an example of the first type. The master-slave relationship is an example of the second. Admiration is the result of the first, irrational adulation results from the second.

The authoritarian looks to the past for support.

Fate has determined his life, and he is powerless to change his course. "What has been will eternally be."

In summary the individual described by Fromm, externally free but internally hostile and fearful, bears a close resemblance to the "authoritarian character" described earlier by Maslow. Still another similarity between the two treatments is Fromm's attempt to explain the manifestations of authoritarianism where Maslow merely described what he could observe. It is interesting that the results of two apparently independent investigations should be so similar. These men furnished a firm theoretical basis upon which others, like Adorno and Rokeach, could profitably build through experimental documentation and elaboration.

The Authoritarian Personality. Undoubtedly the most extensive undertaking in the investigation of authoritarianism is the California studies reported in The Authoritarian Personality. Beginning in 1944, under sponsorship of the American Jewish Committee, the scope of the studies ranges over a vast area of political, religious, social, and ideological conflict. This present discussion will concern itself only with The Authoritarian Personality because of its relevance to this particular investigation. It should be noted, however, that there are companion volumes which join

The Authoritarian Personality under the general label "Studies in Prejudice."

As in the case of the previously cited studies by Maslow and Fromm, The Authoritarian Personality relies heavily upon the concepts developed by Freud for the basis of its theory of personality. Personality, driven by various needs, is the "determinant" of ideological predisposition. However, the authors point out that personality can be understood only in the context supplied by its environment.

- Far from being something which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social totality within which it occurs. . . . This means that broad changes in social conditions and institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds of personalities that develop within a society.³²

Once again the personality is treated as an adaptive structure.

There is a close similarity between the Adorno researchers and Fromm in the motivation behind their respective studies. Both express a curiosity about the reasons why people seem to flock to the banner of the authoritarian leader. Both have drawn upon Freud to establish their diagnostic theories. The major difference lies in the application of method. Fromm emphasized the interview method of the

³²Adorno, pp. 5-6.

psychoanalytic approach for his data while The Authoritarian Personality includes a wide variety of investigative procedures in the exploration of "fascism." Both clinical and questionnaire techniques were used extensively. The studies have an overwhelming empirical "tone" as a result of the extensive statistical data accumulated.

Perhaps the most important of the conclusions reached in The Authoritarian Personality is that "authoritarianism" appears to operate as a generalized "syndrome" of attitudes and behavior. If an individual is prejudiced toward one minority group, it is probable that he is hostile toward all minority groups. If he acts rigidly in one kind of situation, he is likely to react in rigid and stereotyped patterns in all situations.

Thus a basically hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitive parent-child relationship is apt to carry over into a power-oriented, exploitively dependent attitude toward one's sex partner and one's God and may well culminate in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be a strong and disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom.³³

One very important challenge to the findings of The Authoritarian Personality has been leveled at the "F" scale's

³³Ibid., p. 971.

emphasis upon "right authoritarianism." Edward Shils, in his discussion of "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left'," points to the error of assuming that authoritarianism is characteristic of only conservative or fascistic ideological movements.

Fascism and Bolshevism, only a few decades ago thought of as worlds apart, have now been recognized as sharing many very important features. Their common hostility towards civil liberties, political democracy, their common antipathy for parliamentary institutions, individualism, private enterprise, their image of the political world as a struggle between morally irreconcilable forces, their belief that all their opponents are secretly leagued against them and their own predilection for secrecy, their conviction that all forms of power are, in a hostile world, concentrated and total power--all of these showed that the two extremes had much in common.³⁴

The Open and Closed Mind. The distinction to be drawn between The Authoritarian Personality and The Open and Closed Mind lies in the former's approach to the "authoritarian" personality as basic to the understanding of fascism and the latter's emphasis upon "dogmatism" or "general authoritarianism" as characteristic of all manifestations of belief or opinion. In spite of the differences between Rokeach's approach and that of the California researchers,

³⁴Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left'," In Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality, Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 27-28.

the direction of The Open and Closed Mind parallels in many ways the theory outlined in the previous studies and carries the inquiry beyond the limitations imposed by confining the study to prejudice.

Long before we were able to define the phenomenon of ideological dogmatism explicitly, it seemed clear that it referred to a number of things: a closed way of thinking which could be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those of opposing beliefs, and a sufferance of those with similar beliefs. To say that a person is dogmatic or that his belief system is closed is to say something about the way he believes and the way he thinks--not only about single issues but also about networks of issues. The closed mind, even though most people cannot define it precisely, can be observed in the "practical" world of political and religious beliefs, and the more academic world of scientific, philosophic, and humanistic thought. In both of these worlds there is conflict among men about who is right and who wrong, who is rational and who rationalizing, and conflicts over whose convictions are dogmatic and whose intellectual. In both sets of worlds, ideas--and the people and authority figures responsible for them--are accepted and rejected.³⁵

The concept of systematic structure, not unique in this kind of approach, is applied more vigorously in The Open and Closed Mind than in any of its companion studies. Important in the understanding of the structure of beliefs is the development of the "belief and disbelief systems."

³⁵Rokeach, p. 5.

These are described as:

. . . all the beliefs, sets, expectations, or hypotheses, conscious, that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies, conscious or unconscious, that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time rejects as false.³⁶

The "belief-disbelief" system has a three-dimensional structure. The first of these divisions is the "belief-disbelief dimension"; the second, the "central-peripheral dimension"; and the third, the "time-perspective dimension."

The first of these, the "belief-disbelief dimension," involves the isolation of beliefs, the relative amount of differentiation between beliefs and the "detail" of those beliefs, and the comprehensiveness of the system.

One manifestation of isolation is the existence of conflicts between beliefs as in the case of "authoritarianism" and "democracy" above. Another indication of isolation is the accentuation of differences between Protestantism and Catholicism, the United States and Russia, or perhaps speech and psychology, showing a defensive attitude toward ideas that may serve to prevent additional incoming information from making any perceptible impact upon existing beliefs.

³⁶Ibid., p. 33.

The beliefs are isolated because they are insulated from reality. Two other factors contributing to the phenomenon of belief isolation are the perception of irrelevance [when the information perceived is relevant but threatening] and the denial of contradiction.

"Differentiation" refers to the ". . . degrees of differentiation or articulation or richness of detail"³⁷ in the belief-disbelief system. Signs of differentiation can be discovered in an analysis of the amount of knowledge the individual possesses about his beliefs and about the things he rejects as untrue. The "closed-minded" person knows little about the concepts he accepts and less about those with which he disagrees. The "closed mind" tends to "lump" all of the concepts he accepts or rejects under one roof.

The "central-peripheral dimension" includes three basic regions: the "central," the "intermediate," and the "peripheral." The first of these, the "central" region, concerns itself with the "primitive" beliefs of the individual. Examples of this phenomenon might include the way in which you view the world around you, the environment being harsh and cruel or permissive and encouraging. Corresponding

³⁷Ibid., p. 37.

concepts are Maslow's description of the authoritarian world view as threatening, evil, and selfish, and Adorno's categories of "projection" and "destructiveness and cynicism." It includes the self-picture--tall, short, intelligent, or dull--and the way the person relates to other human beings.

. . . One definition of a primitive belief is any belief that virtually everyone is believed to have also. For example, I believe this object I write with is a pencil and I believe that all persons in a position to know (this excludes infants, strangers, etc.) would agree with me on both counts [sic]. All such persons could be said to be external referents or authorities for these beliefs. When this is the case, my belief is primitive. It is rarely, if ever, challenged.³⁸

It is also true that the opposite of the universal belief is a primitive one. There is no dependence upon outside authority or source for validation. An unexplained fear of heights, dogs, and the Ph. D. qualifying examination all fall within this category.

The "intermediate" region contains those beliefs in the authorities accepted by the individual. The Bible, Aristotle's Rhetoric, and The Coming of the New Deal, a seemingly inconsistent trio, may, nevertheless, be examples of the sources of the knowledge we have chosen to include within the scope of our belief systems. The extent to which

³⁸Ibid., p. 41.

we accept a particular authority will depend upon our concept of who is an adequate authority. We often hear the phrase, "I want to know what my enemy is thinking." This indication of "open-mindedness" may indicate that, if we are a political conservative, we read the New Republic; or, if we are more liberal minded, we may scan Human Events or read The Conscience of a Conservative in order that we may evaluate accurately information coming from more agreeable and trusted sources. The "closed-minded" person, of course, will tend to ignore these sources which disagree with his notions of what is right and wrong. A similar pattern is found in the irrational adulation of authority cited by Fromm. Some of the manifestations of this kind of reliance upon authority can be observed readily in our contemporary society. The ethnocentric "ingroup-outgroup" statements of some of the political and social extremists illustrate this. You are either "for or against" socialism, Americanism, democracy, communism, peace, or war. Our communication patterns abound with "opinionated rejection," such as: "People are 'stupid' if they believe that Kennedy's foreign policy will differ from Eisenhower's, or that we can negotiate with Communists, or that we can win friends with foreign aid." The reverse of this condition, "opinionate acceptance," also

has its place when we approve of people because the ideas they hold are the same as our own. In other words, the surrender of our own critical faculties to accepted symbols of authority encourages the acceptance and rejection of people on the basis of how apparently similar or dissimilar their beliefs are to our own.

There are, therefore, "primitive" beliefs about the world, the self, and others; "intermediate" beliefs concerned with the acceptance or rejection of authority and the people whom we identify with that authority; and finally, the "peripheral" beliefs, which are derived from the previous two dimensions. For example, a primitive belief may be that we live in a friendly and permissive world. People, we have observed, usually help each other. The philosophy of political liberalism may, in our judgment, offer the "humanistic" approach we desire for the solution of the world's problems. We favor, therefore, 90 per cent of parity on farm supports because it is the policy of the party we support and from whom we receive valid [we believe] information. This specific adherence to farm supports is a "peripheral" belief. This implies that what we receive has already undergone a screening process. Our primitive beliefs reduced the number of authorities we could choose. Our authorities supplied

only that information they thought relevant. We absorbed only what was in agreement with previously formed beliefs. The things we observe in the world around us will be interpreted because of the beliefs we hold. Change is difficult because it is easier to reconcile information with existing beliefs than it is to allow it to travel untouched, to more fundamental areas where risks of conflict are involved. Note the similarity between this notion of selectivity and Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance," where the individual is motivated to reduce the dissonance or tension between conflicting beliefs.³⁹

The "time-perspective" dimension is the final structural component of the belief system. This refers to the person's beliefs about the past, present, and future and the manner in which they are related to each other. An individual may possess either a narrow or broad time perspective. A broad perspective, characteristic of "open-mindedness," indicates that the person recognizes and utilizes the lessons of history, the demands of the present, and the future consequences of his behavior. A narrow perspective results from an overemphasis of one of these three areas. Rejecting the

³⁹Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957).

traditions of the past or the realities of the present for promises that the future offers is characteristic of "narrowness."

. . . The old man who spends much of his time reminiscing about the days gone by is one case in point. A similar example is found in the ideological movements of the political right, which typically seek their models in the past. We are thinking here of German naziism and of Japanese and Italian fascism whose goals are to reinstate the Aryan myth, or the medieval structure of Japanese society, or the grandeur that was Rome.⁴⁰

In line with Fromm's thesis of "freedom" and its resultant pressures, the over-emphasis of one time period provides an effective avenue of "escape."

The three major dimensions of the belief system do not operate independently. The end product of their relationship will be the "closed" or "open-minded" manifestations of human behavior.

This leads us to suggest a basic characteristic that defines the extent to which a person's system is open or closed; namely, the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside.⁴¹

The irrelevant internal pressures might include any

⁴⁰Rokeach, p. 52.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 57.

number of personality variables such as the need for power, unrelated habits, sets, cues, etc. External factors might take the form of social and cultural norms, pressure from family, peer groups, and financial pressures of various kinds. The more "open" the system the easier will the person be able to withstand these pressures and objectively evaluate what he receives. A "closed" system will have difficulty in distinguishing between objective and subjective reality. Critical senses will be dulled, and the ability to take the initiative will be circumscribed to the areas prescribed by the sources of information.

The characteristics of "dogmatism" outlined in the "Dogmatism Scale" parallel, in many respects, the factors involved in the preceding studies of authoritarianism. Some of the important characteristics examined by the scale are: (1) "the accentuation of differences between the belief and disbelief systems"; (2) the "coexistence of the contradictions within the belief system"; (3) the "relative amount of knowledge possessed"; (4) the "beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation, and helplessness of man"; (5) "beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future"; (6) "beliefs about self-adequacy and inadequacy"; (7) "self-aggrandizement as a defense against self-inadequacy"; (8) "authoritarianism"; (9)

"intolerance"; (10) "tendency to make a party-line change"; (11) the selective avoidance of information counter to one's beliefs; (12) an overemphasis of the past, present or future; and (13) the "belief in force as a way to revise the present."⁴²

By way of summarizing these approaches to the analysis of the authoritarian or closed-minded personality, there appear to be a number of recurrent themes. It might be of value, at this point, to integrate the various characteristics of closed-mindedness into a portrait of the extreme authoritarian individual.

At the inner core of the personality there is an ingrained, generalized hostility directed at the self and at the world at large. The individual suffers from guilt and anxiety, and this results in the manifestations of self-humiliation, masochism, and feelings of self-inadequacy. Toward others, the authoritarian is sadistic, domineering, and cynical. He believes himself to be alone, isolated from the society of which he is a part. In short, he is confronted in his every movement or thought by an overwhelming and hostile system, of his own creation, over which he has

⁴²Ibid., pp. 73-80.

no control whatsoever.

In his search for control and identity, he selects strength and power as his criteria of success and endeavors to surrender himself totally to symbols which represent these qualities. Status is strength and strength becomes status. If he, by chance, obtains a position of superiority over others, he asserts his role with sadistic and humiliating treatment of those he considers to be his inferiors. Because his world is composed of good and bad, leaders and followers, the superior and the inferior, he identifies totally with a cause or group and is hostile or prejudiced toward all others who do not choose to ally themselves with him or his chosen authorities.

The authoritarian individual is "compulsively conventional" in his behavior. He assumes his role and the behavior patterns of that role become the accepted and incontrovertible way of doing things. Those who demonstrate unconventional behavior, attitudes, or beliefs become, for the authoritarian, objects of derision.

He is "time-bound," clinging to the belief that "times were better," or "times will be better," or "now is the time."

The individual is afraid, and his fear leads him to perceive the world as something other than it really is. On

guard for information that will expose his feelings, he distorts and censors all that he receives. He knows only the good of his own cause and only the evil of others.

The authoritarian personality is a total system with beliefs and disbeliefs as its variables, each part interacting and influencing each other part to varying degrees. The environment, as the object of perception, plays its part in the formulation of beliefs but is not necessarily responsible for the ultimate content of the belief system.

Authoritarianism is an integrated, yet malfunctioning, whole. It is not merely a single attitude, a point of view, or act to be examined. It is the person with whom we must deal.

Summary

From the review of ethos, it becomes obvious that the concept of ethos has, for centuries, been accepted as being an integral part of the persuasive situation. Experimental studies reinforce ancient theory by indicating that two main components in establishing ethos are the perceived trustworthiness and expertness of the speaker. A review of experimental studies on ethos further indicates that a speaker who is perceived by the listeners as being both

trustworthy and an expert should be able to cause a greater attitude shift than a speaker perceived as being neither trustworthy nor expert. A review of personality theory indicates that the concept of belief systems is a valuable tool in organizing and explaining human behavior, especially in a person's resistance to change, including the persuasive situation. If these two conclusions are valid, then productive research might be accomplished by studying these factors in their various combinations. This investigation attempts such a study by generating the following hypotheses.

Basic Hypotheses

- I. It was hypothesized that a speech with certain open-minded characteristics would be more effective in changing attitudes than a speech with certain closed-minded characteristics. Symbolically: $O > C$.
- II. It was hypothesized that the relative effectiveness of a communication will vary with the recipient's perception of the communicator's credibility. Symbolically: $C_H > C_O > C_L$.
- III. It was hypothesized that a person's dogmatism would significantly affect his response in a persuasive situation. Symbolically: $D_H > D_N > D_L$.

IV. Based on the hypotheses listed above, certain interaction hypotheses were formulated:

- A. The source's credibility, as reflected in an introduction, will affect the relatively dogmatic recipient more than the open-minded recipient. Symbolically: $(H-L)_d > (H-L)_n > (H-L)_o$.
- B. The recipients with relatively high dogmatism scores will show a greater difference in change of attitude between an open-minded and a closed-minded speech than will more open-minded recipients. Symbolically: $(A_1-A_2)_d > (A_1-A_2)_n > (A_1-A_2)_o$.

CHAPTER III

THE EXPERIMENT

Ethos has held a place in rhetoric from the earliest to the most recent theories while "dogmatism" is a more recent but highly inclusive concept for explaining behavior in persuasive situations. This study sought to investigate certain combinations of these two concepts in order to learn more of their respective importance and relation to each other. In searching previous literature, no study could be found which clearly involved both these concepts so there was no specific precedent to follow in designing the experiment. The purpose of this chapter is to specify the thinking and experimental conditions which governed this study. It includes the basic design of the experiment, the attitude measurement techniques employed, including rationale for the three different scales used in the study, the construction of the test materials (speeches and introductions), the actual administration of the experiment, and ends with a

discussion of some of the limitations and possible sources of error in this study.

Basic Design

Since one of the primary considerations of this study was to examine the experimental data concerning ethos and dogmatism in all their possible combinations, a three dimensional design was chosen as most suitable for the experiment. The first factor was open and closed-minded speeches; one relatively open-minded and one relatively closed-minded speech. The second factor was perceived image or ethos of the two speakers; one with high ethos and the other with relatively low ethos. In order to increase the precision of the experiment, three levels of audience dogmatism were established by the use of each subject's Haiman Dogmatism test score.

The design is shown graphically on the following page. In this diagram, speech (A), introduction (B), and audience dogmatism (C), are the independent factors. This design provides for the simultaneous investigation of the effects of the two speeches (A), the two different introductions plus a condition with no introduction at all (B), and three levels of dogmatism (C). Furthermore, the design

TABLE I. DIAGRAM FOR TWO FACTOR BY LEVELS DESIGN

A ₁									A ₂								
B ₁			B ₂			B ₃			B ₁			B ₂			B ₃		
C ₁	C ₂	C ₃	C ₁	C ₂	C ₃	C ₁	C ₂	C ₃	C ₁	C ₂	C ₃	C ₁	C ₂	C ₃	C ₁	C ₂	C ₃

A - Speech

A₁ - Open-minded Speech

A₂ - Close-minded Speech

B - Introduction

B₁ - High Credibility Introduction

B₂ - Low Credibility Introduction

B₃ - No Introduction

C - Levels of Dogmatism of Audience

C₁ - Relatively Dogmatic

C₂ - Neither Dogmatic nor Open-minded

C₃ - Relatively Open-minded (non-dogmatic)

AB - Interaction of A and B

AC - Interaction of A and C

BC - Interaction of B and C

ABC - Interaction of A, B, and C

takes into account all possible interaction effects of the three independent factors, i.e., AB, AC, BC, and ABC.

Speeches

One of the experimental factors used in this experiment was the type of speech heard by the audience. To meet the requirements of the experimental design, two speeches were constructed: (1) a relatively "open-minded" speech and (2) a relatively "close-minded" speech. The subject of the speeches was the issue of the desirability of parity price supports for agricultural products. This problem was selected as one of national importance on which a variety of opinions existed but one unlikely to be resolved during the experiment and one which was not receiving major attention in the news media.

After investigating the problem of parity price supports, it was decided to present a persuasive speech advocating that parity price supports for agricultural products should be abandoned. This thesis was not receiving wide attention by the Kennedy Administration or in Congress.

The problem-solution pattern of organization was employed. However, the problem phase accounted for about eighty per cent of the material. The suggested solution was

not presented in specific detail. Presentation of an alternative solution to the farm problem was viewed as a rhetorical technique to increase opposition to the concept of parity price supports. The single purpose of the speeches was to increase opposition to parity price support programs; the measure of persuasion is solely determined by the attitude change toward that concept.

The most important factor in the construction of the speeches was the introduction of open- and closed-mindedness. There are many factors which act as determinants of open-mindedness or closed-mindedness. Of course, all of the attributes of open- and closed-mindedness cannot be encompassed in two speeches on the same subject. Rather than seek a difference through an exhaustive variety of techniques, the following criteria acted as guidelines in the construction of the experimental stimuli. These criteria are those which, according to Rokeach, typify the open and closed minded personalities.¹ Closed-mindedness was considered to be established when a speaker:

- (1) reveals an ingrained, generalized hostility directed at the self and at the world at large;
- (2) is domineering and cynical towards others;

¹Rokeach, pp. 54-72.

- (3) believes himself alone, isolated from the companionship others might furnish;
- (4) surrenders himself to symbols which represent qualities of success;
- (5) acts as if the world were composed of good and bad, leaders and followers, the superior and inferior;
- (6) identifies totally with a cause or group and is hostile or prejudiced toward others who do not choose to ally themselves with him or his chosen authorities;
- (7) is compulsively conventional in his behavior;
- (8) assumes his role and the behavior patterns of that role become the accepted and incontrovertible way of doing things;
- (9) those who exhibit unconventional behavior, attitudes, or beliefs become objects of derision;
- (10) is "time-bound," clinging to the belief that "times were better," or "times will be better" or "now is the time";
- (11) has fears which lead him to perceive the world as something other than it really is; and/or
- (12) distorts and censors all that he receives knowing only the good of his own cause and only the evil of others.

Open-mindedness was considered to be established when a speaker exhibits few of the criteria listed above and when he:

- (1) reveals broad knowledge and understanding of many aspects of the problems as well as its relation to other problems;
- (2) supports his views by well-qualified authorities whose expertness is established by the speaker when necessary;
- (3) shows accuracy, care, precision, in his use of evidence, particularly citations of authority and statistics, and in his reasoning;
- (4) reveals or is known to have personal, practical experience with the problem;
- (5) is known to possess widely accepted "expertness" on the subject;

- (6) is known to hold a position which validates his authority; and/or
- (7) is known to have studied the problem intensively.

The speech employing techniques designed to establish attributes of open-mindedness was completed first. This speech included extensive direct quotation from a variety of authorities, statistics presented in exact detail, and material covering a number of years. Reference to personal knowledge and experience with farming and the farm problem was also included.

The manuscript for the open-minded speech was employed in creating the closed-minded speech. All references to sources were deleted. Statistics were changed from precise figures to relatively vague ones. Specific indications of lack of familiarity with farming and the farm problem replaced indication of personal practical experience.

Much of the material, including statements of the thesis, summaries, and transitions, remained unchanged. Arrangements, arguments, and amount of repetition were kept constant.

The two speeches were practiced equally and recorded by a graduate student in theatre. The speeches were recorded on hi-fidelity tape at a constant volume level under identical conditions. The speaker maintained approximately

the same rate for both speeches and was asked to deliver both in the same manner. Since both speeches were recorded by the same speaker, it was impossible to conceal the differences in the speeches from him. Perception of these differences may alter the effectiveness of one of the presentations. However, the impact of such differences has not been demonstrated experimentally. Hildreth, for example, found that judgments of sincerity of the speaker made by audiences seem dominated by competence of the speaker, not sincerity.² A manuscript copy of the speeches is reproduced in Appendix B.

Manuscript copies of the two speeches were submitted to a group of seven faculty members. This panel was unanimously successful in identifying the open and closed minded speeches. After the speeches were taped, they were played to a group of twelve graduate students. This panel also agreed unanimously that there was a difference in the speeches and correctly identified both speeches.

²Richard A. Hildreth. "An Experimental Study of Audience's Ability to Distinguish Between Sincere and Insincere Speakers." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (University of Southern California, 1953).

Introductions

Two introductions were written and recorded by a person who is an experienced radio announcer unknown to the audience. The two introductions attempted to establish one speaker as being both trustworthy and expert on farm price supports while the second left the impression that the speaker was neither trustworthy nor an expert. The introductions were intended to suggest clear differences in the prestige and credibility of the speaker.

Ethos Measurement

Measurement of trustworthiness. The semantic differential technique was used to measure perceived trustworthiness established by the introductions. In evaluative studies of the semantic differential technique, high reliability and validity were achieved in comparison with Thurstone scales, Guttman scales, and other measuring techniques.³

Most semantic differential scales are simple in appearance, consisting usually of a set of ten to a dozen

³Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 194-195.

7-step, bipolar scales designed to tap certain dimensions of meaning. Several scoring procedures are possible. The one adopted for this study assigns the positive numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, to consecutive scale positions. In all cases the negative (bad, untrustworthy, dishonest, etc.) adjective was assigned to the "1" end of the scale. The score for an individual subject was obtained by summing his score on each of the scales.

The actual scales used in this experiment were those found to be efficient measures of trustworthiness of a speaker in a factor analysis study done by Kenneth Anderson.⁴ This scale is reproduced in Appendix C.

Measurement of expertness. A second measuring instrument was used to evaluate the expertness of the speakers introduced. This instrument was also designed by Kenneth Anderson in his study of the various aspects of artistic and non-artistic ethos. This second instrument is a Likert type scale. Reliability of this instrument computed by the split half method was .93 and .98 in two studies. Corrected for attenuation the coefficient of reliability was .96 and .99.

⁴Kenneth E. Anderson, "An Experimental Study of the Interaction of Artistic Ethos in Persuasion," Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 1961), p. 82.

This scale is reproduced in Appendix C.

Pilot Study on Introductions

A pilot study was used to determine the perceived trustworthiness and expertness of the two introductions. The recorded introductions were played to students in different classes (P. A. 101, Oral Communication) who were then asked to reveal their opinion of the man introduced as to his trustworthiness and expertness on the subject of Farm Price Supports. An eleven item semantic differential scale was used to measure the trustworthiness of the man introduced and a twenty-two question Likert type scale was used to measure the expertness of the man introduced. These scales are reproduced in Appendix C.

The criterion for the selection of the introductions to be used in the final study was the consistency and location of the trustworthiness and expertness of the person being introduced as perceived by the subjects. The results of this test are contained in Table I A.

As a result of these data the introductions for both speakers were rewritten and given to another group of 46 subjects. The results of this test are contained in Table I B. From the results of these two pilot studies one

introduction was chosen in which the speaker was felt (by the subjects) to be both "expert" and "trustworthy" on the subject of Farm Price Supports, and a second introduction was chosen in which the speaker was represented to be neither an "expert" nor "trustworthy" on this topic.

TABLE I A. PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY OF VARIOUS SPEAKERS

Speaker	N = 61	"Trustworthiness"		"Expertness"	
		E	$\bar{x}$	E	$\bar{x}$
I High Credibility		3767	61.75	7651	125.43
II Low Credibility		2971	48.71	1781	29.53

TABLE I B. PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY OF VARIOUS SPEAKERS

Speaker	N = 46	"Trustworthiness"		"Expertness"	
		E	$\bar{x}$	E	$\bar{x}$
I High Credibility		2923	63.54	5892	128.09
II Low Credibility		1436	31.21	1244	27.26

Subjects

The sample used in this experiment consisted of P. A. 101 (Oral Communication) and Psychology 201 (Principles of Psychology) classes at the University of Southern Mississippi during the winter and spring quarters of 1963. No student participated in more than one phase of this study. A total of 210 students took part in the experiment. Each student completed a questionnaire supplying information such as sex, age, classification, grade average, home town, etc.

The mean age of each group of subjects ranged from 18.6 to 23.3 with an overall mean of 20.2. The mean number of years of college of each group ranged from 1.1 to 2.3 with an overall mean of 1.7. The grade point average of the 18 groups ranged from 2.1 to 2.9 with an overall mean of 2.4 where 2 indicates a C, 3 indicates a B, etc. Eighty-five (85) percent of those taking the tests were from the state of Mississippi. Additional information gained from a general information questionnaire filled out by the subjects is reproduced by groups in Appendix A. These additional data are included to better define the population from which the sample is drawn.

Dogmatism Measurement

Haiman scale. A version of the Haiman dogmatism scale furnished the necessary data for establishing levels of audience dogmatism in this study. The Haiman scale is derived from Rokeach's theory and utilizes Rokeach's research to develop its scales. Haiman's primary contribution to the Rokeach scale is the check upon response set. The main reason, then, for not using the Rokeach scale is its lack of any internal check upon "response set" or "acquiescence." As in the Adorno scales,⁵ all the questions in Rokeach's dogmatism scales are worded in the same direction so that the "high-dogmatic" respondent will tend to agree with the items and the "low-dogmatic" respondent will tend to disagree. Although the causes of response have not been universally agreed upon, recent studies indicate that there appears to be a tendency, on the part of some individuals, to respond to questions consistently in agreement or disagreement regardless of the content of the questions. If this is the case, the results obtained do not reflect the attitude of the respondent toward the construct under investigation but merely a tendency to agree or disagree with

⁵Adorno, et al.

all of the items.⁶

Rokeach advances three arguments that led him to reject the possibility of response set in the dogmatism scale. First, there are systematic differences between the dogmatism, opinionation, F, and E scales; and all of these are worded in a single direction. It is not likely, therefore, that these differences would exist if response set were present to any great extent. Second, a high incidence of response set cannot account for differences between the dogmatism and rigidity scales. Third, response set could not play a major part in the "rich variety of differences" between the scores on the dogmatism scales.⁷

Couch and Kenniston developed a scale to measure "over-all agreement," or response set, and applied it to the dogmatism scale among other questionnaires. The scores obtained on the three divisions of the dogmatism scale and the scores of the total scale correlated significantly with the

⁶See, for example, L. J. Cronbach, "Response Sets and Tests Validity," Educational Psychological Measurement, X (1950), 3-31; R. Christie and J. Havel, "Is the F Scale Irreversible?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LVI (1958), 143-159; and L. J. Chapman and D. D. Campbell, "Response Set in the F Scale," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LIV No. 1 (1957), 129-132.

⁷Rokeach, pp. 406-407.

Overall Agreement Scale among other similar questionnaires. The thesis of Couch's and Kenniston's study is that the tendency to agree with items on a questionnaire reflects a basic personality syndrome.⁸ Their theory is supported to a degree by Gage and Chatterjee who contend that the answer to a scale could be interpreted in two ways--"logically" and "psychologically."⁹ In other words, the tendency to agree when in doubt may reflect, or be the result of, an "uncritical submissive attitude" characteristic of the authoritarian personality. Therefore, agreement to a vague and ambiguous positive [non-authoritarian] item might reflect submission rather than non-authoritarianism. The conclusion of these authors is that negative items should have greater validity in measuring authoritarianism than positive items. Their evidence was, however, inconclusive. Nevertheless, if there is a personality "syndrome" which leads a respondent (as the evidence appears to indicate) to answer according to direction rather than content, it is important that some check be

⁸C. Couch and K. Kenniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology LX, No. 2 (1960), 151-174.

⁹N. L. Gage and B. B. Chatterjee, "The Psychological Meaning of Acquiescence Set: Further Evidence," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LX, No. 2 (1960), 280-283.

provided to reveal this phenomenon. It is for this reason that Haiman reversed certain statements in the dogmatism scale.

Specifically, the Haiman scale consists of 30 items. Items 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, and 27 are phrased to receive a positive response from closed-minded subjects and a negative response from open-minded subjects. The other 15 items are the reverse of this. Ten of the scale items (5 positives and 5 reversals) were written by Haiman and have survived item analyses on three previous drafts of the instrument. Five of the items are borrowed from the Rokeach Dogmatism scale, and five are reversals of Rokeach items written by Donald Duns. All ten of these items survived item analysis done as part of Duns' doctoral dissertation. Five of the items are borrowed from the California F scale, and five are reversals of F scale items written by Haiman. All ten of these items proved valid on item analyses done with this instrument. The reliability of this instrument as measured by the test-retest method was established by Haiman at $r = .75$.

Attitude Measurement

Since attitude toward the concept is the dependent

variable, attitude measurement becomes an important consideration in this study. Scientific attitude measurement began in the decade that followed World War I. But as in all new areas where tools must be created, precise methods and approaches evolved slowly. Today there are specific definitions which delimit the scope of attitude measurement.

Attitude measurement consists in assessing an individual's responses to a set of social objects or situations. This is done by observing a sample of behavior from an attitude universe. Each behavioral element in the attitude universe is the response to a particular situation or object.¹⁰

Such a definition begs the question of how the investigator taps the "response," a question which has resulted in a variety of measuring methods and devices. Certainly in this area, the experimenter is particularly dependent upon valid and dependable measurements. The measuring instruments used in this experiment were: a Likert type scale for measuring a speaker's authoritativeness or expertness, and a Likert type scale for measuring attitude toward the concept of parity price supports.

Attitude Change Measurement

The attitude change measuring instrument was a Likert

¹⁰B. F. Green, "Attitude Measurement," Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. G. Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), 2 Vols., I, p. 338.

type scale of attitude toward parity price supports. This scale was also constructed by Anderson. The reliability of the instrument was .95 and .98. This scale is reproduced in Appendix C.

Attitude change, in this experiment, is operationally defined as the difference in the subject's scores computed the first day of the quarter and the score obtained immediately after hearing the speech.

Administration of the Experiment

During the first class meeting of the spring quarter, all subjects in the final experiment received a packet containing the initial form of the attitude scale on parity price supports, the Haiman scale, a brief personal information form, and instructions for completing the various forms. A sample of this packet is included in Appendix C. Care was taken not to suggest that the project was associated in any direct way with research in speech.

After tabulating the scores on the Haiman scale and the attitude toward parity price supports, all subjects were grouped into cells according to their dogmatism score. This was done so that all cells in the three dimensional design might be proportional. This, of course, simplified the

statistical operations performed later. After proportionality was established the individual members of the several classes were instructed to report to the assigned rooms at specific times as part of their regular class work in the course. Graduate students in public address were assigned randomly to assist in presenting the various experimental stimuli. The experimental procedure was discussed with the assistant and the measuring instrument carefully explained. Each assistant was provided with a standard set of instructions to be read to the subjects. On the day of the experiment each assistant was supplied with a tape recorder, the appropriate tape, and the test booklets for his group.

The experimental groups met with the assistant at the designed room. A brief statement designed to secure cooperation of the subjects was read. The tapes were then played. After the tapes were heard, the test booklets were distributed, and the marking of the Likert type scale explained. Following the completion of the responses by the subjects, the materials were collected and the subjects thanked for their cooperation.

Statistical Procedure

The three dimensional design (A x B x L) was chosen

for this study because this design provides the means whereby two experimental variables and various levels of subjects may be studied simultaneously for the analysis of the total interaction and interaction between the various experimental variables at the different levels. The source for most of the statistical information is E. F. Linguist, Design and Analysis of Experiments in Psychology and Education.

Possible Sources of Error

Despite the efforts of the experimenter to use an experimental design and statistical methods which would adequately control or randomize all variables not under consideration, some sources of error are likely to appear in a study of this type. Some of these sources of error will be described in order to evaluate properly the conclusions which will be drawn.

1. College students are atypical members of the total population of the United States; conclusions, therefore, do not necessarily apply universally.

2. Another source of error might exist because some of the subjects realized that they were in an experimental situation and this may have altered their normal reactions.

3. The classroom provides somewhat artificial conditions for persuasive process.

4. Although it was deemed necessary to use recorded speeches and introductions, there is a potential source of error in the use of recordings. The recorded presentation is an unnatural one in terms of the speaker-audience relationship.

5. It is possible that the speeches, constructed by the same person, do not reflect the differences which would be present if a dogmatic and an open-minded person constructed the speeches. There are probably a number of subtle differences in style, arrangement, arguments, etc., between a presentation of a dogmatic person and an open-minded person which may not be reflected in the speeches used.

6. It is possible that the introductions of the various speakers did not affect the experimental group as they did the pilot study group. The use of similar randomized groups is an attempt to eliminate this source of error.

7. It is possible that, in an effort toward experimental precision, the experimenter did not allow for enough differences in the construction of the speeches (e.g.--requiring that the same person record both speeches).

It is recognized that all error cannot be eliminated

or measured by this type of investigation. Such measures as were possible have been taken to free the results from error, but potential error must always be kept in mind when generalizing from the results or conclusions of any study.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the statistical results of the experiment. The discussion will consider the mean shift of each cell, the comparative effectiveness of the two main treatments, the relationship between dogmatism scores and attitude change, the interaction effects, a comparison of the individual treatment cells, and a summary of the results pertinent to the hypotheses presented in Chapter II.

Mean Shifts of Cells

As stated in the last chapter, the two factor by three levels design was chosen for this experiment because it presented the opportunity to investigate the three factors of primary interest simultaneously. The first factor, type of speech, and the second factor, ethos of the speaker, are combined with three levels of audience dogmatism to form

a total of 18 individual cells. The mean shifts of these individual cells are reproduced in Table II.

The results of the analysis of variance are shown in Table III. This table includes the analysis of shift of attitude as reflected by the difference between the pre- and post-test scores on the Likert type scale of attitude toward Farm Price Supports.

Table III shows a significant difference between introductions and a significant difference between levels of audience dogmatism. All other sources of variation, including all interaction effects, were not significant. This means that the hypothesis which predicted a significant effect produced by the recipient's dogmatism was confirmed. The hypothesis which predicted significant changes in attitude based upon the perception of the communicator's credibility was also conformed. All other hypotheses were not confirmed. The individual treatment results will be discussed in later paragraphs.

Relation between Speaker's Ethos and Attitude Change

It was hypothesized that the relative effectiveness of a communication will vary with the recipient's perception of the communicator's ethos or credibility as revealed by

TABLE II. MEAN SHIFT OF INDIVIDUAL CELLS

<u>Ethos of the Speaker</u>	Audience Dogmatism	<u>Presentation</u>	
		Closed-minded Speech	Open-minded Speech
High	+	6.30 (3)	8.10 (1)
	o	6.00 (6)	6.26 (4)
	-	2.20 (17)	5.00 (9)
.			
Low	+	1.30 (18)	3.80 (11)
	o	2.53 (14)	3.73 (12)
	-	2.30 (16)	3.50 (13)
.			
No introduction	+	6.40 (2)	6.00 (7)
	o	6.13 (5)	5.06 (8)
	-	2.40 (15)	4.00 (10)

Note: + = individual cells containing subjects with relatively high dogmatism scores.
 o = individual cells containing subjects with relatively neutral dogmatism scores.
 - = individual cells containing subjects with relatively low dogmatism scores.
 () = numbers in parenthesis indicate the rank order of attitude shift, # 1 being the largest shift as indicated by the Likert scale on attitudes toward Farm Price Supports.

TABLE III. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE MEAN SHIFT OF ATTITUDE AS A RESULT OF TREATMENTS

Source of Variation	df	Mean Square	F
Speeches	1	48.58	2.66
Introductions	2	152.75	8.36***
Levels (Dogmatism scores)	2	77.02	4.21**
Speeches X Introductions	2	15.29	.84
Speeches X Levels	2	14.72	.80
Introductions X Levels	4	23.19	1.27
Speeches X Levels X Introductions	4	5.80	.32
Within Cells	192	18.27	
Total	209		

*** = significant at the .001 level of confidence.

** = significant at the .01 level of confidence.

the speaker's trustworthiness and expertness. Specifically, it was hypothesized that a speaker perceived as being both trustworthy and an expert on the subject being presented would be more effective in changing attitude than a speaker perceived as being neither trustworthy nor an expert.

The test of significance of the main effect of the introductions examined the hypothesis that the two introductions and the speech with no introduction would have the same effect on the dependent variable (shift of attitude). Again, using the F-test ratio ($MS_{\text{intro}}/MS_{\text{within}}$) in an analysis of variance this statistical hypothesis was rejected with a .001 level of confidence. The effect of the different introductions is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV. TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MEAN SHIFT DIFFERENCE AMONG INTRODUCTIONS

Introduction	No.	Mean Shift	Difference	SE of MD	t
High	70	5.71			
None	70	5.09	.62	.73	.85
Low	70	2.90	2.19	.73	3.00**
High	70	5.71	2.81	.72	3.90**

** = significant at the .01 level of confidence.

The t-test was used to investigate the difference in the mean shifts among the two introductions and the group that was not exposed to an introduction. A significant difference was found between two of the pairs: between the low credibility and the high credibility introduction there was a significant difference at the .01 level of confidence, and between the low credibility introduction and the group receiving no introduction the difference was also significant at the .01 level of confidence. However, there was no significant difference between the group hearing no speaker introduction and the group hearing the speaker introduced as a person of high credibility. This would tend to indicate that, while the high credibility introduction caused no significant difference in the change of attitude, the reverse was not true. That is, the portrayal of the speaker as having little credibility did have a significant effect upon change of attitude. The results of this test are reproduced in Table IV.

Relation between Audience Belief System
and Attitude Change

Another primary hypothesis of this study was that a person's belief system would significantly affect his reception of a communication. The statistical hypothesis was the

null hypothesis of no difference in the mean attitude change among the various levels. This test was based on the F-ratio of the mean squares for levels and the mean square within-cells. Table V shows the results of the mean attitude change for levels and the resulting F-ratio. In this case there was a reliable statistical difference in the mean shift of the three audiences at the .01 level of confidence. The null hypothesis, that there was no difference in the reactions of subjects at the different levels, was therefore rejected.

T-tests were used to investigate the difference between mean shifts of opinion at the various levels of dogmatism. These results are shown in Table V. A significant difference was found between two of the pairs: between the neutral and open-minded audience the difference was significant at the .05 level of confidence and between the open-minded and dogmatic audiences the difference was significant at the .01 level of confidence. The difference between the dogmatic and neutral audiences was not statistically significant.

TABLE V. TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MEAN SHIFT DIFFERENCE
AMONG AUDIENCE POSITIONS

Audience Position	No.	Mean Shift	Difference	SE of MD	t
Dogmatic	60	5.31			
Neutral	90	4.96	.35	.69	.50
Open-minded	60	3.23	1.73	.72	2.40*
Dogmatic	60	5.31	2.08	.72	2.89**

* = significant at the .05 level of confidence.

** = significant at the .01 level of confidence.

Summary

1. The hypothesis that closed-mindedness or open-mindedness existing in the speeches would have a significant differential effect on attitude change did not prove statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.

2. The second hypothesis stated that the relative effectiveness of a communication will vary with the recipient's perception of the communicator's credibility as revealed by the speaker's trustworthiness and expertness. Using the F-test ratio, this hypothesis was accepted at the .01 level of confidence. Using t-tests to investigate differences between the credibility levels indicated that:

(1) there was no significant difference, at the .05 level of confidence, between the groups hearing the speaker introduced as being both trustworthy and an expert and the groups hearing the speech without an introduction, (2) there was a significant difference at the .01 level of confidence between the group hearing no introduction and the group hearing the speaker introduced as having low credibility, and (3) there was a significant difference at the .01 level of confidence between the groups hearing the high credibility introduction and the low credibility introduction.

3. The hypothesis that the belief system of the receiver would significantly affect the change in attitude was borne out. The F-test ratio indicated that the difference due to varying belief systems was significant at the .01 level of confidence. By using the t-test further differences were indicated among the three audience levels:

(1) there was no significant difference (.05 level) between the dogmatic and the moderate or neutral audience, (2) there was a significant difference between the neutral and open-minded audiences at the .05 level of confidence, and (3) a difference existed between the open-minded and dogmatic audiences at the .01 level of confidence.

4. None of the three double interaction effects nor

the triple interaction effect proved to be statistically significant.

The final chapter will include a summary of the entire experiment, discussion of the results indicated in this chapter, implications of these data, and suggestions for further study.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Summary

This study was concerned with the effect of certain variables on the attitude change of groups of listeners. These variables were: (1) perceived ethos or credibility of a speaker and (2) the "dogmatism" contained within the speech. To make the experimental design more precise and to examine another dimension of the variables involved in attitude change, the audiences were separated according to their varying degrees of dogmatism as indicated by their Haiman Dogmatism Test scores. The study sought conclusions concerning the effects of all combinations of the above factors on attitude change.

A review of the literature revealed considerable research concerning the effect of credibility of the source on attitude change. However, no research specifically concerning the dogmatism of the speech and the relationship of this

dogmatism and credibility of the source to the dogmatism or personality structure of the listener is available in current literature. This study sought to explore some preliminary hypotheses in this virgin territory.

A total of 210 students enrolled in P. A. 101 (Oral Communications) and Psych. 201 (Fundamentals of Psychology) courses at the University of Southern Mississippi were used as subjects in this experiment. Two speeches favoring the abandonment of farm price supports were used as the primary persuasive instruments. One speech was constructed along "open-minded" lines while the other was constructed to be relatively "dogmatic." Introductions were written to identify the speech as coming from a highly credible source and a source of low credibility. In a third condition no introduction at all was used. The audiences were arranged according to their score on the Haiman Dogmatism scale into three groups considered to be: (1) relatively dogmatic, (2) relatively neutral, and (3) relatively open-minded or non-dogmatic.

The method chosen for measuring attitude and attitude change was a Likert scale concerning attitude toward farm price supports. The difference in pre-test and post-test scores on the Likert scale was the dependent variable.

In testing the significance of the effect of the treatments (introductions and speeches), the three dimensional (A X B X L), two factors by levels design was used and the F-test for significance was employed to test the statistical hypothesis that the various treatments would have the same effect on the mean attitude change. In testing the effect of listener dogmatism on the attitude shift, the statistical hypothesis tested was that the difference between the various dogmatism positions had no effect on the main attitude shift.

Conclusions

It must be pointed out that the results obtained in this study can be valid only within the limitations and conditions of the investigation as it was carried out, and that the conclusions drawn may be generalized only to those situations for which this experiment provides a representative sampling. With this in mind, the following conclusions are presented. These conclusions are based on the mean shift of attitude as measured by the Likert scale.

1. There was no significant difference between the effects of the two speeches (dogmatic and open-minded) at the .05 level of confidence. However, the difference was in

the direction predicted and would have been significant at the .10 level of confidence.

2. The speaker who was perceived as being a relatively credible source was able to obtain a greater shift of attitude than was the source whose perceived credibility was relatively low.

3. The speeches when presented without an introduction resulted in a greater shift of attitude than when attributed to a source with low credibility. There was no significant difference between effect of speech attributed to a highly credible source and the speech not attributed to any source.

4. The attitude of the dogmatic audience shifted most, that of the neither dogmatic nor open-minded audience less, and that of the open-minded audience the least.

5. The double interaction effects between the introductions and speeches, introductions and audience levels, and speeches and audience levels were not significant.

6. The triple interaction effect between speeches, audience levels, and introductions was not significant.

Discussion

The findings of this experiment indicate a need for

further research in the area of personality and persuasion. From this study it seems that the belief system of the listener is a significant factor in the persuasive situation. A close examination of the various cell means shown in Table II of the previous chapter supports this view. It should be pointed out to begin with that the total sample population was skewed in the closed-minded direction. In order to make cell n's proportional the experimenter had to take all of the negative scores on the Haiman scale and consider them as the open-minded group. These scores ranged from -1 to -34 while the neutrals ranged from +1 to only +16 and the dogmatic group ranged from +17 to +36. This points out two factors which may have affected the results: (1) the open-minded group contained a greater variety of belief systems as indicated by the Haiman scale and (2) the neutrals were, in fact, heavily skewed in the closed-minded direction.

These speculations assume that the Haiman scale is an equal interval scale. The specific statement that it is could not be found in Haiman's research. However, he continually uses statistical and mathematical calculations which are appropriate for equal interval scales. If this scale is not equal interval, then the statements about the skewness of the population are not necessarily correct. In

fact, if the various positions on this scale do not approach equal intervals, many of the findings of this study might then be artifacts of the scale rather than of the variables studied. In the absence of evidence along these lines, it might be well to follow Rokeach's procedure of investigating only subjects who score very high or very low on the scale.

Table II indicates that the three cells with the most attitude change are all in the relatively dogmatic group. We must go to the cell mean ranked 9th out of 18 before we encounter the first open-minded cell. The eight largest shifts-in-attitude cells were, in other words, all in relatively closed-minded groups. Another fact about these first eight cells is that four of them (ranks 2, 3, 5, and 6) heard the closed-minded speech while the other four (ranks 1, 4, 7, and 8) heard the open-minded speech. Four of these first eight were exposed to the highly credible source and four to the speech with no introduction. None of the top eight cells were in the groups hearing the speaker introduced as having little credibility.

Six of the bottom nine cells (having the least shift of opinion) were in the group exposed to the speaker with low credibility. The other three cell groups of the last nine were all composed of non-dogmatic subjects; one hearing

the credible introduction and two hearing no introduction.

Several speculations can be made from this review. First, there is little difference between the persuasiveness of the open-minded and closed-minded speeches. This could be attributed to several factors. The speeches were very similar in content. They both contained the same arguments, arrangements, transitions, and both were recorded by the same speaker. A closed-minded person would probably not organize his material, use similar transitions, the same intonations, etc., as would the open-minded person. One of the shortcomings of this experiment, then, seems to be a lack of difference between the two speeches used as the open and closed-minded stimuli. When the experimenter submitted the manuscripts for the open and closed minded speeches to a group of seven faculty members and played the tapes to a group of twelve graduate students, all nineteen unanimously agreed that there was a difference in the speeches and correctly identified both speeches. In retrospect it is clear that this was not an adequate test since the concepts of open and closed-mindedness were explained to these two panels before they were exposed to the speech stimuli; an introduction which, of course, was not made to the subjects in the final experiment.

From the point of view of traditional rhetorical theory, the open-minded speech is a "better" speech than the closed-minded speech. It satisfies the logical canons of a basic speech textbook or an argumentation textbook far better than the closed-minded speech. If the differences between speeches are viewed rhetorically, the results coincide with many earlier studies. These studies indicate that changes in messages which are rhetorically sound or unsound seem to produce differences in response which are not significant but are in the direction predicted. The differences between open and closed-minded speeches can be thought of as differences in style, and if thought of in that way, the results coincide with previous findings.

Another important question is "where" the experimental stimuli fell. For example, it seems possible to arrange a continuum of speeches on a dimension of open and closed-mindedness. It is also possible to arrange introductions on a dimension of high ethos-low ethos just as people are placed on a dimension of high dogmatism-low dogmatism.

One possible way of accounting for a number of results in this study is by this question of where on the potential continuum did the particular selected stimuli fall? For example, the small observed differences in the speeches

potentially might be attributed to the fact that they could be thought of as falling near each other on a rather long continuum. In other words, the small difference noted may be a function of the selection of stimuli which fall close together on a long continuum.

One of the obvious changes which should be made if this experiment were replicated would be in the speech stimuli. An effort should be made to get speeches which would represent more extreme positions on an open or closed-minded continuum, rather than trying to match argument, arrangement, etc.

In looking at the effects of the introductions, it seems that the introduction which intimated the speaker had not been completely trustworthy in the past and might not be a "real" expert in farm price supports was effective in creating low ethos. The speaker introduced as highly trustworthy and an expert in the area of farm price supports did not produce results which differed significantly from the speech with no introduction. If these results are typical, they would indicate that "extrinsic" ethos, that which precedes the speaker's words, adds little to source credibility. However, "extrinsic" ethos does seem to have a powerfully damaging effect if it indicates that the speaker has low

credibility.

The results from the introductions offer room for speculation. How can the lack of difference between the high credibility introduction and the condition of no introduction be explained? Rokeach repeatedly insists that with the closed-minded individual, there seems to be a source-concept collapse. The closed-minded individual reacts to the source and message as if they were one. It may be impossible to create a "source loyalty" situation, in Rokeach's sense, with a short introduction. Two different levels of reaction may be involved. Consider, for example, results obtained in a study by Williams.¹ This study investigated two components of source credibility, trustworthiness and expertness. He created four different introductions using trustworthiness and expertness in all possible combinations, i.e., (1) trustworthy and expert, (2) trustworthy and non-expert, (3) non-trustworthy and expert, and (4) non-trustworthy and non-expert. It was predicted that the effectiveness of the speeches would vary with their introductions, and the speech with introduction (1) above would be

¹Bill M. Williams, "An Experimental Study of the Relative Effect of Trustworthiness and Expertness on Change of Attitude," Unpublished M. A. Thesis (University of Oklahoma, 1962).

most effective, (2) next most effective, (3) next, and (4) least effective. Introductions 1, 3, and 4 were attributed to fictitious men. Introduction 2 was attributed to General Douglas MacArthur. This introduction clearly pointed out that while MacArthur was trustworthy he was definitely not an expert in the field under consideration (compulsory health insurance). The results indicated that MacArthur was significantly more persuasive than even the fictitious man who was introduced as being both trustworthy and expert.

These findings seem to support the idea that high credibility may be impossible to establish in a short introduction--that high credibility must be built over a period of time and experiences. On the other hand, low credibility might be established in a few sentences of introduction.

There is, however, some confusion as to the application of the terms "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" ethos. If we apply the Aristotelian notion that there is a kind of ethos which the speaker creates for himself in his speaking, then everything done in this study falls outside that category and is "extrinsic" ethos. A man introducing a speaker and identifying him as a lawyer is, from this point of view, the same thing as identifying him as General MacArthur in a similar introduction. There are, of course, factors of stability,

previous experience, and established attitudes; but these seem to be neither "extrinsic" nor "intrinsic." It seems possible, then, that here is a place where our system of categories needs refinement.

It may be, as noted, that the high credibility introduction actually fell rather near the middle of the high-low credibility continuum. Therefore, we might not expect a large difference between the "high credibility" and the "no introduction" treatments.

Another observation is the fact that the dogmatic audience experienced a greater change in attitude than did the open-minded audience. There seem to be several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, as pointed out in Chapter III in the discussion of the Haiman scale, the closed-minded person may be acquiescing rather than experiencing a change in attitude. Secondly, Rokeach states that one characteristic of open-minded people is that they can entertain more behavioral alternatives; they are "open" to more points of view than the closed-minded person. The data of this experiment might be reconciled to Rokeach's findings if there is a difference in being able to entertain ideas and being convinced by ideas. Rokeach does not discuss whether or not there is a difference in being able to enter-

tain ideas and susceptibility to attitude change. More research seems justified on this point; for example, studies could be designed which would distinguish between acquiescence and agreement, or between entertaining alternatives and accepting them.

Hovland, et al., in their book Personality and Persuasibility, suggest another possibility when they point out that ". . . there is such a factor as general persuasibility and . . . there is evidence that persuasibility exists as a 'content-free' factor."² They further found that one characteristic of a person with high persuasibility was pressure felt toward group conformity and adaptation.³ This characteristic, according to Rokeach, is also indicative of a relatively closed-minded or dogmatic person. If, then, the dogmatic people in this experiment possessed attributes of general persuasibility, we should expect the dogmatic audiences to be affected more by the communication than the open-minded subjects.

Probably the most puzzling result to come from this experiment was the extreme lack of interaction at any of the

²Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, Personality and Persuasibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 255.

³Ibid., p. 235.

levels. Specifically, it was predicted in hypothesis IV-B that there would be a levels by speeches interaction. Statistically this interaction was not significant. As mentioned above, it is possible that the speeches were drawn from a relatively small area of the potential open and closed-mindedness scale and the subjects may have been drawn from a relatively constricted area of the dogmatism scale. If this is the case, it is possible that all the theoretical conditions which would lead a person to predict an interaction might concern themselves with treatment combinations which are "outside" the limits of the variables in this study. This speculation would lead to the suggestion that a further study could tap a much wider range of these variables.

The same comments might be made regarding the introduction by levels interaction predicted in hypothesis IV-A. In this case, if the high credibility introduction fell more toward the end of the high-low credibility continuum, it seems probable that there would have been significant interaction between audience levels and introductions. For example, if the high credibility introduction had cited, as the source, an authority figure for highly dogmatic people, an introduction by levels interaction would have been more likely. In other words, this study may not have tapped the

portion of the scale where interaction is most likely to occur, if it occurs anywhere.

If this experiment were replicated, there are certain changes which obviously should be made. The first change might be in the stimulus material. Tape recordings are an artificial means of communication. Ideally, to test the hypotheses of this study, one would have subjects who are exposed to a "live" speaker who is extremely open-minded while another group is exposed to a speaker who is extremely closed-minded. This certainly would not be an impossible task in the political field. For example, speeches made by Tom Anderson, right wing editor of the Farm and Ranch Magazine, seem to have many characteristics of closed-minded speeches. A speech by him against the "present administration" might be compared with other anti-administration speeches given by more open-minded people. If this were not possible, then tapes of actual speeches before real audiences might be an improvement over the artificially constructed ones used in this experiment. The experimenter feels that one of the weakest areas in this study is in the lack of difference between the two speech stimuli.

One advantage this experiment did have was the freedom to assign subjects to different groups rather than using

"available" subjects. This made the experimenter's job easier and should have increased the precision of this experiment.

Implications

This experiment has several implications for speech pedagogy and practice. First of all, to the extent that the experimental sample is typical, speakers should be aware that our audiences tend to be closed-minded. Of the total population receiving the Haiman scale to measure dogmatism, the closed-minded group outnumbered the open-minded group by more than 2 to 1, and extremely high closed-minded scores were more common than extremely open-minded scores.

Another implication, which seems to be borne out in other studies, is the effect the speaker's ethos has on a persuasive situation.

In summary, the important implication which this experiment expresses is the need for more study in the area of personality and persuasion. In view of the questions posed on page 10 of Chapter I it seems that:

1. Psychological theories can provide rhetoric with new insights into the analysis of speech behavior.
2. Speech behavior can be studied without first employing traditional rhetorical categories.

3. Personality structure of listeners does have significant effects on the outcome of a persuasive message.

Suggestions for Further Study

This study is similar to most other research studies in that it has raised many questions. Some of the questions are worthy of investigation and further study. The more promising ones are indicated below.

1. The question of the lack of difference between speeches seems to offer a fruitful area for more study. A more realistic situation where two different speakers who give their own composition on the same subject might be used instead of having the same person record both speeches. These speakers, of course, should be relatively far apart on the dogmatism scale.

2. In line with number one, a number of speeches might be analyzed to define characteristic differences in speeches composed by open and closed-minded speakers. This might be done using methods such as content analysis, etc.

3. Further examination is needed to determine why these interactions are insignificant when other studies would lead one to expect interaction between the dimensions used in this study.

4. Important results might come from further attempts to define and measure the dimensions of dogmatism as reflected in the content, arrangement, and delivery of a speech.

5. There could be replications of this experiment using only extremely dogmatic and extremely open-minded subjects without the general overlapping present in the neutral group in this study.

6. Profitable investigations might be made to determine the potential width of the continua dealt with in this study.

7. This study might logically be extended by defining more precisely the differences in source credibility to obtain more accurate information about the possible interaction effects of different kinds of credibility and dogmatism on personality structure.

8. Studies designed specifically to investigate the question of the amount of benefit or damage done by complimentary or adverse introductions seem warranted. Are the implications of the results of this study valid when they indicate that little good but much harm may be done by the introduction?

9. Profitable findings might come from studies

investigating the similarities and differences between Rokeach's conception of open and closed-mindedness and Hovland's general persuasibility notions as applied to the persuasive situation.

Although the field of source credibility and personality structure as related to persuasion has received little attention in the past years, this seems, to this experimenter, a most promising field which offers the possibility of insights into the persuasive situation.

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APPENDIX A

RAW SCORE DATA

RAW SCORE DATA

SUMMARY OF DATA AND RAW-SCORES

Audience, -D speech, Hi Introduction, Dogmatic subject							
Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	F	19	2	64	48	16	+28
2.	F	18	1	66	68	- 2	+22
3.	M	18	1	62	50	12	+36
4.	F	18	1	66	51	11	+19
5.	M	18	1	44	31	13	+23
6.	M	19	2	32	30	2	+18
7.	M	21	4	30	16	14	+20
8.	M	22	1	54	45	9	+21
9.	M	18	1	38	31	7	+22
10.	F	18	1	55	56	- 1	+33
Audience, -D speech, Hi Introduction, Neutral subject							
1.	M	41	3	35	30	5	+ 6
2.	M	21	2	59	48	11	+ 1
3.	M	25	4	57	47	10	+ 2
4.	M	18	1	60	51	9	+ 8
5.	M	18	1	68	60	8	+ 8
6.	F	26	4	59	59	0	+12
7.	M	20	2	48	42	6	+15
8.	F	18	1	48	40	8	+13
9.	M	21	4	33	22	11	+ 4
10.	M	22	2	34	36	- 2	+ 6
11.	M	21	2	33	28	5	+13
12.	M	21	2	32	26	6	+14
13.	M	21	1	39	43	- 4	+16
14.	F	19	1	66	57	9	+16
15.	F	20	2	65	53	12	+16

Audience, -D speech, Hi introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects

Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	M	18	1	52	53	- 1	- 3
2.	F	20	4	59	56	3	- 3
3.	M	24	4	44	37	7	- 3
4.	M	22	4	27	18	9	- 5
5.	M	24	1	61	62	- 1	-10
6.	M	18	1	73	65	8	-10
7.	M	18	1	52	43	9	-11
8.	M	19	1	33	26	7	-15
9.	F	19	1	67	63	4	-31
10.	F	20	2	46	41	5	-20

Audience, -D speech, Low introduction, Dogmatic subjects

1.	M	18	1	47	38	9	+20
2.	M	20	1	51	53	- 2	+24
3.	M	19	1	50	44	6	+24
4.	M	21	2	52	46	6	+27
5.	F	18	1	51	42	9	+27
6.	M	20	3	49	45	4	+30
7.	M	18	1	58	55	3	+28
8.	F	18	1	41	46	- 5	+33
9.	F	18	1	41	37	4	+33
10.	M	19	1	48	44	4	+35

Audience, -D speech, Low introduction, Neutral subjects

1.	M	20	1	30	21	9	+ 2
2.	M	18	1	46	51	- 5	+ 3
3.	F	18	1	49	41	8	+ 4
4.	F	18	1	56	46	10	+ 4
5.	F	19	1	46	51	- 5	+ 5
6.	M	22	4	30	25	5	+ 6
7.	F	19	1	61	54	7	+12
8.	M	19	1	60	51	9	+13
9.	M	19	1	46	47	- 1	+17
10.	M	26	2	38	38	0	+ 1
11.	M	20	3	52	44	8	+10
12.	M	21	3	48	44	4	+11
13.	F	19	3	60	57	3	+14
14.	M	19	1	64	66	- 2	+17
15.	F	20	2	44	38	6	+14

Audience, -D speech, Low introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects

Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	M	18	1	46	38	8	- 1
2.	F	18	1	51	50	1	-11
3.	F	19	1	49	43	6	-29
4.	M	18	1	52	47	5	- 6
5.	M	20	1	53	44	9	- 4
6.	F	18	1	50	54	-4	- 5
7.	F	18	1	58	51	7	- 1
8.	M	21	2	23	22	1	-17
9.	M	20	1	61	62	-1	-18
10.	F	27	1	53	50	3	-27

Audience, -D speech, No introduction, Dogmatic subjects

1.	M	20	1	45	38	7	+23
2.	F	19	1	64	58	6	+25
3.	M	20	2	45	38	7	+28
4.	F	19	2	48	39	9	+36
5.	M	20	1	57	59	-2	+18
6.	F	39	1	64	58	6	+21
7.	M	19	2	35	31	4	+24
8.	F	20	4	58	50	8	+18
9.	M	20	2	42	36	6	+19
10.	M	19	1	60	51	9	+20

Audience, -D speech, No introduction, Neutral subjects

1.	F	20	1	63	54	9	+ 4
2.	F	19	3	62	54	8	+ 7
3.	M	19	1	60	52	8	+14
4.	M	23	4	60	57	3	+ 7
5.	M	18	1	59	50	9	+12
6.	F	22	4	53	49	4	+ 5
7.	F	18	1	63	64	-1	+ 6
8.	F	20	2	63	61	2	+ 9
9.	F	18	1	54	45	9	+ 9
10.	F	21	3	47	46	1	+ 9
11.	F	18	1	55	47	8	+12
12.	F	18	1	54	47	8	+12
13.	M	19	2	57	48	9	+16
14.	F	18	1	43	44	-1	+16
15.	M	19	1	50	40	10	+17

Audience, -D speech, No introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects							
Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	F	19	1	58	49	9	- 1
2.	M	20	2	61	55	6	- 4
3.	M	19	1	55	53	2	- 6
4.	M	21	1	50	51	-1	- 6
5.	M	20	2	60	57	3	- 7
6.	F	19	2	52	48	4	- 9
7.	M	18	1	39	40	-1	-12
8.	M	19	1	43	38	5	-13
9.	M	21	1	49	43	6	-13
10.	F	20	2	55	48	7	-14
Audience, +D speech, Hi introduction, Dogmatic subjects							
1.	M	21	2	54	48	8	+19
2.	F	20	3	67	60	7	+22
3.	M	18	1	53	48	5	+22
4.	F	18	2	59	51	8	+30
5.	M	20	2	70	64	6	+14
6.	M	18	1	36	26	10	+22
7.	M	18	1	74	68	6	+25
8.	M	19	1	37	36	1	+26
9.	F	19	2	54	50	4	+29
10.	F	20	2	66	58	8	+38
Audience, +D speech, Hi introduction, Neutral subjects							
1.	M	19	2	63	57	6	+ 9
2.	F	18	1	59	51	8	+ 9
3.	F	18	1	55	58	-3	+12
4.	M	19	1	48	60	8	+11
5.	M	20	3	40	35	5	+13
6.	M	19	1	59	55	4	+ 5
7.	F	20	2	55	45	10	+ 8
8.	M	20	2	54	46	8	+11
9.	F	18	2	60	51	9	+11
10.	F	18	1	58	49	9	+14
11.	M	18	1	39	36	3	+14
12.	M	20	2	47	40	7	+16
13.	F	19	1	64	59	5	+17
14.	M	20	1	55	50	5	+14
15.	M	19	1	48	42	6	+ 8

Audience, +D speech, Hi introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects							
Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	F	20	4	37	33	4	- 1
2.	M	19	2	51	60	1	- 8
3.	F	19	1	53	56	-3	-11
4.	M	20	3	44	46	-2	-40
5.	M	22	4	33	25	8	0
6.	F	18	1	42	33	9	- 2
7.	M	18	1	45	42	3	- 2
8.	F	18	1	66	66	0	- 6
9.	F	18	1	69	68	1	- 9
10.	F	18	1	47	46	1	-29
Audience, +D speech, Low introduction, Dogmatic subjects							
1.	F	20	1	58	53	5	+18
2.	F	20	2	31	36	-5	+18
3.	M	19	1	29	31	-2	+20
4.	M	20	2	59	55	4	+22
5.	M	20	4	66	57	9	+22
6.	M	19	1	53	60	-7	+23
7.	M	18	1	56	50	6	+25
8.	M	18	1	49	49	0	+26
9.	M	18	1	58	53	5	+33
10.	F	19	2	30	32	-2	+28
Audience, +D speech, Low introduction, Neutral subjects							
1.	F	19	1	61	65	-4	+ 2
2.	F	18	1	50	47	3	+ 7
3.	F	18	1	50	45	5	+ 8
4.	M	21	4	32	35	-3	+ 9
5.	M	21	3	54	54	0	+12
6.	M	27	4	54	66	-2	+15
7.	M	21	1	62	58	4	+15
8.	F	19	1	66	60	6	+ 4
9.	F	19	2	53	51	2	+ 4
10.	F	18	1	47	40	7	+ 6
11.	F	20	2	56	48	8	+ 8
12.	M	18	1	61	56	5	+11
13.	M	18	1	57	49	8	+ 3
14.	M	18	1	53	53	0	+ 5
15.	F	19	1	45	46	-1	+ 8

 Audience, +D speech, Low introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects

Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	F	46	4	45	36	9	- 1
2.	F	20	2	47	43	4	- 7
3.	M	21	2	43	46	-3	-17
4.	F	18	1	56	52	4	- 8
5.	M	25	4	46	43	3	-13
6.	F	18	1	50	46	4	-16
7.	M	20	1	63	58	5	-19
8.	F	19	2	29	30	-1	- 1
9.	M	19	1	58	60	-2	- 6
10.	M	19	2	57	57	0	-10

 Audience, +D speech, No introduction, Dogmatic subjects

1.	M	19	1	52	46	6	+32
2.	F	19	1	55	45	10	+25
3.	M	22	4	48	50	-2	+31
4.	M	21	3	50	41	9	+28
5.	M	44	4	33	26	7	+22
6.	M	21	1	51	43	8	+31
7.	F	21	4	63	55	8	+36
8.	M	24	2	47	41	6	+26
9.	F	18	1	38	31	7	+27
10.	M	19	2	46	41	5	+22

 Audience, +D speech, No introduction, Neutral subjects

1.	M	19	1	56	49	7	+ 2
2.	M	20	1	60	55	5	+ 2
3.	F	19	1	57	48	9	+ 3
4.	M	19	1	47	50	-3	+ 3
5.	F	19	2	51	41	10	+ 7
6.	M	25	4	53	46	7	+10
7.	F	21	2	66	60	6	+ 6
8.	M	18	1	58	51	7	+12
9.	M	19	1	59	54	5	+17
10.	M	20	4	60	50	10	+ 1
11.	F	35	3	44	36	8	+ 4
12.	M	28	4	53	47	6	+ 5
13.	F	21	2	58	63	-5	+ 7
14.	M	20	2	40	32	8	+ 8
15.	F	46	3	61	48	13	+14

Audience, +D speech, No introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects							
Subject No.	Sex	Age	Class	Pre-test	Post-test	Shift	Dogmatism score
1.	F	19	2	46	43	3	-11
2.	F	18	1	52	52	0	- 1
3.	M	18	1	43	42	1	- 2
4.	F	18	1	54	51	3	-11
5.	M	19	1	69	63	6	-11
6.	M	18	1	57	55	2	-35
7.	M	19	1	34	31	3	-10
8.	M	18	1	43	40	3	-14
9.	M	21	1	39	38	1	-18
10.	F	18	1	41	39	2	-19
Control Audience, No speech, No introduction, Random subjects							
1.	F	19	2	64	60	4	+28
2.	M	40	3	35	38	- 3	+ 6
3.	M	24	4	44	44	0	- 3
4.	F	18	1	33	38	- 5	+27
5.	M	21	1	25	27	- 2	+ 6
6.	M	20	2	57	50	7	+12
7.	F	18	1	33	32	1	+ 5
8.	M	22	1	33	32	1	- 3
9.	M	21	2	39	37	2	- 1
10.	M	21	2	57	63	- 6	+16
11.	M	19	1	51	46	5	+ 9
12.	F	19	2	45	55	-10	+ 6
13.	M	19	1	55	61	- 6	+23
14.	M	21	2	43	40	3	- 7
15.	M	18	1	50	50	0	+ 7
16.	M	18	1	36	44	- 8	+ 9
17.	M	22	2	47	49	- 2	+ 1
18.	M	20	2	64	62	2	+21
19.	M	19	1	42	43	- 1	+11
20.	F	23	4	51	48	3	- 4
21.	F	22	3	42	40	2	+ 7
22.	M	34	3	32	34	- 2	-10

Control group mean shift = -.82.

APPENDIX B

TEST MATERIAL

DOGMATIC SPEECH

No problem demands more urgent attention than this one. The current program has become a disaster. Both of these statements refer to a problem which is termed "the insolvable farm mess."

The present program is one of parity price supports. A so called "fair" ratio of farm income to farm expenses is arbitrarily established. This is then labeled "parity." Crop prices are then guaranteed by law at some percentage of this parity through government loans or purchases.

Although everyone agrees on the desirability of an adequate farm income, the present system has not achieved this for many farmers. I haven't had much direct experience on the farm but the solution seems clear. Yet, some politicians seem to think continuing or expanding the present system will achieve this goal. However, the real problem which is one of increasing economic opportunities for the marginal farmers is ignored. Let us examine the causes for the failure of the present system despite its great cost, then indicate a solution to the problem.

It is rather obvious price supports haven't worked. For several years after the war we were under the influence of high rigid price supports but farm income declined several billion dollars. And despite all the ups and downs since then, this decline has generally continued. Recently, gross farm incomes declined a few percentage points with production expenses rising a few percentage points. This cost-price squeeze represents a considerable drop in net farm income.

The history of price support programs since they came into being sometime around the 1930's should have indicated the error of relying on price supports. I would think

that anyone with any understanding of the problem must have realized that the government programs didn't have anything to do with solving the farm problems of the 1930's. World War II and the weather were the means of solving the agricultural problems of the 1930's.

Despite their lack of success in raising farm income, these price support programs have been expensive. I would suppose that there are some hidden costs which could make the total difficult to estimate. Personally, I would guess that the present support policies have cost us between twenty-five and thirty-five billion dollars in the last seven or eight years. This represents a rather good percentage of our non-defense budget. Also, every time we go to the grocery store we pay a little more because of price supports. For some people in various sections of the United States, these prices contribute further to an already inadequate diet.

If price supports had helped the farmers perhaps this cost would be justified. We already know that the programs are ineffective. The farmer does not benefit for two reasons. First, much of the money expended never reaches the farmer. The money is spent for foreign disposal at a loss (while our farm exports decline), for storage costs, for interest on borrowed money. The government lends individuals money to build storage facilities and then pays rents that assure a high profit for these people. With all the expenses that our farm program encounters, I estimate that less than half of the money that is spent ever gets back to the farmer. And this may be a conservative estimate.

Secondly, price supports necessarily raise total farm costs. I suppose this idea will be particularly disturbing for farm leaders who have advocated price support programs. Why is this true? As far as I have heard, current parity price supports are paid on farm crops but not on livestock products for the most part. Yet, more than half of the farm income comes from livestock and livestock products and less than half from farm crops. I don't know just what the relationship is between the cost of feed crops and the cost of raising beef cattle, but price supports have to be increasing the costs of the farmer. We raise the production costs of many farmers to benefit the few. And, as we shall see, these few are not the farmers truly in need.

Stated simply, then, average farm income has declined fairly constantly under price support programs while increased taxes, higher consumer prices, and higher production costs for the farmer resulted from the program. There isn't any sure way to estimate the loss to farmers from destruction of foreign markets and lowered domestic sales.

This failure of parity price supports is explained by two basic factors which have been neglected. First, American agriculture is becoming fantastically productive. Second, many farmers can not participate in such productivity because they lack adequate land, financing, or education to adopt these practices--these become the marginal farmers.

Comparing our recent farm productivity with that of earlier in the century shows that we have increased productivity sharply and that it is rising even more sharply. Somebody's estimate that farm productivity has increased two or three times seems to be conservative to me.

Today's production rate is only the beginning. We had the greatest crop production in history on the fewest acres recently. Production from present acreage can be doubled by known good farming practices. A seventy-five per cent increase could be expected through a moderate increase in the use of fertilizers alone according to some sources. Items in the farm revolution include such things as machines, power, crop and livestock improvement. There are books available which present description of the explosive potential of the family sized farm.

This ability to produce makes guaranteed price levels, even at eighty per cent of parity, high profit incentives for efficient farms and ensures production far in excess of what can be consumed. So, the government stockpiles of surpluses increase each year. We now spend huge sums of money to store all these useless surpluses. But many farmers do not earn such profits for they cannot produce at anything like an efficient level. These are the marginal farmers who present the real farm problem.

Some very high percentages of our crop and livestock products are said to be produced by less than half of the farmers of our country. And this trend is surely going to become even more pronounced which will make these figures

grow even more startling. Now of the half that produce, say ten per cent of our products, some of these are part-time farmers. Some must be retired I would assume. But the remainder constitute the marginal farmers. Many are concentrated in the South. Why, everybody knows that farmers in southern states such as Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, West Virginia, and South Carolina have among the lowest farm incomes in the nation. A man sharecropping fifteen acres of red clay with half the crop going to the owner is not going to be helped by any level of price supports.

Unfortunately, the government has not adequately publicized this group. At least, I haven't seen much information from the government on this aspect of the issue. But the government does know that inadequate farms and inadequate education (even complete illiteracy) make this group of farmers largely incapable of economic farm practices. I am sure there must be a survey to show that educational level correlates highly with acceptance of productive ideas, therefore with income.

This marginal farmer constitutes a more difficult and serious problem than the chronic unemployment in a few of our cities. This presents a real problem for the Kennedy Administration to do something about.

The inflation of wartime did not even touch this depressed group and the problem has persisted to the present time. Farm leaders certainly recognize these people as a problem. A friend of mine was putting it most simply when he said that these people present a relief problem, not a farm problem.

What are the living conditions of these farmers? They live in a slum that is ignored because there is open space between one slum home and the next. In stark contrast there are those farmers who can in one year pay cash for a new car, television, refrigerator, and bedroom suite.

How do we meet the needs of the marginal farmer? We can do away with the expensive price support programs that do nothing to meet his needs. The productive family farm can meet the adjustments this action will cause for the limited group who have been helped by supports. In the past farmers have lost such support payments and they have nevertheless

increased their profit margins. We have many groups recommending the removal of the artificial price elements from agriculture and have been doing so ever since World War II. They recommend substituting emphasis on research as the best solution to meet economic changes. There isn't an economist who would not concur in the recommendation for expansion of research and other adjustment methods.

The marginal farmers can be helped in two ways--by efforts in increasing their productivity--while lowering production costs or by reeducation and relocation for new occupations. Now, I don't know anything about the operation of most of the present programs but they are operating with limited funds which should be expanded. In helping these people we truly increase the economic health of the entire nation for they can become a productive asset, not a continuing liability.

These marginal farmers must be as ready as anyone in the nation to profit from opportunities for improvement. There are surely many examples which could be found to illustrate this. But they need help in order to adopt these opportunities.

So, I think the solution is quite clear. Remove the useless program of parity price supports while increasing the variety of present services that are shown to be effective aids. While I don't know too much about the available types of programs, I know that they can do the job. Use a portion of the money saved to provide programs to directly meet the needs of the marginal farmers, the real farm problem.

I am sure that current programs and proposals can meet the problems that these recommendations might bring. The solution to these problems will take time. But, I submit, if we do not take these steps, the nation must continue to pay the cost of such neglect of human welfare for a long time.

OPEN-MINDED SPEECH

"No problem demands more urgent attention," declared Eisenhower in a 1956 message to Congress. "The current program has become a disaster," headlined Time in an October lead article. If you have been following this problem as I have, you too have noticed many such statements about what is now termed that "insolvable farm mess."

The present program is one of parity price supports. Congress by law arbitrarily establishes a "fair" ratio of farm income to farm expenses which is then labeled "parity." Crop prices are then guaranteed by law at some percentage of this parity through government loans and purchases.

Although everyone agrees on the desirability of an adequate farm income, the present program has not achieved this for many farmers. Yet, some politicians seem to think continuing or expanding the present system will. However, the real problem which is one of increasing economic opportunities for the marginal farmers is ignored. Let us examine the causes for the failure of the present system despite its great cost, then indicate a solution to the problem.

It is rather obvious price supports at whatever level haven't worked. Harry Truman's Secretary of Agriculture reported that under high rigid price supports, farm income declined steadily from seventeen billion in 1945 to ten and one-half billion in 1952. Despite the ups and downs of the agricultural statistics since then, the decline has generally continued. In 1959 alone, despite price supports, conservation acreages, and so on, gross farm incomes declined three and one-half per cent with production expenses rising an equal amount. This cost-price squeeze represents a considerable drop in net farm incomes.

The history of price supports since that twelfth of May, 1933, brought us the ill-fated Agricultural Adjustment

Act, should have indicated the error of relying on price supports. Those of you who had parents on the farm as I did or who farmed through the depression have long anticipated the statistical demonstration of historian Gilbert Fite of Oklahoma in his proof that weather and World War II, not the government, solved the 1930 farm problem.

Dispite their lack of success in raising farm income, these price support programs have been expensive. Hidden costs make the total difficult to estimate. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who has generally opposed lower flexible supports in favor of higher, rigid ones, nevertheless estimated that the less costly lower supports cost thirty-one billion tax dollars in seven years. This represents almost twenty per cent of our non-defense budget. Every time we go to the grocery store we pay a little more because of price supports. And, what worries me even more, these prices contribute further to an already inadequate diet for some Americans.

If price support had helped the farmers perhaps this cost would be justified. We have already seen that the programs are ineffective. The farmer does not benefit for two reasons. First, much of the money expended never reaches the farmer. The money is spent for foreign disposal at a loss (while our farm exports decline), for storage costs, for interest on borrowed money. Those stories in which the government has lent individuals money to build storage facilities, then paid rents that assured a high profit are unfortunately all too true. Less than fifty per cent of the total spent ever reaches the farmer estimates the American Enterprise Association. And my research indicates that this may be too conservative.

Secondly, price supports necessarily raise total farm costs. In discussions I find this idea particularly disturbs farm leaders who advocate price support programs. Now, why is it true? Price supports are currently paid on some crops but not livestock or livestock products except wool. Now, the 1950 Census showed 54.9 per cent of farm income coming from livestock items, 44.5 per cent from crops. I spent too many years of my youth shoveling corn into feed bunks for fat cattle not to realize what a few cents extra per bushel of feed can do to the cost of raising a truckload of fat cattle. We raise the production costs of many

farmers to benefit the few. And, as we shall see, these few are not the farmers truly in need.

Stated simply, then, average farm income has declined fairly constantly under price support programs while increased taxes, higher consumer prices, and higher production costs for the farmer resulted from the program. And there is no valid way to estimate the loss to farmers from destruction of foreign markets and lowered domestic sales.

This failure of parity price supports is explained by two basic factors which have been neglected. First, American agriculture is becoming fantastically productive. Secondly, many farmers can not participate in such productivity because they lack adequate land, financing, or education to adopt these practices--these become the marginal farmers.

Using 1935 to 1939 as a base of one hundred, farm productivity rose to 144 by 1952; and is rising ever more sharply. I think Walter Wilcos, Agricultural Specialist of the Legislative Reference Bureau was far too conservative in his much quoted figure that farm workers today produce 2.7 times as much per hour as in 1910.

Today's production rate is only the beginning. Last year saw the greatest crop production in history on the fewest acres. Production from present acreage can be doubled by known good farming practices--a seventy-five per cent increase could be expected through a moderate increase in the use of fertilizer alone, according to the report of the President's Materials Policy Commission.

Having lived and worked with farms for most of my life, I have seen much of this revolution in machines, power, crop and livestock improvement. Perhaps the best book I have read on the explosive potentials of the family sized farm is the 1960 Yearbook of Agriculture: Power to Produce.

This ability to produce makes guaranteed price levels, even at eighty per cent of parity, high profit incentives for efficient farms and ensures production far in excess of what can be consumed. So, the government stockpiles of surpluses increase each year. We now spend over one million dollars a day to store these surpluses says agriculture Secretary Freeman but many farmers do not earn

such profits for they cannot produce at anything like an efficient level. There are the marginal farmers who present the real farm problem.

Some ninety per cent of our agricultural products are produced by less than half of the farmers according to the 1950 census. Observation of the farm belt and estimates from the 1960 census indicate the percentage is even more striking today. Of the fifty per cent who produce less than ten per cent of our products, about half are part-time farmers with other sources of income. Some are retired. But the remainder constitute the marginal farmers. Many of these are concentrated in the South. Net farm incomes in Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, West Virginia and South Carolina averaged less than fifteen hundred dollars in 1959. A man sharecropping fifteen acres of red clay with half the crop going to the owner is not going to be helped by any level of price supports.

Unfortunately, the government has not publicized this marginal farm group. Only technical reports have adequately treated the problem; for example, a USDA and Census Bureau report of 1959 concluded: "Inadequate farms and inadequate education including complete illiteracy make this group of farmers largely incapable of economic farm practices." A survey by Edward Moe of Cornell Extension showed that educational level correlates highly with acceptance of productive ideas, therefore with income.

This marginal farmer constitutes a more difficult and serious problem than the chronic unemployment in a few of our cities. This is according to liberal economist Arthur Burns in his analysis of the problems facing the Kennedy Administration.

Even James Patten of the Farmer's Union who gets rather vehement in his support of the present system notes this marginal group was not helped by the wartime price rise of the support programs of today. Perhaps family friend Frank Miller, a Professor at Missouri, put it most simply when he said, "these people present a relief problem, not a farm problem."

I have seen these farmers. They live in a slum that is ignored because there is open space between one slum home

and the next. In stark contrast, my brother Harold farms four hundred acres near Harlan, Iowa. He paid cash this year for a new car, television, refrigerator, and bedroom suite.

Now, how do we meet the needs of the marginal farmer? We can do away with the expensive price support programs that do nothing to meet his needs. The productive family can meet adjustments this action will cause for the limited group who have been helped by supports. I watched with interest the success of the dairy industry in increasing profit margins after removal of dairy price supports. I have long concurred with the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Land Grant Colleges, first made way back in 1944, that removal of artificial price supports and greater emphasis on research techniques is the best way to meet the economic changes. I know of no economist who would not concur in the recommendation for expansion of research and other adjustment methods whatever his view on price support programs.

The marginal farmers can be helped in two ways--by efforts to increase their production while lowering production costs, or by reeducation and relocation for new occupations. Both Kennedy and Nixon suggested we should expand the very limited funds currently available for such programs. In helping these people we truly increase the economic health of the entire nation for they can become a productive asset, not a continuing liability.

The extension service of the Department of Agriculture testifies that these marginal farmers are ready to profit from such opportunities. Look what the broiler industry did for some Southern farmers. But these people need help in order to adopt these opportunities.

So I think the solution is quite clear. Remove the useless program of parity price supports while increasing the extension services, the credit facilities, the research techniques that have been shown to be effective aids. Use a portion of the money saved to expand the program now directly meeting the needs of the marginal farmer, the real farm problem.

I have not meant to suggest that these solutions are panaceas nor that they will work overnight. There will be

difficult adjustments but I think these adjustment problems can be met through available programs. The solution to these problems will take time. But, I submit, if we do not take these steps, the nation must continue to pay the cost of such neglect of human welfare for a long time.

LOW ETHOS INTRODUCTION

Our speaker, Dale Jones, is a sophomore Chemistry student from Cleveland, Ohio. His subject today is the Farm Problem. Perhaps this surprises you as it surprised me. Since this is a new subject for him, one with which he is not as directly concerned as many of us, he thought we might be interested in his views about this problem. The title of the speech is "Making Sense about the Farm Problem."

Dale--

HIGH ETHOS INTRODUCTION

We are indeed fortunate to have as our speaker Dr. E. Merrit Burdick. In turning to the current issue of Who's Who in America, I discovered that our distinguished speaker was born and raised on a farm near Pontotoc, Mississippi, and received his B.S. from Mississippi State University in 1925. Following his degree he worked in a variety of occupations relating to agriculture: as secretary of the Farm Bureau Federation in Mississippi, as a farm advisor for the State of Mississippi, and as a teacher. His work in teaching led to a social science research council fellowship in 1930, a Ricardo prize fellowship in 1931, and his Ph. D. in Agricultural Economics at Harvard in 1933.

Since that time he has been at the University of California in Berkely where he is Professor of Agricultural Economics, Director of Agricultural Research, and has the distinction of holding the Giannin Foundation Chair. Dr. Burdick has served in many professional associations and is past-president of the American Farm Economic Association.

In addition to his educational activities, Dr. Burdick has served the government in numerous capacities: as advisor to the Department of Agriculture, as a consultant on the Lend Lease Program, on Farm Credit Policies, and so forth. He is a fellow of the American Statistical Association and since 1939 has been an advisor to the Director of the Bureau of the Census.

One of his more outstanding contributions has been his work as research director for the 20th Century Fund Committee on American Agricultural Policy. Of his many published books and articles on Agriculture, two of the more recent were published by the 20th Century Fund: Farm Policies of the United States 1790-1950, in 1953, and Can We Solve the Farm Problem in 1955.

In view of all these diverse qualifications, therefore, I think we could find no better authority to speak to us on the subject, "Making Sense About the Farm Problem," Professor Burdick.

APPENDIX C

MEASURING INSTRUMENTS

DIRECTIONS FOR THE PILOT STUDIES OF THE INTRODUCTIONS

This spring we are conducting a series of experiments on persuasion. One of the problems we face is equating the impact of two introductions that we must use. Therefore, I wish to play each one of these introductions and have you react to them on the semantic differential and the questionnaires which you have been given. On the semantic differential react to the concept printed at the top of the page after listening to the introduction of that speaker.

The middle or four position on the scale represents a "neutral" or a "don't know" or "doesn't apply" attitude toward the continuum presented by the two words. Then, moving out from the center, the three and five positions represents "slightly," and the two and six positions represent "quite," and the one and seven represent "extremely." Thus, if you thought a speaker, for example, would be quite unfair, you would check space six on the fair-unfair scale; if extremely fair, you would check space one; if neutral, check the middle space.

The questionnaire consists of a series of opinion statements. You are asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements. Again, the middle or four position represents "neutral," the "slight," "moderate," and "strong" agreement or disagreement.

There are no right or wrong answers. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items; it is your first impressions, the immediate "feelings" about the items that we want.

Check your expectations of the speaker on this topic. Please do not try to guess what reactions we want, just respond honestly.

Are there any questions?

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

"THE FARM PROBLEM"

FAIR: ₁ : ₂ : ₃ : ₄ : ₅ : ₆ : ₇ : UNFAIR

REASONABLE: : : : : : : : UNREASONABLE

DISHONEST: : : : : : : : HONEST

UNSYMPATHETIC: : : : : : : : SYMPATHETIC

AGGRESSIVE: : : : : : : : NON-AGGRESSIVE

UNINTERESTING: : : : : : : : INTERESTING

ACTIVE: : : : : : : : PASSIVE

GOOD: : : : : : : : BAD

FAST: : : : : : : : SLOW

IMMORAL: : : : : : : : MORAL

WEAK: : : : : : : : STRONG

#2 SCALE

"THE FARM PROBLEM"

1. This person is not an expert on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
2. This person is not well informed about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
3. This person can speak with authority on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
4. This person lacks personal experience with the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
5. This person deserves to be accepted as an authority on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
6. This person lacks adequate practical experience with the problem to be considered an authority.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
7. One can place confidence in what this person says about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
8. By virtue of his education and training, this person speaks with authority on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
9. This person probably spends considerable time thinking about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
10. This person is a reliable source of information about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
11. Because of his position, this person may be considered an authority on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE

12. This person is a reliable source of information about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
13. This person could accurately predict future developments concerning the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
14. This person has broad knowledge of the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
15. This person has studied the farm problem intensively.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
16. This person knows nothing about the historical development of the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
17. This person has had exceptional opportunities to learn the truth about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
18. This person has read widely on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
19. Few people have access to better information about the farm problem than does this person.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE
20. This person is not adequately prepared to analyze the farm problem.
AGREE:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: DISAGREE

ATTITUDE SCALE ON PARITY PRICE SUPPORTS

TO THE READER:

You are being asked to take part in a project to create a scale to measure attitudes toward parity price supports for farm products. For this scale to be valid, the sincere cooperation of many individuals is needed.

You are asked to read a number of opinion statements presented in the following manner:

All college students should be exempt from the federal draft.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Place an X on the one of the five blanks that most accurately describes your reaction to the statement.

Do not puzzle over any item; it is your immediate reaction that is desired. There are no established "right" or "wrong" answers.

Please give your reaction to every item. Average time for completing all items is about ten minutes.

DEFINITIONS: in order to clarify some of the opinion statements on the succeeding pages, the following definitions are supplied:

Parity Price Support Program: This is a program where a predetermined "fair" ratio of farm income to farm expenses is established by law. Farm income is then guaranteed at some percentage of this parity for the producers of certain farm products through government loans on or purchases of these agricultural products. A program of this type is now in operation nationally.

Farm Problem: This general term includes such items as the problem of declining average farm income, rising farm costs, and crop surpluses.

1. A parity price support program is one of the best ways
to solve the farm problem.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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2. A parity price support program is essential to the
economic stability of the nation

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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3. The continuance of parity price supports will hinder the
progress of agriculture.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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4. A parity price support program is beneficial to the
nation as a whole.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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5. Parity price supports should be continued.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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6. The parity price support program aids the advancement of
American agriculture.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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7. Parity price supports are essential for a strong American
agriculture.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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8. Parity price support programs limit the efficiency of
agriculture.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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9. A parity price support program represents the best long-term solution to the farm problem.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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10. A parity price support program is based upon unsound economic principles.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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11. It is extremely unlikely that a parity price support program can solve the farm problem.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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12. The principle of parity price supports for farm products is essentially sound.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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13. Parity price supports for farm products are a necessity for the nation.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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14. It is advisable for the nation to continue a program of parity price supports for farm products.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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15. A parity price support program is harmful economically to the nation as a whole.

<u>Strongly</u> agree	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Undecided</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> disagree
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16. Parity price support programs should be abandoned.

Strongly
agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Thank you for your cooperation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HAIMAN SCALE

This questionnaire is part of a survey being conducted on this campus and is designed to obtain information about the attitudes and opinions of college students in a number of areas of concern.

This is neither an intelligence test nor an information test. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. The best answer is your own personal opinion. You can be sure that whatever your opinion may be on a particular subject, there will be many who will agree with you and many who will disagree.

It must be emphasized that the sponsors of this survey do not necessarily agree or disagree with the statements in it. We have tried to cover a great many points of view. We agree with some of the statements and disagree with others. Similarly, you will probably find yourself agreeing strongly with some statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and being, perhaps, more neutral about still others.

All that we ask of you is that you:

1. Read each statement carefully and mark it clearly according to your first reaction. It isn't necessary to take a lot of time for any one question. We have allotted about 10 seconds per question.
2. Answer every question.
3. Give your personal point of view. Don't talk over the questions with anyone. Avoid discussing this questionnaire outside this classroom as it will be given to others throughout this quarter.
4. Be as sincere, accurate, and complete as possible in the limited time we have.
5. If you find that your questionnaire has a page missing or is not legible, please raise your hand and you will be helped.
6. When you have finished, recheck the answers to make sure that you have completed all of the questions. Then raise your hand and the questionnaire will be picked up.

The following are statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please mark each one in the left margin, according to the amount of your agreement or disagreement, by using the following scale.

+3: strong agreement	-1: slight disagreement
+2: moderate agreement	-2: moderate disagreement
+1: slight agreement	-3: strong disagreement

- ___ 1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
- ___ 2. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
- ___ 3. Governments and communities should not set up censorship boards which can ban movies on the grounds of immorality.
- ___ 4. With our progress in education and communications, the people of this world are more sympathetic with each other's needs, problems, and aspirations than ever before in history.
- ___ 5. A person should have a job that interests him and work on it for its own sake, without regard for the importance or the recognition it will bring.
- ___ 6. All teachers and government workers should be required to sign loyalty oaths swearing that they are not communists.
- ___ 7. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power.
- ___ 8. The more intimately we get to know people we work with, the more we are likely to respect them.
- ___ 9. It is difficult to believe that some people will go to heaven and others to hell.
- ___ 10. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

- ___11. Capital punishment (the death penalty) should be abolished.
- ___12. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
- ___13. If the Voice of America is going to do a proper job of competing with Soviet propaganda for the friendship of the uncommitted people of the world, it should avoid discussing such sore spots as the race question and concentrate on strong points such as our standard of living.
- ___14. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world, there is probably only one which is correct.
- ___15. It is poor advice to tell a person who has a problem or worry that it is best not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things.
- ___16. It makes little sense to treat homosexuals like criminals who deserve to be punished.
- ___17. Christmas or Hanukkah observance, Bible reading or other religious activities, should not take place in the public schools.
- ___18. I believe that my confidence in my fellow man has been justified more often than not.
- ___19. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
- ___20. Marriages between Christians and Jews should be strongly discouraged.
- ___21. I simply can't bring myself to condemn people just because they seem greatly concerned with their own well-being.
- ___22. People who can afford to dress according to prevailing styles ought certainly to do so.

- ___23. The necessity of appealing to masses of unthinking voters justifies the widespread tendency of political campaigners to oversimplify issues and emphasize personalities.
- ___24. Artists and professors are just as important to society as businessmen and manufacturers, if not more so.
- ___25. Most people don't realize how much of our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
- ___26. A group which tolerates extreme differences of opinion among its members cannot exist for long.
- ___27. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
- ___28. I have so much trouble finding out what is or is not true that I can't understand how some people can feel so certain that they know the truth.
- ___29. There should be no efforts made to prevent Negroes and Whites from living in the same neighborhood.
- ___30. It is not important that people have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions they obey without question.

This is the final page of the survey. Before you complete this page, please recheck your answers to make sure that you have answered all of the questions on the preceding pages.

Fill in the proper answers:

1. Age _____
2. Sex (circle) M F
3. Classification (circle) Freshman Sophomore Junior
Senior Graduate Special
4. Do you have a religious preference (circle) Yes No
If the answer is yes, would you indicate what it is?
(Specify denomination, if possible.) _____
5. Are you a member of a fraternity or a sorority?
(circle) Yes No
If the answer is yes, would you indicate what it is?

6. Name of the course in which this survey was taken.

7. Do you have a political preference? (circle) Yes No
If the answer is yes, would you indicate what it is?

8. What do you plan to do after you have completed your
education? Describe. _____
9. Name _____
10. If you have any comments to make about this
questionnaire, please make them below.

Thank you for your cooperation.