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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

DEMOCRATIC STABILIZING STRATEGIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ELITES IN SPANISH REGIME POLITICS

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

JOHN D. VAN DOORN
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
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DEMOCRATIC STABILIZING STRATEGIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ELITES IN SPANISH REGIME POLITICS

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY



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Chapter 1: Introduction

Spain was one of the first cases in the current "third wave of democratization" that has swept over the world since April 25, 1974. Long before the current fascination in the Political Science literature with the importance of "social capital," Spanish civic life was built around community, in public squares, festivals, outdoor malls and the like. However, political life in Spain varies widely by its internal regions. The intent of this study is two-fold:

1. To learn how elites in the regions of Spain devised strategies to ensure regional political stability during the transition to democracy in their region, and
2. To learn how the Spanish have built their democracy around community life, known as communitarianism in Political Science literature.

As Myron Weiner observed, in order to explain democratization, one should examine the "strategies available to those who seek a democratic revolution" (Weiner in Huntington 1993, 38-39).

The study of the consolidation of democracy at the sub-state or regional level has broad implications for countries with strong regional divisions (cleavages) attempting to make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It is a useful starting point for policy makers who are interested in the "best practices" models, or models to avoid.

The Research Problem and Thesis Statement

What follows is essentially a "report from the field" that hopes to lay the groundwork for future hypothesis-testing and studies of the phenomenon identified. It

is a study that, according to Van Evera's criteria (1997, 89ff), attempts to make a contribution to the larger literature on democratization, and political leadership in a democratizing context, by performing a "historical evaluative" function of a specific set of actors at a specific time and place. To a lesser extent, it is hypothesis-generating within a larger theoretical framework.

The bulk of the political science literature on democratization is still largely focused on understanding and classifying the strategies, behaviors, and institutional arrangements made by national elites during the relatively brief "transitional" phase, i.e. the short period of time during and directly after the change of regime type from authoritarianism to at least a nominal democracy.[1] In general, two areas have been neglected in this now-large body of scholarship: an in-depth consideration of what occurs *after* the transitional phase in a given country that helps the democratic regime survive over a long period of time (*viz.*, democratic consolidation), and secondly, the role of non-national elites in democratic consolidation. The dissertation will examine the second neglected area in some depth.

In this dissertation, I examine three selected regions in Spain--*Catalunya*, *Galicia*, and *Andalucía*[2]--as a series of case studies of a successful consolidation of a

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[1]An example is Barbara Geddes (1997).

[2]Note on regional names: even the names of the regions themselves are freighted with regional tension: the Catalans prefer "*Catalunya*" instead of "*Cataluña*" because the tilde over the "n" is a symbol of Castillian suppression of their language. Therefore, I will follow the following convention on regional names: either they will be rendered in their English equivalents: Andalusia, Galicia or Catalonia, or in their "authentic" regional languages: *Andalucía*, *Galicia*, and *Catalunya*.

democratic regime.

Statement of the Problem and Research Question

Why has democracy been successfully consolidated throughout Spain despite significant inter-regional variations in approaches and strategies among regional elites, variations that some of the literature (e.g. Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989) predicts will lead to a breakdown of democracy? What role was played in the process of democratic consolidation by strong inter-regional cleavages in Spain, such as separatist movements, and ethnic and linguistic differences? Against this remarkable backdrop, the research question is, "what strategies do regional elites use to promote democratic stability in their region of Spain?"

General Theory

According to Van Evera's (1997) criteria, all hypotheses must be derived from a more general theory, along with explanations and antecedent conditions (pp. 8ff.). This is similar to the requirement of *audiatur et altera pars*. The general theory employed here is that of Huntington (1993), Putnam (1993), and, to a lesser extent, Wildavsky (1989). Although Huntington is very skeptical of "single-factor" explanations, he does conclude that two factors– (1) political leadership, and (2) economic development– are the keys to both democratic transitions and longer-range consolidation (pp. 311-316). Putnam noted that regional variations in Italian democratic institutionalization (and institutional performance) can be explained by variations in regional "economic context and political tradition" (p. 10).

The assumption *behind* why regions of countries matter for democratization is

that "context matters"; context being equated with the underlying society. Putnam (1993, 8) phrases it well: "the practical performance of [democratic] institutions, we conjecture, is shaped by the social context within which they operate." Therefore, societal variations must be accounted for, and "societies" tend to vary by regions of countries, i.e. very seldom is a country of any size composed of only one society. Wildavsky concurs that it is futile to try to understand leadership without understanding the society within which it is embedded, which he calls a "regime." I borrow from all three theories to develop a hybrid theory that purports to explain regional variations in democratic institutionalization by variations in regional political leadership, acknowledging regional context as important antecedent conditions. These antecedent conditions, in turn, shape leadership potential to bring about democratic stability in that region. As the literature review makes clear below, however, there is no general body of theory on the role of *regional* political leadership in a country undergoing democratic transition/consolidation. Therefore, it is the intent of this study to make an original contribution to the theory in this important new area of comparative politics scholarship, in addition to the historical-evaluative function mentioned at the outset.

Hypothesis

Within any theory worthy of the name, Van Evera continues, is a "prime hypothesis" that is the "overarching hypothesis that frames the relationship between a theory's independent and dependent variables in the study" (p. 11). The prime hypothesis of the theory under consideration here is:

Regional elites' strategies and behaviors → democratic stability→ degree of democracy.

While "degree of democracy" is the ultimate dependent variable, the focus will be on the independent variable (regional elites' strategies), and the intermediate dependent variable (democratic stability).

The prime hypothesis can be restated in the form of a testable hypothesis, as follows:

The variation in behavior and strategies of regional elites in Spain, conditioned by regional factors to be defined, resulted in variations in democratic stability in each region.

The nature of the independent, intervening and dependent variables can be depicted more clearly as follows:

{Int. Factors}

↕

E(s,b) → indicators of democratic stability. [→ level of democratic consolidation.[3]]

x

Regional economic and social conditions

where the study variable is the behavior and strategies of regional elites, regional economic and social conditions are the antecedent condition variables, international

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[3]Please see the definition of Democratic Consolidation, below for a fuller explanation. In short, this phrase means the institutionalization of key democratic practices.

factors are an intervening variable, democratic stability is the study dependent variable and finally, degree of regional democratic consolidation (D.C.), is the ultimate dependent variable, which will remain unstudied. Because of more direct links with the international community, international factors are postulated to be more strongly causative in one of the cases (Catalonia) than the others. Regional economic and social conditions are, in the words of Hempel and Van Evera, "antecedent condition variables" meaning that they are variables "whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis" (Van Evera 1997, 9-10).

It was impossible to spell out all of the possible antecedent condition variables affecting *E(s,b)*, but below are those variables that were assigned beforehand, based upon prior research and theorizing:

X_1 = Regional institutional structure and the actor's position within it.

X_2 = Regional actor's position vis-à-vis national (and in some cases international) actors and institutions.

The focus of this study is on the variation in regional elites' "leadership style," which is operationalized as elite strategy and behavior, or *E(s,b)*, composed of four components, which are spelled out below:

$E(s,b)_1$ = The basic "exit" or "voice" option (Hirschman 1970) of regional elites; i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a democratic system.

$E(s,b)_2$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents;

e.g., a populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperation strategy.[4]

$E(s,b)_3$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites.

$E(s,b)_4$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites; e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the center/national elites).

Style is defined as the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by regional elites in pursuit of both electoral gain and "higher" values like democracy and regional political and economic advancement. Although one could attempt to quantify "real change," a more useful rule of thumb would be, do the citizenry and fellow elites perceive or *believe* that real change and more of the "higher values" have been implemented *after* the political leader came into power than before? And, since this reaches to states of mind, subjective judgements are necessary on the part of the researcher.

The difficulty of "proving" that leadership is a cause has been treated at some length in the literature. This problem has been succinctly described by Aaron Wildavsky:

> [Although] conceiving of leadership as a causal relationship is an advance...there are as many types of leaders as there are kinds of causes, and there is much difficulty in distinguishing one from the other in assigning them relative weights in different situations (1989, 94).

---

[4] The difference between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived "payoffs" (usually electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).

The difficulties identified by Wildavsky are addressed in this study by utilizing a standard set of variables (above) *across* regions to operationalize "leadership style," and through the use of the concept of "elite culture" from Diamond (1999) below; i.e. it is the judgement of fellow elites, not the distant analyst, that matters in assessing the degree of "intended real change." The focus on elite culture (beliefs, perceptions) helps escape problems identified with the approach of McFarland and Greenstein[5] that constraints in which a leader acts, eg. "general social forces" or the "environment," are too vague to operationalize. Finally, by identifying a limited number of political institutional contexts (or "regimes") in which these elites operate, and creating ideal-typical models based upon the combination of style and context, the study avoids the problem of infinite regress identified by Wildavsky.

Each of the component variables of leadership styles are hypothesized to be both dichotomous and continuous, and to show a wide range of variation when continuous.. Each of these component variables of leadership style could theoretically matter to democratic stability and bridging social capital in the following ways.

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[5]The books cited, respectively, are Andrew S. McFarland, *Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 157-158, and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," *APSR* 61 (1967), pp. 629-641.

Regional Elite Leadership Style	**Democratic stability**	**Social capital**
E(b,s)1 "choice of exit or voice options"	if exit option–low voice option–medium to high	if exit option–low; voice option–medium
E(b,s)2	if populism–medium to high if intra-elite cooperation–low to high, depending on intent of pacting/exchange	if populism–medium to high if intra-elite cooperation–very low to medium, depending on intent of pacting/exchange
E(b,s)3 "characteristic relations with national elites/organizations"	if cooperative–medium to high if confrontational–very low to medium, depending on purpose of the challenge	if cooperative–medium to high if confrontational–low to medium, depending on purpose of the challenge
E(b,s)4 "characteristic relations with international elites/orgs".	if cooperative–medium to high	if cooperative–low to medium, depending on use of funds and expertise

Concepts and Variables

The key concepts in this study are "regional elite actors," "democratic stability," "social capital," "institutions," "elite strategies and behaviors," and "Democratic Consolidation." Less crucial, but still important, are "international factors."

Regional elite actors refers to government officials in Spain's autonomous regions, and leaders of "peak" civic organizations/institutions at the regional level; i.e., leaders of the highest-level organizations representing business, labor, ethnic and the particular indigenous interests of that region. These are leaders who are constantly in

include shared mind-sets, recurring social practices, etc. They are important to this study because, as Putnam notes, "they shape actors' identities, power and strategies" (1993, 8)

Elite strategies and behaviors will be operationalized to mean:

1. Strategies-- calculations, plans and intentions of the identified political actors as they and other elites understand and/or perceive them;
2. Behaviors-- will be operationalized to mean elite actions that were actually observed.

International Factors will be operationalized to mean only those identifiable links between international and regional elites whose purpose was to directly assist a region in Spain during the phase of democratic consolidation (Phase 3 in my definition, below).

The final key variable is **Democratic Consolidation**, the ultimate dependent variable. In attempting to come to grips with this variable, the purpose is not to perform an exhaustive literature review on the concept, but rather to clarify the relationship of the independent variables to the ultimate dependent variable.

Definitions of the concept "democracy" represent some of the oldest and most contentious discussions in political science. A review of the literature going back to the incarnation of the study of politics as a science (about 120 years ago) would reveal literally hundreds of definitions and usages of the term, and many of these uses of democracy were contradictory or self-serving (Huntington 1989, 11-16). In fact, a literature review by Collier and Levitsky in 1997 indicated that there were no fewer

than "550 subtypes of democracy" cited in 150 recent studies of the phenomenon (Diamond 1999, 7). It is therefore with a great deal of humility and perspective that anyone should propose yet another understanding of democracy, or specific sub-components of the term.

First, some background discussion to the formal definition of democratic consolidation is in order. The concept "democratization" is a multi-dimensional term that is used in the literature for the sake of convenience and not clarity. It describes a host of historical and theoretical "moments" (or phases) on the road to self-governance that have vague beginning and ending points.

Democratization is usually broken down into two large component-phases known in the literature as "transition" and "consolidation." A book on the consolidation of democracy in neighboring Portugal insists that:

> ...the issues of democratic transition and consolidation are both conceptually and empirically distinct. Whereas transitologists seek to discover the origins of a democratic regime, consolidologists search for variables that keep a regime robust, stable and durable (Manuel 1996, 1-2).

Dankwart Rustow wrote a seminal article (1970) on the phases of democratization in the article, "Transitions to Democracy." He uses the terms "Preparatory," "Decision," and "Habituation," to describe the distinct phases in democratization. This terminology is still preferred by some writers today (Pridham *et al.*, 1984) because of its seemingly greater precision and accuracy than the terms,

was unfair to the prospects for developing democracy elsewhere in the world, and, as it turns out, the assumption was empirically inaccurate as well (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 156ff.).

More recently, Larry Diamond has contributed a synthetic work on the subject of democratic consolidation, drawing on his two decades of work and collaboration in this field, and his thorough knowledge of a voluminous number of cases and studies. He reminds us of the dangers of teleological assumptions that plagued the first generation of political scientists (at the turn of the 20th century); i.e. there is nothing inevitable, permanent, or intrinsically "good" about democratic governance; rather it is the result of deliberate choice and can be undone almost as easily as it was created (1999, 273ff.). His normative concern centers around preventing a "third reverse wave" by helping to consolidate the currently fragile democracies, and even moving beyond that to an enlarged "fourth wave," which would include much of Asia. Especially relevant to this study is his concern with the *process* of democratic consolidation, and his *indicators* of the process. His indicators are sub-divided into "norms" (or political culture) and "behavior," much like my $E(b,s)$, above. The most important shared norms and behavior, he reaffirms, are on the elite level because of their disproportionate influence on the process, but any complete account should include the intermediate and mass level as well (1999, 65-70). Elites, for Diamond, are loosely defined as the, "most significant leaders of opinion, culture, business and social organization" (p. 69). But Diamond does not distinguish among *levels* of elites, as this study proposes to do.

Obviously, no one constitutional-institutional configuration can serve as an absolute model for democratic consolidation. I propose the following working definition. My definition is composed of three phases. The first two are widely used "markers" in the literature to identify that a transition has taken place, and the *process* of democratic consolidation is well underway (and that the democratic mechanisms are in place); the third phase is an equally important criterion to identify the *substance* of democratic consolidation.

Democratic Consolidation: **Phase 1** (Transition)- A relatively brief phase in which the decision is taken by political elites to inaugurate a democratic regime-type, often by engaging in pacts and constitution-making. **Phase 2**: At least two open, genuinely contested elections for the most powerful political positions have been held in which the entire adult population is eligible to vote,[8] and at least one peaceful transfer of administration has been made from one party to another. **Phase 3**: An institutionalization of democratic attitudes and practices begun during the transition stage into more permanent structures or practices, including at least, the institutionalization of "uncertainty"[9] as defined by Przeworski, and the acceptance of all parties of the political rules of the game, especially rules governing succession. A respect for basic differences and a modicum of trust exhibited between and among the population as a whole. This definition follows that of Huntington (1993, 7), Schmitter (1990, 21ff) and Whitehead (in Pastor, ed. 1989).

The third part of this definition is now acknowledged to be of paramount importance in the most recent literature. Although "convoking elections" is a crucial

---

[8]Note that the entire adult population should be *eligible* to vote, but a small number may be disqualified under objective legal criteria, such as universally-applied codes of criminal conduct.

[9]"Uncertainty" is described by Przeworski (in O'Donnell et al. 1986:1) as that counter-intuitive state that is accepted by true democrats in which those who assume power do so with the knowledge that their power is temporary and not secure--*viz.*, "uncertain"--and that they will peacefully vacate office as soon as their public mandate expires.

first step, it is not enough to bring about a genuine consolidation of democracy (see especially Rosenberg 1991). As Karl (1991, 36) notes: "The notion that you can simply have elections and resolve conflict is false; it will not work."[10] Diamond calls Phase 1 regimes, hollow "electoral democracies," and cites Pakistan as an example (1999, 72-73). In the same vein, Touraine (1991, 268) attempts to move beyond elections in his definition of democracy, which is as follows: "the free choice of a government which represents the interests of the majority and respects the fundamental rights of all human beings to live according to their beliefs and basic interests." The spirit of Touraine's definition will help guide this study, but it is still necessary for clarity and agreement to have technical markers of the phenomenon under discussion, as in the definition offered above.

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[10]A short, popular synthesis of this new literature can be found in the article, "In Failed States, Can Democracy Come Too Soon?" by Michael Massing, *New York Times*, February 23, 2002, electronic edition.

own, although the institutionalization of attitudes into permanent structures (or "habits of the mind") is still under way and will take more time, especially in regions like Galicia (see chapter three, below).[11] Again, the main purpose for wrestling with the meaning of democratic consolidation at such length here is to help guide the formulation and research of the causal variables.

It should be reiterated that the focus of this study is on *explicitly political factors*, although it is acknowledged that social and cultural factors provide a floor upon which political actions take place. Moreover, it is argued that these political factors have been controlling in the process of democratic consolidation, not the social or cultural factors; while the latter play a role in "distant" or "antecedent" causation, do not control the actions of elites.[12] These political factors would include the nature of exchanges, bargains, compromises, leadership style (as defined above), scandals, etc.

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[11]Most analysts date the end of the Spanish transition to the year 1982 due to two events: the survival of a coup attempt in 1981, and the general election in October,1982 which resulted in the second rotation in power from one party to another. The most authoritative statement is that of Linz and Stepan (1996, 108).

[12]Although this is an assertion to be treated in the subsequent study, this claim enjoys plausibility and empirical proof from a wide variety of other recent studies. Thus Diamond (1999, 162) concludes, "The most striking finding here is the autonomy of the political," a surprisingly assertion from a former adherent to the Lipset structuralist school. See also Manuel (1996, 2), who similarly questions the guiding assumptions of the earlier generation of democratic and developmental scholars (i.e. the post-World War II generation).

Justification

The primary justification of this work is that it is a practical study that could be of use to policy-makers who want to encourage the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in similar cases. The general justification for the study of elites in politics is that it has a long pedigree and proven utility in political science. In any political system, they are the primary *actors*, *viz.*, those by which and through which political activity and concrete policy actually comes into being. Thus, Fenno asserts that,

> [E]lective politicians...are so crucial to the operation of the political system. There is...a huge mismatch between the central importance of elective politicians...and their peripheral importance in political science scholarship. One of the reason for this mismatch is the reluctance and/or inability of political scientists to observe elective politicians personally and at close range (1990, 1).

The recent scholarship of Diamond (1999) reaffirms that, "elites matter most for the stability and consolidation of democracy, not only in their behaviors but also in their beliefs.....elites also play a crucial role in shaping political culture and in signaling what kind of behavior is proper and improper.....there has been strangely little attention to the political culture of elites in new democracies and little thought on how to measure it" (p. 66).

More specifically, why focus on *regional elite* strategies and behaviors as they affect democratic consolidation? The question of which is the most appropriate or "proper" level of government in which to practice democracy is as old as political philosophy itself. It resonates in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau (who sang the praises of the small republic, like his native Geneva), the current debate over

"devolution" and all of those who call themselves "federalists," whether America's founders, or our contemporaries. The proper size and "sphere" of government is one of the dominant themes of the *The Federalist* papers. It is often forgotten that the Founders saw as much–if not more–virtue for democracy in smaller government than in a very large state government; a large state regime was only desirable in a democracy if "checked" by local and state democratic governments. Madison, in particular, recognized that some of the most vital functions of democracy could only be practiced in a "small republic":

> It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances ... (Madison 1789, *The Federalist*, No. 10).

As Putnam (2000) points out, Jefferson went so far as to suggest a constitutional amendment to strengthen democracy by bringing it home to the people; that by:

> [M]aking every citizen an acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him, [it] will attach him by his strongest feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican constitution (Jefferson quoted in Putnam 2000, 336).

The contemporary communitarian movement makes the point that the traits so vital to democracy–e.g. self-government, mutual self-help, participation, vibrant neighborhoods and cities, among others–can only be practiced in a bounded area in which citizens can realistically come to know (and trust) one another. As an extreme example, Inis Claude (1968) points out that it makes little sense to talk about an international "community" unless one is referring to a handful of elites who regularly

Theoretically, how can regional elites affect the quality and level of social capital within their region? Two main lines of argumentation will be suggested here, one borrowed from Putnam (2000). First, social capital can be neither created nor maintained at the state level, especially in a large, diverse state such as Spain, because social capital is, *by its nature* based upon iterated, interpersonal contact of the type that can only occur within a relatively small geographical space. Putnam quotes the famous American philosopher John Dewey, and his biographer Robert Westbrook, to make this point:

> "Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community." "Only in local, face-to-face associations," adds Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook, "could members of a public participate in dialogues with their fellows, and such dialogues were crucial to the formation and organization of the public" (Putnam 2000, 337).

Secondly, although it is at least theoretically possible to *create* social capital at the regional/community level, it is quite another matter to maintain it. The foremost proponent of the concept, Putnam, admits as much by specifically calling upon American elites in a wide variety of settings to help create new stocks of social capital (Putnam 2000, 404-414), much as Progressive elites did in an earlier era. In *Making Democracy Work* (1993, 167-169), the manifestations of social capital that are repeatedly cited by Putnam are regional institutions that were deliberately created or altered by regional elites–both civic and political elites, e.g. mutual-aid practices like rotating credit associations. More broadly, Putnam notes that political institutional reform changes political practice, including enriching stocks of social capital, or overcoming problems of a "low social capital equilibrium":

> As institutionalists would predict, institutional changes were (gradually) reflected in changing identities, changing values, changing power, and changing strategies (Putnam 1993, 184).

In addition, regional elites can thwart or affect the pacing and timing of democratic measures, short of taking the drastic exit option; that is, they affect the *path* of democracy. Secondly (as will be seen in the review of the literature below), regional elites have seldom been studied for their role in democratic consolidation. Regional elites are not usually studied as autonomous actors engaged in strategic games with other elite actors at the regional, national and international levels; when mentioned at all, they are usually depicted as engaging in subservient, avoidance, or coping behaviors vis-à-vis national and international elites. As we will see below, the return of "regionalism" as a fashionable academic study usually bypassed, or marginalized the role of regional elites; instead it has focused on culture, class, the center-periphery dichotomy and theories of federalism, which are undoubtedly important fields of study in their own right (Rokkan and Urwin 1982).

Long before Europe was a continent organized politically around states,[14] it was a continent organized around regions, fiefdoms and small republics and principalities, united by contiguous territory, language, ethnicity and/or religion. Thus, the "territorial dimension" has been, and will continue to be, of extraordinary importance to understanding European politics, and politics in many other areas of the

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[14]Only since the treaty of Westphalia recognized their legal existence in 1648 have states formally existed, and most European states came into existence long after then. Thus, in the scope of recorded human political history, formal states represent only a small fraction of that history.

world (Sharpe 1987; Rokkan and Urwin, eds., 1982; Eisenstadt and Rokkan, eds. 1973). In fact, many future "scenarios" of political organization from well-respected scholars suggest the demise, or at least fragmentation, of the nation-state (Nye 2000; Russell 1994, 84). In addition, a United Nations report from a panel of experts suggests that, if current trends continue, in the future states will become even smaller and more "region-like" with the emergence of about 300 additional states in the next 150-200 years (for a total of almost 500 states!). It would behoove the discipline to understand why regionalism retains such a vital political force, and how and why regional elites are harnessing this force.

Sharpe (1987, 152ff.) suggests four concrete ways in which territory shapes politics, the first three of which he asserts have been critically neglected in the political science literature[15]:

1. How the unique character of every polity is shaped by its unique territorial location;
2. How an individual's physical location can override his economic class, party or other affiliations in political matters.
3. How the tendency towards increasingly large political entities (or of large

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[15]Sharpe (1987, 148ff.) notes that political science has been dominated by economic (class) and individualistic (behavioral) analysis because, under the dominant positivistic paradigm, it seeks generalizable laws across space (territory) and time; territorial-based politics implies uniqueness, and thus has been demoted by the "covering-law" model still dominant in political science.

scale) undermines democratic responsiveness and accountability.[16]

4. Territory defines who the polity is, and is one of three essential ingredients of the definition of the state (population and a recognized government being the other two).

Beyond this general justification for studying elites and the effect of territory on politics, why study regional politics in Spain? Spain is widely acknowledged to be one of the three European countries where territorial cleavages (and core-periphery cleavages) matter the most (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam 1987; Rokkan and Urwin 1982, Heiberg 1982; Díaz López 1982; Sharpe 1987).[17] Other scholars note how regional politics (or "micronationalism") in Spain shapes everything from labor negotiations to party politics to national governments (Gunter et al., 1986). My own trips to Spain and on-the-ground observation confirmed the importance of regionalism in Spain and guided me to this topic. The perceptive observer notices dramatic differences in language, dress, customs, and most importantly, political practice. For example, the region around Madrid resembles any other modern metropolitan city, while large-scale protests (hundreds of thousands of people) were observed in both Galicia and Andalusia.

In addition, EU policy, at just about the time that Spain joined the EC/EU, had

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[16]This, of course, was Rousseau's classic argument for a small republic, and the subject of the celebrated argument for federalism in the U.S. in the *Federalist*, No. 51.

[17]The other two being Belgium and Switzerland.

begun to favor regionalism (a "Europe of the regions"), a marked shift from its previous state-to-state policy.[18] The EU effected this policy through the use of EU funds, known variously as European Structural Funds (ESF) and FEDER (European Regional Development Funds). Although the ESF and other funds earmarked for regional development were technically negotiated between the EU and state-level elites (in Madrid), many of the Spanish regions had established direct representation before the EU with offices in Brussels (Morata 1994, 162). The idea behind the policy is that gross disparities between the regions of Europe could lead to instability, which would, in turn, threaten the values that were at the very core of Europe's self-identity: democracy and universal human rights. The idea of "subsidiarity," similar to the idea of "devolution" in the United States, has been widely discussed in Europe in the last twenty years (Lodge). Theoretically, the work of Marks, Hooge et al. (1996) has advanced the idea of "multi-level governance" in the European Union.

Taken together, these trends and theories make European regional politics an important topic of study in its own right, and give *prima facie* evidence–to be explored in this study–that international factors are important in regional politics, and that regional elites *can* benefit from international assistance. The extant literature has not

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[18]For example, the European Regional Assembly (ARE) was founded in 1985, which united several disparate pre-existing organizations in a permanent organization with fifteen founding members, its own bureaucracy, Secretary-General, and six working groups. It a "Final Declaration" from its 1993 Bonn meeting, the ARE made two noteworthy resolutions to further a "Europe of the regions": to promote the widespread application of the principle of "subsidiarity," and secondly, the permanent establishment of the "Committee of the Regions" in the EU system as called for in the Maastrict Treaty (Morata 1994, 161).

asked (or answered) what the regional elites are doing with these funds politically beyond building infrastructure. More important, what are regional elites doing with these additional funds to overcome historical societal problems–such as low social capital equilibrium–that have retarded democracy in those regions? There is a dearth in the extant literature on these important questions.

Finally, at the most specific level, why study regional *elites* in Spain? The most basic reason is that, given the importance of the territorial dimension to Spanish politics set out above, especially its re-emergence post-Franco, regional elites have been grossly understudied. But equally important is that they have been significant, autonomous actors in the process of democratic consolidation in post-Franco Spain. Preliminary research had indicated that at least some elites in post-Franco Spain were showing the reverse course of the U.S. pattern of "progressive political ambition" from local to state to national politics (Fowler and McClure 1987) by either leaving the national stage for regional politics, or by choosing to remain in regional politics, despite their clear ability to move into national politics and frequent urging that they do so. Two clear examples of figures with national renown in Spain: Manuel Fraga Iribarne, now the President of the *Xunta* of Galicia, who had been a cabinet minister under Franco, and was the founder of the post-Franco center-right party AP, the forerunner of the current ruling party, the P.P., and secondly, Jordi Pujol, who had been a heroic opposition figure to the Franco regime, suffering several years of imprisonment, and now the venerable president of the *Generalitat* of Catalunya.

Secondly, the democratization literature in general has posited that two of the

most critical factors in the democratization process are inter-elite "concertation" (bargaining and pact-making), and the role of elites in promoting labor organization and what Przeworski calls the "democratic class compromise" (O'Donnell et al. 1986: 1), yet this literature is virtually silent on the role that regional elites can, should, and did play in the process. Again, my preliminary research indicated (and I believe my fieldwork supports the notion) that regional elites were actively involved in, and, in some cases, crucial to, the *concertación* and pacting process in their regions. Moreover, my fieldwork also confirmed what Putnam et al. (1987, 1988; 1993) observed about Italian politics since the 1970's: many of the political organizations, and much of the political action, has "devolved" from the center to the regions in Italy.

The causal hypothesis stated above, which focuses on the role of regional elites in bringing about specific outcomes, will permit a focus on specific actors located within specific institutional matrices (Steinmo et al., eds. 1992; Hall 1986). It is very important to focus on specific actors, their behaviors and strategic intentions, in order to achieve precision and clarity, and to avoid the mistake of further mystifying such institutions as the "state," or to ascribe causal weight to vague theoretical constructs. It is also important to examine actors' *intentions* and *perceptions*, both as they describe them and others perceive them, in order to gain a fuller understanding that is not possible with the observation of empirical behavior alone. More importantly, one cannot ascertain whether leadership actually occurred unless one knows whether the change was, as Burns asserts, "broadly intended real change," and "collectively purposeful causation" (1978, 434).

Models

The methodological framework employed here is the "most different" systems design of Mills, and the "most similar" research design of Lijphart (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This method seeks to carefully select a few cases which are as closely matched on "secondary characteristics" as possible in order to control for common systemic characteristics which helps to minimize the number of experimental variables. Therefore, as Przeworski and Teune explain:

> if some important differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone (1970, 32).

The advantage of this method is that the researcher is able to more accurately gauge the causation of a given phenomenon because the outcome is held constant. To be certain, there is a danger of "overdetermination" if the researcher identifies a large number of independent variables that purport to explain the same dependent variable. However, as Huntington (1993, 36-37) observers, overdetermination is a problem "only for those concerned with evaluating theories. The same does not exist for those concerned with explaining events," as is the goal of this study.

Putnam et al. (1993) has argued that what makes democracy "work" is effective institutional, i.e. policy, performance and a historical tradition of high "social capital" (e.g. trust, political participation and connectivity) at the *regional* level (what they call the "civic community"). This book provides the closest blueprint in the existing literature as a model for the proposed study. Putnam's recent approach is

salutary for the study of democratic consolidation in at least three ways.[19] First, it is properly located at the level "where the action is" and prevents obscuring important regional differences by treating a national state as only one case. Secondly, it represents a more manageable research project than the study of an entire state. Finally, the variation across several regions in one state can provide valuable insights, much as the "most different" system design does by deliberately juxtaposing different cases--usually states--in the comparative method.

There are several differences between *Making Democracy Work* and the proposed study, however. Most fundamentally, Putnam et al.'s dependent variable of "institutional performance" is clearly different than of this study, what I have termed the "democratic stabilization." As Tarrow (1996) rightly points out, policy "performance is as likely to be positive in nondemocratic as in democratic states" (pp. 395-396). While an undoubtedly important dependent variable, "institutional performance," as operationalized by Putnam, does not measure or indicate the degree of democratic stability necessary for long-term democratic consolidation.

More recently, Putnam has made the term "social capital" more analytically useful by making the distinction between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital (2000, 22). The analytical distinction is simple: bonding social capital *reinforces* existing social cleavages and relationships, while bridging social capital *cross-cuts*

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[19]Methodologically, several reviewers have praised Putnam et al. for their bold, and at least partially successful, marriage of quantitative techniques and historical-institutional analysis. See Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time..." *APSR* 90: 2 (June 1996), 389-397.

these cleavages, creating new social connections.[20] According to Putnam, "bridging" social capital is far more important to the consolidation and long-term health of democracy than "bonding" social capital is; in certain circumstances, "bonding" social capital can even undermine the democratic system.[21] However, even in his latest, large-scale work devoted to fleshing out the implications of social trust on American politics and society, Putnam never fully explores these provocative assertions, especially the critical relationship between types of social capital and the survivability of the democratic system itself.

Review of the Literature

The most significant literature on democratization, from a theoretical standpoint, is the O'Donnell and Schmitter series, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (1986). Its importance to the field cannot be overstated.[22] Written at the beginning of the world-wide trend towards democratization, however, it focused on "transition" to (versus "consolidation" of) democracy. There is now however, widespread acknowledgment that the focus on transition has become dated, and detailed

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[20]However, in practice, Putnam notes, the two types of social capital are often intermingled.

[21]In Putnam's evocative language, bridging social capital is held to be "sociological superglue," while bonding social capital is merely "sociological WD-40," i.e. it provides only superficial lubrication to grease the skids of everyday life (Putnam 2000, 23).

[22]Barbara Geddes, in a conference paper, notes that the *Transitions* volume is still cited more than six times as much as the next closest citation in democracy scholarship. See Geddes (1997, 2 fn. 3).

scholarship has emerged in this next area of comparative politics at the next stage of the democratization process, the consolidation of democracy. The series editors (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead) spin out a smorgasbord of causal factors affecting democratic transitions, with no clear hierarchy of explanation. For example, Schmitter offers the following independent variables that purport to explain the process of democratic transition: the diminishing of the military threat and repression, the rise of a "civil society" as a necessary base for democratic attitudes and resistance (a major transformation), the discrediting of the Soviet-Communist party model ("real existing socialism") and other extreme alternatives, and the proximity and attractiveness of the relative tolerance of the European parliamentary/proportional representation system over the American "winner take all system," and vague international and cross-national pressures. The real focus of the *Transitions* volume, however, was on the behavior and strategies of national elites during the relatively brief, choatic and heady transition period; actions and choices that would later chart the course of the transition's political outcome. This approach has become known as the "elite-agency" model (Schmitz and Sells 1999, 31), and it has dominated the literature on democratization ever since; most post-1987 studies on democracy in Spain adapt this framework.[23]

Based on Spain's long history and the more recent "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian"

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[23]And, of course, the chapter on Spain by Maravall and Santamaría within the *Transitions* volume followed the general approach laid out by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead. The focus was on the pacts made by political elites and peak associations (such as Labor and Business) during the early transition period following the death of France from 1977-79.

practices of General Francisco Franco (1939-75), and Spain's cultural legacy of corporatism (Wiarda 1982), the apparently successful consolidation of liberal democracy was not anticipated in most of the literature. As Gunther notes (1986, 13), "both of its previous experiments in democracy, the Restoration ... [period of] 1874-1923 and the Second Republic of 1931-1936, culminated in the establishment of authoritarian regimes." Despite this lack of foresight in the professional literature, not only has Spain made the "transition" to democracy, it is well through a period of "consolidation" of democratic practices and institutions. It is now widely agreed in the literature that democratic consolidation *has* taken place in Spain, by whatever measure is employed (Story and Pollack 1991, 125; Preston 1986, 227; Gunther et al. 1988; Linz and Stepan 1996). There have been six successful national elections (many more regional ones), one major coup attempt thwarted (but none recently), and the hallmark of consolidated democracy: a complete rotation of parties in power from conservative to (relatively) liberal and back again (*viz.*, the current conservative ruling party coalition under Aznar). Schmitter (1990, 21) insists on only *one* election, in which power is peacefully transferred to the opposition, as the starting point for democratic consolidation. Others stress the acceptance by all major political players of certain "rules" (Schmitter 1990, 21ff; Whitehead 1989; Huntington 1989; Sáez 1991).

The bulk of the literature on the process of democratization in post-Franco Spain can be grouped into nine 'clusters.' The following clusters are treated in the literature as independent causation of democratization in Spain (the dependent variable).

1. Spain's cultural history of *corporatism*.
2. The role of the *Church*.
3. The role of the *political parties* (especially centrist ones).
4. The *institutional-constitutional arrangements* that were made, especially during the transitional phase.
5. The role of *national elite leadership*, both Franco's attempts at modernization, and later the key roles they played in the transition.
6. The role of *Labor* (including that organized under Franco's initially puppet labor confederation, the "Vertical Syndicate").
7. The role of the *Military*.
8. The role of the *radical left*.
9. *International pressures* by themselves.

Each of these clusters in the literature will be treated briefly in turn, below. The methods employed in the relevant literature range from historical analysis to political economy. This brief overview gives *prima facie* evidence that sub-national/regional factors are not cited in the literature as having independent causation for the process of democratization in Spain. Each of the nine clusters identified above will now be treated in more depth.

There are two distinct trends in the general literature on *culture* in relation to the process of democratization. An older trend looks at national-mass measures of culture, and the newer revival of "political culture" examines national-elite and civil society indications of culture.

The older national-mass cluster in the above list is represented by Howard Wiarda, best known for his culture-based corporatist explanations for regime types in the "Iberic" world. Wiarda asserts that corporatism explains the current democratic regime type in Spain, but one searches his large work (1989) in vain for an explanation of how. Because of its anti-democratic history, argues Wiarda, democracy in Spain is

throughout much of their history by mountains and the sea. I have proposed above (e.g., in variable X_1) to disaggregate the concept of "culture," and to examine the effects that *identifiable* facets of culture have on regional elites' behavior and strategies during the consolidation phase of democracy.

Diamond (1999) concurs with this proposed understanding of political culture, as in the following quotation:

> It may even be argued that differences in basic cultural biases are often greater within nations than between them. The existence of these political subcultures compels us to disaggregate and to tread with caution in speaking of *the* political culture of a nation, except as a distinctive mixture or balance of orientations within in a country (p. 164).

The function of centrist **parties** is widely acknowledged to have been important in the transition phase in Spain, especially in formulating the initial pacts between themselves, regional governments and peak business and labor organizations (Villa Gil and Sagardoy Bengoechea 1987). These famous tripartite pacts (the Pact of Moncloa is the best known) governed the rules of succession, fiscal matters, power-sharing arrangements, and, in general, insured that the early Spanish transition would be a relatively smooth one. What is not clear is what role the party system has played in the consolidation phase, or the emerging relationship between national and regional parties in the context of democratization. Two outstanding analyses of the role of the parties are: Gunther (1989) and Caciagli (1984). Caciagli writes of the "crisis of the party system" and the widespread "*desencanto*" (a combination of apathy and cynicism) that has infected the Spanish public's view of the parties. This is reflected

in the PCE's and UCD's rapid demise in the eighties, and the rise and fall of several other parties (Lancaster 1994; Perez-Diaz 1993). The only stable, consistent party in state-level politics through the early 1990's was the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), but its platform and tactics have changed so radically for the sake of survival and pragmatism as to be almost unrecognizable. The PSOE itself is now in eclipse after losing the national election in 1996 to a newly resurgent center-right coalition represented by the *Partido Popular* (Popular Party–PP). And, over the long term, parties and other electoral links are a poor descriptor or predictor of elite-mass linkages (Putnam 1972, 144-160). Clearly, political parties alone cannot serve as strong independent variables to explain Spanish democratic consolidation, as one cluster in the literature hoped they might (e.g. see Pridham ed. 1990).

Spain is depicted by much of the literature as a "model" of **institutional-constitutional** construction during its transition phase (Bermeo 1994; Bresser et al. 1992; Schmitter 1992, 168; Villa Gil and Sagardoy Bengoechea 1987; Bonime-Blanc 1987). In other words, "Spain [is] the most 'impressive' example of the marriage of concertation[24] and democratization, [and is] a near-perfect model for a 'concerted' approach to the challenges posed by dual transitions"[25] (Encarnación 1996, 484).

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[24]"Concertation" comes from the Spanish word "*Concertación*", meaning to harmonize interests. In practice, it means a mode of policy formulation in which elite representatives from "peak" associations (usually Labor, Capital and the State) attempt to reach a mutually beneficial, or satisfactory, "pact", or agreement. See Villa Gil and Sagardoy Bengeochea 1987, and Encarnacíon 1996, 490 n. 13).

[25]Encarnación (1996, 477) means by "dual transition" the "historic coincidence of [political] democratization and economic liberalization in dozens of nations...".

acknowledge, however, the initial and continuing relevance of Spanish regional politics to its democratic consolidation. Other sources provide only a descriptive-configurative approach to the study of regions in Spain (e.g. Heywood 1995; Kern 1995).

Another cluster in the literature portrays the movement towards democratic consolidation in Spain as completely or almost completely the product of **national elite** direction and leadership. Franco himself knew that he had to begin liberalization in his waning years if his legacy were to survive. By both (1) naming Juan Carlos as his successor, and (2) allowing increasing labor liberalization, he helped propel Spain on a course that became far more open and inclusive (esp. of the Communists and far Left) than he would have liked. In addition, liberal elite elements of *Opus Dei*[26] and the Military helped the process of democratization through greater liberality in the financial system and legal code, and provided the crucial "opening" in the *reforma pactada*. Indeed, Share and Mainwaring (1984) have gone so far as to claim that Spain is purely a case study of "Democratization from Above" (i.e. directed by national political and military elites). Their hasty reasoning does not support this broad claim, however. This cluster in the literature tends to exaggerate the importance and impact on democratization of the actions of a few national elites during the short but intense early transition period, 1977-1979, and by the same token, to ignore the

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[26]*Opus Dei* is a secretive Catholic lay organization, originally founded in Spain in 1928, that gained increasing prominence in the Franco regime. It "married a progressive belief in technocratic rationalization as the key to Spain's economic development with a highly conservative theological, social and political outlook (Heywood 1995, 70). It still exercises considerable influence in Spain today, especially in economic and social affairs.

regional lines, and that most of today's regional elites came of political age in the struggle against Franco. Ironically, however, Franco's (state-led) corporatist attempts to co-opt and control Labor through the "Vertical Syndicate" (OSE) later evolved into a platform for genuine democratic reforms (Encarnación 1996, 488-89). Foweraker's work is criticized by Heywood (1991) as having a "romantic vision of the working class struggle against Franco" (p. 136), and for clearly overstating Labor's role in Spain's overall democratic transition, especially the vineyard workers in the southern *El Marco de Jerez* province of *Andalucía* on which Foweraker focuses. Nonetheless, Foweraker's focus on democratization efforts below the state level is a rare and useful departure from the bulk of the literature.

What Foweraker and others (e.g., Fishman 1990) do not explore is the role that provincial and regional labor leaders played in regional democratization efforts, i.e. how they devised strategies or responded to pressures from both rank-and-file members below or from above, from the European-based international unions (such as the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC). For example, Perez-Diaz (1993) notes that rank-and-file members of Catalonian trade unions pressured their more radical leaders to pursue more accomodative strategies with regional and national political elites, as did international labor leaders. This moderation was key to establishing liberal parliamentary democracy, he asserts. Before these compromises, regional instability was very high in Catalonia and other industrial regions; the number of strikes by Spanish workers was second only to those of Italy (Heywood 1995, 239). Perez-Diaz does not elaborate on the actual strategies and bargains struck, however. In

addition, the social costs and austerity measures imposed by the Spanish national government as a result of its commitment to European "convergence" fell disproportionately on Labor, especially in the more heavily industrialized region of Catalonia and elsewhere. Regional leaders were left largely to deal with the aftermath of these national policies.

One of the big surprises in post-Franco Spanish politics is the small and declining role played by the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and other elements of the **radical left**, who once claimed a large allegiance among Spanish voters, and who played such a vital role in the often dangerous and underground struggle against Franco. Gunther (1986, 148ff; 1989) asserts that internal splits and personality clashes lead to the PCE's demise. This same conclusion is arrived at in a book devoted exclusively to the subject by Alba (1983), a self-professed insider and political journalist. Alba, however, focuses almost entirely on the PCE's early years, i.e. the 1920's-60's. A more likely explanation is the deliberate choices of national and regional leaders to refrain from the "Exit" option urged by the radical left, and to instead accept the "Loyalty" and "Voice" options within a democratic regime. And the recent success of the Popular Party and the new Spanish right suggests that the basic appeal of the far leftist ideology has lost its resonance with a majority of the Spanish voting public. Whatever attractiveness and force the radical left once held in Spanish politics, it clearly has played a very limited role in the process of democratic consolidation, at either the regional or national level.

Under the general heading of **international factors**, one finds works that

democracy in the first case (the so-called "bad luck"[27] thesis) and its success in the second case. Maravall et al. (1986:1, 91) are in complete agreement on this point. In general, Tovias makes a good case for the importance of international factors and the integration process of Spain into Europe for any complete understanding of Spanish democratization.

Laurence Whitehead (1986, 1989, 1991) also stresses international factors in explaining the successful recent cases of democratic consolidation, especially in Southern Europe. Whitehead believes that the EC/EU has done a far better and more consistent job than the United States at promoting democracy; the EC has at least always made membership and the hope of membership "non-discretionary," i.e. unyieldingly dependent on a democratic form of government (Powers 1988, 28). In addition, argues Whitehead, the EC offered critical external guarantees to Spain's business and propertied classes. He calls the approach of the EC "democracy promotion" (versus the "imposition" approaches of the U.S. in Latin America). In his 1991 book, he explains the differences this way:

> The broad alternative to democracy promotion by unilateral imposition is democracy promotion by mutual accommodation. In this case the giver may well recognize the imperfection or vulnerability of the home democracy, which may be strengthened by external reinforcement (1991, 240).

In this quotation, Whitehead echoes Gourevitch's earlier assertion that there is a *two-*

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[27]The "bad luck" thesis asserts that a harsh international climate in the 1930's, especially in Europe, was an important reason for the failure of so many nascent democracies of that time period. Factors cited include an economic depression, "beggar thy neighbor" economic policies, the rise of fascism, and retrenchment by the world's democracies.

way interaction between the domestic and international levels (or "images). In this instance, democracy appears to be strengthened (or further consolidated) in both the supported country and the supporting country(-ies).

More recent work on the international factors on domestic democratization (e.g., see Grugel, ed. 1999) have moved away from examining formal and procedural links between national and international governmental elites and instead attempted to shift the focus to trans-national ("people-to-people") links between NGO's and other non-governmental civil society actors. The understanding of "regionalism" in this approach, however, is of contiguous groups of developing countries, not sub-state territories, and the approach frankly disdains elites at any level, hoping to "bring the masses back in." There appears to be a large normative element in this proposed change of focus; in any case, empirical support for the proposed linkages remains very limited at this early point in this type of international democratization studies.

As valuable as these insights on international factors are, they tend to treat the effect of international factors as uniform across regions in the recipient country, and the interaction as occurring solely between national and international actors. It is postulated here that the effect of international factors (finance, technical and other assistance) will be different depending on the needs (e.g. basic infrastructure, agricultural subsidies or trade links) of the region, the region's elites and their strategies and interactions with international elites.

The only body of literature that could be located on the importance of regional elites and politics in a democratizing country are studies on India. For example, a

noted scholar of India, Subrata K. Mitra, asks this penetrating question, "[I]f India's political process as a whole has remained democratic, then why are the regional and local exceptions so frequent and persistent?" (Mitra 2003, 638). Mitra does not fully answer his own intriguing question, but notes that strong regional variations in religion, economic development and class alignments throughout India must be a part of the answer.

Given the foregoing review of the literature, this study seeks to make a contribution to the literature in the following ways. First, it seeks to treat regional elites as fully autonomous political actors. Secondly, it seeks to understand the nature of their role in providing democratic stability in their region during the transition and early consolidation period.[28] Third, it seeks to understand their mediation with national and international elites in ensuring democratic stability in their region. This third goal of the study is to be pursued for both theoretical as well as practical reasons. Theoretically, it is derived from the Gourevitch's (1978) "Second Image Reversed" thesis in which he asserted that domestic political outcomes could be increasingly understood with reference to international factors. Spain's proximity to the European Union, and the EU's role in the Spanish democratic transition, at both the state and regional levels, make Gourevitch's theoretical observations of great practical value as

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[28]The literature generally dates the transition phase in Spain from 1975-1982, and the consolidation period from 1982 to the present (e.g., see Linz and Stepan 1996, 108ff). However, I will assert that democracy is not fully consolidated in at least one *region* of the country, e.g. Galicia in this study, according to my "P-3 indicators of democratic consolidation" set out above, and also according to Linz and Stepan's measure of the "behavior of [politically] significant groups" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 109).

well.

Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is comprised of six chapters. This chapter has introduced the subject matter, working hypotheses, and performed a preliminary review of the literature. Chapter two will introduce and justify the selection of cases, and the methods to be employed to study them. Chapter three will begin the substantive work with a discussion of the patrimonial, or "democratic authoritarian" regional elite leadership style found in Galicia, in northwest Spain, during the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Chapter four will continue to discuss the fruits of my fieldwork with an exploration of the "communitarian" leadership style of *Andalucía* in southern Spain. Chapter five will conclude the substantive fieldwork chapters with a discussion of the "visionary" leadership style observed in Cataluña in northeastern Spain during the transition and consolidation period. Chapter six will serve three purposes: first to sum up the findings across and among the selected Spanish cases, two, to show the findings of the relationship between regional elite leadership styles and the level and quality of democratic stability in that region, and three, make heuristic suggestions for future research and generalizability of these cases to other similar cases in the future. As a result of the case studies, four patterns were uncovered: (1) structuring of political dissent, (2) regional elite intermediation with national and international elites, (3) the use of nationalism, and (4) region-specific policymaking.

Chapter 2: Case Selection and Methods

In this chapter the methods that were actually used in gathering the research for this project will be justified and discussed. It is hoped that such a discussion will not only prove to be intellectually sound, but also a useful guide to other researchers who are contemplating using similar methods. First, we will consider the question of case selection, and appropriate methodology, then the elite interviewing technique in general, and finally, the actual process of interviewing Spanish regional elites.

I. **The Logic of Case Selection**

While no pretense is made here that the selection of the three regions in Spain represents a truly random sample, there is a logic to their selection, *viz.*, it increases the "leverage" of the data and the explanations proffered (King et al. 1994, 29-31). Secondly, these cases are selected for a wide range of variation on the independent variable, regional elite leadership style. As noted earlier, there is some variation on the study variable, political stability, and the ultimate dependent variation, the degree of democracy.[29] The cases selected increase leverage in two ways:

1. They allow for the collection of "as much data in as many diverse settings as possible" (King et al. 1994, 24), and
2. Their selection, along with the multiple levels of analysis in the structure of the research hypotheses, allows for the collection of evidence in "varied contexts."

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[29]Degrees of democracy is held to be a continuous, not at dichotomous variable, but no attempt to quantify this variable will be made.

and "different levels of aggregation," which, according to King et al. (1994, 30), makes the explanation more "powerful," by increasing the number of observable implications of theory (p. 218). Ultimately, the result of these procedures is that, "the more confidence we and others should have in our conclusions."

More specifically, each case selected brings a set of unique elements and diversity to the overall study. This diversity applies to each of the major variables laid out above: demographic characteristics, language, history, form of regional government, geography, and political-economic relations (such as that between Labor, Capital and the State). Although more detail on each of the regions will appear in the appropriate chapters, as outlined in the proposed table of contents (above), a summary chart here will help highlight the diversity of the regional governments on the selected variables.

that different styles of leadership are capable of contributing to political stability and democratic consolidation. The case will also help illustrate some variation in the dependent variable, showing that differences in the styles of regional elite leadership also produce variations in the trajectory of democratic consolidation in a region.

II. Research Design and Methodology

This is a study of "observable implications" of democratic consolidation in selected autonomous regions of Spain. The use of the term "observable implications" here follows the definition of King et al. (1994, 28ff): "an observation that is relevant to the implications of the theory [which] enable us to infer about the correctness of the theory."

Eckstein argues persuasively for the importance of single test cases for theory building or modification of existing theory, and the general advancement of knowledge not possible from a compilation of single-point observations (1970, 113ff). The particulars gained from such case studies can be used *inductively* to construct broad, abstract theories that may be applied across cases and across time. The end-point of such theorizing, according to Przeworski and Teune (1970) is a theory that makes generalized, causal statements. These kinds of statements are also referred to as "covering laws" by Hempel (1956), and are the cornerstone for the scientific model to which political science aspires.

For our purposes, Skocpol and Somers' (1980) notion of the "cycle of research" is more modest than the "covering law" model, and probably is more realistic for the case-study driven field researcher. It preserves a special place of importance for

"macro-causal" case studies, such as this one. Macro-causal case studies both limit overly-grand theory (by providing an independent means of falsification), and help in the construction of new theory.

There are very *practical* reasons for employing the case-study method as well, especially from the policy standpoint (Russett 1970, 427). Although every case is slightly different, policy-makers look to similar cases as guidance for future policy action. Since my interest in social capital, democratic consolidation and leadership styles is prescriptive and normative as well as explanatory, the 'how to' or 'how not to' components--as revealed in a case study--are very important to me. If a strong case can be made for the validity of the hypotheses in the Spanish cases, then the hypotheses presented here may be worthy of application to similar cases.

Data Collection Method. The primary qualitative sources of data for this study is the field research from my 1998 trip to Spain, which includes interviews, on-site archival research, and some disciplined observation. I found to be true Fenno's observation (1990) that, "data collection and data analysis do not proceed in a linear progression. They proceed simultaneously" (p. 84).

One way in which I attempted to "triangulate" the research *within* the qualitative format was to obtain as many different types of elite interviews as possible; i.e. to ask elites what they thought of one another, and to obtain *non*-political elite interviews (or "private sector") as well as political elite interviews. The aim here was to boost reliability of interview data by asking several different sources similar sets of questions. Furthermore, I believe that one of the great strengths of this study lies in

this attempt to better understand the *context* and the broader institutional networks in which regional political elites operate. This is particularly true of smaller regional elites, because they have both the opportunity and necessity (in order to build the necessary political base) of dealing with every significant sector of society within their relatively narrow geographical boundaries. However, this method of interviewing and "soaking and poking" adds a additional layer of complexity to the already severe demands, physically and mentally, of this type of research that Fenno notes (1990, 84-87).

Elite Interviewing Technique

Perhaps the strongest defense of using elite interviews in studying modern politics is offered by Dexter (1970). Dexter makes the following counter-intuitive statement about the rarity and recent nature of rigorous, academic interviewing:

> [I]nterviewing...goes back a long way–back to Lord Bryce or, for that matter, back to the Greeks–but emphasis upon empirical methods of investigation (which in practice generally meant interviewing) as symbolizing a new political science, was a characteristic of the early 1950's (p. 13).

Dexter is given strong support by an earlier practitioner of the interview technique, Heard (1950):

> They [political elites] talked with a generosity and interest which suggested that political scientists should tap more and more this great source of information about politics, the politicians themselves (p. 892).

There are at least three reasons why this method is particularly useful to the research question under examination in this study:

1. The exploratory[31] nature of this research,

2. The need to understand the complex and contextualized framework in which regional elites operate, and

3. The need to understand a set of cases in depth; "a deliberate decision to sacrifice analytical range for analytical depth" (Fenno 1990 [1978], 60).

Concerning the first point, the literature review in chapter one (above) demonstrates the lacunae in the existing literature on the role that regional elites play during a transition and on what styles of leadership they develop towards their newly democratic constituency. In other words, there is a lack of the most basic data on this phenomenon, and the need is clear for qualitative, data-gathering work.

In his earlier work, Dexter (1970) also amplifies point one, as he stresses the unstructured nature as the *sine qua non* of the elite interview:

> ...[A]n elite interview [is] an interview with *any* interviewee...who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, non-standardized treatment. By special, non-standardized treatment, I mean:
> 1. Stressing the interviewee's definition of the situation,
> 2. Encouraging the interviewee to structure the account of the situation,
> 3. Letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent...his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator's notions of relevance (Dexter 1970, 5; italics in original).

As Dexter points out, the most interesting (i.e. new knowledge) part of the

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[31]The role of regional elites in democratization is not an established research agenda like the role of class analysis is in Comparative Politics, or the effect of the incumbency advantage on Congress is in American Politics.

interview may be the least "structured," and that the investigator should always be open to learning something genuinely new or unthought of from the experts in the field.

On the second point general point above (the importance of context), Dexter notes why the interview technique–in the right hands–is of paramount importance:

> [T]he experienced person in any field knows that things happen in a subtle, confused, foggy, complex way, which cannot be studied or codified simply; the person without practical experience and without much contact wants to sharpen and simplify (1970, 20).

Dexter (1970, 17ff) issues a coherent framework for when to use interviewing, when not to, and some useful caveats. The most useful caveat (for this study) is the observation that one should never rely primarily upon interviews for data if the interviewer has no training in the same field as the interviewee, and an ability to "listen with the third ear," that is an ability to place one's self into the same framework as the interviewee.[32] I believe that my two trips to Spain, and long study of Spanish politics, history, language and culture have given me the ability to "listen with the third ear."

Even though I primarily employed the elite interviewing technique, I carefully observed the context in which each elite actor operated. In order to understand this *milieu*, I expended considerable time and energy reading and watching all local media outlets, attending cultural fairs, observing street life, and even participating in parades

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[32]This point was illustrated dramatically for the author when a Spanish citizen was unable to understand, or even adequately translate, one of the interviews for this study which was shared with her. Even though she was fluent in her own language, she did not have an adequate "vocabulary" of understanding to make sense of the interview.

and political demonstrations (as an unobtrusive observer).[33] In one instance, I spent several late evenings "hanging out" with political elites in Sevilla as they made the rounds of eateries, bars and other gathering places. I did find such "soaking and poking" to be very useful in understanding attitudes and contexts in which regional political leaders operate.

It is important to separate academic elite interviewing from typical journalistic interviews. Fenno minces no words as he describes the difference between good elite interviewing and political journalism:

> [M]y conclusion is that journalists will come to conclusions about politicians too quickly, too superficially, and too inflexibly to fill the political scientists' need for an understanding of the politicians. Their collective rush to judgment, the incompleteness and lopsidedness of their evidence, and their large swings in attentiveness, give plenty of support for this conclusion. Especially since so much of what they [do] is explainable by the durable built-in incentives...of their profession...(Fenno 1990, 54).

This distinction is not lost on politicians themselves, in my experience. One of the first questions I was asked before I could begin my interviews with Spanish elites was usually, "you're not a journalist, are you?"[34] In fact, the tendency by the public to

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[33]Participating in street demonstrations does present some tricky moments. In one instance, I blended in with a large, chanting crowd roving the streets in Santiago de Compostela that was loudly denouncing the United States and using anti-U.S. epithets. More than once there were whispered looks thrown my way.

[34]Another reason that interviewees may ask this question is the legitimate concern about not being misquoted, or quoted out of context. Before I even began the interview, I tried to allay any of those fears by explaining the nature of the project, asking for their permission to quote them, and showing that I was assiduous about getting what they said right through notes and tape recording. See sections on "establishing rapport" and the interview instrument.

view politics as a cynical, scandal-ridden enterprise is probably even more prevalent in Spain than it is here; it is a phenomenon that has been widely identified as *desencanto*, or "disenchantment" in the literature on Spanish democratization (see Chapter 1, above). The rise of scandal-mongering and scandal-driven media coverage is also the subject of a fairly recent book on Spanish politics by a Spanish author, entitled *Behind the Political Scandals* (Jiménez Sánchez 1995). Accordingly, Spanish politicians of all levels appreciate being treated seriously and with respect.

In Spain, I began at the University of Salamanca (where I have some personal experience with the University's resources), and began a "snowball sample" that resulted in a series of interviews. These interviews were conducted with local and regional elites in the selected regions, party officials, and officials of the regional and local governments. All but one of these interviews was conducted in Spanish. I searched for data on campaign finances, and the financial connections between regional and local elites[35], in national and regional ministries, reporting agencies, and regional and local libraries. In order to gather more background information about Spanish regional elite attitudes and motives pertaining to the democratization process in their region., I have researched the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) covering Europe while in the United States.

Framework for Analysis. The research question and subject matter of this study are best analyzed using the general approach of the neo-historical

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[35]By "local elites," I mean municipal government officials, and local labor, business and party and civic organization leaders.

institutionalists (Steinmo, et al., eds. 1992). That is, the analyst should investigate "the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and structure their relations of power to other groups" (p. 2). It is these dense networks and matrices that provide the incentives and disincentives that shape actor's strategies and self-perception of interest.

I do not propose to be a purist in the use of analytical frameworks, however. Insights from other strands of theory will be used where appropriate; for example, the judicious use of game theory to explain the behavior and strategy sets employed by regional elites as they affect democratic consolidation at the regional level (see also Putnam 1993, 7).

Units of Analysis. The primary unit of analysis is the individual, but at the level of the regional elite. This concrete unit of analysis helps to avoid the problems of imprecision in specifying the object of study.

Methods of Analysis. The primary method of analysis is thorough evaluation of original archival materials and interviews, supplemented by analysis of secondary data. I use simple tabular data where appropriate. This method required that I read not only Castillian Spanish, but also Galego and Catalan, which, although related to Spanish, are distinct languages. Many of the most important documents were only available in the regional language.

However, the primary focus of this study is, and should be, field work. As Laitin (1996, 10) notes, "we should go out into the field, for we cannot go to OECD

data bases and look for packaged codings" for most new phenomena under study.[36] And, as Fenno notes, most of the data to be gleaned from interviews is "nonstandardized and, hence, not quantifiable" (1990, 89). Any attempt to quantify data from interviews inevitably involves choices and judgement, which would involve issues of reliability and replication[37].

The Interview Instrument

The interview instrument combined three elements: standard questions asked to all interviewees, specific questions tailored to the interests/expertise of the particular interviewee, and finally, open-ended questions. If an interview was going particularly well, then I made no attempt to cut it off prematurely, or restrict it into a rigid interview format. There are solid methodological reasons for maintaining this flexibility in interviewing, as Fenno (1990) notes. Fenno goes so far as to say that, when he began, "I had no idea what questions to ask" (p. 57). While I do not entirely

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[36]Laitin's observations are also part of a more fundamental critique of the use of "political culture" as an analytical concept in the way that it has been formulated and employed by Almond et al. (1963; 1989) to mean that mass public opinion surveys and other quantitative data reveal the political culture of any given political unit, *and* that such attitudes directly translate into public practices (e.g. policy, institutions, etc.). Laitin's observations buttress my own (above, in Chapter 1) about the inadequacy of this operationalization of culture to study democratic consolidation and elite regional leadership styles in the context of democratic consolidation. See also Berezin's literature review (1997) for additional observations on this subject.

[37]See also Heard's decision to use interviews as a primary source of data, in full knowledge of the reliability problem (Heard 1950, 895).

1990 72ff.).

The Interview Setting and Format Heard (1950, 891ff.), Fenno (1978; 1990) and Babbie (1989, 264ff.) write a great deal on the topic of how and where interviews should be conducted. All of these authors suggest that the better interview will occur in "informal" settings, unencumbered by a tape recorder or any other artificial device (notebooks, cameras, etc.). Most of my interviews occurred in formal settings of the interviewees' choosing, however.

In my experience, Spanish elites were no less likely to talk freely in a "formal" rather than in an informal setting. This is probably true for two reasons:

1. The great feeling of freedom of the post-Franco era means that they still revel in not having to guard against their comments and behavior;
2. Most Spaniards, in general, love to talk in flowery terms, and specifically, Spanish elites enjoy talking about matters political, social and economic. Regional differences were observed, however. Andalusians were generally the most talkative, Galicians the least, although still more than the more reserved north Europeans. This phenomenon is useful to an interviewer. The trick was, as Fenno suggests, to get interviewees away from stock phrases and glittering generalities, and towards an original answer (Fenno 1990, 82). This is an area in which research in Spain–in general–probably differs from comparative research in other settings (e.g. north European countries) the tendency of Spanish speakers to embellish, and even obfuscate, the issue under discussion with apparently "unnecessary" detail.

The reasons of necessity and practicality for obtaining formal interviews were as follows:

1. The cultural divide and limitations of time meant that I would not have many opportunities to "tag along" with elites (on any level) in Spain, as Fenno has done in his various studies. Some exceptions to this did occur, especially in Galicia and Andalusia, but my tagging along there usually occurred with the subordinates of the elites, which was still valuable in its own right to understanding context. The point here is that informal access is an expensive commodity in both time and money; these costs have to be carefully weighed against the "payoff" that one might obtain with greater informal access.
2. Intensifying concerns with terrorism due to a resurgence of Basque nationalist assassinations of non-Basque politicians and "ordinary" people meant that elites were increasingly relying on controlled settings during my stay in Spain.
3. If one adds to that the barriers of language (including several dialects) and culture, then it is especially important to have a record to return to do discover nuance, inflection and meaning that simple memory could not capture after only one experience of listening.[39] Often expressions and nuance that do not come across in a literal transcription of an interview communicate important

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[39]The importance of having the tapes' recording of nuance and inflection was powerfully demonstrated to the author when he consulted with fluent Spanish teachers on difficult passages of the tapes. Like the author, these native/professional speakers had to listen to the difficult passages repeatedly–only possible with a recording–in order to decipher the overall meaning of the passage.

non-verbal preferences or tension with the spoken word that can be the most valuable part of an interview.

4. I wanted to leave open the possibility that future "codings" could be taken from these interviews by obtaining an "objective" recording of the interviews, tapes which could then be quantified and reviewed by several coders in order to obtain inter-coder reliability.

III. **The Logic of Interview Selection**

If one accepts the cases selected, and the need for interviews to understand the phenomenon just described, the logic of elite interview selection remains to be justified. My methodological starting point was the widely-discussed phenomenon in political science and democratization literature that elites have a disproportionate impact on political outcomes, especially during times of systemic change (Diamond 1999; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Higley and Burton 1989; Putnam 1977; Putnam 1993). Heard (1950) gives two other sound reasons for elite interviewing. First, only elites have the experience, the point of view and the "freedom" to speak their minds. In pointing out the type of interviews that made up the bulk of the classic work, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Heard is very explicit: "the most valuable interviews were held with practitioners who related their personal experiences.... Their contribution was particularly significant because it was unavailable from other sources" (p. 894). Secondly, Heard continues that the higher up the politician was, i.e. the "more" elite that he was, the better the quality of information elicited from him: "the more self-sufficient the individual, the freer he was to talk...." and "the older and more

experienced the politician, the more likely he was to speak freely" (p. 895).

One can anticipate the objection, "why no mass, or 'man in the street,' interviews?" As Heard (1950) notes, interviewees are most helpful on subjects that *directly* touch on their personal experience and knowledge, which few persons outside of elite political circles have, *viz.*, "interviewees were most helpful when they described their own personal activities, things they knew about at first hand" (p. 896).

Elites can exercise influence in a democratizing setting in a number of ways:

1. Most importantly, by establishing and/or altering the "meta-rules" of the political game, elites help frame[40] the "possible" to be achieved in social and political life at any level. regional elites can perform this function at the regional level;
2. By establishing or altering procedural or policy decision-rules;
3. By setting agendas, both short and long-term;
4. By establishing infrastructure, communications networks and the physical institutions of governance.
5. By introducing a style of political leadership and bargaining into regional politics.

Selection of Interviewees

Forty-eight interviews were conducted in the three regions of Spain cited

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[40]Political sociologists have recently begun to apply "frame analysis" to understand how "preset narrative packages" and "networks" helped to simplify the task of collective action, especially among new social movements. For a review of the concept see Berezin (1997).

above, of which number thirty-seven proved to be particularly useful (see Appendix "B"). Following my definition of "regional elites" set out in chapter one, they included politicians, political observers and other regional decision-makers such as leaders in business, the community and the (Catholic) Church. i.e. they were both public and private-sector elites. How were they selected?

Well before the I left for Spain, I determined who the formal elites were in each region– primarily leaders of the regional governments, political parties, business leaders and a few church leaders. I wrote and mailed a standard letter to each one explaining the project, its overall purpose, invoking a connection (if one existed) and asking for permission to obtain an interview within a one-month framework that the researcher would be in that region. As is often the case in international social-science research, few of these letters were actually mailed back to me; however, this was a worthwhile exercise for two reasons: first, it explained the purpose of the interview to allow true informed consent, and secondly, when I would later call upon interviewees by telephone or in person, they were usually much more amenable to be interviewed than if the call/contact was the first of any kind.

Upon arriving in Spain, I set about two tasks: to more thoroughly familiarize myself with the major political issues in each region, and to establish personal contacts that would allow me to actually gain access to the elites in the potential interview list. After two weeks of intensive study at the National Library, I first made a stop at the University of Salamanca to establish initial contacts that were to prove crucial in gaining access to elite interviews later on. As this contact told me, "Spain is a

Mediterranean country; you have to go through the 'back door' [use connections] always."

I followed a similar pattern in each of the three regions: first a period of study (usually at the leading university library) and orientation, followed by the actual interviews. I spent about three to five weeks in each region. The first few interviews were usually as a result of the written letters (above), but after that, interviews came as a result of references from those interviews and others (often university professors). Therefore, like Heard (1950, 888), it was a combination of a structured and a snowball sample. It was not entirely possible to identify all of the relevant elites before beginning field research. After establishing a rapport with the initial interviewees, they would then vouch for the author to other elites. On many of the later interviews, I found it best to just "hang out" where regional elites gather–often at the Parliament building, party offices, etc. Because one usually has to have special permission to gain access to such locales, the mere fact that I was "inside" and had talked to others was often introduction enough.

Establishing Rapport

Unlike Heard (1950), I could not "exploit common bonds" with interviewees, or "adapt...to colloquialisms, and even to local habits of dress," because I am not a Spaniard. Instead, however, I had three elements working in my favor: (1) my knowledge and interest in the individual interviewed and his situation, (2) as a knowledgeable outsider with no axe to grind, I presented myself as being impartial throughout, and (3) the prestige factor of a U.S. researcher coming such a long way to

listen to what the interviewee had to say. As a Spanish graduate student noted, "you can get into to see people that it would be very hard for me to see."

Unlike Fenno, I found it necessary to have a prepared list of questions (see Appendix "A") so as to standardize questions across regions; then to move to open-ended questions tailored for the interviewee as time and the interviewee's interest allowed. Interviewees were usually generous with their time, however. Interviews lasted from twenty-five minutes to three hours, with the average interview lasting just over one hour. In the intense period of interviewing in each region the author obtained between one and four interviews per day; two per day was the average.

Chapter 3: Galicia, Political Stabilization without Social-Capital Building

We begin our analysis of the three Spanish regions with Galicia, a beautiful, but "peripheral," region located at the far northwestern corner of Spain. It has the smallest population of the three regions that will be examined, with just under three million inhabitants today.

In this chapter, we will be concerned primarily with the greatest threat to long-term democratic stabilization in Galicia, which is the lack of broad and dense networks of social trust, civic participation and citizen mobilization, which together have become known as "social capital" (Putnam 1993; 2000). This is in contrast to the other two regions of Spain, where the threat to democratic stabilization is quite different. We will first establish the low level of social capital that exists in Galicia. Then we will examine three problems in regional elite leadership that have exacerbated the social capital problem, as well as other political problems in post-Franco Galicia, *viz.*,

1. the elite-mass disconnect that has led to intra-elite struggle and party fractionation;
2. the "sequencing problem," or bad timing in the progression of post-Franco Galicia leaders; and
3. lack of "fit" between the majority of the Galician voting public and the transitional leaders in Galicia.

I will conclude that only a small "window of opportunity" for overcoming the

historic problems of low-social capital exists in a newly democratizing region, and that window is rapidly closing.

As set forth in chapter one above, the broad research question for this study is, "can regional elites, through their leadership style and strategies, take steps towards democratic consolidation in their region?" More specifically, the technical question is, what effect do the strategies of regional elites have on the level of democratic stabilization (explained in chapter one)? Using Putnam's ideas about social capital as a starting point, I theorized that the level and quality of social capital are highly correlated with democratic stabilization, or what I have termed "P-3 indicators of democratic consolidation."[41] No claim is made in this study, however, that regional elites can *single-handedly* bring about a higher or lower "degree of democracy," but rather that they play an important role in the relationship between social capital and democratic stabilization.

First, what is the notion of a "low social-capital equilibrium" and why is it important to this case study of Galicia? The concept of social "equilibrium" is one borrowed from economics and game theory to describe a social stasis that obtains when the social system provides enough "payoffs" to all major players that they will stay in the "game," that is, they will not "defect" (which in turn, includes two options: to rebel, or simply to "exit"). In this theory, any system, including social and political

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[41]However, Putnam's major concern in both *Making Democracy Work* (1993, 8ff.) and *Bowling Alone* (2000, 336ff) is not the direct connection between social capital and a democratic system *per se*, but rather how social capital makes democratic policy more efficacious and responsive, and makes other contributions to civic life.

systems, will naturally seek a "balance." Furthermore, in technical terms, "equilibrium" is an "interactive" causal relationship, not a linear causal relationship (Putnam 1993, 181).

Low social capital equilibrium can be characterized as a vertically-organized society in which a sub-optimal "equilibrium" has been reached that nonetheless satisfies all the major segments of society, and a situation in which it is both irrational and extremely difficult for the actors to attempt to change the status quo. "Sub-optimal" means here that the outcome is far below what any objective observer would want for that society *as a whole*. A society characterized by "vertical" networks of exchange are ones in which "unequal agents" are linked "in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence" (Putnam 1993, 173). According to Putnam, a vertical network, "no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation" (p. 174). Putnam uses the example of southern Italy (e.g., the *Mezzogiorno*) to illustrate a vertically-organized society which has obtained stasis by operating at a low social capital equilibrium. In both organization and function, it is strikingly similar to Galicia. Putnam describes it this way:

> The strategy of "never cooperate" is a stable equilibrium.... Once trapped in this situation, no matter how exploitative and backward, it is irrational for any individual to seek a more collaborative alternative, except perhaps within the immediate family. The "amoral familism" that Banfield observed in the Mezzogiorno is, in fact, not irrational, but the only rational strategy for survival in this social context (Putnam 1993, 177).

Manifestations of Galicia's Low Social Capital Equilibrium

First, it should be established what level of "social capital"–both bridging and

bonding–has obtained in the region of Galicia after the demise of the Franco regime. Preliminary research had indicated that social capital was likely to be relatively low in Galicia. On-site research, however, especially interviews with regional actors, confirmed that social capital in the region is low, and has been low since well before the transition–indeed far lower than one might suppose from just examining secondary sources. Regional elites, despite their position, party or ideology, repeatedly described a low social capital equilibrium (in their own words).

Galicia's low social capital equilibrium is demonstrated in at least three ways, each of which will be evaluated in turn: (1) the relationship of citizens to authority, (2) in the discourse and language of politics used between elites and masses, and (3) an accounting of how political change actually occurs in the region. It is beyond the scope of this work to devise a quantitative measure of social capital; such a measure would be useful in future work. For our purposes here let it be noted that social capital is a continuous variable, ranging from "low" to "high." Each of these manifestation will be treated in a separate sub-section:

Citizens' Relationship to Authority

According to the interviews, several factors account for a low social capital equilibrium. The primary factor is the patriarchical and clan structure of social relations, which has deep historical roots. Put differently, Galicians have a long tradition and expectation of a dependent relationship to authority, much like that of child to parent. As a well-informed Galician professor explained it to me:

Because of the structure of their families [rural Galicians] do not

> attempt to discuss collective political projects, but rather [they see politics as] a simple market transaction, votes for favors, like buying water at the market (Corbacho 1998).

The "Powers" and the *Caciques*

One step up from the basic family structure, several regional elites described a feudalistic society, also deeply rooted in history, in which isolated individuals are "dependent" upon the "*poderes facticos*" (powers-that-be) for the basic necessities of life, including all political transactions. One type of "powers-that-be" are known as "*caciques*" (no English equivalent), a type of social-economic hierarchical organization found in smaller towns and provinces similar in structure to Italian "*mafioso*," but usually more benign in practice in Spain.[42] The author of the book, *The Agony of Galician Municipalities*, describes the *caciques* this way: "organic arrangements of coexistence in the territory, e.g. dirty dealings, protectionism, etc." (Corbacho 1998). The physical isolation of Galician peasants, as well as a high level of illiteracy and other factors,[43] allows the *caciques* to flourish. They work by providing a basic service, such as providing information in exchange for a percentage of the business, a vote, job prospects, or some type of barter arrangement. They are

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[42]Again, Putnam's description of the structure and function of the *mafioso* in the *Mezzogiorno* of southern Italy bears a strong resemblance to the *caciques* of Galicia, with the exception that the latter have a more cooperative relationship with the various levels of Spanish government, and less violent tendencies. See Putnam (1993, 145-148).

[43]E.g., even today, there are only @ 32,000 telephones in the entire region. This is about 80 telephones per 1,000 residents, or about eight percent, an extraordinarily low level. Note that the number of telephones per 1,000 residents was one of the basic measures used by Lipset (1954) to judge the level of socio-economic development in a region/state. He has continued this "economics factors" analysis in later works (1983; 1991).

seen by many Galician rural inhabitants as a "positive" institution because no other institution has the capacity to offer the kind of services that the *caciques* do; in addition, they can serve as a vital intermediary between citizen and markets, and the citizen and the daunting official bureaucracy. A Spanish authority on clientelism and *caciques* describes the latter this way:

> In general, the *caciques* have been agricultural owners, in all of the regions that have an abundance of landless workers, in which they assume the role of political bosses of a party in the *comarca* [county] or region, by means of controlling the labor market and the utilization of diverse forms of particularism and favoritism towards the small farm worker (Cazorla 1992, 8).

Although *caciques* reached their apogee in Spain in general in the period of 1874-1923, they remain strong in pockets of the country, the largest single concentration being in Galicia, and to a lesser extent, in Andalusia: "it is particularly the case in Galicia, in which the levels of [electoral] participation have been the lowest in the country since 1977; this immobilization facilitates the customary maneuvers of *caciquismo*" (Cazorla 1992, 30). Cazorla provides an important clue to the persistence of *caciquismo* in Galicia–the "immobilization" of an important part of the electorate–the rural peasantry which has persisted even after the dual transition from authoritarianism and economic autarky.

Therefore, in Galicia, the *caciques* and other patron-client relationship actively exacerbate the problem of a low social capital equilibrium. Corbacho continues in his description of the weakness of social capital in Galicia (especially rural) society:

> [Galicia] is an agricultural and peasant society, a servile society, dependent on the "powers"–political, religious, judicial, etc. (Corbacho

> [the Socialists] must become a party that is able to understand and articulate the problems of the citizenry, [but] in the first place, we must undertake a "general" political project, a project with a strategy for making Galicia work, for changing Galicia; [for example] social change, economic change, a change to more pluralism, cultural change, better territorial relations... (Touriño 1998).

It is unlikely, however, that social capital can be built, or such a transformational project could be undertaken, *without* an intense public dialogue; thus the chasm between such laudable goals and the means to achieve them is indeed vast for the Galician Socialists.

The same source (Touriño) bemoans the lack of a cosmopolitan capital and other sophisticated urban centers which would allow them to "overcome" the isolation of the rural sectors (and presumably win elections). A leftist intellectual and professor expresses the same frustration very eloquently:

> At the heart of the matter is a drama of learning "to speak" democracy, no?– to buy one's freedom to think– it is not a game when one sells his freedom, but [in rural Galicia] there appears to be no cost as a consequence for doing so....one can successfully transfer these [democratic] ideas, but one cannot "buy" these ideas of devotion to liberty, free thought, etc.; ideas that the Left is devoted to... (Corbacho 1998).

Of course, for the Right (e.g. the A.P./P.P.) which has been in power for most of the post-Franco period in Galicia, the level of "discourse" with the citizenry is just fine. Indeed, one of Fraga's great political strengths is that he "sounds" more Galician and authentic than do other regional elites (except Beiras) when he speaks in Galego.[44]

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[44]This is probably because he was born in the relatively rural and isolated village of Vilalba near Lugo on the Atlantic Coast

which he usually does on regional television. Not only is his pronunciation more authentic, but he taps into highly conservative Galician values like patriarchy, hierarchy, self-sufficiency and cultural separateness (e.g. the slogan, "we're different, but we're equal"). However, even rightist elites admit that the conversation is largely one-way:

> Political power dominates society and relations with others; relations with the civil powers are not collaborative; their powers are weak (Barreiro 1998).

Such an observation begs the question, however, of why the elites could not use this power to effect significant change in social capital. Below the question is examined empirically; that is what efforts did regional elites actually attempt or refuse to undertake to affect the level and quality of social capital in Galicia? As postulated in chapter one regional elite leadership style could at least theoretically affect levels of social capital.

The second area of elite concern in the impoverished discourse of politics as manifestations of a low social capital equilibrium is what I have here termed the "federalism" question: at what level can/should citizens attempt to foster political discourse? Critics charge that the *Xunta* thwarts genuine citizen discourse by retarding and/or circumventing local government in the administration of public programs which, in turn, prevents them from developing the kind of long-term competence that would enable them to "bring democracy closer to the people" and to build social capital at the grassroots:

> [A]s the government closest to the citizenry, shouldn't they [be able] to

> apprehend how collective questions should be settled, what is necessary in this community and who should pay for it? How is it [public budget] to be distributed? These are basic values in a democracy that are built and fortified in the political parties, the schools, but also in the political institutions closest to the society. But we [in Galicia] are able to invert this activity in which a remote government makes decisions more abstracted from the citizens (Corbacho 1998).

Explanation of Political Change in Galicia

Surprisingly, elites from across the political spectrum and in private organizations concurred that fundamental political change is very slow and difficult to effect through normal electoral politics:

> [I]n the peasant's world it is different because, in the manner of "local" politics, change is brought about [through] a coup (Corbacho 1998).

From the head of the Socialists comes this gloomy assessment of Galician society: "[it] is an immature, invertebrate society which relies upon local power bases; e.g. in *Coruña, Vigo, Santiago....*" (Touriño 1998). In order to bring about real change in this setting, he continues, "it would take a great deal of skill to overcome the traditional dominance of the Right; [and they] completely control the autonomous community's budget of almost eighty billion pesetas [@ $533 million]." He went on to note that this budget gives the P.P. complete control of public financing, public works and public media, which they use in a very partisan manner, essentially for credit claiming, and discrediting political opponents. He is backed up in this statement by Llagares (1996) and Jiménez Sanchez (1998) who notes that the P.P. created and maintains several mass media outlets (televison, radio and newspapers) and uses them to

disseminate highly flattering stories of party leadership in "action."[45] In fact, almost all newspapers in Galicia are *not* economically viable and therefore depend upon "public" funds (i.e.) from the regional government, the *Xunta*, for survival.

An example of the partisan press in Galicia is the "leading" newspaper (in terms of number of copies printed), *O Correo Gallego*, which is "one-hundred percent supported by the *Xunta*," according to professor Jiménez (1998). An example of this kind of "credit-claiming" by Fraga and his cabinet in the *Xunta* was observed in the front-page banner headline of *O Correo Gallego*: "The *Xunta* will invest 278,470 million pesetas [@ $1.8 billion] in order to create employment; the creation of 70,000 work-posts every year until the year 2001 is foreseen" (*El Correo Gallego* 4-6-88, p. 1ff.). The article fails to note that a large portion of these funds came from sources outside of Galicia, largely the European Union; instead, it seeks to claim credit almost entirely for the amount and the work of many other levels of government. This article also specifically denigrates the head of the Galician Socialists, Emilio Touriño by name, calling his concerns and objections to the plan "ridiculous." Since the *Xunta* under Fraga and the Popular Party controls most of the media outlets in Galicia, not just this newspaper, it is likely that this kind of assessment will be the dominant one, and conversely, it will be very difficult for fresh voices and those advocating

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[45]See also Parente (1997). Parente notes that the *Xunta* directly controls the following media, public works and "mercantile societies": Radio Galicia and TV Galicia, IGAPE, Verín Hospital Foundation, Galician Ports and Port Authority, TURGALICIA (Tourism Promotion Board), SODIGA (Industrial Development), Galician Energy Development, Provincial Business Agencies, SOGAMA, Center for Supercomputing, GALIOIL, FOSTER, Galician Quality Council, MEDTEC Institute, XACOBEO

fundamental change to be heard.

The description of the difficulty of significant political-social change is given credence by a prominent political figure from the opposite end of the political spectrum:

> In terms of our national picture [within Spain], it is a society that is only a little developed, or only has a little "backbone" (*vertebrada*). Its powers are weak; the action of citizens is very dependent on the power [holders], this is noticeable also in the institutions, the private organizations, business owners, financial and the Church–these are the great weaknesses of our society (Barreiro 1998).

Finally, the leader of the rising "nationalist" party in Galicia, Xosé Manuel Beiras, said flatly that "Galicia is not developed socially." and has a need to "[increase] the very low levels of basic social capital–the structures, the groups, sanitation and health, etc." (Beiras 1998). However, his prescription for overcoming this problem varied dramatically from other regional elites, as we will see below.

Paradox of Galician Social Capital

Galician society presents an apparent paradox in social capital. The paradox is this: how can there be so much rich associational life at the local/community level, and yet simultaneously, how can the levels of region-wide social capital–such as trust, mutual toleration, trans-regional associations, and large-scale reciprocity–be so low? This paradox is neatly addressed by the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam 2000, 21ff). In Galician cities there are many clubs, and I have personally observed families and friends milling about and talking animatedly in the *plazas* and other public spaces, often late into the evening. The author has witnessed

public fairs and other community spectacles in abundance, even in some of the smallest communities in Galicia. This associational activity appears to match the requirements of social capital described by Putnam (1993) of connectivity and participation in civic organizations; in fact, such activity would appear to be a model for the precisely the kind of civil society he would wish for the United States. However, based upon my personal observation, Galicia is rich in bonding social capital and yet poor in bridging social capital. The associational activity in Galicia–especially in the predominately rural sectors–tends to reinforce already strong ties to family and a small circle of friends, often to the exclusion of fresh connections across familial clan and vocational activity. According to one Galician authority, the system of "foral" land rents and other feudalistic practices still obtains in much of rural Galicia, and, along with high rates of illiteracy, poor secondary roads and physical isolation, help explain why bridging social capital is so low (Viejo-Viñas 1998).

Of the two types of social capital, bridging social capital would be the greatest threat to the power bases of the *caciques* and other powers-that-be because if diverse citizens from around the region were able to effectively communicate and associate, they simply would not need the *caciques*, because the *caciques'* services (e.g. providing information, job services, etc.) depend upon isolation and immobilization of the rural masses. Bridging social capital would give them the organizational confidence and capacity for effective interest articulation and aggregation. The *caciques* are well aware of this threat, according to several interviewees, and have actively worked to retard it. How have they done so? They insist on power-sharing

arrangements to coopt would-be reformers (Corbacho 1998; Barreiro 1998), or they simply ignore attempts to build bridging social capital.

An attempt at region-wide building of social capital was undertaken by the Catholic Church in the late 1970's eager to shed its former association with Francoism. According to a prominent Galician priest and academic, however, relations between the Church and the *caciques* deteriorated rapidly in the post-Franco period, partly because the Church refused to enter into the traditional regional power-sharing agreements with the *caciques* and other power-holders. Partly as a result of its conflicts with the *caciques*, and partly because of long-range demographic trends, the Church has lost a great deal of influence in the region, and has now "retreated" from grand social-capital building projects to its traditional strength in secondary education (Torres 1998).

The *caciques* have found that a "divide and conquer strategy"–the antithesis of bridging social capital– helps maintain their power in Galicia. As the former Vice-President explains in some detail:

> the difference between the modern state and the Galician revolution is that in the modern state, power is unified and creates state leadership...but here [in Galicia] there are a multitude of powers, each of whom live together by making pacts which are useful in serving themselves, but which none of them control or dominate in this sense...the territorial powers, who rule over the provinces and *diputaciones* and city governments and the political parties–they have internal agreements, an internal accord of power (Barreiro 1998).

These "internal accords of power," or secretive pacts, subvert the notion of democratic *concertación* discussed earlier; *viz.*, harmonizing the interests of several discrete

classes for the benefit of society as a whole. They also vividly illustrate the problem of late reverse incorporation, i.e. when, as Barreiro perceptively noted, the state is created after the local leadership and power relationships have already solidified, the question of whose interests should prevail (traditional power brokers or the people acting through the state) becomes difficult to resolve. For the power-holders, the answer is obvious–their interests should continue to be served. It would take an extraordinary and courageous act of leadership at either the level of the Spanish state or the *Xunta* to break these ossified bonds, but since the system "works" (like in the classic low-social-capital equilibrium) there is little incentive for these actors to do so.

The key element in bridging social capital is that of "trust," or "*confianza*" ("confidence"). If the citizen does not trust anyone outside of his immediate family or clan, then they will not associate with them on a regular basis, cleavages will be reinforced rather than cross-cut, and bridging social capital will remain low. In a series of interviews conducted with regional elites of all types, when asked to identify the "greatest problem facing Galicia" most placed the problem of low confidence/trust at the top of their list; surprisingly, above high unemployment and other economic and social problems. There is an awareness, therefore, among regional elites of the importance of social capital (although few actually use that term), and its impact on regional politics and economics. For example, the head of the PSG (Socialist Party of Galicia) said that "the greatest problem is Galician values, which is behind the lack of trust" (Touriño 1998). Given their awareness of the phenomenon among regional elites, the motivation for addressing the problem should have been present in the

transitional period among this group, but it remains to be seen if they possessed the other two necessary ingredients to bring about change through "collectively purposeful causation" (Burns 1978): the intention to bring about real change, and specific policy proposals to do so.

The New Historical Institutional paradigm discussed in chapter one (above) helps understand how actors formed their political preferences, and understood their role and function in the political system, including how they could or could not go about facilitating needed political change. It sheds light on why, despite almost universal agreement among "foundational" elites (in the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's) that change was desperately needed, there was a near-universal perception among these elites of the difficulty, indeed, the futility of attempts, of bringing about the change in low social capital equilibrium. In short, the way that institutions shape their perceptions, they cannot see "what's in it (change) for me?" Only extraordinary leadership (Burns 1978), gifted with transformational vision and ability, would have been able to rise above the powerful limiting force of this kind of institutional inertia.

Having established the low level of bridging social capital in Galicia in the post-Franco period, let us now trace what steps the regional leadership took during the transition period to democracy that affected the low social capital equilibrium positively or negatively. Recalling variables $X_{1,2,3}$ above, we can examine their behavior and strategies in terms of the study variables $E(s,b)_{1...4}$, which are repeated below:

$E(s,b)_1$ = The basic "exit" or "voice" option (Hirschman 1970) of regional elites;

i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a democratic system.

$E(s,b)_2$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents; e.g., a populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperation strategy.[46]

$E(s,b)_3$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites.

$E(s,b)_4$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites; e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the center/national elites).

As indicated above, $E(s,b)_1$ is the most fundamental political decision that regional elites can make, with profound implications for the consolidation–even survival–of democracy within not only each region, but the larger state. The question of which strategy–exit, voice or loyalty–to pursue at the beginning of the post-Franco period in Spain was very much on the minds of regional elites for several reasons. Nationalists and extreme leftist forces were seriously urging the "exit" option–that is secession from the state of Spain. Along with Basque, some Catalans and other "peripheral" nationalisms, these forces argued that the region would be far better off in terms of social and economic development, recognition and an "authentic" political system if they formally separated from the Spanish heartland. Secondly, for those

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[46]The difference between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived "payoffs" (usually electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).

Galician elites who did not want to completely sever ties with Spain, there was the fundamental choice to make of whether to remain quiescent ("loyal") and accept whatever constitutional arrangements were proposed by the national elites meeting in Moncloa in Madrid, or whether to try to actively shape the relationship of Galicia to the center (the "voice" option).

That the exit option was ever seriously considered would, *prima facie*, appear to be unlikely, considering the basic conservatism of the majority of Galicians, as noted above. However, the majority of the outspoken regional elites in the immediate post-Franco era were on the Left of the political spectrum because they were clustered in the more liberal cities, where their "transaction costs" of organizing were lower than the rural-based rightist forces. The chart below, summarizing the evolution of the Spanish party system shows the numerical dominance of the Left in Galicia in the late 1970's and early 1980's. To be sure, in the very first legislative elections, the Spanish state party, the aptly-named Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) was a powerful actor (because there was very little organized opposition to it), but it completely disappeared by the second elections held in the late 1970's.

Even today, one hears echoes of the powerful calls by the radical Left to take the exit option from Spain, as in this assertion of the strength of Galician nationalism from the head of the Nationalist Block of Galicia (BNG):

> The social basis of the Left are radical nationalists–not just "regionalists" but Galicians–a nation without a state, with a distinct culture and language. This is a *radical* nationalism in the context of the Spanish state. This social base is much greater than in either the Basque or Catalan cases... (Beiras 1998).

Although Beiras' assertion that the "social base" (i.e. language, historical symbols and cultural "distinctiveness") for Galician nationalism is theoretically greater in Galicia than in the better known Basque and Catalan cases, it is probably wishful thinking that the Galician citizenry would become as mobilized as the in the other two cases in the cause of Galician nationalism.

[CHART 1 ABOUT HERE–EVOLUTION OF THE GALICIAN PARTY SYSTEM]

[See Appendix "C"]

and nationalist (possibly separatist)–"orthodox" Marxist-Leninist

The First Elections and the Leadership Problem

The first three regional elections were marked by great confusion and lack of an absolute majority by any party in the regional parliament. The first two elections, in 1977 and 1979, were known as "pre-autonomic," while 1981 was the first "autonomous" election. One observer (Barreiro 1998) blames the political confusion of the time on the underlying "social disorganization," but this begs the question of *why* the regional political elites themselves could not organize internally and get ahead of the voters.

The party fractionation, frequent defections between parties, and frequent name changes of the parties attest to the confusion and political disorganization of most of the democratic transition period (see party chart above). A regional political analyst sums up the state of the parties of that time as follows:

> The weakness of the system of parties is, in general terms, evidence of a pre-political system in large sectors of the citizenry in virtue of which the parties are seen as factions and not as instruments absolutely necessary for the functioning of a free and open society (Blanco et al. 1982, 168).

Unlike the other two regions in this study, no "transformational" political leader emerged at this critical moment in Galicia's transitional period. The governments of the *Xunta* in the 1980's suffered from a lack of decisive leadership with a clear vision for the future of Galicia, and most especially, how to ameliorate the critical problem of a low social capital equilibrium. See the general conclusions and

region by region comparison in chapter 6 for an explanation of the sorts of steps that *could have* been taken to improve both democratic stability and social capital in the region. Note also the strong contrast between regional elite leadership style during the transition period in Galicia, as compared to those in Andalusia and Catalonia. The story of how the leader of the first autonomous government for Galicia was chosen illustrates the haphazard nature of the selection process amid the euphoria and confusion of those heady days.

None of the Galician parties was prepared to govern when called upon to do so in the first autonomous election of 1981, and with some good reason. As can be seen in the table below, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), a state-level center-right party led by the very popular Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, was crushingly superior to all the other parties in Galicia in the early post-Franco period (the late 1970's). Electoral data from those first three region-wide Galician elections gives credence to the wariness of the other Galician parties about their chances for electoral success in the early post-Franco elections. The 1981 electoral returns must have come as a genuine surprise to the leadership of the Popular Alliance (A.P.).

CHART: Party Percentages of Vote Totals in Early Post-Franco Galician Elections

Party/Coalition	**1977** (in percentages)	**1979** (in percentages)	**1981** (in percentages)
UCD	52.5	47.5	27.6
AP	12.8	13.7	30.1
PSOE/PSdeG	15.1	17	19.6
BNG/PSG/BN	1.9	5.9	6.2

In a critical miscalculation, the Popular Alliance (A.P.), forerunner to today's ruling Popular Party (P.P.), both in Spain and in Galicia, so distrusted its own chances for electoral success, that it threw together a fragmented, inexperienced leadership team. This team included the eventual President of the *Xunta*, Fernando Albor. An active participant in the process now admits that he was chosen as a "titular figurehead." In this selection, the AP showed its unwillingness to prepare to be a "government in waiting" which is a fundamental requirement of the "responsible" loyal opposition in a parliamentary system (Sartori 1997):

> The forecasts predicted that UCD [Union of the Democratic Center] should win. We were, in reality, just looking for a head of our group in [the Galician] Parliament when we named Albor; we were not counting on forming a government; we were not sure about these things... [but] we succeeded beyond our hopes and won the election; we had to head a government (Barreiro 1998).

Although Albor was a well-respected medical doctor, all regional elites who were interviewed agreed that he was not an optimal choice to head the *Xunta* during

who already had a proven competence in specific areas of governance.

However, the first *Xunta* did have some successes, especially from the viewpoint of Labor. According to the head of the largest labor confederation in Galicia in the late 1990's, the first *Xunta* did help the cause of organized Labor and "social production." An institutional framework was created and pacts (accords) were signed. Here Galicia was clearly following the model set by larger "successful" cases of democratic transition in Europe and elsewhere in Spain, such as Cataluña.

The Emergence of Popular Government Under Fraga

Given the foregoing disarray in successive Galician governments, an unexpected development occurred--the emergence of clear, popular leadership under a former Franco government official--Manuel Iribarne Fraga. It was unexpected in Galicia for two reasons: first, Fraga a man of immense ambition, was expected to remain in national politics where he had been for most of his long political career, and secondly, he had openly derided the regional movement in the early 1980's when he still harbored hopes of becoming the Prime Minister of Spain. Now, he did an about face and had competed in the 1990 elections. As the former Vice-President of the *Xunta* noted, "it's like Clinton going back to be the governor of Arkansas; it just doesn't happen" (Barreiro 1998).

Whatever Fraga's motivation, after his election in 1990, for the first time, the regional government had a truly popular leader, who could justifiably claim a "mandate" to govern. The relationship between the population and Fraga was described this way:

> When Fraga arrived, it was almost like hand in glove, or a second skin. In reality, Galicia got what it wanted, and it wanted what Fraga offered. It is a symbiosis that gave an exceptional political result (Barreiro 1998).

Attempts by Regional Elites to Confront L.S.C.E.

From the foregoing narrative, it becomes clear that regional elites in Galicia have been painfully aware of what we have termed here "low social capital equilibrium," or L.S.C.E. Given that awareness, however, what did they actually try to do about the perceived problem? And if they acted or failed to act, what reason did they do so? As already noted, the clearest manifestation of a low social capital equilibrium in Galicia is the lack of mutual trust and *generalized* reciprocity (cf. Putnam 1993, 168, 172). Generalized reciprocity means that one undertakes actions that will contribute to building civil society and civil trust without expecting a *specific and immediate* return favor; rather there is the hope and trust that such a favor will be repaid "down the line." As Putnam notes, "an effective norm of generalized reciprocity is likely to be associated with dense networks of social exchange" (1993, 172).

Generalized reciprocity is, however, very difficult to create. At the most basic level, it is not "rational," in the strict sense, for one to give up something of value to one's self in *hopes* that someone, sometime in the unspecified future, would do the same for you. Generalized reciprocity logically requires that someone, at some specific place and time, break the cycle of "specific" reciprocity (a simultaneous exchange). In order to have a "demonstration effect" for the larger society, such an

organization and social capital provide crucial insights; in his formulation, civics drives economics and not vice-versa (Putnam 1993, 157). As noted above, the primary method of organizing labor in Galicia until relatively recently was "*caciquil*" meaning that agricultural/political bosses dominated labor in a patron-client relationship not based upon mutual trust, but rather upon asymmetric need by largely landless, illiterate peasants, and the ability of the bosses to provide for their needs in exchange for political and economic loyalty (Cazorla 1996). For example, the primary sector (agriculture) continued to constitute 52 per cent of the Galician work force as late as 1973, and what industrialization that did exist before the 1970's was of the "colonial" or "dependent" kind: semi-finished goods were brought in from outside to take advantage of cheap labor, and then they were taken out for final finishing and sale elsewhere, adding little long-term value to either the Galician economy or to worker security. Thus the massive emigration that had characterized earlier loss of Galicia's most productive workers continued, with a loss of 500,000 workers between 1951 and 1970. The one exception was the relative industrialization in a few cities on Galicia's Atlantic coast, primarily in ship-building (Máiz 1994, 193). Nothing demonstrates the lack of Employer-Worker social capital better than massive emigration of the next generation of workers as has occurred in periodic waves in Galician history. The low social-capital equilibrium is maintained by the "defection" or "exit" of the very people who might disrupt the equilibrium.

Unless one accepts a completely deterministic view of history, however, such a bleak past does not mean utter failure in the future in rebuilding Labor-Employer

social capital. Specific alliances and political decisions during and after the democratic transition have been equally to blame for the lack of social capital among Labor sectors and between Labor and Capital. For example, the history of labor organization of the five largest organized unions is tied to the radical struggle against Franco. Using the chart ("Evolution of the Galician Party System") in the Appendix. note the close association between the U.P.G. and the union, the I.N.G. (National Intersyndicate of Galicia), which was founded with U.P.G. support in the late 1960's (it later becomes the I.N.T.G.). U.P.G. was also instrumental in the organization and recruitment of the C.L. (Peasant's Commissions), one of the few attempts to organize rural workers (Máiz 1994). A similar relationship existed between the Galician Communist Party (P.C.G.) and the CC.OO. (Workers' Commissions). The Galician Socialist Party (P.S.G., not to be confused with the P.S.de G.), another radical leftist party, is strongly influential in the C.I.G. (Galician Intersyndical Convergence). Because of this very close association between Labor and the radical political Left in Galicia, there is little social trust between most of the Right and Labor.

Since the Right, under the A.P. and the P.P., has been the dominant ruling party in Galilcia since the mid-1980's, not surprisingly, it has repeatedly tried to perform "end runs" around organized labor. Thus, successive rightist *Xunta* governments have dealt with organized labor at arms-length, conducting largely symbolic pacts only as absolutely necessary. Typical is the document: "*Xunta*-Unions Accords" conducted in 1992. It was concluded between only three of the nine organized labor unions in Galicia. Conspicuously absent is the largest, the CC.OO.

At only 40 pages, it is one of the shortest of the regional corporatist accords that the author has seen, and it is written in vague, innocuous terms lacking specific goals or targets. It largely catalogues existing organizations under the *Xunta*'s control and prior efforts at attracting jobs to the region.

In 1998, organized labor was pushing hard to conduct a far more specific set of accords with the *Xunta* of Manuel Fraga over thirty-five major areas of concern. According to the leader of the U.G.T./U.X.T., those negotiations were "going nowhere," and the biggest impediment was, quite simply, the "lack of *confianza*" or trust, and a feeling of generalized reciprocity (Carro Garrote 1998).

The same lack of *confianza* was manifested on the *Xunta*'s side in an article in its mouthpiece, *O Correo Gallego*: "The government of Galicia today concluded its retreat...with a plan over *closed* labor and with a proposition to immediately open up negotiations for a pact with localities, it is said, [in order to] transfer autonomous competencies to the municipalities" (4-5-98, 13; italics added). This quotation also reveals the government's plan to utilize local-level governments (among other mechanisms) as a conduit to distribute funds directly to workers, bypassing organized labor unions. The unions were completely excluded in the plan's formulation. This conservative government obviously does not share the neo-liberal orthodoxy of other rightist administrations (e.g. Reagan or Thatcher) about the "magic of the marketplace" or government non-interference in economics; clearly it sought to both "create" jobs and claim credit for doing so through a relatively massive expenditure of public funds, 278 billion pesetas, or about 1.8 billion dollars, over a four to six year

period. There were great doubts about the permanence of many of these jobs, and the simple economic reality that funds from the E.U., and other external sources that this massive program was based upon, would be rapidly coming to an end in the early twenty-first century. Whether or not the plan was actually implemented as envisioned, the point is that the damage to social capital with Labor had already been done in the plan's formation and initial announcement.

According to labor elites, most organized labor groups have been biding their time, hoping for a change of government in the regional election of 2002; however Fraga decided to run again at age 78, and won another term.

Corbacho sums up the prevailing elite stance: "the political elites here like to play [the role of] fathers, of benefactors, in which [the people] must necessarily depend on them" (1998).

Building Social Capital "From the Bottom Up"

The literature on social capital and civil society, stresses that, in order to be effective, social capital is best promoted through *voluntary* associations and programs, or "bottom up" approaches, and not from forced, third party, "top down" approaches (Putnam 1993, 163-167).[48] Game theorists, rational actor analysts and the new institutionalists have likewise stressed "cooperative communities" in overcoming the classic "collective action dilemma" of Olson and the problem of "third-party

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[48]Alexis de Tocqueville (1961 [1830]) was one of the first to stress the voluntary nature of an effective civil society. "Bottom up" approaches are understood here to mean political action that originates from ordinary citizens and non-governmental organizations, and not as the direct result of regime action.

(1998). An expert on political scandals in Spain notes that the *Xunta* is further justified in its stance because "Galicia has had lots of scandals at the level of the city and provincial governments, but the *Xunta* appears clean" (Jiménez Sánchez 1998).

The *Xunta* has refused to disperse desperately-needed local funds and develop local competencies despite the clear Spanish state "model"of financing that is supposed to be followed. Under this model, approximately 40 percent of all public funds is supposed to be used by localities. However, localities in Galicia expend only about 30 to 40 percent of the average of the expenditures of all other localities in Spain, despite the fact that Galician localities have more funds available to them–in theory–than do other Spanish localities. In all, "over 90 percent of the income that is supposed to be for cities and local governments [in Galicia] is taken to the regional government" (Corbacho 1998). Given this level of expenditure, and the reduced capacity that it represents, it is clear that local and provincial government in Galicia would not be able to build social capital from the bottom up.

Furthermore, Galician elites tend to *promote* the status quo instead of trying to change it because they largely benefit from it. Recall the former Vice-President's observation that:

> The territorial powers--that rule over the provinces and *diputaciones* and city governments and the political parties– have internal agreements, an internal accord of power (Barreiro 1998).

Clearly, then any attempt to construct *bridging* social capital across the territorial and functional boundaries that are enforced by the *caciques* and other "territorial powers" would be doomed to failure unless a strong regional leader or

leaders was able to dismantle this system, which would be a revolutionary change. However, the leaders of the *Xunta* during the 1980's were too weak, and the regional parliament was too internally divided to take on these traditional powers.

In the 1990's, Manuel Fraga had the personal stature, the political capital and the links with the ruling national party that might have enabled him to effect this kind of revolutionary change. He choose not to. A series of interviews helps understand why. In short, Fraga sought maximum visibility and minimum risk. He was seeking a post that would cap an extraordinary and lengthy political career (now almost 50 years): up from modest means in rural Galicia, into the Franco regime, serving as both as Minister of Industry and Tourism, and later, as ambassador to the Court of St. James (England). He then was the founder of the state-level Popular Alliance (forerunner of today's ruling party, the P.P.) and a member of the Spanish Parliament. As one observer notes, his strength–his authoritarian manner in both speaking and organization–was also his weakness in Spanish state-level politics when memories of Francoism were still fresh. When it became clear to him, despite heroic struggles on his part, that he would never become the Prime Minister of Spain, he decided to stand for election to the Galician Parliament, where he was a shoo-in as President of the *Xunta*.

Given the reality of low social capital equilibrium as detailed above, Fraga simply choose to strike a bargain with the existing powers:

> Fraga does not do anything to resolve it [the problem of low social capital and societal "dependency"]; completely on the contrary, he is happy with this situation; he provokes it, and the potential for more

power (Barreiro 1998).

The projects he has undertaken are clearly to build upon his legacy, to secure more recognition for himself and the region of Galicia internationally (e.g. his risky international trips to Cuba and Libya).

The Complicating Factor of Regional Nationalism

In this section, the relationship between nationalism and regional elites' attempts to improve social capital will be addressed. As a starting point, the simplified relationship might be specified as follows:

R.E.L. → (nationalism) → social capital

Recent books on the importance of social capital to democracy, most notably Putnam, (both 1993 and 2000) simply ignore nationalism or give it cursory treatment. This is understandable; nationalism is an extraordinarily complex topic, and to treat the topic as it relates to social capital would dilute the clarity of the core arguments. Where, for example, should one place "nationality" in the causal chain? Is there any relationship between high and low levels of nationality and low social capital equilibrium? How does one clarify the deeply interactive nature (or "multi-collinearity") of social phenomenon like nationalism and social capital? In European cases such as the ones under consideration, however, the problem of nationalism is inescapable, especially since much of the core reason for seeking regional autonomy has to do with an historic tradition of "national" separateness. As noted above, in Chapter One, Spain is cited by several scholars as the European country with the existence of strongest sub-state "peripheral" nationalism (Rokkan and Urwin 1982).

Clearly, today's Galician nationalists do not represent the first attempt to use nationalism to address Galicia's social problems and lack of development. Although this is not the place to give a detailed accounting of the history of nationalism in the Spanish and Galician contexts, nationalism has been advocated, primarily by Galician intellectuals (especially by Manuel M. Murguía), several times during the past 150 years as "the" solution to Galicia's social and political problems (Máiz Suárez 1998; 1997; 1996; 1994; Vilas Nogueira et. al 1994). Attempts were made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and in the short-lived Second Republic of the 1930's[49], to create a genuine mass-based nationalist movement. These attempts largely failed due to factional divisions within the movement. There were two primary elite factions that championed Galician nationalism, the Catholic-traditional and the Liberal-regionalists (Máiz Suárez 1994, 182 ff). These factions often worked at cross-purposes, and mass-based nationalist movements in Galicia were always crushed by events at the very moment they were beginning to take root. The historical processes can be neatly summed up in the following cycle: after years of struggle between elite factions in Galicia over the proper message and tactics for Galician nationalism, one faction would emerge stronger or absorb the other one, and just as this new united front would begin to gain a larger following, some external event would swallow up the whole movement, and it would have to start again from scratch later on.

One historical episode will demonstrate this cycle. First, in 1880's the

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[49]For elaboration of the particular political movements associated with the attempted promulgation of Galician nationalism, see Máiz Suárez 1994, 181-191.

Catholic-tradition faction of elites headed by Alfredo Brañas began to gain a relatively large following in Galicia due his writings and the influence of the most traditional sectors of the Catholic Church. Essentially, Brañas et al. argued that Galicia *was* different, that its true values were best reflected in conservative church teachings, and that the contemporary state-level regime in Madrid had strayed from those cherished values and teachings. In addition, this variant of "Galicianism" was specifically anti-modern, anti-industrial, and anti-urban, identifying these traits as a menace to authentic Galician interests. The opposition to the Catholic-traditional faction was that of the liberal-regionalists, led by Aureliano Pereira, who proposed a radically progressive mixture of democratization and federalism. Their program was composed of calls for thorough democratization and economic modernization, including the abolition of the feudalistic system of "land rents" (*sistema foral*) which retarded both the economy and the peasantry. However, internal squabbles and intellectual differences among this group resulted in the lack of stable organization and self-destruction from 1880-1900. For its part, the Catholic-traditional group became co-opted and absorbed by the centralizing tendencies of the larger Spanish monarchical project of the Carlists (Máiz Suárez 182-183). A similar pattern or dialectic was repeated up until the Franco era, when all such attempts had to be moved underground. It was not until late in the Franco regime that Galician nationalist organizations hesitantly began to re-group; the first was the U.P.G. (see acronym list above and the chart in the Appendix) in 1964.

It is clear this historical nationalist struggle continues to be played out today.

The current leader of the regional government, Manuel Fraga, and his rightist party, the P.P., have attempted to coopt the legacy of Brañas[50], while that of Pereira lives on, albeit in a more radical guise, in the leftist version of the Nationalist Block of Galicia (BNG), discussed below.

In the standard formulation, there are two types of nationalism in terms of its affect on democracy, or any political order, one mostly salutary, the other destructive. The salutary type is known as "civic" nationalism, and the destructive type is known as "ethnic" or "exclusionary" nationalism.[51] The difference centers around the basis of citizenship in the state. In civic nationalism, everyone who is born or naturalized within the border of a state is granted citizenship; in ethnic nationalism, only those who are identified as being a part of the ethnic or folkish community are called citizens. This latter type is also known as nationality "of the blood" because there is supposed to be something in the blood of these self-identified groups that separates them from the (supposedly inferior) blood of the "other." The fact that this is a mythic construction and no such "gene" exists does not dilute the power of this appeal to followers. The destructive potential of ethnic nationalism is obvious–it requires an "other" or out-group in order to obtain collective identity–it is only a short step to scape-goating and pogroms if the logic of exclusion is followed through. History shows many examples of virulent exclusionary nationalism, especially in nineteenth

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[50]Fraga's attempt to coopt Braña's legacy is seen most explicitly in his monograph "*O Rexionalismo de Onte a Hoxe*" ("The Regionalism of Yesterday and Today") (1992).

[51]See for example, the formulation in Hockenos (1993), *Free to Hate*. Another variant of this standard dichotomous depiction of nationalism is that of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*.

and twentieth-century Europe.

However, this traditional formulation of nationalism does not capture a third "type" or use of regional nationalism–that is the use, or potential, of nationalism as both a state-building (Irvine 1993) and developmental exercise (Bendix 1977, 408ff). The *potential* of this third type of nationalism is clearly evident in the case in Galicia. It also becomes clear that this is *leftist* nationalism, not the rightist nationalism of Franco and so many other nationalist movements of the 20th century. In the discussion above of the problem of low social capital equilibrium in Galicia it became clear that, while elites in the leftist-nationalist National Block of Galicia (BNG) describe the problems of Galicia in almost identical terms as other elites on the right and in other sectors of Galician society, their *diagnosis* and *prognosis* of the problem are completely different. Combining variants of Marxism, such as dependency theory, with their own hybrid nationalism, the leader of the BNG, the fastest growing political force in Galicia, passionately argued for nationalism as the solution to Galicia's problems of low social capital, low physical capital, and other economic and developmental challenges. At least hypothetically, Beiras believes that self-sufficiency and self-development is the key to overcoming these problems.

One of the great advantages of the interview method is that allows the interviewer to gauge the *intensity* of the words that are spoken, which simply cannot be divined by the same words printed on the page. The interview with Beiras was perhaps the most intense of any of the ones conducted in Spain, especially in the key points in which he stressed nationalism, autonomy and separateness as the solution to

Galicia's problems, including, specifically, "lack of social capital" (his words). It was clear to me that if he were elected to head the *Xunta*, Beiras would be committed to effecting his "nationalist" program, both because of his deeply-held ideological beliefs, and the expectations of his core supporters.

The analysis of the left-of-center nationalists, like the BNG, begins with a historical-geographical argument similar to the "dependency school" in international relations theory. It asserts that Galicia has been "for years" treated as a "colony" for the heart of Spain (Castille) and the rest of Europe because of its rich resources, cheap labor and physical isolation. In his own words:

> Galicia is on the socio-economic periphery of both Spain and the European Union. Political expression is poor because Galicia has functioned, economically, politically and culturally, like internal colonies for a long time. We have a weak, under-developed economy because we have few *internal* motors of development (Beiras 1998).

The Nationalist Block's argument is that as long as Galicia continues to depend on outsiders for development funds and technical expertise, then the fundamental problems of Galician politics and society will never be resolved. Beiras continues.

> [W]e didn't have the industrial revolution that occurred in the nineteenth century in the rest of Europe, and we don't have [today] the kind of strategy and hi-tech industry for integration [into the larger economy] (Beiras 1998).

The only way to obtain the kind of *internal* capital, knowledge and expertise to overcome this dependency trap is draw off from the rest of Spain and use the powerful galvanizing force of Galician nationalism to develop the kind of cohesion, pride and skills necessary to become truly self-sufficient and less vulnerable to fluctuations in

the Galician population. Whether or not his prognosis to the problem is realistic or not is another matter. The one element that has not changed in his long political career, from the fringes of the left to closer to the center-left is his advocacy of thorough-going Galician nationalism. From my interview with him, it is clear that he sees electoral politics and his personal leadership "style" as mere tactics to achieve his more fundamental goal, or strategy, of improvement for Galicia through nationalism. The style that he currently prefers is one of populism; he eschews the intra-elite bargaining strategy of the PP and other rivals. However, this master strategy, if implemented, would very likely bring him to brink of $E(s,b)_1$, that is the basic "exit" versus "voice" or "loyalty" strategy.[52] As suggested earlier, even the consideration of the "exit" opposition violates the democratic norm of either "voice" or "loyalty," whether one is in government (power) or in the opposition, and it would threaten the democratic stability that is necessary for democratic consolidation to occur.

Regional Elites and Economic Development

The second greatest problem confronting Galicia as a region, according to a majority of my interviews is the lack of economic development, and, more

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[52]As noted in chapter one, the basic options of "exit," "voice" or "loyalty" follow the tripartite scheme of Hirschman 1970, which he derived from economics theory. Hirschman suggests that individuals, firms and states are all confronted with one of these three basic choices. The first option ("exit") is to simply completely leave the political system to which they have been connected, often by violent and revolutionary means. The second option is to remain within the system, but to actively articulate one's views ("voice"), and the third and final option ("loyalty") is to remain in the system and to go along meekly with decisions that are made by others in that system.

specifically, the highly uneven economic development in the various provinces that comprise the region. Two charts below indicate the gaps between Galician economic development and in Spain as a whole, and secondly, the unevenness of development within Galicia. Such economic underdevelopment matters politically because of the threat it poses to long-term democratic stability. This is also part of the reason that the European Union has been so generous in providing economic and other assistance to the region.

CHART: **Comparison of GNP Per Capita Between Galicia and Spain to the Average in the EU** (15 members) in constant 1996 terms [EU-15 = 100]

Year	**Spanish GNP/per capita** avg. cf. EU (100 %)	**Galician GNP/per capita** cf. EU (100 %)
1960	57.2 %	39.7 %
1975	77.8 %	58.3 %
1985	69.8 %	57.2 %
1996	76.2 %	63.4 %

Source: Fundacion BBV (1997, 60) and Eurostat

However, such averages tend to conceal wide disparities not only between regions in Galicia, but also between sectors and age groups. The chart below gives some indication of the disparity between the four provinces that comprise Galicia. Obviously, the provinces of *Lugo* and *Orense* lagged far behind *Coruña* and *Pontevedra*, largely because of the concentration of ship-building and a few other heavy industries in the key cities in the latter two provinces.

CHART: **Comparison Between the Economic Output in the 4 provinces of Galicia** Spain = 100

Year	*Coruña*	*Lugo*	*Orense*	*Pontevedra*
1975	78.93 %	57.30 %	58.95 %	77.30 %
1995	89.35 %	73.57 %	75.01 %	84.35 %

Source: Fundacion BBV (1997, 61)

European Union aid and direct links–help or hindrance?

Intuitively, the massive amount of European Union aid to Galicia–administered directly, or through the Spanish state, sometimes with "matching" funds from Madrid–would appear to be extraordinarily efficacious in addressing the problem of low social capital equilibrium, *if* properly administered. Such funds could be used to. as Putnam says, not only pave roads, but to build institutions capable of maintaining the roads. The more immediate and practical concern of the E.U. in dispersing such funds is to insure democratic stability in a member-state, which is the *sine qua non* of a healthy Europe. As postulated above, these kinds of "international factors" clearly have some causal weight as an intervening variable.

Recognizing the extraordinary potential importance of the EU to help spur regional development and cross-state regional trade and ties, Galicia was one of eight autonomous communities (regions) in Spain that established a direct "official" EU representational office in Brussels (Morata 1994, 160). This representation, along with statistics that indicated that Galicia lagged far behind not only the EU average (see chart above), but also the Spanish average, has resulted in an very high level of

EU funds being channeled to the region for various infrastructure and developmental projects. These funds are known variously as "structural," "cohesion," or "solidarity" funds. An economist gives an idea of the scope of this funding:

> Galicia is receiving today [1998] 80,000 million pesetas [@ $533 million] from European Community "solidarity" funds, and is [was] the number one region receiving these funds because it was so far below the EC and Spanish average of PCI and GNP... In total, the funds from the Spanish state and the EC are extraordinarily important...the re-distribution [within Spain] of the public income in total is approximately 400 to 500,000 million pesetas [@ $2.64 to $3.3 billion]. This massive re-distribution pays for the basic services and physical infrastructure [in Galicia]: roadways, pensions, health, welfare, education, etc. (Corbacho 1998).

However, the sheer volume of funds alone does not guarantee its efficacy. The way that the post-Franco Spanish Constitution designed regional autonomies meant that, even though the Spanish state alone can negotiate directly with the EU for funds, the vast majority of these funds would be sent directly to the regional governments, in this case the *Xunta*, at least until the local and provincial governments developed sufficient "capacity" to administer the funds competently and impartially on their own.

Regional elites, especially the *Xunta*, who were granted this volume of funds were presented with two basic choices in their use: first, construct physical and social institutions (practices, norms and procedures) that would have a lasting impact and which would, in theory, be self-regenerating, or secondly, to commission and execute projects directly, and make payments directly to individuals, bypassing local governments, which would both temporarily alleviate a need, and allow the regional

employment in Galician primary sectors (such as agriculture) in order to help lower the problems for Europe as a whole associated with a surplus of agricultural products in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP/PAC), then the funds have partially succeeded. In the space of just over 10 years, employment in the primary sectors in Galicia has declined from over 40 percent to just over 20 percent (Corbacho 1998). However, unemployment remains very high among secondary sectors and the younger generation (18-34), which does not bode well in the long term.

Galicia faces a difficult reckoning, however, in the not-too-distant future as significant declines in EU funds begin to take effect. At least some Galician elites are well aware of this reality, *viz.*, "it is inevitable that the external funds, especially European structural funds will be ended in the next few years, especially as the EU expands eastwards" (Corbacho 1998). The actions that Galician elites failed to take mean that it will become increasingly difficult to overcome the fundamental problem of a low social capital equilibrium in the future.

Conclusion: Efficacy of Regional Elite Leadership to Overcome a L.S.C.E.

Barreiro's conclusion about the efficacy of leadership to overcome Galicia's fundamental problems is unintentionally revealing. Probably because of his personal disapprobation of Fraga, he is unable to see that Fraga had exceptional political "capital" with which to bring about fundamental change. He makes the point in a backhanded way:

> [I]t is an exceptional situation with an exceptional leader [Fraga] that will be seen as a parentheses; we cannot be preoccupied with the situation that produced it because the same PP [Popular Party] with

> different candidates in other situations [facing] other parties; things would have been very different (Barreiro 1998).

What Barreiro means is that other candidates would not have given the "exceptional result," *viz.*, the very high levels of popularity Fraga garnered for himself and the P.P. However, his conclusion about Fraga's efficacy in bringing about change appear to be right on the mark; *viz.*, Fraga was more concerned with burnishing his personal legacy and continued re-election to a fairly high-profile post than he was about tackling the fundamental problem of Galicia–the low social capital equilibrium. Barreiro makes this point abundantly clear:

> Fraga has a very personalistic [leadership] style; he operates in the manner that he is more important than his party, than his programs, than his government; his government is him. He doesn't need great collaborators, he doesn't need a great party, he only needs, likewise, himself. It is a leadership style marked by the idea that there is one grand leader around which [rotate] the others. He is the center of all activities. He is the power, he is always ready, he is the worker, he is the orator; this is exacerbated by weak parties.... [T]he result is a situation of very personalistic leadership... (Barreiro 1998).

Whether from the Right or Left, regional elites in Galicia tend to be quite pessimistic about the ability of elites (both their own ability and that of their colleagues) to overcome the problem of low social capital equilibrium. Most share an implicit traditional model of modernization and development– only improved standards of living can bring about fundamental social change, after a certain "takeoff" stage is reached (cf. Gershekron). If Putnam (1993; 2000) is correct, however, the causal flow is just the opposite–it is social change (*viz.*, reaching and maintaining a high social capital equilibrium) that produces sustained, higher standards of living

over the long run.

That Fraga is more concerned about his own legacy than the future of Galicia (without him) is made abundantly clear by the succession crises that has been brewing for some time inside his Popular Party (Llagares 1997). He temporarily averted this crisis by standing, one more time, for re-election in 2002 as he approached his eightieth year. However, even today, Corbacho notes, leadership selection in all the parties, including the P.P., "is still very bad; it is not a process that produces excellence, the most able person. It has other characteristics that benefit the institution [party], but it does not select well" (Corbacho 1998). Another observer fears the return of the inchoate coalition governments of the 1980's if talented and experienced leaders are not groomed now to take over after the inevitable departure of Fraga (Garrote 1998).

Overall, the Galician case gives credibility to Putnam's observations that a region with pre-existing social capital will tend to get the effective governance that it deserves because society has the strength–the independent power–to demand and articulate such policy, and the interest and ability to hold the government accountable. It may be true, as Putnam (1993, 176) points out, that a strong society produces both a strong economy and a "strong"[53] state, but in the case of Galicia, a weak society produces an over-bearing state. How does one create such a "strong society" in a

[53]I believe that "effective" state is a better word choice, because the phrase "strong" state conjures up the weak society-strong state dichotomy of Migdial et al., i.e. an authoritarian state that keeps a fragmented society together, often by military or police coercion.

relative short period of time (e.g. 25-50 years)? Such practical questions are of paramount concern to policy-makers confronting the reality of several of the world's states that want or need to become democratic without any historical repertoire of social capital at all.

This case study has pointed a way forward on the question of overcoming low social capital equilibrium without providing any definitive answers. The Galician case demonstrates two critical needs for leadership to build social capital in a transitional setting: the proper sequencing of leaders, *and* the proper "fit" between society and its leadership. On the first point, that a society's *best* leadership should be brought forward during the critical *early democratic consolidation* phase, and secondly, that such leadership should "fit like a glove" with the mass public. The Galician case illustrates the point that neither condition is sufficient by itself to overcome the fundamental problem of low social capital equilibrium.

In parliamentary-style democracies, leaders must necessarily arise through the ranks of the parliamentary system, which is dominated by parties. However, the parties remain underdeveloped and fragmented in Galicia even today, and, as Corbacho pointed out, such parties do a poor job of elite recruitment and training. The Galician case has illustrated another problem that is common to societies undergoing a dual transition: it did not have a strong party structure, and little knowledge of how to create one, at precisely the moment that such knowledge and structure is most needed: the early transition. Despite the nationalists' council to turn inward in search of leadership and developmental capacity, it would be at exactly at this early stage that

external expertise would be the most helpful. International assistance is most needed at the foundation-laying stage, not later on. Unfortunately for Galicia, Spain did not join the EC/EU until 1986, well beyond this critical stage in the sequence. After that point, the massive amounts of EU "cohesion" and "structural" funds, despite the best intentions, have not been efficacious in the larger mission of consolidating democracy *internally* in the Galician region of Spain.

Political stability does unquestionably obtain in Galicia today. At least by that most basic measure, the political elites in Galicia have succeeded in providing a stable order in which democracy has a chance to become consolidated in the region at some point in the future. But it is political stability that comes at a high price: without building social capital and my "P-3 indicators," democratic consolidation will be undermined in the long run.

Chapter 4: Communitarian Democratic Leadership: The Case of Andalucían Elites

Andalucía, or Andalusia in its Anglicized version, is the region of Spain located all along the entire southern border of Spain from Portugal in the west, and bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on both the south and east. It is the largest of today's seventeen "autonomous communities" that make up Spain. It is the region of *Don Quijote* and the plains of La Mancha. However, it is topographically quite varied, from the wetlands of *La Doña* in the west to the mountains and narrow valleys around Granada. It has long been a region of sharp political contrasts–e.g. wealthy sea merchants and impoverished *campesinos*.

In this chapter, we will explore the roots of a distinctive "communitarian" leadership style that has developed among regional elites in *Andalucía* since the 1977 transition from authoritarian rule. This chapter will also seek to provide a link between the theory of regional leadership in a newly-democratizing context that was suggested in chapter one, and that of practice, as revealed through interviews and on-site archival research. *Andalucía* provides the researcher with fertile ground to "test" theory against practice, which should be the goal of political science research. The chapter will also seek to understand the concrete mechanisms by which the needs of the citizenry are met by regional leaders in a democratizing context.

II. The Research Design

To recapitulate from chapter one, the research hypothesis is as follows:

The variation in behavior and strategies of regional elites in Spain, conditioned by regional factors defined below, resulted in variable

democratic consolidation in each region, and in Spain as a whole.

The overall goal of this study is to understand the neglected role of regional elite leadership style in a democratizing context by using the methodologies of the interview, participant-observation, and on-site archival research. "Style" is defined as the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by regional elites in pursuit of electoral gain and "higher" vaules like democracy and regional political and economic advancement.

Recall the key variables from chapter one:

{Int. Factors}

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$X_1+X_2+X_3+X_4 \rightarrow \quad E(s,b)$

where $X_1...X_4$ are the independent variables affecting *E(s,b)*, the intermediate dependent variable, which is the behavior and strategies of regional elites; and DC outcome, the ultimate dependent variable, is the variation in the process of the consolidation of democracy in a given region. Because of more direct links with the international community, international factors are postulated to be more strongly causative in one of the cases (Catalonia) than the others.

In addition, here are the key variables:

$E(s,b)_1$ = The basic "exit" or "voice" option (Hirschman 1970) of regional elites; i.e., the fundamental decision to leave or participate in a democratic system.

$E(s,b)_2$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis their constituents;

e.g., a populist strategy, or intra-regional elite cooperation strategy.[54]

$E(s,b)_3$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis national elites.

$E(s,b)_4$ = Strategy and behavior of regional actor(s) vis-à-vis international elites; e.g., pursuing international assistance directly (bypassing the center/national elites), or pursuit of an export strategy.

Following Burns (1978), leadership is asserted to be collectively purposeful causation in the direction of "higher" values by a self-identified group. Recall that the difficulties of proving leadership is a cause, and of avoiding infinite regress in leadership styles/types is addressed in this study through: (1) a standardized set of variables (above) across regions, (2) the concept of "elite culture," and (3) focus on a limited number of institutional contexts (or "regimes") in which elites operate.

The case of the Andalusian region stands in sharp contrast to the rest of Spain in many ways, although for many outsiders, it is the "real Spain."[55] Most relevant for this study is its *political* contrast with the rest of Spain during the post-Franco period, and especially the other two regions under consideration, both in its consistent post-

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[54]The difference between these two strategies is that in the first instance, elites promise some material gain to their constituents, or utilize some mechanism to foment popular unrest, in order to achieve perceived gains to themselves, while in the second instance, regional elites cooperate with each other in order to achieve perceived "payoffs" (usually electoral) vis-à-vis their constituents (Tsebelis 1990).

[55]This region seems most typically Spanish to foreigners for two primary reasons: (1) its colorful and vibrant foklore (songs, dance, pageants and costumes) have widespread appeal, and (2) the region has seen the largest immigration of any region of Spain over the last few centuries, thus spreading the customs of the region around the world. Much of the Andalusian popular culture is, in turn, due to the intersection of the culture of long-term occupiers the Moors from the south (i.e. Africa) and the Spaniards from the north.

transitional preference for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE and PSA) and its underlying, supporting social structure. The post-transitional trajectory of democratization has taken a very clear, distinct path from the rest of Spain, thus providing strong *prima facie* support for this study's thesis. It remains to be demonstrated, however, the mechanisms that translate mass preferences into leadership styles, and how regional elites make conscious choices to maximize their support among their "mass clients" within this *milieu*. Secondly, this chapter will elucidate the *operational* strategies that regional elites employ in the federalist struggle with the center (national elites in Madrid) over resources, ideology and party affiliation. Finally, the chapter will build inductively towards a generalizable regional elite leadership style that shall be termed "communitarian."

First, why should the regional case of *Andalucía* be included in this study? Five clear reasons are elucidated below.

1. It is the largest region in Spain, both geographically and in population, and it is the fastest growing economically (*ABC* 6/98); to ignore it would be to ignore the heart of Spain and to miss perhaps the single-most important region in Spain, which would make any attempt at generalization less powerful or credible (see the discussion on generalization in chapter 2, above).
2. It is one of the three "historic" regions in Spain, recognized as such under the 1978 post-transition Spanish national constitution, which entitles it to special considerations and material benefits.
3. Its "nationalist" identity, which forms the basis of its claim to historic status, is

of a completely different character than that of the other two regions in this study, but is still nonetheless effective in bringing unity to a very diverse region.

4. It should bring more variation to the study, in terms of regional elite leadership style and the lack of a historical nationalist identity.

5. Its politics show a sharp center versus periphery cleavage that throws the underlying federalist question of this region's relation to the central government in this overall study into sharp relief.

I will suggest in this chapter that elite regional leadership explains most of the anomalies identified in this numbered list, especially the last one.

It is generally well-known that *Andalucía*, in particular the areas around Sevilla, the regional capital, and Cordoba, have long been the home to leftist politicians and intellectuals, even well before the death of Franco in 1975. For example, the long-time tic mayor of Cordoba, Julio Anguita, was an orthodox member of the Spanish Communist Party (*PCE*), but he is now the leader of the new national party, the *IU* (the United Left), an alliance of the reformed Communist party and the Green party. The poverty of the region, combined with an alienation from Madrid and Barcelona, gave the leftist parties a stronghold here. Combined with the unique political-economy of the south of Spain, the conditions have been ripe for a very distinctive style of elite leadership and interaction with the Andalusian public. Although often pictured as the most typically "Spanish" of all the regions by outsiders, it has historically been looked down upon by the rest of Spain as being relatively poor

and backwards. An artifact of the grinding poverty of the region before and shortly after the transition were the huge waves of immigration from the region to other regions of Spain, Latin America and Europe, composed primarily of workers seeking opportunities abroad.

The post-transition political-economic development of Andalucía has been remarkable regardless of the measure used. According to the President of the Andalusian Parliament (a position similar to Speaker of the House), Torres Vela, *Andalucía* is the fastest growing region of Spain, its growth rate eclipsing even the more prosperous region of *Cataluña*. In addition, *Andalucía* has reversed the historical pattern of exporting its labor to other regions of Spain and Europe; it now "imports" labor, especially from north Africa and the Middle East. Recent racial incidents have occurred in the port cities of the region (e.g. Malaga) because of the demand for inexpensive foreign labor to fulfill growing shortfalls (much like the southwestern United States) has pulled in a large number of immigrants, which has caused a backlash among long-time Spanish residents. As the table below demonstrates industrial production in *Andalucía* has outpaced that of Spain as a whole during the decade of the 1990's.

TABLE ONE: Comparison of Industrial Production in Spain and *Andalucía*

(Measured in growth in aggregate production rates, including energy, metals, construction and manufacturing)

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
And.	114	78	97	109	105	121
Spain	98	91	97	105	101	113

Source: Junta de Andalucía, Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, Coyuntura Económica de Andalucía, No. 30, March 1998, p. 28.

Clearly, Andalucía has come a long way economically in a short period of time. The challenge of this chapter is to ascertain the unique "path" that democratization has taken in *Andalucía* that is in keeping with its history and social base, which, in turn, may suggest a ideal-typical leadership style that may be replicated elsewhere in similar cases in terms of its "communitarian" structure and lack of strong capitalist economy before the transition to democracy. Of course, the leadership styles that Andalusian elites actually employ has to be ascertained through empirical research.

III. Pre-transition Background in Andalucía: Constructing an Identity Whole Cloth

A brief history of attempts to create a nationalist identity for this region demonstrates that, despite heroic efforts, there was no significant mass-based nationalist movement or identity. This fact makes the recognition of Andalusia in the post-Franco Spanish constitution even more remarkable.

"*Epistolario Bético,* " written by José Vázquez in 1917, has been cited by regional writers as the perhaps the greatest journalistic statement of *Andalucían* identity. In this piece, the author disagrees with then commonly-heard "solutions" for southern Spain's problems: *viz.*, chiefly, agricultural reform or radical revolution. Instead, he identifies the problem as one of a lack of "civic consciousness" and opines that:

> If *Andalucía* will become a force, it will not be like some stopped-up avalanche that, under the influence of a fiery and deceitful revolutionary, sweeps and surges forth, but rather by means of fortifying itself with the thought and the affirmation of a collective consciousness, and then all of its problems can be resolved with a surprising facility (Vázquez 1982 [1917], 30).

In essence, Vásquez was calling for a *social* revolution based on thorough-going educational reform (he refers to Rosseau's *Emile*), not some technical "solution" like improved agriculture or revolution imposed from above. In calling for a social, or civil society, reform, Vázquez was surprisingly modern, anticipating the main thrust of Putnam's (1993) conclusions 66 years later.

Unfortunately, the history of *Andalucía* over the next fifty years was not to follow the pattern that Vásquez laid out. Historians and political analysts have speculated on various reasons for the historical "backwardness" of the region, even in relationship with the rest of Spain: e.g., poor soil and climate, dominance of the church, a work-adverse culture, an anti-capitalist culture, high illiteracy and even social radicalism (Carr 1989). In addition, the "dependency" theorists have cited *Andalucía* as a case of a "periphery" being consistently "underdeveloped" through its interaction with the "core," Madrid in this case (Barzelay and O'Kean1990, 56) .

Regardless of the preferred explanation, the surprising fact is that *Andalucía* has made a dramatic and almost *wholly unpredicted, even counter-predicted* "dual transition" in both politics and economics in the last quarter of the twentieth century.[56] It is here asserted that there were four critical factors in *Andalucía*'s unexpected turnaround: primarily the socialist-led transition to democracy, strong regional elite leadership who helped direct social as well as political change, massive aid and support from the EU and other European IGO's, and finally (yes) technical advances in agriculture and air-conditioning. The collective consciousness that Blas Infante, Vázquez and other Andalusian elites hoped for so fervently seems to have been the product of, and not the cause of, these other four factors, i.e. they had the causal chain exactly backwards. In one way, however, at least the *illusion* of a collective Andalusian consciousness was important for securing special rights for the region during the transitional period, and that is the story that we turn to below.

IV. Regional Elites in Andalucía Since the Transition

Despite that lack of historical nationalism at the mass level in the region, *Andalucía* was one of only four regions that was able to garner recognition of its "historic" status in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. This status is important for the region, because, as previously noted, it allows regional elites to apply for and receive additional funding, special exemptions from laws of the central state, and a much

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[56]Note that the "dual transition" that *Andalucía* has had to make in the post-Franco era is in contrast to much of the rest of Spain, particular the regions around Madrid and Barcelona, which had already undertaken a successful economic transition under Franco, and had the lesser, but still daunting, challenge of making a single transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

(out of a total population of only about seven million at the time!). This move robbed *Andalucía* of its vital economic base; one could justifiably conclude that the problems of underdevelopment in *Andalucía* during the Franco regime were "not a consequence of natural characteristics, but (rather) the result of political decisions that were taken" (Torres Vela 1998).

The sea change that occurred in the strategy of Andalusian elites was the diminution of the Marxian dialectic in favor of American-inspired emphasis on the state, institutions, the market, and proper sequencing (process) in bringing about political and economic development. According to Torres Vela, who was intimately involved in this sea-change in strategy,

> [W]hen the modern political science, like that of the United States, Easton and others, was embraced at the University of Granada, and finally introduced into Spain, it produced a new analysis that explains political development in terms of our own lack of political process. Under-development is linked to the lack of political power itself (Torres Vela 1998).

Because academics like Torres Vela (both a professor of economics and the President of the Andalusian Parliament) are also in positions of political power in Andalucía and elsewhere in Spain, the link between theory and practice is plausible. It may be that this group of professors (around the University of Granada) is claiming too much credit for such a momentous social and political change. However, one concrete manifestation of the stress on state "capacity" and "planning" is clearly illustrated in the case of the Andalusian Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPIA) discussed below.

Two of the key figures for Andalucía during the transition phase in Andalucía

were Rafael Escuredo and Fernández Viagas.[57] In the Spanish Constitution, the Andalusian foundational *Pacto de Antequeria* and elsewhere, they were able to recognize the importance of "historic" status for the region, and concomitantly, they consciously sought to foster and promote Andalucían nationalism and integrate it with early elements of what is identified in this study as the "communitarian" leadership style (see Table 2, below). Escurerdo, in particular, understood the needs of the moment, and rose to the occasion, with a style that has been described by local political observers as "tic" (Montabes 1997a, 4).[58] Escuredo was also president of the regional government of *Andalucía* (the *Junta*) during the critical period of 1979-1984, when, according to Montabes et al. (1997a, 1997b), the elections and regional elite leadership played the dual role of normal mediation with the public, and the extraordinary role of consolidating or normalizing democratic practice as a meta-system (1997a, 4; Porras 1987).

According to professor Pérez Royo (1998) of the University of Granada, Escuredo was instrumental in helping to create an "historic" identity for *Andalucía*. The idea of "creating" an historic identity is, of course, an oxymoron (how can one create the past?), but it comports with other counter-intuitive findings of the

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[57] Moreover, in the Spanish transition in general, it was a native of Seville, Felipe Gonzáles, who was to prove to be one the pivotal figures in the consolidation phase of democratization in Spain in the 1980's.

[58]Escurerdo has lived in hermetic isolation since his term as President of *Andalucía*; even former close associates have lost touch. Several associates believe that he lives in Madrid. Attempts to contact him for an interview for this study were unsuccessful.

democratization literature[59]. It also comports with the idea of the charismatic leader as the "law-giver" or creator or new orders and new identities (Conger and Kanungo 1998, 140ff; Wildavsky 1989, 101). In addition, empirical research has concluded that, "leaders who are entrepreneurial founders, the probability is higher that they are principal assemblers of the vision" (Conger and Kanungo 1998, 142), that is truly charismatic, and not manufactured by political handlers to appear that way (cf. Weber's "routinized charisma").

Escuredo worked hard for, and achieved, a referendum on October 28, 1981 on both the historic status on *Andalucía*, and its relationship with the rest of Spain. This public referendum gave him the ammunition needed to change the national constitution of Spain. He also was instrumental in changing the wording of the Spanish Constitution in "Title VIII" in order to allow *Andalucía* to seek the same level of autonomy granted to only two other "historical-national" communities–the Basque Country and *Cataluña* (Barzelay and O'Kean 1989, 57).

In order to create or "reinforce" this "historic" nationalistic identity, and as an electoral strategy, Escuredo and his fellow elites in the Socialist Party undertook a two-prong strategy: first, argue that *Andalucía*'s "underdevelopment" was as a result of cultural repression from the center of Spain (picking up on the leftist "dependency"

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[59]For example, one of the strongest and most surprising "counter-intuitive" findings of the democratization literature is that elites have been able to create (but not necessarily sustain) a democratic predilection among the *mass* of people, although the mass-national political culture had been "anti-democratic" just a short time before (O'Donnell et al. 1986). However, Diamond (1999, 173) reminds us that elites alone cannot sustain a democratic culture.

argument), and secondly, separate the Andalusian Socialists from the state-level Socialist Party (PSOE). The first strategy was carried out in political speeches, and in a magazine (since disbanded) that was founded at the time, *¡Andalucía Libre!* (Free Andalusia!). The second strategy was enacted in a deliberate electoral plan that sought to capture the traditional left of Andalusian politics *and* the far left of the former Communist party supporters. It was, in contrast to the "rightist" nationalism of *Cataluña*, explicitly a "nationalism of the left." As part of its electoral platform, the PSA argued that it was "the major [party] that represents the identity and interests of *Andalucía*" (Barzelay and O'Kean 1989, 57). Even before *Analucía* was recognized as a "historic" region under Title VIII, Escuredo was able to become the "pre-autonomous" President of the Andalusian government (the *Junta*) by winning the votes of the Communist delegates in the Andalusian Parliament in 1979. Also in this election, the decision to separate the PSA from the PSOE paid off–the vote for the PSA increased by seven percentage points, and that for the PSOE declined by six points, and this in the PSOE's "home" region (Barzelay and O'Kean 1989, 58)!

As a direct result of this two-part strategy, Escuredo and the PSA sought to create a positive component (instead of just a negative, anti-Madrid, position) which could simultaneously:

1. Help consolidate democracy in the region,
2. Bring about desperately needed social change and economic development, and
3. Serve an important and historically neglected "mass client" in *Andalucía*: the small-to-medium sized entrepreneur/farmer/business-owner.

4. Demonstrate the institutional capacity of the new *Junta* to bring about these comprehensive political and economic changes (Barzelay and O'Kean 1989, 59).

IPIA as an example of Leadership Style

The Andalusian Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPIA) was created as part of a specific political strategy by Andalusian regional elites to address all four points that were critical in Andalusia during the transitional and early democratic consolidation period, and are still relevant today.[60]

According to a well-respected case study of IPIA, the ambitious goals included "actively animating socioeconomic change processes in several particular contexts." IPIA, under President Escuredo, and the particular guidance of Ricardo Moreno, went far beyond the usual business-promotion role of such government bodies and attempted to simultaneously consolidate democracy and promote social change in the region. Their relative success in achieving these goals has lead to the "case of IPIA" being included in the famous Harvard case-study series (Barzelay 1990a; 1990b).

What makes IPIA so unique in Spain–and indeed in systems of corporatist intermediation–was that it was not a "peak association" of either labor or business-owners that one would typically find in European tripartite corporatist arrangements, but rather a full-fledged development agency whose purpose it was not to merely represent interests at bargaining sessions with other interlocutors, but rather to

[60]When asked what the greatest problems facing *Andalucía today* were, the President of the Parliament, Torres Vela answered, "lack of region-wide modernization and unemployment" (Torres Vela 1998; translated by the author).

simultaneously help consolidate democracy and develop infant industries and fragile small business located in the region.

The uniqueness of IPIA, and Escuredo's strategy attached to it, is not an historical accident, but is rather the product of specific strategies and behaviors of Andalusian elites in the early 1980's vis-à-vis other regional, national and international elites, as hypothesized by variables $E(s,b)_{1,2,3,4}$. Escuredo was attempting to build his power base, not only for himself, but also for the Andalusian Socialists in the long-term. Because of the sum total of his strategy in relation to other elites, he eschewed traditional tripartite corporatist arrangements that have been so celebrated in the political science literature (di Palma; O'Donnell et al. 1986); *viz.*, one is which the state plays merely a coordinating role between already existing and powerful "peak" associations representing employer and labor interests. In addition, this form of tripartite corporatism did not fit into his model of "democratic planning" ("*planificación democrática*). In particular, he found the *CEA* (Andalusian Confederation of Employers) to an unreliable partner and overly-ambitious (Barzelay and O'Kean 1989, 62-63). He may have also found their frank identification with the right to be at cross-purposes with his own electoral strategies and preferences.[61]

The IPIA sought not only to bring about economic change, but also "social learning," through action plans. Developmental specialists, like Ricardo Sánchez, had long been frustrated by the lack of innovation and fatal resignation among the

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[61]During the 1982 election campaign, the *CEA* did not help relations with Escuredo and the Socialists by supporting an advertisement that depicted the Socialists as a red apple (suggesting Communist links) with a worm coming out it (rotten to the core?).

Andalusian populace. Therefore, they sought to truncate that process, described by Putnam (1993) as taking many hundreds of years, of social development that must *precede* successful economic development. The specific mechanisms were: social animation, institution-building, strategic planning and networking (Barzelay 1990b, 1). The director of IPIA, Ricardo Sánchez believed that social learning would free up the minds of those involved in regional production from traditional social structures that retarded political and economic development, such as isolationism in communities, weak entrepreneurship, and very weak coordination among employers (Capital) (Barzelay 1990b, 3-4). The link between improved social capital and economic production is clear and explicit in Sánchez's plans.

For the IPIA, Escuredo's support, built upon his communitarian leadership style, was a much more powerful source of legitimation than any other alternative, e.g., an alliance with a party, or the *CEA*. His public "discourse" both legitimated and brought new sources of income and "suppliers" to the IPIA so that it could better serve its client: the small and medium-sized private enterprise who would be both the political and economic base of a resurgent post-Franco *Andalucía*.

There were political costs, however, to Escuredo's strategies for improving democratic stability and social capital in the region. The most potent one, that eventually forced his departure from office, was $E(s,b)_3$ (strategy and behavior vis-à-vis national elites). Although the norm in most European democracies is to have tightly disciplined parties at all levels of government, Escuredo's strategy called for him to "run against the center," i.e. blame the national government in Madrid for

However, the tension between Sevilla and Madrid continued, as well as the underlying regional institutional structure, or mass client. After the departure of Escuredo, other elites rushed in to fill the void.

Upon closer examination on site, and interviews with elites in *Andalucía*, it becomes clear that historical animosities, even cleavages, remain from the past. For example, there still exists an east-west rivalry, centered around Sevilla and Granada, and extremes of right versus left over the question of whether the region is historically, or should be, nationalistic or socialistic.

However, the transition in *Andalucía* was not bloody or extreme. Why? An extraordinary circumstance, unlikely to be widely repeated in other democratizing contexts, obtained in *Andalucía* in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Direct Andalusian-European links between regional, socialist-party and labor elites were formed that largely *bypassed the central government* and provided both material and technical support that was badly needed in the region in order to insure a peaceful transition to democracy (Jérez 1998; Van Doorn 1994; Barzelay and O'Kean 1989). The Andalusian economy is further helped by the rapid development, for the purposes of attracting tourist revenues, of its natural resources–its coasts, mountains, picturesque villages and historical sites. Some Andalusians are proud of, and some resent, its new appellation-- the "Florida of Europe"-- but this new status undeniably brings a huge inflow of foreign capital into the region, and helps its democracy through a "demonstration effect," i.e. successful economic performance boosts the legitimacy of democracy with the populace. Even today, the regionalist *Partido Andalucista*

("Andalusian Party"):

> manifests its adherence to European federalism, based upon the solidaristic interdependence of all peoples, and with the knowledge of the historic continuity and institutions of the Spanish state, as a result of a pacted process of federal association between free and equal peoples (*Partido Andalucista* 1997, 6).

Towards a Model of "Regional Communitarian Leadership"

Based on the foregoing analysis, a model of the regional communitarian leadership style in a democratizing context will be explicated below. Because relatively little has been written about this leadership model, it is not possible to compare the proposed model with many existing models.

Author	Model Features	Social Setting	Elite Strategies	Elite Behaviors	Application
Wildavsky	Potentially unlimited terms of office: "discontinuous" i.e. long gaps without strong leadership, alternating with charismatic leaders	Radical egalitarianism and "social democracy"; heavily regulated markets; charismatic leaders arise in times of trouble	Appear to be an "anti-politician" in order not to threaten followers or appear to be "lording it" over others; in time of crisis, however, leaders should show supreme virtue and unlimited authority	Persuasion (low coercion), facilitation and self-effacement; in crisis a bringer of a "new law" that is unlimited in scope	Societies marked by low coercion, voluntary consent and little inequality.

Van Doorn	Diffused, non-heirarchical leadership style; isolated instances of charismatic leadership	Homogenous; strong sense of shared, albeit non-national values; equality often based upon dispossession or shared hard times	(1) Use "loyalty" option to avoid rocking the boat; (2) Electoral: intra-elite cooperation; (3) Seek benefits from the center; (4) seek benefits from international sources	(1) use of pacting as a device to insure loyalty and as development tool; (2) Electoral: welfare and benefits populism; (3) Forge alliances with center elites in order to secure benefits; publicly blame center as necessary for bad times (4) promote external tourism and seek representation in IGO's	Appropriate in developing regions where center (capital) is weak, marked by non-hierarchical social relationships and relative deprivation that creates "equality"; conversely also applicable in advanced social democracies based upon radical egalitarian-ism

What are the implications of this new model for both understanding regional leadership styles, and the role that regional leadership can/should play in a democratizing setting? First, it helps understand what sort of leader will be needed (and tolerated) at different phases of democratization in a communitarian setting: the charismatic during the transition phase, and the "ordinary," or even "anti," leader during the consolidation phase, at least at the regional level. Secondly, the model helps solve a persistent puzzle about the types of leaders who do well in a communitarian political-institutional context: *both* charismatic leaders and "anti" leaders, but not usually at the same time at the same level. Thirdly, my communitarian model predicts, contrary to what communist or social democratic versions do, that communitarian leadership style may be found in lesser-developed countries or regions of countries. The social-democratic version of Wildavsky, for example, presupposes that the communitarian sense of "radical egalitarianism" occurs only after a high level of political and economic development has taken place, much as orthodox Marxism would predict. On the contrary, I have found that this sense of radical egalitarianism can be authentically found in communities whose relative deprivation gives them a shared sense of solidarity, and an anti-capitalistic, or extra-systemic, outlook in economic matters. Recall, for example, the lament by the head of the peak Capital (business owner) association, *Señor* Moya, that almost a third of the employment in *Andalucía* was still *today* in the black economy, and it was very difficult to change this

mentality because it was based upon deep-seated institutions.[63] This is the main reason that IPIA, under the guidance of President Escuredo and Morena was such a success–it was tailored to regional institutional realities (or "culture"), and not a cookie-cutter model from other democratizing experiences.

To elaborate from the Andalusian experience, two charismatic leaders were clearly needed and appreciated during the transitional phase when Andalucía was fighting for its identity and its place within the new democratic Spanish state. They helped build a different kind of social capital–one that bridges from community to community (where bonding social capital tends to be *very* strong), and overcome historical distrust between small rural and larger urban business owners, and between the eastern and western parts of the region. However, once that "critical" phase was over, the region has been led by what appears to be a series of lackluster elites who succeed precisely because of their very ordinariness, because they do not threaten the community's sense of self. They can build upon their predecessors' foundational work in creating bridging social capital. The current president of the *Junta*, Chaves, has been an "utilitarian" political leader in this regard. Yet, even today in some communities in Andalucia, and in their representatives to the Andalusian Parliament, are leaders who fit the charismatic leader ideal-type; one is even jokingly called the

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[63]Moya's analysis was given even more credence at an academic conference held at the University of Malaga in Andalusia on July 3, 2002. Even though the share of the "irregular" or black market economy was said to have declined slightly to about 25 percent of the total economic output, it still is one of the most difficult social-economic problems to solve in Andalusia today. See *El Pais* (Spanish newspaper), July 4, 2002.

"Messiah" and "Moses" by his colleagues for his fiery oratory and his ability to connect with the people in his community.

Chapter 5: Visionary Leadership Style: The Case of Cataluña

Section One: Introduction and Research Questions

Cataluña, or Catalonia in its Anglicized version, is the region of Spain located at its extreme northeast corner where Spain joins with France, not too distant from Italy and Monaco. It is also the area where the Pyrenees slope down into the Mediterranean, allowing relatively easy access from the Mediterranean to both the mainland of the European continent, via France, and to the rest of Spain. Because of its geo-strategic location, this region has been important since antiquity, for travel, trading and military purposes. It is also a naturally beautiful region of mountains, ancient villages with Roman ruins, valleys and scenic coastlines.

This is a study of regional leadership *styles* during the transition and consolidation phases of democratization in Spain, as explicated in chapter one. To briefly recapitulate from that chapter, the research hypothesis was as follows:

> The variation in behavior and strategies of regional elites in Spain, conditioned by regional factors defined below, resulted in variable levels of democratic stability and democratic consolidation in each region.

The theoretical relationship between variables was forecast to be as follows:

{Int. Factors}

↕

E(s,b) → level of democratic stability → degree of democracy

x

cases that are "most likely" to confirm the hypothesis, and do so after testing[64]. It is much more common in the literature to find the "most likely" case-study approach because such an approach is often perceived to be "safer" on the part of the researcher–he or she wants to prove what they set out to prove, ignoring the value that disconfirmed hypotheses add to the general body of knowledge. See chapter one, above, for a more complete explanation of the methodology and logic involved in Eckstein's case-study approach.

Why is Cataluña a "least-likely" case to confirm the hypotheses in this study? Cataluña boasts a long history of political independence from the rest of Spain, well-developed traditions of representative government, public policy apparatus, and long periods of much higher economic prosperity than the rest of Spain. In terms of advanced political-economy, it is similar to some of the regions of the north of Italy, cited by Putnam (1993) that enjoy high "social capital" among the populace. Therefore, Cataluña would appear, superficially, to be a "most likely" case to confirm Putnam's thesis that democratic development explains both economic and policy performance (and not vice-versa, as was previously believed). Conversely, Cataluña would appear to be a "least likely" case to support the thesis here that regional leadership matters in democratic consolidation. Why? If Putnam is correct, regional leadership does not matter much, because it is the enduring (1000-year long?)

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[64]In fact, according to Eckstein's criteria, if a "most likely" case fails to convincingly confirm the hypothesis, this has the same vitiating effect on the hypothesis that a disconfirming case would have.

and a discussion of this style.

Cataluña presents a set of intriguing challenges for the researcher. The primary *problematique* for this case in this study is, how did a region that was actively repressed for over 40 years by the Franco regime[66] re-emerge with a high level of economic development, more united internally, and more democratic than ever before? A related question is why has Cataluña not experienced the same violent separatist struggles (and terrorism) that the Basque region has, despite more widespread nationalist identity among the people of Cataluña than the Basque country[67], and more active suppression by the Spanish state under Franco? The secondary problem-area will be an understanding of the role that the leadership style of Jordi Pujol and his fellow elites played in the path that democratic consolidation took in Cataluña. Specifically, what was the elite-mass client interaction during this phase of democratic consolidation? Finally, we shall examine the problem of *sequencing*; i.e. does it matter what type of leader comes along during the different phases in the democratization process, or do different types of leaders become more or less crucial during the early vs. later stages of democratization? Any work of this type on the

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[66]And actively repressed for even longer periods of time under the monarchs, dictators and other "central" Spanish authorities.

[67]The levels of nationalist identity among the public in each of the regions of Spain have been thoroughly measured by annual surveys conducted by the respected Spanish research institute, CIRES. See, for example CIRES (1991). One measure (among many used by CIRES) is the use of the "national" language. A scientifically-conducted poll found that only 10 percent of respondents in the Basque country even understood *Euskedai*, and an even smaller percentage used it regularly. In contrast, over 80 percent of Catalonians understood Catalan, and 60 percent said that they used it regularly.

democratic transition in Spain should include the region of Cataluña, for the following reasons, among others:

5. It has one of the strongest levels of nationalist identity (measured by both voting strength of nationalist parties and in repeated public opinion polls), of the new "autonomous communities" of Spain, a status that enabled it to be the first to claim "historical status" under the 1978 constitution.

6. It has the clearest and most widespread nationalist identity of any region of Spain (much more so than the well-known Basque region).

7. Cataluña has proven to be an extraordinary breeding ground for political leaders in post-Franco Spain. To cite a few examples: the Vice-President of the dominant post-Franco Socialist government (1983-1997), Narcis Serra, the recent mayor of Barcelona, Maragall, (who is widely considered to be a leading candidate for Prime Minister of Spain, or president of the regional government), and, Jordi Pujol, the president of the *Generalitat* (Catalan regional government) almost since its re-emergence in the late 1970's. As we will see below, Pujol embodies a "visionary" leadership style of an "authentic" leader.

8. Finally, it appears to be the most "successful" of all the 17 autonomous regions of Spain by most conventional measures: aggregate standards of living, infrastructure, levels of literacy, public health, public policy performance and effectiveness, etc. What explains this success vis-à-vis the rest of Spain in many of the measures thought to be indispensable for democratic

consolidation? What role does regional political leadership, if any, play in this success? Or can political success be explained solely in terms of economic success (a version of Lipset's $8500 PCI "threshold" for democracy, cited in chapter one).

Section Two: The Research Design

Logic and terminology

This study seeks to understand the neglected role of leadership style through the methodologies of the elite interview, and on-site archival research. Because these methods and the research questions (above, Section One) involve subjective and qualitative analysis, it is asserted that quantitative analysis of leadership style would be inappropriate. It would be useful here to recall the independent variables identified in this study, as well as a quotation from James MacGregor Burns classic, *Leadership* (1978). First, the conceptual definition of political leadership from Burns:

> *Political leadership* is those processes and effects of political power in which a number of actors, varying in their composition and roles from situation to situation, spurred by aspirations, goals, and other motivations, appeal to and respond to the needs and other motives of would-be followers with acts for reciprocal betterment, or, in the case of transforming leaders, the achievement of real change in the direction of "higher" values. Political leadership is tested by the extent of real and intended change achieved by leaders' interactions with followers through the use of their power bases. Political leadership is *broadly intended "real change."* It is *collectively purposeful causation* (italics in original; Burns 1978, 434).

Style is defined as the characteristic strategy and behavior exhibited by regional elites in pursuit of electoral gain and "higher" values like democracy and

regional political and economic advancement.

Leadership style is operationalized in this study as being composed of the following four variables, $E(s,b)_{I,J}$ (see chapter one).

Section Three: Relevant History

Cataluña has a long history of political and economic development separate from, and somewhat in competition with, the rest of Spain. As early as 1150, it was a self-identified region under the control of it own royalty, (an Archduchy), which were newly separated from the Frankish kings (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 21). Its distinctive language, Catalan, emerged slightly earlier (around the 10th century A.D.). The Middle Ages and European Renaissance period were occupied with securing ever-expanding regional power and trading routes (primarily maritime) through intermarriage and outright conquest. The western end of the Mediterranean Sea was increasingly under Catalan dominance by the end of the Medieval period. Catalan language, culture and influence had spread down the eastern coast of Spain as far south as Murcia, and eastward to the Baleric Islands (Majorca). The 14th century also witnesses the zenith of Catalan territory and influence, in which the most of north Mediterranean coastal states, west of Turkey, were under direct or indirect Catalan control. (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 23). By the late 1400's, Cataluña had united with Aragon, and then with the rest of central and northern Spain, primarily in order to expel the Moors from southern Spain. It is not without some historical justification that today's Catalans boast that they have "rescued" Spain several times from serious challenges, both domestic and

foreign. What many modern Catalan nationalists conveniently overlook, however, are the many benefits Cataluña has gained from its association with the rest of Spain.

Relatively representative government also claims a long lineage in Catalonia, longer than in any other region of Spain; interrupted, however, from time to time, especially by conflict with the central Spanish state. The predecessor for today's regional government, the *Generalitat*, was the *Corts-General*, (much like the later French *Estates-General*) which met for the first time in the Federation of the Aragon Crown in the 14th century A.D (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 21). It, in turn, appointed an executive committee, the *Diputació del General*, which carried out the practical, daily functions of government, and is usually considered the "embryo" of the self-governing *Generalitat* (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 29).[68] The *Generalitat* first broke free of absolutist, royal control in 1413 when Ferdinand I of Spain recognized its powers and legal standing. The subsequent history of the *Generalitat* (1413-1977) is too lengthy to be recounted in any detail here. Suffice it to say that, over the centuries since its establishment, its power waxed and waned, and it was often a corrupted, coopted and non-representative body. It ceased to exist for long periods of time. In fact, a (Castillian) Spanish textbook describes political control under the combined Aragon crown this way:

> Aragon had the most repressive system of nobility in the [Iberian]

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[68]In fact, the facade of the same building that housed the old *Diputació* in 1365 still serves as the eastern facade of today's *Generalitat* in Barcelona. The *Generalitat* claims that this Gothic palace is the only one that has continually housed a government in Europe, and the oldest government building that still houses the same type of government for which it was originially built (Pagès i Rejsek, 29).

which was admired throughout Europe" (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 38). The second incident was similar treatment under General Franco from 1940-1977. Franco further inflamed Catalan resentment by cooperating with German agents in the capture of the elected President of the *Generalitat*, Lluís Companys (who was in exile in France), and then his execution in 1940 by court-martial. Clearly, Franco's vision for a "unified" Spain was far different than that of the Catalan nationalists, but it is one that still enjoys some currency today in the democratization literature–the need for a "one size fits all" model of governance (political-social-economic affairs). Of course, the insults suffered under Franco are much fresher in the memories of Catalan nationalists and ordinary citizens than those suffered under Philip V, but a vague impression of long-term and systematic oppression of Cataluña by the central Spanish state is widely shared in the region.

Section 3: Regional Elites in Cataluña Since the Transition

Cataluña is alone among the regions in having just one significant head of regional government since the transition from authoritarianism on the death of Franco, Jordi Pujol.[69] Pujol was a militant at an early age under Franco, in both Christian and nationalist causes. He was imprisoned by the Franco regime for his oppositional activities. Ironically, however, this imprisonment gave him far more credibility as an "authentic" leader than he would have otherwise enjoyed. Soon after his release from prison, in 1974, he founded the Catalan Democratic Convergence party (CDC), and

[69]Technically, there was a "trustee" President of the *Generalitat* from 1977 to 1980, Joseph Tarradellas, who had been President of the same body during the 38 years of its "exile" under Franco (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 50).

was elected to the Spanish national parliament (the *Cortes*) in 1977 under his party's banner. In 1980, the CDC entered into coalition with the Democratic Union of Catalunya (UDC) and won the status of the majority in the first elections for the *Generalitat*, and according to parliamentary practice, the membership of this majority coalition in the *Generalitat* elected him as President of the *Generalitat* on April 10, 1980.[70] Pujol is now in his fifth term of office after winning re-election by absolute majority in 1984,1988 and 1992, and by simple majority in 1995 (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 70). He has announced his decision to step down in 2003 (Company 2002), and has already named his desired "successor."

Catalan regional elites in the early transition

In the years before the death of Franco, many of today's Catalan political elites were heavily involved in anti-Franco struggles *throughout* Spain wherever the opportunity best presented itself. One such turning point and time were the "Burgos trials" held in the early seventies against suspected members of the Basque liberation front, the ETA. Although most of the Catalan elites who participated in the struggle in 1971 now believe that ETA has become a terrorist organization, at that time it was a rare outlet to channel anti-Franco "anti-fascist" resistence that might (and did) receive international attention. One such Catalan elite with whom I conducted a personal interview was Rafael Ribó, head of both the ERC party (Left Republican Party of Catalunya) and the Catalan Initiative (IC). I shall quote it at some length because it

[70]The two parties later formally merged into the Convergence and Unity party of Catalunya, or the CiU.

captures both the times and provides an "insider's view" of it:

> I became involved in the so-called "intellectual assembly of Cataluña" [in 1971] which was founded against the trial in Burgos of the ETA members. Remember that in Franco's time, ETA was another thing [than it is now], and we were backing the ETA, asking that there not be a death penalty sentence in Burgos. [T]here were 6,000 people involved in the international movement there... (Ribó 1998).

After the Burgos trials were over, however, the movement that it had started lived on because the leaders who were there went back to their regions and created organizations and fora for resistance. The anti-Franco movement became institutionalized at the *regional* level, as Ribó explains:

> This [movement] became the Assembly of Cataluña, which I was involved in for four years [underground]– we were gathering in churches... because the [Catholic] Church was offering us protection, in the monasteries as well as the churches, and I was nominated by the Assembly to be the Secretary of the so-called "Relations Committee" which was formed by the already important leaders and personalities of the clandestine community, leaders like Josep Bennet, that was in charge of relations with the other democratic platforms [throughout] Spain. These were not legal platforms, like the one presided over by Felipe Gonzáles in Madrid, the *plaza junta* (?) or *General Caban*; this meant that we were traveling a lot to Spain to meet with all of these anti-Franco platforms... (Ribó 1998).

Regional elites in Catalonia then focused on formalizing their opposition to Franco through (usually leftist) political parties so as to broaden the appeal of the message throughout Catalan society. Again, we follow the tale through the personal story of Professor Ribó:

> After 1974, I decided to enter into the SUC [United Socialists of Catalunya], the Catalan branch of the Socialist Party allied with the Communist Party [recounts history of the SUC since its creation in 1936]... but in the 70's it regained its character as being a unified party rather than as a [ideologically] communist party because of the fight

> against Franco. You can see this if you look at its [diversified] membership, like Alberto Frei, famous architect, or Josep Pique, current Minister of Industry [now Foreign Minister in 2002] in the Aznar government; very different people were in the SUC then... So in synthesis, you see that it was not any special talents on my part, but the unusual times in which I was involved (Ribó 1998).

After the death of Franco, the political focus of most regional elites lay in obtaining legal recognition for the region (especially its political and economic systems) enshrined in any post-transitional pacts or the proposed new constitution. The first democratic elections for legislative seats to be held in Spain after the death of Franco were held on July 15, 1977. Every Catalan party that won legislative seats in the Spanish national parliament promised (in their party's electoral platform) to obtain legal recognition for Cataluña, the return of the *Generalitat* as its primary governing institution, and the return and recognition of the Catalan President elected in exile, Josep Tarradellas. There were mass demonstrations in Barcelona on September 11, 1977, the "national" holiday of Cataluña, for the same goals, a demonstration that was estimated at over one million, one of the largest ever in European history (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 48-51).

The story of how Catalan elites managed to obtain all of these goals vis-à-vis the central Spanish state has been told elsewhere, especially in the intense negotiations known as the "Pacts of Moncloa" (for the Prime Minister's residence in Madrid where they took place) and the negotiations surrounding the writing of the new constitution (see especially Heywood 1995; Maravall and Santamaría 1986:1). Their basic goals were achieved in fairly rapid succession: drafting of the autonomy statute (Statute de

Sau) in 1977, recognition of Catalunña's "historic status" in the Spanish Constitution, which was sanctioned by the King in December 1978, and finally, sanction of the autonomy statute by the Cortes, the Catalan people and the King by December 1979.[71]

Even with the higher level of economic development that the region of *Cataluña* has enjoyed vis-à-vis the rest of Spain, the early post-transitional period was marked by severe economic crisis in the region, and labor-management clashes (Pujol 1998). Part of the reason was the general economic problems facing Spain and much of Europe during the time period, but an alternative explanation is the lingering labor radicalism that typified the region from a previous generation that could now resurface after the death of Franco.

Much has been written in the democratization literature about the importance of "pacting" and "concertation," much of it based upon the successful Spanish state-level pacting in Madrid after the death of Franco, as noted above in chapter one (see also Bermeo 1994 and di Palma 1990). However, "pacting" in Cataluña under Pujol took on a different character. There pacting was used not as an incomes policy, or as a grand social design in itself, but rather as a narrow framework to buy social peace and allow him maximum latitude in which to pursue his larger vision of a unified *Cataluña* within Spain. Without social peace, all of his other goals would be in jeopardy, including the survival of democracy itself in the region. Seen from this perspective,

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[71]The Statute de Sau states in its preamble that it is "the expression of the collective identity of Catalonia and defines its institutions and relations with the State within a framework of free solidarity with the other nationalities and regions...." and that, the Generalitat is "the institution around which the self-government of Catalunya is politically organized" (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 51).

Pujol's pacting in the early 1980's in *Cataluña* was a success.

In the early 1980's, Pujol and his party faced the difficult problem of a "dual" transition: economic, as well as political reform, as this noted by the head of the "peak" business association, Joan Pujol (no relation to President Jordi Pujol):

> The early 1980's, the period of the political transition, were a difficult, complicated period economically [in the region]. It was a hard change. I think that it was a problem due to the difficulty of the adjustment here [in Cataluña]. Many of the labor unions were strongly linked to the old Communist Party of Spain–especially the CC.OO.--and the far left. The UGT was strongly socialistic. On the other hand, the old regime had absolute control of both the political and economic systems. It was a time of both very high inflation and unemployment which lead to more conflict. It was a very bad climate, no? In those years, the early 80's, the government produced two social accords between the two [main] labor unions and the business-owners. They really lessened the social tension. This was a very successful process from the point of view of reducing conflicts for that time period (Joan Pujol 1998).

Other political observers, from the left of the spectrum, concur that Pujol had "firm control" of the political process by the early 1980's. but one in which voices from the left were effectively stifled, breeding some long-term resentment. One veteran politician and professor observed that the Socialists actually had the most seats in Cataluña (a plurality), so that Pujol had to cobble together an electoral coalition in order to govern. He is described as having "as little interchange as possible" with other Catalan elites during this time period (Molas 1998). In addition, leftists criticize the pacts for being too narrowly focused and lacking a grand political design, but it appears that Pujol preferred this type of pact in order to maximize his room for maneuver.

According to the leader of the business "peak" association (FMT), the most

important of all of the tri-partite accords in Cataluña was the 1993 accord. It created, among other things, the Catalan Labor Tribunal (*Tribunal Laboral de Cataluña*) to arbitrate and resolve all Labor-Capital disputes that might arise in the region. It was important to institutionalize an impartial arbitration body, because the labor unions often felt persecuted or at a disadvantage vis-á-vis business owners; it has met "with great success" (Joan Pujol 1998).

Pujol was fortunate that the left had fragmented in the early 1980's, thus reducing their ability to stonewall in the pacting process. The far left, represented by the PSUC (United Socialist Party of Catalonia) had experiencing the most precipitous fall, from 18 percent to 4 percent in the 1982 elections, just above the minimum threshold for the right to hold legislative seats (Ribó 1998). In the 1986 election, the far splintered even further, causing it to go below the minimum threshold, and thus losing all seats. Part of the collapse of the left in the region can be blamed upon the general crisis of orthodox "Euro" communism during this time period, but Pujol's ability to capture both the left and right with his cross-cutting, nationalist/moderate electoral strategy contributed further to the collapse. For example, Pujol's major initiative of the late 1990's, the "ley de Catalan," or Catalan Law, appeals to both the Old Right and the New Left, as my elite interviewees of various ideological/party identification indicated. As one interviewee said,

> [W]e are not for the old nationalism that just helped to hide social inequalities, but we [Catalans] are quite far from equality [with the Castillians]; that's why we [the United Left Party] are backing any democratic measures [like the "Catalan Law"] that would help Catalan [language, media and culture] exist at the same level as Spanish

[language, media and culture] (Ribó 1998).

The essence of any democratic process is the willingness to compromise on all both the most fundamental rules of the game itself; those towards the extremes on both sides of the spectrum are likely to be disappointed with the results of compromise.

By the mid to late 1980's, however, the pacting process had served its purpose of solving the "social crisis" by helping to buy social peace, and generally promoting moderation. By this time, both the right and left in Cataluña had grown disenchanted with the process. Despite the success of Pujol's pacting for social peace, the leader of the largest business alliance in Cataluña found the process to be increasingly inefficient from his perspective:

> The FNT [Catalan National Work Creation Chamber] has participated in the pacts. They were important in the eighties. But the FNT does not have much confidence in these kinds of agreements. Because, in reality, they are conducted now *solely* for the benefit of the government. We preferred bipartite, direct relations between business and labor. The government tried to control the whole process for political goals, not for the good of business and labor. It is not a good mechanism. It's a holdover from corporatism (Joan Pujol 1998).

The Catholic Church has been another important actor in Spanish politics, and especially during the early transition period, when most Roman Catholic clergy reversed the historic support that the Church had given from roughly the Civil War until the late 1960's (after Vatican II) to Franco's vision of "organic" church-state unity. Instead, the newer clergy played a fomenting role similar to that played by the church in Eastern Europe during the fall of Communism there–providing safe havens, encouragement and organizational expertise to anti-Franco elements. Because of this

experience during the transition, many Catholic clergy became leftist in their political outlook, and they had a strained relationship with Pujol, whom they perceived as being rightist. However, even a critic of Pujol, like the well-known Catholic priest, José Ignacio Faus, stated that, during the transition phase, Cataluña has had good "luck" in its leadership because Pujol is "very pragmatic," and his nationalist program "has been a blessing" for increasing a sense of collectivity, or "agglutinization." On the other hand, however, Father Ignacio states that Pujol's "time is passing because he has a very poor social sense...there is another Cataluña of the poor, and immigrants, but Pujol ignores them" (Ignacio Faus 1998; translated by the author).

Catalan Regional Elites in the Consolidation Period

Pujol has been a tireless champion of his vision of a free, semi-autonomous and democratic Cataluña that, while anchored in Spain, has its own "presence in the world" outside of, and apart from, the rest of Spain.[72] Typical of his overall vision was a speech that he delivered at the London School of Economics on May 8, 1996 entitled, "Two Nations, One State." In this speech, he continually stresses that Catalan history is equal to, and, in some ways, superior to that of "Castille," or central Spain:

In reality, in southern Europe before the 20th century, the names of

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[72]In fact, his many speeches have been collected and published by *Generalitat* in a thick, 30-volume series, that correspond with his 32 years as head of the Catalan government. In addition, every year the *Generalitat* publishes a slick, 500 pp.+ compendium of Catalan contacts and resources around the world entitled *Presència catalana en el món* [Catalonian Presence in the World].

> [only] two countries [can be] mentioned as having undergone the Industrial Revolution: Catalunya and Lombardy. All of the rest of southern Europe did not achieve this until much later. And when one speaks of southern Europe, it is in reference to south of a line between Paris, Lió and the southern Alps. Probably, [this] is caused by the fact that Llombardy and Catalunya have two different personalities with respect to Italy and Spain, respectively. Lombardy, because it belonged to the Austrian Empire, and, therefore, is a country very connected both to the mentality, the manner of thinking, and the political, social and economic tendencies of central Europe. And, we [in Cataluña], as a result of the totality of our history that I have already briefly explained, we have had a different personality, and, therefore, a different social and economic structure than the rest of Spain.... [W]e have a strong civil society, different from the rest of Spain (Pujol 1997, 85-86).

Pujol, however, is not content to merely set the historical record straight and to foster recognition of Cataluña's impressive past achievements. He was always future-oriented, or, in a word, visionary. Later, in this same speech, Pujol, in very strong language, lays out his vision of the connection between Catalan national symbols–culture, language, institutions–and Cataluña's future in terms of continued political and economic progress:

> This economic and demographic recuperation of Catalunya is going to be followed by a recuperation of the language. Our language has been in an extremely difficult situation. There is going to be also an authentic recuperation of the culture, and, later, a political *revindication* of our identity, and a recuperation of the idea that Spain is not strictly a unity from the point of view of the language, the culture, the history the manner of thinking, the mentality, etc., but [rather] a union of these parts, one of which is going to be Catalunya (Pujol 1997, 87; emphasis added).

Section 4: The Relationship Between Political Elites and Sub-Administration

Since Cataluña is one of the most economically-developed of all the regions of Spain, it has the greatest need for complex public administration. Accordingly, Cataluña has one of the largest public sectors of all the regions, employing about 35,000 civil servants, and has an annual budget of Pt 1,500,000,000 (@ $10,000,000) to serve a population of slightly over 6,000,000 (Matas 1995, 3). Compare this with the much larger population of Andalucía in chapter 4, a region with a smaller overall budget. However, it is surprising that *Cataluña* has one of the most "politicized" regional governments of all the regions (Matas 1995). Explanations for this counter-intuitive finding are explored below.

Formally, the Catalan system of public administration is patterned after the British "Whitehall" model, with the top posts being political appointees, and sub-ranks being staffed by nominally professional (career) administrators. The top ministers are designated as Ministers and their role is to oversee a vast bureaucracy of specialists. They are nominally in charge of fifteen "departments." However, the top administrators (i.e. those in charge of day-to-day administration of the departments) are the Secretaries-General (Pagès i Rejek 1996, 130ff). Unlike other regional administrations, the Catalan system adds another layer of managers, the "Directors-General," who are also appointed by the government at the request of a Minister (Matas 1995, 18). The thinking behind this additional layer is that public administration can be made more efficient by allowing specialized managers to be in direct control of their area of expertise. However, in practice it has proven to be another political tool for the President and other top regional executives to exercise

more effective political control by allowing an "end run" around other public administrators directly into the desired area of the bureaucracy.

Section Five: Analysis of Elite Behavior and Strategy in Cataluña

Building a power base. Even visionary political leaders must first get elected, and then re-elected, if they wish to see their overarching ideas put into action, into specific policy. In order to get elected, they must appeal to more than a narrow constituency, and once elected, they must, especially in a parliamentary system, be able to operate with the assistance of supportive legislators, administrators and fellow elites. In short, they must construct power bases both inside and outside of the government. Even in regions with strong social capital will not automatically support a visionary leader.

Electoral strategies.

To appreciate the electoral success of Pujol and his CiU party, one should recall two salient facts about the recent history of Cataluña: first, that it was the hotbed of far leftist (anarcho-syndicalist) extremism in Spain during much of the twentieth century (muted, of course, under Franco), and secondly, that separatist pressures (from the rest of Spain) were very strong in the immediate post-Franco era. In this section, we shall consider *E(s,b)* mentioned above; i.e. how did Pujol build his power base(s)? In order to win significant elective office in the region, he had to appeal to two widely divergent mass constituencies simultaneously, the far left and right. In the late 1970's, the Catalan electorate was anything but the classic Downsian (1959) "normal"

distribution; rather it was strongly bi-modal. Pujol's blend of Catalan nationalism working *within* the Spanish state[73], Europeanism, globalism and pro-business stands artfully crossed this seemingly impossible electoral chasm. This is how one veteran Catalan politician and political analyst described it:

> Pujol never proposed a Catalan state, but rather a Christian-Democratic, Catholic version... he doesn't want to raise a front against Spain, but rather, he wants to elaborate on his own model of development as a modern, progressive state; he accepts the reality of Spain. True Catalan nationalists are very few in Pujol's government; his is not really a nationalist government. Pujol has put together a government of the center that distinguishes between a "Catalinist" and a nationalist (Molas 1998).

In the immediate post-Franco era, Pujol had the crucial advantage of being seen as an "transformational" leader (Burns 1973; 1978) in Cataluña (but not, of course, in the rest of Spain). Pujol obtained the status of an "transformational" Catalan leader due to his championing Catalan causes during the Franco regime, and going to jail for his political beliefs. However, such status did not guarantee that his tenure as President would long continue, especially as a new generation of post-Franco voters came of age. As he notes in his speeches, the "demographics" of Cataluña were constantly changing, meaning that many immigrants had flooded the region looking for jobs and economic opportunity. Electorally, this presented a formidable challenge because many of the immigrants tended to bring their old political affiliations with them; Socialists from the South, Conservatives from other parts of Spain.

One of the strategies that Pujol and the CiU successfully employed was to

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[73]Please see Pujol's artful construction in the "One State, Two Nations" speech cited above.

break up the large voting blocs of immigrants by re-vitalizing the old *comarque* (i.e. "county") system that, while they followed natural geographical boundaries, tended to cross-cut and dilute opponents' voting strength. The official justification in documents produced by the Office of the Presidency was that the *comarques* would be "facilitate the principles of efficiency, decentralization and participation in the provision of public services" (Pagès i Rejsek 1996, 148).

As we saw in the case of Galicia, nationalism is a useful electoral strategy as well, because it cross-cuts the typical left-right political spectrum, incorporating and appealing to elements of both the right and the left. The nationalist electoral strategy appeals to the traditional Catalan's desire to "return" to the glory days of Cataluña's past, to recapture lost symbols of the nation, but it also appeals to the left's desire for change, to follow one's own destiny, for autonomy from the central state. Business interests, while usually allied with conservative interests in the United States, tend to be slightly left of center in most European political systems because of the history of statism in most European countries. The head of the largest "peak" confederation of business owners in Cataluña, FTN (Catalan National Labor Promotion), had this to say about Jordi Pujol's personal and political ideology:

> The government of Pujol is very broad-based; it is really a coalition of parties. Pujol is very long-lived. We have a collaboration with Pujol because his personal philosophy is very close to business, although he has a popular global vision (Joan Pujol 1998).

As this quotation points out, Pujol's "global vision" and turn towards Europe were also popular electoral strategies, for at least two reasons. First, following classic

Machiavellian advice in the *Prince*, a leader who is experiencing domestic dissension can promote unity at home by seeking wealth and new benefits for his citizenry abroad. In this case, the EU seemed to offer that hopeful future. Secondly, given Catalan history, such concrete links with Europe were seen as legitimate and desirable by a majority of the population. Europe was seen as a reliable lifeline for Cataluña, in case something were to happen again in the rest of Spain, tight economic and political ties with the rest of the Continent would help keep the region secure and prosperous. Of all the regions, Cataluña had the longest history of extra-Spanish links with other European nations; therefore, such renewed economic and political ties only seem natural today. One well-known democratic opposition leader explained the attraction and utility of European links this way:

> Europe is important to us because it is a reality...not only in economic links, but also social, political and cultural ones as well. Europe is kind of a democratic goal for us. For democratic Cataluña, within Europe, it is an easier framework to get the recognition of our personality and collective political unity; call it a "nation," or a "special autonomous community"–I do not care about the name (Ribó 1998).

Creating Bridging Social Capital

In a transitional setting, how does one (re)-create flourishing, vibrant associational life? Can civil society be "created" at all, or does it have to gradually evolve out of hundreds of years of preparatory, incremental growth? According to the now-dominant understanding of Putnam et al., the latter understanding is the correct one, and there has been little attempt to look at "prime movers" of civil society; instead it has been thought to be sufficient to count or document the epi-phenomena of

civil society–e.g. the number of cooperatives, voter turnout, mutual aid societies, mass party membership, etc. (Putnam 1993, 149). If a region (or country) was so fortunate to have a large number of these civic (technically non-political) associations in a critical period (about 75-130 years ago), then it will most likely have not only a vibrant civil society today, but also a thriving economy as well.

Although the same kind of comprehensive statistical work that has been done for Italy does not yet exist for regions of Spain, Cataluña is clearly the case that comes closest to the Putnam ideal type for civil/civic society both then (1860-1920) and now. That is why it was stated at the outset that it is a "most likely" case to confirm his hypotheses. Cataluña has a very large number of civic associations, many of them centered around sports, labor, management and culture. The official Catalan guide, *The Catalan Presence in the World*, lists 107 recognized "non-governmental" associations/groups in a recent issue (*Generalitat* 1998); and these are just the Catalan NGO's that have some international component as well.

Therefore, the question remains, how did Cataluña move from the immediate post-Franco period, when suspicion ran rife and associational life was in shambles, to today's thriving civil society, in the space of a short 20 years? Did Franco merely represent a "deep freeze" for Catalan civil society that would be naturally restored once he had passed from the scene?

The electoral breakdown in the 1977 elections provides a critical clue: Catalans were badly divided, and unsure about the future of their region; i.e. the distribution of the Catalan electorate was strongly bi-modal. Part of this schism is

explained by 20th-century Catalan history in which "anarcho-syndicalism" was so prevalent.

It is at this critical juncture that Pujol emerges. Through the articulation of a democratic, capitalistic, semi-autonomous region that will continue to improve itself through direct links with Europe and the world, use of pacts, and increasing stress on national symbols, he was able to bridge the social cleavages that threatened not only stability within the region, but the viability of a fragile democratic regime itself within Cataluña, and perhaps in Spain as a whole.

Section Six: Towards the "Regional Visionary Political Leadership" Model

Below, I shall construct a new typology of the "visionary" political leadership style that may be generalizable, and useful in similar cases. It should be useful to compare and contrast this new model with existing ones in the literature.

	Model title	Character-istic	Social setting	Elite Strategies	Elite behaviors
Burns	Transforming	Achieves a higher level of performance in a society	conflictual, but some lines of mutual communica-tion exist between leaders and followers	Seek out the motives and "higher needs" of followers; Use power base as mutually enforcing	Engage the "full person" of the follower
Dror	VPL (Visionary Political Leadership)	Leads society past crises	conflictual	Lifetime training in political arts	Participate in structured, ritualistic settings

Wildavsky	Meteoric	Limited terms of office based on "contract"; the right person at the right place at the right time for the right purpose	Free market; individualism and equity	Use of coalitions to achieve immediate goals	Constantly shift alliances as necessary; nimbleness; avoid imbalances of power (threatens "contract")
Van Doorn	Regional Visionary Leadership	Bridges societal cleavages through articulation of broad, yet moderate, vision of future political order; leaves daily administration to others	Transitional, and conflictual, but not revolutionary; strong traditional of representative institutions and symbols to draw upon	(1) Uses the "voice" option to provide stability for vision; (2) Electoral: populism and/or nationalism; (3) Run against and bypass the "center"; (4) use international links to foster vision and bypass center	(1) consistently articulates a vision of a stable, united society; use of short-term devices like "pacts" to create stability (2) appeals to potent, but generic common symbols; (3) castigate the "other," but in a controlled fashion; (4) create/ exploit direct international links with states and IGO's

Implications and Limits of the Model

In regions with a long history of high social capital and representative institutions, charismatic or authoritarian leadership styles simply will not work with the underlying political-institutional matrix during a transition back to democracy. However, evidence from the Catalan case does not support Wildavsky's contention that leadership in "market" regimes will be necessarily "meteoric"–i.e. intense and short-lived.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

Section I: Key Factual Findings

This study has undertaken to perform a historical evaluation of the role of regional elites–both public and private sector– played in facilitating democratization in their region during the transitional period in Spain, 1975-early 1990's. The evidence gleaned from three cases gives some factual support to the general proposition that the strategies and behaviors of regional elites do affect levels of democratic stability, social capital, and ultimately democratic consolidation in their region.

CHART ONE: Overview of Regional Democratic Stability and Democratic Consolidation

	Democratic Stability	Democ. Consolidation
Andalusia	Medium	High
Catalonia	High	High
Galicia	High	Low

The regional variations in the chart above need explanation. Democratic stability was slightly lower in Andalusia than the other two regions because of the more frequent recourse to strikes. However, as noted below, conflict itself does not lead to lack of a consolidated regime; indeed it may be an important indicator of a more robust democratic system (cf. Putnam 1993). In Galicia, the difference between democratic stability and democratic consolidation is highlighted; democratic stability

nationalism to help increase democratic stability, bridging social capital and a sense of local autonomy. In all three cases, nationalism was used by regional elites to argue for a special "historic" status in the post-Franco Spanish Constitution, which, in turn, granted an extraordinary degree of autonomy to regional government during the early transition stage when political practices were being first established. In addition, appeals to regional nationalism are an explicit part of the electoral program of each of the three ruling parties, or, in the case of Galicia, has been coopted somewhat into the P.P. platform.

The fourth pattern that emerged was in policymaking: tailoring policy to address region-specific problems which would serve two purposes: add to the legitimacy of the regional government, and solve specific problems associated with the democratic transition in that region. This pattern is seen most strongly in Andalusia, less so in Catalonia and Galicia. In the next section, the specific behaviors and strategies of the three sets of regional elites will be compared and contrasted.

Section II: Comparison and Contrast of R.E.L. Across 3 cases

Building upon the key factual findings listed above, it is now possible to undertake a systematic comparison of regional elite leadership across the three regions included in this study. Each of the three patterns identified in the previous section can be characterized as a simple ordinal level of activity, *viz.*, low, medium or high. A fairly high degree of regional variation on this ordinal scale is observed for each pattern of activity, as detailed in the chart below. Taken together, variations in the

patterns identified help explain relative success and failure in each region at promoting democratic stability, social capital and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.

CHART: Comparison of patterns of regional elite leadership styles

	Andalusia	Catalonia	Galicia
Pattern 1 (structuring political dissent)	Medium, use of mobilization of labor base in party (P.S.A.) to "channel" protest into mass demonstrations	High, through use of already existing "peak" organizations and pacting for social peace	Low; elites continue "divided and conquer" strategy by making pacts with already existing power-brokers
Pattern 2 (Intermediation)	High during period 1980-1997 due to connections with ruling national party; medium, 1997-present	High, due to personal prestige of Pujol and the power in his regional party, the CiU in the national legislature; e.g. secured approval of the "Catalan Law"	Low during period 1977-1990; high in Fraga era, 1990-present due to connections with ruling national party
Pattern 3 (moderate nationalism)	Medium, 1977-1980; low and muted since	High and explicit	Initially high; now coopted and moderate
Pattern 4 (region-specific policymaking)	High; e.g. IPIA	High, but left to large cadre of professional bureaucrats	Moderate; mostly in form of direct aid from EU and others.

Next, pattern three (the use of nationalism as a strategy for developing regional autonomy) will be examined in more detail. Electoral data showing the relative voting strength of regional parties in each of the three regions, plus the Basque Country and *Castilla-La Mancha*, is a useful baseline for comparison.

consolidation phase; e.g. in gaining recognition in the Spanish constitution, to wrest more concessions and benefits from the central state than "normal" regions enjoy.

Despite being strongly implanted in Catalonia, a center-right version of nationalism under Pujol managed to diffuse center-periphery tensions between the region and Madrid, and to build bridging social capital between radicalized labor and conservative business elites.

Nationalism in Galicia plays a more ambivalent role. There it has been a radical leftist version, seeking outright independence from Spain (the "exit" option), and to use nationalism as a separatist development strategy. At least logically, this political program could conceivably help build social capital in the region, but at a terrible cost–making the overall Spanish state weaker, and in all likelihood, making the region of Galicia economically unviable as an independent political unit. This version of nationalism, however, has been firmly rejected by the voters, forcing the leading nationalist party, the BNG to moderate into a more electorally viable "catch-all" center-left nationalist party, where it is the fastest-growing political force in the region today. Nationalism in Galicia may yet play an important role in building social capital there.

Section III. Limitations

In light of the strong evidence of patterns that emerge from the case studies, limitations, nonetheless exist. The primary limitation of the study is the classic "small-*n*" problem (a small number of cases from which to draw conclusions) that, in a strict interpretation of "the logic of social inquiry" would limit the generalizability of

them to boost their own legitimacy and regional pride. In fact, the President of the *Junta*, Manuel Chaves, marched at the head of one of the larger demonstrations that day, and used his participation to pointedly note his disagreement with the Spanish central state. This finding is in accord with Putnam's (1993) theoretical finding that there is "no correlation between conflict and the civic community" (p. 117).

Recall that social capital is defined as those dense networks of voluntary civic associations which help build mutual trust and tolerance among citizens. A high level of social capital is desirable, according to Putnam (1993, 2000) because it is positively correlated with better indicators of public health, and even the democratic regime itself.

The case studies demonstrated three concrete strategies that resulted in greater democratic stability, and social capital, although the latter concept is more difficult to measure:

1. Through the construction of formal, region-specific institutions (e.g. the Andalusian Institute for Promotion of Industry),
2. A series of regional pacts between "peak" representatives of labor and business elites, coordinated by the Catalan regional government that resulted in social peace during an especially tense time between radicalized labor union members and business elites,
3. Use of moderate nationalism, that specifically eschews the "exit" option, in both Catalonia and Andalucia to build bridging social capital across the region.

Section Four: Thematic Summary

Region	Sequencing	Leader-follower "fit"
Andalusia	High	First high, then medium Optimal type: charismatic communitarian
Catalonia	High	High Optimal type: pragmatic visionary
Galicia	Low; out of sequence	First low, then high Optimal type: authoritarian transformational

As Linz and Stepan (1996) found in their thorough re-examination of Spanish democratization, *timing*, or "sequencing," proved to be critical in explaining the relative success in achieving democratic consolidation in each case. A second theme that emerged was the importance of a good "fit" between regional elites and followers (the voting public).

Each region needed a different type of sequencing and a different type of elite-mass fit. During the transition, the first phase of democratization, Andalusia needed–and had–a "charismatic communitarian" leader in the person of Rafael Escuredo. In other words, they needed a leader during the transition who would:

1. Help bridge historic gaps between communities, the basis of political life in Andalusia.
2. Articulate a moderate Andalusian "nationalist" identity that could overcome sharp cleavages between east and west Andalusia, highlands and lowlands.

3. Argue in national fora that such an common Andalusian identity did exist and warranted special recognition in the new post-Franco constitution, which he did achieve. He then pushed for, and achieved, a referendum in Andalusia ratifying this decision.

4. Help build regional state capacity. Not only Escuredo, but also President of the Parliament, Torres Vela, and the majority Andalusian Socialist Party in Parliament, recognized that a key to democratic stability was to increase the capacity of the state to administer programs that would be necessary for political and economic development of the region. Here, these leaders specifically learned from American Political Science and economics. They reversed a trend among leftist oppositional elites in the late Franco period who believed, for ideological reasons, that the state was the problem because it was a tool of the ruling classes.

5. Most importantly, a leader who understood that creating institutions that would help achieve democratic stability. Escuredo called this his *planificación democrática* ("democratic plan"), and the goal was not only to increase economic output dramatically (which it did), but also to build *bridging* social capital by increasing cross-regional communication between communities and large and small businesses in a way that had never been done before. The Andalusian Institute for the Promotion of Industry (IPIA) was the most visible manifestation of this plan. He understood that the key to economic success in Andalusia was political restructuring. However, he undertook such bold

initiatives at some personal political risk; he alienated traditional power holders, such as the Confederation of Andalusian Employers (CEA) who claimed to have the sole right as a "peak" organization, to represent the interests of *all* business owners, large and small. Escuredo's political initiatives may have played a part in his premature departure from Andalusian politics.

By the time that President Escuredo departed Andalusian politics in the early 1980's, the fundamental needs of the transition in Andalusia had been met, and he had paved the way for more "normal" democratic leaders, like the current President, Manuel Chaves. The importance of sequencing in the case of Andalusia gives support to other theories of leadership, such as Skrownek's ideas about "political time" in American Presidential succession. Escuredo was a colorful character, personally appealing and charismatic, who proved to be a good fit with the Andalusian public.

In Catalonia, much of the necessary institutional structure for a successful democratic transition was already in place due to its long prior history with representative government, as detailed in chapter five. However, radicalism among labor elites and lingering bitter anti-Castillian sentiments among the Catalan populace threatening democratic stability in that region. What was needed was a leader of authenticity and vision who could:

1. Articulate a new, pragmatic vision of the role of Catalonia in the world, not just as a subordinate part of Spain, so as to quench credible talk of the "exit" option (i.e. secession from Spain), and to pull together a society cleaved around

ideology (left vs. right), and workplace ownership issues.

2. Use existing social institutions, like the pacting process, to help achieve the social peace necessary for democratic stability in the early transitional phase.

3. Address the powerful force of Catalan nationalism (see chart on nationalist voting patterns) in a way that would satisfy the need for celebration of Catalan culture, language and symbols without coming into direct conflict with the central Spanish state. Even more so than the Andalusian case, Catalan elites were the first to recognize the importance of "historic status" in the 1978 Spanish-state constitution. Despite his unceasing advocacy of the "Catalan Law, Pujol was a moderate nationalist (to the frustration of his more radical peers) who always prized democratic stability even above Catalan nationalism.

4. Be a tireless promoter of Catalan business and political interests in the European Union and in the world at large.

5. Serve as a power broker in Spanish national politics behind the scenes, securing additional benefits and recognition of Catalonia's special status without directly becoming involved in political conflict at the Spanish state level.

The government of Jordi Pujol has been able to bring about the goals in each of these areas; his extraordinarily long tenure has provided Catalonia the stability that was its greatest need. In contrast to Andalusia, however, Pujol was not very involved in institution-building, or in the daily management of government affairs. He has been criticized by other Catalan elites as being too aloof. Clearly his mandate has now

expired, and his is voluntarily stepping aside to make room for another "ordinary" leader in 2003, Arturo Mas. Again, the sequencing was optimal. The fit was also very good. Catalans perceive themselves to be the most hard-working, no-nonsense business-oriented region in Spain. Therefore, they want leaders who are pragmatic, and not flamboyant. Pujol also answered the need for a head of state figure who appeared above day-to-day politics, although they admired his tenacity and principled stands on key issues.

Galicia is the exceptional case that helps demonstrate the importance of sequencing and leadership fit in regional leadership, if only in their absence. During the transition, the need for authoritarian transformational leadership was great, but did not exist. Such leadership would use its authenticity with the public to bring about much needed changes in order to achieve long-term democratic stability, overcome a classic low social capital equilibrium and consolidate democracy. Among other problems, regional elites during the transition:

1. Showed a disconnection with the Galician public, which lead to intra-elite struggle, party fractionation, and the lowest rates of voter turnout in Spain.
2. Had a sequencing problem. The least experienced and least able leaders were nominated by poorly organized parties.
3. They failed to create institutions that would bridge historical cleavages and break up the customary dominance of the *caciques*. In short, they achieved a kind of undesirable short-term democratic stability that short-circuited the potential for building bridging social capital. Today, the problem of a low

social capital equilibrium remains.

4. Showed a lack of fit between the Galician electorate and leadership style in the early 1980's, but a very good fit in the 1990's.

5. Despite the goodness of fit, the government of Fraga has largely failed to use its authenticity with the public to achieve a long-term democratic stability based upon heightened participation. Instead, he has made the customary intra-elite pacts that keep the old *poderes facticos* and *caciques* dominate in local and provincial politics in exchange for his unchallenged pre-eminence in regional politics. In addition, he has used windfall funds from the EU to heighten his popularity through direct payments to Galician individuals and firms, again failing to build long-term institutions that would better serve democratic stability.

Section V: Heuristic Suggestions for Further Research

Applications for future research could focus much more on efforts to build bridging social capital at the regional level. Social capital could be treated in future studies as a dependent variable, and not just an independent or intervening variable.

Regions and regional elite politics could be treated as less of a "problem" (Linz and Stepan 1996) in the literature than as an appropriate level and unit of analysis to understand the building blocks of democratic consolidation and the trend towards devolution in many democratic states.

The overall conclusions are basic: that regions of Spain could serve as a model

for democratization for other societies and countries that are fragmented by pronounced cleavages, such as regional, ethnic, economic, linguistic and "national" divisions. One cannot help but think of the many "failed states" in the Global South today, beset by "warlordism" and not attempt to apply some of the lessons and observations from these Spanish cases. The cases supports the observation that regional elite leadership style can affect the level of democratic stability within different parts of a divided country, such as in this examples. Therefore, U.S. policymakers should not ignore regional politics as they consider "nation-building" plans. As I frankly acknowledged above in the "limitations" section, many caveats would apply, but if the analyst ignores important regional differences and the needs of the mass "clients" in each area of the country, one's prescriptions for democracy are likely doomed to failure. That just such an overdue assessment is now underway is evidenced by the article, "In Failed States, Can Democracy Come Too Soon?" (Massing 2002). Looked at far more closely than the early democratization literature did, it becomes obvious that merely conducting and concluding national pacts and holding national elections is not enough to consolidate democracy. On the other hand, we should not be completely pessimistic about the further spread of democracy beyond areas that already have a "thousand-year" experience with it (Putnam 1993), or whose "culture" is supposedly anti-democratic (Wiarda 1989). A return to authoritarianism is now unthinkable in all of the regions of Spain, although politics in Galicia is clearly more authoritarian than in other regions, primarily because that is what the mass public appears to want, and regional elites there failed to take foundational steps towards

overcoming its low social capital equilibrium.

The variation in the three cases in the efficacy of regional leadership in affecting the level and quality of social capital shows much more clearly the importance of sequencing than the study of any single case could have on its own. Two out of the three cases demonstrated an efficacious sequence; one demonstrated the results of an inefficacious sequence. In both Andalusia and Catalonia, the leadership selection process produced excellent leadership *at the beginning* of the democratization process when it is so critically needed. Despite a great deal of ambivalence in the literature of the importance of political parties in early democratization detailed above in chapter one, well-defined, experienced "parliamentary-fit" parties are critical in selecting their best leadership to actually govern from the moment that the new government is installed in power. This, of course, is difficult, in transitional settings. In both Andalusia and Catalonia, however, the parties had long organized *before* the death of Franco, often in secret at some personal danger to themselves. Both Escurerdo and Pujol emerge from the shadow of the Franco regime fully prepared to govern, with pragmatic strategies to overcome the social capital problems in those regions. The disarray in the Galician parties, illustrated vividly in chapter three by personalistic factions, frequent name changes, splinters and mergers, and an admittedly haphazard leadership selection process, produced inexperienced leaders and a badly divided government that lacked the power and focus to combat the problem of low social capital equilibrium in that region. By the time that Manuel Fraga comes to Galician politics, he is "out of sequence" both

personally and in for the needs of Galicia. By that time, traditional powers (e.g. the *caciques*) had made additional power-sharing agreements and settled into a new *modus vivendi* that intentionally retarded the development of bridging social capital because it would threaten their power basis. Indeed, it appears that his government has made the problem of a low social capital equilibrium *worse* and even harder to overcome than before. A Spanish critic is especially harsh in this regard:

> It is not a coincidence that Fraga Iribarne–who is well known in this context for his Galician origin–has dedicated all of his energy to create, wherever is was possible, a structure of party-clientelism, that is helped at times by persons who have had political roles in the old regime...it is particularly the case in Galicia, in which the levels of participation have been the lowest in the country since 1977; this immobility has facilitated the usual maneuvers of *caciquismo* (Cazorla 1997, 30).

Only the passing of time will allow that judgement to be fairly made, however.

For the future, more research needs to be done on specific mechanisms that regional elites can use to overcome the weight of history, to overcome low social capital equilibria. In addition, the affect of other political processes and institutions on social capital needs to be explored. Social capital is a useful, but multi-dimensional term; no doubt future research will help "disaggregate" it into more precise sub-components that can be isolated and more rigorously tested. The distinction between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital recently elaborated by Putnam (2000) proved to be analytically useful in the Spanish cases, but still not flexible enough to account for wide variation in the concept across the cases. Each of the regions had a problem with low social capital, but in very different ways.

Especially in highly varied states, regions should be studied as cases in themselves, and not just administrative units of a larger country. They are the units in which the people's primary education and political values are formed, they are often the sites of revolution and terrorism. More positively, they can be the laboratories of democracy that are close enough to the people to invite their active participation and overcome the problems coincident with radical isolation.

It is hoped that this study of the effect of regional elite leadership styles on democratic stability will become part of a larger body of research devoted to understanding this neglected role of an important set of political actors. They have emerged as powerful actors in their own right in the process of democratic consolidation who deserve far more attention in the literature than they receive.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:

The Interview Instrument

A sample set of questions

Asked to all interviewees:

1. (If political elite): how did you get your political start? (If non-political elite): how do you view the characteristic leadership style of president of the region?
2. How would you describe (the president's) characteristic method of interaction with (a) other political elites? (b) other powerful regional actors [*poderes facticos*], (c) the national government of _____ in Madrid?
3. How would you compare or rate this president of the region with his predecessors (list one by one).
4. If you have knowledge of other regional president(s), how would you compare president _____ with them in terms of leadership style and effectiveness?
5. Would you say that there are good relations between the regional government of president _____ and (a) business owners, (b) labor leaders, (c) the Church, (d) the media, (e) other major political interests? Why or why not?
6. What is the greatest social-political problem in _____ (region) today and in the recent past (during the transition period)?
7. (After problem(s) identified) How well has the government of _____ dealt with the problems you just identified?
8. Over the last 25 years, how well–and in what specific ways–has the overall political development necessary for democracy been undertaken in your region (*CC.AA.*) and in Spain in general? In what ways do _____ social structure(s) limit and guide the possibilities of democratic leadership in your region?
9. [At conclusion of the interview] With whom else should I speak about these matters? Specifically, in (a) the regional government, (b) labor unions, (c) business leaders/owners, (d) the media, (e) university professors, (f) in the Church.
10. What books/periodicals would you recommend?

Specific questions, depending on the interviewee, might include the following:

1. [To political elites] How did you develop your political style of leadership? Which social, political and economic factors in the context of your region have affected this style? What was your first electoral victory?
2. [To labor and/or political leaders] What helps explain the lack of confidence between labor leaders and business owners in this region?
3. [Example of a specific regional question] How well is the regional government dealing with the severe problem of the fishing industry in Galicia?

APPENDIX B: Interviewees

List of Elite Interviews with Elites in Galician Region of Spain

1.	Manuel Barreiro former Vice-President of the *Xunta*	April 23, 1998 his office, USdC
2.	Andres Torres Queiruga, University SdC professor of religion and author	April 28, 1998 Cathedral, SdC
3.	Ramon Maíz Suárez, University SdC professor, Dean of the Department of Social Sciences	April 14, 1998 his office, USdC
4.	Xosé Manuel Beiras Torrados, head of the leading opposition political party, the National Block of Galicia, the BNG	April 29, 1998 Parliament, SdC
5.	Xosé Alvaro Carbacho, University dSC Professor	May 7, 1998 his office, USdC
6.	Emilio Perez Touriño, head of political party, Socialist Party of Galicia, PSG	May 5, 1998 Parliament, SdC
7.	Xavier Carro Garrote, head of Galician labor confederation (UGT/UXT)	May 8, 1998 his office, SdC
8.	Manuel Saez Alcántara, University of Salamanca professor	April 3, 1998 his office, Univ. of Sal.
9.	Ivan Llamazares, university professor and author	April, 1998 *plaza mayor*, Salamanca
10.	Nieves Llagares, University SdC professor	April, 1998
11.	Pedro Doñate, (elected) minister of finance/Pres. assistant	May, 1998 his office, *Xunta de Galicia*, SdC
12.	Roberto Blanco Valdés, law professor USdC and author	May 7, 1998 his office, USdC

13.	Sr. Lopez-Veloso, University SdC Administrator	April 13, 1998 his office, USdC
14.	Fernando Jiménez Sánchez, University professor, USdC, and author	April 22, 1998 his office, USdC

List of Elite Interviews in the Catalan Region of Spain
June 1998

Name		**Date interviewed/place**
15.	Dr. Carlota Solé	June 9/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ. (Terra Bella campus out of town)
16.	Dr. Joan Botella	June 5/ UAB, over lunch
17.	Dr. and MP Isidre Molas, PSC	June 9/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ., the Faculty of Law
18.	Father Ignacio Faus	June 10/ Theological Seminary of the Univ. of Barcelona (downtown)
19.	Dr. Robert Fishman	June 10/ UPF, his office
20.	Dr. Joan Estruch (rel.)	June 11/ Barcelona Autonomous Univ., his office
21.	Dr. Richard Zapata (immig.)	June 12/ Univ. of Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Dept. of Social Sciences
22.	Miguel Salvados, grad. student	June 12/ UPF, Dept. of Social Sciences
23.	Antonio Comin	June 13/ his apartment, Barcelona
24.	Rafael Ribó, MP of IC	June 15/ Barcelona, his office at the Catalan Initiative
25.	José Luis Coscubiela. head (S-G) of CC.OO.	June 15/ CC.OO/BULA headquarters, Barcelona
26.	Joan Pujol, head of FMT	June 16/ FMT headquarters, Barcelona

List of Elite Interviews in the Andalusian Region of Spain
May 1998

1.	Univ. Professor and lawyer	May 26, 1998 (Granada)
2.	Univ. Professor	May 22, 1998 (Granada)
3.	MP and head of party (IU-United Left)	May 28, 1998 (Sevilla)
4.	President of the Parliament	May 29, 1998 (Sevilla)
5.	Head of the business confederation (CEA)	May 28, 1998 (Sevilla)
6.	MP and head of party (PA-Nationalist)	May 18, 1998 (Sevilla)
7.	Head of agricultural union	May 26, 1998(Granada)
8.	Univ. Professor & regional expert	May 22, 1998(Granada)
9.	Univ. and law Professor	May 15, 1998 (Sevilla)
10.	Researcher for Parliament	May 17, 1998 (Sevilla)
11.	MP and assistant to regional President (Chaves)	May 29, 1998 (Sevilla)

CHART: Evolution of the Galician Party System, 1964- @1998

Sources: Máiz (1994); Raimundo (1998); author's interpretation

