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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL AFLAQ AND
THE BA'ATH PARTY IN SYRIA.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL AFLAQ
AND THE BA'ATH PARTY IN SYRIA

A DISSERTATION

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degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

MOHAMMED EL-ATTRACHE

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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL AFLAQ
AND THE BA'ATH PARTY IN SYRIA

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PREFACE

I selected this topic on The Political Philosophy of Michel Aflaq and the Ba'ath Party in Syria because I believe it is difficult for the average reader to comprehend the philosophy of a political system merely by reading journals of events and there is very little written material other than this on the subject of the Ba'ath translated and published in the Western world.

I also chose to write on the Ba'ath because of my personal interest and knowledge of it as a native of Syria. I read and speak Arabic and French, therefore, I was able to handle the untranslated materials which constitute approximately eighty percent of the quoted materials and research. Simultaneously, my education in the field of political science and theory interested me in undertaking such a project as this.

One particularly personal reason for choosing Ba'athism as my subject is the fact that the El-Attrache family has played an important role in the making of Syrian history for over a century, especially during World War One when the

Syrians participated in a joint Arab effort to help defeat the Turks. This historical reality was followed by the 1925 Syrian Revolution for independence against France under the leadership of Sultan Pasha El-Attrache, political leader of the El-Attrache family and the Jebel Druse Province. Several members of the family have held prominent positions in the Syrian government during and after the French mandate, namely Yussef Pasha El-Attrache, Amir Hassan El-Attrache, Zayd Pasha El-Attrache, and Hamad Bey El-Attrache. More recently, a few young members of the family who joined the Ba'ath Party, particularly Mansour Pasha El-Attrache who held a high ranking position during the Aflaq regime, have had roles in Syrian affairs.

It is important to note here that the Ba'ath Party is still alive and in existence in all parts of the Arab world whether it be legal or illegal in particular countries. It is my opinion that the Ba'ath, unlike Nasserism which was based primarily on the charismatic personality and cult of the late Gamal Abdul Nasser, is the major political party in the Middle East that is grounded upon specific or determinable political ideology. Ba'athism states most elaborately philosophical-practical Arab ideas of unity, nationalism, and socialism. The Party achieved power in Syria in 1963, and most recently has established itself in Iraq. It has influenced politics in other Arab countries and has cells everywhere.

However, this study is not a foreign government discussion per se; it is intended basically as a normative political theory dissertation which follows an ideological scheme of analysis and uses the conceptual tools of normative thought. Specifically, it is an analysis of an ideology in terms of: (1) the philosophical conceptual value tools: nature of the universe, epistemology, nature of man, society, politics, and the state, and (2) the practical conceptual categories: organization and structure of the state, decision making in the state, and the functions of the state.

The problems encountered in this research were the unavailability of documental materials and the scarcity of published Arabic books on the subject. In Syria, it is considered dangerous and often arouses suspicion to go to governmental offices and bureaus and ask for documents and papers. After the ill-fated six-day war of 1967, the Ba'ath and Syrian officials have become even more cautious of anyone seeking written materials or asking questions concerning the Party and/or the government.

The primary sources used in this dissertation consist of Arabic books, Ba'ath and Syrian government publications, observations, and anonymous interviews with Party members held when I visited Syria during the zenith of the Ba'athist regime under the leadership of Michel Aflaq in the summer of 1965 and also during a return visit in January

of 1971. Other sources include books, dissertations, journals, and pamphlets published in Arabic and English which are included in the bibliography. Also at the Library of Congress I was able to gather additional materials concerning this topic.

This investigation into the political philosophy of Michel Aflaq and the Ba'ath movement and the explication of it would not have been possible without the sustained intellectual support, criticism, and encouragement of John Paul Duncan, David Ross Boyd Professor of Political Science, who directed it. His interest in and direct knowledge of the Middle East dates back to his professorship at The Faculty of Law, Ein Shams University, Cairo, in 1952. In addition, he later became personally acquainted with a number of officials of the Ba'ath Party, as he afterwards travelled extensively in the Arab World for ten years, sponsored the Arab Club at the University of Oklahoma and carried on continued correspondence with contacts in the Middle East.

I also wish to extend my gratitude to other members of the Political Science Department of the University of Oklahoma: Dr. John W. Wood, Chairman of the Department of Political Science; Dr. Rufus G. Hall, Assistant Dean of Arts and Sciences; Dr. Walter F. Scheffer, Director of Advanced Programs in Governmental Studies; and to Dr. Alexander J. Kondonassis, David Ross Boyd Professor of Economics and

Director of the Economics Program in Advanced Studies.

Deep gratitude, also to a number of friends who were extremely helpful in collecting the original publications on the Ba'ath Party used in preparation of this study. To my anonymous interviewees, members of the Ba'ath Party, my humble thanks.

To my wife, Shirley, without whose encouragement, aid, and understanding this work would not have been completed, I hereby make acknowledgement.

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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MICHEL AFLAQ AND THE BA'ATH PARTY

INTRODUCTION

This study will seek to describe, analyze, and criticize a political-philosophic system that has been of considerable influence in the modern Middle East. As is well known, this area of the world has been historically a meeting ground of the political and philosophic systems of both the East and the West. It is the birthplace and home of three great modern religions and their correlative philosophies. It has been the birthplace and burial ground of Empires. Its economic resources and conflicts of politics have caused it to be still proclaimed by some writers as a possible Armageddon of nuclear war.

It is thus the purpose of this study to examine one of the more important militant and aggressive political-philosophic systems that have evolved in this area during the twentieth century which has played its ideological role in the immediate conflicts. The system under examination is that of Ba'athist Socialism, especially as it is found in the

writings and ideas of Michel Aflaq and his followers. In a day of mass communication and arguments based on ideology (even if the latter be considered mere "superstructures"), it is unfortunate that so little attention in the West has been paid to a system which has been so influential at various levels in terms of particularly Syrian--but more broadly modern Arab--intellectual philosophy and politics. This study is a response to this fact and the need in the Western countries for knowledge of Ba'athist thought and programs.

CHAPTER I

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND IDEOLOGY

Political Evolutionary Development of Greater Syria

Greater or Geographical Syria,¹ which occupies the western half of the Fertile Crescent,² has attracted ambitious conquerors attempting to take advantage of its strategic position since the dawn of history. This fertile land has been subjected to repeated blood-baths as the native people of Syria have resisted the intrusion of foreign elements which have sought to eliminate them. The Syrian would often leave his homeland, rather than submit to oppression and tyranny by outsiders. For the Syrian to leave his native land, he had to feel the hopelessness of life and the ambition for self-government. This was particularly true in light of the Syrian's pride in the ancient position of Syria. Yet through the ages the Syrian has managed to retain a feeling of historical uniqueness while existing under the influence and even the rule of many conquerors.

The entire political geography of the Eastern Medi-

terranean also has been the scene of repeated conflicts through the ages, the creation of a New Power element on May 18, 1948, being merely one more event in Middle Eastern history. This new power element came when the State of Israel was carved out of the traditional and recent political units.

The early settlers of Syria, as opposed to conquerors, were the Nabataeans, Palmyrenes, Ghassanids, and Petraeans. These settlers played a notable part in the future development and history of Syria. In ancient historical times, however,--about 3000 B.C.--one of the first groups to establish flourishing civilizations in Syria was the Amerites, a Semitic people. Still another Semitic race, the Canaanites, followed with a civilization established in Southern Syria, or what came to be called Palestine. Another foreign element was established by the Phoenicians along the northern coast of Syria and Lebanon. These invaders controlled and remained in Syria for approximately 1000 years. Coming after these were the Aramaeans in about 1500 B.C. Next, two non-Semitic peoples, the Hurrians and the Hittites made many intrusions into Greater Syria from the North. Thence, over the many centuries the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, and Byzantines subdued Syria for varying lengths of time. Though the Arab tribesmen of Taghleb had long lived in Northern Syria,

the Moslem Arabs from the peninsula conquered Syria in the seventh century A.D.³

Syrian relations with the Arabs⁴ date back, therefore, to at least the fifth century B.C. The insular Arab conquest of Syria was complete on August 20, 636 A.D. Iraq and Jerusalem also soon fell under the sway of the Arabs; and the whole Fertile Crescent became Arabic, with Damascus serving as the capital of the Empire. The Omayyad dynasty ruled Syria until January, 750 A.D. The capital remained at Damascus for this one-hundred-fourteen-year period. With the Abbasid dynasty's ascendancy, the capital and the center of Empire activities was transferred to Baghdad, the capital remaining there until 1256 A.D. The Mamluks, a dynasty of slaves (a large number of them from the Caucasus and Balkans), gained control and ruled the country for three centuries. They, in turn, were defeated by the Ottoman Turks in 1516 A.D. The Ottoman Turk's control of Syria and most of the Arabic countries continued for more than four centuries, until 1918.⁵

The Ottoman Sultans ruled the Arabs by appointing Governors or Pashas (somewhat as the earlier Turks had created the Mamluks). These pashas served as both administrative and military leaders and became also the dominant economic group. The best land was controlled by Turkish pashas who ruled from Damascus. This situation afforded them great luxury and ease.

The few pashas who lived in the regions that they governed tended to be native emirs, who seldom got other than the poor or bad lands. Furthermore, in order to maintain their iron-hand control, the Turks broke the land into separate provinces or vilayats. They also deliberately spread hate and mistrust between the various classes throughout the land. They used the administrative device of carefully selected secret agents to spread this malaise. Particularly they sought to encourage tribal animosity and raids. These raids, engineered by the Turkish agents, continued until large massacres occurred involving the autonomous Druse Principality and Maronite peasants in Lebanon in 1860.⁶ This hostility reached such a point, in fact, as to allow the French (Maronites) and British (Druses) governments the excuse for intervention to "protect the interests of the natives."

As a result of these and other factors, there developed a growing interest on the part of Syrians toward a union of all Arab countries. This became an ideal that survived under the aegis of Pan-Arabism. Arab political thought naturally found deep roots also among the intellectual local leaders of Syria. These leaders, in fact, organized a secret society in 1875 which had as its aim the liberation of Syria from all foreign influences. Branches of this society appeared in Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo, Tripoli, and Sidon.

Though they were soon suppressed by the absolutist Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the spirit of independence and a movement toward unity of all Arabs had now been aroused as a modern phenomenon.

Impetus for Syrian Independence

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the establishment and growth of a new national movement by Syrian emigres. La Ligue de la Partie Arabe was formed in Paris, in 1904, to crystallize support for the freeing of Syria and Iraq. In 1907, the society began to publish a revolutionary monthly review entitled L'Independence Arabe. In Turkey, Sultan Abdul-Hamid was overthrown in 1908 by the Young Turks.⁷ Though this was first viewed as a breath of fresh air for Arab nationalism, the Young Turks soon embarked on a program of Turkification of non-Turkish peoples in the Empire. This action brought a heightened sense of Arab nationalism to the forefront. Eventually, these pressures forced the Arab nationalistic movement underground.

After several other secret societies appeared, the political situation was so repressive that it caused greater growth for these societies. Some of the societies were al-Ahd or (Covenant), al-Fatat or (The Young Arab Society). Doctors, writers, landowners, government officials, and other people from all walks of life found expression for

their political ideals in the secret societies. Their aim, pure and simple, was to achieve Arab independence by the overthrow of the Turkish Empire. These societies, headquartered in France, expressed the ideal of full Arab political rights, independent administration, and recognition of the Arabic language as the official language of Syria and Iraq. The Young Turks ignored these demands until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

The Young Turks first realized the strategic importance of Syria in 1914. It is ironic that this time was the first for Arab Nationalism to become a major factor in the internal and external security of Turkey. Germany, an ally of Turkey, was also concerned about the security of this area, recommending the extraordinary device of granting self-government in order to win Arab support. In so doing, the Turks expected Jamal Pasha, whom they had placed in command of the Arab Fourth Army in Syria, to be an effective military ally. When Jamal Pasha, however, was defeated by the British at the Suez Canal in 1915, the Turks resorted to terror and repression as their means of maintaining control in Syria. During this period scores of Syrian leaders were hanged on charges of treason and conspiracy. This unrest had, of course, grown out of the belief in Arab nationalism; and many of the most energetic and politically conscious sons of Syria were either killed or exiled.⁸

Famine and plague also swept the country during this period of persecution by the Turks and drove thousands of Syrians into the desert and to their death. Some Arab tribesmen, meanwhile, joined the young Arab Society to aid in the Syrian Revolution as soon as it was declared. In the Hejaz, Emir Faisal approved the plans of the Syrian Revolution. His father, Sherif Hussein,⁹ meanwhile dispatched his son Ali to raise troops from the neighboring villages and tribes; while Abdulah, his second son, was sent to inform the British that there would be further Arab revolts against Turkey.¹⁰

The British troops were in a deplorable condition at the Dardanelles--their ill-fated Gallipoli expedition--and their armies were on the defensive in Europe. Some high officials in the British army believed that an Arab rebellion against the Turks in Syria would enable England, while still fighting Germany, to defeat Turkey simultaneously.¹¹ The British government therefore pledged to assist Arab unity and independence in return for the Sherif's help in leading the revolution against the Turks. This promise was made through correspondence between the Sherif and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. The Sherif's communication, dated July 14, 1915, was as follows:

Great Britain should recognize the independence of the Arab countries which are bounded: on the north by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37 N.

and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Madiat-Jazirat ibn' Umar Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to Mersin.

To this demand, Sir Henry McMahon replied in his letter dated October 24, 1915, as authorized by His Majesty's Government:

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.

Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally France, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:

That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.¹²

In accordance with the Hussein-McMahon Agreement, the British government assigned Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence and other officers to help the Arabs stage their revolution against the Turks in order to facilitate the general attack launched by the British forces under the command of General

Allenby in November, 1917. Colonel Lawrence later wrote about the Arab revolt and his experiences with Sherif Hussein, Emirs Faisal, Abdulah, and Ali, and other tribal chiefs who fully cooperated with the British officers to oust the Turks. In his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence wrote from his own experiences of actual combat with the Arabs:

Allenby had appointed us watchmen of the Fourth Army. We had just seen its disordered fight. Our duty was completed, and we might honourably pull back to Bosra, twenty miles out of the way to the east, where the Druses were collecting under Nesib el-Bekri to help us. We might wait with them for the British to take Dera, and for our reward, in the victorious close of the campaign.

This attitude passed me by, since, if we withdrew to Jebel Druse, we ended our active service before the game was won, leaving the last brunt on Allenby. I was very jealous for the Arab honour, in whose service I would go forward at all costs. They had joined the war to win freedom, and the recovery of their old capital by force of their arms was the sign they would best understand. . . . The Arabs were fighting like devils, the sweat blurring their eyes, dust parching their throats; while the flame of cruelty and revenge which was burning in their bodies so twisted them, that their hands could hardly shoot.¹³

In any case, with the capture of Damascus came the end of the long years of struggle for Arab independence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Arabs soon realized that the Western Powers had simply used them for their imperialistic ambitions and had entertained no real intention of granting the Arabs their independence and assisting them to self-government. Instead, the Foreign Office in London, for example,

issued a note recognizing the Arabs simply as belligerents within part of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ Arab aspirations for unity and independence, however, lingered on in the minds of every Arab who fought in all the corners of Syria and elsewhere, although these aspirations proved at that time no more than a mirage which disappeared in the harsh actualities of the Peace Conference.

Allied Powers' Ambivalent Diplomacy

The imperialistic ambitions of the Allied Powers, Britain, France, and Russia, had actually (as it turned out) conspired against the cause of Syria and the Arab aspirations for independence. In 1916, these three powers had "concocted" a secret agreement to divide portions of the Ottoman Empire according to their traditional interests. This agreement was to have an important effect on the Arab lands. According to its terms, France claimed northern Syria, mainly the Lebanon coastal section. Britain expressed deep interest in maintaining and controlling the key point of the route to India. Russia was to get parts of Asia Minor. More specifically, the terms of this tripartite agreement, which was known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, may be summarized as follows:

Russia to obtain the Province of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, and Trebizond, as well as territory in the southern part of Kurdistan, along the line Mush-

Saïrt-Jazirat; ibn^o Umar-Amadiya-Persian Frontier. The limit of Russian acquisition on the Black Sea coast to be fixed later at a point lying west of Trebizond.

France to obtain the coastal strip of Syria, the villayet of Adana, and the territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala-Dagh, Kaisariya, Ak Dagb, Yildiz Dagb, Zara, and Egin-Kharput.

Great Britain to obtain southern part of Mesopotamia with Baghdad, and in Syria the ports of Haifa and Acre.

By agreement between France and Britain the zone between the French and British territories to form a confederation of Arab States, or one independent Arab State, with the zones of influence to be determined at the same time.

Alexandretta to be proclaimed a free port.¹⁵

As to so-called Palestine (Palestine dates back to the Arab conquest of Syria and the establishment of the Omayyad Caliph about 634 A.D.), the three powers agreed together on establishing an international administration for Palestine and the Holy Places, subject to their supervision. After the Bolshevik Revolution, which brought the downfall of the Czarist regime, however, another compromise was developed between Britain and France for them alone to undertake the responsibility of safeguarding the Holy Places in Palestine. In still another treaty known as the Lloyd George-Clemenceau Agreement (December, 1918), France also surrendered some of her previous claims in Syria, so that Mosul and Palestine were placed in the British sphere. These secret agreements

were made public after Turkey was defeated by the Arabs in Syria, and after the British troops had already occupied the whole region to carry out and execute the Sykes-Picot Treaty.¹⁶

These secret betrayals by the Allied Powers were not yet known to the Arab world, and the Arabs still continued to shed their blood to gain their independence. As Colonel Lawrence wrote:

The Arab Revolt had begun on false pretences. To gain the Sherif's help our British cabinet had offered, through Sir Henry McMahon, to support the establishment of native governments in parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, 'saying it is to the interest of our ally, France.' The last modest clause concealed a treaty (kept secret, till too late, from McMahon, and therefore, from the Sherif) by which France, England, and Russia agreed to annex some of these promised areas, and to establish their respective spheres of influence over all the rest.

I had had no previous or minor knowledge of the McMahon pledges and the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which were both framed by war-time branches of the Foreign Office. . . . If we won the war, the promises to the Arabs were dead papers. . . . Yet, the Arabs' inspiration was our main tool in winning the Eastern War.¹⁷

Also, when Russia withdrew from the war in 1917 because of the Bolshevik Revolution, England issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, pledging the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine¹⁸ while at the same time declaring that the rights of the Arabs were to be protected. Britain's aim, of course, was to win world

Jewry to fight on the British side, especially the Jewish element in Russia where the Bolshevik Revolution at that time was considered an enemy to the Allied countries. In actuality, despite the double talk, this declaration not only denied that Palestine was an Arab country in a political sense as included in the pledge given to Sherif Hussein, but recognized the Jews as the original inhabitants of Palestine. That is, Britain then supported the Zionist ambitions as an aid in the realization of its imperialistic motives. The Arabs, then and since, naturally charged that violations of pledges, utter disregard of promises, conflicting and contradicting loyalties were involved in such a course.

Faisal was thus faced with a fait accompli policy when he visited London in September, 1919. He tried to reason with the British government, but the only response received from His Majesty's government was to involve Faisal in direct negotiations with the French government since Syria, as agreed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, had been within the French sphere of influence. Faisal returned immediately to Syria after failing to reach any agreement whatsoever with either imperialist power for the realization of Syria's independence. A Syrian Congress crowned Prince Faisal on March 18, 1920, proclaiming him King of Syria and Palestine. Britain and France disregarded

the resolution and treated the Syrian Congress as illegal.

The Allied Powers themselves later met at San Remo in April, 1920, to act upon the fate of Syria and other portions of the Middle East.¹⁹ They decided that the former Turkish provinces of Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon should be "mandated": Syria and Lebanon to France; Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain. In 1921, Transjordan, with a Biblical name, but with no historical or political existence, was also amputated from Palestine and placed under Prince Abdulah, who was to be under the supervision of Great Britain. France issued an ultimatum to King Faisal and his government to surrender within four days. The climax was reached upon the advance of the French troops under the command of General Gouraud into Syria. Prince Faisal departed for exile and later was crowned King of Iraq.²⁰

A new struggle for independence against the two Western Powers then began in many parts of Greater Syria. Resistance to the French Mandate reached its climax in 1925 when the great Syrian Revolution led by Sultan Pasha El-Attrache²¹ broke out in Jebel Druse. It began when Adham Khanjar attempted to assassinate General Gouraud. Khanjar took refuge in the El-Attrache's home. Sultan Pasha of Jebel Druse declared war on the French Mandate for violating the honored customs of the country by arresting the accused man during the absence of the Sultan. The violent indignation

developed into a national revolution for independence.

Outside Syria, the British troops, meanwhile, had already established their military authorities in Palestine in December, 1917, under the command of General Allenby, when they occupied the Holy City, Jerusalem. They established their political headquarters there. According to present Arab belief this occupation of Palestine by Britain was actually meant for the purpose (which the Palestinian Arabs now claim they did not know about until it was too late) of implementing ultimately the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which, as noted before, provided for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This Declaration stated:

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. [The last phrase was a reservation introduced at the request of non-Zionist Jews.]²²

The Declaration was not made known to the Arabs of Palestine until 1920.²³ In the meantime, the Arabs understood or believed that the British entry into Palestine was to liberate them from the Turks and undermine the Central Powers in Europe. Naturally when the real intent of the British occupation and knowledge of the Balfour Declaration

came to light, the Arab opposition also became known all over the world. Even President Wilson of the United States rejected the Zionist claim as recorded in the King-Crane Commission. From 1920, opposition and some guerrilla fighting took place between the British troops and the Palestinian Arabs because of that issue; of course, guerrilla fighting also occurred later between Jews and British because the British apparently did not really intend to give either Jews or Arabs political independence until forced to do so. As Churchill later said, he did not become the Queen's first minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. Much more has been made of Jewish opposition than of Arab opposition, however, because the Jews secretly received and used more weapons, had more agents in foreign countries to supply them, and controlled the flow of information more easily than did the Arabs. Later, after the Declaration of the Establishment of Israel by the Jewish-Zionists, the fighting has never fully abated between Jews and Arabs; and animosity by Arabs continues toward the Western imperialistic states, which gives so much support to the state of Israel.

Western Thought and Nationalism

At this point a few words should be addressed specifically to the subject of nationalism and its relation to

this area although it is not within the scope of this study to discuss it as such at any length. This study will, of course, be dealing with nationalism later in a more concrete way in discussing Ba'athist Socialism than is now necessary.

Nationalism is a term that is difficult to define. In fact, many people consider any attempt to define nationalism to be an exercise in futility.

There is no real agreement as to what a nation is. No one has succeeded in devising a definition which is watertight in the sense that . . . it enumerates the constituent elements of the nation, we know in such fashion as to distinguish them satisfactorily from other types of communities in which men have intensely lived their lives through the ages . . . a nation exists . . . only after the fact when the reasonable doubt that it is there and must be reckoned with . . .²⁴

There is one premise generally accepted, however, by most authorities as being indigenous to all concepts or definitions of nationalism. This basic ingredient is that nationalism does not exist without a social-philosophical formation that is somewhat economically or materialistically based as well as containing "racial" or "moral" or "religious" elements.²⁵ Only with such a philosophical base may one begin to understand the separation or isolation of the elements of humanity into these segments called nations.

Also despite the semantic vagueness, one may say that nationalism seems to express an emotional impulse, a senti-

ment, and an attitude. As C. Kerr has said, "Nationalism is more a sentiment than a system of thought."²⁶ This "sentiment" is perhaps the reason for the difficulty in defining nationalism.

Some authorities--for example, Rupert, Emerson, Boyd, and Shafer--have also claimed that certain characteristics must be existent for nationalism to appear. They include such things as "certain defined territory," common dominant social and economic institutions (as indicated above), and a belief in a common history. It is these criteria, when developed, which presumably evolve into future national goals. Other authorities, such as Professor Carlton Hayes, has identified nationalism with the volume of affliction and agony which has visited a section of humanity since the dawn of history. Hayes draws his reference from the industrial revolution and the emergence of the middle class,²⁷ which, however, then became a "national group" in the sense in which one usually speaks of nationalism.

Historians tell us, however, that national movements have been especially identified with the advent of the liberal bourgeois or middle class.²⁸ National movement became more immediately apparent in the rise of commercial cities following the Dark Ages. In fact, some writers maintain that Joan of Arc (1429) was among the first modern nationalists. Her nationalism was manifested in her efforts to drive the

British forces from French soil. Even so, it is difficult to cite a specific date which can be accepted as the beginning of modern nationalism as a movement.²⁹

From the beginning of the Roman Empire to the end of the Middle Ages, political thought was characterized by the conviction that "mankind was one and had to form one community." Even the thinker Dante gave to nationalism the concept of universality, "that the whole race forms one community under a single ruler . . ." Dante, of course, put forward this proposition: "That which has the most reality has the greatest unity, and that which has the greatest unity is best."³⁰

Still one must bear in mind that many states existed prior to the emergence of national consciousness. Both England and France were states prior to their becoming aware of their national identity. On the contrary, Germany and Italy had attained cultural nationalism before achieving political independence. In fact, some political scientists have advanced the thesis that Johann Fichte was responsible for igniting German nationalism (1806) on a basis of both cultural and economic appeal. In Italy, Giuseppe Mazzini is similarly credited with igniting Italian nationalism.³¹ From these developments, it is clear that the movement to national states and spirit became characterized by common bonds of religion, language, customs, habits, and so on,

but not on a universal basis, rather on a territorial, racial, and economic basis.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave rise to a heightened sense of community even while individualism was increasing as an ideology. Mankind everywhere began to accept this communal political attitude as nationalism. Nationalism, which soon experienced a phenomenal growth, began to find even a fuller fruition in World War I and World War II. It became even more apparent among the Africans, Asiatics, and Middle Easterners as well as the peoples of Europe and the Americas. In fact, this determined growth began to force the colonial powers to face the problem of giving up their colonial possessions. Moreover, this spirit of nationalism finally became not limited to that area of the world that is called "free." Nationalism has also shown a surprising strength in the Communist countries. It has been manifested by the rejection of "supra-nationalism," and by their efforts to evolve an independent national brand of socialism. An independence from Moscow has cropped up in Titoism, Albanianism, Maoism, and Castroism, not to mention the tragic suppression of Czechoslovakia and the earlier tragedy of Hungary.

Continuity of Syrian Nationalism

With this background, one might inquire as to what

constitutes Syrian Nationalism. Syrian nationalism has been considered by some as "a liberal movement that has for its objectives the independence and welfare of the whole Syrian nation."³² It evolved out of the spread of science, technology, and learning in certain parts of the Arab world. One must, therefore, examine the spread of modern education and culture in this area to find the genesis of Syrian nationalism. The late blooming, comparatively speaking, of Arab nationalism is attributed by most students to the limited scope of the colonial educational systems, which reflected the standards and interests of the West and were often unrelated to local conditions and requirements.³³

To argue that Syrian nationalism is a twentieth-century phenomenon is misleading. It is now believed that Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi (1838-1897), known as al-Afghani, became the seminal force in igniting the asabiyya (solidarity) and the jinsiyya (bonds of nationality and the force of religion). Al-Afghani believed that religious solidarity was more important and stronger than national solidarity.³⁴ Islam, of course, is a "revealed" religion which has transcended different nationalities and therefore created a greater asabiyya.

Because al-Afghani's travels took him to Persia, Turkey, Egypt, France, and England, he was able to spread the new attitudes and revolutionary temper throughout the Moslem

Near East. However, it was in the writings of Rashid Rida (1865-1935) that one can point concretely to a date and person for the concretization of the movement of Arab nationalism. Rida attempted to rationalize the salafiyya (return to the ways of the ancestors), in what was an orthodox manner. His thesis was centered on a return to the way of the Prophet, when (it was claimed) Islam was in its pure condition under the Arab Caliphate. Rida argued that the Turks, though Moslems, were not part of the umma (Arab nation). The umma, it was understood, consisted only of Arab Moslems. In an article written in 1900, Rida said,

The Turks are a warlike nation, but they are not of greater moment than the Arabs. How can their conquests be compared to those of the Arabs, although their state lasted longer than all of the states of the Arabs together? It is in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs that Islam spread, became firmly established and prospered. Most of the lands which the Turks conquered were a burden on Islam and the Muslims and are still a warning of clear catastrophe. . . . A little knowledge of past and present history shows that most of the countries where Islam was established were conquered by the Arabs who were the active agents of the propagation of Islam.³⁵

Al-Kawakibi (1849-1902) was another zealous Syrian nationalist (and Arab enthusiast). This follower of Rashid Rida expressed his ideology in almost the same manner through his writings. He exposed the Ottoman tyranny in his books, such as Tabat al-Istibdad (The Characteristics of Tyranny). Al-Kawakibi is considered the propagator of modern secular

Pan-Arabism because of his championing of the Arabs over the Turks and his introduction of the idea of a spiritual caliph (chosen from the Arabs). The methodology of al-Kawakibi was adopted by Nagib Azouri in his book entitled Le Reveil de la Nation, which incorporated al-Kawakibi's ideas of the spiritual leader. However, he advocated the separation of civil and religious powers, and went further in the idea of establishing an Arab Empire stretching from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to the Suez Canal in the south, the Indian Ocean in the east, and the Coast of the Mediterranean in the west.³⁶ This ideology later came to be expounded by Antoine Sa'adi, the founder of the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Nationalist Party. He was, however, executed by the Lebanese government in 1950 for conspiring to overthrow the government by force.

The time from this early period to World War I revealed that the concept of Arab nationalism was largely a "cultural awakening," the effectiveness of which was confined to the small literary circles of the time.³⁷ With World War I, and the revolt against the Ottoman Empire, came the second phase of Syrian nationalism. At that time, the Syrian Arabs began to struggle for their political independence. Faisal was elected King of Syria and was briefly installed on the throne with the tacit approval of the British, but was later expelled by the French. Faisal expressed a rudimentary

philosophy of Arab nationalism in his speech delivered on May 9, 1919. Here he repudiated Western thought that equated the Arab of the desert with the Arab of the towns. He said that,

We are one people, living in the region which is bounded by the sea to the east, the south, and the west, and the Taurus Mountains to the north. We are Arabs before being Muslims, and Mohamet is an Arab before being a prophet . . . there is neither minority nor majority among us, nothing to divide us. We are one body, we were Arabs before the time of Moses, Mohamet, Jesus and Abraham.³⁸

Sati al-Husri, a Syrian from Aleppo, served as Faisal's Minister of Education. With the exile of Faisal, Sati al-Husri was banished from both Syria and Iraq for his ardent nationalism. He wrote a series of essays that became known as a reasoned exposition of Arab nationalism. The tone of his argument appealed to both the traditionalist and the modernist factions. In al-Husri's theory, one finds a stress on the unity of language and history, rather than on environment and race. He believed that the unity of culture makes the people aware that they are members of one nation. The drive toward nationalism, as articulated by al-Husri, emphasizes three major points: 1) that the individual attains his freedom within the state, 2) that Egypt is part of the Arab nation, and 3) that Pan-Arabism does not contradict Islam.³⁹

Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., in his book The Ideologies of

the Developing Nations asserted that:

Part of the impetus of regional cooperation comes from the awareness of a common heritage of values. . . . However, the common background of Islamic culture and Arab language in the Middle East . . . serve in varying degrees to strengthen the common bonds in their respective regions.⁴⁰

The Arabs entered their third stage of Arab nationalism in 1945, which continues until the present. The credo of this movement--independence, unity, and self-betterment--remain integral elements in present Arab political thought. Both the Christian and the Moslem see and realize that the culture which arose out of Islam is a part of the national heritage. Because of this inheritance, one finds an acceptance that transcends religious beliefs, an acceptance which is necessary in this part of the world.

That Arab nationalism is not incompatible with Islam is a fact that troubles many Westerners. Islam enjoins nationalism, often substituting it for a religious faith. This fact does not, however, disturb the Christian Arab intellectual who has come strongly to support Arab nationalism. Among these intellectuals are such authors as Qustantin Zuraiq, Antoine Sa'adi, Khalil Qubrusi, and Michel Aflaq. It was Aflaq, in fact, who became the founder of Ba'ath Socialism in the Middle East.⁴¹

All of these authors have been quite preoccupied with the study and the articulation of Islam. They found both to

be necessary in their proof that they were good Arab nationalists as well as Christians. Qubrusi circulated a pamphlet in 1931, bearing the title of "Nadwat Nasara al-Arab ila 'l-Dukhul fil-Islam" ("A Call for the Christian Arabs to Embrace Islam"). In this pamphlet, Qubrusi argues that

Since the religion of God has always been one among the ancients and the moderns and has differed in nothing but its outward form, while its essence and truth are always one, namely what the whole world is commanded to do through the intermediary of the prophets and the messengers, and since the highest aim in religion is belief in God alone and his steadfast worship as well as mutual aid and forbearance, and since the good is worthy to be loved wherever it is found, what harm would it do the Christian Arabs if they united in religion as they are united in race [with the Muslims] and we may then get away from this misleading faction in fulfillment of His saying, Glory be to Him ⁴²

Qubrusi believed that Christianity had been corrupted by the Europeans. Through them, it had sowed hate instead of love, slavery instead of freedom; and he begged a return to pure Christianity (through Islam). His primary interest was in healing the na'ra diniya (religious antagonism) which had been fomented by outsiders (Imperialists, Zionists, and so on).

Michel Aflaq meanwhile found "God" to be an expression of man's need. Thinking thus, Aflaq departed from orthodox religious attitudes. In a speech delivered in Damascus in 1943, commemorating the Prophet's birth, Aflaq said that

We, the new generation carry today a non-political message, a belief and a creed, not mere theories

and talk. Only those who suffer and those who believe will understand. . . . Islam is a faithful picture, a complete and true symbol of the nature of the Arab soul, its rich possibilities and its noble leanings. For this reason, it is right to consider it as able continuously to renew itself in its expression.⁴³

Aflaq, as will be noted in detail later, affirmed also that Islam was an Arab movement; that the revelation of the Koran is Arabic; that the religion of Islam represents Arabism, unity, power, progress; and that nationalism is "love before everything else."⁴⁴ To Aflaq, Islam was Arab nationalism, and everything else was a degeneration of Western imperialism. He does not define Arab nationalism in terms of boundaries, but in an evolutionary and revolutionary practical political doctrine. This change has been continuing since the Ba'ath became an expression of the intellectual and political doctrine of political action in the Middle East.

It is to the movement of Ba'ath Socialism and the political philosophy of Michel Aflaq that this work primarily addresses itself.

A Biographical Sketch of Michel Aflaq

Michel Aflaq, the Syrian nationalist leader, was born into a Greek Orthodox family in Damascus in 1910. As in many Middle Eastern middle-class homes, politics was a favorite discussion topic during evening gatherings. In 1943, Aflaq and Salah Bittar along with several others founded the Ba'ath

Party in Syria. Although Aflaq does not presently hold any position in the Party, until comparatively recent times he served the Party as Secretary-General.⁴⁵

In the opinion of this writer, Aflaq serves as the philosophical fountainhead of the Ba'ath Party. That is, the strategy and the philosophy of the Party have been controlled generally by the ideas of Michel Aflaq. It is difficult to determine and measure his particular influence, considerable as it is. Still, it would not be incorrect to say that Aflaq has been the primary guiding force in the development of the Party.

During the years 1928 to 1932, Aflaq studied history at the Sorbonne. These formative years at this world-famous university affected the development of his thinking. At the conclusion of his university years, he returned to Syria to teach. There his ideas soon led him into conflict with the Syrian authorities, who relieved him of his duties as a teacher in 1940. He was then forced to depend for his economic support upon income received from tutoring. During the 1940 to 1943 period, nevertheless, he spent considerable time spreading his nationalistic ideology at a series of weekly discussion meetings in the homes of friends. As indicated above, in 1943 an expression of his ideology was realized in the formation of the Party, Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki (The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party).

This organization was created from those groups which had been studying with or under him.⁴⁶

From that time Aflaq's career has primarily been one of philosopher and party leader rather than that of government functionary. The three times that he ran for Parliament, he was defeated. He once served as the Minister of Education, but for merely a three-month period. He claims to have an aversion to "public jobs," however, and says that he would rather "think."

On the other hand, the impact of the ideas of Aflaq is far greater than one would expect in viewing even the extent of his published work. True, he has published Fī Sabil al-Ba'ath (For the Sake of Ba'ath), Marakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The Battle for Common Destiny), Nouktat al-Bidaya (The Point of Beginning), and is the co-author of Hawla al-Ishtirakiya wal-Qaumiya (Socialism and Nationalism), and Dirasat Fī al-Ishtirakiya (A Study of Socialism). These books consist of a collection of essays, articles, and speeches covering a variety of topics. That his works are unusually difficult to read and understand is the result of his peculiar style and the character of his logico-speculative thinking. Yet, as has been noted, Aflaq was very influential in spite of these difficulties and his lack of public governmental power or experience. How can one account for his great influence?

First, the historical ferment that existed during the French Mandate and the Arab reaction to the establishment of the Zionist state made his call for Arab unity, freedom, and socialism (the slogan of the Ba'ath Party) especially appealing and comforting to his listeners.

Secondly, Aflaq is a powerful speaker and a highly effective writer, in spite of his difficult style, in that he understands and reflects the Arab mind. Certainly he has thoroughly identified himself with larger numbers of the Arabs who read his works or listen to him. As he has written:

The Arabs of the dark ages used to believe that the spirit of the murdered, if not avenged, becomes after his death a bird which flies continuously over his own grave screaming painfully out of burning thirst for revenge. Prior to extinguishing my thirst, it is as if I have become a thousand persons who are buried daily, because the social conditions have transformed me into a lowly beast in search of food, instead of being a human creature craving light according to the best it can afford.⁴⁷

Obviously he makes the Arabs' agony for unity and feeling of persecution by foreign and domestic separatist forces his personal agony. This appeal is a powerful one which all great leaders have successfully made.

Thirdly, his ideology offers the Arab world the modern goals of "unity, freedom, and socialism" as opposed to the traditional feudalistic Islamic stance. This alternative is the more attractive in that the stance of earlier days

obviously had a negative practical effect on the Arab in terms of political and economic independence and success and cultural pride.

At the time this work was written, Aflaq was a refugee, a resident in Iraq. He is, nonetheless, still considered as the titular head of the Ba'ath Movement although a different faction is presently in power in Syria.

With this brief biographical sketch as background, this paper turns to a consideration of Aflaq's more practical endeavors and the development and structure of the Ba'ath Party.

The Evolution of the Ba'ath Party

During the 1940's Aflaq developed his "trinitarian" ideology of "unity, freedom, and socialism"⁴⁸ as the Arab world struggled for independence. Those participating in the struggle were repeatedly subjected to harsh repressive measures. When struggle was forced underground, most of Aflaq's thought was passed to comrades (rifaq) in secret meetings at their homes. Their doctrine of humanitarian nationalism, meanwhile, became heavily socialistic.⁴⁹ This philosophy or doctrine did not become limited to only one territorial state, but became Pan-Arabic in nature and in fact, as can be seen in the following quotation: "When Arabs free themselves from all regional, religious, and communal

loyalties "50

In 1942, Aflaq began the campaign for his movement by appealing to mature high school and college students. In doing so, he rejected consideration of the traditional religious, bourgeois, and communal leaders as being ultra-conservatives, not open to change. The Party and the Aflaquian ideology were referred to as the "Idealists" or the "Imaginary Ones."⁵¹ These names resulted from the assumption of the people that the program was non-realistic.

As indicated, Aflaq failed to develop the extensive support of the masses that was needed to effect his aims; he then turned to the nouveau riche--the young rural and middle-class population that had come to Damascus, seeking education and enlightenment. These came primarily from the newly liberated states, which had been under the French mandates of Jebel Druse, the Alawite region, and Aleppo.⁵²

Many of these newcomers were students, governmental employees, and teachers, and were primarily from the religious minorities of the Druses, Alawites, Ismailites, and Christians. Aflaq, like most Christians, had always enjoyed good relations with the various other minority groups, particularly with the Druses in the province of Jebel Druse.⁵³

With the growth of the Party, a propaganda program developed, and was directed increasingly toward the peasants and the laborers as well as the intellectuals and used the

slogan, "The Revolution of March 8, 1963, is a revolution for the peasants and labor."⁵⁴ This propaganda depicted the proletarians involved in the struggle for an "Eternal Mission"⁵⁵ and encouraged the peasants and laborers to seize land and the industrial complexes. The addition of peasant-labor struggle also supposedly satisfied the Party's slogan and program of "unity, freedom, and socialism." In any case, the introduction of these ideas brought a struggle between the Syrian proletariat and peasant group and the bourgeois and landowners which has characterized Syrian life since 1963.

With the Ba'athist success in Syria, there was a tendency on the part of some members to take advantage of the situation without regard for the Ba'athist principles and ideology.⁵⁶ The leaders became increasingly concerned about the absence of discipline and organization and attempted to regain them. In 1952, during a speech in Damascus, Salah Bittar, co-founder of the Ba'ath Party, stated:

Some members think that party ideology is represented in the faith of its members to Ba'ath principles and constitution. This is an erroneous thought, because the majority of the masses believe in its principles without being members . . . and the majority of the members believe that the Party is absolute, separated from the populace, and that he [the member] is a means to fulfill his objectives apart from the masses and this is also an erroneous statement Rather the goals of the Party are to teach and train its members the ideological and political beliefs of the Ba'ath and its practical implementation and organization in order to lead

the populace in their struggle to free themselves from slavery, opportunism and colonialism.⁵⁷

The Party leaders felt that the weaknesses of the Party resulted from the traditional communal societies from which the members came as well as the fact that some members were opportunists or seekers of personal gains. The leaders therefore foresaw the need to neutralize these traditional and opportunistic elements in order to avoid the creation of factions and the destruction of the "spiritual revolution" of the Ba'ath Party.⁵⁸

The Party members thus were urged to rid themselves of traditional leanings or opportunistic leanings based on greed, selfishness, and self-orientation. They were told that members must discipline themselves on the basis of the Ba'athist creed and, in so doing, help the revolution succeed in the schools, factories, hospitals, and homes. This should be done by personal writing, participating in dialogues, and working in active programs for the people's cause.⁵⁹

Bittar further defined the Party by saying that a nation is equal to the leading party, plus the contending masses (Nation = Party + Masses), and he emphasized leadership as an integral part of the education of the illiterate struggling masses so that they might fulfill their objectives. The leadership he distinguished from the masses by saying

that:

First, the Party must meet with awareness the criticism of the masses. Second, the coming of the masses must be met with the eloquence of the Party. Third, the quivering [fearful] masses must be met with the continuing struggle of the Party. Fourth, the anarchist masses must be met with an organized Party.⁶⁰

It was also claimed that according to Ba'athist ideology the Party is, above all, revolutionary. The Party organization and objectives were to be revolutionary. The Party should also believe itself to be (in internal structure) truly democratic in the sense that the members freely and secretly elect their representatives on all levels--an inherent right within the "true democracy."⁶¹ On the other hand, the Party, it was argued, must be centralized per the above leadership idea so it may be said that the Party could reflect the principle of "Democratic Centralism,"⁶² as in Marx-Leninism. (This principle does not mean that the Party was consciously Marxist as such, of course.)

This concept may be understood to mean that the rank and file membership are allowed freedom of discussion and debate following the principle of majority rule. Once the majority is found, however, and has decided such and such, all members must submit to the result. The subsidiary elements must in fact always submit their findings to the higher level for their use and information, thus providing a direct communication between the membership and the leadership.

The concept is actually somewhat misleading because the centralism element works from the top down to the bottom, also--from the leaders to the membership. Since there must be direct obedience to the decisions of the leadership, the Ba'athist society operates more closely according to the principle of centralism than to the principle of democracy. This principle, centralism, is therefore an operational device for maintaining organization, authority, and discipline in the Party. The National Secretary, indeed, exerts total control over all of the lower elements of the Party⁶³ (the structure of the Party being Pyramidic as shall be seen). Because Aflaq's acceptance and use of Marx-Leninism ideology came from his knowledge of these ideologies, he felt them to be the most useful and practical in the organization of his Party. This structure follows Lenin's injunction that a revolutionary party could not be a fully democratic party for the "party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁶⁴

The two necessary provisions for any candidate to join the Ba'ath Party were thus stated: (1) He must strongly believe in Arab nationalism, and (2) he must be committed to the struggle to achieve the "Eternal Mission"--"unity, freedom, and socialism."⁶⁵ Beginning this long journey, the candidate must work to remain worthy of Party membership. Not all candidates, of course, proved successful in achieving

this ambition, but the ones that did so are referred to as the "true ones," the "disciples," or more practically the "informers."⁶⁶ The duties of membership are now listed as:

1. The member must work toward elevating his intellectual standards and knowledge about Ba'athist doctrine, policies, organization, and theory.

2. The member must totally immerse himself in the internal life of the Party, and become an individual expression of the Party.

3. The member must give part of his time to matters of the Party and serve in one of the offices of the Party.

4. The member must work to strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses by explaining the policies and doctrine of the Party to the masses.

5. The member must pay his monthly dues for the support of the Party and its projects.⁶⁷

The success of the Party, it is said, is therefore dependent on the success of both the members and the leaders. This success is a matter of quality, rather than merely quantity. It is the duty of the member to secure as many effective friends and sympathizers to the program of the Party as possible but the character of these additions and of their efforts is as important as the sheer numbers.

Membership in the Ba'ath Party is considered to be permanent, and the future of the individual is assumed to be

the future of the Party. Michel Aflaq, in a lecture to the members of the Party, thus endorsed this principle of his Party and stated that the pillars (members) had educated the populace so that "The voices of the members are based on their travail, and their rights extend as far as their responsibilities."⁶⁸ Aflaq indicated also that it was a waste of time to criticize others unless it was a "spiritual, true criticism" because to criticize is to say that the leaders have erred in their communication of the "Eternal Message."⁶⁹ In other words, there can be only one duty according to Aflaq: "Your duty must be bound to your work which would be equivalent to your spiritual and reflectional bindingness with party ideology."⁷⁰ This notion of full devotion, duty, and work is considered to be the reality of Ba'ath membership, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

It is meanwhile said to be the responsibility of the leaders to function in such a manner as to contribute to a greater whole. As Aflaq has said, "The Company [lower office] is also the Party in a small way. The organizers and leaders do function separately but when united these working parts constitute a whole."⁷¹ Since each leader must carry out the orders from above he must be knowledgeable in party doctrine, policies, and operations so that he may efficiently carry out his duties. Aflaq further emphasizes that the lower offices are vitally important for the day-to-day operation of

the Party when he states, "The lower grades in leadership should not be looked down upon, for it is the lower degrees of the Party that are sincere and loyal to the doctrine of the Party."⁷²

While the lower leadership must handle things on a day-to-day basis, the higher or top leadership, it is argued, must concern itself with spiritual and intellectual matters. In ideal form (though not in fact) these concerns presumably take the top leadership away from everyday life. Organization, it is said, "is a true spirit of love and respect for human dignity."⁷³ The duties and functions of the leadership, it is also said, is to make an Arab who is responsible, mindful, independent, and free by living in intellectual and practical form--the ideal character. Of course, as just indicated, if all leadership had to do was to live "spiritually," it would not be long in a practical position. Obviously what is meant is that while the leadership acts at the top of the pyramid and really dominates, practically it is to set the moral tone, to dream out and create the spiritual ideals, and it is to do this in practice as well as in "mind."

The Structure of the Ba'ath Party


The Ba'ath Party does not approve of a party structure such as that which has evolved in the United States, despite the foregoing statement of ideals. The Ba'ath structure is

cellular and is, therefore, an exclusive party structure rather than an inclusive party structure. This difference is quite logical when one considers the feudalistic culture which gave impetus to the growth and development of the Party.⁷⁴ Thus this feudalistic orientation explains why the Party defines its purpose as, "to perform a mission, to put a program into action, and to capture power and use it."⁷⁵ The fulfillment of this purpose requires a highly disciplined organization in a hierarchist cellular basis to carry out the stated programs of the Party.

The cellular structure of the Ba'ath Party, of course, is not unique, since it can also be found in most or perhaps all Communist and Fascist parties. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because of this similarity, the Ba'ath is a Communist Party. It is true the Ba'ath claims to be the champion of a particular class in the same sense as the Communist (to wit, the proletarians and peasants and/or even intellectual workers of hands and brains), but contrary to the Communist philosophy, the Ba'athists feel no need to articulate and develop a theory of world-wide revolution. The similarity between the Ba'athist and the Fascist Parties is more immediately apparent in that the Ba'ath includes the military-militia among its membership and advocates an ethno-centric solidarity as means of accomplishing its revolution as well as the end of the same.⁷⁶

To satisfy party needs, however, the Ba'athists adopted the Communist cell block theory of party organization. Traditionally an opposition party, the Ba'ath Party was forced to operate on the secret or clandestine level. The Ba'athists learned early that the cell had certain manipulative characteristics which would allow the Ba'ath Party and its ideology to survive in extremely hostile circumstances.⁷⁷

At this point, a brief sketch of the organization and structure should be made, with a comprehensive look at the various elements later in this section.




The Ba'ath Party structure, therefore, is analogous to a Pyramid and is arranged in the classical triangular structure.⁷⁸ At the top of the pyramid is the National Secretary, selected by the segment that rests immediately below him in the pyramid. This next level of the pyramid is the National Committee, consisting of thirteen members. Below the National Committee in the Ba'ath Pyramid are the various regional organizations; each Region is the representation and/or name of an Arab country or state. Below the Regions are the various branches which make up each region. Each Branch contains a minimum of two divisions, the next lower level on the Ba'ath pyramid. Each Division is made up of two or more Companies which form the next layer of the Pyramid structure of the Ba'ath. Each Company consists of a minimum of three and a maximum of seven cells. These cells are the units that make up the base Pyramid of structure and organization. The development of relatively small and parallel units of organization allows the Ba'ath Party to maintain secrecy and control. At this point, it is necessary to examine each of the units of the Pyramidal structure and organization beginning with the smallest and the most elemental of the units.

The cell is the primal unit of the Ba'ath Party structure. The membership of the cell is kept to a majority of seven members and a minimum of four members which is much

smaller in size than a comparative Communist cell. There are three different types of cells, each with different purposes. First, there is the Area cell which consists of a collection of several Ba'ath Party members in a given place or area.⁷⁹ There is no effort to unite people of similar jobs or training in the Area cell. Next, there is a so-called Work cell which is made up of members who share a common background or vocation.⁸⁰ It is, therefore, possible, perhaps probable, that an individual Party member will be a member of both an Area cell and a Work cell. Such an arrangement provides many advantages, such as a cross-reference, a security, and a mobility. These cells will generally meet in the home of one of the cell members.

The other cell structure that is a part of the Ba'ath Party is called Halagat al-Ansar (Friend Cells). The people that are members of these cells are not members of the Ba'ath Party. They are people who are simply sympathetic to the goals and ideals of the Ba'ath, and they far outnumber the members themselves. This group serves a double purpose as it keeps the Ba'ath Party itself small, while it provides a broad base of support for the Ba'ath. The Friend Cells also serve as a training ground for prospective Ba'ath Party members.⁸¹ The leadership of these Cells is provided by a Secretary who is a member of the Party and is appointed by the Company commander.


The Company is the next unit in the structure of the Ba'ath Party, and it is made up of three to seven cells (Friend Cells are excluded from the Company). All members of the cells which comprise a Company meet, vote, and select the leadership of the Company. This leadership then selects the secretaries for the cells. The Ba'ath points to this selection of the Company leadership as an indication of the



democratic process at work. The Amin al-Sir (Keeper of the Secret) or the Secretary is appointed by the leadership of the next highest organization, the Division. A Company may take in an area equivalent to a small town, village, or a section of a city.

The next level of the Ba'ath Party structure and organization is the Division which consists of two or more Companies. The leadership of the Division is elected by a conference of the lower organizations. The Division Secretary is appointed by the Branch leadership. The leadership and the Secretary at this level share the duties of receiving and carrying out the instructions of the superior or higher organization, the Branch, and consider applications for member-

ship and submit them to higher authorities. They also examine and evaluate complaints of lower organizations and members and submit monthly reports on operations. The Division Secretary represents the Division at Party Conferences and is the only one to communicate with the higher organizations.⁸²




The structure of the Ba'ath Party also has an intermediate level between the Division and the Region levels. This level is known as al-Firi (Branch), and consists of a minimum of two Divisions. The area covered by this Branch can be comprised of a city, a country, or a department. The leadership of the Branch is selected by a group made up of all

the Secretaries of the Divisions and a selected number of the Divisional leadership. The Branch leadership and its Secretary General are responsible to and report to the Regional Command. Unlike the lower organizations, the Branch Secretary is elected by the leadership of the Branch and is responsible for the keeping of records and representation of the Branch in party conferences.⁸³ Among the powers of the Branch are acceptance or rejection of new members, submission of recommendations, propaganda efforts, local party education efforts, and submission of local monthly reports to the superior organizations.

The Regional level of the Ba'ath Party is the most active party level. A Region is an entire country such as Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait, and other Arab states located between the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf. There is also a Region that is made up entirely of Arab students studying abroad. The Regional convention elects the Regional Command and the Regional Command selects its own Secretary.

It is possible for the Regional Convention to force the resignation of the Regional Command and Secretary by a vote of "no confidence."⁸⁴ In addition to this power, the Regional Convention makes policy decisions relating to its Region, sets and approves the regional budget of the Party, and sends recommendations to the National Command.⁸⁵ The

Regional Command has the power to implement National Command decisions, dissolve the lower organizations' leadership, and accept or reject new and old members. It is also responsible for the political, cultural and ideological direction of the Party.




The so-called National Organization, al-Hizb (the Party) includes all party organizations within the Arab world as well as those in other areas.⁸⁶ Except in times of duress and stress, the Organization assembles every two

years in a National Convention which is made up of the membership of the Regional Command plus a selected number of delegates from lower organizations.⁸⁷ The Convention elects the National Command and the Secretary-General of the Ba'ath Party. At no time may the National Command exceed thirteen members. It has the power to make studies and recommendations and decisions, determine the National Command budget, elect the National Command, and vote on "confidence" in the National Command.

The National Command is the highest policy-making and policy-implementing organization within the Party. Its authority must be submitted to by all leaders, members, and organizations. If necessary the National Command may assume direction of any Division, Region, or lower organization at its own discretion. The National Command also assumes the responsibility for cooperation or non-cooperation with any other political party or government.⁸⁸

Within the province of the National Command falls the disciplinary powers over the Regional or National Command; it prepares the agenda for and convenes the National Convention and also controls organizational, political, cultural, and financial aspects of the Party. The National Command has seven offices (organization, party education, peasants, labor, propaganda and information, culture and studies, and finance), and has created a "school to educate

and graduate prospective leaders of the Ba'ath Party."⁸⁹



It is immediately apparent that the true power in the Ba'ath is held by the Secretaries at each level. Communication in the Ba'ath Party obviously is and must be vertical. There can be no horizontal communication or contact between any of the organizational levels. As has been said, the Ba'athists thus have developed a Party that follows the principle of "Democratic Centralism" in which one is not allowed to criticize the Party or Party leadership after the program or decision has been carried out. Within the Ba'ath Party, the minority is subjugated to the majority, as are the lower organizations subjected to the higher organizations.

It is possible for any Arab who is eighteen years of

age to become a member of the Ba'ath Party if he is not a member of another political group and if he believes in the Constitution and principles of the Party. Upon becoming a member, he takes a Party oath, pays dues, defends the Party, fulfills his duties, belongs to unions or associations, and becomes a "true" example of the struggling Arab.⁹⁰

Leaving these historical and practical political concerns, however, this study now turns to the more specific subject of this work, the political philosophy of the Aflaqan movement and the Ba'ath and its implementation in politics.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Geographical Syria is historically located in the western one-half of the Fertile Crescent and is considered to consist of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.
2. The Fertile Crescent is a political term used by Arab political theorists which includes geographical Syria and Iraq. The territory stretches from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Suez Canal in the south, the Persian Gulf in the east, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west.
3. Fouad Chayeb, Syria (Damascus: The Directorate General of Information, 1955), pp. 57-63.
4. For the purpose of this discussion one can understand that the word Arab has two general connotations: (1) the semitic meaning of the word Arab is "desert" or the inhabitants thereof; (2) refers to the people who occupy a geographical region and speak the Arabic language. See, for a more comprehensive development of the etymological differences and similarities, Phillip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (New York: St. Martin Press, 1967), pp. 41-44.
5. Chayeb, Syria, pp. 64-86.
6. F. I. Massey, Druse History (Detroit: Druse Organization, 1952), pp. 88-108.
7. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Putnam Press, 1965), pp. 98-100.
8. Thomas E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 44-48.
9. The Sherif of Mecca is the title of the Chief Magistrate of Mecca. Hussein of the Hashimite family was the political leader of the Hejaz as well as the guardian of the Holy Cities.

10. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 49-55.
11. Ibid., p. 28.
12. H. C. Holme, The Middle East (London: Broadwater Press, 1951), p. 23.
13. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 623-24, 632.
14. Maurice Harari, Government and Politics of the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 107-109.
15. Holme, The Middle East, pp. 25-26.
16. Nejla Izzedin, The Arab World (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 97-103.
17. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 275-76.
18. This is in direct contradiction to the Hussein-McMahon authorized correspondence dated October 24, 1915.
19. C. J. Hambro, "Background on Palestine," Rotarian, LXXII (May, 1948), p. 8.
20. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 443.
21. Sultan Pasha El-Attrache is the leader of the 1925 Syrian Revolution. He is also the political leader of Jebel Druse Province in southern Syria. In February of 1954, the Province of Jebel Druse rebelled against the Shishakley military dictatorship and helped overthrow this regime.
22. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Text of the Balfour Declaration (A/s/ supp. 11/v.2) (Lake Success, New York, 1947), p. 18.
23. This was not made known to the Arabs until over two years later in order to insure Arab participation in the Allied effort.
24. K. H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), p. 14.
25. Ibid., p. 14.

26. C. Kerr, T. J. Dunlop, F. Harbison and C. A. Myers, "Industrialism and World Society," Harvard Business Review, XXI (January, 1961), pp. 119.
27. Silvert, Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, p. 17.
28. Carlton Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (London: Russell Press, 1966), p. 15.
29. Hans Kohn, Nationalism Its Meaning and History, (Princeton: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965), p. 11.
30. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 254.
31. Kohn, Nationalism Its Meaning and History, pp. 81-91.
32. Omar A. Khadra, "Arab Nationalism," Bulletin of the Near East, VI, No. 7 (September, 1953), 6.
33. Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 9.
34. Sylvia G. Haim ed., Arab Nationalism, An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 5-14.
35. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
36. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
37. Fayez Sayeg, "Arab Nationalism," The Scribe, No. 30 (Cairo: Autumn, 1959), 15.
38. Haim, Arab Nationalism, An Anthology, p. 35.
39. Sati' al-Husri, Ma Hiya al-Qawmiyya [What is Nationalism] (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1949), pp. 251-55.
40. Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, p. 31.
41. Haim, Arab Nationalism, An Anthology, pp. 49-60.
42. Ibid., p. 61.

43. Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath [For the Sake of Resurrection] (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1963), pp. 51-52.
44. Ibid., pp. 42-47.
45. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 10.
46. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
47. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 25.
48. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 153.
49. Ibid., p. 153.
50. Ibid., p. 154.
51. Muta^s Safadi, Hizb al-Ba'ath [The Ba'ath Party] (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1964), pp. 54-56.
52. Izzedin, The Arab World, p. 158.
53. Safadi, Hizb al-Ba'ath, p. 68. The Moslem Sunnis constitute approximately 78% of the total population of Syria. They have controlled primarily the political setting for many centuries thus depriving the other minority groups of their equal rights as citizens. This in effect brought about togetherness of some of the religious minorities--Alawites, Druses, Ismailites, and Christians.
54. This phrase has become the key slogan of the revolution and is an effective day-to-day propaganda device. The slogan is found on banners in the streets, posters on walls, movie screens and television. This propaganda strategy was present during the author's visits to Damascus in the summer of 1965 and also during the spring of 1972.
55. In the Party program, the term "Eternal Mission" is used interchangeably with "unity, freedom, and socialism."

56. Interview, Anonymous, Damascus, July, 1965.
It was stated that the members who have joined the Party belong in one of the following categories: (1) the true believers; (2) those who joined for social acceptance; and (3) opportunists who joined for personal gains.
57. Salah al-Din al-Bittar, "Nahwa Bina' Hizbi Assassi," Abhath Fi al-Tanzeem al-Hizbi ["Toward Organizing a Primary Party," Discussions on Party Organization] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), p. 5.
58. Interview, Anonymous, Damascus, December, 1971.
59. Ibid.,
60. Salah al-Din al-Bittar, Ba'ad al-Mabadi' al-Inkilabiya [On Revolutionary Principles] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1952), p. 5.
61. Interview, Anonymous, Damascus, December, 1971.
62. al-Bittar, Ba'ad al-Mabadi' al-Inkilabiya, pp. 5-7.
63. Interview, Anonymous, Damascus, December, 1971.
64. Albert Fried & Ronald Sanders, ed., Socialist Thought on the Foundation of Leninism (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 499-504.
65. Salah al-Din al-Bittar, "al-Oudwiya al-Hizbiya Sifatouha wa Wajibatouha," Abhath Fi al-Tanzeem al-Hizbi ["Duties and Characteristics of Party Members," Discussions on Party Organization] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), p. 43.
66. Ibid., pp. 43-47.
67. Michel Aflaq, "Wajib al-Ada'," Abhath Fi al-Tanzeem al-Hizbi ["Duties of Members," Discussions on Party Organization] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), p. 38.
68. Ibid., p. 32.
69. Ibid., p. 34.

70. Michel Aflaq, "Wajib al-Kiyada," Abhath Fi al-Tanzeem al-Hizbi ["Duties of Leadership," Discussion Party Organization] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), p. 38.
71. Ibid., p. 39.
72. Ibid., p. 40.
73. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, p. 139.
74. Interview, Anonymous, College Station, Texas, June 1970. The Cellular structure allowed a certain anonymity that prevented wholesale destruction of the Party, both during and after the Mandate.
75. Ibid.,
76. al-Nizam al-Dakhili [The Internal Organization of the Ba'ath Party] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1963), p. 14.
77. Interview, Anonymous, College Station, Texas, June, 1970.
78. Ibid., The program of the Friend cells consists of lectures, indoctrination, discussion of issues, objectives and policies. This program is articulated by a member who has been specifically trained for this task. In addition to the above, a selected article from Aflaq's writings is read and then discussed. During this selective period each of the Friend cell members is subjected to tests of sincerity, conviction, sacrifice, and courage. Only by passing these tests do the members of the Friend cells become Party members.
79. al-Nizam al-Dakhili, p. 11.
80. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
81. Ibid., pp. 16-19.
82. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
83. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
84. Ibid., p. 23.

85. Ibid.. pp. 24-25.
86. Ibid.. pp. 25-28. This function has been fulfilled primarily by the military academy at Homs, Syria.
87. Interview, Anonymous, Beirut, December, 1971.

CHAPTER II

AFLAQ'S METAPHYSICS

All political theories and ideologies rest upon some metaphysical basis, even though many fairly prominent ones ignore or omit a formal statement of the same or, worse, pretend that they do not have such, when in fact they do. This issue need not be debated here because those ideologies which are related to some theological strain or in the modern world involve socialism are more explicit in relation to metaphysics--even though expressing ideas that are internally inconsistent, paradoxical, or vague and especially subject to external criticism by such schools as logical positivism, "social scientists," and schools of philosophy grounded in subjectivist assumptions of epistemology, psychology, and skepticism.

Since Ba'athism as stated by Aflaq and his followers does rest upon "Arabism," with Islamic influence and some formal allegiance to socialism both utopian and "scientific," it obviously falls into that category where metaphysics is explicitly noted, no matter what the internal (or external)

criticisms of it may be.

In order to understand Aflaq's philosophy it is thus necessary to examine first his view of reality, the nature of the world, of the universe, and of man. The ideas of the interpretative followers of his Ba'athist philosophy will also be reviewed.

In brief and by way of introduction: Aflaq sees man in an atomistic relationship with the universe. Yet he believes that it is possible for one to examine both man and the universe within the same critical light. His conception of the universe is essentially monistic, but with a limited pluralistic element based upon certain epistemological assumptions. The reason for this view is that it is, on the one hand, a somewhat traditional expression of monism (particularly influenced by Islam) which has been reinterpreted in the light of socialism and the industrial-technological age, which has in turn forced recognition of the material versus spiritual dichotomy and of man as an individual creative "thinker" versus human dependency upon nature. The universe is assumed to be comprehended by both the feeling-emotional and the rational-intellectual capacities of man as a totality that "is." As in traditional classical Western philosophy, the universe has both purpose and meaning reflected in a "will." Practically, and as far as politics is concerned, this will reveals itself for the possibilities

of human life in the drive to an ultimate realization of Arab independence from other human political forces and in cultural and political unity. That is, the life, spirit, and mind of the universe--as such--are the basis of the meaning and purpose which express themselves in a national social-political unity and purpose. But this expression, it is argued, occurs only when the Arab human being understands the latter and thus is enabled to develop and realize the purpose and meaning of the universe in his life and in that of his people.¹ This concept is not much different from a number of Western "theologically" based "nationalisms" in the modern world and obviously undergirds movements such as Zionism (in the mind of the Orthodox Jew), whether admitted or not by such movements.

Ba'athist socialism, meanwhile, claims also to be a moral expression within the contextual reference of a moral universe. The theory of this morality claims itself to be a positive socio-political and philosophical force within the universe. Ba'athist socialism, then, is distinguished from more materialistic and "scientific" movements in that it seeks to realize and perfect practically in human life an already existing spiritual-cultural heritage. Practically, too, this philosophy has been claimed by Ba'athists as more solidly based than that of materialistic socialist movements, which to a large degree, it is argued, must create a new

viewpoint opposed to the old.² Contrariwise, this movement argues that it seeks to produce a unity that simultaneously transcends the previous feudal condition, both mental and physical, of the Arab people and provides a change toward egalitarianism and openness which is in tune with both the spiritual and the material or physical reality of the universe.

Monism

Philosophic problems are usually shaped by circumstances and occurrences which are characteristic of the historical period in which the problems were formulated, as well as by borrowing from intellectual history. The problem of the singular or plural nature of reality has appeared over and over again in history and has been stated in the terms of the prevailing interest and knowledge of the thinker and of the time. Aflaq's interpretation of the problem is typical of this fact.

Does Aflaq view Reality as a unity or a plurality? This section will demonstrate that Aflaq claims to rest his view of reality upon a unity, even though obvious difficulties result.

In his monism, Aflaq appears to have been influenced by two sources, both present in Arabic culture. Each will be discussed in this section. One is Aristotle, especially

the latter's concept of the Prime Mover. To Aristotle the Prime Mover "is an everliving being whose influence radiates through the universe in such wise that everything that happens (at any rate, if we leave out of account the obscure realms of chance and free-will) depends on Him."³ It was Aristotle who also emphasized that the nature of a thing (including a man) is not what it is, but what it may (by its nature--potentiality) become. (Thus a man without a state, it will be recalled, was either a god or a beast--for the state is natural to man; so too the family, etc.) Even though Aflaq may not show that he is aware of the influence, Aristotle's thoughts seem to have been mediated through medieval Arab philosophers whom Aflaq read and the Arab literary tradition. The second source is Islam, specifically the concept that Mohamet as the Prophet of Allah is the great Initiator.

For there to be meaning and coherence in nature, a causal relationship between a prime mover and the created-moved has appeared to many philosophers to be necessary. The idea of a prime mover impelling the natural process forward, however, provides the idea of potentiality. According to Ba'athism, only through the actualization and utilization of the idea and fact of potentiality and possibility can the realization or spiritual development come about (and the desired social goals). As in most growth-process philosophies,

this concept assumes that the whole has a more significant meaning than the mere sum of individual parts. The part is that which is possible and potential; the whole is that which is both the creator and the realized. The Ba'athists affirm, therefore, that the practical realization of their idea will come in the form of a greater awareness of meaning and unity in Arab life, though provided by Ba'athist thought about the true nature of things and the Ba'athist movement as a true outgrowth of the original "beginning" and understanding.⁴

There is another practical significance in these ideas in that Aflaq does not see the moving force in the process of change as a transcendent one toward a complete unity of all men, but rather as existent within history as a movement of man toward nationalism. "There are no metaphysical forces that move nations, but there are the forces from within that keep them at odds with one another."⁵

Previous Arab attempts for unity have failed to realize Arab potential, he argues, because of the failure to perceive the forces toward unity within that permeate the Arab nation. For this reason, Aflaq urges in Hegelian fashion an awareness of these forces:

If we look back at the human ambition behind a collection of revolutionary attempts, not only relative to the Arab nation, but also to all the nations bound by historic evolution, we would find the deep-seated goals to be in the

roots that seek to reach the essence itself and not just the external symptoms.⁶

Similarly, he challenges Arabs to tap both philosophically and practically the essence of the Arabic culture and, in so doing, harness the forces present within the natural and historical process of Arab life and destiny. Of course, this within-versus-without concept and his affirmations of differences within the whole, though consistent with nationalism, is obviously inconsistent with his previous philosophic affirmation that the whole is more significant than the mere sum of the individual parts. This inconsistency exists within all pluralistic philosophies and political movements, including that of some so-called democratic ideologists of the West who seek to rest their practical case on metaphysical monism as is the case of those who seek to wed democracy to the Judeo-Christian tradition (more specifically, Catholic Center Parties in Europe, Christian Democrats, English Christian Socialists, American liberal Christians such as Niebuhr, et al--not to mention "God fearing" American democratic politicians).

An inseparable, especially distinctive component of Arabic culture is of course the religion of Islam, a source from which Aflaq drew support also for his monistic view of reality. Here a comment on the practicality of this fact is important. As indicated in the introduction, although

he came from a Christian Greek Orthodox family, he has been in the vanguard of those who have identified and valued Islamic thought as particularly Arabic. To many, his support of Islam is nothing but a means to achieve an end. To others, his sincerity is unquestioned. As opposed to polytheism and anthropomorphism, to Aflaq, Islam contains a message embodying eternal truths. To him, Islam proclaims the unity, transcendence, and omniscience of God, which is again the apparent dichotomy in view of his idea that the forces that drive a people are not transcendent but immanent and this view, too, has significance for political philosophy and practical politics.⁷

That is, Islam embraces a fundamental creed--monotheism. The explanation of the apparent dichotomy (above) is that its "God," being neither cold nor abstract, is a lively God. He is near to man, loving, caring, forgiving. He is one with whom the believer can commune, as illustrated in the widely used words Insha'a Allah, ("If God wills it"). Man's faith in Islam is also connected with action and the conduct of a good life. Although Islam is a universal religion, it encompasses man's practical life and action, and thereby provides the basis for men acting as they are in real life--as national-ethnic groups. This situation is similar to American Fundamentalist Christian nationalists.

Although the emphasis on the singularity of God is

extreme in Islam it is furthermore related in a peculiar way to Arab life and destiny. Thus as the Quran, Sura CXII, states,

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Say: He is God alone;
 God the eternal;
 He begetteth not;
 and He is not begotten;
 and there is none like unto Him.⁸

This prayer is to be affirmed five times a day by the faithful Arab Moslem in the Creed, "There is no God but Allah" Even His title, "Allah"--"The One," underscores this axiom of the Islamic faith. But Ba'athism, though agreeable to this belief in a single initiator who created both the material and spiritual aspects of the universe, insists that this Initiator has asserted His will through the Prophet. That is, His will was first revealed to an Arab prophet and to the Arab people. Aflaq thus suggests the idea of an Arabic Deity and destiny as well as the Islamic Deity and universal alone.

God was capable of revealing the Quran to His Prophet Mohamet in one day--but it took twenty years to reveal it. He could have revealed His religion to other nations which He created centuries before the appearance of Islam, but He revealed the Quran in a particular time, and chose the Arab nation and its champion the Arab Prophet.⁹

In fact, Aflaq points out that the Quran revealed to the Prophet was in the language of the Arabs, "Each apostle we

have sent spoke in the language of his own peoples, so that he might make plain to them the message."¹⁰

Its comprehension was totally according to the Arabic mentality . . . be it perfect or imperfect. And the Muslims were Arabs, for the Arabs who believed in the new religion did so because they have gathered all the attributes and necessary virtues to understand that this new religion is not only a religion but the springboard of Arabism toward unity, strength, and progress.¹¹

Despite the fact that the Ba'ath metaphysical system affirms the initiating role of God as Prime Mover, it does not deny the continuing influence of this Initiator or Prime Mover. That is, there is no point within the continuing Arab life during which the Initiator ceases to initiate. As Dr. Razzaz, co-founder and Secretary General of the Party in 1965, said, "In the past, the Prophet transformed the Arabs from the dark ages--the age of ignorance, fanaticism, individualism, and slavery--to an age of enlightenment."¹²

Of course, philosophically this idea of a continuing revelation is analogous to the idea of the life force within the human body and precludes the thesis that either the Initiator or the initiated is an artificial entity who ceases at some point in history. Aflaq makes this latter distinction when he writes, "There is a marked difference between the human body and the machine which is made to duplicate life. The machine exists outside the reality of life and is removed from time."¹³ Logically and practically this distinc-

tion further supports the idea of the continuing realization of an Arab national destiny. The latter did not die when temporarily conquered by "foreigners."

Aflaq is obviously of the Arab culture. Even though religious differences exist between the Greek Orthodox religion and the Arab religion of Islam such as Trinitarianism in Greek Orthodoxy, they share much of a common religious tradition. There is, therefore, no difficulty philosophically for Aflaq in using the monistic view of the Universe of Islam (despite Greek Orthodoxy) as a springboard of his political ideology. As we have noted above, Jewish-Christian thought has often easily identified itself with nationalism: "Onward Christian Soldiers" and "Zionism." Aflaq is a practical politician (like those of the West) and a "radical" and uses what he needs to appeal to his people (unconsciously or consciously) to create a metaphysics for his politics.

Metaphysically also, Ba'athism as Aflaq develops it interprets monism "traditionally" in the sense that Islam is regarded as the initial total revelation placing the Arabs under Allah (The One). In fact, even in Islamic "traditionalism" there is some recognition of a continuing re-interpretation of the initial revelation by continuing revelation. It is this recognition that Aflaq uses to provide the basis even for revolution. Although Aflaq thus sees the monistic reality as having existed since the beginning, it

provides for drastic growth in a bursting forth at times (as in Marxist dialectic revolution) in the life of the Arab-Islamic people. For example, the materialistic aberrations that have been a part of the Arab existence, he argues, were simply the results of forgetfulness and misinterpretation of the initial revelation and so require drastic realignment with "truth." To Aflaq, however, any real deviation from the growth-unity of the Prime Mover is undesirable and retards the realization of the Arabic potential. That is, a revolution may be justified only because it gets in line once more with reality as growth and thus the tendency toward Arab cultural and national unification.

Aflaq, meanwhile, also provides a metaphysical basis both for order and for "revolution" because Ba'athism is a revolutionary philosophy, an aspect which will be explored in the following chapters.

The Universe as Ordered Growth

Aflaq reflects the conviction that the universe is orderly by the use of a concept, familiar in Western philosophy, that of natural law, "There are laws in life. Amongst these laws is natural law."¹⁴ One may rightly ask concerning the source of Aflaq's concept of natural law. Aflaq himself does not indicate clearly the sources from which he drew the

concept of natural law. At times, his ideas are similar to the natural scientific conception of law current among the eighteenth-century deists and materialists and among the nineteenth-century naturalists. Aflaq not only considers these laws of which he speaks to be universals that transcend geographic and political boundaries but one can see their "origin" is the same as those of the earlier Europeans. "Natural law is discovered only once. But the laws of life must be discovered anew by every individual during his lifetime."¹⁵ Aflaq, at times, thus speaks of natural laws as if they are derived from and related to the life experiences of the human individual. In addition, however, at other times he speaks of another type of natural law. This law is related not to individual experiences, but to the natural process of the universe, as has already been noted concerning his belief in its nature. That is, the universe itself is considered to be ordered and rational because of a Prime Creator-Mover. These natural laws, moreover, operate independently of man if man denies them.

There is aloofness and neutrality in nature toward man, for natural law, and the laws of magnetism, electricity and thunder, neither benefited from the ignorance of man nor was opposed to his knowledge and mind.¹⁶

The concept of laws which are derived from and illuminated by human life experiences suggests that natural law may also be reflected in the historical, societal process,

and is, in fact, the case.

Laws . . . make history even as . . . laws make chemistry. If we learn these laws, our struggle for the cause of unity, freedom, and socialism will be moving in the right direction. With this knowledge we will save ourselves a great amount of time which would have been spent in searching for the right direction through trial and error.¹⁷

It may be that Aflaq here has been influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideas which it is certain he read.

Not only does he use materialist-naturalist philosophic terms to express his view of an ordered universe in a cause-effect sequence, it is clear that he connects or relates the universe to his Islamic (and perhaps Greek Orthodox) view.

Every great nation that is deeply tied to the mysteries of the eternal universe finds itself self-directed to the everlasting principles. Islam is a case in point. And Islam is specifically Arabic and its range humanistic.¹⁸

The phrases "eternal universe" and "everlasting principles" clearly indicate Aflaq's affirmation that the natural world--created by Allah--is rational and orderly.

In summary, Aflaq's (and consequently the Ba'athist) concept of the Prime Mover and Initiator (discussed in the previous section) is also closely related to his concept of a rational and orderly universe. The fusion of elements drawn from materialist-naturalist philosophic, Islamic, and Classical Greek sources produces the assertion of a purposeful order. This order logically implies, as has been seen,

the destiny of the Arabs as a unified, independent people, and leads one to examine further Aflaq's view of the meaningfulness of the universe.

The Meaning of the Universe

The Ba'athists logically see the universe also as an entity that was created as more than an idle development in eternity. That is, they see the universe consequently as one with meaning as purpose. Here Ba'athism means a universe with more than coherent order which gives form and stability to all aspects of life. The universe is the place where a certain "Endedness" develops out of coherency and order. This characteristic of purposefulness also comes to mean a "rightness" in the nature of things as seen in the Ba'athist view of a nature (as has been noted) even as umma which is connected integrally with the political ideas as a potential or a movement toward a "Something" which is naturally unity and national independence.

Our nationalism comes to us from within and not from without. A tree, regardless of its size, when uprooted from the ground will dry and decay until it is easily carried away by the winds. However, a buried seed continues to grow until it blossoms, thus filling the air with its sweet scent.¹⁹

Ba'athism, therefore, is viewed as a spirit in the universe in the form of meaning. It was always there, although it may not have been seen before. Presumably, Ba'ath-

ism assumed its pre-ordained significance only after the new needs or developments in life when movement became apparent and conditions for further growth were created. Aflaq communicates this idea when he says, "The Ba'ath came into being due to the maturing of the Arab mind and the awakening of the young generation." But " . . . its spirit and inheritance is Arabic."²⁰ The Ba'athists thus believe that they have not sought to adopt and incorporate some subjectively derived and developed metaphysical system, but are in tune with an infinite process. This belief does not mean that the Ba'athists do not utilize terms derived from subjective sources to explain certain qualities of Ba'athism or Arab destiny, but they do regard their system as a whole to be derived from a process of life with "universal" connections.

Ba'athist socialism, therefore, supposedly is not a socio-political philosophy that has been structured only in subjective, individualistic roots (the state of mind or discoveries of particular persons). The Ba'athist claims, "Socialism was there even before the theorist theorized upon its objective."²¹ It is considered by its adherents to be an integral part of Arabism; it reflects also a prior metaphysical basis present in the natural order itself. This thought might be compared with Western idealism--both German and English--certainly with most forms of Western so-called

objective idealism.

To summarize, the Ba'athist philosophy therefore adheres to the view that the universe is meaningful and purposeful. In this way, the Ba'athists are attempting to create a sense of purpose in which each Arab may participate directly toward the realization of a so-called Arab "Eternal Mission" a phrase which, as will be seen, becomes crucial for an understanding of the Ba'athist answer to another metaphysical question: "Is Reality characterized by matter or spirit or both?" With this question, Aflaq is most preoccupied, again because of its practical implication.

Universe: The Material and/or Spiritual Issue

From the height of civilization, glory, and greatness of spiritual mission, the Arab world declined to the level of ignorance and disunity. Only recently has the Arab world begun to wake up from its long sleep.²²

One of the major problems in the metaphysics of a political ideology is that of the spiritual and/or material character of life or the universe in terms of its significance and meaning for human relations.

For obvious practical reasons Ba'athist socialism seeks to take not an either-or but a both-and position on this question. This position is based, in turn, upon the existence of both the traditional historical-cultural forces such as

Arabism, Islam, and other Middle Eastern religious notions and the increasing impact of science, economic materialism, and values of technology and industrialism. Ba'athist socialism is thus based on the practical political necessity of recognizing the force of traditional belief systems deeply rooted in the cultural life of the masses of the people, yet calling for revolutionary social-economic change. This position is reflected both unconsciously and consciously in the writings of leaders such as Aflaq.

For example, as indicated in the introductory quotation, the Ba'athists believe that at some point in the past the Arab world exemplified the characteristics of "unity, freedom, and socialism" and hence of civilization, glory, etc., as the above quotation suggests. This view reflects a situation which not only indicates the past ideal reality but also points toward a desired future goal. This understanding of a past which is ideal and of a hoped-for future is in fact indicated by the phrase "Eternal Mission." That is, the Ba'athists believe that an original spiritual condition and ideal has been perverted by a false, superficial, and materialistic life and value system. The latter value system taught the Arab that his benefit would lie only in his own material self-interest and gratification, which usually turned out to be in the material interest of the European colonialists or others, for example, the Turkish

conquerors. During the period of acceptance of this latter ethic (based on practical conditions also), the Arab man, nation, and view of the "universe" began to disintegrate, so that the Arab became separated from his original spiritual meaning, that is, from the Arab "Eternal Mission."

More specifically, the Ba'athist argument is that the de-emphasis on the spiritual and over-emphasis on the material made the Arab world more susceptible to exploitation and manipulation by outsiders, a condition, which was precisely what the conqueror wanted in order to influence social conditions in his favor. This change, according to the Ba'athists, was not merely the result of ineptness on the part of the Arab, but also the result of other factors and forces which developed as a pressure on Arab culture.

The errors committed are [were] not always the errors of the Arab nations. Some are related to their history, others to customs, still others to their economic conditions, as well as their regressiveness and tensions between religious factions, all of which were inherited from the past.²³

This past, it is charged, was shaped largely by foreign pressures.

The Ba'athists further argue then that the uniqueness of the Arab "Eternal Mission" is actually constituted by a "proper" synthesis of the material and the spiritual consistent with the true character of the universe. Failure to maintain a proper view of the synthesis led and leads to the

constant repetition of the mistakes present in recent socio-political and economic philosophies. The Ba'athists admit, however, that it is easy to become involved more strongly either in the material or in the spiritual. Yet he also argues that such over-emphasis and imbalance must be avoided for it is not based on the demanding realities of life itself. Thus, Aflaq has said, "The greatest danger is to slumber in abstract thinking; it strips everything from its livelihood and eliminates exactness and preciseness, for the opposites become similar and the irregular, regular."²⁴ Idealism, he argues, must be related to practical realities and vice versa.

Aflaq argues, too, that the proper synthesis between the material and the spiritual has, in the past, been disturbed. Such disruption is representative of those negative and undesirable qualities that have limited and hampered the Arab individual and nation. He, thus, maintains that a proper synthesis and balance must be recreated with each aspect in its proper place.

Meanwhile, in order to explain adequately the Ba'athist view of a balance of the material and the spiritual dimensions of man's existence in relation to each other, he thinks that man will need to determine which dimension should naturally receive the most emphasis. For example, did spirit originate from matter or vice versa? The answers which are

given by Aflaq and his followers reflect strong disagreements.

Jamal Atassi, an early Ba'athist, asserts that all things began with matter and that this beginning embodied meaning and coherence which reflected a symbiotic relationship with the beginning itself.

In the beginning there was matter and nothing but matter, and movement was in the nature of matter. Communism assures us that creation, societies, civilizations, and arts emanated from this inner movement of matter.²⁵

Atassi is logically and essentially materialistic in his understanding and views of the economic process, that is, man's physical needs and activity, seeing them within the context of Marxist materialism.

In certain writings Aflaq seems to come close to this position of Atassi's in placing stress upon the material needs and the economic program and belittling the spiritual idea. Aflaq writes:

To secure man that precious thing which is freedom, there must be a movement toward uniting the Arab countries and liberating man from the yoke of colonialism, toward increasing his productivity and preserving justice in the distribution of the national income. This must be done in order to help the socialists all over the world attain their precious objectives of creating a socialist government based upon equality, justice, and the elimination of all causes which lead to wars.²⁶

And again:

Our socialism does not speak of man philosophically

but places the tools for productivity in his hands. Socialistic systems improve the distribution of goods which is dependent upon productivity, and at the same time protect man's freedom, dignity, talent, and innovative ideas, for these are the basis of man's existence.²⁷

In contrast with statements such as these, Razzaz, the co-founder of Ba'athism, rejects the materialistic viewpoint, preferring instead an understanding based on non-materialistic concepts such as the spirit and ideas of people, especially the Arab peoples.

Socialism teaches us first that the people themselves are the only weapon for realizing the people's objectives. . . . Our first and foremost dependence is on the people.²⁸

Indeed, in many of his other writings, Aflaq seems to agree with Razzaz, not with Atassi, arguing for both dimensions, but appearing to give primacy to the non-material. Aflaq writes:

I see socialism as a tool to feed the hungry and to clothe the naked. However, my concern is not for this. Rather, my concern is for man's capabilities which are hindered by his animalistic needs in order that he may be able to perform his human duties.²⁹

Aflaq further writes that

True socialism is a phenomenon of the future. We do not possess in the phenomenon anything except the theory. For theory is one thing and putting the theory into practice is something else. It would be much easier to write theory and practice socialism if we were able to remove man from his society and historical setting. However, this is impossible for we know that man is a lover of freedom, and the Ba'ath has supported man's freedom and liberty from the beginning of its inception.³⁰

Here Aflaq's Ba'athism seems to offer more than a program to satisfy the physical or material needs of the people. His position is that this material improvement must be made in conjunction with spiritual development and growth.

There is no escape from explaining the myth of "heaven and earth," even after having exhausted its religious connotation. It may be truly said that anything that is transient does not last, and anything that is spiritual is everlasting. The scientist or the artist, each has his own earth and his own heaven. The soul and the mind belong to the heavens; they are of highest value, while the physical needs are of lower value.³¹

More specifically in terms of a metaphysical position, Aflaq also claims that because of its finite nature, that which is of the earth--the physical--has less importance in the ultimate realization of the dignity of the Arab nation. It is not enough for a socialist philosophy to attempt changes only within the material-earth realm. Rather, any such movement must necessarily seek change also within the realization of the Arab spirit.

It is this Arab spirit, therefore, and its realization which seem of primary importance to Aflaq in statements such as the above. Here his emphasis is on the spirituality of the Arab destiny and material is not realizable without the spiritual force behind it:

Socialism offers economic solutions to many problems related to production, consumption, distribution of wealth, labor problems, etc. All of these solutions are regarded as primary to socialism but secondary to the concept as a whole [Eternal Mission].³²

In summary, Aflaq in one position argues that it is the spirit which must furnish the motive force; also that it is an exercise in futility to satisfy a person's physical needs without making an effort to meet his spiritual needs: "The body prefers to be naked rather than to wear a tight robe. And the hopeful soul would rather remain poor than to suffice with the bare necessities of life."³³ It is, certainly, statements such as these which illustrate the extensive effect of the Arab religion on Aflaq's development of Ba'athist socialism.

In addition to the above, however, Aflaq also appears to be highly critical of the Marxist attitude toward religion. For example, he says:

Marx stated that religion was the opium given to the poor. This is the corner-stone of all Marxist philosophy concerning religion. Marxism considers all types of religious organizations as an instrument of the bourgeoisie which aims at exploitation through the drugging of the working class.³⁴

With this attitude Aflaq does not agree. Rather, he maintains that the Marxists fail properly to study and interpret the religious aspect of man which is intrinsic to the Arab Eternal Mission. "As it has appeared in the history of mankind since ancient times, religion is a basic foundation in the lives of peoples."³⁵ He argues, furthermore, that the depths of the spiritual, expressed by religious faith, are experienced by the individual throughout his life span: "Faith is dis-

covered only through the results of the experiences and the struggles of the individual within the confines of his country."³⁶

Aflaq thus feels that "religion is a fundamental principle which will be revived to overcome its superficial expression in order that it may return to its purest form."³⁷ Especially does Aflaq pretend at least to take a serious view of the "true" religion.

Religion is a serious matter that can neither be expressed in a few words nor can it be judged superficially. For we must distinguish between the true religion and its objectives and other religions and their objectives. The problem is then the difference between the true religion and the superficial one.³⁸

To emphasize or explain the seriousness and significance of religion and to give content to the spiritual aspects of the so-called Eternal Mission of the Arabs, Aflaq and other Ba'athists appeal to traditional Islamic belief and practice.

Islam is a movement portrayed in the life of the Prophet [Mohamet]. It is not only an historical Arab event, expressed in time and place, cause and effect, but its magnitude is associated directly with the perfect Arab life. Thus it is a true image, an immortal symbol, of Arab spiritualism.³⁹

And again:

The spirit of Islam that prevailed during the time of the Prophet [Mohamet] is the true spirit that we are seeking today. It is universal in as much as the message is valid for all time, all places, and all men.⁴⁰

Aflaq further asserts that from the practical standpoint,

Islam is a living force which harnesses the hidden strength of an Arab nation, mobilizing its temporal life to sweep away all obstacles and chains of customs and traditions, to reinstate the Arab nation to its rightful place in the [world] universe.⁴¹

In Aflaq's view, moreover, the beginning and continuation of Islam was no accident. Rather it was the result of the spiritual capacity of the Arabs. Thus he argues:

The Arabs were chosen to spread Islam . . . because they had matured enough to accept the responsibility. Their long victorious conquest which took almost twenty years was for a purpose: in order that the Arabs might realize their objectives through their own initiative and experience, agony, and pain, despair and hope, failure and success.⁴²

Aflaq thus argues that the Arab conquest was--and must be--the result not of blind obedience but of Arabic response to a spiritual preparation and motivation. In this sense Aflaq says, "As long as we conceive of Arabism as a body whose soul is Islam, there is nothing to fear."⁴³ On the surface, then, the Ba'athists cannot blend their socialism with a materialistic dialectic type.

Yet, there is some evidence that the written expressions of Aflaq in support of Islamic religion are possibly only a somewhat superficial endorsement of religious respectability. For one thing, the Ba'athist admits to a sense of alienation that many Arabs feel today relative to "organized" religion. In fact, Aflaq argues that "organized" religion at times in the past has served actually as a disruptive factor and a destructive force. He states that "The Christian religion

[in the West] continues to side with corruption and defends tyranny for its own existence."⁴⁴ More important, however, as the practical actions of the Ba'ath Party during his leadership and afterwards demonstrate, the appeal to Islamic religion reflected not a sincerity in acceptance, but expediency in usage and propaganda. For example, the riots that followed the March 8, 1964 revolution forced the Ba'athists to show their true colors when they stormed and occupied the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus with military troops and when they destroyed Islamic mosques in Hama, causing the death of innocent men, women, and children who were taking refuge there. (Of course, their rationale--as in the case of political people everywhere--was that they were forced to act so because of a threat to the state by subversives rather than religious folk.)

Here and there in Ba'athist literature may also be found expressions of an attitude toward Islam which suggests political expediency rather than approval:

Our people are still backward and are subject to the influences of the religious leaders of various denominations and creeds. If we attack the fundamental principles of the people's religions, we would alienate the populace, the populace that we cannot spare, the populace that constitute the means to achieve our end. We would easily have closed the doors of our mission to them, and this would end our revolutionary fervor.⁴⁵

This quotation implies that the Ba'athists temporize about religion as a means toward achieving their political objectives.

even if this temporizing means at times working with religious leaders whom they consider false and espousing religious ideas as part of the movement. Their primary consideration in approving Islam is, therefore, not the truth of traditional Islamic religion or its "spirituality" giving meaning to the Arab "soul," but the feeling of Arab people for Islam. That is, it would appear that the main concern is for the realization of the Ba'athist political "mission," rather than for an Arab Eternal Spiritual Mission and the leaders are simply appealing where necessary to traditional Islamic beliefs and practices. In fact, a reading of all the literature shows that whereas the traditional Moslem stresses the sovereignty of Allah, the Ba'athists (like Hegel) prefer to stress a spirit immanent in the natural, social, and historical order. Also, whereas the traditional Moslem stresses obedience to Allah, the Ba'athists prefer to stress the active involvement of each Arab in the realization of "unity, freedom, and socialism" in the life of the people. From such spiritual Hegelianism, it is never a long step to Marx and dialectical materialism, whether stated directly or not.

Yet even though the Ba'athists appear in actuality to look with some cynicism upon traditional Islamic belief and practice, they nevertheless stress more than one notion of "spirituality" as an essential part of what they call Arab (and Ba'athist) Eternal Mission. This aspect of spirituality

to which they refer is love. Here they argue that love may be directed toward both the material and the spiritual aspects of life. More specifically, the Ba'athists contend that love may act as a unifying force to cause the material and the idealistic aspects of life to be brought into coincidence to carry out the Mission. What they are after here, from a practical standpoint, is some device that, while permitting them to continue on a course toward economic change, will subordinate self-interested materialism of party members and dissident groups (including those who must "give up" or "endorse" something as the course of change).

Similarly and without "religious reference" they appeal to the concept of "unity of spirit" to offset the divisiveness of materialism. No aspect of life, they argue, is capable of fulfilling its function when it exists in a state of disunity caused by materialism. Only when the Arab man and nation are in spiritual and even humanitarian accord, beyond materialistic self-seeking, will its "Eternal Mission" be realizable.

There must be a differentiation between the meaning of life and the mission. Every individual, large or small, has a meaning in life. Every nation regardless of her wealth has a life of her own. This is not what we mean by our mission. Courage is not merely a meaning in life; it is the limit that one reaches of maturity and fruition. One must attain a certain level in order to be effective. This level is attained when the nation rids herself of material wealth and selfishness in order to realize her humanitarian role among other nations.⁴⁶

It is obvious, of course, that such notions are the customary appeals made by revolutionists in traditionally religious countries, as well as by conservatives seeking to maintain a status quo.

Especially significant for an understanding of the spiritual appeal is the Ba'athist interpretation of the metaphysical concept of time as "no time" or of time as a "now." Here the Ba'athists define time in such a way that it may be treated as an external measuring unit to give form to a continuity which exists apart from a sense of fatality. Since the Ba'athist philosophic system provides a basis for a revolutionary politics while appealing to the past and a motive force in the universe both immanent and transcendent, it must do some real tricks with traditional concepts of time--now spiritualizing it--now materializing it. As Aflaq says, "We are not in need of months and years to reach the future, for it can be reached within seconds when the individual becomes aware and matures ideologically."⁴⁷ Though appealing to an Eternal Mission as a continuum on the one hand, the idea of "no time" as "now" performs a practical function within the Ba'athist system in telling the individual he may leap in and out of time, if his mind is right, and participate in revolution. That is, Aflaq seeks to guarantee to his followers an opportunity to share in a greater unified movement, that of the Arab socialistic nation and

in the present as well as past and future time through a unity in time implied by the spirituality or Islamic metaphysics: "It is a spiritual life that we can now achieve and possess eternally."⁴⁸ The acceptance of Ba'athist interpreted Islamic thought will allow one to transcend the artificial limitations of the man-made concept of time.

Thus, "The revolutionary movement will not allow time to govern its action for the movement must act before it is too late. It is therefore a movement that enhances time."⁴⁹ Obviously the Ba'athist is seeking to get time on his side practically while claiming it has metaphysical status also in an ultimate unity. On the one hand therefore he says, "The idea of realization is the heart of the revolutionary movement, which means that there must be a movement that can govern time and speed its realization; the presence of such a movement requires time also."⁵⁰ More practically Aflaq states:

Socialism is not rules and regulations, but it is an outlook on life. Thus the comprehension of these rules and regulations govern life. For this reason, socialism is neither a machine nor a conglomeration of rules, but the way to infinity--it has a beginning but no end--for it travels with time and changes with time and place.⁵¹

This conception is that Ba'athism moves toward a construct that brings into harmony the past, the present, and the future.

The idea of mission strives to relate the past to the present and future. Whereas communism refutes the past and calls upon nations to begin anew, Ba'athism is contingent upon acceptance and utilization of the past. Communism refutes the Arab past.⁵²

In any case, Aflaq considers this perspective to be one of the primary differentiating characteristics of the Arab-Ba'athist "Eternal Mission." A Ba'athist conception of time incorporates the totality of the Arab people, whereas a Communist conception, it is claimed, robs them of their continuing means and identity.

The Ba'athists meanwhile are able to develop such a theory because they claim also a psychological status for this metaphysics:

The necessary conditions for the revolutionary movement is based upon consciousness, responsibility, and faith. Accomplishing these conditions should not take a long time because all of these elements are abundant and present for the growth of the revolutionary movement in our new generation.⁵³

That is, the Ba'athists contend that such realization will be present when "the future is realized and revived among us. At that time, all social, racial and religious barriers as well as all traces of tyranny will be removed."⁵⁴

It is presumably, therefore, a consciousness of this removal of the limitations of time as extension that differentiates the Arab Eternal Mission from other partial or pseudo-eternal missions.

The Moral Character of the Universe

Although seldom discussed directly, the Ba'athist writings infer that the leaders believe that the universe is moral as well as essentially orderly. Also, the moral principles which appeal to and undergird the Ba'athist thoughts are considered to be eternal, as Razzaz states: "The eternal moral principles are not changed even though there are many moral creeds and philosophies."⁵⁵ Moreover, this moral system issuing originally from the power of the Prime Mover of the universe is conceived to be inherent in the universal process itself.

In human society and history, therefore, morality is considered to be intrinsic to the universal Spirit which finally is said to express itself in the Arab Eternal Mission. This claim is suggested also by Razzaz, "True morality is an expression of the spirit. It is not an imposition."⁵⁶ Thus the moral order is not the invention of a man which somehow is forced by him on the natural order. Rather, it is the expression of the Arabic "geist" (al-rouh, الروح) as a part of nature.

It may seem surprising to some that Aflaq and the Ba'athists have spent so little time exploring the metaphysical dimensions of morality in contrast with their efforts in other areas and those of many Western philosophers. On the other hand, the Ba'athists continually stress morality in-

ferentially and socio-historically simply as a part of the Islamic Arab movement and its modern effort toward political freedom and economic justice. The fact is that the Ba'ath movement, despite the above expressions of Aflaq about spirituality, is more occupied with the human than with the metaphysical dimension. This concern is true also although, as noted, it deals with metaphysics when necessary, and in doing so it is true to and appeals to the Arab mentality. In fact, the concept of Spirit (al-rouh) seems to ensure that morality is not purely a human artifice, but is a metaphysically grounded force.

In any case, this element of life is considered to be within the make-up of the Arab as such. As Aflaq says, "In the essence of every Arab are the seeds of . . . morality, responsibility, and faith."⁵⁷ It is believed, furthermore, that this character is not limited to one segment or group within the population. It is shared by the old and the young, and by the rich and the poor. It is certainly shared by all who are committed to the realization of an Arab Eternal Mission.

Yet the Ba'athists claim to be aware that forces and persons are present within the culture and past history that have opposed and do oppose this morality supposedly intrinsic to the Arab Spirit. As Razzaz states,

We have inherited the principles of Turkish moral-

ity. This morality does not agree with the resurrection of the nation. This morality enslaved the individual within his society by destroying his individuality. This morality required complete submission to the Turkish state.⁵⁸

Thus some Ba'athists claim that the Arabs have had forced on them at times an alien morality which is also of an evil nature in that it suppresses the human spirit. The practical reason that they so interpret Turkish morality is, of course, their claim that as an ethical system it "used" the Arabs while favoring Turkish citizens. It was also a system, they claim, that was hostile to the Arab's participation in the Eternal Mission. The Ba'athist writers thus define a system as being moral when it puts first the acceptance of the uniqueness of the Arab human being and nation and when it requires, secondly, participation in the so-called Eternal Mission of the Arabs, which, it may be recalled, has itself a metaphysical status.

Contrariwise, the Ba'athists define as evil an ethical system which is predicated on the master-servant basis, particularly if the servants are the Arabs. To the Ba'athists, the Turkish morality is "in reality . . . the morality of the masters and not the slaves. For the masters the system is the means for protecting their society."⁵⁹ There is a comparison here which might be made between the new "Black Morality" of the Black Power advocates in the United States, especially the Black Muslims who claim a higher morality than white

racists. In addition, the Ba'athists contend that the imposition of the external moral system of foreigners has adversely affected the development of the nature of the Arab human being by introducing an alien element into Arabic culture specifically individualistic profiteering.

The Turks added a new morality to our society--the profit factor. This new factor began to color our attitudes toward materialism. This materialistic influence--respectability of money and the worship of wealth--is nothing but an indication of false philosophy.⁶⁰

Another type of morality externally imposed has been those systems that emphasize prescriptive injunctions. Those systems, predicated on the anticipation of any and all needs and desires that might develop, negatively affect the moral nature of the Arab. Such thoughts imply that man is intrinsically evil. On the contrary, the Ba'athists claim that the nature of man is constructive and that they are dedicated to an evolutionary self-realization of the positive in man. They say, therefore, that they reject the negativistic foreign approach. For example,

Do not kill, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not drink, do not gamble, etc. These words are of no use to us in erecting a new and healthy society. They are of no use to us especially when morality is dependent upon these conditions.⁶¹

By the latter statement they do not mean that they approve of killing, etc., but that the very injunction of the foreign thought depends upon the condition enjoined;

particularly, the forbidding of killing depends on a system by which foreigners kill Arabs. Such moral systems (obviously, the Jewish-Christian negative injunctions), with their long list of injunctions of "don'ts" only allow the rulers to gain further control over those people subject to such a system. "These negative moralities of 'don'ts' are indicative of the morality of our society. These 'don'ts' do not allow the individual to break away from the chains of tyranny and slavery."⁶² Here the writer is referring even more specifically to colonial-imperialist influence. The Ba'athists believe, furthermore, that these systems of negativistic morality simply do not work: "The old morality is like an object made of china that has been preserved in a china cabinet; once it is removed it is exposed. However, an object made of copper can take all types of abuse without breaking."⁶³ The old colonial morality thus is fragile and in the process of being shattered; the new Ba'athist morality, like the object made of copper, will be durable and strong.

The concepts of the Arab morality are based also on certain values that give meaning to the total system and to the individuals who participate in the system. These values include the following:

First, this new morality is based upon equality. Each citizen must feel that he is in essence equal to every other. Their differences are neither hereditary nor economic. Rather, differences must be based upon the extent of services rendered to

society and tenaciousness in fighting corruption in support of the higher moral values. Secondly, morality must be based on freedom--the freedom to express his mind and thought. Thirdly, morality must be based on associations--the feeling of serving the general welfare and the belief in the rights of the society.⁶⁴

The Ba'athists believe, moreover, that "Natural, true morality does not exist in any but a free atmosphere--one which allows progress and change."⁶⁵ The Ba'athists thus claim that a moral system is not and cannot be a static system; it is one that is constantly evolving, developing, and growing. That is, the Ba'athists claim to be committed (despite Islam) to a moral system that will meet with equal strength varying stresses in different times and in different places.

This morality, reminiscent of some Western humanisms, is identified by the Ba'athists with their revolutionary movement, and thus also with their Eternal Mission:

The revolutionaries, who are the Party, must prove their objectives and plans, not only in writing, but also in showing a new trend of thought, a new spirit and a new morality. These objectives and plans must be entirely different from those of the present corrupt regime.⁶⁶

In fact, the Ba'athists see their movement as one purifying the spirit of the Arab individual and people. For one thing, the commitment to it demands total dedication and willingness to sacrifice, in itself a moral notion to many. More specifically, the Ba'athists believe that an individual

so committed is an exceptional individual who may be characterized as "heroic"; thus, "Heroism is demonstrated by fighting our apparent enemies: love of leisure, tepidity, hopelessness, and despair."⁶⁷ This heroism (which means not only courage but a certain spirituality) will, they believe, ultimately bring about not only the realization of the Arab cause, but also the creation of superior human beings. The mission thus which they call Eternal transcends all other elements that are deleterious to the development of the moral nature of man. Aflaq states with regard to the rise of the Ba'athist Spirit:

It is the age of heroism, or shall I say the age of infancy, for this new generation is preparing to enter the arena of life. This new generation exhibits the frankness and truthfulness of a child who does not yet comprehend the meaning of politics but does believe that justice need not be masked.⁶⁸

But in this age the Ba'athists claim that since the Ba'ath is committed only to those things which enhance the expression of the Arab moral order, new morality is socialism and Arab unity; for something to reflect morality, it must have an answer for a real human need, thereby supplying a reason for its continuity and socialism and unity are the present needs. Thus "The Arab nation denotes justice and proclaims socialism as more than an economic plan that creates its own justification. If there were not a theory of socialism, then the Arabs [he means the Ba'athists] would

have discovered it."⁶⁹ In addition, "I am obliged, therefore, to believe in socialism if I believe in freedom

I can say that I believe in unity without socialism as readily as I can believe in sunlight without warmth."⁷⁰

That is, the Ba'athists believe, "In reality, socialism is not an economic order; but it is a way of life, a creed to understand. It is, therefore, a means for life and for understanding."⁷¹ If Ba'athist socialism were not a means, it would not occupy a unique position within a unique mission. The circuitous verbiage does not invalidate the basic idea. To a Ba'athist, socialism means to be moral and vice versa.

Socialism is humanism and has man as its objective. Socialism strives to liberate man from tyranny and exploitation, to elevate man to the level of humanity, and to strengthen his dignity among the human race. He is given the chance to explore and utilize his talents to the utmost. So socialism places man in both his natural environment and historical perspective.⁷²

And Ba'athist socialism especially, it is argued, places man logically within the real, natural, historical process.

Even if somewhat inconsistently, as has been said, Ba'athism also seeks to utilize the traditional morality of Islam: "Morality cannot be legislated. It comes from beliefs."⁷³

The youth must comprehend that religion does not side with corruption and tyranny. True religion is always with those who have suffered the greatest from social corruption, and they must be the revolutionaries. . . . Religion was founded to encourage love, brotherhood and to protect the weak.⁷⁴

Aflaq is speaking, of course, of Islam as a true religion morally in contrast with religion which is false.

In any case, as has been seen, the Ba'athists adhere to the belief in a universal moral order, although they do not fully explore the metaphysical dimension as in an appeal more specifically to Islam. Rather, they stress the human and historical aspects of morality as it is encompassed by their concept of the Spirit of Arab culture and the understanding of the Eternal Mission of the Arabs as calling for unification culturally and politically. They are especially reject alien moral systems as evil and consider true morality to be embodied in socialism, which will, in turn, result in the realization of "unity, freedom, and socialism," and the potential morality of every Arab:

The Arab movement is a serious factor in the present and future. It believes that its awakening is a result of hard labor; it regards vice and corruption as having sapped the life of Arab society; its frankness in confessing mistakes, its steadfastness, and its determination to save itself from extinction is the beginning of the Eternal Mission. This experience will allow the Arab to know the meaning of justice, truth, faithfulness, sacrifice, independent thinking, freedom ⁷⁵

To clarify the foregoing discussion it is necessary to point out some problems and even fallacies in Aflaq's metaphysics. First, however, the Western reader must be aware of the cultural differences that exist between the West and the Middle East. He must also realize that in an

Arab political movement there is naturally the insistence upon the development of a philosophy which is as uniquely Arabic as possible, certainly one which may be distinguished from traditional Western philosophy. Even if it appears that the distinctions do not "come off," the Western reader must take this effort into account in order to understand the difficulties encountered in translating and presenting the Arab mind. The Arab Ba'athist wishes to de-brief and de-brainwash himself of Western colonial, especially Turkish and now "Zionist" colonial "corruption" and, like the Black in America, identify and establish his own soul.

Aflaq's system of metaphysics is still based, however, upon two sources. One is Aristotelian and "Western" and the other Islamic; from the latter he receives his monistic concept of reality and the idea of a historic Eternal Mission or destiny. He utilizes this concept to achieve a practical end--the establishment of a sense of Arab belongingness and destiny. On the other hand, the Aristotelian concept of the Prime Mover and the Greek humanist, practical ethics also not only play a similar part, but aid in the development of a definition of moral reality, especially humanism implying socialism and Arab dignity and worth.

Obviously, Aflaq is not preoccupied with the question of whether or not the universe is orderly, except at this concept fits the notion of Arab purpose (that is, purpose

cannot exist, as has been seen, without order). He rather takes this concept for granted, although he says it is true. He is not systematic or sophisticated, however, in his argument. Instead, he wanders from one topic to the next, sometimes leaving his readers puzzled as to what will follow. To the Arab--a person of poetry--this criticism would not be valid, since one need not be a philosopher to communicate with another Arab. The truth of an orderly, purposeful universe is supposed to be obvious. The proclamation that "unity, freedom, and socialism" are necessities of nature is useful to help raise an army overnight even if not to fight very scientifically or systematically.

But to the Ba'athists, the fact that moral principles are considered to be eternal seems to be a necessity even if one must be practical and shift a bit as in situational ethics now calling for socialism, unity, and Arab independence instead of calling the faithful to prayer. Of necessity the morality is expressed in the Arab human being and nation because of the universal status of both. On the other hand, again it is admitted that morality does shift, for the Ba'athists have employed the same tactics as foreigners to weaken certain traditional ties inherent in Arab society, for example, private property and the dependent position of women. It is also true that the profit-motive system, now considered as immoral and alien to the Arab way and mission (which the

Ba'athists blame on Turkish morality), was present before the Turks ruled the Arabs. The Prophet Mohamet was a merchant who traveled extensively between Jerusalem, Damascus, and Mecca, seeking goods to be sold in the market place. He did not buy and sell at cost. Raids by tribes upon each other were almost a common way of life in the desert. Islamic conquests also seem to have been based on profit seeking, arising from desire not only to spread religion, but to secure tribute. Aflaq would like to think that Ba'athist socialism will bring a non-profit organization of life, one which strives for equality among its citizens although paying for "services rendered to society," an organization, also, which aims to free man from his chains and to give him a feeling of satisfaction and belonging. Here it would appear that Ba'athist morality is not so much historically based but idealistically metaphysical and according to humanist--not Arabic-Islamic or other traditional religious-metaphysics.

The Arab Ba'athists, like other political theorists in religiously influenced societies, would like to believe that their program is "in tune with the infinite," after re-defining their "infinite." In fact, it is almost a practical necessity for them to do so since they wish to create a humanistic socialism and develop political nationalism which will achieve Arab unity and independence (as far as

the West and Zionism are concerned), but cloak it in the Eternal Mission as a part of traditional Islamic religion and historic Arabic ethnocentrism.

This result, as in all political philosophies which serve more practical ends in a confused world, must be paradox and dichotomy despite attempts at intellectual consistency and logic.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Michel Aflaq, Ma'arakat al-Masir al-Wahid [Struggle for Common Destiny] (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1963), pp. 33-38.
2. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 9.
3. W. O. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1956), p. 181.
4. Aflaq does not think in the metaphysical sense but rather he implies it. The concept of a force active within the physical world is most emphatically stated by Dr. Munif Razzaz, a physician and co-founder of the Ba'ath Party.
5. Michel Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya [A Study in Socialism] (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1960), p. 152.
6. Muta' Safadi, al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat [The Application of the Revolution] (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1963), p. 89.
7. "Islam and Arabic Culture," The Young Arab Speaks (New Haven: The Organization of Arab Students in the U.S.A., 1953), p. 50.
8. J. M. Rodwell, The Koran (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1913), p. 29. Sura CXII: The Unity.
9. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 54.
10. Rodwell, The Koran: Sura XIV: Abraham, On Whom Be Peace, p. 226.
11. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 55.
12. Munif Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida [The New Signs of Arab Life] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lil-Malayeen, 1966), p. 23.

13. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 43.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
15. Ibid., p. 26.
16. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 140.
17. Ibid., p. 135.
18. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 55.
19. Ibid., p. 41.
20. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 39.
21. Ibid., p. 42.
22. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
p. 23.
23. Ibid., p. 25.
24. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 42.
25. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 268.
26. Ibid., p. 45.
27. Ibid., p. 44.
28. Ibid., pp. 136-37.
29. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 25.
30. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 38.
31. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 33.
32. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 119.
33. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 156.
34. Ibid., p. 126.
35. Ibid., p. 122.
36. Ibid., p. 147.

37. Ibid., p. 127.
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. Ibid., p. 52.
40. Ibid., p. 52.
41. Ibid., p. 52.
42. Ibid., p. 54.
43. Ibid., p. 55.
44. Ibid., p. 125.
45. Ibid., pp. 134-35.
46. Ibid., p. 139.
47. Ibid., p. 35.
48. Ibid., p. 43.
49. Ibid., p. 33.
50. Ibid., p. 168.
51. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 134.
52. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 141.
53. Ibid., p. 168.
54. Ibid., p. 135.
55. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
p. 261.
56. Ibid., p. 262.
57. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 168.
58. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
p. 262.
59. Ibid., p. 264.
60. Ibid., p. 265.

61. Ibid., p. 264.
62. Ibid., p. 263.
63. Ibid., p. 264.
64. Ibid., pp. 267-68.
65. Ibid., p. 264.
66. Aflaq, F1 Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 157.
67. Aflaq, Ma'arakat al-Masir al-Wahid, p. 101.
68. Aflaq, F1 Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 21.
69. Aflaq, Dirasat F1 al-Ishtirakiya, p. 41.
70. Ibid., p. 133.
71. Ibid., p. 119.
72. Ibid., p. 95.
73. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
p. 261.
74. Aflaq, F1 Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 125.
75. Ibid., p. 146.

CHAPTER III

BA'ATHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

One of the most obvious weaknesses of the Ba'athist philosophy and program is the absence of a developed epistemology. As in the case of many modern political theorists, the Ba'athists give little direct attention to this area of philosophy which provides support for the remainder of a political philosophical system. Rather, the Ba'athists have a tendency, as will be seen, to utilize any system that tends in any way to support their overall substantive practical position and belief. Such an approach leaves a great deal to be desired if one is attempting to justify Ba'athist thought. Since the latter is not the purpose of this work, however, an attempt will be made simply to elucidate the epistemology implicit (or explicit) in Ba'athist ideology.

Skepticism

The Ba'athist thought is hardly similar to the skepticism exemplified, for example, by Hume in the tradition of Western philosophy. The Ba'athists assume not only that

truth is objectively existent, but that such truth is accessible to anyone who is willing to search for it. They even seem to believe that not only the sense experience and the exercise of ordinary rational powers but "revelation" yields results which are reliable and trustworthy. They imply also that a person is capable of exercising critical judgment concerning the implications of experiences, which judgment yields at least a fair approximation of reality. The Ba'athists thus say, "Whatever one may know, one is capable of judging whether it is true or false."¹

Scientific Analysis

The Ba'athists, however, claim to use scientific methods in determining the content, not only of their philosophical system, but of the Ba'ath ideology, an understandable assertion since the Ba'athists are of this latter part of the modern scientific industrial era. In fact, many would claim that the Ba'athists are pseudo-scientific, rather than truly scientific as is evident when one considers the subjective bias which is present within Ba'athist thought.

The socialist theory opens our eyes to the laws that make history even as the scientific theory opens our eyes to the laws that make chemistry. If we learn these laws, our struggle for the cause of unity, freedom, and socialism will be moving in the right direction. With this knowledge we will save ourselves a great amount of time which would have been spent in searching for the right direction through trial and error.²

That is, it is apparent that although the Ba'athists claim that their unique perspective is the result of the scientific approach, such perspective actually rests upon value assumptions prior to scientific analysis--a condition, of course, true in much social science research--and claims to "objectivity" in contemporary political theorizing. It is also evident that the Ba'athists have borrowed consciously or unconsciously from some of the Marxist epistemological paraphernalia in order to give both "Socialist" and "scientific" support to their movement.

Perhaps some of the Ba'athist appeal to the "scientific" method arises from the awareness of the weakness in previous Arab philosophies to come to grips with modern claims to systems of knowing. In any case, their appeal to the scientific method remains vague, generalistic, and often disjointed and certainly not "scientific" in the natural science sense of tight correlation of fact and judgment.

Philosophic-Speculative

The philosophic-speculative methodology actually seems to be that which is most often used by the Ba'athists to justify their pragmatic, utilitarian-based goals. This situation is apparent when one recalls the idealistic concept of a so-called Arab Eternal Mission and the claims for its realization as grounded in a metaphysics of monistic

reality and of an orderly, meaningful, moral universe. All of these aspects were discussed in Chapter II. Here, as has been noted, the Ba'athists depend heavily upon a synthesis between religious and temporal thought in developing their philosophic-speculative methodology.

The following is an example of this Ba'athist philosophic-speculative approach though posed as a "scientific" process:

Life is like a stream. It is a tributary flowing into a river. It is continuous. When the mind attempts to study this stream, it does so by analyzing what it contains, that is, water. This is called chemistry. The mind will then study its inclination and velocity. This is called physics. Then the mind studies its source and ending, and this is called geography. But this stream is not chemistry, nor physics, nor geography for it is all these three phases of study. So man must go on analyzing things until he comprehends them, for this is the way the mind works. The duty of the mind is to gather its findings and apply them step-by-step in order to realize the truth.

In this statement one sees that the Ba'athists conceive of life as an organic whole, although a "flow," and that there is an order and structure imparting coherence and meaning to the universe, if one will simply observe the available facts. The human mind does not create values: it participates in discovering them. Such an approach suggests certain points of contact with non-Arabic philosophers.

First, Aflaq and his followers apparently have been influenced by Aristotle and Plato, probably mediated through

medieval Arabic philosophers who translated the Greeks and were affected by them. The most direct contact with Aristotle is, as has been seen, found in the concept of the Prime Mover, obviously related to the Islamic concept of Allah. The combination of these two elements is common in Arabic culture, and Aflaq's utilization reveals acceptance. From Plato, directly or indirectly, the Ba'athists also draw the possibilities of discovering an ideal--including a society--or "the good"--including the good society. As one of Aflaq's followers, Safadi, says, "Plato attempted to change the present in accordance with the highest ideals. He felt the responsibility of the philosopher toward his society and found an idealistic method for changing the present."⁴ This observation has also been made by a modern analyst of the Ba'athist movement, Khalidi:

Writing over 2,500 years ago, Plato in the Republic diagnosed the political canker of his own and of all times by maintaining that the trouble lay in the separation between the men of thought and the men of action. The world has never heeded his advice although his 'philosopher king' is a concept familiar to the least academic of university undergraduates. We in the Arab world have suffered grievously from such separation, and Aflaq's vision was perhaps the first serious attempt to offer a Platonic remedy.⁵

To be accurate, Aflaq does not discuss the Platonic ideal, but he does mention Plato in passing, revealing some degree of acquaintance. Some of his comments, such as the following, have a distinctly Socratic flavor, "Fortunately,

we are not politicians who take to the street or give banquets to spread propaganda, and strive to communicate with the feeble-minded and the possessors of the superficial, lukewarm feelings."⁶

The philosophic-speculative cast of Aflaq and his followers is also exemplified by their suggesting the importance of the intangible and that which is difficult by normal comprehension. This awareness, characteristic in general of the Islamic religion (as of others of the "great religions") is intrinsic to Ba'ath ideology. It is expressed concretely in sayings such as the following:

Our dreams and ambitions are difficult and far-fetched. It is for this reason that we have chosen the pen to express ourselves to those with calm minds and true feelings. This method will attract and enrich the educated and matured youth who are seeking the truth.⁷

Eclecticism

In view of the foregoing it would perhaps appear most accurate to regard the Ba'athists as employing an eclectic method in epistemology even though they make no admission of it. But obviously the Ba'athists view all things from their own contextual programmatic reference, accepting or rejecting those things which best support their position.

As a revolutionary intellectual movement, Ba'athism, like most "practical" modern political theories, does what it needs to do in both goal determination and an explanation

of how it proceeded in its thought. If this is a weakness to some thinkers, and it undoubtedly is, it is only a reflection of an age which is more interested in achievement than what the means or the validity of the process of knowing its goals.

NOTES

CHAPTER III

1. Safadi, Al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat, p. 34.
2. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 135.
3. Ibid., pp. 122-23.
4. Safadi, Al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat, p. 75.
5. Tarif Khalidi, "A Critical Study of the Political Ideas of Michel Aflaq," Middle East Forum, XLII, No. 2, (June, 1966), p. 68.
6. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 24.
7. Ibid., p. 24.

CHAPTER IV

NATURE OF MAN

Having examined Ba'athist metaphysical understanding of the universe and Ba'athist epistemology as generally related to the political thought, this study will now explore the Ba'athist answer to the problem of defining human personality and individuality in terms of philosophy and politics. One question, for example, is as always the definition of man as related to society as a basis for conscious institutionalizing. A second is the question of his rationality or irrationality as a basis for the same practical end. A third has to do with his moral nature as a basis for ethical judgment about the two practical ends.

Individuality and Corporateness

Many contemporary systems define man in terms of a social-corporate concept, that is, that man's behavior is determined basically in relationship to natural conditions and social institutions of life. Such a social-corporate understanding of the nature of man has been put forth since the time of Plato and in the modern world is a "hall-mark"

of most types of statist socialism although some, such as National Socialism and Fascism, show grave inconsistencies by combining the idea with irrationalist subjectivist individualism. The Ba'athists claim that they do not approve of such a system as the latter, which actually reduces the value of the individuals participating in it. For example, the following is the Ba'athist interpretation of the Hegelian concept of the individual and the state, of which they claim they do not approve:

Hegel said that there is a unifying thought which unifies individuals regardless of their differences. This general idea is but a reflection of the individual's thoughts and ideas which is represented in the state. The state projects the desires of individuals as a united desire. The state is the highest form, higher than the individual; the individual and the state become one and the same.¹

The Ba'athists charge that this Hegelian concept (as they interpret it) does not take into account all of the factors involved in the relationship between the individual and his society.

Hegel's solution to the identity of the individual is very simple, but he fails to mention the many obstacles that are related to the symbiotic relationship between the society and the individual and between the society and the state.²

The Ba'athist on the other hand claims that he defines man on both an individual and a communal basis. Some sort of unity between the individual will and the communal will, however, appears to be extremely important in the Ba'athist system.

for if society as a whole and the individuals who constitute it do not share the same ultimate goal, then the Ba'athist claims of the Arab human being's uniqueness and Arab goals fail to be substantiated. Thus, it is necessary to examine in some detail the Ba'athist interpretation of this relationship between the individual and the communal will.

First, according to Ba'athist thought, without an awareness of the importance of the individual and his fuller realization, the individual may be defeated by his submergence in the governmental structures and processes.

If we attempt to study the relationships of the individual with his society, the individual with his state and the society with the state, we can better clarify these relationships, these rules, these laws, and these traditions which bind the individual and create the basis for society. These individuals become nothing but images and shadows managing the more complicated government machines, wondering in their minds what is going on. Therefore, we assume that the individual loses his values in his inanimate object [government] which has no meaning.³

The Ba'athists thus argue that individual realization can only occur when the communal and national life recognize the validity of the individual as a creator and contributor to the values and structure of the society.

It is the nature of the individual to see himself as the center of creation. He believes that his values and his worth relies upon what he does and what he produces.⁴

Yet it must also be recognized that this individual can be realized only through the society's realization and the

roles he plays in the society.

Generally, the life in a society is similar to the life of the individual. I am a doctor, a citizen, a friend to many, a father, a husband, and a member of an organization. I perform different roles, but these roles are not opposites from me, they are part of me. I am the individual that represents these roles. The discovering of one functional role will determine to a great extent myself or who I am.⁵

But the premise of a harmony of individual and communal will and the fulfillment of individuality must be recognized also in terms of the responsibility of the individual.

The individual's responsibility to himself is compatible with his responsibility toward the society. This responsibility does not emanate from the memorizations of rules, regulations, and laws, but from the conscience. It is the conscience of the responsible citizen that knows he has certain rights and responsibilities, and the enjoying of the former will reaffirm the latter.⁶

Also it must be admitted that the individual also tries and fulfills himself to some extent in an unconscious manner as a part of his society and that the society depends upon this fact. A harmony is thus established by a historic social life, the whole and parts being strengthened together (shades of Burke in England).

Man lives his life without knowing that he is a part of the whole [past], and is not aware that he is one of millions who struggled in the past centuries, tilling the land, erecting structures, engaging in thought and spirit, and fighting in wars. All this is done so that he may establish a historical record of the great civilization he has cultivated in order that mankind may survive.⁷

And again:

If I were to examine and study my judgments systematically, I would discover that my judgment is the result of my heredity, my upbringing, my education, and my environment. I declare this to be true judgment for me.⁸

In fact, they argue that the success of the Ba'athist movement depends on the Arab history and in turn the success of Arabism today depends upon the Ba'athist movement which consciously recognizes the truth about the nature of the society.

The Arab is able to place his faith in Ba'athism because of his capabilities, his circumstances, his historical experiences, and his culture. The past is the foundation of the present and the present is the foundation of the future. The future and the destiny of the Arab are in his [Ba'athist] hands.⁹

In any case, the point is that the uniqueness of the individual is defined by the Ba'athist on a basis of both certain unique qualities of an individual as a creator of values and on the basis of certain social qualities as effective agencies that make up the totality of the nature of man including the thrust of a social history.

Viewed practically the Ba'athist insistence upon a unity of the "inner" and "outer" qualities of man is understandable when one realizes that they are dealing with a dispossessed and alienated people like the Black leaders in America. In modern times the Arab man and nation have felt themselves to be externally an extremely limited people as a society in terms of "self-determination." Because of these

conditions, the traditional modern Arab has defined the nature of man more on the basis of internal factors alone without reference to external potentiality (other than religion) and social-institutional capability. The Arab has suffered from such an interpretation because of the colonial-imperialist situation created and maintained by the oppressors. He had to turn within himself or be self-seeking practically to survive even at times. Thus the Ba'athists maintain that some Arabs who became a part of the oppression to succeed "individually" were still oppressed because of their inability and unawareness even of the need of expressing outwardly the qualities that constitute Arab uniqueness. For this reason the Ba'athists maintain, "We must comprehend that the performance of any individual, party, or government cannot be evaluated on the basis of one action; rather his performance must be considered in the light of his attitude to other problems."¹⁰ The Ba'athists thus value those qualities of intellectual and emotional development within the nature of man that are unique to him as long as they contribute to the evolution and development of the Arab nation and its unity.

This idea of diversity within the larger unity is expressed in the Ba'athist concern for the integrity of Arabic culture, but conversely the Ba'athists take a critical view of the effects, on Arabs, of other cultures and cultural ex-

pressions.

Culture expresses the true life of a nation. The French culture expresses the true life of the French people because it emanated from the heart of France. It is a part of their heritage, their political system, their aspirations and hopes. Here the individual Arab has become a part of a vicious circle, void of any will to live in his Arabic environment and culture. And this is what we have observed among the Western-educated class who are deprived of their Arabic spirit and Arabic culture. They have become absorbed in the systems of Europe.¹¹

That is, the Ba'athists insist that the unfortunate influences on Arabs have been due to the effect of the colonial nations in the Middle East. The Arab has become, therefore, a truncated version of the realizable nature of himself in a true Arab world. The colonial systems simply did not allow for expression of Arabism and thus crippled the developments of the Arab's potential. It is even true in European capitalist states, they add, that "The worker and the peasant lose their freedom and much of their dignity and worth when they become coupled with the means of production."¹²

The Ba'athist answer therefore to the individuality versus social view about the nature of man is that the individual may be "uniquely" embodied--as far as Arab culture is concerned--in the so-called Arab Eternal Mission and "its" society, yet still may retain and fulfill his individuality. When the Arab is oppressed by another society or made into a

non-Arab, his individuality is destroyed. A further argument is that Ba'athism best helps an individual become a full Arab person. This argument is patently a practical one and scarcely overcomes the individual-social dichotomy as a philosophic question.

Emotional or Rational

Man's emotional, in relation to his rational, characteristics has been for centuries a major topic of dispute among philosophers. That is, often philosophers have attempted to draw a line between man as emotional and man as rational. Plato recognized the emotional element as important, but feared it so much that in the Republic he devised an objective political-educational system to keep the emotions firmly controlled and in fact those who were emotion-ridden firmly under the control of the rational man. Aristotle viewed man as a rational, thinking animal, differentiating him from other animals, but he distrusted democracy because many men were of a lower order in thinking ability; slaves he considered incapable of creative reason. The Stoics, on the other hand, placed great emphasis on man's rationality qua man arguing that even a slave can be rational and equal in this way with other men.

The Christian theologians, including some in the twentieth century, have viewed man as so dominated by the

emotional (the cult of the irrational; fallen man) that whatever is done to "control" must come by the purer emotional process of "salvation" or a "discipline" of the devil in him including the Calvinist theocracy. Practical ideologists, such as the Fascists and the Nazis, capitalized on the idea of the dominance of the emotional factor of people to shape animalistic politics and devices to achieve their goals and objectives (as in Rosenberg's idea that man is an animal and every animal is destined to end in the belly of another animal). Much individualist-democratic theory is curiously similar although sugar-coated with palaver about "human" dignity.

Ba'athist socialism does not explicitly discuss the question of whether man is rational or emotional in terms of its political theory. One can deduce from certain statements, however, that the Ba'athist accepts the belief that both emotional and rational characteristics are integral parts of man. Beauty and optimism, as well as reason, are suggested as essential elements in human character. This insistence upon the value of emotion especially comes to the fore when the Ba'athist feels that Western colonial pressure has taken advantage of the Arabs by appealing to the value of abstract knowledge. Here the Ba'athist feels that Arab culture is being undermined. "Once the Arab man has been brought into Western educational environment which advocates

abstract knowledge he loses his Arabic spirit and culture."¹³ That is, the Ba'athists believe strongly that the feeling aspects of man's life as reflected in Arab culture are important and ought not be reduced by abstract knowledge. But why does the Ba'athist not discuss the questions explicitly? The answer is that for the Ba'athist, reason and emotion are useful only to attain the revolutionary ends already selected.

The Ba'athist admits that man can be molded to believe whatever the state tells him; hence, man can become a tool whose feelings are "used" in his own hands as well as those of his conqueror. For example, the Ba'athist, in order to achieve their objectives, assert that,

National indoctrination is a humanistic deed and not an angelic task, for it is on earth and not in heaven. Its first duty [The Party's] is to become successful, and in order to succeed, the non-believers [non-Ba'athists] must fail. . . . It must be organic; it must be alive in order to succeed. National indoctrination is not based upon any independent thought but upon a thought represented by a person who is to project in such a manner that his thoughts may live in others who out of total involvement adore both the idea and the man behind it.¹⁴

Ba'athist political propaganda, therefore, admittedly depends highly upon accepting the emotional element of man as well as the rational. When the Ba'athist leaders tell (as they do) the peasant and the factory worker that they must rise up and destroy the feudalists and the capitalists for it is their

labor that has made the landlord and factory owner rich, the peasant and the worker are not expected to rationalize or combat this emotional propaganda for it is assumed that the end, implicit in Arab destiny, justifies the means, including violent revolution. It is not assumed that there is a need to balance this appeal to individual thrift, etc., which is the usual bourgeois-owner apologetic. Similarly, politicians of the Ba'ath passionately blame Western nations for the Arab failure to liberate Palestine, saying that giant nations are teaching Israel how to defeat the Arab nation. Here the leaders do not expect their listeners to balance this statement against, say, the failure of the Arabs to unite themselves, industrialize, discipline themselves in armies, and fight successfully. By inference, the leaders emotionally assume that the frailties are not in the Arab character at present and also that the masses are so emotional that they will believe anything (just as democratic politicians assume generally in the West in dealing with Western voters).

On the other hand, the Ba'athists seem at times to value the rational element in man, but for the same reason they value man's emotional element because man's rationality serves a political end: "If man does not take advantage of time to nourish his talents he will eventually become useless to the Party."¹⁵ The Ba'athists take this position because they know that if man's rationality is alienated from his

emotion, the Party will eventually collapse from lack of organization and leadership. In other words, the utilization of reason according to Ba'athist teaching is a necessity if the Party is to achieve its goals.

The Ba'athists definitely encourage, then, the synthesis of both the rational and the emotional aspects of man in a special practical sense. That is, the synthesis, they believe, should be realized within the character of the Party members, "The Ba'athist activist must be versed in the truth of their [the people's] religions and in humanistic [Ba'athist] principles, based upon positive faith that refutes falsehood and staleness."¹⁶

At times, like St. Thomas in the Medieval West, Aflaq appears to regard faith as an indispensable motive expression of man's nature: " . . . faith precedes logic. Faith is the heart of and mind of the people" ¹⁷ At other times he is critical of a faith which simply, emotionally, and blindly follows the old ways.

We find that youth is innocence; he cannot express himself wisely. . . . He is at the stage of learning about the past, observing, meditating and thinking, in lieu of deciding and acting irrationally. This is looked upon by the old as a sign of immaturity. As the youth matures he often falls too deeply into the acceptance of the ways of the old, and then he becomes a domesticated animal. The elders see this as a sign of perfection and maturity. In reality, however, he is merely a loser, a weakly individual submitting to the ways of the old.¹⁸

Obviously he finds emotion-faith important and valid when it speeds the revolution as a breaking from the old. He is critical of emotion-faith when it gets in the way of the revolution. Then he turns to reason and ceases to deride it as a mere tool of the West to undermine and destroy the Arab's "Soul."

Man as a Moral Being

Is man moral, immoral, or amoral? This question plagues some ideologists. If man is moral, from whence does he secure his morality? The Ba'athists answer this question without hesitation by affirming that man is a moral being. They claim a moral nature is intrinsic to every individual man. "Even the ugly and poverty-stricken Arab contains hidden spiritual treasures and moral thoughts."¹⁹ That is, each individual man has the power of moral judgment: "The individual is aware of his goodness and his evil. It is only the individual that can adjudge what is good or evil."²⁰ Also this statement suggests that the basis of moral judgment is a highly individual matter.

The Ba'athists admit, however, that exercise of the moral judgment is not achieved apart from the influences of the culture of which the individual is a part. Thus, " . . . every individual in society adjudges that society according to its own rules and traditions which have a direct impact

on him."²¹ The history, customs, traditions, values of the society, therefore, influence the way in which the individual exercises his moral judgment.

It is evident, then, that the Ba'athists understand better than some Western individualists that the realization of morality occurs only with social relationships and between individuals. As Razzaz states:

True morality is an expression of the spirit. It is not an imposition. It is the result of interaction between the individual, society, and the experiences of life. It is not the result of advice and conditions. Conditions could limit the conduct, but it does not limit the force of morality.²²

Aflaq, however, sees the true realization of the morality of man as arising from the synthesis of the spiritual and the physical aspects, a synthesis provided only by Ba'athist socialism. In this way he carefully (and somewhat cunningly) relates the awareness of the socialist and nationalist to the "inherent" moral nature of man.

The following is the creed of humanity from which all values and objectives emanated; If I believe in man, his values and capabilities, I must, therefore, believe in unity and nationalism, in freedom and socialism, because each objective represents a basic aspect of human values. Henceforth, my faith in freedom would be worthless if I did not believe in socialism; for freedom is not given to man unless you have faith in him. . . . Faith in man cannot be compromised.²³

This concern for what the Ba'athists consider to be a union of moral goods, as freedom plus socialism, especially

insists upon the latter as a part of moral character. In any case, it is Ba'athist socialism which is the means by which the moral nature of man may find expression and fulfillment.

Socialism existed as an economic order before it became a philosophy and a theory. No one has a monopoly over socialism. It desires freedom, freedom of the peasant from land enslavement, the worker from his machine, and freedom of man from the chains of tyranny and exploitation.²⁴

Self-Interest and Altruism

Although--as shall be seen--the Ba'athists appeal to altruism as the motive for change, the movement appears to assume that man in his natural condition is also ruled by self-interest, especially with respect to the necessities of life. In most cases this rule is not condemned, particularly in the case of the peasants. The reason for this position, it is claimed, is that the peasant lives close to the edge of mere survival, must be concerned with self-preservation, and does not have the opportunity or the understanding to develop altruistic ideas.

The aspirations of the peasants do not exceed self-sustenance. If God is gracious enough to make it rain, and gracious enough to protect the crops from natural dangers that affect growth, then the peasant has survived the year.²⁵

Yet the Ba'athists are aware that the urban dweller has even more needs than those that control the peasant's life, even if the latter lives close to the edge of survival.

The city dweller has become a specialist; in addition to the necessities of life, he must secure something more than survival; he must achieve a sense of meaning.

The needs of the working man and the peasant differ. The working man has found that life in the city requires more than food, clothing, and shelter. The urban environment demands more than a subsistence philosophy.²⁶

For this reason, the Ba'athists assert, the Arab is even more subject to self-interested pressures within urban areas than within rural areas, even though the needs are particularly social ones.

These developments, it is claimed, have exposed the Arab to another, and according to Ba'athism, more vicious type of self-interest: the practice of seeing one's natural, necessitous self-interest without reference to or regard for historic communal and social responsibilities. "Men are measured by their wealth, influence, and personal gains. Their errors are absolved and their evils are gratified."²⁷ The practical importance of this fact is that too many Arab leaders even now "sell out" to the old order, including becoming directly or indirectly "pawns" of a neo-colonial system.

In our society we have politicians, among them the young and the old, who have surrendered to the status quo because it was advantageous to do so. They have occupied governmental positions without commitment to the Eternal Mission.²⁸

In addition, it is argued that this giving way to

self-interest has led to the misplacement of authentic Arab values and meaning which emphasized the dignity of man.

It did so as leaders again accepted in their self-interest the mechanization which in turn destroyed the dignity and identity of the spirit so important to Arabs in their history.

Mechanization and rapid progress, desired by the developing nations, is quite problematic, because in this process the dignity of the individual is diminishing. . . . Humanism is coming to an end. It is like the story of a God who created the earth but could not control it. He died and left the earth rotating around the sun.²⁹

In terms of the problems besetting a socialist movement, it is argued that this development of self-interest also expressed itself in the Arab world in the development of the belief in individual property rights at the expense of social need and development such as political freedom and economic equality. The concept of individual property rights has led, that is, to many other evils, including the separation of one Arab from another and thus from the so-called Arab movement for independence. Here the point should be made that it is not that the Ba'athists do not accept property rights, but that they believe that property rights should rest first on communal, societal needs and responsibilities. "Ownership must be directly connected with the preservation of man. On the other hand, absolute ownership [for individual profit] is nothing but the accumulation of wealth and the domination of others."³⁰

The same self-centered interest, according to the Ba'athists, meanwhile, even expresses itself in the perversion of religious belief and practice. In fact, it is Aflaq's contention that religion has been perverted by individualism to enslave the more philosophically naive Arab people. For this reason, the Arab youth must be taught to determine what is a "true" religion and what is a "superficial" religion.

The interpretation of religion is complicated not only because of the lack of objectiveness, the variance in ideologies, education and emotions of the interpreters, but also because opportunism often enters into it. The Arab youth must look at all times to these ingredients with an open mind in order that he may be able to make a distinction between the true and the superficial religions.³¹

At this point the Ba'athists raise the question of the possibilities of reformation. Here they see first in man the possibility of improvement because as indicated they believe that altruism is also basic to man's nature and can also be turned to practical account. Aflaq writes:

My thoughts are with those who move about restlessly in the graveyards weary of the hopes which the society did not allow them to have, and the treasures of benevolence, love, and enthusiasm remain hidden in their hearts, untapped and unused.³²

Especially does Aflaq (like most practical politicians) claim to have hope.

We have a new generation that has witnessed and now feels morally compelled to correct the errors of the opportunists and politicians. This new

generation is still in its uncorrupted infancy, but eventually will be able to control and demand the righting of the many illnesses of our society. This, in truth, will take time; but this new generation according to their principles and creed must execute these principles of justice.³³

But more particularly the Ba'ath naturally places its faith in the validity of its brand of socialism which it insists is "true socialism" without the errors of Marxism. That is, it is grounded in the communal nature of the older Arab society, not in abstract theories about alienation and class struggle.

Our socialism does not believe in the non-productivity of the individual nor in the class struggle as proposed by the Marxists. We believe in the freedom of the individual and his willingness to protect his social life and race.³⁴

Ba'athist socialism can make this claim, according to the Ba'athists, because its social philosophy has arisen, not only from the altruistic nature of man in general, but of Arab communal life in particular before the Arab man was subjected to foreign contamination.

We have understood the meaning of [our] socialism prior to reading about the subject academically. For when we visited the villages in our beloved nation, we observed thousands upon thousands of people that have goodness and inherent talents. [Our] Socialism . . . is lessening the burdens of these peoples, the burden of abject poverty, ignorance, and disease. It is guiding them towards the road to progress so that the nation may be proud of them.³⁵

And again:

Socialism is the image of each Arab, his existence,

and his future, which unites him with humanistic progressiveness. . . . When the time is ripe for the rebirth [Ba'ath, البعث] of socialism, the Arabs shall follow the road to humanism.³⁶

They reiterate, however, that there must be a rebirth of this socialism and that it will not take place spontaneously; rather it must be brought about by an instrument--the "people."

Any revolutionary accomplishment needs an instrument which will be a means and have the ability to express the causes of the revolution and to personify it to the details of every day life. . . . It has been agreed that the instrument of every revolution is the people.³⁷

In turn, however, it is clear that the Ba'athist movement sees itself as the means by which the "people" can carry out the revolution, which will result in the rebirth of socialism and the conditions necessary for the expression of the innate altruism of the people themselves. Hence the Party has adopted the name Ba'ath (rebirth or resurrection) to signify its critical role in effecting the "rebirth" of Arab altruism, humanism, and natural socialism.

It is this faith, the Ba'athists argue, which provides the basis, on the one hand, for concern for the masses, for opposition to present corrupt self-seeking political practitioners, and for dedicated rulers. Aflaq commented, thus, with reference to the small group of early Ba'athist members:

This faith became apparent among a group of young men who stayed aloof from political corruption. They were called the Idealists, the bewildered

children, for in this stage of Arab life they proved to some parts of the Arab world the unshaded truth and the sacredness of strife. They humbled themselves before the ideology and before the truth--the misery of the masses.³⁸

Almost inevitably Aflaq further argues that the logic of altruistic Ba'athist socialism will be translated into the necessary sacrifice (as is claimed in the case of most political ideological movements).

In order to minimize the misery of man on earth, and in order that he may feel that he lives in heaven, one must sacrifice for the love of the Mission. It is through this sacrifice that he achieves heaven on earth.³⁹

It is admitted, however, that this insistence on sacrifice for the success of the movement, which is another way of speaking of the need for altruism in every Arab, is not accepted by all Arabs. Some, it is said, still exhibit self-interest; and some Arabs, in effect, are working against the fulfillment of the Eternal Mission.

The things that endanger our new generation are numerous and varied. Even worse than imprisonment and torture is the danger of apathy and aloofness expressed by the many who say 'let the children play for awhile, trying to reach the moon with their short hands.' Our decline is due to the lack of faith in ourselves as well as the lack of duty to our nation.⁴⁰

Yet the Ba'athists argue that its members cannot be relieved of their responsibility to the revolution.

Although laboring and sacrificing is thought to be undesirable, there is no escape from it. It is our duty to overcome these man-made obstacles. It is our duty to lessen the pains of man.⁴¹

Hence, the final appeal is for sacrifice out of man's natural altruism.

In summary, the Ba'athists see man in general and Arab man in particular as basically altruistic and socialistic. The Ba'athists maintain that this altruism is not only one of the essential characteristics of the nature of Arab man as is self-interest, but that the altruistic aspects of man are more fully expressed and realizable within and by Ba'athism. They argue their difference from other forms of socialism, for example, Marxism, because it is a part of the true Arab "soul" and would, if practiced, cause Ba'athism to stand preeminent within the socialistic camp.

This chapter, therefore, has examined the Ba'athist understanding of man and has shown that man is viewed as having both an individual and a corporate identity; also, that he combines within himself elements of both emotionality and rationality. Also demonstrated has been the view that the Ba'athist regards man as basically moral and altruistic, as well as self-interested. The essential Ba'athist argument, of course, is that it requires Ba'athist socialism to place the individual and society in proper relation, to balance emotion and reason, and to catalyze the self-interest with altruism, developing the full possibilities of life on earth for all Arabs through societal cooperation and political independence. It requires a proper social movement--Ba'athism--

a correct understanding in terms of what society is all about and what glues it together. But how do Ba'athists understand the force or forces which bind men together in society? This study now turns to the Ba'athist view of social solidarity.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, pp. 50-51.
2. Ibid., p. 51.
3. Ibid., p. 47.
4. Ibid., p. 48.
5. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 123.
6. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 260.
7. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 48.
8. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 48.
9. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 40.
10. Ibid., p. 134.
11. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 63.
12. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 110.
13. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 62.
14. Ibid., p. 120.
15. Ibid., p. 169.
16. Ibid., p. 135.
17. Ibid., p. 139.
18. Ibid., p. 36.
19. Ibid., p. 146.

20. p. 48. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
21. Ibid., p. 49.
22. Ibid., p. 262.
23. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 130.
24. Ibid., p. 111.
25. p. 35. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
26. Ibid., p. 35.
27. Ibid., p. 265.
28. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 32.
29. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 153.
30. Ibid., p. 145.
31. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, pp. 122-23.
32. Ibid., p. 25.
33. Ibid., p. 32.
34. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 156.
35. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
36. Ibid., p. 41.
37. Safadi, Al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat, p. 99.
38. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 29.
39. Ibid., p. 34.
40. Ibid., p. 22.
41. Ibid., p. 34.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

In the Ba'athist view, there are several characteristics of society. First, society is necessary for the perpetuation of the individual; and secondly, society should be characterized by equality. Each of these characteristics are evident in the following quote:

Society is a necessity for the individual like Spring is for the flowering of roses. . . . This sacred right [society] must not be limited to a select group but it should be shared by all people.¹

They assert, furthermore, that "The [Ba'athist] society is free from class divisions socially and economically. It is the raising of barriers that hinders the relationship among its citizens."²

In addition, the Ba'athists believe that for society to exist, it must have a purpose that will bind individuals together in some type of structured order. They maintain, therefore, that the romantic ideal of the individual without commitment or responsibility to others is fallacious.

The individualism of Robinson Crusoe is but a

fable and cannot possibly exist or survive in a society which contains unlimited relationships. Individuals are tied to the family that raised them, to the group they lived with, to the town they worked in, and to the nation that they related to. Upon these ties and relationships society is founded.³

Do these "ties and relationships," however, emerge from common agreements among individuals, or are they the product of institutions and forces within the social order itself? The Ba'athists do not accept the concept of individual agreement; rather, in their viewpoint social cohesion must be based upon social institutions and the positive law of the state. It is not the state of mind of individuals but institutions which build society and social solidarity.

The latter is exemplified in the Ba'athist understanding of the fikra al-jadida (new ideology). The "new ideology," appearing in the twentieth century, is an interpretation of the Arab's common sense of nationhood on a historic basis, a past history projected as an integral part of the future. That is, the Ba'athists maintain that the future should incorporate the "glorious" Arab cultural past.⁴ This belief leads the Ba'athists to attempt a synthesis of the past, present, and future in the idea of the "Eternal Mission." This synthesis is stated in the following:

First, it [Ba'athist ideology] strove to create a political identity which served as the foundation of modern nationhood. In this capacity, ideology was nationalistic. Secondly, ideology attempted to consolidate the social content of the political

state through a series of economic and educational measures. In this function, it was socialistic. Thirdly, ideology attempted to enlarge the cultural and intellectual horizon of Middle Eastern society in conjunction with nationalism and socialism. The modernizing functions of ideology are embodied in nationalism and socialism.⁵

The Ba'athists maintain, however, that it is only through revolution that this "new Arab ideology" can be effectively applied. The unity that is found within the revolution will be a fusion of the requirements of the physical and the spiritual. Such a fusion is possible only when the ideology of "unity, freedom, and socialism" has spread throughout the entire society. The Ba'athists are thus committed to negating that which has been negative, divisive, and unequal as perpetrated by the colonial powers and conquering forces of the past. And one expression of this "new ideology" as a "resurrected" sense of Arab nationalism is the belief that the proletarians, the masses, are the bearers of this sense of belonging.

The Proletarian should become aware of his nationalism and understand his rights, and learn that he is the majority of the population in the nation; and that he could not possibly better his lot when divided; he must be aware that the working classes are but one class with a common interest which constitutes a strong historical force capable of changing the trends of Arab history as well as saving the Arab nation.⁶

In fact, this new ideology transcends geographical and class boundaries and is to be shared by every Arab. Ba'athism is committed to a "universal" realization, rather

than a purely geographical realization.

Unlike Marxism, we have not renounced the idea of unity and nationalism. Nor have we neglected to treat the problem of disunity and colonialism. Disunity is the major problem of the Arab world and it greatly hinders Arab economic and political progress. We must, therefore, build from a new base.⁷

Another source for the development of social cohesion is the creation of a just economic institution which provides for the three basic needs of mankind--food, clothing, and shelter. It is, thus, necessary to provide a system that maintains its members, yet rewards those who are greater contributors to the society. But such a society must not allow the development of an elite.

Income is a means to compensate the fruits and hard work of the individual. Monetary compensation encourages him to do better. However, these compensations must be limited within a narrow contextual framework in order to safeguard a healthy equilibrium between the blue collar workers and the white collar workers as well as the rulers . . . the economic differences must be small.⁸

In other words, the Ba'athists believe that an equalitarian economic system can serve as a factor in the development of the cohesive society.

One way the Ba'athists have determined that it is possible to provide for this economic societal cohesion is by the evolution of what is thus known as Ba'ath socialism. That is, the Ba'athists argue that it is necessary to put into effect their economic program in order that the goal of

Arab independence may be realized. Since they know from past experience, both their own and that of others, that such an implementation is difficult, the Ba'athists have been committed to the implementation of socialism first within a fairly restricted geographical area, namely, that part of the Middle East that is known as modern-day Syria. Syria naturally was chosen because it is the first Arab country to fall under complete control of the Ba'athists. They say, furthermore, that "Unless its principles are implemented initially in a small region of the Arab world, the socialist [Ba'athist] will be confronted with numerous problems."⁹ Of course, after "ironing out" many of the problems of socialism within Syria, the Ba'athists will then extensively implement their plans of socialism based on the Syrian model in other Arab countries in which they have gained control.

In addition to political and economic structures, it is emphasized that social solidarity is based on a common institutional sharing of a linguistic, racial, religious, and cultural tradition and heritage and that such exists in the case of the Arab people.¹⁰ Specifically, for example, they point to the heritage of the religion of Islam. They admit that in the recent past this religion has been used in a prescriptive manner to maintain and to continue the established order. But since the established order was that of the conquering-colonial forces, they do not believe that

this was true Islamic religion and therefore the Ba'athists are committed to the ideal of a resurrection or restatement of earlier basic concepts that in their eyes made Islam a true religion. Here the connection between Islam and Ba'athism, which they emphasize is the need for sacrifice and commitment, required in modern times as it was required by the Prophet Mohamet in 622 A.D.

No one, who has not known persecution and who has not fought on the side of right against overwhelming odds, has the right to speak in the name of Islam. I personally do not believe that anyone has exclusive title to Islam, unless it is those people that are persecuted because of their principles and courage--the preaching of the message against overwhelming odds. Only these men have the right because all calls and messages must be judged by social action and not by talk.¹¹

According to the Ba'athist view, the only true religion which will serve as a unifying and cohesive factor within the Arab world is one which calls for sacrifice rather than simply promising individual "salvation."

Another source of social cohesion that is emphasized by the Ba'athists, as has been noted, is morality. "Morality is one of the aspects of society. Morality is, therefore, a social glue that binds people in societal units."¹² They add that "The morals of the proletariats are the morals of a revolution. They are political morals based upon winning the battle and controlling the government."¹³ Here again morality based on sacrifice, not selfishness, is the major

emphasis.

In addition to political, economic, cultural, religious, and moral factors, the Ba'athists also incorporate in the "new ideology" of social solidarity certain aspects of the ancient traditional family structure. Their encouragement for the development of society along the lines of the family unit is critical in understanding their approach to unity and coherence. Not only do they encourage such development, but they also maintain that such encouragement is the responsibility of the state itself.¹⁴ On the other hand, although the Ba'athists support and encourage the family, as an institution solidifying society, they also seek to redefine the family situation and relationship; that is, they attempt to limit family cohesion and ties to early childhood. At the conclusion of Arab childhood, the Ba'athist society as a whole is to become the family in which all Arabs share in moving forward as a people. (This is an idea, of course, reminiscent of the efforts of ancient Athens to secure social cohesion.) The Ba'athists claim, moreover, that it is possible to be free only within the total Ba'athist society.¹⁵ This separation from primary family ties after childhood is thus intended not only to bind together the Arab people in a shared mission but to give a larger freedom to all as an independent people.

The insistence upon the value of the family unit is

apparently based upon the needs of propagation and the value of marriage as a protective, stabilizing social device.

Here to avoid burdening the Arab man, they argue that the state must assume the responsibility for health, welfare, and education.¹⁶ In assuming responsibility for these tasks, however, the state acquires the right to ensure the acceptance and transmission of a common tradition and heritage, language, religion, and identity.

Logically then, the Ba'athists believe in the validity of the state and the political apparatus as the crowning device for achievement of social solidarity and stability, for it is the encouraging protector and giver of aid relative to all the other factors already noted. Naturally, too, the Ba'athists proclaim their role to be indispensable for the realization of the "new ideology in state life." This position was first articulated at the First Arab Ba'ath Congress in April, 1947. The Congress stated:

The Ba'ath is the party of the future. It is the one and only avenue of salvation for the Arab people. The leaders of the Arab people personify these people's geniuses and virtues. These leaders emerge from among the masses, not from the selfish exploitationist pro-foreign elements.¹⁷

Furthermore, the Ba'athists believe that the reason they are able to undertake this role, which numerous other groups and systems have attempted and failed, is that they have been able to bring together a cohesive unit within a

broader base.¹⁸ They assert that their role is essential to the basic concept of "unity, freedom, and socialism" as they provide the means for unity.

The motto of the Arab Ba'ath is not far from being realized. It is directed toward fulfilling the needs of the present Arab unity. Superficial division is no longer acceptable and we shall continue to strive toward the realization of unity, now and forever, spiritually and eternally.¹⁹

This unity will allow the Arab man and nation to evolve and develop in a political, spiritual, and humane sense. Ba'athists further claim that "Ba'ath Socialism is a positive movement which recognizes the hope for the future, and the feelings which will connect the Arabs with their past history and its social unit."²⁰ The Ba'ath Party itself becomes the very epitomy of institutions, the reflection of a common need and the will to fulfill it, doing so through a structure of ideas and organizations more than individual states of mind.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

1. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, pp. 155-56.
2. Ibid., p. 147.
3. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 47.
4. Elias Morkos, Nakd al-Fikr al-Kawmi [A Critical Analysis of Nationalist Thought] (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1966), pp. 424-28.
5. Kemal Karpas, ed., Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 6.
6. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, pp. 20-21.
7. Ibid., p. 26.
8. Ibid., p. 253.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Leonard Binder, "The Constitution of the Ba'ath Socialist Party of Syria," Middle East Journal, XIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1959), 195. "(Hereinafter referred to as Ba'ath Constitution.)"
11. Karpas, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 194.
12. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 261.
13. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 274.
14. Ba'ath Constitution, Art. 38, sec. 1.
15. Munif Razzaz, al-Houriyat [Liberty] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lil-Malayeen, 1965), pp. 45-50.

16. Ba'ath Constitution, Art. 39, secs. 45-48.
17. "Hizb al-Ba'ath Huwa al-Mustakbal," [The Ba'ath is the Party of the Future], Nidal al-Ba'ath, Vol. I (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1963), 189.
18. Karpas, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 17.
19. Michel Aflaq, al-Rissalat al-Arabiya [The Arab Mission] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), pp. 1-6.
20. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 204.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL CHANGE

This section will examine the Ba'athist attitude toward social change. Here an examination of Ba'athist thought will reveal an emphasis on the validity of some revolutionary political and consequently economic change. This conclusion is the result of the Ba'athist belief that the recent past individual and institutional changes have not had a sufficient positive and effective impact on the realization of the Arab aims and needs.

Individual Versus Institutional Change

The Ba'athists believe that a change in individuals is of negligible value in the ultimate realization of the Arab goals, "proper social change." It is only "in the beginning" that they accept that a significant part in their history was played by a single individual. To the Ba'athists, this is Allah's Prophet Mohamet and even then (according to their theology) actually he was only an instrument of Allah. The traditions of both Islam and Ba'athism claim for the part played by the Prophet basically a conclusion and summation of

the prophetic vision as a contribution to social change. Though the result is a continuing one in terms of implementation, the Ba'athists believe that even then the Messianic appearance is only an aspect of an immortal plan and historic destiny.

Islam is a movement portrayed in the life of the Prophet. It is not only a historical Arab incident expressed by time and place, cause and effect, rather its magnitude is associated directly with the absolute Arab life; thus, it is a true image, an immortal symbol of Arab spiritualism.¹

Hence, it is immediately apparent that only in the initiation of the spiritual mission of the Arabs through Islam was the part played by a single individual unique and exceptional. Even then the Ba'athists admit that the revelation created merely the opportunity for the development of the total Arab contribution to human life.

When deeply tied to the mysteries of the eternal universe, every great nation finds itself directed toward the everlasting principles. Islam is a case in point. It is specifically Arabic and its range is humanistic. As long as we conceive of Arabism [Ba'athism] as a body whose soul is Islam, there is nothing to fear.²

Of course, this belief is basically an idea which supports their essential nationalism or an attempt to give the movement a practical-spiritual-ideological status as with metaphysical foundations.

Other than this case the Ba'athists view the individual contribution to social change mainly in the sense of the

individual's "uniqueness" in terms of human worth, dignity, artistic and intellectual creativity within the developing system. But this view does not mean that whatever any individual may think or do is correct just because he is an individual: "If the individual is to be saved from the corrupt state, he must work vigorously. Mere membership or superficial beliefs in the principles or creed of the Party is not sufficient."³ In other words, for an individual to contribute to proper and effective social progress he must become and act as part of a movement which would effect such change.

A similar attitude is found in the Ba'athist interpretation of the role played by labor unions. Even unions, they believe, are too individualistic and self-interested in nature to effect proper social change.

The unions can organize themselves in a revolutionary manner and play an important role politically. Their role, however, will be limited to the realization of the revolution only. They will not become a major political instrument once socialism is achieved. Their primary objectives are to work within the welfare of society and raise its standards.⁴

Obviously, the Ba'athists are not so two-faced as the Russian Communists, who pretend that there is a continuing validity for unions during the socialist stage even while they treat unions as mere tools of the party and state. The Ba'athists insist that this change must be by the whole. Unions repre-

sent, as do individuals, excessive self-interest and a tendency to stabilize such self-interest. Real social change must be of a continuing communal reality. In fact, there is little attention paid to non-communal contributions in social change anywhere in the Arab world.

Naturally the role and function of institutional conditioning in effecting social change is integral to the Ba'athist type of belief. The Ba'athists argue, however, that the role and the function of the institutional change will be most effective when it is understood and utilized relative to Arab aims and destiny.

That is, since the Ba'athists accept the idea of a unity and the synthesis of the various aspects of their culture as significant to their "fruition" politically and culturally, they believe that various institutional factors may add to or detract from "proper" social change. Still it is possible, as a result of the utilization of all factors within the insitutional apparatus, to realize the "Eternal Mission."

To support this position the Ba'athists maintain that institutional influence and structures have traditionally played a major role in the social life and change of the Arab people. In the Turkish colonial period, the people were forced to live different from their destiny; and it is these foreign influences which must now be eliminated.

The birth of new morality depends upon the elimination of two things: First, the corrupt morality that was inherited from the Turks which divided the society and tyrannized the people. Secondly, materialism which has a negative influence.⁵

As indicated before, a specific major institutional influence affecting social change has been religion. It has been especially noted previously that the Ba'athists accord a high position to the role played by religion as an institution in the development of Arab life; but it was also indicated that when religion was a constructive force, the reason was that the religion was the "true" religion. Now this problem is to resurrect the proper institutional religious life, not merely deny the validity of religion, as do the Marxists.

The problem that we face is not a simply one, for it affects our individuality and consciousness . . . those who represent religion in its present form are corrupt . . . religion has fallen into the hands of tyrants and non-believers. This is, however, what Communism expounded upon, for Marx observed that religion became in Europe the tool in the hands of the exploiters, imperialists, and tyrants in order to suppress and keep the people slaves forever.⁶

That is, the Ba'athists maintain that the institution of a false religion as referred to above may do great damage. On the other hand, they have claimed for Islam the validity of a true religion, insisting that the influence of it can have great benefits. In any case, "The [Ba'ath] Party sees religion as a fundamental criteria in human life, capable of

modifications to meet the changing times, and it should not cease to exist."⁷ Indeed, although of a "spiritual" character, it becomes a conditioning factor for the realization of social change, "We believe that the spirit is the foundation of everything. The spiritual incentive does not have power over the material things but it creates them."⁸ More specifically,

The Arab Mission is entering the experimental stage of faith, and hopes to overcome the widespread corruption and selfishness of the past. This path will lead the Arabs toward the nourishment of their humanitarian soul, because they would have become one with the greatest experiment that is life.⁹

In still other words, "The realization of Arab unity shall release the heavy burden that plagues the deprived Arab Spirit. Upon this realization, economic and social reforms shall become a reality."¹⁰ For this reason, Ba'athism, although a political-economic movement, accepts at least outwardly the social influence of religion, "The revolution must join with this spirit; it must not let anything stand in its way."¹¹

On the other hand, it is argued that a third factor which influences Arab social change is the influence played by the economic system. It is also argued that the economic system of the colonial-conquering nations which discouraged social change did not lead toward equality and human dignity. Contrarily, the Ba'athists claim that they advocate an

economic system that will enhance and encourage a social change in behalf of Arab dignity and destiny. This means, however, that there must be a truly revolutionary social change initially. "Unless we come out with a new revolutionary method of altering the Arab way of life from a declining stage to an ascending stage, we will have surely failed."¹²

Although the details of this system will be noted later, the following indicates that a changed property order will certainly be necessary, one in which a socialist economy will replace the present private system.

The socialist government will solve all problems of inequity with a positive approach through the pooling of small acreages into communes and with the establishing of state farms from expropriated lands. The government will mechanize farming by the loaning of agricultural equipment, by offering their agricultural services via the Department of Agriculture, by providing capital, and by dividing the profits among the producers and the consumers. The government has the right to charge for its services.¹³

In effect a change in spirit, and a change through religion, is not sufficient. A change in the property order is also requisite.

Revolutionary Versus Evolutionary Change

The foregoing indicates that the Ba[®]athists are basically revolutionary, not believers (at least relative to the present) in an evolutionary type of social change. They

contend that the only people that were helped by evolutionary social change in the past were the people of the colonial-conquering nations and the puppets among the Arabs who cooperated with them for cowardly and selfish reasons.

In going through the pages of our history and culture, we find some pages that show weak people who are unable to face the problems of their country, so they weep and express their misfortunes by saying, 'la howla wa la kuwatan ila bilah' ['As Allah wills it'). Other pages show opportunists who have filled their pockets with bullion, saying 'there is no need to hurry in making these changes--everything changes in an evolutionary way.¹⁴

The Ba'athists point to other nations that have accepted an evolutionary social change and their appraisal of such nations is that they have had limited success. One exception to this interpretation is the Ba'athist view of the evolutionary program of social change in Great Britain. While the Ba'athists do not interpret the "socialist" system there to be necessarily applicable to them, they do admit that Great Britain has achieved a certain degree of success. They argue, however, that the success was caused more by the fact that it was of a socialist nature rather than a political-democratic nature. Even these reforms often were put into effect within short periods of time.

The difference between moderate and immoderate socialism is great. Great Britain, for example, is a moderate socialistic nation, which always has been known for its equalization and evolutionary progress, and its avoidance of violence and shock. [But] Many reforms of the British Labor Government, which are mentioned in the Syrian Constitution, have been put into effect within a period of five years.¹⁵

In general, the Ba'athist philosophy thus finds evolutionary social change to be unacceptable; one of the major reasons for this attitude being the sense of immediacy about the problems besetting the Arab world. In fact, the Ba'athists insist that those who would "join" them understand their belief in revolution: "We must make those who believe that Ba'athism is evolutionary understand that it is a revolutionary movement."¹⁶ And to the Ba'athists, revolutionary social change is understood as any action event, or idea that causes societal change in such a manner as to preclude continuation of those societal institutions which have failed to be responsive to the needs of those who have a right to a participatory share in the society. They reiterate that such a change can only succeed if it is a true revolution.

Coincidental with their belief, the Ba'athists contend that an excessive number of societal influences and institutions that have recently existed within the Middle East are actually merely "external" artificial institutions applied by the conquering-colonial nations to maintain order and further the interests of the outsider. By definition, these institutions were not responsive to the needs of the Arabs. The Arab has become a dispossessed and alienated segment of society although the majority in terms of numbers. Of course, the Ba'athists believe, a revolution is the process

required.

The Ba'athists maintain also that the difference between their revolutionary approach and other reputed revolutionary approaches is found in the concept of the "true revolution." The failure of the other revolutionary systems is their dependence on the premises of an internal class struggle, the complete elimination of private property and removal of personal initiative. Ba'athists believe that such action "simply impoverishes the rich without aiding the poor . . . terrorizes . . . [and] humiliates."¹⁷ More importantly, it would divide the Arabs inside their society, which is the end desired by the foreigners.

In effect, as will be seen in more detail later, the Ba'athist system is committed, therefore, to more than a simple "internal" economic revolution. The Ba'athists argue that when one utilizes only the economic forces for revolutionary efforts, there is a tendency simply to replace one established order for the self-interested with another established order of a similar character. What is needed in the case of the Arabs is an emphasis on a unity and synthesis between that which is physical-material and the spiritual, for example, the acceptance of the religion of Islam as a part of the indigenous revolutionary movement:

Islam is a true and viable force in opposition to the power of materialistic ideology that has been adopted in Europe, the United States, the Soviet

Republic, and China. Islam contains the whole picture of the unity of life and existence; it, thereby, strengthens the social guarantees of humanity. It creates a spiritual context and base for life and its relationship to its creator in heaven who regulates his mandate on earth ¹⁸

The Ba'athists claim that their philosophy of synthesizing their spiritual heritage with equalitarian economic change will bring a more viable social situation than one founded on purely materialistic class goals which divide one Arab from another.

The Ba'athists again admit, however, that in the past religion has been used by the elite oppressors as a negative influence in the maintenance of the established order suppressing Arab life. Here they compare their situation with the same type of use of religion in Europe which prevented an equalitarian revolution from succeeding. But they insist that their revolution, like the humanist movement in Europe which seems actually to strike at certain aspects of religion, will really bring again a belief in true religion and aid the revolution.

The uprising against religion in Europe is a religion in itself. It is faith in the human moral principles and it is the closest to the true religion. This revolution carried with it the seeds of progress; it has changed the social structure of its society and has freed the people from exploitation and tyranny. It has freed their personalities and spirits. It will be impossible for the people to believe in apostasy once they are awakened from their slumber and their rights

and dignity returned to them. This new step forward completes the renewal and revival of the true religion.¹⁹

Another influence opposed by the Ba'athists is a fragmented and undirected form of revolutionary social change. Here the Ba'athists believe that such revolutionary effort is indicated by mere childish reaction which fails to bring real change. The Ba'athists point to the period in the Arab world immediately prior to World War II for an example of what happens when undirected and unorganized attempts are made to effect revolutionary social change.

The first revolutions which started during the period before World War II were automatically near chaos. In reality, the creation of these revolutions was due to a strong counteraction from the people without knowing the impact of this strong reaction and its historical significance. Hence, they were accidental revolutions without an organized vanguard.²⁰

But one of the most important factors that require revolutionary social change is the failure of present society to provide for full participation in its life. (This is similar to the complaint of the American New Left that society in the United States does not permit real participation in its life.) There is thus a lack of response to the needs of those who should share in the society. The Ba'athists maintain that a system that favors the few in terms of participation is no longer acceptable in modern times when the means of allowing all men to share in a participatory manner

has been developed. It is this belief that causes the Ba'athists to assert that "We must fight with passion the materialists [referring to large landowners and foreign capitalists] who stand in the way of unity. This struggle is not the product of jealousy nor selfishness but the love of life itself."²¹ All elements of society, they claim, have the right to a participatory share in all aspects of the society. When they do not, revolutionary social change is indeed required. It will only be by a revolution in which the masses participate that the Arab spirit will rise and a socialistic society be created.

In any case, it is a separation of interest between varying segments of the population which, they charge, now practically creates the revolutionary mood and need: the segments of society that benefit from the established order, foreign influences and their puppets, wish to maintain the status quo; whereas, those that do not benefit see the need for immediate social change. The concept of immediate social change as it has been previously indicated creates the acceptance of and need for a revolutionary stance.

We have placed the struggling Arab masses in one category and those who are delaying their unity and progress in another category. The capitalists and the feudalists are the enemy of our people. They are the holders of the status quo, the status of colonialism and imperialism.²²

Hopefully the Ba'athists do not believe that their revolution

will replace one wealthy segment with another as in Orwell's Animal Farm.

One must understand, then, that the Ba'athist stance of revolutionary social change is necessary because of their commitment to the ideals of the so-called "Eternal Mission," as well as the lack of responsiveness to it by the status quo. "If the individual is not totally convinced and if his state does not have the welfare of the people in mind, it will force him to resist. This resistance could lead to armed revolution for it will be the only way for him to express his discontent."²³

In summary, the Ba'athists admit that the accomplishment of revolutionary social change is a difficult task that calls for drastic methods and innovative means of effecting such change.

The Arab future depends upon the state of struggle. If we are unable to realize its historic dangers, and if we are so unsure of ourselves that we are writing a new page in our history and the history of humanism, we will not have the strength to realize our goals. Unless we come up with innovative ideas, we shall be doomed forever.²⁴

In order to effect revolutionary social change, it is imperative that divisions and distinctions based on superficial characteristics should not separate the Arab man and nation. All Arabs, young and old, rich and poor, intelligent and non-intelligent must become unified in the realization of ongoing social change: "The responsibility

is for the young to preserve their youth even after they have passed this age if they are to develop a sound society as seen in the progressive countries."²⁵

The Ba'athists also claim that they are aware that evolutionary programs effect social change only during an extended period of time. During this extended period of time, they argue, evolutionary social reform movements make errors that lessen the commitment of the Arab people in their cause. The Ba'athists, therefore, claim to have dedicated themselves to the principles of revolution.

In this context the Ba'athists also place emphasis on the need for socialism as opposed to capitalism. Socialism in general, they argue, is a form of social change; and they believe that

Socialism . . . contains certain principles that differentiates it from capitalism. Socialism is the nationalization of all important industries which are the backbone of the nation's economic life and it could mean the distribution of land as well as control over imports and exports.²⁶

Because of the frailties of the evolutionary socialistic systems and the peculiar Arab needs (anti-colonialism), the Ba'athists say that they have chosen a revolutionary brand of socialism. Economically, the Ba'athist revolutionary social change is not simply a matter of expropriation of lands and nationalization of industries, but rather a predication on the removal of the ability of the colonial

and foreign influences to exploit the Arab people.²⁷

Their revolutionary social change, the Ba'athists insist, will permeate all areas and parts of society. They say that revolutionary change will not be limited simply to those areas of economic interest, but are committed to a concept which includes a spiritual rebirth. In fact, the Ba'athists consider only this type of social change to be truly revolutionary. It is this type of social change that will ultimately ensure the participation of the entire Arab nation; though it will originate in the interpretation and actions of the elite, it will become a revolution of the masses.²⁸

In effect, then, the Ba'athists contend that reality has forced the present generation to the position of a choice between decadence and nationalistic, socialistic revolution. This extreme position is the result of their interpretation of history: that the Arabs have been forced in recent times into a decadent revolutionary state.²⁹ Since decadence will ultimately destroy the Arab nation, nationalistic revolutionary social change is the only viable alternative; as one Ba'athist states, "The revolution is the only answer."³⁰ Nationalism is obviously the impulse, socialism, presumably the goal; revolution is the ensuing and historic necessity.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

1. Michel Aflaq, Zikra al-Rassoul al-Arabi [In Memory of the Arab Prophet] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1943), p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 169.
4. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 173.
5. Bazzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 266.
6. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 126.
7. Ibid., p. 132.
8. Michel Aflaq, al-Ba'ath al-Arabi Huwa al-Inkilab [The Arab Ba'ath is the Revolution] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1950), p. 12.
9. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 148.
10. Aflaq, Ma'arakat al-Massir al-Wahid, p. 34.
11. Aflaq, al-Ba'ath al-Arabi Huwa al-Inkilab, p. 14.
12. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 157.
13. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, pp. 57-58.
14. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 21.
15. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, pp. 31-32.
16. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 169.
17. Karpas, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 215.

18. Sayed Qutb, al-Adalat al-Ijtima'iyat Fi al-Islam [Social Justice in Islam] (Cairo: Issa Halabi Publishing Co., 1964), p. 291.
19. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 128.
20. Safadi, al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat, p. 121.
21. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 29.
22. Ibid., p. 26.
23. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida,
p. 49.
24. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 157.
25. Ibid., p. 38.
26. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 60.
27. "al-Souriyoun Youhariboun al-Diktatoriya al-Asskariya," [The Syrian's Battle against Military Dictatorship], Nidal al-Ba'ath, Vol. V (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1965), pp. 53-57.
28. John Somerville and Ronald E. Santoni, ed., Social and Political Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 396.
29. Ba'ad al-Muntalakat al-Nazariyat [On Ba'athist Thoughts and Theories] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1963), pp. 42-45.
30. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 169.

CHAPTER VII

NATURE OF POLITICS

Once a successful revolution is achieved, the Ba'athists argue, the function of politics is to serve as a lubricant that allows the machinery of society to continue to operate in the most efficient manner possible, depending upon the nature of the remainder of the society. Ideally, the political system would be the means by which an equilibrium is maintained within societal structures in which both order and feelings of justice are in relatively stable balance. Here they seem to ignore politics as the power to achieve revolutionary change.

Social Harmony

It is, however, the Ba'athist contention that the practice of politics has been so perverted and warped in the Arab world by the colonial and conquering nations that it does not achieve its ideal meaning of maintaining a social harmony. They claim that these countries have attempted, for their own purposes, to impose a system of politics of power to control the Arab world. This system is conducive to the development

and welfare of only the colonial and conquering nations. In fact, the Ba'athists argue that the colonial nations, with their political operations, have so warped the spirit of the Arabs politically that both a Party and nationalism are needed to restore the "Soul" of Arabism--the sense of destiny--and create a politics of harmony.

The difference between the progressive nation and ours is that our nation needs a stimulating medicine to cure her from her illness. So the duty and mission of our Party is to cure the nation before curing the government. The Western nations were founded on legal government and function like a body without a soul . . . but in our situation we need to direct the Arab nation with the aid of the Party toward the creation of a new soul that will give life and light to the majority of the people. The true Party is the Party which can realize itself in this description, and become a state within a state whose function is the realization of its goals.¹

Certainly, Aflaq says, "Human history is an organic whole controlled by the twin ideals of humanism and nationalism."² But like so many who consider the support of nationalism important, the Ba'athists also emphasize the importance of history as a basic component of the political institution. Further, to support both their nationalism and their history, they claim that the essence of both is indeed humanism. That is, they argue that humanism is expressed through a nationalism which is compatible with the history of a people. The interference with the historical national life destroys humanity in the political, and thus takes the heart out of politics.

Again, as in the case of most philosophies of historic nationalism, the Ba'athists claim that different manifestations of the political will occur at various times in history. This attitude allows them to accept different specific systems which will help to bring about the evolution and development of what they believe to be their mission. They argue, however, that the main thrust of their Arab nationalism will in itself help overcome problems arising because of acceptance of some of these other systems. For example, they say with regard to Marxism, "We do not deny that the class struggle will ever cease to exist as Marxism purports. But unlike Marxism, we do not neglect the lonely historical experiences which knitted our people together."³ In essence, Ba'athist politics will presumably somehow even overcome the class struggle.

At the same time, Ba'athists admit that the problem of "goods," as stressed in Marxism, is important to their own idea of political life. In their socialism, that is, they see the purpose and meaning of politics to be the improvement of the material conditions of the masses as well as their spiritual welfare, a concept which has been noted before. The Ba'athists argue, however, that the Marxist hostility toward nationalism is contrary to the Arabs' political needs of life and indeed what might be called the Arab "nature." Aflaq writes: "Because of Marxian hostility and

indifference to nationalism, there can be no confusing of this program with the program advocated by the followers of Marxian thought."⁴ Especially, as has been seen, the Ba'athists claim that in their understanding of the nature of politics they are engaged in the creation of "a harmonious and mutually inclusive society as opposed to a classless and mutually exclusive society."⁵

Ba'athist argument is that there are countries saddled with colonial rulers who have perpetuated deliberately the feudal Arab class system, pampering in some cases the Arab elite (where it was not necessary to liquidate them) and oppressing the masses. With the gradual overthrow of the older colonial system of rather direct imperialism, however, there came indirect imperial-colonial rule through private foreign corporations and capital, and the transference and resurrection of the older feudal elite to positions of commercial-industrial power.

As a composition of a somewhat new ambitious middle class and of intellectuals, the Ba'athists, especially those who have assumed positions of party leadership, see the need to bridge the gap between themselves and the new city proletariat and the old peasantry. With a desire to trade on Arabism and not to buckle to foreign Communist Party leaders, the Ba'athists expect to maintain leadership by emphasizing spirituality, idealism, history, and Arabism,

plus economic justice. They even admit to the necessity of classes--even if someday the latter may be "unified order" and Arab "Eternal Mission." Their emphasis, however, is on a politics composed of "good" class relations in which the intellectuals will act to aid the working class.

The Arab Ba'athist is supported by the true cooperation of two classes: the intellectuals and the proletariats. But the intellectual class must understand that their education and experiences must be utilized to benefit as well as to serve the working class.⁶

One of the paramount differences the Ba'athists draw between themselves and other socialistic philosophies, however, is that they claim to believe that by realizing politics in their manner, they will arrive at the point beyond which there is no such need for realization. That is, what the Ba'athists claim they are establishing and what they believe to be ultimately the truest nature of politics is a system which incorporates a new morality. This morality is one of justice, love, and a responsible feeling by all elements of society for all elements of society. They argue, of course, that they will be able to achieve these goals only when they are able to eliminate certain discordant elements--individualistic economics, foreign capitalism, feudalism--the politics of self-interest and foreign "power" which destroy or damage a harmonious Arab society. They say specifically with regard to individualism,

"Individualism is an economic phenomenon that strives toward the multiplication of poverty in our society. Individualism can only lead to colonialism and imperialism."⁷

Another indication of the Ba'athist view of politics is belief in the political role and function of labor unions. Unions (as noted earlier) are seen by the Ba'athists as proper agencies of their system when they participate co-operatively in the movement and as an instrument of it. This requirement is explained with a somewhat unreal revolutionary socialist rhetoric.

The Arab socialist movement regards local labor unions as an important instrument in massing the poor classes, peasants, and revolutionaries against exploitation, tyranny, dictatorship, opposition, disunity and colonialism. In so doing, they preserve liberty, justice, democratic unity, neutralism, and peace. Unions are part of the masses and must join in our struggle to realize these objectives. They must move toward building anew a united, free, socialistic Arabic society.⁸

Logically, unions which stand in the way are not the "true" unions, and in some cases their leaders may have to be imprisoned or shot. It should be obvious from the foregoing description and discussion that Ba'athist attitudes toward politics are somewhat typical of most revolutionary socialist movements, to wit, the appeals to history; to the national heritage; to the casting out of foreign and individualistic elements; to opposition to capitalist imperialism and to classism which interferes with social cohesion, while

still paying lip service to class resistance; and to viewing politics as a social harmony in which dissidents are submerged or liquidated. Finally, appeal is made to the idea of "true" politics substantively as justice, humanity, and brotherhood.

Naturally the Ba'athists identify their politics as the true politics and as peculiar to the Arab spirit and opposed to the "foreignism," in which Marxism is included. They are also careful to connect their identification with Islam (whether they are devout Muslims or not) as a religious movement peculiar at first to the Arabs, teaching unity, brotherhood, justice, and social harmony. In this regard their notions may not seem much different from many of the Western so-called idealist-socialist movements which trade on a "Christian ethic" except that Ba'athists do not admit that justice and unity may automatically mean injustice and oppression for others. In any case, this Ba'athist concept gives an idealist-religious justification for Ba'athism as similar also to the reasons put forward in defense of Western idealist revolutionary movements.

It is obvious, however, that the circumstances are different. The Arabs represent, as far as recent and some present history is concerned, an actually oppressed national majority; and because of multi-ethnic groups within the Arab world, they cannot have the racist feeling of some idealistic

Western revolutionaries. In this regard, they appear to be on more compatible grounds with ideals of brotherhood and justice relative to politics than has sometimes been true of Western movements claiming similar goals.

Politics as Power

David Easton asserts that Harold D. Lasswell in Power and Society, and George Catlin in The Science and Method of Politics, (as well as more recent American political scientists) write that a political situation is present wherever power relations exist. David Easton argues that power is merely one aspect of the political situation which is generally marked by "authority." In any case, Lasswell defines power as a situation in which one person or a group can influence the action of another and thereby direct this action toward the former's own desires.⁹ Sanctions are expressions of power which are imposed to ensure the fulfillment of these desired actions; and, indeed, without sanctions power would not exist. Long before Lasswell suggested the sanction of death (and lesser penalties), Locke in his Two Treatises of Government stated, "Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties."¹⁰ Hobbes was even more "brutal." However, Charles E. Merriam warns:

It cannot be concluded, as many have, that the essence of the power situation is found, in the

sense of violence and physical brutality. Altruism as well as egoism has a place in human relations and organizations, and cooperation has as genuine a position as coercion.¹¹

Of course, when one defines power so broadly as does Merriam, it dissipates some of the argument between those who define politics as a social harmony and those who see it as "power."

In any case, much traditional Western political thought since Machiavelli suggests that order (harmonious or not; violent or not) is the result of expressed power of some kind. It also suggests that power can assume either a positive or a negative form. That is, when power is in positive form, order exists. When power is in negative form, order is in a tenuous condition relative to the social relations. In every case the assumption is that it is necessary to utilize politics as some type of power--coercive or cooperative--if sufficient order is maintained to allow the social units to continue in some balance and at least outward harmony. It is also assumed that where injustice and imbalance exist, some forms of power will be exerted to restore order and justice.

As we have seen, the Ba'athists appeal especially to Arab nationalism as a major political influence to bring a social change which will favor the Arab people. Such utilization of nationalism is supposed to be an expression of the Arab spirit. They also say that this goal is realizable

because of the unique political role which may be played by the Ba'ath Party.¹²

The Ba'ath Party thus assumes that power can have a revolutionary political perspective, as well as act as a stabilizing harmonizing force because of the present predicament in Arab society and politics. Like Machiavelli, as well as Hegel, the Ba'athists believe that political success balances upon a moment of time when society is prepared to be led in a different path. Their revolutionary stance is personified in the political statement of the Party's official slogan, "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism." Not only does this slogan apply to the political expression of the Ba'ath Party, but it is claimed to be a statement also of the essence of the Arab mission. Since the Ba'athists believe the present Arab situation is that of a so-called underdeveloped people oppressed by foreigners, they associate this idea of power and their need of power and its use with that of revolution as well as social harmony.

First of all, the Arabs are underdeveloped economically and weak politically. Our socialism is not a design but a necessary means to guarantee the society the highest standard of production and the greatest harmony among its nationals. In order to achieve these two objectives, our socialism must be of a different line. . . . It is a socialism that will save the nation from complete annihilation, and it will resurrect the nation anew. Therefore, our socialism must be revolutionary in its philosophy and methods in order to fulfill its objectives.¹³

Here, as before, the Ba'athists give content to power by associating it with the nature of the situation and the needs of the people they represent as a Party.

The Ba'ath is the Party of the future. It is the one and only avenue of salvation for the Arab people. The leaders personify these geniuses and virtues of the people. These leaders emerge from among the masses, not from the selfish, exploitationist, pro-foreign elements.¹⁴

Power, then, is defined in dialectical terms as the faith and movement of "the good guys" versus "the bad guys"-- throw the oppressor out.

In reality, and at one time, the people had faith in their rulers to the extent of worshipping them. This worship was brought forth when their leaders organized the front for liberation . . . the liberation of their countries from under the yoke of colonialism.¹⁵

It is not possible to over-emphasize the influence and importance of this Ba'athist dialectic of power between the foreign and the Arab as it unites the idea of politics as a possible harmony (discussed earlier) among Arabs, with the idea of politics as a power of the Arabs against the evil oppressors. Here the Ba'athists emphasize the fact that Arab history has never been one of compromise where oppressors were concerned, but an idea of force by Arabs in pursuit of their independence. As often happens, "ethics" and "power" are quaintly united under the fabric of the political, in this case political freedom. Naturally, the

Ba'ath Party identifies itself with the cohesion and the mission to bring a new day.

It is fair to compare those who are selfish and those who are altruistic--those whose aims are centered around their own world and those [Ba'athists] who carry with them the Eternal Mission. Our silence is stronger than their words. Our patience is greater than their goals. But we are not born to be patient and quiet. It is our duty to tell the truth and work accordingly, to build while they destroy, and to criticize when they sow hatred and ill-will.¹⁶

That is, the Ba'athists argue that it has become their function within the Arab destiny to obtain those means (power) which will accomplish the aforementioned political ends and will lead to the ultimate synthesis of that which is physical power and that which is spiritual goals. In fact, they claim it is the Ba'ath Party itself, as a political element, which is to create all the power necessary to bring order to the incoherent present-day Arab life and states, and thus, the good life.

First, it [Ba'athist ideology] strives to create a political identity, which serves as the foundation of modern nationhood. In this capacity our ideology is nationalistic. Second, [our] ideology attempts to consolidate the social content of the political state through a series of economic and educational measures. In this function it is socialistic. Third, [our] ideology attempts to enlarge the cultural and intellectual horizon of Middle Eastern society in conjunction with nationalism and socialism. The modernizing functions of ideology are thus embodied in nationalism and in socialism.¹⁷

In order to achieve their aims both methodologically

and substantively, the Ba'athists claim, as we have seen, that it is necessary to establish a broad political base. Here the emphasis and appeal is on an equality for the Arab nation, "What we mean by the Eternal Mission is that the nation will not recognize her ill-fated presence among nations, but will demand equality."¹⁸ But to accomplish this aim they insist it is necessary to achieve unity, and to do so, it is necessary to acquire direct political capability. But these objectives, in turn, require that a vanguard (shades of Lenin) is necessary to secure and know its power as a Party.

The first problem that faces the intelligencia of the Arab vanguard is the formation of the vanguard into a political party. This problem is not purely intellectual in nature but many results came from it relative to the revolutionary task.¹⁹

Practically, these goals and devices, especially the goal of unity and exercise of power by a knowledgeable past, also require that its power be directed internally at groups not as readily or purely identified with Arabism as are the Islamic Arabs. Specifically, the power-unity program must be directed at and utilized not only as the Muslims, but relative to those people of the religious minorities--the Druses, Alawites, Ismailites, and Christians. In attempting to unite all of these into a political power base, the Ba'athists admit that they accept and follow these objectives:

1. Invade the ancient pyramidal, traditional, and social structures in the big cities that are controlled by the Moslem Sunnis and the traditional bourgeoisie class which controls the social, political, and economic ways of life in the capital city.
2. Even though there has been a heavy rural influence, these rural illiterates should be excluded from the Party. With time, the rural members may begin to move to the cities to seek government offices, particularly those controlled by other Party members.
3. Ba'ath members, who are also members of the minority religious sects--Druses, Ismailites, and Alawites--are to replace the sectist feudalistic family leadership with new Ba'athist leadership. (An example of their success was the time when the Ba'ath Druses were successful in overthrowing the feudalistic leadership of the El-Attrache family.)²⁰

In any case, it is necessary to understand that with regard to this search for practical political power, the role of the Ba'athists is not so much that of an innovator, but that of a Party seeking to use a heritage whose values are found within the history of a people. These values, because of their inherent political meaning, become the basis of the new system that will give order and coherence to the Arab nation. They conceive here that theirs is a commitment and an effort to be realized on a basis of even communal religious solidarity. The power base, then, is not abstract, but concrete. Yet it is grounded on economic socialism as well as religiousfamilial grouping, "Our major objective is the realization of a harmony between the freedom of the individual and the progress of the nation by placing the tools

of production and wealth of the nation in the hands of the government as long as the people own it."²¹

Psychological and Physical Power

Under what circumstances is political power created in societal associations? Charles E. Merriam believes that power emanates from three major circumstances: group pressures within society which give impetus to the rise of organized political action; types of human characteristics which need to be harmonized and become suitable to society; and power aspirants who are anxious to take advantage of the first two situations, or rather, to enforce their will upon society.²² Merriam thinks, however, that violence alone is not sufficient if the leaders are to be truly successful in achieving their goals through the exercise of power:

No power could stand if it relied upon violence alone, for force is not strong enough to maintain itself against the accidents of rivalry and discontent. The might that makes right must be a different might from that of the right arm. It must be a might deep-rooted in emotion, embedded in feelings and aspirations, in morality, in sage maxims, in forms of rationalization among the higher levels of cultural groups.²³

In a more simplified manner, Rousseau also expresses the same point: "The strongest man is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his power into right and obedience into duty." Hobbes, interestingly enough, states the point even more explicitly, "Even tyrants must sleep."²⁴

Although the Ba'athists recognize the need of power as "force," as was noted in the last section, they prefer to emphasize "peaceful" devices. In fact, the Ba'athists contend that the physical expression of the revolution has no meaning unless the psychological expression of power has been fully utilized toward its objectives. It is psychological power which enables them to persuade the people to join the Ba'athist ranks for the achievement of their goals. That is, as has been seen, they believe in the influencing of the citizens' minds in order to bind them into a unity. In fact, the leaders have devised a set of rules for their members to follow when trying to influence the masses. They impress upon their members the fact that their propaganda is not to be the "cheap" type used in commercial advertising, but is "to present Ba'athist thought, its goals and aspirations, as well as the means to achieve them in the best light."²⁵ They warn their members, moreover, not to indulge with others in the critical analysis of the weaknesses and pitfalls of the Party as it will undermine the whole idea of achieving power, "Self-criticism must be done within the Party [elite] circles, otherwise the Party will collapse."²⁶ Members may freely discuss any issue among themselves, but once the Party makes a decision to adopt a policy, this decision must be accepted or followed without questions as in the democratic centralism of Lenin. One reason they give

for this policy is that it is the members of the Ba'ath who are leading the way in revolution, and therefore they must present a common front.

The revolutionary movement is responsible for making the necessary preparation toward a justifiable revolution, that is, to indoctrinate its members in the ideology of the Ba'ath. The revolutionary movement is responsible for the success of the Party--its organization, unity, and expansion. It also sees that the revolutionary spirit continues to hover over them.²⁷

Once the Ba'ath members have been instructed by the Party, they are released to spread its propaganda among the populace. This method of allowing the organization of the Party to take the place of the Party itself has proven very successful in winning the masses.

Of course, the use of psychological power is not new in the Arab world. The difference, according to the Ba'ath, lies in the purpose and intent. It is the intent of the elitist leadership of the Ba'ath, who, like Plato's Ruler, believe that deception is permissible in order to achieve their goals, thoroughly to indoctrinate their members, who in turn, will manipulate and instruct the masses because they have the good of the Arab masses at heart. This fact is true even if they have to "lie a little" to help the masses.

The Arab people are not our enemies but our friends and we must gain their confidence. It is true that they are deceived and lost, but we cannot tell them so. We must side with them right or wrong, understand them, and protect them, otherwise we would lose them.²⁸

Here it is worth noting that the Ba'athists do not pretend to be giving effect to the present popular will. In fact, they feel that there is nothing to learn from the immediate "felt" wants of the people except that it does give them a basis of determining what the people can be induced to do. This information, in turn, enables the Ba'ath to achieve its aims mainly by propaganda and with what they believe to be a minimum usage of sanctions. The Ba'ath presumes that it, as intelligent leadership, knows the real, fundamental, long-term wants of the people, the "Eternal Mission."

The Ba'athists argue that the latter is true because it is aware of the way the Arabs have been brainwashed by the colonial-conquering nations and the manner in which their present Arab leadership has been leading the masses in darkness, making fools of them for selfish reasons. Contrarily, it realizes the need for psychological unity among the masses, even for the need of sacrifice. The Ba'ath argues, therefore, that the present rulers must be eliminated "The people feel that there is no tangible change. The colonial masters are gone but they have been replaced by dictatorial, selfish, and arrogant masters, the products of Western education."²⁹

The Ba'athists, then, believe in exercising a tight control over the media of communication if they are to achieve power; furthermore, to prepare the masses for the

revolution and also to widen the popular base of the Party, the leaders believe in the need of giving public speeches and publishing and circulating books and pamphlets. Their official daily, al-Ba'ath, provides the voice for the Party and keeps the populace and their supporters advised on how it stands on political issues. These indoctrinating methods are supported by Aflaq's statement:

We must continuously remain in contact with the society, strengthen the bonds of our creed, ideology, and the soul of our nation. It is at this time that we become [both] idealistic and realistic. Thus, with full comprehension of our national struggle, we would have accepted the premise that it was not bad to take advantage of these means of politics.³⁰

The Ba'athists contend that what is needed both in substance and in procedure is to create a new mode of thinking and morality for an entire generation:

What we mean by creating a new generation is that we are not going to teach them [Arabs] anew, but organize their culture and set them on the right path through the nourishing and strengthening of their moral principles and faith in their nation.³¹

It is argued, that is, that a generation still under the influence of the colonial-conquering nations' political manipulations of the psychological power must be taught a new process of thought, one that is compatible with the Arab dignity and capability.

The entire effort, therefore, is predicated on the goal of giving identity, unity, and meaning to both the

individual and the communal Arab human being. Of course, as has been noted, the Ba'athists contend that the Arabs are not able to define these aims at the present because of a lack of knowledge of their history. To overcome this lack, the people need to be told, the Ba'athists say, that "Socialism will give us understanding and show us the way toward realizing the evolutionary history of humanity. It will give us the principles to organize our social and economic order, to distribute the land, and to manage the industrial sector."³² The Ba'athists thus are giving the masses an alternative, so that the Arabs may achieve the needed goals with a minimum of resistance and also not have the goals of another people imposed upon them.

The realization of our goals can be measured either by a few years or decades and centuries. We [Arabs] are to make the road shorter or accept the zigzags already delaying our progress. . . . This will make the difference between the Arabs writing their own history or having someone else write it for them.³³

The Ba'athists thus believe that this understanding of what they consider to be a unique ideological knowledge gives them the right to engage in any activity that will bring about success. "Our ideology is to live, to fight without losing our hopes, until victory is gained over every corruption that surrounds us. From the midst of this corrupted society that we shall overcome, a new Arabic life-light will emerge."³⁴

This position of the Ba'ath is not unusual when one examines other political efforts, for example, either the United States or the Soviet Union. The justification for the exerting of power is the belief that an elite knows best and therefore has the right to act. Similar, too, is the Ba'athist contention that "Our main purpose is to express and explain the Arab Spirit in order to see under which conditions the Spirit can best realize its freedom and liberty."³⁵ This claim of controlling the minds of others in the interest of "freedom" is found in many political philosophies and movements, not only in those with a heavy religious influence undergirding them. It is, however, especially easy to understand this attitude on the part of the Ba'ath when one is familiar with the duties and requirements of Islam with particular reference to the Jihad (Moslem Holy War).

This concept of Jihad as a device for achieving power has been manipulated by many Arab political parties and is especially used now by the Ba'athists, who, in their appeal to the masses emphasize that it is their religious duty not only to rise and liberate a land such as Palestine, but also to unite the Arab world generally under one banner and free it from "colonial oppression." It is certainly as effective as the American secular call to "rally around the flag." However, since the establishment of Israel has become

a reality to many Arabs, as one of the latest examples in Western colonial effort, a religious tone is also set therein. The Ba'athists now emphasize that the duty of the people is to liberate this occupied land lost in the 1948 War and certainly the lands further lost in the 1967 War.

Realizing that psychological power alone is not sufficient to achieve their aims, the Ba'athists now and again do admit that they are prepared to use physical force whenever it is deemed necessary. The Ba'ath Constitution states, "Those who do not identify themselves with the Arabs will be expelled from the Arab homeland."³⁶

Merriam states that "Political power is the will of the majority expressed through some institutional form of consent."³⁷ Merriam, as is well known, had a predilection for democracy. The revolutionary Ba'ath Party does not. It is willing to admit that political power can also be the will of the minority expressed through forceful coercion by the vanguard, the army, and the police under its control to bolster its power and thereby build its majority afterwards. Violence and the exercise of force is thus considered acceptable by the Ba'athists not only against an enemy such as Israel or Arab monarchs, but also against any citizens who dare to disagree with the ideology of the Ba'ath Party. In fact, violence which appears as sadistic torture is practiced sometimes in the interests, it is claimed, of law and order. It

is alleged that Ba'athist prisons are filled today with citizens who have opposed or criticized the Ba'athist efforts at socialization and that brutal tortures occur there. Aflaq himself states that "Violence is not part of our program."³⁸ Nevertheless, this statement is negated by Safadi who says that "Aflaq totally approves of what is happening in the prisons and dungeons because he feels it is a necessity for the success of al-thourat [revolution]."³⁹

Certainly the radical and particularly the militant (Marxist) members of the Ba'ath seem determined in the belief that violence and force must be employed if the "proletarian revolution" is to succeed. This abusive use of power they even consider to be "ethical" because it coincides with the interest of the revolution. In addition, the Ba'athists have organized an armed vanguard, styled after the Fascist Black Shirts, to ensure that law and order will prevail.

Externally, as well as internally, the Ba'athist display of force can be seen. In similarity to the revolutionary Castroites, they thus offer their forces to be utilized by other revolutionary Arabs or governments to overthrow Arab monarchs or other leaders opposed to them. In the Fall of 1971, for instance, they offered armed support to the Palestinian guerrillas against King Hussein of Jordan. Aflaq does claim, however, that this type of involvement is a necessity as he states, "Perhaps we shall not be able to

give the people all they desire; perhaps even we shall take a part of what they need, in order to equip the army and ensure the success of the coups d'état in all the Arab countries."⁴⁰ The Ba'athists, moreover, threaten and have not hesitated to use force where any success seems possible against any nation which supports the Israeli state. Of course, in its acceptance of violence as an aspect of power, Ba'athism appears no different from any other political movement that affirms the validity of positive law and the modern State.

NOTES

CHAPTER VII

1. Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba'ath, pp. 154-55.
2. Michel Aflaq, Fikratuna [Our Ideology] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1960), p. 30.
3. Aflaq, Dirasat Fī al-Ishtirakiya, p. 25.
4. Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba'ath, p. 212.
5. Ibid., p. 212.
6. Aflaq, Dirasat Fī al-Ishtirakiya, p. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 146.
8. Ibid., pp. 172-73.
9. David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 123-24.
10. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 76.
11. Ibid., p. 76.
12. Khalidi, "A Critical Study of the Political Ideas of Michel Aflaq," p. 56.
13. Aflaq, Dirasat Fī al-Ishtirakiya, p. 34.
14. "Bayan al-Mou'tamar al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Awal," [Statement of the First Ba'ath Party Congress], Nidal al-Ba'ath, Vol. I (Beirut: Dar al-Taliat, 1963), 189.
15. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabia al-Jadida, p. 32.
16. Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba'ath, p. 136.
17. Karpavich, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 6.

18. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 140.
19. Safadi, al-Thourat Bi al-Tajribat, p. 126.
20. Safadi, Hizb al-Ba'ath, pp. 69-71.
21. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, pp. 155-56.
22. Charles E. Merriam, Political Power (Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 15.
23. Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. 121.
24. Ibid., p. 121.
25. Bittar, "al-Oudwiyat al-Hizbiyat Sifatouha wa Wajibatouha," p. 47.
26. Ibid., p. 59.
27. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 166.
28. Ibid., p. 135.
29. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 32.
30. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, pp. 31-32.
31. Ibid., pp. 168-69.
32. Aflaq, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiya, p. 102.
33. Razzaz, Ma'alem al-Hayat al-Arabiya al-Jadida, p. 43.
34. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath, p. 31.
35. Michel Aflaq, Howla al-Rissalat al-Arabiya [About the Arab Mission] (Damascus: Ba'ath Party Publications, 1950), p. 17.
36. Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 165-66.
37. Merriam, Political Power, p. 120.
38. Safadi, Hizb al-Ba'ath, p. 32.

39. Ibid., p. 32.

40. Karpát, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 192.

CHAPTER VIII

NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

The classical concept of the state stemmed from the Greek idea of a parochial "human society"--the polis. Although empires were in existence, the Greeks chose the smaller-sized polis as the ideal system in the exercising of their democracy.¹ This choice was partially caused by geography, tribalism, and functionalism; but "city states" were common in this period.

Both Plato and Aristotle viewed the polis as the perfect association where men can have the "good life" through participation in the life of the State. They conceived of the polis as being like an organism requiring performance of necessary duties by each part with corollary results for each. In Plato's view, the well-known "three classes" even perform roles similar to jobs done by parts of the human body. Aristotle's organic theory views the forms of individual association--citizen, family, village--as being similar to the hand, arm, or other parts of the body because they are not self-sufficient except as a whole. The polis

is the whole, natural to man, and the man and the "State" become indistinguishable.²

During the seventeenth century, the influence of the Greek philosophers' and medieval Christians' "rational-natural" conception of the state began to weaken. Unlike the organic theories, the political thinkers of this age (for example, Hobbes and Locke) made a distinction between both state and individual and state and society. In line with the growing subjectivism and disorder, they emphasized "Will and Artifice," viewing the State as being a "machine"--consciously concocted by man as individual to serve first the particular needs for law and order. The individual, of course, was considered as prior to the state and not as Aristotle wrote, "The State is prior to the individual."³ From politics as a study of harmony came politics as a study of power.

The development of European "Tribalism," called now nationalism and an interest in history, provided the basis which led the eighteenth-century thinkers, such as Hegel and others, to the tradition of "Historical Coherence" as the basis of the state. This tradition moved away from the "Mechanistic" theories in search of theories more compatible with reality.⁴ Although exhibiting individual variances, these historicists again conceived of the state as somewhat organic. That is, they thus considered the state as "natural"

because it was supposed to be the result of a historical evolution, yet they still considered it to be to some degree artificial because men presumably in the age of technology and "science" could transform nature. Most of these modern theorists, moreover, did not refer to the state as being simply like an organism because the relationship of parts to the organic whole was supposed to be "intrinsic." That is, the development of an organism was thought to take place from within, and the organism existed for an end which lay within itself. Similar to the Greek philosophers, they did not make an exact distinction between state and society insofar as man was absorbed in his relation to the state.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed an abundant crop of Socialist writers, among whom was Karl Marx, the most important practically. In one way he belongs to the tradition of "Will and Artifice" since he viewed the state as the "tool" of a "class," yet he remained in the historical-naturalist "camp" because he viewed the class as the product of and determined by naturally developing economic forces, even though the latter grows dialectically.⁵

In order to explicate these ideas about the nature of the state, most traditional political philosophers also discuss how they believe the state originated. For example, Plato believed that the state originated as man's natural desire to benefit by a division of labor; whereas, Aristotle

held that the state arose for the same reason, but as an organic outgrowth of the primitive association represented by the family. With Locke, the state arose out of deliberate contract, a deliberate volition on the part of man; yet Rousseau saw the origin occurring by chance when man "slid into it" by making property "private." Marx, in his historical-materialist view, also believed that the state arose because of the development of private property, thence exploitation by one class vis-a-vis another class.

As this study comes now to consider Ba'athist ideas about the state, however, it will be seen that the Ba'athist leaders do not write about the origin of the state as such because they are concerned only with the Arab who already finds himself in society and is ruled by government; for this reason they are more concerned with the historical aspect of how the recent Arab State was created and it developed as a part of their theory of the nature of the state.

Origin of the Recent Arab State

The possible influence of Hegel upon the Ba'athist concept of the state is noted by the Ba'athist emphasis on a national teleology and history. The Ba'athist writers, however, alter Hegel's dialectic toward a cyclical though revolutionary concept. For example, Aflaq writes

The progressive march, then, the ascendant march on the road of the revolution, is the only possible

means for us to join up with our past, and this joining up cannot but be an ascent. It cannot be a descent or a degeneration; it cannot be immobility or persistence in immobility and passivity.⁶

Aflaq views the past in alternating stages of glory and decline. Prior to the appearance of the Prophet, the Arab people were in a period of disunity, politically, economically, and religiously, the Asr al-Jahiliyah (Time of Ignorance). The Asabiyyah (spirit of the Bedouin clan) was the basis of Bedouin society, demanding that the clansman give complete loyalty simply to his tribe. "Be loyal to thy tribe, its claim upon its members is strong enough to make a husband give up his wife."⁷ This non-civic spirit existed along with other Bedouin characteristics, such as an intense individualism which discouraged discipline and respect for law and order. For example, there is a prayer of a Bedouin, "O Lord have mercy upon me and upon Muhammad, but upon no one else besides!"⁸ The Bedouin passivity toward change as well as immediate political, economic, and social conditions was an all-important element in the weakening of a civic spirit even in the following period of glory--the Islamic stage.

Aflaq does argue that this period of awakening gave the Arabs, perhaps for the first time, a real sense of common destiny along with the view that values are derived from even beyond the group. He admits, however, that the Arabs retained

the seeds of the past; and not long after its rise, Islam, being without the force of a "true" civic spirit, was not strong enough to cause the Arabs to feel as a nation nor keep the Islamic States from being drowned in a seemingly bottomless sea of foreign conquerors.⁹

This invasion of various foreign conquerors (Crusaders, Mamluks, Mongols, Ottoman Turks) which had begun in the twelfth century, Aflaq argues, resulted in a decline. This decline of the Arab countries continued even after World War I with the colonialism of the Western Powers who mandated these areas under the League of Nations until World War II. The recent Arab states and their governments, artificially created by power externally exerted, are the existing political agencies which the Ba'athists must contend with and overcome if their goals are to be achieved.

The experience in which our struggle takes place is that of the Arab nation dismembered into different countries and statelets, artificial and counterfeit; we struggle until we can reunite these scattered members, until we may reach a wholesome and natural state in which no severed member can speak in the name of all, until we can get rid of this strange and anomalous state. Then will it be possible for the Arabs to unite, for their spirit to be upheld, their ideas clear, their morality upright. . . . They will have become that wholesome natural entity, one nation.¹⁰

Since the Ba'athists feel that these states and their governments, externally exerted, are actually Western-created agencies of life, they can be responsive only to the needs of

these colonial rulers rather than of the Arabs as a whole. They also warn the Arabs as people that they will never be able to receive justice from a Western power or their puppets, "The Western powers in deed, if not in word, treated the Arab countries as if the desires and wishes of their inhabitants were matters of minor importance."¹¹

In fact, the Ba'athists claim that the Western Powers are committed to maintaining a political status quo in the Arab countries which will enable them to exploit the Arab countries' resources--both human and natural. The maintenance of this essentially feudal condition, they say, is seen clearly in the area of agriculture.

Agriculture in the Arab world is still the same. There have been no changes in the past centuries. The land area [of fertility] has not increased in proportion to population. Agricultural methods used hundreds of years ago are still practiced in many regions of the Arab world.¹²

This lag in agricultural technology symbolizes to the Ba'athists that the only motive which the recent state has had was one of exploitation, and certainly this was true also for the local overlords who acted as puppets of the foreigners. To the Ba'athists, this condition is not only non-economically beneficial, but immoral.

In contrast, the Ba'athists are convinced that their own state will be a moral state for one aspect of morality is its relationship to society.

Morality is but one of the many images of society as a whole. If it is acceptable, the society becomes acceptable. If it is positive, the society becomes productive. If it is corrupt, the society becomes corrupt.¹³

In this connection, the Ba'athists oppose the traditional theory of individualism which they say the Western colonial rulers claim imparts a positive morality to the state in its relation to man; for they argue that this individualism really has only a defense of the interest of the strong as individuals (colonial rulers) and impose their ways for their benefits upon the weak (Arab people).

The theory of individualism is based upon the freedom of the individual. . . . The political principles recognize every individual, the freedom of thought, speech, work, and ownership; and the social organization allows the government legally to take some of the profit made by the individual in order to maintain the social structure. The fallacy of this theory is that history proves that the individuals who governed throughout the century did so for their own benefit; and the freedom they spoke of and controlled was nothing but a mockery.¹⁴

Aflaq believes, therefore, that the truly moral state can be achieved only through revolution because the "true past" of the Arab State was moral and was itself a revolution; therefore, these two revolutions must rise and meet each other. Although Aflaq does not tell when this "true past" existed (apparently during the Arabs' own empire), but merely that it was "an awakening of the Arab spirit at a decisive stage in history."¹⁵ He does describe how the state was moral in contrast with the present one, in that it

satisfied Arab needs and desires, was compatible with the goals of the Arab people, and harmonized the individual and the "whole."

To hold on to existing conditions, to preserve them, to defend these conditions which threaten the Arabs with extinction, such is the past and it is [also] the present, the vitiated reality, the selfishness, and the servitude to material interests. [But] As for the true past, it is our yearning for it which leads us to strive and work, to struggle and ascend. This is the free, spiritual, healthy past which the Arabs had. Such a past . . . was itself a revolution in which the intellect attained freedom and independence and youthfulness of feeling for life and the world; it innovated, organized, and was in harmony with the laws of life and nature. The human personality realized in it freedom, individuality, earnestness, and responsibility, and went on to engage in free actions, to take up heroic stands, to transcend the limits of egoism, to harmonize with the general will and with the whole. Then the spirit reached its pure source and was filled with fertility and renewal; it knew its eternal destiny and was filled with faith.¹⁶

Restoration of the State through Nationalism

Aflaq and the Ba'athists argue, of course, that it was only after World War II that it became possible for the Arab people to begin to reclaim and restate their identity politically. This was facilitated by the inability of the colonial nations to continue their systems at home and abroad to the same degree as previously was true and because of the growing awareness among the Arab intellectual classes of their identity with the Arab as a whole. This identity finds its expression, he thinks, in Arab nationalism and conse-

quently revolution.

In this section, therefore, the role of nationalism in the creation of a modern state and more particularly the possible Arab State will be noted. As has been seen, the modern definition of nationalism involves three major factors: (1) the desires of a people who anticipate a common destiny; (2) the shared concepts of a people who share a common history; and (3) the ideas of the people embodied in a common political system. Nationalism arises and develops, that is, when shared ideas and desires become identified with a political community. These ideas and desires can evolve gradually from a common culture, be altered or influenced by outsiders, be hastened by factors of political socialization, such as public schools and mass communication, and can certainly be aided by common causes such as revolutionary movements against prevailing imperialism and colonialism. Because nationalism is an attitude which particularly appeals to the masses and often is an embodiment of the desires of a people for social change from their unequal conditions, it has been an essential and driving force in the growth/development of most modern states. It is, in fact, as a large number of political scientists believe it to be, the most important factor in the life of the modern state. The following pages therefore contain a specific examination of nationalism in regard to the political ideas of Arabism

and the Ba'ath.¹⁷

Arab nationalism writes Sylvia G. Haim, "was hardly known before the beginning of the twentieth century, and it was only after the World War I that a comprehensive doctrine of Arab nationalism was elaborated."¹⁸ Arab nationalism became evident, as has been seen, when the Western Powers (England and France) failed to live up to their agreements in establishing an independent Arab nation. Instead, in effect they created Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon as mandated territories out of former Arab people and territories controlled by the Turkish Empire.

Arab nationalism thus became expounded by most groups claiming to desire the liberation of the Arab world from the yoke of Western colonialism. Yet, a systematic ideology of that nationalism was generally absent, and it was not until the 1930's that Arab politicians and theorists began to speculate as to what constituted Arab nationalism. It was Prince Faisal, who had been promised an emirate in Syria, but was expelled by the French, who was among the first to express a theory of Arab nationalism in a speech given in May, 1919:

We are one people living in the region which is bounded by the sea to the east, the south, and the west, and by the Taurus mountains to the north.

We are Arabs before being Muslims, and Mohamet is an Arab before being a prophet. . . . There is neither minority nor majority among us, nothing to divide us. We are one body, we were Arabs before the time of Moses, Mohamet, Jesus and Abraham.¹⁹

Because of statements like these, Prince Faisal is considered by many in the Western world and by the Western-oriented Arabs to be the initiator and the originator of real modern Arab nationalism.

Yet other expressions of nationalism were voiced in the following years; for example, in 1938 the writer Amin al-Rihani said in a speech;

The Arabs existed before Islam and before Christianity. The Arabs will remain after Islam and after Christianity. Let the Christian realize this, and let the Muslim realize it. Arabism before and above everything.²⁰

And in 1939 Sami Shawkat, Iraqi Director-General of Education, stated:

We have up to now neglected a most vital aspect of our glorious history; we have made it start at the prophetic message, and this is a period of less than fourteen centuries. In reality, however, the history of our illustrious Arab nation extends over thousands of years, and goes back to the time when the peoples of Europe lived in forests and over marshes, in caves and in the interstices of the rock; at that time our own ancestors used to set up banks, sculpt statues, and lay down canons and codes of law; they invented then the first principles of medicine, geometry, astronomy, the alphabet, and the numerals. On the Stele of Hammurabi in the Louvre, we find inscribed the basic law given by one of our ancestors, Hammurabi; one of its clauses concerns the legal punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; this took place before the Torah, The Gospels, or the Koran. In the same way we find that everything makes us lift our head high when we consider the histories of the Semitic empires formed in the Fertile Crescent--the Chaldean, the Assyrian, the African, the Pharaonic, or the Carthaginian. . . . These Empires and their dependencies are all our property; they

are of us and for us; we have the right to glory in them and to honor their exploits just as we have the right to cherish and exalt the glories of Nebuchadnezzar, Hammurabi, Sargon, Rameses, and Tutankhamen, in the same way that we glory and take pride in Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil, Abd al-Malik b. Marwan, Harun al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun.²¹

In spite of statements such as this one, Arab Muslim theorists negate this theory that Arab nationalism dates before the revelation of the Prophet. The theory was necessary, however, because of an Arab need for an origin, common ancestry, and identity even prior to the religious identity--one based on a racial-ethnic factor and territory.

Sati al-Husri, a native Syrian writer, in his book, *Ma Hiya al-Qawmiya* (What is Nationalism), expressed meanwhile the theory that was based on the unity of language, culture, tradition, common sufferings, aspirations, and history which made the individual aware of his identity as a member of one nation distinguished from any other.²² Al-Husri pointed out three major facets of his theory which were later incorporated into Aflaq's ideas on nationalism. The first is that freedom of the individual cannot exist outside the nation. He argued that this idea helps create the solidarity of the citizen in the state or blind obedience to the umma (nation). The second idea was not earlier considered to be true by either Egyptians or Arab nationalists, that is, it was not believed that Egypt was a part of the Arab umma, in the sense evidenced in the poem:

The country of the Arabs is my fatherland,
 From Damascus to Baghdad,
 From Nejd to Yemen,
 To Egypt and Tetuan.²³

The third idea was that Pan-Arabism neither opposes nor is hostile to Islam, but is highly compatible as Islam originated with the Arabs; thus Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz writes:

Islam, although it is a universal religion suitable for all peoples . . . is undoubtedly a religion first revealed to the Arabs themselves; in this sense, it is their own special religion. The Prophet is from them, the Koran is in their language; Islam retained many of their previous customs, adopting and polishing the best of them.²⁴

Even many Christian Arab nationalists--such as Qustantine Zuraiq, Michel Aflaq, and a host of others--have thus argued that the duty of every Arab, regardless of his faith (be it Jew, Christian, or Moslem), must be to respect the memory of the Prophet Mohamet. Also, these Christian writers are well-versed in the historical-anthropological knowledge that the great Middle Eastern prophets originated from the same stock with Abraham being the unifying father of all; and of course, they argue that this stock was Arab.

Aflaq, in fact, feels that Islam is a phenomenon that may be considered only in a specific historical context, that of the Arabs. Islam is "umbilically attached" to the eternity of the Arab spirit.²⁵ Since he argues that the spirit

is dialectical, it is a logical transition to the concept that it is right that Islam will be manifested in different ways in different times.²⁶ Islam must also be considered as an ideal way that was transmitted to the Arabs because their innate humanity made them the most likely people to carry the message. That the fact that all of the ethics of Islam are still unfulfilled, it is argued, should not be misconstrued to mean that the Arabs have failed, but that the dialectic has gone no further on its course.²⁷ As a result of this realization, the Arab people, in fact, have for the first time the opportunity to utilize the unity that is Islam. It is thus apparent that Islam and the Arab Renaissance are interrelated and are partners in both the seeking of the Arab destiny and the fulfillment of Islamic ethics. That is, the introduction of Islam brought the concept of the destiny of a people as well as a set of ethical values that were not dependent on any human community for their existence and meaning. Here the "ought" of politics was wedded to the politics of power.

Islam constitutes a perpetual state of idealism for the Arab nation disavowing simplistic materialism and humanism; it moves Arabs toward the realization of the spiritual aspects of life and as a people together. As the Hegelian spirit is a relative and an absolute at the same time, Islam and Arabism are a unity of the paradox. Aflaq's argument, therefore, is

"that at the proper point of time and space, Islam provides the moral and spiritual impetus to the realization of Arab nationalism."²⁸

In order to examine the development of Aflaq's dialectic of Arabism and ethics, it is necessary to understand or view Aflaq's conceptualization of history in relation to nationalism. Aflaq, on the basis of his study of history, says that nationalism is not a passing phenomenon. Nationalism remains alive even when it is subjected to the most extreme developments of economic and political forces. In fact, he argues that only through nationalism is it possible for man to realize both his humanity and the more materialistic drives of life. Nationalism is, then, both a humanistic expression and an Arab nationalism, out of the necessity of interaction in all human history. He claims, furthermore, that Arab nationalism is the most humanistic of all.²⁹ Simultaneously, Aflaq views history as the cradle of all nationalistic humanism, past, present, and future.

Nationalism, then, he argues, is an eternal phenomenon requiring different manifestations at different times in history although he also says, "Human history is an organically knit whole controlled by the twin ideals of humanism and nationalism."³⁰ This somewhat deterministic, absolutist approach is not consistent with other parts of Aflaq's thought in which there is present a curiously relativistic and "creative"

approach. The latter is represented in Aflaq's thesis that human beings have and hold nothing in common except the fact that there will be change.³¹ There is not attempt by Aflaq to bring together or reconcile these two positions of an absolute and determined relativistic and absolutist historical viewpoint.

In any case, he argues that in order for the Arab people to realize their meaning, it is necessary that they develop a comprehensive understanding of the present. By employing the concept of the eternal Arab message, Aflaq is saying that an understanding of the real demands of the present indicates a need for achieving the eternal effort toward unity. He also says, meanwhile, that "Eternity is not progress from the present to the future, but transferring the future to the present."³² Also, because in Ba'athist thought the past, the present, and the future are a unity or organic whole in the present, it is not only possible to renew the ancient Arab spirit and civilization within the context of the present, but necessary; here is the determinist in his theory. As has been seen, he also thinks that it is the Ba'ath Party in this development of life that not only personifies and embodies the Arab destiny, but provides the creativity of bringing the forces of past and future together. The Party is the logic of history, and the Ba'athist must totally embrace the Party and believe totally in the mission

to be a member. The Party, then, is the manifestation of the "Eternal Arab Spirit" in the present and operates creatively to fulfill the necessity. Obviously, the Ba'ath is trying to "have one's cake and eat it, too." The most that can be said for such a "now-we see-it--now-we-don't" philosophy is that it is quite compatible with a great many other attempts as in both Hegelianism and Marxism, not to mention democratic apologetics, to bring opposites together in a mish-mash batter of rhetorical nonsense. Still, most nationalistic statisms do so, and Arab Ba'ath nonsense is no less effective than most others.

Re-creation of the New State

As seen from the foregoing analysis and from further discussions following, the Ba'athists believe that they have forged a new state by welding the following elements:

1. Arab "peoplehood";
2. Islamic spirituality, especially ethics and morals;
3. Historic, teleological Arab destiny;
4. The past and the future of the Arabs into a "present";
5. Economic needs of "present" Arabs and the right to be free of foreign control;
6. Socialist ownership systems and spirit and method of commonality;

7. Partyism as the technique of politics;

8. A dialectical movement combining opposites among the foregoing elements.

The Ba'athists claim to have first re-created the new Arab Muslim socialistic state in the case of Arab Syria. They believe, however, that present Arab Syria will allow the Party only partially to fulfill its goals. This partial success has been caused not only by the smallness and limited resources of Arab Syria, but more particularly by the unfriendly pressures exerted from the other countries which include Arabic populations as well as the Western imperialistic ones.

The Ba'ath Party designates Damascus as the capital of the Arab State,³³ but stresses that this designation is only a temporary expedient because in the future it could also be either Baghdad, or Beirut, or Cairo, etc. The capital is not important, for it is the Ba'athist belief that the continuing disintegration of the governments of the other Arab states will ultimately lead to a direct confrontation with the newly re-created Arab Syria. This confrontation will be revolutionary in character; and in order to secure the revolution, and with it, the new Arab "united state," it will have to remain a continuing revolution. It is the Ba'athist contention that the really new Arab State is possible only when all of the old Arab states and governments have been

completely changed or destroyed.

We struggle and fight against the artificial, vitiated political and social conditions, not only to remove and change them but so that the nation may recover its unity in this struggle also. . . . It [nation] no longer knows itself, its parts no longer know one another, it has become mightily divided, and its parts and members have been scattered. It has sunk to a low level. . . . At this level, no unity can be created in the nation. . . . Fervor is then necessary, turmoil and movement at a high level are necessary . . . a long march in which intellect and morality interpenetrate is necessary, trial and error and the correction of error are necessary.³⁴

Thus, the only form of change at present in the re-creation of the Arab State, according to the Ba'athists, has to be through continuing revolution relative to each present state, plus unions of the new units under the Ba'ath Party as soon as possible. To amplify this view, Aflaq states that "To rely on slow evolution and to be satisfied with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten these aims [unity, freedom, and socialism] and to conduce to their failure and to their loss."³⁵ In order to build a new civic spirit for the new State, he defines an Arab as one who belongs to the Arab nation; therefore contrarily he says, "any traitor to Arabism is not an Arab."³⁶ That is, every true Arab must experience the struggle and pain which are integral parts of the revolution. This struggle and the attendant pain (something like "bloodstained feet at Valley Forge") must first be experienced on an individual basis to overcome

despair, slackness, and the love of conformity to the present and then be expressed in a wider range and spectrum of institutions. But it is only through struggle and pain that the dialectical process may properly evolve and thereby cause the Arab people to move again with the "stream of history" as a political people.³⁷

The importance of the dialectic cannot be over-emphasized in the thought of Aflaq. Since the spirit of the Arab nation is the guiding force of the dialectic, it is ultimately this force that will create the immediate necessity for revolution. Arab history, it is argued, has never contained compromise, and it has been characterized by either revolution or decadence.³⁸ Aflaq reaffirms this argument by saying, "Either we will bring something new and important which will transform the life of the Arabs from humility to glory and from degeneration to progress, or our attempts shall have failed; we do not recognize a middle solution."³⁹

To "recognize a middle solution" would mean to continue to accept the preservation of values derived only from the past and the present; and as has been seen, Aflaq clearly states why this solution would be unacceptable, even though some values of the past are of value. Arab destiny calls for a new life in the future.

The Arab nation . . . still does not enjoy its freedom and sovereignty, and in addition has lost its national unity and complains about the partition of its regions. . . . The Arab countries are not involved [only] in the preservation of spiritual, intellectual or social values because the Arab nation perceives clearly that her life depends on disre-

garding the old and entering a stage of strong and decisive renewal. She also knows there is nothing in her life worth preserving as against the Western countries⁴⁰ whose histories have been cumulative and cohesive.

The progress of the revolution is therefore even now in a positive stage, in that it is linked with the immediate Arab needs. Aflaq thus calls for a fusion of the requirements of the spirit, that is, freedom and independence. This fusion is attainable, it will be recalled, only when the radical outlook of the Party spreads down from its leaders to the masses and thereby negates the "evil present," which contains the seeds of the "evil past." The revolution will be of the masses then even though it will originate from the thoughts and actions of an elite.⁴¹ It is this elitism that ties Aflaq to the ideas and writings of Plato, Hegel, Marx, and other elitist political philosophers.

In any case, the Ba'athists believe that it is the state as an institution not simply an elite individual that is in the higher degree of development and thus of responsibility for the fulfillment of national destiny. In fact, the citizens must assume their individual share of the communal responsibility in deeds, not in mere talk, to act in the State. Aflaq says, " . . . all messages and calls, whether social or religious, should be judged by action, not by talk."⁴²

One reason why the Ba'athists are so concerned with and favor the active intervention of the State into both

individual and communal life is that they believe that previous revolutionary attempts to expel and remove the colonial powers from the Arab world failed because of the diffused and unrealistic efforts of the Arabs. In other words, the Ba'athists are stating that the only really effective method of implementation for the ideals of the Arab destiny and needs is through an active and strong State that will secure real independence and therefore freedom for Arabs vis-a-vis foreign control. At the same time, they argue that a "Ba'ath State" will be governed in a benevolent and free manner to keep such state from developing into a totalitarian regime. Somehow, it is argued, an Arab "people's" revolution will carry its own democratic protections.

Any democratic government that believes in these freedoms must continue to place its faith in the strength of its people. It must retain its freedom by continuing to free those who were taken advantage of because of the unfavorable conditions that have existed--economically, socially, and politically.⁴³

And again:

The faith of the Ba'athist in man generally and in the Arab man in particular must constantly compel him to be more audacious in combating erroneous and outdated beliefs. Since the Arab nation is fertile and holds within it the experience of centuries of misery, regression, and injustice, he must not suppose that it cannot support so much revolution and liberation. Thus, it is ready to surge forth and, to attain a spiritual level of great intensity.⁴⁴

In fact, it is argued further that the Ba'athist State will be responsible for the realization of human dignity. Since the state is organic, each individual within the society or the state will fulfill his responsibility rather than use it for purposes of tyranny.

The main purpose of liberty is to realize and conserve the individual's dignity and self-respect. . . . He must become positively involved in taking the responsibility for the continuation and the development of the country, regardless of whether this involvement is critical or favorable. But the citizen cannot fulfill this responsibility if his freedom is bought and sold.⁴⁵

It is further stated:

The path toward liberty should be directed toward all [Arab] people . . . for the people are a shield, a protector and guarantor of freedom. Freedom has evolved to the point that every individual should be given equal opportunity to realize his freedom.⁴⁶

The State, however, must take an all-pervasive role within the Arab mission in order to ensure the ultimate realization.

One point the Ba'athists make to support their proof of public spirit is their own type of socialism.

We believe in [Ba'athist] socialism as a lively, practical and natural phenomenon . . . which has regards for the individual's higher values, where man will remain the master of all things that he produces. It is a socialism that will do away with all shades of exploitation without destroying the freedoms of the individual.⁴⁷

Also they argue: "The Ba'athist socialistic government will legally protect the existence and encouragement of independent democratic unions in order that it may be able to spread

internally the ideas of democracy."⁴⁸ As a further means of guaranteeing the responsiveness of their socialistic State, the Ba'athists, to guarantee individual development and growth, say that their program is predicated on certain political and economic equalities within the new Arab nation. In other words, it is dependent upon the abolishment of economic differences within the state itself.

. . . we [Ba'athists] will abolish the differences between the privileged classes and the others; we will ensure justice, at the same time preparing ourselves to perfect our work. . . . Our socialism is based on the individual and his personal freedom; it does not allow his individual liberties to be scorned and considers all individuals as equal and a tyrannical dictatorship unnecessary.⁴⁹

In summation, it is obvious that various theories of Arab and Western nationalism and socialism are included and incorporated within Ba'athist thought about the Ba'athist State. This incorporation is affected, even though relative to each other the birth and revelatory theories appear to be and philosophically are not always consistent. For example, Ba'athism desires the racial heritage of nationalism stretching through thousands and thousands of years while claiming ultimate justification for the Ba'athist movement in the revelation of the Prophet. The Ba'athists insist on a socialist state run by a Party, which is in turn led by an elite, but one which will be equalitarian and give freedom to individuals. They claim that their state will be revolutionary,

yet be the bearer of the Arab past and meaning.

Here is the usual "heady" talk of the idealist, even as individuals and groups are imprisoned or exiled. One idea does not always fit another. Nowhere, however, is there more contradiction than in facing the question specifically of the control of the state.

Who Controls the State?

In examining any type of political system, one must first ascertain who the decision makers are. In thus determining, one is able correctly to evaluate who does actually control the state. This question of who should control is one that has caused argument among political scientists and political theorists throughout the ages. Earlier, it was noted that the Ba'athists accept the idea of elitism as a part of the Party system. Here shall be discussed their ideas as to decision making in the formal State and government or laws.

It was Plato's contention that virtue should rule without reference to power, or economic means. This concept should not be understood to mean rule by the masses, but rule by an intelligent and selfless elite. This elite would indeed be philosopher-kings.⁵⁰

Machiavelli, in examining this question in his work The Prince, stated that for the building of a state, a king

or "war leader" was needed. He believed, however, that for a state to endure, a republican system was best although he did not expect that the representatives would be chosen on a basis of America's individual manhood--suffrage system. Edmund Burke, the British conservative, believed that government functioned best in the hands of an aristocracy founded on land, culture, and a tradition of public service. More democratically minded theorists, especially in the "Jacksonian" tradition, believe that the many should rule rather directly, being chosen in frequent elections.

Curiously, despite their acceptance of rule by an elite, the Ba'athist seem to accept, to some degree, ideas of certain Western social-contract theories as found in the writings of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Since each of these theories is so structured as to provide for submission on the part of the government to the will or needs of the people, they provide a basis of so-called "legitimacy." Hobbes theorizes that for legitimacy to exist, it is necessary for political authority to acquire all individual rights. This step must be taken in order to provide security for the individual.⁵¹ This concept was seemingly rejected by Rousseau as a surrender of freedom. Nevertheless, Rousseau's contract requires that each individual surrender his rights to the community in a total manner because the people as a body, reflecting the general will, are sovereign.⁵² Locke's theory

is based on the Greek belief in man's innate need to come together in a community. Locke believed that such an innate need would cause the people to entrust their security to a representative government responsible for protecting the individual's rights which have been surrendered to the city-state.⁵³ Thus for Locke the decision makers were to be representative of the people, but could only "act" on a basis of goals agreed to by the people when the original contract was made.

For Hobbes, the decision maker was a king, who found it in his own interest to make the laws protective of the people's interest (if he did not he might be killed). For Rousseau, the people themselves directly decided what should be done in a general meeting, cooperatively exerting the general will. Representatives that were elected could act only to administer the decisions.

In understanding the Ba'athists, one must remember that although they accept rule by an elite, they do not accept Burke's idea that the elite shall be chosen on a basis of wealth in land. Nor do they accept the Fascist notion that the elite represent sheer physical power as will. Rather, their elite is representative of the Arab people's needs of freedom from colonial oppression and the Arab cultural, ethnic, historic destiny. The elite are also selected on a basis of dedication to Arab Socialism or the masses.

One thus finds the elite to be based on commonality of blood, religion, history, and economic need. It is the Ba'athist contention, therefore, that their elite are unique representatives, in that although they are not democratically elected, they are democratically representative⁵⁴ (a bit of Hobbes).

But still remaining is the question of who, practically, are the ones within society who are to become the Ba'athist elite? As previously stated, it is not the ones with money in the sense of great wealth, though the elite may come from those with adequate means to provide themselves with the basic requirements of living and education and time for political participation in revolution first and governing second. That is, the elite will be drawn basically from the educated, middle-class segment of the urban Arab world although some poor may rise to power and some rich may "benevolently" join. In fact, the present Ba'athist elite is basically an educated group divided between military and civil segments, but with the present dominance exercised by the military part of the elite group, of which many of whom come from less fortunate economic backgrounds.⁵⁵

Fred R. von der Mehden cites statistics taken from a small sampling that show that the education of this elite was also not the traditional Islamic-Arabic education, but

was mainly Western-oriented and influenced education. He further maintains that these individuals came from families who had already separated from many of the older traditions.⁵⁶

The Ba'athists claim to be aware of the historical lesson that even revolutionary non-responsive control of the State tends in time to be replaced by another control. For this reason, they do justify their elite by describing its source and its representation:

How can we find the proper individuals to rule? Shall we either elect them from the wealthy class, or those who have influence in the society? Shall they be economists or intellectuals? Or is one attribute enough to enable them to run the affairs of the nation?⁵⁷

In most cases, the Ba'athists argue that the elite must first know and be aware of their obligation to the whole.

Organization of Decision Making

But in order to understand who the elite are by showing how they function, one must be familiar with the state structure as established in the Syrian provisional constitution of 1964.⁵⁸ This structure consists of four branches of government. These four, in order of importance, are the Executive Council, the National Revolutionary Council, the Financial Affairs, and the Judicial Branch.

The Executive Council must be considered the most important branch or element of the Syrian State because of the extraordinary constitutional powers and privileges

reserved to it. The Executive Council consists of a President, a Vice-President, and five members who are selected initially from the National Revolutionary Council.⁵⁹ In fact, the Executive Council has the right to make, implement, and control all policy, in both domestic and foreign affairs.⁶⁰ Its responsibility is to provide foreign representation in the person of the President, appoint and dismiss all military and civilian authority, annul cabinet decisions, determine internal and external state policies, enter into all treaties and agreements, exercise all executive powers, appoint and remove ministers and cabinet members, grant amnesty in times of emergency, mobilize the country, and in emergencies assume the powers of the National Revolutionary Council.⁶¹ Though all of these powers are expressed in the name of the Executive Council, they are, in fact, powers reserved and exercised by the President of the Executive Council. It is immediately apparent that an inordinate amount of power is given to and reserved for the President under the Syrian Constitution of 1964.

The powers reserved constitutionally for the National Revolutionary Council are more limited in scope. This council contains, essentially, legislative powers with little right to and opportunity for initiation of programs. It is constitutionally "guaranteed" the opportunity to initiate proposals, but in fact its primary function is to ratify, within a

fifteen-day period, actions and laws proposed by the Executive Council.

Another power reserved to the National Revolutionary Council is the approval of a Prime Minister and his cabinet, who are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the government.⁶² This body is made up of individuals who have been appointed by the Ba'ath Party in agreement with the various districts within the region. All such individuals must be members of the Ba'ath Party.⁶³ It is immediately apparent here that the National Revolutionary Council, with the exception of its right to create and appoint the Executive Council, has little constitutional power. In fact, even this exception does not hold true. The power of the National Revolutionary Council is truncated and is simply one of ratification. Such a structure is analogous to the structure of the state in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, for both of the structures of these states reserve the power to a small segment responsible to no one else. This lack of responsibility continues as long as the ruling body successfully maintains a strong and successful posture.

The Financial Affairs Branch is that branch of the government responsible for budget preparation and maintenance. This branch has the right to provide monthly credits in the amount of one-twelfth of the previous year's budget if a new budget has not been prepared and approved.⁶⁴ The primary

purpose of this branch is to segregate the gathering and control of money from the expenditure decision apparatus (Executive Council).

The fourth branch is the Judicial Branch; and even though it is constitutionally responsible for the judicial process, it has little actual authority or power.⁶⁵ The reason is that it has no right constitutionally to evaluate the laws or to annul them or to declare them unconstitutional. On the contrary, its very nature and operation is determined by the law and is not protected in the constitution by any guarantees of judicial independence. The Judicial Branch thus is simply a rubber stamp to be applied at the discretion of the Executive Council through the governmental Minister of Justice--a cabinet post. This system is unlike the United States judicial system, which is provided for and guaranteed in the Constitution and whose independence and powers to nullify laws was accepted by the country generally in Marbury vs. Madison decision.

The way that the elite functions within the state structure, therefore, is through the process which involves the selection of governmental participants. As previously stated, the National Revolutionary Council is made up of Ba'athists who are chosen by the leadership of the Ba'ath in accord with the districts; therefore, there is a resulting duplication of leadership within the Party and the state.

The individuals who control the Ba'ath Party are those individuals who control the state, as mentioned in Chapter I. The selection process of the Ba'athist leadership is not one of popular election, but a selection by the leadership from their fellow leadership members. The President of Syria, then, will correspond to the regional secretary of the Syrian (region) Ba'ath Party. Because of the existing situation in the Arab world and the general non-acceptance of the Ba'athist program, the President will also be the Ba'ath Party's Secretary-General. This situation will continue until the time that governments of other regional Ba'ath Parties that are in control of national state governments unite, and at that time the Party apparatus will assume the projected governmental structure.

In summation and as one can clearly discern, the Ba'athist theory and practice of state organization--the elite, democratic centralism, collective leadership on top, etc.--fit the Ba'athist philosophy of the state, that is, Arab destiny, need for freedom from foreign oppression, dialectical movement in politics, Islamic traditions, and socialism.

NOTES

CHAPTER VIII

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CHAPTER IX

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

Western political philosophers in the past and in the present have been primarily concerned with the ideal role and function of a state within a body politic. They have been concerned also with such practical problems as security or protection of life and property, as well as questions of economics and welfare.

Especially does the problem of the role of the state deal with the degree to which it should actively affect the lives of the individuals, groups, and corporate bodies which compose it. In general, the Ba'athists appear to accept what is often called by Western theorists a totalitarian theory of state-functions, but assert that the "evils" of this form as well as the authoritarianism usually associated with it will become obsolete once national self-determination or Arab "unity, freedom, and socialism" has been achieved.

After independence and nationhood has been achieved, the Ba'athists say, the greatest problem will be nation-

building; that is, the relating of administrative forces to the political forces within the transitional society¹ (besides establishing socialism). The problems of instability and disunity within the nation, it is argued, have already been the major contributors to the lack of communication among the rulers and the ruled. Fred von der Mehden states that in general the hoped-for cooperation between the newly independent nations and their previous masters has been halted by a rash of "emotional nationalism" and "anti-imperialism" feelings which are directed toward the West.² These contests, in turn, have resulted in the internal struggle for power between the elitist groups within the new state and the military. The rash of successful and attempted coups d'état have thus become a way of life in many of the developing nations, leaving little energy or time for the solution of economic problems by the state.

Nonetheless, the basic task for any national government and the responsibility of leadership is first to ascertain where the national values are to be arranged in hierarchical position and which values the state shall attempt to aid or implement (or hinder). Programs must be designed for a course of action in the achievement of its goals. That is, there must be implementation, administration, and enforcement of the specific policies carrying out the values.³

Policies of a government are often accepted, of course, and adhered to by its citizens, even though these policies may

be temporarily contrary to their interests or beliefs. The use or threat of force is undoubtedly a positive factor to secure acquiescence, but many political theorists since the time of Aristotle have been enunciating the theory that adherence to the laws is primarily caused also by agreement, habit, and custom. Robert MacIver, for example, espouses the "firmament of law" idea which he suggests encompasses most governments and originates from customs, culture, and religious traditions, as well as the rules enacted by political authorities and supported by force. In agreeing to what seems natural to them, people therefore ease the problem of "law" enforcement although only as long as the authorities do not enact policies that stray excessively from the traditional beliefs and behavior patterns of the citizens.⁴

Some political scientists maintain that even the Soviet Union has had to make large concessions to its citizens, particularly concessions pertaining to their demands for better living standards. Professor Carl J. Friedrich argues that perhaps Stalin exceeded the people's "level of tolerance," but that one must also take into consideration the fact that values and interest apparently shared by the rulers and people have taken a gradual and different form; that is, a transformation has occurred in political order toward the basic belief system even though it appeared that the government was enforcing a different, new one.⁵

The correctness of the above judgments about the relation of the government, the people, and public policies may be seen in observing the Ba'athist theory of government and public policy and its implementation, especially in Syria.

Economic Transformation in the Syrian Arab Republic

As has been seen, the political and economic transformation which followed the Ba'athist takeover in Syria on March 8, 1963, was allegedly in essence an ideological rebellion against "Western" values and was aimed at a radical change within the social structure of modern Syria. Ba'athist socialism, it is claimed, is partially based upon different moral values, and not wholly upon the economic order espoused by Western socialists. A member of the Syrian Parliament has described it as "a Marxist drink in an Islamic cup."⁶ The Arabic word for socialism is "al-Ishtirakiya," which means participation. It is, therefore, the sum of human values, the realization of human dignity, and the participation in the fabric of social transition. One of the slogans of the Ba'ath is "Every citizen has a role in the battle."⁷

The Ba'athist transformation is defined by another co-founder, Jamal Attassi, in the following manner:

To us socialism means a modern Arab society built upon solid foundations of unity, justice, and freedom. It encompasses modern, scientific, and humanitarian principles with a popular and democratic

regime. The end result of this new society is to alter the present socio-economic system through such new politics as land reform, new work laws, and socialist relations between the state and the people.⁸

The Party propaganda and literature are therefore a mixture of Islamic moralism of the Arab nationalist slogans about freedom, independence, and the Eternal Mission; the ideology of socialism; and the pragmatic approach toward the implementing of the socialist principles in Syria. According to a radical faction within the Ba'ath Party, Aflaq was a utopian philosopher while Munif Razzaz was more pragmatic in his outlook and approach to Ba'athist socialism than was Aflaq. Nonetheless, it is true that Razzaz shared with Aflaq two major dilemmas confronting the Ba'athist: first, methods of correlating liberal and reformist ideas with a mass movement; and secondly, the manner in which the Ba'ath could implement genuine social and economic reforms in a country that tends not to like fundamental change in institutions.⁹ Debate over the answer espoused by the founding fathers of Ba'athism and the new radical Ba'athist group, mainly the leftists, resulted in a power struggle whereby after three years of control in Syria, the Ba'athist leaders--Aflaq, Bitar, Razzaz, and others--were driven into exile and the Ba'athist military-civilian (leftist) coalition emerged victorious in the "bloodless" coup d'état of February 23, 1966.¹⁰

To clarify the character of this military-civilian coalition one must understand the military-political situation which exists in many of the Middle East countries, particularly Syria, the latter having been under military rule, directly or indirectly, since 1949. To ensure that the basic ideology of Ba'athism will prevail (despite the above coup d'etat), the military in Syria has been completely and deliberately infiltrated by the Ba'ath Party. This situation is true throughout the Middle East. That is, the Ba'ath Party members strive (and have succeeded in many instances) to secure high positions in the military itself because of the important role the military plays in the political scenes of most Middle Eastern countries. The new Ba'athist officers who are in control of the Syrian military are mainly of poor origin (a natural source of Ba'athist recruitment) and have been heavily recruited from the Alawite and Druse minorities. In addition, officers who are neither Ba'athists nor sympathizers with the Ba'athist cause are forced out of the military. To keep them from becoming an effective, cohesive opposition force, however, the Ba'ath obtains or provides jobs for the ousted military non-Ba'athists in strategically unimportant places, but ones with generous salaries.¹¹

Following the 1966 coup, Nouredine el-Atassi, a doctor, was appointed as the Syrian President and Premier

and also as the General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party. The following month General Hafez el-Assad, who was considered highly instrumental in the coup and its success, was appointed Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. General Assad, aged forty-three, is an Alawite, and has been a member of the Ba'ath Party since his youth.¹²

The ideological outcome of the above mentioned struggle for power in 1966 was outlined in the treatise al-Muntalaquat al-Nadhariyya (The Basic Theories), and is summarized below:

1. The reaffirmation of the principle that the purpose of socialism is to create a free society where opportunities are equally available to all, and where exploitation is abolished. In underdeveloped countries, this abolishment includes all types of foreign and domestic exploitation and getting rid of the decadent aspects of the past.

2. The repudiation of the sanctity of private ownership since this is a bourgeois fabrication. Scientific socialism accepts only human work as the source of value for man. Therefore, any private property that exceeds the personal use of an individual must be exploitative no matter how small it is.

3. The national-liberation struggle in under-developed countries is a natural reaction to the feudalism-bourgeois system. Local capitalism has been involved in commercial real estate and financial concerns and is not concerned with rapid

industrial development. Thus, it is unable to cope with the fast pace of growth that has to be achieved.

4. The conclusion, therefore, is that class struggle and socialism become a necessity in order that the exploited masses may enter a new historical stage. These masses are the workers, peasants, ideological army, revolutionary intelligentsia and the petit-bourgeoisie in the commercial, industrial, agrarian, and service sectors.¹³

These new Party principles are not meant to declare the earlier principles of Aflaq and his primary followers null and void, but merely to give them a new definition. This new elite felt that the principles must be updated to the present conditions of the Arab states and must also take advantage of the experiences of other socialist states.¹⁴ Obviously, the program is further "left" than Aflaq's economically and does not place so much stress on Arabism and "morality." Understandably, there was a wide diversity of opinion. The proponents made progress, however, and the revised theories were accepted by the Ba'ath Seventh National Congress and gradually adopted into the policies and programs of the Ba'ath Party in Syria.

The general guidelines that were proposed for the transformation from capitalism to socialism, however, were basically the same as those of the Aflaq regime; yet they were more specific and gave more attention to a real socialistic,

revolutionary approach than did Aflaq. Economists were employed to place the theories into a perspective of current conditions and to implement such theories as well. The following guidelines were set forth:

1. The incorporation of the private sector into the public sector of the major productive units, the financial institutions, the transportation system, large real-estate property, foreign trade, and major domestic concerns.
2. The systematic incorporation of the petit-bourgeois into the socialist sector.
3. The by-passing of the stage of state capitalism while bureaucracy is kept under constant surveillance and democratic administration is substituted for private, autocratic management in the industrial sector.
4. The completion of the land reform program, and the establishment of socialist relationships on the farms.
5. The use of planning for socialist transformation with due consideration to planning on a Pan-Arab level.¹⁵

In general, Ba'athist socialization is, therefore, one of nationalization, agrarian land reform, and extensive economic planning. The economic program for Syria covers the whole economy. These plans determine the division of productive national resources between capital and consumption goals, prescribe the wage and price levels, and determine the credit and currency policies. In addition, the social and cultural

goals are described extensively. The plans are so massive that it would be impossible totally to implement them in short order. The statement of them, however, is obviously meant to provide an inspiration to the masses as well as goals for the government officials.

The conversion of socialism is to be achieved in stages, with heavy emphasis to be placed upon rapidly increasing the productivity of agriculture and industry. Through land reform, cooperatives and collective farms are to be established, it is claimed, to increase productivity and thereby free a large number of workers for the activities of the nationalized industries. Industry, it is further claimed, will raise the standard of living for the masses; but of prime importance to the state is the ability of industry to provide economic support of the state and for security and defense.¹⁶

Nationalization in Syria

The impetus for nationalization was to achieve the goals of transforming the economy into a socialist system and to transfer to the state the ownership of the means of production. In 1964 all banks and insurance companies were nationalized. The nationalized commercial banks were then merged into the Commerical Bank of Syria in 1967.¹⁷ The insurance companies were all placed under the Syrian Insurance

Organization.¹⁸ Textile factories and cotton gins at Aleppo were nationalized in April, 1964. All mineral resources were placed under national control in December, 1964. The following month, the government also placed under national control the large industrial establishments connected with cement, dyes, textiles, sugar, canning, food production, chemicals, soap, glass products, and mechanical industries. These measures led to a revolt in the form of demonstrations and strikes by the merchants of Damascus. To combat these actions, additional decrees were issued which enabled the government to confiscate the property of any merchant who is held by the Military Court to be responsible for the disorder. The Military Court was established in January, 1965, and was provided with sufficient powers to handle all offences, whether by word or deed, which were directed against the decrees of nationalization and the socialist revolution.¹⁹ In February, 1965, trading companies were nationalized. This step enabled the state-owned Importing and Exporting Organization to be the only importer of basic commodities (tea, rubber, iron, cars, drugs, fertilizers, fish, timber, textiles, tractors, salt, tobacco, and paper). In March, 1965, the nine foreign owned-oil companies were also nationalized.²⁰

These decrees during 1964 and 1965 resulted in more than 108 industries, as well as all foreign trade, being placed under national control.²¹ At this stage of conversion,

private enterprise was allowed to continue if it was not exploitative and as long as the owners and the types of businesses did not interfere with the "national interest." The government promised to reimburse the owners of the nationalized industries over a period of fifteen years with a three percent rate of interest to be paid annually to the owners as a token of good faith.²² The government gained an unknown amount of confiscated property, moreover, because of the decisions of the Military Court. All of the industries were formed into joint-stock so-called Arab companies and the Institute for Economic Affairs was given the authority to manage them under the direction of the Ministry of Public Affairs. The Ministry of Industry was later established to carry out the execution of these laws and to manage the untold wealth of the previous private enterprises. Each enterprise is governed by a troika, a board of directors, with each man representing one of the following divisions: labor within the firms; the government; and the Ba'ath Party. These features render a striking resemblance to the Soviet Union's administration of industry and agriculture.²³

In the beginning period, nationalization dealt a heavy blow to the economy of Syria. During a visit to Syria in 1965 it was noted by the writer of this paper that many of the industrial complexes that were being built through private capital had ceased to continue construction. The economic

activity all over the country was in considerable chaos. Over 200,000 entrepreneurs and technicians left Syria and smuggled with them their capital either to build anew in another country or hopefully to await a change in the Syrian government.

Management of these nationalized industries also became a foremost problem. It was obvious that many of the new officials of these industries failed to compare with the previous experienced management. Loyalty to the Party could not possibly substitute for managerial ability. The Ba'athists therefore attempted to recall the owners of these enterprises to manage them for the state, but most of the owners refused.²⁴ To combat the lack of managerial ability, the Ba'athist regime established managerial schools in cooperation with a United Nations agency. Many officials were sent abroad to Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Soviet Union for on-the-spot training in industrial management and control.²⁵

In summation, then, it is obvious that as of 1972 if one checks the result with the so-called guidelines (see page 245), implementation of some of these theories have not been entirely successful while other plans have yet to be implemented. There has been nationalization and incorporation of most of the private into the public sector. But the petit-bourgeoisie fled rather than become incorporated. Democratic

management has not developed. What management which does exist, in fact, is quite authoritarian. One can note below that some land reform has taken place, but socialist relations in agriculture have been slow to develop and the initial situation has remained such that Pan-Arab planning economically could not occur.

Agriculture: Reform and Development

The population of Syria (excluding Palestinian refugees) is approximately six million with 35 percent of the population residing in cities, 65 percent in rural areas, 15 percent of whom are not engaged in agriculture. Syria consists of about 18.5 million hectares of land (72,000 square miles), of which 8 million hectares are cultivated land and the remainder is desert or rocky mountains.²⁶ Agriculture, with its attendant services, is the major industry in Syria. Table I shows the structure of the gross domestic product of agriculture and other industries in Syria for the years 1963-1970.

In the attainment of sufficiency (that is, the obtaining of the necessities of life in adequate amounts to support the population in general), Syria has been severely handicapped in the past by the fixed amount of arable land and the institutional monopoly in land ownership which is accompanied also by absentee ownership. Coupled with the

TABLE I

THE STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS BY SECTORS FOR THE YEARS 1963-1970
(At constant prices of 1963)

Sectors	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	1964	1963
Agriculture, forestry & fisheries	20.3	25.6	22.9	27.9	25.0	29.2	31.3	30.1
Mining & manufacturing*	20.5	18.2	17.4	16.9	16.7	16.3	15.7	15.9
Building & construction	2.9	3.0	3.3	2.6	3.1	2.6	2.7	3.0
Transport & Communication	11.1	10.0	10.6	8.9	9.0	8.8	8.4	8.2
Wholesale & retail trade	17.7	17.8	17.5	17.3	19.0	17.3	17.8	19.0
Finance & insurance	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.9	2.5	1.9	2.0
Ownership of dwelling	6.0	6.1	6.9	7.0	7.2	6.8	6.8	7.2
Government	12.3	10.8	12.1	10.7	11.0	9.8	9.9	9.1
Services	7.1	6.6	7.4	7.1	7.1	6.7	5.5	5.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 277, page 473.

*Including electricity, gas, and water.

static arable land production situation and the growing pressures of population (an increase of approximately 3.9 percent annually),²⁷ moreover, rents have constantly increased to exorbitant heights. The farm laborer has had little or no hope of ever owning or working his own plot of land. These factors have increased the already existing shortage of capital and certainly cannot improve the total productivity of agriculture. In general, profits that were returned to agricultural pursuits were not in the nature of long-term improvements. The profits the landlords received were mainly used in non-agricultural pursuits, such as the building of city homes, foreign-investment, or loans to the farm workers and smaller landowners for consumer goods, which frequently have a high rate of interest tacked on to them (in many cases the interest rate has exceeded fifty percent).²⁸

The previous law for agrarian reform (1958) failed to provide a means for quick expediting of the reforms, as well as failing to make provisions for the variations in land; that is, the proximity to the market, productivity, actual returns, type of crops and so on.²⁹ In 1963, therefore, Legislative Decree #88 was enacted to encompass all of these omissions in the realm of land reform.

Maximum private holdings of irrigated land were reduced to between 15 and 50 hectares per person, depending

upon the locations. The maximum holding of non-irrigated land was dropped to between 80 and 200 hectares per person, also depending upon location. Non-irrigated land with pistachio and olive groves was reduced to between 35 and 40 hectares per person. The area of land which a landord could transfer to his dependents was limited to 8 percent of his land allowable.³⁰

The beneficiaries of land were required to pay the state one-fourth of the amount that the state promised to pay the original owners (Article 10). The beneficiaries, furthermore, were to pay annual installments over a twenty-year period to the cooperative society. This money was to be used in agricultural and social pursuits which would benefit all the beneficiaries-members of the cooperatives.³¹

The total area of expropriated land from the beginning of land reform in 1958 and through 1969 has amounted to 1,513,564 hectares, which practically reaches the total of 1,543,643 hectares called for in the Agrarian Law Reform of 1958.³² Decree #88 (1963), however, called for a larger area; but at present there is no data available to show how many more hectares are to be expropriated. The expropriated land area is shown in Table II.

The Law of State-Domain Land (1959) provided for distribution of state-domain land among the peasants. The exact area and location of this land is not known. It is

TABLE II

EXPROPRIATED LANDS SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF THE AGRARIAN
LAND REFORM LAW 1958-1969 (IN HECTARES)

Province	Non- cultivated	Non- irrigated	Irrigated & Trees	Total Area
Damascus, Dara and Sweida	44912	24976	8504	78392
Aleppo	40232	181857	6656	228745
Homs	--	145444	3145	148589
Hama	610	114536	8115	123261
Latakia	866	1818	3103	5787
Deir-el-Zor	--	999	15501	16500
Idleb	18417	60952	4040	83409
Hasakeh	163847	476152	15528	655527
Al-Rakka	18079	127635	18392	164106
Tartous	1352	5326	2570	9248
TOTAL	288315	1139695	85554	1513564

EXPROPRIATED LANDS IN 1969 (IN HECTARES)

Damascus	5161	18511	1332	25004
Aleppo	134	33660	318	34112
Homs	--	9020	1528	10548
Hama	1	14233	1005	15239
Latakia	95	1178	2156	3429
Deir-el-Zor	--	2402	6040	8442
Idleb	350	11651	2772	14773
Hasakeh	1508	25699	4308	31515
Al-Rakka	8679	75971	10812	95462
Tartous	717	3219	752	4688
TOTAL	16645	195544	31023	243212

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 76, page 132.

estimated that during the period 1960 to 1965, however, over 1,500,000 hectares were distributed virtually free to beneficiaries.

At the end of 1969, the distribution of expropriated land (excluding state-domain land) amounted to 442,635 hectares. This figure, along with the number of recipients and their families, is shown in Table III. One may note the large difference between the expropriated land area and the distributed land area, a difference caused, in part, by the newly developed land areas. These areas require population resettlement and the building of roads, housing, education and medical facilities, and so on, in other words, a large investment that the state cannot provide readily. In addition, some of the areas are in Israeli-occupied territories and possibly the state is holding some of the other areas for implementation of its long-term projects (for example, state farms). The expropriated and undistributed land is utilized by lease or by the Land Reform Institute until distribution occurs.

In the redistribution of agricultural income, one of the major facets of the reform measure has been the government's fixing the maximum rates of rent. A large number of the agricultural labor force are recipients of these rent reductions, which amount to 20-25 percent in the non-irrigated land and about 35 percent in irrigated land.³³

TABLE III

NUMBER OF VILLAGES WHERE EXPROPRIATED LANDS WERE DISTRIBUTED, AREA
DISTRIBUTED AND NUMBER OF NEW LANDOWNERS -- 1959/1969

(Area in Hectares)

Province	No. of villages	No. of new landowners	Area excluded	<u>Distributed Area</u>		Total
				Non- irrigated	Irrigated & trees	
Damascus, Dara, and Sweida	112	5151	33022	20251	5697	37346
Aleppo	429	10848	21093	136692	5639	186518
Homs	108	5071	18346	54803	4994	78143
Hama	152	7486	19814	78069	2210	100093
Latakia	71	3238	600	1859	2665	5124
Deir-el-Zor	35	3262	1350	--	9363	10713
Idleb	169	6968	2059	49375	3866	55300
Hasakeh	48	1481	1855	2877	9178	13910
Al-Rakka	192	5618	91237	33435	14229	138901
Tartous	70	3381	1450	5149	2284	8883
TOTAL	1386	52504	192296	382510	60125	634931

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Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 77, page 133.

Land reform as instituted by the Ba'ath should not be identified with land distribution alone. It is not the intent or the purpose of the Ba'athists to limit agrarian reform to land distribution alone, for they believe that the distribution of land is not a progressive step in itself, in that it places burdens upon the culturally unprepared peasants. A case in point was the issuance of cereal grains to new land owners who, instead of planting the seeds, either ate or sold them. The Ba'athists maintain, therefore, that a socio-psychological change of attitude within the personality of the peasant is needed. What is advocated is a change in planning and programming whereby public institutions will take over the land as soon as it is nationalized and re-educate the peasants as to the processes of modernization. This method is not interpreted by the Ba'ath as complete public ownership of the land with government having full reins in the administration of agriculture, but as a policy of flexibility that takes into consideration the diversities of the land, weather, products, and present capacities of the peasants; for example:

1. In al-Soueida, the dead land has been developed and made productive by the peasants. Cooperatives have been founded but with the peasants enjoying private ownership of the plots.

2. The members of the Shammar Tribe in al-Jazira

were distributed land. However, the "Sheiks," (large former land owners), through manipulations of the cultural, economic, and political institutions, managed to regain control of the land. Here the Ba'athists argue that a collective farm system must be implemented if progress is to be achieved.

3. Collective farming would also be necessary on large farms, such as those which produce fruits, olives, and nuts; for these crops require a high degree of capital and maintenance. Furthermore, the divisions of these types of farms after nationalization would only be damaging to the economy as a whole.³⁴

Decree #88 has thus authorized the establishment of cooperatives and collective farms. Additionally, in the long-term program of the state, state farms are to be established. The land of the individual members in the cooperatives cannot be sold, rented, leased, donated, or used as collateral for loans. A Director, appointed by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform, supervises the cooperatives in accordance with the plans of the agricultural ministry.³⁵ At the end of 1970, there were 1,631 cooperatives with a total membership of 103,606. The total paid-in capital amounts to L.S. 2,495,012 and the subscribed capital is L.S. 4,960,840.³⁶

At the present, there are no real collective or state farms in Syria in the Soviet Union sense; but when the plans

are implemented, such farms will exist and will be supervised by an appointee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The collective farm in Syria will then be an exact pattern of the kolkhoz in the Soviet Union. The state farms will be likewise fashioned after the Soviet Union's sovkhoz. Unlike the sovkhoz, however, the peasant will be given a plot of land to build a house on and to grow produce for his private needs.

A legislative decree in 1964 made provision, meanwhile, for the establishment of a peasant union. Economically, the target of this decree is to improve agriculture, support the plan of development, and allow the peasant's active participation in the implementation of land reform. In the socio-psychological realm, its goals are to raise the standard of living of the peasants and to provide the peasants with a spirit of mutual cooperation--socialist relations in agriculture per the aforementioned guidelines. The peasant union has representatives on all governmental committees pertaining to rural affairs.³⁷

Once the land reform is completed, the state intends to organize the administration of the agricultural sector into one ministry, thereby replacing all of the present agricultural ministries and institutions. This step will assist in the planning and implementing of agricultural development. The following is a summary of the further plans

set forth by the government:

1. Agriculture to be expanded vertically by a) intensifying the use of machinery and fertilizers, b) improvement of seeds and methods of combating pests, c) introducing modern scientific methods.
2. Agriculture to be expanded horizontally by increasing the amount of cultivable land through irrigation, reclamation of arable land, and study of water basins.
3. Development of animal wealth in the country by a) using modern methods of animal husbandry, b) establishing cattle and poultry farms, c) establishing a college of veterinary medicine, d) establishing fisheries and introducing modern methods.
4. Encouragement of agricultural production by a) reduction of the cost of production, b) prospecting for new markets, c) concluding commercial exchange agreements, d) supervising and publicizing export activities.
5. Reduction of ignorance of agricultural methods through an educational program.
6. Cooperative movement in the agricultural sector in the fields of production, marketing, services, and consumption.
7. Reorganization and expansion of the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, while simplifying it in order to allow the farmer to utilize loans with a minimum of effort.

8. Development of forestry and wooded areas.

9. Support for and development of the technical and administrative machinery of the Ministry of Agriculture.

10. Expansion of agricultural industry and encouragement of setting up rural industries which help develop agriculture by expanding their markets, stabilizing prices, and organizing consumption; in other words, an increase in the income of the agricultural worker and a decrease in unemployment.³⁸

In the implementation of these plans, the government has initiated several projects. One of these is the al-Ghab project, which went into full operation in 1968 and was pointed toward the reclamation of 72,000 hectares of submerged land and marshes. An average of 25 hectares per family has been distributed to 28,000 beneficiaries (this figure includes the families of the beneficiaries). The project also involved the construction of irrigation and drainage systems and the establishment of fisheries.³⁹

Several irrigation projects have been implemented, among them the Euphrates Dam. According to the government, this dam will double the agricultural production in Syria as it will irrigate approximately 1,640,000 acres of land.⁴⁰

The yield from cotton has increased and is now the most important article of export, primarily because of the role of the government as it has rigidly controlled the

planting and the harvesting of this crop. The government also controls the quality of the seed used and has been successful in treating and halting the diseases to which cotton is subject.⁴¹

In 1969, the government initiated a grain storage plan which is expected to cost about L.S. 29 million and should be completed in 1972. Silos with a total capacity of 153,000 tons will be built in major towns.⁴²

Thus, as has been seen, with considerable planning the Ba'athists have been able to accomplish many of their goals in agriculture; moreover, with the annihilation of the land monopoly, the reign of political power by the large landlords has been broken. The attitude of the peasant was previously one of subservience to the landlord. With an increasing socialization and mechanization of agriculture, however, many peasants no longer feel tied to the land as they did previously. This factor has been useful to the Ba'athist plans of modernization of industry because the leaders have realized that although Syria now has a higher productivity in agricultural goods, this alone is not sufficient for full modernization. The Ba'athists, therefore, have taken advantage of the new agricultural situation and have encouraged peasants to move into urban areas as industrial laborers, instead of to remain an unneeded labor force in the rural areas.

Economic and Social Objectives

The general economic and social objectives of Syria, it is claimed by the Ba'ath, are to realize a constant increase in the rate of output which shall thereby increase the national income. A doubled national income within a period of ten years is the optimum objective. Other objectives include full employment, a standard of living that will be in accord with man's dignity, and the securing for all citizens the maximum in cultural, social, and educational benefits. In order to protect the purchasing power of the monetary unit, prices, profits, and wages are to be regulated in such a manner as to resist any inflationary or deflationary tendencies as a result of either national or international factors.⁴³

As previously indicated, it is also claimed that the intent of the state is to achieve the above-mentioned objectives through complete and comprehensive planning of economic affairs at all stages of socialist undertakings. The government will thus utilize technical personnel who are capable of realizing the new objectives to reorganize and redevelop the organs of planning within the state. The administration of statistics is to be centralized and given adequate machinery and technicians, and scientific research in all branches of the national economy is to be fully sup-

ported by the government.⁴⁴

Socialist conversion in Syria is directed, therefore, toward making the public sector the "backbone" of the national economy. The nationalization and agrarian reform decrees during the first Five Year Plan (1960-1965) have led to the establishment of a relatively large and strong public sector which is now, in effect, dominant over the private sector. According to the government, the private sector previously used the state as a tool to serve capitalism and feudalism and in so doing exploited the toiling classes. The private sector is now a tool of the state for the masses.

To help complete the full transfer of the national economy into a socialist economy, the government says that it also intends to create a new consciousness of the people, that is, to impart to them the values and beliefs of the socialist society. This conversion is to be democratic in that organized masses will develop such consciousness by participating in the public planning and implementation of public tasks. In carrying out its economic and socialist plans, the government also assures the people that it prefers to use means of persuasion such as the appeal to their national loyalty, rather than "obligatory orders issued by top authority" and supported by physical violence.⁴⁵

The basic structure of the national economy during the conversion stage is to be composed of a public, a cooper-

ative, a joint, and a private sector. In strengthening and enlarging the public sector, the state intends to establish new industries, improve existing industries, draw and confirm the lines of the public sector in all fields, merge the number of the present industries and institutions into larger units--thereby increasing output with a minimum of expense--and improve equipment and machinery.⁴⁶ Table IV represents the general budget for Syria in 1970, and reflects the massive amount of money that was supposed to be expended for such development.

The present administration, it is also claimed, is to be developed and maintained in the light of both democracy and socialism. The administrative agencies thus are to secure the establishment of labor councils. Laborers will participate in the administration through these councils, provided that the transformation will be gradual and will meet the "objective circumstances of the state and its economic requirements."⁴⁷

The cooperative sector, it is said, will also contribute to economic and social development and aid in the elimination of capitalist establishments. The government plans to continue encouraging the forming of cooperative institutions in all fields of economic endeavor. Legislative measures are to be enacted to simplify legal requirements for the establishment of cooperatives, to give them special

TABLE IV

GENERAL BUDGET FOR 1970
(In Million Syrian Pounds)

General Expenditures		1,242
Development Projects		1,538
Euphrates Dam	529	
Industrial Sector	447	
Communications & Public Works	343	
Culture & Information	48	
Social Welfare & Rural Development	23	
Services	148	
	TOTAL	1,538
TOTAL		2,780 Million

Source: Compiled from figures quoted in Argus of Arab Economy, Economic Review of the Arab World, Bureau of Lebanese and Arab Document, (Beirut, January 1970) pp. 44-45.

privileges and grants, and to provide trained personnel. Local unions are to be encouraged to establish cooperatives and in so doing shall become the means for the end: a general cooperative union. Cooperatives are to share in all activities of the government.⁴⁸

The joint sector is to coordinate investment, technical experience, and individual ingenuity between the public and the private sectors in carrying out certain activities of the economic development plans such as the enterprises of tourism, building, and certain commercial agencies. Participants are promised a return on their invested money.⁴⁹

The Ba'ath does not perceive the private sector as a contradiction to its emphasis on the public sector. Since the state is to control the principal activities in industry, commerce, and banking, it has taken over this final stage, planning and working toward the achievement of the goals in this area. The government thus assures the small remaining private sector that the private rights there will be maintained. The Ba'ath also claims that it wishes the state to receive as a whole the benefits from the initiative and the capital of the private sector, thus warning the latter that its activities are controlled and that income must come from active work so that the exploitationist and monopolistic era will be ended.⁵⁰

During the stage of economic transition, the Ba'ath

further says that the state will recognize the importance of defining the relationships between the various development sectors, particularly between the roles of agriculture and industry. Here the formation of proper financial principles is the key to the economic development plan of the state. Since agriculture is still the principal source of finance, the Ba'ath maintains that the means of increasing finance will have to come through a net increase in agricultural production and investment. This increase will then, it is believed, allow investment in non-agricultural sectors.⁵¹

Agricultural development itself, however, requires industrial development in order to provide for the attendant machineries, chemicals, and other necessities of modern technologically developed agriculture. It is therefore the intent of the government to develop both industry and agriculture simultaneously and technologically.⁵² As the former Secretary-General of the Ba'ath Party, Dr. Nouredinne Atassi states:

Thus the wheel of construction is cranking: in the countryside, modern machinery is helping the youthful hands in turning our fields into a green paradise; in the towns, chimneys are everywhere--indicating there are factories that are helping raise the living standard of our masses, and the reconstruction of a strong economic base.⁵³

Industry

It is admitted by the Ba'ath that plans for industrialization and the allocation of priorities within the

industrial sector cannot be taken without certain prior considerations. It is said thus that the government intends to make a complete study of the minerals and raw material resources available and also to determine the energy power both available and required to provide for production and consumption. To improve the balance of payments, the state will strive both to ascertain the basic needs and to limit the imports of some goods and increase the exports of others. An agreement between the Arab states with attention given to the requirements of an Arab common market will be further secured.

The state will assume the responsibility for the organizational needs of the industrial process and will encourage industrial production in accordance with its plans and long-term objectives.⁵⁴ Table V shows the First, Second, and Third Five Year Plans issued by the Ministry of Planning in Syria to establish and carry out the economic goals of the government. The following is a summary of the guidelines to be utilized:

1. Tighten the financial control over the general industrial sector and take any legal or administrative steps necessary to prevent waste.

2. Re-examine all present laws governing industrial affairs and place them in accord with the new policy standards.

3. Develop technical and administrative skills for the

TABLE V

INVESTMENT PROGRAM IN THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD FIVE YEAR PLANS
(Value in Million Syrian Pounds)

	<u>1960-1965 Plan</u>		<u>1966-1970 Plan</u>		<u>1971-1975 Plan</u>	
	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total
Irrigation and Reclamation	830	30.5	955.8	19.3	352	4.4
Agriculture	270	9.9	436.3	8.8	576	7.2
Industry, Mining, Electricity, and Petroleum	509	18.7	1010.4	20.4	2337	29.2
Transportation and Communication	537	19.7	894.3	18.0	883	11.0
Public Utilities and Housing	292	10.9	1278.1	25.0	1489	18.0
Services	282	10.5	379.8	7.7	870	10.8
Euphrates Dam	-	-	-	-	1593	19.9
TOTAL	2720	100.0	4955.0	100.0	8000	100.0

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, The Five-Year Plans, 1960-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975.

working class through the use of modern methods.

4. Enact laws to modernize, assemble, and improve the manual and traditional industries and crafts.

5. Exert a wider effort toward finding new foreign markets for national industries and increase the volume of commercial exchange and improve commercial diplomacy.⁵⁵

Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Latakia are the primary industrial centers of Syria. The textile industry is the largest single industry, and several new spinning and weaving mills have been established in recent years. These mills handle the local cotton and imported yarn. Between 1951 and 1967, the output of cotton yarn has increased over 13,000 tons,⁵⁶ with a further increase foreseen in the future.

Since the Ba'athists gained control of Syria in 1963, the state has developed and established several other industries. After a sugar refinery was installed in Homs to process sugar beets, sugar production between 1963 and 1970 increased from 9,370 tons to 123,700 annually.⁵⁷ An important grape distillery has been established at Soueida to process grapes grown in that region. Another important establishment is an onion dehydration plant in the district of Salamiyeh. This plant will employ 260 laborers and bring in an estimated L.S. 3 million annually. A glass factory near Damascus is now in operation and an iron-bar factory is already producing in the Hama area.⁵⁸ Phosphate deposits in the Sharqiyeh and

Khnaifis area encouraged the 1968 implementation of a nearby phosphate plant at a cost of L.S. 25 million with an estimated annual production of 100,000 tons. It is further estimated that the national income will increase by L.S. 200 million because of the phosphate and its contribution to the expansion of agricultural products.⁵⁹

The project for rock-salt mining in the Dair-el-Zor district was implemented at an estimated cost of L.S. 10 million after an agreement with Spain in 1969. The mine will produce 36,000 tons annually in the first stage and will increase four-fold once the mine is fully developed.⁶⁰ In 1969 Syria officially announced that Poland will supply Syria with equipment for three slaughter houses, a steel plant, an iron ore plant, phosphate mines, and a glassware plant. In addition, Poland will establish factories for electric bulbs, bicycles, and batteries and expand the existing cement plants in Aleppo and Damascus. In this barter agreement, Syria agreed to furnish Poland with cotton, phosphates, petrol, and finished products.⁶¹

Many of the industries in existence prior to 1963 have witnessed a considerable production increase under the Ba'athist regime. The production of cement, for example, increased from an estimated 685,000 tons to 964,000 tons between 1967 and 1970. This cement production figure, along with other production figures of the main industries in Syria

between 1967 and 1970, is shown in Table VI. During the industrialization of Syria, considerable attention has been given also to the petroleum industry. The plans call for an expansion of the prospecting operations for crude oil and natural gas and the implementation of the necessary projects for its utilization, as well as the establishment of complementary industries and markets.⁶²

In the actualization of the petroleum industry's development, Syria, with the slogan "National Production of Oil,"⁶³ began with the nationalization of petroleum resources and all foreign-owned oil companies. The government-owned agency, the General Petroleum Company, holds the oil concession for all of Syria. This state organ organizes refining, storage, and distribution of petroleum. The total production of oil in 1970 was 4.5 million tons.⁶⁴

After new oil fields in north-east Syria were discovered, an agreement between Russia and Syria was reached, in 1969, whereby the two countries will explore and develop the oil industry of Syria in joint cooperation.⁶⁵ A barter agreement was signed in the same year between Yugoslavia and Syria. Yugoslavia agreed to provide machines and equipment for development projects in Syria. In return, Syria will export large quantities of oil to Yugoslavia. This trade agreement has a monetary value of \$100 million.⁶⁶

In 1967, a contract was awarded to an Italian firm

TABLE VI

PRODUCTION OF THE MAIN INDUSTRIES IN S.A.R., 1967-1970

Industry	unit	1970	1969	1968	1967
Asphalt	ton	23.6	29.1	20.1	12.7
Salt	ton	46.3	31.5	29.7	19.6
Sugar	ton	123.7	113.8	83.1	72.3
Veg. Oil	ton	25.1	26.3	22.9	26.1
Olive Oil	ton	15.5	25.6	21.9	24.2
Margarine	ton	6.5	5.7	4.0	3.9
Canning	ton	5.5	3.6	4.8	4.2
Chocolate	ton	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7
Macaroni	ton	4.4	2.4	2.4	2.9
Biscuits	ton	2.3	1.7	1.4	1.4
Alcohol	mil.lt.	6.7	5.2	4.5	3.8
Tobacco	ton	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.1
Silk & Cotton	ton	27.0	28.3	23.8	28.3
Tricot	ton	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
Woolen Cloth	mil.Mts.	6.1	4.5	2.6	1.6
Stockings	doz.	906.0	1,179.0	1,091.0	997.0
Underwear	doz.	847.0	756.0	710.0	601.0
Wool Yarn	ton	1.7	1.5	1.4	0.9
Silk Yarn	ton	2.2	2.4	2.4	3.4
Cig. Paper	m.bookl.	93.0	99.3	93.2	80.9
Rubber Shoes	m.prs.	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.9
Soap	ton	21.2	18.7	14.2	13.9
Matches	m.croz.	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.4
Oxygen	m ³	812.0	556.0	551.0	392.0
Paints	ton	3.1	2.3	1.2	1.2
Cement	ton	964.0	993.0	917.0	688.0
Glass	ton	15.9	13.7	16.1	12.8
Refrig.	one	16,895.0	16,621.0	10,000.0	7,701.0
Televisions	one	7,590.0	6,728.0	4,208.0	6,250.0
Washing Mach.	one	15,937.0	12,634.0	11,395.0	9,298.0
Electricity generated	mil.KW	946.9	934.0	773.2	676.1
Cotton yarn	ton	20.0	21.1	17.3	19.4

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus, Table 85, page 145.

for the construction of a pipeline at a cost of \$900,000; it now transports oil from the Soueida and Rumaila fields to the Homs Refinery and then to the Tartous Port for exportation.⁶⁷ Two other pipelines, both foreign-owned, extend across Syria and provide an important source of revenue to the government. The Aramco pipeline extends across approximately 100 miles of Syrian territory but much of it is presently in Israeli-occupied territory.⁶⁸ The pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Company has recently been nationalized by the Syrian government in a joint effort with the other Ba'athist state, Iraq (Iraq nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company).⁶⁹

The Homs Refinery, which was built prior to the Ba'athist regime, has recently been enlarged to meet the requirements of the new supplies of oil.⁷⁰ In addition, the waste product from the Homs Refinery, oil coke, is to be utilized by a new electricity generating plant in Homs.⁷¹ Other development projects have emerged from the by-products of the petroleum industry. For instance, the nitrogen fertilizer plant at Homs, with a potential output of 148.5 million tons annually, has an annual hard currency savings of L.S. 30 million.⁷² The petroleum industry is also looked upon as a training center for petroleum engineers and skilled labor.⁷³

In the development of a socialistic economy in Syria,

the Ba'athists have found the agricultural sector considerably easier to develop than the industrial sector because industry was controlled for so long by "capitalists" and "foreign managerial entrepreneurs" who had knowledge of the technical, commercial, and even personnel relations required for the modern age. Still another impediment to industrialization has been the inconsistencies in policy formation among the various factions within the Party itself. For example, these factions disagree as to the extent and rapidity desired in the implementation of the Party's program of industrial socialization. It is apparent, however, that socialism remains both the goal and the propaganda instrument of development and unity and that socialism is working in large measure. Now that Syria is in its Third Five Year Plan, many people--not all, of course--have become accustomed to identifying with the socialistic slogans, expressions, and programs of the Ba'ath Party.

Public Works

As mobility is a condition of modernization, the Ba'athists say that the duty of the state is to construct a modern system of transportation that is consistent with the progress of the country. The Ba'athists, therefore, intend to increase the length of paved roads and implement a rural roads project in order to connect country and towns, thereby

facilitating the marketing of agricultural products. Additional bridges, railroad lines, and air transport facilities are to be established by the government; and existing ones are to be expanded and improved.⁷⁴

During the period from 1963 to 1970, the total length of motorcar roads increased from 7,886 kilometers to 11,687 kilometers. These figures include asphalted, non-asphalted, paved, and leveled roads, and amount to an approximate 48 percent increase in kilometers. The greatest increase during this period has been in the asphalted road category, which realized an increase of approximately 78 percent in total kilometers. The smallest increase was in the length of the leveled roads. The 1970 total is only 29 kilometers more than the 1963 total. It is claimed, however, that this almost static number is due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war with the consequent Israeli occupation of portions of Syrian land.⁷⁵

Syria presently has 733 kilometers of ordinary gauge railway track.⁷⁶ The Aleppo-Tabaqa line, consisting of 148 kilometers and completed in 1970, links the production area of the Jezira in northern Syria to the Mediterranean Sea port of Latakia. This new railway provides a relatively inexpensive transportation means for goods going to Iraq.⁷⁷ In addition, the governments of Syria and Iraq announced in January, 1970, that the two countries would cooperate in the building of a 500-kilometer railway which will lie parallel

to the Euphrates River and will eventually link the Gulf area to the Mediterranean area. This line will carry farm products of the Euphrates Valley and aid in the economic development of both Syria and Iraq.⁷⁸

Narrow gauge railroad tracks, which constitute 307 kilometers, are found totally within the Hejaz railway system and were in existence prior to the Ba'athist government.⁷⁹ The three-nation Middle East Hejaz Railway Recommissioning Board, however, announced in 1970 that the two-gauge system would be remodeled to ordinary gauge track and used to transport phosphates from Syria and Jordan to Saudi Arabia for export.⁸⁰

In 1970, Syria affirmed that it would receive modern railroad carriages from Russia.⁸¹ Machinery and equipment for railway expansion will be furnished by India in return for rock phosphate from Syria.⁸²

The port of Latakia, which has been in existence for approximately twenty years, is served by six foreign lines.⁸³ The Ba'athist regime has extensively developed this port and has been able to realize a 122 percent increase in imports since 1963. During this same period, however, exports have decreased 16 percent in the Latakia port. Table VII reveals the type of goods imported through this port. Another port which was begun by the Ba'athist regime and completed in 1970 is the Tartous Harbor. This port is connected by the major

TABLE VII

GOODS IMPORTED THROUGH LATAKIA PORT, 1963-1970

(In 1000 Tons)

Goods	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	1963
Cement	20	37	10	10	10	10	10
Iron & scrap	259	275	172	176	202	112	131
Wood	110	105	79	75	81	72	77
Sugar	142	103	111	112	83	71	49
Rice	39	30	40	36	33	29	26
Machines	68	87	84	62	66	39	57
Chemical	195	165	141	80	130	95	73
Foodstuffs	58	52	51	59	53	124	24
Fibers & textiles	18	27	22	13	22	15	18
Oils and fats	27	43	55	21	37	25	29
Asphalt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canvas	18	20	8	3	11	7	20
Cereals & their derivatives	402	109	328	163	275	-	-
Miscellaneous	119	112	77	79	104	83	149
Total	1475	1165	1178	889	1107	682	663

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 115, page 180.

highways, the railroad line that runs to Homs and Aleppo, and the oil pipeline from Homs.⁸⁴

In 1963, surface dams did not exist in Syria. By 1967, 29 dams had been constructed, providing water for 100,000 citizens. During the following year an additional 31 surface dams were constructed. From 1963 to 1968, almost L.S. 27.7 million were expended to develop projects which provide drinking water for 1,204,528 persons in 964 rural villages.⁸⁵

Both political and financial problems confront the government in the building of the Euphrates Dam. This project began in 1968 and has an estimated cost of L.S. 2,400 million (\$628 million). Before the project can be completed, agreements concerning how the waters of the Euphrates River are to be shared must be completed between the other riparian states, Turkey and Iraq. In 1963, West German officials agreed to issue credits of approximately DM 350 million towards fulfilling the foreign exchange costs of the dam. Because of deteriorating diplomatic relations, however, this financial offer was nullified in 1965. Russia and Syria then signed a technical-financial agreement for the initial stage of construction in 1966. This pact provides the necessary technicians and L.S. 600 million (\$157 million) towards the meeting of the foreign exchange cost.⁸⁶

The Third Five Year Plan of Syria (1971-1975) provides for an L.S. 1,593 million investment on the Euphrates Dam and in the Syrian General Budget for 1970, L.S. 529 million or 34.3 percent of the amount allocated to development projects for the year is to be expended.

Because of its social and economic importance, the complete electrification of the country is another important target for the state's development and operation, according to Ba'athist philosophy. The General Electricity Institution has thus been established by the government to supervise the production and distribution of electricity. The implementation of the Euphrates Dam project is one of the major achievements toward this goal as the connecting power station will have an initial capacity of 200,000 kilowatt hours.⁸⁷ In 1969, another large project was also announced, the building of a \$2.5 million electricity generating plant in Homs.⁸⁸

The airports in Syria were not capable of landing large freighters and passenger jets until the 1969 construction of the International Airport under the Syrian Arab Airway Network. This new airport is located 26 kilometers south of Damascus.⁸⁹ The reason for this relatively long distance from Damascus is the fear of air attack from Israel such as that witnessed in the 1967 War. With the airport's location a distance from Damascus, it is hoped that the city will not

be bombed. Table VIII shows the air transport traffic at Syrian airports for the years 1963 through 1970.

Syria signed an agreement with Poland in 1969 for construction of an assembly plant for automatic telephones.⁹⁰ In the following year, Russia and Syria agreed to the installation of direct telephone and cable links between the two countries. The lines have been laid between Moscow and the Euphrates Dam. The stated purpose of these lines is to expedite information pertaining to the importation of any necessary equipment and raw material needed for the Euphrates Dam.⁹¹

In April, 1969, the assistant-director of the Postal and Telecommunications Department acting under the Ba'athist program announced that a ground station will be set up to receive telecommunication through artificial satellites.⁹² The proper government officials, furthermore, have made agreements with both Russia and France on cooperation in satellite communication. Russia is also providing the necessary technicians to train Syrian personnel who will handle the communications between Damascus and Moscow.⁹³

Housing

In the attempt to build and improve houses, the government under the Ba'ath says that it intends to cooperate with the private sector which is to provide the necessary capital

TABLE VIII

AIR TRANSPORT TRAFFIC AT S.A.R. AIRPORTS, 1963-1968-1969-1970

Years & Airports	Freight (kgs)		Number of Passengers			No. of Planes	
	Unloaded	Loaded	Transit	Disembarked	Embarked	Arr.	Dep.
<u>1963</u>	702035	2073258	44724	83125	85526	7172	7168
Damascus	565490	2001317	40092	58780	59923	4992	4990
Aleppo	102560	44106	4614	12495	12915	1105	1104
Kamishli	23832	7984	1	5541	6358	232	232
Latakia	5971	17399	17	2045	2059	300	300
Palmyra	867	883	-	1101	362	236	234
Deir-el-Zor	3315	1569	-	3163	3909	307	308
<u>1968</u>	813770	544896	29869	113981	121084	3819	3817
Damascus	785476	525901	26325	103612	108230	3367	3368
Aleppo	16205	5562	3544	3274	4488	221	220
Kamishli	6710	10586	-	3081	3709	105	103
Latakia	1227	904	-	705	814	27	27
Palmyra	-	-	-	12	15	9	9
Deir-el-Zor	4152	1943	-	3297	3828	90	90

TABLE VIII (continued)

Years & Airports	Freight (kgs)		Number of Passengers			No. of Planes	
	Unloaded	Loaded	Transit	Disembarked	Embarked	Arr.	Dep.
<u>1969</u>	872730	769100	33309	156758	159808	4377	4380
Damascus	825251	745357	26318	124607	123662	3640	3644
Aleppo	27931	10972	6943	13851	15243	404	403
Kamishli	14146	9295	28	6711	7820	116	116
Latakia	710	605	-	76	61	26	26
Palmyra	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Deir-el-Zor	4692	2871	20	11513	13022	191	191
<u>1970</u>	1557989	827706	63860	152284	154419	5435	5433
Damascus	1519010	812462	55603	118708	116240	4640	4639
Aleppo	18195	9102	8257	13336	13971	590	591
Kamishli	13665	3467	-	8004	9741	156	156
Latakia	580	460	-	76	53	32	30
Palmyra	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Deir-el-zor	6539	2215	-	12160	14414	217	217

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 118, page 182.

and contracting ability. In addition, the government says that it wishes to encourage the establishment of cooperatives for housing construction and the securing of loans.⁹⁴ To further this program, the Popular Credit Bank was founded by the state in 1966 to assist in financing small loans; and the Real Estate Bank, with a capital of L.S. 25 million, was also established.⁹⁵ It is difficult, however, to ascertain the success of housing programs. It is obvious that because of the pressure to develop heavy industry and improve agricultural production, plus the defense needs, a public housing such as found in many countries has not been either strong or successful thus far in Syria. In fact, it is obvious that socialist governments in most underdeveloped countries put houses far down on the list of necessary priorities.

Municipal and Rural Affairs

The Ba'athist government also maintains that it is seeking to secure a feeling of compatibility between all sections of the country and between all classes and includes the urban-rural relations. The government goal, therefore, is to re-distribute and increase municipal and rural services to the areas deemed most important to the state. These services include the securing and improving of the quality and quantity of water resources to municipalities and villages,

the renovation of apartment houses, and the redistribution of the population. The state says, furthermore, that it intends to provide more transportation between cities and rural areas in order to improve marketing operations and the transport of people. To enable the state to be consistent in this stage of socialist conversion, the Ba'ath says that all existing legislation pertaining to municipal and rural affairs will be modified legally. The amendments include new financial and ownership laws for municipalities, the appropriation, organization, and development laws for cities, and the water institution laws.⁹⁶ Emphasis will be on public ownership and operations as well as improved services and facilities.

Foreign Economic Relations

The Syrian Ba'ath government imposes the same strict control over imports and exports as it does over internal development. Only government agencies can participate in foreign trade. Foreign exchange rates are also rigidly controlled by the government.

The government says that it wishes to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries and will do so along the general policy line that is "based on independence in exchange and rejection of subjugation."⁹⁷ It is especially interested, it says, as has been seen, in Pan-Arabism and

Arab unity. In its program, the government thus claims that it will take any steps necessary to realize the Arab Common Market. This Common Market, it says, will allow capital to move unrestricted between the Arab countries and promote economic unity, a solid base for political unity and independence. National savings are considered as the primary source of financing the state's economic development; but at this stage of rapid development, the government says that it will exert all efforts to obtain credit from "friendly" countries (which particularly means those countries that are unfriendly to Israel). As in most underdeveloped countries that act socialistically and nationalistically, however, all foreign investment must be subsidiary to and complementary to national investment; this situation creates the classic paradox of how one secures funds from a banker whose "loan" from one was not signed. In any case, any foreign investment is to be limited to special cases, subject to state law, and accompanied by a thorough study of the circumstances involved in the case.⁹⁸

Foreign economic trade even with "friendly" countries must be on a basis where those countries will

Cooperate on equal terms which do not infringe on the sovereignty of the state in order to increase the country's exports and secure the best possible markets for them, and meet the country's needs of inexpensive imports necessary for the industrialization of the country as well as the consumption requirements of the people.⁹⁹

Syria's foreign trade problem, then, is reflected in the deficit in the balance of payments which has continued into 1970. The total trade of both imports and exports fell during the year by approximately L.S. 51 million, from L.S. 2,201 million in 1969 to L.S. 2,150 million in 1970. The L.S. 31 million decrease in imports from L.S. 1,405 million in 1969 to L.S. 1,374 million in 1970 represents a conscious effort made by the government to restrict imports. In November, 1970, restrictions on several imported items, including luxury goods, were lifted; but this measure has had little or no effect on the 1970 figures.¹⁰⁰

Exports for 1970 decreased L.S. 15 million from L.S. 790 million in 1969 to L.S. 775 million in 1970. The total trade deficit, however, was reduced about L.S. 37 million from L.S. 621 million in 1969 to L.S. 584 million in 1970.¹⁰¹

There has been a definite change in the pattern of Syria's foreign trade which is visible from the 1969 and 1970 figures. (See Table IX for a list of the suppliers and markets of Syria in order of importance.) The most apparent change is the general trade with Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union has continued to be the major supplier to Syria, it has dropped into third place as a Syrian foreign market. On the other hand, Italy has risen from third to first place, a rise which also represents a rise in Syrian

TABLE IX

MAIN SUPPLIERS IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Soviet Union	Soviet Union
Italy	Canada
West Germany	West Germany
France	Italy
Iraq	Iraq
China	Lebanon
Lebanon	Japan
Czechoslovakia	France
Great Britain	Bulgaria
Japan	Czechoslovakia

MAIN MARKETS IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Soviet Union	Italy
Lebanon	Lebanon
Italy	Soviet Union
China	China
Jordan	Japan
Turkey	Turkey
France	France
Poland	Jordan
Spain	Iraq
Iraq	Egypt

Source: "Syrian Trade Pattern in 1970 Shows Major Direction Changes," Middle East Economic Digest, XV, No. 36 (September 3, 1971), p. 1003.

exports from 12.7 percent to 21.5 percent during 1969-1970. Imports from Italy, however, fell from 8.8 percent to 6.5 percent during this period. Although with insignificant amounts of imports from Syria, Canada has appreciably increased its exports to Syria and has risen to the second country of importance in terms of trade.

Syria's imports from the Eastern European countries declined from 24.4 percent in 1969 to 21.5 percent in 1970 (See Table X), and its exports to these countries also declined from 31.1 percent to 18.8 percent. These declines are revealing, in that they show a reversal of the trend since 1957 towards increased economic dependence on the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Yet another trend is the 6 percent decline between 1969 and 1970 in exports to other Arab countries. During this period, however, imports increased 3.4 percent. The Syrian government intends to promote additional trade between the Arab countries and has taken several steps in this direction. One of these steps is the 1970 economic pact between United Arab Republic, Syria, and Iraq. In this pact, the governments hope to form joint enterprises in such areas as land reclamation, foreign trade, construction, and the creation of a bank with joint capital. This bank will finance trade operations between the three states, as well as their foreign trade transactions. Another economic union, which was men-

TABLE X

SYRIAN FOREIGN TRADE 1970 (LS millions)

	Imports	%	Exports	%
Arab States	242.3	17.6	193.1	24.9
EEC	297.8	21.7	230.4	29.7
EFTA	142.6	10.4	18.8	2.4
E. Europe & USSR	295.6	21.5	145.7	18.8
Japan	80.2	5.8	54.3	7.0
China	37.6	2.7	60.6	7.8
Canada	97.0	7.1	0.2	.03
USA	47.2	3.4	2.9	.4
Others	429.8	31.3	69.3	8.9
TOTAL	1,374.6	100.0	775.3	100.0

Source: "Syrian Trade Pattern in 1970 Shows Major Direction Changes," Middle East Economic Digest, XV, No. 36 (September 3, 1971), p. 1004.

tioned earlier, is the Arab Common Market. This market united six Arab countries into a customs union in 1971.¹⁰²

Economic Policies of Regulation and Finance

The Ba'ath argues that rapid economic development is a responsibility of the state, but duties regarding economic regulation must also be considered since the state is primarily responsible for the guidance of the national economy. The Ba'athists believe it to be common knowledge that "the extent of state interference in the economic life of the country under a socialist system is a matter that is not subject to discussion."¹⁰³

One of the most important elements to the Ba'athist regime is the stability of its economic policy for Syria. That is, Ba'athists argue that future objectives beyond the temporary regulation for passing purposes should govern the economic policy of the state. Here the Ba'athists say that their interpretation of stability does not mean static conditions, but a long-term and studied change which will be consistent with improved conditions for the national economy.

The vital principle stated is that the economic policy of the state should be based upon the achievement of full employment through the elimination of all types of unemployment, including concealed and temporary unemployment. Full-employment, it is further argued, is attainable primarily

because Syria does not have the problematic density of population.¹⁰⁴

Prices

To carry out its basic goals of Arab nationalism--unity, social justice, and morality--the Ba'ath, as has been seen, not only advocates nationalization, but has carried out an extensive program in this direction. At the same time, it argues that such a policy helps to solve the problems of inflation that a free enterprise system witnesses during a process of economic development. Specifically, nationalization of the main industries and of foreign trade enables the government to develop a program for setting the prices of products within the public sector which protects against runaway inflation. The Ministry of Supply is given the responsibility of maintaining stability in internal prices, including prices in the private sector. A General Consumption Authority has also been established to aid in this matter. Special consideration, it is claimed, is given also to the limitation and adjustment of rents.¹⁰⁵

Wages and Salaries

The policy of the state, meanwhile, prescribes an improvement in the standard of living for the working classes. Still, since economic development demands an increase in capital formation, the state policy prohibits any increase

in consumption that may interfere with the process of capital formation. Therefore, an increase in wages and salaries can only occur with a net increase in productivity. Distribution of housing, health, and education benefits are to be reorganized in order to redirect these benefits to the working classes. The Ba'ath also states that there is a necessity for the establishment, by the state, of consumer cooperative stores which will allow consumer goods at fair prices.¹⁰⁶

It is obvious that the objectives and the necessities above are often antithetical. At this stage of development, it does not appear that the conflicts have been well adjusted and general observation (statistical data being unavailable) indicates that improved "real" wages, salaries, etc., have often been sacrificed in the interests of capital formation and investment by the state. Under the initial stage of socialist control, this sacrifice occurs in most of the underdeveloped countries.

The Financial System

The Ba'athists, meanwhile, propose necessarily that radical reform must be taken in the financial policy of Syria since the burden of directing the national economy falls upon the socialist state itself. In order to achieve additional revenue, the tax situation in the state must be adjusted.

It is claimed, however, that this adjustment is to be done on a basis that will achieve equality between the citizens and thus force the wealthy to pay a larger share than formerly.¹⁰⁷ A summary of the state's policies for the achievement of revenue are as follows:

1. To support the direct income tax system by (a) preserving the ascending scale of taxes (progressive income tax), (b) applying this income tax on commercial and industrial profits in order to levy the tax on actual profits, (c) introducing a special direct tax on full occupation (that is, the self-employed individuals), (d) carrying out the direct tax on income arising from ownership of buildings, (e) expanding the application of the wages and salaries tax (at present the tax is applicable to government employees only), and (f) converting the cattle tax to a direct tax on animal products.

2. To reconsider the agricultural product tax and develop it on lines that render it close to equality and in line with the importance of the agricultural sector in net national income, while taking into consideration the effect of annual changes in production on the agricultural taxpayer when this tax is applied.

3. To reconsider the basis of the taxes on inheritance, wills, gifts, and donations in a manner that realizes the principle of equality in income between citizens.

4. To introduce a general tax on income that will be in line with the targets of the socialist conversion.¹⁰⁸

To execute the financial policy and to reform the fiscal system, the government naturally argues that it must have the necessary technicians. Some officials of the state thus will be sent (and are) to socialist countries to obtain practical procedural studies. Special training courses have been organized to improve the technical skills of those who are not sent abroad. The state policy is based upon a "hardship policy," in that the state claims it must receive the maximum results with a minimum of expenses. The government also says that it intends to utilize trained technicians who can point out any area of waste in expenditures.¹⁰⁹

The Currency and Banking System

The Ba'athists also see a need for radical reform in the banking system before the banks can perform their socialistic duties. A summary of the new state policies under the Ba'ath follows:

1. Establishment of a unified banking organization and the realization of banking specialization on the basis of economic sectors (agricultural bank, industrial bank, real estate bank, foreign trade bank, internal trade bank, people's credit bank and cooperative credit institutions.

2. Redistribution of financial resources between

banks, after completion of specialization, and in line with each bank's needs and importance to the state.

3. Spread of branches of banks where they are needed and are applicable throughout the country.

4. Reorganization of the basis of credit lending to meet socialist standards.

5. Upgrading the concepts of banking methods to enable the banks to perform their duties correctly and efficiently.¹¹⁰

Savings and Consumption

To create savings for socialist-development purposes, the Ba'athist Party and administration advocates that the people "tighten their belts." (See section on Wages and Salaries.) The government also encourages the people to increase their personal savings, the banking system being directed to assist this purpose. Consumption is to be decreased by a limitation on the import and purchase of luxury goods and services.¹¹¹ If this step should fail, the Ba'athist government, although it claims it does not stipulate this process, can deliberately inflate prices to curb consumption. This occurrence is possible because, as previously noted, finance in this state is not an "independent" factor, but an agency of control.

Public Welfare

At the present time, many of the social policies of the Ba'ath Party in Syria are intended, in actual implementation, merely to provide the minimum of service to all the citizens although, as the Ba'athists proclaim, the Party is particularly interested in guaranteeing needed services to the poor struggling classes. More exclusive social policies that the Ba'athists sometimes mention are not to be actualized until some future date.¹¹² For, they hasten to add, because production and economic development must have primacy, only those social services that are directly linked to the foregoing (which assists or gives to the economic development and production increase needs) will be provided now to any great extent.

The family, it is admitted, being the basic unit of society, is entitled to the protection, development, and aid of the state. Since marriage is viewed by the Ba'ath as being essential to the successful family, the state accepts a role in the regulation of it.¹¹³ That is, it is said that one of the duties of the state is to remove from marriage the economic and social obstacles that have traditionally existed among the Arabs, such as the dowry demanded by a father for his daughter. This dowry frequently was financially excessive for the prospective bridegroom, particularly

if the daughter came from a wealthy and influential family. Also, such dowries tended literally to breed "gold" to "gold" and inbreed wealthy families or a financial "aristocracy," as well as to form unions on other than mutual love and respect.

Despite the "population explosion" in underdeveloped countries, the Ba'athists believe that it is binding upon parents to increase the number of children and on the state to assist in this goal.¹¹⁴ To ensure the health of a child, a couple must, however, undergo an extensive medical examination prior to marriage. If it is found that from this union a mentally or physically defective child might result, the marriage is forbidden. This action will also serve the purpose of not allowing a financial and social burden to be placed upon the state and society.

As for medical care, the Ba'athists believe that the state, at its own expense, should establish modern medical facilities and provide "scrupulous medical treatment" for all of its citizens. Provision for free medical treatment is considered to be fundamental to Ba'ath socialism. To liquidate the private sector in the field of medicine, the state, therefore, is to expand educational facilities in the field of medicine and to provide medical doctors and clinics and treatment for all of its citizens.¹¹⁵

Although the Ba'athists contend that their socialized

medicine has provided a greater program for the average citizen in Syria than before, the medical facilities and doctors are thus far located primarily in the urban areas. The medical technicians who are assigned to rural areas are limited in educational training. Many of the elite party members, moreover, are doctors themselves who find it in their own interest to hinder the real growth and development of socialized medicine.

In Table XI the statistics show that there are approximately sixty additional medical treatment facilities of all types which were established during the period 1963-1970. The medical facilities available reached a peak of 424 in 1969, but were followed by a decrease to 400 facilities in 1970. Although the overall view shows a total increase, of primary importance is the decrease in 1970, which can be attributed mainly to the dissolution of medical dispensaries available to the average rural citizen. Still another fallacy in the statistical reports is the fact that many of the hospitals are simply empty shells that have not been equipped or staffed.

There is little mention by the Ba'ath of the non-productive member of society except for the stipulation in the Ba'ath Constitution under Article 40: "The state will provide for the subsistence of invalids out of the total national product."¹¹⁶ It is not clear, however, who and what

TABLE XI

MAIN INDICATORS FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT IN THE S.A.R.

1961-1963, 1967-1970

	1970	1969	1968	1967	1963	1962	1961
No. of Physicians	1623	1513	1437	1403	978	966	1001
No. of Dentists	376	353	350	345	292	288	246
No. of Nurses	*883	1113	1030	483	698	859	685
No. of Midwives	566	300	371	223	290	269	283
No. of Pharmacists	1099	594	616	422	348	341	375
Total	4547	3873	3804	2876	2606	2723	2590
Av. No. of people to one physician	3849	4127	4345	4133	5427	5362	4967
No. of medical institutions	400	424	402	383	340	345	309
No. of beds	6216	6156	6135	6206	5914	5583	5543
Av. No. of people to one medical institution	15618	14727	15533	15141	15611	15013	16092
Av. No. of people to one bed	1005	1014	1018	934	897	928	897

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 198, Page 356.

*Excluding male nurses.

the words "invalid" and "subsistence" actually cover. There is inference as to coverage in the brief outline in the Syrian Program of the March Eighth Revolution:

1. Caring for orphans and the deprived;
 2. Establishing institutions and providing rehabilitation for the disabled;
 3. Establishing institutions for the dumb and deaf;
- and
4. Developing prisons and rehabilitating prisoners.¹¹⁷

Surprisingly, there is no specific mention of what, if any, special services shall be provided for the 180,000 Palestinian refugees now living in Syria.¹¹⁸ However, the Nomads of Syria, who outnumber the industrial workers, are necessarily treated with special attention by the Ba'athists, who view Nomadism as an embarrassment, an aspect of underdevelopment that hinders real productive growth. The intent of the Ba'ath therefore is to confine all the Nomads on granted land and to replace the tribal system of rule with the laws of the state. Once they are confined and have conformed to this restriction of territory, they will receive the same benefits of the state as will any other Arab citizen.¹¹⁹ Some actual developments have occurred in this program, but it is difficult to secure accurate information as to the extent of the "enclosures" or the resulting treatment of those "enclosed."

Social policies concerning labor are necessarily important to all economies, particularly to the economy of an underdeveloped country such as Syria. In striving to reach a stage of full employment, the Ba'ath proposes that either physical or mental work is mandatory, and such work will be guaranteed by the state to all citizens who are capable of working.¹²⁰ (Mental work is placed on a par with physical work probably because of the academic background of the leadership.) There is to be no exploitation of labor. Wages are to be sufficient to provide "at least a proper standard of living."¹²¹ Just labor legislation is to be enacted to provide labor with paid vacations, old age insurance, compensation for "just" unemployment, limitation of working hours, and the right to form unions. In this connection, since the privileges and guarantees are all given through the state, the unions that will exist will be, in actuality, largely "tools" or agencies of the state.¹²²

Under the "Ba'ath Formulas for Change Program" in Syria, however, the Congress gave the working class the right to strike, but this right is true only in principle, not in actual practice. It also emphasized that labor, student, professional, and feminine popular organizations should have complete freedom within a socialist/national framework. It further stated that there is

. . . the need for them [unions] to be independent of

the state authority, so long as that authority is marching towards the socialist transformation and so long as the current situation has not yet been transformed into a socialist reality.¹²³

In a further attempt to improve the productivity of the labor force in Syria, the Ba'ath has gathered a considerable amount of statistical information pertaining to labor. Included in this section, therefore, is a statistical survey on labor and its activity: the distribution of unions and members grouped according to economic activity, Table XII; the number of unions according to economic activity, Table XIII; distribution of labor force according to economic activity, Table XIV; the distribution of labor force according to education status, Table XV; and the distribution of population by labor force and manpower, Table XVI.

Education

According to its spokesmen, it is the intent of the Ba'athist state to achieve universal literacy and to re-create an educational system that will give education a national and scientific aspect which will allow the coming generations to receive a "profound, total, and coordinated understanding of human knowledge."¹²⁴ In addition to the traditional courses offered, there will be a program of vocational training and the "discipline of emotions and good taste."¹²⁵ Committees are to be set up by the government, and some of the starting points in the reconsideration of

TABLE XII

NUMBER OF TRADE UNIONS & MEMBERSHIP

Economic Activity	Trade Unions	Registered Members
Mining	8	5842
Manufacturing	61	56370
Construction	14	16457
Public Utilities	10	6512
Commerce, Banks, & Insurance	11	11571
Transport	26	32421
Government & Non-government services	36	33871
TOTAL	166	163044

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 232, page 415.

TABLE XIII

NUMBER OF TRADE UNIONS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
1963-1970

Economic Activity	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Mining & Quarrying	7	9	12	12	7	7	8
Manufacturing	86	68	77	85	62	62	61
Construction	8	10	10	11	13	14	14
Electricity, Gas, & Water	10	13	13	13	9	9	10
Commerce, Banks, & Insurance	17	15	16	17	11	11	11
Transport	21	22	24	24	22	26	26
Government & Non- government services	32	38	41	36	36	36	36

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 230, page 414.

TABLE XIV

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
1969

Economic Activity	Male	Female	Total
Insurance & Services	170,430	19,560	189,990
Transport	44,217	588	44,805
Commerce	131,811	1,100	132,911
Construction	74,176	112	74,288
Public Utilities	6,784	216	7,000
Mining, Petroleum, & Gas	137,238	12,738	149,976
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, & Fishing	684,200	638,436	1,322,636
Others	44,177	5,157	49,334
TOTAL	1,293,033	677,907	1,970,940

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 228, page 413.

TABLE XV

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS
1969

	Male	Female	Total
Illiterate	634,187	628,162	1,262,349
Read Only	27,497	1,079	28,576
Read & Write	464,675	23,685	488,360
Elementary Certificate	109,152	8,447	117,599
Primary Certificate	20,064	3,470	23,534
Secondary Certificate	25,505	11,028	36,533
University	11,953	2,036	13,989
TOTAL	1,293,033	677,907	1,970,940

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 226, page 409.

TABLE XVI

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY LABOR FORCE
AND MANPOWER, 1969

	Male	Female	Total
Employed	1,214,078	671,557	1,885,635
Unemployed	78,955	6,350	85,305
Outside of Labor Force ¹	426,520	1,052,144	1,478,664
Outside of Man Power ²	1,459,929	1,366,764	2,826,693

¹Figures include government employees, military, and population in the occupied territory and refugees.

²Men and women under the age of 18, the disabled population, and those in retirement.

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus, Table 224, page 407.

the framework for education are summarized as follows:

1. Expanding primary and secondary education through compulsory methods and establishing additional free schools;
2. Securing and improving teachers, their methods of instruction, and their material;
3. Eliminating private schools;
4. Diversifying secondary education through the addition of vocational studies and an emphasis on foreign languages;
5. Reconsidering the university system's curricula and methods of research, and channeling of students into proper branches of study;
6. Limiting the number of university students; and
7. Reconsidering the school books at all levels of education.¹²⁶

Considering the many difficulties encountering it, the Ba'ath has been successful in Syria in the partial achievement of some of the above goals as well as others.

To achieve the goal of universal literacy the Ba'ath has increased the number of elementary schools and the enrollment therein. There has been an absolute increase of 508,909 primary school students in seventeen years.¹²⁷ Education on the preparatory and secondary level in Syria has been made free and compulsory. Currently, of the total graduates of primary schools, however, only 20 to 30 percent will continue

toward a higher education.¹²⁸ This situation occurs largely because of limited finances of the state, which are still further drained through the expense incurred in the attempt to universalize literacy (a minimum requirement of six years of primary education). In fact, in 1964 the Ba'ath established what they call "anti-illiteracy schools" in order to educate the illiterate adult citizen, and in 1970 the adult students and teachers therein more than doubled.¹²⁹

Another hindrance to the furthering of secondary education is the rise of vocational education, which also requires a comparatively large amount of capital outlay, although, as shown in Table XVII, these vocational schools are able to accommodate only a small segment of the students. In terms of preparatory and secondary education, however, definite progress is seen in the student enrollment--an increase from approximately 148,000¹³⁰ during the period 1964/1965 to 281,254 for the period 1969/1970. Table XVIII reveals the distribution of schools and pupils for 1970.

The Five Year Plan of Syria (1960-65) estimated that 50 percent of the primary school graduates would be accepted into vocational preparatory schools with half in government schools and half in private schools. Another estimate allows that by the end of preparatory school training, 85 percent of the possible students were to be enrolled in general schools, with 15 percent entering vocational education. During

TABLE XVII

DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, & PUPILS
BY SPECIALIZATIONS
1970

Specialization	No. of Teachers	No. of Pupils	No. of Schools
Industrial	670	6,800	14
Feminine	37	272	5
Commercial	101	1,266	8
Agriculture	222	747	8
TOTAL	1,030	9,085	35

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 226, page 339.

TABLE XVIII

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLS AND PUPILS AT THE
PREPARATORY AND SECONDARY STAGES
BY PROVINCE, 1970

Province	No. of Schools	No. of Sections	No. of Pupils
Damascus	179	1,769	73,432
Aleppo	96	994	42,937
Homs	99	743	30,810
Hama	83	623	27,996
Latakia	90	571	25,573
Deir-el-Zor	23	216	9,881
Idleb	50	365	15,446
Hasakeh	33	291	12,430
Al-Rakka	16	81	3,063
Sweida	17	168	7,147
Dara'	35	238	9,828
Tartous	83	461	19,456
Quneitra	9	81	3,255
TOTAL	813	6,601	281,254

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 182, page 335.

this same five-year period, 80 percent of the preparatory school graduates were to be accepted into general and vocational secondary education with 60 percent in government schools and 20 percent in private schools. By the close of this period, 25 percent of the enrollees in government secondary schools were to be channeled into vocational education with 75 percent proceeding to general schools. There is no material or information from the Syrian government as to whether this plan was ever implemented, and if so, to what extent it has been successful.¹³¹

The Ba'ath recognizes that the supply of teachers, educational facilities, methods of teaching, and equipment must be improved and expanded. There has, indeed, been some progress made insofar as the funds allocated to education from the general budget has increased considerably (see Table XIX). Yet, a survey of elementary school teachers in Syria reveals that only 62.6 percent of the men and 82.8 percent of the women constituted the regular teachers. The remaining percentage being of temporary arrangements with various contractual agreements. Of the regular primary teachers, only 16 percent have secondary school certificates. "Officially," the secondary schools are to hire teachers with at least a college degree; but because of the shortage of college graduates and the salary scale, many are hired with doubtful academic standards. With the exception of higher

TABLE XIX

FUNDS SET APART FOR EDUCATION FROM
THE GENERAL BUDGET, 1945-1970

(Thousand Syrian Pounds)

Years	<u>Funds for education</u>				% of educa- tional funds
	General Budget	Lower	Higher	Total	
1945	103678	9954	-	9954	9.6
1946	129704	14127	-	14127	10.9
1947	125821	16966	-	16966	13.5
1948	127909	20459	-	20459	16.0
1949	130710	22278	-	22278	17.0
1950-51	215720	38783	-	38783	18.0
1951-52	265000	49769	-	49769	18.8
1953	205000	36604	-	36604	17.8
1954	208000	37097	-	37097	17.8
1955	260570	49540	-	49540	19.0
1956	324054	52678	-	52678	16.3
1957	415515	59392	-	59392	14.3
1958-59	461118	64024	-	64024	13.9
1959-60	493375	71557	-	71557	14.5
1960-61	512225	70469	-	70469	13.8
1961-62	554425	80068	-	80068	14.4
1962-63	943372	140800	-	140800	14.9
1964	728288	139736	-	139736	19.2
1965	710588	126868	-	126868	17.8
1966	783009	159455	-	159455	20.4
1967	864624	140671	16792	157463	18.2
1968	1142715	154921	22890	177811	15.6
1969	2199278	157615	26730	184345	8.4
1970	2780000	177364	49225	226589	8.1

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 178, page 331.

education, furthermore, all persons in the teaching profession or in related educational positions must be Arab nationals.¹³²

The study load of students in Syria consists of 30 periods per week, and students are allowed during the last two years of secondary school to select either a "literary" or a "science" course of study. Most students select the science course because of governmental pressure which argues in behalf of the needs of developing the Arab world.¹³³ The methods of teaching, however, hinder the students because the general method in the Middle East is still mainly a matter of memorization and recitation of the facts without questions being stimulated or allowed by the teacher. Other hindrances include the lack of proper educational materials and facilities. Mostly Western books are used, many of which have been poorly translated or are of inferior quality and quantity. Also, many of these books are not readily adaptable to the needs of the Arab in his locale. Proper libraries and laboratories are still practically non-existent.¹³⁴

The granting of rights to women has produced an emphasis on the establishment of co-educational schools. The benefits of granting rights to women have been quite impressive in Syria. This measure in itself, can be considered a revolution of social mores because of the Arab's traditional emphasis on the segregation of sexes and the subordination of

women in business and in political life. From the educational view, however, this consolidation allows for a reduction in per-unit cost of education, a savings which will enable the government to erect and/or improve educational facilities. In the rural areas, moreover, the government can now justify the expense of establishing schools because the additional number of girls provides for a sufficient number of children to be educated within a particular rural area.¹³⁵

The Ba'athists, then, view education as a role of the state and believe that the state alone should indulge in it if the results are to be in accord with the national interest. They have thus written in their Constitution, under Article 45, that "all private or foreign institutions of learning will be abolished."¹³⁶ In Syria, the Ba'athist government has nationalized the former private foreign schools; and although they retained the same administrative personnel in many cases, the school program itself must conform to that of the state. It is carefully regulated through the Ministry of Education.

A few Syrian nationals, approximately 1,500, are granted government scholarships for college-level studies. Some of these students study in Syria; whereas others go abroad. As one might assume the predominant countries of study are the socialist ones.¹³⁷ It is interesting, though,

to note in Table XX that only about 12 percent of the students who study at their own expense select the socialist countries. Since Syria is not able to offer educational programs for higher specialization in certain areas, the government, as shown in Table XXI, has granted a total of 436 scholarships up to 1970 for study abroad.

Information

Information, as defined by the Ba'ath, has an important role in moving the revolution ahead. "Information" coupled with educational media is communication which strives to eliminate the ideas and beliefs of the old society deleterious to the new, to enlist people in support of the national interest, and to persuade the people to work more extensively than before in the support of the development programs. The government emphatically denies, however, that information services will be used like those of individual dictatorship systems which rely on an "approach to instincts, lying to the people, and various other means of psychological influence."¹³⁸ What the difference is, however, is not precisely clear. The Ba'athist targets in the use of information are also to explain their goals that are to be achieved by the revolution, to spread a social, national, and humanitarian consciousness, and to bring Arab emigrants near to the motherland in terms of aid to further its national causes.

TABLE XX

NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO STUDY AT THEIR OWN EXPENSES
BY SUBJECT & COUNTRY OF STUDY - UP TO 1970

Country of Study	<u>SUBJECT</u>						
	Total	Fine Arts	Law & Commerce	Lit. Sciences	Eng.	Med.	
Arab Countries	9758	62	3776	3812	557	888	663
Western Countries:	11118	80	469	517	582	2955	6515
W. Germany							
Italy							
France							
Spain							
Belgium							
Switz.							
Turkey							
Austria							
England							
Socialist Countries	2929	13	58	64	201	1272	1321
U.S.A. & Canada	946	5	103	44	124	369	301
Others	210	2	10	11	20	73	94
TOTAL	24961	162	4416	4448	1484	5557	8894

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 193, page 348.

TABLE XXI

STUDENTS OF HIGH SPECIALIZATION HOLDING GOVERNMENT SCHOLARSHIPS
BY COUNTRY & SUBJECT OF STUDY - 1970

SUBJECT OF SPECIALIZATION	TOTAL	BULGARIA	CZECH.	YUGO.	U.A.R.	SPAIN	LEBANON	FRANCE	SWITZ.	POLAND	BELGIUM	ENGLAND	U.S.A.	E. GERM.	W. GERM.	AUSTRIA	U.S.S.R.
Literature & Languages	9	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Engineering	121	-	3	1	5	-	-	40	-	-	-	5	2	2	-	1	62
Mathematics & Metrology	15	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
Agriculture	68	1	1	2	18	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	8	1	-	-	33
Medicine	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	28
Pharmacy	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Sciences	55	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	39
Statistics & Planning	9	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
Industrial Sciences	33	-	1	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	21
Sociology	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5
Psychology	6	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
Archeology	5	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1
Librarianship	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Law & Economics	29	-	-	-	3	-	-	5	1	1	1	-	10	-	-	-	8
Socialist Economy	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Commerce & Accounting	28	-	-	-	7	-	-	4	1	1	8	-	4	-	-	-	3
Physical Training	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
Arts & Decoration	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Theatre & Movies	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	436	1	5	3	50	1	1	70	3	4	9	6	33	8	9	1	232

Source: Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts, 1971, Government Printing Press, Damascus. Table 194, page 349.

In the achievement of these objectives, the Ba'athists have proposed a program which includes the following:

1. Establishment and support of the Unity Institution for Printing and Publication;
2. Establishment of a Journalism School and encouragement of a Journalist Union;
3. Preparation of pamphlets and documentary magazines in foreign languages to acquaint the world public opinion with the experiences of socialist conversion and the progress of the state; and
4. Expansion of the broadcasting systems and television stations in order that the voice of Syria may reach other Arab countries and all other parts of the world.¹³⁹

Tourism

The Ba'athist government asserts that tourism should no longer be confined to the rich, but is of unique value to all persons in the state and the state itself. First, therefore, it is considered to be an important means for economic and social development and the obtaining of foreign exchange through encouraging foreign tourists to visit Syria. Moreover, tourism, it is argued, has cultural and educational aspects for the Syrians by developing an interest in the homeland. Tourism between people of different nationalities also promotes an understanding.

The Ba'ath maintains, however, that the tourism field should be basically of a private nature and that the private sector must take an active role in this field. Still the government says that it intends to give full support to the private sector in the promotion of tourism.¹⁴⁰ There are two public tourist organizations in Syria: The National Tourist Organization of the Syrian Arab Republic, founded in 1958, and the Youth Tourism and Travel Organization with three branches, established under the Ba'athist regime in 1966. It is clear that the leaving of tourism presently in basically private hands is to encourage foreigners to tour Syria. If the government were to take over its ideal of tourism for all within the country, it would not be able to carry on more basic needs. At present, therefore, it talks about tourism for all, but provides help for practically none, even restricting foreign travel by Syrians because of the foreign exchange problems and political necessities.¹⁴¹

Culture and National Guidance

The Ba'athist state also attempts to provide public opinion "with cultural production that deals with the struggle of our people against Zionism, backwardness, and imperialism as well as the struggle in this country for socialist construction and people's democracy."¹⁴² In order to spread

this culture, the state authorities indicate that they will use a variety of means, such as writing, translation of foreign authors, the theatre and cinemas, and all other arts. The practical measures to accomplish these goals include the development of cultural centers, an increase in the availability of library materials to rural and urban citizens, and the reducing of prices for printed materials. A cultural series to be established will introduce projects for writing, and the General Cinema Organization will be established to administer a new cinema industry.¹⁴³

Civil Liberties

Upon examining the Ba'ath Constitution, one can clearly discern its formal pretence at following the institutions of Western parliamentary democracy. Democracy in fact (as in the West) and real civil rights, however, are of secondary importance to the achievement of Ba'athist goals, and thus of national interest, which are defined and determined by the Ba'ath Party and its ideology.

As has been seen, Razzaz views society as a historical reality that includes a continuation of the Arab nation through the ages. The latter is not something that stops and then must begin anew. The interests of Arab society and the Arab nation are considered to be far superior to the interests and the needs of the individual. Article 38 of

the Ba'ath Constitution states that "the family is the basic unit of the nation; it is the means and society is the end."¹⁴⁴

In Bronislaw Malinowski's Freedom and Civilization, Razzaz finds support for his thesis that Arab society as such is the primary consideration and that it must remain superior to the individuals that comprise it. Malinowski maintains that freedom grows with civilization and that it is necessary for society to set conditions, rules, and laws to acquire and preserve the liberties of man. Thus the concept of Razzaz is like that of Malinowski's and is the antithesis of Harold Laski's theory of absolute freedom for the individual (in the period before Laski became a Marxist), a theory which maintains that man must be totally free of government restrictions to be a man and that society, too, cannot establish conditions, rules, and laws that would infringe on his personal liberties without destroying his individuality. Razzaz states, "When society realizes its happiness and goals, then man realizes his own happiness."¹⁴⁵ Hence Razzaz is also in agreement with most of the great collectivist socialist writers versus the anarchists, be they libertarians or conservatives. Man is individualized by a society, especially a good society; he is not restricted.

Aflaq agrees with Razzaz that there is a need for the restriction of liberty even by the "executive" to enlarge the common good and thus the human being in the long run.

In those countries where the popular movement has grown to the extent of participating in the government, as in Syria and now in Egypt, we believe that we can now allow some enlargement of the power of the executive and restriction of personal liberty to allow faster progress toward our objectives.¹⁴⁶

It is thus apparent that Aflaq believes that as the power of the Ba'ath Party increases, the amount of individual freedom in the sense of license should decrease; but this situation will mean ultimately the good life for all. This process is to be carried on until the time when the indoctrinational policies of the Ba'ath have been effective enough to create an awakening in the Arabs as to the proper awareness of themselves and their interests. When this proper awareness occurs, it will be possible to increase their so-called individual freedoms accordingly; for then the masses will see these freedoms as the good of all, the Arab nation.¹⁴⁷

Aflaq's ideas may also be compared with those of Rousseau. True freedom, according to Rousseau, is possible only if man lives in an orderly and useful way and as a part of the general will. This belief is reiterated in the fundamental principles of the Ba'ath Constitution,

The value of members of the nation is to be assessed--after they have been granted an adequate opportunity--exclusively on the basis of efforts on behalf of the Arab nation and its efflorescence.¹⁴⁸

With similarity to Rousseau and Hegel as well, the Ba'ath

finds the "true freedom" of the individual in the enacting of all his potentialities to the fullest, but as the member of a people and nation. Thus the equality of the Arab citizen is determined by his potentialities, which are to be directed toward the rebirth and renewed growth of the Arab nation. It is the shaping of his own destiny, his Spirit as a part of his people, by which the Arab man becomes "truly free."

The Ba'athists claim that the right to vote is a primary one. Only if people have this freedom, the Ba'ath believes, is the state truly democratic. This requirement is particularly true if the government applies coercive pressure on the individual. A further political freedom is stated within the Ba'ath Constitution: "There will be freedom--within the limits of Arab nationalist ideology--in the establishment of . . . parties . . ." ¹⁴⁹ Historically speaking, however, the Ba'ath has not tolerated the existence of other political parties except when they coincided with its own interests or with the so-called "higher national interest of the Arab nation" (as defined by the Ba'ath). In fact, the Ba'ath is the only legal political party in Syria at the present time. Aflaq himself has stated that an individual either must be a true and loyal member of the Party, or is already a member unaware of this fact. In the latter case, he will have to be forced to become a member or, as

Kant would say, "be forced to be free." Aflaq states:

Our mercilessness has for its objectives to restore them to their true selves which they ignore, to their hidden will which they have not yet clearly discerned and which is with us even though their swords are against us.¹⁵⁰

In the fundamental principles of the Ba'ath Constitution, it is stated that "Freedom of speech, association, belief, and science are sacred, and may not be limited by any government whatsoever."¹⁵¹ And again in Article 41:

The state will be responsible for protecting the freedoms of speech, publishing, association, protest, and of the press within the limits of the higher interest of the Arab nation

The Universal Declaration holds that all persons are entitled to civil and political liberties. It is apparent, however, that the above statement, "within the limits of the higher interest of the Arab nation," again points out the belief of the Ba'ath that the masses have not reached their proper level of awareness or consciousness and the interests of the Arab nation are to be defined by the Ba'ath. These freedoms, therefore, are not supported with a precisely defined law and can easily be restricted or eliminated by the Party. In fact, this circumstance only reveals more clearly that a government with a single ideology, and with a single party system in control, cannot allow the right to differ from the official value system. Khalid Yashruti, a member of the Regional Command in Lebanon states the concept quite clearly: " . . .

those who disagree on the goals we preach, will have no freedom to associate."¹⁵³ While very little specific written and oral material is available for proof, it is generally known that the Ba'ath has actually restrained or completely done away with many of the liberties of speech, press, and assembly in Syria. Two cases in point, which occurred only five days after the rise of the Ba'ath Party to power in Syria, were the halting of demonstrations and the closing of approximately sixteen newspapers which were considered as opposed to the Party.¹⁵⁴

Of course, the Ba'athists maintain that they must restrict the social structure as they do because it is totally unacceptable: it embodies the domination of already privileged classes who are oppressive toward less fortunate people, hence, it does not allow for the development of all individuals, only some.

One of the most deprived classes, for example, has been women. They have been looked upon as simply a means of reproduction and have had nothing to do with the shaping of their own destiny. The Ba'ath claims that it intends, therefore, to liberate women and has included this liberation in its constitution.¹⁵⁵ The advocacy of and actual practice of women's liberation has served a two-fold purpose, in that it helps to create a greater nonacceptance of the past and of the status quo; and secondly, the support of it provides a

means to the acquisition and preservation of Ba'athist political dominance by adding women to its supporters. Under the Ba'athist state, woman is thus officially proclaimed to be an equal partner in the struggle for liberation and freedom. She has the right to vote, the right to equal education, the ability to express her beliefs, a share in the responsibilities of society, her right to work, and the right to petition for and secure, in some cases, divorce. At the same time she is enjoying these liberties, it is hoped that she will keep her qualities of motherliness, lovability, and femininity.¹⁵⁶ According to the Ba'ath, this measure will combine the best aspects of the role of the woman in both the West and the East.

Finally, according to Ba'athist principles and their constitution, the political status of religious minorities, as well as national minorities, is to be no different from that of the majority. As the Arab nationalism of the Ba'ath is spiritually humanistic, there can be no differentiation made, it is argued, as to race or creed.¹⁵⁷ Islam is not specifically mentioned in the constitution and, as has been mentioned earlier, Aflaq views the role of Islam as simply "a part of the moralistic and humanistic Arab mission," not the "State" religion.¹⁵⁸

Law and Order

The phrase "law and order" is subject to varied interpretations, some of which are highly charged with emotion. The distinction has frequently been made between order based on law with violence supporting it and order based on law with common agreement of the parties involved that the law is just. For example, at the Nuremberg trials that followed World War II, the German leaders were convicted, not for violating order based on law supported by violence, but for the "justice" within the legal system they followed which conflicted with the ideas of justice of the victors. This instance is true unless one believes in some absolute standard of justice such as in certain forms of "natural law." Nevertheless, this case is one where conflict arose between the values of order, law, and justice of one body of people and contrary ideas of the same by another.

The arguments concerning what is equal constitute, according to Aristotle, the very core of so many arguments about justice, particularly where order, law, and justice are intertwined theoretically and practically. Here Western standards of substantive due process usually mean that there must be a legal treatment of equality between equals, but even here the question remains of who shall be understood to be equal. In their consideration of "distributive" justice,

two forms of equality are envisioned: numerical and proportional. "Numerical equality" establishes the equality of each man (as a unit) with each other man, regardless of "merit." The rendering unto each man that which he is qualified to receive in accordance with his character, his achievements, his personality, his power, and his contribution to society (the polis) is defined as "proportional equality."¹⁵⁹

Having raised these jurisprudential questions which involve every legal system of a modern state and its political theory, this study now comes to consider the ideas of the Ba'ath as expressed and institutionalized, especially with violence to Syria.

The Judicial System in Syria consists of the Court of Cessation, the highest court of appeals, which is located in Damascus. Nine Courts of Appeal "beneath" this court try all criminal cases which are subject to appeal; and decisions of the court are given by three judges, one of whom is the President. There are also eighty-five Summary Courts each of which is presided over by one judge (Judge of the Peace). These latter Courts try both civil, commercial, and penal cases within their territorial jurisdictions. In 1962, a so-called People's Court was also established in Damascus, to hold public trials of persons accused of crimes or "insolences" against the state. In addition, there have been the tradi-

tional religious courts, but these have now been largely superseded by the civil courts. However, these religious courts--Muslim Courts, Druse Courts, and Courts for Non-Muslim Communities--still handle some cases pertaining to personal status such as marriage and divorce. The Courts for Minors were established with their constitution, officers, sessions, jurisdiction, and competence determined by a special law.¹⁶⁰ Finally, a Military Court, which was mentioned earlier, was established in 1965 to handle any problems dealing with demonstrations against nationalization.¹⁶¹

In the reorganization of the Syrian society legally and relative to the use of these courts, the Ba'athists have composed the following fixed-term program which they envision as a necessity in guaranteeing equality to all citizens in rights and duties before the law, protecting the new status in social relationships, and providing a firm base for the establishment of values for the new socialist society and legal order.

1. Simplifying judicial measures, thereby helping to effect justice, to provide the lower classes with means by which to gain their rights, and to protect public liberties;

2. Removing all corrupt and hostile elements from the judicature and state council;

3. Enlarging the cadre of judicature with a moral

staff qualified to administer during this phase of socialist transformation;

4. Establishing legal measures to ensure the independence of the judicature;

5. Broadening the authority of the judicature in the supervision and investigation of the administrative machinery; judicial power shall also be strengthened in the review of cases between citizens and government; and

6. Enacting a law of economic penalties in order to halt any action which infringes upon the economic development and socialist conversion of the state; this law is also to prevent any economic resistance shown by the reactionary classes against the new regime.¹⁶²

In Syrian law and order and the judicial process, the public interest (which, in effect, is that interest defined by the Ba'ath) is now assumed to be superior to the individual or private interest. The Syrian Constitution abounds with the phrase "according to the law," but this law is determined by the Ba'athist Party and means according to the public interest as the Ba'ath sees it. Although the constitution stipulates equality for all citizens in rights and duties and guarantees liberty, safety, and equality of opportunity, except as the Ba'ath decides that its standards shall be applied to all, it does not provide for a basis of impartiality in justice. Especially if a crime is committed against

the state (which means Ba'athist policies), it is considered to be more serious than one committed by one private citizen against another involving some "private" dispute. It is a nice question, of course, how there can even be really "private" interests in a truly socialist Arab-nation society. In making these observations, one must admit that this situation may be seen as not much different from the law, order, and justice generally existent in so-called Western democracies, insofar as the imposition of ideas of justice upon the law by a dominant class be concerned. But as the law or justice has in both cases resulted from the interests of some people who have had the power to define what is law and what is just. This situation is true as to the "substance" of the law.

The difference between the legal system and order in Syria, as seen by the Ba'ath, and that in Western democracies, it may be charged by some, is at the procedural level, wherein the Ba'ath members are treated more favorably (unequally) than ordinary non-member citizens. If this be true, then Syria follows a distributive system, not a numerical system, of justice on the assumption that the Ba'ath members are more deserving than others. The claim that this circumstance is true may be doubted by those who have read and now sense the truth in the "Godfather" or "justice" in the American system, where the "underworld" is more "deserving."

In any case, evidences of inequities are found in the positions before the Syrian law in cases between Party and non-Party members. In the case of X (this case and the following two cases cannot be documented because of the defendants' and/or their families' fears of reprisal), a former member of the pre-Ba'athist hierarchy had been allowed to retain private ownership of a relatively prosperous commercial business and had in recent years managed to recoup and rebuild parts of his previous business which had declined during the earlier period of "revolution." When he began to enjoy a greater prosperity, he came to the attention of Z, a ranking local party official. Mr. Z had been unable to accumulate those economic resources he felt both right and proper for his party position. When he learned of X's recent prosperity, he initiated steps within the legal system to acquire the property of X without remuneration. X then carried his case to the court, claiming protection under Article 26 of the Syrian Constitution:

Private property is protected; the law shall regulate its social function. Private property shall be expropriated only in the public interest, and a just compensation according to the law shall be paid.¹⁶³

The court, however, held that it was in the "public interest" for prosperous property to be taken and held by the state. The court also held Article 26 as the basis for its decision and awarded the property to the Ba'ath Party member, Z, as a

"trustee" for the state.

A case where "security" recently replaced both order and "justice" occurred because Colonel Y believed that the ruling members of the state had deviated from their socialistic and humanitarian goals and philosophy and he allegedly attempted to organize a coup d'état. His alleged attempt failed because one of the individuals who was approached to participate in the coup reported his actions to the state officials. The officials arrested Colonel Y and ordered him executed within two hours of his actual arrest without even an informal trial where defense could be given. This violation of "due process" was executed under Article 19 which states that "The state will protect the health of the citizens."¹⁶⁴ It was the contention of the state that this coup d'état would have endangered the "public and private security." It was further claimed that authority for summary execution without trial existed under Article 72, which provides for the creation of a special judicial unit at the discretion of the state.

Another example of the inequities that are found in the administration of the Syrian state law and its constitution is in the case of U, who was the son of a high-ranking party official and who, according to some observers, had drawn state funds without providing any work service for the state. This form of nepotism, which is practiced quite often

in Syria, received public attention when U was involved in an automobile accident which killed four peasants who were non-party members. Although it was immediately apparent that the said accident had resulted from negligence on the part of U, his case was never even presented to the courts. The families of the dead peasants received no compensation; furthermore, they were instructed not to discuss the nature or details of the accident.

As indicated above, it is apparent that the administration of Syrian law involves "proportional equality" as it favors the influential or, more particularly, the members of the Ba'ath Party, not the uninfluential or non-members of the Party. Or as the big brother pig in Orwell's Animal Farm says, "We are all equal, but some are more equal than others."

Foreign Policy and Defense

Since World War II, the international relations of Syria have been characterized by three particular elements: (1) the extremist stance taken by Syria against the West itself, or anything Western, because of previous colonialism; (2) the profound ambition of the leaders (especially Ba'athists) to achieve Arab unity through their own power and appeals to nationalism; and (3) Syria's involvement with the Soviet Union, because of the American anti-Arab, pro-Israel, and anti-

socialist position based on its own power politics (internal and external).¹⁶⁵

A formulation of a true anti-Western stance did not actually occur until the Baghdad Pact of 1955. As a result of this pact, a joint military command agreement between Egypt and Syria was signed. In 1956, during the Suez crisis, the pipelines in Syria were sufficiently damaged to halt the flow of oil to the Mediterranean. Further formative steps were taken in 1957 when the leaders of Syria not only refused to meet with emissaries of President Eisenhower, but also vowed to fight against any attempts to enforce the Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine was interpreted as another attempt to stop Arab unity and to maintain the political and economic status quo. With the actual intervention of the United States in the civil war of Lebanon, the anti-Western policies of Syria gained even more momentum. In 1967, however, the deterioration of relationships reached its zenith with the renewed Arab-Israeli war. Syria saw this war as a plot between the United States and Israel, Israel moving for expansionist reasons and the United States for the destruction of Arab nationalism and pro-Soviet alliances and positions.¹⁶⁶

The Ba'ath of Syria, believing itself to be the core of Arab nationalism, naturally took a strong stand against Israel. In an attempt to push Egypt away from any course

of "softness" toward Israel and toward what the Ba'athists consider the "true" course--the use of force completely to annihilate the "artificial" Jewish state--the Ba'athists in Syria during the latter part of 1966 released a barrage of propagandist attacks against Nasser, perhaps hoping to undermine his position in the Arab world. In May, 1967, and perhaps partially because of these propagandist tactics, Nasser gave orders for the blockading of the Gulf of Aqaba. The resulting war and the humiliating Arab defeat have only heightened the extremism of the Syrian government.¹⁶⁷ They refuse to discuss any alternative policies regarding Israel, other than that of a forceful confrontation and the ultimate destruction of Israel; of course, they are especially bitter now because Israel holds actual Syrian territory.

"Freedom is the natural right of all people."¹⁶⁸

This statement, the Ba'athists contend, represents the belief of all the Arab people and is the very basis of the Ba'athist relationship with all countries. Yet they hasten to add that this relationship with other countries must also include the stipulation as to "the extent of appreciation and understanding which they [the other countries] show toward our just causes."¹⁶⁹ These "just causes" specifically include the fight for their goals: "unity, freedom, and socialism" (not to mention the destruction of the Zionist state structure of Israel).

One of the most effective means the Arabs have shown toward the achievement of their goals is the attempt to weaken Israel militarily and economically. The policy of the Arab states, especially pressed by the Ba'ath, is to boycott any foreign corporations which carry on trade with Israel. A case in point are the corporations of Japan. After the massacre at Lod Airport (June, 1972), Premier Golda Meir, striving to use this incident for a practical purpose, suggested to Japan that it should apply pressure on the Japanese corporations to increase trade between the two countries. Japan found that it could not afford to comply because it is dependent upon the Arab states for approximately 30 percent of its oil. At the present time, Japanese trade with Israel averages a mere \$48 million (despite the "boycott"), but trade with the Arab countries reaches an overall total of \$1.7 billion annually.¹⁷⁰

On the other hand, Aflaq, insisting upon the nationalistic aspects of the Ba'athist ideology, has clearly stated his belief in a policy of non-alignment insofar as the two major power blocs, the Soviet Union and the United States, are concerned. He maintains that only harm to the Arab people can result from an alignment with either of these two countries.¹⁷¹ This policy, however, has not been carried out by the Syrian government; for the events between 1954 and 1957 culminated in a profound dependence upon the Soviet Union and

its satellites. Syria recognized Communist China, received military supplies from the Soviet Union¹⁷² (one arms shipment in 1957 was rumored to be worth approximately \$240 million), and entered into trade contracts with several communist countries. A twelve-year financial-and-technical-aid pact between Syria and the Soviet Union was signed in 1957.¹⁷³ Because of this fact and the growing communistic nature of Syria, Turkey became alarmed and stationed troops on the borders of Syria. An international crisis was averted, however, because Egypt and Syria united in 1958 under the name of the United Arab Republic. Nasser, as the head of the new republic, banned the powerful Communist Party (which the Ba'ath had previously cooperated with) and thereby succeeded in so limiting communist influence in Syria and Egypt that Turkey at least was mollified.

After the 1961 dissolving of the union between Egypt and Syria (a result of two forms of nationalism clashing), the Communist Party for a time re-established itself in Syria. At the present time, however, the Communist Party, as well as any other party, is officially illegal in Syria. The Arab-Israeli war of 1967, meanwhile, has caused an even greater dependence on the part of Syria for Russian military and economic aid as the Ba'ath Syrians now themselves see the danger in their own position in a military clash with Israel.¹⁷⁴ The part now is one of self-preservation from the Syrian point

of view. In addition to actual weaponry, the Soviet Union provided Syria with approximately 500 military technicians in 1969. Syria also sends several hundred men to Russia annually for extensive military training.¹⁷⁵

The influence of the military is thus reflected not only as foreign policy in general, but in the rising cost of defense for military modernization. Defense expenditures rose from L.S. 39.4 million (approximately \$10.2 million) in 1953 to L.S. 364.8 million (approximately \$100 million) for the fiscal year 1965, an increase of nine times the original figure. This is an expenditure of over 9 percent of Syria's Gross National Product for the year 1963 as shown in Table XXII. Since 1965, no statistics on military expenditures have been published.¹⁷⁶

The Ba'athists of Syria recently have begun to identify themselves with the Africans, Asiatics, and Latin Americans who feel oppressed by the West. As evidenced in the following statement, they intend to take on an international aspect in their struggle against the West which can be compared to Castro's evangelistic cry against "yankee imperialism":

We cannot remain in seclusion during the fight of other peoples in the world who are fighting for their national independence, national unity, and socialist conversion. We believe that the cause of freedom is one for all peoples of the world, and that the struggling of the masses should be broadened and extended to different regions of

TABLE XXII

Syria: Government Expenditures, and GNP, 1958-65

	Population (millions)	Government Expenditures (millions of Syrian pounds)			GNP	Defense (as % of GNP)
		Defense	Development	Total		
1958/59	4.7	268.4	80.8	531.2	2,595	10.3
1959/60	4.8	288.9	185.5	677.0	2,665	10.8
1960/61	5.0	295.3	248.9	749.5	2,886	10.2
1961/62	5.2	300.2	229.7	748.7	3,622	8.3
1962/63 ^a	5.3	516.7	313.1	1,217.4	3,741	9.2 ^c
1964 ^b	5.5	355.3	198.9	843.0	4,120	8.6
1965 ^b	5.6	364.8	403.6	1,114.2	4,141	8.8

Source: J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 159.

^aEighteen months fiscal period ending December 31.

^bBudget estimates

^cBased on an estimated defense expenditure in calendar 1963 of L.S. 344 million; or two-thirds of the outlay for the 18 month period.

the globe until imperialism and exploitation are stamped out, and the cause of liberty prevails in all parts of the world.¹⁷⁷

In this connection, the Ba'athists are trying to create an Afro-Asian socialist federation.¹⁷⁸ To date, this effort has met with little success.

To complete this section on foreign policy and defense, the articles published by the Ba'athist Ninth National Congress in the formulation of foreign policy are summarized and listed below and will perhaps give a comprehensive self-explanatory view of the international position which the Syrian Ba'ath is prepared to take.

1. The Party resolves to back and support the fight for liberty waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and stresses the necessity of meeting with progressive movements in countries of the Third World.

2. The Ba'ath Congress recommends promoting cooperation and friendship with all socialist countries.

3. The Party will fight alongside the Arab masses and all progressive forces in the world against old and neo-colonialism. It will participate with all progressive forces of the world in their fight for achieving the following objectives: (a) abolishing military bases and evacuating all foreign troops (from territories of people who desire their own independence); (b) fighting foreign pacts; (c) destroying nuclear and atomic weapons and banning nuclear tests; and (d)

stopping the world armaments race.

4. The Ba'ath Congress considers that capitalist and world monopolies have become the means to which neo-colonialism has resorted in dominating the world. It is necessary to face these monopolies and fight them with all means.

5. The Ba'ath Congress considers it necessary to expose the imperialistic racist nature of the Zionist movement and to secure support from the progressive forces of the world against Zionism.

6. The Ba'ath Congress recommends the necessity of economic cooperation and the strengthening of cultural and spiritual ties with developing countries.

7. The Ba'ath Congress does condemn all forms of discrimination and racial attitudes existing in the United States of America and in some racist countries in Africa.¹⁷⁹

In conclusion, this chapter on the role and function of the state is an attempt to reveal by some empirical evidence the practical status in Syria of carrying out by the Ba'ath its normative philosophy as to the functions of government.

It is apparent that the Ba'athist goals of socialism, technological modernization, Arab nationalism, and unity implemented within Syria are an attempt to provide the basis for what its leaders believe to be progressive and unified

Arab states. From a practical viewpoint, a large degree of success of the Ba'athist regime in accomplishing the goals--despite the agrarian society of Syria, where traditional social and economic status and foreign influences have long dominated the political system--has been due to ideological and practical pressures of (a) awakening a changed social and economic consciousness among many Arabs which advanced them beyond the rural and narrow tribal concepts of loyalty and responsibility; (b) emphasizing the value of participation by the masses; (c) instilling the belief that employment opportunities are both a right and a responsibility; (d) expanding education and basic social services, thereby realizing a fuller utilization of the human resources; and (e) forcing changed property relations that appear to mean greater control by larger numbers over the means of production and distribution of goods.

On the other hand, a major disadvantage to the development of the goals of a unified and progressive state has been the inconsistency which has resulted from the arguments between the Party's factions as to the extent and rapidity required to fulfill their socialistic goals and personal struggles for power, plus plans which include attention to military expenditures and war. The nationalization goals in Syria, moreover, though practically completed, have fallen short, in that the Ba'ath failed to apply the principle of

adequate compensation to the former land-holders and industrial owners, and caused unnecessary dissension and conflict. Political discrimination and police state administration have thus caused alienation and a mass exodus of the entrepreneurial class from Syria, a fact which can only result in a further disturbance of unity within Syria, as well as between it and other Arab countries. In the pursuit of its ends, the Ba'ath Party, through its actions in Syria, has failed to recognize that political stability and economic stability are necessary means and ends.

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CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

This work has been an attempt to explicate the philosophy of the Ba'ath Movement and its implementation in Syria. As has been seen, however, in order to understand and interpret the theory of Ba'athism, one must be familiar with conditions in the Arab world and its history. For example, one must have some awareness of the cultural differences that exist between the West and the Middle East. There must be also a first-hand awareness of the Arab attitude in regard to Western thought and influence. Especially must one have a sympathetic understanding and intellectual-empirical knowledge of how Western colonialism and its attendant policies are viewed by the Arabs of the Middle East as the enslaving and exploiting factors hindering Arab progress toward the modern era; for it is such knowledge which explains the movement toward independence and nationalism within each modern Arab state expressed by the Ba'ath. This work, then, has particularly demonstrated the following facts about the movement and its philosophy.

The Emergence of Nationalism and Ideology.--Individual nationalist and anti-colonial movements within the "paternal area" of each Arab state existed prior to World War I, but grew in intensity after World War II. These movements claimed to be seeking "Arab" independence and unity, but an extensive feeling for Pan-Arabism was not aroused until after the mid-twentieth century when a number of Arab states did secure a greater degree of overt political sovereignty, but felt threatened and humiliated by the establishment of Israel and subsequent military defeats by this new State. In the earlier period of independence, the Arabs had witnessed the division of the Turkish-dominated Arab World into mandates designed especially for the interests of particular Western nations. The new Anglo-French-American support for the Zionist cause became now an added stimulus for Arab nationalism and the movement for Arab political unity. Colonialism, it appeared, had crept back into the Arab World in this new political form, plus neo-colonialism through capitalistic business corporations. These factors appeared to many Arabs to be a threat to the new oil and business wealth and to the political, cultural, and social hopes of a modern Arab society. Socialism, meanwhile, both democratic and communistic as a political and economic theory, had become as widely known in the Middle East as in the West. Socialism tied to anti-colonialism

became especially used by the Communists in their appeal to all previous peoples to throw off the Western "Imperialist" yoke. Not only Lenin, but later Stalin, used this appeal vigorously in seeking to foment revolutions in still Western-dominated areas and against Middle Eastern governments which seemed still under Western influences. Many of the indigenous Middle Eastern landed elite, and new members of a rising middle class, meanwhile, had attended Western universities and learned the ideas of democratic socialism, as well as notions about self-determination of people and philosophic critiques of colonialism and inequalitarianism in the relations between ethnic groups. Also, with the Turkish yoke removed, schools such as the American Universities of Beirut and Cairo became hotbeds of Arab nationalistic ideas, wherein the Arabs were able to re-learn their own history and rekindle their cultural pride. Another important factor in the development of nationalism is that although the Arab people were subjected during all those years to foreign tutelage, they had--in the case of the majority--held relatively fast to the ancient religion of Islam as a unifying cultural factor wherein the Koran, originally spoken and written in Arabic, had caused the Arabs to feel as one people. This factor also became a political and economic influence with both negative and positive effects in terms of the new political social awaken-

ing and expression.

As has been noted, Michel Aflaq, a practical, ardent nationalist and a somewhat speculative philosopher, developed a theory expressed in popular slogans such as "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" and "One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission." It is within the context of the foregoing events, then, that one must describe and evaluate both the ideology and practical influence of Aflaq and the Ba'ath Party.

Metaphysics.--As noted in Chapter II, the basis for Aflaq's practical thinking is traceable to his metaphysics, which includes the traditional expression of Monism found in Islamic religion. This idea contains the idea (similar to that in the Judeo-Christian-Platonic-Aristotelian thought) of a universe which "hangs together," has meaning, purpose, spirituality, rationality, and morality because of the assumed existence of a Prime Mover such as the Islamic God, who created the universe and "wills" it so. Aflaq, however, reinterprets this message in the light of present, practical, and secular Arab problems centered around the need of the Arabs for political unity and socialism. That is, the philosophic notions are deliberately related to a specific Arab destiny in regard to the practical world. This fusion of Aflaq's contemporary political-practical concepts with classical religious ideas are logically made to imply that

the destiny of the Arab people is somehow connected with the very nature of the universe and thus an Arab nation is natural and should act as a unified, independent social, political, and economic entity. This claim is, of course, parallel to Zionism, including the "chosen people" idea, and to the ideas of evangelical Christianity (without ethnic underpinning) especially when the latter has expressed itself politically.

Epistemology.--The epistemology is equally eclectic. For example, although Aflaq and the Ba'athists, as has been shown, accept the "truths" of Islam, they depart as often as they choose from the philosophical methodology of the divine "revelation" of "the Book." In fact, at times they claim to utilize the modern scientific method, including modern skepticism, and the philosophic speculative and eclectic methods of secular philosophy. Here, the "revealed" goals are to be achieved (and at times modified) by pragmatism, utilitarian and positivistic knowledge. Also, in social policy, "socialism" as a correct goal which is known by empirical and rationalistic methods is wedded to the "Arab Eternal Mission," which includes nationalistic independence: a goal given by "revelation" and the "Book." When approaching Ba'athism, therefore, one must realize that epistemology is simply a practical tool for the political

end, just as it often is in present Western states.

Nature of Man.--Concerning the Ba'athist views on the nature of man, as has been seen, Aflaq has built on the spiritual values of the Arabs derived from the metaphysics which are not only inherent in their society, but essential to the development of human personality and thus to the success of the Ba'athist goals. More specifically and in the light of their metaphysical-ethnological-philosophical concepts, the Ba'athists see man as having both a unique "spiritual" individuality and the social character of "Arabism" and "socialism," which if properly institutionalized will help realize the Arab "Mission" of each member of the people. Psychologically, man is also seen as a synthesis of emotional and rational factors and of altruistic interest and self-interest. Through the "proper" institutionalized combination of these elements in a finally and fully unified independent Arab socialistic state, the Ba'athists argue again that it will be possible for each person to achieve the good life individually and the good society on a large scale.

Social Solidarity.--As the foregoing ideas indicate, the Ba'athists view society as being both natural and necessary for the perpetuation and fulfillment of the individual. The primary concern of the Ba'athists, they argue, is to develop a unified society with moral and equalitarian rela-

tionships free from class divisions and foreign oppression. The belief that this kind of society is possible is predicated upon the further belief that the Arabs can be led by reflection upon their past history of solidarity and by contemporary restructuring socially to become again one people and one nation with a political, cultural, and economic unity and "mission" that belongs to them alone; correlative to this belief is their argument that no foreign element has the right to share as exploiters in the wealth of the Arab world, also a necessary factor in social fulfillment and solidarity. The needed social coherence, therefore, is then conceived partially as the result of an inherent tendency toward unity which has existed within the Arab world for centuries. Partially, however, the Ba'athists believe that it will now require a new state or political apparatus and socialism in economics to achieve the destined goal of social solidarity and fulfillment. This belief causes Ba'athism to be committed to unite by use of the state all the Arab societies into a single political-societal cohesion and the institution of Ba'athist socialism.

Social Change.--The Ba'athists believe that the changes in the recent past in individual and institutional character have not had a sufficiently adequate and positive impact in

achieving the above goals. It is argued that the social change was so slowly evolutionary that it was but a tool utilized by the Western Powers and the indigenous elite to continue their self-interested domination and influence in the society of the Middle East. Change was used, like all other instruments of the conservative elite and foreign forces, merely to perpetuate greed, self-interest, inequality, and injustice. It, thus, will require revolutionary social change to modify the prevailing system and enable the Arabs to express their potential as persons and to achieve the goals and aspirations of a people. In stressing this need for revolutionary change--both political and economic--the Ba'athists continually place little emphasis on the potential contribution of the "individual," but see his role as being merely a part of a necessary larger social movement. Here their thought compares interestingly with that of many Western thinkers, such as John Dewey and E. Jordan, who insist that social problems can be solved only by social answers, certainly not by changing the states of mind of "individuals." Logically, then, institutional change, in such forms as religion, unions, the economic and political system, is integral to this belief, not a "change in hearts" of individuals. They thus advocate that institutions that are Western influenced must be drastically modified since they have resisted movement toward the desired social goals and have restricted

the Arabs in movement toward their "destiny." These modifications include change in regard to Western capitalism and the Western forms of democracy.

Nature of Politics.--As has been noted throughout this work, the Ba'athists consider politics as social harmony both as to goals and as to the power of achievement. Because the conquering-colonial nations utilized politics as power only, the ideal form--where order and feelings of justice are in balance--was not achieved. Specifically, as has been seen, to the Ba'athists politics is the moralistic-humanistic activity which will achieve the improvement of the material conditions of the masses while simultaneously improving their spiritual welfare. However, by accepting politics as power, also, and synthesizing it with the moral end, they believe that the large goal will result. Especially through the Ba'ath Party and nationalism--with Arabic history considered as an integral component of nationalism--the Ba'athists believe that they have the correct means to achieve this goal. Contrariwise, to legitimize power politics, the Ba'athists associate it with the nature of the present situation and the physical-spiritual needs of the Arab masses. Their dialectical definition of power politics thus brings a unity between power and social harmony.

Within a "truly" democratic society, the nature of

politics is often conceived to be a process by which human interests of a conflicting nature can be made public and means or actions be sought to minimize or eliminate the conflict of interests among the parties by compromise or accommodation or sublimation. As has been noted in the detailed discussion of this subject, the Ba'athists, by virtue of their revolutionary "needs" and doctrine, do not and probably cannot espouse such a process in formulating public policies. First, the social historical background of the Arab nation has created interests that tend to be highly diversified and unnegotiable, especially the recent class divisions, a non-functional elite, and foreign influences. The political philosophy of the Ba'ath thus avoids the so-called "open" process in handling specific issues and instead accepts the employment and the utilization of secrecy and of both physical and psychological power in implementing the Party program. This real--non-ideal--positive law and power politics process wedded to authoritarianism (rather than "democracy") is, of course, an attempt to develop a revolution--not maintain an orderly and just government now. This process even has a disruptive effect in that the specific devices of propaganda of fear and violence tend to limit the creation of a true general interest and make the constructive goals appear at times hypotonic. As in most states accepting the Machiavellian definition of

politics in fact as well as in theory, political instability results once the forces act practically and the masses are awakened and see through some of the artificial and/or superficial propaganda of their political leaders no matter how "ideal" the goals.

Yet within this context, it is clearly discernible that the utilization of power politics is what the Ba'athists believe will both allow and help their socialistic philosophy to achieve completion of the "Eternal Mission." In other words, once the revolution is completed, the Party believes that it will serve as the lubricant which the system needs to operate smoothly, efficiently, and justly. Hence will come the restoration of the national heritage, Arab "soul," and Arab "destiny" through a stabilized and harmonized society with an accent on politics as the good society.

Nature and Organization of the State.--Logically, the Ba'athists place an emphasis on national teleology and history with a continuing revolutionary "spiral" approach to develop their concept of the state. The Arab state in the past, according to the Ba'athists, was a moral revolution in itself. This true past (before the colonial-conquering nations) can be achieved again, but only through a rising revolution that will meet with the past one. In their deterministic

theory, only the Ba'ath Party, as the creative element or personification of the Arab destiny, will unite the forces of the past, present, and future into an organic whole in the "present."

With a strong and active state and the use of Partyism as a technique of politics, the Ba'athists intend to gain full independence and a state that is like "politics" both "powerful and truly moral." It will be a state which will not be created on the traditional Western theory of individualism, but will admit to the need of harmonizing the individual and the "whole." Each individual within society will be able to fulfill his responsibility through the state, rather than to use the state for his own purposes or have it used for purposes of tyranny. Despite Ba'athist lip service to individual freedom and liberty, the "real will" is the guiding factor for all state action, a will geared to the "national interest." The Ba'athists support this belief by arguing that a highly centralized and powerful state can bring both needed revolutionary social change and improvement for individuals. The State is thus to be "re-created" by the Ba'athists through the elements discussed before, including the forging of the Arab masses into a "peoplehood," the utilization of Islamic spirituality especially ethics and morals, and the use of socialistic methods.

As mentioned also in the foregoing material, although

Aflaq has recognized the importance of Islam and its culture to the Arab destiny and knows that these "Arab cultural and spiritual values" will remain, he does not see it as the driving force of the Arab people to the extent that the state should be Islamic; rather, it should be nationalistic and socialistic. To Aflaq, socialism and nationalism are not separate doctrines, but are "fused into one entity"; and Islam must not be allowed to be the determining factor in the shaping of the state, but must conform to the larger movement. Nationalism beyond Islam is to be the emotional tie in the Arab state. Religious persecution and other forms of exclusiveness are to be suppressed or eliminated. Of particular importance, then, is Aflaq's view of the secular role of Islam in the state as it serves the dual purpose of helping to cement the Muslim-Arabs, but eases the fears of the non-Muslims in the Arab world, and thereby provides a broader base of support for the Party.

As to the form of the State, the Ba'athists claim to believe in a constitutional parliamentary regime elected by the people. They argue, however, that this type of regime can only be achieved after the completion of the independence of the Arabs and after socialist goals are achieved.

As to who shall run the state, meanwhile, it is argued that the Ba'ath Party--a one party system-- is to control the parliamentary system; therefore, there will not

be a real democratic state in the Western sense. Until this time arrives, the state is to be controlled and led by an elite vanguard of the Ba'ath which will recognize the ills of the Arab society and will have the necessary strength and faith to command change. The elite, the dedicated and conscious few, is, however, ideally to be representative and responsive to Arab needs as a whole. There is, of course, no time limit stipulated for the disassemblage of this elite vanguard; it can only be assumed that Aflaq believes that the vanguard, because of its "spiritual" qualities, will not become a tool or instrument of repression.

It is through the Ba'ath Party that Aflaq hopes not only for the elimination of foreign influences within each Arab state and the gradual uniting of every Arab state into a Ba'athist socialistic state resembling a federation in form, but a unitary state as to party control. From the beginning, therefore, the Ba'ath Party, with its Communist-borrowed internal organization and cellular-structure, was established not on a regional basis but on an all-Arab-lands basis with branches established in most of the Arab countries in order to be a vehicle of both revolution and reconstruction within a particular Arab state and a unity in the broader Arab arena. The Party, therefore, although given birth in Syria with Damascus as its headquarters, is considered by many

to be the champion of Pan-Arabism and has followers in every Arab country.

At the same time, although the Ba'athists have borrowed, as has been seen, the internal organization and structure--cells, democratic centralism, and collective leadership on top--from the Communist Party, they denounce the Communist Party itself as a pillar of shuubiyah (belonging to the people) because it fails to stress the value of ethnocentric attitudes and values. The Ba'athists claim that although they will run the state, they espouse the concept of urubah, which denotes Arab communal consciousness, Arab self-awareness, and Arab identity; whereas Communism, with its internationalistic aspects, seeks to tie the Arab destiny to the destiny of other states, particularly to the Russian destiny. Still another situation considered equally intolerable by the Ba'ath in terms of who shall run the state is the Marxist view of class struggle. According to Aflaq and the Ba'athists, the only class struggle that should exist is between the Arab people and those who oppress them. It should not be between Arabs themselves.

The Role and Function of the State.--To point out the shortcomings of other economic systems as well as to overcome criticism and gain support from traditionalists who tend to identify socialism with communism and atheism, Aflaq argues

that the socialistic policies to be followed must be in accordance with religious principles especially reflected in the ethics of Islam. Since the past of the Arabs is identical to the Islamic past, socialism, he argues, is a uniquely ethical ideology. Ba'athist socialism, as an economic policy, has thus an "inner" strength because of the infusion of the "spiritual" values, thus making it more moral and humanistic while communism or capitalism are purely materialistic. (Here he sounds almost like the Catholic, Salazar) Through the linkage of Islamic ethics and socialism, which he claims strives for equal opportunity for all, Aflaq seeks to cloak Ba'athist socialism in both the Arab Mission and an historic Arab ethical ethnocentrism. This linkage is designed also to legitimize the role of the state in operating the economic system.

As the Ba'ath Party has seized control of Syria, its theories of government and public policy and the implementation of these theories may be seen in this country. The desired economic objectives (although not always consistent with one another) stressed repeatedly by the Ba'athist government include a high level of employment, a rapid increase in per capita income, a more equitable distribution of total income between regions and classes, a relatively stable price level, equilibrium in the balance of payments, self-sufficiency in certain industries for political and military purposes, and

a diversified economy, in short, almost all the ideal goals espoused by most modern states today.

To achieve these objectives, Ba'athist socialization in general has in fact promised policies of nationalization of many businesses, agrarian land reform and social ownership, and extensive economic planning. All banks, large industries, and various enterprises have been nationalized. In addition, the worker now participates in management and profits; foreign trade is completely under government control. Emphasis has been increasingly placed upon technical education; citizens are either being sent abroad for such education or attend special schools within Syria in order to provide the state with an adequate number of skilled technicians.

Although a large percentage of national wealth has been expended for military and industrial developmental purposes and there is a scarcity of trained technicians at the present, the Ba'athist government has made serious efforts toward the improvement of life and opportunity for the Syrians. These efforts are noticeable particularly in the areas of education, health, and agrarian reform. The changes in the economic and administrative structure of Syria have created a new social and geographical mobility with education seen as the key to rapid advancement in various positions which have not been open previously to the villager or the urban,

lower-middle-class person. Under the Ba'athist regime, education is high on the list of priorities, and considerable expenditures have been made in an effort to eradicate illiteracy through establishment of new schools, broader programs of curriculum development, and teacher training. The government policy has been one of discouraging minority ethnocentrism and encouraging the people to think of themselves as Arabs, not even as Syrians or as members of religious groups. In Syria, one can witness the new cultural values conflicting with the traditional cultural values as people seek to conform to the political, social, and economic changes.

The Ba'athist doctrine in Syria has been carried out to a great extent in order to achieve the aforementioned goals, but it has not been applied in some areas. Many "ultimate" basic rights--such as the freedoms of press and speech, the right to assemble, and the right to form political parties--are still either limited or prohibited. Many of the social services or provisions of public welfare called for in both the Syrian and the Ba'ath Constitutions have not been implemented. It is promised, however, that these services will be provided when Syria achieves a higher degree of economic development and international political stability.

In the field of foreign policy, a change from the ideology of Aflaq can be clearly seen in the doctrine of

the new Syrian Ba'athist elite. In direct opposition to Aflaq's policy of non-alignment and in true Marxist fashion, they advocate the aligning of the Party with oppressed people "everywhere" and state that capitalism must now be eliminated from the entire world, not only from the Arab states.

It is apparent that the program of the regime is, in fact, leftist and places less emphasis on Arabism and morality than is called for in the principles of Aflaq and his followers. In Syria, however, a new regime was established in 1970, when General Hafez el-Assad became the President and General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party. He has been a member of the Ba'ath since his youth; and although it is still too early to make an adequate assessment of his programs, he is considered to be a "moderate" with a greater tendency toward the ideals of Aflaq than those of the previous "doctrinaire" group.

A substantive point in regard to the above question of political change which should be made here is that perhaps this new regime, although possibly suffering a decline in ideological vigor by breaking away from the leftist-reformist tendencies, actually may be striving toward the creation of a more effective and stable institution than previously, that is, one more practical in nature and capable of adjusting its goals to the immediate needs of Arab people and Arabism. The

values of morality and competence as the requisites of legitimate authority and the massive and continually increasing problems of public policy reveals the difficulty in proving the true competence of a leader under the conditions of the constant change required in the underdeveloped Arab countries. The authority of such national leaders and their national movements becomes even more questionable when promised practical goals are not realized or even realizable. The truly "Arab" nationalists, therefore, can only hope that President el-Assad has the necessary ingredients of morality and competence, if not the charisma of the late Nasser of Egypt, and hence will be able to attain the desired degree of acceptance.

Obviously, through the many struggles to gain and to hold power in Syria, many of the ideals of Aflaq have been sacrificed; but there are still members of the Ba'ath Party who are totally committed to Aflaq's philosophy and are faithfully working to gain full control of the Party. All of these factions, nevertheless, have two serious problems: the maintenance of Party discipline over the Party's military element, and the determination of practical measures to be taken in order to achieve Arab unity and economic success.

As a direct result of various foreign policy, meanwhile, the Western Powers and the Communist bloc of Russia and China have consistently played a dynamic role in the

evolution of events in the Arab world. The Arab-Israeli conflict has particularly become the consideration that enables an ever-increasing participation by the Big Powers. Because the 1967 War has increased the frustrations felt by the Arabs, their leaders are being pushed with an almost fanatical demand for action or, as the Arabs contend, "the vindication of national honor." There are numerous obstacles to a peaceful settlement--lack of communication, pressure by Palestinian guerrillas for retaliation, etc.--but what can be considered of prime importance is the availability of military aid from the foreign powers. Although none of the Arab countries allow the Communist Party to exist legally in the Middle East--with the exception of Lebanon (and Israel) where the Lebanese Communist Party Congress was held in January, 1972, for the first time--the Arabs have found the Communist bloc countries "friendly" to their cause and anxious for an even closer relationship. The question thus arises as to what might be the consequence if the Ba'athists and other Arab nationalist leaders were willing to stop paying lip service to Islam and were really to accept "pure" communism. Obviously, because of strategic, economic, and political considerations, both Russia and China would be willing to support, more fully than before, the Arab goals of destroying what the Arabs consider the artificial-state structure of Zionist Israel and ridding the Middle East of all Western

influence. The necessity of the whole modern world for oil is the economic factor effective, of course, in practical affairs beyond all ideological considerations although no one power--Arab, Israeli, Western, or Communist--even seems to admit this fact.

To avoid a direct military confrontation with the West over oil and indeed to further Arab interests, it is clear that many of the Arabs, including some of the Ba'athists, would now settle for recognition of Israel with the stipulation of a reduction of Israel to the territorial borders set by the 1947 Partition Resolution of the United Nations and with a coalition government that would include all Palestinians who fled from their homeland in 1947. Such a position is naturally unacceptable to Israel. Because the Ba'athists and other leaders identify Arabism with Islam, however, they conceivably cannot accept communism per se and do not really want this type of an economic system, preferring actually a "mixed" economy. Viewing these factors and the ideology described, therefore, the only stable trend which can be predicted with a degree of certainty is that continued conflict will be the outstanding factor in shaping the internal and external policies of most of the Arab countries far into the future. To this conflict, Ba'athism remains an effective force.

Whether the Ba'ath Party itself, and hence the Arab

national movement, will perish if the Party fails in Syria is questionable. Certainly the role and influence of the Ba'ath in Syria (the first Ba'athist controlled state) and its impact in the Middle East cannot be under-emphasized. In regard to Syria's influence upon the Arab East with the Ba'ath at the helm, Dr. W. F. Abboushi, in his book Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century, states:

To the Western man Syria is 'sick,' to many Arabs she is the embodiment of 'Arab virtues' Whether Syria will perish in the heat created by her restlessness or be able to achieve her ambitious goals remains to be seen. We can be sure of one thing, however: whatever happens to her will have an impact upon the Arab world If Syria succeeds, the Arab world will be a different world.

Certainly, if the Ba'ath succeeds, the Arab world will have gained an ideology at least useful as a continued rhetoric for it, as "democratic-capitalism" has long been in the West.

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