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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION ANALYSIS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

ANGELA L. ROGERS
Norman, Oklahoma
2001

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MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION ANALYSIS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY



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ABSTRACT

Multilateral Military Intervention Analysis in the Post-Cold War Era

During the Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy goals concentrated on containing Soviet expansion. Containment was a simple, yet powerful, idea that provided a strategic vision of world politics in an essentially stable bipolar global security system. The collapse of this stable order has resulted in a security environment operating in a world of transition, turmoil, and uncertainty. New assertions of nationalism and sovereignty have led to humanitarian crises and regional instability. While the U.S. can exercise leadership in coping with the insecurities that this era of transition brings, the U.S. must be selective in choosing which issues to address. Consequently, questions of why, where, when, and how Washington should intervene in the affairs of other countries continue to confound foreign policy decision-makers in the post-Cold War era. Thus, the critical question that directs this research is the following: *When regional organizations or the UN decide to pursue multilateral military intervention, when is it in the U.S. national interest to be involved and to what extent?* While the U.S. can certainly intervene unilaterally, this study concentrates solely on multilateral military intervention (often referred to as U.S.-led coalitions).

This research is intended to bridge a gap between theory and practice in intervention decision-making. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to provide an intervention decision-making calculus consisting of three components: threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis. Threat and risk assessments will be conceptualized at three levels: high, mid, and low. Threat levels will be assigned to the salience of national interests being threatened and the degree of U.S. commitment to protect those interests. A threat-level intensity continuum will be developed to guide decision-makers in placing the crisis at the proper threat level. In addition, a risk-level intensity continuum will be developed to guide decision-makers in placing the crisis at the proper risk level. Risk level representation will be determined by the perceived costs of intervening. An analysis of selected case studies of U.S. military involvement in multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War era will identify critical factors that contribute to high, mid or low level risk. Finally, an opportunity analysis will assess the potential effectiveness of the intervention (the idea that intervention will make a lasting difference) and the impact of moral/humanitarian concerns on intervention decisions (e.g., domestic pressure to intervene).

A basic premise of this study is that U.S. decision-makers should avoid multilateral military intervention in world affairs when the *risk* level outweighs the *threat* level. When the *risk* level and *threat* level are equivalent, an *opportunity* analysis should determine the intervention decision. If the *threat* level is greater than the *risk* level, U.S. multilateral military intervention would be warranted. Clearly, if the threat to U.S. national security is high, the U.S. should do whatever is necessary to protect the country (irrespective of the risk level).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: WHEN IS IT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST TO PURSUE MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION?

> *When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary....Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace.*
>
> — Presidential Decision Directive 25

During the Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy goals concentrated on containing Soviet expansion. The principle of containment was a simple, yet powerful, idea that provided a relatively uncomplicated strategic vision of the world in an essentially stable bipolar global security system. However, the shift in the post-Cold War era from a bipolar to the more complex multipolar global political system which has prevailed in the post-Cold War era created an unpredictable security environment which is operating in a world of transition, turmoil, and uncertainty. New assertions of nationalism and sovereignty have intensified in the post-Cold War era and have contributed to increased regional instability. This instability has, in turn, encouraged increased military intervention, especially at the multilateral level. Consequently, questions of why, where, when, and how the U.S. should intervene militarily in the affairs of other countries have continued to challenge foreign policy decision-makers. Moreover, with the collapse of the bipolar system, regional and international organizations are now in a position to further test the possibility of collective security and advance humanitarian efforts. In this global security environment, the U.S. is in a unique position to exercise leadership in

coping with the insecurities that this era of transition brings. However, U.S. resources are limited, and the U.S. *must* be selective in choosing which issues to address. Thus, the critical question that directs this research is the following: *When regional organizations or the UN decide to pursue multilateral military intervention, when is it in the U.S. national interest to be involved and to what extent?* While the U.S. can certainly exercise the option of intervening unilaterally, this study concentrates solely on multilateral military intervention (often referred to as U.S.-led coalitions).

This research is intended to bridge a gap between theory and practice in intervention decision-making. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to provide a multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus consisting of three components: threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis. Threat and risk assessments will be conceptualized at three levels: high, mid, and low. Examination of the literature on intervention decision-making and risk analysis will identify critical factors that contribute to high, mid or low level threat and risk. Threat-level representation will be determined by the salience of national interests being threatened and the degree of U.S. commitment to protect those interests. A threat-level intensity continuum will be developed to guide decision-makers in placing the crisis at the proper threat level. In addition, a risk-level intensity continuum will be developed to guide decision-makers in placing the crisis at the proper risk level. Risk-level representation will be determined by the perceived costs of intervening. Finally, an opportunity analysis will assess the potential effectiveness of the intervention (the idea that intervention will make a lasting difference) and the impact of moral/humanitarian concerns on intervention

decisions (e.g., domestic pressure to intervene).

This study contends that high level threats are not typically expected in the post-Cold War era. If a high level threat to U.S. national security emerges, the U.S. should do whatever is necessary, including unilateral intervention, to protect its national security (irrespective of the risk level). In contrast, U.S. decision-makers should avoid military intervention in world affairs when the *risk* level outweighs the *threat* level. When the *risk* level and *threat* level are equivalent, an *opportunity* analysis should determine the intervention decision. Clearly, when the *threat* level outweighs the *risk* level, U.S. multilateral military intervention would be warranted. Each of these ideas will be examined further in Chapter 3.

Purpose of Study: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice

The plethora of theories and approaches to studying international relations can be overwhelming. The topic of international security raises a number of theoretical debates centered around the concepts of realism, idealism, isolationism, internationalism, balance of power, collective security, and deterrence to name a few. These competing perspectives offer a rich debate within the field that can help explain the security environment of the post-Cold War era. The literature within international relations also points to a shift from U.S. unilateral intervention to multilateral intervention (often U.S.-led coalitions) as the method of advancing the national interest. This is particularly evident when examining the recent cases of U.S. military intervention in the post-Cold War era; the United States has carried out its foreign policy goals in a multilateral context

— even when acting in a unilateral fashion.

There are a number of explanations for this movement toward a security strategy emphasizing multilateralism. During the Cold War, the international system was categorized as a bipolar system with each superpower dominating a coalition of allied states and competing with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries.[1] While there is only one superpower today, the world is not necessarily unipolar (one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers).[2] Huntington (2000) characterizes contemporary international politics as a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers: "The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states."[3] Moreover, with the collapse of the bipolar system, changes in the international security environment have encouraged multilateral solidarity in order to identify common problems and take collective actions:

> The unanimity within the UN Security Council was remarkable [during the Persian Gulf Conflict] and clearly demonstrated how great-power politics had changed with the end of the Cold War. Previously, the council's five permanent members — the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China — had agreed on virtually nothing and the two superpowers had vetoed any call for collective action.[4]

Clearly, collective security is not limited to the UN. Regional organizations (specifically NATO and OAU) have on occasion also taken the lead in advancing multinational intervention efforts in the post-Cold War era.

While the United States can continue to employ unilateral intervention to protect its national interests, there are advantages to acting multilaterally. As the Department of Defense points out, "acting in coalition or alliance with other nations, rather than alone, generally strengthens the political legitimacy of a course of action and brings additional resources to bear, ensuring that the United States need not shoulder the political, military, and financial burdens alone."[5] Similarly, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), approved in 1994 by the Clinton administration, acknowledges the important role of multilateral action:

> U.S. Foreign Policy, UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.[6]

Unfortunately, creating and sustaining effective coalitions can present significant challenges. For example, the U.S. relinquishes *total* control when agreeing to support a UN or regional organization military operation. This could result in problems if a disagreement among coalition members arises regarding the operation's objectives and mandate. Moreover, command and control capabilities can be weakened due to interoperability problems — different working languages, equipment, procedures, levels of military training, and lack of experience working together. While multilateral intervention has become the norm of the post-Cold War era, scholarly debate about the

costs and benefits of this security strategy is underdeveloped. Since this study concentrates on *multilateral* intervention, additional risks and challenges that accompany multilateral efforts will be analyzed.

There also appears to be a dearth of information regarding military intervention decision-making. As Vertzberger (1998) notes, "Only three studies — by Brands (1987-88), Little (1975), and Tillema (1973) — represent serious attempts to conceptualize a generalized decisionmaking process for foreign military intervention."[7] However, the security environment has changed significantly since these studies were conducted. A more recent study conducted by Vertzberger (1998) does provide a theoretical analysis of risk and intervention decision-making. Yet, of the five cases Vertzberger advances, only three include the U.S., and none occur in the post-Cold War era. More importantly, other components, besides risk, should be included in the intervention decision-making calculus. Risk emphasizes the consequences of involvement. Before analyzing the level of risk that is incurred when intervening, it is important to assess the value of U.S. involvement — whether the intervention is important to U.S. national security interests and whether U.S. intervention is expected to make a significant difference.

Other recent attempts to examine military intervention advocate a list of conditions that can serve as an aid in decision-making. While a list of prerequisites provides an excellent contribution to the examination of U.S. military intervention, missing is a theoretical basis for intervention decision-making. This study, once again, seeks to bridge the gap between theoretical development and practice in intervention decision-making.

Organization and Focus of Study

Certainly other types of intervention, such as political and economic, can be important components of the overall makeup of the current security environment. However, the use of force is the most critical form of intervention and potentially has the greatest impact on U.S. national interests. Therefore, this study concentrates solely on *military* intervention allowing for some attention to the implications of the diplomatic realm. For the purposes of this analysis, *multilateral intervention* can be defined as a security approach to further national interests in which the state does not act alone, but instead in concert with other countries, generally under the auspices of *international organizations* (an institution composed of states as members, such as the United Nations, European Community, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In addition, *military intervention* can be defined as "the introduction or deployment of new or additional combat forces to an area for specific purposes that go beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for national interests."[8]

It is also important to have an understanding of the term *engagement*. In the context of this paper, military engagement refers to the extent or level of *military* involvement. For example, the use of force applied in any one conflict can range from deterring aggression and coercion in crises, to small-scale contingency operations, to fighting major theater wars.[9] Once the type of intervention is determined, selection of the level of military engagement must be decided. Each of these levels of military engagement will be discussed at a later time.

This study is divided into five chapters. The introductory chapter is followed by a

background of the new security environment in the post-Cold War era and its challenges. Discussion centers around the definition of the U.S. national interest and the intervention debate. The concept of the *national interest* is important because how it is defined often affects the extent of U.S. intervention. Nevertheless, when examining the criteria for intervention advanced throughout the post-Cold War era, it appears that one recurring theme can always be identified within each prescription — a broad, *unclear* definition of what exactly constitutes national interest. Policy is modified with each administration; consequently, the U.S. national interest can be manipulated to define almost any intervention as *in* the national interest. In response, this study approaches the concept of national interest differently. The framework for military intervention analysis should not rely solely on perceived *national interests*. Instead, this analysis contends that the traditional core national interests have remained fairly constant. For example, during and after the Cold War the U.S. continues to want to protect its sovereignty, territory, and population; prevent the emergence of hostile regional coalitions; ensure access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources; and the like. What has changed significantly, however, are the *threats* to the U.S. national interest. For example, while old issues must continue to be addressed, a new set of issues add to the complexity and scope of national security problems. Therefore, this study attempts to provide a clear linkage between the two concepts (national interest and threat) in order to develop an effective intervention strategy. Moreover, as the Commission on America's National Interest notes "once interests are identified, choices about preferred policies require complex analyses of threats and opportunities, options for action, costs and benefits, and

capacities for implementation."[10]

Chapter 3 explores the components of the intervention decision-making calculus — threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis. Factors are identified that can enable decision-makers to assess whether the crisis is a high level, mid level, or low level threat. Similarly, factors are identified that can indicate different levels of risk. Finally, an opportunity analysis should assess the potential *effectiveness* of the intervention. In other words, will the intervention achieve its objectives and make a lasting difference? Moreover, the opportunity analysis will operationalize the impact of morality on intervention decision-making. While this analysis does not attempt to include the concept of morality as a factor itself in the intervention decision-making calculus (e.g., whether the intervention is moral or whether the U.S. is morally obligated to intervene), there is attention drawn to the impact of moral/humanitarian concerns on intervention decisions (e.g., domestic pressure to intervene).

Theory cannot be developed entirely without relying upon knowledge derived from past cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention. As Jackson (1995) points out, "from experience comes judgment, which involves knowing how to decide such things, knowing what is the right thing to do under the circumstances — undoubtedly the most important practical moral faculty of statecraft."[11] Therefore, Chapter 4 analyzes six representative case studies of multilateral military intervention during the post-Cold War era — Persian Gulf Conflict, Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Based upon the conclusions drawn from the case studies, a framework for multilateral intervention analysis will be presented in Chapter 5 (which will synthesize all

three components of the intervention decision-making calculus), and conclusions and implications for the future will be advanced.

Case Study Selection and Development

Case selection is based upon the following minimum requirements: (1) U.S. military intervention occurred; (2) multilateral actors were involved; and (3) the intervention occurred in the post-Cold War era. For the purposes of this study, the post-Cold War era is defined as the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989. The Persian Gulf Conflict (August 1990) is typically accepted as the first major international crisis of the post-Cold War era even though the collapse of the Soviet Union did not occur until 1 January, 1992. Therefore, the following six case studies are examined: Persian Gulf Conflict, Gulf Conflict Aftermath (N/S No Fly Zones), Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Each case study will include an analysis of the factors affecting threat and risk, an assessment of each, and an opportunity analysis which will conclude whether multilateral military intervention is warranted. As Haass (1999) notes, "the purpose is not to write the definitive history of any of these interventions but to provide sufficient information to facilitate comparison and permit the drawing of conclusions."[12] In addition, analysis of each case will demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral intervention. Most importantly, the above comparisons will indicate which factors contributed to success or failure of the intervention based upon an assessment of the extent to which the enunciated policy was realized.

When studying international relations, the most commonly used level of analysis

involves a three-dimensional approach: (1) the individual, (2) states and other actors, and (3) the international system itself. Thus, this paper advances a *tri-partite framework,* "a comprehensive analysis of international relations [which] requires that, at a minimum, investigation of factors in each of these three levels be included."[13] The *individual level of analysis* focuses on the role of decision-makers in global politics. Such analysis:

(1) examines the role of political leaders and government officials in defining and pursuing the foreign policy goals of states;
(2) includes an assessment of the role of citizens in domestic politics and in transnational activities that influence, directly or indirectly, the international behaviors of states and other actors;
(3) explores how different individual backgrounds, alternative historical experiences, and distinct leadership styles can influence foreign policy decisions;
(4) examines the impact of ideologies (belief systems) on individuals' perceptions and actions and assesses the role of different decision-making contexts (e.g., routine versus crises); and
(5) calls attention to the role of normative assumptions of human nature and political morality on the interpretation and analysis of IR.[14]

The *national level of analysis* focuses on the states as the principal actors in the international political system. This level of analysis concentrates on the nature, source, implementation procedures, and effects of foreign policy. For example, factors are derived from characteristics of the internal structure of states, such as the type of government, economic system, ethnic homogeneity, interest groups with the country, national interest, and the like.[15] Non-state actors, such as multinational groups and guerilla groups, are also important to consider in today's security environment. Finally,

the *global level of analysis* focuses on the structures of the international system. This systematic level of analysis examines three themes:

(1) the impact of international anarchy on the priorities and behavior of states;
(2) the nature and impact of different configurations of power (e.g., unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar distributions) on global order and assess the forces that contribute to transnational cooperation and international conflict; and
(3) the nature, role, and impact of international law and international organizations.[16]

This tri-partite framework is essential in the study of multilateral military intervention. As Amstutz (1999) notes, "most international issues and disputes are rooted in the ambitions and personalities of leaders, the character and political dynamics of states, and the formal and informal ties among actors in the international community."[17] This approach is particularly important in understanding military engagement in the post-Cold War in order to further understand the new security environment.

Certainly, there can never exist one formula for intervention or a guarantee for success. Moreover, it is impossible to predict every circumstance that the international security environment will face in this world of uncertainty. Yet, as Hastedt (1997) points out, "What is needed is the articulation of a strategic perspective in which goals, threats, opportunities, and tactics are linked together by an overall vision and sense of purpose."[18] It is the vision of this study that the framework for multilateral military intervention analysis will indicate the threats, risks, and opportunities that accompany multilateral military intervention and facilitate the intervention decision-making process.

CHAPTER 2

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSE TO NEW CHALLENGES: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

> *We have slain the bear, but there are still a lot of serpents around.*
>
> — James Woolsey

Depiction of the Post-Cold War Security Environment

During the Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy goals concentrated on containing Soviet expansion. After the Cold War ended, however, neither conflict nor threats to U.S. national security necessarily ended. In fact, in the post-Cold War era, the threats to U.S. national security have been more numerous and varied. Former U.S. Representative Dave McCurdy (R, OK) states that "new areas of dispute — religious, ethnic, and national rather than ideological — threaten to replace the U.S.-Soviet standoff as the engines of world instability."[19] Similarly, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali captures the image of this new dimension of insecurity in his *Agenda for Peace*:

> We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communication and global commerce, and by the decisions of states to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of states is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.[20]

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet contends that this changing threat

environment consists of three attributes: complexity, scope, and speed.[21] First, he argues that "the dangers facing the United States today – ranging from chemical warfare to terrorism, regional crises, and societal turmoil – are linked in unprecedented ways and frequently span multiple countries or continents."[22] Secondly, the scope of the dangers has increased. Tenet goes on to assert that not only must the U.S. concern itself with the issues focused on for years, but it must also address a new range of unforeseen security issues. He argues that "we live at a moment when the past and the future are colliding:"[23]

> In other words, today we must still deal with terrorists, insurgents, and others who have hundreds of years of history fueling their causes — but chances are they will be using laptop computers, sophisticated encryption, and weaponry their predecessors could not even have imagined.[24]

Finally, Tenet categorizes this era as one of speed – "incredibly rapid technological change."[25]

John Gannon, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, argues that these global trends will present the U.S. with new opportunities and risks: "In considering the world today, with its good news and bad, challenges and opportunities, and statesman and dictators....if we don't exercise vigilance, consider all options, and help our government to react quickly, the Saddams, Qadhafis, Milosevic's and Kim Chong-ils of the world are likely to surprise us."[26] Gannon highlights five main challenges to U.S. national security which have strained U.S. intelligence, diplomacy, and military capabilities:

> (1) there are the great powers in transition: Russia and China. Each unique, both nuclear armed, both undergoing major economic transformations, both of concern to their neighbors and to us;

(2) there are those non-democratic states whose hostile policies undermine regional stability and threaten, directly or indirectly, our interests abroad, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea;
(3) there are transnational issues that transcend country and region and could strike any of us at home or abroad with little notice: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime and drug trafficking, and threats to our information and computer systems;
(4) there are regional hotspots, where tensions between nations can erupt into conflict, cost lives, and take unpredictable turns: the Middle East, the South Asian subcontinent, Bosnia, and the Aegean;
(5) from Bosnia to Burundi, there are states and regions immersed in ethnic conflict, civil war, natural disaster, forced migration, refugees, disease, and starvation.[27]

In addition to the above challenges, outlined by Gannon, Tenet includes India and Pakistan as well as the Balkans as regional hotspots that could threaten U.S. national interests. Furthermore, he argues that Haiti and Africa continue to present security demands as a result of setbacks to the institutionalization of democratic rule in Haiti and weak political and economic institutions in Africa.[28]

Similarly, the Department of Defense contends that the U.S. now faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment. The Department asserts that the U.S. can anticipate important trends such as the following:

(1) regional or state-centered threats;
(2) transnational threats such as terrorism, illegal drug trade, and weapons trade;
(3) the spread of dangerous technologies;
(4) failed states which can create instability, internal conflict and humanitarian crisis;
(5) foreign intelligence collection which target American military, diplomatic, technological,

economic and commercial secrets; and
(6) environmental and health threats.[29]

The Commission on America's National Interests contends that the defining feature of American foreign policy since the Cold War has been confusion: "Absent a compelling cause and understandable coordinates, America remains a superpower adrift."[30] Thus, in retrospect, it appears that containment had its strengths. As Bowman and Dunn (1996) point out about containment:

> It gave an intellectual, political and security framework to American foreign policy enabling it to deal both coherently and purposefully with the international system following the collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance. Containment was a simple but an enormously powerful idea around which to organize American security policy. It gave legitimacy to the promotion of U.S. liberal democracy, international capitalism and to the stationing and employment of American armed forces around the world....As well as bringing international attention and resources to local political disputes bipolarity also kept the lid on other tensions which existed within and between states. By interlocking local and regional disputes into the bipolar framework with its ever present prospect of escalation to nuclear holocaust the Cold War prevented both major wars between the great powers and, as a byproduct, the disintegration of weak states.[31]

The collapse of this stable order has resulted in a need for an extensive reevaluation of American foreign policy.

When depicting this new era of uncertainty, it sometimes appears that the security environment is bleak and overwhelming. Nevertheless, the U.S. is also experiencing an era of opportunity. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen speaks to this potential opportunity in the 1998 *Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy*:

> The threat of global war has receded and the nation's core values of representative democracy and market economies are embraced in many parts of the world, creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations. The sustained dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture, and global interactions. The United States' alliances...are adapting successfully to meet today's challenges and provide a foundation for a more stable and prosperous world. Former adversaries like Russia and other former members of the Warsaw Pact now cooperate with the United States across a range of security issues. In fact, many in the world see the United States as the security partner of choice.[32]

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Patrick Hughes also argues that opportunity lies within this new security environment: "on the one hand, for at least the next decade, the threats facing the U.S. will be of a decreased order of magnitude and we will not likely see a global 'peer competitor' within 20 years."[33] Moreover, the U.S. is in a unique position to exercise leadership in coping with the insecurities that are brought about by this era of transition. Cohen notes "everywhere...they look to us as the country that provides for their security and their safety and their freedom."[34] However, resources are limited, and the U.S. *must* be selective in choosing which issues to address. Thus, it is extremely important to set a clear direction and an operational framework that will help determine the priority of threats facing the U.S.. As Blacker (1994) notes: "U.S. policy makers must navigate their way through this thicket of issues to determine *which* conflicts in *which* parts of the world constitute genuine threats to the national interest."[35]

Assessment of the U.S. National Interest

National interests are the fundamental building blocks in any discussion of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy *must* be grounded on the foundation of solid national interests. Since resources are limited, U.S. foreign policy decision-makers must be selective in choosing which issues to address. The proper basis for making such judgments is by developing a hierarchal conception of what U.S. national interests are. Certainly, among foreign policy decision-makers, widespread disagreement exists about exactly what constitutes U.S. national interests. As Schlesinger (1972) notes, "This is not to say that 'national interest' is a self-executing formula providing an automatic answer to every perplexity of foreign affairs. Men can argue endlessly about the content of national interest. One man's national interest may be another man's poison."[36] For example, some scholars take a narrow, military/security dominated view of national interest. Others take a wide view and discuss national security in terms of military, political, economic, and environmental issues. Nevertheless, Schlesinger (1972) points out that "the idea is not totally open-ended. Every nation, for example, has a set of fairly definite strategic interests."[37] The Clinton administration developed "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" to define and rank U.S. national interests into categories of vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian and other interests.[38] When the interests at stake are vital — that is, they are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of the country — the U.S. will do whatever is necessary to protect them. According to the *Annual Report to the President and Congress* (from the Secretary of Defense), U.S. *vital national interests* include:

(1) protecting the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States;
(2) preventing the emergence of hostile regional coalitions or hegemons;
(3) ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources;
(4) deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression against U.S. allies and friends; and
(5) ensuring freedom of the seas, airways, and space, and the security of vital lines of communication.[39]

In contrast, *important interests* are those that do not affect the nation's survival, but do affect the national well-being: "regions in which we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm, and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows."[40] In these cases, military forces should only be used if other means are not available to meet these objectives. The interests that are *humanitarian and other interests* are usually best met without assistance of the military, and actions are taken based on moral duty:

> Examples include responding to natural and manmade disasters; promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection.[41]

While it is too early to identify the current administration's national interest priorities, President George W. Bush has ordered a review of the National Security Strategy to try to better determine national interests.

Similarly, the 2000 Commission on America's National Interests contends that there exist a hierarchy of U.S. national interests: *vital interests*; (conditions necessary to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation);

extremely important interests (conditions that, if compromised, would severely harm the ability of the U.S. government to carry out the vital interests); *just important interests* (conditions that would have major negative consequences); and *less important or secondary interests* (conditions that are desirable, but have no major effect on U.S. national security).[42] The Commission identifies five *vital* interests today and maintains that the U.S. should be prepared to protect these interests with or without the assistance of allies:

> (1) to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the U.S. or its military forces abroad;
> (2) to ensure U.S. allies' survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
> (3) to prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders;
> (4) to ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and
> (5) to establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.[43]

Moreover, they believe that in order to protect U.S. vital interests, the U.S. must promote "singular U.S. leadership, military, and intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and even-handedness in dealing with other states), and strengthening critical international institutions — particularly the U.S. alliance system around the world."[44] For *extremely important* interests, the Commission contends that "the United States should be prepared to commit forces to meet threats and to lead a coalition of forces, but only in conjunction with a coalition or allies whose vital

interests are threatened."[45] These interests include the following:

(1) to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere;
(2) to prevent the regional proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and delivery systems;
(3) to promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes peacefully;
(4) to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, especially the Persian Gulf;
(5) to promote the well-being of U.S. allies and friends and protect them from external aggression;
(6) to promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere;
(7) to prevent, manage, and, if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographic regions;
(8) to maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems;
(9) to prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders;
(10) to suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking;
(11) to prevent genocide.[46]

The *important* U.S. national interests call for the U.S. to sustain the UN and other regional and functional cooperative mechanisms. Intervention decisions should be made on a case by case basis, and the U.S. should participate militarily only when the costs are low. These include:

(1) to discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries;
(2) to promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization;
(3) to prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions;

(4) to protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations;
(5) to reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations;
(6) to prevent the nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad;
(7) to boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors;
(8) to maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations;
(9) to promote international environmental policies consistent with long-term ecological requirements;
(10) to maximize U.S. GNP growth from international trade and investment.[47]

Finally, *less important or secondary* national interests should be pursued without military intervention. These include:

(1) balancing bilateral trade deficits;
(2) enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake;
(3) preserving the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states everywhere; and
(4) enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.[48]

For the purposes of this analysis, interests will be conceptualized at three levels: vital (high level interests), important (mid level interests), and secondary interests (low level interests). Similar to the "National Security Strategy," *vital* interests are important to the survival, security, and vitality of the United States. *Important* interests are those that affect the national well-being, but not its survival. *Secondary* interests are those that are important to the international community, but do not have major consequences to U.S. national security. The hierarchical concept of national interests can provide a useful guide to decision-makers when prioritizing threats and opportunities to the United States.

However, while examples can be given for each level of interest, it is important to recognize that some issues can span all three levels depending on the context of the crisis. For example, the issue of terrorism can be identified as a secondary interest, important interest, or even a vital interest depending on who the attacks are against and the weapons used by the terrorist groups. Terrorist attacks against the U.S. using weapons of mass destruction would constitute a vital interest. Terrorist attacks against U.S. cities or embassies would generally be considered an important interest. Finally, terrorist attacks against individuals would normally be considered a secondary interest. Thus, this analysis identifies specific issues that would normally be considered vital, important, or secondary, with the caveat that issues are not always fixed in any one interest level (see Table 2.1). Certainly, judgments about which specific issues are vital, important or secondary can be disputed. For example, the Commission on America's National Interests placed some issues (e.g., maintaining the lead in technology, promoting the acceptance of international law, and the promotion of democracy) that are considered secondary interests in this analysis as more important to national security.

TABLE 2.1 — HIERARCHY OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

VITAL INTERESTS (high level)
1. Protect the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States; 2. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the U.S. or its military forces abroad; 3. Prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; 4. Ensure uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources; 5. Ensure freedom of the seas, airways, and space, and the security of vital lines of communication; 6. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or regional coalitions or hegemons in regions with high geostrategic salience; 7. Deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. allies and friends; 8. Maintain diplomatic relations with countries that could become strategic adversaries, such as China and Russia.

IMPORTANT INTERESTS (mid level)
1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks anywhere; 2. Prevent regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; 3. Respond to crises with the potential to generate substantial and *highly* destabilizing refugee flows; 4. Protect the environment from *severe* harm; 5. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders; 6. Suppress terrorism (specifically attacks against U.S. cities and embassies and state sponsored terrorism) and transnational crime 7. Prevent, manage, and if possible at a reasonable cost, end major conflicts in geographic regions with sizable economic stakes; 8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems.

SECONDARY INTERESTS (low level)
1. Maintain minor economic markets; 2. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions; 3. Respond to natural and manmade disasters; 4. Promote human rights; 5. Support democracy, rule of law, and civilian control of the military; 6. Promote sustainable development and environmental protection; 7. Preserve the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states; 8. Respond to terrorist attacks against individuals.

Not only do debates about U.S. national interests occur between U.S. foreign policy makers, but also among scholars in general. There has been considerable debate over how to define *national interest*. Clinton (1994) presents a clarification of the different senses in which the term national interest is used by analysts and officials, and he develops and justifies his own definition. Clinton argues that the term *national interest* has contributed to the confusion among international relations scholars when defining U.S. national interests. First, the term *interest* itself is used in many different ways. Clinton maintains that five different meanings exist:

(1) a group with a common goal;
(2) the pattern of conduct members of the group display in attempting to reach that goal;
(3) something that is sought after or desired;
(4) the object of a reasoned claim; and
(5) that which is good or beneficial for one, regardless of whether it is what one wishes.[49]

Second, Clinton contends that there exist several meanings of the national interest. One is that the national interest is nothing more than the sum of all the particular sub-national interests found within the society in question.[50] The second meaning is that it consists solely in the public's maintenance of an arena open to the free and fair competition of all interest groups.[51] The third usage has been advanced by Krasner (1978) who contends that U.S. interests are defined by "the preferences of central decision-makers."[52] The fourth definition is looked upon not as constant and instead defined by the type of regime in place. Different policies are necessary for different regimes.[53] Finally, a fifth definition (advanced by Morgenthau and others) of national interest contends that the key concept of interest defined as power and is common to all states, regardless of their

philosophy.[54]

Clinton further contends that additional confusion has occurred because in reality two types of national interest exist: (1) the common good of a society, which looks inward to the basic principles of the domestic regime; and (2) a specific claim made by the state on other states or the society of states. In other words, the two usages of national interest are internal/domestic and external/international.[55] Once again, the common good or interest, according to Clinton, "is an end that is defined by rational consideration of what leads to the benefit of the society, and by a normative choice of where the good of the whole lies."[56] In the international realm, "safeguarding the good of society includes the ability to protect the society from outside threats."[57] Both, however, can influence each other.

The concept of the national interest is important because how it is defined often dictates the degree of U.S. intervention. Snow (1998) contends that "how interests are defined will have a visible effect on the extent of American military activism in the new order, as well as framing the size, extent, purposes, and content of military and nonmilitary actions."[58] A question that must be considered, however, is whether or not the concept of the national interest has changed since the Cold War. It appears that the while the world has changed dramatically, American interests have remained somewhat constant. According to Snow:

> One normally thinks of interests in enduring terms: secure national boundaries, access to important markets and sources of natural resources, and freedom to pursue economic well-being do not change over time. What *do* change are the circumstances that facilitate or impede the

> pursuit of those interests — that is to say, the structure of threats to interests and the consequent risks one entails in realizing one's interests.[59]

Thus, the structure of threats have changed. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies posed the major threats to U.S. national security. Other areas of concern such as a regional aggressors were secondary in importance. Accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, was the collapse of the central threat structure that guided foreign policy decision-makers. Thus, we face what Snow calls an interest-threat mismatch: "where America's most vital interests exist, there are essentially no threats (with the possible exception to Persian Gulf petroleum). Conversely, where there are threats, hardly any important interests are at stake."[60] As a result, Snow (1998) argues that "the American response to this changed circumstance to date has been ambivalent, revealing a lack of consensually agreed-upon principles about what will and will not activate the United States into various forms of action."[61] The Commission on America's National Interest also notes that a distinction should be made between interests and threats and that "interests exist independently of specific opportunities and threats."[62] Moreover, the Commission argues that interests remain distinct from policy prescriptions: "The first questions are: why should we care, and how much? But once interests are identified, choices about preferred policies require complex analyses of threats and opportunities, options for action, costs and benefits, and capacities for implementation."[63] In response, this study approaches the concept of *national interest* differently. Because the U.S. national interest is modified with each administration, it can be manipulated to define almost any intervention as *in* the national interest. Thus, the

concept itself does not always provide a clear intervention decision-making tool. By concentrating on the *threats* to the U.S. national interests and the *risks* that accompany military intervention, however, decision-making can more effectively determine whether the U.S. should intervene militarily.

Criteria for Intervention — The Debate

Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and then Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark contend that the defining characteristic of the post-Cold War era is that conflicts in this era take place more within countries rather than among them. Consequently, it is difficult for the international community to decide when, how, and where force should be used to further security goals.[64] In addition, intervention may be more attractive to the United States in the post-Cold War world. Kanter and Brooks (1994) note four reasons why this may be the case. First, the removal of Cold War constraints lessens the perceived risks of intervening. Second, intervention can be viewed as a means of promoting economic prosperity, such as in the Persian Gulf Conflict. Third, America's emphasis on democracy and human rights may require U.S. intervention. Finally, the post-Cold War security environment is characterized by uncertainty and new threats to U.S. national security.[65] Nevertheless, while there may exist more opportunities for the United States to intervene, this does not mean that intervention in the post-Cold War era is necessarily more effective or warranted.

The debate over military intervention has been predominantly influenced by senior members within the executive branch. For example, Former Secretary of Defense

Caspar Weinberger articulated six conditions which must be met before the United States commits U.S. military forces abroad:

(1) interests vital to the national interest of the United States or an ally must be at stake;
(2) there must be some reasonable assurance of congressional and popular support for the intervention;
(3) the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should come only as a last resort;
(4) the United States should commit to force only if it is prepared to do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning;
(5) force should only be deployed on behalf of clearly defined objectives; and
(6) the size, composition, and disposition of the forces should be continually reassessed and where necessary adjusted as conditions change.[66]

These conditions, today known as the *Weinberger Doctrine*, continue to serve as an aid in intervention decision-making. Others also have advanced various conditions that should be met before the U.S. commits military forces abroad in hostile environments. For example, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell believed that political objectives should direct the nature of intervention, and he advanced six principles to guide military intervention decision-making:

(1) is the political objective important, clearly defined, and understood;
(2) have all other non-violent policy means failed;
(3) will military force achieve the objective;
(4) what will the cost be;
(5) have the gains and risks been analyzed; and
(6) once the situation is altered by force, how will it develop further and what will the consequences be?[67]

Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued that prerequisites for U.S. military

intervention include, clearly articulated objectives, probable success, likelihood of popular and congressional support, and a clear exist strategy.[68] More recently, Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake articulated four "rules" of engagement for situations in which the United States would deploy military forces. First, is using force in the national interest? Second, can force actually do any good? Third, is the cost acceptable? Finally, is there a way out after forces are deployed?[69] In response, then President Clinton identified four questions that should be asked before allowing U.S. forces to participate in UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions:

(1) is there a real threat to international peace and security (interests);
(2) does the proposed mission have a clear objective (any good to be done);
(3) can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate (a way out);
(4) are the forces, financing, and mandate that will be needed to accomplish the mission available (acceptable cost).[70]

Clinton further set forth a list of seven questions about U.S. participation in UN-sponsored missions (six of them are similar to the criteria of the Weinberger Doctrine — reiterated in parentheses):

(1) is the use of force necessary at this point and have other means, including diplomacy, been fully considered (force as a last resort);
(2) is the commitment of U.S. force necessary for the success of the proposed peace operation or to persuade others to participate (the intention to win);
(3) are the stakes or interests involved worth the risks to American military personnel (vital interests);
(4) will there be domestic, political, and congressional support for U.S. participation (public and congressional support);

(5) has an end point for U.S. participation been identified (clear political and military objectives);
(6) are the command and control arrangements for American forces acceptable; and
(7) in instances involving the significant use of American forces, is the United States committing sufficient forces to achieve decisively its political and military objectives (clear intention of winning).[71]

Others have also contributed to the list of principles that guide foreign policy decision-makers. For example, in 1994, the conference on "The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era," was held under the auspices of the Aspen Strategy Group, a program of the Aspen Institute. At the conference, a number of prominent scholars met to discuss pressing national security issues, specifically the use of military force. The purposes of the conference were to "identify and analyze the situations in the post-Cold War era in which U.S. military force may be required to protect U.S. interests; to develop guidelines, objectives, and limits for the use of military force by the United States; and to discuss the process through which the decision to use force is to be made."[72] The Aspen Institute hosted a second conference in 1995 on Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention. The recommendations for effective interventions that emerged from that conference are summarized in the form of a checklist of key questions and considerations for decision-makers:

(1) what is the political objective;
(2) what are the risks and costs of acting; how do they compare with the risks and costs of *in*action;
(3) what constitutes "success"; what are the conditions necessary for success; what is the likelihood for

success; is assurance of success a precondition for deciding to intervene; what are the consequences, including to credibility, if after intervening we stop short of success; if we persist until successful, what are the risks of unintended escalation that radically changes the cost/benefit calculation or of getting bogged down in a commitment of indefinite duration;

(4) what other parties need to be involved to achieve the objective or avoid threats to achieving it;

(5) who is supposed to do what; how important is a UN or other multilateral imprimatur; is there a particular role for regional organizations or coalitions; do political realities necessitate unilateral or coalition action; with what implications for effectiveness;

(6) are we willing to use force; if so, what is the military objective; how is the military objective linked to the political objective; should there be limits on the use of force;

(7) are there steps that should be taken now to prevent or prepare for a future action;

(8) what public support exists or can be mobilized; and how important is the support to the success of the mission.[73]

Similarly, the Eighty-Fifth American Assembly on "U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses" was held in April 1994 to make recommendations to U.S. policymakers and was attended by distinguished representatives of the government, academia, business, industry, nonprofit organizations, military, the law, science, technology and the media. The following guidelines were proposed for policymakers to consider when making intervention decisions:

(1) any decision about a prospective intervention should start from the presumption of nonintervention;

(2) the magnitude of the burden that must be borne depends upon the interests at stake;

(3) a decision to intervene must satisfy the following

practical considerations: have a clearly understood objective with yardsticks for measuring success, and a strategy for termination; build and sustain domestic support for the duration of the intervention; preserve the capability to intervene in higher priority contingencies; regularly reassess the ongoing intervention in light of changing circumstances; seek multilateral consensus and participation; and have a high probability of success;

(4) finally, the decision to intervene must satisfy the following ethical considerations: the means of intervention must be proportional to the objectives sought; and collateral damage and innocent casualties should be minimized.[74]

Finally, Haass (1999) examined twelve case studies of U.S. military intervention in order to draw lessons concerning when and how military force should be used. He developed the following guidelines to assist in intervention decision-making:

(1) interests are only a guide;
(2) tolerance for costs reflects the interests at stake;
(3) the purpose of the intervention must be clear;
(4) the adversary's response must be anticipated;
(5) neither victory nor an exit date should be prerequisites;
(6) popular and congressional support are desirable but not necessary;
(7) deterrence is not cost free and not always an option;
(8) the adversary is not the only audience;
(9) affecting internal politics through force is difficult; and
(10) media should not determine policy.[75]

When comparing the different conditions that are proposed as prerequisites for U.S. military intervention, there are a number of similarities. For example, most guidelines include using force as a last resort when U.S. interests are at stake, having clear objectives and an exit strategy, and ensuring that the resources and capabilities

necessary to achieve success are available. Disagreements, however, have been raised regarding the importance of popular and congressional support, whether an exit date should be set, and whether the intervention strategy should be modified in light of changing circumstances. While the recommendations discussed above are certainly important for decision-makers to consider, they generally are broad statements with little concentration on how to distinguish the magnitude of consequences to U.S. interests. The purpose of this analysis, then, is to incorporate these guidelines into the three main components of the intervention decision-making calculus (threat, risk, and opportunity) that will be developed in Chapter 3.

Types of Military Intervention

If the United States chooses to intervene, however, action can be undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally. Finkelstein (1969) contends that the "proponents of each course cite the conspicuous failures of the other and submit wishful designs varying from triumphant world government to uninhibited national sovereignty."[76] In effect, the real divide between the two schools is "the chasm between anticipated crises and U.S. capabilities and national willingness to assume fresh burdens as crises evolve."[77] Unilateralists propose "selective disengagement from cold war security commitments and concentration of existing resources on amelioration of domestic problems."[78] Proponents of this school are critical of policies that would require an increase in U.S. intervention internationally, such as Clinton's strategy of "democratic enlargement," which seeks to enlarge democratization efforts world-wide. Furthermore, Lewis (1994) contends that

"the consensus emerging within this school is that the unraveling and resulting turmoil in some areas do not threaten U.S. interests, and their irrelevance is a clear indication that the international community has become less than the sum of its parts."[79] In contrast, internationalists adopt a multilateral perspective by encouraging "continued American leadership in the post-cold war world, utilizing a combination of regional coalitions, together with a concert of like-minded states sharing a common global agenda when required."[80]

Traditionally, the U.S. has carried out foreign policy in a unilateral fashion even when acting in a multilateral context. Nevertheless, the perceived limits of U.S. economic, political, and military resources in the post-Cold War environment has "led many observers to conclude that in the future American military power will have to be exercised in truly multilateral frameworks."[81] Hastedt (1997) contends that two different versions of multilateral military interventions exist: alliances and coalitions. The Department of Defense defines coalitions as "informal agreements for common action between two or more nations" and alliances as a"more formal arrangement for broad, long-term objectives."[82] Hastedt further argues that "controversy surrounds both of these options due to a constant tension between the demands of coalition or alliance politics and the promises and lengthy consultations and the latter place a premium on speed, expediency, and unity of command."[83] A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral intervention will be advanced further, following the examination of the case studies.

Levels of Military Engagement

Following decisions to intervene, however, require an assessment of the level of military engagement necessary to advance security goals. The *National Military Strategy* of 1997 articulates three basic elements of strategy for U.S. military engagement:

> (1) shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security;
> (2) respond to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interests (e.g., Small-Scale Contingencies and Major Theater Wars; and
> (3) prepare our forces now for an uncertain future.[84]

The first category on shaping the international environment involves deterring aggression and coercion in crises. In general, the first response to conflict consists of efforts to deter an adversary to prevent the further need for military forces. As explained by the Defense Department, "deterrence in a crisis generally involves signaling the United States' commitment to a particular country or expressing its national interest by enhancing U.S. warfighting capability in the theater."[85] In this level of engagement, military forces are used for peaceful, essentially political, purposes; it does not constitute the direct use of force. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry further articulates the use of military assets to "shape" the international security environment:

> The purposes are to promote awareness of and positive attitudes toward U.S. values such as democracy and human rights; enhance commonality of doctrine, technology, procedures, and attitudes to promote military cooperation with the United States; and prepare the way for actual coalition operations.[86]

In contrast, conducting small-scale contingency operations raises the level of U.S.

commitment to the use of military force. If acts of deterrence are unsuccessful, "swift intervention by military forces may be the best way to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly."[87] Small-scale contingency operations consist of full range joint military operations that include show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, and military support to civilian authorities.[88] As Ambassador Robert Oakley (Ret.) points out, the primary rationale of small-scale contingency operations is "to protect United States citizens and interest, support political initiatives, facilitate democracy, and promote other fundamental ideals (e.g., human rights, rule of law), or to disrupt specified illegal activities [that could constitute a threat to U.S. national security]."[89]

Consequently, in the post-Cold War era, demand of small-scale contingency operations are high, and the challenges posed by small-scale contingencies often require *multilateral intervention*:

> The number and types of forces required, and the relevant foreign-policy considerations often result in the involvement of combined (or coalition) military forces and of civilian personnel from governments as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and regional and international organizations (IOs).[90]

On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed PDD-25 establishing U.S. policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. While no one factor constitutes the absolute determinant of U.S. participation in multilateral intervention, the following serve as conditions for the

use of military force:

(1) participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable;
(2) personnel, funds and other resources are available;
(3) U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
(4) the role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
(5) domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
(6) command and control arrangements are acceptable;
(7) there exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
(8) there exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; and
(9) there exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.[91]

Finally, as the Department of Defense points out, "the high end of the possible crisis continuum is fighting and winning major theater wars....To protect American interests around the globe, U.S. forces must continue to be able to overmatch the military power of regional states with interests hostile to the United States."[92] Oakley argues that the list of criteria in deciding whether to use force in a crisis situation that has the potential of becoming a major theater war is similar to that of those with limited force. Four questions or criteria, however, are advanced to serve as a decision-making tool:

(1) does the administration consider the situation of sufficient importance to U.S. interests to warrant expending hundreds of millions of dollars and risking scores or even hundreds of U.S. lives, and can Congress be convinced at least to acquiesce;
(2) is there a clear, achievable objective, satisfactory for U.S. interests, with an approximately perceivable end date and end state, which will not leave the U.S.

military engaged in large numbers in a risky situation for an indefinite period;

(3) there needs to be a reasonably accurate idea of the amount of U.S. military and financial resources required, both at the outset and over time; what resources will be available from others; and that these resources will be adequate for success; and

(4) what will be the political, military, and financial support of other countries, starting with NATO nations and Japan, but including China and Russia and states in the region of the prospective operation.[93]

Nevertheless, as Oakley points out, "in the post-cold war world of today and tomorrow, the clear-cut, emotionally and politically satisfying fight-and-win war has, for all intents and purposes, disappeared."[94]

Levels of military engagement have also been distinguished as constituting a spectrum of activities from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. In 1992, Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* discussed four areas of action that contribute to maintaining international security:

(1) *preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur;

(2) *peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations;

(3) *peace-keeping* is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well;

(4) *peace-building* is action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.[95]

These four areas for action, taken together, offer a contribution towards maintaining international security. Preventative diplomacy requires confidence-building measures, an analysis of early warning systems concerning threats to peace, and may involve preventive deployment.[96] Between the tasks of trying to prevent conflict and maintaining peace lies peacemaking. Peacemaking attempts to bring hostile parties to agreement through mediation and negotiations, however, it also may require the imposition of sanctions or the use of military force. Moreover, peacemaking is often a prelude to peacekeeping, which further expands the possibilities for the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.[97]

In recent years, the Security Council has expanded the definitional parameters of peacekeeping: "while in the past peacekeeping operations monitored, observed, verified cease-fire agreements or truces in inter-state situations, more recent peacekeeping operations have dealt with intra-state or internal conflict situations."[98] In addition, the mandates of peacekeeping have been expanded to include "non-traditional" tasks. For example, peacekeeping operations now include humanitarian mandates (ensuring a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid) and enforcement mandates (the ability to take action to enforce sanctions or other missions).[99] Boutros-Ghali (1992) contends that for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations to be successful, they must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace:

> Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts

> to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.[100]

Thus, in order to prevent the recurrence of violence, post-conflict peacebuilding seeks to contribute to economic and social development and achieve a sense of confidence and well-being.

Scholars have also contributed to the discussion of which mechanisms are available to maintain international peace and security. For example, similar to *An Agenda for Peace*, Doyle (1995) divides multilateral peace operations into three categories: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peaceenforcement. In peacekeeping operations, unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties in order to monitor a truce or demobilization of military forces while political negotiations are undertaken by both sides.[101] Peacebuilding, in contrast, involves the implementation of peace agreements. Responsibilities may include monitoring human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation.[102] Finally, peaceenforcement (also called peacemaking) involves "implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build a long-term foundation for stable, legitimate government."[103]

Similarly, Lepgold and Weiss (1998) present a typology of multilateral security operations which divides the spectrum of activities into four categories: preventive deployment, peacekeeping, selective enforcement, and enforcement. Each type of operation is distinguished based on degree of consent from parties to the dispute and the degree of force required:

> As in virtually any foreign policy decision related to

> international peace and security, the international stakes and the domestic costs of peace operations are inversely related. Operations on the left end of the continuum are the easiest to justify domestically, since their costs and risks are low, but they are often unimportant in narrow strategic terms to the states that carry them out. Conversely, those toward the right end are harder to justify internally, but if successful carry higher strategic rewards to those that carry them out.[104]

Lepgold and Weiss (1998) define preventive diplomacy similar to Boutros-Ghali. They contend that it involves stationing observers or troops in an area of conflict to discourage an increase in the conflict as opposed to trying to stop it afterward. While the degree of force required is low, preventive measures have the ability to escalate into more costly peace operations.[105] The concept of peacekeeping, in contrast, they note is often misused in contemporary discussions about multilateral security by including almost any type of operation under the "peacekeeping umbrella." Thus, they define the term narrowly as taking on two forms: (1) observation missions consisting of unarmed observers which monitor a cease-fire; and (2) interpositional forces which consist of larger and lightly armed military contingents that provide a kind of buffer. In other words, peacekeeping forces monitor a pause.[106] In contrast, selective enforcement imposes a pause in the violence. Depending on the circumstances, such operations can be more like consensual peacekeeping or more like nonconsensual enforcement. Lepgold and Weiss (1998) argue that these operations appear beneficial when states are authorized to carry out limited objectives, such as humanitarian efforts, maintenance of safe havens, and selective enforcement of human rights and democracy.[107] Finally, enforcement imposes a collective solution and requires more coercion than the other types of operations. Each

type of operation is illustrated in Figure 2.1.[108]

FIGURE 2.1 — The Spectrum of Collective Conflict Management Operations



Finally, RAND's National Defense Research Institute conducted a research project to "help decision-makers to understand the limitations of peace operations, to select the optimal type of operation for a given situation, and to evaluate the success of an operation."[109] The report presents a spectrum of activities ranging from diplomacy to peace operations to enforcement. Diplomacy involves negotiations to resolve conflict and promote settlement. Peace operations are divided into five types of activities:

(1) observation: observe, report and mediate violations;
(2) interposition: control a buffer zone;
(3) transition: help parties to change the status and condition of a country;
(4) security for humanitarian aid: secure delivery, storage, and distribution of aid; and
(5) peace enforcement: compel recalcitrant parties to comply with their agreements or Security Council resolutions through combat operations.[110]

Finally, enforcement involves maintaining peace and security through combat operations against an identified aggressor. The RAND report also summarizes each of these

activities characterized by the section in the UN Charter that supports the action, the consent required from the parties, and the defined mandate.[111] See Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.2 — Diplomacy-Peace Operations-Enforcement

	Diplomacy	Peace Operations: Security Council does not take sides					Enforcement: Security Council sides with the victim against the aggressor
		Peace-Keeping		More-Ambitious Operations			
		Observation	Interposition	Transition	Security for Humanitarian Aid	Peace Enforcement	
Chapter of the U.N. Charter	Chapter VI			Chapter VI or Chapter VII	Chapter VII		
Consent Required from the Parties	Accept a peace operation	Allow access to observers	Acquiesce in impartial control of a buffer zone	Cooperate in achieving new condition and status	Allow provision of aid	None: occurs when party *withdraws* consent	Not required
Typical Mandate	Negotiate mandate for a peace operation	Observe compliance with agreements; report violations; mediate among parties	Create buffer zones; control entry into buffer zones; monitor arms limitations	Provide secure conditions; oversee demobilization; secure electoral activities; facilitate reconstruction	Provide security for humanitarian aid	Coerce recalcitrant parties into complying with UNSC resolutions of their agreements	Enforce sanctions; conduct other military operations to maintain or to restore peace and security

Clearly, there are many similarities between the RAND report and previous studies. Differentiating between these levels of engagement will be an important factor contributing to different levels of risk. The assumption is that operations on the left of the spectrum would constitute lower levels of risk. Nevertheless, based upon an assessment of the level of military engagement used in the case studies in this study and the costs that accompanied such operations, a spectrum of military activities will be applied to high, mid, and low levels of risk.

CHAPTER 3

COMPONENTS OF A U.S. MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISION-MAKING CALCULUS

> *The calculus of intervention...is risk-rich, highly complex, and multivariate. To make an optimal decision, decisionmakers contemplating intervention must take into account...a broad range of both external and internal variables.*
>
> — Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger

When international organizations such as the UN or NATO decide to pursue multilateral military intervention and U.S. participation is requested, U.S. decision-makers are tasked with assessing the threat of the crisis to national interests in order to determine the proper level of American involvement. While international relations scholars have advanced a number of variables as important in intervention decision-making, simply listing variables does not provide much direction for the decision-maker. To be more useful, the variables must be given value in accordance with the main components that accompany the intervention decision-making calculus. This analysis contends that there are three main components of U.S. multilateral military intervention that must be considered: threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis. Variables relevant to threat and risk are then given value by linking them to three levels: high, mid, and low. Different than the components of threat and risk, an opportunity analysis will be conceptualized as either an opportunity (the potential long-term effectiveness of the intervention) exists, or it doesn't. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to further define and examine which variables are central to each component. In other words, factors are identified that can enable decision-makers to assess whether the crisis

is a high level, mid level, or low level threat. Similarly, factors are identified that can indicate different levels of risk. Identifying both the level of threat and risk posed by the crisis can aid intervention decision-making. Again, if the *risk level* outweighs the *threat level*, U.S. multilateral military intervention should be avoided. If the *threat level* outweighs the *risk level*, U.S. multilateral military intervention would be warranted. In situations where the *threat level* and *risk level* are equivalent, an opportunity analysis — the assessment of the potential long-term effectiveness of the intervention — should be conducted.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

The concept of threat is central to multilateral military intervention decision-making. The *perceived* threat to national interests by decision-makers largely dictates the extent of U.S. intervention. Threat is usually defined in two ways. The first view fits the traditional definition of threat: "a declaration of or an intention to inflict punishment, injury, death, or loss in retaliation for, or conditionally upon, some action or course."[112] The second defines threat as a perception of danger: "an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm — usually of a military, strategic or economic kind — to the state."[113] For the purposes of this analysis, threat constitutes an actor anticipating with some degree of probability the loss of something of value, such as territory, population, economic assets, and restriction or loss of sovereignty.[114]

Early studies on threat perception continue to be cited as important contributions to the study of intervention decision-making. Singer (1958) maintained that threat

perception was a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. Central to his argument was the belief that "a powerful predisposition to suspect and distrust the people and government of all other nation-states underlies the perceptions of decision-makers."[115] Pruitt (1965) expanded Singer's theoretical formulation by including four factors that influence the perception of decision-makers about what constitutes evidence of intent:

> (1) *capability*: armament may in itself give rise to suspicion;
> (2) *actions*: when intentions are inferred from actions, the actions are being used as *signs*, such as stepping over a "boundary" on a conceptual dimension;
> (3) *statements*: when predispositions are strong, even minor statements may look like evidence of threat;
> (4) *conditions faced by the other nation*: the more benefit a nation can derive from harming our interests, the more threatened we are likely to feel.[116]

Similarly, Knorr (1976) maintained that perceived threats could be either "actual" (inferred from signals of intent) or "potential" (inferred from the state of the environment of capability of an opponent).[117] Thus, the perception of actual or potential threats involves the estimation of the likelihood that the anticipated loss will materialize.

In short, when international relations theorists discuss the concept of threat, they often concentrate on the constraints that affect how threat is perceived by decision-makers. In fact, according to Myers (1991), theory identifies two kinds of factors as influencing the perception of threat. First are intervening predispositions which cause decision-makers to be more or less sensitive to information about threats. These include: the predetermined expectations and mind set of national security decision-makers;

lessons learned from past experiences; perceptions of the capabilities and inclination of forces in the larger international arena to intervene; perceptions of elites and masses concerning the present state of affairs in the region; and the structures, standard operating procedures, and purposes of the foreign and national security policymaking bureaucracies. Second, Myers argues that threat perception is influenced when decision-makers receive information that threatening situations are continuing, dissipating, or crystallizing.[118] Moreover, as Roberts (1988) points out, public opinion can also influence threat perception depending upon the extent to which the decision-maker adjusts perception of the situation in response to public pressure.[119]

While it is important to recognize these biases and limitations that intervention decision-makers are faced with, this analysis moves beyond the decision-makers' "perception" of threat to concentrate on the actual factors that contribute to different levels of threat. A basic premise of this study is that factors can be identified to indicate whether actual threats to U.S. interests exist in response to a crisis situation. Guidelines can be summarized in the form of a checklist of key questions and considerations that decision-makers can use when deciding whether and how to intervene.

Explanation of Factors

Certainly, a number of factors are important to determine the magnitude of threat to U.S. interests. Yet, instead of simply asking whether the threat constitutes a vital interest, important interest, or secondary interest, this study attempts to provide a type of road map that categorizes a crisis as a high, mid, or low level threat based on the factors

that affect national interests. Similar to ranking intensities of conflict (high intensity, middle intensity, and low intensity conflict), the three purposes of ranking the changing threat environment are the following: (1) to identify potential conflicts in terms of importance and consequences; (2) to show the inverse relationship between likelihood and importance (i.e., high level threats which are most important to U.S. interests are less likely to occur; low level threats which are more likely to occur are less important); and (3) to define the mission and requirements. Ultimately, decision-makers should assess the *level of threat* to U.S. national interests to guide intervention decisions.

A set of questions can be provided to guide decision-makers in placing the crisis upon the threat-level intensity continuum, and the position on the continuum should determine the appropriate type of intervention and level of U.S. military engagement. The following eight questions can serve as a guide to correctly place the threat upon the continuum. First, what contentious issues are at stake? And are they military-security, economic-development, political, cultural, technological, or a combination of different issue areas? Second, who are the major actors involved in the crisis? And what is the extent of involvement by major powers? Third, where is the crisis located in terms of natural resources and its distance from major power centers? Fourth, which countries does the threat appear to endanger? Fifth, is military intervention necessary to accomplish security goals? If so, what level of military intervention is expected to be required to accomplish the mission? Sixth, what differences in terms of military capability, political regime, economic development, and culture are evident among crisis adversaries? Seventh, could the crisis result in changes to the international system, such

as shifts in the distribution of power? Finally, what are the consequences of inaction to U.S. interests?

These questions can be characterized as eight key factors that relate to different levels of threat:

(1) contentious issues;
(2) crisis actors;
(3) geostrategic salience;
(4) actors endangered (United States, U.S. forces, key allies, actors peripheral to U.S. interests);
(5) potential level of military force;
(6) extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries;
(7) systemic changes (actor, power, alliance, or rule change);
(8) consequences without U.S. intervention (inaction).

The following section will define each variable and discuss how each will be related to the different levels of threat.

Contentious Issues

A crisis may include one or more contentious issues that are within one or more issue areas (e.g., military-security, economic-development, political, cultural, status and technological). Generally, as the number of contentious issues increases so will the probability of the number of actors drawn into a crisis, because the state's interests will more likely be threatened.[120] Brecher and James (1986) have identified four issue-areas:

(1) military-security, incorporating territories, borders, free navigation, change in military balance, military incidences, and war;
(2) political-diplomatic, including sovereignty, hegemony, and international influence;
(3) economic-developmental, including the nationalization of property, raw materials, economic

pressure such as boycotts and sanctions, and foreign exchange problems; and

(4) cultural-status, comprising issues of ideology, challenge to nonmaterial values, symbols.[121]

A fifth issue grouping today might be classified as technological-informational, including exchanges of information technology, information warfare, and information operations.

Issues that comprise *high level* threats are those considered as attacks on the U.S. or U.S. forces. They include threats to the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States; the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the U.S. or its military forces abroad; threats to the stability or viability of major economic markets and energy supplies; and threats to the freedom of the seas, airways, and space, and the security of vital lines of communication. Issues relating to *mid level* threats are those that are important to the well-being of the United States and could potentially result in regional instability, including destabilizing refugee flows, massive uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders, regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and major conflicts in important geographic regions. Finally, issues that make up *low level* threats are generally humanitarian in nature, including human rights, the restoration of democracy, establishing the rule of law, coping with natural and manmade disasters, promoting minor economic markets, and encouraging sustainable development and environmental protection.

Crisis Actors

Crises can result in consequences that reach different levels of the international system: global, regional, interstate, and intrastate. While the state is the major actor in

world politics, other actors can also become involved in crisis situations. These include: international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the UN, NATO, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and multinational corporations (MNCs); and transnational (and other non-state) actors such as fundamental religious movements and terrorist groups.[122] As Roberts (1988) points out, "the larger the numbers [of actors], the more disruptive will be hostile interactions, the greater likelihood of superpower or major power involvement, and the more difficult the system's accommodation, all pointing to greater severity."[123] Similarly, Brecher and James (1986) discuss two consequences resulting from an increase in the number of actors in a crisis situation. First, an increase in the number of participants raises the likelihood of the involvement by major powers, which they argue signifies a greater potential structural change to the international system. Second, they contend that additional participants in a crisis raise the potential of coping with a greater range of issues which complicates the opportunity to achieve solutions that will satisfy all parties involved.[124] In short, as the number of actors increase, so do the chances of other problems that can heighten the level of threat to U.S. interests.

Essentially, there are three main levels of actor involvement: great powers, regional actors, and communal (intrastate). Great power conflicts, while unlikely, involve the highest stakes (*high level* threats). These would include, but would not be limited to, conflicts resulting in military action between the U.S., Russia, and possibly China.[125] These conflicts usually take place in the global arena with many actors

involved, yet can sometimes entail regional hotspots which can escalate into a great power conflict. Regional conflicts are normally begun by regional powers challenging the local balance of power. These conflicts generally constitute *mid level* threats. Potential sources of regional conflict involving weapons of mass destruction are India and Pakistan, and possibly North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Other regional hotspots may include, the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asian subcontinent, and the Aegean.[126] Finally, the most likely conflicts today will be internal communal conflicts over competing identities, territorial claims, and political institutions. As pointed out in the 1996 Report of the Aspen Institute Conference on *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World*, "communal conflicts result from the breakdown of states, tribalism, ethno-nationalism (often formented by ambitious leaders carrying an ethnic banner), radical fundamentalism, scarce resources, and real or perceived inequities."[127]

While the threat of communal conflict is present in every region, the prime locations for ongoing and potential future conflicts are the states of the former Soviet Union and the developing world. As Ramos-Horta (2000) notes, the majority of states experiencing war are the least developed: "A deadly combination of scarce internal resources, imperial legacies, and an international order designed to marginalize the poor politically as well as economically prevents states in conflict from meeting the social, political, and economic needs of their people and sustaining economic and political order."[128] Moreover, according to the 1995 Rand report *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*, the end of the Cold War "has led to an increase in the number of failed states or states that have descended into conditions of anarchy as the result of the collapse of all

political order (e.g., Somalia); it has also facilitated the breakup of multinational political units such as Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia"[129] Communal conflicts always contain the risk of spillover to neighboring states, specifically through involvement by ethnic groups, refugees flows, and the use of adjourning states to stage attacks. Moreover, the violent nature of these conflicts, can result in massive humanitarian crises and human rights abuses that warrant international attention.[130] Even though these conflicts are often violent and long-lasting, they are usually categorized as *low level* threats because they tend to have a lower impact on U.S. interests.

Geostrategic Salience

Geostrategic salience can be defined as the significance of the location and resources of the crisis region. The assumption is that the broader the geostrategic salience the more threatening the crisis will be to U.S. interests.[131] In other words, when the crisis occurs in a region that provides access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources, the geostrategic salience is viewed as more significant to U.S. interests than if the region did not contain such resources. Geostrategic salience can also affect the actors drawn into the crisis. Crises in regions of great significance have the potential to draw more states into the crisis because their interests will more likely be at stake.[132] Thus, crises in regions with broad geostrategic salience are considered *high level* threats. Crises in regions with moderate geostrategic salience constitute *mid level* threats. Crises in regions with limited geostrategic salience make up *low level* threats.

Geostrategic assets can change over time; for example, since the 1950s, oil and

uranium-producing regions have acquired greater salience while coal-producing regions have lost significance. Yet, some assets have retained their geostrategic salience over the decades, such as key waterways and choke points like Gibralter and the Suez Canal.[133] Similarly, safeguarding energy supplies from areas such as the Persian Gulf will continue to be important to U.S. interests.

Actors Endangered

In the post-Cold War era, the United States has been called upon to intervene in situations all over the world. However, it is not feasible for American forces to be deployed in every crisis situation. Thus, U.S. decision-makers must consider which actors are directly or indirectly endangered by the crisis: the United States (and even U.S. forces in general), key allies, key trading partners, or actors peripheral to national interests. Clearly, threats to the *vital* interests of the United States or U.S. forces directly, and/or key allies would be considered *high level*. Threats against friendly actors and key trading partners would be categorized as *mid level*. Finally, threats against actors peripheral to U.S. interests would be classified as *low level*.

Potential Level of Military Force

Decision-makers are likely to assess the threat of a crisis to U.S. interests in order to determine appropriate action. This analysis, however, contends that the estimation of level of multilateral military intervention expected from the parties participating in the operation is a factor that can demonstrate the level of threat to U.S. interests. The higher the threat level, the more likely the use of military instrument of power. While economic

and political rewards and sanctions may be used, the likelihood of military intervention is great in *high level* threat situations. In response to *mid level* threat situations, the U.S. should try to avoid military conflict by relying more upon political and economic instruments of power. The use of military force, however, may be necessary to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly.[134] In this case, military intervention would normally be limited to smaller-scale contingency operations including "show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, and military support to civilian authorities" (i.e., Kosovo or recent attacks on Iraq).[135] Finally, the response to *low level* threats should be economic and political in nature; military intervention should only be used as a last resort.

Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries

The extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries can be measured by the number of attribute differences in terms of military capability, political regime, economic development, and culture.[136] The underlying assumption is that the greater the heterogeneity among crisis actors, the greater the likelihood of a more severe confrontation.[137] The greater the heterogeneity, the more difficult it is to reach a common understanding among states, and there is a greater likelihood of a misunderstanding of motives and actions of the opponent. For example, with respect to cultural differences among crisis adversaries, Cohen (1991) notes that divergent cultures are more likely to

have different experiences and frames of reference which can have serious consequences for negotiations.[138]

Brecher and James (1986) maintain that heterogeneity is likely to lead to higher levels of violence in a crisis: "Members of a diverse group, even if rather small, may experience problems in coordinating their behavior, a challenge that would not confront more homogeneous groups."[139] They also argue that heterogeneity tends to increase the range of issues raised by crisis participants: "Disparity increases the probability that parties to a crisis will possess different images of their bargaining environment. Consequently, some actors may try to link new issues to those already under consideration."[140] In short, heterogeneity can further complicate a crisis environment. As a general rule, this will tend to increase the level of threat the crisis presents to U.S. interests. Thus, when the extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries is low (few differences), the crisis is more likely to be considered a *low level* threat. Some differences among crisis adversaries would raise the level of threat to U.S. interests to a *mid level* threat. Finally, a large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries is more likely to constitute a *high level* threat.

Systemic Changes

Systemic changes can trigger conflict and have major implications for the foreign policy orientation of states. These may include actor change, alliance change, a change in the balance of power among states, and change in the "rules of the game." Actor change can include the creation or elimination of one or more actors or a change in regime type,

such as the breakup of Yugoslavia. Alliance change involves the change of actors into or from a formal or informal alliance, or a change in cohesiveness of an existing alliance such as the enlargement of NATO or the elimination of the Warsaw Pact. A change in the balance of power among states involves a change in relative power or power rank among the most powerful states in the system.[141] For example, in 1990, Hussein attempted to achieve political and economic domination of the Persian Gulf region. If he was successful, this would have changed the balance of power in that region. Finally, rules of the game are "those norms derived from law, custom, morality, or self-interest that serve as guidelines for legitimate behavior by the actors of a system."[142] These changes can be informally or formally codified. Changes in "rules of the game" include the creation or elimination of rules or a change in actor consensus about existing rules of behavior and international law. Arend and Beck (1993) maintain that Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates three principal sources of international law:

> (1) treaties — written agreements between two or more states that regulate behavior;
> (2) customs — evidence of a general practice accepted as law as a result of state behavior;
> (3) general principles of law — basic legal principles present in most domestic legal systems, general principles about the nature of international law that states have come to accept (e.g., sovereignty), and principles of higher law (e.g., equality or humanity).[143]

Systemic changes resulting in the emergence of hostile major powers, regional coalitions, or regional hegemonic powers not closely aligned with the U.S. in locations

with high geostrategic salience are considered *high level* threats. Systemic changes resulting in the emergence of hostile regional hegemonic powers not closely aligned with the U.S. in areas with lower geostrategic salience are considered *mid level* threats. There are no significant systemic changes in *low level* threat situations.

Consequences without U.S. Intervention

Finally, it is important for intervention decision-makers to consider the consequences of U.S. inaction. The assessment of the costs of inaction are fairly subjective and matters of individual judgment. Nevertheless, judgments should be made regarding whether inaction would threaten U.S. interests. Two questions will facilitate the decision-making process. First, what is the expected outcome of the crisis without U.S. military intervention? Second, is that outcome acceptable to the U.S.? If the outcome is acceptable, this would mean that the crisis would have minimal consequences to national interests and can be classified as a *low level* threat. If the expected outcome is not acceptable and there are consequences important to the well-being of the United States, inaction represents a *mid level* threat. Finally, if the expected outcome is not acceptable and there are major consequences important to the survival of the United States, inaction represents a *high level* threat. Clearly, U.S. inaction would be warranted in the first case and unacceptable in the last case. It is the second case that provides the dilemma for decision-makers. At what point does U.S. inaction become harmful to U.S. interests? An assessment of the other factors contributing to different levels of threat should assist decision-makers in recognizing the importance of U.S. intervention in

response to this type of crisis.

Threat-Level Intensity Continuum

In today's world, high level threats requiring immediate action are few or non-existent. Thus, the U.S. has been able to focus its attention on lower level threats. Nevertheless, if a high level threat was to appear, it clearly would take precedent over other security problems. What is important to understand, however, is that threats can move in and out of each level depending on the intensity and environment. For example, the threat of terrorism can move from category to category. If terrorism is occurring in an African country whereby the U.S. interests are not directly at stake, it can be categorized as a low level threat. In contrast, if terrorists are attempting to steal nuclear weapons from Russia, this is a high level threat. Thus, there exists a continuum of intervention possibilities with high level threats on one end and low level threats on the other.

When a crisis breaks out, the factors above can assist intervention decision-makers in pinpointing where the crisis falls on the threat-level intensity continuum (See Figure 3.1). It is unlikely that every crisis will fit neatly into one level of threat, as defined by the above factors. Thus, if factors are split between different levels of threat, an assumption can be made that the crisis could eventually develop into the higher level threat. Moreover, decision-makers can also look at the relative importance of each factor to determine the most accurate level of threat. Once a threat level is determined, the crisis must be examined with regards to the level of risk that accompanies the intervention decision.

FIGURE 3.1 — THREAT-LEVEL INTENSITY CONTINUUM

	HIGH LEVEL THREAT	MID LEVEL THREAT	LOW LEVEL THREAT
Contentious issues	Issues are of vital importance	Issues are important, but not vital	Issues are secondary in importance
Crisis Actors	Potentially many actors involved (major powers) (Global)	Several actors involved (Regional)	Few actors involved (Communal)
Geostrategic Salience	Broad	Moderate	Limited
Actors endangered	Attacks on U.S./U.S. forces directly and/or key allies	Attacks on friendly actors and key trading partners	Attacks on actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential level of military force	High level (Strategic Nuclear Exchange and/or Theater Warfare)	Mid Level (Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations)	Unlikely (Shaping)
Extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries	Large # of attribute differences	Some differences	Few differences
Systemic Changes	Potential emergence of hostile major powers, regional coalitions, or regional hegemonic powers not aligned with the U.S. with high geostrategic salience	Potential emergence of hostile regional hegemonic powers not aligned with U.S. in general	No significant systemic changes
Consequences without U.S. intervention (inaction)	Major consequences important to the survival of the U.S.	Consequences important to the well-being of the U.S.	Minimal consequences

Overall Threat — Contingent upon the analysis of the above factors for the case under study.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk in international politics has been given limited scholarly attention. Although the concept of risk has been researched in a broad range of fields, such as medicine, economics, industry, technology, and environmental studies, Vertzberger (1998) points out that "it has largely gone unnoticed in the field of international politics and specifically in the study of international security issues, where risk is perennial and its consequences are visible and critical."[144] McDermott (1998) recognizes that theories about risk have certain basic tenets in common: "First, risk is inherent in choice and can substantively affect the decision made among various prospects. Second, it is assumed that options can be ordered [ranked] in some meaningful hierarchy of preferences. Last, risk is related to the distribution of the outcomes and how these outcomes are valued by the decision maker."[145]

Risk can be conceptualized in terms of a relative threat to values. Risk, as defined by Vertzberger (1998) and for the purposes of this analysis, is "the likelihood that validly predictable direct and indirect consequences with potentially adverse values will materialize."[146] Unfortunately, risk assessments are inherently probabilistic; there is no guarantee of outcome. Thus, risk estimates have three dimensions: outcome ambiguity (whether the full range of outcomes is known or unknown), outcome value (whether the outcome is positive or negative, desirable or undesirable), and outcome probability (high or low).[147] Similarly, McDermott (1998) maintains that any investigation into risk must examine the components of chance (likelihood of outcome) and loss (their relative value). She notes that "chance is fundamentally about probability, in terms of likelihood or

frequency....Loss is critically a function of magnitude. Thus, risk is about how much of what is lost."[148]

Similar to the concept of threat, which was perceived as actual or potential, risk can be divided into three types: real, perceived, and acceptable. According to Vertzberger (1998), *real risk* is the actual risk resulting from a situation or behavior, *perceived risk* is the level of risk attributed to a situation or behavior by the decision-makers, and *acceptable risk* is the level of risk representing the net costs that decision-makers perceive as tolerable in pursuit of their goals. Perceived risks are then measured against what are presumed to be acceptable risks.[149] For the purposes of this analysis, emphasis will be placed on determining *perceived risks* which will then be measured against the perceived level of threat.

Intervention decisions are difficult to justify unless the cost-benefit ratio is favorable and the perceived risk involved is acceptable. However, military intervention decisions entail a high level of uncertainty. This uncertainty may result either from the event itself, or from the difficulties that decision-makers face when observing, interpreting, anticipating, and evaluating important aspects of the event and its outcomes. In addition, the risks of military intervention are complex; they have multiple dimensions (political, economic, military), and information about each dimension contains a different degree of uncertainty.[150] Moreover, as Vertzberger (1998) notes, "there are no risk-free choices, including the decision not to decide....In such cases, the choice is not between risk taking and risk avoidance but between different types of risk."[151]

As noted earlier, there is a dearth of information regarding risk in international

politics. While the literature on risk perception recognizes different costs associated with military intervention, missing is an analysis of how each factor relates to different levels of risk. Thus, the purpose of the discussion of risk in this chapter is to identify and define key factors that indicate potential levels of risk in military intervention operations and provide the analysis necessary to associate each factor to the appropriate level of risk.

Risk can be categorized into three levels — high, mid, and low — by assessing the potential consequences of key factors affecting the intervention operation. Low level risk is present when the chances of goal achievement can be reached with minimal costs and would not be substantially affected even if many elements went wrong in their implementation. Risk increases as the odds of success become less likely and costs increase. Similar to perceptions of threat, risk is not a static concept. As values shift over time in response to internal and external factors, perceptions of risk are likely to change.[152]

Explanation of Factors

A set of questions can distinguish key factors relating to risk. First, what is the type of conflict (intrastate, interstate)? If the conflict is intrastate, is it a civil war, revolution, factional conflict, failed state, or identity/secession movement? Second, what is the expected duration of the conflict? And will it remain open-ended? Third, what stage of conflict is the crisis in (initial stages of conflict or initial stages of negotiation)? Fourth, what costs are expected to accompany multilateral military intervention (economic, military, human, political)? Fifth, what level of support does the intervention receive

from the public, Congress, and the international community? Sixth, what level of military engagement is expected (U.S. forces and leadership)? Seventh, how organized is the intervention force (capabilities, size, composition, control)? Eighth, have the crisis parties given consent for outside intervention? Ninth, what are the target state attributes, including the political aim of the opposition, the strength/ability of the opposition, and the physical environment where the crisis takes place? Finally, will the intervention adversely affect U.S. prestige or relationships?

The above questions can be summarized as the following ten factors:

(1) type of conflict;
(2) duration of conflict;
(3) stage of conflict;
(4) potential costs (economic, military, human, and political);
(5) level of support (domestic and international);
(6) extent of engagement (forces and leadership);
(7) organization of intervention force (capabilities, size, composition, control);
(8) consent of parties;
(9) target state attributes (political aim, strength/ability, and physical environment);
(10) consequences for U.S. prestige and relationships.

The following section will define each variable and discuss how each is expected to relate to the different levels of risk.

Type of Conflict

Conflict can usually fall into one of two categories: interstate (conflict between states) and intrastate (conflict within states). Interstate conflicts generally focus on limited aims, such as a territory or policy dispute. In contrast, intrastate conflicts are

essentially civil wars, fought along ethnic or sectarian lines. Conflicts in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to take place within states rather than among them. For example, Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) argue that since the early 1990s interstate wars have been almost non-existent. They point out that there were "no interstate wars in 1993 and 1994, and only a minor border altercation between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 and a flare-up in the long-running dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1996."[153]

There are a number of explanations for the low level of interstate war. Mueller (1989) argues that "war is becoming obsolescent between major states because it is too destructive to be a usable policy instrument, and irrelevant to the real conflicts of interest that divide major states."[154] Keohane and Nye (1986) maintain that interdependence has played a large role in transforming relations between states: "when states' interests are tied together in a web of interrelated issue areas, governments tend to move towards bargaining as the main instrument for resolving conflicts of interest."[155] Similarly, Axelrod and Keohane (1986) contend that the prevalence of international institutions have strengthened contacts between governments, made their actions more transparent, diminished security dilemmas and created a basis for reciprocation and mutual gains.[156] Finally, as Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) note, "non-militarized economic power is seen to bring a greater enhancement of influence and ability to defend interests than investment in military power.[157]

While interstate conflicts can pose a number of different challenges to multilateral military intervention, *high level* risks are likely to result when the conflict is between

major actors. *Mid level* risks are likely to result from conflicts between regional actors. *Low level* risks are likely to result from conflicts between actors peripheral to U.S. interests.

While both interstate and intrastate conflicts can pose high levels of risk for multilateral military intervention, intrastate conflicts tend to be long-lasting, zero-sum struggles, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Iraq after the Gulf War. As Carment and James (1998) note, "ethnic strife unfolds against a backdrop of fear that it will be resolved through destruction or assimilation of a group."[158] Moreover, as Haass (1999) points out: "there are often multiple protagonists, usually with no clear, authoritative leaders, making diplomatic efforts that much more difficult. As a result, internal wars have a way of lingering."[159] Intrastate conflicts also have the potential to "spillover" into neighboring states. As the 1995 Rand report *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict* notes, "the mass exodus of Kurdish refugees fleeing internal civil strife in Iraq during the spring of 1991 raised the specter of the destabilization of southeastern Turkey, where a Kurdish insurgency had been smoldering for years."[160] In short, multilateral military intervention in intrastate conflicts may result in additional consequences that heighten the level of risk accompanying intervention.

There are three general categories of intrastate conflict: ethnic, religious, and ideological. Ethnic conflicts involve groups that identify with a distinct ethnic or cultural heritage. Religious conflicts involve groups that are organized in defense of their religious beliefs. Ideological conflicts involve groups contesting the dominant political or economic ideology, which may or may not incorporate an ethnic or religious

component.[161] Regan (2000), maintains that the makeup of the participants to the conflict affects the strategy and effectiveness of outside military interventions in resolving conflict. He argues that "if issues of identity play such a key role in the initiation of civil conflict and their ultimate resolution, then those same issues of identity will affect the relative effectiveness of third-party interventions."[162] For example, he notes that "conflicts that have no easy line of demarcation, and where the calculations of the combatants are determined more by emotions and history than by gains and loses, may require intervention strategies that differ from those conflicts with a different set of identity patterns."[163]

Intrastate warfare today encompasses a wide spectrum of conflict. For example, intrastate warfare may include ideological insurgencies, ethnic separatist conflicts, failed states, intercommunal violence in disintegrating multinational federations, local warlordism, disputes over residual ethnic enclaves, urban warfare, Islamic fundamentalist uprisings, and ethnically based disputes between rival elite groups over the control of an existing state.[164] Scholars disagree on how to categorize the different types of intrastate conflict. Thus, there are many conflict typologies which differentiate in terms of conflict parties, issues, and causes (e.g., Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1999; Singer, 1996; and Holsti, 1996). For the purposes of this analysis, five main types of intrastate conflict can be identified: (1) civil wars, (2) revolutions, (3) factional conflict, (4) failed states, and (5) identity/secession movements. Different levels of risk can be associated to each.

Civil wars are typically the most violent type of intrastate conflict, and thus,

constitute *high level* risks. As Walter (1999) points out, civil wars are long lasting (almost twice as long as interstate wars — 33 months versus 18.5), difficult to resolve short of a decisive military victory, and likely to experience renewed violence in the future.[165] The dynamics of civil wars make negotiated settlements extremely difficult to achieve. Stedman (1996) discusses four reasons why this is the case:

> First, political settlements in civil wars require the parties to disarm and form a single army and government. This creates intense security concerns: the parties will face worrisome military vulnerabilities. Second, civil wars are often total wars, in which combatants come to believe that the character of their adversary is a cause of the war and that the only way to end the war is by eliminating their opponent. This creates survival stakes for the combatants, who fear that defeat will mean death. Third, civil wars are often fought by leaders who will accept nothing less than complete victory and complete control over the country in question. Fourth, even if the parties are fighting for limited aims, the rhetoric of total war increases risks and fears; those willing to contemplate negotiation must judge whether an opponent will be satisfied with less than complete victory.[166]

When peace settlements are signed, Walter (1999) notes that more than half of them fail to prevent the reemergence of conflict:

> Designed to incorporate competing factions into a shared government, restore law and order, and rebuild working state institutions, these settlements often dissolve into one-party dictatorships, corrupt and arbitrary governments, ineffective institutions, or renewed civil war. They do not create the new domestic political order most people envision when they sign the original settlement.[167]

Revolutions can also present significant challenges to a multilateral military intervention force. Revolutions occur when a government is confronted with a massive

popular uprising to change the nature of the government in a state. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) maintain that these ambitious aims may include changing the system from capitalist to socialist. changing the form of government from dictatorship to democracy, or changing the religious orientation of the state.[168] Revolutions have the capability of being fairly violent as a result of their sheer mass and political character. However, they can also be short-lived when they do not have the strength to overthrow the regime in power. Thus, when the likelihood of success by the revolution is high, conflict may escalate to higher levels, and revolutions have the potential of being *high level* risks. Revolutions with moderate chances of success are more likely *mid level* risks. Revolutions with a low likelihood of success are likely to be *low level* risks.

Factional conflicts occur when there are competing interests or power-struggles of political or criminal factions. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) argue that factional conflicts include "*coup d'etat*, intra-elite power-struggles, brigandage, criminality and warlordism, where the aim is to usurp, seize or retain state power merely to further particular interests."[169] Haass (1999) argues that it is "less difficult to use force to affect the success of coups or still-modest insurrections — either to support them or oppose them — than it is for revolutions, which by their sheer mass and political character are resistant to interventions by outsiders."[170] Risks can be associated in terms of public support and military capability. *High level* risks are likely when public support and military capability for the factional group is high. *Mid level* risks are likely when moderate levels of public support and military capability are present. *Low level* risks are present when public support and military capability are low.

Failed states can be defined as having no local political authority. As Haass (1999) notes, "rather, several competing authorities tend to have varying degrees of control in different parts of the country, resulting in chaos, violence, widespread suffering, and the neglect of basic human needs."[171] The 1995 Rand report *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict* notes that the number of failed states, or states descending into conditions of anarchy as a result of a collapse of all political order such as Somalia has increased since the end of the Cold War.[172] The report presents the following explanation for this increase:

> During the Cold War, the superpowers did not wish to see any of their client states collapse because they feared this could lead to regional political losses. Thus, regimes in developing-world states like Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and North Korea, which would otherwise have had difficulty in maintaining legitimacy and social order, were propped up by financial aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic support. The removal of much of this support with the end of the East-West rivalry has left some states incapable of maintaining a functioning domestic order that can ensure the safety of the citizenry and provide economic subsistence. This results in anarchy, lawlessness, and warlordism, factors that often bring about mass violations of human rights, interminable low-level violence between armed gangs of irregulars, and large refugee flows into neighboring countries.[173]

Snow (2000) notes that conflicts occurring in failed states tend "to be vicious (typically 90 percent or more of the casualties are civilians), unmilitary (rarely do battles occur between organized armed units), and often politically pointless (in some cases, it is not clear that either side has as its goal gaining control of the country and governing)."[174]

Haass (1999) discusses two types of multilateral military intervention that are

possible in response to failed states. He argues that humanitarian interventions are designed "to bring relief to some or most of the local population until the political situation sorts itself out."[175] While humanitarian interventions are less demanding, they tend to be open-ended. Multilateral military intervention can also attempt to "fix" the political situation by replacing the failed state with a successful one. As Haass notes, this type of intervention is aimed at nation-building and may first require peace-making.[176]

Levels of risk can be associated with the likelihood that the multilateral military force will fulfill the intervention goals. Thus, when the ability to fulfill intervention goals are low, *high level* risks are likely to follow. When the ability to fulfill intervention goals are moderate, *mid level* risks are more likely. Finally, when the ability to fulfill intervention goals are high, *low level* risks are expected to follow.

Identity/secession movements involve the relative status of communal groups in relation to the state. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) argue that "depending upon the nature of the group and the contextual situation, this includes struggles for access, for autonomy, for secession or for control."[177] In some cases, ethnic groups claim the right to national self-determination and attempt to disengage from the state (e.g., the ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia claim to be a part of the historic Somali nation). Moreover, the end of the Cold War facilitated the breakup of multinational federations such as Yugoslavia and the USSR which has resulted in a number of identity/secessionist movements. Different levels of risks can be associated with the willingness of the regime in power to grant autonomy or sovereignty to the identity/secessionist movement. Low levels of willingness on the part of the regime in power are generally *high level* risks.

Moderate amounts of willingness are typically *mid level* risks. High levels of willingness are expected to be *low level* risks.

Duration of Conflict

Assessments regarding the expected duration of the conflict are important to consider when contemplating the use of military force. Costs increase in time. Thus, as the expected duration of conflict increases, so does the level of risk. As Regan (2000) points out, there are material costs of keeping troops overseas and increased risk associated with prolonged presence in a hostile environment.[178] He contents that "if the planning stage of the intervention suggests a long-term involvement, then the relative costs to benefits might quickly overwhelm the capabilities — or interests — of the potential intervenor."[179] Moreover, the 1995 Rand report *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict* stated that sustaining support for military intervention over an extended period, especially when setbacks occur and costs mount, is more likely to generate significant domestic political problems. Certainly, multilateral intervention would help spread these costs across a larger number of actors. As Regan (2000) notes, "national leaders will be more likely to support interventions that require a long-term outlook if they can delegate responsibility beyond their national borders."[180]

Multilateral military intervention can sometimes result in open-ended commitments which further increase political and material costs. For example, multilateral forces in the Balkans have maintained a presence for years and will likely continue for many more. Nevertheless, Brown and Rosecrance (1999) believe that it is

possible for policymakers to distinguish "between long-term involvement in open military hostilities (another Vietnam) and commitments to low-risk, low-cost, largely nonviolent operations, designed to prevent conflict."[181] They argue that conflict prevention efforts may involve long-term commitments, but that they are nevertheless low-risk undertakings.[182] Therefore, while long-term involvement (years) generally constitute *high level* risks, the level of risk can be reduced when the intervention operation is considered to be a low-cost, nonviolent operation. Generally, mid-term involvement (months) involve *mid level* risks. Short-term involvement (weeks) are typically *low risk* undertakings.

Stage of Conflict

The stage of conflict at the time military troops are deployed may also have an influence on the level of risk in military operations. Regan (2000) argues that different stages of conflict can be identified by the extent of hostilities or cooperation among the antagonists. He argues that "the particular phase of a conflict can influence the character of an intervention in two ways: (1) the risks incurred by intervenors, and (2) the perception of the status quo ante at the time of an intervention."[183] He further notes that "once the most violent phases of the conflict have passed it is increasingly likely that a multilateral community can achieve consensus on an intervention policy....Not only does consensus become easier, but also risks are reduced and the probability of success increased."[184]

Rubin (1991) maintains that "conflict varies in intensity over time, and such

changes in intensity create opportunities for movement."[185] However, problems can result from engaging too soon or too late in what Rubin refers to as de-escalation efforts (attempts to reduce the intensity of conflict and move toward a settlement of the dispute). He argues that engaging in a conflict too soon can be a problem when there is insufficient motivation by parties to negotiate: "without the motivation to take their dispute seriously and to do whatever may be necessary to bring about a settlement, the disputants are unlikely to engage in the exchange of views that can create a negotiated agreement."[186] In contrast, waiting too long can be a problem when the parties involved in the crisis are entrenched into extreme, well-publicized, positions that leave little opportunity for compromise.[187]

Conflict resolution theorists discuss conflicts in terms of "life cycles" and "entry points" and argue that one ingredient of effective third-party intervention is the "ripeness" of conflict.[188] Kriesberg (1991) defines *ripeness* as "circumstances when the conflict is ready for an effort to bring about a particular change."[189] Zartman (1989) argues that a *ripe moment* exists "when there is a mutually hurting stalemate, when unilateral solutions are blocked and the parties recognize that continuing violence will damage all sides."[190] Pirnie and Simons (1996) discuss the importance of the timing of ripeness in peace operations (activities beyond diplomacy and short of enforcement). They note that a crisis may not be amenable to peace operations until culmination or stalemate is reached: "*Culmination* is reached when a stronger party has attained important aims and cannot attain more aims through force. *Stalemate* occurs when parties countervail so that no party is likely to attain its aims through force."[191] Moreover, they maintain that

"culmination is usually more propitious for peace operations than stalemate, because parties are reluctant to concede that stalemate cannot be overcome."[192]

Other scholars contend that military intervention should not be confined to a single "ripe moment." For example, Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) argue that different phases of conflict contain several turning points and sticking points. They contend that turning points occur at critical points "when parties see a way forward through negotiations, either by redefining their goals, opening new political space, finding a new basis for agreement or because the conjunction of political leaders and circumstances is favorable."[193] In contrast, they argue that sticking points occur when political elites are "unfavorable to the process (as in Israel), when parties to agreements defect (as in Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka), or when political space is closed or conditions are attached to negotiations which prevent forward movement."[194]

Certainly, violence takes on its own dynamics, and different phases of conflict are not always clear. Nevertheless, the extent of hostilities or cooperation among the parties can generally identify different stages of conflict as well as the level of risk to the multilateral military intervention. Three broad stages of conflict can relate to each level of risk: (1) stages of active conflict (often the initial stages of conflict), (2) initial stages of negotiation by some parties to the conflict, and (3) initial stages of negotiation by all parties of the conflict. Intervention in active conflict, which often entails the initial stages of conflict, is more likely to contain greater levels of uncertainty, and conditions for negotiation are very unlikely. Thus, this stage is more likely to be categorized as a *high level* risk. Stages where some of the conflicting parties accept that pursuing the conflict

is unlikely to achieve their goals, may result in the initial stages of negotiation. However, without agreement of all parties involved in the crisis, the conflict is likely to linger. Thus, this stage would constitute a *mid level* risk. Finally, the stage of conflict where all conflicting parties agree that reaching a settlement is preferred to continued conflict represents *low level* risks. Nevertheless, multilateral military intervention may still be necessary to provide confidence-building measures necessary to demonstrate that each party is adhering to the agreements negotiated.

Potential Costs

A comparison of the perceived costs and benefits of military intervention is important when deciding whether to intervene with military force. Even when the intervention is likely to succeed, decision-makers must still gauge whether the outcome is worth the costs that military intervention could entail. Costs can be conceptualized in at least four ways: economic, military, human, and political. The assumption is that as costs increase, so does the level of risk associated with the intervention. Generally, multilateral military intervention resulting in substantial costs result in *high level* risks. Moderate costs present *mid level* risks. Minimal costs are considered *low level* risks.

The deployment and maintenance of a multilateral military force in response to a crisis can result in significant economic costs. While it is difficult to accurately predict financial costs of military intervention, the marginal annual costs for deployment of a division-sized force tend to be $2 billion to $4 billion, which included approximately 15,000 combat troops and twice as many support personnel.[195] Overall economic costs

can be divided into three categories: (1) transport (e.g., ground transportation, airlift, and sealift); (2) operations and support (e.g., personnel, costs for fuel, parts, equipment maintenance, and other types of support); and (3) replacement of equipment (e.g., combat weapons systems).[196] If intervention becomes protracted, "the costs of hardware, spare parts, and ammunition can become a decisive factor in determining the intervener's capability to maintain the level of military activity required for success."[197] Nevertheless, the economic costs of intervention can be offset when direct economic gains, such as access to energy supplies or control of key waterways, result from the intervention. Thus, as Vertzberger (1998) points out, "the economic costs of intervention have to be weighed against the economic benefits that may accrue to the intervener. If the economic costs are higher than the opportunity costs of nonintervention, there is a net economic loss from intervention, and vice versa."[198] In addition to the direct costs of military intervention, situations requiring large-scale reserve mobilization may incur indirect costs, such as a disruption to the intervener's economy. Generally, multilateral military intervention resulting in substantial economic costs result in *high level* risks. Moderate economic costs present *mid level* risks. Minimal economic costs are considered *low level* risks.

Not only can military interventions cost considerable sums of money, but as Kanter (2000) notes, "they also can exact real and substantial costs to U.S. military capabilities in training foregone, wear and tear on equipment, and strains on morale and personnel retention."[199] Moreover, long deployments wear out equipment which diminish resources on hand that might be needed to handle emergencies, training, prepositioning, and other activities related to combat. Thus, similar to economic costs, multilateral

military intervention resulting in substantial military costs generally result in *high level* risks. Moderate military costs present *mid level* risks. Minimal military costs are considered *low level* risks.

The costs incurred involving training and equipment, however, are minor in comparison to the possible human costs. Clearly, some types of operations involve higher levels of risk to military forces than others. As Brown and Rosecrance (1999) note "it is far riskier to send troops into war (as coalition leaders did in the Persian Gulf) or into situations where brutal conflicts have raged for years (as they did in Bosnia) than to use them in prevention efforts."[200] While estimating casualties depends on the political and military variables at play, data from past military operations and training exercises can provide a benchmark.[201] Generally, the potential for a substantial amount of casualties (thousands) is a *high level* risk. The potential for a moderate amount of casualties (hundreds) is a *mid level* risk. Finally, interventions that are expected to result in little-to-no casualties are *low level* risk operations.

Finally, human and material components are translated into political costs as a function of the success or failure of the policy. Regan (2000) notes, that political costs are the product of the interest of domestic or international constituency groups in a particular conflict and the outcome of an intervention.[202] Thus, political risks result from the possibility that the intervention policy will negatively affect the political position of the decision-making individuals, factions, and institutions.[203] Certainly, multilateral military intervention would not be recommended by policymakers in cases that predict operational success to be unlikely. Thus, *potential* political costs cannot be assessed as a

function of the *expected* success or failure of the policy. Instead, decision-makers can gauge the potential political costs by analyzing the degree of international and domestic support given to the operation. The intervention is more likely a *high level* risk when support is low, *mid level* risk when support is moderate, and a *low level* risk when substantial support is accorded to the intervention operation.

In general, the costs of intervention can be offset with multilateral intervention where costs and benefits are distributed across all parties to the intervention. Regan (2000) discusses such benefits of multilateral intervention:

> Political liabilities under collective interventions are often minimized by contributing to the efforts of a broader community rather than orchestrating a unilateral act. International condemnation is much less likely, and domestic political opposition can be deflected to the international organization. Furthermore, the costs of the intervention get distributed across a broader spectrum of countries, decreasing in absolute terms the burden on any one country.[204]

Certainly, costs can also result from the lack of intervention. As Lund (1996) points out, "while many of today's conflicts may not directly threaten our [the United States] national security, they do disrupt trade and investment, gnaw at our sense of responsibility to prevent human suffering, undermine fledgling democracies, and strain our partnerships with key countries."[205]

Level of Support

Support for multilateral military intervention (or lack of) can come from two main sources: domestic (public and Congress) and international (other states and

organizations). Vertzberger (1998) maintains that domestic legitimacy for multilateral military intervention is based on four elements: goals, costs, probability of success, and means.[206] In other words, the intervention receives domestic legitimacy when the public and Congress approve the intervention goals and believe that the goals can be successfully achieved at an acceptable cost within available means. While domestic political and legal mandates demonstrate consensus and efficacy of the intervention, scholars disagree over how important domestic support is in military intervention decisions. For example, while the widely quoted Weinberger Doctrine includes the requirement for explicit public and congressional support, former Secretary of State George Shultz argued that "to require public support before an intervention was to hide behind the skirts of public opinion."[207] Most scholars, however, will agree that public support can be difficult to maintain (as the media acts as a catalyst to rally support or forge protest), and domestic opposition can further complicate intervention operations. Vertzberger (1998) discusses such impediments:

> When the public doubt the efficiency and morality of the policy, even low costs will be considered a burden not worth bearing. Domestic opposition to a policy, however passive, undermines the probability of its success and, particularly in democratic societies, undermines decisionmakers' freedom of action — specifically, the freedom to escalate or de-escalate the intervention. The combination of possible domestic disaffection and failure of a high-stakes policy not only raises the perceived risks to the national interest but is often perceived as threatening decisionmakers' personal interests, such as survival in office or being judged positively by history.[208]

Vertzberger (1998) also notes that as domestic opposition intensifies, third parties, even if

militarily inferior, may become more willing to challenge the intervening power after deciding that the risk of involvement is worth taking.[209]

Decision-makers also rely on external sources of legitimacy from the international community. Attempts are made to persuade other actors that military intervention is moral and consistent with international law. International support can be extremely important to the overall success of the intervention. Acting multilaterally both legitimizes and sanctions the use of force in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences. Pirnie and Simons (1996) maintain that international support can be illustrated by other states voting affirmatively for the intervention, participating in the operation, and applying political pressure on the parties to keep their agreements.[210]

Domestic and international legitimacy can be related. When military intervention loses domestic legitimacy, there is a tendency for international legitimacy to also erode. Similarly, a decline in external legitimacy triggers questions at home regarding the validity of the intervention policy.[211] Lack of domestic and international support can certainly complicate the multilateral military intervention operation. Thus, when support (regardless which type — domestic or international) is limited, this is generally a *high level* risk. When support is divided, this is more likely a *mid level* risk. Finally, when support is substantial, *low level* risks are more likely to follow.

Extent of Military Engagement

As discussed in Chapter 2, military operations can range from preventive deployment to peacekeeping to enforcement. While all military operations involve risk,

the level of risk varies according to the type of operation and the level of support from member states. For example, Pirnie and Simons (1996) discuss the level of risk associated to personnel, both military and civilian, under peace operations:

> Operations under Chapter VI [implying that lethal force will be used only in self-defense while accomplishing the mandate] normally entail low risk to personnel; indeed, high risk would invalidate the very concept. By contrast, participating states should anticipate casualties during operations under Chapter VII [implying that lethal force will be used against a recalcitrant party].[212]

The assumption is that as the level of military engagement increases, so does the level of risk. Thus, large-scale operations (tens of thousands troops) are generally *high level* risks. Moderate-scale operations (thousands of troops) are more likely *mid level* risks. Low-scale operations (hundreds of troops) are expected to be *low level* risks.

Moreover, as the level of U.S. leadership in carrying out the intervention increases, so does the level of risk to the United States. Oudraat (2000) points out that in multilateral military intervention, there is often a lead state that drives and controls the operation. She further notes that "for large-scale operations, the United States has to take the lead, if only because it alone possesses the necessary capabilities to carry out such operations. Moreover, involvement — even limited involvement — of the United States will signal to troublemakers that the effort is a serious one."[213] Similarly, Brown and Rosecrance (1999) argue that multilateral interventions will be carried out by individual states or groups of states and that the United States "has the firepower, transport, command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics, and power projection capabilities needed for large-scale operations."[214] Nevertheless, by continually taking the

lead in intervention efforts, the United States risks overextending its military capabilities; it cannot afford to become the "world's policeman." Thus, when the U.S. takes the lead in intervention efforts (a sizable role), this can generally be viewed as a *high level* risk. When U.S. involvement is accompanied by strong efforts from other countries (a moderate role), this is more likely a *mid level* risk. When the U.S. plays a minimal role in the multilateral military intervention operation, this is more likely a *low level* risk.

Organization of Intervention Force

Creating and sustaining effective coalitions can present significant challenges and risks. The organization of the intervention force contains four key issues: capabilities, size, composition, and control. Decision-makers must determine whether the intervening military force has the capability to accomplish the mission. As Vertzberger (1998) notes, this includes both "the quantities and types of hardware required by the task and by the geographic features of the target country (terrain and climate)."[215] Logistical concerns also include the ability to efficiently transport soldiers and material into battle and sustain combat operations as long as necessary.[216]

Decision-makers must also consider the size and composition of the force structure. Any military force should be configured appropriately for its mandate. In particular, the United States must determine whether it can commit a sufficient number of U.S. forces while at the same time sustaining its other commitments. Decision-makers must also decide what the mix of regular forces, reservists, and national guard will be necessary to accomplish these goals. Calling up reservists involves every day Americans

which can impact public support. As Vertzberger (1998) notes, the use of reservists can raise the risk of unwelcome social effects — the arousal of public sensitivity to the problem and economic and human costs.[217] The public is unwilling to tolerate very high casualties (except perhaps in cases where the perceived benefits justify loss of life).[218] Moreover, Vertzberger argues that "heavy reliance on reservists may pose problems regarding the availability of adequate numbers of highly qualified and trained soldiers."[219]

Command and control issues must also be raised. When the U.S. relinquishes *total* control of a military operation, it risks problems, such as disagreements regarding the operation's objectives and mandate. Moreover, command and control capabilities can be weakened due to interoperability problems — different working languages, equipment, procedures, levels of military training, and lack of experience working together. Thus, Presidential Decision Directive 25 recognizes that foreign operational control over U.S. forces will be less likely as the anticipated U.S. military role increases: "Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations, such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."[220]

When the coalition is disparate, it is more difficult to control often resulting in a *high level* risk. A coalition force that is moderately effective is more likely a *mid level* risk. A well organized and efficient coalition is more likely a *low level* risk.

Consent of Parties

The notion of mutual consent (or agreement) of all parties to have an outside force impose constraints on the course of the conflict and the behavior of the combatants can be an important component of intervention decision-making.[221] Lepgold and Weiss (1998) associate consent of parties to four different levels of engagement — preventive deployment, peacekeeping, selective enforcement, and enforcement. Consent is high in operations of preventive deployment and low in cases where enforcement is required.[222]

Pirnie and Simons (1996) discuss two different types of consent — formal and actual. They maintain that "*formal* consent is manifested in statements, declarations, accords, agreements, and treaties. *Actual* consent becomes apparent from the behavior of the parties in the course of a peace operation."[223] While there have been instances of military intervention without the consent of all parties, the idea is that consent of parties for the intervention will increase the effectiveness of the intervention, thus minimizing risk. As Regan (2000) notes, the notion of consent indicates a willingness by parties of the conflict to see compromise as the best avenue to resolve disputed issues. In contrast, he maintains that "it becomes increasingly difficult to carry out programs generally associated with the notion of humanitarian relief and peacebuilding without the at least tacit consent of the participants in the conflict."[224]

Generally, as the consent of parties to the conflict to have the intervention force present decreases, risk increases. Thus, *high level* risks are likely to result when there is lack of consent. *Mid level* risks usually result when consent of only some of the parties offer consent. *Low level* risks usually have the consent of all parties to the conflict.

Target State Attributes

Attributes of the target state have the potential of influencing the risks and outcome of the intervention. As Haass (1999) notes, "for engagements that promise to be protracted, it is essential to assess U.S. ability to sustain the confrontation relative to the adversary's. Such an assessment must include political, economic, and psychological calculations as well as military factors."[225] This analysis contends that decision-makers should assess characteristics including the political aim of the opposition, the strength/ability of the opposition, and the physical environment of the target state.

The political aim of the opposition is important, because the motives and interests of the adversary can adversely affect the intervention outcome. Similar to assessing U.S. interests, an adversary's interests can be conceptualized into different levels of importance based on what values are at stake. The assumption is that as an adversary's interests increase, the aggressor will less likely accede to the power of another. Thus, when an adversary's interests outweigh U.S. interests, the crisis has the potential to reach greater levels of conflict and for an extended period and is more likely to be a *high level* risk. This does not imply that the United States should never intervene in such situations. However, it is likely that the crisis environment would result in greater levels of risk to the United States in terms of costs, support, and the likelihood of achieving success. When the level of adversary and U.S. interests are the same, this usually presents situations of *mid level* risk. Finally, when U.S. interests are greater than the adversary, *low level* risks follow.

The strength/ability of the opposition is also important to assess, including

military, economic, and even political power. Crises involving adversaries with access to weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons, will increase the risks of intervention. Moreover, the general level of military capability of the target state is important when the U.S. is fighting with those forces. However, in many intervention cases, military forces come in contact with unconventional warfare, including terrorism and guerilla warfare. Technology has also created the capability of modifying forms of warfare. Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes (Director of the DIA) argues that "technology, combined with the creative genius of military thinkers around the world, is leading to the development and application of new forms of warfare, and the innovative modification of traditional military practices."[226] In other words, our adversaries are looking for new ways to attack our interests. For example, asymmetrical warfare — attacking an adversary's weaknesses with unexpected or innovative means while avoiding his strengths — has presented new challenges to the United States, and under such circumstances, military operations can be severely challenged. As Oudraat (2000) points out, "traditional military organizations may be more vulnerable to the coercive uses of force than guerrilla or insurgent fighters."[227] Thus, it is important for decision-makers to assess the potential for unconventional warfare in the crisis environment. The political, social, and economic context of the target state is also important when assessing risks to U.S. military intervention. For example, Vertzberger (1998) maintains that in cases where the intervention goal is to stabilize the regime, the likelihood of intervention success is high when "the target's society is socially cohesive, has a popularly supported government, and is administratively and militarily competent."[228] Oudraat (2000) further

discusses the importance of the political and economic characteristics of the target state when formulating intervention decisions, specifically when choosing between economic sanctions or coercive force. For example, she argues that "when dealing with an authoritarian regime, it may be advisable to forgo economic sanctions altogether and threaten the use of force immediately."[229] Moreover, she maintains that the existence and level of development of a political opposition in the target country is very important in the selection of the intervention strategy when the goal is to weaken the political regime in place: "if the opposition is weak, the imposition of comprehensive sanctions may ruin their changes to develop into a real opposition."[230] Finally, the political, social, and economic characteristics of a target state, as well as their objectives and means, can change over time. Thus, it is important to continually reassess the target states' attributes. Generally speaking, when the opposition has the ability and strength to carry out their political aims, a *high level* risk is likely to follow. When the opposition lacks strength either military, economically, or politically to be successful, but has enough power to prolong fighting, a *mid level* risk is likely to be present. When the opposition has little strength and ability to fulfill its political aims, the situation more likely a *low level* risk.

The physical environment where the crisis takes place can also offer a number of challenges to which the intervener must adapt. Climate and terrain can have important consequences on tactical effectiveness. As Pirnie and Simons (1996) note, "peace operations have taken place in some of the world's most inhospitable, rugged, and densely forested terrain, greatly impeding operations."[231] They also offer five key questions that can indicate the extent to which the physical environment may hamper

military intervention:

(1) how will the physical environment affect the operation;
(2) what effects will climate and terrain have on the operation;
(3) how will the availability of infrastructure, such as airports, seaports, and road networks, affect it;
(4) what facilities will the parties make available;
(5) what facilities must be constructed, improved, or repaired.[232]

Thus, when the physical environment consists of rugged, densely forested, terrain, and adverse weather and climate, major consequences on tactical effectiveness are likely to be present, resulting in *high level* risks. When there are few consequences on tactical effectiveness resulting from the climate and terrain, this is more likely a *mid level* risk. When the physical environment of the target state is not a factor (low consequences), this is generally a *low level* risk.

Consequences for U.S. Prestige and Relationships

When participating in any military intervention operation, U.S. decision-makers must assess who will be held responsible for the outcome of the intervention and consider the possible consequences to U.S. prestige and relationships. As a world power with global responsibilities, prestige is important to the United States. Pirnie and Simons (1996) maintain that the United States can participate in peacekeeping operations without risking prestige, since it is the responsibility of the parties involved to maintain agreements. When the U.S. participates in operations that require higher levels of engagement, however, its prestige can be affected by the outcome. For example, the

experiences accompanying the unsuccessful military intervention in Somalia resulted in negative consequences to the efficacy of future intervention operations in response to humanitarian crises. Moreover, they argue that if the United States "appears irresolute or easily discouraged in an ambitious peace operation, especially peace enforcement, it will lose prestige, which will diminish the United States' ability to advance its own interests elsewhere in the world."[233]

The United States must also consider how military intervention may affect relationships with other countries — especially Russia and China — and organizations such as the United Nations. If key countries or organizations oppose U.S. military intervention, the U.S. risks damaging important relationships if forces are deployed. Risks might include the loss of legitimacy of the intervention, an increase of participants involved in the crisis, and adverse diplomatic consequences for the relationship between the countries involved.

Thus, the potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige and negative consequences to relationships with major powers is likely to result in a *high level* risk. The potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige and negative consequences to relationships with minor powers is more likely a *mid level* risk. When the intervention is unlikely to harm U.S. prestige nor negatively change relationships with other countries, *low level* risks generally follow.

Risk-Level Intensity Continuum

Again, risks can be conceptualized in three levels: high, mid, and low. The above factors can assist decision-makers in recognizing what risks accompany military

intervention (See Figure 3.2). Similar to the concept of threat, it is unlikely that every crisis will fit neatly into one level of risk, as defined by the above factors. Thus, if factors are split between different levels of risk, decision-makers should be more cautious and assume the higher level of risk. Moreover, decision-makers can also look at the relative importance of each factor to determine the most accurate level of risk. The *overall* level of risk should then be compared to the *overall* level of threat. Again, if the *risk level* outweighs the *threat level*, U.S. multilateral military intervention should be avoided. If the *threat level* outweighs the *risk level*, U.S. multilateral military intervention would be warranted. In situations where the *threat level* and *risk level* are equivalent, an opportunity analysis — the assessment of the potential effectiveness of the intervention — should be conducted.

FIGURE 3.2 — RISK-LEVEL INTENSITY CONTINUUM

	HIGH LEVEL RISK	MID LEVEL RISK	LOW LEVEL RISK
Type of Conflict			
Interstate	Conflict between major actors	Conflict between regional actors	Conflict between actors peripheral to U.S.
Intrastate	Civil Wars	—	—
	Revolutions with high likelihood of success	Revolutions with moderate likelihood of success	Revolutions with low likelihood of success
	Factional conflicts with high levels of public support/military capability	Factional conflicts with moderate levels of public support/military capability	Factional conflicts with low levels of public support/military capability
	Failed states w/low ability to fulfill intervention goals	Failed states w/moderate ability to fulfill intervention goals	Failed states w/high ability to fulfill intervention goals
	Identity/secessionist movements with regime willingness to grant autonomy low	Identity/secessionist movements with regime willingness to grant autonomy moderate	Identity/secessionist movements with regime willingness to grant autonomy high
Duration of Conflict	Long-term involvement (years)	Mid-term involvement (months)	Short-term involvement (weeks)
Stage of Conflict	Initial stages of conflict	Initial stages of negotiation by some parties	Initial states of negotiation by all parties
Potential Costs			
Economic	Substantial	Moderate	Minimal
Military	Substantial	Moderate	Minimal
Human	Substantial (thousands)	Moderate (hundreds)	Little-to-no casualties
Political	Support low	Support divided	Support high
Support			
Domestic	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
International	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
Extent of Military Engagement			
Level	Large-scale	Moderate-scale	Low-scale
Leadership	Sizable role	Moderate role	Minimal role
Organization of Intervention Force	Disparate coalition	Moderately effective	Well organized/efficient
Consent of Parties	Lack of consent	Some parties consent	All parties consent
Target State Attributes			
Political aims	Adversary interests outweigh U.S. interests	Adversary interests and U.S. interests same	U.S. interests greater than adversary interests
Strength/ability of opposition	Significant strength/ability to carry out political aims	Moderate strength/ability	Little strength/ability
Physical environment	Major consequences	Few consequences	Low consequences
Consequences For U.S. Prestige	Major loss	Minor loss	No harm
U.S. Relationships	Negative consequences to relationships with major powers	Negative consequences to relationships with minor powers	No negative change to relationships with other countries

Overall Risk — Contingent upon the analysis of the above factors for the case under study.

OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS

The final component of the intervention decision-making calculus — *opportunity analysis* — consists of an assessment of the potential long-term effectiveness of the intervention, specifically once U.S. forces are withdrawn. In other words, an opportunity assessment allows decision-makers to consider whether the intervention is expected to make a lasting difference (i.e., long-term resolution to the conflict). As Vertzberger (1998) notes, "opportunities have positive connotations: a perceived high potential for gain without loss and for successful resolution of the problem, a sense of controllability, and a sense of being qualified, and having the freedom, to take effective action."[234] Opportunity analysis, however, is not an assessment of the likelihood of success or failure of the intervention *policy*. Conditions for success of the immediate outcome of an intervention will not always converge with the conditions that contribute to efforts that achieve a *long-term* solution to the conflict.

As with many intervention situations, there may exist domestic pressure to intervene in an area with humanitarian concerns, such as genocide. Television coverage of humanitarian abuses often create a demand that "something must be done," stimulating a humanitarian response. As Ignatieff (1998) notes, the humanitarian, moral pressure from the political constituency in favor of intervention is integral to the process by which a reason for intervention is eventually discerned and acted on.[235] However, as Hoffman (1993) points out, "if the humanitarian crisis is...provoked either by the disintegration of a state or by the deliberate evil policies of a government, it becomes extremely difficult for the interveners to remedy the humanitarian disaster without addressing the causes that

produced it."[236] Thus, in many cases, military intervention may temporarily halt conflict, only for the situation to revert back to the same conditions prior to intervention. In these situations, and others, an opportunity analysis assists decision-makers in determining whether multilateral military intervention would do any good.

Thus, the purpose of the opportunity analysis is to assess the potential benefits *before* the intervention has taken place. Different than the components of threat and risk, however, an opportunity analysis will be conceptualized as either an opportunity exists, or it doesn't. The following questions can assist decision-makers in determining whether an opportunity exists. First, can the conflict be resolved through outside intervention or will the crises actors reach quicker, more-lasting resolution without third parties taking an active role? Second, can the intervention resolve the underlying issues in the dispute or will it merely halt the conflict temporarily? Third, if the intervention can effectively stop the fighting in the short-term, what are the prospects for long-term resolution of the conflict? Finally, what is the likelihood that the situation will revert back to the same conditions prior to the intervention once U.S. forces leave the conflict area? An opportunity exists when the conflict can be resolved through outside intervention, the underlying issues in the dispute can be resolved, prospects for long-term resolution of the conflict are likely, and the situation will unlikely revert back to the same conditions prior to the intervention once U.S. forces leave the conflict area. While an opportunity analysis should be conducted before every intervention decision is made, it is especially important when the threat and risk levels are equivalent. In those situations, *military* intervention should be avoided if it is not expected to make a lasting difference.

CHAPTER 4

U.S. MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

From experience comes judgment, which involves knowing how to decide such things, knowing what is the right thing to do under the circumstances — undoubtedly the most important practical moral faculty of statecraft.

— Robert Jackson

Each component of the U.S. multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus discussed in Chapter 3 (threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis) will be applied to selected past cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention during the post-Cold War era. Each case study will first assess the level of threat for each of the eight key factors relating to threat: (1) contentious issues; (2) crisis actors; (3) geostrategic salience; (4) actors endangered; (5) potential level of military force; (6) extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries; (7) systemic changes; and (8) consequences without U.S. intervention (inaction). An analysis of the above factors for the case under study will then provide an overall assessment of the level of threat (high, mid, or low) specific to that case. Similarly, the level of risk for each of the ten key factors relating to risk will be assessed: (1) type of conflict; (2) duration of conflict; (3) stage of conflict; (4) costs (economic, military, human, and political); (5) support (domestic and international); (6) extent of military engagement (level and leadership); (7) organization of intervention force; (8) consent of parties; (9) target state attributes (political aims, strength/ability, and physical environment); and (10) consequences for U.S. prestige and relationships. An analysis of the above factors for the case under study

will then provide an overall assessment of the level of risk (high, mid, or low) specific to that case. Finally, an opportunity analysis will be conducted and conclusions will be made regarding whether the U.S. was correct to participate in the multilateral military intervention. While decision-makers applying the U.S. multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus will be assessing the *perceived* threat, risk and opportunity, the analysis of past cases in Chapter 4 will look at the *actual* threat and risk and assess whether the intervention has made a difference. An underlying assumption is made that the perceived threat and risk will closely parallel the actual threat and risk. In cases where evidence points to significant differences in perception and reality, the perceived threat or risk will be assessed. For example, the perceived human costs in the Persian Gulf conflict were substantially higher than the actual human costs. Thus, the *perceived* human costs will be assessed with regard to the risk level intensity continuum. This will be necessary to provide accurate information to facilitate comparison and develop a framework for analysis. Moreover, while this is not a quantitative study, certainly each factor relating to threat or risk will not be equally important. Thus, the case studies will be able to demonstrate how important each factor is for multilateral military intervention decision-making. While there may be additional risk and threat factors important in intervention decision-making, this study concentrates on what appear to be the most critical.

Case selection was based on the following criteria: (1) U.S. military intervention occurred; (2) multilateral actors were involved; and (3) the intervention occurred in the post-Cold War era. As discussed earlier, the post-Cold War era is typically defined as the

period which began after the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989. Therefore, the following six case studies are examined: Persian Gulf Conflict, Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Based upon the conclusions drawn from the case studies, a framework for multilateral military intervention analysis will be presented in Chapter 5 (which will synthesize all three components — threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis — of the intervention decision-making calculus).

Persian Gulf Conflict

The end of the Cold War produced the absence of superpower rivalry leaving behind a power vacuum that Saddam Hussein attempted to fill. As Spanier and Hook (1998) point out, "Hussein's bid for hegemony in August 1990, which occurred while George Bush was still in office and before the Soviet Union finally collapsed, effectively produced the first post-Cold War world crisis."[236]

Mid-July 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered a build-up of Iraqi troops on Kuwait's border. U.S. officials viewed this action as a method of pressuring the Kuwaitis to negotiate on oil production and price. In fact, as Buhite (1997) points out, Saddam told U.S. Ambassador April C. Glaspie "...reassure the Kuwaitis. We are not going to do anything from our side until we meet with them. If we see that there is hope when we meet, then nothing will happen."[237] As a result, a number of diplomatic meetings were held between Iraqis and Kuwaitis in attempt to resolve the crisis. Nevertheless, on August 2, 1990, Hussein ordered the Iraqi army to occupy Kuwait.

Threat Assessment

The Iraqi invasion involved a number of contentious issues, including threats to Kuwaiti sovereignty (and possibly Saudi Arabia), regional stability, and access to energy supplies (i.e., oil resources). As Weisburd (1997) points out, reaction by the United States and the international community was immediate and negative:

> the United States was moved in part by the threat to its interests in Iraq's controlling a large fraction of the world's oil and in part by its objection to what it considered a flagrant violation of international law. The United Kingdom reacted similarly, likewise seeing the incident as a clear case of aggression violating international law. The Soviet Union also saw the invasion as clearly illegal.[238]

In response, the Gulf crisis quickly escalated to a regional conflict drawing in a number of crisis actors. Eventually a multilateral military coalition numbering over 25 states mobilized against Saddam. The American-led multinational force included European states (e.g., the United Kingdom, France, and Czechoslovakia), Arab states (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco), and other diverse countries such as Australia, Canada, Argentina, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Moreover, other states, such as Germany and Japan, provided financial support.[239]

The strong international reaction against the Iraqi invasion also demonstrated the significance of the crisis location. The Persian Gulf contains energy interests that make the region one of broad geostrategic salience. As Morris (1993) notes, "as the source of one of the world's most vital resources, the Middle East has been perceived as a geostrategic asset."[240] As Iraqi forces approached the border of Saudi Arabia, the fear of Iraqi dominance over the world's energy markets forced the industrial powers to act.

Thus, protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (the main countries endangered by Iraqi forces and key U.S. trading partners) was important to the United States to safeguard access to energy supplies.

Following the initial invasion by Iraq, neither political nor economic intervention tools by the United States and other countries appeared to convince Saddam to remove the Iraqi military presence from Kuwait. For example, Blakley (1999) points out that "the United States immediately condemned the invasion, ordered an embargo on all Iraqi commerce, and froze both Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. Most Western European countries immediately followed suit and the Soviet Union halted all arms transfers...."[241] Thus, it became apparent that the likelihood of military intervention would be great.

One reason military force became necessary is in part because of initial misunderstandings. Iraqi transcripts from talks preceding the invasion account U.S. Ambassador Glaspie as saying "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."[242] Some scholars believe that this statement encouraged Saddam to believe that the United States would not respond militarily to an Iraqi invasion in Kuwait. This is important, because many times misunderstandings result from differences among crisis adversaries. Certainly, a large number of attribute differences in terms of military capability, political regime, economic development, and culture can have serious consequences for negotiations. As Snow and Brown (1994) point out, "Saddam is not, of course, motivated by the same drives as Americans, nor does he view different options in the same way."[243] When assessing the Gulf crisis, it is

apparent that the extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries was great.

If the United States had ignored Saddam's attempt for hegemony in the Persian Gulf region, it is likely that Saddam would have maintained control of Kuwait. If Saddam was successful, he could have also changed the balance of power in that region. As Haass (1999) points out, "how the United States and the West reacted to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait would have a significant impact upon the character of post-Cold War international relations."[244]

In the final analysis, the Persian Gulf conflict constituted a significant threat to U.S. interests. By assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-level intensity, the conflict can be placed somewhere between a high and mid level threat (see Table 4.1). The crisis related to high level threats as a result of the broad geostrategic salience of the crisis location, the high likelihood of military intervention, the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries, and the potential emergence of a regional hegemonic power not closely aligned with the U.S. in a region with high geostrategic salience. The crisis signified mid level threats with respect to the important issues at stake (e.g., Kuwaiti sovereignty, regional stability and access to energy supplies), the large number of crisis actors representing a regional conflict, U.S. key trading partners endangered in the crisis, and the consequences important to the well-being of the U.S. that would result from inaction. While the threat assessment of the Persian Gulf conflict connotes a significant level of threat to U.S. interests, a risk assessment must also be conducted to indicate what level of risk would accompany the multilateral military intervention.

Table 4.1 — Threat Assessment of the Persian Gulf Conflict

PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT			
THREAT FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Contentious Issues		• Kuwaiti sovereignty (and possibly Saudi Arabia) • Regional stability • Access to energy supplies	
Crisis Actors		• Regional conflict drawing in a large number of crisis actors	
Geostrategic Salience	• Broad geostrategic salience		
Actors Endangered		• Kuwait and Saudi Arabia key trading partners	
Potential Level of Military Force	• Likelihood of military intervention high; possibly on a large-scale level		
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences		
Systemic Changes	• Potential emergence of regional hegemon in a region with high geostrategic salience		
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)		• Consequences important to the well-being of the U.S.	
Overall Assessment	Crisis placed between high and mid levels of threat.		

Risk Assessment

The Gulf War involved a cross-border or interstate conflict between regional actors. As Blakely (1999) notes, "while less frequent than internal conflicts in the post-World War II era, cross-border conflicts remain an important threat to world stability and can be the most costly type of encounter in human and economic terms."[245] As discussed later, the Persian Gulf conflict resulted in substantial economic and military costs, but only moderate human costs. The lower than expected casualty rate was largely because

of the high tech advantage of U.S. forces which made the conflict short-term. Saddam was prepared for a set-piece type of warfare (such as with Iran).

While the Persian Gulf Conflict was relatively brief, policymakers had a difficult time predicting the estimated duration of conflict. For example, Snow and Brown (1994) discuss the debate over authorizing the President to use force:

> Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) stated one side, suggesting that the way would be 'brutal and costly' and could end with 'thousands, even tens of thousands, of American casualties.' The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Representative Les Aspin, countered with the belief that the war would be over in weeks, certainly not more than a month, and that casualties would be light.[246]

In retrospect, Aspin was closer in his assessment with the conflict lasting approximately seven months (August 2, 1990 to February 27, 1991). The duration of conflict largely depends on the political objectives sought by the intervening parties. While it was clear that the primary objective of the United States was to liberate Kuwait, its objectives could have also included changing the Iraqi regime (i.e., removing Saddam from power). Freedman and Karsh (1999) maintain that the latter policy option could have upset other Arab states and turned into a long-term liability (especially if there was popular opposition). Moreover, as Spanier and Hook (1998) point out, "the United States and its allies did not want to see Iraq disintegrate. They expected Iraq to maintain its pivotal role in the Middle East balance of power, a role not possible if Iraq were partitioned."[247] Thus, by limiting its objectives to the liberation of Kuwait, the United States was in effect lowering the risk of becoming involved in a protracted conflict.[248] Moreover, Saddam's

refusal to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, even after U.S. troops were deployed to the region, indicated to the United States that negotiations with the Iraqi leader were very unlikely.

In response to Saddam's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait, President George Bush announced (August 8, 1990) that "this aggression will not stand."[249] He deployed American troops to Saudi Arabia as a "shield" of protection against Iraqi attack. Bush articulated four principles for Operation Desert Shield: (1) Kuwait's liberation; (2) the restoration of Kuwait's government; (3) the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region; and (4) the protection of U.S. citizens.[250]

On November 8, 1990 Bush announced a build-up to almost 500,000 forces in the Gulf region to further intimidate Iraq and force the liberation of Kuwait. In addition, Bush sought not only U.S. congressional authorization but also international support, which was well-received. The United Nations passed a number of resolutions demanding the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Most significantly, Resolution 678 (Nov 29, 1990) authorized member states to use "all necessary means" after January 15, 1991 to liberate Kuwait and restore international peace and security in the region.[251] Bush continued diplomatic talks with Iraq, and on January 5, 1991, sent a letter to Hussein reaffirming the gravity of this deadline:

> We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world. This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678....[which] establishes the period before January 15 of this year as a "pause of good will" so that this crisis may end without further violence. Whether this

> pause is used as intended, or merely becomes a prelude to further violence, is in your hands, and yours alone. I hope you weigh your choice carefully and choose wisely, for much will depend upon it.[253]

In response to non-compliance after the January 15th deadline, a U.S.-led coalition was launched against Iraq — Operation Desert Storm. The coalition began with an air-only phase destroying Iraqi command-and-control posts, air fields, communications centers, and other military installations. In the phase involving strategic air power, bridges and roads were destroyed to prevent supplies from reaching Iraqi forces. Finally, the coalition initiated a ground operation (combining air, land, and sea campaign) to force Iraq out of Kuwait.[254] Within 100 hours, the Iraqis were defeated, exceeding the expectations of the most optimistic military planners. The Bush administration concluded that the objectives of the intervention were achieved and that further military efforts "would endanger U.S. and coalition forces and meet domestic and international resistance."[255]

According to Blakley (1999), the cost of liberating Kuwait from Iraq totaled $61.1 billion ($7.3 billion payed by the United States and the rest by American allies).[256] Operations and maintenance costs alone were about $11 billion, which included costs for fuel, military construction, equipment maintenance and repair, and various other types of support.[257] Moreover, costs other than military expenditures were absorbed by the United States, such as debt forgiveness, environmental damage, and increases in oil prices. For example, $6.7 billion in debts owed to the United States by Egypt were canceled due to its participation in the crisis. Cleaning up oil spills polluting the Gulf Waters cost over

$2.5 billion, and oil price increases were estimated to have cost the U.S. economy $29-$30 billion.[257] In short, Blakley (1999) estimates the total external cost of the Persian Gulf conflict to have exceeded $100 billion.[258]

While economic costs to the United States were substantial, human costs (casualties) were fairly light. As O'Hanlon (1997) points out, in the course of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm almost 400 Americans died (150 by the Iraqis; almost 100 in training and related activities before the war began; and 150 from "nonhostile" acts during the war).[259] In fact, casualties were expected to be much greater than the actual numbers. For example, Freedman and Karsh (1999) note that early assessments estimated eight to ten percent casualty rates. Once the ground war was initiated, expected casualties were estimated at 5,000.[260] Larson (1996) contends that some prewar predictions ranged as high as 30,000 battle deaths.[261]

As mentioned earlier, a main political concern for the U.S. administration was the potential for military action to escalate into another "Vietnam." Yet, as Freedman and Karsh (1999) note, "restricting intervention objectives to the liberation of Kuwait did not involve the risk of a Vietnam-type quagmire."[262] Limiting objectives to only the liberation of Kuwait, however, may have cost President Bush support in the long-run. While his public approval ratings reached an unprecedented 90 percent following the coalition's victory, political controversy mounted over whether the U.S. should have continued using military force until Saddam was removed from power. As Snow and Brown (1994) note, "controversy over Saddam's eventual disposition has arisen because of the expectation periodically stated by President Bush that his overthrow was

desirable...When he was not, those unsure of the objective could only wonder if it had been achieved."[263] In fact, Schwarz (1994) points out that a Gallup Poll conducted February 3, 1991 revealed that 67 percent of respondents wanted the U.S. to continue war until Saddam was removed from power.[264]

While public support fluctuated according to the conditions surrounding the time in which the survey was conducted, in general, the multilateral military intervention received high levels of public support. Schwarz (1994) points out that initial Gallup polls revealed a divided public, but as U.S. commitment increased, so did the level of public support:

> A Gallup poll conducted six days before the Senate vote showed 52 percent of respondents favoring the 'United States going to war with Iraq to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait' and 39 percent opposing that measure. Six weeks earlier, when asked the same question, only 37 percent approved American intervention, and 51 percent disapproved. Once the United States was committed to action against Iraq, however, the public quickly rallied around the flag. On the eve of the air offensive against Iraq the public had shifted significantly: 79 percent in favor, 15 percent opposed. A little over two weeks later, the public was even more firmly behind the intervention: 83 percent in favor, 15 percent opposed.[265]

Zaller (1992) notes two reasons why this mobilization of mass support was impressive. First, it was achieved without reference to a communist threat, which typically justified the use of force for the preceding 40 years. Secondly, most people anticipated the loss of American life to be costly.[266] Larson (1996) explains that this relationship between casualty expectation and support is linked to how important the public views the intervention objectives. In the case of the Persian Gulf conflict, there was broad

consensus among the public that important U.S. interests were at stake.[267] Moreover, Larson contends that support for military intervention "seems in part to have been the result of a declining belief that sanctions alone would achieve an Iraqi withdrawal.[268]

Bipartisan congressional support was also high for the initial defensive measures (sending troops to Saudi Arabia to deter further aggression, economic sanctions, and the call up of U.S. reserves). Consensus declined, however, when President Bush announced his intension to increase U.S. forces, signaling military action as likely or even inevitable.[269] As Larson (1996) notes, "President Bush's announcement of an increase in forces to create an 'offensive option' in November 1990 was met with congressional hearings and harsh criticism from opponents, mostly Democrats."[270] In fact, the Senate vote in favor of military action against Iraq barely passed with a vote of 52 in favor, 47 opposed; in the House, 250 supported the use of force, 183 opposed.[271]

The United States was not alone in responding to Iraqi aggression. As Blakley (1999) demonstrates, international action was taken against Saddam:

> The United States immediately condemned the invasion, ordered an embargo on all Iraqi commerce, and froze both Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. Most Western European countries immediately followed suit and the Soviet Union halted all arms transfers, effectively isolating Saddam. Iran also demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and Israel announced that any movement by Iraqi troops into Jordan would be met with an immediate military response. Within twenty-four hours of occupying Kuwait, Iraq stood alone.[272]

Broad international support against Saddam was also evident by the large number of states participating in the multinational coalition and by the actions of the United Nations.

The U.N. passed four key Security Council resolutions, each with increasing severity. Security Council Resolution 660 was passed on the day of the invasion, August 2, 1990, with a vote of 14 to 0 (Yemen abstained). The resolution condemned the Iraqi invasion and threatened subsequent action if Iraq did not remove its troops from Kuwait. On August 6, 1990, Security Council Resolution 661, which imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq, was passed with a vote of 13 to 2 (Cuba and Yemen voted against it). When Iraq continued to ignore the international demands for withdrawal, the Security Council passed Resolution 665 with a vote of 13 to 0 (Cuba and Yemen abstained) on August 25, 1990. The resolution authorized the use of naval forces to enforce the economic embargo. Finally, November 29, 1990, Security Council Resolution 678 was passed with a vote of 12 to 2 (Cuba and Yemen voted against it and China abstained). The resolution authorized member states to "use all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait if Iraqi troops were not withdrawn by January 15, 1991.[273]

While international support was broad, there were states unwilling to support action against Iraq. Weisburd (1997) discusses this mixed support:

> Outside of Arab states, few third-world states supported the effort against Saddam, although India allowed United States and Australian aircraft to refuel on their way to the Gulf. Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania spoke out for Iraq, and Morocco, which had sent troops to aid the defense of Saudi Arabia, had to moderate its support in the face of domestic opposition. Only Argentina of the Latin states actively supported the UN effort. While the United Kingdom and France played an important role in the attack on Iraq's forces, other European states were more hesitant in their support. On the other hand, Canada and Australia sent naval and air forces to the Gulf, Germany, Japan, Korea, and a number of the Gulf states provided crucial

> financial support; and Turkey both rigorously enforced economic sanctions and permitted air strikes against Iraq from its territory.[274]

Even though the *entire* international community did not support action against Saddam, international support still reached unprecedented levels.

This broad international support of the multilateral military intervention also demonstrated to U.S. decision-makers that U.S. participation would not risk damaging relationships with important countries. Moreover, since action was legitimized by the UN and supported by the international community, the loss of U.S. prestige resulting from negative experiences accompanying the intervention would be unlikely.

The U.S.-led multinational force included over 25 states with the strength of 695,000 troops (approximately 425,000 U.S. forces).[275] As Freedman and Karsh (1999) note "it was...largely expected that the disparate coalition of Western and Arab states would split under the stress and strains of war: American military strategy therefore had to be reinforced by a careful leadership of the alliance."[276] While the coalition was clearly diverse and vulnerable to political division, decisive and swift action allowed the coalition to accomplish its objectives while maintaining cohesiveness. Moreover, the multinational force had the advantage of modern technology and accurate intelligence. As Blakley (1999) notes, "the Gulf War demonstrated the increasing military power gap between advanced and less developed nations. The Soviet-oriented Iraqi military was no match for the West's sophisticated weapons."[277] The coalition force also had an enormous logistical advantage. According to Freedman and Karsh (1999), "it [the logistical effort] was possible in the Gulf, initially because of the existence of pre-

positioned stocks, but more importantly because of first-class ports and military airfields."[279] Moreover, the success of the coalition force can be attributed to Saddam's delay of further invasion in the region.

While Saddam was able to mobilize a large number of reservists, only a limited number of Iraq's divisions were considered competent. In fact, the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated to U.S. decision-makers that Iraqi reservists were likely to surrender when the opportunity arose. In the face of these disadvantages, Saddam continued his efforts against the strong coalition because he believed that his political survival could be at stake. Seizing control of Kuwait would not only improve his domestic political position, but also solve Iraq's financial crisis. As Buhite (1997) points out, Hussein had a number of possible motives for his action:

> (1) to take territory historically considered a part of Iraq;
> (2) to punish the Kuwaitis for pumping so much oil that they helped depress the world price of that commodity at a time when Iraq needed oil revenues to retire its large debt from its war with Iran; and
> (3) as the first step in a move to achieve political and economic domination of the Persian Gulf region.[280]

While Saddam did not have the military capability necessary to fulfill his political objectives, the threat that he might use weapons of mass destruction raised the risk to coalition forces. In fact, as Snow and Brown (1994) note, "the destruction of remaining capabilities was an explicit term of the ceasefire negotiated to end the war, as was the United Nations' monitoring and inspection of sites within Iraq suspected of hiding either the weapons or the missiles."[281] Saddam's reluctance to cooperate with the UN remains a

source of contention.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention responding to the Persian Gulf conflict represented a mid level risk (see Table 4.2). High level risks were generated based on the low level of negotiation likely by Saddam, the substantial economic, military, and *perceived* human costs (actual human costs were moderate), the large-scale operation, the sizable role of the United States as the lead state, and the high level adversary interests. Mid level risks were likely since the interstate conflict resulted in a regional contest, moderate time frame (months), moderate human and political costs, mixed congressional support, a disparate but well organized coalition, consent by some parties (e.g., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), low capabilities of the target state, and the potential for only a minor loss of U.S. prestige. Finally, low level risks were demonstrated by the substantial levels of public and international support, low consequences resulting from the physical environment, and the unlikely negative change to relationships with other countries.

Table 4.2 — Risk Assessment of the Persian Gulf Conflict

PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict		• Interstate (regional actors)	
Duration of Conflict		• Mid-term involvement (months)	
Stage of Conflict	• Intervention in active conflict		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• Substantial economic costs • Substantial military costs • *Perceived* substantial human costs (actual human costs moderate)	• Moderate political costs	
Support **Domestic** **International**		• Mixed congressional support	• Substantial public support • Substantial international support
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• Large-scale operation • U.S.-led intervention (sizable role)		
Organization of Intervention Force		• Disparate coalition, but well organized	
Consent of Parties		• Consent by some parties (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia)	
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversaries interests outweigh U.S. interests	• Low capability, but has access to weapons of mass destruction	• Low consequences resulting from physical environment
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**		• Potential for minor loss of U.S. prestige	• Intervention is unlikely to negatively change relationships with other countries
Overall Assessment		Crisis placed as a mid level risk.	

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall threat level outweighs the overall risk level, warranting U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. Furthermore, an opportunity analysis further demonstrates that the United States was correct in intervening in the Persian Gulf conflict. Prior to intervention, it

appeared likely that an outside party could resolve the conflict. Moreover, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other surrounding Arab countries were unlikely to reach a quick, lasting resolution without third parties taking an active role. While Iraq will continue to represent a source of potential conflict and impact oil supplies, the prospects for long-term resolution of the Persian Gulf conflict appeared likely. Thus, an opportunity did exist for an external force to make a long-term difference when responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath

Despite the coalition's decisive success in liberating Kuwait and destroying Iraqi forces, Saddam continued to demonstrate his ability to create havoc. As Spanier and Hook (1998) note, "he recognized his importance to the strategic interests of the Western Powers, and he openly exploited his freedom to inflame the Persian Gulf region at the time and place of his choosing."[282] Two major rebellions surfaced against Saddam's authority: a Shiite Muslim uprising in the south and a Kurdish uprising in the north. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to become involved in Iraqi's civil conflicts. As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) note, "at first the United States was reluctant to do anything substantial, not wanting to contravene the principle of non-intervention which had just been upheld in the war, fearing involvement in a Vietnam-style quagmire, and reluctant to trigger a breakup of Iraq which might be to Iran's advantage."[283] Policy changed, however, when in early April, millions of Kurdish refugees were faced with starvation and exposure. As Haass (1999) notes, "television and press accounts created public and congressional as well as international calls for a response."[284]

Threat Assessment

The initial mission of the U.S.-led intervention was justified by the Bush administration as humanitarian in purpose — a response to human suffering and massive flow of refugees. France and Turkey were the first countries to petition an international response. Both countries argued that the massive flow of refugees was a threat to the security and stability of the region. Stromseth (1993) describes the concerns expressed

by neighboring countries:

> Turkey, with a Kurdish population larger than Iraq's, feared the prospect of an accelerating stream of Kurdish refugees within its borders. Turkish officials estimated that up to a million Iraqi Kurds might flee into Turkey. Iran faced a similar refugee problem as Kurds in the north and Shi'ite Muslims in the south fled Iraqi repression, and Iran estimated that 500,000 Iraqi refugees would cross into Iran in early April alone.[285]

Thus, on April 5, 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688 by a vote of 10-3, with two abstentions. The resolution condemned Iraq's repression of its civilian population and maintained that the massive flow of refugees towards and across international borders constituted a threat to international peace and security. In response, the resolution demanded Iraqi repression to stop, called upon the Secretary-General to pursue humanitarian efforts in Iraq, insisted that Iraq allow international humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance, and appealed to member states and humanitarian organizations to contribute to these efforts.[286]

Soon after, the United States, France, Great Britain, and Turkey collectively announced the creation of a security zone in northern Iraq from which all Iraqi military forces were barred as well as a larger no-fly zone located north of 36 degrees in which no Iraqi aircraft would be permitted to fly. While American and allied officials argued that the purpose of Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq (which later became Operation Northern Watch) was humanitarian, not political, it inevitably led to one of the fundamental issues of politics — sovereignty. For example, according to Mandelbaum (1994), "Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq turned into the maintenance of a de

facto autonomous zone for the Kurds of Iraq. They were protected from Saddam Hussein by the U.S. military presence in neighboring Turkey and by the enforcement of a no-fly zone directed at Iraqi warplanes above the 36th parallel."[287] Similar to Operation Provide Comfort, on August 26, the United States, Britain, and France initiated Operation Southern Watch which established a no-fly zone south of 32 degrees to facilitate monitoring of Iraqi compliance with UN requirements in response to the repression of the Muslim Shiites in the south.[288]

As noted earlier, the United States was reluctant to be involved in a multilateral military intervention. The crisis was clearly a communal conflict that didn't appear to have a large impact on U.S. interests, no significant systemic changes were likely as a result of the conflict, and while Iraq was located in a geostrategic region, the conflict did not surround issues relating to energy interests or other strategic resources. Moreover, the Kurdish and Shi'ite populations endangered by the crisis were peripheral to U.S. interests. The United States was concerned, however, with the concerns expressed by Turkey and Iran that the crisis would threaten regional stability. For example, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering argued the following:

> it is the Council's legitimate responsibility to respond to the concerns of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran, concerns increasingly shared by other neighbours of Iraq, about the massive numbers of people fleeing, or disposed to flee, from Iraq across international frontiers because of repression and brutality of Saddam Hussein. The *transboundary impact* of Iraq's treatment of its civilian population threatens regional stability.[289]

While Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch were quite

effective initially, Saddam repeatedly violated the no-fly zones as well as other cease-fire agreements. In January 1993, Iraq deployed anti-aircraft missiles in areas that threatened allied aircraft enforcing the northern and southern fly zones, closed Iraqi air space to UN aircraft, and removed weapons stored in the demilitarized zones. As a result, a U.S.-led coalition conducted air strikes against Iraqi missile sites and related facilities in southern Iraq in order to enforce UN Security Council resolutions. Iraq continued to violate the cease-fire agreements (specifically failure to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors), and in October 1994, Iraq moved troops toward the border of Kuwait in an effort to lift the oil export embargo. Consequently, the United States and allies responded by deploying additional troops in the Persian Gulf region. President Clinton warned that "it would be a grave error for Iraq to repeat the mistakes of the past [the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait] or to misjudge either American will or American power."[290] These events once again demonstrated the potential danger of the likelihood of misunderstanding resulting from heterogeneity among crisis adversaries. While Iraq subsequently withdrew its forces and shortly after recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and borders, Saddam continued to pose a threat to the region.

While it is difficult to assess the possible consequences without U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in the Persian Gulf aftermath, it is expected that U.S. inaction would have resulted in larger refugee flows and additional human suffering. While ethical concerns surrounding humanitarian concerns may be important to decision-makers, it seems that inaction would have had only minimal consequences to U.S. national interests.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-level intensity, the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath constituted a low level threat to U.S. interests (see Table 4.3). Certainly, the crisis had the potential to escalate to a mid level threat if the refugee flows disrupted stability in the Persian Gulf Region. The threat assessments of the Persian Gulf aftermath demonstrated that one high level threat was present — the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries. Mid level threats included the massive flow of refugee flows and the amount of force that would be required to enforce the intervention objectives (e.g., no-fly zone enforcement and limited strikes). Finally, low level threats resulted from the fact that the crisis was humanitarian in nature, a communal conflict, not surrounding issues relating to geostrategic interests, unlikely to cause any systemic changes, and unlikely to harm national interests from U.S. inaction.

Table 4.3 — Threat Assessment of the Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath

PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT AFTERMATH			
THREAT FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Contentious Issues		• Massive refugee flows potentially resulting in regional instability	• Humanitarian concerns
Crisis Actors			• Communal conflict
Geostrategic Salience			• Conflict did not surround issues relating to geostrategic interests
Actors Endangered			• Threats against actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential Level of Military Force		• Limited amounts of force: no-fly zone enforcement and limited strikes	
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences		
Systemic Changes			• No significant changes
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)			• Minimal consequences to U.S. interests
Overall Assessment			Crisis placed as a low level threat with the potential to escalate to a mid level threat if the refugee flows disrupted stability in the Persian Gulf Region

Risk Assessment

It is important for decision-makers to understand the context of the crisis when determining what risks the United States can expect by participating in a multilateral military effort. Following the success of the coalition forces in the Gulf War, early March 1991, both rebel Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Shi'ite opposition forces in southern Iraq perceived an opportunity to challenge Saddam. The Kurds sought

autonomy and self-determination, a struggle that has been ongoing for years. Although, as Stromseth (1993) points out, the Kurdish leaders are now seeking greater autonomy and political rights within Iraq rather than a separate Kurdish state.[290] The second group, the Shi'ite Muslims, constitute more than 50 percent of Iraq's population, but they have been disadvantaged both politically and economically within Iraqi society. While the rebellions had initial success in taking control of cities and territory, by the end of March, Iraqi forces were able to quickly crush the rebellion and retake control of the rebel-held areas. Consequently, thousands of Kurdish and Shi'ite refugees fled toward neighboring Turkey and Iran. Saddam continued to oppose any attempts for either group to gain power and demonstrated his willingness to use force against the Kurdish and Shi'ite populations.[291]

When the international community responded, Saddam denounced the allied operation as an intervention in Iraq's internal affairs. It was clear that Saddam would continue to present challenges to the U.S. and allies. Thus, efforts to maintain the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq required a long-term commitment on the part of the U.S.-led multilateral force. Such involvement has proven to be costly economically and militarily. As Byman (2000) notes, "contingency operations in the gulf cost roughly $1 billion a year, in addition to the money necessary for overall force posture in the region. The large military presence in the gulf and the need to carry out frequent military strikes have hindered U.S. military preparedness and hurt the morale of U.S. forces."[292] A substantial portion of these costs would finance the no-fly zone enforcement operations. He further contends that morale, retention, and overall readiness have fallen as a result of

the inhospitable welcome given to U.S. forces.[293]

Maintaining a strong military presence in the region carries a political price as well. Domestic consensus against Saddam has pressured the U.S. administration to respond to Iraqi aggression. However, as Byman (2000) notes, "much of the business community, many of whom do not strongly oppose the U.S. presence on ideological grounds, criticize U.S. policy in the region because they believe the cost of the U.S. presence has led to a decline in government largesse and is generally bad for business."[294] More recently, support for the U.S.-led operation is fading both in Congress and among the American people. In fact, in August 1999, a bipartisan group of Congress formally noted their "dismay over the continued drift in U.S. policy toward Iraq."[295] Yet, as Byman (2000) notes, dissent is even more pronounced abroad:

> The gulf states and Turkey in general support a hard line against Iraq, but have at times criticized or opposed key elements of U.S. policy, such as sanctions of military strikes. Among the major powers, only Britain is solidly behind the United States. France, Russia, and China have at times harshly criticized U.S. policy, claiming that it is both ineffective and unfair.[296]

Air strikes against radar installations and anti-defense sites near Baghdad in February 2001 have received extensive criticism not only among Arab countries, but also from the three other UN Security Council members — China, France, and Russia. The raids were in response to indications that Iraqi air defenses yielded an increased threat to allied aircraft enforcing the zones. Nevertheless, questions have been raised regarding the political and legal grounds for such actions as well as the proper U.S. role in policing Iraqi compliance with the no-fly zones and UN requirements.[297] The strikes were

requested by American military commanders in the region, who maintained that Iraqi air defenses had become increasingly aggressive and effective in their ability to track warplanes, thus, endangering U.S. pilots patrolling the Iraqi skies. Moreover, according to the U.S. European Command, Iraqi forces fired anti-aircraft artillery at planes enforcing the zone, and radar had targeted U.S. planes.[299] It can be argued, however, that President Bush also authorized the strikes to send a strong message to Hussein that the United States would respond to Iraqi aggression as well as violations of UN requirements, such as mandates against the building of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, President Bush contended that the United States would continue to monitor whether Iraq was building weapons of mass destruction and that appropriate action would be taken in response to any such threats.[300] Thus, it appears that the United States will continue to maintain a sizeable role in the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath. Byman (2000) discusses the extent of military engagement by the United States:

> Since the end of the Gulf War, the total number of U.S. military personnel present both on the ground and at sea at any one time has fluctuated between 5,000 and 38,000, depending on the regional security environment and on rotation schedules. Troops in the region regularly include about 2,500 soldiers, 8,000 sailors and Marines, and another 1,000 staff from joint headquarters and joint units. In addition, about 200 combatants and direct support aircraft are deployed to the region to conduct Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch — the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq — along with their crews and support staff. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are key states for air bases, but Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates also play an important role.[301]

By taking the lead in the intervention operation, the U.S. has not risked command and

control problems. The United States also has the capabilities necessary to carry out its objectives. However, maintaining the no-fly zones requires constant basing and support from regional allies. The waning support expressed by the regional allies has the potential to complicate the U.S. mission.

While Iraq initially agreed to accept a UN presence on Iraqi territory for humanitarian purposes, Baghdad has continually protested the no-fly zone enforcement as illustrated by the recent events precipitating air strikes. Similar to as in the Gulf War, Saddam is fighting for what he believes to be vital interests — maintaining power over all of Iraq's territory as well as protecting his political survival. Iraq's military strength, however, has declined since the Gulf War. According to Byman (2000), Iraq's military capacity is less than 20 percent of what it was in 1990, and he attributes this to sanctions:

> Iraq's economic strength, the foundation of its military power, suffered dramatically because of sanctions....As Iraq depended on imports for logistical and supply assistance, as well as for complete systems, its military readiness and effectiveness has plummented. Efforts to meet shortfalls through smuggling and by increasing domestic production have largely failed. Iraqi forces have not been able to conduct routine maintenance, let alone modernization.[301]

While Saddam does not have the military strength to prevent U.S. air strikes, he does have the military capability to prevent successful rebellions against his regime (such as the Kurdish and Shi'ite groups) as well as to prolong conflict. As discussed earlier, this long-term involvement has been unable to sustain solid domestic and international support for no-fly zone enforcement. Thus, the component of the U.S.-led multilateral force has changed to almost unilateral action by the United States. Certainly, this lack of

support can have negative consequences for U.S. prestige and relationships.

In the final analysis, the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath constituted a significant risk to the United States. By assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, the conflict can be placed as a high level risk, possibly moving to a mid level risk (see Table 4.4). High level risks were present as a result of the Iraqi regime's unwillingness to grant autonomy or sovereignty to the identity/secessionist movements, long-term involvement expected in response to the crisis, intervention in active conflict, potential political costs, limited international support, the large U.S. role required, lack of consent by Iraq, vital interests at stake for Iraq, the potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige, and the potential for negative consequences for relationships with major powers. Mid level risks included the moderate economic and military costs, mixed congressional and public support, and the fact that Iraq has enough military strength to prolong the conflict. Finally, low level risks were the result of little-to-no casualties, the extent of engagement (low-scale operation), well-organized and efficient coalition forces, and the lack of negative consequences resulting from the physical environment.

Table 4.4 — Risk Assessment of the Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath

PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT AFTERMATH			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict	• Intrastate conflict. Regime unwilling to grant autonomy or sovereignty to the identity/secession movement		
Duration of Conflict	• Long-term involvement (years)		
Stage of Conflict	• *Intervention in active conflict*		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• Substantial political costs.	• Moderate economic costs • Moderate military costs	• Little-to-no casualties
Support **Domestic** **International**	• International support limited	• Congressional support mixed • Public support mixed	
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• U.S.-led sizable role		• Low-scale operation
Organization of Intervention Force			• Well-organized and efficient coalition
Consent of Parties	• Lack of consent		
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversaries interests outweigh U.S. interests	• Enough capability to prolong conflict	• Physical environment not a significant factor with air power (unless allied support ceases)
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**	• Potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige • Potential for negative consequences to relationships with major powers		
Overall Assessment	Crisis placed as a high level risk possibly moving to mid level risk		

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall risk level outweighs the overall threat level, which argues against continued U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. While action by the United States may have helped maintain regional stability in the Gulf, decision-makers needed to assess prior to intervention whether limited air power would be capable of effecting any positive long-term resolution. An opportunity analysis demonstrates that while outside intervention could create de facto independence for Iraqi Kurds, independence would only last as long as allied forces were available to prevent the imposition of Iraqi sovereignty.[303] Thus, it seems that an opportunity did not exist for the multilateral force (which is almost unilateral at this point) to make a lasting difference without a continued long-term U.S. military commitment.

Somalia

In 1991, a popular uprising and breakdown of security led to the downfall of the Somali president Siad Barre. In response, fighting broke out among insurgent groups struggling for power. As Lyons and Samatar (1995) point out, "owing in large measure to Barre's destructive, divisive policy, no broadly based political group existed to succeed the old leader. Consequently, competing factions and anarchy filled the resulting vacuum."[304] Initially, the UN was hesitant in becoming involved in the crisis in Somalia. Not only had the UN taken on new peacekeeping responsibilities since the end of the Cold War, but there was also the question of how much action was justified in Somalia. As Hirsh and Oakley (1995) point out:

> The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had rebuffed UN involvement in Sudan and Liberia and did not favor a UN political role in Somalia on grounds that there was no government to request international intervention. This sovereignty argument, and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in internal matters, plagued the United Nations repeatedly as it wrestled with how much action to take in Somalia.[305]

Yet, as the humanitarian crisis in Somalia deepened, the UN agreed to a limited role by delivering humanitarian relief supplies. Thus, in July 1992, the Security Council recommended in Resolution 767 an emergency airlift to deliver food and medical supplies to an area in southern Somalia referred to as the *Triangle of Death.*[306] Furthermore, the Bush administration announced that the U.S. would provide the military airlift required to transport the first 500 UN peacekeepers to Somalia which would also deliver the food and other relief supplies.[307] According to Laitin (1999), "in the U.S.-

support operation of UNOSOM I, called Provide Relief, more than twenty-eight thousand metric tons of relief supplies were delivered to Somalia."[308]

As the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, media attention heightened international response. While Operation Provide Relief was helping to alleviate some of the humanitarian suffering, much of the supplies were not reaching the Somali people. Thus, it became apparent that even a sustained airlift would not be able to reverse the situation in Somalia. Consequently, the UN increased humanitarian efforts and called for further U.S. commitment. In response, in December 1992, President Bush announced a U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), called Operation Restore Hope, that would "create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships over land to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation."[309] In effect, U.S. forces would provide a limited humanitarian mission to prepare the area for a UN political effort, UNOSOM II.

In short, multilateral military intervention in Somalia can be divided into three phases: (1) UNOSOM I, a UN-led humanitarian assistance mission; (2) UNITAF, a U.S.-led humanitarian intervention with limited enforcement duties; and (3) UNOSOM II, a UN-led humanitarian operation with extensive enforcement functions. Recognizing that U.S. involvement in UNOSOM I was very limited, this analysis will concentrate on assessing the threat and risk to U.S. participation in both UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

Threat Assessment

While the situation in Somalia called out for international attention, Somalia was

no longer of strategic importance to the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Although, as Clark (1993) notes, "many regional observers believed that the United States [had] a particular moral and political responsibility [to Somalia], given its long support of the Siad Barre dictatorship and the arguable contribution of American military and economic assistance to Somalia's descent into chaos."[310] Nevertheless, the rationale for U.S. involvement in Somalia was humanitarian in nature.

Violence throughout the country prevented economic production and the distribution of food, resulting in widespread famine. The director of the U.S. Agency for International Development described the Somali famine as "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world."[311] In 1992 alone, an estimated 350,000 Somalis (out of a population numbering less than six million) perished from severe malnutrition and nearly one million fled into relief camps in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.[312] Consequently, then acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger argued that the decision to deploy U.S. forces for UNITAF was made because of the "massive proportions" of the tragedy and the fact that the United States "could do something" about it.[313]

In the case of Somalia, the perpetrators of the tragedy are Somali. Following Barre's downfall, the United Somali Congress split into factions identified with two subclans in particular, one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by General Mohammed Farah Aidid. Yet, a number of militia leaders also became major actors in the Somali conflict. For example, in 1993, the UN organized efforts for discussions on a formula for political reconciliation and invited representatives of fourteen Somali factions.[314] Such efforts

proved to be difficult and generally unsuccessful. Sahnoun (1998) maintains that progress in Somalia could only be made through an understanding of the clan system and by working with the elders. He argues, however, that the UN and other outside parties undermined the traditional consultation and decision-making process in Somalia by antagonizing the elders and failing to make use of local networks.

Initial UN efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance met resistence from warring factions. According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996), some 80 percent of the aid was being confiscated, and entire areas were inaccessible.[315] Consequently, on December 3, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794 which approved the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."[316] Following the adoption of Resolution 794, the U.S.-led UNITAF was directed to ensure the distribution of relief supplies. President Bush wrote a letter to then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stating that the mission was "limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the U.N. peacekeeping force."[317] Yet, U.S. involvement did not end as expected. When UNOSOM II took over May 3, 1993, the U.S. role was intended to only be for specific requests for logistical support. Instead, the U.S. became involved in an expanded mission that included *nation building* — the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia and for the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.[318] In fact, in late 1993, U.S. objectives were modified to include "restoring calm to south Mogadishu, progress in disarming the warlords, and the establishment of credible local

police forces in major population centers."[319] Moreover, following an attack on UNOSOM II peacekeepers, where at least 23 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837 that authorized the pursuit and arrest of Aidid and others responsible for the attacks. On October 3, 1993, during an operation to capture Aidid, 18 U.S. troops were killed, 84 wounded, and one helicopter pilot captured. In response, President Clinton announced that he was sending more troops in the short run in order to protect the U.S. forces already in the country. However, he promised the withdrawal of all U.S. troops by March 31, 1994.[320] While the UN force (UNOSOM II) continued, its diminished strength and lack of success resulted in the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces by March 31, 1995.[321]

Without U.S. participation in humanitarian efforts in Somalia, it is likely that the UN would have had difficultly delivering humanitarian aid to the Somali people, resulting in a larger humanitarian tragedy. In fact, as Patman (1997) points out, claims were made that the U.S.-led force saved some 250,000 Somalis from starvation.[322] Moreover, President Bush discussed the importance of U.S. involvement in Somalia as a way of increasing international attention to the tragedy:

> The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act. In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations.[323]

In contrast, Lyons and Samatar (1995) point out that "some diplomats and observers

suggest that perhaps Somalis would have more success reaching political reconciliation without foreign involvement."[324] Nevertheless, while the Somali crisis calls attention to the moral obligation of the U.S., the events in Somalia are not important to the survival, nor even the well-being, of the United States.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention responding to the Somalia crisis represented a low level threat to U.S. interests (see Table 4.5). Threat assessments demonstrated that one high level threat was present — the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries. Similarly, one mid level threat resulted in the amount of force that would be required to enforce the intervention objectives (e.g., selective peace enforcement). Low level threats included the humanitarian nature of the conflict, limited geostrategic salience, actors peripheral to U.S. interests, no significant systemic changes, and minimal consequences to national interests from U.S. inaction.

Table 4.5 — Threat Assessment of the Somalian Conflict

SOMALIA			
THREAT FACTORS	HIGH	MID	LOW
Contentious Issues			• Humanitarian crisis
Crisis Actors			• Communal conflict
Geostrategic Salience			• Limited geostrategic salience
Actors Endangered			• Actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential Level of Military Force		• Limited amounts of force (e.g., selective peace enforcement)	
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries		
Systemic Changes			• No significant systemic changes
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)			• Minimal consequences to national interests
Overall Assessment			Crisis placed as a low level threat

Risk Assessment

Somalia demonstrated a clear example of a *failed state.* As Haass (1999) notes, a failed state "has no local political authority that can act as a national government. Rather, several competing authorities tend to have varying degrees of control in different parts of the country, resulting in chaos, violence, widespread suffering, and the neglect of basic human needs."[325] Moreover, the divisions within Somali society were less determined by ethnic, linguistic or religious differences than by economic and ecological conditions. As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) note, "the basis of Somali society and the roots of

the current conflict lie in the family, sub-clan and clan system."[326] Factions within Somalia were competing for control of territory and resources, what they perceived as vital interests. Factional strife made humanitarian intervention efforts extremely difficult. As Laitin (1999) notes, "the warlords had the capability to terrorize anyone who ventured into the countryside. Although anarchy in the bush made the success of humanitarian efforts precarious even with warlord acquiescence, they were the principal threats to the security of the refugee centers that humanitarian agencies sought to reach."[327]

The multilateral military intervention carried out by the U.S. and the UN had many facets. Levels of risk can be associated with the likelihood that the intervention goals will be fulfilled. The main responsibility of the U.S.-led UNITAF was to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the mission was also expanded to include some involvement in disarmament, assistance in the reestablishment of the police, prisons, and judiciary, and engagement in clearing roads and rebuilding airports. While UNITAF is believed to have prevented massive starvation and represented a major accomplishment of the international intervention, senior UN officials, including Boutros-Ghali, denied American claims that the U.S.-led force had created a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[328] When UNOSOM II took over the humanitarian intervention, the objectives were modified to include an ambitious task — disarmament of Somali militias, establishment of a police force, and the promotion national reconciliation. The likelihood of the UN fulfilling this mandate was low, especially considering the immediate operational problems with the force.

While U.S. multilateral military intervention in Somali was intended to be short-term (a few months), the actual duration of participation was one year and four months. The U.S.-led UNITAF lasted from December 3, 1992 to May 4, 1993; UNOSOM II lasted from May 4, 1993 to March 1995 (U.S. troops withdrawn March 31, 1994). According to Spencer (2001), the military operations cost the United States $1.5 billion.[329] The initial cost of UNOSOM II was estimated at $800 million, of which the United States would be responsible for a third.[330] The risks associated with the political and human costs depend on the intervention operation. In total, hostile casualties include 30 killed in action and 175 wounded in action.[331] However, most of these casualties took place during the UNOSOM II operation. Generally, throughout the UNITAF operation, casualties were low (e.g., four deaths due to hostile action through March 1993), and public and bipartisan congressional support held. As Larson (1995) points out, "Somalia was an intervention that promised vast humanitarian benefits and high prospects for success at little or no cost in U.S. lives, and accordingly, benefitted from bipartisan congressional support."[332] As U.S. objectives expanded in UNOSOM II, participation became deeply controversial as fighting and U.S. casualties increased. For example, seven additional U.S. deaths occurred between August and September and 18 in early October in the firefight in Mogadishu. Consequently, high levels of congressional and media criticism resulted and public support declined. As Hirsch and Oakley (1995) point out, "Public, congressional, Somali, and international reaction to the American role had gone from the highest praise to the fiercest criticism."[333]

The extent of U.S. engagement and leadership also depended upon the

intervention operation. UNOSOM I was a UN-led humanitarian intervention with a presence of approximately 500 peacekeeping troops. U.S. involvement was limited to an airlift of supplies. The U.S.-led UNITAF was made up of predominantly U.S. troops (25,800 peak troop strength) and under U.S. command. However, twenty three other countries also provided troops totally a force strength of 37,000.[334] In contrast, UNOSOM II took over on May 4, 1993 with a force level of approximately 25,000 troops supported initially by more than thirty countries. The United States (under UN command) provided approximately 3,000 troops for logistical support and some 1,300 combat troops supporting a quick reaction force. In October, the U.S. increased its military presence by over 5,000 troops for a period of just under six months.[335]

Lyons and Samatar (1995) summarize the organization of the three different phases of outside intervention in Somalia:

> The small and militarily weak UNOSOM I had a diplomatic strategy but lacked the capacity to pressure militia leaders. The large and powerful U.S.-led UNITAF had the resources but insisted that its mandate was limited and nonpolitical. The still large but militarily and organizationally weaker UNOSOM II had more ambitious goals but lacked a viable coherent political strategy.[336]

UNOSOM I operated under a traditional UN peacekeeping mandate that required consent by all parties prior to deployment, which ended up taking four months to obtain the grudging consent of General Aidid.[337] Once consent was given, Aidid refused to allow the Pakistani peacekeepers to deploy effectively, and UNOSOM I lacked the mandate to challenge the local militia leaders.[338] In contrast, according to Lyons and Samatar (1995), while UNITAF did not need the consent from the parties to the Somali conflict, Aidid

welcomed the introduction of U.S. forces. He recognized that it would be difficult to resist such a powerful force and believed that the deployment of U.S. forces would forestall any idea by the UN Secretary General to deploy UN troops and impose a UN trusteeship.[339] While UNITAF was a strong force, the U.S. and UN publicly clashed over what the mandate for the operation would include. The U.S. wanted to restrict its mission to only humanitarian purposes, but the UN proposed a more ambitious plan.[340] When the UN took over operational control with UNOSOM II (which encountered large resistance from Aidid's faction), it lacked the forces and operational hardware necessary to assume the responsibilities held by U.S. troops, let along an expanded mandate (e.g., disarming the warlord militias and nation-building efforts).[341]

While U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in Somalia was unlikely to harm U.S. relationships with other countries, the disagreements that rose between the U.S. and the UN could potentially harm future cooperation between the two. Moreover, the UN lost a great deal of credibility following the difficulties of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. Similarly, the U.S. had the potential for a minor loss of prestige because of the large responsibility it undertook in UNITAF and by continuing U.S. participation in UNOSOM II (an intervention that the U.S. believed was too ambitious and eventually withdrew from). As Bolton (1994) points out, "the Clinton policy expanded the UN role dramatically but brought the United States to the verge of withdrawing without having seen that larger role through successfully."[342]

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention (UNITAF)

represented a mid level risk, possibly moving to a low level risk (see Table 4.6). High level risks resulted from intervention in active conflict, the sizable role of the United States as the lead state, and the high level adversary interests. Mid level risks included the moderate likelihood of fulfilling intervention goals in the failed state, mid-term involvement (months), moderate economic and military costs, the moderate-scale operation, the organization of the intervention force (moderately effective), consent by some parties, the fact that the warlord militia groups had enough strength to prolong the conflict, and the potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige. Finally, low level risks were demonstrated by the little-to-no casualties, low political costs, substantial domestic and international support, low consequences resulting from the physical environment, and the unlikely negative change to relationships with other countries.

In contrast, U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention (UNOSOM II), represented a mid level risk (see Table 4.7). High level risks included the low likelihood of fulfilling intervention goals in the failed state, intervention in active conflict, the potential for high political costs, low congressional and public support, a disparate coalition force, and the high level adversary interests. Mid level risks resulted from mid-term involvement (months), moderate international support, a moderate-scale operation, U.S. involvement accompanied by strong efforts from other countries, consent by some parties, the fact that the warlord militia groups had enough strength to prolong the conflict, and the potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige. Finally, low level risks were demonstrated by the minimal economic, military, and *perceived* human costs (actual human costs were much greater than perceived costs), low consequences resulting from

the physical environment, and the unlikely negative change to relationships with other countries.

Table 4.6 — Risk Assessment of the Somalian Conflict — UNITAF

SOMALIA			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict		• Failed state: ability to fulfill intervention goals moderate	
Duration of Conflict		• Mid-tern involvement (months)	
Stage of Conflict	• Intervention in active conflict		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**		• Moderate economic costs • Moderate military costs	• Little-to-no casualties • Low political costs
Support **Domestic** **International**			• Substantial public support • Substantial congressional support • Substantial international support
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• U.S.-led sizable role	• Moderate-scale operation	
Organization of Intervention Force		• Coalition force is moderately effective	
Consent of Parties		• Consent by some parties	
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversary interests outweigh U.S. interests	• Enough capability to prolong conflict	• Physical environment results in low consequences
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**		• Potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige	• Intervention is unlikely to harm relationships with other countries
Overall Assessment		Crisis is placed as a mid level risk possibly moving to a low level risk	

Table 4.7 — Risk Assessment of the Somalian Conflict — UNOSOM II

SOMALIA			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict	• Failed state: ability to fulfill intervention goals low		
Duration of Conflict		• Mid-term involvement (months)	
Stage of Conflict	• Intervention in active conflict		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• *Potential for high political costs*		• *Minimal economic costs* • Minimal military costs • *Perceived* human costs as little-to-no (actual costs higher)
Support **Domestic** **International**		• Congressional support mixed (support decreased as operation continued) • Public support mixed (support decreased as operations continued) • Moderate international support	
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**		• Moderate-scale operation • U.S. involvement is accompanied by strong efforts of other countries (moderate role)	
Organization of Intervention Force	• *Disparate coalition force*		
Consent of Parties		• Consent by some parties	
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversary interests outweigh U.S. interests	• Enough capability to prolong conflict	• Physical environment results in low consequences
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**		• Potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige	• Intervention is unlikely to negatively change relationships with other countries
Overall Assessment		Crisis is placed as a *mid level risk*	

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall risk level outweighs the overall threat level, which argues against supporting the multilateral military intervention. U.S. participation is most warranted in the UNITAF operation. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such intervention would make a long-term difference. In fact, some diplomats and observers have recognized that political reconciliation was more likely without foreign involvement. While the Somali crisis calls attention to the moral responsibility of the United States, decision-makers could expect prior to intervention that outside military intervention would at best provide *temporary* relief to the Somali people and require a continued U.S. military presence.

Haiti

In 1990, the Haitian people had their first experience with democratic elections. Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as president, ending years of dictatorship. Yet Aristide's proposed reforms (calling for the demilitarization of the country and redistribution of wealth) provoked a military coup less than eight months later.[343] As Spanier and Hook (1998) point out, "Haiti's military leaders, ruled by Gen Raoul Cedras, launched a campaign of terror across the island, killing, torturing, and imprisoning those who had fought for reforms and who continued to resist the new rulers."[344] The Organization of American States (OAS) reacted immediately by imposing economic sanctions on Haiti, and the U.S. was forced to confront the crisis. Thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to the United States by any means possible to escape the conditions in Haiti. Consequently, President Bush deployed the Coast Guard to prevent Haitian immigrants from reaching U.S. water.[345]

While criticizing this policy during the 1992 election, the Clinton administration continued the same U.S. immigration measures while intensifying diplomatic initiatives. In July 1993, Haitian leaders agreed to restore the elected government by October 30, but the handover of power was unsuccessful. As Spanier and Hook (1998) point out, "when the 270 U.S. and Canadian peacekeepers arrived on the USS *Harlan County* to oversee the transition back to civilian rule, they were greeted at the waterfront by armed demonstrators who denounced their arrival. The ship then beat an ignominious retreat."[346] The media criticized Clinton's approach to the crisis in Haiti, and opposition in Congress mounted:

> An angry and disappointed Artistide publicly condemned the Clinton Administration's reversal and was joined by many liberals on Capitol Hill, including members of the Congressional Black Caucus who saw a racial bias in Clinton's acceptance of Cuban refugees, while Haitians, of African origin, were turned back in open waters....Clinton was also condemned by conservatives, aghast at his retreat at the first sign of opposition by a weak and corrupt military regime and at the squandering of U.S. prestige, which had been elevated by America's Cold War victory and its more recent spectacular military defeat of Iraq."[347]

In response to the breach of agreement, the UN instituted stronger sanctions, and the U.S. sent six warships for enforcement measures. As Haass (1999) points out, "the hope was that this embargo of Haiti would create conditions for renewed diplomacy and the restoration of democracy."[348]

While the United States first attempted to solve the Haitian crisis through negotiation and economic sanctions, eventually military intervention was perceived as the only effective solution. On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 which authorized the formation of a multinational force to use "all necessary means" to resolve the legitimate government of Haiti.[349] Thus, in September 1994, the Clinton administration announced that the Haitian crisis could only be resolved by U.S. military intervention and agreed to lead the multilateral military force (under code name Operation Uphold Democracy) to restore Aristide to power.[350] The U.S.-led multinational force would be responsible for ensuring the departure of the military regime, restoring Haiti's constitutional authorities to office, and reestablishing a secure and stable environment to facilitate the rebuilding of the country.[351] Following the withdrawal of this force, the task of maintaining a secure and stable environment would

be taken over by a UN-coordinated force (UNMIH). Before deployment of the multinational force, however, one final negotiation attempt was conducted between Haitian military leaders and a U.S. team consisting of General Colin Powell, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, and former president Jimmy Carter. Faced with the imminent threat of a U.S. invasion, the Haitian military regime agreed to relinquish power to Aristide with an amnesty from the Haitian parliament. Thus, the U.S.-led multinational force was able to land unopposed, and President Aristide was returned to power on October 15, 1994. Within a few months, on March 31, 1995, the UN peacekeeping operation (UNMIH) took over from the American contingent to maintain political stability.[352]

Threat Assessment

U.S. multilateral military intervention in Haiti was predicated on the belief that the United States had a direct interest in finding a solution to the Haitian political crisis. Aristide was supported by a majority of the Haitian population. His overthrow challenged not only the will of the people, but also a commitment to representative democracy. Granderson (1998) points out that "the security forces (the Armed Forces of Haiti) were both the power behind the de facto government and the perpetrators of systematic human rights abuse."[353] Thus, the Haitian military leaders' brutal regime precipitated an environment of gross violations of human and political rights which resulted in mass immigration to the United States. President Clinton maintained that the U.S. might be confronted with at least 200,000 Haitians in search of asylum. In fact, June 1994 alone, approximately 5,600 Haitians put to sea to escape the brutality of the military

rule; as many as 6,000 Haitians put to sea in the first four days of July.[354] The U.S. response to the refugee problem was further complicated by the unwillingness of regional allies to absorb large numbers of the Haitian immigrants. As Morley and McGillion (1997) note, "Panama's President Guillermo Endara abruptly reneged on his country's agreement to temporarily house 10,000 Haitians; other Caribbean countries were slow to offer assistance."[355]

If the United States had chosen not to intervene militarily, it is likely that the refugee problem would have continued. Domestic pressures to do something would most likely continue to increase, specifically in response to interest group politics. Certainly, the continuation of massive, uncontrolled immigration to U.S. borders has important consequences to U.S. national interests. Nevertheless, the deployment of U.S. troops can prove to be costly and become long-term. As Spanier and Hook (1998) point out, "stability on the island was largely dependent on the presence of U.S. troops, a steady stream of Western foreign aid, and the deployment in March 1996 of six thousand UN peace-keepers, whose mission later was extended until May 1997."[356] Today, however, except for the decline of immigration problems, little has changed in Haiti as a result of the intervention.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention responding to the Haitian conflict represented a low, possibly mid level threat (see Table 4.8). Threat assessments demonstrated that one high level threat was present — the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries. Mid level threats included the massive

movement of immigration across U.S. borders, the amount of force that would be required to enforce the intervention objectives (selective enforcement), and the important consequences to national interests from U.S. inaction. Finally, low level threats resulted from humanitarian nature of the conflict (e.g., promotion of democracy), human rights violations, limited geostrategic salience, actors peripheral to U.S. interests, and no significant systemic changes.

Table 4.8 — Threat Assessment of the Haitian Conflict

HAITI			
THREAT FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Contentious Issues		• Massive immigration across U.S. borders	• Human rights violations • Support of democracy
Crisis Actors			• Communal conflict
Geostrategic Salience			• Limited geostrategic salience
Actors Endangered			• Actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential Level of Military Force		• Limited amounts of force (e.g., selective enforcement)	
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries		
Systemic Changes			• No significant systemic changes
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)		• Consequences important to the well-being of the United States	
Overall Assessment		Crisis placed as a low, possibly mid level threat	

Risk Assessment

The major risks to the United States resulted from its participation in the multinational force. Although the U.S. military continued to support the UN peacekeeping mission (mostly logistical support), the primary U.S. military role in Haiti ended with the operational transfer to the UN. Thus, risk assessments will be specific to the U.S. role in the UN-authorized and U.S.-dominated Multinational Force that was deployed from 19 September 1994 to 31 March 1995 (when the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was finally deployed.

The U.S.-led multinational force responded to a factional conflict in Haiti. In the 1990 election, majority of the Haitian population supported Aristide (e.g., 67 percent of the popular vote in an election attracting 85 percent of the electorate).[357] Part of this support was in response to his promises to reform both the military and economic basis of Haitian society. The elites whose security was bound in these two traditional power centers, however, strongly opposed Aristide's measures and seized power in a coup. For the elites, long-standing interests and privileges were being threatened by the fundamental social, political, and economic changes that the Aristide government proposed. When the multinational force was ready to deploy in Haiti, it was prepared to do so in a hostile environment. Prior to the intervention, however, the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement, allowed the Haitian operation to deploy in a peaceful environment.

The economic and military costs of U.S. participation in the multinational force were moderate. Spencer (2001) maintains that U.S. efforts in Haiti have cost the U.S. $2.3 billion ($1 billion for military operations).[3588] Following the completion of the

military operation, the State Department expected to pay $1 billion over five years for an aid package to Haiti.[359] Spencer also notes that human costs were low. He contends that there was only one U.S. troop killed in action and three wounded in action (hostile casualties). Other assessments indicate that there were no hostile-fire deaths, but four overall U.S. losses.[360] In contrast, political costs were perceived as particularly high. Following the negative public reaction to the turnaround of the USS *Harlan County*, which appeared to be a victory against the United States, the Clinton administration had to be more concerned with domestic pressures. Moreover, as Granderson (1998) points out, "the Clinton administration could not risk the political backlash of U.S. military casualties in Haiti so soon after the Somalian trauma."[361]

Low levels of congressional and public support for U.S. military intervention in Haiti further heightened the political costs for the Clinton administration, specifically in electoral terms. Congress was hostile to the idea of sending U.S. forces to Haiti and was visably upset with the Clinton administration for not seeking congressional approval before sending troops to Haiti. In fact, both the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions that criticized President Clinton and sought to establish a cutoff date of March 1, 1995 for the return of troops.[362] Division was also apparent within the foreign policy bureaucracy. As Morley and McGillion (1997) point out, "the Pentagon, unlike the State Department, remained steadfastly opposed to an invasion; nor did it believe that the options for inducing the junta leaders to relinquish power for a comfortable exile had been fully exhausted."[363] For the most part, public opinion was also negative to the deployment of U.S. forces. As Morley and McGillion (1997) note, "according to opinion

polls, Americans disapproved of Clinton's handling of foreign policy generally and strongly opposed his sending U.S. troops into Haiti."[364] Some political interest groups, however, supported the deployment of U.S. forces in order to improve the conditions in Haiti, such as the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, the National Urban League, and the NAACP.[365]

International support, however, reached high levels of approval. A number of regional and international organizations immediately responded with sanctions and negotiations with the military regime, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the UN.[366] As Ballard (1998) notes, "on July 25th, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama all announced support. This confirmation of support from other nations in the region not only demonstrated the multinational nature of the effort, but also the commitment of OAS regional allies."[367] International support can also seen by the number of countries supporting the multinational force. On July 14th Madelaine Albright, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, announced that eleven countries had pledged to send troops to support the U.S.-led multinational force.[368] Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Belize even pledged forces to form a token force of 266 troops.[369]

While international support was high, then Secretary General Boutrous-Ghali acknowledged the need for U.S. leadership by admitting that the UN could not organize or finance the multinational force without the United States.[370] Certainly, the majority of the troops were American. In fact, U.S. troops in Haiti peaked at almost 21,000, exceeding the 15,500 planning figure.[371] The U.S.-led multinational force proved to be

well-organized and efficient. As Kumar (1998) points out, "operating with flexible rules of engagement, the MNF [multinational force] was able to respond decisively to any resistance...and to implement its mandate effectively, including collecting large numbers of weapons from supporters of the former regime."[372] Moreover, the capability of the U.S. command-and-control system was demonstrated when the mission abruptly changed from a forcible entry option to a peaceful entry following the Carter Agreement.[373]

Similar to the political costs at stake, U.S. participation in the multinational force had the potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige. The international community was paying attention to how the United States reacted to crises in the post-Cold War era. The difficulties experienced with Somalia, as well as initial attempts to negotiate with the Haitian military regime, further raised questions regarding the capabilities of the United States. In contrast, due primarily to international support (specifically in the region), U.S. participation in military intervention was unlikely to negatively change relationships with other countries.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in Haiti constituted a mid level risk (see Table 4.9). High level risks were present as a result of the potential for substantial political costs, low public and congressional support, a sizable U.S. role, vital interests at stake for the adversary, and the potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige. Mid level risks included mid-term involvement (months), moderate economic and military costs, and the extent of engagement (moderate-scale operation). Finally, low level risks were present as a result of the low public support and military capabilities of

the military regime, intervention in initial stages of negotiation by all parties, little-to-no casualties, substantial international support, well-organized and efficient coalition, and the unlikelihood of negative changes to relationships with other countries.

Table 4.9 — Risk Assessment of the Haitian Conflict

HAITI			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict			• Factional conflict: low public support and military capabilities of the military regime
Duration of Conflict		• Mid-term involvement (months)	
Stage of Conflict			• Intervention in initial stages of negotiation by all parties of the conflict
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• Substantial political costs	• Moderate economic costs • Moderate military costs	• Little-to-no human costs
Support **Domestic** **International**	• Low public support • Low congressional support		• Substantial international support
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• Sizable U.S. role	• Moderate-scale operation	
Organization of Intervention Force			• Well-organized and efficient coalition
Consent of Parties			• Consent of all parties prior to deployment of MNF
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversary's interests outweigh U.S. interests		• Opposition has little strength and ability to fulfill its political aims • Low consequences resulting from physical environment
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**	• Potential for a major loss of U.S. prestige		• Intervention unlikely to negatively change relationships with other countries
Overall Assessment		Crisis is placed as a mid, possibly low level risk	

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall risk generally outweighs the overall threat, which argues against U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. However, both threat and risk levels could be commensurate, increasing the importance of the opportunity analysis. Prior to intervention, decision-makers could expect the multilateral military intervention to create an opportunity for Haitians to once again experience democracy. Nevertheless, decision-makers should have also recognized that problems in the country, such as drug trafficking, corruption, poverty, and political violence, were likely to challenge future democratic attempts. Thus, an opportunity analysis can further indicate to decision-makers that U.S. participation in Haiti is unlikely to make a lasting difference without a long-term military presence.

Bosnia

The end of the Cold War also resulted in significant changes in eastern Europe. Yugoslavia (comprised of six component republics — Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) found itself in an intense political upheaval. As Haass (1999) points out:

> The Serbian-dominated federal army could not contain the centrifugal forces stemming from nationalistic, religious, cultural, and economic differences and divisions; to the contrary, the army became an agent of long frustrated Serbian nationalism and hence a part of the problem that quickly spelled the disintegration of what was Yugoslavia.[375]

The leaders of the republics began discussions on the reorganization of Yugoslavia, and in June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Although the Yugoslav army initially attempted to crush such efforts, the Serbs quickly realized they could not prevent Slovenian independence.[376] In contrast, Croatia, which lost considerable territory to Serbia, was forced to ask the United Nations for help, which dispatched the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to monitor a negotiated cease-fire. The crisis which eventually led to United States intervention, however, began in March 1992 when Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted their own efforts to formally separate from Yugoslavia. As Haass (1999) points out, the Bosnians were not left with many positive options: "Trying for recognition was likely to bring on civil war; not trying would mean becoming part of a Serbian rump state, with 'ethnic cleansing' and the expulsion of Muslims."[377]

Early April 1992, the U.S. and the members of the European Union recognized the independence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet Serbian aggression did not

abate. Soon after, full UN membership was granted to the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia, yet UN efforts to stop the genocide were largely unsuccessful.[378] The international community, acting through the UN, did advance efforts, such as an arms embargo, economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the dispatch of peacekeepers, and diplomatic initiatives. Nevertheless, the Bosnians were unable to defend themselves — resulting in further ethnic cleansing.

Threat Assessment

The UN and other international organizations maintained that three critical issues justified their involvement in Bosnia: massive movement of refugees, the humanitarian crisis brought on by the war, and the Bosnian Serbs' human rights violations (referred to by many as ethnic cleansing).[379] For example, according to Steinberg (1993), "more than 500,000 Yugoslav refugees fled to other European countries, and Croatian and Bosnian Serbs were resettled in Serbia, while hundred of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Muslims filled camps and other temporary facilities in Croatia."[380] Moreover, the international community was concerned that the spillover of fighting and mass refugee movements would continue to spread to Kosovo or Macedonia and draw in more parties to the conflict.[381] Currently, parties to the conflict were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.

The United States, however, initially decided not to commit ground troops to Bosnia. The U.S. reluctance was guided by the belief that Yugoslavia was no longer strategically important to the United States and that the conflict was not worth risking

American lives. As Woodward (2000) notes, "a dominant theme in Washington beginning in 1991, heard loudest in Congress but shared by the executive branch under Bush, was that Yugoslavia was a European problem."[381] As former Secretary of State James Baker remarked, "we have no dog in that fight."[382] Decisions to refrain from committing U.S. forces, however, did not prevent the U.S. administration from attempting to influence the direction of the crisis. For example, the United States helped to mobilize economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, voted to extend the mandate of the UN Protection Force to provide humanitarian assistance to Bosnian civilians, and agreed to sponsor UN Security Council resolutions to permit troop-contributing countries (which did not include the United States at this point) to "take all necessary measures" to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. U.S. military involvement was limited to assisting UN sanction enforcement efforts, relief operations, NATO's enforcement of a no-fly zone authorized by Security Council Resolution 819, and deployment to Macedonia under UN auspices to deter conflict in that location.[383] The Clinton administration also increasingly favored the option of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government and assisting Bosnian ground troops with aerial bombing against the Bosnian Serbs.[384]

As the situation continued to deteriorate in Bosnia, so did the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping force set up to protect the civilian population of Bosnia. As Woodward (2000) notes, the UNPROFOR mandate ballooned to include tasks that were unenforceable:

> the troops required for each new task — supervising and

> controlling heavy weapons, defending six safe areas, stopping ethnic cleansing, opening 'blue routes'; for humanitarian convoys or forcing them through, and so on — were always far above those that the Security Council was willing to authorize, and that number, in turn, was also far above those that countries were willing (and even able) to contribute.[386]

In addition to the declining credibility of UNPROFOR, media attention to Serbian aggression (e.g., the Serbian aggression in Sarajevo leaving 68 dead and the Srebrenica massacre where more than 7,000 people were killed) began to cause American public opinion to shift to demanding increased U.S. involvement. In July-October 1995, the United States reversed course and committed U.S. forces to assist NATO in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. This operation plan (known as Operations Plan 40104) called upon the United States to lead a bombing raid on Bosnian Serbs and commit American forces and commanding officers to an implementation force for a peace settlement.[387] President Clinton maintained that four distinct interests were at stake:

(1) avoid a broader European war;
(2) preserve NATO's credibility;
(3) curb refugee flows; and
(4) promote humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo and Bosnia.[388]

Subsequently, further pressure was placed on the Serbs to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, and NATO intervention increased. Moreover, the Clinton administration re-activated efforts for a peace process. Certainly, the diversity among the crisis actors made negotiation difficult, as demonstrated by the failure of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, and other negotiated settlement attempts.

On November 21, 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement (the eighth consecutive

plan proposed by third party negotiations to end the Bosnian war) was brokered between Bosnia, Croat, and Serb leaders allowing Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain a sovereign state with two entities: the Federation of Bosnians and Croats, and the Bosnian Serb Republic. The Dayton Accords, signed on November 21, 1995, called for "freedom of movement, and the right of refugees and displaced persons to return home safely and regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation," and designated the guarantor of these rights to be the 60,000 NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) troops (including 20,000 U.S. forces).[389] Initially, U.S. deployment was scheduled for one year to secure support and prevent long-term commitment. However, it was widely recognized that the commitment would last several years; President Clinton cited one year in order to gain domestic support for U.S. intervention. As Haass (1999) notes, "the reality, however, proved to be very different, in that in the months after Dayton analysts concluded that the withdrawal of international forces would precipitate the breakdown of the Dayton accords and the resumption of widespread fighting."[390] Consequently, the U.S. continues to support the NATO operation by contributing U.S. troops to SFOR (the stabilization force succeeding IFOR).

It is widely believed that the participation and leadership of the United States was necessary for the Dayton Accords to be implemented and that this leadership continues to be important for enforcement. As Woodward (2000) contends, "only bombing the Bosnian Serbs brought them to the bargaining table to sign a peace, and without American leadership, war would still be raging in the Balkans."[391] Similarly, Gow (1999) argues that "because of the key U.S. role in NATO as well as the size of its armed forces,

no sizeable military intervention with ground forces was conceivable without U.S. involvement."[392] Nevertheless, the implementation of the Dayton Accords has proved to be a large undertaking as illustrated by the on-going requirement of U.S. forces in Bosnia. If the U.S. military presence is viewed as a necessary prerequisite to containing violence in Bosnia, perhaps the United States is participating in a conflict that third parties cannot solve. Without U.S. participation, it is likely, however, that conflict among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims will increase. While the importance of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia can be debated, conflict in the Balkans does not appear to have major consequences important to the survival of the United States. Instead, while the United States does have an interest in strengthening the norm against external aggression and in avoiding the spread of violence, conflict in the Balkans has minimal consequences to U.S. national interests. This was in part demonstrated by the initial U.S. reluctance to become involved militarily.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention responding to the Bosnian conflict represented a low level threat to U.S. interests (see Table 4.10). Threat assessments demonstrated that one high level threat was present — the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries. Mid level threats included the massive movements of refugees and the amount of force that would be required to enforce the intervention objectives (e.g., air strikes and humanitarian operations). Finally, low level threats resulted from the humanitarian nature of the conflict, human rights violations, limited geostrategic salience, actors peripheral to U.S. interests, no significant systemic

changes, and minimal consequences to national interests from U.S. inaction.

Table 4.10 — Threat Assessment of the Bosnian Conflict

BOSNIA			
THREAT FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Contentious Issues		• Massive movements of refugees	• Humanitarian crisis • Humanitarian rights violations
Crisis Actors			• Communal conflict
Geostrategic Salience			• Limited geostrategic salience
Actors Endangered			• Actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential Level of Military Force		• Limited amounts of force (e.g., air strikes and peace operations)	
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries		
Systemic Changes			• No significant systemic changes
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)			• Minimal consequences to national interests
Overall Assessment			Crisis placed as a low level threat

Risk Assessment

As discussed earlier, the United States was extremely reluctant to contribute direct military assistance to Bosnia. This reluctance was in part due to the risks that might accompany multilateral military intervention. The Bosnian conflict was a civil war between factions defined as Serb, Croat, and Muslim. According to the 1991 census, the

population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 43.7% Muslim, 31.4% Serb, and 17.3% Croat.[393] As Mockaitis (1999) points out, "the unique political/military geography of Yugoslavia guaranteed that the conflict would be bloody even by standards of civil war."[394] The Implementation Force (IFOR) was designed to end the brutal civil war between these three groups that had been ongoing for three and a half years.[395] Moreover, animosities between the two groups can be traced back for centuries. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the twelve month mandate (December 20, 1995, to December 20, 1996) of IFOR was not sufficiently long. As Woodward (2000) points out:

> Convinced that peace was not yet self-sustaining, NATO powers then sent a second deployment, a Stabilization Force (SFOR) of thirty-five thousand for another eighteen months. But that too appeared insufficient time by the fall of 1997, when military and civilian assessments were nearly unanimous that war would resume in Bosnia if the soldiers pulled out in June 1998, and NATO and American leaders decided that a third deployment would be necessary.[396]

Thus, while U.S. forces were deployed at a point in the crisis that was ripe for negotiation, the deployment of U.S. forces in support for the multilateral military intervention has required a long-term commitment.

This long-term military commitment has resulted in a number of costs. According to Spencer (2001), the Bosnian operation has cost the United States $12 billion ($10.7 billion for military operations).[397] He further argues that the growing number of peacekeeping operations, such as in Bosnia, negatively impact combat readiness and troop morale:

> if one mechanized infantry brigade is deployed to Bosnia,

> three mechanized infantry brigades will actually be affected: the troops deployed on the mission, the troops training and preparing to deploy and those just returning from the deployments. They must spend months retraining to regain their readiness to perform traditional combat missions.[398]

On the other hand, human costs have been extremely light, in spite of some predictions of sustaining heavy casualties. For example, Spencer notes that hostile casualties include one killed due to a booby-trap and six wounded in action. In contrast, political costs had the potential of being high. As Gow (1999) points out:

> the political worries of Western politicians concerned popular opinion and the need to win votes at the next election. The prospect that the mission might go wrong, given the complexity of the problem and its apparently intractable nature, made these political leaders reluctant to contemplate intervention seriously enough.[399]

Moreover, opposition mounted in Congress regarding sending U.S. troops in Bosnia. A bipartisan majority in Congress strongly favored lifting the military embargo on Bosnia unilaterally and opposed direct U.S. military involvement. Even after the Dayton agreement, many members of Congress still favored the lifting of the military embargo as a cost-free solution because it would not involve U.S. troops.[400] While conflict intensified between Congress and the President over U.S. policy in Bosnia, ultimately, Congress "left full responsibility for the success or failure of U.S. involvement in the hands of the president."[401] Public opinion on the presence of U.S. troops in Bosnia generally has been divided. According to a Gallup Poll, 41% of the public approved the introduction of U.S. troops into Bosnia in 1995. Since then, approval has risen slightly to 53% in 1998.[402]

Regardless of mixed support, the United States took on a large leadership role with regard to Bosnia. Not only was the general framework agreement for peace negotiated under American auspices, but the U.S. also contributed a third of the sixty thousand troops in the NATO-led implementation force. Strong support by the international community, however, was also evident. While the United States supplied a large percentage of forces, thirty-four other countries also contributed to the multilateral military intervention force. The organization provided by NATO and the United States has resulted in a highly capable and unified military force.[403] While outside military forces are still needed to contain conflict, a significant reduction of troops has been seen; the United States now has approximately 3,900 troops in Bosnia. Coleman (1995) contends that "the symbolic importance of U.S. forces probably outweighs the practical contributions."[404]

While the implementation force and subsequent stabilization force were fortunate in the fact that consent had been given by all parties, thus limiting hostilities, NATO troops have had to contend with bitter weather, treacherous terrain, and land mines. As Powell (1996) points out, "military planners gamed out more than 30 different scenarios for a march into Bosnia. But when the time finally came for the real thing, the terrain and the weather were even rougher than advertised. And...the U.S. suffered its first casualty when a soldier was wounded in a mine explosion."[405] Moreover, wartime nationalist parties remain committed to obstructing Dayton implementation in order to maintain *de facto* division of Bosnia along ethnic lines. According to Western and Serwer (2000), "these parties and their elaborate patronage systems have continued to propagate ethnic

insecurity and separatism in order to maintain control over the country's political, military, and economic resources."[405] In response to these risks, as well as other costs, a widely held belief (specifically among some members of Congress) is that Bosnian efforts should be the sole responsibility of the European allies.[406]

While U.S. decision-makers are concerned with risking U.S. prestige and harming relationships with other countries by participating in multilateral military intervention, as Hamilton (1996) points out, "the Clinton administration had made a commitment to both the Bosnians and our NATO allies to send troops to implement a peace agreement....More than that, the administration could hardly fail to implement an agreement forged by its own diplomats in Dayton."[407] Thus, the United States would instead lose credibility if it did not fulfill its commitment. There was concern expressed by some members of Congress, however, that U.S. military involvement in Bosnia might cause complications with Russia who could not ignore pro-Serbian public opinion at home.[408] Currently, the Bush administration has indicated a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from Bosnia, leaving the responsibility to the Europeans. In April 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the U.S. will reduce, but not eliminate U.S. forces in the region. The potential U.S. withdrawal has alarmed many Bosnians as well as countries contributing to SFOR. Condeleezza Rice, the Bush administration's National Security Advisor, has stated that the U.S. would begin phasing out its involvement only in consultation with European allies.[409] Withdrawing U.S. forces from earlier commitments, however, can become a risky situation with regard to maintaining positive relationships with other major powers.

In the final analysis, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in

Bosnia constituted a significant risk to the United States. By assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, the conflict can be placed as a mid level risk, possibly moving to a high level risk (see Table 4.11). High level risks were present as a result of the crisis being a civil war, long-term involvement expected, intervention in active conflict, limited congressional support, a sizable U.S. role, vital interests at stake for Yugoslavia, major consequences resulting from the physical environment, and the potential for negative consequences to relationships with major powers. Mid level risks included the moderate economic, military, and *perceived* human costs (actual human costs were low), divided public support, the extent of engagement (moderate-scale operation), and the fact that Yugoslavia has the strength to prolong the conflict. Finally, low level risks were present as a result of little-to-no casualties, substantial international support, well-organized and efficient coalition, consent of all parties to employ the implementation and stabilization force, and the unlikelihood of harm to U.S. prestige.

Table 4.11 — Risk Assessment of the Bosnian Conflict

BOSNIA			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict	• Civil war		
Duration of Conflict	• Long-term involvement (years)		
Stage of Conflict	• Intervention in active conflict		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• Potential for high political costs	• Moderate economic costs • Moderate military costs • *Perceived* moderate human costs (actual human costs were low)	
Support **Domestic** **International**	• Congressional support limited	• Divided public support	• International support substantial
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• Sizable U.S. role	• Moderate-scale operation	
Organization of Intervention Force			• Well-organized and efficient coalition
Consent of Parties			• Consent of all parties to employ the implementation force and stabilization force
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversary's interests outweigh U.S. interests • Terrain, climate, and other physical environment factors (e.g., land mines) have major consequences for multilateral military force	• Adversary has enough strength to prolong conflict	
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**	• Potential to have negative consequences for relationships with major powers (i.e., Russia)		• Intervention unlikely to harm U.S. prestige
Overall Assessment	Crisis placed as a mid level risk possibly moving to a high level risk		

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall risk level outweighs the overall threat level, which argues against U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. Furthermore, an opportunity analysis should demonstrate to decision-makers that while ethnic cleansing might be prevented in the short-term, prospects for long-term resolution of the conflict would be unlikely. Because of the complexity of the conflict, continued U.S. military involvement would be necessary to contain the violence. In fact, SFOR is still needed to contain conflict more than five years after the signing of the peace agreement, further demonstrating this point.

Kosovo

While the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords has helped contain the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, only indirect or vague references in the accords were given to Kosovo, the southern province of Serbia that became the next war of Yugoslav succession. In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomy of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, and legislation was passed that denied ownership and work to Kosovo-Albanians. As a result, while the Serbians constituted less than 10 percent of the local population, they monopolized the positions of power and responsibility in the province. As Ramet (1996) points out, "a state of terror prevails in the province, as Serbs have deprived the local majority Albanians of such elementary rights as the right to an education, the right to broadcast media in their own language, and the right to jobs....Kosovo, in effect, operates under conditions of apartheid."[411] Thus, fighting intensified between government forces and those supporting an independent Kosovo — organized as the Kosovo Liberational Army (KLA).

Threat Assessment

The international community became increasingly concerned with the humanitarian crisis, human rights violations, and massive flow of refugees resulting from the armed struggle between Serbian paramilitary forces and the KLA. For example, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo estimates that from March 24, 1999 to June 19, 1999, approximately 10,000 Kosovar Albanians had been killed, 590,000 were internally displaced, and as many as 863,000 sought refuge outside of Kosovo.[412]

Moreover, the Commission notes that "the Kosovo conflict produced shock waves affecting neighboring states as a result of the influx of refugees, the economic damage caused by disruptions to trade and production and the growth of criminality, and the political impact on fragile states such as Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro."[412]

The international community responded to the Kosovo crisis with diplomatic efforts furthered by the UN, NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Contact Group (comprised of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.). Moreover, the U.S. and NATO attempted to persuade Milosovic to negotiate by threatening air strikes (the commitment of ground troops was generally not supported). As a result, in February 1999, diplomatic talks began in Chateau Rambouillet, in France, under the auspices of the Contact Group. The proposed agreement (Rambouillet Accords) set forth a three-year interim period that would provide for democratic self-government, security, and a mechanism for a final settlement. While the KLA were persuaded to sign the accords, the Serbians refused to accept the agreement.[413] In response, on March 24, 1999, NATO air strikes (U.S.-led) began in and around Belgrade as well as in Kosovo. NATO's objectives were for President Milosevic to end the violence and repression in Kosovo, withdraw military forces from Kosovo, guarantee safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and establish a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.[414] As Haass (1999) notes, "the air campaign was linked to an explicit set of political demands; once Milosevic met these, the bombing would come to an end."[415] When the bombing campaign failed to persuade Milosevic to negotiate, NATO member states realized that

they had underestimated the political will of the Serbian government. Moreover, as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out, "multiple and divergent agendas and expectations and mixed signals from the international community impeded effective diplomacy."[417]

As NATO air strikes intensified, the Kosovar refugee crisis worsened. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo either fled the increased violence or were expelled from their homes and began pouring into Albania and Macedonia. Finally, Milosevic accepted NATO demands to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo on June 3, 1999. On June 10, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which established the framework for a UN civil administration of Kosovo and an international security presence. By June 20, all Serb forces had left Kosovo and security matters in the province were handled by KFOR, the international peacekeeping force.[418]

Without substantial U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention in Kosovo, it was unlikely that the international community would have taken such a strong response against Milosevic. The international community's experience with Milosevic led to a belief that negotiations would only be successful if accompanied with threats and coercion. For the threat to be credible, however, there had to be a willingness to employ force which would be difficult to achieve without the United States.

Similar to the Bosnian crisis, the Clinton administration justified U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in Kosovo as necessary to promote humanitarian efforts, prevent a wider European war, curb refugee flows, and preserve NATO credibility.[419] In fact, although widely disputed, the Clinton administration

claimed that the struggle in Kosovo was *vital* to U.S. interests. He argued that the U.S. and NATO must "defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results."[420] Many scholars, in contrast, believe that only the remotest geopolitical interests at are stake in Kosovo. Schwarz and Layne (1999), for example, are not convinced that the U.S. must intervene militarily in Kosovo to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe:

> Washington picks and chooses its humanitarian interventions, inserting itself in some conflicts and ignoring others in which the reasons to act are at least as compelling. This leaves U.S. policy-makers open to the charge that they are using humanitarian concerns as a pretext to mobilize public support for military interventions undertaken for other reasons.[421]

Moreover, Schwarz and Layne (1999) raise an interesting point with regard to the Clinton administration's argument that U.S. inaction would "engulf the entire Balkan region, pit Greece against Turkey, and 'destabilize' all of Europe."[422] They point out that Clinton's strategy of "engagement and enlargement" is based on the principle that democracies do not go to war with other democracies (i.e., democratic peace theory). According to this assumption, since Greece and Turkey are both considered democracies and are members of NATO, a Greco-Turkish conflict should not occur. In addition, they maintain that NATO's air strikes are likely to intensify Serbian aggression, resulting in an increase of refugee flows into Macedonia and Albania.[423] Certainly scholars will disagree on the importance of U.S. military intervention in Kosovo. However, it seems that U.S. inaction would have minimal consequences to U.S. interests.

In the final analysis, by assessing each factor as related to the continuum of threat-

level intensity, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention responding to the Kosovo conflict represented a relatively low level threat to U.S. interests (see Table 4.12). Threat assessments demonstrated that one high level threat was present — the large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries. Mid level threats included the massive movements of refugees and the amount of force that would be required to enforce the intervention objectives (e.g., air strikes and humanitarian operations). Finally, low level threats resulted from the humanitarian nature of the conflict, human rights violations, limited geostrategic salience, actors peripheral to U.S. interests, no significant systemic changes, and minimal consequences to national interests from U.S. inaction.

Table 4.12 — Threat Assessment of the Kosovo Conflict

KOSOVO			
THREAT FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Contentious Issues		• Massive movements of refugees	• Humanitarian crisis • Humanitarian rights violations
Crisis Actors			• Communal conflict
Geostrategic Salience			• Limited geostrategic salience
Actors Endangered			• Actors peripheral to U.S. interests
Potential Level of Military Force		• Limited amounts of force (e.g., air strikes and peace operations)	
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	• Large number of attribute differences among crisis adversaries		
Systemic Changes			• No significant systemic changes
Consequences without U.S. Intervention (inaction)			• Minimal consequences to national interests
Overall Assessment			Crisis placed as a low level threat

Risk Assessment

Following Milosevic's accession to power in 1987, he began efforts to reassert Serbian rule over Kosovo and adopted policies of repression, apartheid, and expulsion. Kosovar Albanians responded by seeking independence from Serbia. In fact, according to Ramet (1996), when a clandestine referendum was held by the Albanian resistance, 87 percent of eligible citizens voted at the polls, and of this number, 99.87 percent voted for independence. In contrast, a Serbian poll found that 83 percent of Serbs were opposed to the independence, or even the restoration of autonomy, of Kosovo.[424] While a non-

violent resistance movement was able to prevent large-scale violence in Kosovo up to 1997, an armed conflict intensified in February 1998 between Serbian forces and Kosovar Albanian forces.[425]

At the stage of conflict in which the United States and international community acted, Milosevic was unwilling to surrender his political aims and negotiate, even after four weeks of NATO air strikes. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out, "the most promising window of diplomatic opportunity was prior to 1998. At each stage of the conflict, the diplomatic options narrowed....The political will to mount a major diplomatic effort could only be mobilized *after* the conflict escalated into full-scale violence."[426] Even after concessions were made, U.S. forces would still be necessary to sustain any peace agreements. Thus, efforts to halt ethnic conflict were likely to result in a long-term U.S. commitment. Certainly, extended U.S. involvement can become costly and result in substantial political risks.

Spencer (2001) notes that the United States has spent approximately $7 billion ($5 billion for air war and peacekeeping) in Kosovo.[427] Moreover, the U.S. military will need to restock the Pentagon's arsenal of cruise missiles, "smart" bombs, and combat aircraft. While postwar reconstruction is expected to be very costly (e.g., conservative estimates were $30 billion), the United States will only be paying a portion of these costs.[428] Moreover, the human costs in Kosovo in terms of U.S. lives were fairly light. According to Spencer, one U.S. soldier was killed due to a land mine, and two were missing in action.[429]

Domestic support for the multilateral military intervention was divided. A June

1999 Gallup poll indicated that 66 percent of respondents favored the presence of U.S. ground troops, along with troops from other countries, in an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. In the same poll, 52 percent indicated that the situation in Kosovo was worth going to war over. Yet the public indicated little tolerance for casualties. According to an April 1999 Gallup poll, "only 14% of Americans say the goal of returning Kosovar refugees to their homes with a lengthy military action is worth many American casualties. Thirty-six percent say the goal is worth a few casualties, and 42% say it is not worth any American casualties at all."[430] For the most part, Congress was divided according to party lines. Republicans in the U.S. Congress refused to support the NATO bombing campaign and called the conflict "Clinton's War."[431] Moreover, as Daalder (1999) points out, the House of Representatives voted in a contradictory manner: "It neither supported a potential ground war nor endorsed the on-going air campaign, but it rejected an end to U.S. participation in the campaign."[432] The Senate was also divided regarding the commitment of U.S. military forces. While criticism of the President's policy was mainly expressed by Republicans, it even extended to some Democrats.[433]

While there was strong political resistance against the use of ground troops in Kosovo by several of the NATO countries as well as the United States, air strikes were generally supported by the international community. However, an extended campaign with increasing destruction of Serbia and increased civilian casualties would have most likely been criticized in many NATO countries.[434] International support has also been evident by the number of contributing countries to KFOR. NATO allies and as many as 18 other countries have deployed over 47,000 KFOR troops (approximately 7,500 U.S.

troops) in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. As one recent report by the Office of the Press Secretary noted:

> Until international and local police forces are able to establish a law enforcement presence, KFOR troops are providing a security presence in Serb towns, villages, and neighborhoods, while checkpoints and patrols have been organized in key areas to enhance these security measures. KFOR also monitors border-crossing points and is involved in humanitarian assistance, establishing sanitation facilities, securing water supplies, and operating and maintaining the railway.[435]

Clearly, the United States took on a dominant role in the air campaign.[436] As Daalder (1999) points out:

> The disparate U.S. and European contributions to the air war — with the U.S. providing over 60 percent of the strike aircraft and close to 80 percent of the support planes — exposed Europe's continued dependence on American military might to undertake any kind of significant operation in Europe, let alone anywhere else. While Europeans will contribute the bulk of troops for KFOR, it was clear that any ground invasion of Yugoslavia would only have been possible with the United States providing the largest share of forces, the vast majority of the lift capacity, and all of the tactical and strategic intelligence.[437]

While the coalition proved to be strong, differing national interests and practices caused serious debates and disagreements between members of the alliance. Consequently, according to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, "frequently, units reported for duty at below their full strength, and NATO member states have sometimes withdrawn their contingents without any attempt at coordination....Added to this list of difficulties is KFOR's inadequate intelligence gathering capacity."[438] Moreover, the Commission notes that "the need for consensus

among all 19 members of the Alliance, including three new member states — Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary — and those like Greece, with close historical ties to Serbia, put additional constraints on the military decision-making process."[439] Yet political cohesion of the coalition forces have held throughout the campaign.

While NATO's military capability was extraordinary, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo maintains that the Yugoslav military was well organized and trained. The Yugoslav air defense capability was sufficient to force NATO air forces above 15,000 feet, thereby reducing NATO's ability to hit Yugoslav military forces.[440] Moreover, the Commission notes that the Yugoslav forces maintained military superiority over the KLA forces:

> At the start of the NATO bombing campaign, the Yugoslav armed forces (VJ) enjoyed a clear advantage over KLA forces, with 40,000 combat troops, a unified police and paramilitary task force, 300 tanks, and anti-aircraft and ground artillery units available in Kosovo or at its borders. In contrast, before mid-March 1999, the KLA was not yet a centrally organized military force. The Albanian resistance consisted of 8000-10,000 lightly armed, poorly trained men in Kosovo, with an additional 5000-8000 men training in northern Albania. These men belonged to different armed resistance groups...[and] maintained their individual identity.[441]

In addition to Yugoslavia's military power, the climate and terrain provided obstacles to the NATO-led campaign. Foul weather in Yugoslavia frequently interfered with pilots' line of sight and with laser beams that direct precision weapons. Moreover, the mountainous terrain and heavy forests limited the military reconnaissance systems' line of sight and diminished the effectiveness of satellite imagery.[442] Finally, the political

aims of Milosevic provided additional challenges to NATO forces and third party mediation. As Schwarz and Layne (1999) point out "For Serbia,...it involves the highest stakes for which a nation can fight: the defense of its sovereign territory. In conflicts like those in Vietnam or Kosovo, the interests of U.S. adversaries clearly outweigh U.S. interests — which means that an opponent's resolve is likely to outlast America's."[443]

By participating in the multilateral military intervention in Kosovo, U.S. prestige and relationships with other countries was also affected. For example, Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) accused President Clinton of allowing the United States to "lose credibility" in the standoff with Milosevic.[444] He maintained that twice Clinton set a deadline where he threatened the use of military force; once the deadlines passed, he did nothing — adversely affecting U.S. credibility. U.S. military intervention has also had important strategic consequences with regard to Russia and China. For example, Van Metre (2000) contends that Russia is concerned about the growth of U.S. influence in the region:

> Moscow's engagement in the Kosovo crisis was primarily to counterbalance NATO, which appeared to be encroaching into a Russian sphere of influence (through the air campaign on Serbia) and threatening Russian sovereignty (by setting a precedent in Kosovo for intervention on behalf of the Chechens in Russia.[445]

Concerns with regard to the U.S.-China relationship have also been raised, specifically after the bombing of the Chinese embassy. As Hartung (1999) notes, "As for international relations, by ignoring the views of Russia and China — let alone bombing the latter's embassy in Belgrade — the Clinton administration may have sown the seeds

of what Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin has described as a 'new cold war.'"[446]

In the final analysis, U.S. participation in multilateral military intervention in Kosovo constituted a significant risk to the United States. By assessing each factor as related to the continuum of risk-level intensity, the conflict can be placed somewhere between a high and mid level risk (see Table 4.13). High level risks were present as a result of the Serbian regime being unwilling to grant autonomy or the independence of Kosovo, expected long-term involvement, intervention in an ongoing active conflict, generally limited congressional support, a sizable U.S. role, vital interests at stake for Yugoslavia, major consequences resulting from the physical environment, and the potential for negative consequences for relationships with major powers. Mid level risks included the moderate economic and military costs, divided public support, the extent of engagement (moderate-scale operation), the moderately effective organization of the force, consent of some parties to conduct air strikes against Serbian forces, the fact that Yugoslavia had the strength to prolong the conflict, and the potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige. Finally, low level risks were present as a result of little-to-no casualties, substantial international support, and consent of all parties to employ the international security presence (KFOR).

Table 4.13 — Risk Assessment of the Kosovo Conflict

KOSOVO			
RISK FACTORS	**HIGH**	**MID**	**LOW**
Type of Conflict	• Serbian regime unwilling to grant autonomy or sovereignty to Kosovo		
Duration of Conflict	• Long-term involvement (years)		
Stage of Conflict	• Intervention in active conflict		
Costs **Economic** **Military** **Human** **Political**	• Potential for high political costs	• Moderate economic costs • Moderate military costs	• Little-to-no casualties
Support **Domestic** **International**	• Generally congressional support limited	• Public support divided	• International support substantial
Extent of Military Engagement **Level** **Leadership**	• Sizable U.S. role	• Moderate scale operation	
Organization of Intervention Force		• Moderately effective	
Consent of Parties		• Consent of some parties to conduct air strikes against Serbia	• Consent of all parties to employ the international security presence (KFOR)
Target State Attributes **Political Aim** **Strength/Ability** **Physical Environment**	• Adversary's interests outweigh U.S. interests • Terrain, climate, and other physical environment factors have major consequences for multilateral military force	• Adversary has enough strength to prolong conflict	
Consequences for U.S. **Prestige** **Relationships**	• Potential to have negative consequences for relationships with major powers (e.g., Russia and China)	• Potential for a minor loss of U.S. prestige	
Overall Assessment	Crisis placed as a high to mid level risk		

When comparing the threat and risk assessments, the overall risk level outweighs the overall threat level, which argues against continued U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. Furthermore, an opportunity analysis should demonstrate to decision-makers that in order for the intervention to be effective, it would require a continued U.S. military commitment. Decision-makers could anticipate KFOR to stop the systematic oppression of the Kosovar Albanians. Nevertheless, violence would also be expected to continue. Eyal (2000) reiterates this point when he argues that while the military deployment in Kosovo has been an operational success (e.g., little-to-no casualties, the return of refugees, and minimal material damage), "a closer look at these undeniably important achievements reveal a long-term political failure, wrapped in a military victory."[446] He maintains that despite the efforts of the multilateral military intervention, other groups (e.g., the Serb and Roma populations) are now openly victimized by the Albanians, the Kosovo Protection Force has not been disarmed, law and order is deteriorating, and the international community's troop and financial commitment is waning.[447]

CHAPTER 5

FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. MULTILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION ANALYSIS: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

> *In a world of eroding sovereignty, intervention is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad, but must be judged on the basis of its purposes, costs, and prospects in each case.*
>
> — Final Report of the Eighty-Fifth American Assembly

The multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus was applied to selected past cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention during the post-Cold War era: Persian Gulf Conflict, Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Three main components were examined in each case study: threat assessment, risk assessment, and opportunity analysis. Factors related to threat and risk were discussed as they applied to the case under study. Threat factors included contentious issues, crisis actors, geostrategic salience, actors endangered, potential level of military force, extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries, systemic changes, and consequences without U.S. intervention. Risk factors included the type of conflict, duration of conflict, stage of conflict, potential costs (economic, military, human, and political), level of support (domestic and international), extent of engagement, organization of intervention force, consent of parties, target state attributes, and consequences for U.S. prestige and relationships. After a brief overview of the crisis situation, discussion centered on each of the above factors. Each factor was then labeled as either high, mid, or low level, and an overall threat and risk assessment was made. When comparing the threat and risk assessments, if the *risk level* outweighed the *threat*

level, U.S. multilateral military intervention should have been avoided. If the *threat level* outweighed the *risk level*, U.S. multilateral military intervention would be warranted. While an opportunity analysis was conducted for each case, it was even more important in situations where the *threat level* and *risk level* were likely to be commensurate. Only in those cases when an opportunity existed for the intervention to make a lasting difference would intervention be warranted.

Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies

In the case of the Persian Gulf conflict, the overall threat level outweighed the overall risk level, warranting U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. The crisis was placed between high and mid levels of threat and as a mid level risk. Furthermore, an opportunity analysis suggested that the U.S. could make a long-term difference when responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In contrast, in the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath, the overall risk level outweighed the overall threat level, arguing against continued U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. The crisis was placed as a low level threat (with the potential to escalate to a mid level threat if the refugee flows disrupted stability in the Persian Gulf region) and as a high level risk, possibly moving to a mid level risk. Moreover, it is unlikely that the multilateral military intervention force would make a lasting difference without a continued long-term U.S. commitment. The Somalian crisis was placed as a low level threat. U.S. participation in UNITAF was a mid level risk, possibly moving to a low level risk. U.S. participation in UNOSOM II was a mid level risk. Thus, in both interventions, the overall risk level

generally outweighed the overall threat level. U.S. participation is most warranted in the UNITAF operation. Yet, it is unlikely that such intervention would make a lasting difference, arguing against supporting the multilateral military intervention. When comparing the threat and risk assessments in the Haitian crisis, the overall risk generally outweighed the overall threat, arguing against U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. The crisis was placed as a low, possibly moving to a mid level threat and a mid, possibly moving to a low level risk. An opportunity analysis further indicates to decision-makers that U.S. participation in Haiti is unlikely to make a lasting difference without a long-term military presence. In the Bosnian crisis, the overall risk level outweighed the overall threat level, arguing against U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. The crisis was placed as a low level threat and as a mid level risk, possibly moving to a high level risk. While an opportunity analysis is not as crucial in this case, it further demonstrated that there was a remote chance for the multilateral military intervention to make a lasting difference without a long-term U.S. commitment. Similarly, in Kosovo the overall risk level outweighed the overall threat level, arguing against continued U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. The crisis was placed as a low level threat and as a high to mid level risk. An opportunity analysis demonstrated that while the systematic oppression of the Kosovar Albanians may decrease, long-term success is unlikely without a continued U.S. presence. In the cases where threat and risk had the potential to be commensurate, an opportunity to make a lasting difference was likely to occur only if the U.S. maintained a long-term military presence. However, the longer U.S. forces are deployed, risk levels are likely to increase — further warning

against U.S. participation in the multilateral military intervention. See Table 5.1 for a summary of the case assessments.

Table 5.1 — Multilateral Military Intervention Case Study Assessments

Multilateral Military Intervention	Overall Threat Assessment	Overall Risk Assessment	Opportunity Exists to Make a Lasting Difference?	Intervention Warranted?
Persian Gulf Conflict	Between High and Mid	Mid	Yes	Yes
Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath	Low possibly Mid	High possibly Mid	No	No
Somalia	Low	UNITAF — Mid possibly Low UNOSOM II — Mid	No	No
Haiti	Low possibly Mid	Mid possibly Low	No	No
Bosnia	Low	Mid possibly High	No	No
Kosovo	Low	High to Mid	No	No

Based on the assessment of the cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War era, a number of lessons can be learned. First, conclusions can be made regarding how well the intervention decision-making calculus is able to assess multilateral military intervention possibilities. Secondly, case assessments can demonstrate the relative importance of each factor and how they connect together. Finally, a thorough review of the selected past cases can indicate what advantages and disadvantages are likely in multilateral military intervention.

Assessment of the Intervention Decision-Making Calculus

More than likely, the case study assessments provided in this study will be disputed by some scholars. This in itself, however, does not discount the thesis of this analysis. First, by having several factors relating to different levels of threat and risk, this tends to reduce the overall impact of any one variable. Thus, disagreement over placement of a factor likely will not affect the overall assessment or may simply cancel each other out. Secondly, while individual perceptions may inflate or deflate threat and risk assessments, as long as both are analyzed from a similar perspective, the overall intervention decision should still be comparable to this study.

One concern with the multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus is how to determine accurately the different levels of threat and risk. Factors are defined somewhat broadly to allow decision-makers more flexibility to use judgment when analyzing threat and risk. Thus, questions may be raised regarding what constitutes high, mid, or low levels (specifically mid level). Generally, decision-makers may find that it is easier to ascertain high and low levels of threat and risk. By ruling out high and low levels, this can help to determine whether the factor falls either within or near the mid level. While questions may also be raised regarding whether one factor is more important than another, this study is not intended to be a quantitative study. Thus, each factor was treated as equally important when assessments were made. Certainly, some factors may be more important than others, and this chapter will discuss the general importance of each factor. When the overall threat or risk level representation is not obvious, decision-makers can look at the relative importance of each factor to help determine the most

accurate level of threat and risk. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for a quantitative weight to be assigned to each factor, because of the way they connect together. For example, as the duration of the conflict increases, costs increase, and domestic opinion is likely to decrease. Consequently, these factors simultaneously move to higher levels of risk. Moreover, by having several threat and risk factors, the impact of the value of any one factor in the intervention analysis is reduced.

Review of Factors Relating to Threat Levels

The threat assessment process is fairly clear cut and simple to determine the different levels of threat for each factor. The factors relating to threat can guide decision-makers in placing the crisis upon the threat-level intensity continuum to determine the overall threat to U.S. interests (see Table 5.2). Based on an assessment of the past cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention, general conclusions can be made regarding the factors that contribute to different levels of threat. Certainly, the small number of cases makes it more difficult to generalize with confidence. Nevertheless, comparisons can be made and conclusions drawn since these six cases are the main U.S. multilateral military interventions in the post-Cold War era.

Out of the six case studies, five closely resemble each other in their threat assessment — Persian Gulf conflict aftermath, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In each of these interventions, U.S. forces were deployed for humanitarian reasons and concerns related to refugee flows (the intervention in Somalia was conducted purely for humanitarian reasons). Moreover, these intrastate conflicts were between actors

peripheral to U.S. interests in regions of limited geostrategic salience, and the crisis was unlikely to cause significant systemic changes. In each of these four cases, large attribute differences existed among crisis actors, military intervention was limited to moderate-scale uses of military force, and U.S. inaction would generally have minimal consequences to U.S. interests (except for possibly Haiti where the large immigrant flows could have important consequences to U.S. interests). Consequently, the overall threat level for these conflicts was low, with the potential to escalate to moderate levels in Haiti and the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath. In contrast, the Persian Gulf conflict constituted a significant threat to U.S. interests (between high and mid levels). Moreover, there were few similarities between the Persian Gulf conflict and the other interventions in the post-Cold War era. For example, it was an interstate conflict between regional actors in a location of broad geostrategic salience. The conflict endangered key trading partners and had the potential to result in important systemic changes. Moreover, the conflict had important consequences to U.S. interests, as demonstrated by the contentious issues at stake — Kuwaiti sovereignty, regional stability concerns, and access to energy supplies.

The threat factors that appear most important to U.S. interests are the *contentious issues* at stake and the *actors endangered*. It is also likely that these factors are related to other threat factors. For example, in the Persian Gulf conflict, one of the contentious issues included maintaining access to energy supplies. This issue suggests that the region has broad geostrategic salience and important consequences to U.S. interests. Regardless of the issues at stake, when the actors endangered are key allies or key trading partners, the U.S. will have a larger interest in protecting these countries. *Crisis actors* can also be

an important factor related to threat, specifically when regional or global conflicts occur. However, in the post-Cold War era, communal conflicts are most likely, which generally have a lower impact on U.S. interests. The *potential level of military force* in the post-Cold War era appears to have been limited, such as air strikes and peace operations. Ground troops were deployed only after other options (such as air strikes) were exhausted. While the *extent of heterogeneity among crisis adversaries* is likely to be large in these cases, as demonstrated by all six cases of multilateral military intervention, the crisis can still represent a low level threat. The disadvantages of large attribute differences among crisis adversaries, however, is that it increases the likelihood of a misunderstanding of motives and actions of the opponent. This was clear in the Persian Gulf conflict when Saddam underestimated the U.S. response following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Finally, significant *systemic changes* are very unlikely in the post-Cold War era when the conflict is intrastate. Regional conflicts, however, have the potential to result in important systemic changes.

The comparison of the recent cases of multilateral military intervention reiterate the current international relations literature. Scholars are correct when arguing that today's conflicts generally take place within countries rather than among them. Moreover, these conflicts have occurred in regions with limited *geostrategic salience*; thus, *U.S. inaction* would have minimal consequences to U.S. national interests. In short, conflicts in the post-Cold War era are likely to be low level threats. In these situations, only when the risk levels are also low, and the intervention appears to be able to make a long-term difference, should military intervention be considered.

Table 5.2 — Summary of Threat Assessments of U.S. Multilateral Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era

	Persian Gulf Conflict	Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath	Somalia	Haiti	Bosnia	Kosovo
Contentious Issues	Kuwaiti sovereignty (Mid)* Regional stability (Mid) Energy supplies (Mid)	Humanitarian concerns (Low) Refugee flows (Mid)	Humanitarian concerns (Low)	Humanitarian concerns (Low) Immigration across U.S. borders (Mid)	Humanitarian concerns (Low) Refugee flows (Mid)	Humanitarian concerns (Low) Refugee flows (Mid)
Crisis Actors	Regional (Mid)	Communal (Low)	Communal (Low)	Communal (Low)	Communal (Low)	Communal (Low)
Geostrategic Salience	Broad (High)	Limited (Low)	Limited (Low)	Limited (Low)	Limited (Low)	Limited (Low)
Actors Endangered	Key trading partners (Mid)	Peripheral to U.S. interests (Low)	Peripheral to U.S. interests (Low)	Peripheral to U.S. interests (Low)	Peripheral to U.S. interests (Low)	Peripheral to U.S. interests (Low)
Potential Level of Military Force	Possibly large-scale force (High)	Limited amounts of force (Mid)	Limited amounts of force (Mid)	Limited amounts of force (Mid)	Limited amounts of force (Mid)	Limited amounts of force (Mid)
Extent of Heterogeneity Among Crisis Adversaries	Large number of attribute differences (High)	Large number of attribute differences (High)	Large number of attribute differences (High)	Large number of attribute differences (High)	Large number of attribute differences (High)	Large number of attribute differences (High)
Systemic Changes	Important (High)	No significant changes (Low)	No significant changes (Low)	No significant changes (Low)	No significant changes (Low)	No significant changes (Low)
Consequences without U.S. intervention (inaction)	Important (Mid)	Minimal (Low)	Minimal (Low)	Important (Mid)	Minimal (Low)	Minimal (Low)
Overall Threat Level	Between high and mid	Low possibly moving to mid	Low	Low possibly moving to mid	Low	Low

* (High), (Mid), and (Low) represent the level of threat to U.S. interests for that factor and case assessment.

Review of Factors Relating to Risk Levels

While the importance of each risk factor may be contingent partly on the circumstances specific to the context of the intervention, some general conclusions can be made. The *type of conflict* appears to be very important in foreign policy decision-making. When examining recent cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention, it is evident that humanitarian intervention has become the norm rather than the exception: protection of the Kurdish and Shiite populations of Iraq; providing humanitarian relief and political stabilization efforts in Somalia; the promotion of democracy in Haiti; efforts to halt ethnic cleansing in Bosnia; and attempts to end repression and violence in Kosovo. While humanitarian crises often provoke an international (and U.S.) response, humanitarian intervention can be less than effective. As Campbell (1997) notes, "the role of military force in humanitarian intervention has often seemed inappropriate if not actually counter-productive."[449] Ending decades of confrontation and conflict is not an easy task; at best, military intervention may produce stalemate rather than solutions. For example, Abrams (2000) notes that in Bosnia, "the social rifts deep enough to produce massive human rights crimes cannot be solved by a brief bit of international policing. We may stop the bloodshed while we are there, only to see it take off again when we leave."[450] Thus, with regards to military intervention, the U.S. should generally stay clear of the internal affairs of another country. Intervention in civil affairs can also intensify aggression rather than contain it. President Clinton justified intervention in the Balkans by arguing that if the United States allows a fire to burn, *the flames will spread.*[451] Nevertheless, as Schwarz and Layne (1999) point out, one way to fight forest fires is to

let *the fire burn itself out*:

> Wars end when both sides are exhausted, or when one side realizes it has been defeated and abandons the struggle....[For example] in Bosnia, the war might have ended with fewer dead if the Bosnian Muslims had tried to negotiate an accommodation with the Serbs much earlier in the conflict. One of the reasons they didn't do so is that they believed that NATO would eventually rescue them. But they did not simply rely on the natural course of events to bring NATO into the conflict. Rather, to create sympathy in the West for their cause, they manipulated the situation and engaged in clever propaganda.[452]

Moreover, intervention in humanitarian crises was often justified to prevent the spread of violence to neighboring countries (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo). Yet, this justification in itself seems less than convincing considering that the spread of violence in the Balkans has continued even *with* U.S. military intervention. For example, while the U.S. intervened militarily in Bosnia, this did not prevent the intensification of conflict in Kosovo. Moreover, even with U.S. military intervention in Kosovo, conflict has continued to spread to Macedonia. While a continued U.S. military presence in the region may help contain violence, the U.S. cannot afford a long-term military presence in every region of the world. In short, with regards to the type of conflict, U.S. multilateral military intervention in the internal affairs of a country can lead to open-ended conditions and should be avoided whenever possible. Other types of intervention, such as political and economic, may be better alternatives to carry out humanitarian efforts.

The expected *duration of conflict* is also important in deciding whether to intervene in multilateral military intervention. The longer U.S. troops are deployed, *economic*, *military*, *human*, and *political costs* are likely to increase. As Snow (2000)

points out, "long deployments wear out equipment,...it diminishes resources on hand that might be needed to handle emergencies, and it drains money from readiness accounts that fund training, prepositioning, and other activities related to combat readiness."[453] In addition to material costs, the risk of human costs are likely to increase with time which would certainly increase political costs. The U.S. is currently engaged in a number of issues throughout the entire globe. Thus, an assessment of military capabilities and a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted. As Haass (1999) points out, "with any commitment of public resources, force should only be used if it promises to provide benefits that outweigh the costs of acting."[454]

If assessments indicate that military intervention advances U.S. national interests, military operations must be conducted with a clearly defined mission, political/military goals, and an exit strategy (not necessarily an exit date). Policy makers must also consider *when* intervention will be most effective. As Haass (1999) notes, "the passage of time may mean the loss of surprise and the loss of initiative while giving the adversary opportunity to prepare militarily and politically for the battle to come."[455] The *stage of conflict* at the time of deployment in the cases of multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War era varied from the initial stages of conflict to the initial stages of negotiation. While negotiation between adversaries does not guarantee a low risk undertaking, it does demonstrate that the actors in the crisis may be more willing to compromise. However, many scholars believe that preventive diplomacy (acting early to prevent problems from worsening) is more cost effective. For example, Mankhaus and Ortmayer (2000) maintain that while in the Somalia case "no amount of preventive

diplomacy could have completely pre-empted some level of conflict...timely diplomatic interventions at several key junctures might have significantly reduced, defused and contained that violence."[456] Moreover, Woodward (2000) contends that "there are few, if any, deadly conflicts in recent history that have provided more opportunity for prevention than the wars that engulfed the Balkan peninsula with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991."[457] Nevertheless, decision-makers may find that it is difficult to gain approval for such interventions. Similarly, it is increasingly difficult to carry out multilateral military intervention without the *consent of the parties* to the conflict.

While *public* and *congressional support* of multilateral military intervention is preferable, it is not paramount. Certainly, domestic political and legal mandates demonstrate consensus and efficacy for the intervention, but they do not necessarily affect the outcome. Moreover, as Snow (2000) points out, "public and congressional support for peacekeeping operations will always be difficult to develop and sustain. Because they arise in places that are invariably foreign, most people and many of their representatives have very little knowledge of them and hence any basis to support them."[458] Preliminary success can generate domestic support that may not have been initially afforded, and as Kanter (2000) points out, "the American people will pay the price — both human and monetary — of U.S. intervention if they are convinced that it is worth it."[459] While substantial congressional support is not a prerequisite for the initial deployment of U.S. troops, generally, congressional approval can lower political costs. However, Congress has been fairly reluctant to approve humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era, specifically following the problems associated with Somalia.

The extent of *international support* can be extremely important to the overall success of the intervention. Acting multilaterally both legitimates and sanctions the use of force in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences. President Bush, in a letter to Saddam Hussein, demonstrated the magnitude that can result from broad international support: "The United States will not be separated from its coalition partners. Twelve Security Council resolutions, 28 countries providing military units to enforce them, more than one hundred governments complying with sanctions — all highlights the fact that it is not Iraq against the United States, but Iraq against the world."[459]

In any conflict situation, there exists the possibility that the crisis will escalate to greater *levels of military engagement*. Thus, it is important to assess the extent to which the United States is willing to engage in high levels of military force. While the U.S. generally has participated in moderate-scale operations in its post-Cold War interventions (except the Persian Gulf conflict which was high-scale and the Persian Gulf conflict aftermath which was low-scale), vital interests were not at stake, except possibly in the Persian Gulf conflict. In most cases the U.S. would prefer strong support for any intervention from the international community. Yet, the greater the perceived threat, the more the U.S. would be expected to engage in military operations with or without the support of others. It is evident, however, that the U.S. has played a major leadership role in all six multilateral military interventions in the post-Cold War era. While there are advantages to mobilizing a broad coalition (e.g., burden sharing and legitimization of the intervention), organizational and operational problems, as well as disagreements among coalition forces, are likely to develop. Thus, the *organization of the intervention force*

can have important consequences to the success or failure of the international operation. Such operational problems were especially evident in Somalia because of the disparate forces.

An adversary's *political aim* can also impact the effectiveness of the intervention. In each case, the adversary's interest outweighed the U.S. interest. This, in itself does not mean that the U.S. should not intervene. It does indicate, however, that the adversary will not easily relinquish power (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo). The intervention becomes even more difficult when the adversary has a large military capability or access to weapons of mass destruction. The cases in the post-Cold War era, however, demonstrated that while the adversary did not have enough *strength/ability* to achieve its political aim, it had enough power to prolong the conflict. In the Bosnia and Kosovo cases, the *physical environment* (e.g., terrain, climate, and land mines) further challenged the multilateral force.

The *consequences for U.S. prestige and relationships* varied for each intervention. While a number of factors are likely to affect U.S. prestige, it seems that the outcome of the previous intervention influences how the U.S. is perceived by other countries. For example, the success of the Persian Gulf conflict raised U.S. prestige. Conversely, the difficulties encountered with the Somalia intervention likely lowered U.S. prestige. It also seems that the potential loss of prestige is influenced by how much support is given to the intervention. Similar to cost sharing, when support is broad, blame can be spread among the participating countries. International support, or lack of, can also demonstrate whether there is a likelihood to harm relationships with other countries. In the Persian

Gulf conflict aftermath, Bosnia, and Kosovo cases, the U.S. had the potential to harm relationships with major powers, specifically Russia and China because they were opposed to U.S. military intervention. Decision-makers must determine whether intervention in conflicts of limited importance to U.S. interests is worth risking relationships with countries deemed extremely important to national interests. See Table 5.3 for a summary of risk assessments of U.S. multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War era.

Table 5.3 — Summary of Risk Assessments of U.S. Multilateral Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era

	Persian Gulf Conflict	Persian Gulf Conflict Aftermath	Somalia	Haiti	Bosnia	Kosovo
Type of Conflict	Interstate (Mid)*	Identity/ secession (High)	Failed state (Mid)	Factional conflict (Low)	Civil War (High)	Identity/ secession (High)
Duration of Conflict	Mid-term (Mid)	Long-term (High)	Mid-term (Mid)	Mid-term (Mid)	Long-term (High)	Long-term (High)
Stage of Conflict	Active conflict (High)	Active conflict (High)	Active conflict (High)	Negotiation (Low)	Active conflict	Active conflict (High)
Economic Costs	Substantial (High)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)
Military Costs	Substantial (High)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)	Moderate (Mid)
Human Costs	Perceived substantial (High)	Little-to-no (Low)	Little-to-no (Low)	Little-to-no (Low)	Perceived moderate (Mid)	Little-to-no (Low)
Political Costs	Moderate (Mid)	Substantial (High)	Limited (Low)	Substantial (High)	Substantial (High)	Substantial (High)
Congressional support	Mixed (Mid)	Mixed (Mid)	Initially substantial (Low)	Limited (High)	Limited (High)	Limited (High)
Public support	Substantial (Low)	Mixed (Mid)	Initially substantial (Low)	Limited (High)	Mixed (Mid)	Mixed (Mid)
International support	Substantial (Low)	Limited (High)	Initially substantial (Low)	Substantial (Low)	Substantial (Low)	Substantial (Low)
Level of engagement	Large-scale (High)	Low-scale (Low)	Moderate-scale (Mid)	Moderate-scale (Mid)	Moderate-scale (Mid)	Moderate-scale (Mid)
Extent of leadership	Sizable role (High)	Sizable role (High)	Sizable role (High)	Sizable role (High)	Sizable role (High)	Sizable role (High)
Organization of Force	Disparate but well organized (Mid)	Well organized and efficient (Low)	Moderately effective (Mid)	Well organized and efficient (Low)	Well organized and efficient (Low)	Moderately effective (Mid)
Consent of Parties	Some parties (Mid)	No consent (High)	Some parties (Mid)	Consent by all (Low)	Consent by all (Low)	Some parties (Mid)
TARGET STATE ATTRIBUTES						
Adversary political Aim	Vital (High)	Vital (High)	Vital (High)	Vital (High)	Vital (High)	Vital (High)
Strength/ Ability	Limited capability/ WMD access (Mid)	Enough to prolong conflict (Mid)	Enough to prolong conflict (Mid)	Limited capability (Low)	Enough to prolong conflict (Mid)	Enough to prolong conflict (Mid)
Physical Environ.	Low consequences (Low)	Low consequences (Low)	Low consequences (Low)	Low consequences (Low)	Major consequences (High)	Major consequences (High)
U.S. Prestige (potential)	Minor loss (Mid)	Major loss (High)	Minor loss (Mid)	Major loss (High)	Unlikely loss (Low)	Minor loss (Mid)
Harm to Relationships	Unlikely (Low)	Major powers (High)	Unlikely (Low)	Unlikely (Low)	Major powers (High)	Major powers (High)
Overall Assessment	Mid	High possibly moving to mid	Mid possibly moving to low	Mid possibly moving to low	Mid possibly moving to high	High to mid

* (High), (Mid), and (Low) represent the level of risks to U.S. interests for that factor and case assessment.

Review of Opportunity Analysis

While the opportunity analysis is brief, it is an important component of the U.S. multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus. The main question that is asked is whether the intervention is likely to make a lasting difference (i.e., long-term resolution to the conflict). In all but one case (Persian Gulf conflict) of multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War, an opportunity did not exist for the intervention to make a lasting difference without continued U.S. military presence.

In most cases, specifically humanitarian crises, there is no assurance that U.S. intervention will be effective in the long-term. In fact, some scholars maintain that U.S. military intervention could do more harm than good by encouraging more violence. For example, Kanter (2000) maintains that "it is at least arguable that the initiation of air attacks on Kosovo by the NATO accelerated, if not intensified, the depredations the Serbs visited on Kosovar Albanians."[460] Furthermore, he argues that intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo may demonstrate to dissident groups that increased violence will prompt military intervention to their advantage. Finally, Kanter (2000) questions whether "ethnic cleansing by the Serbs has been replaced by ethnic cleansing by the Kosovar Albanians, and how much responsibility we [the United States] must accept for that outcome."[461] In short, U.S. decision-makers must assess what consequences will result from U.S. multilateral military intervention and whether this intervention will make a positive long-term difference. It seems likely, however, judging from the intra-state conflicts that have occurred in the post-Cold War era, once U.S. forces leave the conflict area, there is a high likelihood that the situation will revert back to the same conditions prior to intervention.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Multilateral Military Intervention

While the purpose of this study has been to develop a framework for multilateral military intervention, scholarly debate about the costs and benefits of this multilateral intervention strategy is underdeveloped. Thus, the analysis of the past cases of multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War era can also demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages that accompany multilateral efforts.

Advantages of multilateral military intervention include burden sharing, increased legitimacy, and strength in numbers. By intervening in multilateral military intervention, the costs can be spread among a larger number of actors, decreasing the burden on any one country. As Finnemore (1998) points out, multilateral military intervention is "believed to spread the cost of an intervention among more parties, thus making intervention cheaper for big powers, which may give up some control, but save in blood and treasure."[463] For example, while the overall military costs in the Persian Gulf conflict were estimated to be $61.1 billion, the U.S. contribution was estimated to be only $7.3 billion.[464] Moreover, political costs are distributed more widely by intervening through a multilateral force. As Regan (2000) notes, "if the intervention is only marginally effective, then distance from the policy is easy to achieve, at least for most countries; but if highly successful, then claims of active involvement in design, organization, or implementation can serve to lift the political fortunes of a national leader."[465] For example, while the U.S. suffered a loss of credibility following the Somalian crisis, blame was largely passed on to the UN.

In order to secure participation by other states in the multilateral force, the

intervention must have political legitimacy, which is often afforded by an international organization, such as the UN. As Finnemore (1998) notes, "acting through a UN framework can lower the political risks and costs of intervention by legitimating the operation and giving decisionmakers political cover. This legitimacy, coupled with the preexisting organizational structures and communications channels provided by the UN, can facilitate coalition-building."[465] For example, when the U.S. began assembling a multilateral military intervention in Haiti, many contributors, such as Canada, were unwilling to participate in the operation unless it was conducted under the UN flag.[466] Thus, the stamp of legitimacy afforded by an international organization or regional organization is important for the U.S. to be viewed as acting on behalf of the international community. Finally, acting in cooperation with other states when intervening militarily can provide strength in numbers. While the U.S. can act unilaterally, its strength is multiplied when joined by countries with similar objectives and interests. This was apparent in the Persian Gulf conflict when the United States and more than 25 states joined efforts to create an effective supranational force.[467]

Certainly, there are also disadvantages to acting multilaterally, including constraints on the intervention decision-making process, operational/organizational problems, and capability-sharing problems. Constraints on the international decision-making process can occur as early as in the planning stages of the intervention. Countries may disagree on which organization should carry out the mission. For example, Greenberg (1999) points out that the authority over the peacekeeping forces in Kosovo became a point of contention between NATO and the UN: "Russia, China, and

Yugoslavia, among others, insisted that the UN should take command; the U.S. remained adamant that NATO be at the core. Ultimately NATO assumed command of the multinational force under a mandate from the UN Security Council."[468] Further constraints on the intervention decision-making process can occur as a result of the UN veto power or need for consensus among all 19 members of NATO. For example, as Bennett (1998) notes, "in Bosnia, U.S. threats to launch air strikes were repeatedly undermined, often within a matter of hours, by French, British, or Russian objectives."[469] In the Kosovo crisis, fearing a Russian or Chinese veto, legitimization for intervention was sought by NATO, instead of the UN. As Kanter (2000) points out, while this may have been preferable in this case, by circumventing the UN, the U.S. must be aware of costs that may follow:

> Not only did it send an unmistakable message to Moscow and Beijing about our (un)willingness to take their concerns into account, thus making the Security Council less useful and pliable the next time we seek its authorization for interventions we believe are necessary; it also invites others to turn to — or invent — alternative international institutions to sanction actions that are contrary to U.S. interests.[470]

Moreover, disagreements over the mandate of the multilateral force can occur between countries contributing to the force. For example, in the case of UNPROFOR, Bennett (1998) points out that "recurrent disagreements arose between the United States, which favored air strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, and France, Britain, and Canada, which feared that lifting the embargo would lead to retaliatory strikes against their peacekeeping troops."[471] Similarly, disagreements arose

between the U.S. and Italy in the Somalian crisis. While the U.S. set out to disarm the Somali clans and capture Aideed, Italy preferred to negotiate with him directly.[472]

Other challenges to the multilateral military intervention force can occur because of operational and organizational problems. As Finnemore (1998) notes "action through the world organization dilutes state control over the operation, and decisionmaking 'by committee' can be dangerously slow and yield policy paralysis if the intervenors disagree."[473] Moreover, when two organizations work together, chain of command problems may develop. In the Bosnian crisis, the UN and NATO agreed upon a dual command structure. Thus, in order for UNPROFOR to receive NATO air support, the request had to be approved by the UN Secretary General. Yet, approval for air strikes often took up to five hours, which delayed the effectiveness of NATO power. For example, in March 1994, French peacekeeping troops were being attacked by Serbian forces. By the time NATO air strikes were approved, Serbian forces had already been withdrawn.[474]

Finally, while multilateral military intervention is intended to be burden sharing, the U.S. is often relied upon to provide the bulk of the support. Finnemore (1998) maintains that "the Pentagon made it clear that multilateral 'burden sharing' was a 'burden' — that the logistics of dealing with other troops, often with incompatible equipment and different or inadequate training, was more trouble than it was worth."[475] Moreover, as Bennett (1998) points out, "except for the NATO alliance...few regional actors or organizations have appropriate forces and effective decision-making mechanisms, and many have strong political biases."[476] Bennett (1998) maintains that "the states most willing to contribute

troops to peace operations have often lacked the necessary equipment. More than 20,000 of the 70,000 UN peacekeepers deployed as of the fall of 1994 came from five Asian states that lack adequate peacekeeping equipment and air transport: Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Malaysia. Malaysian forces in UNPROFOR, for example, arrived without winter gear or armored personnel carriers."[477]

In short, U.S. decision-makers must assess the advantages and disadvantages for each intervention and determine whether the benefits of acting multilaterally outweigh the costs. Generally speaking, such benefits of multilateral military intervention do outweigh the costs.

Future Avenues for Study

While this analysis focused on *multilateral military intervention*, it would appear that this intervention decision-making calculus could be applied to any type of military intervention. This model may also be applied to situations where the U.S. decided not to intervene militarily. Also, while beyond the scope of this study, a more quantitative focus can be developed. For example, a quantitative value can be assigned to each factor to devise a more rigorous model. However, it may be difficult to give some of the threat or risk factors a numeric value, such as political costs, organization of intervention force, and consequences without U.S. intervention. In cases of multilateral military intervention, the context of the crisis is very important and decision-makers are faced with uncertainty. Thus, the intervention decision-making framework may need to be more flexible, such as the one developed in this study.

While this chapter discussed the general importance of the threat and risk factors, it would be interesting to further explore how each factor is related to one another and whether there are other important factors missing from this analysis. A causal model can be developed to demonstrate how one factor affects another. For example, findings may include a causal linkage from the type of conflict, to duration of conflict, to economic, military, and human costs, to domestic support, to political costs. In this case, intra-state conflicts generally tend to be longer lasting. The longer U.S. forces are deployed, economic, military and human costs are likely to increase. As costs increase, domestic support is likely to decrease resulting in additional political costs. Finally, the intervention decision-making calculus can be applied to potential future sources of conflict to further demonstrate the model.

Conclusions and Implications for the Future

Certainly, there can never exist one formula for intervention or a guarantee for success. It is impossible to predict every circumstance that the international security environment will face in this world of complex interdependence. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War has produced new questions about the purposes of U.S. participation in regional and international organizations, such as the question advanced in this paper: *When regional organizations or the UN decide to pursue multilateral military intervention, when is it in the U.S. interest to be involved and to what extent?* Clearly, a lack of a consistent and coherent foreign policy will not help to promote U.S. national interests. Furthermore, while the United States contains its own constellation of

security issues, national interests, and preferences, today's security environment dictates that in many cases they be advanced through multilateral means.[478] While the United States cannot resolve every conflict, as Nye (1996) notes, it can work to strengthen multilateral institutions in responding to these threats:

> The United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations.[479]

Certainly, the U.S. can respond to international crises without becoming largely involved militarily. For example, the U.S. can aid an intervention by providing low-risk support, such as logistical support, air lifts, equipment, intelligence, and communications support. In addition, other forms of intervention, such as diplomatic and economic approaches, generally pose lower levels of risk and can either accompany or substitute military intervention. For example, Lund (1996) discusses four types of *coercive* diplomatic measures (without the use of armed force) that could be adopted:

(1) diplomatic sanctions (withholding of diplomatic relations, recognition as state, or membership in multilateral organizations);
(2) economic sanctions;
(3) moral sanctions (condemnations or violations of international law); and
(4) war crimes tribunals, trials.[480]

Moreover, he describes fifteen *noncoercive* diplomatic measures (without armed force or coercion) that could substitute or accompany military approaches:

(1) international appeals (moral suasion to conflicting parties to urge accommodation);
(2) propaganda (directed at violators of international principles);
(3) fact-finding missions, observation teams, on-site monitoring (of human rights abuses, instances of violence);
(4) bilateral negotiations (between opposed parties);
(5) third-party informal diplomatic consultations (by official entities);
(6) track-two diplomacy (by non official, non governmental parties);
(7) conciliation;
(8) third-party mediation;
(9) commissions of inquiry or other international inquiries;
(10) conciliatory gestures, concessions (unilateral or reciprocal, 'tit-for-tat' gestures by the opposed parties);
(11) nonviolent strategies (by opposed groups);
(12) economic assistance or political incentives (to induce parties' cooperation);
(13) mechanisms for peaceful settlement or disputes;
(14) arbitration (binding decision by permanent tribunal); and
(15) adjudication.[481]

As demonstrated by the past cases of U.S. multilateral military intervention in the post-Cold War era, it seems likely that *internal* conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic, or political disputes will continue in the future security environment. As Gannon (2001) points out, "such conflicts will occur most frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and parts of South and Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Andean region."[482] Moreover, the potential for *interstate* conflict may increase from rivalries in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq-Kuwait) and Asia (e.g., India-Pakistan and China-Taiwan). Lund (1996) further discusses the likely forms of future

conflicts and associated humanitarian crises:

> expansionist regimes, some with nuclear weapons, seeking regional dominance through intimidation; nuclear or conventional wars between states over territory and natural resources; the collapse of national economies and states; efforts to overthrow newly established constitutional democracies; secessionist conflicts over the domain of states; civil wars driven by competing ideologies (e.g., secularism vs. Islamism); and conflicts involving indigenous, ethnic, or regional minorities and likely to feature gross human rights violations, 'ethnic cleansing,' or genocide.[483]

While conflict will occur in every region of the world, it seems likely that the following security issues may present difficult future scenarios for U.S. decision-makers to determine the role of the U.S. in managing the conflict: intensified Iraqi assertiveness for power in the Persian Gulf region; further military buildup in Iran to gain control of the Gulf; an attempt by North Korea to reunify the Korean peninsula; tensions between China and Taiwan; intensified rivalry between India and Pakistan concerning the status of Kashmir; continued violence in the Balkans; and possibly intensified conflict in the Caucasus. In addition, conflicts in Africa (e.g., South Africa and the Congo) as well as conflicts in Latin America (e.g., Haiti and Columbia) may call for U.S. military action. The challenge that confronts U.S. decision-makers is how to recognize when *military* intervention is in the U.S. national interest. This analysis contends that the U.S. multilateral military intervention decision-making calculus can guide decision-makers in doing so. When the *risk* of intervening militarily outweighs the *threat* to U.S. national security, intervention should be avoided. In contrast, when the *threat* to U.S. national security outweighs the *risk* of intervening militarily, multilateral military intervention

would be warranted. Finally, if the *risk* and *threat* appear to be commensurate, only in those cases when an opportunity appears to exist for the intervention to make a lasting difference would intervention be warranted.

In short, while U.S. leadership is often requested to address the world's problems, sometimes it is not in the U.S. national interest to intervene *militarily*. As Huntington (1999) points out, "the fact that things are going wrong in many places in the world is unfortunate, but it does not mean that the United States has either an interest in or the responsibility for correcting them."[484]

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