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SOME CAUSES OF THE KOREAN WAR OF 1950:
A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
IN KOREA (1945-1950), WITH EMPHASIS ON SINO-
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OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA (1945-1950),
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A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
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degree of
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BY
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Norman, Oklahoma

1963

SOME CAUSES OF THE KOREAN WAR OF 1950: A CASE STUDY
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA (1945-1950),
WITH EMPHASIS ON SINO-SOVIET COLLABORATION

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The writer chose this subject because the Communist strategy in Korea is a valuable case study of an instance in which the "cold war" became exceedingly hot. Many men died and many more were wounded in a conflict which could have been avoided if the free world had not been ignorant of the ways of the Communists. Today, many years after the armored spearhead of Communism first drove across the 38th parallel, 350,000 men are still standing ready to repel that same enemy. It is hoped that this study will throw light on the errors which grew to war so that they might not be repeated at another time in a different place.

This dissertation covers the period from 1945 to 1950. The writer has tried to present a true story of this period, and to prove the thesis accepted by the West that the "Communists carefully planned and executed an aggressive war in Korea."

The writer would like to make special acknowledgment to Professors Oliver E. Benson and Rufus G. Hall, Jr., for their constant assistance and encouragement. Personal gratitude is also extended to Mr. Robert T. Smith and Mr. Grosvener W. Pollard, III, Graduate Students, University of Oklahoma, for their generous assistance in correcting my manuscript. Finally, this dissertation is devoted to my wife, Yong Ja, without whose understanding, consideration and persistence the dissertation would have never appeared.

Norman, Oklahoma

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
LIST OF TABLES	vii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND OF KOREA	1
Geopolitical Factors	1
Historical Factors	11
II. THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CONTROL KOREA WITHOUT WAR	22
Division of Korea at the 38th Parallel	23
Moscow Agreement	25
Negotiations Under the Moscow Agreement	27
III. THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS EFFORT TO UNITE KOREA	40
The United Nations Effort to Unite Korea	40
Two Koreas: The Republic and the People's Republic	50
IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN ARMED ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA: I	59
Early Soviet Occupation Policies in North Korea	59
Soviet Troop Withdrawal from North Korea	65
Withdrawal of American Troops and Power Vacuum in South Korea	72
V. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA: II	76
Military Foundation	76
Diplomatic Foundation	80
Political Foundation	88
Communist Guerrilla Warfare and Border Raids	96
VI. NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN THE FAR EAST IN FAVOR OF THE COMMUNISTS	102
Post-War Soviet Foreign Policy Prior to 1949	102
Formation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance	108
Unpublished Parts of the Sino-Soviet Agreements	116

	Page
VII. MID-CRISIS AND PRE-WAR: I	127
The Soviet Preparation	127
Reorganization of the Communist Party of Japan	136
Chinese Communist Preparation for Invasion of Formosa	147
VIII. MID-CRISIS AND PRE-WAR: II	152
The Final Buildup of Armed Strength	153
The Final Pressure of Psychological Warfare	158
North Korean Communists Demand South Korea's Peaceful Surrender or War	161
IX. ARMED AGGRESSION ON SOUTH KOREA, AND THIRD POWER INTERVENTION	173
Armed Attack by North Korean Forces	173
The United States Intervention	180
The United Nations Intervention	184
Chinese Communist Intervention	190
X. CONCLUSIONS	203
BIBLIOGRAPHY	242

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Strategical location of Korea in the center of the Far East	4
2. Comparison of the Communist Party of Japan prior to June 7, 1950 and post-June 7, 1950	146
3. Approximate deployment of selected Chinese Communist Armies	151
4. Approximate deployment of the North Korean forces in the vicinity north of the 38th parallel	156
5. Operations in Korea (June, 1950)	177
6. The US Western Pacific defense line	183
7. Approximate deployment of Chinese Communist Armies (1950)	200

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Newly organized Korean Worker's Party	94
2. Strength of the National Defense Army	216
3. Potential Resources of Korea	219
4. Armed Strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army . .	222

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF KOREA

Geopolitical Factors

To the student of international relations, Korea offers an interesting case study in the importance of geopolitical factors. Much of Korea's history can be explained by her geographical position. In pre-modern times, during the period when she was known as the "hermit kingdom," Korea's geographical position contributed to her extreme isolation from the outside world. Yet even in her earliest days she was the bridge linking Japan to the mainland of Asia. First, there were the many migrations through Korea to Japan, and then the Mongols used Korea as a stepping-stone in their attempt to conquer Japan. Later, the Japanese general, Hideyoshi Toyotomi, invaded Korea in the sixteenth century as the first phase of his plan to conquer China. In modern times, situated between the China-Russia-Japan triangle, Korea's strategic position had involved the country in the power relations of all the great powers in

the Far East, including the United States.¹

Geography

Geographically, Korea, which lies within the north temperate zone between the 34th and 43rd parallels of latitude, juts out from mainland Asia with the Sea of Japan on its east coast and the Yellow Sea on its west coast. Southern Manchuria lies along its northwest frontier for about 500 miles, the border being formed by the Apnok (Yalu) River, Paektu (White Head) Mountain, and the Tuman River. For about twenty miles on its northeast frontier, it is separated from the Soviet Maritime Province by the Tuman River near its mouth, a scant eighty miles from the Russian port of Vladivostock. On the south it is separated from the Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu by the narrow, island-studded Strait of Korea, only 120 miles in width.²

The Korean peninsula covers some 85,000 square miles (northern Korea, 47,000 square miles; southern Korea 38,000 square miles) which is almost equal to the area of Great Britain and over half that of Japan. At its widest point from east to west it is 170 miles, at its longest distance from north to south 460 miles, and it has a coastline of about 5,400 miles.³

¹C. N. Seams, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. I (New York: Hillary House Publishers, Ltd., 1962), gives a good summary of Korean history in regard to its geopolitical significance.

²Chiho Yi, et al., "Geography, Korea, Its Land, People and Culture of All Ages" (Seoul, Korea: Hakwonsa, Ltd., 1960), p. 1; V. T. Zaichikov, Geography of Korea, trans. Albert Parry (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), p. 2.

³Department of State, Background Summary of Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2. See also Shannon McCune and Arthur Robinson, "Notes on Physiographic Diagram of Tyosen," The Geographical Review, XXXI (October, 1941), pp. 653-58.

Off the west and south coast there are over 3,000 islands, the largest and most notable of these, laying 55 miles due south of Korea, is Cheju Island. Because of its use as a military base during World War II, it is considered to be of great strategic value as a Gibraltar of the Western Pacific.⁴

The interior of Korea is largely mountainous, a range extending from north to south. The southern part of the country is fairly level, and contains most of the arable land and the largest population. With most of the navigable rivers on its western side, or in the south, and with almost all good harbors on the east and south coasts, Korea had been described topographically as laying "with her face toward China and her back toward Japan. This has had much to do in determining the history of the country."⁵

Due to the abundant rainfall, Korea has many rivers and streams, but most of these are navigable for only a few miles inland. Besides the lengthy Yalu and Tuman Rivers which form the boundary on the north, the Han River, which rises in the mountains near the east coast and flows past Seoul, cutting Korea in half, is the most important providing a means of transportation and travel for the populous area through which it passes.

Despite the fact that Korea is bounded on three sides by the sea, it has a continental rather than an oceanic climate, somewhat similar to that of the Atlantic seacoast of the United States between Maryland and

⁴Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington, D.C.: The Korean Pacific Press, 1947), p. 22.

⁵Homer B. Hulbert, The Passing of Korea (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1906), p. 10.

FIGURE 1

Connecticut. Although the climate is excellent nine months of the year, the summers, particularly in the south, are hot, wet, and damp. Having a predominantly agrarian economy, climate is a most important factor to the majority of Koreans. At intervals, droughts or floods have caused disastrous crop failure and famine, even though the rainfall volume and distribution is usually ideal.

Demography

Some of the demographic factors in Korea are difficult to assess, because of the division of the country into the two parts. A contemporary authority on Korea has estimated the population of the country as 28 or 29 million (northern Korea, 12 million, and southern Korea, 16 or 17 million) in 1950.⁶

Thus, Korea ranks as the thirteenth or fourteenth largest nation in the world in respect to population. Comparatively, it has about the same population as Spain, Mexico, or Poland, and about twice that of Canada.⁷ Thus, both from the standpoint of area and population, Korea should assume a relatively important position in the family of nations.

Korea has for many centuries had a homogeneous population despite the many invasions to which it had been subjected. Shannon McCune, an authority on Korean affairs, has observed in his geopolitical analysis of Korea:

Korea . . . maintained a separate and distinct nationality in the

⁶George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 16. See also Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 26.

⁷Chiho Yi, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

Far East because of its physical geography and its people; it is a peninsula cut off from the Asiatic mainland by a broad mountainous base, and its population forms a unique cultural and economic group.⁸

Until its annexation by Japan in 1910 there was very little emigration, except into Russian and Chinese territory. At the same time, there has never been any great number of foreigners residing in Korea.

Unlike many advanced Western countries, Korea has few large cities. The word Seoul means capital, and, since 1395 A.D., the seat of government has been located there, close to the geographical center of the country. Estimated to have a population of over one million in 1950, it has long been the largest city in Korea. It was the seat of the United States occupation zone in southern Korea during 1945-1948, and now is the capital of the new Republic. The Russians selected Pyongyang, the leading city of northern Korea, for the seat of their occupation zone and now it is the capital of the "Korean People's Democratic Republic."

Wonsan, the leading city on the northeastern shore, is also significant historically and politically. About sixteen miles north of Wonsan on the East Korea Bay, which forms a magnificent harbor, is Port Lazareff. Inchun, a port on the west central coast near Seoul, has been important in recent decades as the gateway to the capital. Likewise, Pusan, at the southeastern tip of Korea, has been important as the port nearest to Japan.

Unfortunately, there is no detailed and exhaustive study of the origin and ethnology of the Korean people available for reference.

⁸Shannon McCune, "Korea, Indo-China, and Siam: Historic Asiatic Buffers," World Political Geography, (ed.) Etzel Percy, et al. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), p. 359.

Apparently, the Koreans belong racially to the Mongol family, and differ distinctly as a people from the Chinese and Japanese. Generally, the Koreans are taller and more robust than the natives of China and Japan, although remarkable resemblances to both of these peoples have been noted in individual cases.⁹

Culturally, the Koreans are more closely allied to the Chinese than to the Japanese, and the Chinese writing system has been used for centuries by the upper class Koreans. The Koreans have had an affinity, politically as well as culturally, for the Chinese, whereas they have never lived in friendly relationship with the Japanese but rather have experienced a deep feeling of hatred and fear for the Japanese during long periods of their history.

During the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, the Japanese fostered the impression that "the Korean people are a degenerate and contemptible nation, incapable of better things, intellectually inferior, and better off under Japanese rule than independent."¹⁰ As a reaction to this one-sided presentation of Korean character, for example, Robert T. Oliver has pointed out that "the late Dr. Ales Hedlicka, chief anthropologist of the Smithsonian Institute, once described them as the most capable people of the Orient."¹¹

In any event, it may be said that the Korean people have shown

⁹See details in Kisu Kim, et al., "People, Language," Korea, Its Land . . ., pp. 104-113.

¹⁰Hulbert, op. cit., p. 9.

¹¹Robert T. Oliver, "Impasse in Korea," American Mercury, LXIV, (April, 1947), p. 472.

many shortcomings and undesirable human traits in their performance in modern history, but most of these negative characteristics can be explained logically on the basis of their subjection to oppression and injustice. This subjection came about largely through Korea's misfortune in being a geographical strategic point in the Far East.

In order to emphasize the hereditary background of the Koreans, passing reference should be made to that period of their history when they were in the forefront of human civilization. Prior to the eighteenth century, Koreans were credited with having made many original innovations and contributions, such as the invention of moving metal type for printing in 1403 A.D., a phonetic alphabet in the fifteenth century, the use of the cannon, explosive shells, and the first iron-clad warship in the war of 1592.¹²

Resources

Approximately 80 per cent of the Koreans are farmers. Lacking capital for mechanical equipment, animals and hand labor are used. Furthermore, the average farm is too small to make the use of modern machines practical. Despite the lack of efficient, modern methods of cultivation, the southern half of Korea has, except during periods of flood or drought, always produced more than enough food for her own consumption. Rice has been Korea's largest and best cash crop. Increasing quantities were exported to the Japanese during the years following Korea's annexation. Barely, wheat, and other grains have been second in

¹²See Arthur J. Brown, The Mastery of the Far East (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 53-55; Michener, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

amount of production.

Animal husbandry, on the other hand, is not very highly developed in Korea. Although Koreans are meat eaters, in contrast to the Japanese, the feeding of domestic animals is too expensive for most Korean farmers. Consequently, they have raised only the cattle necessary for farm work or as beasts of burden, exporting many of their calves.

The regions of the Yalu River and east-central sections of Korea exceed all of the Far East except Siberia in the amount of forest area, comprising almost 75 per cent of the entire area. The Koreans have denuded many of their forests, cutting down their trees for fuel and seeking new land to grow crops. Furthermore, the forests have been exploited for many years, first by the Russians and then by the Japanese - during the periods of annexation, although the latter did introduce a plan for reforestation. Pine, bamboo, willow and pack-tal are the most prominent trees, but spruce, birch, larch, acacia, oak, alder, mulberry, and many others are grown in Korea.

Possessing a great abundance of marine life, Korea has always been one of the leading fishing nations in the world, both consuming and exporting large quantities of marine products. Although there are more than one hundred seventy-five kinds of edible fish in the waters surrounding Korea,¹³ including sardines, crabs, oysters, and clams, three-fourths of the catch has been used for purposes other than food.

In recent decades it has been determined that Korea, particularly northern Korea, possesses an appreciable amount of every known mineral

¹³Jinduk Soh, et al., "Industries," Korea, Its Land . . ., p. 258.

with the exception of sulphur, chromium, tin, manganese, and petroleum. Her mineral deposits include coal, iron, gold, aluminum, magnesium, barium, copper, florspar, graphite, lead, lithium, mercury, mica, molybdenum, nickel, silver, iron sulphide, tungsten, and zinc.¹⁴

From the strategic point of view, it would be noted that the site of Korea's greatest iron ore deposits, estimated at over one billion tons, is at Mosan, along the Manchurian border and only 100 miles from the Soviet frontier. These reserves alone are estimated to exceed those in Manchuria. The location of Korea's great anthracite coal deposit in the same area as the water power resources of the Yalu River has led to the concentration of industrial development in the northern section of the country.¹⁵

Under the Japanese, Korea's great power potential was highly developed, primarily for the production of war materials. Water power production is essential to industrial production in Korea, and she is fortunate in being one of the leading nations of the world in this respect. The Yalu River hydroelectric installations, ecompleted shortly before World War II, were said to have rivalled the installation at Supung Dam. Power from these installations was shared with Manchuria. There are also several other major sources of electric power in the north.¹⁶

Thus, it can be reasonably concluded from this brief consideration

¹⁴Pearcy, op. cit., pp. 653-56. See also "Geography of Korea," Scholastic, September, 1950, pp. 11 ff.

¹⁵Zaichikov, op. cit., pp. 70-75.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 68-69.

of Korea's geography, demography, and resources, that the country should be a united political entity in the modern state system. Nevertheless, Korea had rarely enjoyed the privilege of unity in its history. The secret of this anomaly lies, for the most part, in Korea's immensely strategic position in the heart of the Far East.

Historical Factors

The Hermit Kingdom: Korea Before 1870

Korea has a long history. The earliest history of Korea is such a mixture of myth, legend, and fact that it is difficult to distinguish one from another. It is interesting to note from the view-point of historical research that some of these legends have been recounted and repeated so often in successive histories of Korea and the Far East that in recent works they are often-times stated as facts. In any event, Korea's legendary history dates back to antiquity, with the mythical establishment of a kingdom of Korea by Dang Gun in 2317 B.C.¹⁷

In 1122 B.C., Kija, a scholar and official of the Chinese dynasty, is said to have entered Korea with several thousand Chinese emigrants, and established a new Kingdom of Chosun (Land of Morning Freshness). Although the Koreans have no written record of his existence, they apparently accepted him as the founder of their nation. This ancient Kingdom of Chosun expanded far beyond the Yalu to the present city of Mukden,

¹⁷See R. O. K. Office of Public Information, Korea (Seoul, Korea: Office of Public Information, 1953), p. 10; Clarence N. Seams, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. I (New York: Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1962), pp. 1-4.

Manchuria, but its southern border was the Han River. Chinese culture and civilization were introduced into Korea during Kija's regime and his dynasty lasted until about the fourth century B.C.¹⁸

For several centuries Korea has been divided into various petty kingdoms. Kokuryo in northern Korea, Silla in southeastern Korea, and Paekchae in southwestern Korea, were often at war with one another. The whole country was finally united by Silla toward the end of the seventh century A.D. The unification of Korea marked the beginning of a long process of solidification of the Korean people as a distinct nation with its own unique and homogeneous culture. There was no longer a struggle among the tribes, while intercourse with other northeastern Asian people, mainly with the Chinese on the north and the Japanese on the south, served to encourage the productive efforts of the Korean people. The result was the attainment of a high cultural development.

Great cultural development was made following Koryo's victory over Silla in the tenth century, and in the period following Koryo's triumph over various foreign invaders.¹⁹ Through these experiences, **ever**-increasing racial unity was achieved in jointly facing and driving off the alien invaders. As the Korean people attained homogeneity, their cultural and social patterns became firmly fixed, especially during the last dynasty of Korea, Lee's Chosun, which was based upon a unique heritage.

Sungkae Lee, known as General Lee, founded the last Korean dynasty

¹⁸George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 9. See also Brown, op. cit., pp. 20-23.

¹⁹See Brown, op. cit., p. 25.

in 1399, and introduced many reforms in every sphere of Korean life. The capital was transferred to Seoul, and the name Chosun was resumed. Korea enjoyed over a century of peace, prosperity, and intellectual advanced. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, political factionalism developed in Korea, and was, in part, responsible for the initial weakness of the Koreans to the invasion of the Japanese under Hideyoshi Toyotomi in 1592. By 1598, the Koreans succeeded in repulsing the invaders, primarily by victories at sea which cut off the Japanese supplies and reinforcements. The only lasting result of the invasion was a terrible devastation of Korea.²⁰

Again in the early part of the seventeenth century, Korea suffered the ravage of invasion when the Manchus overran the country. Korea remained under the guidance of China, for the Manchus overthrew the Ming Dynasty in China and established their own. Korea withdrew from all foreign intercourse at this time, and became truly a "hermit kingdom," until about 1870.

The International Picture in the Far East as it has Affected Korea since 1870

Modern Korea began with the introduction of Western civilization into the country. From the beginning of this era Korea was unwillingly involved in a series of international entanglements. The ordeal of the Korean people was a repercussion of Western and Russian expansionism that sent the whole of Asia into chaos and disaster during the last two

²⁰Hulbert, op. cit., pp. 295, 349-59.

centuries. Korea, unhappily, could not avoid the great current of the eastward march of the Western powers, the southward march of Russia and the westward march of Japan.

The Japanese have repeatedly tried in the course of the centuries to control Korea and parts of Asia beyond, but until modern times she was never strong enough to acquire a permanent hold on the peninsula. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan's strength increased very rapidly, while China, a status quo power in Korea, was becoming weaker because of the Western and Russian "sphere of influence." Therefore, she was able to penetrate quite easily into Korean affairs. In 1876, the King of Korea was forced to conclude a treaty of commerce with Japan which provided for the opening of harbors to Japanese merchant vessels and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan.²¹

Thus Japan realized a long cherished ambition to establish a foothold in the Korean peninsula, which is a bridge to the Asiatic mainland. Hereafter, Japanese power rapidly increased in Korea and occasioned armed conflicts with China and other powers. On the other hand the rising status of the new Japanese power in Korea seriously threatened long established Chinese interests. China, therefore, advised the Korean government to accept the American proposal to conclude a treaty of commerce to counter-check threats from Japan. A treaty of commerce between Korea and the United States was thus signed at Seoul on May 22, 1882.²² This marked the first treaty relations of Korea with the West.

²¹See details in Isup Hong, et al., "History," Korea, Its Land . . . , pp. 72-73.

²²Department of State, A Historical Summary of US-Korean Relations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 4.

It was followed by similar treaties with the Great Britain and Germany in 1883, and Italy and Russia in 1884.²³

From the very beginning the United States encouraged the Korean government to establish a friendly relationship with Western powers. However, the Americans could not resolve the tension between China and Japan which was caused in part by Western penetration into Korean affairs. In late 1884, tension between the Chinese and Japanese over the problem of Korea was very intense, but during the next year they reached an agreement by which both countries were to withdraw their troops from Korea and not to send military advisers to train Korean troops.²⁴

Observing the power vacuum in Korea, Russia pressed the Korean king to accept Russian military advisers. As a result, in the spring of 1886, the Korean government accepted Russian army officers in an effort to check Japan.²⁵ Great Britain, on the other hand, judged it dangerous to leave Russia alone in Korea. Consequently, she sailed into Port Hamilton in the southern part of Korea in December 1886, and later joined the Japanese side in order to counter-balance the increasing Russian

²³Isup Hong, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

²⁴See the agreement in Edward Hertslet and Edward C. Hertslet (ed.) British and Foreign State Papers, 1884-1885 (London: Harrison and Son, 1900), pp. 297-98.

²⁵Unlike Western interests in Korea, which was mainly based on trade relations, Russian interest was in her strategic position to control ice-free ports. M.F. Nelson, Korean and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. 173.

strength.²⁶ Further, Great Britain agreed with the Japanese to dispatch Japanese troops to Korea "in case of emergency."²⁷

This equal power relationship resulting from the Russo-Sino collaboration and the Anglo-Japanese alliance saved Korean independence for the next ten years. Just as Hans J. Morgenthau says, "the independence of Korea was a mere function of power relations existing between two alliances."²⁸

Even though Japan and China had agreed to refrain from sending troops into Korea, Japanese troops were steadily poured into that country prior to 1894, and the Chinese likewise increased their forces. Meanwhile, in 1893, as a security measure, Japan neutralized Russia by agreeing to recognize "the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea and to abstain from interference in Korea's internal affairs."²⁹ Finally in July 1894, the Japanese created the necessary "emergency" circumstance³⁰ and promptly launched a treacherous attack upon the Chinese

²⁶George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 15.

²⁷Zaichikov, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁸Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p.

²⁹Foreign Ministry of Japan, Nippon Gaiko Nenkan Hyo Narabini Juyo Bunsho, 1840-1945, Vol. I (Tokyo: U.N. Association of Japan, 1955), p. 153.

³⁰In 1894, the revolt of the Tonghak, a young progressive group, against the government was instigated by the Japanese. The king of Korea asked Chinese troops to suppress them. About 1,500 Chinese troops were brought out. Apparently this action broke an agreement with the Japanese that neither country would send in military forces without informing the other. Consequently, the Japanese also sent counter-troops there. Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1951), p. 208.

forces with her own well-prepared military. The result was an easy Japanese victory and the forced approval by China of the maintenance of Japanese troops in Korea.³¹ One of the most significant turning points in Korean history was reached when the Japanese troops were allowed to stay in Korea.

With the elimination of China by Japan, the only power challenging Japanese superiority in Korea was Russia. In spite of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1893, Japanese encroachment on Korean internal affairs grew in intensity along political as well as economic lines with the aim of making Korea a colony. In 1902, as one of the first measures of insuring Japan's economic and financial grip upon Korea, the circulation of Bank of Japan notes were forcibly implemented.

In her desire to eliminate Russian influence from Korea, Japan, encouraged by her 1902 alliance with Great Britain, proposed an unacceptable demand to Russia in 1903 which was a prelude to the war with Russia the following year. As a result of the 1902 Treaty with Great Britain, Japan was in a stronger position than Russia regarding the Korean question and therefore Russia tried to avoid a direct confrontation. A secret agreement was proposed to Japan to take over that part of Korea lying south of the 39th parallel.³² Japan rejected it, because she wanted all of Korea and was actually ready to meet any Russian challenge with war if necessary. In 1904 Japan declared the war on Russia which ended in Japan's victory in 1905 and, practically speaking, in her seizure of

³¹Nippon Gaiko Nenkan Hyo . . . , pp. 165-69.

³²Ibid., pp. 212-13, 217-20.

Korea.³³

Five years later, in 1910, Korea as an independent nation disappeared when she was forced to sign the "Japanese-Korean Treaty of Annexation" in order "to maintain peace and stability in Korea, to promote the prosperity and welfare of Koreans, and at the same time to insure the safety and repose of the foreign residents."³⁴

Efforts at Liberation and the Effect of World War II

We have seen that before Korea was able to transfer herself into a modern state, she lost her sovereignty. After 1910, Korea became a part of Japan's political, economic, and cultural order, but the Korean people could not forget the glory of their country's past. Organized resistance to Japanese rule started before the disgrace and resentment to the "Treaty of Annexation" were forgotten.

On March 1, 1919, one of the most memorable events of the Korean's struggle for the recovery of political freedom was enacted in a nationwide mass rebellion against the Japanese. The result was failure due to the lack of arms and training. However, the event became a rallying point for the spirit of the Korean people in their fight for "self determination," advocated by President Woodrow Wilson. Immediately after

³³Thomas A. Bailey writes: On June 29, 1905, Secretary of War Taft, then on a mission to Manila, negotiated in Tokyo on 'agreed memorandum' with Prime Minister Katsura. By its terms the Japanese disavowed any aggressive designs on the Philippines, and in return obtained the American approval of Japan's 'sovereignty' over Korea. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1955), p. 568.

³⁴Nippon Gaiko Nenkan Hyo . . . , pp. 340.

the event hundreds of Koreans living in exile in China founded "the Korean Provisional Government" at Shanghai. This struggle found its leadership in such men as Syngman Rhee, Koo Kim, Kyooshik Kim, Chingchun Lee, Ikhi Shin, etc. At the same time, tens of thousands of northern Korean residents fled to Manchuria and Siberia where they organized their communities under Communist influence.

However, the Japanese oppression in Korea, after 1919, became increasingly severe with the result that it was impossible for the Koreans to free themselves without help from others.³⁵ It is now evident that the political situation after the beginning of World War II functioned as a key to Korea's liberation. Koreans at home and abroad, of both right and left-wing political beliefs, began to hope again for their country's liberation from Japanese oppression.

For the first time since 1919, the independence of Korea was indirectly suggested in the international pledge of the Atlantic Charter drawn up between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August, 1941, which declared in part that:

We respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and we wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them.³⁶

Unfortunately, President Roosevelt did not originally have an

³⁵See Robsinger L. Lawrence, "Breaking Up the Japanese Empire," Foreign Policy Reporter, June 1, 1944, p. 68, for Japanese policy toward Korea after 1919.

³⁶Department of State, Selected Document on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1945 (Washington, C.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 2-3.

immediate Korean independence in mind.³⁷ When British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, visited Washington in March of 1943 to discuss British-American plans for the post-war world, President Roosevelt said, according to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that he wanted a trusteeship for Korea as well as French-Indo-China for an interim period, the United States and a few other countries exercising collective control.³⁸

A policy of multi-power trusteeship on Korea for an interim period, as advocated by President Roosevelt, was formulated at the Cairo Conference during the month of November, 1943 by the heads of the three big powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. The Cairo Declaration stated that:

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.³⁹

Since the Soviet Union had not participated in the Cairo Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill conferred with Marshal Josif V. Stalin regarding the Korean problem at the Yalta Conference held in February, 1945. On the whole, the Soviet Government supported the proposed plan for Korea as designated by President Roosevelt at the Cairo Conference. Thus the Soviet Government informally concurred on the principle of a multi-power trusteeship in Korea which

³⁷David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 258, states that President Roosevelt's original idea was to place Korea under Chinese trusteeship.

³⁸Cordell Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II (New York: MacMillan Co., 1948), p. 1596.

³⁹Department of State, Korea's Independence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), Annex II, p. 16.

would function on an interim basis.⁴⁰ The Soviet pledge was repeated at the Plenary Session of the Potsdam Conference in late July, where the Soviet Government suggested to the Americans the possibility of their invasion of Korea and wished a possible multi-power trusteeship over Korea.⁴¹

By a statement on August 8, two days before Japan's first offer of surrender was made, the Government of the Soviet Union announced her adherence to the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation.⁴² Thus the Soviet Union formally committed herself to the principle of four-power trusteeship for Korea with the view that the country should ultimately recover its independence.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 17. W. A. Harriman reports that when the plan of multi-power trusteeship on Korea was proposed to Marshal Stalin, his reaction was that "why it is necessary if the Koreans could produce a satisfactory government?" Robert E. Sherwood, White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Vol. II (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 892. See also Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press Mcmli, 1951), p. 56.

⁴¹William D. Leahy, I was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 408.

⁴²Embassy of the USSR in the USA, USSR Information Bulletin, August 11, 1945, pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER II

THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CONTROL KOREA WITHOUT WAR

On August 15, 1945 (August 14, 1945, EST), a new chapter of Korean history began when the Koreans heard the Japanese Imperial Ordinance which declared that:

After pondering deeply the general trend of the world and actual conditions obtaining in our Empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered our government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our Empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration.¹

Thus the hostilities of the so-called "Great East Asian War" formally ceased and it meant "Liberty Day" in Korea.

In the minds of the Korean people, the defeat of Japan in World War II meant the realization of a dream they had treasured in their hearts for more than a full generation. They would be able to bring out of hiding their flags. They could give up their enforced Japanized name and tear down the hated Shinto shrines. They would, in their national life, organize their own government and live under their own laws.

It was in this prospect that Korean people gladly welcomed the

¹F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 474.

arrival of the Russian and American soldiers. However, they soon discovered that the victory by the Allied powers did not at once mean a united and independent Korea.

Division of Korea at the 38th Parallel

As a matter of fact, the question of the problem of allotting zones of occupation to the United States and the Soviet forces had been considered by the United States Government before the Soviet landing took place in Korea; because, when the Allied powers made the first offer of surrender to Japan on August 10, 1945, the Soviet Far Eastern Army was within striking distance of the Japanese troops in the northern part of Korea, while the nearest American troops were still 600 miles away.

The day before the Soviet troops landed on the northeastern shore of Korea on August 12, Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, submitted a draft of "General Order No. 1" to the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in which General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was to cause the Japanese Government to issue its statement of surrender. One of the provisions of this surrender was that the Japanese forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel were to surrender to the Soviet Commander, while those south of that line were to surrender to the American Commander.²

After having had preliminary meetings, it was agreed by Secretary of State Byrnes to submit the draft statement to President Harry S. Truman for his final approval. Following the approval of President Truman, the

²US, Senate, Background Information on Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 2.

text was communicated to Marshal Stalin on August 14th while he suggested certain amendments which were subsequently accepted by the United States Government, no reference was made to those provisions of the order having to do with the 38th parallel.³ Thus the United States was assured of conducting the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel while the Soviet troops were moving down toward this line from the north.

It was on September 2, 1945, that General MacArthur issued "General Order No. 1," the effect of which was to establish an American Military Government in southern Korea. The Order reads as follow:

By the terms of the instrument of surrender . . . the victorious military forces of my command will today occupy the territory of Korea south of the 38th parallel north latitude.

Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. . . .

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38th parallel . . . and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation:

All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38th parallel . . . and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority.⁴

As seen, this line of demarcation was set for purely military convenience in disarming the Japanese troops in Korea. But when the United States and the Soviet Union opposed one another in the formation of an international order after the war, the result was that the 38th

³Ibid. See also details in Arthur L. Grey, Jr., "The 38th Parallel," Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April, 1951), p. 486.

⁴Background Information on Korea, pp. 3-4.

parallel became a front line of the cold war between the free nations and the Communists. This had tragic results for the people of Korea.

Moscow Agreement on the Principle of
Four-Power Trusteeship

In order to prevent the incalculably demaging consequences of the continued division of the country, and to specify definite plans for the future of Korea as pledged prior to the end of the war, the foreign ministers of the United States, Byrnes, the Soviet Union, V. M. Molotov, and the United Kingdom, Ernest Bevin, met at Moscow on December 16, 1945.⁵

As a result of the negotiations, the following agreement concerning Korea was announced on December 27:

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, . . . there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government. . . .
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government . . . there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the U.S. Command in southern Korea and Soviet Command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposal the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission . . . to work out measures also for helping and assisting political, economic and social programs of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.
The proposal of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with the provisional Korean government for the joint consideration of the Government of the U.S., U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative and economic matters between the US Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of

⁵Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1027.

the US and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.⁶

As soon as news of the Four-Power Trusteeship over Korea for a period of five years reached Seoul, political parties of all shades, including the South Korean Communist Party,⁷ immediately protested the Moscow Agreement, and demonstrations took place throughout Korea. At the same time, they organized the "Anti-Trusteeship Committee" on December 28.

South Korean right-wing political leaders headed by Syngman Rhee, Koo Kim and Kyooship Kim, and middle-of-the-road politicians objected to the agreement because it was an insult to their capability of self-ruling and pointed out that it was not in accord with the Cairo Declaration. They further argued that a trusteeship council representing four powers including the Soviet Union would never be able to agree on a single matter, and finally prophesied that the five-year period would be only a beginning.

Within a few days, on the other hand, Korean Communists in both south and north appeared as the only major party to support the Moscow Agreement.⁸ The North Korean Communist Party Chairman, Ilsung

⁶"Communique on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers," *ibid.*, p. 1030. According to Secretary of State Byrnes, this agreement was primarily based on a Soviet draft proposal. See Korea, pp. 105-106.

⁷However, the South Korean Communist Party suddenly changed its policy and appeared as party to support the Agreement after the return of their Party Chairman, Hunyong Park, from his four-day visit to Pyongyang on January 3, 1946. "Korea: A Chronology of Principal Events, 1945-1950," The World Today, VI (August, 1950), p. 320.

⁸The Korean Communist and Soviet support of the Agreement was probably based on political and economic conditions existing in Korea at

Kim,⁹ after being silent for two full days after the announcement of the Agreement, in a rally urged the people to support the Agreement for the benefit of the Korean people. He took the precaution of translating the word "trusteeship" into Korean as "guardianship," meaning help to an independent nation.¹⁰

The communists desertion from the united front of the Korean people in the last day of the fateful year of 1945 completely wrecked their spirit of unity. Disunity was created among the entire people for the first time during the long struggle for freedom, and deep cleavage between the right and left wing groups was destined within five years to plunge the country into a most destructive and tragic war.

Negotiations Under the Moscow Agreement

Notwithstanding the opposition of the majority of Korean people, the problem of Korean unification and independence was turned over to the United States and the Soviet Union. Chief Soviet delegate, Lieutenant

the time. They might have judged that they would ultimately win control of all Korea under the coalition provisional government. Because, Korea presented an environment of poverty and a political vacuum created by the defeat of Japan, which they could easily penetrate. The Soviet influence in the south would be tremendous if they attempted to subvert southern Korea by promising extensive land reform.

⁹Ilsung Kim was born near Pyongyang in 1921. He was said to have been trained at China Whampao Military Academy, and later in Moscow, where he was promoted to the rank of captain in the Red Army at the end of World War II. His original name was Sungchu Kim. The real Ilsung Kim was a dead man who was a Korean hero of guerrilla warfare with the Japanese troops in northern Korea and Manchuria during Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Time, July 3, 1950, p. 21.

¹⁰Jaeduk Han, "I Sue Ilsung Kim," TongAh IlBo, Seoul, July 29, 1962, p. 2.

General T. Shtykov, a veteran of the defense of Leningrad against the Germans and participant in the short Soviet war of August, 1945, against Japan, and his assistant, Simendn G. Tsarapkin, and their mission arrived in Seoul on January 15, 1946, where they met their American counterparts, Major General A. V. Arnold, former acting Military Governor in the United States zone, and H. M. Beinghoff, his assistant.¹¹

The US-USSR Joint Conference
(January-February, 1946)

A preliminary conference between the two authorities was held in Seoul, from January 16 through February 5, to discuss the problem of restoring the administrative and economic coordination of the country. From the first discussions of the conference, it was clear that the two delegates had different interpretations of the directive issued at Moscow, and, consequently, "divergent approaches to the problems."¹² As a result, the conference was a failure.

The Soviet delegate took the position that coordination between the two zones should be preceded by unity under a provisional Korean Government. The Soviet would only discuss a limited number of specific subjects, and refused to consider any unified operation of utilities that would in any way affect Soviet absolute control over the northern zone. Although at first the Soviet delegate agreed to discuss the flow of electric power from the north and the exchange of certain commodities and equipment, they later excluded these subjects from the conference discussion when it was disclosed that no rice supplies were available in

¹¹Chung, op. cit., pp. 85, 89.

¹²Korea's Independence, p. 3.

the south for exchange on a barter basis. When the Americans asked for the right to establish a consulate in Pyongyang, the Russians refused; subsequently, the Soviet Consulate staff in Seoul was forced to withdraw, in June, 1946.¹³

The Soviets finally agreed to a limited coordination in the exchange of mail, allocation of radio frequencies, liaison between the two commands, transportation by rail, motor and water, and the movement of persons between the two zones. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities refused to implement even these limited agreements when the United States Command later attempted to carry them out. Thus, the results of the conference were "confined to intermittent exchange of mail and the exchange of small military liaison teams," and the Soviet approach to the problem of coordination prevailed.¹⁴

First Joint US-USSR Commission
(March 20 to May 8, 1946)

On March 20, the Joint Commission began its deliberations in Seoul. Paragraph two of the Moscow Agreement stipulated that, "in preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations."¹⁵ The divergent interpretation of the Soviet delegate Shtykov on this statement and his attitude of dominating the conference by intransigence and an unswerving policy line resulted in a complete failure of the negotiations.

¹³George M. McCune, "The Occupation of Korea," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (October, 1947), p. 194.

¹⁴Korea's Independence, p. 4.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 19.

From the outset, the Soviet delegate insisted that the Joint Commission should, in connection with the formation of a provisional Korean government, consult only those Korean political parties and social organizations fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement. Such a policy would have eliminated from consultation all Korean groups, labeled reactionary by the chief of the Soviet delegate, which were opposed to the Moscow decision regarding Four-Power trusteeship over Korea. The intent of this Soviet move, as interpreted by David J. Dallin and George M. McCune, was "to eliminate in advance from the government coalition such parties and groups as were opposed to Soviet practice,"¹⁶ and "to provide for a Soviet-oriented Korean state."¹⁷

The American viewpoint was that the Soviet policy

. . . would have excluded from consultation a large majority of Korean people and would have placed in a predominant position in the consultations a Communist minority which has refrained from opposing the Moscow Agreement.¹⁸

The American delegate emphasized the right of Korean groups to exercise free speech and freedom of opinion.

The Soviet delegate achieved a partial and momentary measure of victory when, after four weeks of negotiation, the Americans agreed upon a formula which was issued as Communiqué No. 5, on April 18. The Commission announced that it would consult with groups "truly democratic in their aims and methods" who would subscribe to a declaration to "Uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision," "abide by the decisions of the Joint

¹⁶Dallin, op. cit., p. 302.

¹⁷George M. McCune, "The Occupation of Korea," op. cit., p. 194.

¹⁸Korea, 1945-1948, p. 5.

Commission in . . . the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government," and cooperate with the Commission "in the working out by it . . . of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision."¹⁹

This solution to the problem was short-lived. The Soviet delegate submitted a list of eligible democratic Korean organizations from their zone which did not include any conservative organizations and accused the Americans of excluding certain pro-Soviet organizations from the American list. The Soviet delegate became infuriated when the American Commander issued a statement in explanation of Communiqué No. 5, that signing the declaration for consultation with the Joint Commission would not "indicate that the political parties or social organization favors trusteeship, or that the organization commits itself to support of trusteeship."²⁰ The Soviets reacted by taking the position that no party could be represented by an individual who had expressed opposition to the trusteeship provision of the Moscow formula contained in Communiqué No. 5.²¹

The American delegate rejected the Soviet proposal, and took a strong stand on the principle of free speech. Having reached an impasse on the original problem, the selection of groups for consultation, the Americans proposed the consideration of other measures of the Moscow

¹⁹Full text of Communiqué No. 5 is in Korea's Independence, Annex VI, pp. 19-20.

²⁰Richard E. Lauterbach, Danger From the East (New York: Harper and Brothers Publications, 1947), p. 232.

²¹Korea's Independence, p. 5.

Agreement, such as the integration of Korea's economy and administration. When the Russians refused to discuss these problems, the Joint Commission was adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946.²²

Following the breakdown of negotiations, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, US Army Forces in southern Korea, initiated what developed into a rather lengthy correspondence with Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov, Commanding General, Soviet Forces in northern Korea, in an effort to reach a basis of agreement upon which the Joint Commission could resume its work. General Chistiakov did not reply to the first letters; finally, on August 6, he wrote to General Hodge, offering to resume negotiations, but on Soviet terms.²³

Although the subsequent communications contained charges and counter-charges, the proposals of the Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, appeared to offer a basis for a compromise understanding. General Chistiakov proposed: first, that the Joint Commission "consult those democratic parties and organizations which would uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea"; second, that the organizations consulted could not nominate for consultation any representatives who had actively voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision; third, that the consulted organizations who voiced opposition or incited others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and work of the Joint Commission would be excluded from further consultations by mutual agreement of both delegations.²⁴

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., Annex VII C, pp. 21-22.

²⁴Ibid., Annex VII G, pp. 28-30.

General Hodge's reply of December 24, 1946, represented a considerable compromise on the American side. Regarding General Chistiakov's first point, General Hodge offered no change in the original American position that the signing of the declaration in Communiqué No. 5 would be sufficient to make the signatory organization eligible despite any previous record of opposition. General Hodge did make a concession to the Soviet viewpoint in reference to General Chistiakov's second proposal. He stated that although he considered it the right of an organization to pick its best man for the consultation, the Joint Commission could, "after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman," if it were believed that the representative was "antagonistic to the Allied Powers. . . ."²⁵ General Hodge also accepted the Soviet view on the third point, but suggested a revision of the wording.

These exchange of letters, however, could not solve the disagreement. Recourse to Washington and Moscow appeared to be the only way of breaking the deadlock. Therefore, the subject of Korea was taken up in an exchange of communications between Secretary of State George Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov during the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in April, 1947.

In a letter to Molotov on April 8, Marshall reviewed the events that led to the stalemate in the Joint Commission, and asked that "our governments agree to instruct our respective commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible . . . on basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion," and that "a date be fixed

²⁵Ibid., Annex VII H, pp. 30-31.

for a review by the two governments of the progress made . . . by the Joint Commission."²⁶

In his reply on April 19, Molotov accepted Marshall's proposals, but insisted on consultation with Korean groups which subscribed completely to trusteeship and also blamed the United States for the breakdown of all previous negotiations. Finally he suggested that the Joint Commission reconvene on May 20, 1947. In this respect, it is noteworthy that he stated that there had been "a considerable rapprochement of the point of view of both sides" in the negotiations between Generals Hodge and Chistiakov and that it was expected "that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly."²⁷

Marshall, in his reply on May 2nd, attempted to define more explicitly the terms under which the Joint Commission would operate. He requested that the basis for further negotiations include specifically "respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion."²⁸ He also added, significantly, that "the United States Government had under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development."²⁹

Marshall's statement regarding a rehabilitation plan for Korea lent weight to a fact of which the Soviet authorities were undoubtedly

²⁶Ibid., Annex VIII A, pp. 32-34.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 39.

aware—that is, that "a three-year program of unilateral aid to Korea was being drafted under the Truman policy of quarantining Communism."³⁰ This plan, as David Dallin observed, "did not fail to make an impression in Moscow."³¹ In any event, many observers attributed the conciliatory tone of Foreign Minister Molotov's reply on March 7 to the threat of large-scale American aid for Korea's rehabilitation. He attempted to forestall such an American move by proposing that any "measures of aid and assistance" to Korea be considered by the Joint Commission and the new government for Korea after the "formation of a provisional Korean democratic government."³² At the same time, he offered to accept General Hodge's interpretations of General Chistiakov's proposals in his letter of November 26th, as a basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Thus it appeared that the stalemate over the vital problem of selection of Korean groups for consultation had been broken. The Soviet Union agreed to accept the written declarations of good faith of Korean groups, while the United States agreed that freedom of opinion would not be interpreted to include sanction to attack the Moscow Decision or either party to that decision. On May 12, Marshall acknowledged Molotov's agreement to reconvene on this basis, and the Joint Commission meetings were resumed on May 21, 1947.³³

³⁰Lauterbach, op. cit., p. 235.

³¹Dallin, op. cit., p. 304.

³²Korea's Independence, Annex VIII D, pp. 40-41.

³³Ibid., p. 7.

Second Joint US-USSR Commission
(May 21 to October 18, 1947)

The Soviet delegate, Colonel General Shtykov, continued to disagree with the American delegate on the basic issue of consultation with Korean parties during the first meetings of the reconvened Joint Commission. Nevertheless, it appeared that the question had finally been resolved when the Joint Commission issued its Decision No. 12 on June 12. Quoting from Minister Molotov's letter, his acceptance of interpretations contained in General Hodge's letter of December 24, 1946, the Decision invited applicant Korean groups to submit in writing their views regarding the projected provisional government. It further directed that after the compilation and approval of the list of parties the Joint Commission would have oral consultations with each individual party on the nature of the government to be established.³⁴

Under the terms of Decision No. 12, thirty-eight organizations in the North and 422 groups in the South submitted applications for consultation with the Joint Commission. After formal meetings with the representatives of these groups in South Korea on June 26 and in North Korea on July 1st, the Commission undertook the problem of compiling lists of parties to be consulted.³⁵

At this point, the Soviet delegate reverted to the position which he had taken in the earlier meetings of the Joint Commission by stating that "those parties and individuals which have opposed the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow Agreement were ineligible for consultation...."³⁶

³⁴See Decision No. 12 in Ibid., Annex IX, pp. 41-45.

³⁵Ibid., p. 7.

³⁶Korea, 1945-1948, p. 5.

However, it appeared that the total number of the left-wing political organizations was greater than that of the right-wing, and furthermore, they were well trained throughout the country to follow the Soviet policies. On the other hand, the right-wing leaders were not yet prepared to cooperate in good faith with themselves, and the Americans. For this reason the right-wing political organizations again resumed the "Anti-Trusteeship" campaign for the purpose of blocking the work of the Joint Commission.

Disagreement soon developed on the matter of consultation with the Korean groups. On July 10, the Soviet delegate reverted to the position that it would not allow the inclusion of groups which were members of the "Anti-Trusteeship Committee," and he formally proposed a drastic cut in the number of groups for consultation in the South, omitting most of the rightists.³⁷ The American delegate insisted that "they would not agree to the setting up of a government if the Communists and their groups claimed more than 40 per cent of the posts in it," as they considered that percentage far more than their popular strength.³⁸

Although the Joint Commission remained in session, the deadlock was complete. Subsequent proposals by the American delegate for reviewing the list of consultees and for consulting with the parties were summarily rejected by the Soviet delegate.³⁹ On August 12th, the American delegate submitted a third and final proposal, recommending that a free

³⁷A Historical Summary of US-Korean Relations, p. 65.

³⁸Dallin, op. cit., p. 305.

³⁹Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1947, pp. 294-96.

election with secret balloting by Koreans be held under international supervision in place of oral consultation with Korean parties in order to obtain the opinion of the Korean people. Although the Soviet delegate agreed to dispense with oral consultation of parties, they rejected the idea of a popular election, but David Dallin has attributed their former position to an attempt "to compromise with the Soviet position. . . ." ⁴⁰ Instead of creating a provisional assembly by popular election, the Soviets proposed that the Commission appoint the members on a basis of equal representation from both zones. Again the American delegate rejected the Soviet proposal on the grounds that equal representation would give disproportionate representation to the northern zone which contained less than one-third of Korea's total population. ⁴¹

Thus the stalemate continued. Once again the initiative was taken at a higher level. On August 11, Secretary of State Marshall communicated to Foreign Minister Molotov, referring to his letter of April 19, 1947, in recommending that the Joint Commission be instructed to report by August 21 the status of its deliberations so that "each government may immediately consider what further step may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent and united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations." ⁴²

Foreign Minister Molotov replied on August 23 that "the Soviet Union had no objection to ask the Joint Commission to make report," but

⁴⁰Dallin, op. cit., p. 305.

⁴¹Korea's Independence, p. 9.

⁴²Ibid., p. 51.

stated that the arrest of left-wing leaders for subversive activities in South Korea was inadmissible, and that the Soviet Government could not consent to consult with Korean groups active in the "Anti-Trusteeship Committee."⁴³

The Joint Commission practically ended its function at this time, but it continued as a Commission until October 18, 1947, when both governments formally agreed that it be suspended.

⁴³USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and Korean Question—Document, 1945-1948 (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948), p. 47.

CHAPTER III

THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

EFFORT TO UNITE KOREA

The policy of the United States and the Soviet Union toward Korea during the period after the occupation of Korea had been to select the best available choice from three possible alternatives:

1. To establish a coalition government for Korea in agreement with the United States and the Soviet Union;
2. To establish a government in the South and the North which for a number of years would be controlled or aided politically and economically by the United States and the Soviet Union;
3. To hold general elections and establish a national congress and national government in accordance with the sovereign will of the entire Korean people.¹

Among these alternatives, the first had finally been eliminated because of the failure of the United States and Soviet Union bilateral conference to find means of consultation with Korean groups in order to establish a national legislature. Therefore, the choice rested between the two remaining possibilities.

The United Nations Effort to Unite Korea

The United Nations Resolution For the Unification of Korea

Considering the desire of all the Korean people for a united,

¹Youngtai Pyun, Korea My Country (Washington, D.C.: Library of National Speech, Korean Pacific Press, 1953), p. 59.

independent, and democratic government, and convinced that it was clear that further discussion with the Soviet Union would be fruitless, the United States, therefore, on August 26, 1947, proposed to the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the Republic of China that "the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet at Washington, D.C. to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out" and further set forth a substitute for the Moscow plan.²

The chief feature of the alternative plan was the holding of elections in Korea under the guidance of the United Nations for the formation of a national legislature and government.³ The governments of China and the United Kingdom accepted this proposal but the Soviet Union rejected the idea in a reply on September 4, on the grounds that the Joint Commission had not exhausted all its possibilities, that the United States had acted unilaterally in inviting the United Kingdom and China to such a conference, and the conference itself would be outside the scope of the Moscow Agreement.⁴

In spite of the Soviet rejection, Secretary of State Marshall, speaking for the United States at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 17, asserted the need for the speedy unification of Korea:

Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel There is little or no exchange of goods or service

²The Department of State Bulletin, XVII (September 7, 1947), pp. 473-75.

³Loc.cit.

⁴The Soviet Union and Korean Question, pp. 36-38.

between the two zones. Korea's economy is thus crippled.

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It is therefore the intention of the United States government to present the problem of Korean independence to the session of the General Assembly.⁵

The Korean question was formally proposed to the General Assembly by the United States delegate on September 23. The Soviet delegate A. Y. Vyshinsky, immediately objected to it and insisted that the Korean question should not be brought before the United Nations, because it was a part of the general question of the post-war settlement to be solved by the powers concerned and an international agreement had been made at Moscow on this matter. He further claimed that the United States had been fully responsible for the failure to establish an independent Korean government and unification of the country.⁶

On October 29, in spite of the Soviet objection, the First Committee of the General Assembly began its debate on the question of Korea. The United States delegate, John F. Dulles, proposed a draft resolution which provided for elections in the southern and northern zones by March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations.⁷

Meanwhile the Soviet delegate submitted a proposal of his own for a "purely propagandistic and time consuming" reason.⁸ The first proposal was for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea by the

⁵Korea, 1945-48, pp. 47-48.

⁶The United Nations, UN Weekly Bulletin, November 4, 1947, p. 591.

⁷Ibid., pp. 591-93.

⁸Dallin, op. cit., p. 308.

beginning of 1948, in order to give the Koreans a free opportunity to establish their own government. It was rejected. The Soviet delegate submitted a second proposal which provided that "in as much as the Korean question, which is before the General Assembly, is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence," the Korean question could not be fairly resolved "without the participation in the discussion of representatives of the Korean people from both zones to take part in the discussion of the question." But this was also rejected.⁹

After the debate in the First Committee, the United States resolution was adopted as a whole. And the resolution "Establishment of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) and Program for Korean Independence," which was recommended by the First Committee was adopted by the General Assembly, without the Soviet bloc taking part in the voting,¹⁰ on November 14, 1947:

(A)

The General Assembly

1. ;
2. . . . resolves that . . . , there be forthwith established a UNTCOK, to be represent in Korea, with the right to travel,

⁹Korea, 1945-1948, p. 50.

¹⁰On November 13, the Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko in the First Committee warned, after the American draft resolution was adopted, that the American plan was not designed to settle the Korean question "but would only put difficulties in the way of its settlement. Obviously, it is those who imposed such plans that are primarily responsible for the situation." And then he declared that he would not "take part in the voting on the Committee's resolution at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly." The Soviet Union and Korean Question, pp. 55-56.

observe and consult throughout Korea.

(B)

1. ;
2. Recommends that the election be held not later than March 31, 1948 . . . ;
3. Further recommends that as soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation;
4. Further recommends . . . , that Government should, in consultation with the Commission: (a) constitutes its own national security forces . . . ; (b) take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea; (c) arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days.¹¹

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Function and Operation of the UNTCOK and the Soviet Attitude

The organization of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was the first of a series of measures taken by the United Nations in recognition of the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea. Now the United Nations took over the task on which the United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach an agreement during the preceeding two years. The major function of the Temporary Commission, therefore, was to secure the election of representatives of the Korean people in order to consider the problem of independent government of Korea. The Temporary Commission, representing seven states and composed of seventy-two members,¹² held its first meeting at Seoul on

¹¹United Nations General Assembly, Official Record: Second Session, September 16 to November 29, 1947, pp. 16-18.

¹²The following countries were members of the Temporary Commission: Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, the Ukrainian S.S.R. However, the representative of

January 12, 1948.¹³

On February 15th, the Temporary Commission sent an official communication to the military authorities of southern and northern Korea stating that the Chairman of the Temporary Commission, Krishna Menon of India, wished to pay courtesy calls upon the Commanders. General Hodge promptly replied in the affirmative to the Temporary Commission, but Lieutenant General G. P. Korotkov, Soviet Commander in the north, refused to accept any communications issued by the Temporary Commission, because of the negative attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward the establishment of the Temporary Commission.¹⁴

Following the failure of the Temporary Commission to gain entry into northern Korea or even to establish any contact with the Soviet authorities, the Temporary Commission consulted with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. The conclusion of the Committee was embodied in a resolution adopted on February 26, which was originally submitted by the United States, that the Temporary Commission should "proceed with the observation of elections in all Korea and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as is accessible to it."¹⁵

the Ukrainian S.S.R. refused to participate in the work, because representatives of the Korean people had not been invited to attend the debate at the First Commission of the General Assembly. See Ibid.

¹³New York Times, January 11, 1948, p. 8.

¹⁴The Soviet delegate, Gromyko, declared, on November 13, 1947, at the First Committee that "the formation of such a commission would be impermissible, since it contradicts the right of Korean people to self-determination." The Soviet Union and Korean Question, p. 61.

¹⁵UNTCOK, First Part of Report, Vol. I, General Assembly, Official Record: Third Session, Suppl. No. 9 (A/575), Lake Success, 1948), p. 26.

Two days later, the Temporary Commission decided that elections be held in as much of Korea as was accessible to it. The American military authorities followed with an announcement on the same day that an election, under the observation of the Temporary Commission, would be held in southern Korea on May 9, 1948.¹⁶ (However, this date was later changed to May 10, 1948.)

As a consequence, the realization of the peaceful unification of Korea became an impossible task. As had been the case in China and Greece, the only path to unification was that of bloody struggle between fellow countrymen. With this realization, the possibility of war between the North and South greatly increased.

Communists Obstruction and the Attitude of the Anti-Syngman Rhee Circle

The Communist campaign of terror and sabotage which had continued throughout the south since the arrival of the Temporary Commission in early January, 1948, became increasingly intensive following the official announcement of the date for the general elections in southern Korea. All public utilities and transportation were shut down by a nation-wide strike and a new outburst of Communist terror brought about the death of a number of citizens and police officers.¹⁷

The outlook for political and economic order seemed remote in the South as the critical turmoil reached a condition which would be

¹⁶Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁷New York Times, February 27, p. 10 and February 28, 1949, p. 6.

described as a step short of an armed revolution. However, American military authorities quickly counteracted it by creating extreme right-wing youth corps in all sections of the country to fight the Communist violence, and the Military Government went so far as to label all non-rightists as Communists. The Communist campaign was rendered largely ineffective as election day approached by the actions of the youth corps.

However, in Cheju Island, which forms a portion of the extreme southern part of Korea and has a population of about 280,000 persons, local Communists with the aid of agents from beyond the 38th parallel revolted against local authorities. On April 3rd, mobs attacked local police stations and executed right-wing adherents and police officers in kangaroo courts. Finally they fled into Mount Hanra where they formed guerrilla groups with a view toward further disturbance.¹⁸

While Communists were carefully proceeding with their violent plans for the destruction of law and order in the south, they scored important successes, as far as anti-American pro-Soviet propaganda was concerned, when the North Korean Communists played upon strong sentiment for unity of the country which undoubtedly existed in many citizens in the South. In fact, many people in the South complained against the holding of separate elections on the ground that adequate efforts had not been made to reach an agreement with the regime in the North, and also because they believed that a separate election would permanently divide the country.¹⁹

¹⁸Korea, Its Land, . . . , p. 201.

¹⁹A representative opinion against separate elections can be found in an interview between Dr. Kyooshi Kim, Speaker, South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and the Temporary Commission. Dr. Kim

As early as February 21, 1948, when it appeared that the separate elections in the South would be inevitable because of the Soviet objection, the North Korean "People's Committee" invited some right-wing and many middle-of-the-road political leaders in South Korea who were mostly political foes to Syngman Rhee to attend a "United Conference" in Pyongyang to discuss a possibility of the formation of a united government.²⁰ It brought immediate opposition from the American Military authorities and most of the southern right-wing leaders denounced it as an attempt of the Soviet Union to seize country-wide power.

In spite of this, North Korean Communists succeeded in getting a number of South Korean leaders who knew nothing of the Communist techniques of maneuver to attend. On April 19, more than fifty eminent individuals of the anti-Syngman Rhee circle in South Korea, including such men as Koo Kim, Chairman of the Korean Independence Party from Jungking, China, and Kyooshik Kim, who just stepped out from the office of Speaker, South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, crossed the 38th parallel and attended the conference. Their great common ambition was nothing more than the reunification of the country in a genuine way.

On April 23rd, the "United Conference," as was predicted by

said that "any Korean who talks about a south Korean unilateral government will go down in history as a 'bad egg' because once that term is used, Communists in north Korea under the direction of the Soviet Union will establish what we call a 'People's Republic' or 'People's Committee.' Then you will have two unilateral governments. . . . Not only that, but once such a thing occurs in history, it will go down for ever, and it will be perpetuated; then you are responsible, and we are responsible for perpetuating the division of Korea into a northern half and a southern half. . ." First Part of Report, Vol. I, p. 80.

²⁰New York Times, March 27, 1948, pp. 1, 5.

many observers in the South, produced a notable resolution which amounted to an endorsement of the Soviet stand for the unification of Korea. The adopted resolution reads as follows:

. . . we consider it our duty to say it plainly—that the responsibility for the intolerable situation created in Korea rests squarely on the ruling circles of the U.S.A. who intend to hold separate elections in southern Korea with the aim of perpetuating existing temporary division of Korea and **restraining** the country's unification and the reestablishment of its independence.

. . . the Korean people will never agree to the holding of separate elections in the south and will hinder it by all the means at their disposal. On behalf of the twenty-seven million people of Korea we protest against the holding of separate elections in the south. . . .

The Korean people . . . are striving for unity and democracy. The Korean nation is capable of creating by itself a single democratic government without foreign interference.

The United Conference addresses the request to the governments of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. that they should simultaneously withdraw their troops from Korea and enable our people—freely, according to their own wishes and without foreign interference—to hold general elections for a national Korean democratic government. . . .²¹

In replying to the address of the "United Conference," the Soviet Government, on May 7, affirmed the proposal "to withdraw its troops from Korea on the condition that the United States troops are withdrawn from Korea simultaneously."²² Thus the Soviet Union could openly blame all the responsibility of separate elections on the Americans.

²¹"Message of the United Conference . . . to the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Korea, April 23, 1948," The Soviet Union and the Korean Question, pp. 66-67.

²²Ibid., p. 69.

Two Koreas: The Republic and the People's RepublicElection of May 10, 1948 and
The Republic of Korea

For the first democratic election in Korea history, 80 per cent of the eligible voters in South Korea completed their registration, and on May 10 an estimated 95 per cent of the total registered voters went to the polls to cast ballots in an election characterized by every mark of public approval and enthusiasm, as reported by the Temporary Commission.²³

On May 31, 1948, 170 newly elected representatives convened for the first time to elect a Representative, Syngman Rhee, as Speaker of the National Assembly. Speaker Rhee, in his inaugural address, stressed the policy of unification and pointed out that the Koreans in the northern zone had not been permitted by the Soviet Union to participate in the United Nations sponsored free election, and directed his hearers' attention to the fact that seats proportionate in number to the population had been left vacant for the later participation of the peoples in the northern zone.²⁴

In further efforts to achieve unification, the National Assembly, on June 12, appealed to the people of North Korea, urging them to "hold a general election soon in a free atmosphere, in accordance with the United Nations resolution," as the South had done, "and elect the true

²³First Part of the Report, Vol. I, p. 44.

²⁴UNICOK, Second Part of the Report, Vol. II, Annex I-VII, General Assembly, Official Record: Third Session, Supp. No. 9 (A/575, Add. 4), Paris, 1948, p. 3.

representatives of the people," and send them to the National Assembly to sit with them.²⁵

In the early period of the National Assembly, the major task was to draft a new constitution for the Republic of Korea. After having considerable debate and discussion the National Assembly, on July 12, adopted a constitution, on the basis of a compromise between the American and British model, which proclaimed its sovereignty to extend to all sections of Korea.²⁶ It was formally promulgated on July 17. A few days later, on July 20, the National Assembly elected Speaker Rhee the first President of the Republic, and Syong Iee, Vice-President. The appointment of various executive positions of the government were made early in August.²⁷

Finally, on August 15, 1948, the third anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule, the peoples of South Korea heard that

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶See article 4 of the constitution of the Republic of Korea. Office of Public Information, A Hand Book of Korea (Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1956), p. 62.

²⁷The cabinet ministers of the newly-created Republic of Korea were as follows:

Prime Minister, and Defense Minister: Bumsuk Lee (National Youth Corps)
 Interior Minister: Chyong Yun (Korean Nationalist Party)
 Foreign Minister: Taeksang Chang (Korean Democratic Party)
 Finance Minister: Doyun Kim (Korean Democratic Party)
 Justice Minister: In Lee (Independence)
 Agriculture Minister: Bongam Cho (Ex-Communist)
 Commerce Minister: Louis Ym (Korean Nationalist Party)
 Education Minister: Hosang Ahn (National Youth Corps)
 Communication Minister: Suko Yun (Korean Nationalist Party)
 Social Welfare Minister: Jinhan Chun (Korean Trade Union)
 Ministers Without Portfolio: Yunyong Lee (Chosun Democratic Party)
 Chungchun Lee (Korean Youth Organization)

(Source: Based on George M. McCune, Korea Today, pp. 238-40.)

General MacArthur had transferred the governmental authority to Korean hands. In his address, General MacArthur pledged President Rhee to assist in unifying Korea, and to do it in a way which would promote "the further stability of the continent of Asia," a goal which involved the destruction of Communist power in Asia.²⁸

In accepting the governmental power from General MacArthur, President Rhee once more appealed to the people of northern Korea and to their regime to send "the missing one third of our representatives from the North." And he continued his determination for the reunification of the country:

The thirty-eight parallel division is no part of our choice and is wholly foreign to our destiny. Nothing must be neglected to keep wide open the door to reunion of the whole nation. The White Head Mountain is surely our boundary to the north as are the Straits of Korea to the south. No temporary international situation can obscure what has been established through the centuries of historic fact.²⁹

Following the official inauguration of the Republic, the United States defined their respective position on the Government of the Republic of Korea, and after the United Nations General Assembly's action in favor of the new Republic later that year,³⁰ full diplomatic recognition was

²⁸New York Times, August 15, 1948, p. 1. See also John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 161.

²⁹Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), p. 169.

³⁰On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the following resolution on Korea: "There has been established a lawful government [the Government of the R.O.K.] having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea . . .; that this government is based on elections which were valid expression of the free will of the electorate . . .; and this is the only government in Korea." United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949 (New York: The United Nations, 1949), pp. 288-89.

extended. On January 1, 1949, the United States named John J. Muccio, of Rhode Island, as the first United States Ambassador to the Republic.³¹ Similar action was taken by the other free countries in the following months.³²

Election of August 25, 1948 and the
Korean People's Democratic Republic

The course of events in the South brought a prompt response from the Soviet zone of the North. While they were bitterly protesting the separate elections in the South, the North Korean "People's Assembly," on May 1, 1948, adopted a draft constitution, an example of the Stalin Constitution of 1936, which was originally presented by a Special Committee organized in November, 1947.³³ At this time it also announced its decision to establish another regime in North Korea.³⁴

³¹New York Times, January 2, 1949, p. 1.

³²The following countries recognized the Republic of Korea in the early period of its existence: The Philippines (December 2, 1948), China (January 1, 1949), United Kingdom (January 8), France (February 5), Venezuela (March 3), Holland (April 13), The Vatican (April 13), Chile (May 27), Brazil (July 10), Dominican Republic (June 20), Cuba (July 18), Greece (August 7), Costa Rica (August 12), Australia (August 15), Belgium (August 15), Luxembourg (August 29), Thailand (October), Iceland (February 12, 1950). Source: Based on Korean, Its Land, . . . , pp. 160-75.

³³In fact, right after the General Assembly adopted the resolution on Korea on November 14, 1947, the Soviet Government was determined to create their own puppet regime in North Korea. A special commission was appointed in North Korea to draw up a constitution; on March 2, 1948, the North Korean "Presidium" of the "People's Assembly" adopted this draft constitution which claimed sovereignty over all Korea. See Philip Rudolf, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. 17; and "A Chronology of Principal Events, 1945-1950," op. cit., p. 323.

³⁴New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1948.

In order to finalize preparations to condemn the separate elections in the South and to justify their future course, North Korean Communists once again called a "United Conference" to be held at Pyongyang from June 26 through July 5, 1948. However, most South Koreans who had participated in the conference in April declined to attend, and issued a statement denouncing it as illegal and contrary to the promises of the North Korean leaders that they would not set up a separate government even if the United Nations enforced the elections in the South. Furthermore they condemned the North Korean leaders for cutting off the flow of electricity on March 14, 1948, claiming that this was a violation of their promise to them to continue to supply electricity to the South whatever happened.

The second "United Conference" which ended on July 5 adopted a detailed program for the creation of a Communist regime in the North:

1. Non-recognition of the South Korean "National Assembly" and the "Government" set up as a result of the 'UN' election;
2. Establishment of Korea's Supreme People's Assembly on the basis of general elections and a Korean Central Government composed of representatives from south and north Korea;
3. The Supreme People's Assembly and the Central Government of Korea to see to the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.³⁵

On July 10, the North Korean "People's Constitution," which was adopted by the "People's Assembly" on May 1, was proclaimed by the North Korean "People's Committee," and on July 12, the day South Korea adopted her new constitution, it was announced that the nation-wide elections would be held on August 25 for a "Supreme People's Assembly of Korea" which

³⁵World Culture, A Chronicle of Principal Event Relating to the Korean Question: 1945-1954 (Peking: Shihchieh Chihshin, 1954), pp. 16-17.

would consist of 572 deputies of which 360 deputies would come from South Korea.³⁶

Finally, on August 25th, an election³⁷ for the "Supreme People's Assembly" of Korea, which was claimed to establish a single Korean government, was held in northern Korea. The North Korean regime announced that 99.97 per cent of the eligible voters of North Korea participated in the election, and that the election was also held in South Korea where over 8.5 million voters, that was 77.5 per cent of the total eligible voters in South Korea, elected 360 deputies.³⁸

There is no reliability to the figure that 77.5 per cent of the southern voters participated and we do not know how it came out.³⁹ What actually happened was that a convention of 1002 professed delegates of the South Korean Communists and left-wing leaders met from August 22nd through 24th at Haeju, a town situated just north of the 38th parallel,

³⁶Second Part of the Report, Vol. II, p. 22.

³⁷Unlike the election held in South Korea in May, 1948, it was a single slate of candidates backed by all the parties and organizations under the United Democratic Front of North Korea. On the ballot, therefore, the fiction of existence of separate parties was completely ignored. This slate was submitted to a public rally of the voters and accepted by acclaim after the required speeches. At the ballot, the voters were given the choice either accepting or rejecting the official slate in its entirety by casting votes in public. A white ballot box signified "yes" and black box "no." Quoted from Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 99.

³⁸Second Part of the Report, Vol. II, p. 22.

³⁹The figure probably came out from the result of the widespread campaign of the collection of signatures on the issue "Do you prefer a united or divided Korea?" It was taken in the South since the arrival of the U.N. Temporary Commission. See Ibid.

and they picked 360 deputies to represent southern Korea in the "Supreme People's Assembly" in Pyongyang.⁴⁰

The "Supreme People's Assembly" met at Pyongyang on September 2, to ratify the "People's Constitution" which was proclaimed on July 10, and later proclaimed the establishment of the "Korean People's Democratic Republic" claiming its jurisdiction over the entire territory of Korea and further declared Seoul to be the capital of the regime and Pyongyang as the temporary seat of the government.⁴¹

The Soviets hand-picked Ilsung Kim, Chairman of the North Korean "People's Committee," was named as "the Chairman of the Ministerial Cabinet" of "the Korean People's Democratic Republic" on September 9, 1948, and his choice of a so-called "coalition government" was approved by the "Supreme People's Assembly." The composition of the new cabinet was as follows:

Chairman of Ministerial Cabinet: Ilsung Kim (North Korean Worker's Party—NKWP)
 Deputy Chairman and Foreign Minister: Hunyong Park (South Korean Worker's Party—SKWP)
 Deputy Chairman: Myonghi Hong (South Korean Democratic Independence Party)
 Deputy Chairman and Industrial Minister: Check Kim (NKWP)
 Interior Minister: Ilu Park (NKWP)
 Defense Minister: Yongkun Choi (NKWP)
 National Inspection Minister: Wonbong Kim (South Korean People's Republican Party)
 Justice Minister: Sungyup Lee (SKWP)
 Agriculture Minister: Mungu Park (SKWP)
 Communication Minister: Chunchu Kim (North Korean Young Friend Party)
 Railroad Minister: Yunha Chu (NKWP)
 Labor Minister: Sungtak Hur (South Korean Federation of Labor)
 Education Minister: Namhun Paik (SKWP)

⁴⁰George M. McCune, Korea Today, pp. 246-47.

⁴¹See New Times, Moscow, (September 15, 1948), p. 32.

Finance Minister: Changil Choi (NKWP)
 Trade Minister: Hsiu Chang (NKWP)
 Cultural Minister: Chungduk Hur (SKWP)
 Minister without Portfolio: Kukro Lee (South Korean Society
 for Revival of the Nation)
 National Planning Committee: Jungtak Chung (NKWP)⁴²

Finally, on September 10, Ilsung Kim read the government program to the "Supreme People's Assembly" which put the unification of the country as the prime objective to be sought. The "Declaration of the Korean People's Democratic Republic" which could be regarded as the earliest proclamation of war against South Korea read as follows:

Created by the will of the people of North and South Korea, the national government will rally the entire Korean people and put forth its fullest effort for the earliest unification of the country and the formation of a single democratic, sovereign state. The government will strive for the effectuation of the USSR proposal for a simultaneous withdrawal of the foreign troops from Korea, a paramount and essential condition for the reunification of the Korean nation.

All laws dating from period of Japanese domination and established with the purpose of enslaving the country, as well as the anti-democratic, unpopular laws of the reactionary puppet government of South Korea . . . will be declared null and void. The Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic will consistently enforce the laws on agrarian reform, the law on nationalization of industry, the law on labor, the law on equality of women, and other democratic reforms and changes already effected in North Korea. Together with the entire Korean people, it will struggle and take the measures necessary securing their application throughout the country. . . .⁴³

Upon the request of Ilsung Kim to have close diplomatic and

⁴²William Manel (ed.), Soviet Source Materials on USSR Relations with East Asia: 1945-1950 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), pp. 272-73. It is an interesting fact that Soviet-Koreans occupied not only strategical Ministries, but also all of the Offices of the Vice-Minister. See the inner circle of the Soviet-Koreans in the cabinet in North Korea: A Case Study . . . , pp. 30-31.

⁴³Manel, Ibid.

economic relations with the Soviet Union, Marshall Stalin, on October 12, 1948, extended his recognition and encouraged the Korean people to create a single independent state.⁴⁴ Soon followed the same recognition by the Soviet satellite states.⁴⁵ On October 18, Colonel General Shtykov, former Soviet delegate to the Joint US-USSR Commission, was appointed as first Soviet Ambassador to North Korea. For his past activities in the Joint Commission and for the future activities in Korea, he had been awarded the Order of Lenin on December 3, 1948.⁴⁶ He arrived at Pyongyang on January 11, 1949.⁴⁷ North Korea, on the other hand, sent a prominent intellectual Communist, Yunha Chu, who had served as Transportation Minister since the establishment of the regime in September, 1948. He arrived in Moscow on January 27, 1949, as the first North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

⁴⁴Full text of letter exchange between Ilsung Kim and Marshal Stalin is in USSR Information Bulletin, VIII (October 20, 1948), pp. 619, 648.

⁴⁵North Korean regime was recognized by Communist China, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Hungaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia. New Times, October 20, p. 32, and October 27, 1948, p. 32. New York Times, December 4, 1948.

⁴⁶Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East: 1945-1951 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 176.

⁴⁷New Times, January 19, 1949, p. 32. This time Shtykov served in a dual capacity with diplomatic and military functions. He not only represented the Soviet Foreign Ministry as Ambassador to North Korea, but also was attached to the Soviet Far Eastern Military Command as Colonel General of the Red Army.

⁴⁸Pravda, January 28, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 1, 1949, p. 32.

CHAPTER IV

FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN ARMED ATTACK

ON SOUTH KOREA: I

Early Soviet Occupation Policies In North Korea (1945-1948)

While the United States fumbled in the south, where they had no special program except the one based on the agreement with the Soviet Union, namely to disarm the Japanese troops, repatriate them, and reunite the country as provided for in war time agreements, the Soviet authorities in the north started at once upon a ruthless plan aimed at creating a new satellite favorable to the Soviet Union and bringing the population under the iron rule of state police.

Political Consolidation of Power Under Soviet-Koreans

When the Russian troops entered northern Korea on August 12, 1945, they found that numerous Korean committees of law and order, known as "Korean People's Provisional Committees," were already in existence and had taken over the administration of the country from the Japanese. The Russians gave these committees authority to function under the Soviet Command.¹ At the same time, North Korean Communists who were released

¹J. W. Washburn, "Russia Looks at Northern Korea," Pacific Affairs, XX (June, 1947), pp. 152-53.

from prisons joined these committees and created many new ones.

Furthermore, the Russians imported from Siberia thirty-six young elite Soviet-Koreans, among them Ilsung Kim, Il Nam, Kail Hur, Check Kim and Hase Bang, who had become loyal Soviet citizens. Soon this number increased by thousands. These emigrees were "thoroughly familiar with Soviet ideology and methodology . . . [which] enabled the Russians to set up a Korean speaking bureaucracy [functioning] between themselves and local population."² This tactic of Soviet occupation procedure differed considerably from that of the Americans who brought in "a few aged and conservative Korean exiles and looked to them for assistance and leadership."³

With the local "people's committee" as the base of the new regime, the Soviet Command's next step was to reorganize the Executive powers of the former Japanese government. Guided by the Soviet authorities, the "Executive Committee" began to organize the interim government in the northern zone. In this manner, the Soviet planners were able to gain the advantage by "giving the impression that Korean leaders possessed real as well as nominal authority in the government of North Korea,"⁴ and it also allowed the Soviets to evade responsibility for any chaos resulting from the change over from Japanese control.

Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities still retained complete control, for, according to George M. McCune, "the political officers attached

²Lauterbach, op. cit., p. 212; and Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 59.

³Lauterbach, loc. cit.

⁴George M. McCune, "The Occupation of Korea," op. cit., p. 191.

to the Russian Command exercised final authority on all matters."⁵

On February 9, 1946, the "Provisional People's Committee of Northern Korea" was established at Pyongyang to replace the "Executive Committee" as the central executive body.⁶ Soviet citizen Ilsung Kim became chairman of the central organ. He also was made Secretary-General of the North Korean Communist Party and Chairman of the "North Korean Democratic National Front," a coalition of pro-Communist parties. Thus, in practice, elite Soviet-Koreans became supreme in the interim regime in the northern zone.

The first elections in northern Korea were held on November 3, to confirm the selection of the membership in the various "People's Committees." As a final step in organizing the government in the northern zone, a congress of "People's Committee" was convened in Pyongyang in February, 1947. After approving all the previous activities of the interim government and adopting a national economic plan, it proceeded to elect a legislative body, called the "People's Assembly." They also elected a Presidium and Supreme Court, and changed the name of the "Interim Committee" to the "People's Committee" of northern Korea.⁷ This "People's Committee" functioned with authority by the time the "Korean People's Democratic Republic" was proclaimed in early September, 1948.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Washburn, op. cit., p. 154.

⁷Ibid., p. 159; and George M. McCune, "The Occupation of Korea," op. cit., p. 192.

Early Build-Up of the
North Korean Forces

From the beginning of the Russian occupation of northern Korea, the Soviet authorities pursued a policy to organize powerful North Korean forces under the leadership of the Soviet-Koreans and former Communist Chinese 8th Route Army returnees to serve as a bulwark for the North Korean Communist Party and eliminate the possibility of organized resistance by the people against the Communist rule. However, most important of all was the possibility that this army, following the evacuation of Korea by occupation troops of the Soviet Union and the United States, could be used to "unify the two zones under one Communist government, and make Korea one of the satellites of Russia."⁸

With this in mind, the Soviet authorities recruited thousands of young North Koreans from many different militia organizations. Half of these new recruits were sent to Siberia to be trained as a future North Korean tank corps and air force,⁹ while the remaining men were put into training camps for the future "Security Forces." In early 1946 the training of the regular North Korean forces proper, under the name of "Security Forces," began. Four "Security Staff Training Schools," with unified headquarters in Pyongyang, were established in North Korea.¹⁰ At the same time, the North Korean "Security Bureau" was added

⁸Dallin, op. cit., p. 300.

⁹North Korea, A Case Study . . ., p. 85. See also "Transcript of a Statement by the Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, Before the Committee I on the Korean Item," United States Mission to the United Nations (New York: Press Released October 24, 1952), p. 13.

¹⁰The remaining schools were located as follow: The Second School in Ranam, the Third School in Nam Shinichu, and finally the Fourth School in Kangkae. See Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyong," Tongah Ilbo, June 28, 1962, p. 2.

to the "People's Committee" to direct their activities. General Yongkun Choi, former Commander of the Korean troops in the Communist Chinese 8th Route Army, was appointed its first Director and Soviet-Korean Il Kim, and Lieutenant General Muchung Kim, a former 8th Route Army officer, were chosen as his deputies.¹¹

8 In the autumn of the same year, the Soviet Government dispatched a group of well-trained Russian military instructors, headed by Major General Smirnov, to North Korea, and under their leadership two infantry divisions, the 1st Division in Pyongyang under Ung Kim, another former 8th Route Army officer, and the 2nd Division in Ranam under the Soviet-Korean Kun Kang, were organized in early 1947.¹² Each of these divisions were fully equipped with Soviet arms, and had as many as 150 Russian advisors attached to them.¹³

The size of the "Security Forces" was steadily increased,¹⁴ and on February 8, 1948, when the North Korean "People's Committee" declared the establishment of the "Korean People's Army" it possessed three full-

¹¹Changsun Kim, "Yukio Wa Hunyong Park," Hankook Ilbo, June 25, 1962, p. 2.

¹²Yeoungbook Ju, "I was in the Invading Army in Korea," Korean Survey, XIII, No. 8 (October, 1958), p. 4.

¹³North Korea, A Case Study . . . , p. 15.

¹⁴Even though the Soviet authorities adopted a conscription plan in January, 1947, they depended almost exclusively upon "volunteers" in the 18 to 22 year age bracket. During this period (1947-1948) of selective recruitment, the procedure was for the Security Bureau to send down its quotas to township draft boards via the Provincial and Country People's Committee. A draft board then held a series of public meetings, at which the virtues of military service were extolled, candidates who had been selected beforehand offered their service to the fatherland, and the recruit or his family were promised numerous welfare benefits. Ibid., p. 69.

strength infantry divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions; the 4th Independent Brigade; a Tank Regiment; and an Air Regiment. They also possessed two brigades, the 38th Parallel Patrol and Korean-Manchurian Border Patrol Brigades, a Security Company attached to each of the six provinces and the Coastal Guard. The total strength was estimated between 50,000 and 60,000 men in the "People's Army" and 25,000 in the "Security Detachment."¹⁵ In addition, there were between 100,000 to 150,000 well-trained and indoctrinated militia groups equipped poorly with various Japanese small arms.¹⁶ All civilians between the ages of 18 and 50 were given military training on a part-time basis, thus permitting them to continue performing civilian duties as part of the two-year national plan which was also under way.¹⁷

Through vigorous training and battle experience, which was given both in Korea against the South Korean Constabulary and in Manchuria against the Nationalist Chinese soldiers,¹⁸ these men became crack troops according to their Soviet instructors. Russian advisors

¹⁵ROK, Defense Department, Han Kook Dong Ran Ilnyun Chi (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Defense, 1954), p. 32; North Korea, A Case Study, . . . , p. 7. See also "Transcript of statement by Dean G. Acheson, . . . , op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁶George M. McCune, Korea Today, p. 171; Intelligence Digest, December, 1948, p. 17.

¹⁷North Korea, A Case Study . . . , p. 69.

¹⁸See how the North Korean forces participated in the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria during the Chinese Civil War in the Department of State, United Nations Action in Korea, Under the Unified Command, 4th Report to the United Nations Security Council (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 5. See also U.S. Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearing, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part III, p. 2112; New York Times, July 9, 1950.

believed the Koreans to be the crack troops of the Far East at the time the North Korean regime was established in September, 1948.¹⁹ Moreover, through constant purges and intensive indoctrination which emphasized the soldier's special role as taught by the "cultural officers," who were attached to every unit of the North Korean forces, the army developed into a group of politically minded soldiers.²⁰

Soviet Troop Withdrawal
From North Korea

Having failed to bring the whole of Korea under the Soviet influence during the bilateral conference with the United States (1946-1947), the Soviet Government started a campaign, from mid-1947, for a speedy withdrawal of both American and Russian troops from Korea, knowing that the North Korean Communists could secure an easy victory over South Korea with their vastly superior forces.

This challenge, however, met with only a mild American reaction, an surprisingly the United States Government gave serious consideration to the problem of how American occupation troops could be withdrawn from Korea and be used elsewhere.²¹ Withdrawal was considered because of Korea's strategic insignificance,²² and, in part, because of the severe shortage of military manpower resulting from the tightening defense budget.²³ In light of the Soviet move, the United States arranged to

²⁰Ibid., July 9, 1962, p. 2.

²¹See the strength of the United States armed forces, below

²²See details in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 325.

²³Ibid., pp. 325-26; Military Situation in the Far East, Part III, pp. 2008-2009, 2327.

include the question to be dealt with in the forthcoming second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947.

Therefore, on September 23, the United States delegate to the United Nations submitted a resolution to the General Assembly which supported the following view on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea:

The maintenance of foreign occupation forces on Korean soil any longer than was necessary would be detrimental to the effort of the Korean people to prepare themselves for the responsibility of self-government, as well as inconsistent with the sovereign and independent status of the Korean government, whose establishment it was hoped would be one of the fruits of the resolution.²⁴

The Soviet Government finally secured an American pledge that they would ultimately withdraw from the Korean peninsula. But it was only to take place after the establishment of a Korean government. This American pledge did not guarantee the Soviet Union's ultimate goal of control of all Korea through a process of "civil war" if the Americans established a friendly government in their occupation zone.

In order to make the Soviet position more favorable, and to insure that Korea would be unified under Soviet influence, the Soviet Government immediately launched a series of campaigns for the immediate withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Korea, so that the Korean question could be solved by means of a "civil war." On September 26, the Soviet delegate to the US-USSR Joint Commission at Seoul officially presented the following proposal:

The Soviet delegation . . . holds that the Koreans may be given

²⁴Department of State, The Conflict in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 5.

the opportunity to form a government by themselves, without the aid and participation of the Allies, on condition that the American and Soviet troops, are withdrawn from Korea. The Soviet delegation holds that all foreign troops should be withdrawn in the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be prepared to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops.²⁵

The United States delegate on the Joint Commission took the position "that such a proposal was outside the sphere of authority delegated to the Joint Commission."²⁶ The Soviet Union, however, achieved a notable propaganda victory by making this proposal, which it knew was certain to appeal to many Koreans. Furthermore, if the United States accepted the proposal, the resulting situation in Korea would unquestionably have been to the Soviet's advantage. As David J. Dallin observed, "If the two occupying powers were to withdraw their armed forces, unification of Korea would indeed be achieved—the Soviet way."²⁷

Foreign Minister Molotov repeated the proposal in a letter to Secretary of State Marshall on October 9, 1947, stating:

If the Government of the United States should agree to the proposal for the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops at the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops would be ready to leave Korea simultaneously, with the American troops.²⁸

In his reply on October 18, Secretary Marshall pointed out that the problem of Korean independence had already been submitted to the General Assembly for solution and that, "in the opinion of the United

²⁵"Proposal of the Soviet Government for the Withdrawal of Soviet and American Troops from Korea: Statement by T. F. Shtykov," The Soviet Union and Korean Question, p. 46.

²⁶Dallin, op. cit., p. 303.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸"Soviet Note on Establishing an Independent Korean Government," Korea, 1945-1948, Annex IV, p. 49.

States Government the question of withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of the problem."²⁹ Again, when the Korean question was taken up in the First Committee of the General Assembly on October 28, the Soviet delegate maintained that Korea could not establish its government freely until after the complete withdrawal of foreign troops. A Soviet draft resolution, providing that the occupying powers should withdraw their troops, was rejected in the First Committee, and again in a plenary session of the General Assembly on November 14th.³⁰

Instead, the General Assembly adopted a United States draft resolution on November 14, with a minor amendment. It called for the "withdrawal of all foreign troops as soon as practicable, and, if possible, within ninety days after the establishment of a Korean government."³¹ Even though the Soviet proposals of immediate withdrawal were rejected, they achieved their minimum objective, American troop withdrawal from Korea, thus establishing a situation which would allow the North Korean Communists to take over South Korea.

Not being completely aware of the Soviet strategy in Korea, the United States continued to pursue the principle of American troop withdrawal from Korea. In April of 1948, a joint meeting of the State and Defense Departments, and the National Security Council affirmed the United Nations resolution of November 14, 1947:

²⁹Ibid., Annex V, p. 50.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³¹The Conflict in Korea, p. 5.

The United States should be prepared to proceed with the withdrawal of its occupation forces following the formation of a government in South Korea, such withdrawal to be timed in consonance with the accomplishment of the broad objective of the United States in Korea and with replacement commitments to the United Nations.³²

It was further agreed that "every effort should be made to create conditions for the withdrawal of such forces by December 31, 1948."³³

The decision gave a reassurance to the Soviet Government that the American troops would ultimately evacuate Korea; however, it still remained to be seen if the United States would completely withdraw from South Korea by the end of 1948. To press the American decision for an early withdrawal, the Soviet authorities in the north successfully diverted the so-called South-North Korean "United Conference," held in April, 1948, into a meeting to condemn the American stay in South Korea, and to create a bad American image in Korea. On May 7, the Soviet Government promptly accepted the resolution adopted by the "United Conference" that the "USSR and the US . . . should simultaneously withdraw their troops from Korea,"³⁴ and proceeded gradually to withdraw from North Korea.³⁵

The final campaign on the part of the Soviet Union was launched immediately following the inauguration of Ilsung Kim as the head of the new regime in North Korea in September, 1948; three years of Soviet occupation had resulted in the formation of a "People's Democratic Re-

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴See the resolution adopted by the "United Conference" on April 23, 1948, above p. 49.

³⁵New York Times, May 8, 1948, p. 8 and May 9, 1948, p. 1.

public" in North Korea. The government and its armed forces controlled by the Soviet-Koreans were strong enough to carry out the Soviet objective, the unification of Korea without the actual presence of Soviet troops.

On September 12, 1948, the "Presidium" of the North Korean "Supreme People's Assembly," adopted an appeal for the withdrawal of foreign troops and forwarded their request to Moscow. The appeal reads in part as follows:

Expressing the wishes and firm will of the entire Korean nation, the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea approaches the Government of the U.S. and the Government of the Soviet Union with the urgent request that they would immediately and simultaneously withdraw their troops from Korea, in as much as this is the foremost prerequisite for the unification of Korea for its economic, political, and cultural prosperity and for the creation of a peace-loving, democratic Korean state.³⁶

In response to this request, the Soviet Government, upon the confirmation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on September 19, announced that the Soviet troops would begin to withdraw not later than the second half of October and would complete the process by the end of December, 1948. At this point, the Soviet Government asked Americans in the south to do the same "in accordance with the desire of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea."³⁷

The United States replied to the Soviet request on September 28, and again took the position that the question of troop withdrawal was bound up with the whole problem of Korea's unity and independence and

³⁶"Message of the Supreme People's Assembly . . . on the Withdrawal of Troops," The Soviet Union and Korean Question, p. 74.

³⁷USSR Information Bulletin, October 6, 1948, p.

would be dealt with at an appropriate time by the American delegate to the United Nations.³⁸ Meanwhile, the United States began to withdraw its troops as planned. On September 21, the United States announced that American forces in Korea were being reduced, but final withdrawal would not take place until after the forthcoming third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations had announced its position on the Korean question. The United States in this statement again declared that the withdrawal of its troops was only one facet of the question of the independence in Korea.³⁹

Because they knew the armed strength of North Korean Communists and the ultimate aim of Soviet policy in Korea, South Korean right-wing political leaders were overwhelmingly against the American decision. No doubt they feared the result would be that which actually took place two years later in Korea. During this tense period, in late October, 1948, Communist infiltrators into the National Defense Army of South Korea suddenly revolted in the southern part of the peninsula, where they succeeded in establishing a guerrilla pocket.⁴⁰ As a result, the South Korean National Assembly and President Rhee requested Washington to keep American forces in Korea until the National Defense Army was capable of maintaining order.⁴¹

Consequently, in late November, the reduction of American troops was halted because it had become apparent that the conditions of

³⁸Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1948, pp. 456, 704.

³⁹Francis O. Wilcox, Recent American Foreign Policy, Basis Documents, 1941-1951 (New York: Appleton-Century-Craft, Inc., 1952), p. 401.

⁴⁰See details in below pp. 96-99.

⁴¹New York Times, November 20, 1948, p.4; November 21, 1948, p.30.

stability and public order in South Korea were not such as to justify the complete withdrawal of the American forces.⁴² But, the American principle of withdrawal of troops from Korea was reaffirmed in the General Assembly's recommendation of December 12, 1948, which stated that "the occupying power should withdraw occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable," and the United Nations Commission should "observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces. . . ."⁴³

Steady pressure on the United States, since the Soviet Government accepted the North Korean request of September, 1949, reached its climax, and a new facet of the Soviet strategy and propaganda technique appeared when it announced, in late December, 1948, that its troops had completed their withdrawal from Korea on December 25, 1948⁴⁴ to give Koreans "the foremost prerequisite for the unification of Korea." Though this was a claim which the North Korean regime never permitted the United Nations Commission on Korea to verify, many reports confirmed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Korea; perhaps they retreated to Vladivostock or Manchuria from which "they could return on short notice."⁴⁵

Withdrawal of American Troops and the Power Vacuum in South Korea

⁴²The Conflict in Korea, p. 6.

⁴³The United Nations, Year Book of the United Nations, 1948-1949 (Lake Success: UN Publications, 1950), pp. 289-90.

⁴⁴Department of State, Problem of Peace in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 10.

⁴⁵Department of Army, Army Information Digest, August, 1950, p. 16. See also The New York Times, January 1, 1949, p. 4.

In part through pressure exerted by the Soviet Union⁴⁶ and in part as a result of a changing situation occasioned by the Chinese Civil War in early 1949, the United States Government hastened to withdraw its troops from South Korea. In March, 1949, the National Security Council completed a thorough review of the United States policy with regard to Korea and decided on the following policy for the American position in Korea:

. . . while the United States, would have to provide continuing political support and economical, technical and military assistance to the Republic of Korea, the effectiveness of such support and assistance should not be dependent upon the further retention of American occupation forces in Korea, the withdrawal of such forces being regarded as both politically and militarily desirable.⁴⁷

At the same time, they decided to leave a 500-man American military advisory group to train the South Korean forces, and to complete withdrawal by the end of June, 1949.⁴⁸

When this decision reached Seoul, President Syngman Rhee's reaction was a practical one; in a speech he stated that:

Whether the American soldiers go or stay does not matter very much, what is important is the policy of the United States toward the security of Korea. What I want is a statement by President Truman that the United States would consider an attack against South Korea to be the same as an attack against

⁴⁶In September, 1947, General Wedemeyer predicted what actually happened a year later. In his report to President Truman on his fact finding mission to China and Korea, he reported: There is a strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces which they created are strong enough and sufficiently indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives. A. C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. 475.

⁴⁷"Withdrawal of United States Forces," The Conflict in Korea, p.6.

⁴⁸Ibid.

itself. If this is done, we won't need the soldiers.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding an appeal by President Rhee and his associates to retain American troops in South Korea until such a time as South Korean security forces could maintain law and order, the United States Government faithfully implemented the National Security Council's decision and on June 8, 1949, the State Department announced that "the United States Government will soon have completed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from that country."⁵⁰ As for the security of South Korea, it further emphasized the following policy:

. . . this government recognizes that the Korean problem remains one of international concern and that it is only through continued support by the entire community of nations to which that Republic owes its existence that the security and stability of this new nation can be assured during the critical months and years that lie ahead. So long as the authority of the Republic of Korea continues to be challenged within its own territory by the alien tyranny which had been arbitrarily imposed upon the people of North Korea, the need for such support will be a vital one.⁵¹

The final unit of American troops left Korea on June 30, leaving a 500-man military advisory group headed by Colonel Wright.⁵² Thus, the situation in Korea drastically changed after the American forces were evacuated from South Korea, which was still not capable of defending its own security, without reaching a specific agreement regarding military assistance in case of attack from the North. Now the Soviet Union was faced with a power vacuum to the south of the 38th parallel into which

⁴⁹Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Doad Mead and Co., 1954), p. 295.

⁵⁰"United States Policy Toward Korea," Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1949, p. 781.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²The Conflict in Korea, p. 6.

their "shock brigades" could march. The remaining task for the Soviet Government, if any, was to build up North Korean forces into the decisive position from which they could easily strike at the South Korean forces anywhere and at any time.⁵³

⁵³See Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea, p. 18, for a quotation from an official organ of the South Korean Government which commented on American withdrawal as follow: To Koreans in Korea, the situation looks like this. After the Communist victory in China is fully consolidated, it will be but a matter of time until the Chinese and Korean Communists, coordinated under Moscow's orders, launch a full-scale attack against the Republic when that attack comes it will probably prove irresistible unless definite help should be provided by the United States.

CHAPTER V

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN ARMED ATTACK

ON SOUTH KOREA: PART II

Military Foundation

The modernization and expansion of the North Korean forces increased after Soviet troops withdrew from North Korea late in 1948. In mid-December, 1948, according to ex-Russian Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Kyril Kalinov who had been in North Korea as a member of the Special Soviet Military Mission, the Soviet Government dispatched a special military mission,¹ composed of such famed armored specialists as Colonel Generals T. Shytkov, M. Katukov and Lieutenant General Kubanov, and intelligence specialist, Admiral M. V. Zakharov, to Pyongyang. Their purpose was to form and train a modernized "Korean People's Army" in not more than eighteen months, that is by June, 1950, with the purpose of replacing the recently withdrawn Soviet troops. The ultimate aim was to form a striking force with modern maneuverability and fire power.²

¹Colonel Kalinov said that this mission was organized by the Moscow Conference held in early December, 1948. Among those who attended the meeting were Defense Minister N. A. Bulganin, who presided at the meeting, Marshal R. Malinovsky, Commanding General of the USSR Far Eastern Forces, Marshal I. S. Konev, Commander in Chief of the USSR Ground Forces, Admiral A. G. Glovko, Marine Chief of Staff, and First Deputy Premier G. M. Malenkov. There were also representatives from North Korea and Communist China. Kyril Kalinov, "How Russians Built North Korean Army," The Reporter, September 26, 1950, p. 4.

²Ibid.

Colonel Kalinov further stated that at a Ministry meeting the following policy regarding the modernization of the army was adopted:

The army would be made up of six divisions of intermediate formation of which five reduced divisions of [at Kirin, Manchuria would be a sufficient framework; besides these shock troops a maneuvering force composed of first line divisions, well equipped and well trained, and a reserve force of eight divisions, to be made up of first line troops. . . .³

And as for the future armored division:

[They have] picked a new medium tank, a variation of the one weighing 32 tons. . . . These tanks would comprise . . . of the armored forces, the remainder were to be heavy tanks.

In the latter class [they have] substituted . . . Which was 55 tons, . . . This . . . is armed with . . . cannon, and its armor is thick enough—indeed—practically invulnerable to any anti-tank gun of 90-mm.

The size of the future armored force of Japan is now fixed at two armored divisions with armor . . .

Because of political considerations, the Japanese force is limited.⁵

³Ibid., p. 10; Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, Japanese Army (Tokyo: Nippon Rodo Tsushin Sha, 1954), p. 101. See also Japanese Defense and Foreign Ministers' communiqué, Japanese Army, p. 10; South China Morning Post, Shanghai, May 21, 1954; Coressi and Sheila Harden (ed.), Survey of International Affairs 1950 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950).

⁴Kalinov, Ibid., p. 81. Soviet Nenkan, p. 801.

⁵If the Koreans possessed a strong armored army, they would be able to break through the strongest fortifications in the Korean Peninsula. They would then repeat in reverse the operations of the Japanese at the straits which are dotted with islands, such as the straits of Shimonoseki and Saseco. That is why the Japanese are not interested in provoking a war with the Koreans. Ibid., p. 8.

Colonel Kalinov further stated that at a Moscow meeting the following policy regarding the modernization of North Korean forces was adopted:

The army would be made up of six divisions of infantry, for the formation of which five reduced divisions of [20,000-25,000 men] at Kirin, Manchuria would be a sufficient framework; . . . ; besides these shock troops a maneuvering force composed of eight first line divisions, well equipped and well trained, and a reserve force of eight divisions, to be made up of territorial troops. . . .³

And as for the future armored division:

[They have] picked a new medium tank, a variation of the T-34, weighing 32 tons. . . . These tanks would comprise 75 per cent of the armored forces, the remainder were to be heavy tanks.

In the latter class [they have] substituted . . . , the KV-II, which was 55 tons, . . . This . . . is armed with 152-mm cannon, and its armor is thick enough—6 inches—to make it practically invulnerable to any anti-tank gun of less than 90-mm.

The size of the future armored forces of North Korea had been fixed at two armored divisions with about 500 tanks.⁴

Because of political considerations, the North Korean Air Force was to be limited.⁵

³Ibid., p. 10; Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, Soviet Nenkan, 1953 (Tokyo: Nippon Rodo Tsushin Sha, 1954), p. 801. See also South Korean Defense and Foreign Ministers' communique in New York Times, May 20, 1949, p. 10; South China Morning Post, Shanghai, May 22, 1949; and Peter C. Coressi and Sheila Harden (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 466.

⁴Kalinov, Ibid., p. 5; New York Times, May 20, 1950, p. 10; Soviet Nenkan, p. 801.

⁵If the Koreans possessed a strong air force, together with a good armored army, they would be able to reach Pusan quickly and to attack the strongest fortifications in the straits separating Korea from Japan. They would then repeat in reverse the famous Japanese leapfrog across these straits which are dotted with islands, and, by way of Tsushima reach Shimonoseki and Sasebo. That would mean war with the United States. We are not interested in provoking such a war. Quoted from Kalinov, ibid., p. 8.

Modernization of the "Korean People's Army" began immediately after the arrival of the mission at Pyongyang in early January, 1949. In early spring of that year, hundreds of heavy arms, including tanks, artillery, trucks and motorcycles, and thousands of tons of fuel for the future armored divisions arrived in the northeastern ports from Vladivostock.⁶ Meantime, the Soviets returned about 10,000 Korean trainees from Siberia who had been sent there in early 1946 to learn Soviet military methods and techniques.⁷

A Tank Brigade was promptly created in northeastern Korea from the trainees and equipment already arrived. It was to be stationed in the northeastern section of the country, to keep the existence of the new modern army and the supply of fuel secret. In early 1949, gasoline refineries were built in the northeastern section of Korea which would supply 125,000 tons of 80-octane gasoline a year by the end of 1949, or at least by the spring of 1950.⁸

By mid-summer of 1949, the two Korean divisions of the Chinese Communist 4th Field Army arrived in North Korea from Kirin, Manchuria. They were immediately attached to the North Korean forces. The former Chinese "People's Liberation Army, 164th Division, 55th Army of the 4th Field Army," was sent to Ranam, in the northeastern part of Korea, and was redesigned as "Korean People's Army 5th Division"; the other division

⁶Kalinov, ibid., October 10, 1950, p. 19.

⁷North Korea, A Case Study, . . . , p. 114, and "Transcript of Statement by the Honorable Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, Before Committee I on Korean Item," op. cit., p. 1566.

⁸Kalinov, op. cit., October 10, 1950, p. 19.

the former Chinese "People's Liberation Army 166th Division, 55th Army of the 4th Field Army," was sent to Shinichu, in the northwestern part of Korea, and was redesigned as "Korean People's Army 6th Division."⁹ Thus the strength of the North Korean infantry reached five regular divisions at this stage as Moscow had planned.

The North Korean 5th Division, newly created at Ranam, together with two divisions already existing, became a motorized corps, having a substantial number of trucks equipped with machine guns and a sizeable number of motorcycles.¹⁰ In addition to the ground forces, the Soviet Government supplied about 100 modern Yak-9 and Il-10 planes which formed the North Korean Air Brigade. However, North Korea's ultimate goal was reported to be an Air Force of one division with 220 airplanes.¹¹

By the end of 1949, the North Korean armed strength was impressively expanded to five infantry divisions; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions; three Border constabulary brigades; one tank brigade with about 100 tanks; one air brigade with about 100 planes; and a coast guard which possessed about 30 patrol craft.¹² In addition, youth corps training centers were organized in all provinces of North Korea to train secondary defense forces. As military demands for men rapidly expanded,

⁹4th Report to the U.N. Security Council, p. 6; Problem of peace in Korea, pp. 15-16; North Korea, A Case Study, . . . , p. 117; Dongran Il Nyun chi, p. 32. See also New York Times, March 13, 1949, p. 52; September 15, 1950, p. 6. Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., July 10, 1962, p. 2.

¹⁰Kalinov, op. cit., October 10, 1950, p. 17.

¹¹Ibid., p. 19.

¹²New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6.

the mechanism for enlisting "volunteers" was converted into a device for more open conscription and the draft board shifted to direct coercion, using police power to take draftees. Moreover, the draft age was gradually increased to cover all men between 18 and 30 years of age.¹³

Upon completion of the initial stage of the modernization of the North Korean "People's Army," in late 1949, a part of the Special Military Mission was summoned to Moscow for a new assignment to organize modern forces in East Germany.¹⁴ At the same time, many military advisors attached to the "People's Army" and the North Korean Defense Ministry were replaced. The Chief Military Advisor, Major General Smirnov, was summoned home and Lieutenant General Vassilyev, a hero of the USSR, succeeded him.¹⁵

Diplomatic Foundation

Agreement Between the Soviet Union and North Korea

Three months after the arrival of Ambassador Shtykov in North Korea, top ranking North Korean Communist Leaders: Ilsung Kim, Premier, Hunyong Park, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Myonghi Hong, Deputy Premier, Il Kim, Chairman of the Planning Commission, Siu Chung, Trade Minister, Namhun Paik, Education Minister, and Chunchu Kim, Communication Minister, accompanied by Ambassador Shtykov, arrived in Moscow on

¹³Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., July 10, 1962, p. 2. See also North Korea, A Case Study . . ., p. 69.

¹⁴Kalinov, op. cit., October 10, 1950, p. 20.

¹⁵Yeoungbok Ju, "I was in the Invading Army in Korea," op. cit., p. 4.

March 4, 1949.¹⁶ On March 6, they were given a reception by Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin.¹⁷

According to a Pravda report, negotiations and conferences took place with North Korean delegates during their stay in Moscow. These were held by Marshal Stalin, First Deputy Chairmen Molotov and A. I. Mikoyan, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and Trade Minister M. A. Menshikov. Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, Shtykov, and the Korean Ambassador to Moscow, Yunha Chu, also took part in the negotiations.¹⁸

As a result of these brief negotiations, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Premier Ilsung Kim, for the "Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly" of North Korea, on March 17 announced by communique a ten-year "Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation Between the USSR and KPDR." The aim of the agreement was as follows:

Striving for the future development and consolidation of economic and cultural relations between the USSR and Korea, and convinced that the consolidation and development of these relations is in accordance with the vital interests of the peoples of both countries and will be the best way of contributing to their economic and cultural development, we have decided, with this aim, to conclude the present agreement.¹⁹

The agreement called for the following trade principles for both countries:

¹⁶As a matter of fact, this trip to Moscow was already suggested by Foreign Minister Park in a report to the Second Session of the "Supreme People's Assembly" which had met on February 2, 1949. Pravda, February 10, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 27, 1949, p. 3.

¹⁷Pravda, March 4, 1949, Ibid., April 12, 1949, p. 47.

¹⁸Pravda, March 21, 1949, Ibid.

¹⁹"Soviet-Korean Communique on the Stay in Moscow of the Korean Government delegation," Ibid., pp. 48-49.

Article 1: The contracting parties shall in every way develop and consolidate the trade relations between them on the principles of cooperation, equal rights and mutual advantage. The governments of both contracting parties shall from time to time conclude agreement determining the volume and composition of the mutual supplies of goods . . . and also determining other conditions with ensure a constant and growing trade turnover between both countries, in accordance with the requirement of the development of the national economy of both countries.

Article 2: The contracting parties shall . . . reciprocally accord each other most favored nation status. . . .

Article 3: The contracting parties shall . . . develop and consolidate the relations which have been established between them in the realms of culture, science, and art.

Article 4: The contracting parties shall contribute to an exchange of experience . . . in the sphere of industry and agricultural production, by sending specialists. . . .²⁰

Furthermore, at the same time the following agreements between the Soviet Union and North Korea were reached: "Agreement on the Exchange of Commodities and Payment between the USSR and KPDR" which would provide a considerable increase in the exchange of commodities in 1949 and 1950; "Agreement between the USSR and KPDR on Soviet Credit" to pay for goods supplied in excess of the agreement in regard to commodity exchange; and finally "Agreement between USSR and KPDR concerning Soviet Technical Aid," which would extend technical assistance to North Korea.²¹

Upon signing the agreements with the Soviet Union, Ilsung Kim thanked the Soviet Government, and especially Marshal Stalin, stating that "the establishment of close economic cooperation with the great Soviet Union will help still further to improve the national welfare of

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Pravda, March 21, 1949, Soviet Press Translation, May 1, 1949, p. 268.

the Korean people and to promote peace and security in the Far East."²² Kim's mission accompanied by Soviet Ambassador Shtykov, left Moscow on March 20 and arrived in Pyongyang on April 7.

Possibility of Secret Agreements

The official announcement of the Soviet-North Korean agreements on March 17th annoyed many observers. The timing of their visit, which took place immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from North Korea, and the length of their stay in Moscow appeared to have more military than socio-economic significance. In fact, South Korean intelligence officials were convinced that Ilsung Kim's mission was for the purpose of reaching an agreement regarding the newly developed situation in North Korea which followed the Soviet withdrawal in December of 1948 and to accept on behalf of the North Korean government the new Soviet strategy in Korea.

Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing what was the exact nature of the talks between Marshal Stalin and Ilsung Kim on military affairs. We can only judge tentatively from the consequent events and reliable sources that they conferred on all military situations in the Far East which would concern North Korea and the future role of the Soviet Union in that area. Obviously, since this was the first of this kind of personal meeting between the two men, either Marshal Stalin personally suggested Kim his future plan in Korea (i.e., the attack of South Korea by the North Korean "People's Army"), or Kim, by the advice of Ambassador Shtykov, urged Marshal Stalin to grant permission and aid

²²New Times, March 23, 1949, p. 5.

for the implementation of his plan for a military campaign to unite Korea, and Marshal Stalin personally concurred as far as formal procedure went.²³

Under these circumstances, it is also highly possible that they examined the Soviet military assistance available to North Korea.²⁴ Moreover at this occasion the Soviet Union, following its withdrawal from North Korea, required a formal agreement to the lease of several northeastern Korean ports which the Soviets had operated as naval bases since their occupation of that area.²⁵

Although the Soviet press referred "to all around assistance that the Koreans could expect from the Soviet Union,"²⁶ there seems strangely to have been no general treaty of "friendship and mutual assistance" for the security of North Korea from the "reactionary Syngman Rhee" and "American imperialists" aggression.²⁷ This omission, in contrast to the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with most of her satellites,²⁸ was viewed in part, as Max Beloff had indicated, "to avoid

²³David J. Dalin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 61 ff. See also Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in Far East," Life, December 6, 1954, p. 175.

²⁴See New York Times, May 20, 1949, p. 10.

²⁵Ibid; Kyokto Tsushin, Tokyo, July 1, 1950, p. 1, reported that Soviet Government leased several North Korean ports, such as Wonsan, Chungjin, and Ungki, for 25 years.

²⁶New Times, March 23, 1949, p. 5.

²⁷This fact was verified on July 6, 1961 when the Soviet Union concluded a Ten-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea. See New York Times, July 7, 1961, p. 1.

²⁸Unlike the Western system of mutual defense based on several multilateral agreements, the Soviet Union had concluded unilateral treaties of "friendship and mutual assistance" with all satellites, with

presumed responsibility for the Korean war."²⁹ Perhaps this was due to the possibility that the Soviet Government was already considering the likely repercussions of a conflict over the unification of Korea and wished to avoid public commitments, which would directly oblige her to go to the assistance of the North Korean regime, in case a third power intervened against North Korea.

In South Korea, at this time, the Americans were gradually pulling their troops out of Korea under the assumption that the Soviet Union could not attack South Korea because it would mean an international conflict. Under these circumstances, if the Soviet Government concluded a military pact with North Korea, while the United States did not have one with South Korea, the possible consequence might have led the South Koreans to press the United States to conclude a mutual defense treaty. If such a treaty were concluded, it might clearly hamper the Soviet blue-print in Korea and elsewhere.

The absence of treaty relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean regime, however, inevitably induced a strong possibility of treaty relationship between Communist China and North Korea,³⁰ because

the exception of the Albanian People's Republic by the time Kim visited Moscow. See Department of State, Documents and State Papers, I, No. 4 (July, 1947), pp. 681-89, 727; Robert Slusser, et. al., A Calendar of Soviet Treaties: 1947-1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 140, 176, 191, 193, 196, 201, 207, for a complete text and background of treaty relationships of the Soviet Union with her satellites.

²⁹Beloff, op. cit., pp. 177-78. See also Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948, p. 182, and 1949-1950, p. 479.

³⁰Early indication of the treaty relationship between North Korea and Communist China was reported in New York Times, January 1, 1949, p. 4. Former North Korean Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Sangchin Chung who fled to South Korea in the Summer of 1948, stated that "Chinese Communists

a careful observation of the Soviet conduct with its satellites in the past clearly proved that the Soviet Government never left her satellites without proper means of protection from outside attack. So far, the only Soviet satellite that was not directly provided its security by the Soviet Union was the Albanian People's Republic in the Balkans. Albania's security, however, was put under the direct protection of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. By the good offices of the Soviet Government, Albania concluded a "treaty of friendship and mutual assistance" with Yugoslavia in July, 1946, and with Bulgaria in December, 1947.³¹

As in the case of Albania's security, so there was a strong possibility of military alliance between North Korea and Communist China (then the Chinese Northeastern People's Government) by the good offices of the Soviet Government.³² It has been Soviet practice that when one of her senior satellites could fully take care of one of her junior ones, the smaller satellites were encouraged to put the burden of responsibility for security on the large one if the two were ad-

and North Korea had concluded a mutual assistance pact late in the Summer of 1946 when Chinese Nationalists controlled Antung, north of the Yalu River on the Korean border,"

³¹Documents and State Papers, I, no. 4 (July, 1948), p. 227, and Nos. 12, 13 (March, April, 1949), pp. 681, 689.

³²Kyokto Tsushin, May 11, 1950, p. 8, reported the possibility of a future treaty relationship between the two countries: "In the Spring of 1949 Ilsung Kim visited Shtykov to confer on the necessity of the formation of the Communist Far Eastern Military Alliance. Kim told him that North Korean troops would attack South Korea for the unification of the country. If the attack failed, by the intervention of a third power, there would be a temporary retreat to Manchuria and they would attack again in a favorable time. Therefore, he proposed a military alliance with the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, he urged that Mongolia be added to the pact." See also Kalinov, op. cit., September 26, 1950, p. 7.

jacent. These relations, in addition, raised the prestige of the larger satellite to a certain extent.

Moreover, from a practical point of view, a strong tie with North Korea was not only to the benefit of North Korea but also to the great advantage of Communist China in her military operations against the Nationalists. For example, if the Nationalist Chinese, who were retreating toward South China, should form a mutual-defense treaty with South Korea, they could utilize the air bases in Korea.³³ If such were effected the Nationalist Chinese Air Force could, at any time, strike anywhere in Manchuria and North China, the heart of Communist China.

Numerous reports, private and semi-official, almost positively confirmed a treaty relationship between the two countries; however, officially, we still do not know the existence of this relationship. Thus far, the Chinese Nationalist Government Central News Agency, then in Shanghai, and the South Korean Government issued charges that "Chinese Communists had signed on March 17, 1949, a Mutual Defense Pact with the Russian sponsored North Korean regime." It further said that the North Korean-Chinese Communist pact called for:

Common defense against aggression of whatever nature, joint action against an attack on either, supply to North Korea of arms, material and man-power from Manchuria and North China from the period of July 1, 1949 to August 30, 1950,³⁴

³³In fact, there was an active movement for the formation of "Anti-Communist Pacific Military Alliance" by the trio-conference of Syngman Rhee-Chiang Kai Shek-Qurino in early 1949, and, on March 19, Philippino President, Qurino officially proposed the preliminary conference. See details in Oliver, Syngman Rhee, p. 294 ff., also Wener Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp. 266-67.

³⁴New York Times, May 6, 1949, p. 7. See also Dong Ran Ilnyun Chi, p. 32.

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³⁴New York Times, May 6, 1949, p. 7. See also Dong Ran Ilmyun Chi, p. 32.

Political Foundation

Soon after the return of Kim to Pyongyang from the Moscow Conference of March, 1949, positive steps were taken to establish a foundation for the future adventure. At the same time, a further consolidation of power into the hands of the Soviet-Koreans was carried out.

On May 11, 1949, as a first measure of a real execution of the "Declaration of the Government Program of the KPDR" of September 10, 1948, the "Ministerial Cabinet" of the North Korean regime decided to organize a commission to draft a bill for land reform in the southern part of Korea, because the land had "remained in the hands of small groups of land-owners as a result of the colonial policy of American Imperialism and the Syngman Rhee clique."³⁵

Formation of the United Democratic
Front of the Fatherland

According to the North Korean press, on May 14, South Korean democratic political parties and public organizations, such as the South Korean Worker's Party, the Korean Democratic Independence Party, the Korean People's Republican Party, the Korean Working People's Party, the South Korean Democratic Women's League, etc., proposed to the "Democratic Front" of North Korea "to unite in a single body, an all-Korean national front, to rally all political parties and public organizations around a single center for the speedy withdrawal of American troops."³⁶

The Central Committee of the "Democratic Front" of North Korea

³⁵Pravda, May 13, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 14, 1949, p. 28.

³⁶Pravda, May 19, 1949, Ibid.

immediately accepted the proposal and suggested, by May 25, the formation of a Constituent Congress, consisting of representatives of various parties and organizations, to study the formation of the "United Democratic Front of the Fatherland (UDFF),"³⁷ Having had a month-long preliminary period, Hon Ku, a Deputy Chairman of the Constituent Congress reported on June 25 that "seven groups had proposed the formation of a united front and that this proposal had been supported by 80 political parties and organizations." In discussing the goal and problems of the united front, he further stated that it was "based on the principle of voluntary participation of parties and public organizations in northern and southern Korea and it must conduct an active struggle against all who wish to prolong the stay of American troops in South Korea. . . ."³⁸

After the examination of Deputy Chairman Ku's report, the Constituent Congress adopted the following resolution on June 27, 1949:

. . . the Congress resolves

1. to approve the initiative of the parties and public organizations in organizing the UDFF;
2. to form a united front on the basis of free unity of parties and public organizations represented at this Congress;
3. to elect a Central Committee of the UDFF to guide its activities;
4. to authorize the Central Committee to form a UDFF commission in the provinces, cities, and districts;³⁹

and concluded its work after electing a Central Committee of 99 persons on June 28.

³⁷Pravda, May 20, 1949, Ibid., June 21, 1949, p. 33.

³⁸Pravda, June 29, 1949, Ibid., August 2, 1949, pp. 21-22.

³⁹Ibid.

At the first plenary session of the Central Committee on June 28, Presidium members were elected, and the Committee set as its immediate goal the struggle against the stay of American troops in South Korea; as well as a working program based on the principle of unification under North Korean Communist leadership. The program stated that "further continuance of the division of the country is fraught with the greatest danger for the Korean people." Under these circumstances, the UDFP proposed the following "tasks":

1. to struggle for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from southern Korea, [and] for the departure of the UNCOK . . .;
 2. to mobilize all forces of the people to struggle for the speedy unification of the country . . .;
 3. to struggle for the consolidation of the democratic changes carried out in northern Korea;
 4. to support the government of the KPDR, . . . , and to aid its activities directed toward the happiness of the Korean people . . .;
 5. to struggle for the execution of wide democratic rights and freedom to the whole Korean people . . .;
 6. to struggle for the reestablishment and legalization in southern Korea of the people's self-governing agencies—the people's committee destroyed by the American imperialists and Korean reactionaries;
 7. to struggle for the realization in southern Korea of a land reform on the basis of confiscation of land which belonged to the Japanese state and to Japanese persons and incorporated bodies, and also lands of traitors to the Korean people, and transference of this land to the peasants without charge;
 8. to struggle for carrying through in southern Korea the nationalization of industrial and other undertakings which belonged to the Japanese state and to Japanese persons and Japanese incorporated bodies, and the factories of traitors to the Korean people;
 9. to struggle against the persecutions and terror in southern Korea directed against the democratic movement, and for the liberation of the parties imprisoned in south Korea;
 10. to aid the development and strengthening of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, People's China, the people's democracies and other peace-loving countries; to struggle against the policy of resurrecting Japan as an imperialist
-

state; to struggle for peace and strengthening international cooperation against the policy of the imperialistic powers
⁴⁰

The program contained significant guide lines for the future course of the struggle for unification at the hands of Soviet-Koreans in North Korea. The program, as indicated, obviously ruled out the subversion of South Korea by South Korean Communist elements as the sole means of toppling the Government of South Korea. There was a great possibility of open war as a means of unification by the North Korean Communists.⁴¹

Finally, on June 30, UDDF proposed a so-called "democratic method of peaceful unification" of the country to South Korea. The main points in the proposal were

1. Korea's peaceful unification must be effected by the Korean people themselves;
2. United States troops must be withdrawn immediately; and the United Nations Commission on Korea must leave Korea immediately;
3. Elections to a unified legislative organ must be held in both south and north Korea on September 15, 1949. This legislative organ would be responsible for drafting the constitution of the Korean republic and government would be formed on the basis of the constitution. The government would dissolve the regimes existing in south and north Korea after taking over their functions;
4. The armed forces in south and north Korea must be merged according to democratic principle under the guidance of the

⁴⁰"The Program of the UDDF of Korea," *Izvestia*, July 1, 1949, p. 4, *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴¹There was a wide difference of opinion on the method of unifying Korea between Soviet-Koreans and Communists from South Korea. In anticipating the power-struggle after the conquest of South Korea, South Korean Communists tried to minimize North Korean influence towards unification and emphasized that the role of military invasion was very limited and of secondary importance, whereas the Soviet-Koreans were, as a rule, favoring open blitzkrieg of South Korea. See details in Changsun Kim, "Yukio Wa Hunyong Park," June 26, 1962, p. 2.

government of the Korean Republic.⁴²

President Rhee promptly challenged the proposal as an expression of the Soviet desire in Korea and declared that its methods were contrary to the resolution adopted on December 12, 1948, at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris. On the other hand, Ilsung Kim accepted the proposal on July 5, 1949.⁴³ From now on, the road was open to Communists in the north to invade South Korea at any time for the "unification of the country."⁴⁴

Formation of a Single Korean Worker's Party Under Soviet-Koreans

Shortly after the formation of the UDFR in June, 1949, a party shake-up followed in August, when a secret amalgamation of the North and South Korean Worker's Parties formed a single Korean Worker's Party. The unified party fell under the full discipline of the North Korean Worker's Party.

Two separate communist parties, under the disguise of worker's parties, had been formed in South and North Korea during 1946. The South Korean Worker's Party in Seoul headed by Hunyong Park, and the North Korean Worker's Party in Pyongyang headed by Yennan-trained Doobong Kim as a nominal figure. The real power of the North Korean

⁴²Based on A Chronicle of Principal Events Relating to Korean Question, pp. 21-22.

⁴³Pravda, July 5, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 9, 1949, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁴According to Colonel Rastvorov, ex-Soviet MVD official in Tokyo, he "first began to hear about Soviet war preparation in Korea in the summer of 1949." Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in Far East," op. cit., p. 174.

Worker's Party remained in the hands of the Soviet-Koreans, Ilsung Kim and Kai Hur, who were deputy chairmen.⁴⁵

The two parties had maintained separate organizations, even after the establishment of the regime in North Korea in which Hunyong Park participated as the "Deputy Chairman of the Ministerial Cabinet" and Foreign Minister. It was apparent that Hunyong Park had a premonition that, if some day South Korea were united by the Communists, his party would be the dominant faction in the united country. Precisely, Ilsung Kim and his Soviet-Koreans feared this situation more than ever since Kim's trip to Moscow in the spring. They knew that there were about a half million Communists and their sympathizers in South Korea and Park could command almost twice as many as at the present when the Communists united the country.

Therefore, in June, during the Constituent Congress of the UDFR convention, Ilsung Kim began to purge, in a show down, a number of government officials who were affiliated with the South Korean Worker's Party.⁴⁶ Then a party wide shake-up followed in August. A significant consequence of the so-called amalgamation was the complete control of the party machine by Ilsung Kim and his Soviet-Koreans. Ilsung Kim, who had been only a Deputy Chairman of the North Korean Worker's Party until August, was elected as Chairman of the Central Committee of the new Korean Worker's

⁴⁵Prior to the formation of the North Korean Worker's Party in 1946, there were two Communist party organizations in North Korea. The first, the New Democratic Party was brought by Doobong Kim when he returned from Yennan in 1945. The second, the North Korean Communist Party, was headed by Ilsung Kim and was USSR orientated. They merged to form the North Korean Worker's Party in 1946. See details in Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶North Korea, A Case Study . . . , p. 17.

Party. Hunyong Park, Chairman of the South Korean Worker's Party, was moved to the position of one of the two Deputy Chairmen of the Central Committee of the Party in charge of general affairs, while the other office of Deputy Chairman in charge of organization went to Soviet-Korean Kaii Hur, who had also been a Deputy chairman of the North Korean Worker's Party in charge of organization.⁴⁷

As for the Party's administrative line, Deputy Chairman Kaii Hur and Sanghyup Kim, another Soviet-Korean, were appointed as the First and Third Secretary of the Party, and a prominent South Korean Communist, Sungyop Lee, Justice Minister, became the Party's Second Secretary. Another interesting factor in the new Party was the way they organized the Political Committee, an equivalent to the "Politburo" of most communist parties in other countries, and a center of Party power. Only three seats out of eight, those of Hunyong Park, Sungyop Lee and Hun Hur, went to the former South Korean Worker's Party, while the remaining seats were allotted to Ilsung Kim, Kaii Hur, Check Kim, Ilu Park, Sunghyup Kim, and Doobong Kim,⁴⁸ former members of the North Korean Worker's Party.

Thus, Hunyong Park, once the most powerful Communist in Korea, and his "comrades" from South Korea, became complete puppets of Soviet-Koreans. This occasion provided Ilsung Kim an opportunity to eliminate a potential danger spot in the Party before taking over South Korea,⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁹Soviet-Koreans completely eliminated South Korean Communists by 1953. While the war was still active in Korea, from the middle of 1952 to the middle of 1953, many prominent South Korean Communists, including

TABLE 1

Newly Organized Korean Worker's Party

CENTRAL INSPECTION COMMITTEE	CENTRAL COMMITTEE		CENTRAL AUDITING COMMITTEE
	Ilsung Kim (Chairman) Hunyong Park (Deputy C.) Kaii Hur (Deputy C.)		

POLITICAL COMMITTEE		SECRETARIATS	ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE	
NORTH	SOUTH		NORTH	SOUTH
Ilsung Kim	Hunyong Park	Kaii Hur	Ilsung Kim	Hunyong Park
Check Kim	Sungyop Lee	Sungyop Lee	Check Kim	Sungyop Lee
Ilu Park	Hun Hur	Sanghyup Kim	Ilu Park	
Kaii Hur			Sanghyup Kim	
Sanghyup Kim			Doobong Kim	
Doobong Kim			Changik Chai	
			Yul Kim	

(Source: North Korea, A Case Study . . . , p. 22.)

and he himself became the fullfledged unchallengable leader of both Party and State, a process which in the Soviet Union was not completed by Marshal Stalin until 1941.

Communist Guerrilla Warfare
and Border Raids

Early Soviet Strategy in
South Korea

While one part of the Communist underground in South Korea was launching bitter riots against the American authorities and the right-wing groups, the other segment successfully infiltrated the South Korean Constabulary and organized their cells to destroy the existence of the South Korean regime from the inside.

When the South Korean Constabulary was first recruited during 1946, the American military authorities adopted a policy stating that it should not be a political army, as were the "Security Forces" in North Korea, and would consequently not have allegiance to any particular persons or groups. Therefore, no tests were given recruits except physical examinations. Any applicant who had a sound physique was automatically selected. It was a marvelous chance for Communists to deeply penetrate the armed forces of the South Korean Interim Government.⁵⁰

Sungyup Lee, who was Mayor of Seoul during the Communist occupation, were sentenced to death for the alleged crime committed during 1946-1948. In addition, Hunyong Park was removed from the posts in the Government and Party. See details in New York Times, January 29, 1953, p. 1, August 15, 1953, p. 3, and December 19, 1955.

⁵⁰At one time the American advisory group estimated about 10 per cent of the 50,000-man South Korean Constabulary were either Communist Party members or sympathizers. Sekino Ugoki, December, 1949, p. 15.

After the breakdown of the Second Joint Commission in late 1947, it became apparent that the Soviets were determined to destroy the South Korean regime from inside. In this regard, former North Korean Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Sangjin Chung, disclosed the following Soviet Plan:

Soviet advised North Korean Communists would attempt to infiltrate and destroy the Government of South Korea for approximately two years i.e. by Summer of 1950 before attempting to take over South Korea.⁵¹

The first of a series of actions to cut off the flow of electricity from the north took place on May 14, 1948.⁵² It was maintained by the North that this was done as a protest against United Nations sponsored elections in the South, however, it had intentions beyond that. Since all major industrial plants of the South were dependent on the North for their supply of electrical power, depriving them of this fundamental necessity was a death blow designed to throw the economy of South Korea into chaos, thus paving the way for an anticipated successful Communist conquest.⁵³

However, a real test took place after the establishment of the Government in South Korea in August, 1948. A violent uprising on Cheju Island began in April, 1948, continuing unabated into the initial phases of the newly established Government. Therefore, in early September two regiments of the South Korean National Defense Army, the 9th and 11th, were sent to the scene to crush the revolt. However, the desertion of

⁵¹New York Times, January 1, 1949, p. 4.

⁵²Korea, 1945 to 1948, p. 25.

⁵³It happened at the same time that the Soviet Government announced a blockade of the highway that linked Western Germany to Berlin.

a number of men and officers of the 11th Regiment to join the rebels, made it apparent that more troops were required.⁵⁴

Therefore, in early October, 1948, the Defense Department ordered the 14th Regiment, which was stationed in the southern part of Korea to enforce the government troops on the Island. A crisis arose at Yosu, the port city in South Chulla Province, when a battalion of the 14th Regiment suddenly rebelled while embarking on a Cheju-bound ship on October 19. They captured the ammunition stocks and, as it became dark they rushed into the city and occupied it. The armed insurgents, numbering about 2,000, with the combined strength of the local underground Communists, then moved to nearby Sunchun which they occupied the following day. There, as they had done in Yosu, they killed the local policemen and right-wing leaders.⁵⁵

The Defense Department promptly established an emergency field headquarters in Kwangju, the capital of South Chulla Province, and sent two brigades, the 2nd and 5th, and two regiments, the 6th and 15th, into the area to meet the situation. By November 16, the revolt was crushed, but many dissidents escaped to the mountains to carry on guerrilla activities.⁵⁶

They were provided with North Korean supplies transported to them through the mountain ranges along the coast. Their activities in

⁵⁴Korea, Its Land, . . . , pp. 200-201.

⁵⁵Conflict in Korea, p. 17. Major Kitong Oh, Commander of the 14th Regiment was a member of the South Korean Worker's Party. He was arrested in early October, 1948 for his communist activities. However, he was successful in organizing more than 75 per cent Communist cells in his Regiment.

⁵⁶Korea, Its Land, . . . , p. 201.

the high mountains of the deep south played an important role in disturbing transportation and security; their role was not only highly effective in the interior but was regarded as important in the exterior as well. The South Korean police force, armed with rifles, was not successful in their attempt to defeat the guerrillas. Moreover, the rural inhabitants were even unfavorably inflamed toward the police. These facts contributed to the successful operation of the guerrilla activities.

By spring 1949, their mountain holdings were complete, from north of the 38th parallel all the way to the southern tip of Korea, with a substantial cadre of young local underground Communists. Major guerrilla forces were concentrated in the areas of Mounts Odai, Bong, and Chiri,⁵⁷ and in some other areas. They even successfully established some so-called "liberated areas," which they controlled only after sunset.

Armed Conflict on the Border

From the beginning of 1949, North Korean Communist attacks against South Korean forces involved units of company or battalion strength. The area of conflict was also gradually increased until tactically the entire 38th parallel border area was involved.⁵⁸ Obviously the Communist strategy was to induce the major portion of the South Korean

⁵⁷The largest center was Mount Chiri where about 26,000 guerrillas were active in Spring of 1949.

⁵⁸Since May of 1948, the Ongjin Peninsula became a battle field between North Korean forces and South Korean Constabulary day and night. North Korean forces attacked with Russian 120-mm. self-propelled artillery and trench mortars. However, these remained small clashes which involved troops of approximately platoon strength.

forces to remain on the border so that guerrillas in the southern area would be immune to attack. Thus the guerrilla activities were rendered highly effective.

However, since early May of 1949, when Ilsung Kim returned from Moscow, the North Korean Communists stepped up preparation for an open war. Their attacks became more organized and concentrated on the key-stone of South Korean defense, the Seoul-Uijongbu corridor. The greatest crisis was on May 3, 1949, when the Communist forces pushed over the border line with a 400-man unit to occupy Mount Songhack and other strategic hills north of Kaesong, the only large city close to the 38th parallel.⁵⁹ Only after a furious skirmish the next day were the Communists driven back by the South Korean 11th Regiment. Afterwards, Kaesong became a battle ground and two-thirds of the 90,000 population fled to the south as refugees.

In attacks such as this, North Korean Communists could choose any objectives they wished, and attacked in what every force they desired. When their mission was accomplished, they retreated north of the parallel. Usually, the attacks were company strength and at most a battalion was involved. The encounters were of short duration at first, but after the North Korean UDFP announced its program for the unification of the country in June, the attacks were continued with nearly division strength.

⁵⁹Korea, Its Land, . . . , p. 20. Two important events occurred at the same time North Korean forces, for the first time, pushed over the border line. Two battalion commanders of the South Korean forces deserted to North Korea on May 4, tricking large elements of their commands into following them across the 38th parallel. And a week later, the crew of a vessel belonging to the South Korean Navy went to the side of North Korea. New York Times, May 7, 1949, p. 4; Pravda, May 14, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 7, 1949, p. 28.

In connection with the political tension created by the North Korean UDF, South Korean defense officers feared a possible North Korean attack during July and August.⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, the North Korean forces widely spread a rumor that "the KPDR was determined to hold an August 15th ceremony at Seoul and national elections for the National Supreme People's Assembly in September."⁶¹ This rumor probably had no factual basis, because "the Soviet Government was very hesitant to launch an attack on South Korea" prior to the conquest of the Chinese mainland, as Philip E. Mosely explains:

Begun at a time when the Nationalist Chinese forces still held substantial bridge heads in the South, such an attack might have led to the abandonment of South Korea by the United States, and to substantial reinforcement of the Nationalist armies which were resisting Mao's advance.⁶²

⁶⁰See I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 64.

⁶¹Sekanio Ugoki, September, 1949, p. 21.

⁶²Philip E. Mosely, "Kremlin and World Politics," Journal of International Affairs, VI (1952), p. 108.

CHAPTER VI

NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN THE FAR EAST

IN FAVOR OF THE COMMUNISTS

The Post-War Soviet Foreign Policy Prior to 1949

At the end of the Second World War, the power of the Soviet Union was very much greater than it had been before the war broke out. To the leaders of the Soviet Union, their old dreams had become a reality. The Soviet Union was in a position to expand along three great courses that their fathers had long dreamed of—to the west into Europe, to the south into the Middle East, and to the east into Asia.¹

Though many in the West expected the Soviet Government to concentrate its energies for a number of years in rehabilitation and consolidation in the expanded Soviet area, and to accept the status quo elsewhere,² such proved not to be the case. Instead, it initiated, without delay, a policy designed to expand its power yet further, if possible, without grave conflict with the great powers. Such an extension, according to the Soviet leaders, was obligatory, and in carrying it out, all

¹Department of State, The Partnership For Freedom (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 9.

²See Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interests (New York: Alfred A. Knop, 1951), pp. 92-113, for an early post-war American foreign policy based on utopianism.

diplomatic, legal, and propaganda obstacles must be disregarded.

European Priority
(1945-1948)

The Soviet Union began to direct its major effort in the direction of Europe and Balkan nations. It was sure that these areas alone could determine the outcome of the new balance of power between the West and the Soviet Union because of their potential industrial strength and resources. On the contrary the Soviet activities in Asia seemed mainly defensive³ even though fellow Communists in China were fighting to take over the leadership of that area for the cause of a Communist International headed by the Soviet Union. If they succeeded, prospects for Soviet expansion in Asia would be bright, but for the moment it seemed that this would require quite some time.

The focal point of the Soviet drive was said to be the heart of the Western half of Europe, namely Germany, at whose hands she had suffered terrible losses and had been shaken to her political foundations.⁴ Until early 1948, the Soviet policy seemed to work extremely well. In eastern and central Europe, she knocked over territories one after another and established a vast empire under the name of "People's Demo-

³See Andrei Zhdanov's speech at the opening session of the Cominform at Belgrade in October, 1947, in New York Times, October 6, 1947, p. 3.

⁴Many authorities on Soviet Foreign policy agree that it was Colonel General Andrei Zhdanov, Chief of the Foreign Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who advised that the Soviet Union should attempt to expand into the capitalist half of Europe with the help of the French and Italian Communist Parties. Stalin shared this view and supported him. See Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 4; Louis Fisher, This is Our World (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 148; Walter B. Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1950), pp. 322-29.

cratic Republics."⁵

As the West became aware of the Soviet policy, however, Western opinion, especially in the United States, demanded counter measures while the United States had its monopoly of atomic bombs. Therefore, the United States Government, in developing its future course, gradually implemented its policy of counter resistance in Europe and the Balkans. The result was the continuance and increase of American military and economic aid to those areas. These policies are known as "the Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan," adopted in 1947 and 1948 respectively.

The west became extremely alarmed by the Communist subversion of Czechoslovakia in early 1948, and feared the piecemeal subversion of the whole of Western Europe. Consequently, the Western nations signed the "Brussels Treaty" of March 1948,⁶ which marked the beginning of a new era for the defense of freedom against any Communist advance. Also in 1948, the West witnessed a new course in the Communist camp when Marshal Tito parted company with Moscow amid angry words.

The Soviet Shifting Policy and Its Asian Outlook (1948-1949)

While the Western world breathed easier when Marshal Tito had split with Moscow, the Soviet Union pushed further toward the "brink of

⁵John C. Campbell, "Soviet Policies and Success in Eastern Europe," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, (ed.) C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1954), p. 207 ff, gives a good account of the Soviet foreign policies in regard to East and Central Europe since 1945.

⁶Britain, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, and Holland originally participated in the treaty.

war"⁷ in Berlin when she precipitated the Berlin Crisis, which continued to keep Western eyes, especially American, fixed on Europe while China was finally conquered.⁸ The outlook for Soviet expansion in Asia was quite different from that of Europe and the Balkans. The governments of most of the Asian states were weaker and less experienced. Many of them were newly independent states emerging from centuries of control by colonial powers. In these new states, hunger and misery were rampant, and little progress had been achieved through liberal systems of government. This was an ideal situation into which Communist strategy and tactics could be maneuvered.

Moreover, there was growing popular revolution in Malaya, Burma, Indo-China, the Philippines, and South Korea against the old order, and the two giant powerhouses in Asia, China and Japan, seemed, at this time, to lie open to the Soviet Union as compensation for Western Europe. The Chinese Communists in particular were in an excellent position in the latter half of 1948 to launch an attack against the Nationalist Chinese forces.

It had been repeatedly reported, particularly after Deputy Premier Georgi M. Malenkov achieved firm control of the post that had been held by Zhadanov before he died in August, 1948, that the Soviet

⁷"Brink of War" policy, according to Dallin, was the Soviet's course "to take initial risks, advance to the brink, and then retreat if the threat of war became serious." Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 18.

⁸Philip E. Mosely, "Kremlin and World Politics," Journal of International Affairs, VI (1952), p. 129. See cf. Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 315. Dallin says that Soviets returned to an Asian offensive because she failed with the Berlin blockade in 1949.

Government had greatly increased its military assistance to Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that several Soviet Marshals, including Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet Far Eastern Army Commander, had personally visited Manchuria and North China, aided in planning the campaign and to supervise field operations against the Chinese Nationalist forces.⁹ With increasing Soviet military assistance, Chinese Communist forces launched an intensive assault against the Nationalist forces in late 1948. This offensive resulted in the rout of the Chinese Nationalists.¹⁰

Communist Victory in China Mainland and New Balance of Power

The civil war that ended in such a dramatic fashion brought a new era to China and to the entire Far East. On October 1, 1949, the new "People's Republic of China," under the five gold stars on the red flag, was formally proclaimed at the Imperial City of Peking by the "Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress." At the same time, the Government Council, headed by Premier Chou En Lai, declared to the governments of all other countries:

This government is the sole legal government representing all people of the People's Republic of China and this government is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit

⁹Fisher, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁰The United States Government officially blamed the Chinese Nationalists for the loss of the mainland, but it is hard to deny the fact that the only American policy toward China, which was the policy of appeasement, added extra strength to the Chinese Communists and as American policy shifted toward a mild-intervention in 1948, it was too late to stop the Communist advance. See Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, p. 204; John F. Dulles, War and Peace (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950), p. 227.

and mutual respect of integrity and sovereignty.¹¹

This Government was soon recognized by some major countries in the world, Communist and non-Communist, as the legal and central government of China.¹²

450 million people had fallen under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse Tung who was violently anti-American and anti-Western, and openly leaned to the side of the Soviet Union. His entire philosophy was guided by so-called "theory of leaning to one side." He advocated that:

To lean to one side [the Soviet Union] is the lesson taught us by . . . Sun Yat-Sen and . . . the Communist Party. We firmly believe that, in order to attain and consolidate victory, we must lean to one side. In the light of the 40 years . . . of experience, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. There is no exception to this rule. To sit on the fence is impossible, and there is no third path. We oppose the illusion of the third path. Not only in China, but in the whole world, one leans without exception either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a hoax.¹³

¹¹Theodor H. Chen, The Chinese Communist Regime: A Documentary Study, Vol. I (Los Angeles: The University of Southern California Press,), p. 2.

¹²The following nations of the Soviet bloc recognized the Chinese Communist regime as of February 17, 1950: USSR (October 2, 1949), Bulgaria (October 3), Rumania (October 4), Czechoslovakia (October 4), Poland (October 4), Hungary (October 4), North Korea (October 4), Yugoslavia (October 5), Mongolia (October 8), Albania (November 20), Viet Nam (January 16, 1950).

The following non-Communist states recognized Chinese Communist regime as of February 4, 1950: Burma (December 17, 1949), India (December 30), Pakistan (January 4, 1950), United Kingdom (January 6), Norway (January 6), Denmark (January 6), Ceylon (January 6), Israel (January 9), Finland (January 13), Afganistan (January 14), Sweden (January 14), Switzerland (January 31). Source: "A List of Government recognized People's Republic of China," Kyokto Tsushin, March 1, 1950, pp. 32-33.

¹³Mao Tse Tung, On the People's Democracy (Hong Kong: Hsin Min Chu Chu Pao She, 1949), pp. 7-8.

Thus, the birth of Communist China drastically changed the balance of power in the Far East. Because the new regime in Peking would presumably be powerful enough to exert either open or covert pressure upon adjacent Asian states, it would thereby generally stimulate the Communist movement in the entire area.¹⁴ For the first time in Soviet history, as Deputy Premier Malenkov said at the 32nd Anniversary of the Great October Soviet Revolution on November 6, 1949, Nikolai Lenin's prediction seemed to have materialized. Malenkov said:

Lenin said in 1923 that the issue of the world struggle between capitalists and Communism depends in the final analysis of the fact that Russians, Indians, Chinese constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the world, and this majority was being drawn with extraordinary rapidity into the struggle for its emancipation.

.....
The victory of Chinese democracy has opened a new chapter in the history not only of the Chinese people, but of all the people of Asia oppressed by the imperialists.¹⁵

Formation of the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist Alliance

Mao Tse Tung Visits Moscow

On December 16, 1949, Mao Tse Tung, accompanied by Professor Pa Ta Chen, Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department, Chinese Communist Party, and others arrived in Moscow "to attend Generalissimo

¹⁴See "Cold War: Russia Gains Edge," US News and World Report, February 24, 1950, pp. 19-20.

¹⁵"Proud and Calm with Abundant Reasons, USSR marks 32nd Anniversary," USSR Information Bulletin, November 18, 1949, pp. 696-97. From past experience, speeches of this kind, and on such occasions, are pretty reliable forecasts of the immediate future trend of Soviet Policy. This speech clearly indicated a decision to exploit Russia's Asiatic success, and to subordinate Soviet European policy to the Asiatic objectives. See full text of speech Ibid., pp. 692-99.

Stalin's 70th birthday celebration." The Soviet Ambassador to Peking, N. V. Roshin, accompanied the delegates. They were met by First Deputy Chairmen Malenkov and Molotov, Defense Minister N. B. Bulganin, and other high officials of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party at the Moscow railway station. On the same day they were received at a grand party by Marshal Stalin who had never offered such a courtesy to any other of his satellite chiefs.¹⁶

However, Mao Tse Tung's journey was dictated by more than a birthday celebration. It so happened that at the time when Mao was ready to negotiate, Marshal Stalin's 70th birthday was approaching. Mao simply seized this chance to visit Moscow on the pretext of celebrating the occasion, but in reality he wished to discuss the whole range of Sino-Soviet relations with the Soviet leaders.¹⁷

On January 2, 1950, in response to a Tass inquiry concerning the duration of his stay, Mao replied regarding his real purpose of sojourn that:

I have come for several weeks. The length of my sojourn here depends in part upon the amount of time which it will take to solve the questions of interest to the people's Republic of China. Among them, first of all, are such questions as the existing treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR, the question of Soviet credit

¹⁶New Times, December 21, 1949, p. 32.

¹⁷Since September, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it would recognize, or annul, according to their nature, the treaties concluded with foreign countries by the Kuomintang. A. K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union, A study of Sino-Soviet Relations (New York: The John Day Co., 1950), p. 332. See also Article 55 of the Common Program quoted by Levi Werner, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 281; H. E. Salisbury, Moscow Journal (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961), pp. 70, 105; Payne Robert, Portrait of Revolutionary: Mao Tse Tung (New York: Abelard-Schuman Ltd., 1961), p. 264.

to the people's Republic of China, the question of trade agreements between our two countries, and others.¹⁸

His words thus implied that prolonged negotiations must be necessary to reach agreement on these issues. It appeared that his stay would not follow the pattern of show visits by Eastern European and North Korean leaders for summary acceptance of Soviet terms.

Mao Tse Tung's mission, supplemented on January 21, 1950, by the arrival of Chou En Lai and others,¹⁹ took an added significance in view of the array of problems in Peking which demanded attention. It was understood that the general basis for the broadest Sino-Soviet understandings had been laid in extensive conferences between Mao Tse Tung and Marshal Stalin.²⁰ The task of Chou En Lai and his mission seemed to reduce these understandings to specific agreements and treaties.²¹

A New Treaty and Agreements

Month-long negotiations between the two countries ended with the signing, in the Kremlin on February 14, of a treaty and agreements,

¹⁸Pravda, January 2, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 25, 1950, p. 23.

¹⁹Chou En Lai was accompanied by the following persons who were considered as Communist China's top economic specialists: Fu Chun Li, Vice Chairman of the Northeast Government, Fu Ting Sai, Vice Chairman of the Singking Government, Hsiu Chuan Wu, Head of the Soviet Union and Eastern European Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Tung Lu, Deputy Chief of the Department of Industry, Northeast Government, and Hua Tung Chang, Deputy Chief of the Department of Trade, Northeast Government, New China News Agency, Peking, January 21, 1950, p. 93.

²⁰According to a report, Mao's visit to Marshal Stalin on January 8, 1950 was the longest of all his visits to the inner sanctuary of the Kremlin. Robert, op. cit., p. 265.

²¹Salisbury, op. cit., p. 105.

with Premier Chou acting for the "Central People's Government of China" and Foreign Minister Vyshinsky acting for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.²² The new set of instruments had aspects which were regarded as generally advantageous to Communist China as far as formal text goes, contrary to Western expectations.²³

After the signing of the treaty and agreements, both parties stressed their great significance. Foreign Minister Vyshinsky said:

The treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and agreements based on a respect for the principles of equality, state independence and national sovereignty, seal the historical bonds between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China.²⁴

And Premier Chou replied that:

The significance of the treaty and agreements between the Soviet Union and China is of particular importance for the new born People's Republic of China. This treaty and agreements will help the Chinese people to realize that they are not alone, and will help in the restoration and development of Chinese economy.²⁵

Thirty-Year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance

²²New York Times, February 15, 1950, p. 1.

²³See C. M. Chiang, "Communism and Nationalism in China," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1950), p. 548; R.C. North, "The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950," The Far Eastern Survey, XIX (July, 1950), p. 126; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 81; Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, N.J.: D Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), p. 208. Cf. Department of State, "Strengthening the Forces of Freedom: Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson, February, 1949-April, 1950 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 145-53.

²⁴Foreign Ministry of People's China, The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1950), p. 20.

²⁵Ibid., p. 24.

The 1945 treaty between Nationalist China and the Soviet Union was called a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance;" that of 1950, a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance." The difference in wording between the two titles does not seem to be accidental. In the new treaty, the provisions for mutual assistance, in both positive and negative aspects, are more numerous and more comprehensive in scope than those in the preceding treaty.

Under the new treaty, the scope of the Sino-Soviet Alliance had been widely extended. While the 1945 treaty agreed to close cooperation only to cope with untoward events in the Far East, especially aggression on the part of Japanese Imperialism,²⁶ the 1950 treaty agreed

to prevent jointly, by strengthening friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and USSR, the revival of Japanese Imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other states that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression, imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the aims and principle of the United Nations.²⁷

Furthermore, the new treaty declared that both parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression.

²⁶Full text of the 1945 treaty is in The Nationalist Chinese, Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1945 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 176-78.

²⁷New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 80. Article 6 of the Moscow Pact, which was reported signed in March, 1949, between the Chinese Northeast Government and the Soviet Union and was widely confirmed, including among others by the United States, indicates early Chinese support of world-wide revolution. It says "in the event of another war in Europe involving Russia, the Chinese Communists should send an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to assist Russia in her war effort." H. K. Tong, et al. (ed.), China Handbook, 1950 (New York: Rockport Press, 1950), p. 279.

In the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any other state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.²⁸

The difference between the two has considerable implications; it clearly indicates that the new treaty aimed at the United States as much as or even more than at Japan.²⁹ It not only strengthened the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China but also encouraged the Communists' struggle elsewhere in Asia. In commenting on the new treaty, North Korean Defense Minister, Yongkun Choi, implied that it insured a North Korean victory even before the fighting started in June of 1950. He said that

. . . the Korean people, who are struggling for the independence and unity of their motherland, are encouraged by the gigantic victory of the friendly relations between the USSR and China, and, with added confidence in victory will redouble their struggle to drive the American imperialist's aggressive forces out of Korea and wipe out the treacherous Syngman Rhee.³⁰

²⁸New China News Agency, Ibid.

²⁹An article published on February 26, 1950, the Jen Min Jih Pao, official organ of the Peking Government, said:

This Sino-Soviet Alliance, established in a new era of history . . . , is an unconquerable alliance for opposing imperialist aggression. This alliance will effectively prevent Japan and other countries allied directly or indirectly. . . . For this reason, it is a heavy blow against American imperialism which is now fostering the reemergence of Japanese aggression.

On the same day, Pravda said in a special article that:

At present, the reactionaries of Japan are becoming more fanatic and reckless under the protection of the American occupation authorities and have openly declared their attempt at revenge. At present, American imperialism is making all efforts to transform Japan into a strategic bridgehead for attack on the Soviet Union and on the people's democracy of China.

³⁰New China News Agency, February 22, 1950, p. 109.

Agreement Concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway,
Port Arthur and Dairen

The 1945 agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway was intended to run for 30 years, and only upon the expiration of this agreement was the railway to be returned to China.³¹ The new agreement, however, provided for the return of the railway to Communist China "immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952."³²

According to the 1945 agreement on Port Arthur, the Soviets were to withdraw from the port in 30 years.³³ But, under the new agreement, the Soviets pledged to withdraw "immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952." However, the Chinese Communists agreed to compensate the Soviet Union for expense which it had incurred in restoring and constructing installations since 1945.³⁴

It is noteworthy that a "limitation clause" was attached to this agreement for returning the port to the Chinese Communists. The condition was that "in the event of either of the contracting parties be-

³¹China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 170.

³²New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 82. On December 31, 1952, the Soviet Government transferred the railway to the Chinese Communist as was agreed. See People's China, Peking, January 16, 1954, p. 8.

³³Wei, op. cit., p. 338.

³⁴New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 82. Philip Mosely interprets that the Soviet promise to withdraw from Port Arthur, and return it to Chinese Communist control by 1952 "was adopted on the assumption that the Korean peninsula would shortly be brought solidly under Soviet control, through the device of joint Soviet-Korean base or of Soviet-Korean treaty of mutual defense." See Mosely, op. cit., pp. 325-26.

coming the victim of aggression on the part of Japan or any state that may collaborate with Japan," then the Soviet Union could "jointly use the naval base of Port Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggression."³⁵

In the new agreement regarding Port Dairen, the Soviet Government pledged to hand over to Chinese Communists, "on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, or by 1952 without compensation all the property in Dairen now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union."³⁶ There was no counterpart of this pledge in the 1945 agreement on Dairen.

Agreement on the Granting of Credit

In 1950 the Soviet Government agreed to extend to the Chinese Communists credit amounting to 300 million dollars³⁷ for a five-year period at an interest rate of one per cent annually and the first payment of ten equal annual installments was to be made not later than December 21, 1954.³⁸ Thus, the Chinese Communists would receive 60

³⁵New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 83. Due to the Korean War in 1952, the extension was made, and it was on May 22, 1955, duly transferred to the Chinese Communists. See Oliver Benson, "Changing Patterns of Policy Formation and Implementation in Communist China," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, (September, 1959), p. 77.

³⁶New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 83.

³⁷It was reported in the New York Times, January 29, p. 1 and February 16, 1950, p. 13, that the Chinese Communist Government asked the Soviet Union for credit amounting to 2800-3000 million dollars.

³⁸New China News Agency, February 16, 1950, p. 83-84.

million dollars per year.³⁹

Exchange of Notes Between Vyshinsky and Chou

In connection with these agreements, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and Premier Chou exchanged notes stated that "both governments declare the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic, resulting from the referendum of 1945, and establishment of diplomatic relations with it by the Chinese, to be fully ensured."

Simultaneously, they also exchanged notes on the decision of the Soviet Government to transfer, without compensation, to the Chinese Communists "the property acquired in Manchuria, by the Soviet economic organizations in Manchuria from Japanese owners and all the buildings of the former Soviet military establishment in Peking."⁴⁰

The Unpublished Part of Agreements Between The Soviet Union and Communist China

Many observers outside of the Communist regimes immediately suspect the possibility of a more important secret parts of the Sino-Soviet agreements. Without access to further documentary materials, however, we can only offer a tentative estimate of the Sino-Soviet exchange. Whether this estimate corresponds to realities only time will tell. As a matter of fact, in the light of past Sino-Russian diplomacy, secret agreements between Communist China and the Soviet Union were by no means improbable, and, furthermore, the Soviet Government had dis-

³⁹See the United States government critique on the Soviet credit to Communist China, "Strengthening the Forces of Freedom," Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson, February, 1949-April, 1950, pp. 145-53.

⁴⁰The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements, 17.

played a strong tendency toward secret diplomacy since 1936.⁴¹

Agreement on Communist China's Role in the
Far East and Southeast Asia

Reports said that the fundamental problems in Asia were discussed and decided during Mao Tse Tung's stay in Moscow. Marshal Stalin, as part of his plan for world communization, assigned Mao to "the duty of personally directing the 'Far Eastern Cominform,'"⁴² which was to engage in clandestine activities and open military operations against the existing governments in Indo-China, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, India, Pakistan, Japan, the Phillipines and South Korea."⁴³

It probably satisfied Mao Tse Tung and his "commrades" to assume such an important role in the Communist International. In fact, a month before Mao's visit to Moscow, his right hand man, Liu Shao Chi, Vice-

⁴¹See some of the secret agreements concluded between the Soviet Government and other states since 1936, Robert M. Slusser, et al., op. cit., pp. 403-12; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 240; R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddir (ed.), Nazi-Soviet Relations (New York: Didier Co., 1948), pp. 217-54; Wei, op. cit., pp. 277-78.

⁴²There was no official announcement of the establishment of the Far Eastern Cominform, however, it was generally understood that it was formed under the disguise of the "Trade Union Conference of Asia and Australasia" which met at Peking from November 16 to December 1, to which representatives from Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Iran, Malay, Mongolia, Indo-China, North Korea, Communist China and the Soviet Union sent representatives. In addition, European members of the Executive Bureau of the Federation were also present. George W. Keeton, et al. (ed.), Year Book of World Affairs, 1952, Vol. 7 (New York: Frederick A. Prager Inc., 1953), p. 119. See also For a Lasting Peace and For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, December 12, 30, 1949.

⁴³China Handbook, 1952-1953, pp. 412-13; Sunday Mainichi, Tokyo, June 25, 1950, p. 32; Kyokto Tsushin, July 1, 1950, p. 16; Sekai, June, 1950 and December, 1952, p. 115; Tai Pei Radio, Tai Pei, Formosa, June 13, 1950.

Chairman of the People's Republic of China and Chairman of the Chinese Trade Union, had openly requested of the Soviet Government that the conquest of Asia be carried out under Chinese Communist leadership.

In the opening address of the "Trade Union Conference of Asia and Australasia " held at Peking from November to December, Liu delivered an impressive speech in which he declared in part:

The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and in founding the People's Republic of China is the path that must be taken by the people of all colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.

Its distinct strategy is: Coalition with other parties, a national front under the leadership of the Communists, a 'liberation of army': Armed struggle is the main form of struggle and the national liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies can be led only by the proletariat and its party, the Communist party.⁴⁴

Further, he presented a blueprint for a Communist-led revolution in Asia. He emphasized that in furthering the "liberation struggle" in these areas "armed struggle" should be carried on in the countryside, while illegal mass struggle should be conducted to coordinate with the guerrilla warfare in the rural districts.⁴⁵

Liu's proposal was accepted by the Soviet delegate, Louis Saillant, General Secretary of World Federation; in response to Liu he declared that the "Chinese example would have tremendous consequences for the future of the whole Far East."⁴⁶

Because of their geographic significance, their closeness to

⁴⁴For A Lasting Peace . . . , December 30, 1949.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., December 12, 1949.

the Chinese mainland, and their remoteness from Soviet Asia; Indo-China and Tibet were expected to be early goals for Communist Chinese expansion.⁴⁷ According to a British Government intelligence source, a fairly detailed program was laid down for the Ho Chi Minh regime by the Moscow Conference. It was reported that the Soviet Government urged Mao Tse Tung to assist Ho, who was carrying on guerrilla fighting throughout Indo-China, and establish strong military bases in the border area of Kwangsi Province.⁴⁸ As a result the Chinese Communists started active operations in Southeast Asia, and they planned eventually to throw their military forces numbering about 150,000 men then stationed on the Kwangsi border into Indo-China to participate in the fighting.⁴⁹

Agreement on the Soviet Military Assistance to Communist China

Now Communist China assumed the broad responsibility of leading the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries to achieve their "national Independence" and "liberation." For this reason and for the immediate

⁴⁷ Communist China was the first Communist regime to grant diplomatic recognition, on January 16, 1950, to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The Soviet Government followed suit on January 30, 1950. From this fact, which was unprecedented in the Communist bloc, Peking's interest in that area was openly recognized by the Soviet Union. See "Front Line Memo on Far East," US News and World Report, April 7, 1950, p. 26.

⁴⁸ Facts on File, Weekly World News Digest, February 17-23, 1950, p. 57; Kyokto Tsushin, July 1, 1950, p. 16; China Handbook, 1953-1954 (Tai Pei, Taiwan: China Publishing Co., 1954), pp. 422-23; Intelligence Digest, May, 1950, p. 32.

⁴⁹ Kyokto Tsushin, February 11, 1950, p. 2. See also Seymour Topping, "Indo-China on the Razor's Edge," Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April, 1951), pp. 468-469, for an eyewitness accounts of Viet-Nam-Chinese Communist cooperation in campaigns in early 1950.

occupation of Formosa which remained under the control of Nationalist China,⁵⁰ the Chinese "People's Liberation Army" required modernization. However, this offered a great challenge not only to Communist China but also to the Soviet leaders. Even though they commanded a regular army of tremendous numbers this army was equipped with Japanese supplies conveniently abandoned by the retiring Soviet Army in Manchuria and with American booty captured from Nationalist units. The goal of the modernization of the "People's Liberation Army" was to develop from a guerrilla organization to a massive force capable of positional and mobile warfare which would be unequalled in Asia.

The Soviet Government assumed responsibility, according to the information available, to modernize the "People's Liberation Army" by equipping between 50 to 100 divisions with modern Soviet weapons and ammunition. Ten armored divisions, and some anti-aircraft divisions were included.⁵¹

For the immediate goal, the Communist Chinese forces had to have an air force and navy with strength that must be superior or at least equal to that of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa. With this in mind the Soviet Union promised to organize a new Chinese air force with from 600 to 1,000 aircraft including fighters, bombers and reconnaissance planes.⁵²

⁵⁰See below, pp.147-51.

⁵¹Tai Pei Radio, February 11, 1950, and Kyokto Tsushin, January 16, 1950, p. 24. Subsequent development in China was confirmed by following information: Kyokto Tsushin, April 11, 1950, p. 6; Intelligence Digest, April, 1950, p. 10, and May, 1950, p. 31. See also Hanson W. Baldwin, "China as a Military Power," Foreign Affairs, XXX (October, 1951), p. 53.

⁵²Tai Pei Radio, February 11, and May 4, 1950; Intelligence Digest, April, 1950, p. 10; New York Times, February 24, 1950, p. 3; Sekai No Ugoki, May 11, 1950, p. 12.

As to the new navy, according to the Tai Pei Radio, the Soviet Government promised Communist China to transfer about thirty-four ships amounting to 37,000 tons, which the Soviets received from Japan as compensation for war damage. Some submarines would also be furnished.⁵³

In return for this Soviet assistance, Mao Tse Tung agreed to accept the Soviet proposal to send a considerable number of Soviet military advisors to every unit of the "People's Liberation Army," including the Air Force and Navy, for military training and instruction in the use of the new equipments. Information on the number of the Soviet advisors and their organization was kept secret. Cautious estimates put the number at from 15,000 to 25,000.⁵⁴ The Soviets seemed to have acquired substantial privileges, including the concurrent right of the appointment of high commanders and their removal.⁵⁵

Reports further indicated that Mao Tse Tung concurred in permitting his forces, numbering fifty divisions to be transferred to the "International Communist Forces" to be governed by the Cominform. These forces would be employed in the event of an international crisis.⁵⁶ For

⁵³Tai Pei Radio, May 4, 1950.

⁵⁴China News Analysis, Hong Kong, May 3, 1957, pp. 10-11; Kyoto Tsushin, February 21, 1950, p. 9. Existence of the Soviet military advisers in China was confirmed by Richard Walker, China Under Communism: The First Five Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 159; W. W. Rostow, et al., Prospect for Communist China (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1954), p. 208; New York Times, December 14, 1950, p. 1.

⁵⁵See Peter S. H. Tang, Communist China Today, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Research Institute on the Sini-Soviet Bloc, 1961), p. 495. According to China News Analysis, May 3, 1957, p. 957, the Soviet Government dispatched Marshal Kirill A. Meretskov, former Commander of Maritime Military District, to Peking as the head of the Soviet Military Advisory Group in early spring of 1950. See also Intelligence Digest, March, 1950, p. 4.

⁵⁶Tai Pei Radio, February 11, 1950; China Handbook, 1952-1953, p. 401.

the rearrangement of military districts, the Soviet Government transferred North Korea to the Manchurian Military District which would be controlled by the Chinese "People's Liberation Army 4th Field Army," under General Lin Piao, and the territory east of the first and second outlets of the Sungari River delta was annexed to the Soviet Maritime Province District, which thus became an independent district under the Soviet Far Eastern Army.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Soviet Union gained the privilege of operating their submarine bases from five additional ports, besides Port Arthur and Dairen, on the western coast of the Yellow Sea. The five ports involved were Chinwangtao, Chehow, Chefoo, Weihaiei, and Tsingtao.⁵⁸

Significance of "1952" and the Sino-Soviet Defense Build-up

Great significance lay in the meaning of the year "1952" already noted in several of the agreements discussed above. By the 1952 deadline, the Soviet Union would have achieved a whole set of strategic planning objectives, which was one of the most important aspects of her post-war plan.⁵⁹ By 1952 the very first stage of the Soviet defense perimeter was to be completed and at the same time, with the completion of this stage, the Soviet Union could launch offensive warfare against the United States and the West.

⁵⁷Chuo Koron, May, 1953, p. 111. See also China Handbook, 1952-1953, p. 410; Tai Pei Radio, February 11, 1950.

⁵⁸New York Times, February 15, p. 11 and February 16, 1950, p. 13; Intelligence Digest, April, 1950, p. 9; China Handbook, 1952-1953, p. 410.

⁵⁹Furthermore, for the United States, 1952 was the year for the completion of the first stage of the Marshall Plan in Europe.

By that time, the Soviet Union would have possessed a considerable atomic weapon stock-pile, and advanced far with the H-bomb project plus all necessary devices for using these weapons, particularly a vast submarine fleet and guided missiles. From 1952 on, each year would be more critical than the last, either for the West or for the Soviet Union, according to their relative efforts. Certainly, if the Soviet Union wanted hot war with the West, it would be better any time after 1952.⁶⁰

But the Soviet's Asiatic defense in 1950 was very far from the 1952 goal. In spite of the fact the Soviet Far Eastern Army was rated the best prepared and equipped command of the Soviet Army within the Soviet Union,⁶¹ its great weakness lay in the fact that it was still dependent on the single-track Trans-Siberian Railway for any large scale reinforcement in the event of war with the west in the Far East or the world at large. Not only did the Trans-Siberian Railway need a multi-line track, but the Soviet also had to open a new railway which would connect the Chinese east coast through Sinking territory for closer and more efficient cooperation with Communist China in the event of war.⁶²

Furthermore, in order to offset the American air bases in Alaska, the Soviets had to maintain closer counterbases in Siberia and

⁶⁰See US News and World Report, September 22, 1950, p. 16; New York Times, February 10, 1950, p. 12; Intelligence Digest, July, 1950, p. postscript, and February, 1952, p. 3; R. Hartwell, "Korea: Incident or Global War," Eastern World, IV, No. 8-9 (August-September, 1950), p. 7.

⁶¹B. H. Liddell Hart, Soviet Army (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1952), p. 181.

⁶²Military Situation in the Far East, Part II, p. 743.

in the deep interior areas as well. For these reasons, the Soviet Union needed a tremendous amount of low-cost Chinese labor. Subsequently, according to reports, Mao Tse Tung agreed to send manual laborers numbering about a million for the construction of Sino-Soviet military establishments.⁶³

Sino-Soviet Conference and the Korean War

The Korean problem may have held high priority during the Moscow Conference between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Yet, there was no official evidence regarding discussion and agreement on Korean affairs, which led to the June of 1950 attack by the North Korean forces. Neither was there any official report that North Korean representatives participated in the conference between the two countries.⁶⁴ Therefore, an

⁶³New York Times, January 29, p. 1, February 16, 1950, p. 1; Tsushin, February 21, 1950, p. 8, July, 1950, pp. 1-2; China Handbook, 1952-1953, pp. 410-12; Intelligence Digest, April, 1950, p. 9.

⁶⁴While Mao Tse Tung was in Moscow, Doobong Kim, Chairman of the Presidium, Supreme People's Assembly, Talhyun Kim, Chairman of the UDFP and Sungyop Lee, Second Secretary, Korean Worker's Party, represented North Korea at Stalin's birthday celebration.

From the composition of their representatives, it is obvious that this mission had something to do with the June 25, 1950 attack. Interestingly, these three representatives were very influential men for the so-called "Unification of the Fatherland." For instance, Doobong Kim was probably chosen to be head of the mission on the ground that he was not only the Chairman of the Presidium, but also that he was the most closely associated with Mao Tse Tung as far as Koreans were concerned. He was a returnee from Yennan in 1945 with Mao's teaching of "New Democracy." Dalhyun Kim represented the nucleus organ for the "Unification of the Fatherland" which was called UDFP. Sungyup was No. 2 man of the South Korean Communists and became Mayor of Seoul during the Communist occupation.

Doobong Kim's report to the Presidium after his return from Moscow on January 18, 1950 was of special significance. He emphasized very strongly that "Russians wished speedy unification of Korea as soon as possible and they encouraged our people who are fighting for the unification and independence of Korea." Kyokto Tsushin, February 1, 1950, pp. 27-29.

extreme view regarding the conference could be that the Soviet Government did not inform Mao Tse Tung of the forthcoming attack, but this is unlikely.

The length of their discussions and subsequent developments in relations between Communist China and North Korea after February, 1950 indicated that the Peking regime knew of the North Korean plans for invasion well in advance. Many outstanding authorities on Sino-Soviet foreign policy, at home and abroad, have agreed in common that Marshal Stalin conferred on the forthcoming adventure in Korea with Mao Tse Tung, who approved the Soviet plan.⁶⁵

It is highly possible that the exact timetable was decided in this conference. It seemed certain that South Korea was picked as the first target in June, 1950, and Formosa possibly the next. With this in mind, the Peking regime returned to North Korea thousands more Korean "Volunteers" from South China soon after the Moscow Conference. The movement of Korea "Volunteers," under General Hongkwang Lee, from South China to North Korea started in early February, 1950 and they entered North Korea during April where the group was redesignated as the North Korean "People's Army 7th Division."⁶⁶ At the same time, the movement

⁶⁵See T. F. Cheng, A History of Sino-Soviet Relations (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p; Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: the MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 45; Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics (New York: The Vintage Books, 1960), p. 325; Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 271; Howard L. Boorman, et al., Moscow-Peking Axis, Strength and Strains (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 37; Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1955), p. 37; Barnett, op. cit., pp. 93, 345; Intelligence Digest, December, 1950, p. 3.

⁶⁶See below, p

of a part of General Lim Piao's crack 4th Field Army; the 38th, the 39th, and the 40th Armies, from South to Northeast China and to the Korean-Manchurian border, where the 42nd Army had already moved in, was completed during May and the early part of June, 1950.⁶⁷

These facts only point to a confidential agreement between Marshal Stalin and Mao Tse Tung regarding Korea. However, reliable report, according to David J. Dallin, stated that:

Peking and Moscow had agreed that the North Koreans would start the war. They counted on the North Koreans to win without outside military assistance. Only when the Americans started to win did the Chinese have to enter the war with Soviet air cover and military assistance to the Chinese Communist.⁶⁸

Furthermore, in early 1950, General Suksan Min, former Premier of Nationalist China, openly charged that "Communist China agreed to assist North Korea with armed forces numbering 100,000 if North Korea appeared to be losing the war."⁶⁹

⁶⁷Whiting, op. cit., p. 45. See also Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen, "The Japanese Communist Party, The Soviet Union and Korea," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (December, 1950), p. 350.

⁶⁸D Papers, II (November 26, 1956), pp. 128-29, quoted by Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 87; see also Kyokto Tsushin, April 21, 1951, p. 20.

⁶⁹Suksan Min, "Prospect of the Third World War," Kaizo, September, 1950, p. 35.

CHAPTER VII

MID-CRISIS AND PRE-WAR: I

The Soviet Preparation

Soviet Union Boycott of International Organizations

Beginning in 1950, Soviet representatives in international organizations: the United Nations in New York and in Geneva, the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, and the Four Power Allied Council in Tokyo, simultaneously walked out from meetings protesting the presence of Nationalist China's delegates, but in reality it was the Soviet maneuver in the United Nations to paralyze the function of the Security Council and protect themselves against a possible threat of their time schedule.¹

On January 8, 1950, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En Lai, for the second time since independence on October 1, 1949, informed the United Nations Security Council that his government considered the presence of the Nationalist Chinese delegate, Ting Fu Tsiang, in the Security Council illegal, and that the position of his government

¹See Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. 310-11. For a comparison of the Soviet behavior in 1950 and in 1939, see New York Times, December 14, 1939, p. 1. Soviet Union walked out from the League of Nations in December, 1939, when she attacked Finland.

was that the Nationalist delegate should be expelled.²

The Soviet Government shared the same view, and its delegate to the Security Council, Yakov V. Malik, on January 10, submitted a draft resolution which considered the statement of "People's Republic of China" of January 8, and proposed that the Security Council not recognize the credentials of the representative concerned and exclude Tsiang from the Security Council. At the same time Malik warned that if the Security Council failed to take the appropriate measures they would not participate in the work of the Council until the Nationalist Chinese delegate had been excluded.³

The Soviet draft was rejected on January 13 by a vote of six to three with two abstentions. The Soviet delegate Malik immediately declared:

The Soviet Union will not participate in the Security Council until Kuomintang group's representative is removed from the Council. This representative is occupying a position in this United Nations body illegally; his presence here undermines the prestige and authority of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole and will cause the Security Council itself to become an agency of the decisions which cannot, under these circumstances, be considered legal.⁴

He stated further:

The Soviet Union will not recognize as legal any decision the Council made with the participation of the Kuomintang group's representatives, and that the Soviet Union will not abide by such a decision.⁵

²United Nations Year Book, 1950, p. 52.

³Ibid.

⁴United Nations Bulletin, February 1, 1950, pp. 117-18.

⁵Ibid.

Many observers judged that it was another political gesture intended to convince the Chinese Communists—at the time that difficult negotiations were taking place on the highest level in Moscow between Marshal Stalin and Mao Tse Tung—that the Soviet Union was their true and only friend and the "Anglo-American Imperialists," who held the majority in the United Nations, were their common enemies. At the same time, it was also judged that this signaled a strategic withdrawal of the Soviets from the Security Council as they used to do under similar circumstances.

It was certainly true that in part it was intended to win Chinese support, as many observers believed,⁶ but the Soviet's underlying purpose lay beyond this immediate end. Ultimate Soviet strategy was a complete withdrawal from international bodies so that the United States, as well as United Nations, prestige would be reduced, and the function of the Security Council would be paralyzed until such time as the Soviet Union had achieved its primary objectives in Korea and elsewhere in 1950.⁷

After January 16, the Soviet Union and its satellite delegates gradually withdrew from all branches of the United Nations organization: Economic and Social Council, its Commissions and Sub-Commissions; the Trusteeship Council, its Commissions and Sub-Commissions; and the Atomic Energy Commission, where the Nationalist Chinese were represented as the central government of China. Soon, Soviet withdrawal was extended to

⁶See "Chinese Public demand Expulsion of Kuomintangites from UN," Pravda, January 25, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.

⁷See details in below, pp. 198-201.

the Thirteen-Nation Far Eastern Commission in Washington, where the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Alexander S. Panyushkin, was the Soviet delegate; and to the Four Power Allied Council in Tokyo, where Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyankov was a member.⁸ Soviet delegates also walked out from specialized agencies.

The process of complete withdrawal from more than thirty international bodies was completed, except for the International Court of Justice, when on June 1, 1950, the Soviet delegate to the Trusteeship Council walked out.⁹

Moscow Summons its Key Envoys

Upon the completion of groundwork for the invasion of South Korea and Formosa, and for the subversion of Japan, a huge corps of Russian diplomatic and military experts whose duties concentrated on Korea, Japan, and the United States were recalled to Moscow one after another for further consultation in order to insure the closest possible cooperation in the campaign ahead. The recall was also intended to orient the diplomatic and military experts to new strategy in the Far East after the Soviet success in Korea; it began in early April of 1950 and was completed by the end of May.

The Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, General Shtykov, was summoned to Moscow in early April after the South Korean Government announced its general elections date for May 30, 1950. South Korean

⁸New Times, January 18, 25; February 1, 8; May 7, 10, 1950, p. 32.

⁹New York Times, June 2, 1950, p. 6.

intelligence sources reported his departure date as April 7.¹⁰ We do not know what he did in Moscow upon his return there, but from past experience with Soviet post-war diplomatic practice in Korea, it was certain that his early summons was concerned with the final details of plans with the Soviet Defense Ministry and representatives of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. General Shtykov was one of the best known authorities on Korea in the Soviet Union at that time, and his intimate contact with the whole development in the Far East would make his advice valuable.¹¹

Then, during May, Moscow recalled two more key strategists on Japan, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, concurrently serving as Soviet Representative to the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, Panyushkin, and Soviet Representative to the Four Power Allied Council in Tokyo, General Derevyankov, who was widely known as the Soviet Intelligence Chief in Japan. From the timing of their appearance in Moscow in late May and early June, their recall was not so much concerned with the "June Attack" as with the next objective after Korea, namely Japan. In fact, their return to Moscow was to initiate a new strategy with regard to Japan.

According to the New York Times, Ambassador Panyushkin visited Acting Secretary of State Webb on May 12 and told him that he would

¹⁰Tongah Ilbo, June 10, 1950, p. 1. See also Sunday Mainichi, July 16, 1950, p. 4.

¹¹Ex-Russian MVD Colonel Yuri Rastvorov stated that "It was Shtykov who was mostly responsible for selling the idea that South Korea could be had for the taking." Yuri Rastvorov, "The Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East," Life, December 6, 1954, p. 175.

leave for Moscow on May 16 via the Polish ship Batory. He declined to comment on the cause of his return. On May 16, however, he mentioned that he was leaving for Moscow for a two-month "rest in the fatherland" on the advice of his physician.¹² Two weeks later the New York Times again reported that General Derevyankov and his fifty-man staff, including his deputy, Major General A. P. Kislenkov, "suddenly" departed from Yokohama on May 27, leaving Major General Espolyshenkov temporarily in charge.¹³

Numerous speculations continued in Tokyo after General Derevyankov and his large staff departed. However, later the News Secretary to General Derevyankov, Sergenkov, revealed to Japanese reporters that:

General Derevyankov may have gone to Moscow for his vacation. It may take two or three months. As we know his mission in Tokyo is to conclude the peace treaty with Japan. Since it is not yet concluded, therefore, he will surely be coming back to Tokyo after taking his vacation.¹⁴

It is evident that these important key members of the Soviet military and diplomatic corps of the Far East were in Moscow long before Communist North Korea launched the June 25 attack on South Korea. The Soviet Ambassador to Peking, Roshin, just returned to his post on March 26, 1950, after negotiating with Chinese officials on the terms of

¹²New York Times, May 13, p. 6; May 17, 1950, p. 26.

¹³Ibid., May 28, 1950, p. 3. Both men, Ambassador Panyushkin and General Derevyankov, took ships instead of airplanes. Perhaps it was intended not to give an impression that they were returning to Moscow for official business but simply taking a sort of vacation.

¹⁴Sunday Mainichi, June 18, 1950, p. 8. Although, from available sources, General Derevyankov returned to Moscow having been assigned with his staff to a new post in the Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, there seemed to be a large amount of personal exchange between Tokyo and Kaharovsky.

the Sino-Soviet Conference of December, 1949-February, 1950. (All of the above personnel returned to their original posts about the same time, Ambassador Shtykov seems to have been in Pyongyang from late July or the early part of August, 1950. Ambassador Panyushkin returned to his post on August 25;¹⁵ however, General Derevyankov never went back to Tokyo. Instead his deputy, Major General Kislenkov, appeared in Tokyo on August 30,¹⁶ replacing General Derevyankov, with a new thirty-man staff, from the Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, said to have formerly been in charge of Japanese prisoners in Siberia.¹⁷)

The Charge of Bacteriological Warfare
and the Sino-Soviet Common Target

For the first time since the end of the war in 1945, the Soviet Government suddenly brought forward an indictment drawn against twelve former members of the Japanese Kwantung Army on December 25, 1949, charging them with the preparation and employment of bacteriological agents in Mongolia, China, the Soviet Union and the United States—classified as a felony under Article 1 of the "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 9, 1943."¹⁸

The trial was conducted by the Military Tribunal of the Mari-

¹⁵New York Times, August 26, 1950, p. 6.

¹⁶Ibid., September 2, 1950, p. 4.

¹⁷See Beloff, op. cit., p. 133; D Papers, V (January, 1957), pp. 316-27, quoted by Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 62; Rastvorov, "Goodbye to Red Terror," op. cit., December 13, 1954, p. 50.

¹⁸See "indictment in the case of Former Members of Japanese Armed Forces," New Times, January 1, 1950.

time Military District, presided over by Major General of Justice, D. D. Cherkov, and other justices, with State Counselor of Justice, L. N. Smirnov, participating. It ended on December 30, 1949, with sentence, ranging from two to twenty-five years, "after the defendants [had] confessed themselves guilty as charged." It was said that the germs had been used after 1940 against the Chinese and Mongolians, and had been prepared for use against the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, General Yamashida, Ex-Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army, and three members of his staff, Lieutenant Generals Kajitsuka and Takahashi, and Major General Kawashima were sentenced to twenty-five years in corrective labor camps and the rest were sentenced to less than twenty-five year terms in the same.¹⁹

It was obvious that the Soviet Government brought the charges in an attempt to turn the peoples of these countries, especially the Chinese, against the Japanese and the United States, Japan's backbone. On the other hand, it would promote friendship between the people of these areas and the Soviet Union, as an editorial of Jen Min Jih Pao pointed out, "this trial . . . is an expression of the friendship of the Soviet Union toward the Chinese people."²⁰

Above all, it was a Soviet attempt to provide a fresh fighting spirit to the newly oriented Communist Party of Japan, which would soon launch a campaign for the "peace and independence of Japan." Therefore,

¹⁹Pravda, December 26, 30, 1949, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 18, 1950, pp. 22-26.

²⁰The Jen Min Jih Pao editorial was quoted in Pravda, January 6, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 25, 1950, p. 25.

on February 1, 1950, the Soviet Government officially presented a proposal to the governments of the "People's Republic of China," the United States, and Great Britain to establish a "special international military court" to which the following Japanese "war criminals," who were charged with playing "a leading role in preparing and waging bacteriological warfare which constitutes a severe crime against humanity," must be brought: the Emperor Hirohito and ex-Kwantung Army Lieutenant Generals Ishii, Kitano and Kasahara, and Major General Wakamatsu.²¹

On February 3, the United States Government pointed out the legal impropriety of the Soviet action due to the fact that the Far Eastern Commission had, on April 3, 1946, agreed to instruct the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that the Emperor should be exempted from indictment as a war criminal without direct authorization, and if the Soviet Union wanted this decision reviewed it should apply to the Far Eastern Commission. The United States further charged that the Soviet communication was intended to divert attention from the question of the missing Japanese prisoners.²²

While Great Britain judged that it was not even worth replying to the Government of the Soviet Union, the Communist bloc, headed by Communist China and including North Korea and Mongolia, promptly supported the Soviet proposal and expressed a determination to fight for the ultimate prosecution of the named "war criminals." At the same time, the Communist Party of Japan followed their pledge to fight for the "course

²¹New Times, February 8, 1950.

²²Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1950, p. 244.

of justice."²³ Soon, all over the Far East, there were parades, rallies, demonstrations, and exhibitions concerning the alleged bacteriological warfare campaign.

On May 30, 1950, the Soviet Government, soon after it announced that all Japanese prisoners had been returned to Japan by the end of April, 1950, again raised the matter of trying the Emperor and other alleged war criminals. But the United States, on June 8, again cited the Far eastern Commission, which had been paralyzed since January 19, 1950, because of the Soviet withdrawal, as the proper body to adjudicate this matter.²⁴

Reorganization of the Communist Party of Japan

Characteristics of the Communist Party of Japan Prior to 1950

In October, 1945, the United States occupation authorities under General MacArthur opened the prison gates to the handful of surviving Japanese Communists. Soon afterward they were reinforced by the arrival from Yen'an of the former member of the "Presidium of the Comintern" and the director of the "Japanese Anti-War League" at the Mao Tse Tung Headquarters, Sanjo Nosaka.²⁵

Unlike Communist parties in other countries, the Communist Party

²³See Pravda, February 10, 14, 15, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April 1, p. 17 and April 8, 1950, pp. 20-21.

²⁴Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, pp. 60-61.

²⁵Sanjo Nosaka is currently the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Japan. Until the time the Cominform criticized him in early 1950, he was a member of the Party Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat. He also headed four Party sections.

of Japan officially adopted the gradualist approach of its mentor Nosaka. Nosaka's theory of "Peaceful Revolution," known as parliamentarism, or "lovable Communists," was derived from the special circumstances which existed in Japan at that time. In his report to the Fifth Party Congress, convened during February 2 to 6, 1946, Nosaka indicated the new course for the Japanese Communists:

. . . the Communist Party of Japan must adopt new methods of tactics, namely, the peaceful, democratic method of revolution.
 . . . The democratic way is nothing but parliamentarism.
 There is ample reason to believe that a 'people's government' may be established under the American occupation.²⁶

He held that the following five existing situations would make it possible:

1. The strength of the world capitalistic monopoly decreased. its strength by the war.
2. Systematic terror ceased in Japan as a result of defeat in the war.
3. The Japanese government itself is unstable.
4. The Japanese are given freedom.
5. The occupation army has come not to make Japan as their permanent colony, but they will withdraw as soon as Japan becomes a truly democratic country.²⁷

Nosaka's strategy made rapid headway, and by 1949, many labor and farmer's unions were under Communist control, as were a large number of cultural organizations. The national elections of 1949 resulted in a Communist vote of three million, equal to about 10 per cent of the total votes cast and the Communists elected about forty deputies of the Lower House.

However, with China in the Soviet orbit, both Moscow and Peking

²⁶Sekaino Ugoki, February 11, 1950, p. 24. See also For a Lasting Peace . . . , January 6, 1950; Rodger Swearingen, "Nosaka and the Cominform," Far Eastern Survey, XIX (May, 1950), pp. 99-100.

²⁷Sekaino Ugoki, Ibid.

called for a more dynamic struggle from the Japanese Communists—if not immediate victory, then at least more active endeavor toward a later victory by increasing underground preparations for civil war and intensified propaganda for peace designed to weaken the American position in the Far East.

Cominform Criticism of Sanjo Nosaka and
New Course Toward International Communism

The first direct attack to be made by an outside agency on the Japanese Communist's "peaceful revolution" strategy, occurred at the Peking meeting of the "Trade Union Conference of Asia and Australasian Countries" held in November and December of 1949. In addressing the Conference, General Secretary of the World Federation, Louis Saillant, took an extremely pessimistic view of the Communist prospects in Japan. He thereby, by implication, questioned the correctness of the Japanese Communist's "peaceful revolution" strategy.²⁸

Then, evidence of the Soviet dissatisfaction with the role of the Communist Party of Japan began to appear early in 1950, while Mao Tse Tung was in Moscow.²⁹ The Cominform³⁰ organ, "For a Lasting Peace

²⁸For a Lasting Peace . . . , December 12, 30, 1949.

²⁹Unlike previous years, the "Voice of Japan" in Moscow, on January 1, 1950, broadcast a New Year's message, not General-Secretary, Kuichi Tokuda's, nor Sanjo Nosaka's, but Yoshio Shiga's, who was a leading member of the International Faction of the Party, the "New Year and the Proletariat Internationalism." This was surely evidence of Moscow's dissatisfaction with the Nationalist Faction of the Party. See Kaizo, July, 1950, p. 86.

³⁰The Cominform is an organ of nine European Communist Party groups formed at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in October, 1947. But in reality it is a puppet of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

and for a People's Democracy," published in Bucharest, Rumania, suddenly turned its attention from Europe to the Far East. On January 6, 1950, a Cominform editorial, titled "Concerning the Japanese Situation," bitterly assailed the successful Nosaka strategy which was termed as the "naturalization of Marxism-Leninism in Japanese conditions." His approach was described as "nothing more than a Japanese variation of the anti-Marxist and anti-socialist 'theory' of the peaceful growing over of reaction to democracy, of imperialism into socialism, a 'theory' which was exposed long ago and which is alien to the working class." After continuing at some length in this vein, the Cominform editorial concluded:

Nosaka's 'theory' has nothing whatever in common with Marxism-Leninism. Actually . . . it is an anti-democratic, anti-socialistic, theory . . . of independence. . . . Consequently . . . it is simultaneously an anti-patriotic, and anti-Japanese 'theory'.³¹

The criticism from Bucharest seemed not to have come as a surprise to Nosaka and his Nationalist Faction in the Party. Because the criticism was so sudden and bitter, most Party members did not want to believe its truth. Two days after the Cominform criticism, Party Spokesmen characterized their first reaction to the criticism as "an attempt by the enemy [right-wing elements] to disrupt Party unity." "If we believed the foreign communications," he continued, "Comrade Stalin would have been dead more than twenty times and likewise Comrade Mao Tse Tung have committed grave mistakes more than ten times."³²

However, criticism was broadcast through Radio Moscow on January

³¹See full text, Observer, "Concerning the Japanese Situation," For a Lasting Peace . . ., January 6, 1950.

³²Akahata, January 9, 1950.

9, and upon receiving the complete text of the Cominform editorial, handed over to Party officials by the Soviet Representative in Tokyo, on January 11, the Nationalist Faction, which was the majority faction, evidenced surprise. On the following day, the Party Politburo met to decide the official Party attitude toward the Cominform criticism of Sanjo Nosaka in which critical debate was exchanged between the International Faction of Shiga and Miyamoto and the Nationalist Faction of Tokuda, Nosaka, Ito, Hasegawa and Amano. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Communist Party of Japan officially rejected the Cominform suggestion and once more emphasized the independent role of the Party.³³

The reaction against the Party decision on January 12, was immediate. However, it was not from Moscow, but from Peking. On January 17, an editorial, "The Road to the Liberation of Japanese People," in Jen Min Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist counterpart of Pravda, attacked Nosaka in language similar to that of the Cominform article of January 6. Its editorial encouraged the Japanese to take the same course that had been taken by the Chinese, and urged them to accept the Cominform suggestion:

The Japanese and Chinese are friends. The people of Japan and China have common enemies, that is, Japanese imperialism and American imperialists who support it. The people of the two countries have common friends. They are the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. . . . The Chinese people are greatly concerned with the liberation of the Japanese.

The courage which the Japanese Communist Party exhibited in fighting the enemy has won for it the admiration of the Chinese as well as the Japanese people. As comrades we sincerely hope

³³Ibid., January 13, 1950. See Masaji Yanaginuma, Nippon Kyosanto Undo Shi, Post-war Period (Tokyo: Kaibun Kaku, 1953), pp. 70-71, for a good account of the subject of debates between the two factions.

that the Japanese Communist Party will show the same courage in accepting the Cominform criticism and in correcting Nosaka's mistakes. Only in this way, we believe, can the Japanese Communists live up to the expectations of the Japanese people and of the Chinese Communists, and in this way can they avoid the traps set by the imperialists.³⁴

After the Jen Min Jih Pao's criticism, the Party central Committee held its regular monthly meeting. It was a great day of victory for Moscow and Peking. In spite of a bitter confrontation between the International and National Factions, both finally accepted the positive meanings of the Cominform criticism. At the same time, Nosaka, in an occasion of "self-criticism," reviewed the "theory" and pledged to support the "International Proletariat Movement." He stated:

My 'theory' reflected in my articles, as the Cominform article observes, was erroneous in principle and did not take into consideration the features of the domestic and international situation of the time. Subsequently I understood the error and tried to correct it but again committed an error in that I did not break openly and finally with this 'theory' and later even published similar views, irrespective of my subjective intention.

We shall therefore try in the future not to repeat such an error and to act in accordance with the principles of the international proletariat.³⁵

This was followed by a lengthy statement, titled "My Self-Criticism," which appeared in Akahata on February 6, 1950, in which Nosaka flatly admitted that his "theory" had exhibited "rigidly opportunist tendencies, exercising an adverse influence on party activities," and agreed to further the role of the Party in the line of the Moscow-Peking direction:

³⁴"Path of Liberation of Japanese People," Jen Min Jih Pao, January 17, 1950 was quoted in New China News Agency, January 18, 1950, p. 71.

³⁵Yanaginuma, op. cit., p. 70.

I hope from the bottom of my heart that the above self-criticism of my erroneous diagnosis, which was an error and inflicted harm on the Party, will educate and discipline not only myself but the Party, and further contribute to the fostering of true leaders through severe and trying practice. We must, thereby, fulfill the important mission assigned to the Communist Party of Japan as a link in the international revolutionary movement.³⁶

Our concern in this survey is what motive caused Nosaka and his Nationalist Faction to publically submit to the dictates of the Moscow-Peking line. To this no authoritative answer is possible, but one important clue may be discerned in Nosaka's statement on "the important mission assigned to the Communist Party of Japan" and in the timing of the Cominform attack. It came while Mao Tse Tung was in Moscow, and it was possible that plans were formed between him and Marshal Stalin for the assault upon South Korea. In that event, the role of the Communist Party of Japan, after the occupation of South Korea, would be to stir up as much trouble as possible in Japan, in hope of pinning down the American occupation forces.³⁷

After February, 1950, there was a conspicuous shift of emphasis from legal to extra-legal activities of the Party as it made underground preparations for guerrilla warfare, and at the same time, student demonstrations, Korean resident riots, trouble at railway terminals, Ship-yards, and factories, throughout Japan—these and similar symptoms of growing Communist militancy could be observed during the spring of 1950.

³⁶Akahata, February 6, 1950.

³⁷Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 200. Max Beloff states that "there was a rumor at this time that the Russians announced semi-officially that they would return the Kuriles to Japan if a suitable regime came into being." Beloff, op. cit., p. 141.

On the other hand, the Party intensified its propaganda for an overall peace treaty and inaugurated a nation-wide drive for "peace and national independence" aimed at weakening the position of the United States in the Far East.

Finally, on March 22, the Central Committee of the Party adopted an "Appeal to all People for National Independence" which evidenced the turn of Party sentiment to that of violent revolution.³⁸ It was regarded as a temporary Party platform until May 18, 1950, when the Party completed its first stage of reorientation to the Moscow-Peking line. Announcement of the "1950 Draft Theses," which was entitled "Fundamental Duties of the Communist Party of Japan in the coming Revolution," on May 18 constituted the last rites for the "Lovable Communist." It was a completely new line of militant obstructionism in Japan. It read in part as follows:

Geographically, politically and economically, Japan constitutes an important base of operations for the forces which attempt to prevent this, [world revolution] by rallying the Japanese nation in the deadly fight against war and for peace, is the primary duty of the Japanese Communists. The Party must realize its heavy responsibility, for success or failure of the Party in its fight against imperialism will have a decisive influence on the outcome of the world struggle. To be as effective as possible, the Communist Party of Japan must adopt its strategy and tactics to the domestic situation.

.....
Out of this situation, arises the urgent need for revolution. Basically, such a revolution would fulfill two missions: It would free the Japanese people from the tight grip of the international capitalists who exploit Japan and are turning a colony and military base; simultaneously this revolution would wipe out the remnants of feudalism and with them the power of Japanese capitalism.³⁹

³⁸Akahata, March 28, 1950.

³⁹The full text is in the Communist Party of Japan's Kitarubeki Kakumei Ni Okeru Nippon Kyosanto No Kihonteki Na Ninu. Ni Tsuite, Tokyo,

Secret Underground Organization
of the Communist Party of Japan

By the end of May and early June, 1950, the Party had barely completed its basic reorganization for the new adventure. On May 30, three days after the departure of General Derevyankov to Moscow, the Japanese Communists openly attacked American occupation soldiers. In this incident, four American Military Police were beaten by a mob of Communist militia at the Palace Square in Tokyo where the Communist rally for the "Defense of the Communist Party, to preserve Peace and the United Fatherland," was held. Eight young Japanese were arrested immediately in connection with the incident and were quickly brought to trial by the American authorities.

It was the first instance of such violence in more than four years of American occupation. During the past years, the Japanese Communists had constantly challenged the American authorities by general strikes and propaganda, however, they had never participated in any incident similar to this. Perhaps, it was an open communication to Moscow and Peking that they were ready for further instructions from them.⁴⁰

1950. This draft was officially adopted in February, 1951, at the 4th National Consultative Conference, which was supposed to be held in August, 1950. Zenei, May, 1951, pp. 7-11. It is note worthy that the Communist Party of Japan readopted the concept of "lovable Communist" after the failure of the Soviet attempt in Korea during 1950-1953. On January 1, 1955, Sanjo Nosaka emerged from underground life, which he had been engaging in ever since June 6, 1950, and denounced the Moscow-Peking directed "ultraleftist adventurism" and returned to his old concept of "peaceful gradualism." See Akahata, January 1, 1955, also A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 478.

⁴⁰The incident on May 30 was highly praised by the Chinese Communists. An editorial in the People's China of June 16 commented: "The Chinese people greet the Japanese people in their heroic fight against the United States imperialism and salute them in joining the ranks of the Asian people's united front against these Trans-Pacific Aggressors." This editorial was quoted by New China News Agency, June 17, 1950, p. 107.

As significant as the incident itself, was the rally at which it occurred, The question of whether the Communist Party of Japan should continue to enjoy legal protection was immediately raised by General MacArthur. Therefore, on June 6, General MacArthur addressed a directive in the form of a letter to Premier Shigeru Yoshida, asking the Japanese Government to remove from public service twenty-four members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan, including all seven of the Politburo members, namely Tokuda, Nosaka, Shiga, Ito, Shida, Hasegawa and Amano. The following day, June 7, in a letter to Premier Yoshida, General MacArthur asked that an additional seventeen leading officers and staff members of the Akahata, the Party organ, be added to the purge list of June 6.⁴¹

However, their top members had effectively vanished underground prior to June 6, 1950.⁴² And without delay, they promptly organized the "Interim Central Directorate Committee" on June 7, to meet the new situation.⁴³ (According to Rodger Swearingen "information regarding the scheduled attack seems to have reached Party Headquarters at least ten weeks before the event."⁴⁴)

Meanwhile, a top Korean Communist veteran in Japan, Politburo

⁴¹New York Times, June 6, 8, 1950, p. 1.

⁴²According to an eyewitness account, Tokuda was last seen on June 4 and Nosaka on June 6, 1950. Sunday Mainichi, August 13, 1950, p. 16.

⁴³Akahata, June 8, 1950. Kyokto Tsushin, May 21, 1950, pp. 52-53, reports that the final preparation for the underground organization was decided on May 2, 1950, at the Nineteenth Central Committee meeting.

⁴⁴Swearingen and Langer, Red Flag in Japan, p. 240.


COMMUNIST PARTY OF JAPAN

FIGURE 2

member Chunhae Kim, known as Tenkai Kin,⁴⁵ having seen the completion of the "Fatherland Defense Committee" under the defunct "Chosen Jin Ranmai," disappeared from Japan on June 15, and was reported passing through Wonsan, Korea on June 21, 1950.⁴⁶

Chinese Communists Preparation of
Formosa Invasion

The Chinese Communists immediately after their victory on the mainland made plans to invade Formosa. For months, the official Peking radio predicted an invasion, referring to it as a "sacred task." As early as New Year's Day in 1950, the Central People's Liberation Army to "liberate" Formosa and rid all Chinese territory of "the final vestige of American imperialism."⁴⁷

From a military standpoint, it was judged impossible for the Chinese Communists to occupy Formosa in early 1950 because of their lack of air sea power.⁴⁸ The Nationalist Chinese Army, consisting of six

⁴⁵He had fulfilled a two fold mission: responsible for coordinating the Korean movement in Japan with the activities of the Japanese Communist Party, he had simultaneously served as the unofficial ambassador of the North Korean regime at Party Headquarters in Tokyo. Ibid., pp. 122-25.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 122-23; Ichiro Fujihara, Niko No Kaeiei Saiho To Kongo No Taisaku (Tokyo: Far Eastern Affairs Research Insitute, 1955), p. 198.

⁴⁷New China News Agency, January 2, 1950, p. 7.

⁴⁸In early February, 1950, General Su Yu, Vice-Commander of the 3rd Field Army which was in charge of the main invasion of Formosa, spoke of the difficulty of the task: "I must first of all point out that the liberation of the islands along the southeast coast, especially Taiwan, is an extremely big problem, and will involve the biggest campaign in the history of modern Chinese warfare. This island cannot be occupied without sufficient transports, suitable equipment and adequate supplies. Only when we have fully prepared the material and technical conditions for overcoming these difficulties can we smoothly carry out this tremendous

infantry divisions numbering 100,000 men, was equipped with United States supplies, and supported by 300 air planes, two destroyers, and several destroyer escorts. The Nationalists were strong enough to defend Formosa from a Chinese Communist invasion unless they were "backed by Soviet sea and air forces." "If the Soviet Union sends ships and planes to aid the Communist that will be a different story" said Ting Fu Tsiang, Chinese representative in the Security Council.⁴⁹

However, the Soviet Union and Communist China accepted the dangerous risk in order that they might accomplish their mission. With Soviet military assistance apparently definite, top military strategists began to mention the pending invasion, predicting an early victory. On March 1, 1950, General Chu Tah, Commander-in-Chief of the "Chinese Liberation Army," suggested the pending Soviet assistance to build up modern Chinese air strength and sea power. He said publically:

There are of course difficulties in carrying through the great task of liberating Taiwan. In order to wage a battle, a mighty military force is needed, and the people's Liberation Army is now carrying on intensive and all round preparatory work for this task.

I can tell you that the People's Liberation Army is absolutely certain to fulfill its sacred task of liberating Taiwan. The day of liberation is already not far off.⁵⁰

As spring advanced beyond the winter monsoon season, activities in the southern and southeastern sections of China intensified. Soviet shipments of planes and auxiliary materials, such as radar equipment and

military assignment and thoroughly eradicate the Kuomintang remnants." People's China, February 16, 1950, p. 8.

⁴⁹New York Times, January 26, 1950, p. 2.

⁵⁰New China News Agency, March 1, 1950, pp. 1-2.

aviation fuel, poured into these areas beginning in early March of 1950. It was reported by the official Central News Agency that "scores of planes in more than 200 wooden craft arrived in Shanghai early in March from Russia. . . . by March 14, sixteen had been assembled and test flown over Shanghai."⁵¹

Under the supervision of Soviet technicians, an intensive air-field development program started. It was reported that "Soviet technicians helped to establish a radar net on the coast of east China." At the same time, dozens of air bases were under construction "along the Yangtse River and in South China, including clusters of bases around Shanghai along the Fukien coast facing Formosa, in the vicinity of Hong Kong and north of Indo-China."⁵²

In addition, "more than 3,000 fishermen and boatmen were recruited with their junks and assembled for training in the seaport of Chekiang and Fukien," and "the National Seamen's Union of East China received orders to assemble one million tons of wooden shipping." Meanwhile, the "Chinese Communists purchased old coastal freighters, and second hand automobile engines to give power to sampans, in Hong Kong and the Philippines."⁵³

During this period, a large number of the Chinese Communist

⁵¹New York Times, March 14, 1950, p. 21. The first air fight between the Nationalists and Communists occurred on April 3, 1950 over Shanghai. For the first time since the Civil War, the Nationalists lost two planes, which were shot down by the Russian built LA-9 fighters. Time, April 17, 1950, p. 40.

⁵²New York Times, July 21, 1950, p. 3.

⁵³Walter Karig, et al., Battle Report: The War in Korea, Prepared from Official Source (New York: Farrar and Reinehart, 1952), pp. 39-41.

soldiers were assembled in the sea coast provinces for the invasion. General Chen Yi, Commander of the 3rd Field Army, was in charge of the forces. In this invasion, the main force was composed of the 3rd Field Army. For weeks, special amphibious assault training was carried on. Two other armies of the 4th Field Army were known to be moving toward Fukien from Hainan.

Thus by the middle of June, 1950, "virtually all preparation had been completed for the invasion of Formosa."⁵⁴ By this time, 250,000 soldiers with 6,000 vessels, mostly wooden junks were on the coastline. Also poised nearby, looking eastward to Formosa 100 miles away, were between 300 and 400 planes, including the Soviet Yak-21 Jets, LA-4 and LA-9 fighters, twin-engin bombers, and a number of Japanese "Type 90) planes.


Finally, the message officially endorsing the invasion of Formosa was sent on June 23, 1950, by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Its message to the invading forces read in part as follows:

Your courage and excellent discipline have won the heartfelt goodwill and support of the whole nation. The peoples of Taiwan . . . await your arrival with enthusiasm and we have every confidence that you will certainly plant the five-star flag on the national territory of Taiwan. . . .⁵⁵

Thus an important part of the Sino-Soviet plan for the scheduled attack in 1950 was completed. From now on, the "liberation" of Formosa was imminent at any time. For this offensive was planned to follow immediately the North Korean assault on South Korea in late June.

⁵⁴New York Times, July 1, 1950.

⁵⁵"Great People's Liberation Army," New China News Agency, June 24, 1950, p. 152.



APPROXIMATE DEPLOYMENT OF
SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMIES
(Mid - May - June)
1950

Source: Based on Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

FIGURE 3

CHAPTER VIII

MID-CRISIS AND PRE-WAR: II

(NORTH KOREA IN 1950)

Upon the successful conquest of China by the Chinese Communists, in the second half of 1949, the Soviet and Chinese Communist strategists immediately turned their attention to the next targets: South Korea and Japan. The prospective invasion of South Korea was an inevitable result of the changing balance of power after the collapse of the Nationalists in Mainland China, and it seemed that no one could stop this new trend.

In fact, since early 1950, the expression of aggressive ideas by North Korean leaders was common. In this connection, Ilsung Kim publicly announced his determination to invade South Korea as a means of unifying the country. In his New Year's message of 1950, Kim reviewed the situation in 1949:

We could not accomplish our task of the unification of the country in 1949, because of the objection of the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee clique. . . . under the situation, we were forced to build a strong foundation in the North to accomplish the unification of the fatherland.

And he declared the task for the year 1950:

The People's Army, National Garrison, Security Detachment, . . . , should prepare for battle and ready themselves for defeating the enemy at any time. The people in the southern part of the Republic . . . must enlarge their struggle for the unification of the fatherland.

The victory is on the side of the entire people who fight a just struggle for unification, freedom and democracy for their fatherland. May the year 1950 bring unification of our fatherland, and be an honor to Korean people who are marching toward new victory. Long live a new united Korea!¹

The Final Buildup of Armed Strength

The process of Soviet buildup of the modernized North Korean "People's Army" entered its final stage in early 1950. If 1949 were described as the year for the mass expansion of North Korean armed strength, the first half of 1950 was its adjustment period. It was also a period of the strengthening of its secondary defensive strength. For these purposes, in early 1950, trainees for the reserve divisions, numbering about 37,000 men, who were recruited in the latter part of 1949, completed their training and were organized into three reserve divisions: the 13th Division at Shinichu, the 10th Division at Sukchun, and the 15th Division at Hoiryong.² At the same time the "People's Army 4th Independent Brigade" was expanded to the 4th Division. This division included medical, engineer, anti-aircraft and other support units.³

By day and night, all regular troops were given intensive training for a large scale operation under the direction of Russian military advisors, headed by Lieutenant General Vassyliev. Furthermore, the basic training of all North Korean male citizens from the ages of 17 to 50 con-

¹Ilsung Kim, "Victory is on the side of the People," Chosun Jung Ang Tong Shin, January 1, 1950, was quoted in Kyokto Tsushin, January 21, 1950, p. 10.

²Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., August 1, 1962, p. 2.

³Dongran Ilnyun Chi, p. 32.

tinued, paving the way for general mobilization if necessary.⁴

In April, 1950, huge shipments of Russian arms flowed into North Korea by rail and sea. Hundreds of tanks armored cars and heavy field guns; and tens of thousands of tons of other war materials were brought. Most of these arms, according to an eyewitness account, were produced between 1946 and 1948, but some of them were of 1949 manufacture.⁵

By the end of April and the very early part of May, all forces were brought to full strength, and the Tank Brigade and Air Brigade were promoted to the 105th Tank Division and Air Force Division respectively.⁶ Thus, the preparation for the June offense was being completed. Furthermore, additional muscle was added to the North Korean front divisions. During April, the most famed Korean troops in the Chinese 4th Field Army, the former 15th Independent Division, secretly entered North Korea and was redesignated as the "Korean People's Army 7th Division" at Wonsan.⁷

Thus, by the end of April, the North Korean People's Army was completed, a buildup of ten infantry divisions, including approximately 145,000 men, of which six were front line divisions. Three of the latter were returned from the Chinese 4th Field Army (the 5th, 6th, and 7th

⁴"Transcript of a Statement by Secretary of State . . .," op. cit., p. 13.

⁵Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., August 3, 1962, p. 2.

⁶Dongran Illyun Chi, p. 32.

⁷4th Report to the UN Security Council, p. 7; New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6; News Week, September 25, 1950, p. 26.

Divisions);⁸ and the remaining three divisions had been organized prior to 1949 (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions). Three secondary divisions, organized in early 1950 (the 10th, 13th, and 15th Divisions), and the 4th Independent Division, completed the total of ten divisions. Besides, there were three brigades of constabulary (the 1st, 3rd, and 7th Constabulary Brigades) numbering 24,000; one air division including 1,800 men with about 200 planes including Yaks, Stormoviks and some bombers; the 105th Tank Division of 10,000 men with about 250 medium and some heavy tanks; and a 15,000-man naval force equipped with 30 vessels.⁹

Upon the completion of its preparation for military attack against South Korea, the North Korean Defense Ministry ordered re-deployment of all troops from the interior to the vicinity of the 38th parallel. This was done during the campaign period in South Korea which ended on May 30, 1950. Colonel Doyong Chang, South Korean Intelligence Chief, testified at the UNCOK hearing held on May 12, that "the 1st and 3rd and 7th Brigades of the constabulary are acting as first line forces." "Immediately behind them," he continued, "are the 6th Division at Sariwon, the 1st Division at Yunchun and the 3rd Division at Chwon." And "one tank regiment had completed its transfer from the rear and is now stationed at Sariwon."¹⁰

⁸These transfers of Korean troops from the Chinese 4th Field Army were verified by the Peking Government in September, 1950. See New York Times, September 24, 1950, p. 7.

⁹See 1st Report to the UN Security Council, p. 2; "Toward Triumph," Korea and the UN, p. 8; New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6; Soviet Nénkan, p. 801.

¹⁰New York Times, May 11, p. 14; September 15, 1950, p. 6.




FIGURE 4

During the month of May, the busiest month to many North Korean soldiers, they were brought to the field to repair bridges and roads leading to the 38th parallel, and to supervise evacuation of civilians within five kilometers of the parallel. This was carried out in such areas as the Ongjin Peninsula and the Seoul-Uijongbu corridor.¹¹

At the same time, they were subjected to concentrated political indoctrination for their "sacred task." The soldiers were also taught practical battle maneuvers with emphasis on close cooperation between infantry and armored units. This training was under the direct supervision of the Soviet advisors. The North Korean soldiers were also given instruction regarding their own organization, strength, position and equipment and the relationships of these to the arms of the South Korean forces. Moreover, the geography of South Korea (mountain ranges, rivers, roads and railroads) was specially emphasized.¹²

Upon the completion of the preparation for an open war in June on South Korea, the North Korean Worker's Party on May 30 transmitted a final message to its guerrillas in the southern mountains, many of whom had infiltrated from the North in early 1950.¹³ The message read in part

¹¹On June 9, two weeks before the North Korean attack, the Chief of the CIA, H. Hillenkoetter, reported to the Defense Department that "the North Korean army had ordered civilians to evacuate in the 38th parallel area, a sure sign of approaching military activities." US News and World Report, August 4, 1950, p. 18. See also New York Times, June 26, 27, 28, 1950.

¹²Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., August 4, 1962, p. 2; Marvice Hinous, Crisis in the Kremlin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1953), p. 301.

¹³The South Korean Defense Ministry estimated about 6,000 well-trained and indoctrinated guerrillas, who were recent graduates of the Kangton Political School and Hoiryong School, invaded the South and joined South Korean guerrillas. New York Times, April 2 and September 15, 1950, p. 6.

as follows:

You must expand your active area to achieve the year 1950 as our victorious year. . . . last March, 1950 our Central Committee, of the Korean Worker's Party, appealed to you to expand your active area as an immediate goal of early summer, this must be done!¹⁴

The Final Pressure of Psychological Warfare

For the grand Russian offensive in the Far East in 1950, the Soviet puppet "Permanent Committee, World Peace Congress," which was a sort of counterpart of the United Nations, organized in Paris in April, 1949 right after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, called its third session at Stockholm, Sweden, lasting from March 15 to 19.¹⁵ It adopted the following anti-American resolution:

We demand the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and mass extermination of human beings and the institution of strict international control.

We shall regard as guilty of war crimes the government that is the first to use atomic weapons against any country.¹⁶

The resolution further called "all men and women of good will throughout the world to affix their signature to this appeal."¹⁷ It was obviously aimed to promote and intensify the peace propaganda campaign against the United States and spotlight the charge that the United States was the war-

¹⁴Pyongyang Radio, May 30, 1950, was quoted in Kyokto Tsushin, June 11, 1950, p. 18.

¹⁵The meeting of the Permanent Committee was held a month earlier than the date fixed at the second session of the Committee on December 16, 1949. It was originally intended to hold a third session some time about the middle of April, 1950. Ibid., January 21, 1950, p. 39.

¹⁶"The Peace Movement—A New Stage," New Times, March 22, 1950.

¹⁷Ibid.

monger and the chief threat to world peace. On the other hand, it was a part of the Soviet strategy to gain more time for her defense build up and at the same time to attempt to isolate the United States from the West.¹⁸

However, in North Korea, signature of the appeal of the Permanent Committee was directly linked with the resolution adopted by the UDFR on June 28, 1949. In a statement, Serya Kang, Chairman of the All-Korean National Peace Committee, pointed out:

The movement for peace in Korea is closely linked with the movement for peaceful, democratic unification of the country on the way towards which the Korean people encounter the same enemies—the Anglo-American imperialists and their puppets who are striving to prevent the unification of Korea with the aim of keeping its southern part enslaved by the US.¹⁹

With a view toward still further unification of public sentiment, All-Korean National Peace Committee, which was organized in 1949, submitted an appeal for consideration to the "Supreme People's Assembly" of North Korea. The "Supreme People's Assembly," of course, approved the Permanent Committee's proposals and decided "to launch a nation-wide movement in defense of peace and consolidate even more the ranks of the champions of the peace."²⁰

The North Korean national campaign to collect signatures to the Stockholm peace statement was formally launched on the 1st day of April,

¹⁸See US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Part IV (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 244, for a good account of the Soviet implementation of peace.

¹⁹For a Lasting Peace . . . , June 3, 1950, p. 1.

²⁰Ibid.

1950.²¹ At the same time, in thousands of towns and villages, Peace Committees set to work throughout North Korea. Millions of printed slips asking "Do you want peace?" and "Do you also want a peaceful unification of the fatherland?" were distributed to all adult citizens of North Korea. By the end of May, Committee headquarters announced that "5,680,000 inhabitants of North Korea had signed the Stockholm Appeal."²²

Thus, the North Korean Communist justification for the military attack in June successfully obtained overwhelming approval of the citizens of the North. Not only that but the majority of Korean residents in Japan also signed the appeal effected by a secret order sent by the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party to the "Chosen Jin Renmai" to launch a campaign to collect signatures in Japan during May of 1950.²³ The UDFJ branches in Japan conducted a campaign to receive ten million signatures and to collect thirty million Yen (Japanese money).

Korean Communists in Japan initiated the campaign in accordance with the order sent by the Korean Communists in Pyongyang, however, in Japan, it became the most violent demonstration ever conducted by Korean Communists. They shouted on the street: "We oppose the preparation for civil war in Korea initiated by the Syngman Rhee clique who are in alliance with the reactionary Yoshida Government!"; "We oppose American imperialists who are busy in preparing a World War III!" and "We oppose

²¹North Korea was the first Soviet satellite state to launch a campaign to collect signatures for the Stockholm Appeal.

²²For a Lasting Peace, . . ., June 3, 1950, p. 3.

²³From available sources, it is judged that the order was sent in the early part of April, 1950. Kyokto Tsushin, May 21, 1950, pp. 7, 9, 29-30.

the Japanese intention to make South Korea to a military base!"²⁴

North Korean Communists Demand of South Korea
Peaceful Surrender or War

Upon the successful completion of preparation for the "June 25" attack by North Korea, political and psychological pressure on South Korea was stepped up immediately after the South Korean election of May 30. On June 3, the "All-Korean National Peace Committee," which was an organ of the UDFP of Korea in Pyongyang, released a statement to the effect that "five and half million North Koreans had signed a Peace and Unification Appeal," thus "we are moving into a new phase of the struggle for the unification of the country."²⁵

Then suddenly on June 5, Dalhyun Kim, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the UDFP, criticized the election held in South Korea on May 30 as unfair, and announced that he would presently consider the possibility of an appeal by Lee Yon, Chairman, Central Committee of the Working People's Party of South Korea, on June 3, 1950, "to adopt all steps possible to speed up the implementation of measures for peaceful unification proposed by the UDFP on June 28, 1949."²⁶

Thus, the UDFP of Korea once again took the course of a "peaceful unification" struggle against South Korea which it had advocated since

²⁴See Kyokto Tsushin, May, 1950.

²⁵US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 19.

²⁶"Appeal by Chairman Lee Yon," Izvestia, June 6, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 22, 1950, p. 28. It was true that Lee Yon was a South Korean, however, he was a member of the North Korean Cabinet when he proposed an appeal on June 3.

June of 1949. On the basis of the so-called "Lee Yon's Appeal," the UDFF, on June 8, pointed to the resolution, adopted on June 7, 1950, for South Korea. As a whole it was similar to the one proposed in June of 1949, but it contained details by indicating the dates and places for further negotiations.

The resolution appealed to the emotional sentiment of the Korean people for unification and read as follows:

In June, 1949, the UDFF came out with the proposal for the peaceful unification of our country. This proposal has not yet been realized, however, in the near future the Korean people will be celebrating the fifth anniversary of the historic day of liberation, August 15. But the 38th parallel still artificially divides our country. The division of Korea into two parts is causing immense damage to the country's economy. Those responsible for the delay in the peaceful unification of Korea are the American imperialists and the clique of Syngman Rhee which is against the people.²⁷

The new resolution, however, contained terms unacceptable to President Rhee and their South Korean leaders as was the case in June, 1949. The proposed resolutions were:

1. From August 5 to 8, 1950, general elections should be held throughout Korea for a united supreme legislative organ.
2. On August 15th, . . . a session of this organ shall be held at Seoul.
3. From June 15 to 17, a conference of the representatives of North and South Korea . . . should be convened either at Haeju or Kaesung near the 38th parallel.

At this conference the following questions must be discussed and answered: (a) The conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea; (b) The program of the country; (c) The agencies of the central committee to direct the elections.

4. Those responsible for obstructing unification of the country are national traitors and should be debarred, and interference

²⁷"Appeal of Central Committee of UDFF of Korea to Korean People," Pravda, June 10, 1950, Ibid., July 29, 1950, p. 37.

by the UNCOK should not be tolerated.

The Central Committee of the UDFR suggests the following conditions for participation in the conference of representatives of the democratic political parties and public organizations of North and South: (a) Those responsible for thwarting the peaceful unification of our native land or national traitors, including Syngman Rhee, Lee Bunsuk, Kim Sungsu, Shin Sungmo, Cho Pyongok, Chang Taksang, Paik Sungok, and Yoon Chiyong should be barred from the conference; (b) Interference by the UNCOK in the country's unification should not be tolerated. The Korean people must independently decide the question of the peaceful unification of their native land without foreign interference.

5. The authorities of the Northern and Southern parts of Korea must be responsible for the maintenance of public order during the conference and the general elections.²⁸

The proposal was flatly rejected by South Korea on June 10.

Instead, they presented a counterproposal to the effect that "for the unification of Korea, an election should be held in the North under UN supervision." Concurrently, South Korean Army chief of Staff, Major General Pyongduk Choi, disclosed the ultimate aim of the North Korean proposal:

In order to destroy law and order in the Republic of Korea, North Korean puppets brought out a new proposal which was actually ordered by Shtykov, Soviet Ambassador to the puppet, on April 7, 1950.

This is one of the five orders given by him to puppet, North Korea. As we have seen, the puppets are faithfully executing his orders. All of our citizens should not follow the Soviet Union.

Whoever attends this meeting will be considered as a traitor to our nation.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., pp. 36-37. According to a South Korean government intelligence source, Soviet Ambassador Shtykov ordered the North Korean regime "to propose a North-South Peace Conference right after the South Korean election of May 30. See details in Tongah Ilbo, June 9, 1950, p.1.

²⁹Tongah Ilbo, June 10, 1950, p. 1. The same day, in Japan, "Chosen Jin Remmai" informed to the UDFR in Pyongyang to dispatch their representatives to the meeting of June 15 and 16. Kyokto Tsushin, June 21, 1950, pp. 15-16.

Thus, the first proposal was brought to an end by the South Korean rejection. This was what north Korean strategists had already anticipated. To initiate the second move, they sent their men across the border to deliver a resolution to South Korean representatives knowing that South Korean troops would arrest them. On June 10, the day the South Korean Government officially rejected their proposal, according to the UDFF announcement

Three emissaries, Ingui Lee, Kinhong Kim, and Jaehong Kim, were awaiting the delegates from the South at the appointed place south of the border. However, by 2:00 P.M. no one had appeared at the appointed place while twenty men in civilian clothes and more than twenty men in the uniform of the so-called Army of National Defense appeared on the territory south of the 38th parallel. From 2:00 P.M. until 3:00 P.M. the place . . . was subjected to concentrated firing from carbines . . . from the territory south of the 38th parallel.

"Therefore," the statement continued to say, "the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the UDFF instructed them to depart on June 11, at 10:00 A.M. via Ekhen station for Seoul to deliver the UDFF appeal to the addresses."³⁰

These men crossed the border and headed for Seoul where they were immediately arrested by South Korean troops on June 11. Seoul radio broadcast in the evening news of the arrest of the North Korean "emissaries" and provided favorable material for the Communist campaign for the so-called peaceful unification of the country. A week-long series of developments now reached a point where the possibility of armed action for the release of their "emissaries" could openly be mentioned. In a protest message to South Korea, the communique published by the Central

³⁰"South Korean Troops Fire on Peaceful Emissaries," Pravda, June 13, 1950, The Current Digest of Soviet Press, July 29, 1950, p. 38.

Committee of the UDDFF on June 13 stated:

All Korean people express their indignation and wrath at these barbarous actions of the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique, on the instructions of the American imperialists, to frustrate measures for peaceful unification of the country in order to kindle fratricidal war. The Korean people will develop a mighty movement for the release of the UDDFF emissaries.³¹

During this critical period, the North Korean Defense Ministry and Russian military advisors enthusiastically made the final military preparations "for the release of the UDDFF emissaries." Every day, high level meetings were held at the Ministry, and at the same time, the Russian advisors were also having their group meetings. Certain bureaus, such as the Operation Bureau, and offices, such as those of Defense Minister Yongkun Choi and Chief of Staff Kun Kang, were strictly sealed as "off limits" to "unauthorized" persons. The Russian advisor's rooms were also closed to visitors.³²

On June 10, the North Korean Defense Ministry hastily recalled all of its front division and brigade commanders to Pyongyang³³ to give an oral order to prepare battle readiness by June 23, 1950.³⁴ Two army corps, the 1st Army under Major General Ung Kim, former Director of the

³¹"Korean People Express Indignation at Barbarous Deeds of Syngman Rhee's Treacherous Clique," Pravda, June 14, 1950, *Ibid.* Interestingly, these three men immediately deserted to South Korea in denouncing North Korea as hell. See Tongah Ilbo, June 17, 1950, p. 1.

³²Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyung," *op. cit.*, August 4, 5, 6, 7, 1962, p. 6.

³³Most of these commanders, except brigade commanders, were recalled to Pyongyang on May 17 during the meeting of the Party, Government and Army for the discussion of the "Method of Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland," In this meeting, Ilsung Kim suggested to them to prepare armed mobilization for the unification of the country. Changsoon Kim, Uklo Wa Hunyong Park, " Hankook Ilbo, Seoul, June 25, 1962, p. 2.

³⁴Dongran Ilnyun Chi, p. 33.

Training Bureau, and the 2nd Army under Major General Kwanghyup Kim, former Director of the Operation Bureau, were organized on June 11, and the new staff were sent to the front on June 12 to conduct a final field maneuver, which was planned to last for about two weeks, in the vicinity of the border.³⁵

The Defense Ministry also commissioned as general officers three of the most-trusted and able Soviet-Koreans: Chan Kim, the Deputy-Minister of Finance; Il Nam, Deputy-Minister of Education, and Yul Kim, Director of the Organization Department of the Korean Worker's Party. Chan Kim became a "commissioner" of the newly created 2nd Army, and Il Nam and Yul Kim assumed functions at the rear that assured them general surveillance over critical sectors of military and related civilian operations.³⁶

Thus the situation allowed the North Korean Defense Ministry to issue a series of "Battle Order," which were translated from the original plan submitted by the Russian advisors, to the front Field Headquarters. "Reconnaissance Order No. 1," the original Russian document which was captured by the UN Forces on October 4, 1950 at Seoul, instructed the Chiefs of staff of the front divisions, on June 18 "to carry out reconnaissance prior to the attack in order to determine the location of the main forces of South Korea and to work out an accurate target map of the installation of such forces."³⁷

³⁵Yeoungbok Ju, "I was in the Invading Army in Korea," op. cit., p. 4.

³⁶North Korea, A Case Study . . . , p. 114.

³⁷Full text of "the North Korean Reconnaissance Order" in The Conflict in Korea, p. 26, 34. Ex-North Korean Major, Yeoungbok Ju, who

To promote new political pressure on South Korea, the UDFP, on June 16, pleased with the "Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly" of North Korea, the only organ that could declare war, "To consider possible measures for peaceful unification of the country along the lines of the organs of power." In this connection, on June 19, the "Presidium" had adopted a new resolution which was absolutely impossible for South Korea to accept. It could be regarded as an ultimatum or the declaration of war on South Korea. The preface of the resolution reads as follows:

Syngman Rhee's anti-people's clique, has forbidden the democratic parties and public organizations to take part in negotiations for the peaceful unification of our country. In this the Syngman Rhee clique has once more shown something foreign to it and that it is not acting in its own mercenary interest, but in the piratical interests of the American imperialists and on their orders.³⁸

"Expressing the unshakable will of the Korean people for unification," the North Korean "Presidium" resolved to place the following proposals before the National Assembly of South Korea:

1. The peaceful unification of the country must be secured by merging the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea into a single Korean legislative body.³⁹

translated "Operation Order," stated his experience as follows: "When I appeared before Colonel Nampack Kim, Chief of the Engineering Department, I was sworn before him to keep the secret strictly and was handed over a bundle of documents written in Russian and immediately ordered to translate it into Korean. It was the military operation plan to storm South Korea. The document contained the locations of the engineering units, future routes of their march and many duties to help the main forces." Yeoungbok Ju, "I was in the Invading Army in Korea," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³⁸"Decree of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly of KPDR on Acceleration of Peaceful Unification of Korea," *Pravda*, June 21, 1950, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, August 5, 1950, pp. 35-36.

³⁹It is important to note that in such an amalgamated assembly North Korea would have had more than twice as many seats as they would be

2. The all-Korean legislative body thus created must draw up a constitution for the Republic and form a government.
3.
4. . . . the national traitors Syngman Rhee, Lee Bumsuk, Kim Sungsu, Shin Sungmo, Cho Pyongok, Yoon Chiyong, Chang Taksang, and Pack Sungok must be arrested; . . . all political prisoners must be freed.
5. The Government formally formed by the legislature must recognize on democratic foundations the military and police forces now existing in North and South Korea as a single army and police.
6. It must be proposed to the UNCOK, . . . , that it must leave Korea immediately. The Korean people must decide the peaceful unification of their country on their own without the interference of foreign states.
7. All measures concerned with the peaceful unification of our country must be fulfilled by August 15, 1950.
8. When the National Assembly agrees to conduct the negotiations, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly is ready to send delegation to Seoul . . . to conduct negotiations from June 21, 1950.⁴⁰

The resolution was formally presented to the one-day-old South Korean National Assembly on June 20, 1950, by Yongok Kang, Secretary of

entitled to on the basis of population. Total number of the members of the National Assembly of South Korea was 200, whereas the North Korean "Supreme People's Assembly" was represented by 565 deputies.

⁴⁰Ibid. The Jen Min Jih Pae editorial occasioned the call of the "Presidium" for peace and unity throughout Korea "not only vested with the desires of the Korean people but a benefits the cause of peace and democracy in the Far East as well as in the World." The commentary concluded that "under these internal and international circumstances, we are convinced that the just call of the Korean Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly is sure to make itself heard despite all difficulties, and what it calls for will finally be attained." See New China News Agency, June 21, 1950, p. 130. In this connection, there have been interesting comparative surveys made between two official papers in Peking and Moscow. The Soviet papers, Pravda and Izvestia, gave much space to the activities of the UDFF, but no editorial comment upon it gave any indication that the North Koreans intended to proceed to such forcible measures as Jen Min Jih Pao pointed out.

the North Korean "Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly." It was an ultimatum for the surrender of South Korea even before the provocation of war. This was similar to the "path" taken by the Communists in China for their conditions at the Peace Conference in early 1949.⁴¹

However, even before the resolution reached Seoul, President Rhee, on June 19, in a message to the South Korean National Assembly, in its first session following its May 30 election, rejected the proposal. He said that: "Any compromise with or any concession to the Communists . . . would be a road leading toward disaster."⁴² John F. Dulles, the Department of State Special Consultant, was present in the opening ceremony. He told the members that "you are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom."⁴³

The political situation, after the announcement of the resolution by the North Korean "Presidium" and its subsequent rejection by President Rhee on June 10, deteriorated in favor of a North Korean armed attack at any moment. Because, according to their one-sided accusation, they "took every measure to unite the Motherland by peaceful means," but

⁴¹See C. R. Shepherd, A Nation Betrayed (New York: Exposition Press, 1954), pp. 129-30, for conditions proposed by Communists for the peace conference with the Nationalists in early 1949.

⁴²Tongah Ilbo, June 19, 1950, p. 1. President Rhee had one major weapon to utilize against "peaceful unification" as proposed by the Communist dominated North. The Korean Aid Bill passed by the Congress in February, 1950, carried the provision that aid would be terminated in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of the coalition government which would include one or more members of the Communist Party or of the Party now in control of the government of North Korea.

⁴³"The Korean Experiment in Representative Government," Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 13.

"the Syngman Rhee clique prevented the realization of peaceful unification of the motherland."⁴⁴

Under these circumstances, on probably June 19 or 20, the North Korean Defense Ministry transmitted its final order, "Operation Order No.1" to each front division and constabulary commanders which instructed them to prepare for attack by 12:00 P.M., June 23, 1950. Following are some excerpts from an enemy document, which was captured by the United Nations forces on July 20, 1950, in the vicinity of Taejon, directed to Kwanmu Lee, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division located in the front corridor of Seoul:

1. The 1st Infantry Regiment of the enemy's 7th Infantry Division is standing on the defense against our attack.
2. The most important objective of our Division in the frontal attack is to penetrate the enemy's defensive line on the KWAN-DONG (05.18)—AJANG-DONG (03.33) line, and after taking MAJI-RI (03.16), hill 535.6 (03.33), P'YONGMAUL (95.13), and NAEHOMEAM (91.32), advance to UIJONGBU-SEOUL Area. The plan calls for completion of preparation by 23 June 1950.
-
4. The main attack will be directed toward the wide road on the left flank. Battle will be in two echelons.
5. The corps artillery battalion will be placed under my command. Artillery preparation fire will be laid down for 30 minutes; 15 minutes bombardment and 15 minutes rapid fire. . . . The preparation for bombardment calls for completion by 2400 hours 23 June 1950.
-
14. The Division Command Post (presently at Hyopko 13.28) and the Observation Post (presently at 03.31) will be moved to a point along the road leading to UIJONGBU.
15. Report will be made
 - a) When attack preparations are completed.
 - b) When the attack is begun.
 - c) By messenger, radio, and written report when the

⁴⁴See Ilsung Kim, "Message to Korean People," Pravda, June 27, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 15, 1950, pp. 13-14.

present, the next, or a day's duty has been completed.
 d) Once every two hours on matters other than the above
 e) Written reports will be sent twice a day.

16. Standard signals-

No.	Signal	Flare	Telephone	Radio
1.	Begin attack		Storm	244
2.	Begin charge	Green	Fine	224
3.	Begin bombardment	Red	Storm	333
4.	Begin supporting Charge	Green	Snowstorm	111
5.	Cease firing	White	Stop firing	222
6.	Call for fire power	Red and Green	Thunder	444 ⁴⁵

Concurrently, all citizens of North Korea were called daily to take a part in mass rallies to support the "Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly" proposal and to demand the immediate arrest of the "principal traitors," headed by President Rhee, and the speediest possible unification of the country. Just one day before the attack, upon the completion of planning on June 24, "all Russian officers attached to the units withdrew to Pyongyang,"⁴⁶ and the UNCOK Field Observation Team, which had been inspecting the 38th parallel since January 12 "to report developments likely to involve military conflict," returned to Seoul with the view that there was "no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent."⁴⁷ This report was made, even though Yongok Kang, Secretary of the "Presidium," clearly suggested that war was imminent in a news conference held on June 24 when he de-

⁴⁵Full text of the "Operation Order No. 1," in The Conflict in Korea, pp. 28-32.

⁴⁶Statements by captured North Korean soldiers were quoted in News Week, September 25, 1950, p. 26.

⁴⁷New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6.

clared in part that:

No matter what steps are taken by the corrupt, reactionary clique, it will not succeed in concealing the Presidium's proposals from the Korean people; it will not succeed in stifling the voice of the people, which is responding to this proposal.⁴⁸

⁴⁸"Korean People Demand Peaceful Unification of their Country," Izvestia, June 24, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 12, 1950, p. 31.

CHAPTER IX

ARMED AGGRESSION ON SOUTH KOREA FROM COMMUNIST NORTH KOREA, AND THIRD POWER INTERVENTION

The bitter exchanges of extreme expressions, such as "national traitor" or "clique," between the South and North for the five years since the end of the war, grew in the few months prior to the attack, and finally erupted into a hot war on the peaceful early Sunday morning of June 25, 1950. Soviet-supported North Korean Communists finally resorted to war against South Korea, a Republic supported by the United Nations and the United States. It has been widely speculated that Korea was one of the most likely potential areas in the world for the cold war between the Soviet camp and West to burst into a hot war. In spite of the American warning that any change of status quo in Asia as of mid-1949 would be faced with a collective defense by the West, the Moscow-Peking axis risked the danger, feeling the gains to be worth the try.

Armed Attack by North Korean Forces

The Battle Picture at the Opening of the War

At 4:00 A.M. Korean time on June 25, 1950 (2:00 P.M. June 24, Eastern Standard Time), Sunday, an artillery barrage was directed across the 38th parallel from the territory north of the parallel. By 6:00 A.M.,

well organized and prepared North Korean troops, under Russian direction,¹ launched an unprovoked invasion of South Korean territory. A simultaneous amphibious invasion was made by North Korean units further south.

The North Korean forces, according to the United Nations Command report to the United Nations Security Council, attacked initially with six infantry divisions, three constabulary brigades, supported by approximately 100 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, ample planes, and heavy artillery. It reported in part as follows:

The main attack was down the Pochun-Uijongbu-Seoul Corridor. The North Korean 4th Division plus 42 to 50 tanks crossed the border at 4:00 A.M. Another North Korean force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men plus more than 50 tanks drove down the Pochun-Uijongbu Corridor toward Seoul.

Simultaneously, an attack was launched on the Ongjin Peninsula to the west by a North Korean constabulary brigade against approximately one South Korean regiment. A division of North Korean troops, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck Chunchon in the eastern mountains.

Along the east, a border constabulary reinforced to approximately 10,000 attacked Kangnung and carried out two amphibious landings further south.²

Early Development

However, it was not immediately clear whether it was another

¹According to the former North Korean Major Yeoungbok Ju, as soon as he heard the roar at 4:45 A.M., June 25, he went to the Headquarters, 2nd Army. He stated that "Major General Rim Choi, Chief of Staff, Colonel Hae Lim, Vice-Commander in charge of Political Affairs, and a Russian Lieutenant Colonel, whom I have never met before, were already in the Headquarters. Major General Choi told me that from now on every report must be interpreted to the Russian advisor as soon as possible." He also stated that the "Russian advisor left for Pyongyang at 9:00 A.M., June 25, 1950." Yeoungbok Ju, "Manghyang," op. cit., August 8, 1962, p. 2.

²Department of State, UN Action in Korea, Under the Unified Command, 1st Report to the Security Council (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 2.

simple border raid in force or a major attack. The South Korean Defense Department and the American military advisory group for the first few hours judged that this was just another incident in which a few South Korean soldiers and cattle would be killed, a few villages pilfered and burned, after which the invaders would go back north as was usual.

But, by 6:30 A.M., it became quite clear that an invasion in full force was probably commencing. Intermittent reports from the American military advisers and South Korean Field Headquarters provided the factual information from frontlines which indicated a big push was in progress all along the border. It appeared nothing could stop the Soviet-made tanks and heavy artillery. About 9:00 A.M. the City of Kaesong, largest city north of Seoul and the location of the South Korean Army Field Headquarters, was reported captured by North Korean troops.

Therefore, the American Ambassador to South Korea, John J. Muccio, officially elaborated his earlier flash report to General MacArthur to the effect that:


North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea at several points this morning. . . . Action started at 4:00 A.M., when Ongjin was blasted by artillery fire; about 6:00 A.M., North Korean infantry crossed the 38th **parallel** at Ongjin, Kaesong, Chun Chon . . . , amphibious landing was reported south of Kangnung.

Kaesong reported captured at 9:00 A.M. with 10 North Korean tanks participating. . . .

It would appear from the nature of attacks and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.³

On the contrary, Radio Pyongyang, from early morning, alleged

³Karig, op. cit., p. 21.



OPERATIONS IN KOREA
UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE
Situation 5 August 1950 and
Operations Since 25 June

that the South Korean forces had invaded North Korea during the early morning and the North Korean Interior Ministry instructed "Security Forces" to "repulse invading forces by decisive counterattack." They further placed responsibility for the consequences on South Korea.

Radio Pyongyang warned:

. . . the government of Korean People's Democratic Republic had authorized the Republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs to warn the authorities of the puppet government of South Korea that if they do not immediately cease their adventurist military operations in the region of the 38th parallel, decisive measures will be taken to crush the enemy and South Korean authorities will bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences which these adventurous military operations may involve.⁴

At 9:30 A.M. Ilsung Kim further alleged in a broadcast from Pyongyang that:

South Korea, having rejected every northern proposal for peaceful unification, has 'crowned its inequity' by launching invasion forces across the parallel in the sector of Haeju area thus precipitating a North Korean counterattack for which it would have to assume consequences.⁵

In the same broadcast, Kim called on South Koreans for a mass uprising and sabotage against the South Korean Government.

In Seoul, President Rhee having held an emergency cabinet meeting at 10:00 A.M. personally cabled the Korean Ambassador to Washington, John M. Chang, "to ask the Government of the United States to send more arms."⁶ Meanwhile, the battle was continued and the situation worsened by the

⁴"Declaration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of KPDR," Pravda, June 26, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 5, 1950, p. 12.

⁵"Message of Kim Ilsung to Korean People," Pravda, June 27, Ibid., p. 13.

⁶Hankook Ilbo, June 26, 1962, p. 2.

hour. Therefore, Ambassador Muccio decided to report to the Department of State at 11:26 A.M. (9:26 P.M., June 24, EST). This was the first official battle report made to Washington from South Korea. The cable stated:

. . . , North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4:00 A.M. Ongjin was blasted, by North Korean artillery fire. About 6:00 A.M. North Korean infantry commenced crossing the [38th] Parallel in the Ongjin area, Kaesung area and Chunchon area, and amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9:00 A.M., North Korean forces, . . . are reportedly closing in on Chunchon.

It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.⁷

A North Korean declaration of war was rumored at 11:00 A.M. over Radio Pyongyang, but no confirmation was available from any source, and President Rhee did not treat Ilsung Kim's 9:30 and 11:00 A.M. broadcast as an official notice. But an hour later, at 12:00 noon, Radio Pyongyang declared that war was effective at 11:00 A.M.⁸

The situation drastically changed after the North Korean declaration of war at 12:00 noon. Shortly after the North Korean declaration of war, Ambassador Muccio, after having conferred with President Rhee at the Presidential Mansion, cabled the second message asking for an additional supply of ammunition:

I earnestly appeal to the Department of State to back up . . . Korean Military Advisory Group's Appeal for additional ammunition. Without early receipts of such ammunition . . . it is

⁷"The American Ambassador in Korea to the Secretary of State," US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 11.

⁸Ibid., p. 12.

feared that the modest stocks in South Korean hands will be exhausted within ten days. In my opinion it would be catastrophic for the United States to permit gallant Korean forces to succumb for lack of ammunition.⁹

The same afternoon the United Nations Commission on Korea sent an official report to the United Nations Secretary General, Trygve Lie, and requested further action:

Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hrs. 25 June attacks were launched in strength by North Korean forces all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong area and Chunchon and the east coast where seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kangnung. Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in Pohang area on southeast coast. . . .

 Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary General to serious situation developing which is assuming the character of full-scale war may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. . . . Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later.¹⁰

Approximately ten hours after the North Korean invasion was launched, the situation was officially cleared. It became obvious to the United Nations to which South Korea owed her birth, and the United States to which she owed her life-line that a full-scale armed invasion which was well-prepared and planned by Communist North Korea was in progress. Now, the fate of South Korea's life or death depended on the degree of the United Nations and the United States' willingness to contain the naked aggression executed by the Communists, and it appeared that the chances of a Communist success in Korea were much greater than a failure.

⁹Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

The United States Intervention

Decision to Intervene

The United States, risking the danger of a war and deciding to stop the North Korean advance south of the 38th parallel, surprised the Communists. On the basis of the report made by American Ambassador Muccio in Seoul on June 24 (EST), the Department of State directed Ernest A. Gross, the United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council, to submit a draft resolution in accordance with Articles 33 and 34 of the United Nations Charter. Upon the return of President Truman to Washington on June 25, positive action was initiated.¹¹

In an evening conference in Washington at Blair House, President Truman met Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this meeting, the official American position, to defend South Korea from the Communist takeover, was determined. As the first of a series of measures, General MacArthur was instructed to furnish military supplies and assistance of the type furnished under the Mutual Defense Program.

On June 26, the proceedings of Sunday evening's meeting were made public, including the announcement of President Truman in which he criticized the North Korean regime and the forces behind them:

I conferred Sunday evening with Secretaries of State and Defense, . . . , and Joint Chief of Staff about the situation in the Far East created by unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea.

¹¹President Truman said that he had made up his mind as to the principle of American intervention on the side of South Korea during his flight to Washington. See Truman, op. cit., p. 332.

The Government of the United States is pleased with the speed and determination with which the United Nations Security Council acted to order a withdrawal of the invading forces to positions north of the 38th Parallel. In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the United States will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.

Our concern over the lawless action taken by the forces from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the people of Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated by the cooperative action of American personnel in Korea, as well as by steps taken to expedite and augment assistance of the type being furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance program.

Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such a threat to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the United Nations Charter.¹²

However, the rapidly changing situation in Korea constituted a serious threat to any American effort to stop the North Korean forces at the point where it originated, and the subsequent developments would threaten American security in other parts of the Western Pacific. Therefore, a second Blair House meeting on the evening of June 26, was held in which President Truman decided to provide South Korea with limited United States Naval and Air Force support, and the entire military situation in the Far-East, including Formosa, the Philippines and Indo-China, was reconsidered.

On June 27, President Truman, with the endorsement of the Congressional leaders, announced the course of action which the United States had decided to follow:

In Korea the Government forces, . . . , were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and

¹²"Statement by the President, June 26, 1950," US Policy in the Korean Crisis, pp. 16-17.

to withdraw to the 38th Parallel. This they have not done. . . . The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In those circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . .

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines to strengthened. . . . I have similarly directed the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and associated states of Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.¹³

Thus, the United States officially intervened in the war with its own armed forces. The decision to limit aid to naval and air forces was apparently "based on the view that more was not needed to check the attack."¹⁴ However, the situation in Korea was daily getting worse with strong possibilities of rapid deterioration. Therefore, on June 30, President Truman in reply to the Security Council's June 27 resolution "authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific

¹³"Statement by the President, June 27, 1950," US Policy in Korean Crisis, p. 18. In this connection, it should be pointed out that President Truman justified American intervention on the ground that the Security Council had "called upon all members . . . to render every assistance . . . in execution of this resolution." But it still did not mention the military measures to be rendered, thus the President's action in this part was still on the basis of American unilateral intervention.

¹⁴L. M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in the UN (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 109.




FIGURE 6

military targets in North Korea whenever militarily necessary and ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast." He also announced that "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units."¹⁵

The United Nations Intervention

Resolution-of June 25

The Security Council met on Sunday afternoon, June 25, 1950 (EST), upon the request of the United States Deputy Representative, Gross. Having considered the United States draft resolution, which was based on the reports made by the American Ambassador Muccio and the United Nations Commission on Korea in Seoul, the Council speedily adopted it by nine votes to none with one abstention, Yugoslavia, and one absence, the Soviet Union.¹⁶

The Security Council noted that the armed invasion constituted a breach of the peace and resolved in part as follows:

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel;
2. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
 - a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
 - b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel; and
 - c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;
3. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to

¹⁵US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 25.

¹⁶Year Book of the UN, 1950, p. 222.

refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.¹⁷

This resolution was sent to the Member states and the North Korean regime and South Korea. While South Korea and many other states sent favorable replies to the United Nations' call, the North Korean regime refused the "calls for immediate cessation of hostilities; and . . . to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel" and challenged the legal validity of the decision on the basis that the "Security Council discussed and adopted a decision on the Korean question ignoring the Korean People's Democratic Republic and without the participation of its representative."¹⁸ It further stated:

The representative of such a power as the Soviet Union was absent and the representative of such as China excluded from the Security Council meeting. For this reason the Korean People's Democratic Republic Government declares it holds the decision and the resolution adopted by the Security Council to be illegal.¹⁹

Resolution of June 27

The Security Council met again on June 27 to consider further measures to be taken. The representative of the United States, Warren R. Austin, urged the Council that since the authorities of North Korea had shown no intention of heading the Council resolution to cease hostilities and to withdraw north of the 38th Parallel, it was the "duty of the Security Council to apply stringent sanctions to restore international peace"; therefore, he submitted a draft resolution which

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸World Today, p. 329.

¹⁹"Declaration of Government of KPDR," Pravda, June 28, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 22, 1950, p. 10.

recommended that "the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."²⁰

The representative of Yugoslavia also submitted a draft resolution that would have the Council renew its call for the immediate cessation of hostilities, initiate a procedure of mediation between both parties, and invite a representative from the government of North Korea to the United Nations in order to participate in the procedure of mediation.²¹

The Security Council put these two draft resolutions to a vote. Finally, the American draft resolution was adopted seven to one, with one absent, the Soviet Union, and two not participating in the vote, India and Egypt.²² The adopted resolution stated that:

The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
Having called upon the authorities of the North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel, and
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th Parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate effective steps to secure peace and security,²³

²⁰Year Book of the UN, 1950, p. 223.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Message from the South Korean National Assembly to the General Assembly, dated on June 26, 1950 (Korean time), stated the following request: "Beginning in the early morning of 25 June the North Korean Communist Army began aggression throughout the 38th Parallel area. For self-

Recommends that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.²⁴

This was a landmark in United Nations' history because it circumvented the difficulties which the United Nations had faced in attempting to establish an international force to be placed at the disposal of the Council. On the occasion that the veto would have been extremely useful to the Soviet Union, it could not be used. Six months before the outbreak of the Korean war, the Soviet representative to the Security Council, Yakov Malik, had made a sensational walk-out, pledging not to return until Communist Chinese delegates were seated, thus making it possible for the United Nations to raise an international force. If Russia had been there, she could definitely have cast a "veto,"²⁵ and then the United Nations would have been pressed to act illegally, against the Charter, or else outside the framework of the United Nations.

Resolution of July 7

protection, our brave and patriotic army and navy opened heroic defense operations. This savage and unlawful act of the rebel force is the commission of an unpardonable sin. We, representing thirty-million Koreans, hope the United Nations General Assembly realizes that our defensive fight against aggression is the inevitable reaction of our people and Government. We also appeal for your immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security not only for Korean but also for the peace-loving people of the world. US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 17.

²⁴"Resolution adopted by the Security Council, July 27, 1950," Ibid., p. 24.

²⁵It is the writer's view that if the Soviet representative had been present in the Council, there would have been no grounds to veto the first resolution passed on June 25, even if the fighting had been started by an attack of South Korean troops as alleged, but he could definitely have stopped the passage of the second resolution. See more on Soviet maneuvers in the United Nations below, pp.

Secretary-General Lie sent a communication to the governments of the Members of the United Nations on June 29, stressing "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area."²⁶ Fifty-three member states indicated approval and their support of the resolution and sixteen supplied or offered military contributions. Only three, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, opposed the Council's resolution.²⁷

The United Kingdom called attention to the necessity for coordinating the assistance which the Security Council's resolution of June 27 had recommended should be furnished by the member states of the United Nations. A joint resolution by the United Kingdom and France was submitted to the Security Council on July 7, 1950. This was adopted by the Council by a vote of seven to one, with three abstentions, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, and one absence, the Soviet Union.²⁸ The adopted resolution stated in part that the Security Council:

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and people of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offer of assistance for the Republic of Korea;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolution make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

²⁶US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 24.

²⁷For a summary of replies, see Ibid., pp. 28-66.

²⁸Year Book of the UN, 1950, p. 230.

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.²⁹

The representative of the United States, Warren Austin, immediately informed the Council that the United States would accept the responsibilities and obligations placed upon it by the Security Council. The next day, July 8, President Truman formally accepted the Council's request:

I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council and have designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the military forces which the members of the United Nations place under the unified command of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it.

I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.³⁰

The United Nations, under the vigorous support of the United States and her allies, could undertake to expel the invaders under the flag of international justice and peace. Thus, the ruthless invasion of South Korea became a test which would determine the fate of the United Nations and the influence of the United States. For the first time in history of an international organization, forces could participate in a great international "police action."

²⁹"Resolution adopted by the Security Council, July 7, 1950," US Policy in the Korean Conflict, pp. 66-67.

³⁰Ibid., p. 67.

Chinese Communist Intervention

Brief Survey of Military Situation in Korea
up to Chinese Communist Intervention

After a bitter defense of the Pusan Sector, the United Nations forces in September, 1950, launched a counter-offensive against the North Korean forces, and in October they rushed toward the 39th Parallel amidst signs that the North Korean forces had ceased to exist as a coordinated unit. South Korean troops pushed over the Parallel On October 1 and sped to the east coast. On the same day, General MacArthur formally issued a message to the Commander in Chief of the North Korean force "calling on the North Korean forces to surrender":

The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decision of the United Nations may be carried out with the minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, . . ., call upon you . . ., forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities. . . .

I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of properties.³¹

The world which had waited with bated breath to see whether the North Korean regime would accept the note of surrender, or Communist China or the Soviet Union would be provoked to action, began to feel that its alarm had not been necessary. It supposed that its attention in Korea could be turned to other matters besides fighting. There were good reasons for this view. Already the devastation was shocking, though nothing like what it was to become later. Prosperity had to be restored,

³¹Department of State, "Inquest of Peace and Security," Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1949-1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp.76-77.

and refugees resettled.

Under these circumstances, on October 6 the General Assembly voted implicit approval of the decision to make the crossing of the 38th Parallel. The resolution stated:

The United Nations General Assembly recommends that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of unified government in the sovereign state of Korea; that the United Nations force may remain in any part of Korea for the achievement of the foregoing objectives; and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea.³²

Before ordering the United Nations forces, except South Korean ones, across the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur issued a second message "calling on North Korean forces to surrender" on October 9, after which the United Nations forces proceeded to cross over the parallel. Anticipating the total collapse of the North Korean forces, General MacArthur flew to Wake Island on October 15, to see President Truman and discuss further measures to be taken. General MacArthur reported to him that he expected all resistance to end by November 24, 1950, Thanksgiving Day, and hoped to be able to withdraw the 8th US Army to Japan by December 25, 1950, Christmas Day, leaving the X Corps and the detachments provided by other countries.³³

He also advocated the holding of elections by the end of 1950 and the withdrawal of all United Nations troops from Korea immediately after

³²"Free and United Korea is goal of Policies adopted by General Assembly," UN Bulletin, November 1, 1950, p. 449.

³³Truman, op. cit., p. 366. See also Military Situation in the Far East, Part II, pp. 926-28, 959.

the election. In regard to the possibility of Communist Chinese or Soviet Union intervention, he considered there to be as "very little chance they would come in. At the most they might be able to get fifty or sixty thousand men into Korea, but since they had no air force, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." Furthermore, the Soviets in Siberia had an air force but they were decisively inferior to the United Nations squadrons.³⁴

Under these assumptions, the United Nations troops hurriedly marched toward the Korean-Manchurian border. However, as they reached some parts of the border, new enemies unexpectedly began to block the mountain passes. The intervention of the Communists troops on the side of the North Korean forces was the Communists' real answer to General MacArthur's call on enemy forces to surrender. The order was to undertake a "human sea" attack on the United Nations position in deep northern Korea.

Chinese Communist Decision to enter the War

As the Communist North Koreans attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, strangely, no newspapers and radios in Communist China, or in the Soviet Union, reported on Korean affairs for two full days. The silence in Peking and Moscow might have been politically determined. While the Moscow newspapers reported on the North Korean advance on June 26, transmitted by Pyongyang Tass, Peking newspapers continued the silence. On June 27 Jen Min Jih Pao broke the silence with a New China News Agency dispatch from Pyongyang.

³⁴Truman, Ibid.

The first Chinese Communist official statement, since the outbreak of the Korean war, was made on July 28 after President Truman ordered "the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa." Mao Tse Tung appeared at the "Council of the Central People's Government" and criticised the American policy, regarding the President's order as "United States aggression in Asia." It appeared that he welcomed American action, because "this open exposure by the United States of America of its true imperialist face is useful to the Chinese people and the peoples of Asia." In regard to Chinese support of Korea and other countries, he said "the sympathies of [all the] Chinese people as well as the masses all over the world are for the victims of aggression."³⁵

At the same meeting, Chou En Lai elaborated on this theme by declaring them that the American move was no surprise "because for a long period the Chinese people had been constantly exposing all plots of American imperialism, plots of aggression against China and of forced annexation of Asia." "The attack on the Korean People's Democratic Republic," he continued, was only the first step "to provide a pretext for United States invasion of Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and Philippines," and "this is nothing new as an act of intervention by American imperialism in Asiatic affairs. Like Mao, he also predicted that the Chinese people would extend "sympathy and respect for the people of Korea."³⁶

While Moscow officially declined to comment on the American

³⁵Pravda, June 30, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 22, 1950, p. 18.

³⁶Ibid.

intervention in Korea and Formosa, Peking's immediate reaction was their suggestion that open support by Communist China might be caused by the fact that "the Communist Chinese felt themselves directly involved in the Korean war."³⁷ China seized upon the American intervention to whip up the anti-American campaign to unprecedented heights. The national campaign for "Liberation of Taiwan" and "Against the American Aggression in Korea" got underway with amazing rapidity. The Government hastily organized spontaneous rallies, pledges, and campaigns in every city, town and village.

There were, on the other hand, continuous rumors leaking from Southeast China that some of General Lim Piao's troops, which had been posed against Formosa for months, had departed on July 10 and were reported to be heading for Manchuria and the Korean border.³⁸ The same pattern was also reported in Manchuria where three armies of the 4th Field Army were stationed.³⁹

On July 12, it was announced by the "representative of the All-China Federation of Labor" that a "national campaign week against United States aggression in Taiwan and Korea will start on July 17 throughout China to give Chinese people a clearer picture of what America is doing in the Far East and thus turn into practical action the powerful opposition to the United States aggression and support for

³⁷See Levis, op. cit., p. 295.

³⁸Karig, op. cit., p. 49. See also New York Times, July 21, 1950, p. 3.

³⁹News Week, July 17, 1950, p. 7. See also Sekaino Ugoki, July, 1950; Kyokto Tsushin, July 11, 1950, p. 16.

the liberation war now proceeding in Korea."⁴⁰

A "National Campaign Week Against American Aggression" had been underway since June 16 throughout China. The slogans for the week announced for many days in succession all over the country were:

1. Oppose the United States imperialist aggression on Taiwan and Korea, and disruption of peace in the Far east and of world peace.
2. Oppose the unlawful resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council under the United States manipulation.
3. United States imperialism, in launching oppression on Taiwan and Korea, merely presents a bloody front void of inherent strength.
4. People of the whole world unite, Defeat the criminal aggression of United States imperialism.
5. Salute the Korean people and the Korean People's Army. Fight against the United States imperialists. The people in the East and West oppose the United States imperialist aggression.
6. Stand by the Korean people in their righteous war for national liberation and unity, and defense of world peace.
7. People of all Asia, rally around the world peace camp headed by the Soviet Union.
8. Unite, consolidate our force and get ready to defeat imperialist provocation.
9. Intensify our world, consolidate our force, defend world peace with actual deeds.
10. Intensify our preparation for the liberation of Taiwan—our own territory.
11. Long live the unity and victory of world peace.⁴¹

The possibility of a Chinese "Volunteer" force to assist the North Koreans could be foreseen in this appeal. Soon local campaign committees all over the country adopted resolutions and proclaimed Chinese support for North Korea. The Peking Campaign Committee, for example, a-

⁴⁰New China News Agency, July 12, 1950, p. 81.

⁴¹Text based on Shanghai News, Shanghai, July 15, 1950.

dopted the following resolution on July 19:

On the eve of its collapse, American imperialism has launched armed intervention in Taiwan and Korea. . . . Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse Tung, we are fully confident, that we have the means for liberating Taiwan. We are also convinced that the Korean people will succeed in crushing the armed aggression of the American imperialists.⁴²

On July 25, Tsai Chang, President of Democratic Women's Federation, sent a cable to Chungae Park, President of the Democratic Women of Korea, pledging that "Chinese women will stand together with the peace-loving peoples of the world to give our support for your just war and are firmly convinced that final victory will be yours."⁴³

In this critical period, Western speculation increased that something was awry in Peking for Mao Tse Tung was absent from the twenty third anniversary observance of the "People's Liberation Army," on August 1, and the Peking press remained silent. Mao Tse Tung was not present in public or private meetings until August 10, when he attended a banquet given by the Burmese Ambassador to Peking.

Some sources indicated that Mao Tse Tung was summoned to Moscow, and others reported that Soviet Deputy Premier Molotov and General Derevyankov flew to Peking in late July and agreed that China would definitely take part in the fight if Americans crossed over the 38th parallel. News Week, quoting a French source, reported that "they conferred from August 1 to 10 and decided that the Chinese would provide 150,000 troops, if and when the Americans crossed into North Korea."⁴⁴

⁴²New China News Agency, July 20, 1950, p.129.

⁴³Ibid., July 26, 1950, p. 167.

⁴⁴News Week, August 28, 1950, p. 20. See Also Ibid., November 13, 1950, p. 36.

In addition, Japanese sources further reported that "the Russians promised to equip thirty divisions of the People's Liberation Army in a short time and supply 2,000 airplanes to China. If the Americans continued their offensive into Manchuria, the Russians would intervene on behalf of the Chinese Communists."⁴⁵

In any event, the open support of North Korea by Peking leaders and the subsequent development of the Sino-North Korean relationship indicated some kind of positive decision might have been reached by the Chinese Communist Government. Peking newspapers reported, on August 11, that twenty-two top Communist Chinese leaders, headed by Ku Mo Jo, Vice-Chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese People's Republic and Chairman of the Chinese Peace Committee, and Li Li San, Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor, and their mission, left for Pyongyang "to take part in the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea on August 15."⁴⁶ However, the real purpose of sending this mission was, as Liu Ning Ye, Chairman of the Campaign Committee Against United States Aggression in Taiwan and Korea, stated in a farewell message to the mission, to "tell them [Koreans] that the 500 million people of China are standing squarely behind them in the fight for our common victory."⁴⁷ Peking appointed General Ni Chih Liang as

⁴⁵Choo Koron, May, 1953, p. 111. In connection with this Sino-Soviet movement, Time, August 14, 1950, also reported that "a week ago, Red China's boss Mao Tse Tung, Premier Chou En Lai and No. 1 field General Lin Piao were conferring in Mukden with Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. See also Intelligence Digest, January, 1951, p. 15.

⁴⁶New China News Agency, August 15, 1950, p. 103.

⁴⁷Ibid.

the first Chinese Communist Ambassador to North Korea and sent him to Pyongyang with this mission.

This was the first definite indication that the problem in Korea was one of common Communist interest. From the timing of the mission's appearance in Pyongyang, it was judged that it was probably sent there to encourage the North Korean leaders and to assure them that they were not alone; in case of "great war," the Chinese and the Soviet Union were standing behind North Korea. Ilsung Kim, in a return message to Mao Tse Tung's on August 15, openly claimed that he was supported by Communist China. This was the first time Chinese support was ever mentioned by the North Korean leaders. He said: "I am confident that the friendly relations between the Korean and Chinese people will now be more consolidated in the common struggle against the imperialist interventionists."⁴⁸ On the same occasion, Hunyong Park, North Korean Foreign Minister, made mention for the first time since June 25, 1950, of "the friendly support of the Soviet Union in their battle for South Korea."⁴⁹

From late August there were increasing statements that were designed to point up the threat that Chinese troops would enter Korea. Chou En Lai, in a letter to the United Nations Security General, mentioned that "Korea is China's neighbor, the Chinese people can not but be more concerned about the solution of the Korean question."⁵⁰ In addition,

⁴⁸Ibid., August 29, 1950, p. 197.

⁴⁹New York Times, August 16, 1950, p. 8.

⁵⁰New China News Agency, August 15, 1950, p. 101.

the Peking regime started a national campaign to condemn American bombing of Manchuria. This charge⁵¹ was probably made for two reasons: first, by this means, the Chinese people were given an impression that the United States would subsequently try to invade Manchuria and conquer the Chinese mainland, and, second, it would make China's mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union immediately effective.


By mid-September, virtually all troops stationed in southwestern China had been moved northward. Most of the 4th Field Army was at the Korean-Manchurian border and the 3rd Field Army was located in the northeastern quarter of China. Western military experts estimated about 200,000 troops were brought to the Korean-Manchurian border by the end of September.⁵² From the beginning of October, supplies and combat forces started moving into North Korea at the rate of one to two army corps per week.

Knowing the American intention to invade North Korea and the collapse of North Korean forces, Chou En Lai officially reported to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, that the "Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they simply tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists."⁵³ It was obvious that the Chinese

⁵¹According to General MacArthur's special report to the Security Council, on August 22, 1950 the United Nations airplanes were shot at by Communist Chinese anti-aircraft from the Manchurian side of the Yalu while RH-29's were flying inside the Korean border. Special Report of the UN Command on Communist China Intervention, November, 5, 1950.

⁵²News Week, September 25, 1950, p. 26.

⁵³Korean Question, p. 34.



APPROXIMATE DEPLOYMENT OF
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMIES
(1950)

Source: Based on Whiting, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 120, 121.

knew there was no choice, but the Chinese saw no obligation to intervene as long as the United Nations, except for South Korea forces, stopped at the 38th parallel.

On October 2, Chou En Lai personally called the Indian Ambassador to Peking, K. M. Panikkar, and requested him to relay to the United States Government assurance that China would not intervene if the United Nations troops stopped at the 38th parallel.⁵⁴ However, General MacArthur judged that the Communist Chinese were bluffing and ordered his army across the parallel on October 9. Thus there would be an inevitable collision between the two forces. The same day the Peking Government officially announced a sort of declaration of war against the United Nations. It stated:

The United States troops are now actively taking steps for a large scale crossing of the 38th parallel in the attempt to bring the flames of aggressive war to the border of China. The Chinese people cannot stand by idly with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice countries and with regard to the dangerous trend to extending the war.⁵⁵

Thus, the Chinese Communists officially entered the war against the United Nations forces. The first contact between the two forces took place on October 16 when the United Nations forces met the Chinese Communist 370th Regiment, of the 42nd Army, in northwestern Korea.⁵⁶ At this time, the Chinese Communists had moved approximately ~~ten~~ army corps composed of thirty divisions into Korea or to the Korean border

⁵⁴Panikkar, op. cit., pp. 110-113.

⁵⁵New China News Agency, October 11, 1950, p. 9.

⁵⁶Special Report of the UN Command on Communist Chinese Intervention, November 5, 1950.

in Manchuria.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Department of Defense, Chinese Communist Aggression and Barbarism in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 3.

CHAPTER X

C O N C L U S I O N

Causes of Communist Attack

In the preceding chapters, factors relating to the preparation and execution of the North Korean aggression against South Korea, under the guidance of the Soviet Union and Communist China were presented. Why had South Korea so long been the number one target for Communist expansion in Asia? In choosing South Korea to be the first victim of an open war, the Moscow-Peking-Pyongyang trio thought they had acted timely and had high hopes for a favorable conclusion. **There may have** been other candidates, but South Korea offered advantages that far outweighed the few risks involved.

International Factors Related to South Korea

1. South Korea Played no Strategic Role in United States Defense Planning.--The Korean peninsula was insignificant when viewed in the light of current United States military grand strategy of total war with the Soviet Union, and early post-war American defense planners were confident of prohibiting Communist expansion into the Pacific area following Communist victory on the Mainland of China.

As early as September, 1946, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer's fact finding mission, in China and Korea, officially recommended to the

United States Department of Defense the exclusion of South Korea from the possible American defense line in the future, and this was very likely adopted as the major American policy toward South Korea. The report, which was made public in 1951, pointed out the following American prospect in Korea:

. . . the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, the Soviet's prospect in Korea was estimated, as follows:

If . . . an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan and adjacent islands.

However, it reached the following conclusion:

such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subjected to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large scale **ground** operations.¹

Under these circumstances, the United States accepted the Soviet proposal for "withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea." The United States proceeded with its troop withdrawal from South Korea and completed it by the end of June, 1949. Thus, South Korea's security was not considered as vital to the strategic interest of the United States. The political commitments of the United States were limited to "extend to the Korean Government aid and assistance for the training and equipment

¹Truman, op. cit., p. 325.

of their own security forces and offer extensive economic help to prevent a breakdown of the infant nation."²

Since the American forces withdrew from South Korea without pledging to give her military support, rumors were widespread indicating that South Korea was not required as a part of the American defense line in the Pacific, and important defense officials suggested the possibility of a future line of defense which would exclude South Korea. For example, General MacArthur, in early March, 1949, described Pacific defense to the British reporter, G. W. Price, as follows:

The Pacific was looked upon as the avenue of possible enemy approach. Now the Pacific had become an Anglo-Saxon lake with our line of islands fringing the coast of Asia.

And in regard to the future United States defense line in the Pacific, he continued

It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.³

While the Sino-Soviet Conference, of early 1950, was in process in Moscow, a conference which surely considered a wide range of subjects of common interest in the Far East, there prevailed in the United States a particularly uncertain policy regarding South Korea and Formosa. In an address to the National Press Club of Washington on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson defined the security interest of the United States in the Pacific. His carefully-worded address in part was as follows:

²Ibid., p. 329.

³New York Times, March 2, 1949, p. 22.

The American defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under the trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defense perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defense perimeter runs from the Ryukyu to the Philippines Islands. Our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in the agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. . . . An attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States.⁴

Finally he concluded, regarding the security of other areas in the Pacific that "should . . . an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it. . . ."5

Secretary Acheson's speech, which apparently exempted South Korea⁶ and Formosa from the areas to be defended by the American armed forces, was an official endorsement of long standing American foreign and military policy toward South Korea. South Korea's security was thus officially no longer accepted as vital to the interests of the United States,⁷ and became dependent upon political factors, primarily,

⁴Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia—An Examination of the US Policy," Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 116.

⁵Ibid.

⁶However, it is still questionable whether Secretary Acheson completely excluded United States responsibility, because in a later passage of his speech, he mentioned: "In the north, we have direct responsibility in Japan and we have direct opportunity to act. The same thing to a lesser degree is true in Korea. There we had direct responsibility, and there we did act, and there we have a greater opportunity to be effective than we have in the more southern part. Quoted from Loc.cit.

⁷At this time, another controversial issue was revealed in Washington. The United States' only guarantee to South Korea, to supply economic assistance, was denied by the United States House of Representatives.

on just how far the Moscow-Peking axis desired to go in testing the United States and the United Nations.

While Secretary Acheson's remark did not measurably affect the Communists long standing preparation for the invasion of South Korea, it made them feel they would be assured of United States non-intervention.⁸ For, it was apparent that Secretary Acheson's speech was a reflection not only of his attitude but that of the directing forces of the United States Government.⁹

The Administration's position in regard to South Korea was solidly backed by a leading member of the Congress. Senator Conally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, accepted the United States Pacific defense perimeter as defined by Secretary Acheson in early 1950. In a press interview on May 3, 1950, he stated that "it has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa, and Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary." He refused to admit the strategic importance of South Korea.¹⁰

2. The United Nations Security Council was Paralyzed.---Certain from the Communists' point of view, they saw no reason to believe that

⁸Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co., 1951), pp. 103-104; Arthur H. Vandenburg, Jr., (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenburg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), p. 542; Judd, op. cit., p. 55; Shuman, op. cit., p. 392.

⁹That the Soviet Union and Communist China carefully evaluated Secretary Acheson's speech was suggested by the fact that Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and Communist China's Foreign Minister Chou reacted ten days after the speech was made. See Pravda, January 21, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 13, 1950, pp. 3-4, and New China News Agency, January 21, 1950, pp. 89-90.

¹⁰Nippon Times, Tokyo, May 5, 1950.

the Americans deeply desired to save the life of the Syngman Rhee Government in the event of invasion from the north. However, in the course of American foreign policy formation in the preceding years, it was often proposed that any attempt to change the status quo in Korea as of August, 1948 could be countered through United Nations channels.¹¹

In order to make the Security Council ineffective, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, Yakov Malik, boycotted the Council meeting after his draft resolution was rejected by the Council on January 13, 1950. His parting words were:

The Soviet Union will not recognize as legal any decision the Council makes with the participation of the Kuomintang group's representatives, and the Soviet Union will not abide by such a decision.¹²

This seemed curious, because it would give the Security Council a free hand to endorse the non-Communist proposal for military as well as political sanction to any further Soviet-Communist Chinese adventure.¹³ In fact, a day before Malik's boycott of the Security Council, Secretary Acheson publicly declared that the security of the nations' outside of the United States Pacific defense perimeter, namely South Korea and Formosa, would depend upon "the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression."¹⁴

¹¹See above p. 74

¹²United Nations Bulletin, February 1, 1950, pp. 117-18.

¹³Cf. Shuman, op. cit., p. 390.

¹⁴Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 116.

In this regard, however, there was very little reason for the Soviet Union to believe that the Security Council would be an effective tool to stop a North Korean advance, because the United Nations had so far never enforced any kind of military sanction during the five years since it was first organized in 1945, and, moreover, it had no armed forces of any kind, but relied solely on moral and political forces. In fact, the Soviet Government had been regarding the United Nations as "a fussy old woman" incapable of positive action.

In boycotting the Security Council, the Soviet strategists may have calculated that it might at most vote a mere resolution of censure against the Government of North Korea. If, instead, the Soviets used their veto power to block the motion at the Security Council it would have caused other states to assume the Soviet's involvement in the invasion and provide an opportunity to intervene against North Korea.¹⁵

Under the expectations of a very early victory of Communist North Korea over South Korea, the Soviet strategy was, probably, for the Government of North Korea to reject the possible first resolution of the Security Council under Articles 33 and 34 of the United Nations Charter (a recommendation that the Government of North Korea cease fire) on the basis of alleged illegality of any decision by the Security Council where the delegates of the Soviet Union and the "People's Republic of

¹⁵See Mosely, op. cit., p. 330; Alexander W. Rudzinski, "The Influence of the UN on Soviet Policy," International Organization, V (May, 1951), p. 293; Chuo Koron, November, 1950, pp. 26-27.

China" were absent.¹⁶

Furthermore, if the Security Council further moved to take military measures under Article 41, 42, and 43 of the United Nations Charter, the North Korean forces would have undoubtedly already occupied all the territory of South Korea¹⁷ and have completed the organization of "People's Committees" all over the South by a quick election. Thus once a unified Korea had been established, it would be, the Communists may have thought, settled as a new status quo.

3. The United States Ground Force Strength was not Sufficient to stop North Korean Advance.--The Communist, looking forward to a possible United Nations and United States intervention, even though the United States expressed again and again that the Korean peninsula was not essential to her own security, were firmly convinced that North Korea would have risked no great danger or setback even in the event of an American decision to resist, either alone or under international command, against North Korean forces. They could hold this opinion because the United States had "literally no military forces outside the Navy and Air Force," as General Marshall once declared.¹⁸

¹⁶See above p.127. See also Pravda, June 30, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 22, 1950, pp. 10-11, and New China News Agency, July 2, 1950, p. 51, for the Soviet and Communist Chinese Governments' reply to the United States and the United Nations request to carry out the United Nations resolutions passed on June 25 and 27, 1950.

¹⁷Available information confirmed that the Communists had believed the North Korean military operation in the South would be over by July 10, 1950, at the latest. See Chuoo Koron, November, 1950, pp. 25-26; Rudzinski, op. cit., p. 292; Kalinov, op. cit., October 10, 1950, p. 20. See also press interview between Ilsung Kim and French correspondent on August 2, 1950, New China News Agency, August 2, 1950, p. 21.

¹⁸Military Situation in the Far East, Part I, pp. 382, 352.

While the Soviet Union continued to maintain a large standing army of approximately one hundred seventy divisions, including 2,500,000 men,¹⁹ the tightening defense budget during the post-war period had drastically reduced the American military manpower to a point where it reached a below-peacetime standard. Army manpower was scheduled to be reduced to a combined force totaling ten divisions of 596,000 men. It was maintained, however, that the security of the United States, from the over all strategic point of view, was still guaranteed because of her monopoly of atomic bomb stockpiles and the capability of their delivery by B-36 and B-50 bombers.²⁰

However, three events—the Soviet Berlin blockade in 1948; Soviet attainment of the atomic bomb in 1949; and finally the elimination of Nationalist China from the Asian mainland in 1949—seemed to have been sufficient cause for the United States defense planners to decide to rebuild the ground forces to correspond to Soviet strength.²¹ The Pentagon anticipated, as General J. L. Collins, Army Chief of Staff, described, that by spring of 1950, the United States ground forces would be ready "to fight anyone, and whip them anywhere."²² But, by June of 1950, the rebuilding process was far from completion. The total strength in June

¹⁹This number was reported by Fact on File, February 17-23, 1950, p. 57.

²⁰"Korean Fumble: Whose Fault?" US News and World Report, August 4, 1950, p. 19, gives a good account of American strategy toward the Soviet Union prior to June, 1950.

²¹The decision was embodied in National Security Council Paper, No. 68. See also Stanley B. Blum, "Sharing the Burden," Journal of International Affairs, VI (Spring, 1952), p. 147.

²²US News and World Report, August 4, 1950, p. 19.

had reached twelve combat divisions, including two Marine Corps Divisions, numbering 600,000. Of these, each was considerably under strength. It was reported that these units stood at 60 per cent strength, except for the 1st Infantry Division, then in Europe.²³

The immediately available American forces in the Far East were the 120,000 men of the United States 8th Army stationed in Japan as occupation garrisons: the 24th Infantry Division in Kokura, southern Kyushu; the 25th Infantry Division in Osaka, central Japan; the 7th Infantry Division in Sapporo, Hokaido; and finally the 1st Armored Division, located in central Japan. These forces were not only to prove too small to play a significant role in a short war, but also most men in uniform in Japan were very young and few had ever been exposed to hostile fire during World War II.²⁴

In addition, there was a part of the 7th Fleet in the area with one carrier, two cruisers, ten destroyers cruising in the northeastern Pacific, and five air force fighter groups stationed on Guam Island; the 5th Air Force was in Okinawa.²⁵ These occupation forces in Japan were carefully designed by the defense planners to meet minimum requirements for the security of Japan. There were no reserve forces for use in Japan for other than internal security. The changing revolutionary tactics of the Communist Party of Japan by early 1950 required more strength even for internal security.

²³Military Situation in the Far East, Part I, p. 328.

²⁴Ibid.; Department of the Army, Korea, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 4. See also Rastvorov, op. cit., December 6, 1954, p. 175.

²⁵London Times, June 26, 1950, p. 4.

It might be possible, perhaps, that one or two divisions out of five: the 2nd Infantry Division, the 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored Division, and the 11th and 82nd Airborne Divisions, remaining at home, could be mobilized in a conventional crisis,²⁶ but Korea was too remote from the United States and since no one knew whether the Korean crisis was merely a sideshow to divert attention from a larger Communist thrust elsewhere, it would be deemed inadvisable to send large forces to the Orient.²⁷

Domestic Factors in South Korea

1. Anticipated Easy North Korean Victory over South Korea.---

The Communist strategists foresaw that the North Korean "People's Army" would be opposed only by the South Korean National Defense Army, and the balance of strength between these two forces was decisively in favor of the "People's Army." The military weakness of South Korea was in part accident and in part a deliberate policy of the United States Government.

When the Soviet military authority in northern Korea began to organize sizable North Korean forces behind the Iron Curtain, the armed strength of South Korea remained comparatively weak. During the early months of the American occupation of South Korea, a real army was denied to South Korea on the ground that to have one would violate the US-USSR understanding during the war. And, it was in part the American intention to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that the United States was not

²⁶Military Situation in the Far East, Part I, p. 382.

²⁷See New York Times, July 1, 1950, p. E-5, for Soviet "war of nerves" strategy at this time in the vicinity of the Yugoslavian and Iranian borders.

building any armed bases from which to threaten Soviet territory.

However, after the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December, 1945, which heightened the intensity of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, the American military authority in the south decided to organize a force which would match that of the north. By April, 1946, the South Korean National Constabulary, organized in early 1946, completed a build-up to the strength of five regiments numbering almost 5,000, and May saw further reinforcement of the Constabulary forces by more than seven regiments and the introduction of volunteers into their ranks.²⁸

Steady increase of the National Constabulary's manpower and equipment was seen in 1947. They had reached a 16,000-man strength by the end of 1947. When the Republic of Korea was formed in August, 1948, the National Constabulary possessed seven brigades. The independence of South Korea from American occupation, however, changed the character of the Constabulary from occupational to an independent status. Accordingly, from September, 1948, it became known as the National Defense Army of the Republic of Korea. Thus the Army moved up a step further and promoted the seven brigades to divisions.²⁹

South Korean forces were mostly armed with light arms supplied by the United States 8th Army, and numbered about 70,000 men by the end of 1948. This force was sufficient enough to suppress the small eruptions of Communist violence along the 38th parallel, and revolts in

²⁸Korea, Its Land, . . . , p. 203.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 203-204.

the country side of the South. To meet the new situation, after the withdrawal of American troops, the National Security Council decided to strengthen the South Korean National Defense Army in order to maintain its own security. In March, 1949, the Council announced that "the United States should complete the equipment of the 65,000-man army," and "turn over to the Republic a stockpile of maintenance supplies adequate to cover a six-month replacement and consumption requirements . . . and that the United States Military Advisory Group should be established forthwith."³⁰

In June, 1949, the last American combat troops withdrew to Japan leaving a 500-man military advisory team headed by Colonel Wright, which would aid in training the National Defense Army, and instruct them in the use of their equipment. In spite of the South Koreans' cry that "definite help should be provided by the United States," tanks and planes were not given to them, because "in the first place, Koreans did not know how to use them, and in the second place, the United States did not have them to give them."³¹

Nevertheless, intensive training by the American military advisors led them to become one of the finest armies in Asia. By June, 1949, the eight full combat divisions numbering 96,000 men of the National Defense Army was classed, by many experts, as the highest rated army in the Far East. The Senior Officer of the American military advisors, Brigadier General William L. Robert who was a founder of the Korean

³⁰Building the Peace, Autumn, 1950, pp. 6-7.

³¹Military Situation in the Far East, Part II, p. 2010.

National Defense Army, pictured the Army as "organized and trained as the best army of its size in Asia which could stop any attack on Korea from the north."³²

Without doubt it was true that as far as their fighting spirit and training were concerned, the National Defense Army was surely, "the doggedest shooting army outside of the United States."³³ But the real handicap to the National Defense Army, after the second half of 1949, was not only its comparatively small size but also its lack of heavy weapons. In comparison with the North Korean "People's Army" which possessed about 200 fighters and bombers, 250 medium and heavy tanks, and hundreds of heavy field artillery pieces, the South Korean National Defense Army had none of these.³⁴

TABLE 2

STRENGTH OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ARMY

(as of June, 1950)

MANPOWER	Eight Infantry Divisions	80,000
	Auxiliary Units	17,000
ARMS	Armored Vechicles	27
	Rocket Launchers (2.36 inch)	1,900
	Howitzers (105-mm)	90
	Anti-Tank Gun (37-mm)	150
	Aircraft (AT-6)	10
	Vessels	30

Source: Korea, Its Land, People and Culture of All Ages, p. 20.

³²US News and World Report, August 4, 1950, p. 19.

³³New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6.

³⁴See two articles by Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, June 27,

Above all, the Soviet-made tanks were the most powerful threat to the South Korean forces. The American military advisory group felt that a tank-led blitz by northern troops would be impractical because of terrain,"³⁵ and judged that a sufficient supply of anti-tank guns would be adequate to stop the Soviet-made tanks of the North Korean forces. On this assumption, the United States supplied a substantial number of rocket launchers, howitzers, and anti-tank guns to match the North Korean tank strength. Unfortunately, the judgment of the American advisors was founded on a miscalculation concerning the Soviet-made tanks. They believed these tanks to be the T-34, weighing 27 tons and having a front protective cover of 2.8 inches, which was used against Germany during World War II. However, the Soviet Government had supplied the North Korean forces a variation of the T-34 which weighed 32 tons and was 4 inches thick. This tank was called T-34-85 and was produced after the end of the Soviet war in Europe. Thus its thickness of 4 inches made it practically invulnerable to any anti-tank gun that South Korean forces possessed.³⁶

Furthermore, the North Korean strategy successfully weakened the defense strength of South Korea on the border. In early 1950 well-trained and indoctrinated North Korean guerrilla fighters, so-called "People's National Corps," numbering approximately 6,000, had established

and July 2, 1950, for complete picture of the South Korean forces' strength and also US News and World Report, February 12, 1956, p. 45, for General MacArthur's charge on the Truman Administration's failure to organize a strong South Korean Army.

³⁵Edwin O. Richauer, An Asian Policy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957), p. 37.

³⁶Kalinov, op. cit., September 26, 1950, p. 5. See details on capability and maneuvering ability of the T-34 -85 in Arch Whitehouse,

themselves deep in the southern mountains where their activities forced the South Korean Defense Ministry to pull two full divisions from the front to the rear.³⁷ Therefore, the North Korean attack would be initially opposed by four South Korean infantry divisions numbering 50,000 located in or north of Seoul.

Advantages to the Communists

1. North Korea: Result in Stable Regime.--The unification of Korea under North Korean initiative would have fulfilled two aspirations: the satisfaction of psychological needs and the economic-political demands of the Korean people. The end of World War II brought to the Korean people liberation from Japanese rule, but it also brought a division of Korea into two parts. The two Koreas became permanent political entities and, unhappily, partition of Korea was not enthusiastically accepted by the majority of Koreans. Thus, the unification of Korea would have removed the anxiety suffered by the Koreans as a result of common national aspirations.

Economically, a divided Korea was a more hopeless problem. Its industrial center was located in North Korea; the rice bowl, on the other hand, the source of the Korean's main staple, was in South Korea.

Tanks (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 362-64, and News Week, July 31, 1950, pp. 13-17, for capability of South Korean anti-tank guns at the time war broke out.

³⁷New York Times, September 15, 1950, p. 6.

TABLE 3

POTENTIAL RESOURCES OF KOREA
(as of 1950)

		South	North
		Percent	Percent
AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES	Rice Field	70	30
	Field, Farm	32	68
INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES	Gold	29	71
	Silver	27	73
	Tungsten	21	79
	Coal	17	83
	Electricity	8	92

Source: Soviet Nenkan, p. 792.

Neither side could exist or have a balanced economy without the other unless both sides were given immense quantities of aid from an outside source.

Thus the unification of Korea would have greatly enhanced the achievement of the foundation of a self-supporting and stable Communist state, over all of Korea.

2. Defensive Point of View: Eliminate Potential Enemy Threat.--

The strategic planners of the Soviet Union and Communist China were confronted with a basic policy problem in the area nearest to the Soviet Far East and Communist China's northern region. From their standpoint, President Syngman Rhee's stubborn anti-Communist regime in the southern half of Korean peninsula, with substantial American influence, was certainly a potential threat located less than 250 miles from the Yalu and Tuman

River boundaries of Communist China and the Soviet Union. Thus, seizing all of the Korean peninsula would have provided a forward shield to protect the industrial and military center of the Soviet Far East, particularly the Maritime Province, where the home of the Soviet 5th Fleet is located, and Communist China's industrial center of Manchuria, the administrative and cultural center of northeastern China.³⁸

Defensively, controlling South Korea would have guaranteed the security of the powerful Soviet submarine bases on the northeastern shore of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. With a future war with the United States in mind, the Soviet strategists developed and built vast submarine bases in Vladivostock, Rachin, Chungjin, and Ungki on the coast of the Sea of Japan, and Port Arthur, Dairen, Chinwangtao, Weihai and Tsingtao on the coast of the Yellow Sea. However, as history proved,³⁹ without control of the southern tip of the Korean peninsula these bases were ineffective because of Korea's significant location.

Further more, for more effective operation of Soviet submarines, they urgently needed advance bases closer to the United States bases in Japan, since their submarines were relatively short-range vessels.⁴⁰ If any port in South Korea, such as Pusan, Chinhae, Pohang

³⁸In these respects, Soviet Union and Chinese Communist sentiments and interests are directly paralleled, and it seems useless to seek some complicated anti-Soviet Maneuver in the Chinese interest in the Korean War.

³⁹One of the causes of Japanese victory over the Russian Pacific Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the apparent fact that the Japanese Navy controlled the naval bases in southern Korea and in southern Japan which formed the mouth of the Sea of Japan.

⁴⁰Available information indicated that the Soviet navy in the Far East had a submarine strength numbering 100 vessels in these areas in 1950. However, these were mostly of pre-war construction and only 10 or 20 were new Snorkel-type submarines which are capable of long-range activity. See US News and World Report, July 7, 1950, p. 19.

or Mokpo, were under Soviet control, it would not only provide the Soviet naval superiority in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the Southeastern China Sea, but also prove to be a decisive threat to the United States 7th Fleet's activities in Western Pacific area; Sasebo, the only American naval base in southern Japan, could be made ineffective by close Soviet surveillance.

As was the case with the Soviet naval power in the Far East, which was organized on the basis of an unbalanced submarine domination, so also her air power was unbalanced by being composed solely of extensive fighter groups. In an anticipated war with the United States it would have been totally ineffective to counterbalance the strength of the United States 5th Air Force, based in Okinawa and supported by powerful long range bombers, so long as the Soviet bases were located in a remote area. If the Soviet air force monopolized the bases in South Korea, she might be able to cripple the activities of the American long-range bombers. This would become possible because the United States bombers would not have fighter support in South Korea, and also because the bases in Okinawa would thus be brought within the range of Soviet aircraft.

Thus the significant location of Korea together with Formosa in conjunction with Soviet Sakah Lin, the Kuril Islands, and the Kamchatka peninsual would have completed the fortified Sino -Soviet Far Eastern "Defense Perimeter" of considerable importance for the Moscow-Peking Axis.

3. Offensive Point of View: Potential Threat to Enemy's Stronghold.--If the strategy of the Soviet Union and Communist China had

proved successful in South Korea, they would have maneuvered into an encircling position for an offensive against Japan, which remained the greatest threat to their security in the Far East. Once in possession of the entire Korean peninsula, Japan's Tsushima would be only four miles distant. Already the nearest of the Kuril, now under the Russians, was within three miles of Mamori Island, and Soviet Sakahlin lay just fifty miles from Hokaido's northern most point. Thus the Soviet Union would possess a well-rounded air-sea perimer all the way from northern Japan to Okinawa.

TABLE 4

ARMED STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET FAR
EASTERN ARMY IN EARLY 1950

	Far Eastern	Maritime	Amure	Kamchatka	Port Arthur
INFANTRY	6 (div.)	4	4	4	2
TANK	1 (500)	3 (900)	3 (600)	1 (150)	1 (300)
AIRBORNE	2	1	1	2	
ARTILLERY	1	1	1	1	
CAVALRY		1	1	1	
AIR FORCE	5 (700)	6 (600)	4 (600)		2 (300)

SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET Cruiser 2, Destroyer 22, Escort 15, Submarine 100.

Source: Information collected by Soviet Nenkan, p. 395.

As was predicted by Sanjo Mosaka long before the Korean war broke out in June of 1950, the political and psychological pressure on Japan would be great if South Korea should fall to the Soviet bloc. He said:

If all Korea should follow the example of China, the influence on Japan would be extremely great. The islands of Japan instead of being surrounded on three sides by capitalism and reaction,

would instead be surrounded by People's Democracies and socialism. The waters which wash the docks of Shanghai, Pusan and Vladivostok beat also against the shores of Japan. There is absolutely no barrier that can stem this tide.⁴¹

Thus, eventually, the Japanese, instead of feeling greater readiness to entrust their defense in major part to the United States, would doubt the ability of distant America; strongly committed in Europe, to give adequate or timely protection. It would be safe to predict a great upsurge of "neutralism" and the possibility of a strong movement to reject all military entanglements with the United States as directly dangerous to Japan's survival.⁴²

However, the Moscow-Peking expectation of rewards of victory in South Korea was more than a mere reversal of Washington-Tokyo relations. The ultimate Soviet and Chinese Communist ambition was to subvert Japan through the "path" shown by the Chinese Communists. This "path" was nothing but the armed struggle for "national liberation" and "national independence" under the leadership of the Japanese Communist "United Front."⁴³

⁴¹Sanjo Nosaka, Atarashi Chukoku To Nippon (Tokyo: The Communist Party of Japan, 1949), p. 109.

⁴²See G. F. Hudson, "Korea and Asia," International Affairs, XXVII (January, 1951), p. 19, and a statement by John F. Dulles, Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1950, p. 50.

⁴³Kyokto Tsushin, June 21, 1950, pp. 16-17, reported a secret resolution adopted at "Chosen Jin Renmai" and "Minshu Seinekai" at a Communist conference in Chiba, a province in Central Japan, in mid-April, 1950 as follows: "In view of the present situation, a strong fight for the overthrow of the Yoshida and Syngman Rhee governments seems indicated. This fight must be coordinated with the guerrilla activities of Korean Comrades and with the activities of the Japanese Communists. The North Korean People's Army will carry out the southern campaign for the unification of the country at the beginning of the rainy season. They will be assisted by the Chinese Communist forces. To facilitate the achievement of this objective, we will engage in guerrilla activities directed

In the achievement of this objective, South Korea would serve as the Moscow-Peking Axis's front base from which political, economical, ideological and cultural agitators, and arms could be sent to southern and central Japan, while the Russians would take care of the northern part of Japan.⁴⁴

Why the Communists Chose June 25, 1950

For the Moscow-Peking planners, the month of June was the earliest and most ideal month of the year for the implementation of their plan. Numerous factors, natural and political made it inevitable that they should choose this month and date.

1. Political Factors.--In South Korea the political campaign for 200 seats of the National Assembly ended on May 30, 1950,⁴⁵ and the

at the destruction of imperialist industries. Foods, clothes, and money will be supplied by the Communist Party of Japan. Our operations are scheduled, until further notice, for August."

⁴⁴Guerrilla activities from Soviet-held territory in Sakhalin and Kuril was a distinct possibility for Hokaido, particularly if the Soviet Union consolidated the so-called "Japanese People's Liberation Army," numbering an estimated 40,000 men, in the Soviet Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. This force was organized by Japanese Kwantung Army veterans detained in the Soviet Union after the war, and by Communists from Japan. If this force invaded northern Hokaido, about 4,500 secret members of the Communist Party of Japan were supposed to join them. In addition, their activities would be supported by the Communist sympathizers numbering about 55,000. Thus their guerrilla fighting in Hokaido would have been assured of success. (The Soviet saw this as a possibility about the end of 1951. According to one report, on October 30, 1951, the Fifth National Consultative Conference of the Communist Party of Japan secretly sent an order to the local Communist Headquarters in Hokaido that "we have to prepare for armed action.") Kaizo, December, 1952, pp. 182-83. See also Ashida Hitoshi, "Japanese Communist Temptation," Contemporary Japan, XX, Nos. 1-3 (1950), p. 18.

⁴⁵As a matter of fact, President Rhee issued a decree, on March 31, 1950, which ordered the elections, supposed to have been held on May 30, postponed until November on the excuse that more time was needed to complete the budget. However, in reality, he had determined to organize

new Assembly representatives met on June 19, 1950. Perhaps the Moscow-Peking planners feared that if an attack occurred in the middle of the campaign Syngman Rhee and the United States could not be blamed for the war. Neither the free world nor the Communists themselves could be expected to believe such a report. It would hardly be creditable that President Rhee had invaded North Korea while his political power was at stake in the South. Evidence now conclusively demonstrates that the Moscow-Peking strategists deliberately avoided an armed attack during the South Korean campaign period.⁴⁶

Just as there were sound reasons why President Rhee would and could not launch an invasion of North Korea earlier than June, 1950, if he had been put under pressure to do so by the United States, so also the Soviet Union had its own reason to wait until late June, 1950. On March 12, 1950, for the first time since 1936, the Soviet Union held a general election to elect deputies for the Supreme Soviet in which Marshal Stalin himself was a candidate. According to the Soviet Government announcement, 99 per cent of voters participated in the elections.⁴⁷

The newly-elected deputies first convened in Moscow, on June 12 to choose the 17 member Presidium and to approve the Council of Ministers'

his own party for control of the National Assembly. For the past two years, he had had an uneasy time with the legislators. He was immediately challenged by Secretary of State Acheson, on April 3, warning that South Korea would lose aid unless the elections were held accordingly to law. President Rhee immediately voided the decree. See Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1950, p. 602.

⁴⁶See Kyokto Tsushin, June 21, 1950, p. 15.

⁴⁷Pravda, March 13, 15, 1950, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April 29, 1950, pp. 40-41.

activities for the past and coming years. On June 17, the deputies approved the state budget for 1950-1951 and the budget that had been used during 1948-1949. The session ended on June 19 with approval of the activities of the Council of Ministers for the past year and "instructed them to continue their work." On the same day, 19 incumbent members of the Presidium were also reelected.⁴⁸

Thus, Marshal Stalin and his top "comrades" in the Council of Ministers were tacitly endorsed for their future adventures in the Far East by the people of the Soviet Union. The Council of Ministers won its "first victory" on June 19 when the newly formed Presidium approved the "Stockholm Peace Congress Appeal" of March, 1950 and chose July, 1950 as the "Campaign for Peace" month which the North Korean "Presidium" had approved in March, 1950.

The Peking regime, as the Soviet Union, had to have tacit approval for the coming major military operations against the Nationalist Government in Formosa, and in other areas. The second session of the "National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," convened on June 14 at Peking with 150 representatives attending. This meeting ended on June 23 after having reviewed all situations and endorsed the principle of the "liberation" of Formosa and Tibet as immediate objectives, and adopted a message to the "People's Liberation Army." The conference also decided to call on the people of China "to develop the signature campaign in "Defense of World Peace

⁴⁸Pravda, June 13 and 18, 1950, Ibid., July 29, pp. 25-26, and August 5, 1950, p. 20.

Week" July 1-7, 1950.⁴⁹ The act followed the lead of the Soviet Union a few days previously.

2. Psychological Factors.--The Communist designated well in advance of the opening of hostilities the day of August 15 as their objective for the completion of the military and political operations in South Korea. By that time, they planned to have completed their elections to form the local "People's Committees" in all parts of the South and the "Supreme People's Assembly" in both the South and North, to establish a united "Korean People's Democratic Republic," and to hold the 5th anniversary ceremony on August 15 in the capital city, Seoul.

Certainly to many people the date August 15 means nothing, but to Koreans it was the day when they were freed five years before. Even though the nation had been divided into two parts against its will, the people had a deep emotional feeling when they faced this occasion of national joy, because they were one and the same race who spoke the same language, had the same customs and even possessed the same antagonism toward the Japanese.

Moreover, from the view-point of morale, the Communist strategy would have a great effect on the fighting spirit of the North Korean soldiers. It would be obvious that the morale of the North Korean Army would reach an all-time high in anticipating that the 5th anniversary of the liberation would be held in the capital, Seoul, under a unified Communist government.

⁴⁹New China News Agency, June 24, p. 152, June 25, 1950, p. 156.

3. Natural Factors.--Communist strategists were deeply involved with the timing of the attack and its subsequent effect on the rice crop in the South. In Korea, farmers ordinarily sow rice during the months of April and May. A Communist North Korean attack at this time would have prevented the farmers from doing their work, which would result in disastrous failure of rice crops in the Autumn. The failure of rice crops greatly influenced the policies of the government. Thus, an untimely attack would have resulted in a serious problem even in the case of a victorious outcome. For the Korean farmer, June is a month of great leisure.

The weather in Korea also played a considerable part in the Communists' plan to attack in June. Korea is known as a rainy country, and the Korean monsoon starts about the end of May and ends in mid-July.⁵⁰ From the standpoint of the location of American military forces in the Far East, the only immediate threat to the Communist North Korean attack on the South was the superior air force located on Okinawa. Communist strategists may have believed that a heavy overcast would have hindered a counter-attack by air, should the United States attempt to interfere with their advance. (In fact, in June, 1950 there was no rainfall until the 20th and heavy rain started the day the Communists launched their offensive against South Korea on June 25. The United States air attack was not too effective until June 30.)

4. Strategical Factors.--Two courses of action to attack South Korea and Formosa were indicated in the Communist time table for

⁵⁰See Korea, Its People, . . . , pp. 9-10.

the year 1950 in the Far East. Moscow and Peking strategists had to determine which course should be taken first. From the view point of Communist political strategy, simultaneous operations in both South Korea and Formosa would be the most desirous, but this course would cause too much friction with the United States and the West.

It seemed certain that South Korea was deliberately picked as the first target and Formosa possibly the next.⁵¹ If North Korea were to delay its campaign, it might have had to postpone its attempt until after the Formosa campaign by the Chinese Communists, which it was widely rumored would be initiated during the month of July or August, or, at the latest, September, according to the best available evidence.⁵² If the North Korean army should be delayed in completing its work until after October, 1950, then it would jeopardise the Soviet timetable in other areas.

5. Surprise Attack on June 25 (Sunday).--(1) This attack, on early Sunday morning, was an exact duplication of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor nine years before. As a whole, the situation along the 38th parallel was that South Korean forces were almost defenseless. In

⁵¹From an analysis of the past close coordination of military operations between Communist China and North Korea, the Soviet Government would presumably attempt to turn over surplus North Korean air power of about 200 planes and naval power to the needy Communist Chinese campaign against Formosa after the North Korean victory in Korea, just as Communist Chinese transferred Korean "volunteers" to North Korea.

⁵²See Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's statement at the Senate hearing, Military Situation in the Far East, Part III, p. 2621; New York Times, April 30, and July 2, 1950; Kyokto Tsushin, July 1, p. 11 and July 11, 1950, p. 15; Sekaino Ugoki, July 21, 1950, p. 8; Sunday Mainichi, June 11, 1950, p. 5.

spite of the fact that the Communist army had been ordered to be prepared for a surprise attack on the South since June 22, more than half of the South Korean soldiers on the rear and some on the front had been released from duty on Sunday.

In anticipating the Communist attack from the North, South Korean forces had been in full alert during the three-month period up to the end of May when South Korean voters elected their representatives to the National Assembly. After the election on May 30, however, the border defense returned to semi-alert.⁵³ Thus, the surprise attack by the North Korean forces, as a whole, was very successful in humiliating the National Defense Army. In fact, lightning military operations by North Korean forces wiped out one third of the entire strength of the South Korean forces during the first three days after the war was launched.⁵⁴

(2) Early Sunday morning, June 25 in Korea was a usual Saturday afternoon, June 24 in Washington. In fact, Washington was totally unprepared militarily and psychologically to meet the new crisis in Korea. Prominent government officials were out of the capital. President Truman was far away from the White House, off on a trip to his hometown, Independence, Missouri, and Secretary of State Acheson was va-

⁵³US and South Korean intelligence sources, since the end of 1949, generally confirmed the North Korean invasion plans for March and April of 1950, if there is any. See the intelligence reported by General MacArthur's Headquarters to the Defense Department on November 5, 1949, January 1, and February 19, 1950 in Isidor F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 64.

⁵⁴See details in the UN Action in Korea, 1st Report, pp. 2-3.

cationing on his farm at Sand Springs, Maryland.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Johnson and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, were on their way to Washington from Tokyo where they had held a conference on United States strategy in the Far East with General MacArthur. As a matter of fact, policy-level officials in Washington were few: there were only Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; and finally Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army.⁵⁶ (That so many were absent from the capital brought memories of Hitler's weekend coup when prominent members of the British Government were away from London.)

In planning this attack, the Moscow-Peking axis had really counted the very hours for the winning of, and quick establishment of a new status quo. As far as Communist strategy was concerned, in the early stages, it seemed quite successful; the surprise element caused a delay of almost thirty hours before any decision could be reached. Thus when the United States decided to intervene, North Korean troops had already captured the capital of South Korea, which would heighten morale for the North Korean advance.

Causes of Third Power Intervention

The United States

⁵⁵President Truman received the message from Secretary Acheson about 10 P.M. Saturday night, June 24: "Mr. President, I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea." Truman, op. cit., p. 332.

⁵⁶London Times, June 26, 1950, p. 4.

The United States suddenly shifted its attitude from the course of "waiting for the dust to settle" into an active military involvement to contain Communist expansion in the Far East. About five and a half months before the Communist attack on South Korea, the United States had almost ruled South Korea, as well as Formosa, out of the American defense perimeter in the Western Pacific. The shifting policy of the United States was not simply caused by the fact that the Government of South Korea was an American creature, but there were other causes.

1. Idealistic Motive to Intervene: The Communist Aggressive War.--President Truman in his statement on June 27, 1950, clearly stated the position of the United States: The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.⁵⁷ This constituted the first instance in thirty-five years of Communist history wherein they deliberately challenged free people by an armed assault.

If there were no clear act of warning and demonstration against the Soviet Union and its satellite's aggression in Korea, their expansion against free states would roll ahead with increasing speed.⁵⁸

⁵⁷US Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 18.

⁵⁸See the following addresses by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson in which they explain why the US intervened in the Korean War. These documents are published by the Department of State and printed at the Government Printing Office. National Emergency (1950); Preventing a New World War (1951); Why We need Alliances (1951); Measure of Today's Emergency (1951); American Frontier (1951); Defense of Freedom (1951); It has Fallen to Us (1951).

Past history had witnessed the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Italian aggression in Ethiopia, and German aggression in the Sudeten area. Thus, the defense of South Korea by the United States was not only designed to stop the Soviet Union and its allies in Korea, but was also meant to assure the security of the people of the free world, especially the people of Asia, who were already threatened by the impressive victory of Communist China on the Chinese mainland.

While the United States had been strongly committed to a policy of "containment" of Communism in Europe since 1947, the Asians were only supported by moral assurance to resist Communism and accept Democracy. Thus the big unanswered question for them was the degree to which the United States would fend off Communism if a crisis arose. In fact, the announcement of the "White Paper" on China and the subsequent collapse of the Nationalist Chinese Government were disturbing indications to many Asian peoples that perhaps the United States would resist Communist aggression only with talk and excuses. These questions would be answered by the American intervention in Korea.

2. Realistic Motive to Intervene: Direct Threat to American Security.--Even though the United States Government seldom admits it, the most important single factor that made American intervention possible was that the North Korean advance into South Korea directly threatened the American position in the Pacific, especially in Japan.

Undoubtedly, two ultimate targets of the post-war foreign policy rivalry between the United States, as representative of the Free World, and the Soviet Union, head of the Communist International,

was the control of Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. The significance of the latter lies partly in the fact that Japan, in Asia, has not only tremendous industrial capacity but also manpower. Alone among the nations of Asia, she had been able to rise to the status of world power, controlled the Far East and waged a four-year long war against the West.

So long as Japan remains on the American balance sheet, the United States will not only maintain substantial balance of power against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, but could threaten the position of the Communist base in the Far East. This was the reason why Secretary Acheson, in January, 1950, declared that "the defeat and disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security in the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security." In his speech, he further stressed:

. . . there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defense of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.⁵⁹

In fact, defensively, the four main islands of Japan and Okinawa provided the American forward base to check a Sino-Soviet offensive against the United States mainland across the Pacific Ocean. Offensively, the naval and air superiority of the United States bases on Japan and Okinawa constantly threatened the industrial and military

⁵⁹"Crisis In Asia," The Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp. 115-16.

centers of the Sino-Soviet Alliance anywhere in the Far East.

If Japan were to be seized by the Sino-Soviet Alliance,⁶⁰ it would not only have meant that one of the cornerstones of the Pacific defense would have been destroyed, but also the entire security of the United States, in the Western Pacific, would have been seriously threatened. Once the Sino-Soviet Alliance possessed Japan, in addition to the Chinese mainland, South Korea, and Formosa, the Communists would undoubtedly extend their offensive line along the shore of the Pacific to threaten the United States west coast and would utilize the tremendous Japanese industrial power for the advantage of Soviet activities in other areas.

If this could be realized, the Soviet strategic position would be enormously strengthened all over the world. It was also obvious that if the Sino-Soviet Alliance, especially the Soviet Union, were successful in Korea and then in Japan, her vast armed forces in the Far Eastern area could be transferred into the Soviet defense perimeter in Eastern and Central Europe for heavy pressure against the West.

The United Nations

The foundation of hope for the majority of the free nations of the world was in fact the United Nations. In 1945 at San Francisco, many nations pledged "to save succeeding generations from the scourge

⁶⁰According to reports the Soviet Union had stationed six airborne divisions in the Far East. We can only suppose how she planned to employ them. But it is clear that she would not have stationed them in the area without any intentions of using them. If the time came, the Soviets could occupy and expel American influence from Japan.

of war." However, during the years prior to the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, it seemed almost hopeless that the United Nations could bring peace and stability. The question was presented: Would the United Nations survive? In other words, would the United Nations suffer the fate of the League of Nations?

In making a new policy against armed aggression, the United States was determined to make the United Nations the defender of the status quo. On June 8, 1949, and again on January 12, 1950, when Secretary of State Acheson defined American policy to stop the Communist advance in the Far East, he clearly warned the Soviets, or whatever forces might be involved, that an attack on South Korea would be defended by "commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations."

The Government of the United States and her major allies found the armed attack by Communist North Korea was a clear violation of Article 1 and constituted a breach of the peace in the sense of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter⁶¹ (because their attack was directed against an independent state which had been established with the assistance of the United Nations). They judged it was proper time to act to save the authority of the United Nations and to act quickly for the sake of people everywhere, who wanted nothing more than a firm peace.

Furthermore, the defense of South Korea by the authority of

⁶¹Department of State Special Consultant, John F. Dulles, visited South Korea a week before the North Korean attack of June 25 and told South Korean legislators that ". . . if the Republic of Korea were attacked, it would expect support from the United Nations" because the "United Nations Charter requires all nations to refrain from any threat of the use of force against your territorial integrity or political independence." Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, p. 90.

the United Nations was a cause directly linked with the prestige of the United Nations itself. As was well known, the Republic of Korea was established by the election sponsored by the United Nations in May, 1948, and was recognized as the sole legal unique government in Korea on December 12, 1948 and again on October 21, 1949. This was the first time in United Nations history that a world organization had participated in determining the validity of a nation. Because of this particular relationship of the United Nations with the Republic of Korea, the preservation of peace in Korea would be directly concerned with the political and moral prestige of the United Nations itself.

Communist China

1. Pre-War Commitments.--We still know virtually nothing of the official relations among the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, which preceded the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, and the subsequent intervention by Communist China, in late 1950. The only known treaty relations of North Korea with Communist China were the Sino-North Korean "Postal and Communication Agreements" signed at Peking on November 25, 1949, while the "Trade Union Conference of Asia and Australasia" was in session. These agreements were ratified by the North Korean "Council of Ministers" on January 21, 1950 and became effective on February 1.⁶²

We may, however, reach the conclusion that Communist China must have been aware of and presumably have approved the Soviet plan for the

⁶²New China News Agency, January 27, 1950, p. 122.

June operation. Judging from many intelligence sources, and on the basis of research, it appears almost certain that the Chinese Communists were deeply involved in advance discussions of the Korean operation. This is shown by the fact, that while the Peking regime outwardly advocated a peaceful resolution of the Korean War, it was actually planning a large-scale resistance to United Nations intervention in late June, 1950. This does not support the view of some writers that Mao Tse Tung was forced into the Korean War against his will.

The fact was that the Communist Chinese Government was deeply involved in advance as much as was the Soviet Union,⁶³ or more, as far as formal procedures are concerned.⁶⁴ The possibility of Communist Chinese intervention to aid the North Korean regime was not at all unexpected. Long before the war broke out in June, 1950, the rumor was repeated over and over again that when North Korea attacked South Korea, the Chinese Communists would assist in "liberating" South Korea in

⁶³Military Situation in the Far East, Part V, p. 3555.

⁶⁴The post-Korean War international relations of North Korea with the Soviet Union and Communist China indicated the story untold before the war. On September 19, 1953, about two months after the truce agreement had been signed, the Soviet Government announced it would grant one billion rubles (\$250 million) to North Korea for economic reconstruction. Pravda, September 20, 1953, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 31, 1953, p. 18. Later, on November 23, 1953, the Peking regime followed suit. They announced the granting of financial assistance to North Korea amounting to JMP 8 million million (\$363 million). This grant would be made in the form of equal yearly payments for four years. Jen Min Jih Pao, November 24, 1953, p. 1. Thus the question rose why was Communist China obliged to assume great financial obligation, even more than the Soviet Union, at the time Communist China was being given Soviet financial support. There must be some logical reason which we may assume to lie in the special relationships between Peking and North Korea.

return for the assistance given to them by North Korea.

An early report, for example, dating back to mid-1948, and made by former Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the North Korean regime, Sangjin Chung, indicated Soviet ambition in Korea and further supported the thesis that this would be accomplished under close cooperation between North Korea and Communist China. He said: "The North Korean regime will make no attempt to invade South Korea for one to two years," but "if such an invastio takes place, it will be supported by large forces of Chinese Communists."⁶⁵

From these and other reports, it is seen that the Soviet Union might have judged that the North Korean "People's Army" alone could easily defeat South Korea unless a third power intervened. It seems, therefore, that the Soviet Government asked the Peking regime only to defend North Korea in the case of an unexpected situation, such as American or United Nations intervention on the side of South Korea. It would not be too great a burden for Communist China to assume this responsibility with a view toward gaining possible future security. Thus, the Peking regime apparently was pledged to support the Soviet plan. By this means, the Soviet plan, from the Soviet point of view, almost guaranteed the already-established Soviet interests in Korea and was possibly designed with a view toward advancing a future interest in Japan.

2. Post-June Development.--The marching of the United Nations

⁶⁵New York Times, January 1, 1949, p. 4. See also Ibid., October 9, 1949, p. 22.

forces across the 38th parallel and toward the Korean-Manchurian border immensely threatened the security of the Chinese Communists. Directly, it seriously threatened the great hydro-electric plants on the Yalu River which supplied more than half the total electric power of Manchurian industries. Manchuria, for the Chinese Communists, had been regarded as the life line of national strength. It not only has tremendous reserves of industrial resources, such as coal and iron, but it also produces basic agricultural products, such as beans, wheat and corn.

Moreover, the presence of American troops on the Korean-Manchurian border threatened the foundation of Communist China's internal security. For a half decade, and especially since the establishment of the regime in Peking in 1949, the regime's total propaganda campaign was aimed at nothing but the creation of an image of hate against Nationalist China (together with the United States) as "reactionaries" and "imperialists." To them this propaganda drive was an effective measure for deflecting attention from themselves and laying the blame for existing social problems at the feet of others. It also served them in their effort to bring together the various groups within the Chinese people. Under these circumstances, if the United States maintained bases just beyond their border, the moral and political support of the Chinese people toward the new regime would be entirely undermined.

* * * * *

The tragedy of the Korean War is thus seen as a result of many factors of the world political situation following World War II. A crucial battlefield of the cold war, here become hot, Korea was a

much-desired prize for the Communists both of China and of Russia. The unfortunate division of the country into North and South made inevitable domestic conflict which could be portrayed as civil war, though Communist propaganda to that effect did not, in the actual event of aggression, deceive neither the United States or the United Nations. The continued separation of Korea, after the indecisive war, remains as a symbol of the continued separation of the world into two opposing political systems.

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