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LARRY ALBIN HJELLE

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AS FUNCTIONS OF FAMILIARITY

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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ACCURACY OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS AS FUNCTIONS OF FAMILIARITY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between degree of familiarity with a person and ability to make accurate judgments of that person's behavior. A secondary purpose is to explore two related techniques for measuring judgment accuracy in order to determine the extent of comparability and, thus, generality between them. Following is a review of the literature dealing with the relationships between familiarity and several aspects of interpersonal prediction.

One aspect of the study of cognitive-perceptual functioning examines the process of how one comes to know and to understand other persons, their characteristics, qualities, and inner states. In most systematic approaches to this process, judging accuracy is included as a central concept (Asch, 1946; Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Cline, 1964; Murray, 1933; Sarbin, Taft, & Bailey, 1960; Secord &

Backman, 1964; Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). Each of these writers recognizes the relevance of accurate social perception for effective interpersonal behavior. For example, Cline states:

> In a great variety of formal occupations, positions of leadership, and marital, parental, and psychotherapeutic relationships, as well as in informal social units, effective functioning would appear to be critically related to and dependent upon our ability to perceive subtleties and nuances in the behavior of others (1964, p. 222).

Despite the accepted importance of the concept, disagreement and confusion about the meaning of judgment accuracy exist (Cronbach, 1955, 1958; Cronbach & Gleser, 1953; Crow, 1960; Gage & Cronbach, 1955; Gage, Leavitt, & Stone, 1956; Hastorf & Bender, 1952; Hastorf, Bender, & Weintraub, 1955; Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). Tagiuri and Petrullo (1958), for instance, view studies of the accuracy concept as yielding data that are inconsistent, difficult to interpret, and impossible to compare. In extending this position Tagiuri states:

> For a number of reasons, attempts at studying correlates of accuracy have with very few exceptions produced negligible correlations and yielded very little insight into processes. First there is no single satisfactory criterion against which to match the judgments. The criteria used--objective behavior, self ratings by the object persons, ratings by the experts, consensual ratings by peers--do not always agree and have very different psychological implications. Second, the disparity of tasks and abilities subsumed under the various operations

> called measures of accuracy have been glossed over. . . . There is furthermore the extreme dependence of results upon judgmental sets and upon the distributions of the variables that are to be judged. . . . It is the process rather than its achievement that one must investigate if a broad understanding of the phenomenon is to be reached (Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958, p. 324).

Crow (1960) challenges the implications of Tagiuri's position by recommending a cautious examination of any approach to interpersonal perception which ignores the accuracy issue. Rather, Crow considers both the degree of and the conditions leading to accuracy as aspects deserving of legitimate research.

The current interpersonal perception literature continues to reveal a sharp cleavage between research which emphasizes accuracy of judgment and that which focuses on process (i.e., how one judges). In specific instances, the accuracy versus process approaches blend, and of course there are research contributions that fit poorly into this simple dichotomy (Heider, 1958; Izard, 1960a, 1960b; Jackson & Messick, 1963; Leventhal, 1957; Levy, 1961, 1963). The bifurcation remains, however, a convenient categorical scheme from which to survey the work completed.

Definition of Judging Accuracy

In line with current usage, the term "judging accuracy" is defined as the discrepancy between a prediction

and a criterion, e.g., the self-ratings by a subject and the ratings attributed to him by a judge. More specifically, judges, after observation of some other individual or group (objects), are asked to estimate or predict some characteristic(s) of the objects for which some operational measure is available. Then the estimates or predictions are compared to some criterion measure of the actual characteristics of the objects, and a measure of the agreement between the two is taken as an index of the judge's accuracy.

Numerous variations of the operational definition of accuracy have been employed in a substantial number of investigations (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Dymond, 1954; Dymond & Cottrell, 1949; Secord, 1958; Shrauger & Altrocchi, 1964; Taft, 1955, 1966). However, the general experimental paradigm usually includes three components: (a) responses which the judge himself gives to the judging instrument, (b) responses the other person being predicted gives to the judging instrument, and (c) predictions made by the judge about the other's responses to the judging instrument. By summing the correct number of predictions made by each judge on the other person, a measure of judging accuracy is obtained.

Not all researchers agree that judging accuracy is a pure measure of the ability under investigation (Cronbach, 1955, 1958; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). Cronbach (1955), using the D^2 statistic (i.e., the squared arithmetical difference

between judgment and criterion ratings, summed over all items), has shown that accuracy scores can be partitioned into a number of possible sources of variance. Although the breakdown of the variance can be quite complex, three main sources are pertinent to the present study.

1. Accuracy due to assumed similarity refers to the degree to which the judge describes the other person as being similar to himself. When the responses of the judge and the object person are actually similar, accuracy will be a direct function of assumed similarity (Chowdhry & Newcomb, 1952; Nagel, 1954). Taft (1966) suggests two ways assumed similarity could have a differential effect on the accuracy of predictions of acquaintances and strangers: (a) The judge may assume more similarity in one case than in the other. Experimental verification of this notion is offered by Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960). They cite several studies which suggest that assumed similarity in judging persons whom one likes leads to greater accuracy in the judgments. (b) Acquaintances, rather than strangers, tend to be more similar to the judge; thus, due to assumed similarity, judgments of the acquaintances would be accidentally the more accurate.

2. Stereotype accuracy corresponds to a measure of how accurately each judge predicts the traits of the "typical" stimulus person. If the judge has an accurate

conception of how people of the object person's type usually behave in the situation in question, stereotype accuracy may occur. The categorical image may be very broad, such as "an adult human," or it may be as specific as "an introverted, Oklahoma, male student, age 21." It is expected that stereotype accuracy generally applies to judgments of strangers about whom only minimal information is known (Richards, Cline, & Rardin, 1962). In contrast, judgments of acquaintances have the additional advantage of the judge's accumulation of information about the behavior which characterizes the object person. Provided that the judge is capable of utilizing the additional information, it is expected that with increasing familiarity with the object person, the more accurate the judgments.

Sarbin et al. (1960) believe that all social perception judgments are based on stereotypes; that is, the judge categorizes the object person into relevant dimensions with known characteristics by a process of simultaneous and successive "taxonomic sortings." If the dimensions are simple, readily observable, or broad, one refers to the "stereotype accuracy" of the judgments; when they are complex, covert, or narrow, one is more likely to speak of the "differential accuracy."

3. The final source of variance in accuracy scores is the ability to predict differences between object persons

on an item or category in question (i.e., differential accuracy). It could produce a greater degree of accuracy in judging close acquaintances if the judge is able to combine the additional dimensions in a veridical manner.

In summary, each source of accuracy would seem to favor judgments of close acquaintances, and possibly casual acquaintances, over those of nonacquaintances.

Additional Sources of Error in Accuracy Scores

An even more detailed examination of the kinds of biases and response sets which can add error variance as well as "chance success" to accuracy scores is presented below, as originally delineated by Cline (1964).

Social desirability bias is the tendency for judges to predict the most socially desirable response when judging others (Edwards, 1959a). Cline and Richards (1964) reported that when making value judgments, judges differed more in choosing socially desirable answers than in predicting the accurate response. Special scoring keys were constructed to make it possible to analyze separately all possible combinations of correct response and socially desirable response. The finding indicates quite clearly that variation in selecting the socially desirable response may be more important than variation in accuracy in certain judging tasks.

Acquiescence is a response set whereby the judge tends to agree with or predict "yes" to items rather than to

choose the negative or "no" responses.

Making use of an "implicit personality theory" (Cronbach, 1955) is the tendency for judges to assume an invariant relationship between trait A (observed in the other) and traits B, C, and D (not observed but assumed correlated). Koltuv (1962) demonstrated the effect of perceived consistency in trait intercorrelations on judgments of people. She obtained personally relevant and nonrelevant traits together with the names of familiar and unfamiliar people for each of her subjects who then rated these people on both kinds of traits. The findings indicated that judges implicitly assumed a matrix of correlations existed among traits. These correlations were greater for unfamiliar than familiar persons, were greater among personally relevant than among nonrelevant traits, and were not wholly a function of the overall evaluative attitude of the subject or the logical connections between certain traits. In another situation unlike Koltuv's (1962), Secord and Berscheid (1963) studied the generality of trait intercorrelations, showing that certain types of traits are perceived as highly intercorrelated not only in judgments of people in whom these traits are commonly thought to appear together, but also in other people as well. However, Koltuv (1962) and Secord (1958) suggest that it is unrealistic to assume that people apply their implicit theories of personality indiscriminately

in the judgment of all people.

The tendency to make extreme judgments involves a response set whereby the judge gives a characteristic spread to his predictions, thus overdifferentiating in his ratings of others. As an example, one judge may show a large amount of variation in his ratings and another judge may confine all his judgments to a middle range. If both judges are equally skilled at social perception but distribute their ratings with unequal variability, the one who varies them less is likely to achieve the higher accuracy score (Brown, 1965).

A related phenomenon is the central tendency response set, whereby the judge sees most object persons as being very similar or alike and gives them mostly average scores with very little differentiation from other to other. If the judge is in the position of making judgments based on minimal information, he would be wise to restrict the variability of his judgments, giving people closely similar values.

A final source of error in accuracy scores is the occurrence of semantic ambiguities in trait terms. This may result if the judge interprets the trait term in the predicting instrument to mean other than that intended in its criterion development and use.

While it remains impossible to design a study that takes into account all the sources of error variance that

have been identified, a few investigators have sought for new approaches to the accuracy problem with more appropriate methodologies (Bronfenbrenner, Harding, & Gallwey, 1958; Sechrest & Jackson, 1961). For example, measures of differential and stereotype accuracy have been methodologically and conceptually isolated as two independent factors (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958). Furthermore, it has been shown that the ability to judge others cannot be adequately described by a single score (Cline, 1964; Sechrest & Jackson, 1961). Such specific investigations have emerged only recently. In sum, until a fully satisfactory measure of judging ability is found, the relation of accuracy to social perception variables eludes sharp focus.

Relation of Familiarity to Judgment Accuracy

Despite considerable research exploring the factors which influence judging ability, only a few studies have examined the association between familiarity and the accuracy of social judgments (Ferguson, 1949; Knight, 1923; Newcomb, 1958; Richey, 1953; Shen, 1925; Taft, 1966). The central theoretical question prevalent throughout most of these studies is whether one can make more accurate predictions of persons whom one knows well than of persons whom one barely knows. Taft (1955) entertains the possibility that knowing a person intimately may lead to so much information about

him that judgments may give too much weight to some data and far too little to other, more relevant, data. Another potential handicap in judging close acquaintances, as mentioned in the preceding section, is a set towards favorable judgments. Sarbin et al. (1960) consider the set to judge favorably as leading to complicated interactions between accuracy, degree of personal involvement, familiarity, and the attractiveness of the other person's personality. Moreover, such interactions could conceivably reduce the contribution which familiarity might make to the accuracy of various behavioral judgments. In brief, despite the available information a judge has when he evaluates another person, beyond a critical point additional knowledge may interfere with the optimal use of existing information. Only a limited number of studies bear evidence pertaining to this questionable possibility.

Knight (1923) examined the effect of varying lengths of acquaintanceship upon accuracy and reliability of personal ratings. Data obtained in this study were analyzed ratings of 1,048 public school teachers of one school system made by a supervisor under whom the teachers were working. He divided his subjects into four criterion groups to delimit acquaintanceship: Those rated who were known to the supervisor (a) less than 1 year, (b) an average of 1.3 years, (c) an average of 7 years, and (d) more than 8 years. The factor of acquaintanceship operated to make the ratings more

lenient, less critical, and less analytical. The author concludes "It is in the direction of truth to discount the ratings of judges when acquaintance has been long" (Knight, 1923, p. 142). Contrary to the findings of Knight, Shen (1925) found that friendship does not affect the accuracy of ratings in any consistent manner. He considered acquaintanceship as affording an opportunity for close observation, but at the same time as giving one a bias.

Richey (1953) compared the ability of institutional adolescents with that of community adolescents to predict responses of their respective peer group acquaintances. A questionnaire composed of items from the social and emotional scales of the Bell Adjustment Inventory was used to measure accuracy. Community subjects were found to judge members of their own group more correctly than institutional subjects who judged their own group. The finding was interpreted to mean that accuracy of social judgments depends upon factors promoting social-emotional adjustment. Both of the groups assumed similarity to their own members, and community subjects significantly more so. In retrospect, all of the results appear somewhat speculative, especially since the predictive accuracy and adjustment variables were measured by the same scale.

Another investigator has offered more conclusive data on the relationship between familiarity and accuracy of

personality judgments (Ferguson, 1949). He found that ratings made of assistant managers by traveling field representatives in an insurance company became more accurate as the acquaintanceship of the raters with the managers increased. Caution should be exercised in generalizing from this study, since its criterion of accuracy seems uncertain as well as quite limited in its scope.

As part of a larger study of changing interrelationships over time between interpersonal attraction and similarity of attitudes (both actual and estimated), Newcomb (1958) attempted to determine whether accuracy of estimates will increase with time, particularly at higher levels of attraction. The subjects of this study were 17 male students who transferred to The University of Michigan, totally unfamiliar with each other prior to moving into a small university residence. Following two weeks of acquaintanceship and again three and one-half months later, each subject rank-ordered the six values of the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values: Once according to their relative importance to himself, and again as to their relative importance to each of the other 16 men. Newcomb reported a substantial increase in the veridicality of estimates between the two testing sessions. He interpreted this to mean that upon first acquaintance, persons are "scanned" for clues as to their values and attitudes. However, given ample opportunity for association and

communication, judgments tend to become more accurate, especially among highly attracted persons.

Corsini and Oakes (1961) investigated the accuracy of predicted Q sorts, using a college instructor as a standard stimulus person for all subjects. Subjects were instructed first to sort the 50 adjectives for self and then to try to duplicate the stimulus person's self-sort. All subjects were exposed to the instructor from 21 to 78 contact hours in a classroom setting. The results disclosed that fairly accurate Q sorts of another's social self are attainable after only 20 to 30 hours of exposure to that other. Of particular interest is that after observing an instructor in a classroom for 36 hours, subjects were able to form an average accuracy of perception comparable to the average perceptiveness of a mate's spouse attained through 6 years of marriage. In support of this finding, 34 per cent of the 68 subjects exceeded the mean accuracy score for a group of married couples who were subjected to the same procedures.

Indirect but supportive evidence exists in the findings of other investigators that how accurately one is perceived depends with some regularity upon the interpersonal relationship between himself and the judge (Bieri, 1953; Corsini, 1956a, 1956b; Couch, 1958; Dymond, 1954; Fiedler, Warrington, & Blaisdell, 1952; Lundy, 1960; Richards et al., 1962).

Related Research

Corsini (1956b) has provided important results on the relation of accuracy of perception and happiness among marital partners. Twenty volunteer students and their spouses from The University of Chicago participated. Marital happiness was assessed by the Burgess-Wallin scale (1939). A 50-item adjective Q sort was sorted four times by each subject: (a) for self, (b) for spouse, (c) for predicting the spouse's responses, and, adding a new dimension to previous research, (d) for predicting the spouse's description of the subject. A long overdue experimental control was instituted by Corsini: Every conclusion with respect to couples was checked by drawing random samples of noncouples, and the same procedures for couples duplicated. Understanding the mate was not related to similarity of self and mate, although happiness was associated with similarity of self-perceptions.

Dymond (1954) has furnished further data on the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions among married couples. Her subjects were 15 couples well known to her, with a mean length of marriage of 10.4 years. One hundred MMPI items, pertaining to interaction with others, were administered to each of the 30 subjects. After answering for self, each subject predicted the spouse's answers. In order to control for stereotypy of reply, all items which were answered uniformly by more than two-thirds of the group were

eliminated, leaving 55 items exhibiting a reasonable degree of difference. Since the yes-no probabilities of these items were roughly equal, predictive ability ("understanding") would be uncontaminated by knowledge of group norms. Scores were then related to the happiness of the marriage, as rated by the subjects themselves and validated by Dymond's rating. The expected finding occurred: Happily married spouses resembled each other more than unhappily "marrieds." Dymond's principal hypothesis was also verified, namely that "happys" predict spouse replies significantly better than do "unhappys." Further, there was significantly less association between similarity of self-spouse and accuracy of prediction in the happy group than in the unhappy group.

Couch (1958) found consensus on husband and wife roles increased with length of marriage, as did accuracy in assuming the role of the other mate. The study, however, was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Couch offered it principally for its methodological and conceptual interests.

In a dissertation, Lundy (1960) tested the hypothesis that perceptual change will be in the direction of increased accuracy of prediction when the predictor focuses his attention upon another person as opposed to himself. Subjects completed the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values. Two to three weeks later each subject met with two other subjects to discuss a topic for five minutes with each of them. Before and

after each discussion subjects filled in the scale as they thought their partners had completed it. Before one of the discussions the subject was instructed to focus his attention upon himself; before the other discussion he was asked to focus his attention upon his partner. The hypothesis received overwhelming support.

Bieri (1953) dealt with the question of what happens to one's perception of another person as a result of interacting with that person. He hypothesized that an individual will tend to see another person as more similar to himself after a period of constructive interaction than before the interaction has occurred. He divided his subjects into pairs and had each pair participate in one of two experimental conditions. The experimental conditions differed only with respect to a social interaction set created by the experimenter. The set was induced in one group by having pairs of subjects discuss several aspects of psychology courses both were taking and a hypothetical vacation which the two subjects were to spend together. The experimental procedure consisted of (a) completing the Rosenzweig Picture Frustration Test for self and first prediction for partner, (b) holding two 10 minute interaction situations, and (c) requesting a second prediction for partner. Subjects in a control condition participated in (a) and (c), but did not engage in discussion sessions.

A significant increase was found in similarity to self between the first and second predictions for the experimental group, with no change discovered in the control group.

The relationship between perceived similarity and attraction for another person has been studied by Fiedler et al. (1952). Subjects in this study, 26 fraternity members, were asked to describe themselves and then to predict the self-descriptions of their most-preferred and least-preferred fraternity brothers. Perceived similarity of the most-preferred person was significantly greater than the perceived similarity of the least-preferred person. On the other hand, there was no consistent relationship between actual similarity of fraternity members and their sociometric choices.

In one of the most well-designed investigations, Richards et al. (1962) evaluated the effect of varied stimulus information on judging accuracy scores. Using a Belief-Values Inventory and a standard set of six filmed interviews, 95 judges (the full information group) made their judgments on the basis of seeing and hearing the filmed interviews. A second group consisted of 50 persons who filled out the inventory without seeing the films at all, only knowing the age, sex, marital status, and number of children of the six stimulus persons. The third group included 58 judges who filled out the same inventory only twice, once as they thought it would apply to a typical American adult male and

once for a typical American adult female. Thus, in these last two groups the judges were required to make predictions solely on the basis of stereotypes, though the amount of information varied.

Results for the accuracy score revealed that judges in the full information group were significantly superior both at rank ordering the stimulus person in terms of conventional religious values and at predicting exactly the responses of these same stimulus persons. Of particular interest to the current discussion is that differential accuracy among stimulus persons increased as the amount of information provided about them increased.

In view of the research summarized above, it is possible to draw some basic generalizations.

1. Acquaintanceship combined with information on another person serves to increase the accuracy of predictions on a variety of judging scales.

2. The advantage of extra information obtained through familiarity is not counteracted by a bias that might arise from the affective relationship between the judge and object person.

3. Judgments of a relative stranger are attributable to stereotyping plus additional overt information such as sex, age, and expressive behavior.

4. It is apparent that for none of the above

generalizations is there complete agreement among investigators. Lack of agreement may be attributable to differences with respect to judging tasks, sources of criterion data, measures of accuracy scores, and nature of the behavior judged.

Taft's Research

Taft (1966) presented the most elaborate research study dealing with the relationship between familiarity and accuracy of judgmental predictions. In a manner similar to that of other researchers, he assumed that familiarity aids in the accuracy of judgments. Since his experiment has stimulated both the conceptual and methodological reasoning for the present study, it is necessary to consider it in detail.

Initially, Taft hypothesized that personality judgments of acquaintances are more accurate than those of non-acquaintances. An additional purpose of the study was to identify the sources of accuracy in judging both types of object persons. Q sorts of personality traits were used to assess the accuracy of judgments. The underlying rationale for selecting this technique is that it holds constant the mean and variance of the judgments, thus controlling for the amount of spread or dispersion.

Members of a psychology class were instructed to

sort a list of 58 self-descriptive adjectives into seven categories from "least like self" to "most like self." Next, each subject was asked to predict how two of his fellow students would sort the adjectives when rating themselves. One of the object persons was a member of the class whom the subject "knew best" and the other was one whom the subject "knew least" or virtually not at all. The criterion of accuracy, the object person's self Q sort, was correlated with the subject's prediction in order to obtain an index of predictive accuracy.

During a preliminary phase of the study, Taft found that judgments of acquaintances yielded a significantly higher accuracy score than judgments of strangers. The mean correlation was .43 for the former group compared with .31 for the latter group.

In the main experiment, Taft instituted an additional control for knowledge of the task's nature on the choice and rating of the two object persons. A class of 62 students was divided into two unequal groups. One group of 23 subjects selected their two object persons and indicated how well they knew them on a scale developed to reflect extent of familiarity after they learned the nature of the experiment. Another group of 39 subjects selected the fellow student they "knew best" and the one they "knew least" prior to being informed of the purpose of the experiment. Since

there were no differences between the groups on the measures of accuracy, the final results were pooled. The principal findings are summarized below:

1. Although the mean accuracy score for the judgments of acquaintances was significantly greater than that for the judgments of strangers, the latter score was more accurate than chance. In fact, 35 per cent of the subjects predicted strangers more accurately than acquaintances.

2. The degree of actual similarity between the judge and the object person was significantly correlated with total accuracy.

3. The amount of assumed similarity was greater in the judgments of acquaintances than in those of strangers. However, assumed similarity was not an advantage in attaining accuracy, since the actual similarity between the judge and his acquaintance did not differ from that between the judge and his nonacquaintance.

4. Assumed similarity did not correlate significantly with the total accuracy score.

5. A significant difference between the number of "know best" and "know least" persons of the same sex was found, although this did not affect the accuracy of the judgments since there was no relationship between sex similarity and accuracy.

6. Sex of the object person made no difference in

the degree of assumed similarity made by the judge. There was significantly more actual similarity between the judges and object persons when they were opposite in sex than when they were the same, especially when the object person was a stranger.

In all, Taft's results force the conclusion that greater accuracy of judgments of acquaintances cannot be attributed to an interaction between actual similarity and assumed similarity.

The present author has replicated only that part of Taft's study concerned with accuracy of personality judgments of acquaintances and nonacquaintances (Hjelle, 1966). In addition to a Q-sort, a free-sort procedure was included to determine whether subjects distribute self-descriptive adjectives in a way similar to that required by the forced-sort procedure. In brief, the Q-sort findings in regard to degree of accuracy achieved closely resembled those reported by Taft, although they failed to reach statistical significance. In contrast, an examination of the distributions obtained from the free sort indicated consistent differences between the observed number of items in each of seven categories and the expected number. Whether such differences affect the degree of accuracy achieved in predicting another's self sort remains to be determined. If accuracy scores obtained from the use of Q-sort and free-sort

techniques are in fundamental agreement, then both tasks may be used interchangeably in assessing the relationship between familiarity and judging accuracy. The need also seems apparent for greater specification of the association between familiarity and accuracy of judgments than has been exercised by previous investigators.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEM

The present study is focused on the relationship between degree of familiarity with a person and ability to make accurate behavioral judgments of that person's behavior. This study emerged indirectly from an investigation on accuracy of empathic judgments of acquaintances and strangers (Taft, 1966) and represents an attempt to provide more control over the criterion for familiarity, the nature of predictions made, and the kind of person predicted than was considered in that study. A second purpose of the present study is to examine the accuracy of personality judgments using two related judging tasks (i.e., Q sort and free sort) in order to determine the extent to which generality between these techniques exists.

Since the familiarity and accuracy of judgment variables may be characterized in different ways, it seems advisable to indicate the ways in which they are used in this study. "Familiarity" refers to both the length and type of social relationship existing between two people,

extending from a highly intimate relationship (marriage), to a casual relationship (familiar as fellow student), to a nonacquaintance relationship (stranger). "Judgment accuracy" refers to the ability to make correct predictions of another person's behavior on a set of items depicting various social situations and personality traits.

Following from a general statement of the problem in the preceding section, the two specific hypotheses to be tested are as follows:

Hypothesis 1. Social and personality judgments of an intimate acquaintance are more accurate than those of either a casual acquaintance or a nonacquaintance, whereas the same judgments of a casual acquaintance are more accurate than those of a nonacquaintance. In other words, familiarity with the other person is a direct aid to accuracy of judgments. The rationale underlying this hypothesis stems from the observation that with an increase of information regarding another person's behavior there is a concomittant increase in the veridicality of judgments of that person's behavior.

Hypothesis 2. The degree of assumed similarity, as reflected by the social and personality judgments, of intimate acquaintances is greater than that between either casual acquaintances or nonacquaintances, whereas the degree of assumed similarity of casual acquaintances is greater

than that between nonacquaintances. The rationale for this hypothesis derives from published evidence that the affective and role relations between intimate or casual acquaintances serve to increase their respective degree of assumed similarity (Izard, 1960a; Kipnis, 1961; Newcomb, 1958; Taft, 1966).

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subject selection. The design of the study necessitated the selection of male-female dyads who were either intimately acquainted, casually acquainted, or nonacquainted with each other. Accordingly, three groups were formed by two different sample selection procedures.

Group I consisted of volunteer married couples who were recruited from a University of Oklahoma housing complex. All couples were contacted individually by the experimenter who introduced himself as a graduate student in the Department of Psychology. He presented a memo from the Office of Deans of Students which stated that he was authorized to solicit married couples for a social psychology study associated with a dissertation project. It encouraged participation but emphasized the voluntary nature of the experiment. If the couple agreed to participate, they were assigned an appointment time without knowing the purpose of the experiment. Of 40 couples contacted, 32 agreed to participate. Thus, 20 per cent refused to volunteer.

Groups II and III each included 32 male-female dyads selected from seven different sections of an introductory psychology course at The University of Oklahoma. The subjects previously indicated their willingness to participate in a psychological experiment to earn points to be applied to their final grade. Each subject was scheduled for an hour experiment to be conducted in a conference room of the university library. The criterion for inclusion into these groups was operationally defined by ratings on a scale developed to reflect degree of familiarity. During a regular class period each student was provided with a list of names of students of the opposite sex in that class. The student indicated on a 5-point scale adjacent to each name the extent to which he was familiar with every student of the opposite sex. The 5-point familiarity scale contained the following anchor points: 1, very familiar; 2, quite familiar; 3, moderately familiar; 4, quite unfamiliar; 5, very unfamiliar. This procedure generated a list of ratings by each student for all other opposite-sex students. The requirements of the experimental design with regard to familiarity were fulfilled on the basis of rater-versus-ratee comparisons. An inter-rater agreement of either two or three was used in matching dyads for Group II (casual acquaintances), and an inter-rater agreement of four or five was used in pairing dyads for Group III (strangers). For example, if male$_1$

rated female$_1$ with a "2" and female$_1$ rated male$_1$ with a "3", they were matched and assigned to Group II. The above procedure was repeated until the requirement of 32 dyads per group was attained. One female subject failed to report for the experiment, so that the dyad was deleted and replaced by another.

Means descriptive of significant Group I attributes included the following: age=24.9 (males=25.8,females=24.0); and years married=3.9. The mean age for Group II was 18.6 (males=18.6, females=18.6) and for Group III was 18.3 (males=18.8, females=17.8).

Judging Instruments

Personality trait predictions. A list of 58 descriptive adjectives randomly culled from the 100 word list developed by Crandall and Bellugi (1954) were used to assess the accuracy of personality judgments (see Appendix A). Each of the adjectives was typed on a 3X5 index card, forming a deck of 58 cards which was presented to the subject in random order. The deck included adjectives such as "alert," "cold," "noncommittal," and "tactful." As indicated in the procedure section, a subject sorted the deck of adjectives twice, once as the adjectives applied to himself and once to predict the self-sort of his matched partner.

Social predictions questionnaire (EPPS). Both because its content is interpersonally oriented and it has been successfully utilized in widespread research, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) (1959b) was selected as an appropriate technique for obtaining accuracy measures for social judgments. Twenty different items (i.e., pairs of statements) were systematically drawn from the schedule's total number of 225. The rationale employed in selecting the EPPS items was essentially their correspondence to overt social behaviors. The number of items chosen was necessarily limited due to the extensive time (approximately one hour) required to complete the personality trait predictions task. A sample item was:

A. I like to form new friendships.

B. I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble.

The 20 EPPS items were presented in a mimeographed booklet in paired-comparison format. Appendix B contains the items and the various EPPS scales represented.

Procedure

Half of the dyads in each group were randomly assigned to a Q-sort and half to a free-sort instructional condition (collectively referred to henceforth as the personality trait predictions task). The design of the experiment is shown in Table 1. In a single session for each of eight

Table 1

Design of the Experiment

Group	Personality trait predictions		Social predictions questionnaire (EPPS)
	Q sort	Free sort	
Married couple dyads	N=16 (I_Q)	N=16 (I_F)	N=32
Casual acquaintance dyads	N=16 (II_Q)	N=16 (II_F)	N=32
Total stranger dyads	N=16 (III_Q)	N=16 (III_F)	N=32

dyad partners within the same group, subjects completed the Q-sort or free-sort task and the social predictions questionnaire twice, in that order.

The experimenter met the eight dyads who appeared together in a room large enough to permit each subject to work independently of his prearranged partner. The subjects in Groups II and III were introduced to their partners by the experimenter, who then assured both of the confidentiality of the results. After an initial period of trying to make the subjects feel comfortable, instructions and materials for the first task were given. When subjects finished the first judging task, the experimenter gave them the instructions and the material for their second judging task.

Instructions to the Q-sort subjects were given orally as follows:

> Here is a set of cards which have on them adjectives expressing how people think and feel in regard to themselves and others. These cards are to be sorted into different piles. You will find it easier to sort them if you look over a number of cards, chosen at random, before you begin to sort. Your task is to sort these cards to describe yourself as you see yourself today from those that are least typical of you to those that are most typical of you. You will find seven numbered cards spread across the table in order. Card number one should be used for adjectives least like yourself, and card number seven for adjectives most like yourself. The other five cards should be used for adjectives that range between the two extremes. Directly beneath each of the numbered cards you see a corresponding number in brackets. Each of these numbers in brackets represents the number of cards to be placed in each pile. That is, four cards

> must be placed in pile 1, seven cards in pile 2, 11 cards in pile 3, and so on. Any questions? When you have finished, please wait for further directions.

Following the completion of the self Q sort, subjects were read the following instructions:

> Now that you have finished sorting the adjectives as they describe yourself, I want you to sort them again. This time I want you to sort them as you think your partner did when he or she sorted the adjectives for himself or herself. Again, you must place the same number of cards in each pile as you did before. That is, four cards must be placed in pile 1, seven cards in pile 2, 11 cards in pile 3, and so on. Any questions? When you have finished, please wait for further directions.

The free-sort instructions neither specified the number of categories to be used up to a maximum of seven nor the number of adjectives within a category. However, the subjects were instructed that category 1 represented the extreme for adjectives "least" like self and that category 7 represented the opposite extreme for adjectives "most" like self. Free-sort instructions were as follows:

> Here is a set of cards which have on them adjectives expressing how people think and feel in regard to themselves and others. These cards are to be sorted into different piles. You will find it easier to sort them if you look over a number of cards, chosen at random, before you begin to sort. Your task is to sort these cards to describe yourself as you see yourself today from those that are least typical of you to those that are most typical of you. You will find seven numbered cards spread across the table in order. Card number one represents the extreme for adjectives least like yourself and card number seven represents the extreme for adjectives most like yourself. The other five cards represent

> the range between the two extremes. You may use as few as one or as many as seven piles. Any questions? When you have finished, please wait for further directions.

Upon completion of the self free sort, subjects were read the following instructions:

> Now that you have finished sorting the adjectives as they describe yourself, I want you to sort them again. This time I want you to sort them as you think your partner did when he or she sorted the adjectives for himself or herself. Again, you may use as few as one or as many as seven piles, and do not be concerned about the number of cards in any pile. Keep in mind that pile 1 represents the extreme for adjectives least like the other and that pile 7 represents the extreme for adjectives most like the other. Any questions? When you have finished, please wait for further directions.

For the Q sort, categories 1 and 7 have four items each; categories 2 and 6 have seven items each; categories 3 and 5 have 11 items each; and category 4 has 14 items. The distribution of the seven categories was predetermined according to the normal curve. For the free sort, subjects were allowed to use as many categories as they wished up to a maximum of seven. In both sorting conditions, subjects recorded their self and predicted sorts on a form provided by the experimenter. See Appendix C.

In the same session, all subjects completed the social predictions questionnaire (EPPS) twice. Each subject was instructed first to select his own response preference for each item and then to predict the response of his matched

partner on a separate form. The usual EPPS instructions were altered to meet the demands of the judging task. The instructions were printed on the mimeographed booklet and the subject was directed to read these instructions carefully, then to begin the task. The instructions were as follows:

> This questionnaire contains a number of pairs of statements about things that you may or may not like, about ways in which you may or may not feel. Read each pair of statements and draw a circle around either the A or B to indicate the statement that better describes what you like or how you feel. Make a choice for every pair of statements; do not skip any. Any questions? When you have finished, please wait for further directions.

After completing the EPPS questionnaire for self-description, the subjects read the following instructions:

> This time I want you to read the statements again and circle the letter you believe that your partner circled as descriptive of himself or herself. Make a choice for every pair of statements; do not skip any. Any questions? Thank you for participating in this research project.

All questions pertaining to the judging tasks were answered individually. When the questionnaire had been collected, the experiment was over. Subjects were thanked and asked not to talk about the study to other potential participants. No subject evidenced either suspicion or prior knowledge of the experiment.

In summary, the procedures generated a set of self personality and social perceptions and a set of predicted personality and social perceptions for each dyad member.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Product-moment correlations for each dyad member were computed as measures of the degree of personality judgment accuracy and of assumed similarity (see Figure 1). The accuracy correlations were calculated between the partner's actual sorting and the subject's predicted sorting and *vice versa* within each dyad. These correlations specified the level of accuracy observed within any given dyad. The assumed similarity correlations were derived from calculations between each dyad member's self sort and predicted sort, yielding two for each dyad. These correlations indicated the extent to which each dyad member saw himself as being like the other dyad member.

A scatterplot of the above scores revealed that they were not normally distributed, but negatively skewed. Because of the skewness, Fisher's *r*-to-*z* transformation (Walker & Lev, 1953) was made prior to performing any further statistical analyses. Thus all means, sums of squares, etc., were computed from thse *z* values, but to



Fig. 1. Intercorrelations defining various accuracy and similarity scores.

simplify interpretation the resulting *z*-statistics were reconverted to the more familiar product-moment *r*'s in all of the following tables.

The statistical procedure used for assessing social judgment accuracy (EPPS items) was to sum the correct number of predictions made by each dyad member, the criterion for accuracy being the agreement of the judge's prediction with the responses given by the dyad partner and *vice versa*. Measures of social assumed similarity were obtained by totaling the number of accurate and inaccurate predictions made by each dyad member which were identical to his own self responses. There were two measures for each dyad. It should be noted that raw scores, rather than correlations, were derived from the social judgments task since the data were dichotomous.

For both hypotheses and both judging tasks, *t* tests for two independent samples between two group means (Walker & Lev, 1953) were computed using .05 as the region of rejection. Raw scores are contained in Appendix D for both tasks. The data are presented in terms of the two hypotheses advanced earlier.

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between familiarity with another person and accuracy in predicting that person's behavior. The first test of this hypothesis was derived from the

personality trait predictions task. The mean accuracy scores (i.e., average *r*) and standard deviations for the Q- and free-sort groups combined are presented in Table 2. As mentioned previously, significance of differences was tested after applying Fisher's *z* transformation to the correlation coefficients. The table reveals that this hypothesis was only partially supported. Although the difference between married couples (average *r*=.51) and casual acquaintances (average *r*=.49) on personality judgment accuracy was in the predicted direction, the difference was not significant. In contrast, both married couples and casual acquaintances were significantly superior to total strangers (average *r*=.40) in accurately predicting their respective partner's personality traits. All mean accuracy correlation coefficients for the personality judgments task were significantly greater than zero. These results are in close agreement with those reported by Taft (1966).

An analysis was also made of the Q- and free-sort personality accuracy scores separately. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the accuracy results within each of the sorting conditions were consistent with those shown in Table 2 for combined Q- and free-sort data. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. The *t* tests reported in the table indicate that married couples and casual acquaintances were more accurate than total

Table 2

Mean Personality Accuracy Scores

for Q- and Free-sort Groups Combined

Group	Mean	S.D.	*t*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	.51	.29		
Casual Acquaintances (II)	.49	.21		
Total Strangers (III)	.40	.27		
Groups compared:				
I versus II			.547	NS
I versus III			2.945	$<.01$
II versus III			2.833	$<.01$

Table 3

Mean Personality Accuracy Scores

for Q- and Free-sort Groups Separately

Group	Mean	S.D.	t	p (one-tailed)
A. Q sort:				
Married Couples (I_Q)	.48	.32		
Casual Acquaintances (II_Q)	.46	.19		
Total Strangers (III_Q)	.34	.32		
Groups compared:				
I_Q versus II_Q			.253	NS
I_Q versus III_Q			2.196	$<.05$
II_Q versus III_Q			2.282	$<.05$
B. Free sort:				
Married Couples (I_F)	.55	.29		
Casual Acquaintances (II_F)	.52	.21		
Total Strangers (III_F)	.45	.21		
Groups compared:				
I_F versus II_F			.535	NS
I_F versus III_F			1.993	$<.05$
II_F versus III_F			1.755	$<.05$

strangers for both the Q- and free-sort judging tasks considered separately. However, the mean accuracy scores between married couples and casual acquaintances within each sorting condition were not significantly different from each other. These results are in complete agreement with the Q- and free-sort data combined.

The second test of Hypothesis 1 resulted from social predictions on the EPPS questionnaire. Prior to testing differences between group means, the proportion of accurate social judgments for each group was compared to chance accuracy. No transformations of the proportions were needed since Dyke and Patterson (1959) have shown that when proportions are approximately 0.5, conventional analytical methods are applicable. Therefore, it was possible to test the significance of the observed proportions by use of the one sample proportion test. Since each of the 20 EPPS items were dichotomized, the criterion of significance was met where the proportions departed significantly from 0.5. This theoretical value did not depend on computations from observed data.

From Table 4 it is clear that the casual acquaintance and total stranger groups did not judge significantly more accurately than chance. However, the married couple group made accurate social judgments significantly exceeding chance level. Thus, no statistical justification for

Table 4

Observed Proportions of Accurate Social Judgments Compared to Chance Expectancy (0.5)

Group	Observed Proportion	*z*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	.606	1.680	$<.05$
Casual Acquaintances (II)	.554	.857	NS
Total Strangers (III)	.548	.762	NS

comparing casual acquaintances with total strangers exists since both groups did not depart from chance accuracy.

Table 5 shows two instances which support Hypothesis 1 based on data from the social predictions questionnaire. Married couples were significantly more accurate in predicting their partner's social responses than either casual acquaintances or total strangers. All group means were ordered in the expected direction. In sum, accuracy data from both judging tasks lend strong support to the hypothesis under examination.

Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis which predicted a higher degree of assumed similarity between married couples than between either casual acquaintances or total strangers, and a higher degree between casual acquaintances than between total strangers, was subjected to two tests. The first of these utilized the assumed similarity scores derived from the personality trait predictions task. Table 6 summarizes the relevant results. It is immediately apparent that casual acquaintances assumed more similarity between each other than did married couples, a finding opposite to that predicted. Likewise, the comparison between married couples and total strangers fell far short of statistical significance. As for the difference in assumed similarity between the casual acquaintance and total stranger groups, the former did assume significantly more similarity than the latter. In all, very

Table 5

Mean Number of Concordant Items on Social Judgment Task

Group	Mean	S.D.	*t*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	12.11	2.79		
Casual Acquaintances (II)	11.08	2.51		
Total Strangers (III)	10.95	2.71		
Groups compared:				
I versus II			2.20	$<.05$
I versus III			2.39	$<.01$

Table 6

Mean Assumed Similarity Scores for

Combined Q- and Free-sort Data

Group	Mean	S.D.	*t*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	.48	.37		
Casual Acquaintances (II)	.60	.31		
Total Strangers (III)	.47	.32		
Groups compared:				
I versus II			-2.710	$<.005$
I versus III			.066	NS
II versus III			3.020	$<.005$

weak support for Hypothesis 2 was obtained from the personality trait predictions data.

An evaluation of the assumed similarity data derived from the social predictions questionnaire provided a second test of Hypothesis 2. Prior to evaluating the data, however, assumed similarity proportions for each group were tested against a chance proportion of 0.5. As is shown in Table 7, both married couples and casual acquaintances assumed more similarity between each other than that expected by chance. Legitimate statistical comparisons between married couples or casual acquaintances and total strangers were made even though the latter group did not significantly exceed chance on assumed similarity.

Inspection of Table 8 reveals that married couples assumed significantly more similarity to each other than did total strangers. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In contrast, the mean number of assumed similarities for married couples and casual acquaintances was nearly identical, throwing strong suspicion on the hypothesis. The comparison between casual acquaintances and total strangers showed that the former did assume significantly more similarity to each other than did the latter. This finding is in agreement with the second hypothesis.

In brief, only moderate support for Hypothesis 2 was obtained from both the social and personality judging

Table 7

Observed Proportions of Assumed Social Similarity Compared to Chance Expectancy (0.5)

Group	Observed Proportion	*z*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	.614	1.810	$<.05$
Casual Acquaintances (II)	.615	1.830	$<.05$
Total Strangers (III)	.543	.682	NS

Table 8

Mean Number of Assumed Similarities

on Social Judgment Task

Group	Mean	S.D.	*t*	*p* (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I)	12.28	2.69		
Casual Acquaintances (II)	12.29	2.71		
Total Strangers (III)	10.85	2.75		
Groups compared:				
I versus II			-.058	NS
I versus III			2.979	$<.005$
II versus III			2.988	$<.005$

tasks. This was evidenced by the fact that of a total of six comparisons relevant to the hypothesis, only three were in the direction expected.

Comparisons were also made between the Q- and free-sort personality accuracy scores for each of the three groups separately. These comparisons were undertaken for the purpose of providing information on the question of whether Q- and free-sort instructional procedures provide comparable results regarding personality judgment. Table 9 contains the results.

Although the difference between the Q- and free-sort mean accuracy scores for both married couples and casual acquaintances failed to reach the .05 level of significance, there was a consistent trend for both groups in the free-sort instructional condition to attain higher accuracy scores than comparable Q-sort groups. A comparison of the accuracy means for total strangers did yield a significant t value. Thus, it may be concluded that Q-sort (i.e., forced distribution) tasks result in a loss of judgment accuracy which may be retained by the use of free-sort procedures of the type employed in this study.

Finally, additional tests were made to determine the source underlying differences between Q and free sort in personality predictive accuracy, in this case either assumed similarity or real similarity. Accordingly, partial

Table 9

Comparisons Between Q- and Free-sort Personality Accuracy Scores by Group

Group	Mean	S.D.	t	p (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I_Q)	.48	.32	1.28	<.20
Married Couples (I_F)	.55	.29		
Casual Acquaintances (II_Q)	.46	.19	1.58	<.10
Casual Acquaintances (II_F)	.52	.21		
Total Strangers (III_Q)	.34	.32	2.06	<.05
Total Strangers (III_F)	.45	.21		

correlations were computed between predictive accuracy and assumed or real similarity, holding constant first the assumed similarity scores and then the real similarity scores. As can be observed in Table 10, there was a consistent trend in the Q-sort condition for the partial correlation between predictive accuracy and assumed similarity holding real similarity constant to be higher than the partial correlation between predictive accuracy and real similarity holding assumed similarity constant. The opposite trend was found in the free-sort condition, where the predictive accuracy-real similarity partials were consistently higher than the predictive accuracy-assumed similarity partials. Hence, it appears that assumed similarity was the predominant source underlying accuracy in the Q-sort condition, whereas real similarity resulted in greater accuracy in the free-sort condition. However, these statistical conclusions should not be construed as implying that either real similarity or assumed similarity <u>caused</u> predictive accuracy.

Table 10

Partial Correlations of Predictive Accuracy with Assumed Similarity or Real Similarity Holding Either Real Similarity or Assumed Similarity Constant

Group	$r_{12.3}$	$r_{13.2}$	z	p (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I_Q)	+.695	+.509	1.13	NS
Casual Acquaintances (II_Q)	+.544	+.067	2.06	$<.05$
Total Strangers (III_Q)	+.540	+.010	2.26	$<.05$
Married Couples (I_F)	-.124	+.647	3.40	$<.002$
Casual Acquaintances (II_F)	+.132	+.488	1.52	NS
Total Strangers (III_F)	+.474	+.551	.395	NS

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The results of the present study in general give support to the first hypothesis under investigation; namely, that increasing degree of familiarity with another person is positively associated with making accurate social and personality judgments of that person's behavior. Four different score comparisons provided support for this conclusion. First, the personality accuracy means (i.e., average *r*'s) for both married couples and casual acquaintances, gleaned from Q- and free-sort judging tasks, were significantly superior to the personality accuracy mean for total strangers. Secondly, the social accuracy mean for married couples, based on EPPS item predictions, was significantly greater than it was for either casual acquaintances or total strangers. Between married couples and casual acquaintances, the mean difference personality accuracy score was non-significant, although the means were ordered in the expected direction. No comparison between casual acquaintances and total strangers on the social judgment task was made since neither group departed

from chance accuracy. Thus, of a total of five statistically justifiable comparisons, four were in agreement with theoretical expectations.

In relating the results of this study to the work of Taft (1966), the experimenter found two striking similarities. First the present data are in complete accordance with Taft's finding that personality judgments of acquaintances are more accurate than those of strangers. In this study the mean personality accuracy scores for casual acquaintances and total strangers were .49 and .40, respectively, compared with Taft's results of .52 and .42 for similar groups. Since Taft required subjects to make predictions of both an acquaintance and a stranger, whereas the present experimenter required only one prediction from each subject in separate acquaintance and stranger groups, the similarity between the two experiments can be considered even more remarkable.

The second similarity was the finding that the degree of personality accuracy in total stranger groups of both studies significantly exceeded zero or chance accuracy. This result has some parallel in Lundy's (1962) conclusion that judgment accuracy will increase appreciably above chance when the subject focuses his attention upon another person rather than himself. In the current study, similar to that of Lundy's, total stranger dyads met in a group setting, were introduced to one another and then proceeded to complete the

judging tasks. It seems plausible that during the part of the experimental setting when predictions were made, most subjects centered their attention on dyad partners although this was not demanded of them. Thus, overt observable information such as approximate age, sex, race, physical characteristics, and expressed behavior of the dyad partners was available to each subject. Assuming that subjects were aware of and sensitive to these informational factors, it can be argued that accuracy involving strangers was a function of overtly manifested traits observed during the experimental situation. Previous work by Richards et al. (1962) demonstrated that judges who knew the age, sex, marital status, and number of children of six complete strangers were more accurate in their predictions than judges who knew only the nationality and sex of the strangers. Many other examples could be cited of stimulus information leading to predictive accuracy.

Casual acquaintances undoubtedly used additional behavioral information obtained through greater familiarity with their respective dyad partners. Barring the unlikely possibility that the subjects were familiar with how their partners rate themselves on social and personality tasks, additional information resulted in more valid observations than was available to total strangers, who relied primarily on superficial trait characteristics. On the basis of such

additional cues, accurate behavioral judgments can be made despite the constant possibility of a biasing effect arising from the affective component associated with casual familiarity.

The accuracy results also warrant the conclusion that, on the whole, married couples were able to use their longer period of familiarity in a valid manner. Consequently, it may be inferred that the advantage of the extra information obtained through marriage was not outweighed by any bias that might have arisen from the emotional aspects of the dyadic relationship. However, this conclusion must be tempered in light of the fact that married couples did not attain significantly higher personality accuracy scores than did casual acquaintances. It seems reasonable to suggest that the nature of the personality judgment task limited the degree of accuracy possible. Consider the sequence of events involved in arriving at personality predictions. Subjects sorted 58 different adjective traits into a series of categories, the exact number of categories and adjectives in each depending on the condition to which they were assigned. Each adjective was broad and descriptive with no specific reference to a particular behavioral domain, such as attitudes toward sex or group leadership. For example, "wild" may be perceived and judged for one's self and for an other as either a desirable or an undesirable personality trait,

depending on the distinctive social context in which it is applied. In relationship to the current study, it seems quite doubtful that familiarity would add to the accuracy of married couples' personality judgments if no behavioral context is provided. In contrast, supposing that a specific behavior is signified, a subject should be able to categorize accurately his spouse's self-perception along a continuum from "most like self" to "least like self." This explanatory approach is consistent with the finding that married couples did, in fact, predict significantly more accurately than casual acquaintances on the social judgment task where forced-choice social behaviors were supplied.

In summary, while few investigators have directly examined the relationship between familiarity and predictive accuracy, there is a growing consensus among investigators that familiarity coupled with valid behavioral observations can serve to increase the veridicality of various types of judgments (Ferguson, 1949; Newcomb, 1958; Richards et al., 1962; Taft, 1966). One task for future researchers will be to specify the relative contribution of which specific cognitive, emotional, or other factors associated with familiarity seem to produce facilitative effects on predictive accuracy. It would also be of interest to study other clearly defined criterion groups of familiarity, such as "steadies," "fiances," and "newlyweds," in order both to extend the

present results and to give more generality to the hypothesis. Finally, an equally important task for future research should be the question of whether ability to perceive others accurately generalizes over various levels of familiarity. For if such ability does not hold over different persons and task characteristics to be judged, then, of course, the search for personality determinants of a hypothetical generalized ability must be abandoned. Because each subject in the present study judged only one other subject, no evidence was obtained concerning the problem of whether ability to perceive others accurately generalizes over levels of familiarity.

The overall results pertaining to the second hypothesis were both equivocal and surprising. It will be recalled that Hypothesis 2 predicted an increase in assumed similarity as a function of increase in familiarity. The findings on the personality judgment task were partially inconsistent with the hypothesis. The difference between casual acquaintances and total strangers was in agreement with the original prediction, since the former assumed more similarity to each other than did the latter. On the other hand, casual acquaintances did assume significantly more similarity to each other than did married couples. Moreover, the difference was non-significant between married couples and total strangers. Both of these results are in opposition to the hypothesis.

In a similar vein, although the findings were less equivocal, assumed similarity data on the social judgment task did not entirely support the original predictions. In accordance with the hypothesis, married couples and casual acquaintances both assumed significantly more similarity to each other than did total strangers. Contrariwise, the mean comparison between married couples and casual acquaintances was not significant. In all, of a total of six relevant comparisons, two were non-significant, one was in the opposite direction to that predicted, and three supported the assumed similarity hypothesis. It may be concluded that the unrestricted hypothesis of familiarity leading to assumed similarity is untenable.

Since the bulk of previous research has shown that assumed similarity does increase as a function of the affective interpersonal role relations between dyad partners (Bieri, 1953; Chowdhry & Newcomb, 1952; Newcomb, 1958; Taft, 1966), there was a sound basis for the theoretical predictions. Taft, for example, found assumed similarity to be appreciably higher between casual acquaintances than between total strangers. Newcomb (1958) has gone so far as to suggest that similarity assumed between dyad members is the definitive quality of the interpersonal prediction process. Working with college males who were brought together as strangers who shared common quarters for several months, he

pointed to assumed similarity as the most significant factor in interpersonal attraction. Furthermore, Newcomb argues that "accurate communication tends to result in increased attitudinal similarity" (1958, p. 183).

All of the authors cited above have offered the same theoretical explanation as to why attraction, and in this study's context considered concomitant with familiarity, is positively associated with assumed similarity: In brief, they consider that subjects tend to assume more similarity in judging persons to whom they are attracted than to those for whom attraction has not been established. In support of this formulation, Corsini (1956b) found that happiness in marriage is positively associated with similarity of the self-perceptions of mates, while Kipnis (1961) found that individuals perceive their friends to be more similar to themselves than others they like less well. In terms of the present research, if it can be assumed that married couples are more attractive to their spouses than male-female dyads who are casually acquainted, then why did the social and personality assumed similarity scores for the former not attain a significantly higher value? This question is clearly a fruitful subject for further study. In any case, perhaps the most relevant contribution from the present data is that interpersonal attraction and its subsidiary factors (e.g., affect and increased social interaction) as they relate to assumed

similarity is a considerably more complex relationship than previous researchers have implied.

Results regarding the consistent, although moderate, discrepancy between Q- and free-sort personality accuracy scores for each level of familiarity considered separately warrants discussion. It will be recalled that Taft (1966) employed only a Q-sort technique for obtaining indices of personality accuracy between casual acquaintances and total strangers. The present experiment was stimulated, in part, by the question of whether accuracy measures derived from Q- and free-sort procedures would be in fundamental agreement with each other. Mean comparisons within each familiarity level involving these two judging tasks suggest that the free-sort procedure does enable the subject to attain moderately higher accuracy scores, regardless of the level of familiarity considered (see Table 9, p. 52).

A possible explanation for the moderate superiority of free-sort over Q-sort accuracy measures is that the latter both limits the spontaneity of the judging task and places rather rigid restrictions on the subjects' judging behavior. Some support for this explanation is found in a comparison of the partial correlation coefficients (see Table 10, p. 54): 1. Partial correlations between assumed similarity and predictive accuracy with real similarity partialed out were higher in the Q sort; 2. partial correlations between real

similarity and predictive accuracy with assumed similarity partialed out were higher in the free sort. It seems reasonable to believe that the relatively unrestricted free-sort condition permitted dyad partners, independently of one another, to express their real similarity to a greater extent than did the Q-sort condition. The lack of restrictions included the unspecified number of cards to be placed in each category as well as the relative choice to use as few as one or as many as seven categories. As such, there appears to be considerably more opportunity to attain higher accuracy scores in the free-sort condition, which, in fact, occurred.

In contrast, it would follow that subjects in the Q-sort condition considered the requirement of an exact number of cards in each category as forcing them to concentrate on counting cards, which in turn distracted them somewhat from the main task (i.e., predicting their partner's self-sorts). Consequently, a Q-sort procedure may be a distortion of the very process under investigation, namely, the ability to accurately predict another person's behavior. Of course, additional research will be needed to resolve the noted discrepancy found between Q- and free-sort accuracy measures.

Methodologically, these findings have important implications for any researcher who may use Q- or free-sort techniques indiscriminately. In addition, extreme caution should be exercised in generalizing from any one interpersonal prediction task.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Clearly, the ability to correctly predict another person's behavior is a fundamental characteristic of all social relationships. In recent years there has been an intensifying interest in delineating the various aspects of the process of how one comes to know and to understand other persons, their qualities, characteristics, and inner states. Consistent with this, research in the area of interpersonal perception has concerned not only studies of accuracy of perception (e.g., Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958), but also components of accuracy (e.g., Cronbach, 1955) and generality of accurate social perception (e.g., Cline & Richards, 1960; Crow, 1960). Although these studies indicate an increasing concern with cognitive processes, as yet there have been only meager attempts to analyze a judge's ability to predict another person's behavior accurately, depending on the extent of familiarity involved (Ferguson, 1949; Knight, 1923; Newcomb, 1958; Shen, 1923; Taft, 1966).

The present experiment investigated the relationship

between degree of familiarity with another person and ability to make accurate social and personality judgments of that person's behavior. Two hypotheses were tested:

1. Predictive accuracy is positively associated with degree of familiarity between male-female dyads.

2. Assumed similarity varies directly as a function of the degree of familiarity between male-female dyads.

Finally, another purpose was to examine the accuracy of personality judgments using two related techniques, Q sort and free sort, in order to determine the extent to which generality between them exists.

The experimental design required the selection of male-female dyads who were either intimately acquainted, casually acquainted, or nonacquainted with each other. Accordingly, three groups of 32 dyads each were formed on the basis of two separate sample selection methods. Group I (intimate acquaintances) consisted of volunteer married couples drawn from a University of Oklahoma housing complex. Groups II (casual acquaintances) and III (total strangers) were undergraduate students recruited from seven sections of an introductory psychology course at The University of Oklahoma. A 5-point rating scale designed to reflect degree of familiarity between male-female dyads in each class was used to assign subjects to the latter two groups.

In a single session for each of eight dyads within

one of the groups, subjects completed either a Q- or free-sort personality trait predictions task and a social predictions questionnaire, in that order. For the Q- or free-sort task, subjects were instructed to sort a deck of 58 descriptive adjectives twice, once for self-description and once for predicting their partner's self-sort. For the social judgments task, consisting of 20 Edwards Personal Preference Schedule items, each subject was instructed first to select his own response preference for each item and then to predict the response of his matched partner.

Scores from these judging tasks were selected to measure the variables under investigation in the following manner: for personality judgment accuracy, correlations between partner's actual sort and subject's predicted sort; for social judgment accuracy, the number of correct predictions made by each subject on his matched partner; for personality assumed similarity, correlations between each subject's self-sort and predicted sort; for social assumed similarity, the number of each subject's predictions which coincided with self descriptions. There were two measures within each dyad for the four variables.

The mean accuracy scores for each of the three groups on both judging tasks indicated general support for the first hypothesis. The explanation was offered that familiarity has a facilitative effect on predictive accuracy

by allowing for valid behavioral observations and information. A number of suggestions for additional research were proposed, including investigation of other types of familiarity relationships and the question of generality over various levels of familiarity.

Results concerning the second hypothesis were equivocal since three statistical comparisons supported original predictions, while two disconfirmed the predictions and one was non-significant. It was concluded that the association between assumed similarity and degree of familiarity (presumably reflecting interpersonal attraction) may be more complex than former investigators have thought.

Differences between Q- and free-sort personality accuracy scores, favoring the latter condition, were noted; free-sort procedures may allow subjects to attain higher accuracy because of the absence of restrictions on their judging behavior.

In all, the current experiment disclosed many new avenues for research dealing with the familiarity variable and for methodological questions pertaining to Q- and free-sort techniques.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Adjectives Comprising Q-sort and Free-sort Decks

Abnormal	Forward	Popular
Alert	Friendly	Proper
Amusing	Generous	Reasonable
Apprehensive	Gentle	Restless
Careful	Gracious	Rude
Charming	Happy	Sad
Cold	Honest	Sarcastic
Compliant	Hostile	Selfish
Confident	Independent	Shallow
Conservative	Innocent	Suspicious
Contented	Insecure	Tactful
Co-operative	Intense	Trusting
Critical	Jealous	Unassuming
Delightful	Lazy	Undisturbed
Discontented	Noisy	Unhappy
Distant	Noncommittal	Unsophisticated
Dumb	Obstinate	Unusual
Eager	Particular	Upset
Fearful		Wild
Forlorn		Wonderful

APPENDIX B

EPPS Variables, Number of Times Represented and Selected Items Employed in Social Predictions Questionnaire

EPPS variable	Number of times represented	EPPS variable	Number of times represented
Abasement	1	Dominance	5
Affiliation	3	Exhibition	4
Aggression	4	Heterosexuality	5
Autonomy	1	Nurturance	6
Deference	5	Succorance	6

1. A. When planning something, I like to get suggestions from other people whose opinions I respect. (def)
   B. I like my friends to treat me kindly. (suc)

2. A. I like to be the center of attention in a group. (exh)
   B. I like my friends to make a fuss over me when I am hurt or sick. (suc)

3. A. I like to criticize people who are in a position of authority. (aut)
   B. I feel timid in the presence of other people I regard as my superiors. (aba)

4. A. I like to praise someone I admire. (def)
   B. I like to be regarded as physically attractive by those of the opposite sex. (het)

5. A. I like to talk about my achievements. (exh)
   B. I like to listen to or to tell jokes in which sex plays a major part. (het)

6. A. When I am in a group, I like to accept the leadership of someone else in deciding what the group is going to do. (def)
   B. I feel like criticizing someone publicly if he deserves it. (agg)

7. A. I like to ask questions which I know no one will be able to answer. (exh)
   B. I like to tell other people what I think of them. (agg)

8. A. I like my friends to be sympathetic and understanding when I have problems. (suc)
   B. I like to accept the leadership of people I admire. (def)

9. A. I like to have strong attachments with my friends. (aff)
   B. I like to say things that are regarded as witty and clever by other people. (exh)

10. A. I like to be called upon to settle arguments and disputes between others. (dom)
    B. I like my friends to do many small favors for me cheerfully. (suc)

11. A. I like to do things with my friends rather than by myself. (aff)
    B. I like to argue for my point of view when it is attacked by others. (dom)

12. A. I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble. (suc)
    B. I like to treat other people with kindness and sympathy. (nur)

13. A. I like to be one of the leaders in the organizations and groups to which I belong. (dom)
    B. I like to sympathize with my friends when they are hurt or sick. (nur)

14. A. I like to be loyal to my friends. (aff)
    B. I like to go out with attractive persons of the opposite sex. (het)

15. A. When with a group of people, I like to make the decisions about what we are going to do. (dom)
    B. I like to engage in social activities with persons of the opposite sex. (het)

16. A. I like to do small favors for my friends. (nur)
    B. When planning something, I like to get suggestions from other people whose opinions I respect. (def)

17. A. I like to forgive my friends who may sometimes hurt me. (nur)
    B. I like my friends to encourage me when I meet with failure. (suc)

18. A. I like to show a great deal of affection toward my friends. (nur)
    B. I like to be regarded by others as a leader. (dom)

19. A. I like to attack points of view that are contrary to mine. (agg)
    B. I like my friends to confide in me and to tell me their troubles. (nur)

20. A. I feel like making fun of people who do things that I regard as stupid. (agg)
    B. I like to listen to or to tell jokes in which sex plays a major part. (het)

APPENDIX C

Data Sheet

Name _____ Group _____

Sex _____

Age _____

Partner _____

Category	Self Sort	Other Sort
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

APPENDIX D

Personality Judgment Accuracy - z_r and r Scores for Married Couples

Group I - Q sort					Group I - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	z_r	r	z_r	r		z_r	r	z_r	r
1	.189	.187	.332	.320	1	.582	.524	.460	.430
2	.448	.420	.506	.467	2	.416	.394	.805	.667
3	.623	.553	.922	.727	3	.444	.417	.275	.268
4	.922	.727	.894	.713	4	.766	.645	.698	.603
5	.623	.558	.725	.620	5	.609	.543	1.101	.801
6	.614	.547	.567	.513	6	.748	.634	.484	.449
7	.725	.620	.693	.600	7	.591	.531	.957	.743
8	.745	.633	.540	.493	8	.628	.557	.719	.616
9	.369	.353	.456	.427	9	.729	.623	.570	.516
10	.424	.400	.456	.427	10	.904	.718	1.156	.820
11	.302	.293	-.007	-.007	11	.644	.567	.775	.650
12	.295	.287	.448	.420	12	.709	.610	.380	.363
13	.558	.507	.506	.467	13	-.497	-.460	.099	.099
14	.704	.607	.480	.447	14	.831	.681	.430	.406
15	-.523	-.480	.758	.640	15	.470	.438	.680	.592
16	.497	.460	.747	.633	16	.873	.703	.639	.564

Personality Judgment Accuracy - z_r and r Scores for Casual Acquaintances

Group II - Q sort					Group II - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	z_r	r	z_r	r		z_r	r	z_r	r
1	.673	.587	.549	.500	1	.650	.571	.170	.168
2	.576	.520	.736	.627	2	.370	.354	.718	.615
3	.175	.173	.385	.367	3	.688	.597	.234	.230
4	.532	.487	.489	.453	4	.687	.596	.924	.728
5	.339	.327	.456	.427	5	.636	.562	.781	.653
6	.623	.553	.182	.180	6	.450	.422	.592	.531
7	.595	.533	.936	.733	7	.786	.656	.573	.518
8	.148	.147	.472	.440	8	.277	.270	.412	.390
9	.643	.567	.540	.493	9	.739	.629	.446	.419
10	.400	.380	.456	.427	10	.275	.269	.761	.642
11	.238	.233	.736	.627	11	.423	.340	.592	.532
12	.332	.320	.567	.513	12	.835	.683	.884	.709
13	.576	.520	.416	.393	13	.558	.506	.377	.360
14	.385	.367	.295	.287	14	.968	.748	.561	.508
15	.817	.673	.817	.673	15	.248	.243	.535	.489
16	.662	.580	.309	.300	16	.628	.556	.814	.672

Personality Judgment Accuracy - $\underline{z}_{\underline{r}}$ and $\underline{r}$ Scores for Total Strangers

Group III - Q sort					Group III - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	$\underline{z}_{\underline{r}}$	$\underline{r}$	$\underline{z}_{\underline{r}}$	$\underline{r}$		$\underline{z}_{\underline{r}}$	$\underline{r}$	$\underline{z}_{\underline{r}}$	$\underline{r}$
1	.416	.393	.288	.280	1	.297	.289	.379	.362
2	.332	.320	-.614	-.547	2	.788	.657	.446	.418
3	.324	.313	.259	.253	3	.688	.597	.571	.516
4	.317	.307	.324	.313	4	.380	.363	.533	.489
5	.805	.667	.464	.433	5	.382	.364	.593	.532
6	.347	.333	.309	.300	6	.734	.626	.234	.230
7	.141	.140	.168	.167	7	.410	.389	.690	.598
8	.013	.013	.693	.600	8	.674	.587	.565	.512
9	.614	.547	.060	.060	9	.091	.091	.369	.353
10	.381	.363	.595	.533	10	.677	.589	.618	.550
11	.604	.540	-.155	-.153	11	.293	.285	.138	.138
12	-.385	-.367	.549	.500	12	.871	.702	.247	.242
13	.489	.453	.472	.440	13	.630	.558	.394	.375
14	.908	.720	.217	.213	14	.609	.543	.560	.508
15	.704	.607	.633	.560	15	.736	.627	-.017	-.017
16	.576	.520	.400	.380	16	.401	.380	.656	.576

Personality Assumed Similarity - z_r and r Scores for Married Couples

Group I - Q sort					Group I - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	z_r	r	z_r	r		z_r	r	z_r	r
1	.643	.567	.385	.367	1	.006	.006	.035	.035
2	.259	.253	.981	.753	2	.123	.122	.104	.103
3	.894	.713	.965	.747	3	.637	.563	.946	.738
4	.704	.607	.643	.567	4	1.239	.845	.842	.687
5	.725	.620	.805	.667	5	.601	.538	.701	.605
6	.489	.453	.633	.560	6	-.013	-.013	.452	.424
7	.480	.447	.854	.693	7	.510	.470	.664	.581
8	.523	.480	.880	.707	8	.274	.267	.575	.519
9	.259	.253	.514	.473	9	.404	.383	.215	.212
10	.280	.273	.842	.687	10	.199	.196	.271	.265
11	.161	.160	.354	.340	11	.227	.223	.258	.252
12	.604	.540	.894	.713	12	.255	.250	1.449	.895
13	.252	.247	.643	.567	13	.413	.391	-.629	-.558
14	.408	.387	.489	.453	14	.642	.566	.669	.584
15	-.595	-.533	.714	.613	15	1.049	.781	.442	.416
16	.714	.613	.894	.713	16	.978	.752	.891	.712

Personality Assumed Similarity - z_r and r Scores for Casual Acquaintances

Group II - Q sort					Group II - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	z_r	r	z_r	r		z_r	r	z_r	r
1	.424	.400	.392	.373	1	.201	.199	.343	.330
2	1.268	.853	1.137	.813	2	.913	.723	.873	.703
3	.558	.507	.480	.447	3	.042	.042	.366	.350
4	.448	.420	.385	.367	4	.752	.636	.921	.726
5	.817	.673	.339	.327	5	.861	.697	1.261	.851
6	.182	.180	.714	.613	6	.699	.604	.877	.705
7	.867	.700	1.293	.860	7	1.203	.835	.856	.694
8	.736	.627	.693	.600	8	.611	.545	.713	.613
9	.614	.547	.908	.720	9	.534	.488	.765	.644
10	.950	.740	.497	.460	10	-.035	-.035	.355	.341
11	.725	.620	.456	.427	11	.768	.646	.511	.471
12	1.045	.780	.514	.473	12	1.256	.850	1.036	.776
13	.704	.607	.880	.707	13	.371	.355	.583	.525
14	.302	.293	.683	.593	14	.796	.662	.775	.650
15	1.319	.867	.758	.640	15	.616	.548	.389	.371
16	.400	.380	1.080	.793	16	1.134	.812	.297	.289

Personality Assumed Similarity - z_r and r Scores for Total Strangers

Group III - Q sort					Group III - Free sort				
Dyad No.	Male		Female		Dyad No.	Male		Female	
	z_r	r	z_r	r		z_r	r	z_r	r
1	.189	.187	.408	.387	1	.227	.223	.579	.522
2	1.099	.800	-.295	-.287	2	.978	.752	.476	.443
3	.354	.340	.400	.380	3	.676	.589	.359	.344
4	.332	.320	.781	.653	4	.530	.485	.793	.660
5	.416	.393	.867	.700	5	.554	.504	1.045	.780
6	.324	.313	.633	.560	6	.916	.724	.420	.397
7	.317	.307	.060	.060	7	.785	.656	.975	.751
8	1.029	.773	.175	.173	8	.525	.482	.872	.702
9	-.087	-.087	.280	.273	9	.580	.523	.497	.459
10	.683	.593	.381	.363	10	.975	.751	.493	.456
11	-.027	-.027	.936	.733	11	.011	.011	.632	.560
12	.456	.427	-.424	-.400	12	.680	.592	.461	.431
13	.725	.620	.332	.320	13	.507	.468	.819	.674
14	.317	.307	.867	.700	14	.652	.573	.669	.585
15	.908	.720	.662	.580	15	.193	.190	.843	.688
16	.558	.507	.107	.107	16	.254	.249	.721	.618

Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores

for Married Couples

Group I - Q sort			Group I - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	12	11	1	17	10
2	15	13	2	14	11
3	12	13	3	11	5
4	14	16	4	10	11
5	13	14	5	8	13
6	9	15	6	11	15
7	15	13	7	16	14
8	14	10	8	9	12
9	15	8	9	13	14
10	11	5	10	13	11
11	15	12	11	17	14
12	8	15	12	14	11
13	18	7	13	9	13
14	9	15	14	8	13
15	10	12	15	8	12
16	14	13	16	11	12

Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores

for Casual Acquaintances

Group II - Q sort			Group II - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	15	13	1	8	13
2	10	14	2	15	9
3	13	12	3	8	11
4	14	9	4	11	11
5	12	10	5	11	11
6	14	16	6	6	10
7	17	13	7	12	12
8	9	10	8	7	13
9	13	9	9	11	12
10	12	9	10	8	10
11	8	12	11	9	14
12	10	13	12	9	9
13	12	10	13	12	13
14	9	12	14	14	11
15	13	7	15	13	5
16	15	9	16	11	6

Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores

for Total Strangers

Group III - Q sort			Group III - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	14	6	1	11	5
2	10	12	2	5	12
3	13	6	3	12	10
4	16	18	4	13	11
5	10	9	5	9	9
6	12	14	6	11	9
7	7	13	7	12	10
8	7	13	8	12	13
9	13	10	9	13	9
10	12	8	10	13	13
11	5	12	11	10	15
12	10	7	12	10	9
13	16	11	13	12	11
14	14	14	14	12	11
15	13	10	15	10	8
16	13	9	16	12	12

Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores

for Married Couples

Group I - Q sort			Group I - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	13	10	1	12	13
2	10	14	2	7	9
3	16	13	3	13	13
4	13	13	4	16	11
5	13	16	5	8	13
6	12	15	6	14	16
7	8	13	7	16	14
8	14	10	8	13	12
9	17	8	9	14	14
10	10	14	10	13	11
11	17	14	11	11	10
12	10	17	12	7	10
13	12	11	13	9	11
14	10	12	14	7	8
15	17	9	15	14	10
16	15	12	16	13	16

Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores

for Casual Acquaintances

Group II - Q sort			Group II - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	11	7	1	10	10
2	17	13	2	14	15
3	10	15	3	11	12
4	14	11	4	14	8
5	13	7	5	15	17
6	8	12	6	13	11
7	14	14	7	16	10
8	19	10	8	8	15
9	12	14	9	18	9
10	10	11	10	11	11
11	10	14	11	12	11
12	13	12	12	15	15
13	14	13	13	8	9
14	13	12	14	12	9
15	16	12	15	12	12
16	9	17	16	14	11

Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores

for Total Strangers

Group III - Q sort			Group III - Free sort		
Dyad No.	Male	Female	Dyad No.	Male	Female
1	9	12	1	14	12
2	15	13	2	13	10
3	13	4	3	7	14
4	11	7	4	11	11
5	12	11	5	7	11
6	12	6	6	14	8
7	14	16	7	9	12
8	7	11	8	14	11
9	10	9	9	9	5
10	12	12	10	13	11
11	9	11	11	10	9
12	14	11	12	11	4
13	8	11	13	12	13
14	12	8	14	7	12
15	9	16	15	14	14
16	14	10	16	10	14