UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

EFFECTS OF MORAL INTENSITY AND SELF-EVALUATION ON ETHICAL PROPENSITY: A CROSS LEVEL ANALYSIS

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Norman, Oklahoma
2004

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EFFECTS OF MORAL INTENSITY AND SELF-EVALUATION ON ETHICAL PROPENSITY: A CROSS LEVEL ANALYSIS

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you GOD for embracing me throughout this project, I cannot express a greater joy for the spiritual growth and faith that I have experienced as a result of this dissertation. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my graduate committee for their constructive input and guidance: Dr. Michael Buckley, Dr. Jorge Mendoza, Dr. Ryan Brown, Dr. Michael Harvey, and Dr. Michael Mumford. An extra note of gratitude goes to Dr. Michael Buckley for being an exceptional committee chair by devoting his academic skills, talents, resources, and patience in developing this research project, data-collection, and giving persistent encouragement to me to complete this project. Thank you to the great faculty, staff, and students at the University of Oklahoma, with whom I was fortunate to work and learn.

Millions of thank yous to my parents, Mr. Fung Him Hing and Ms. Maggie Tsui, and my sisters, Jo and Amy, for their unfailing support. My graduate career was a true family project that was coordinated between 3 countries. Heartfelt thanks to my friends who shared in my despair and joy: Michelle Abraham, Justin Bearden, Juan and Teri Benavidez , Dr. Monika Cogoini and Dr. Bodo Katz, Sherry Cox, April Dobbs, Jan Durbin, Brian Friel, Lisa Harvison, Tracy Henning, Irish Hookano, Wallace Kaserer, Todd Kosmerick , Barbara Lamb, Jean-Michele Lamoine, Dr. Bob Mooneyham, Dr. Milorad Novicevic, Dr. Diana Padro, Rosemary Schultz , Dr. Barbara Smallwood, Dr. Herb Spencer, Mary Treaftis, Ka Ki Tsui , Nancy Tung and Bob Connolly, Etta Walden, Dr. Catherine Webb, Connie Wong, Dr. Grady Wray and Herman Carrillo, and Judy and John Van Door.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

A question that has piqued the curiosity of many businesspersons is concerned with the behavioral motivation of employees and managers. For example, why do employees and/or managers make the decisions that they make? Answering this question has enormous implications for shaping and predicting the behaviors of different organizational members (employees, managers) at work. Unfortunately, individuals sometimes fail to make ethically sound decisions and the primary focus of this research concerns ethically unsound decisions are made. This study is an empirical examination gauging the impact of different levels of moral intensity on the self-reported propensity to engage in an unethical behavior.

Business Ethics in Transition: Why?

Varieties of corporate scandals (primarily due to the occurrence of unethical decisions) have dominated recent media coverage and have had disastrous consequences for numerous organizations as well as organizational members. It seems as though these unethical decisions are exposed, investigated and reported in the mass media on a regular basis. Recent examples cover a wide range of behaviors and include the Enron scandal, Parmalat executives falsified financial statements (Italy's Enron: Does Wall Street Share Parmalat's Blame?, March 2004), financial institutions assisting clients in designing questionable financial structures (CIBC Pays $80m to settle Enron, December 23, 2003), government leaders' refusal to participate in Koyoto Protocol (Europe Backs Kyoto Accord, March 31, 2001), and a firefighter set off a multiple states forest fire (*New York Times*, July 23, 2002, A7). Some would argue that the United States is facing an ethical crisis as President Bush has exclaimed the need for stricter laws to reinforce ethics standards in business (*Bush Speech on Business Fraud Signals a Shift*,

July 10, 2002). However, some might object to the exclusive dependency on explicit contacts and social obligations to restrain or punish individuals from engaging in unethical actions (Bowie & Freeman, 2001).

The consequences of aforementioned ethical misdeeds illustrate the implications and contingencies of ethical decision-making have on the miscreants themselves, their organizations, as well as business and society as a whole. How do people resolve the tension between abide to legal constraints and attaining ethically questionable goals?

It could be concluded that the preceding examples were clearly negative to the perpetrators (criminal charges), their organizations (bankruptcy and penalty), to their stakeholders (loss of stock value) and their community (job loss and environmental damages). However, perpetrators in each of the preceding cases engaged in various forms of questionable decision-making as they were motivated by immediate positive outcomes at the personal level (personal wealth and job security), organizational level (increasing organizational stock value and organizational competitive advantages), as well as societal level (employment and economic growth). According to the teleological perspective, the ethical nature of an act is consequentially dependent such that the overall gain or loss determines the right or wrong of that action (Lefkowitz, 2003). However, the deontological ethics perspective advocated the ethical nature of an action is determined by the act itself and whether it abides to culturally embraced moral principles and laws---ethics should be evaluated independent of outcomes (Lefkowitz, 2003). Recently, May and Pauli (2002) empirically examined and reported the presence of both teleological and deontological ethics perspective in moral evaluation. Hence, it is necessary to integrate both deontological and teleological evaluations in an ethical decision-making model as both perspectives provide

insights as to why and when decisions conform to social and legal parameters in a given situation for a particular environmental context.

Jones's (1991) issue-contingent ethical decision-making model emphasized both the characteristics of the ethical issue, moral intensity, and the individual's evaluation of the issue were determinates of the subsequent ethical intention and behavior. This decision-making model generated a number of empirical studies that examined the different stages of the model (Duberich, Waller, George, & Huber, 2000; Frey, 2000; Harrington, 1997; Marshall & Dewe, 1997; May & Pauli, 2003; Singer & Singer, 1997). Jones (1991) argued that the different characteristics of an ethical issue should influence an individuals' ethical judgment of the issue, their intention, and subsequent decision. The following chapter will briefly review the issue-contingent ethical decision-making model and social perception and its relevance to ethical decision-making.

Scores of studies has examined the influences of moral intensity with the teleological and deontological ethical evaluation, but no conclusive findings regarding the relationship between contextual characteristics with the two ethical evaluations were established (May & Pauli, 2002; Pauli & May, 2002; Singer & Singer, 1997). These previous studies focused on the moral issues and its influence on moral recognition, evaluation, and intention, relative little attention has been given to the relevance of social perception bias during different stages of ethical decision-making (Harrington, 1997). Individuals often would have a self-enhancing tendency when outcome implications were relevant to their self-concept in areas such as grades, teamwork performance, and interpersonal skills (Brown, 1986; Krueger, 1998; Paulhus & John, 1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Self-enhancing bias in evaluating self-ethicality was found in Manley, Russell, & Buckley (2001) where undergraduate business students perceived others having a lower level of ethical propensity in comparison to themselves under identical circumstances. Implications remained unanswered regarding the relationship with the self-enhancing bias with different outcome implications and contingencies of decisions with decision-maker's subsequent ethical propensity.

Therefore, the primary objective of the study is to examine whether an individual's ethical propensity changes as the magnitude and scope of beneficial consequences is manipulated from a low level of magnitude (self-gain) to a higher level of magnitude (organizational-gain and societal-gain). A second objective is to examine whether outcomes of unethical actions in combination with social perception bias would influence the extents of decision-makers' self-perceived unethical propensity in comparison to their perceptions of other's unethical propensity. A third objective is to understand whether teleological and deontological ethical evaluation is related to self-evaluation bias in decision-making. Further, this dissertation will also empirically determine the contingencies of ethical decision-making, a.k.a. accountability, with ethical propensity. This supplemental objective was to determine a level of accountability that might serve as deterrence to an individual and will potentially dissuade individuals from engaging in unethical decisions/actions.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

Moral Intensity: Magnitude of Consequences and Concentration of Effects

Jones (1991) proposed a multidimensional ethical decision-making model; however, this study only examined the relationship between moral intensity and social perception with moral evaluation (See Jones 1991 for the complete model). Jones proposed 6 dimensions of an ethical issue that might influence ethical decision-making in organizations. The six moral intensity dimensions were: a) magnitude of consequences – the sum of harm/benefits as the result of the decision itself; b) social consensus – the degree to which a social norm and standard regarding the ethical nature of the decision; c) probability of effects – the joint probability of the action will actually occur and its predicted harmful/beneficial consequences; d) temporal immediacy – the time lapse between the decision and the occurrence of its consequences; e) proximity – the physical and psychological distance between the decision maker and the victims/beneficiaries; and f) the concentration of effects – the number of people affected by the decision.

The current study is concerned with the magnitude effect of positive consequences and concentration of effects on individuals' ethical propensity. Singer and Singer (1997) reported individuals judged a questionable act that resulted in beneficial outcomes as less unethical, and their ethical evaluation was predicted on: 1) social consensus; 2) magnitude of consequences; and 3) probability of effect. Past studies have used scenarios or vignettes to depict a questionable act with detailed negative consequences to arouse respondents' ethical awareness and elicited their ethical intention (i.e., Butterfield, Trevino, & Weaver, 2000).

Indeed, magnitude of consequences should predict the perceived ethical nature of an act that resulted in harmful consequences. However, the aforementioned perpetrators engaged in the unethical acts were believed to be motivated by the beneficial outcomes, rather than the destructive consequences. Therefore, this study will examine the effect of predicted beneficial outcomes with two levels of magnitude of consequences (high or low) and three levels of outcome concentration (self, organization, and society) on a person's self-perceived ethical propensity.

Studies such as Bersoff (2001), Vardi, and Weitz (2004) identified threetypes of outcome that motivate organizational members to engage in unethical behavior: 1) benefit to the self; 2) benefit to the organization; and 3) harmful to specific targeted individuals or organizations. The current study focuses on the first two types of outcome, but it also incorporates a third type of motivation for unethical propensity – outcomes that benefit society. However, individuals that engage in unethical behavior for gains other than their own interest might contradict classical economic/rational predictions of human behavior. According to classical economic-rational heuristics, individuals pursued self-interest for survival. This is a universal feature of human behavior. The ethical nature of an action is evaluated solely based on the degree to which the actor acquires benefits, which suggests that an extreme form of teleological evaluation. Therefore, ethical egoism would be the dominant form of ethical evaluation in different decision-making contexts (Bowie, 2001)

Although some economists (i.e., Yang, 1996; Chin, 1989) embraced Adam Smith's "invisible hand" concept and insisted on the advantage of economic rational heuristics in predicting decision-making for social and economic development, they have not ignored the importance of including deontological ethical judgment human decision-making. These

authors did agree that being egoistical did not necessary imply being destructive to others. Egoism, according to philosophical analyses, was motivated by a combination of self-directed motivations to improve one's condition, but not purposely sabotaging others' gain (Sober, 1989). Therefore, in order for a society to maintain its order while its members are behaving egoistically (i.e., striving for self-gain) an intact and effective legal and social system was absolutely necessary to govern behavior and protect its members from others' destructive actions (Yang, 1996, Chin, 1989). China is experiencing unprecedented economic growth resulting in annual growth of 10 percent a year but is lacking an effective legal system to regulate its members from engaging in various counterfeiting and other intellectual piracy activities that will have long term devastating consequences to its social, economic, and international development (Yang, 1996). In sum, the classical economic-rational theory is not adequate in describing and predicting human behavior, instead ethical considerations that includes contextual constraints and individual differences must be integrated in order to better understand human decision-making (Bowie, 2001).

Bowie (2001) and Miller (2001) argued traditional economic teaching of human behavior presents a powerful but simplistic view on human behavior. However, the aforementioned economic analyses and empirical prisoner dilemma-type studies (i.e., Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1987; Hu & Liu, 2003) did not fully support classical economic predictions of decision-making. In addition to the rational economist's perspective on egoistical ethical decision-making, investigating the presence of both forms of teleological and deontological ethical evaluations were necessary in understanding ethical decision-making evaluation.

As business complexity has increased dramatically with globalization, organizational members are under constant pressure to make decisions that can maximize not only their own personal gain, but also benefiting the organization as well as the society in which their organization is headquartered but have divergent legal ideals as well as systems. Hypothetically, organizational members' teleological form of ethical evaluation might exceed the deontological reasoning in a morally intensive situation; the teleological oriented decision might prevail with salient negative consequences, especially when legal rules were violated. Therefore, a close examination of decision-makers' unethical propensity concerns outcomes across different levels of magnitude and levels of concentration should yield some insight into the coexistence of the theological and deontological forms of business ethics in practice.

Social Perceptions and Biases on Ethical Evaluation

Organizational members rarely work completely independent or free from any form of monitoring or governance. Vardi and Weitz (2004) summarized an on-site organizational field study and concluded an effective reward and accountability system was a key in developing an ethical organizational culture that effectively discourages unethical organizational behavior. Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe's (1998) survey of organizational unethical conduct also found a significant (negative) relationship between ethical organizational culture with perceived unethical conduct across two samples (r_1=-.53 and r_2=-.58). Furthermore, Trevino et al. also found a positive relationship between an individual-oriented organizational climate with perceived unethical conducts (r_1=.38 and r_2=.49). However, Ford and Richardson (1994) reported a positive discrepancy between self-perceptions of ethical nature in comparison to the perception of others in a numbers of organizational ethical decision-making studies. Although Ford and Robinson did not offer plausible explanations for the discrepancy

between self and others perception of the ethical nature of an individual, Jones (1991) suggested cognitive biases might influence ethical awareness and evaluation.

Negative consequences of holding a distorted self-perception included an increase in unethical propensity, disregarding others' position and underestimated negative consequences from one's actions on themselves, their organizations and the society as a whole (Maxwell & Ames, 1981; Mesick & Bazerman, 2001). Payne and Giacalone (1999) have opined that social-cognitive psychology could contribute greatly to the study of business ethics because individuals constituted an organization that was then embedded within a larger social system. They argued that social cognitive perception should be incorporated into understanding how individuals would perceive their own ethics under different circumstances. Past studies have examined individual differences (i.e., role orientation and denial of responsibility) in ethical evaluation, but the examination of the effect of social perception in one's ethical evaluation has been largely ignored (Harrington, 1997).

Social Perception: Self-Evaluation Biases

Harvey and Weary (1985) summarized different aspects of social cognitive biases and their relevance to business ethics. An example of biased judgment was Messick and Bazerman's (1996) examination of manufacturers' reliance on cognitive heuristic that underestimated the odds of birth defects related to using their products. Attribution is a form of biased inferential reasoning that individuals use to assign responsibilities/causality to consequences. The fundamental attribution error is an example of a form of self-serving perception bias that the actor and the observer would interpret the same action differently (Reeder, 1982; Harvey & McGlynn, 1982). An observer is likely to justify his/her own actions with external contextual influences but ignores the situational influences while judging the

same action displayed by another person. The observer would likely to make internal attributions about the actor's character and personality that corresponded to the observed actions. An alternative form of the fundamental attribution error is the self-enhancement bias thatsuggested evaluation bias might obscure one from having a realistic self-perception (Paulhus, 1998; Taylor and Brown, 1988).

Self-evaluation biases, notably the self-enhancement bias, are the tendency that people would favorably distort their evaluation of themselves relative to others. It is a form of self-protective mechanism that preserves and maintains one's self-image in a positive light (Robins, 2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). Taylor and Brown (1988) reported participants rated positive traits as being more descriptive of themselves and negative traits were lesser accurate in describing themselves.

Recently Paulhus and John (1998) proposed that individuals engage in unconscious positive self-distortions and suggested two distinct self deception styles as basic self defense mechanisms. The natures of these two types of self-deceptive style were categorized as being egoistical and moralistic. The egoistic deceptive biases manifested through traits such as need for power, self-deceptive enhancement, self-promoter, achievement, competence, dominance. The above constellations of competency and achievement oriented self-regarding bias were collectively labeled as the Alpha bias. Moralistic deceptive bias associated with relationship-oriented traits such as need for approval, social-acceptance, need for affiliation, nurturing, and collectivism. These aforementioned self-driven biases were collectively labeled as the Gamma bias. Paulhus and John's (1998) factor analyzed a collection of values, motives, personality traits, self-evaluation measures; a two-factor solution emerged and the two factors were labeled as the Alpha bias and the Gamma bias. Gamma biases of self-evaluation are relevant

to current investigation of different moral intensity levels might affect self-perceived ethical propensity. Discussions of both Alpha and Gamma biases provide some insight into the issue of ethical decision-making.

Narcissistic, extraversion, and openness of the Big Five Personality Traits collectively characterized the Alpha bias, such that individuals tended to over-estimate their competencies and accomplishment such as their intelligence, academic grades, and task performance in comparison to objective performance criteria or others' ratings (John & Robins, 1994; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998). Recently, Robins and Beer (2001) conducted a longitudinal study to examine the long-term effects of self-enhancement bias. They reported negative to null relationships between university freshmen' self-enhancement bias with their later levels of self-esteem, academic engagement, academic performance, and graduation rates. Individuals also exhibited the self-enhancing bias in their self-ratings on different types of task behavior. For example, drivers reported that other drivers had a lower level of consideration and drove at a higher speed than they did (Walton, 1998; 1999). Pfeffer, Cialdino, Hanna, and Knopoft (1998) found MBA participants attributed a higher level of quality to a task when they had actively participated in and supervised—where they were most involved in the process of task completion. Negative behavioral implications of self-enhancement bias or the Alpha biascould be predicted from preceding studies that drivers might engage in reckless driving to defend themselves against the 'other' reckless drivers and managers might be unwilling to empower subordinates with autonomy because of their positive bias in appraising outcomes in which they had personally participated.

Another form of self-evaluation bias is the Gamma bias. Pro-social tendencies characterized the Gamma bias such that the Gamma Biased individuals tended to see themselves as the 'law abiding citizens' who conform and abide to social norms. Gamma Bias characteristic also positively correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness of the Big Five Personality Traits (Paulhus & John, 1994;Robins & Paulhus, 2001). Paulhus and John (1998) suggested the Gamma biased individuals were likely to perceive themselves to be more ethical than other people are; this illusion of being more moralistic is a different form of biased self-perception than the Alphas bias. Morgan (1993) reported that managers' self-rating of their ethical nature was higher than the ratings obtained from their subordinates and peers. Bowie (2001) also reported an earlier study (Maxwell and Ames, 1981) that found executive tended to perceive other executives as being less ethical and justified their own unethical behavior as self-protective maneuvers. What is needed is a closer examination of the effects of Gamma biases in ethical evaluation under different levels of moral intensity.

Gamma biased individuals' had a positive and inflated self-perception of their ethical nature, which was a means to maintain their pro-social and communal self-image. Therefore, these individuals should be more likely to engage in unethical behavior to achieve a greater gain for the common goods than for their own benefit. It might be reasonable to predict that Gamma biased people might behave unethically if beneficial consequences can justify their actions. However, the same people who value common interest and conformity might perceive others' unethical actions differently. Therefore, Gamma biased individuals might use a 'double standard' to estimate the likelihood of the self and the others to engage in the same action, and this biased might be related to the magnitudes and the beneficiary of the expected consequences. Stogdill identified ethics as an essential component in leadership (Bass, 1988).

Therefore, a distorted self-perception of ethics could obscure organizational members, especially those in leadership positions, from monitoring their own actions and modeling ethical behavior for peers and subordinates.

A recent study demonstrated that student participants exhibited a form of self-enhancement bias in their evaluation of self and others' unethical propensity (Manley et al., 2001). Interestingly, they also found a discrepancy between the unethical propensity evaluation of the self relative to others, and the discrepancy decreased as the probability of being penalized increased. An increase in accountability seems to prompt individuals to engage in a deliberate attribution process that had given a greater consideration to situational influences, such as consequences of being caught (Gawronski, 2003; Krull, 1988; Tetlock, 1985; Uleman, Newman, & Mokskowitz, 1996). Therefore, the effect of a salient beneficiary and moral intensity with one's ethical propensity might diminished by elevating the level of accountability, but moral intensity also increase the saliency of deontological reasoning in ethical evaluation.

Research Questions: Integration of Moral Intensity and Self-Evaluation Biases

Table 1 depicts the hypothetical influence of self-perception biases on the perceived moral intensity and the dominated ethical reasoning. The effect of self-perception bias, the Gamma bias, would be most salient within the high moral intense and self-relevant condition. The classical economic-rational decision-making theory predicted individuals were likely to engage in unethical behavior that directly benefiting the self-benefit; however, teleological ethics doctrine would also predicted that individuals would engage in unethical actions for the benefit of others, which would eventually benefiting the self through different venues such as psychological gratification or a long-term reward. Self-perceived prø social oriented

individuals, such as the Gamma biased ones, were therefore likely to engage in unethical behavior to benefit the collective goods for their organization and community rather than solely for their own benefit. However, these Gamma biased individual would also be prone to the self-serving effects since they already had an enhanced sense of moralistic relative to the others. Therefore, the Gamma biased individuals were predicted to account for the salient contextual influences regarding his/her own unethical behavior meanwhile discounting the same contextual influences surrounding others people actions. Hence, Gamma biased individuals might be more likely to display a higher level of unethical propensity when organization and society was the salient beneficiaries than when the self was the only beneficiary. According to Paulhus and John (1998), the Gamma bias tendency correlated with traits such as consciousness and conformity; therefore, the self-enhanced Gamma biased individuals should likely underestimate their own unethical propensity more so relative to others' in conditions where the positive pro-social outcomes could further enhance their self-image.

The effect of moral intensity should be a potential situational facet that influences one's social judgment. Individuals should account for the salient situational factors, i.e., magnitude of consequences and concentration of effects, and make decisions of teleological ethics while maintaining their ethical self-perception. For example, Singer and Singer (1997) would have predicted outcomes that were beneficial to one's organization and society might beevaluated as being less unethical than outcomes that benefit solely the self.

When organization or society are the salient beneficiaries of unethical actions that unambiguously violate societal norms and standard, the magnitude of consequences and the concentration of effects that are sufficient to amplify one's teleological ethical evaluation and

overshadows the deontological ethical consideration. However, these same individuals might discount the same moral intensive elements preceded other people's ethical nature and estimate these people would behave unethically regardless of the beneficiary. The integration of moral intensity and social perception generated two primary research questions.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The first research question concerns whether these individuals would perceive a discrepancy between their own ethical propensities relative to others' ethical propensity, especially within high moral intensive conditions. The second research question concerns whether moral intensity influences one's ethical propensity. Self-reported ethical propensity was predicted to be higher in the high magnitude conditions across the three levels of outcome concentration. In addition, self-reported ethical propensity is postulated to be higher in the high outcome concentration conditions when magnitudes of consequences were high.

A third supplementary research question examine whether there was a threshold accountability level (i.e., probability of being caught and penalized) that could dissuade the continuation of displaying unethical actions. Past research showed participants' self-reported ethical propensity decreased as the levels of accountability increased, but the level of accountability that deterred individuals' ethical intention remains to be determined (Manley et al. 2001). Therefore, the current study will extend past findings bymeasuring the threshold level of accountability that could dissuade the display of unethical propensity, or display of deontological ethical decision-making.

According to the findings of self-evaluation and fundamental attribution error, Gamma biased individuals were likely to estimate different unethical propensity about them self and others' ethical decision-making. Individuals were likely to account for the situational

influences (i.e. outcome consequences and magnitude) about their own actions but discounted the saliency of the same situational influences. Therefore, if Gamma biased individuals were to engage in unethical acts for the greater collective good than for their own benefits in a high moral intense situation (high magnitude and outcome concentration), then these individuals were engaging in teleological ethical decision-making and likely to believe the others would engage in the same unethical act but only more likely so. Thus, Gamma biased individuals were expected to make deontological ethical decisions in high personal gain condition and teleological ethical decisions in the two collective-gain conditions, while their estimation of others' unethical propensity would remain consistently across the three outcome conditions. Therefore, the first research question predicted the magnitude of the Gamma bias would be lower in the two collective-good conditions than in the personal-gain condition because of the changes in self-reported unethical propensity as the effects of the Gamma bias of ethical propensity are postulated to be especially evidenced in the two "collective-gain" conditions than in the self-gain condition.

Research Questions One and Two generated the following three hypotheses:

> **H_1:** *The numerical mean of self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity (Gamma Bias) should be increasing linearly with the ascending accountability levels.*
>
> **$H_{1.2}$:** *The numerical mean of the self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity bias would be significantly smaller in the high organizational and societal gain conditions than in the high self-gain condition.*
>
> **H_2:** *Individualswith the self -enhanced ethical propensity bias could also display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high moral intensive condition (high magnitude and high outcome concentration) than in the lesser intense condition (low magnitude and high outcome concentration).*
>
> **H_3:** *Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity could display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high outcome*

concentrated conditions (organizational and societal gain) than the low outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology: Procedure and Analyses

Participants

Two hundred and seventy-three undergraduate students who enrolled in a management course participated in the survey research. The entire sample consisted of 172 male (63 %) and 100 female (37%), one participant did not indicated his/her gender. The average self-reported Grade Point Average (GPA) was 3.25. The divisions of academic majors were as follows: 211 (77%) participants were business majors (34 Accounting, 60 Management, 21 Finance, 24 Marketing, 72 Management Information Systems), and 61(23%) participants were non-business majors. Two hundred fifty participants (92%) who identified themselves as United States nationals were retained for the subsequent analyses. Thirty students (11%) of other country nationals or those did not declare their nationalities were excluded from subsequent analyses to rule out cross-cultural effects as an explanatory variable.

Procedure

Participants completed an in-class exercise entitled "Student Opinion Questionnaire" which asked students' perception of themselves and others regarding different types of unethical behavior and different factors which surrounded such behavior. No identifying information was required to encourage accurate and honest responses. Participants returned the completed survey and were rewarded with extra credit for their participation.

Instruments

Demographic variables. According to Beu, Buckley, Harvey (2003) and Buckley, Wiese, and Harvey (1998), the following types of participants' demographic data were collected to control for individual variance while analyzing variance of unethical propensity: Gender

(Male/Female), self-reported graded point average, citizenship (USA or International), and academic major.

Independent measures. Each participant indicated their perceived likelihood of engaging in an unethical action across 24 different vignettes. Vignettes were hypothetical cases where experimenters embedded manipulations and measured respondents' ethical intention. An example of ethical decision-making study using detailed vignettes was Fritzsche and Becker (1984). The vignettes were created to ask each participant to imagine themselves in two situations: 1) him/herself versus an average student in a school context, 2) him/herself versus an average businessperson in a business context. Within each situation, participants would indicate the probability of themselves and the other to engage in different unethical actions for an expected positive outcome at 2 levels of outcome magnitude (high vs. low) and 3 levels of outcome concentration (personal, organizational, or societal). The followings were the sample vignettes:

> Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to _____ *(SELF, THE AVERAGE STUDENT, SELF IN BUSINESS, or THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON).*
> Suppose unethical behavior would result in _____ *(high or minimal personal/organizational/societal)* gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that _____ *(SELF, THE AVERAGE STUDENT, SELF IN BUSINESS, or THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON)* would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in _____ *(school or business***)**? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

Stauffer (2003) used the above vignettes and found negative correlations within the -.40 range between individuals' self-reported unethical propensity with measures of altruism,

agreeableness, and organizational citizenship behavior. The negative relationship between the self-reported ethical propensity with the pro-social conventional oriented measures suggested the content of the vignettes could provoke respondents' tendency to deliberately violating social norms. This study would further establish the content validity of the 24 vignettes through measuring inter-rater reliability on the perceived levels of outcome magnitude and concentration of effects.

Response measures. Dependent measures were participants' self-reported propensity to engage in unethical behavior. This was operationalized as the self-reported likelihood of engaging in unethical acts and their perceived likelihood of others to engage in the same unethical behavior within each of the school and business scenarios. Within each vignette, the likelihood of being caught and penalized was increased in a 10% increment from 0% to 100%. Participants then indicated their perceived likelihoods (of self in school, an average student, self in business, and an average businessperson) to engage in an unethical behavior.

The Gamma Bias measurement was modeled after the computation used in past studies' (John and Robins, 1994; Paulhus and John, 1994; 1998). The discrepancy between self-reported tendency and perceived others tendency on the same variable was a form of self-evaluation bias. Each individual's bias index was then computed as the residual variance that remained after regressing perceived others measure on the self-reported measure within the same condition. The residual variance was the variance not shared between self-reported unethical propensity and perceived others unethical propensity. Therefore, self-reported unethical propensity would be regressed onto the perceived others unethical propensity for the same level of outcome and concentration of effects. For example, perceived others unethical propensity of the high self-gain condition was regressed on the self-reported unethical

propensity of the high self-gain condition. A positive residual represents individuals' bias in perceiving themselves to be more ethical in comparison to the others and a negative residual represents individuals' bias in perceiving themselves to be less ethical in comparison to the others.

Analyses

H_1 replicated Manley et al. (2000) in which the discrepancy between the self-reported and perceived others unethical propensity decreased as accountability increased. Therefore, this hypothesis predicted the same relationship between the Gamma Bias of ethical propensity in this study. The dependent measure was the self-evaluation bias, which was measured as the mean of each participant's Self-Evaluation Bias Index (details of computing the self-evaluation bias index would be discussed further in the Result Section). Two 11 (levels of accountability) x 3 (high-concentration effects conditions) x 2 (outcome magnitude) within-subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to examine the main effect of accountability. Participants' demographic data were the covariate variables to control for individual difference variability. If a significant accountability main effect emerged, then a linear trend contrasts would be tested for the positive relationship between numerical mean of self-evaluation bias with accountability. $H_{1.2}$ tested the assumption that Gamma Biased individuals could perceive others were more likely to engage in unethical actions for self-benefits than themselves would do; therefore, the mean of self-evaluation tendency would be significantly lower for the self-gain condition than the two collective good conditions.

H_2 tested whether individuals of Gamma Bias would be more likely to engage an unethical action themselves for high moral intense situation. The dependent measure was the mean of the self-reported unethical propensity. Two 11 (levels of accountability) x 2 (outcome

magnitude) x 3 (outcome concentration) within-subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to examine the variance of an overall mean difference in self-reported unethical propensity. Participants' demographic data were the covariate variables to control for individual difference variability. If a significant omnibus effect emerged, then interaction contrasts would then locate the mean difference in the self-reported unethical propensity between the two conditions (high vs. low organizational gain, high vs. low societal gain) across the 11 levels of accountability.

H_3 examined the relationship between the self-reported unethical propensity with outcome magnitude. Two 11 (levels of accountability) x 2 (outcome magnitude) x 3 (outcome concentration) within-subject ANCOVA analyses were computed to examine the variance of an overall mean difference in self-reported unethical propensity. If the outcome main effect emerged, then 2 sets of contrast would be tested to compare means between self-gain vs. organizational gain and self-gain vs. societal gain.

A supplementary research question was attempted to model the level of accountability that could deter individuals from engaging in unethical actions. Manley et al. (2001) reported a negative relationship between the levels of accountability with unethical propensity. Hence, preliminary analyses would be computed to determine a dissuading threshold level for unethical decisions across different moral intensive conditions.

CHAPTER FOUR

Results

Self Evaluation Bias (Gamma Bias): Enhancement Tendency vs. Diminishment Tendency.

Participants were grouped into either the self-enhancement or the self-diminishment group based on their overall standardized residual, which was the sum of the 11 standardized residuals from each of the 11 accountability level (1- 0% to 11- 100% being caught and penalized) of each vignette. The standardized residuals were the variance remained after regressing unethical propensity of the perceived target comparison (an average student or an average businessperson) onto their self-reported unethical propensity.

$$Self_{shConai} = a + \beta * Other_{shConai} + \varepsilon_{shConai}$$

$$Self_{bhConai} = a + \beta * Other_{bhConai} + \varepsilon_{bhConai}$$

Other – Perceived target comparison's unethical propensity,
Self- Self reported unethical propensity,
$_{s}$ – An average student comparison,
$_{b}$ – An average businessperson comparison,
$_{o}$ – outcome magnitude,
$_{Con}$- Outcome concentration (self-, organizational-, and societal- gain),
$_{ai}$ – Accountability levels, i=1-11

Negative standardized residuals meant individuals perceived others having a higher level of unethical propensity than their own, which then reflected respondents' self-enhancement tendency in their ethical evaluation of themselves. The magnitude of the Gamma Bias corresponded with the numerical value of the negative standardized residuals. A positive standardized residual indicated individuals' tendency to see others having a lower level of unethical propensity than their own, which suggested a self-diminishment tendency. Past studies (i.e., John & Robins, 1999; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce,

& Lysy, 2003, Paulhus & Robins, 2002) computed a single standardized residual for each participant by regressing self-reported ratings onto the ratings made by a third party or a target comparison, which then resulted in a single self-evaluation bias index. The current study computed a total of 66 standardized residuals for each participant across their responses over two outcome magnitude levels, three outcome concentration levels, and eleven levels of ascending ordered accountability. Each participant's overall self-evaluation bias index was the sum of the sixty-six standardized residuals.

Past studies (i.e., John & Robins, 1999; Paulhus & Robins, 2002) classified Gamma biased participants if their self-evaluation bias index was above zero (see the aforementioned studies for their explanation regarding the direction of self-evaluation bias indexes). This study examined self-enhancement tendency in unethical propensity; thus, negative standardized residuals in this context suggested the Gamma biased in the self-reported unethical propensity when in comparison to others. Therefore, 146 Gamma biased participants who had an overall negative self-evaluation bias index were retained for subsequent power calculation and hypotheses testing.

Power Calculation: Sample Size Adequacy.

Post-hoc statistical power analyses for within-subject design's main effect were computed to determine the probability of rejecting the null hypotheses when they were false. Power computation was calculated by GPower, a software package with algorithms that were developed based on Cohen's work (1973, 1988) (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1998).

Two assumptions were made in order to calculate the statistical power of the existing sample size: 1) the population correlation between the within factors, and 2) the

effect size. Rho is the population correlation between the within factors, which was assumed to be 0.3, and the effect size was assumed to be in a medium range, .015, according to Cohen's terminology. Therefore, given the current sample size of 146, three within-subject factors, the computed statistical power was 100% even after adjusting for the sphericity violation. A total of 146 Gamma biased participants was an adequate sample size.

Manipulation Checks: Raters Consensus and Reliability on Ethicality, Outcome Magnitude, and Outcome Concentration.

Post hoc manipulation checks were conducted to establish vignettes' content validity and reliability in the study, as the data were collected for purposes other than the proposed hypotheses. Three independent raters evaluated a total of 24 vignettes (12 vignettes for each of the school and business context) on the following three dimensions: ethicality, outcome magnitude, and outcome concentration. One rater was a psychology graduate student, and the two other raters were senior-level undergraduate students. Each rater was informed about the purpose of the study and the dimensions embedded within each vignettes, then each rater was presented with the following rating guide and rating form, plus the vignettes. Raters were asked to evaluate each targeted dimension, as they were to complete the survey. Raters' consensuses were measured by intra-class correlation (ICC 2, k) which assessed the rater reliability when all cases were rated by the same raters for the mean of k ratings (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Cronbach's alpha coefficient (α) was also computed to assess response reliability among the three raters. The sample rating descriptions and questions are listed in the following page.

Ethical Decision-Making Experimental Task Rating Guide

Thank you for agreeing to become a rater of the experimental task administrated in my research. The task was designed to capture respondents' ethical propensity in different circumstances.

Before you begin on your rating, please carefully read through the copy of experimental tasks provided to you. Make sure to read the description of each question carefully. Once you do this, proceed to the ratings. The purpose of the ratings is to gather your impression of the experimental tasks whether they are capturing what they are designed to measure (i.e., different raters share similar or dissimilar impression of the same task).

Answer the following questions for each of the scenario (A-N) in the following pages.

1) Do you think the suggested action was ethical or unethical? 1) Ethical 2) Unethical

2) Do you think the consequences would benefit 1) Self 2) Organization 3) Society?

3) What kind of impact would you believe the consequences have 1) High 2) Low?

	Do you think the suggested action was ethical or unethical?		Do you think the consequences would benefit			What kind of impact would you believe the consequences have	
A	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
B.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
C.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
D	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
E.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
F.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
G	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
H	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
I.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
J.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
K	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
L.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
M	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
N	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
O	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
P.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
Q	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
R.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
S.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
T.	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
U	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
V	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low
W	Ethical	Unethical	Self	Organization	Society	High	Low

All three raters achieved complete consensuses regarding the ethical nature of the issue embedded within in each vignette; therefore, the complete consensuses among raters suggested content validity of the vignettes.

Three raters disagreed on the outcome magnitude dimension embedded within the vignettes. The intra-class correlation was .89 and $\alpha = .88$. The disagreement about different outcome magnitudes resided on the perceived likelihood of achieving a high-magnitude beneficial outcome when engaging in the suggested unethical actions.

Three raters disagreed on the outcome concentration dimension embedded within the vignettes. The intra-class correlation was .43 and $\alpha = .43$, which suggested a lack of content validity and reliability of the targeted dimension. The disagreement mainly surrounded the outcomes of a societal scope where raters could not agree on whether the suggested beneficial societal consequences could be a direct result of the unethical actions. After removing the societal level responses, the intra-class correlation and reliability improved to an acceptable level, ICC=.73 and $\alpha = .79$. Although the content validity and reliability of the outcome concentration dimension remained questionable, subsequent hypotheses testing still retain the societal level responses but the result interpretation regarding societal level effect would be cautious. Suggestions for future study modification would be discussed in details at the study conclusion section.

Hypotheses One Testing.

Hypotheses 1 to 3 were analyzed twice, one for an average-student target comparison (self vs. average student) and one for the average businessperson target comparison (self vs. average businessperson).

H_1: *The mean of self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity (Gamma Bias) should be increasing linearly with the ascending accountability levels.*

$H_{1.2}$: *The mean of the self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity bias (Gamma Bias) would be significantly smaller in the high organizational and societal gain conditions than in the high self-gain condition.*

H_1 tested for a positive linear trend of the means of SEB with ascending accountability levels. $H_{1.2}$ tested two sets of contrast between means of SEB among the three levels of outcome concentration only within the high magnitude condition.

A completely crossed 2(outcome magnitude – high vs. low) x 3(outcome concentration level – personal, organizational, and societal) x 11(accountability – 0% to 100% being caught) within subject analyses was computed with self-evaluation bias index (SEB) as the dependent variable. Gender, academic majors, and GPA were included in the analyses as covariates. Means, standard deviations, and within-subject analyses results were presented in the following tables. The magnitude of the self-enhancement tendency in unethical propensity was measured by the negative numerical value of SEB; the larger the numerical value of the negative standardized residuals, the higher magnitude of the Gamma biased.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Self Evaluation Bias

	Self vs. A Student (n=143)	Self vs. A Businessperson (n=143)
GPA	3.18 (0.48)	3.17 (0.49)
SEB-High Personal	-3.84 (4.7)	-4.1 (5.0)
SEB-High Org.	-3.94 (5.8)	-4.3 (5.0)
SEB-High Societal	-3.76 (4.5)	-3.05 (8.1)
SEB-Low Personal	-2.71 (4.9)	-3.59 (6.3)
SEB-Low Org.	-3.3 (5.0)	-3.53 (4.8)
SEB-Low Societal	-3.99 (4.3)	-3.62 (6.0)
SEB – High gain	-11.49 (11.78)	-11.36 (12.4)
SEB- Low gain	-9.98 (10.87)	-10.74 (12.5)
SEB – Personal	-6.52 (8.02)	-7.6 (9.1)
SEB – Org.	-7.25 (9.12)	-7.8 (8.9)
SEB – Societal	-7.7 (7.75)	-6.6 (11)

Table 3. Correlations of Self Evaluation Bias with Outcome Magnitude and Outcome Levels

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
1)GPA	--	-.01	.10	-.11	-.025	-.08	-.036	-.20*	-.18*
2) Gender	.038	--	-.006	-.007	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09	-.06	-.07
3) Major	.181*	-.014	--	-.026	-.00	-.036	-.089	-.062	.065
4) SEB High/P	-.21*	-.11	-0.012	--	.72**	.036	.28	.50 **	.37 **
5) SEB High/O	-.047	-.02	0.007	.44 **	--	-.014	.26**	.67**	.44**
6) SEB High/S	-.116	-.049	0.017	.39 **	0.42 **	--	-.00	.21*	.22**
7) SEB Low/P	-.202 *	-.01	0.044	.39 **	0.27 **	0.17 *	--	.25**	.16
8) SEB Low/O	-.141	.00	0.03	0.36 **	0.42 **	0.53 **	0.37 *	--	.51**
9) SEB Low/S	-.091	-.016	0.081	0.39 **	0.29 **	0.55 **	0.20 *	0.53 **	--

Self Evaluation Bias's correlations of the business setting were above the diagonal.
*p<.05, ** p<.01

Tables 1 and 2 presented descriptive results of SEB for both target comparisons. Tables 3 and 4 presented the results of the within-subject analyses using SAS 8.0's Proc Mixed. Proc Mixed was preferred over the GLM because Proc Mixed used list-wise deletion instead of pair-wise deletion for the missing responses, plus Proc Mixed offered

a greater flexibility and ease in testing different statistical assumptions and calculating contrast effects. Several statistical assumptions were tested, only the compound symmetric and autoregressive assumption reached an iteration convergence. When comparing the AIC fit statistics between the assumptions of compound symmetric and autoregressive. The autoregressive assumption resulted in a smaller AIC index, which suggested a better fit between the model and the data. Therefore, subsequent within-subject analyses adopted the first order autoregressive assumption for computation. The basis of autoregressive assumption was that correlation would progressively decrease between each response with each of its subsequent response.

The means of SEB changed in the expected direction as the levels of outcome concentration changed (personal – organizational – societal) for both target comparisons. The following two tables presented results of the within-subject analyses for high and low outcome magnitude conditions and analyses for the high outcome magnitude condition only. GPA was a significant covariate for both target comparisons. GPA was significantly correlated with academic majors and with SEBs the two personal gain conditions for the average student comparison target, while it correlated significantly with the SEBs in the low organizational gain and societal gain conditions when the target comparison was an average businessperson. Accountability emerged as the only significant main effect, $F (10, 1410) =41.4$, $p=.00$ and $F (10, 1400) =18.8$, $p=.00$, respectively for the student and businessperson target comparison. A set of polynomial contrasts coding was used to test the positive linear trend of SEB means within the high and low outcome magnitude conditions.

Within the high outcome magnitude condition, the linear trend analyses for both average student and businessperson target comparison were statistically significant, F (1, 1410) =108.39, p=.00 and F (1, 1400) = 56.6, p=.00. Within the low outcome magnitude condition, the linear trend analyses for both average student and businessperson target comparison were also statistically significant, F (1, 1410) =137.79, p=.00 and F (1, 1400) = 55.7, p=.00. The following figure graphically depicted the positive relationship between the SEB's mean with ascending levels of accountability.

Figure 1 . Linear Trend of SEB across High and Low Organization and Societal Gains.



Figure 1.2. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity between Self with Target Comparisons.





$H_{1.2}$ was not supported as the SEB means did not differ significantly between the high organizational gain and the high societal gain conditions with the high personal gain condition. The mean contrast of SEB between the high organizational and high personal gain condition was F (1, 280) =0.35, p=.51 and F (1, 278) = 0.0, =1.0, respectively for each of the student and business target comparison. The mean contrast of SEB's between the high societal gain and high personal gain condition was F (1, 280) =0.43, p=.51 and F (1, 278) = 1.79, p =.18, respectively for each of the student and business target comparison.

In sum, results supported the predicted positive linear trend of SEB means with the ascending levels of accountability. The magnitude of the self-enhanced bias of unethical propensity corresponded with its absolute value: As the mean approached zero, the magnitude of the self-enhanced bias became smaller as well. Regarding $H_{1.2,}$ further analyses did not fully support the context dependence assumption in Gamma biased individuals' estimation of self and others' unethical propensity. Figure 1.2 graphically displayed the means of self-reported unethical propensity and perceived others' unethical propensity. Gamma biased participants consistently commit to an unethical action, a reflection of the non-deontological ethics, and they also perceived others would do so at a greater extend. However, participants perceived other students were more likely to be unethical for their organization than for themselves (t (142) =2.08, p=.004) and for the society (t (143) =2.47, p=.014). However, Gamma biased participants perceived others to be consistently unethical across the different moral intense conditions. Therefore, the mean differences of perceiving others' unethical propensity reflected the observer accounted for the changes in the beneficiary only within the context of school but not in

the context of business. Thus, findings demonstrated that these Gammon biased individuals were making non-deontological ethics decisions in personal gain condition, and evaluating others' ethicality differently according to the context of the actors.

Table 4. Proc Mixed Overall Results of Self Evaluation Bias

	Self vs. An Average Student	Self vs. An Average Businessperson
Gender	(1,134) 1.26, .264	(1,133) 3.75, .055
Major	(5,134) 1.83, 0.11	(5,133) 1.34, .25
GPA	(1,134) 16.9, <.0001	(1,133) 10.21, .002
Magnitude	(1,134) 2.12, .15	(1,140) 0.28, .60
Level	(2,282) 1.52, .22	(2,280) 1.37, .25
Accountability	(10,1410) 41.37, <.0001	(10,1400) 18.77, <.0001
Mag. * Acct	(10,1410) 0.60, .816	(10,1400) 0.42, .94
Mag. * Level	(2,278) 1.68, .189	(2,278) 1.64, .19
Level * Acct.	(20,2820) 0.78, .74	(20,2800) 0.66, .87
Mag.* Level * Acct.	(20,2758) 0.92, .56	(20,2757) 0.36, .99

Table 5. Proc Mixed Result of Self Evaluation for the High Outcome Magnitude Condition

	Self vs. An Average Student	Self vs. An Average Businessperson
Gender	(1,134) 1.06, .30	(1,133) 0.33, .57
Major	(5,134) 1.87, .10	(5,133) 1.15, .34
GPA	(1.134) 8.36, .005	(1,133) 4.29, 0.04
Level	(2,280) .024, .79	(2,278) 2.66, .072
Accountability	(10,1410) 14.9, <.0001	(10,1400) 7.25, <.0001
Level * Acct.	(20,2789) .96, .51	(20,2772) 0.55, .944

Hypotheses Two and Three Testing.

> **H_2:** *Individuals with the self -enhanced ethical propensity bias could also display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high moral intensive condition (high magnitude and high outcome concentration) than in the lesser intense condition (low magnitude and high outcome concentration).*
>
> **H_3:** *Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity could display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high outcome concentrated conditions (organizational and societal gain) than the low outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).*

H_2 and H_3 examined the self-reported unethical propensity to see whether Gamma biased respondents would made different ethical decisions as the decision implications

and beneficiary changes. Therefore, a significant interaction effect between outcome concentrations with outcome magnitudes was predicted. A completely crossed 2(outcome magnitude – high vs. low) x 3(outcome concentration level – personal, organizational, and societal) x 11(accountability – 0% to 100% being caught) within subject analyses was computed with self-reported unethical propensity (UE) as the dependent variable. Analyses were based on the 146 respondent who exhibited the ethical self-enhancement tendency in the aforementioned analyses. Gender, academic majors, and GPA were included in the analyses as covariates. Means, standard deviations, and repeated measure results were presented in the following two tables. Participant's unethical propensity was measured by their self-reported likelihood of engaging in an unethical act.

Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Reported Unethical Propensity (UE)

	Self	A Student	Self	A Businessperson
GPA	3.18 (0.48)		3.17 (0.49)	
UE-High Personal	86 (101.1)	343.4 (189.2)	82.17 (108.6)	324.5 (196.1)
UE-High Org.	82.7 (117.1)	373.6 (197.3)	59.1 (78.98)	325.0 (187)
UE-High Societal	64.96 (87.8)	340.4 (195.6)	176.83 (210.1)	332.9 (198.8)
UE-Low Personal	33.86 (76.2)	229.9 (187.3)	71.11 (121.9)	306.8 (201.6)
UE-Low Org.	20.41 (38.6)	194.3 (172.9)	35.59 (60.9)	227.4 (180.9)
UE-Low Societal	25.03 (43.3)	235.5 (181.3)	55.94 (96.42)	253.8 (183.0)
UE – High gain	233.62 (237.4)	1052.4 (500)	317.1 (299.9)	998.9 (503.4)
UE- Low gain	79.31 (114.86)	656.4 (456.4)	162.7 (226.8)	788.0 (506.0)
UE – Personal	119.86 (138.1)	570.9 (336)	153.29 (188)	646.9 (363.6)
UE – Org.	103.1 (118.5)	565.3 (334)	94.89 (125.5)	553.32 (338.4)
UE – Societal	90.0 (118.5)	572.6 (347.9)	231.54 (258.2)	589.7 (348.9)

Table 7.Correlation of Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Outcome Magnitude and Outcome Levels

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1)GPA	--	-.01	.10	-.19	-.12	-.07	-.12	-.27	-.20
2) Gender	.04	--	-.01	-.05	-.21*	-.11	.02	-.04	-.10
3) Major	.18*	-.014	--	-.10	-.04	-.11	-.1	-.08	-.08
4) SEB High/P	-.17*	-.12	-.035	--	.77**	.19*	.33**	.5**	.37**
5) SEB High/O	-.05	-.12	-.022	.38**	--	.2*	.37**	.6**	.41**
6) SEB High/S	.02	-.14	-.14	.46**	.38**	--	.20*	.26**	.33**
7) SEB Low/P	-.09	-.08	.03	.20*	.08	.13	--	.57**	.39**
8) SEB Low/O	-.09	-.12	.1	.23**	.43**	.24**	.22**	--	.50**
9) SEB Low/S	-.1	-.01	-.23*	.39**	.15	.59**	.23**	.34**	--

Self Evaluation Bias's correlations of the business setting were above the diagonal.
p<.05, ** p<.01

Results of means and standard deviations showed that the mean level of the self-reported unethical propensity decreased as the levels of outcome concentration increased within the context of school. However, the level of self-reported propensity increased with the level of outcome concentration for the business context. This finding was unexpected as Manley et al. (2000) did not report any difference in self-reported unethical propensity between the contexts of school and business.

The following two tables presented the ANOVA results using SAS 8.0's Proc Mixed. Gender and GPA were significant covariates within the school context when comparing the self-reported unethical propensity and academic majors and GPA were the significant covariates within the context of business. All main effects were statistically significant within both school and business contexts. One exception was the outcome concentration main effect, which was non-significant within the context of school. The hypothesized two-way interaction between outcome magnitudes with outcome concentration was significant within both the context of school and business.

H_2 predicted Gamma biased individuals would have a higher mean level of self-reported unethical propensity in the higher moral intensive condition (high magnitude and high concentrated) than in the lower moral intensive condition (low magnitude and high concentrated). Two contrast effects were tested: 1) high organizational gain versus low organizational gain, and 2) high societal gain versus low societal gain. Within the context of school, the mean level of self-reported unethical propensity was significantly higher in the high organizational gain condition ($F(1,710) = 46.15$, $p=.00$) and in the high societal gain condition ($F(1,710) = 21.59$, $p=.009$) than the mean level within their respective low outcome magnitude condition. Within the context of business, the mean

level of self-reported unethical propensity was not significantly higher in the high organizational gain condition (F (1,704) = 3.24, p=.07) than in its low outcome magnitude condition. However, the mean difference was significantly higher in the high societal gain condition (F (1,704) = 92.15, p=.00) than in its respective low gain condition.

H_3 predicted Gamma biased individuals would have a higher mean level of self-reported unethical propensity for the high magnitude societal and organizational gain than the high magnitude personal gain. Two mean contrasts were tested: 1) high personal gain condition with high organizational gain condition, and 2) high personal gain condition with high societal gain condition. Within the context of school, the self-reported unethical propensity mean level between the high personal and high organizational gain conditions did not differ significantly, F (1,284) =2.64, p=.11, and the mean difference between the self-reported unethical propensity also did not differ significantly between high personal and high societal gain, F (1,284) =0.35, p=.56. Within the context of business, the self-reported unethical propensity mean difference between the high personal and high organizational gain was not significant (F (1,281) =2.64, p=.14), but it was significantly different between the high personal and high societal gain conditions (F (1,281) =33.74, p<.0001).

In sum, the statistically significant interaction between outcome magnitude with outcome concentration and the subsequent contrast testing supported $Hypothesis_2$ but did not support H_3. According to H_2, those Gamma biased individuals would engage in the suggested unethical act for high outcome magnitude. However, evidence did not support

H_3 that these Gamma biased individuals were not likely to engage in the suggested unethical act for the greater collective benefit than for their own self-benefit.

Results suggested participants did not differ in their willingness to engage in an unethical act solely for self-benefit and for an organizational benefit. However, organizational commitment, organizational identification, and the organizational culture/climate would influence one's willingness to engage in ethical decision-making for the benefit of an organization. Therefore, the non-significant mean difference might due to failure to control for these organizational variables.

The interpretation of the significant mean differences of the unethical propensity between self-gain and societal-gain conditions should be with cautions because of the low consensus among raters over the societal outcome dimension. First, participants' willingness to engage in the unethical acts for a greater societal gain did not exceed that for their own personal benefit within the context of school. Raters' comments suggested that the lack of an example of a realistic societal outcome as a result of behaving unethically in school might obscure the effectiveness in capturing the dilemma between participants' societal concerns and their ethical values. Another interpretation regarding the mean difference in unethical propensity between the personal-gain versus the societal-gain in the context of business as the reflection of the voluminous corporate scandals reported in the media, which could fuel the negative stereotypes of business ethics. Therefore, negative business ethics stereotypes might suggest a higher level of tolerance and acceptability of unethical actions, especially when the goodness of the outcome outweighed the negative of the action.

Table 8. Proc Mixed Results of Self-Reported Ethical Propensity

	Self vs. An Average Student	Self vs. An Average Businessperson
Gender	(1,135) 6.6, .011	(1,134) 2.19, .14
Major	(5,135) 0.41, .84	(5,134) 2.16, .06
GPA	(1,135) 4.21, .04	(1,134) 13.6, .00
Magnitude	(1,142) 71.0, <.0001	(1,141) 36.5, .00
Level	(2,284) 2.66, .072	(2,282) 31.8, .00
Accountability	(10,1420) 395, <.000	(10,1410) 391.3, .00
Mag. * Acct	(2,284) 1.04, .35	(2,281) 20.3, .00
Mag. * Level	(10,1420) 42.1, <.0001	(10,1410) 9.9, .00
Level * Acct.	(20,2840) 0.81, .71	(20,2820) 2.3, .00
Mag.* Level * Acct.	(20,2834) 1.08, .36	(20,2807) 1.5, .061

Table 9. Proc Mixed Result of Self -Reported Ethical Propensity for the High Gain Condition

	Self vs. An Average Student	Self vs. An Average Businessperson
Gender	(1,135) 4.92, .028	(1,134) 1.98, .16
Major	(5,135) 0.25, 0.94	(5,135) 1.32, .26
GPA	(1,135) 2.12, .15	(1,134) 5.77, .018
Level	(2,284) 1.38, .25	(2,281) 32.9, .00
Accountability	(10,1420) 233.7, .00	(10,1410) 178.0, .00
Level * Acct.	(20,2836) 1.08, 0.36	(20,2810) 2.24,.001

Dissuading Effects of Accountability on Unethical Decision-Making.

Figure 1 depicted the negative relationship between the unethical decision-making with the ascending levels of accountability (0% to 100%) for both school and business contexts. Within each of the context, the relationship was negative but the likelihood of unethical decision-making never fully diminished even when the chance of being caught and penalized reached the level of 100%. Initially, the likelihood of unethical decision-making decreased more than 10% (a 11% decrease in the school context and a 13% decrease in the business context) when the accountability level rose from no chance of being caught and penalized to a 10% likelihood. However, the likelihood of unethical

decision-making no longer decreased as the accountability went above 50%. Thus, when the chance of being caught and penalized was above 50%, the average likelihood of unethical decision-making was 0.79% and 1.25% respectively for a school and a business organization versus the 8.02% and 12.23% when the accountability was below 50%. Therefore, the observed level of accountability that effectively dissuaded participants from engaging in the suggested unethical decisions for both school and business contexts was 50%.

The next table presented the means and standard deviations of self-reported unethical propensity at each level of accountability for all conditions. Figures 1-3 were the graphical representations of the relationship between the average self-reported unethical propensities at each accountability level across for each condition.

Table 10. Means and Standard Deviations of Unethical Propensity at Each Accountability Level within a School and a Business Organization.

	High Personal		High Org.		High Societal		Low Personal		Low Org.		High Societal	
%	M	*SD*	M	*SD*	M	*SD*	M	*SD*	M	*SD*	M	*SD*
School Organization												
0	38.2	*33.8*	32.7	*32.3*	29.45	*30.9*	15.07	*24.8*	12.19	*20.1*	14.86	*22.7*
10	20.4	*26.9*	17.5	*25.3*	15	*22*	7.67	*16.8*	4.45	*12*	5.07	*10.9*
20	12.14	*20.2*	11.85	*20.7*	8.36	*16.4*	3.67	*11.8*	2.12	*7.2*	2.53	*7.7*
30	7.19	*15.7*	8.77	*19.5*	4.79	*11.8*	2.47	*9.7*	0.82	*3.62*	1.38	*5.5*
40	4.2	*11.2*	4.9	*14.3*	3.1	*9.3*	1.38	*7.9*	0.48	*2.4*	0.62	*2.7*
50	2.12	*6.9*	3.4	*11.6*	1.64	*7.2*	1.23	*7.2*	0.21	*1.42*	0.14	*1.7*
60	0.69	*3.7*	1.37	*5.9*	0.96	*5.2*	1.09	*6.9*	0.21	*1.42*	0.14	*1.7*
70	0.34	*2.17*	0.96	*4.6*	0.62	*3.8*	0.55	*3.86*	0	*0*	0.07	*0.8*
80	0.21	*1.88*	0.48	*2.96*	0.34	*2.2*	0.21	*1.4*	0	*0*	0.07	*0.8*
90	0.07	*0.8*	0.21	*1.4*	0.21	*1.4*	0.0	*0.0.*	0.	*0*	0	*0*
100	0.	*0*	0.07	*0.83*	0.68	*0.83*	0.	*0*	0	*0*	0	*0*
.Business Organization												
0	33.85	*34.8*	28.39	*32.1*	47.0	*36.2*	28.2	*32.6*	19.0	*27.4*	23.7	*29.8*
10	20.6	*28.3*	14.3	*21.9*	34.3	*33.7*	15.5	*24.8*	7.69	*14.8*	11.8	*20.8*
20	12.31	*20.8*	8.18	*15.6*	28.24	*42.6*	9.37	*18.6*	4.19	*11.0*	6.99	*16.4*
30	7.55	*14.9*	4.83	*11.4*	20.4	*28.9*	6.01	*15.4*	1.96	*7.3*	5.03	*13.7*
40	4.34	*11.2*	20.3	*6.67*	14.44	*24*	4.27	*12.9*	1.33	*5.8*	3.36	*10.7*
50	1.96	*8*	0.91	*4.26*	10.5	*19.9*	2.94	*11.3*	0.77	*3.9*	2.38	*8.4*
60	0.91	*4.43*	0.42	*2.62*	6.97	*16.1*	1.68	*8.3*	0.49	*2.7*	1.4	*5.93*
70	0.42	*3.1*	0.2	*1.44*	5.3	*14.1*	1.33	*7.14*	0.14	*1.2*	0.77	*4.3*
80	0.21	*1.9*	0.07	*0.8*	4.37	*13.1*	0.8	*4.7*	0	*0*	0.28	*1.7*
90	0.07	*0.84*	0	*0*	2.96	*10.2*	0.63	*4*	0	*0*	0.21	*1.4*
100	0	*0*	0	*0*	2.69	*9.5*	0.49	*3.4*	0.	*0*	0	*0*

The high values correspond to a high likelihood to engage in an unethical action.

Figure 2. Relationship between Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability.



Figure 3 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical decision-making in a **school** organization at each level of accountability respectively for the high and low outcome magnitude. For each of the outcome concentration condition, participants' willingness to engage the suggested unethical decisions diminishing as the likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness dropped below 1% as the accountability level exceeded 50%. The average likelihood of unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level was 0.26%, 0.62%, and 0.44% respectively for each of the high personal, high organizational, and high societal gain outcome. The average likelihood unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level was 0.37%, 0.0%, and 0.05% respectively for each of the low personal, low organizational, and low societal gain outcome.

Figure 3. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the School Context





Figure 4 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical decision-making in a **business** organization at each level of accountability for the high and low outcome magnitude, respectively. For the high personal and high organizational gain condition, participants' willingness to engage the suggested unethical actions diminished as the likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness

dropped below 1% as the accountability level exceeded the 50% likelihood. The average likelihood of making unethical decisions above the level of 50% accountability was 0.32% and 0.14% respectively for each of the high personal and high organizational gain outcome. A noted exception was the unethical decision-making within the high societal gain condition: its average likelihood of unethical decision-making diminished below 5% until it reached the accountability level of 80%. When the outcome magnitude was low, the average likelihood of unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level was 0.99%, 0.13%, and 0.53% respectively for each of the personal, organizational, and societal gain outcome.

Figure 5. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the Business Context





In sum, respondents consistently making an ethical decision, by not engaging in an unethical action, when the chance of being caught and punished exceed 50%, with one exception. Not only did the means of the self-reported unethical propensities decrease with an increased in accountability, the variations of the responses also decreased as well. The decreased in standard deviations implied a lesser degree of variability in making an

unethical decision as the accountability increased. The one exception to the aforementioned observed trend of means and standard deviations was that individual were willing to continue in engaging an unethical action for the benefit of the society in a business organization given a definite chance of being caught and punished. This finding was unexpected but this observation perhaps reflected the effects of teleological ethics doctrine, as well as the stereotypes of a higher level of tolerance and acceptability of unethical business conducts.

Table 11. Figure 2. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the School Context





Figure 3 depicted the relationship between the average likelihood of unethical decision-making in a business organization at each level of accountability for the high and low outcome magnitude, respectively. For the high personal and high organizational gain condition, participants' willingness to engage the suggested unethical actions diminished as the likelihood of being caught and punished increased; their willingness

dropped below 1% as the accountability level exceeded the 50% likelihood. The average likelihood of making unethical decisions above the level of 50% accountability was 0.32% and 0.14% respectively for each of the high personal and high organizational gain outcome. A noted exception was the unethical decision-making within the high societal gain condition: its average likelihood of unethical decision-making diminished below 5% until it reached the accountability level of 80%. When the outcome magnitude was low, the average likelihood of unethical decision-making above the 50% accountability level was 0.99%, 0.13%, and 0.53% respectively for each of the personal, organizational, and societal gain outcome.

Figure 4. Self-Reported Unethical Propensity with Accountability in the Business Context





In summary, respondents consistently making an ethical decision, by not engaging in an unethical action, when the chance of being caught and punished exceed 50%, with one exception. Not only did the means of the self-reported unethical propensities decrease with an increased in accountability, the variations of the responses also

decreased as well. The decreased in standard deviations implied a lesser degree of variability in making an unethical decision as the accountability increased. The one exception to the aforementioned observed trend of means and standard deviations was that individual were willing to continue in engaging an unethical action for the benefit of the society in a business organization with a definite chance of being caught and punished. This finding was unexpected but this observation perhaps reflected the effects of teleological ethics doctrine, as well as the stereotypes of a higher level of tolerance and acceptability of unethical business conducts.

Table 10 is a brief summary of the aforementioned hypotheses and their findings.

Table 10 Hypotheses Testing Summary

H_1: *The numerical mean of self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity (Gamma Bias) should be increasing linearly with the ascending accountability levels.*	The hypothesis **was supported** for both school and business organizations.
$H_{1.2}$: *The numerical mean of the self-enhancement tendency of unethical propensity bias would be significantly smaller in the high organizational and societal gain conditions than in the high self-gain condition.*	The hypothesis **was not supported**. Participants' Gamma biases did **not** differ significantly between the high personal and high organizational gain conditions, as well as between the high personal and high societal gain conditions. Same patterns of SEB mean difference were observed in the context of school and business.
H_2: *Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity bias could also display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the* ***high moral intensive*** *condition (both high magnitude and high outcome concentration) than in the* ***lower moral intense condition*** *(low magnitude and high outcome concentration).*	The hypothesis **was partially supported**. Gamma biased participants reported a higher mean level of unethical propensity in the higher moral intense condition than in the lower moral intense condition. Same patterns of mean differences were observed within school and business organizations. One exception was that the unethical propensity did not differ significantlybetween the high and low organizational gain condition within a business organization.
H_3: *Individuals with the self-enhanced ethical propensity could display a higher level of self-reported unethical propensity in the high outcome concentrated conditions (organizational and societal gain) than the low outcome concentrated condition (self-gain).*	Hypothesis **was partially supported** for a **business** organizational context. Gamma biased participants reported a significantly higher mean level of unethical propensity in the high societal-gain condition than the high self-gain condition within the business organizational context.

CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to investigate the ethical decision-making process as both the levels and the scopes of the consequences were manipulated. The purpose was threefold: 1) to investigate the effect of accountability on ethical decision-making; 2) to analyze the relationship between the Gamma bias with moral intensity; 3) to analyze the effect of moral intensity on Gamma biased individuals' ethical decision-making. The significance of such investigation stemmed from the philosophical debate revolved between teleological versus deontological ethicists (Kline, 2003; Lefkowitz, 2003). Specifically, this study attempted to explore whether individuals use different ethical behaviors in response to changes in situations, namely the outcome magnitude and outcome concentration. An additional focus then targeted individuals with a self-inflated sense of moral righteousness by questioning whether these individuals would engage in a utilitarian, teleological or the principle abidingdeontological orientation in decision - making. Economic theorists had have long argued that individuals were self-interest driven by engaging only in egotistical, self-beneficial behavior. Teleological ethics perspective not only complements economists' self-interest position in ethical decision-making, but the utilitarian outcomes would also include others-oriented outcomes that are indirectly self-beneficial. Individuals of a teleological ethics orientation might make unethical decisions to enhance the social institutions such as a school, a business organization, and a greater social community; although the personal benefit might not be salient at the time. Individuals of deontological orientation should forgo the benefits of

unethical actions because of their pro-social beliefs in conforming to moralistic rules and legal regulations. These individuals were therefore believed to ascribe themselves as being ethical because of the legitimacy in following norms and rules.

Social psychology research recently proposed of different forms of self-evaluation bias as a manifestation of self-defense mechanism, the Alpha bias and the Gamma bias (Paulhus & John, 1998). The Gamma bias was a form of self-evaluation bias that individuals would either self-enhance or self-diminish their own moral characters. Therefore, the enhanced Gamma biased characteristics (i.e. conscientiousness, agreeableness, collectivism) might be associated with a deontological ethics orientation. This study then examined whether the enhanced Gamma biased individual would engage in an unambiguous unethical act when beneficial societal and organizational outcome could also enhance their pro-social self-perception. Furthermore, Gamma biased individuals might also be susceptible to a common social perception fallacy, the Fundamental Attribution Error, by discounting salient circumstantial motivations for other's unethical decisions but not for their own actions. Hence, an empirical question investigated whether the Gamma biased individuals would behave unethically because of the social judgment fallacy where salient non-egotistical beneficial outcomes could maintain their pro-social self-concept but yet violating the ethical principles.

Result Summary.

The magnitude of the enhanced Gamma bias decreased when chance of being caught increased, but it did not change with the different outcome scopes as had been predicted. The narrowing discrepancy between individuals' assessment of self and others' ethical propensity with increases in accountability essentially replicated Manley et al.

(2001) findings, which suggested the responsibility of justifying and defending one's actions would motivate one to exert greater cognitive effort to anticipate the implication of decisions thus given greater consideration to the issue and its consequences. A similar negative effect of accountability on self-evaluation bias was reported in Sedikides et al. (2002) were the discrepancy between the self-estimated grade with the objective grade narrowed as respondents was liable to justify their estimation.

Furthermore, the discrepancy between individuals' self-reported likelihood to engage in unethical acts in comparison to the perceived likelihood of others to do so did not change with high moral intensive situation. In the context of school, Gamma biased individuals' self-reported unethical propensity was not significantly higher within the organizational- and societal-gain conditions than in the personal-gain condition. They also perceived others to be more likely to be unethical for the organizational gain than for the personal or societal gain. Within the context of business, Gamma biased individuals' self-reported unethical propensity was significantly higher in the societal gain condition and perceived no differences in others' unethical propensity across three beneficiary conditions. Although the self-reported ethical propensity and perceived others propensity changed with condition, the pattern was not predicted by the self-serving bias.

Two implications concerned the relationship between moral intensity with Gamma biased individuals' ethical decision-making that helped to clarify the ambiguity around the issue of moral intensity. In general, Gamma biased individuals reported a higher likelihood to engage in the suggested unethical act for a higher magnitude outcome than for the lower magnitude outcome. The first implication was that the Gamma biased individuals' decision-making did not reflect the deontological ethics. The

second implication was that the Gamma biased individuals exhibited teleological ethics orientation and the likelihood to engage in an unethical act was higher at the higher moral intense level. However, one exception was found within a business-organization context where no difference between individuals' willingness to engage in an unethical act whether the outcomes could greatly profit the organization or not. This finding might attribute to the organizational ethics culture and climate, plus individuals' organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behavior.

These unique organizational behavior factors reflect the organizational tolerance and governances in regulating unethical actions, and members' identification with the organization. If organization tolerated unethical behavior as a means to reach strategic goals and its members identified with this objective, then individuals would behave unethically for consequences that not necessarily benefiting them directly at times. A final significant finding was that the Gamma biased individuals were more likely to behave unethically for a social cause than for their own personal gain only within the business context. However, this finding should be interpreted in light of the raters' consensus that the societal-outcome dilemma embedded within the vignettes was not well understood by the participants; therefore, this particular statistical significant finding could not be interpreted as a strong support for utilitarian ethics.

In summary, this study found the tendency of perceiving the self to be more ethical than others was consistent across different scope and types of outcomes. Furthermore, the Gamma biased individuals, on average, demonstrated teleological ethics reasoning rather than the previously expected deontological orientation. The Gamma biased individuals made teleological ethical decisions consistently for egoistical gains as

well as for others-oriented gains. In addition, collective findings of the supplemental analyses suggested participants would not engage in unethical actions when the chance of being caught went above 50%. Although the accountability was operationalized as a direct estimation of the subjective probability to act, that was deemed to be a less optimal means to reflect one's decision-making process (Godden, 1976). Nevertheless, the result demonstrated a less sensitive measure such as this could still capture the calculated risk estimation made in ethical decision-making process. Therefore, accountability scales incorporate behavior anchors that depicting different behavioral consequences would be a more precise measure of individuals' ethical decisions in response to accountability.

Implications for Theory and Future Research.

Current study integrated business ethics research with social psychological research, which yielded some insights onto the dynamic of ethical decision-making. Jones' (1991) seminal work on moral intensity has inspired numerous empirical studies to examine the circumstantial effect on one's ethical decision-making. Indeed, the economists seem to be partly correct in their positions of the self-interested driven and risk calculated in ethical decision behavior, especially when unethical decision-making was exhibited by those who actually esteemed their own ethical values over others. Results of this study did not support the findings reported in Stauffer (2002) where individuals were most likely to engage in unethical behavior for the greater gain of the society than for the personal gain and an organizational gain. Past studies of different types of Gamma bias has focused on individuals' self-perception, motivation, and impression management. However, this study was an initial step to examine the work behavioral implications of the enhanced Gamma bias. Self enhanced Gamma biased

individuals would engage in unethical actions while perceiving others making unethical decisions, but only more likely so. Therefore, future studies are needed to examine enhanced Gamma biased individual's ethical behavior within a competitive (i.e. prisoner dilemma, tic for tat) and a cooperative (i.e. teamwork) situation. According to this study, Gamma biased individuals would likely to over-estimate their competitors' unethical propensity and therefore engaging in aggressive tactics to maximize self-benefits while minimizing others' gains, regardless of opponents' intention.

Findings suggested higher levels of accountability (i.e. above 50 percent), could deter individuals from unethical decision-making. Although the effect of different levels of accountability was not a main objective of the current study and the generalization of these findings are limited, but the result suggested participants seem to use a psychological 'threshold' to determine whether the potential gain would offset the potential risk of engaging in an unethical act. The ratio-scale representation of accountability might not be not as sensitive a measure to approximate respondents' conception of accountability as behavioral anchor scales. Behavior anchors could depict accountability as different situations where expectation and responsibility for the individuals to justify their unethical actions to others. A greater generalization and prediction can draw by using specific behavioral anchor-scales.

Although the results failed to support the original propositions, the findings still shed some important insights about the enhanced Gamma biased individuals' ethical intention and the prediction of potentially unethical behavior.

Implications for Organizations

In general, enhanced Gamma biased individuals will engage in unethical behavior, equally if not more so, when it benefited themselves as opposed to benefit the organization or the society. Self-perceived ethical individuals did behave egoistically, according to the rational economist position that individuals should value their own interest as much as for the interest of their school, business organization, and their community . One realistic implication is that organizational members not only engage in unethical decision making for their own self-interest, but would do so for causes thatthey support. According to the agency theory (i.e. Bowie & Freeman, 1992; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999), the goal of effective organizational governances is harmonizing agents' objective with organizational agenda. This study therefore suggests that organizational members would behave unethically for personal agenda, as well as for a collectively beneficial objective (Trevino, Butterfield, & McCabe, 2001). Managers are then faced with the dilemma of monitoring members' unethical behavior not only as a manifestation of self-interested, but it can also be a manifestation of the salient pressure of meeting strategic goals and organization's ethics culture and climate (Gatewood & Carroll, 1991).

Study Limitations and Conclusion.

This study was an ongoing research effort to capture students' ethical propensity under different circumstances; hence, the lack of external generalization was one of the study's limitations. Student participants might have limited life and work experiences to reflect upon their hypothetical decisions in some of the vignettes; thus, findings of this study might not be applicable to organizational members who might actually make similar decisions instead of the hypothetical ones. Furthermore, Maxwell & Ames (1981)

suggested seasoned executives would make different ethical decisions than those with lesser experience, suggested that work experience is a potential variable in predicting one's ethical propensity.

Another limitation of the study was the levels of complexity in this within-subject design. Each of the sixty-six vignette and its response scale was related to its subsequent one; therefore, the autoregressive effect would distort the later responses. Future studies could computerize the test administration that the items order could be randomized for each participant. In addition, a third party's evaluation of respondents' ethics would be a superior way to generate the self-evaluation bias index. Another limitation of the study design was the missing control of Gamma biased individuals' ethical orientation prior to the study. Future study would be beneficial to investigate whether ethical orientation would change with different levels of moral intensity.

Summary

In general, this study attempted to understand ethical decision-making motivated by immediate beneficial outcomes through the perspective of moral intensity and social perception. Gamma biased respondents in this study, on average as a group, demonstrated teleological orientation rather than the deontological orientation in decision-making. Although deontological ethics decision making is not necessary the best practices for profits and strategic growth, organizations are obliged to be socially responsible to its stakeholders, stockholders, members, customers, and community. In the absence of conflict of interest, as investigated in this study, individuals had demonstrated utilitarian rather than principle-oriented decision-making, then when and how deontological ethics would prevail as multiple constituents' objectives are at odds. The supplemental analyses

revealed accountability as a key motivation to practice deontological ethics. Future researches to quantify and qualify different accountability are necessary to gain a glimpse of the complex ethical decision-making.

In summary, the current study was a continuation of Manley et al. (2001) and Stauffer (2002) and accomplished three objectives. First, the study examined the self-enhancement bias observed in Manley et al. (2002), which did not change with outcome magnitudes and concentration, but decreased as the levels of accountability elevated. Second, the study reinforced a relationship between outcome magnitudes with unethical propensity (Pauli and May, 2002) but did not find conclusive evidence to support relationships between outcome concentration with unethical propensity. Somehow, the ultimate question of why people made unethical decisions seemed to be answered by the economists: individuals would make unethical decisions for self-relevant gains, whether the self or the others were the salient beneficiary. Even the respondents who believed others to be more unethical would continue making unethical decisions, as long as they perceive the chance of them being held responsible for their actions was less than an half. Individuals choose to make ethical decision on a teleological- deontological continuum rather than seeing these two ethical perspectives as two orthogonal doctrines. Further studies are warranted to explore the teleological-deontological continuum to predict the various forms of unethical behaviors in a workplace (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990).

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Appendix

Student Opinion Questionnaire

There is a common perception that many people, given an opportunity, will engage in unethical behavior. Yet, many others believe that most people are honest and ethical. We are interested in your perception of yourself and others regarding unethical behavior (misrepresenting another's ideas and efforts are one's own) and the factors which surround such behavior. No identifying information is required, so we ask that you please be candid. Thank you.

A. In order that we may gain an understanding of business students – how they feel, think, react, and so on – please indicate your responses to the following statements about how you feel about yourself and aspects of your emotions and behavior. Indicate whether each statement is very much like you, like you, neither like you nor unlike you, unlike you, or very much unlike you. (Please circle your response to each item).

	Very Much Like Me	Like Me	Neither Like Me Nor Like Me	Unlike Me	Very Much Unlike Me
1. I made a better leader than a follower.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I am usually quite confident when learning a new game or sport.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I feel self-conscious in a strange group.	1	2	3	4	5
4. It is easy for me to strike up a conversation with someone.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I have always been a popular person.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I am ill at ease when I am meeting new people.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I enjoy stating my opinions in front of a group.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I often wish that I were more outgoing.	1	2	3	4	5
9. People seem to be interested in getting to know me better.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I am seldom at a loss of words.	1	2	3	4	5
11. I seem to do more listening than talking in conversation with others.	1	2	3	4	5
12. I usually try to add a little zest to a party.	1	2	3	4	5
13. I have trouble expressing my opinion.	1	2	3	4	5
14. I like to remain unnoticed when others are around.	1	2	3	4	5
15. I prefer to go to social functions with a group of people so as not to stand out.	1	2	3	4	5

B. Answer each question according to what is generally true to you. (Please circle your response to each item)

	Almost Always True	Usually True	Seldom True	Never True
1. I do not like to wait for other people to complete their work before I can proceed with my own.	1	2	3	4
2. I hate to wait in most lines.	1	2	3	4
3. People tell me that I tend to get irritated too easily.	1	2	3	4
4. Whenever possible, I try to make activities competitive.	1	2	3	4
5. I have a tendency to rush into work that needs to be done before knowing the procedure I will use to complete the job.	1	2	3	4
6. Even when I go on vacation, I usually take some work along.	1	2	3	4
7. When I make a mistake, it is usually due to the fact that I have rushed into the job before completely planning it through.	1	2	3	4
8. I feel guilty for taking time off from work/school.	1	2	3	4
9. People tell me I have a bad temper when it comes to competitive situations.	1	2	3	4
I tend to lose my temper when I am under a lot of pressure at work.	1	2	3	4
11. Whenever possible, I will attempt to complete two or more tasks at once.	1	2	3	4
12. I tend to race against the clock.	1	2	3	4
13. I have no patience for lateness.	1	2	3	4
14. I catch myself rushing when there is no need.	1	2	3	4

For section D through AE, please circle the appropriate probability of engaging in unethical behavior for each probability of being caught and penalized. There are 11 questions to each section, one question per chance of being caught and penalized (0%,10%,20%,…,100%).

C. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

D. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

E. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

F. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

G. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in high societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

H. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

I. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal societal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

J. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organization gain, such as maintaining a minimal aggregate GPA which is necessary to keep a fraternity/sorority character. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

K. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organizational gain, such as maintaining a minimal aggregate GPA which is necessary to keep a fraternity/sorority charter. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

L. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal organizational gain. It will not improve your organization in a tangible manner. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

M. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal organizational gain. It will not improve his/her organization in a tangible manner. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

Chances of being caught and penalized	Probability of engaging in the behavior											
1. 0%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

N. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high organizational gain, such as engaging in bribery of public officials to obtain business in a foreign country which will more than double the organization's business, assuring profibability. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

Chances of being caught and penalized	Probability of engaging in the behavior											
1. 0%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

O. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.

Suppose unethical behavior by the average business person would result in high organizational gain, such as engaging in bribery of public officials to obtain business in a foreign country which will than double the organization's business, assuring profitability. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

P. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal organizational gain, such as doing whatever it takes to keep a contract which is worth minimal profit, in an industry that differs little new business opportunities. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

Q. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON.

Suppose unethical behavior by the average business person would result in minimal organizational gain, such as doing whatever it takes to keep a contract which is worth minimal profit, in an industry that offers little new business opportunities. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

R. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high personal gain , such as meeting a required GPA to maintain your scholarship. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

S. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in high personal gain. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

T. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in minimal personal gain, such as getting an "A" on a quiz that does not alter (up or down) your grade in the class. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

U. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE STUDENT.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as getting an "A" on a quiz that does not alter (up or down) the student's grade in the class. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE STUDENT would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in school? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

V. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior by you would result in high personal gain, such as securing a high dollar contract which would result in a large commission for you, as well as making certain that you would receive that promotion you have been seeking. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

W. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to THE AVERAGE PERSON.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in high personal gain, such as securing a high dollar contract which would result in a large commission for the employee, as well as making certain that s/he would receive that promotion s/he has been seeking. Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

X. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as having the organization pay for lunch when it is not really a business luncheon (or falsification of an expense report). Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that YOU would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

Y. Answer question 1 through 11 as they pertain to YOU.

Suppose unethical behavior would result in minimal personal gain, such as having the organization pay for lunch when it is not really a business luncheon (or other falsification of an expense report). Given that the chances of being caught and penalized are some specific percentage (0% to 100%), what is the probability that THE AVERAGE BUSINESS PERSON would engage in unethical behavior (cheat) in business? (Please circle the appropriate probabilities of engaging in unethical behavior)

		Probability of engaging in the behavior										
Chances of being caught and penalized	**1. 0%**	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	2. 10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	3. 20%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	4. 30%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	5. 40%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	6. 50%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	7. 60%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	8. 70%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	9. 80%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	10. 90%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
	11. 100%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%

Z. Cheating in school occurs for a number of reasons. Evaluate the following motivations to cheat in school based on following scale:

1. Contributes very little to cheating
2. Contributes little to cheating
3. Contributes an average amount to cheating
4. Contributes a great amount to cheating
5. Contributes a very great amount to cheating

_____ College of Business Administration requires a minimum GPA to stay in school.
_____ Top employers give more consideration to people with higher GPAs.
_____ Top Graduate Schools give greater consideration to people with higher GPAs.
_____ Parents pressure their children to raise grades.
_____ Peer pressure makes people cheat.
_____ Assistance from friends is easily available.
_____ Students did not have the time to study properly.
_____ Student did not take the time to study properly.
_____ Professors assign too much work for students to do.
_____ Students enjoy too much work for student to do.
_____ Because everyone else cheats, "honest" students have to cheat to stay ahead of the curve.
_____ Student do not identify with the university and therefore feel no responsibility toward it or its code of conduct.
_____ Professors do not care about teaching, so students do not care about learning.
_____ It is easy to cheat.
_____ Certain students just got in the habit of cheating in high school and continue it in college.
_____ People are just dishonest.

AB. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

1. I agree very little
2. I agree little
3. I agree an average amount
4. I agree a great amount
5. I agree a very great amount

_____ Professors expect me to engage in unethical behavior.
_____ Professors expect the average student to engage in unethical behavior.
_____ The average business person is expected to engage in unethical behavior.

_____I will be expected to engage in unethical behavior in business.
_____ People are unethical by their nature.
_____ I will behave in an unethical manner because there is an expectation for me to behave in that manner.
_____ The media creates the expectation that people will engage in unethical behavior.
_____ The media creates the expectation that people will engage in ethical behavior.
_____ When I have behaved unethically, it was because of the situation I was in.
_____ When I have behaved unethically, it was because of the type of person I am.
_____ When I have behave unethically, it was because othes expected me to, so I might as well.

AC. Answer the following questions based on the scale:

1. A very little amount
2. A little amount
3. An average amount
4. A great amount
5. A very great amount

_____ To what extent have you cheated in your college career?
_____ To what extent has the average student cheated in his/her college career?
_____ To what extent does the average business person engage in unethical behavior at work?

AD. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

1. I agree very little
2. I agree little
3. I agree an average amount
4. I agree a great amount
5. I agree a very great amount

_____ I describe myself as honest and ethical.
_____ I describe myself as dishonest and unethical.

AE. Circle "Y" if you agree with the following statement and "N" if you do not.

Overall, I consider myself an honest and ethical person.	Y	N
My actions demonstrate to others that I am an honest and ethical person.	Y	N
My friends would describe me as an honest and ethical person.	Y	N
From my perspective, most people are honest and ethical.	Y	N
From my perspective, my friends are honest and ethical.	Y	N
From my perspective, most people are not honest and ethical.	Y	N
From my perspective, my friends are not honest and ethical.	Y	N