7817921

VISSER, JAMES ALLEN
THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ROLE CONFLICT:
POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES OF OFFICIALS IN
COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENTS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, PH.D., 1978

© 1978

JAMES ALLEN VISSER

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ROLE CONFLICT:

POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES OF OFFICIALS

IN COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENTS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAMES ALLEN VISSER

Norman, Oklahoma

1978

THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ROLE CONFLICT:

POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES OF OFFICIALS

IN COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENTS

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was prepared in connection with graduate study in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. Special thanks are in order for the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. David R. Morgan, Dr. F. Ted Hebert, Dr. Oliver E. Benson, Dr. John W. Wood, Dr. Jeffrey L. Rinehart, and Dr. Jean McDonald. I am particularly indebted to Doctors Morgan, Hebert and Benson for their years of patience and valuable assistance in this project. I am also grateful to Dr. Richard S. Wells and Mrs. Gerri Rowden for their continued moral support and to Mrs. Margaret Clawson for her efficiency and persistence in typing this document.

Finally, this dissertation would not have been completed without the years of hope and quiet support of my mother, Everdena Visser, and the loving and unwavering confidence of my wife, Karen.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ROLE CONFLICT:
POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES OF OFFICIALS
IN COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH ARENA

This study is an analysis of the potential for policy-making
and political role conflict among those officials making policy deci-
sions in council-manager municipal governments. It is concerned with
the perceptions of city managers, council members and selected depart-
ment heads in several Southcentral American cities of the policy-making
roles to be exercised by themselves and their colleagues. This study
also examines the perceptions of these officials toward (1) roles for
themselves in the local electioneering or "politicking" process, and
(2) the roles interest groups in the community should be allowed to
play in shaping public policy.

Two fundamental presuppositions underlie this study. The
first is that political system variables—official decisions, citizen
demands, interest group pressures—are strong influences on the sub-
stance of policy. The second is that the influence of these political
variables is interdependent with and sometimes independent of the

1

influence on policy substance emanating from the socio-economic environment.

In recent years, conflicting conclusions in the urban public policy literature about the extent of the "impact" of political system variables on the outcome of city policies have occupied the attention of policy scholars. Many of these analysts have argued that even though environmental and other input factors greatly influence the nature of policy outputs, the political system in which policy decisions are made should not be regarded as irrelevant when considering either the types or the substance of policy outputs.[1] The influence of political system factors on policy has been treated extensively in the policy analysis literature. This influence has been examined in regard to: the central role of city governmental forms and other system characteristics,[2] the role of formal political power in determining city policies,[3] the role of system characteristics in determining the types of policy goals pursued by city officials,[4] and the perceptions of city officials as to their problems, needs, and goals.[5] As a result of this recognition that the decisions of city officials do indeed make a difference in the outcomes of public policy, the need to examine aspects of decision-making at the urban level that contribute to policy outcomes is still with us. An examination of the conflict among these officials as to who is to play what role in making policy decisions is highly relevant to this continuing task.

In examining the effects of the local political system on city policies, however, one cannot ignore the socioeconomic environment in which each city's officials must operate. The general social and

economic characteristics of any given community,[6] as well as the
influence of community elites[7] and other citizens organized for the
purpose of influencing city policy,[8] must be taken into account. In
this analysis, community background characteristics and the personal
and professional attributes of council-manager officials will be
examined for their impacts on policy role conflicts and interest group
orientations among these city officials. The remainder of this chapter,
however, (1) presents a brief review of the thrust of much of the
literature about the policy role perceptions and interest group orien-
tations of council-manager officials, and (2) explains the theoretical
foundation and research techniques used in the remaining chapters.

Urban Policy Role Research

The Range of Research

The impetus for much of the research into policy-making role
orientations of city officials during the 1960's was provided by the
use of role analysis by John C. Wahlke and his associates in their
examination of role perceptions among state legislators.[9] For Wahlke,
the legislator's role "concept"--his own conception of his various
roles--was the crucial element in examining legislative behavior.[10]
Role conflict was thought to result from contradictory expectations
among the roles as the legislator saw them and as seen by those with
whom he interacted in different role "sectors."[11] It was from the
elements of this approach, and a growing interest in role analysis in
general,[12] that other scholars in the 1960's began to draw paradigms
for role conflict studies of urban legislators and administrators.

Unfortunately, the idea that city officials play different "roles" in the making of public policy has been used rather loosely in much of the literature of city politics. Indeed, the notion of role has often been merged into or assumed to be a part of the more general categories of "decision-making" and "leadership." Studies of urban leadership focusing on the rise and fall of political bosses in American cities were produced in the 1930's by Merriam, Zink, and Gosnell, and more recently by Royko and Steinberg.[13] More recent studies of urban leadership by Cunningham, and Crain and Rosenthal focused on the degree of innovation, controversy, or "success" found in the administrations of urban chief executives.[14] Other scholars such as Hunter and Dahl focused on the making of decisions by city officials within the context of community elite politics.[15] Still other analysts combined their concerns by examining policy making by city officials in the light of leadership qualities as well as socioeconomic phenomena. This was done in order to judge the quality of decisions made, to illuminate the difficulties in operating modern municipal governments, or to compare the political "cultures" in which decisions were made.[16] Finally, other teams of researchers attempted systematic categorizations of city councils as singular units of analysis. Williams and Adrian, for example, developed a typology of four different roles of government that resulted when city councils had different goals in mind to be pursued by municipal government.[17] The range of literature cited here indicates the degree to which policy leadership and decision-making roles have been subsumed under other analytical constructs.

In addition to subsuming policy role concepts under other

constructs, there also exists the problem of a lack of study of the

roles of bureaucratic sub-leaders in policy formulation. Although a

number of earlier studies examined the role of urban governmental

bureaucracies in policy making within the general context of the entire

urban leadership system,[18] today there is a paucity of analyses

focusing exclusively on the direct involvement of urban bureaucracies

below the manager level in municipal policy making. Robert Alford's

study of four Wisconsin cities, for example, pointed out that increasing

bureaucratization affected the dispersion of policy-making authority

among both elected and appointed officials.[19] He did not, however,

examine policy role conflicts among these officials or the involvement

of specific members of the bureaucracy in drafting policy proposals.[20]

Two recent examples of urban bureaucracy research were Lipsky's study

of "street-level" bureaucrats and an analysis by Blank, Immerman, and

Rydell of the New York City Library system. Both were attempts to

isolate relevant variables for further analysis. The Lipsky study

examined the factors explaining how police officers, social workers,

and classroom teachers responded to conditions of stress imposed by

their work environments.[21] The New York Library study was concerned

with developing measurements for comparing public bureaucracies at the

urban level.[22] Other examples of research concerned with policy making

by bureaucratic agencies might be cited, but their concern for policy

"roles" was not framed within the paradigms of the contemporary notion

of "role analysis."

Policy-Making Roles in Council Manager Government

The key to understanding the potential for policy role conflict within the conceptual framework of role analysis is to examine the extent to which council-manager officials hold attitudes that differ from those expected under the "pure model" of council-manager government. Those attitudes dictated by or "expected" under council-manager structure are defined below as role anchors since they are functionally prescribed and structurally cast standards of behavior that provide the foundation upon which policy roles are to be exercised. If attitudes held by council-manager officials do not stray from those prescribed by the system, no potential for conflict exists since all officials are in full agreement with the roles as prescribed. If, however, the attitudes of officials do not match those prescribed, the potential for conflict is created. There may be, for example, conflict between officials adhering to the role anchors and those who do not, between officials who stray but whose degree of "straying," so to speak, differs, or some other combination of officials whose policy role attitudes do not match.

An example of how the potential for policy role conflict can come about is the concern over the demise of the traditional politics-versus-administration dichotomy in council-manager government. The role anchors of the original schema for council-manager government provide that an elected council initiate, shape, and decide questions of policy while a council appointed manager is to administer and implement those policy decisions. With the exception of council's general oversight of all city operations, neither council nor manager is to "meddle" in one

6

another's operational sphere of authority. The extent to which attitude differences result in meddling by council or manager determines the degree of policy role conflict.

The Manager's Policy Role. The extent to which the attitudes of managers and council members—especially in regard to the manager's policy-making role—stray from those traditional anchors became the subject of scholarly inquiry beginning in the late 1950's. The body of research coming out of this inquiry utilized the concept of role in more theoretically exact and operationally useful ways than were found in the general leadership and decision-making literature. This research was largely concerned with examining the perceptions of managers, mayors, and other council members as to the proper policy-making role of the manager.

Is the city manager an administrator or policy leader?[23] According to Clarence Ridley, the question is not "whether" but "in what manner" the manager is to take part in policy making. The politics-administration dichotomy is unrealistic since by the very nature of his job, the manager is a policymaker.[24]

> Legally it is the council's responsibility to decide the policy questions. But in operation it is impractical to pinpoint policy formulation exclusively at any one level, since wherever there is action affecting the public there is policy making.[25]

The vast majority of managers questioned in Ridley's national sample appeared to agree with that view. Of the 88 managers included in his study, 77 stated that they were initiators of policy as a matter of course.[26]

Other scholars in the 1960's were in basic agreement with Ridley that the manager had an active role to play in policy formulation. Jeptha Carrell's 1962 study of six council-manager cities concluded that council members adhered more to the classical view of the manager as a non-political administrator than did the managers themselves.[27] Robert Wood found that the suburban manager's role was inevitably "political" since more and more government functions were regarded as administrative and professional and required the manager's expertise.[28] Gladys Kammerer, in her 1962 study of Florida's city managers, found that all of the managers in her ten case-study cities were involved in "the making, shaping, or vetoing of policy proposals."[29] Of the seventy-six managers who answered her initial questionnaire, 75 percent were found to have some kind of special role in policy initiation--alone, with the council, or with the mayor.[30]

These scholars found, however, that the manager's activity in policy making was usually viewed by manager and council member alike as a form of partnership between the council and their manager. James Kweder's study of 21 North Carolina cities found that councils placed heavy reliance on managers not only for suggested alternative solutions, but recommendations as to the best alternatives as well as to what policy issues the council should consider.[31] Williams and Adrian, however, found that picture of council dependence on the manager to be incomplete. Their study of four cities concluded that in three of the four, managers usually took the public position of policy leadership but they attributed the initiation of policy to technical experts and citizen groups.[32] Councils, therefore, had multiple sources of policy

guidance. Booth's study of a national sample of small council-manager cities (less than 10,000 residents) concluded that while the manager was influential in policy formulation at all times, he shared that role. When policy issues were highly sensitive, the issue was usually settled by public referendum. Non-controversial issues were settled by the council with the manager's recommendations assuming importance in the deliberations.[33] Of the managers responding to Booth's questionnaire, 21.6 percent said they initiated policy alone while 54.7 percent reported sharing policy initiation with either the council or the mayor.[34]

Other, more recent studies, however, have indicated that managers often take policy role views that go beyond a council led policy partnership. Stillman's 1974 study of a national sample of city managers, for example, found that managers were nearly unanimous in their view of themselves as "community" as well as policy leaders. In fact, only 16 percent felt their exercise of leadership should be "confined . . . to within the city administration," while only 14 percent felt that leadership should be confined only to policy issues.[35]

There is, however, a limit to the manager's freedom of movement in policy matters, and it usually centers on the elected council's views on the subject. Loveridge's 1971 study of councilmanic officials in the San Francisco Bay area, for example, pointed to an active rivalry between council and manager as to the manager's policy roles. Actual conflict surfaced over the _extent_ of the manager's role, however, and not whether he is to take any part in shaping policy. For example, 81 percent of the manager-respondents and 82 percent of the council member

9

respondents agreed that the manager should advocate major policy

changes, and 80 percent of the council members felt that the manager

should work informally with them to prepare policy proposals. Direct

disagreement, however, surfaced over policy "leadership" roles. Bay

area managers saw themselves primarily as leaders in shaping policy and

not as administrators. Bay area council members, however, perceived

that managers were administrators (and policy advisors) and not policy

leaders.[36]

> City managers largely hold the policy values of the
> political executive—they are interested in formu-
> lating and defining the purpose of city government.
> City councilmen, for the most part, regard the city
> manager as their man in city hall who administers
> the city and who is on tap for advice, information,
> and recommendations.[37]

Role Anchors as Constraints. The research cited above points

to an active policy role for the manager that is at least partially

constrained when his council elects to curb the extent of his policy

role. Additional factors have been cited by scholars as constraints

on the manager's freedom of movement in both administrative and policy

arenas.

For example, Carrell's study found that city managers regarded

the council's concern with administrative matters as natural, inevitable,

and healthy.[38] All final decisions were to be made by the people's

elected representatives regardless of the manager's policy or leadership

roles. In other words, managers recognized legislative oversight by

the elected council as fundamental to anchoring the council-manager

system in democratic decision making.

The potential for conflict may occur in regard to the policy and community roles exercised by the manager, but fundamental agreement between manager and council exists in regard to prohibiting any role for the manager in electoral politics. For example, Loveridge found strong opposition by council members in the Bay area to candidate recruiting and election campaign activities by the city manager. Managers in that study tended to agree to the taboo—although agreement was stronger in regard to political campaign activities than in regard to recruiting activities. While 83 percent of the council members opposed a recruiting role for the manager, only a bare majority (56 percent) of the managers eschewed such a role for themselves.[39] The manager as an appointed official has no role to play in election campaigns. But managers may have been more likely than council members to recognize that the manager as private citizen has a right to encourage people he rexpects to become candidates for public office.

Mayor-Manager Relations as Constraints. Much of the research cited above either implicitly or explicitly concludes that the manager often assumed a policy making role because he was the only official with the necessary training and experience. His professionalism was needed to raise the proper policy questions, initiate action, and recommend options. If so, the legal division of labor in council-manager government was rendered "technologically" obsolete unless an elected official with both administrative and policy expertise could be found to provide the necessary professionalism.

A number of scholars have pinpointed the mayor as the manager's policy partner or competitor in council-manager government. More

specifically, scholars such as Gladys Kammerer, David Booth, Deil Wright and Robert Boynton have examined whether or not the separate election of the mayor, or granting him powers beyond those given other council members, constrained the policy leadership role of the manager.

Separate studies by Kammerer and Booth resulted in opposite conclusions regarding the impact of a popularly elected mayor on the manager's policy leadership roles. Kammerer's study was an empirical analysis of "institutional-structural" factors affecting the range of the manager's powers in performing his tasks. She concluded that managers were more constrained in their powers (and enjoyed shorter tenure) in cities where mayors were popularly elected than in cities where mayors were appointed. Indeed, a "role collision of significant proportions" was said to exist between managers and popularly elected mayors.[40] David Booth, however, found no association whatsoever between mayor-elected and mayor-appointed council-manager cities and (1) interference by the council in administrative matters, (2) the strength of the manager's policy role, (3) the manager's view of his policy role, or (4) the manager's tenure.[41]

Research conducted by Boynton and Wright in 1971, however, concluded that a direct role clash between a popularly elected mayor and the manager in which one yields policy-making position to the other was too simplistic an explanation of their relationship. Indeed, the relationship depended upon the activity arena (or regime) and the policy field in which it took place. More often than not, the leadership pattern in council-manager cities having "strong" mayors—mayors usually enjoying extragovernmental political resources—was one of a

policy-making team consisting of both mayor and manager. Under such a leadership pattern, mayor and manager shared administrative, public relations, and policy leadership regimes. Or, one partner dominated in one regime while the other partner controlled another activity arena. In traditional policy fields such as public utilities, streets, and parks, not much leeway was afforded the manager in initiating changes in already established "goods and services" politics. The mayor tended to dominate the team under this circumstance. In economic and social areas, however, "where the public interests were either not well represented within the government or not well articulated in the community," the manager had more freedom to initiate policy.[42]

While the differing methodologies and research arenas chosen for the three studies cited above may have affected their findings, two conclusions can be reached. First, the focal point of policy leadership in council-manager government usually rests in a partnership in some form between the manager and the strongest faction or element (often the mayor) on the council. The partnership itself operates as a constraint on the manager's freedom of movement. Second, all constraints on the manager's policy role discussed above—council attitudes, administrative oversight, political activity taboos, and a mayor-manager policy partnership—are constraints largely imposed by the role anchors of council-manager government. More specifically, the manager is constrained at all times by the council-manager prescription that all final decisions are to be made by the elected representatives of the people.

Interest Group Policy Roles

Review of Previous Research. Policy leadership and policy

decision making do not occur in council-manager government without at

least minimal input from interest groups within the community being

governed. It has become axiomatic in American politics at all govern-

mental levels that organized interest groups influence the direction,

scope, substance, and implementation of policy decisions made by the

peoples' representatives. A great deal of literature has been written

about interest groups and their activities in American politics.

Interest groups have been cited as the fundamental building blocks of

the Group Theory of politics.[43] Other studies have examined the

ideology of "interest group liberalism" and its alleged acquiescence to

the private appropriation of governmental power.[44] Others have

explored the character of interest groups; their history, internal

dynamics, ideological orientations, methods of coalition building, and

lobbying techniques and practices.[45] Interest groups have been regarded

also as fundamental to the Pluralist school of community power theories.

In fact, the concept of group politics has been central not only to the

Pluralists and their Group Theory predecessors, but also to the Elite

theorists who utilize the group concept as a major component of their

critique of the Pluralist school.[46]

In the 1960's, lobbying and influence-peddling by organized

groups at the state and local levels occupied the attention of scholars

concerned with measuring the impact of political influence in sub-

national political arenas. Scholars such as Patterson, Zeigler and Baer,

Francis, Wahlke, and Teune examined lobbying in state legislatures.[47]

Other scholars explored the activities of organized labor, and the courts, and the media as mediators and supporters of the authoritative and symbolic interests of local government.[48]

Still other scholars examined local interest group activity through more or less systematic paradigms. Banfield and Wilson spent several chapters in their book City Politics examining the political "roles" of the major organized and unorganized interests in city-level politics—businessmen, organized labor, the press, racial minorities, and city employees.[49] Robert Salisbury found two major interest group clusters in St. Louis, each targeting its attention on different sets of urban officials. One cluster was oriented toward bread and butter issues and focused its attention on county officials. Another cluster was interested in broader policy considerations and focused its attention on the mayor's office.[50] Charles Liebman dichotomized the local interest group configuration into "personal oriented" and "policy oriented" categories. Personal oriented groups were mainly ethnic and religious groups whose attentions were focused on local elections. Policy groups were primarily economic groups whose interests were geared toward post-election stages of policy making.[51]

In more recent years, scholars also turned their attention to the "latent" interests in local communities—those unorganized and/or powerless interest groupings whose influence traditionally has been negligible in City Hall. The research focus of these scholars has often been the relationship between the poor and/or minorities and urban-level government bureaucracy. Studies by Davies, Peterson and Kloman have examined citizen access, participation, and influence in federally

15

sponsored urban programs.[52] Harold Savitch examined educational issues

in a school district where low-income blacks were regular losers to

middle class whites in their access to educational decision makers.[53]

Research on Group Role Orientations. A common bias has run

through much of the literature cited above--its approach has been from

the perspective of the interest group, its members, aspirants to mem-

bership in the pressure group system, or the degree of influence exer-

cised by the group. Only a few serious attempts have been made to

examine the process of interest-group influence from the perspective

of the primary targets of lobbying--the officials themselves. At the

state level, Teune, Francis, Zeigler and Baer, and Wahlke have examined

state legislators' perceptions of interest group influence.[54] Wahlke's

study of four state legislatures examining legislative role perceptions

also included the legislators' orientations toward the role of pressure

groups in the legislative system.[55] Wahlke and his associates discovered

that "any given legislator's behavior with respect to groups will depend

largely upon his general affective orientations toward pressure politics

and his awareness of such activity when it occurs around him."[56]

Legislators' reactions to pressure groups as legitimate parties

to policy making, then, varied according to (1) their degree of know-

ledge or awareness of group activity, and (2) the degree to which they

accepted pressure politics as legitimate political activity. The Wahlke

study constructed a typology of group orientations based upon these

two factors. Group "facilitators" were aware of group activity and

favorable to its exercise. Legislators holding hostile attitudes

toward group activity and/or who were largely ignorant of the existence

of pressure groups and their actions were labelled as "resisters."
Those falling between these two ends of the continuum were regarded as
"neutrals."[57]

Scholars such as Teune, and Zeigler and Baer took the analytical tools of role theory several steps further by examining the "interaction" between legislator and pressure group rather than only the legislator's perception of group roles. Teune's analysis of the Indiana legislature relied heavily on the perceptions of legislative candidates, but his research hypothesis clearly tied the candidate's perceptions to actual group activity. Teune discovered that a favorable attitude toward pressure group activity was a function of what groups could contribute to the candidate's success. Those candidates favorably disposed to groups were constantly in contact with a variety of groups in their constituencies. In fact, the importance of the group to the constituency overshadowed most other considerations.[58]

> What interest groups do in the legislative halls,
> hotel rooms, and in committee hearings seems to be
> of less significance in shaping attitudes [toward
> groups] than activity in the constituency which the
> legislator or the candidate is going to represent.[59]

Teune's research pointed to the importance of viewing pressure politics as interaction——a contact between legislators and groups important to his electability.

Zeigler and Baer viewed lobbying as a total interaction of attitudes and behaviors among all participants in the legislative process. As a social relationship, lobbying was said to involve orientations, communications, and actual interaction activity. The presumption was that the actions of each person affect others.[60] Zeigler and

Baer utilized these elements of role theory to examine the attitudes and reported actions of both legislators and lobbyists in their quest to examine all relevant variables of the lobbyist-governor interaction.[61]

A few contemporary studies have borrowed the approaches described above and have applied them to local government. Two recent studies of San Francisco Bay Area councilmanic officials by Zisk, and Eulau and Prewitt have examined the group orientations of these officials as at least potential factors of and results from interactions between officials and local interest groups.[62]

Both studies had roughly the same research concerns, but they differed somewhat in approach. Eulau and Prewitt took the council as their unit of analysis, while Zisk's analytical base was the individual council member. Eulau and Prewitt examined many of the "linkages" in the democratic governing process and focused on interest group life in cities as part of the process of petitioning the council for action. Zisk's focus was entirely on the interest group predispositions of the Bay area council members.

Both studies viewed the government official-interest group relationship as a social interaction in which the attitudes and behavior of both parties to the interaction had to be accounted for. Eulau and Prewitt, for example, recognized the interactive nature of the relationship be identifying interest groups as one of three channels of contact "linking" the council and its public.[63] They found that groups quite often became active because the council or its members drew them into the political process—often as tools in skirmishes among council members.[64] This indicates a two-way activity initiation which is contrary

to the usual notion that groups activate and initiate while officials
are the passive receptors of political influence. Zisk recognized that
". . . any attempt to analyze influence must take into account the
behavior and biases of all major parties to the transactions observed."[65]
Both studies, however, focused on the attitudes and behavior of govern-
ment officials rather than interest group leaders or members. Zisk's
working hypothesis reflected this approach:

> The predispositions of elected officials will act as
> a filter through which group efforts to influence
> public policy must pass. How accessible officials
> are to groups will depend in part on these predis-
> positions.[66]

Both Bay area studies also examined the inclination of councils
and council members to hold attitudes favorable to groups and group
activity. The relationship between favorable attitudes and certain
antecedents in the Eulau and Prewitt Study was discussed above. Eulau
and Prewitt also examined the reasons for group strength in relation to
the favorability of councils toward groups. They discovered that
councils distinguished between "pressure" and "information" groups,
reacted favorably when groups provided them with information and expert
advice, and were favorably inclined toward groups whose strength lay in
their stake in the community or the respect earned by the group in the
eyes of the council. As often as not, raw political resources such as
money, votes, or organizational zeal did not bring about a favorable
inclination by the council.[67] Eulau and Prewitt also discovered, however,
that raw political resources became important to the council's inclina-
tions toward groups when the arena of activity shifted from policy-
making to campaign electioneering.[68]

The basic thrust of Zisk's research was to construct a typology of the interest group orientations of council members and to compare these orientations with the council members' representational styles and their purposive roles. In constructing her typology of role orientations, Zisk borrowed from the criteria set by Wahlke's legislative study. Her typology was based on council members' perception of the presence and activity of groups, their "esteem" for groups as useful to the policy process, and their "group sophistication"--the degree of their understanding of the pressure group function.[69] Pluralist council members were those who esteemed groups, who perceived the existence of many groups, and who were sophisticated in their knowledge of the group function in policy-making. Antagonists were those officials who were perceptive of group activities and understood their policy functions, but who rejected the usefulness and/or legitimacy of group activity in the policy process. Tolerants were those council members not fitting the criteria of either of the two other categories, and whose characteristics did not place them firmly in either the pro or anti-group camps.[70]

Zisk also borrowed or constructed two additional typologies of council members. Zisk's typology of representational styles, borrowed from Wahlke, included Delegates, Trustees, and Politicos. Delegates used constituent instructions as the basis for their votes on the council, Trustees voted their own convictions, and Politicos attempted to balance constituent wishes with personal conscience.[71] Zisk's typology of purposive roles was constructed to measure the council member's conception of the nature of his job as a legislator and it

contained negotiators, advocates, and administrators. Negotiators

sought out the views of others and attempted to negotiate agreements

between those holding conflicting views. Activist council members con-

cerned with revising and advocating programs and selling them to their

colleagues were classified as Advocates. Administrators were council

members primarily interested in choosing from policy alternatives

initiated by the city manager and his staff or other policy originators.

Other sub-types of purposive role holders were also identified.[72]

Zisk discovered that council members with Pluralist group

orientations were likely to take Negotiator views of their council roles

and adopt the Delegate or Politico representational styles. Antagonists

were most likely to take the Administrative view of their purposive role

and adopt the Trustee representational style. Finally, Tolerants were

likely to see their purposive role as council members as one of Negotiator

of conflicting interests and their representational styles as Trustee

oriented.[73]

The Eulau and Prewitt, and Zisk studies were concerned also

with the relationship between interest group orientations and certain

"antecedents" to attitudes and behavior such as personal characteristics

and community environmental variables. Eulau and Prewitt found that

city size was strongly related to group activity levels. Group activity

in larger cities was not only much livelier and more intense than else-

where but also served as an intermediary link between council and

citizenry.[74] The degree to which councils were favorable to group ac-

tivity was also found to correlate with group contact and city size.

Councils were more likely to come into contact with groups when they

were favorably inclined toward them.[75] And, as cities grew, group life became more varied and intense, and councils became more favorably inclined toward group politics.[76]

> If there is an active group life in the smaller
> political unit, it more often produces an adversary
> relationship than a collaborative, cooperative one.
> In sharp contrast, councils in large cities are
> much more likely to form a collaborative than an
> adversary relationship with groups.[77]

Zisk also examined environmental antecedents in relation to group role orientations. Examination of community characteristics revealed that groups were more likely to be active in large, socially diverse cities, and council members in these cities were more likely to be Pluralists.[78] Her analysis of such personal characteristics as age, income, education, occupation, length of residence and party identification revealed some modest trends. Pluralists were likely to be young, well-educated, and/or in low status occupations, nonpartisan, and from "interest-oriented" political backgrounds. Tolerants were likely to have the opposite characteristics while Antagonists came from all walks of life.[79]

Finally, Zisk's study pointed up the continual existence of a major social more of council-manager government. She concluded that although Pluralists were favorably disposed toward groups and the general concept of interest articulation, the majority of council members in the Bay area target cities were not Pluralists. The majority of them took a "managerial" rather than "political" view of the governing process. Governing the municipality, to them, was simply a matter of applying solutions to problems—a mechanical process in which bargaining

and group struggle played no part. These council members did **not** regard groups either as alien or indispensable and, therefore, did **not** modify their behavior to accomodate groups in the governing process. Zisk concluded, therefore, that the interaction between groups and governors took place ". . . on a one-way street."[80]

Research Design

A Model of the Urban Policy Process

The policy role research described above is part of a much larger body of literature on policy making in American politics. The urban political arena, like its counterparts at the state and national levels, is a complex system of decision-making. It is a system of inputs, conversion processes and outputs in which the demands and needs of the populace and capabilities of the socio-economic environment are translated or converted by governmental and private structures into policies and programs. This study is concerned with one of the three major steps in this decision system--the conversion process. The "roles" played by the participants in this process constitute some of the factors that determine how the conversion process operates and how effectively demands are converted into policy and program responses. Figure 1.1 depicts how the conversion process fits into the larger decision system.

In effect, role playing is crucial to making the conversion process dynamic rather than static. The attitudes and behavior of those who affect and shape policy, in regard to how they behave as participants in the policy process, are major components of a governing system's

FIGURE 1.1

A PARTIAL MODEL OF THE URBAN POLICY PROCESS

```
+-------------------------------------------------+
|                     INPUTS                      |
|                                                 |
| Public Demands, Perceived                       |
| Needs, Environmental Factors                    |
+-------------------------------------------------+
                       |
                       v
```

```
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                       CONVERSION PROCESS                          |
|                                                                   |
| Structural Anchors:  organizational framework, formal            |
| rules, organizational social-functional mores.                   |
| (e.g., election systems, charters, legal authority,              |
| legislative-administrative separation of powers,                 |
| traditional standards of operating procedure, etc)               |
|                                                                   |
| Political Culture:  attitudes and behavior, norms,               |
| precedents, traditions, customs, taboos, etc.                    |
| (e.g., orientations and expectations of: official                |
| actors--mayors, council members, managers; and                  |
| unofficial actors--elites, community groups, etc.                |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
                       |
                       v
```

```
+-------------------------------------------------+
|                    OUTPUTS                       |
|                                                 |
|            Policies and Programs                 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
```

political culture. The operation of this culture is determined by the interplay of traditions, customs, precedents, norms, and the substantive and policy role orientations of government officials, unofficial political activists, and the lay public.

The concept of "governmental role" has two meanings pertinent to the present analysis. As Williams and Adrian operationalize it, the concept refers to images held by governing officials of the proper role to be played by municipal governments in outputting policy. These authors explain that policy outputs and the nature of urban governmental systems are partly determined by several kinds of these images of the role of government.[81] This is a macro-view of the concept of governmental role.

A more micro-view of the role concept is taken by Eulau and Eyestone. Recognizing the importance of actor perceptions in determining role behavior, these authors attempt to directly connect the notion of role orientations to policy outputs. They hypothesize that the "policy maps" that council members (and other officials) bring to the council chambers help to determine the substance of policy and programs.[82] If an actor's conception of what his role should be affects how he plays that role, then the policy maker's point of view toward a given policy problem clearly affects his decision as to how to approach and solve it. These authors argue that policy maps include three kinds of conceptions: perceptions of the problems or environmental challenges faced by the city, preferences the policy maker brings to the policy situation or develops during the process of decision making, and his values or ends the policy decisions are supposed to bring about.[83] If

this list exhausted all of the possible determinants of an actor's policy maps, we might be led to conclude the politicians are completely issue-oriented and are never influenced by position, status, or power. Realistically, we are led to believe that an important factor is missing from the list--the perceptions of the policy-maker as to what should be decided and by whom. Such a perception often affects the outcome of policy, as when a city council refuses to pass a strong mayor's program because it might tip the balance of policy-making power too heavily in the mayor's favor. How officials and unofficial community activists are predisposed to view their own and each other's roles, then, becomes critical to how policy is handled during the conversion process. It is this aspect of the political culture of the conversion process that forms the central concern in this study.

The Concept of Roles

The focus of this study is on potential role conflicts among city officials arising out of differing conceptions held by these decision-makers. These differing conceptions are of their own and their colleagues' policy-making roles, and of the role of community interests in the policy-making process. Implicit in this inquiry is the idea that conflicts stem in part from differences in attitudes which, in turn, originate in the officials' "predispositions," "conceptions," and "definitions of the situation."

Individuals perceive stimuli directed at them by others in accordance with a psychological filter or "set" comprised of a variety of interrelated environmental and personal factors that are physiological, psychological, social, and cultural in nature. This "set"

determines the individual's susceptibility to external stimuli; i.e.,
he becomes "predisposed" to accept certain stimuli, reject others, and
remain neutral toward still others. How the individual perceives and
interprets any given grouping of stimuli sent by any given individual
or group at any one time is his "definition of the situation." These
predispositions and definitions are components of his points of view or
orientations toward the entire complex of roles he plays as an indivi-
dual interacting with others in a social setting. And, his definition,
orientation, or self-conception of any one of his roles will play a
large part in determining how he acts out that role.[84]

The importance to role theory of the government official's
orientations or self-conceptions of how his policy-making tasks are to
be defined, as well as how he acts them out, cannot be overstated. It
is almost axiomatic to argue that orientations affect attitudes which,
in turn, affect behavior. Any decision to act or not to act is itself
". . . preceded by a definition of a situation, that is to say, an
interpretation, or point of view, and eventually [is followed by] a
policy and a behavior pattern."[85] Yet, the social observor must be
cautioned against assuming that roles are entirely comprised of self-
conceptions or the role-player's orientations. The notion of "role" is
built on two assumptions. First, roles are social—they presuppose an
interaction between two or more individuals. Individuals do not act out
roles in a vacuum. A role is defined not only by the person or actor
playing it, but also by an alter—the individual with whom the role is
being played. A role is defined, then, by the orientations of the
actor and the expectations of the alter toward the actor's role. Second,

roles are tied to social positions, and positions within organizations are structurally and functionally defined. Thus, roles are structurally "anchored"—they take their definitions, in part, from the dictates of the organization irrespective of the orientations and expectations of the roles' actors and alters.[86]

When considering the dimensions of roles still another word of caution is in order. Although roles are comprised of both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, total congruence between attitudes and behavior cannot be assumed. In both cases, the relations of both actors and alters toward prescribed versus actual attitudes and behavior may differ. For example, the actor's attitude toward the prescribed behavior of his role may differ substantially from how he deliberately or unwittingly carries out that role. Or, the actor may perceive his role prescriptions and actual behavior as congruent, while his alter(s) may perceive the actor's role prescriptions and actual behavior as incongruent. The possible combinations indicating incongruence are quite numerous. The present study, however, is limited to examining the attitudinal dimension in regard to conflicts arising out of the differing conceptions of officials as to what should be the prescribed behavior of any given role. In effect, this is a study of the potential for role conflict arising out of differing conceptions of what standards are prescribed for a role. At the same time, however, it is assumed that political actors will make at least a minimal effort to bring attitudes and behavior into some kind of harmony.[87] Since knowledge of attitudes can go a long way toward explaining behavior, behavior is assumed to be affected when orientations differ.

28

The concepts and terminology of role analysis—keys to understanding the dimensions of roles and role theory—tend to suffer from over-generalization and ambiguity in meaning. In the literature of role analysis it is often difficult to tell whether the researcher is defining his concepts in terms of attitudes or behavior, in regard to the actor's or the alter's point of view, or in regard to normative prescriptions or actual behavior. This often results in the use of similar terminology to mean quite different things. For example, Gross and his associates define role "conflict" as "any situation in which the incumbent of a position perceives that he is confronted with incompatible expectations."[88] Biddle and Thomas define role conflict as "inconsistent prescriptions . . . held for a person by himself or by one or more others."[89] Both definitions conceive of "conflict" attitudinally, but while the first is unclear as to the source of the incompatible definitions (actor or alter), the second defines the term in regard to the perceptions of both. Biddle and Thomas also include "feelings of unease resulting from the existence or assumption of inconsistent prescriptions" as part of their definition of role "conflict."[90] Yet, this notion of unsettling "feelings" is also part of Goode's definition of role "strain" as the "felt difficulty in fulfilling role obligations."[91] Sigel and Pindur take Goode's definition to mean "the frustrations a role occupant feels when he cannot conduct himself as he thinks his role demands."[92] It appears that for Biddle and Thomas, role "strain" is a component of the larger attitudinally defined phenomenon of role "conflict." For Goode, however, role strain seems to be either a separate concept to be defined in regard to inconsistency between

attitude and behavior, or role conflict is what he means to be subsumed

under the term "strain." What is apparent here is the amount of

definitional overlap between concepts such as "conflict" and "strain."

The same conceptual ambiguity occurs with regard to the term

"congruency." For example, Gross, et al., define role congruency as a

situation in which the actor "perceives that the same or highly similar

expectations are held for him."[92] Thus, congruency is defined attitud-

inally and results when several alters expect the same behavior from an

actor. Sigel and Pindur, however, define role congruence to mean simi-

larity between an actor's perception of an orientation toward his role

and his actual role behavior as perceived by others.[94] While Gross

sees congruency as similarity of alters' perceptions of what the actor's

role should be, Sigel and Pindur focus on a similarity between the

actor's perception of what his role should be and the perceptions of

alters of how the actor actually behaves. Not only are the attitudinal

and behavioral dimensions of congruence used differently, but the

question of normative prescription versus actual behavior is also

confused.

Additional confusion results when we fail to clarify what is

meant by an "interaction" between actors. Of which interacting actors

do we speak? Are we referring to only those actors whose interaction

is direct and constant, such as government officials in the same muni-

cipal organization? Or does interaction also refer to actors whose

contact with each other is intermittent and indirect? Municipal offi-

cials from different cities may share similar orientations and expec-

tations even though their interactions are limited to occasional

30

gatherings of professional organizations such as the ICMA or shared-interest organizations like the United States Conference of Mayors. The prescriptions of the council-manager system of municipal government, the political mores of the larger society, and the policy stances of professional and shared-interest organizations may serve as indirect determinants of role attitudes that cut across city boundaries. These attitudes, in turn, may have an impact on the operation of norms within specific cities. In other words, inter-city attitudes may help to reinforce intra-city norms, or they may conflict with these norms.

Definitions

Much of the difficulty in accurately delineating the parameters of role concepts results from the necessity of having to include both the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of role playing by both actors and alters, differentiating between normative prescriptions and actual behavior, and ascertaining the kinds and degrees of interaction among political actors. What is needed are more manageable and clearly demarcated definitions that can be operationalized along separate dimensions. Since we are concerned here with the attitudinal dimension as it contributes to the potential for role conflict, and assuming that attitudes generally precede action, the definitions of role concepts used in this study will be narrowed to include orientations and expectations, while excluding role behavior (the enactment of roles). An attempt will be made, however, to examine intra-city as well as inter-city role attitudes. The definitions used in this study are as follows.[95]

31

ACTOR or OCCUPANT: An actor or occupant is a person engaged in particular interactions with other persons because he occupies a specific role position (or several positions) in a system of social relations, i.e., in the system of council-manager urban government.

ALTER: An alter is a person functionally and/or structurally related to the actor and interacting with him, and who occupies a separate role position in the structure or social system. The relationship is reciprocal; the city manager as actor has council members, and department heads as alters, while these alters as occupants of their own roles have the city manager as an alter.

ROLE ORIENTATION: A role orientation is a view or conception of an actor/occupant as to how he should conduct himself in his role.

ROLE EXPECTATION: A role expectation is an alter's conception of what the actor's role should be. For example, a role expectation is an anticipation by a council member that the city manager should conceive of and behave toward the managerial role in accord with standards prescribed by the council member or in accord with role anchors (such as specific requirements in the city charter). While the actor-manager's view of his managerial role is a role orientation, the alter-council member's view of that role is a role expectation.

NORM: A norm is a group expectation of behavior within that group. It is a set of expectations held by groups of interacting actors regarding appropriate or proper behavior by them, where the group members are believed to share these expectations, and where group mechanisms are

32

used to encourage conformity.[96] This study is primarily an _inter-city_ analysis; that is, it focuses on expectations of groups of urban officials occupying similar role positions in different cities. In chapters 2 and 4, however, limited _intra-city_ analyses are attempted. The role attitudes of directly interacting actors occupying similar and different role positions within the same city governments are examined. This intra-city analysis, however, is only a partial operationalization of the norm concept, since the mechanisms used to secure conformity to shared expectations are not examined here. Thus, the intra-city attitudes examined here will be referred to as "norm expectations."

STRUCTURAL ROLE ANCHORS: Role anchors are the structural and functional standards of behavior formally prescribed for the role occupant by the authoritative base of the role system (e.g., the city charter and/or the intended divisions of labor inherent in the council-manager form of municipal government). They operate largely as indirect guides to role behavior in that the strength of role anchors in helping to prescribe role behavior depends on the extent to which alter's expectations fit with the role anchors. The primary policy role anchors in council-manager government for the role positions of council member, city manager, and department head are policy making, translative, and implementative in nature. Inherent in the council-manager plan is the notion that the policy-making role--that of initiating, advocating, and deciding policy--is anchored to the council member role position. The translative role in policy making--translating and coordinating council-made policy decisions--is anchored to the role position of city manager. The

implementative role--the carrying out of council-made decisions as
translated and coordinated by the city manager--is anchored to the role
position of department head. The primary community group role anchors
are based on the assumption that the council-manager form of government
is designed to reject any _special_ role for community groups in the
political process. Instead, the demands of community groups and indi-
vidual citizens are treated as equal in value. Thus, the role anchor
for council member-community group relations recognizes an active but
non-preferential interaction between them as legitimate. In assuming,
however, that a major purpose for designing council-manager forms was
to separate administration from "politics," the role anchors for city
manager-community group and department head-community group relations
prescribes a largely no-contact, no-interaction relationship between
non-elected city officials and private community interests.

SIGNIFICANT OTHER: A significant other is a person in the role system
who, as a role occupant, is not the focus of inquiry, but whose relations
with either actor or alter are affected by and/or affect actor-alter
role relations, the actor's expectations of the other's role, and the
alter's expectations of actor-other relations. For example, "C's" (in-
terest group 'other') relations with "A" (city manager 'actor') are
colored by "A's" orientations toward "C," and by "B's" (council member
'alter') expectations of "A's" orientations to "C." "C" becomes a
significant other because he affects and is affected by relations
between "A" and "B."

ROLE: A role is a structural and functional position or location within a system of social interactions occupied by an actor having a set of actor orientations, alter expectations, and role anchors which prescribe the relevant behavior of the role occupant. For example, an individual occupying the position of city manager in council-manager government will find his role as city manager defined by his own orientations, the expectations of alters with whom he interacts, and prescriptions of the structure itself for how he is to act out his role.

ROLE CONFLICT: Role conflict results from any situation in which an actor-occupant is confronted (knowingly or not) with incompatible expectations about his behavior in that role. Conflicts arise in the first place when actor's and alter's conceptions of actor's role(s) are incompatible. When the actor-manager perceives his role to be one of policy leadership while the alter-council member does not, role conflict exists. Conflicts also arise when several alters hold conflicting expectations for an actor's role behavior. The city manager finds his effectiveness curtailed when confronted by a council whose members cannot agree on his proper roles. Then too, conflict arises when the actor perceives inconsistencies among his roles. The manager may feel his role as a politically value-free budget official is incompatible with his role as a policy innovator. The conscientious police chief may be caught between his professional role—as guardian of a merit system as the best way to insure an honest and professional police force, and his role as a public servant—his desire to insure that the police force is responsive in its actions to the council and the community it serves. Other role patterns may also produce role conflict. Regardless of the

35

pattern, the incompatibilities or strains inherent in role conflict may be difficult to erase.[97]

ROLE CONSONANCE: Role consonance, as the opposite of role conflict, occurs when all actor's orientations, alters' expectations, and role anchors in reference to a particular role are consistent or in harmony. When all members of a given role set agree about the proper attitudinal and behavioral standards for an actor's playing of his or her role, role conflict does not occur. The coalescence of norm expectations, examined in the intra-city analyses of chapters 2 and 4, is an example of role consonance.

The Scope of This Study

This study is concerned with policy making role conflicts and urban interest group[98] orientations among city managers, council members, and selected department heads (police and fire chiefs) in the 56 council-manager cities having a population of 25,000 or greater in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.[99] This investigation includes two types of data. The first type involves environmental characteristics of the 56 cities gleaned from the U. S. Census Bureau's County and City Data Book (1972).[100] The main body of data is taken from questionnaires mailed to 530 officials (56 city managers, 360 council members, and 114 police and fire chiefs) in the target cities during March and April of 1974.[101] The findings of this study are based on returns from 42 city managers (a 75 percent response rate), 189 council members (a 52.5 percent response rate), and 69 police and fire chiefs (a 60.5 percent response rate). Since the respondents examined here do not constitute a random sampling of city

officials in the three states, no attempt is made to infer that the findings of this study are representative of officials' attitudes in any larger population.

In effect, this study combines the research foci of the Zisk and Loveridge studies of the San Francisco Bay area by examining policy-making role orientations and community or "interest" group orientations of city officials. This investigation, then, is addressed to four major research questions.

First, what potential policy-making role conflicts exist among city managers, council members, and department heads as a result of differing conceptions of their own and their colleagues' proper policy-making roles?

Second, what potential policy role conflicts exist among these officials as a result of their community group predispositions; that is, their conceptions of the proper relations between themselves and community groups, and their alters and such groups, in the urban policy-making process?

Third, to what extent are policy-making role orientations and expectations, and community group predispositions, related to such antecedent factors as city environmental variables, political philosophies, and personal and professional background characteristics?

Fourth, how do the policy-making role orientations and expectations of these officials relate to their community group predispositions?

In Chapter II, the first research question is examined within the framework of a typology of policy-making role orientations, alter

expectations, role anchors, and in regard to norm attitudes. The impact of background variables of a city environmental, philosophical, personal and professional nature on policy-making role orientations and expectations is analyzed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, a second categorization is developed--a typology of community group predispositions among managers, council members, and department heads. These predispositions are also examined in the light of actor orientations, alter expectations, norm attitudes, and role anchors. A general description, provided by the officials questioned, of community groups operating in the 56 target cities is provided in Chapter V, along with an analysis of the impact of background variables on community group predispositions. In Chapter VI, the interrelationships between policy-making role orientations and expectations and community group predispositions are analyzed. The purpose here is to delineate patterns of relationships between the tendency of a city official to take a given stance toward his own and his colleagues' proper policy-making roles, and his predispositions towards the role of community groups in the municipal policy-making process.

A Statistical Note

Four statistical measures are utilized in this study as aids to identifying and analyzing relationships between variables. Yule's Q and Chi-Square (X^2), measures of association, are used to identify relationships between nominal-level variables. Yule's Q is applied here where both variables are dichotomous. Chi-Square is used in those few cases where at least one variable is trichotomous. In this study, Q and X^2 are used to identify relationships between (1) actor attitudes and

environmental characteristics, and (2) between attitudinal orientations and attitudinal expectations.

Statistically related variables are identified in the tables of this dissertation by the Q or X^2 value and the letters "ps" which indicate that the value shown is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval (probability = .05).

$$\text{(Eg. } Q = .65, \text{ ps)}$$

The letters "ns" are used to identify those relationships failing to meet the .05 significance level test. In Chapters III and V, however, the "ns" indicator is omitted in Tables 3.6--3.13 and Tables 5.4--5.11 in order to avoid obscuring the data presentation. Finally, Arithmetic Means ($\bar{X}$) and Standard Deviations (S) are used in Chapters II and IV to compare the coalescence of norm expectations among officials in one city with norm coalescence in other cities. The uses of the latter two statistical tools are described in Chapter II.

As mentioned above, no attempt is made in this study to infer that the data are a random sample of a larger population. Measuring the probability that a relationship identified in the sample is true of the sample's population, therefore, is an irrelevant exercise. Yet, some rational means for determining the meaningfulness of the statistical values generated must be constructed. At what point, for example, does a specific Q value cease to measure the existence of a relationship between two variables in the sample and begin to indicate that no relationship exists. Such a "threshold" can be measured by testing for probability as though the sample data were not seriously biased.

39

Randomness in the data used in this study, therefore, is assumed here

for the analytical purpose of establishing a threshold or break-point.

Although findings generated by analysis in this study can be inferred

to be true for all managers, department heads, and council members in

the 56 target cities, no inferences can be drawn for any larger universe

of municipal officials. Probability levels for Chi-Square are calcu-

lated by using standard probability tables found in most statistics

textbooks.[102] Probability for Yule's Q is calculated by utilizing a

formula developed by G. Udney Yule, the creater of Q, as a measure of

association.[103]

Notes

1. An excellent summary of the contemporary urban policy literature and the controversy that has raged in this corner of the discipline can be found in Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

2. For example, an analysis of the effects of partisanship, strength of the executive, and structural forms of city governments on adopting fluoridation in city water supplies is found in Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of the Fluoridation Decisions," Journal of Politics 28 (February 1966): 169-95.

3. See, for example, Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," Journal of Politics 26 (November 1964): 775-97.

4. Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963).

5. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 124-43.

6. Linkages between environmental characteristics and specific policy outcomes have been explored in, among others: Lewis A. Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics 29 (February 1967): 94-108; Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (December 1968): 141-65; and Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

7. Fathering the enormous body of literature on community power structures are the two studies that initiated the community power controversy. See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). An excellent review of the controversy in the light of democratic theory is found in David C. Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis (New York: Random House, 1971).

8. Studies of the activities of organized interests in city politics include: Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, "Organized Labor in City Politics," in Urban Government, rev. ed., edited by Edward C. Banfield (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Donald H. Bouma, "Issue-Analysis Approach to Community Power: A Case Study of

Notes

Realtors in Kalamazoo," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 29 (July 1970): 241-52; Charles Liebman, "Electorates, Interest Groups, and Local Government Policy," American Behavioral Scientist 5 (January 1961): 9-14; Schley R. Lyons, "Labor in City Politics: The Case of the Toledo Auto Workers," Social Science Quarterly 44 (March 1969): 816-28; and Robert H. Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties, and Governmental Structure," Western Political Quarterly 13 (June 1960): 498-507.

9. John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962).

10. Ibid., p. 9.

11. Ibid., pp. 10-11, 15.

12. The use of "role" as an analytical construct in the social sciences was popularized by scholars such as Talcott Parsons in his seminal book, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951). Excellent and exhaustive examinations of the elements, uses, and ramifications of role analysis can be found in Neal Cross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1958); and Bruce Biddle and Edwin Thomas, Jr., eds., Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York: Wiley, 1966).

13. Charles E. Merriam, Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1929); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1930; Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Alfred Steinberg, The Bosses (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: Dutton, 1971).

14. James V. Cunningham, Urban Leadership in the Sixties (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1970); Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain, "Executive Leadership and Community Innovation: The Fluoridation Experience," Urban Affairs Quarterly 1 (March 1966): 39-57.

15. Hunter, Community Power Structure; Dahl, Who Governs?.

16. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1960); Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics: A Comparative Guide to the Political Systems of Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Seattle (New York: Random House, 1966); Roscoe C. Martin, et al., Decisions in Syracuse (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1965).

17. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities.

18. Sayre and Kaufman's Governing New York City, for example, includes the general role of city bureaucracies in the making of policy.

19. Robert R. Alford, Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 200.

20. One study that attempts to examine such involvement is: Harry W. Reynolds, Jr., "The Career Public Service and Statute Lawmaking Lawmaking in Los Angeles," Western Political Quarterly 18 (September 1965): 621-39.

21. Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (June 1971): 391-409.

22. Blanche D. Blank, Rita J. Immerman, and C. Peter Rydell, "A Comparative Study of an Urban Bureaucracy," Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (March 1969): 343-54.

23. For a brief review of the elements of the administrator versus policy leader argument, see: Gladys M. Kammerer, "Is the Manager a Political Leader?--Yes," Public Management 44 (February 1962): 26-29; H. G. Pope, "Is the Manager a Political Leader?--No," Public Management 44 (February 1962): 30-33; Duane Lockard, "The City Manager, Administrative Theory and Political Power," Political Science Quarterly 67 (June 1962): 224-36. For an espousal of the classical "administrator" view see Leonard D. White, The City Manager (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 301.

24. Clarence E. Ridley, The Role of the City Manager in Policy Formulation (Chicago: International City Management Association, 1958), p. 1.

25. Ibid., p. 11.

26. Ibid., p. 19.

27. Jeptha Carrell, The Role of the City Manager: Views of Councilmen and Managers, Public Affairs Monograph Series No. 2 (Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies Inc., 1962), pp. 18-29, 21.

28. Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959), p. 163.

29. Gladys Kammerer, et al., City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination, Social Science Monograph No. 13 (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 83.

30. Gladys Kammerer and John M. DeGrove, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure (Gainesville, Fla.: Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida, 1961), pp. 12-14.

31. James B. Kweder, *The Role of the Manager, Mayor, and Councilmen in Policy Making: A Study of Twenty-One North Carolina Cities* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina, Institute of Government, 1965), p. 44. The strong policy influence of the manager is also documented in Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totawa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964), Ch. 16, "The Oberlin City Manager"; See also, John C. Buechner, *Differences in Role Perceptions in Colorado Council-Manager Cities* (Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, 1965).

32. Williams and Adrian, *Four Cities*, p. 306.

33. David A. Booth, *Council-Manager Government in Small Cities* (Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1968), p. 105.

34. Ibid., p. 102. The percentages are based on data provided by Booth in Table 26.

35. Richard J. Stillman, *The Rise of the City Manager: A Public Professional in Local Government* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 74.

36. Ronald O. Loveridge, *City Managers in Legislative Politics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), see Tables on pages 49, 86, 96.

37. Ibid., p. 95.

38. Carrell, *Role of the City Manager*, p. 4. For a more recent analysis of the council's legislative oversight function focusing on city staff as the source of council information used in performing that function, see Cortus T. Koehler, "Policy Development and Legislative Oversight in Council-Manager Cities: An Information and Communication Analysis," *Public Administration Review* 33 (September/October 1973): 433-441.

39. Loveridge, *City Managers in Legislative Politics*, pp. 49, 86.

40. Gladys M. Kammerer, "Role Diversity of City Managers," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 8 (March 1964): 439-440.

41. David A. Booth, "Are Elected Mayors a Threat to Managers?" *Administrative Science Quarterly* 12 (March 1968): 581-585.

42. Robert P. Boynton and Deil S. Wright, "Mayor-Manager Relationships in Large Council-Manager Cities: A Reinterpretation," *Public Administration Review* 31 (January/February 1971): 31-35.

43. See, for example, Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929); Earl

Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-point Legislation (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952); Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Bloomington, Ia.: Principia Press, 1908, 1949); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1951).

44. See, for example, Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1966); Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); Henry Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1961).

45. See, for example, Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Karl Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston: Little, 1951); Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966); Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Frederick N. Cleaveland, Congress and Urban Problems (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969); Suzanne Farkas, Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena (New York: New York University Press, 1971).

46. Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory.

47. Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Lobbyist: The Case of Oklahoma," Journal of Politics 25 (February 1963): 72-92; Harmon Zeigler and Michael Baer, Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislatures (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969); Bernard D. Kolaska, "Lobbying in the Non-Partisan Environment: The Case of Nebraska," Western Political Quarterly 24 (March 1971): 65-78; John C. Wahlke, et al., "American State Legislators' Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," Journal of Politics 22 (May 1960): 203-227; Henry Teune, "Legislative Attitudes Toward Interest Groups," Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (November 1967): 489-504; Wayne L. Francis, "A Profile of Legislator Perceptions of Interest Group Behavior Relating to Legislative Issues in the States," Western Political Quarterly 24 (December 1971): 702-712.

48. Clement E. Vose, "Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and Local Government," Western Political Quarterly 19 (March 1966): 85-100; Lyons, "Labor in City Politics"; David L. Paltez, Peggy Reichert, and Barbara McIntyre, "How the Media Support Local Governmental Authority," Public Opinion Quarterly 35 (Spring 1971): 80-94.

49. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage, 1963).

50. Robert H. Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics."

51. Charles Liebman, "Electorates, Interest Groups, and Local Government Policy."

52. James C. Davies, III, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Paul E. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," American Political Science Review 64 (June 1970): 491-507; Erasmus H. Kloman, "Citizen Participation in the Philadelphia Model Cities Program: Retrospect and Prospect," Public Administration Review 22 (September 1972): 402-408. See also Michael Steinman, "Low Income and Minority Group Participation in Administrative Processes: Mexican-American Orientations to Health Care Services," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (June 1976): 523-543.

53. Harold V. Savitch, "Powerlessness in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Political Bias and Differential Access in New York City," Polity 5 (Fall 1972): 19-56.

54. Teune, "Legislative Attitudes Toward Interest Groups"; Francis, "Legislator Perceptions of Interest Group Behavior in the States"; Zeigler and Baer, Lobbying; Wahlke, The Legislative System.

55. Wahlke, The Legislative System, p. 14.

56. Ibid., p. 324.

57. Ibid., p. 324-325. See also, Francis, "Legislator Perceptions of Interest Group Behavior in the States."

58. Teune, "Legislative Attitudes Toward Interest Groups," pp. 484, 489, 503.

59. Ibid., 504.

60. Zeigler and Baer, Lobbying, pp. 7-8.

61. Zeigler and Baer also examined the effects on interaction of such background environmental variables as: party systems, chamber size, tenure and compensation, legislative procedures, etc.

62. Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Betty H. Zisk, Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).

63. Eulau and Prewitt, Labyrinths, p. 366.

64. Ibid., pp. 338-339.

65. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, p. 2.

66. Ibid., p. 3.

67. Eulau and Prewitt, Labyrinths, pp. 324, 330-333.

68. Ibid., pp. 352-353, 363. See also, Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

69. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, pp. 175-178.

70. Ibid., p. 19. Zisk's typology first appeared in Betty H. Zisk, Heinz Eulau, and Kenneth Prewitt, "City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations," Journal of Politics 27 (August 1965): 618-46.

71. Ibid., p. 99.

72. Ibid., pp. 109-116.

73. Ibid., pp. 99-101, 109-110.

74. Eulau and Prewitt, Labyrinths, p. 321.

75. Ibid., p. 325.

76. Ibid., p. 327.

77. Ibid., p. 344.

78. Zisk, Local Interest Politics, p. 67.

79. Ibid., pp. 65-66, 68-71.

80. Ibid., pp. 142-143.

81. Williams and Adrian, Four Cities, p. 23.

82. Eulau and Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils," pp. 124-143.

83. Ibid., pp. 130-131.

84. The literature of role analysis is heavily imbued with inquiries into the relationship between attitudes and behavior. For an examination of self-conceptions, attitudes, and behavior, see: Edmund I. Volkart, "Social Behavior and the Defined Situation," in Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research, ed. Edmund I. Volkart (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951), pp. 1-32.

85. W. I. Thomas, Primitive Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), p. 8.

86. The term "anchored" is borrowed from Lelan E. McLemore, "The Structuring of Legislative Behavior: Norm Patterns in a State Legislature" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1973), pp. 23-24. McLemore argues that roles reflect not only the orientations of the actor, but also "positionally anchored" norms in regard to the expectations of alters. The notion of positional anchoring in regard to roles needs to be carried one step further by tying roles to a third element--their <u>structural</u> position within a social setting or organization. This need is argued in F. L. Bates, "Some Observations Concerning the Structural Aspect of Role Conflict," <u>Pacific Sociological Review</u> 5 (Fall 1962): 78-82.

87. The notion of a "strain toward consistency" between normative prescriptions and actual behavior is examined in Leon Festinger, <u>A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance</u> (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).

88. Neal Gross, Alexander W. McEachern, and Ward S. Mason, "Role Conflict and its Resolution," in <u>Role Theory</u>, edited by Biddle and Thomas, p. 288.

89. Biddle and Thomas, <u>Role Theory</u>, p. 12.

90. Ibid.

91. William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," <u>American Sociological Review</u> 25 (August 1960): 483.

92. Robert S. Sigel and Wolfgang Pindur, "Role Congruence and Role Strain Among Urban Legislators," <u>Social Science Quarterly</u> 54 (June 1973): 55.

93. Gross, McEachern and Mason, Explorations in Role Analysis, p. 288.

94. Sigel and Pindur, "Role Congruence and Role Strain," p. 54.

95. The conceptual definitions used here are based in part on modifications of definitions used by Biddle and Thomas, <u>Role Theory</u>, pp. 10-12, Table No. 3.

96. The concept of "norm" entails difficulties in both definition and and operationalization. The definition used here is taken from McLemore, "Structuring of Legislative Behavior," p. 42. The difficulties in developing an adequate operational definition for the concept of "norm" are aired in F. Ted Hebert and Lelan E. McLemore, "A Comment on Operationalizing the Norm Concept," and Michael Betz, "On the Measurement of Normative Diversity: A Reply," <u>Social Science Quarterly</u> 54 (December 1973): 647-49.

97. Goode gives a similar definition for "role strain." See footnote 91.

98. In this study, the notion of "urban interest group" is given the term "community group." Community groups are defined here as ". . . all groups that are generally recognized in your community' as having some identifiable political, social, or economic similarity of interest." This definition broadens the parameters of what does or does not constitute an interest group, and it allows the respondent some latitude in defining for himself who in his community can be classified as an interest group. For a full explanation of the definition used in this study, see the questionnaire in Appendix B.

99. See Appendix A for a list of these cities.

100. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1972 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). Data has also been drawn from: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 1, United States Summary.

101. See Appendix B.

102. For Chi-Square, see "Table I: Distribution of X^2" in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 569.

103. The formula for calculating probabilities for Yule's Q is that for the standard error of Q:

$$s = (1-Q^2) \quad \sqrt{(1/a \quad 1/b \quad 1/c \quad 1/d)} \quad /2$$

The value for s resulting is the basis for the z-value (Q/s). The z-value is then utilized in finding probability levels for two tails of the normal probability curve.

The formula for the standard error of Q is from G. Udney Yule, "On the Methods of Measuring Association between Two Attributes," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 75, Part 6, (May 1912): 579-642. Probabilities for z-values were taken from "Table 2: Probabilities that Given Values of Z Will Be Exceeded" found in Morris Zelditch and Theodore R. Anderson, A Basic Course in Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 320.

CHAPTER II

THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ROLE CONFLICT:
ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

The Nature of Policy-Making Roles

The first series of major questions to be asked in this study
center around policy and other political roles that official actors in
city government feel they and their colleagues should be carrying out.
Who is to make policy, who is to implement policy, and who is to advise
on policy and supervise its implementation? These questions can be
misleading unless there is a clear understanding that (1) a given role
may consist of other roles, and (2) an actor may occupy more than one
role or, conversely, a role may be occupied by more than one actor. The
structural role of city manager, for example, may be made up of policy,
administrative and implementative functions. These functions, in effect,
are roles since they and others are defined by and have a position in
the council-manager system. It is true that structural roles are also
functional because functional activities have been charged to them--the
manager is charged with administering city government. However, it is
easier to think of the role of manager as "structural" and the role of
administrator as "functional," and this usage will be retained here for
convenience.

Secondly, actors may occupy more than one role, and vice-versa.
As a result, structural and functional roles also overlap on occasion.
For example, council members may be sharing policy shaping and policy
initiating activities with the manager. The manager becomes, in part,
a council member—even though role anchors for council-manager government
do not recognize this type of structural role as authoritative. Con-
versely, more than one role occupant may be exercising one role function,
as when the functional role of administrator is in fact exercised
jointly by the manager and the mayor. The permutations of this poten-
tial for role overlap are quite numerous.

The crucial question for analysis, then, is to what extent are
functional roles carried out by the occupants of more than one struc-
tural role? For purposes of analysis, the structural roles examined
here are that of council member, manager, and department head. Func-
tional roles are those policy process roles described below.

The presupposition that the traditional policy-versus-adminis-
tration functional role dichotomy either should be or is operational
stems from the structural-functional dictates of the traditional schema
for council-manager government. The role anchors provided in the
original Model City Charter[1] (and found in most council-manager charters
operating today) clearly placed the policy-making role, the role of
administrative oversight, and the "politicking" roles of promoting policy
to the public, electoral campaigning, and candidate recruitment in the
hands of council members as well as the public at-large. Purely adminis-
trative and implementative matters were the concern of the city manager
(with a minimum of interference from the council) and line department

51

heads appointed by him. Under no circumstances were administrative personnel to become involved in the political side of the dichotomy.

Evidence that the dichotomy is far too simplistic and that some administrative officials--especially city managers--are involved in policy making in some fashion has been gathered elsewhere. Indeed, the nature of public decisions may make the dichotomy false on its face.[2] A more sophisticated view of the policy making process in council-manager government night center around a continuum of functional roles that help determine the shape of policy. This is a continuum in which policy advising, policy shaping and politicking (recruiting, campaigning and policy promoting) constitute different degrees of involvement for non-elected officials in other than purely administrative roles. The amount of involvement by non-elected officials in policy-making that is acceptable to various prime actors in the policy process, then, becomes the prime measurement indicator.

Eight functional policy roles to be played within the structure of council-manager municipal government by official actors can be identified and linked to specific actors by role anchors.[3] The categories of these roles and the extent to which they overlap are shown in Figure 2.1. The first of the "politicking" roles, campaigning, involves an actor actively supporting through electioneering those persons attempting to retain or obtain positions of policy-making authority in the governmental structure (council posts). The bureaucratic counterpart to this is the lending of support to an administrative official whose tenure is in jeopardy. Recruiting refers to searching for new members to co-opt into the official governmental elite (finding "good" people to run for

FIGURE 2.1

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF POLICY PROCESS ROLES AND ROLE ANCHORS
FOR OFFICIAL ACTORS IN COUNCIL-MANAGER MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Policy	Functional	Structural
Process Category	Policy Roles	Actors

Politicking — Campaigning / Recruiting / Promoting → Council Members

Policy Making — Shaping / Advising → City Manager

Administering — Translating / Implementing / Maintaining → Department Heads

NOTE: Role Anchors ◄————

53

the council). Promoting involves "selling" policy proposals or programs to the public either to gain public support for anticipated proposals or to quiet public opposition to actions the council has taken or is contemplating. Of the policy-making roles, shaping policies involves determining the substance of policy and authorizing its implementation through majority vote on the council. Policy advising refers to aiding in the determination of policy that is finally authorized by others through lending one's experience and expertise to the deliberations. Policy translating involves turning council mandated policies and programs into tasks and activities designed to carry out those policies. Implementing refers to carrying out policies and programs as directed and determined by others. Finally, maintaining refers to conducting activities that maintain the structure that serves as the prime vehicle for policy delivery--the city's government.

The roles listed in Figure 2.1 are roles mandated by traditional role anchors for various actors in the policy process. The public is involved to some degree in all of these roles, regardless of which side of the politics-administration dichotomy these roles happen to fall. The degree to which official actors are willing to tolerate such role playing by community interests is a subject for a later chapter. The role anchors for council-manager government largely dictate that the public be excluded from administrative roles while administrators are excluded from policy and politicking roles. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role orientations and expectations of three sets of actors[4]--council members, city managers, and police and fire chiefs--in order to ascertain the degree of involvement in the policy process tolerated by each of them for each of them.

Policy and Politicking Role Conceptions

The evidence gathered in this study unmistakably points to some kind of policy role for all target actors, but disagreement among these actors as to the nature of the policy role they are to play points to the potential for role conflict. Substantial agreement appears to exist among these actors that council members are to predominate in the making of policy, while administrative matters are to be left to the city manager. This is indicated in the pattern of responses of council members, managers and department heads to identical statements listed in Table 2.1. But the role of policy maker is not exclusively the council member's. Council member respondents overwhelmingly agree that they should cooperate with the city manager in matters of policy. This agreement holds true for both mayors and other council members (Table 2.2), leading us to conclude that Boynton and Wright, and Saltzstein are correct in their assertions that collaborative relationships are not infrequent patterns of mayor-manager or manager-council interaction in council-manager cities.[5]

City Manager Policy Roles

Whether "cooperation" means a sharing of policy-making prerogatives or only the giving of policy advice appears to be a point of potential conflict between managers and council members (Table 2.3). The responses of council members indicate their strong desire for the manager to concentrate on the administrative matters of municipal government, to refrain from policy promotion, to remain neutral in council conflicts, to consult with the council on budgetary matters, and yet to

TABLE 2.1

COUNCIL MEMBERS' POLICY ROLES: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF COUNCIL MEMBERS, CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

| Policy Roles[a] | Council Members | | City Managers | | Department Heads |
	Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Percent Agree
	(N = 189)		(N = 42)		(N = 69)
A. Policy Initiator	97.9	(2.7)	95.2	(21.1)	76.8
B. Policy Promoter	84.7	(12.9)	97.6	(12.4)	97.1
C. Policy Partner	82.0	(8.5)	90.5	(16.6)	98.6
D. Policy Non-Administrator	90.5	(2.4)	92.9	(0.6)	89.9

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 2.1–Continued

Role A: Council members should take the initiative in shaping and advocating major changes in city policies.

Role B: Council members, rather than the city manager, should try to gather public support for council proposals and actions.

Role C: A council member should cooperate with the city manager in policy making matters as much as possible.

Role D: Council members should leave the administration of city government to the city manager.

[a]These roles have been adapted in part from Ronald O. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

[b]The difference is between the actor's percentage and that of council members.

57

TABLE 2.2

COUNCIL MEMBERS' POLICY ROLES: ORIENTATIONS
OF MAYORS AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS

Policy Roles[a]	Mayors Percent Agree	(Difference)	Other Council Members Percent Agree
	(N = 31)		(N = 158)
A. Policy Initiator	100.0	(2.5)	97.5
B. Policy Promoter	93.5	(9.5)	84.0
C. Policy Partner	90.3	(8.4)	81.9
D. Policy Non-Administrator	93.5	(3.1)	90.4

[a]See Table 2.1 for statements corresponding to these policy roles.

58

TABLE 2.3

CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLES: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF CITY MANAGERS, COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Policy Roles[a]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Council Members Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Department Heads Percent Agree
	(N = 42)		(N = 189)		(N = 69)
A. Policy Initiator	92.9	(36.8)	56.1	(3.0)	89.9
B. Policy Administrator	31.0	(52.6)	83.6	(9.6)	40.6
C. Policy Promoter	2.4	(2.4)	4.8	(8.1)	15.9
D. Policy Non-Disputant	45.2	(25.2)	70.4	(1.7)	43.5
E. Budget Consultant	50.0	(24.1)	74.1	(3.6)	53.6

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 2.3-Continued

Role A: A city manager should take the initiative in shaping and advocating major changes in city policies.

Role B: A city manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.

Role C: A city manager should appeal to the community at large for support of policy proposals he believes are sound, even when they are opposed by the council.

Role D: A city manager should maintain a neutral stand on issues over which the council is divided.

Role E: A city manager should consult with the council before drafting his own budget.

[a]Adapted in part from Loveridge, City Managers.

[b]Difference compared to city manager percentages.

be a policy initiator. Taking sides in council disputes, monopolizing the budgetary process, and competing with the council in public on matters of policy would indicate a desire for a manager who is a vigorous policy partner. Clearly, council members are willing to "let the manager in" on matters of policy, to allow him to help shape the substance of policy, and even advocate policy before the council. But, they also expect him to refrain from becoming a "shadow" council member.

Managers agree that their role in policy making is to be limited. Managers are divided on whether or not they should take sides in council disputes or consult with council before drafting budgets, and they feel strongly that going over the heads of the council to the public on policy matters is strictly taboo. Yet, managers also feel strongly (and department heads agree) that their role is composed of more than just administrative tasks, and that they too should be initiators of policy.[6] The crucial point of conflict between managers and council members is not the question of who has the ultimate responsibility for policy making and policy promotion--all the target actors agree that the council does. The key question is to what degree does the manager's role as policy advisor constitute a policy-making partnership with the council? Both council members and managers agree with the distinction between policy making and administration, and thus the traditional role anchor remains intact. That role anchor must be modified, however, in light of the evidence presented here that council members, managers, and department heads agree on a policy role for the manager that lies somewhere between that of technical advisor and full policy partner. The potential for conflict arises when managers--

61

supported by department heads—pull in the direction of policy partner
and council members pull in the direction of technical advisor. It is
that gap that produces dynamic creative tensions in council-manager
government.

For purposes of analysis throughout this study, those managers
who feel they are not merely administrative technicians, but also have
a strong role in determining policy, are classified as having Policy
Partner orientations. In contrast, managers who see a clear boundary
line between administration and policy making that they must not cross
are classified as Policy Administrators.[7] Policy Partners comprise 69
percent of the target city managers.

The evidence presented in Table 2.4 suggests that managers
holding Policy Partner orientations tend not to regard themselves as
policy equals to council members. The percentage patterns of Table 2.4
reveal an indication that Policy Partners are willing to take sides in
council disputes while Policy Administrators shy away from such conduct.
This relationship, however, failed the test of statistical significance.
There is evidence too that Policy Partner council members—those 56.1
percent of the council member respondents who would allow the manager
some initiative in the policy arena—are not only willing to accept the
manager as a policy partner, but also to allow him to operate as some-
what of a shadow council member by taking sides in council disputes
(Table 2.5). Most council members, however, feel that the council should
take the initiative in policy making (Table 2.1).

TABLE 2.4

SECONDARY POLICY ROLES OF CITY MANAGERS, BY CITY
MANAGERS' MAIN POLICY ROLES

Other Policy Roles	Main Policy Roles	
	Policy Administrator	Policy Partner
Budget Consultant	percent ns[a]	percent
Consult	53.8	48.3
Do Not Consult	46.2	51.7
	100.0 (13)[b]	100.0 (29)
Policy Non-Disputant	ns	
Remain Neutral	61.5	37.9
Take Sides	38.5	62.1
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)

[a]ns = not statistically significant.

[b]Number of cases.

TABLE 2.5

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLES,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' POLICY SHARING ORIENTATIONS

Council Member Expectations for City Manager Policy Roles	Council Member Policy Sharing Orientations	
	Policy Partner	Policy Retainer
City Manager as a Policy Partner	percent $Q = .74, ps^{a}$	percent
Policy Partner	25.5	4.8
Policy Administrator	74.5	95.2
	100.0 (106)	100.0 (83)
City Manager as a Policy Non-Disputant	$Q = .35, ps$	
Remain Neutral	65.4	79.3
Take Sides	34.6	20.7
	100.0 (106)	100.0 (83)

[a]ps = statistically significant, see Chapter I for an explanation of Q.

64

Department Head Policy Roles

The traditional role anchors of council-manager government dictate that the line department head is not to be a member of a policy-making team. His role is confined to that of implementing policy made by others and to make technical recommendations to his immediate superior—the city manager. As the responses in Table 2.6 indicate, however, department heads take quite a different view of their roles in the policy process. Department heads feel their role goes beyond mere implementation of policy to include the giving of advice directly to the council on matters of personnel, departmental operations, and even matters unrelated to their functions within the governmental structure. Yet, department heads do recognize that their policy role is limited to one of advisement. They eschew any role in the promotion of policy and are divided on the question of whether or not council members should actively seek the views of department heads on matters of policy.[8]

Interestingly, police chiefs appear more willing to assume an active policy advisement role than fire chiefs (Table 2.7). As the head of a bureau containing the most visible of "street-level bureaucrats"[9] at the local level, the police chief is probably in contact with and under far more pressure from politicians and the public than any other municipal administrator, save the city manager. Although no direct evidence is generated in this study to "prove" that police departments are probably more politicized than other line departments of city government, constant citizen contact and pressure force all police departments to be extremely sensitive to public opinion.[10] Such sensitivity probably generates a strong desire to have a greater role than acting merely as

TABLE 2.6

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLES: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF DEPARTMENT HEADS, CITY MANAGERS, AND COUNCIL MEMBERS

Policy Roles[a]	Department Heads Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Council Members Percent Agree
	(N = 69)		(N = 42)		(N = 189)
A. Policy Implementer	44.9	(24.1)	69.0	(43.5)	88.4
B. Personnel Advisor	68.1	(53.8)	14.3	(25.8)	42.3
C. Dept. Op. Advisor	71.0	(54.3)	16.7	(28.1)	42.9
D. Policy Promoter	15.9	(11.1)	4.8	(13.3)	2.6
E. Policy Generalist	58.0	(13.4)	71.4	(7.6)	65.6
F. Policy Advisor	52.2	(35.5)	16.7	(2.8)	55.0

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 2.6-<u>Continued</u>

Role A: A department head should stick to implementing policy and leave policy making and decisions as to how to implement policy to the city manager or the council.

Role B: A department head should assume leadership in making recommendations to the council about changes in personnel policy.

Role C: A department head should assume leadership in making policy recommendations to the council about changes in departmental operations.

Role D: A department head should appeal to the community at large for support of his recommendations when opposed by the city manager.

Role E: A department head should be free to make recommendations to the manager about matters outside his department.

Role F: A council member should actively seek the views of department heads before proposing policies to the council.

[a]Adapted in part from Loveridge, <u>City Managers</u>.

[b]Difference compared to department head percentages.

TABLE 2.7

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLES: ORIENTATIONS OF POLICE AND FIRE CHIEFS

Policy Roles[a]	Police Chiefs Percent Agree	(Difference)	Fire Chiefs Percent Agree
	(N = 32)		(N = 37)
A. Policy Implementer	28.1	(31.4)	59.5
B. Personnel Leadership	84.4	(30.3)	54.1
C. Dept. Op. Leadership	84.4	(24.9)	59.5
D. Policy Promoter	15.6	(0.6)	16.2
E. Policy Generalist	59.4	(2.6)	56.8
F. Policy Advisor	50.0	(4.1)	54.1

[a]See Table 2.6 for statements corresponding to these policy roles.

68

a conduit for policies set by others. When we classify department
heads according to policy making orientations (based on the disagree-
ment response to Role A of Table 2.6: 100-44.9 percent), 55.1 percent
of all department heads chose the Policy Partner orientation.[11] Police
chiefs are more likely than fire chiefs to be oriented toward policy
partnership (Table 2.8). The responses indicate that police chiefs are
significantly more likely to want to assume policy leadership over
matters of personnel and departmental operations than fire chiefs whose
departmental functions are comparatively less controversial and thus
less politicized.

The potential for role conflict begins to appear, however,
when we examine the responses of council members and managers to the
policy roles of department heads. As the responses in Table 2.6
indicate, both council members and managers oppose policy-making and
policy-promotion roles for department heads. Both sets of actors feel
that department heads should concentrate their efforts on policy imple-
mentation and leave policy making to others, and that they should not
attempt to exercise leadership in matters of personnel policy or depart-
mental operations.

Yet, the route to some kind of policy role for department heads
is not completely cut off. Both council members and managers feel that
policy recommendations from department heads are welcome, even on matters
outside that official's professional expertise. Also, those managers
classified as Policy Administrators are also more likely to favor a role
for department heads in the policy process than are managers with a
policy partner orientation (Table 2.9). This pattern may appear to be

69

TABLE 2.8

DEPARTMENT HEAD POLICY ROLE TYPES, BY ORIENTATIONS
OF POLICE AND FIRE CHIEFS

Policy Role Orientations	Police Chiefs Percent		Fire Chiefs Percent
Main Policy Role		$Q = .57$, ps	
Policy Partner	71.8		40.5
Policy Implementer	28.1		59.5
	100.0 (32)		100.0 (37)
Personnel Leadership		$Q = .64$, ps	
Assume Leadership	84.4		54.1
Reject Leadership	15.6		45.9
	100.0 (32)		100.0 (37)
Dept. Operations Leadership		$Q = .57$, ps	
Assume Leadership	84.4		59.5
Reject Leadership	15.6		40.5
	100.0 (32)		100.0 (37)

TABLE 2.9

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS OF DEPARTMENT HEADS' MAIN POLICY ROLES,
BY CITY MANAGERS' MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

City Managers' Expectations for Department Head Policy Roles	City Managers' Policy Roles	
	Policy Administrator	Policy Partner
	percent	percent
Policy Partner	92.3	58.6
Policy Implementer	7.7	41.4
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)

$Q = .78, ps$

incongruous until we understand that the policy oriented manager may not wish to share those policy activities in which he is permitted to participate with anyone except the council. As was true for manager-council member policy relations, there exists some flexibility in defining the policy role for department heads, although their inclusion in the policy-making process will be as junior partners.

It is the nature of the advisory process that becomes crucial for the degree of involvement in policy determination to be exercised by department heads. The evidence presented in Table 2.10 indicates a reciprocal support relationship between managers and department heads on matters of policy—a relationship supported by council members. While the city manager is expected to listen to the views of his subordinates prior to making policy recommendations to the council, the department head is expected to support the manager's proposals, even when these proposals are opposed by the council. A second relationship between department heads and council members involves council members listening to and seeking out the views of department heads on matters of policy. This relationship is supported by both council members and department heads but not by managers. The city manager, then, appears to believe in a sharing of views between himself and his subordinates but frowns on any similar relationship between his subordinates and members of the council. The reason for this may be the fear that such a relationship may by-pass him, reduce his role as translator of policy, and usurp his policy relationship with the council. As indicated in Table 2.10, however, those fears may be unfounded since going over the manager's head is a kind of behavior that all three target actors reject.

72

TABLE 2.10

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY RELATIONS WITH CITY MANAGERS AND COUNCIL MEMBERS

Policy Relations Statements	Department Heads Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	Council Members Percent Agree
1. The views of department heads should be considered by the city manager before he recommends policy to the council.	(N= 69) 98.6	(0.2)	(N= 42) 98.4	(3.4)	(N= 189) 95.2
2. A department head should support a city manager he respects when that manager's proposals are opposed by the council.	79.7	(8.3)	71.4	(8.4)	88.1
3. A councilman should listen to the views of department heads even when those views differ from the city manager's views.	50.7	(15.0)	35.7	(12.3)	63.0
4. A councilman should actively seek the views of department heads before proposing policies to the council.	52.2	(35.5)	16.7	(2.8)	55.0
5. A department head should appeal to the council for support of his recommendations when opposed by the city manager.	21.7	(7.4)	14.3	(14.6)	7.1

[a]Difference compared to department head percentages.

73

The department head's primary role as defined by the expectations of his alters, then, is to engage in the policy-advisement process with the city manager, but as a subordinate member of the manager's team and not as a co-equal partner in face-to-face contact with the council. Given the orientations of department heads, and especially chiefs of police, in this study, the potential for conflict is great.

Tenure Politicking Roles

Policy making is but one form of political activity in which administrative members of city government might become involved. Another form is that of providing encouragement and support for those actors who wish to gain entrance to or retain their positions in the governmental structure. These activities, commonly referred to as the recruitment of political leaders and campaigning, are traditionally not within the acceptable realm of behavior for non-elected bureaucrats. The history of the merit principle and the development of such legal prohibitions as the Hatch Act demonstrate the public's desire that civil servants not be allowed to engage in electoral politics. Yet, this role anchor is occasionally violated--openly, clandestinely, or unwittingly. Departments, government unions, and individual employees may surreptitiously give of their time and services in support of electoral candidates. What are often known as "flower funds" may abound. Some civil servants may engage in partisan electoral activity simply because they are not familiar with which activities are or are not permitted.[12] Politicized civil servants today, however, are increasingly more likely to engage in policy-oriented politicking rather than traditional electoral politics.[13] Yet, policy-oriented political activity by public employees may

have an effect on electoral outcomes. For example, pressure by civil servants against a particular policy may have negative consequences whether intended or not for the public image of a politician associated with that policy and perhaps even his continuation in office. Although cases in which civil servants manage to drive politicians from office are apparently rare, policy politicking and tenure politicking are related activities.

The question here is to what extent are the target actors'in council-manager government willing to legitimize an active role for managers and department heads in the tenure politicking process? According to Table 2.11, a considerable amount of role consonance exists among these actors. Although encouraging citizens to run for council posts appears to be not quite the dastardly deed as helping favored incumbent council members in their efforts at reelection, all target actors agree that electioneering is largely a forbidden activity for appointed city officials. Although giving one's support to a manager whose job is in jeopardy is not electioneering in the traditional sense, it is the natural administrative counterpart to supporting favored incumbent council members in their efforts at reelection. As Table 2.11 indicates, the target actors agree that department heads should remain loyal to managers they respect.

The electioneering dimension of the politics-administration dichotomy appears to take on one qualification. Crossing the line from neutral administration to electioneering is taboo, but politicking within one's own backyard is not necessarily regarded as illegitimate political activity.

TABLE 2.11

TENURE POLITICKING ROLES OF APPOINTED OFFICIALS: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF COUNCIL MEMBERS, CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Tenure Politicking Roles[a]	Council Members Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[b]	Department Heads Percent Agree
City Manager Roles	(N = 189)		(N = 42)		(N = 69)
Recruiter	24.9	(6.1)	31.0	(12.8)	37.7
Campaigner	13.8	(10.0)	23.8	(9.4)	23.2
Department Head Roles					
Recruiter	28.6	(9.6)	19.0	(6.2)	34.8
Campaigner	18.0	(3.4)	21.4	(3.5)	14.5
Tenure Supporter	65.6	(3.7)	61.9	(2.5)	68.1

NOTE: Tenure politicking role statements for both managers and department heads are as follows:

TABLE 2.11-Continued

Recruiter: A city manager (department head) should encourage people he respects to run for the city council.

Campaigner: A city manager (department head) should give a helping hand to good councilmen who are up for re-election.

Tenure Supporter: A department head should support a city manager he respects when the council becomes dissatisfied with the manager's job performance.

[a]Adapted in part from Loveridge, City Managers.

[b]Difference from council member percentages.

Since both policy making and electioneering are politically oriented activities, we might assume that those non-elected officials desiring an active role in policy determination would also sanction their own involvement in recruiting council candidates and campaigning for incumbents. The evidence gathered here, however, indicates that policy-making ambition bears no relationship to electioneering activity (Table 2.12). Neither managers nor department heads who can be classified as Policy Partners are any more likely than their administratively oriented counterparts to hold pro-electioneering attitudes.

There does exist, however, that minority of non-elected officials who approve of playing electioneering roles. Managers who allow themselves to recruit candidates for public office are also less likely than non-politicking managers to oppose an active campaigning role for themselves (Table 2.13). Also managers classified as Recruiters tolerate such behavior among department heads (Table 2.13), and department heads return the favor (Table 2.14). Of the department heads questioned, police chiefs were no more likely to engage in electioneering than fire chiefs, but police chiefs were significantly more likely to tolerate recruiting activity by managers than were fire chiefs (Table 2.15). Finally, although council members were strongly opposed to an electioneering role for non-elected officials, those council members who would tolerate such conduct by managers were also willing to tolerate it by department heads (Table 2.16).

TABLE 2.12

ELECTIONEERING ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS,
BY THEIR MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Electioneering Role Orientations	Policy Role Orientations	
	Policy Administrator/ Implementer	Policy Partner
	percent	percent
	(City Manager Orientations)	
City Managers' Recruiting Role	ns	
Recruiter	23.7	34.5
Neutral	76.3	65.5
	100.0 (29)	100.0 (13)
Department Heads' Recruiting Role	(Department Head Orientations)	
	ns	
Recruiter	35.5	35.1
Neutral	64.5	64.9
	100.0 (38)	100.0 (31)

TABLE 2.13

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS OF DEPARTMENT HEADS' RECRUITING ROLES
AND CITY MANAGERS' CAMPAIGNING ROLES, BY CITY MANAGERS'
RECRUITING ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Manager Attitudes	Manager Recruiting Role Orientations		
	Recruiter		Neutral
Expectations of Department Head Recruiting Roles	percent	Q = .94,ps	percent
Recruiter	53.8		3.4
Neutral	46.2		96.6
	100.0 (13)		100.0 (29)
Orientations Toward Own Campaigning Roles		Q = .68,ps	
Campaigner	46.2		13.8
Neutral	53.8		86.2
	100.0 (13)		100.0 (29)

TABLE 2.14

DEPARTMENT HEADS' TENURE POLITICKING CONCEPTIONS BY
DEPARTMENT HEADS' RECRUITING ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Tenure Politicking Roles	Department Head Recruiting Role Orientations	
	Recruiter	Neutral
Department Heads' Support for Managers' Jobs	percent $\qquad$ $Q = .65, ps$	percent
Supporter	87.5	59.1
Neutral	12.5	40.9
	100.0 (24)	100.0 (44)
Department Heads' Expectations for Managers' Recruiting Roles	$Q = .77, ps$	
Recruiter	66.7	20.5
Neutral	33.3	79.5
	100.0 (24)	100.0 (44)

TABLE 2.15

ELECTIONEERING ROLES OF APPOINTED OFFICIALS: EXPECTATIONS
OF POLICE AND FIRE CHIEFS TOWARD CITY MANAGER
ELECTIONEERING ROLES

Electioneering Roles of Managers	Police Chiefs Percent Agree	(Difference)	Fire Chiefs Percent Agree
	(N = 32)		(N = 37)
Recruiters	53.1	(28.8)	24.3
Campaigners	28.1	(9.2)	18.9

TABLE 2.16

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' RECRUITING ROLES,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR CITY MANAGERS' RECRUITING ROLES

Department Heads' Recruiting Roles	Managers as Election Recruiters	Managers as Election Neutrals
	percent	percent
	$Q = .94, ps$	
Department Heads as Recruiters	78.7	12.1
Department Heads as Neutrals	21.3	87.9
	100.0 (47)	100.0 (141)

Intra-City Role Conceptions and Norm Expectations

The preceding inter-city analysis has illuminated the potential for role conflict between managers, council members, and department heads throughout 56 communities over the sharing of policy-making roles. Actual conflict is more likely to occur, however, among actors and alters interacting directly and constantly within the same organizational structure. The existence of major differences in policy role attitudes among officials in the same municipal organization, then, is a more complete indicator of the presence of potential role conflict. Conversely, the first step in building policy role norms is taken when there exists a sharing of similar policy role attitudes by officials in the same city government.[14] Adding an "intra-city" analysis to the inter-city investigation, then, brings us a step closer to accurately measuring both policy role norms and the potential for role conflict.

The intra-city analysis is operationalized here by examining the degree of agreement or disagreement exhibited by council members, the manager, and police and fire chiefs in the same city to key policy role statements. If the responses are substantially the same, norm expectations can be said to exist. If the responses vary widely, however, we can conclude that norm expectations do not exist and that the potential for role conflict is great. Of the original 56 target cities, the 21 cities selected for analysis here are those cities in which at least a majority of the council members and the city manager responded to four key policy and politicking role statements. In 14 of the selected cities, the response of both police and fire chiefs also could be included.

84

Shared Role Conceptions

One of the three methods of intra-city analysis used here measures shared role conceptions. This method assumes that council members are the authoritative actors for enforcing conformity to norms in accordance with the role anchors of council-manager government. The responses of council members to the four key statements are compared with those of their own managers and department heads. A similarity of responses indicates a sharing of role definitions and, thus, the potential for norm expectations.[15]

A comparison of council member responses with those of non-elected officials in the same city reveals a lack of response similarity in regard to policy-making roles (Table 2.17). City managers wish to be Policy Partners regardless of whether or not the members of their own councils share this view. Seventy-five percent of the council members who see their managers as Administrators have managers who see themselves as Policy Partners. Likewise, 94 percent of the council members who see their managers as Policy Partners also have managers who see themselves as Policy Partners.

Similarly, there exists no sharing of role definitions between council members and their own department heads over policy making roles. A vast majority of the council members find their department heads either divided in their policy role orientations or taking an opposite viewpoint. Of the council members who regard the department head's role as one of policy implementation, 96 percent find that their department heads are either divided on the issue or take the opposite view. Conversely, of the council members who would allow the department head a

85

TABLE 2.17

POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS,
BY THE POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR COUNCIL MEMBERS

Orientations of Council Members' Own City Manager[d]	Council Member Expectations	
	Manager as Administrator	Manager as Policy Partner
	percent	percent
Manager as Administrator[a]	24.3	6.2
Manager as Policy Partner	75.7	93.8
	100.0 (70)	100.0 (16)

Orientations of Council Members' Own Department Heads[e]	Department Head as Implementer	Department Head as Policy Partner
	percent	percent
Department Head as Implementer[b]	4.0	9.1
Department Heads Divided[c]	64.0	63.6
Department Head as Policy Partner	32.0	27.3
	100.0 (50)	100.0 (11)

NOTE: Measures of association are not calculated for this table.

TABLE 2.17-Continued

[a]Based on Policy Role Statement b, Table 2.3.

[b]Based on Policy Role Statement a, Table 2.6.

[c]Department heads are divided in their policy role orientations. In the other two categories, both department heads agree.

[d]Based on respondents in 21 target cities.

[e]Based on respondents in 14 target cities.

policy partner role, 72.7 percent have department heads who are either divided on the issue or perceive their role to be implementative rather than policy sharing. A similar pattern of responses in regard to politicking role attitudes is displayed in Table 2.18. The majority of managers wish to refrain from election recruiting, regardless of whether or not their own council members would allow them such a role. At the same time, of the 52 council members whose managers share their policy views (the number of respondents found in the upper-left and lower-right cells at the top of Table 2.18), 45 share the view that managers should stay out of election recruiting.

Nor is there any real role agreement between council members and department heads' politicking activities (Table 2.18). A substantial majority of department heads either divided on or take the opposite view from their council members. Of the council members who would allow their department heads a recruiting role, 90 percent have department heads who are either divided on the issue or who don't wish to engage in recruiting. Likewise, of the council members who would not allow their department heads to engage in recruiting activities, 61.9 percent of them were faced with department heads taking the opposite view or who were divided on the subject. Finally, no relationship exists between the views of council members and their department heads over the issue of department head support for the manager when his job is in jeopardy. Regardless of the council members' views, their department heads feel they should provide tenure politicking support to the managers. (The data are not exhibited here.)

TABLE 2.18

POLITICKING ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS,
BY THE POLITICKING ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR COUNCIL MEMBERS

	Council Member Expectations	
Orientations of Council Members' Own City Manager[c]	Manager as Election Recruiter	Manager as Election Neutral
	percent	percent
Manager as Election Recruiter[a]	41.2	34.8
Manager as Election Neutral	58.8	65.2
	100.0 (17)	100.0 (69)

		Department Head as
Orientations of Council Members' Own Department Heads[d]	Department Head as Election Recruiter	Election Neutral
	percent	percent
Department Head as Election Recruiter[a]	10.5	7.1
Department Heads Divided[b]	42.1	54.8
Department Head as Election Neutral	47.4	38.1
	100.0 (19)	100.0 (42)

NOTE: Measures of association are not calculated for this table.

TABLE 2.18-<u>Continued</u>

^aBased on Recruiting Role Statement, Table 2.11.

^bDepartment heads split over their orientations. In the other two categories, both department heads agree on their orientations.

^cBased on respondents in 21 target cities.

^dBased on respondents in 14 target cities.

Potential Role Conflict Between
A Manager and His Council

The most important area of potential role conflict is between the manager and his council. An analysis of that potential was conducted by comparing each manager's response-score to the key questions with the average response score for his council. The difference between scores is an indicator of whether or not a sharing of role definitions exists between them. Since the council is the role enforcing body in council-manager government, this analysis also measures the independent influence of the council on the manager's attitudes (and potential behavior).

The findings are presented in Tables 2.19 and 2.20. For analytical purposes a difference of 1.00 or greater indicates a potential for policy role conflict. The potential for conflict between the manager's view of his policy role and the view of his council exists in 13 of the 21 cities examined (Table 2.19). In all 13 cities, the council sees the manager as an administrator while the manager conceives of his role as a partner in policy-making. The potential for conflict is reduced, however, with respect to the department head's policy role. An important statistical difference in regard to the department head's role is found in only 8 of the 21 cities. In 2 of these cities, both manager and council members agree that department heads should be implementers-- the difference is merely a matter of degree. In 6 of the 8 cities, managers are willing to embrace policy partner status for department heads while their councils are not.

Potential conflict with regard to politicking roles was also examined. As indicated in Table 2.20, an important difference for

TABLE 2.19

POLICY MAKING ROLE "KEY QUESTION" SCORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITY MANAGERS AND THEIR COUNCILS

City No.	Conceptions of Policy Making Roles for City Managers[a]			Conceptions of Policy Making Roles for Department Heads		
	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference[b]	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference
1	1.66	3	1.34	2.00	2	0.00
2	2.00	4	2.00	2.33	2	.33
3	1.66	4	2.34	2.00	2	0.00
4	1.75	3	1.25	1.75	1	.75
5	1.40	4	2.60	1.00	4	3.00
6	1.20	4	2.80	1.80	2	.20
7	2.00	4	2.00	1.75	3	1.25
8	2.16	3	.84	1.83	1	.83
9	2.20	4	1.80	1.40	4	2.60
10	2.40	3	.60	2.00	3	1.00
11	3.00	3	0.00	1.50	1	.50
12	1.25	3	1.75	1.25	2	.75
13	1.80	2	.20	1.80	2	.20
14	2.00	3	1.00	0.75	2	.25
15	1.33	2	.67	1.00	2	1.00
16	1.33	3	.67	1.66	1	.66
17	1.00	4	3.00	1.00	1	0.00
18	1.40	2	.60	1.60	3	1.40
19	1.66	3	1.34	1.33	1	.33
20	1.75	2	.25	2.00	1	1.00
21	1.50	3	1.50	1.00	3	2.00

[a]A low score in a range of 1-4 indicates opposition to a policy partner role for the manager or department head.

[b]A potential for conflict is indicated by a score difference of 1.00 or greater.

TABLE 2.20

CANDIDATE RECRUITING ROLE "KEY QUESTION" SCORE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CITY MANAGERS AND THEIR COUNCILS

City No.	Conceptions of Recruiting Roles for City Managers[a]			Conceptions of Recruiting Roles for Department Heads		
	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference[b]	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference
1	2.66	3	.34	3.33	3	.33
2	3.00	4	1.00	3.33	1	2.33
3	3.00	3	0.00	3.33	4	.67
4	2.75	4	1.25	2.75	4	1.25
5	4.00	1	3.00	3.80	4	.20
6	2.80	2	.80	3.20	3	.20
7	3.50	2	1.50	3.00	3	0.00
8	3.50	1	2.50	3.33	1	2.33
9	2.40	4	1.60	2.60	4	1.40
10	3.80	1	2.80	3.40	1	2.40
11	4.00	4	0.00	3.25	4	.75
12	3.50	3	.50	2.50	4	1.50
13	2.40	4	1.60	2.60	4	1.40
14	4.00	2	2.00	3.50	4	.50
15	3.33	3	.33	3.00	3	0.00
16	3.00	1	2.00	3.33	4	.67
17	4.00	3	1.00	4.00	3	1.00
18	3.20	4	.80	3.60	4	.40
19	3.33	3	.33	3.33	4	.67
20	3.25	4	.75	3.00	4	1.00
21	3.50	2	1.50	2.75	2	.75

[a] A low score in a range of 1-4 indicates opposition to a candidate recruiting role for the manager or department head.

[b] A potential for conflict is indicated by a score difference of 1.00 or greater.

manager recruiting roles exists in 12 of the 21 cities. In 8 of the 12 cities, the manager accepts a recruiting role for himself while the council does not. In 1 city the pattern is reversed, and in 3 of the 12 cities the difference is one of degree with neither manager nor council accepting a recruiting role for the manager. The potential for conflict is again reduced, however, with respect to department head politicking roles. In 9 of 21 cities a difference of 1.00 or greater was noted. In only 3 of the 9 cities, however, is that difference a matter of substance between a manager favoring a department head recruiting role and a council that does not. In the remaining 6 cities, the difference is a matter of degree with both managers and their councils rejecting department head recruiting roles.

The findings here indicate substantial role disagreement similar to that documented earlier in this study. The potential for disagreement is greater for managers playing policy-making roles than for department heads playing those roles. Substantial agreement appears to exist that department heads should take the more traditional implementative role. The potential for politicking role disagreement is less, however, for both managers and department heads. Both managers and their councils largely appear to agree that appointed officials should stay out of municipal electoral politics.

Norm Expectations

The evidence presented above indicates that the views of council members often do not independently influence the policy or politicking role conceptions of their own managers or department heads.[16]

The preceding analyses allow us to measure shared role definitions and to determine if council member attitudes are determinants of the attitudes of appointed officials in their own cities. These methods of analysis, however, are not the most accurate means for detecting the existence of norm expectations since the unit of analysis remains, in part, the individual actor rather than the municipality (the collective opinion of all relevant actors in the same city).

A more accurate method is to measure norm "expectations" (see Chapter I) by calculating an arithmetic mean $(\bar{X})$ for each key statement for the aggregate of respondents in each city.[17] A standard deviation (S) value is then calculated for each city as the first step in determining the degree to which coalescence occurs around the city's mean response. A high degree of coalescence indicates a high likelihood of the existence of a norm expectation. High and low values of S may indicate low and high coalescence, respectively, for each city.[18] Utilizing S to detect the presence of a norm expectation, and comparing it with the $\bar{X}$ to determine the substance of that expectation, is an effective and accurate method of examining policy and politicking norm expectations.

The data displayed in Table 2.21 indicate at least a partial attachment of council-manager officials to conceiving of an Administrative or Implementative role for managers and department heads as potential norms. A glance at the mean scores for both policy role conceptions indicates a fairly widespread substantive attachment to these traditional role concepts.

TABLE 2.21

COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INTRA-CITY
POLICY ROLE RESPONSES OF TARGET ACTORS IN FOURTEEN CITIES

City[c]	City Manager's Policy Making Role[a]		Department Head's Policy Making Role[b]	
	$\bar{X}$[d]	S[e]	$\bar{X}$	S
City 1	2.16	1.22	2.16	1.17
City 2	2.50	.95	2.83	.91
City 3	2.00	1.00	2.16	.70
City 4	2.14	.84	2.14	1.13
City 5	1.88	1.00	1.88	1.30
City 6	2.12	1.27	2.12	.93
City 7	2.57	1.04	2.28	1.04
City 8	2.00	.81	1.88	.76
City 9	2.50	1.11	2.00	1.22
City 10	2.62	1.22	2.12	1.17
City 11	3.14	.84	1.57	.73
City 12	2.00	1.06	1.71	1.03
City 13	1.55	.50	2.22	1.14
City 14	2.70	1.30	2.00	.75

[a]Based on Policy Role Statement B, Table 2.3.

[b]Based on Policy Role Statement A, Table 2.8.

[c]Only the 14 cities were included in which the manager, both
department heads, and at least a majority of the council members
responded to the statements.

[d]The lower the mean value in a score range of 1-4, the greater
the acceptance of the Administrative or Implementative role conceptions.

[e]A score of less than 1.00 indicates a tendency toward high
coalescence, while a score of 1.00 or higher indicates a tendency toward
low coalescence.

As indicated by the S scores in Table 2.21, however, coalescence around the mean does not appear to be very high in many of the 14 cities examined. The S score is less than 1.00 (high coalescence) in 5 cities and 1.00 or greater (low coalescence) in 9 of the 14 cities. Coalescence is somewhat more apparent with regard to department head policy roles. An S score of 1.00 or greater is found in 8 of the 14 cities, while high coalescence is found in 6 cities. We must conclude, therefore, that while widespread substantive acceptance of the Administrative and Implementative role concepts exists, these concepts tend to constitute norm expectations in less than a majority of the target cities.

A somewhat different conclusion, however, can be drawn in regard to politicking role norms. As indicated by the $\bar{X}$ values of Table 2.22, substantial agreement exists that neither manager nor department head should engage in electoral recruiting. A high level of coalescence is found in 7 of the 14 cities for managers' politicking roles, and in 8 of the 14 cities for department heads' roles. Therefore, both substantive agreement and norm expectations appear to exist for recruiting roles in a large number of the target cities.

Summary

The findings presented in this chapter, and diagrammed in Figure 2.2, indicate that the policy role anchors for council-manager government remain largely intact for this universe of municipal officials. Non-elected officials have not adopted attitudes which would allow them to usurp the council's authority to make and promote public policy. Bureaucrats, however, are desirous of some kind of role

TABLE 2.22

COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INTRA-CITY
POLITICKING ROLE RESPONSES OF TARGET ACTORS IN FOURTEEN CITIES

City[b]	City Manager's Politicking Role[a]		Department Head's Politicking Role	
	$\bar{X}$[c]	S	$\bar{X}$	S
City 1	2.83	.70	2.83	.91
City 2	3.66	.78	3.00	1.15
City 3	2.66	.96	3.16	.72
City 4	3.60	1.19	3.16	1.23
City 5	3.44	.96	3.44	.96
City 6	3.00	1.11	3.12	.94
City 7	2.85	1.01	3.14	.84
City 8	3.22	.88	3.11	1.10
City 9	3.00	1.11	2.87	1.17
City 10	3.00	1.11	2.87	1.06
City 11	4.00	0.00	3.57	1.05
City 12	3.14	1.03	3.00	1.30
City 13	2.55	1.17	2.55	1.01
City 14	3.71	.72	3.71	.72

[a]Based on Recruiting Role Statement, Table 2.14.

[b]Only the 14 cities were used in which the manager, both
department heads, and at least a majority of council members responded
to the statement.

[c]The lower the mean value in a score range of 1-4, the greater
the acceptance of a recruiting role for managers and department heads.

[d]A score of less than 1.00 indicates a tendency toward high
coalescence, while a score of 1.00 or higher indicates a tendency
toward low coalescence.

FIGURE 2.2

POLICY PROCESS ROLES PERCEIVED BY OFFICIAL ACTORS
IN COUNCIL-MANAGER MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

Policy	Functional	Structural
Process Category	Policy Roles	Actors

Politicking — ┌Campaigning[a]
              ├Recruiting — Council Members
              └Promoting

Policy Determining — ┌Shaping
                     └Advising — City Manager

Administering — ┌Translating
                ├Implementing — Department Heads
                └Maintaining

NOTE: Roles perceived as legitimate ————

[a]The dotted lines indicate the acceptability of tenure politicking by administrators for fellow administrators, which is a special case of campaigning.

in the policy-making process—a role that centers around providing advice to members of the council. The point of potential conflict among the target actors is the nature of that advisory role, i.e., to what degree should it move in the direction of greater equality with council members in the shaping of policy substance?

In this context, the potential for conflict appears to be greatest in respect to two relationships: (1) between managers and department heads in regard to how equal these two actors ought to be in approaching the council as policy advisors; and (2) between managers and council members in regard to the degree of policy-shaping activity to be exercised by the manager. Policy Partner oriented managers and department heads appear to want to stretch the definition of their policy roles while Administrator managers and department heads hold more to the traditional role anchors. The difference in policy role orientations found here for both managers and department heads closely approximates those found by Loveridge for city managers in the San Francisco Bay area. Both studies reveal (1) the sharp separation between policy making and tenure politicking as permissable political activities, and (2) the role expanding views of Policy Partners (Loveridge's Political Leaders and Executives) versus the role maintaining perspectives of Policy Administrators (Loveridge's Administrative Directors and Technicians).[19]

The potential for role conflict among the relevant actors in council-manager government is also uncovered in the preceding intra-city analysis. A similarity of role conceptions can be said to exist, but the expectations of council members do not appear to be independent

100

influences on the orientations of their own managers or department heads. Likewise, policy role attitudes held by actors in the same cities do not appear to coalesce sufficiently in order to constitute norm expectations. While the same is partly true for politicking role attitudes, high coalescence in a number of cities in regard to manager and department head recruiting roles may indicate some degree of norm expectation.

Notes

1. Model City Charter, 6th ed. (New York: National Municipal League, 1964). See especially, sections 2.03, 2.04, 3.01-3.04.

2. See Chapter 1, page 7 for a quote from Clarence E. Ridley, The Role of the City Manager in Policy Formulation (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1958), p. 11. Also see the studies by Loveridge, Carrell, Buechner and others cited in Chapter 1.

3. These roles are not meant to be mirrors of or replacements for the indicators used by structural-functionalists for ascertaining the functions of government carried out by non-governmental social structures in developing countries. Instead, these are roles played by official actors within already established political structures. They illustrate the degree to which these officials are involved in the larger functions of rule-making, rule application, interest articulation, and interest aggregation so thoroughly explored by Almond, Coleman, Apter, Powell, and others. See, for example: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bigham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). The structural-functional approach has been used in urban analysis by several writers, among them: Robert Warren, Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization (Davis: University of California Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1966); and Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

4. When referred to in the aggregate in this paper, these three sets of actors will be designated as "target" actors.

5. Robert P. Boynton and Deil S. Wright, "Mayor-Manager Relationships in Large Council-Manager Cities: A Reinterpretation," Public Administration Review 31 (January-February 1971): 33. See also Alan L. Saltzstein, "City Managers and City Councils: Perceptions of the Divisions of Authority," Western Political Quarterly 27 (June 1974): 275-288.

6. Ronald O. Loveridge, City Managers in Legislative Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 96. This is in essence what Loveridge found to be the pattern among city managers in the San Francisco Bay area.

7. This typology classifies respondents according to their responses to the statement keying the Policy Administrator role in Table 2.3. Those respondents agreeing with the statement were classified as Policy Administrators, and those disagreeing as Policy Partners.

The methodology for classification used here is based upon responses to single statements by managers and department heads that the author feels are crucial indicators of the respondents' policy role orientations. For another method of classification see Loveridge, City Managers, p. 52 and Appendix C. His method is to sum scores based on responses to nine policy questions. He also divides the Policy (Political) and Administrative orientations into sub-types.

8. The nature of that policy role is also somewhat obscured by the statement behind the Policy Implementer role in Table 2.6. The anti-implementative responses may be just as indicative of an orientation toward a role in determining programs for implementation as it is of an orientation toward policy partnership.

9. See, Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (June 1971): 391-409.

10. An excellent study of that sensitivity is James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

11. The typology is based upon responses to the statement: "A department head should stick to implementing policy and leave policy making and decisions as to how to implement policy to the city manager or the council." The method of classification is the same as that used for manager policy role orientations.

12. See, Gary Walter, "The Effects of the Hatch Act on the Political Participation of Federal Employees," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (December 1972): 723-729.

13. A journalistic account of the politicizing of employees in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is found in: "HEW: The Department that Lost its Head," Science, June 19, 1970, p. 1432.

14. See the discussion of the nature of "interaction" as it affects role conflict (and the development of norms) on page 26 of Chapter 1.

15. This is one of the methods used by Loveridge, City Managers, p. 96.

16. Loveridge found the same to be true among San Francisco Bay officials. Ibid., p. 97.

17. The range of possible responses to the key statements and the numerical values assigned to each possible response are: Strongly Agree (1), Somewhat Agree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), and Strongly Disagree (4).

18. Under a symmetrical (normal) distribution curve, about two-thirds of the values distributed about the mean will fall within 1 S of

the mean. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., <u>Social Statistics</u>, 2nd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 100. Given this pattern, we
can safely assume that an increase in the value-size or "width"
of 1 S indicates a wider dispersion in one or both directions of
the vast majority of the distributed values. Thus, the wider the
S (or the higher the S value), the greater is the dispersion of
attitude positions among the relevant actors.

19. Loveridge, <u>City Managers</u>, pp. 49-57.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNITY AND PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS AS
SOURCES OF POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES

In recent years policy analysts have become increasingly interested in examining the degree to which policy outputs are determined by environmental input variables that are external to the political conversion process. A great deal of controversy has been generated about whether environmental factors have a greater impact on policy outputs than political system variables.[1] Although the controversy does not directly concern us here since policy outputs are not a part of this analysis, it does serve to remind us that environmental community characteristics and the personal and professional characteristics of political actors have an impact on both the substance of policy and the biases of those making policy. Thus, these antecedents may have an impact on not only the policy maps of decision makers--their "perceptions of problems, policy positions, and policy images,"[2] but also on how these actors view their respective policy roles. The question concerning us in this chapter, then, is to what extent are policy role orientations and expectations related to such factors as community environment, personal and professional characteristics, and the philosophical biases of the actors?

105

Community and Actor Profiles

Community Profile

It has become conventional wisdom that the nature of a city's
social and economic base affects the style of politics practiced by
actors in the local political arena.[3] For that reason, a composite
picture is needed of the environment of the cities from which interviews
for this study were drawn. The 56 council-manager cities with popu-
lations of greater than 25,000 exhibited the environmental character-
istics shown in Table 3.1.[4] The first series of variables (population
size, density, and rate of change) are indicators of the physical attri-
butes of a city's population. These indicators reveal that the target
cities are essentially small to medium-sized urban places of relatively
low population density and fairly steady population growth since 1960.
As indicated in Table 3.2, the rate of growth for these cities is
somewhat greater than the average for all U. S. Urbanized Areas.

A second set of variables serve as indicators for the degree
of cultural (at least ethnic and racial) diversity to be found in the
target cities. As the data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate, the black
population is somewhat less than the average for the total U. S. urban
population, with less than 10 percent of the population black in over
10 percent of the target cities. The proportion of the population of
foreign stock found in the target cities, however, is considerably
smaller than the average for all U. S. Urbanized Areas. Since relatively
large numbers of Spanish Americans (including first-generation) reside
in the cities of the Southwest, and since the Census Bureau classifies

TABLE 3.1

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS OF FIFTY-SIX COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES
IN KANSAS, OKLAHOMA AND TEXAS HAVING POPULATIONS
OF 25,000 OR GREATER

	Variables	Characteristics (Expressed in Percentages)		
1.	Population Size (N = 57)	25,000-49,999 50.0	50,000-99,999 30.4	100,000 and over 19.6
2.	Population Density (N = 57)	0-2249/sq. mile 62.5	2250 and over/sq. mile 37.5	
3.	Population Change (N = 55)	Lost Population 25.5	Under 15% gain 29.1	15% & over gain 45.4
4.	Proportion Foreign Stock (N = 57)	Under 5% 33.9	5-9.9% 50.0	10% and over 16.1
5.	Proportion Negro Population (N = 57)	Under 10% 64.4	10-19.9% 17.8	20% and over 17.8
6.	Proportion College Graduates (N = 57)	Under 10% 25.0	10-14.9% 50.0	15% and over 25.0
7.	Proportion High School Grads (N = 57)	Under 50% 25.0	50-59.9% 37.5	60% and over 37.5
8.	Proportion White Collar Workers in Work Force (N = 57)	Less than 50% 32.1	50% or more 67.9	
9.	Median Family Income (N = 57)	Under $8,000 32.1	$8,000 and over 67.9	
		Under $10,000 78.8	$10,000 and more 21.2	

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Country and City Data Book, 1972.

107

TABLE 3.2

STATISTICAL AVERAGES OF COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS FOR FIFTY-SIX
TARGET CITIES AND THE URBAN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Community Environment Variables	Populations of Target Cities $\bar{X}$	U. S. Urban Populations[a] $\bar{X}$
1. Population Size	100,197	447,607[b]
2. Population Density	2125/sq. mile	3375/sq. mile
3. Population Change	27.8% gain	23.6% gain
4. Percent Foreign Stock	9.5%	21.6%
5. Percent Negro	11.1%	13.5%
6. Percent College Graduate	14.8%	NA[c]
7. Percent High School Graduate	67.2%	55.9%
8. Percent White Collar Workers	55.2%	54.0%
9. Median Family Income	$8,834	NA

[a]Data is for all 248 "Urbanized Areas." See: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1972, Table 4.

[b]Average population size per "urban place" is 21,145. See: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 1, United States Summary, Table 4.

[c]Not available.

virtually all non-Negroes as white, we can assume that the low "foreign stock" population count somewhat distorted and underestimated.

A third set of variables serve as indicators of the socio-economic status (SES) of the target cities. Again, as Table 3.2 indicates, if the proportions of high school graduates and white collar workers in the population are status indicators, then the populations of these cities rest somewhat higher on the status scale than urbanized area residents as a whole. The data in Table 3.1 indicate that over 10 percent of the population of over 75 percent of the target cities have at least four years of college, over 50 percent of the population in 75 percent of the target cities have at least a high school diploma, and over 50 percent of the population in 67.9 percent of these cities are white collar workers.

The characteristics discussed above allow us to construct a somewhat crude "profile" of the target cities of this study. These cities tend to be medium-size municipalities experiencing considerable growth in population. These populations are largely white (with black and chicano minorities), well-educated, and middle-class. These target cities, then, exhibit characteristics of many of the relatively new and growing Sunbelt cities of the Southwest.

Actor Profile

Personal and Professional Characteristics. Another "profile" important to this analysis is that of the personal and professional characteristics of the respondents. Are the managers and department heads professionals chosen for their competence and expertise, or are

they amateurs appointed for partisan political purposes? Are council members representative of the entire community, or do they represent certain segments of social, economic or political elites? These attributes help determine the patterns of decision making in municipal government.

The city managers of this study constitute a highly educated professional group with a good deal of career experience in municipal affairs. As exhibited in Table 3.3, an overwhelming majority of managers have college degrees in professional or business fields of study. Nearly 60 percent of them have been involved in municipal government for more than 15 years, and over three-fourths have gained their experience through general administrative duties. A slight majority of these managers were appointed to their posts from outside their present city—a considerably smaller proportion than that found by Loveridge among managers in the San Francisco Bay area.[5] Yet, the managers here are not immune to the high turnover rates that have afflicted managers across the nation for many years.[6] Finally, a slight majority of managers indicated a nonpartisan stance in their personal political preferences.

The department head respondents of this study also bring many years of government service to their jobs. As indicated in Table 3.4, department heads are older than city managers and somewhat less likely to have college experience (although most of them do). A majority have experience in fields of study that are non-technical in nature. The relative lack of the formal attributes of professionalism, however, are offset by many years of government "apprenticeship" prior to becoming department heads. Four-fifths of the respondents have had prior service

TABLE 3.3

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF CITY MANAGER RESPONDENTS

Indicators	Respondent Distribution (Expressed in Percentages)		
1. Age (N = 39)	21-40 Years 35.9	41-50 Years 38.5	Over 50 Years 25.6
2. Education Level (N = 42)	No College 11.9	Bachelor's 47.6	Graduate Degree 40.5
3. Education Field (N = 42)	Professional 52.4	Business 28.6	Other 19.0
4. Municipal Government Experience (in years) (N = 42)	15 Years or less 40.5	16-20 Years 31.0	Over 20 Years 28.6
5. City Manager Experience (in years) (N = 41)	10 Years or less 56.1	Over 10 Years 43.9	
6. City Manager of Present City (in years) (N = 41)	5 Years or less 61.0	Over 5 Years 39.0	
7. Type of Appointment To Present Position (N = 42)	From Outside This City 54.8	From City Ranks 45.2	
8. Career Experience (N = 42)	General Public Administration 78.6	Specialized or Technical 21.4	
9. Partisanship (N = 41)	Partisan[a] 46.3	Non-Partisan 53.7	

[a]16 Democrats and 3 Republicans.

111

TABLE 3.4

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF DEPARTMENT HEAD RESPONDENTS

Indicators	Respondent Distribution (Expressed in Percentages)		
1. Age (N = 66)	21-40 Years 12.2	41-50 Years 43.9	Over 50 Years 43.9
2. Education Level (N = 67)	No College 34.3	Some College 65.7	
3. Education Field (N = 56)	Specialized or Technical 44.6	Non-Technical 55.4	
4. Municipal Government Experience (in years) (N = 66)	15 Years or less 15.2	16-20 Years 21.2	Over 20 Years 63.6
5. Department Head Experience (in years) (N = 69)	5 Years or less 50.7	6-10 Years 24.6	Over 10 Years 24.6
6. Type of Appointment to Present Position (N = 68)	From Outside This City 20.6	From City Ranks 79.4	
7. Prior Government Service (N = 67)	Yes 79.1	No 20.9	
8. Partisanship (N = 68)	Partisan[a] 75.4	Non-Partisan 23.2	

[a] 41 Democrats and 11 Republicans.

and 63.6 percent have been in municipal government for over 20 years. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents were appointed to their positions from within their present city, probably from within their departments and, perhaps, as the result of rising through "the ranks." Unlike their managerial counterparts, these department heads are also over- whelmingly partisan (and Democrat) in their political party preference.

It is often charged by elitist theorists among community power scholars that municipal politics is dominated either directly or indirectly by the social and economic elite of the community. Although this study is not designed to either prove or refute this contention, the data here suggest that a particular "type" of socioeconomic status tends to predominate among the council member respondents. The respon- dents tend to be the more educated, socially involved, and occupationally respectable members of their communities, but not overwhelmingly so. As indicated in Table 3.5, nearly 60 percent of the council members have managerial, business or professional occupations; 66 percent have college degrees, and 58 percent have degrees in professional or business fields of study. Over half have had some kind of community or governmental service experience prior to being elected to the council, over half indicated that serving their community was the main reason for their decision to run for office, and four-fifths have been residents of the community for at least ten years. Council members here, as elsewhere, tend to be respectable, service-oriented, and active long-term residents of their communities. They tend to be highly partisan but governmentally inexperienced--only 22 percent indicated a nonpartisan preference, but 70 percent have held their council posts for less than five years.

TABLE 3.5

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF COUNCIL MEMBER RESPONDENTS

Indicators	Respondent Distribution (Expressed in Percentages)		
1. Age (N = 186)	21-40 Years 22.8	41-50 Years 38.6	Over 50 Years 37.0
2. Education Level (N = 186)	No College 33.9	Bachelor's 35.0	Graduate Degree 31.2
3. Education Field (N = 180)	Professional 35.0	Business 23.9	Other 41.1
4. Occupation (N = 179)	Managerial/ Business/ Professional 59.2	Clerical/ Sales/ Crafts 21.2	Other 19.6
5. Prior Community Service (N = 187	Political/ Governmental 27.8	Other 25.1	None 45.1
6. Council Experience (in Years) (N = 189)	2 Years or less 39.2	3-4 Years 31.7	5 Years or more 29.1
7. Length of Residence in City (N = 188)	10 Years or less 13.3	11-20 Years 28.7	Over 20 Years 58.0
8. Partisanship (N = 187)	Partisan[a] 78.1	Non-Partisan 21.9	
9. Why Run for Council Post? (N = 187)	Concern with/ Encouraged by Groups 9.6	Issues and Dissatisfied 17.5	
	Community Service 57.1	Other 15.8	

[a]90 Democrats and 56 Republicans

114

Ideological Characteristics. One personal characteristic of great importance as a determinant of the behavior of government decision makers is the actor's personal ideology or political philosophy. For example, Crain and Vanecko have demonstrated that school board liberalism was the most important factor producing greater school desegregation among a group of eight large cities in the northern United States.[7] Assuming that the notion of "political philosophy" encompasses many dimensions, three separate philosophical indexes were used in this study. The first, a Conservative-Liberal Index, was adapted from Herbert McClosky's Conservatism scale and attempts to measure the intensity of general, non-political conservative beliefs among individuals.[8]

Four of McClosky's original fourteen statements are used here and are listed in Appendix B.[9] The second Index, Ideology, is a restructured adaptation of an index by Free and Cantril and attempts to measure political attitudes toward the general role of government in problem solving and the regulation of economic and social life.[10] The third index, also adapted in part from Free and Cantril, is a Government Operations Index designed to measure attitudes toward the Federal government's role in attacking specific social and economic problems of special concern to municipal officials. The statements comprising the Ideology and Government Operations indexes are also found in Appendix B.[11]

As indicated in Figures 3.1 through 3.3, some interesting commonalities and differences appear among the three sets of actors in this study. While all three groups tend to be slightly liberal in their general attitudes (as measured by comparing the mean ($\bar{X}$) score for each

FIGURE 3.1

DISTRIBUTION OF CITY MANAGERS ON THREE IDEOLOGY INDEXES

Conservative-Liberal Index

No.
Respondents

Score Range[a]

Conservative   Liberal

$\bar{X} = 12.1$

Ideology Index

No.
Respondents

Score Range[a]

Limited   Active

$\bar{X} = 8.1$

Government Operations Index

No.
Respondents

Score Range[a]

Active   Passive

$\bar{X} = 8.7$

[a]Theoretical midpoint = 10.

FIGURE 3.2

DISTRIBUTION OF DEPARTMENT HEADS ON THREE IDEOLOGY INDEXES

Conservative-Liberal Index

Ideology Index

Government Operations
Index

[a]Theoretical midpoint = 10.

FIGURE 3.3

DISTRIBUTION OF COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THREE IDEOLOGY INDEXES

Conservative-Liberal Index

Ideology Index

Government Operations
Index

[a]Theoretical midpoint = 10.

index with the theoretical midpoint of 10 for each scoring range),

managers tend to be more liberal than their counterparts. In regard

to ideological concerns with the role of government, all three sets of

actors are markedly conservative (desirous of limiting the role of

government) with managers appearing to be slightly less so. The res-

ponses of the target actors to the specific roles of the Federal govern-

ment in regard to urban problem-solving, however, indicate somewhat

less (although still conservative) opposition to governmental "inter-

ference" than the ideological predispositions of the actors would lead

us to expect. In this instance, council members are a bit more liberal

in their attitudes than either department heads or city managers.

Apparently, all three sets of actors tend to be slightly conservative

Democrats whose ideological opposition to Federal interference is

tempered somewhat by the tempting carrot of Federal aid.

Sources of Policy Role Attitudes

City Managers as Policy Partners

Community Background. The community background characteristics

examined in this study can be placed in one of two general categories.

The first category, cultural complexity and diversity, incorporates

population size, growth and density, and proportions of foreign born and

Blacks (Negro) in the population. This presupposes that larger, more

rapidly growing and more densely populated cities with higher propor-

tions of foreign born and black residents are more culturally complex

and socially diverse. The second category is community socioeconomic

status (SES) and includes such indicators as median family income, the

proportions of high school and college residents, and the proportion of white collar workers in the city's population. The assumption here is that higher status communities contain larger proportions of wealthier and better-educated residents in white collar occupations.

As indicated in Table 3.6, a community's degree of cultural complexity and diversity appears to have a limited impact on policy-role conceptions. The Policy Partner orientation predominates among city managers regardless of these community characteristics, with only one exception. Policy Partner orientations are more likely to be held by managers having higher proportions of foreign-born residents in their cities. One explanation might be that the greater variety of ethnic identities found in these cities opens up the normally consensus oriented political arena to more conflict. Such politicization of nominally administrative government not only allows the activist manager a role in political and policy leadership, but may require that he add his talents to the search for policy solutions.

Similarly, only one indicator of community status appears to relate to manager policy orientations. Policy Partner orientations appear to be strong among managers from cities with relatively high proportions of high school graduates. This pattern is directly opposite that found (but originally hypothesized) by Loveridge among Bay area managers.[12] Communities having a more educated citizenry may be more perceptive of the realities of policy-making in council-manager governments.

Analysis of department head expectations for the manager's role revealed one relationship between expectations and community diversity

TABLE 3.6

CITY MANAGERS' MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS AND ALTERS' EXPECTATIONS
FOR THAT ROLE, BY COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

| | Community Characteristics | | | | | |
| | Population Size | | Population Density[a] | | Population Change | |
Actor Attitudes	25,000-49,999	50,000 & over	Less than 2250	2250 & over	Under 15% gain[b]	15% gain or more
Managers' Orientations:	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Administrator	31.6	30.4	36.0	23.5	28.0	35.3
Policy Partner	68.4	69.6	64.0	76.5	72.0	64.7
	100.0 (19)[c]	100.0 (23)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)
Department Heads' Expectations:			Q = .56, ps[e]			
Administrator	37.0	47.8	31.3	61.9	46.0	35.5
Policy Partner	63.0	52.2	68.8	38.1	54.0	64.5
	100.0 (46)[d]	100.0 (23)[d]	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (37)	100.0 (31)
Council Members' Expectations:	Q = .39, ps					
Policy Initiator	65.3	45.5	57.0	54.4	55.2	58.3
Non-Initiator	34.7	54.5	43.0	45.6	44.8	41.7
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (121)	100.0 (68)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (84)

121

TABLE 3.6-Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Proportion of Foreign Stock		Proportion Negro		Median Family Income	
	Less than 5%	5% more	Less than 10%	10% or more	Less than $8,000	$8,000 or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Managers' Orientations:	Q = .53, ps					
Administrator	50.0	23.3	29.2	33.3	23.1	34.5
Policy Partner	50.0	76.7	70.8	66.7	76.9	65.5
	100.0 (12)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)
Department Heads' Expectations:					Q = .58, ps	
Administrator	42.3	39.5	38.6	44.0	20.0	49.0
Policy Partner	57.7	60.5	61.4	56.0	80.0	51.0
	100.0 (26)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (49)
Council Members' Expectations:						
Policy Initiator	59.4	54.4	58.9	50.8	59.6	54.7
Non-Initiator	40.6	45.6	41.1	49.2	40.4	45.3
	100.0 (64)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (124)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (137)

Community Characteristics (Continued)

TABLE 3.6-Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Proportion of College Graduates		Proportion of High School Graduates		Proportion of White Collar Workers	
	Less than 15%	15% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Managers' Orientations:			Q= .53, ps			
Administrator	34.4	20.0	·50.0	23.3	· 43.8	23.1
Policy Partner	65.6	80.0	50.0	76.7	56.3	76.9
	100.0 (32)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (26)
Department Heads' Expectations:			Q= .59, ps		Q= .57, ps	
Administrator	36.0	52.6	18.8	47.2	21.7	50.0
Policy Partner	64.0	47.4	81.2	52.8	78.3	50.0
	100.0 (50)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (46)
Council Members' Expectations:						
Policy Initiator	59.3	48.1	56.5	55.9	61.2	53.3
Non-Initiator	40.7	51.9	43.5	44.1	38.8	46.7
	100.0 (135)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (46)	100.0 (143)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (122)

Community Characteristics (Continued)

123

TABLE 3.6-<u>Continued</u>

[a]Population per square mile.

[b]Including cities having lost population.

[c]Number of cases.

[d]Category breaks at 75,000 population.

[e]See Chapter 1 for an explanation of Q.

and three relationships between expectations and community status. Department heads expecting managers to be Policy Partners are found in cities of lower population density. Department heads expecting Policy Partner behavior from managers are also very likely to be found in lower status communities. Department heads in cities having lower family incomes, fewer high school graduates and fewer white collar workers may tend to look to the manager to fill a leadership vacuum that results from a perceived lack of sufficient leadership potential in the community.

Finally, community status appears to be unrelated to council members' expectations of the manager's role, while only one indicator of community diversity is related to council members' expectations. Council members in larger cities are more likely to see policy matters left to the council. This is possibly because of a conception that an adequate pool of policy-making talent exists among council members in larger communities. As a result, there may be no need for the manager or department head to fill a policy leadership vacuum.

Personal and Professional Background. The degree of "professionalism" exhibited by city managers may be related to their policy role orientations. Since the concept of professionalism encompasses both formal credentials and experience in the job, this study utilizes a number of both credential and experience indicators to explore the relationship between professionalism and policy role attitudes. In Table 3.7, education level and field, and the type of administrative experience accrued by managers are utilized as indicators of formal credentials. Managers with "professional" credentials are those with

TABLE 3.7

CITY MANAGERS' MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS, BY CITY MANAGERS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Policy Role Orientations	City Managers' Characteristics					
	Education Level		Education Field		Career Experience	
	No College	College Degree	Professional or Business	Other	General Pub. Admin.	Specialized Technical
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
			$Q= .58$, ps			
Policy Administrator	60.0	37.0	35.3	12.5	27.3	44.4
Policy Partner	40.0	63.3	64.7	87.5	72.7	55.6
	100.0 (5)	100.0 (37)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (9)

	City Manager Experience		Present Tenure		Government Experience		
	10 years or less	over 10 years	5 years or less	over 5 years	15 years or less	16-20 years	over 20 years
Policy Administrator	26.1	33.3	28.0	37.5	35.3	23.1	33.3
Policy Partner	73.9	66.7	72.0	62.5	64.7	78.9	66.7
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (12)

TABLE 3.7-Continued

City Managers' Policy Role Orientations (Continued)	City Managers' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Appointment Type		Age		Partisanship	
	From outside city	From city ranks	21-50 years	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
			Q= .65, ps			
Policy Administrator	21.7	42.1	24.1	60.0	31.6	31.8
Policy Partner	78.3	57.9	75.9	40.0	68.4	68.2
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (22)
	Conservative-Liberal Index[a]		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
	Q = .58, ps		Q = .53, ps			
Policy Administrator	42.9	16.7	40.9	15.8	23.8	35.0
Policy Partner	57.1	83.3	59.1	84.2	76.2	65.0
	100.0 (21)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (20)

[a]The divisions for these indexes are based on the mean ($\bar{X}$) for each index as shown in Figure 3.1.

college degrees in professional or business fields and whose experience and the type of appointment to manager positions are indicators of professional experience. Managers with wide experience in more than one city (i.e., appointed from outside this city), and those with many years of governmental and managerial experience and tenure can be thought of as having accrued "professional" experience. As indicated in Table 3.7, two of the professionalism indicators appear to be related to policy role orientations, but in a contradictory fashion. The expected relationship is that "outside" managers with professional or business backgrounds are more likely to adopt policy partner orientations. However, while managers appointed from outside the city are more oriented toward policy partnership, managers with professional or business educations are more likely to adopt an administrative orientation than managers trained in other fields. This may indicate that while the "outside" manager is more confident of his experience and abilities as informal credentials for having a role in shaping policy, his professional/ business training orients him away from policy shaping and toward administration. Yet, a substantial majority (64.7 percent) of the professional/business respondents indicated a preference for policy partnership. A more plausible explanation, therefore, may be that while all managers are more or less oriented toward policy roles, the business/professional is less likely to be oriented toward overt policy roles since he tends to view administration itself as a policy oriented task.

Age and philosophical characteristics of managers also seem to affect policy role attitudes. As indicated in Table 3.7, younger, liberal and ideologically activist managers are more likely to be Policy

Partners than their older and conservative colleagues whose perception is that government action is to be rather limited.

A similar array of indicators of department head professionalism are utilized in this study. However, these indicators do not appear to be related to department head expectations for the policy roles of city managers. Department heads strongly support an active policy role for the manager (Chapter II), and this support appears to be largely unaffected by the personal, professional, or philosophical backgrounds of department head respondents (Table 3.8).

The willingness of a majority of council members to allow managers to initiate policy changes was documented in Chapter II. The presence of a sizeable minority of council members who oppose such a role, however, leads us to believe that their personal backgrounds have an effect on their policy role expectations for managers. Unfortunately, the data did not support such an hypothesis. With one exception, none of the individual background variables examined here were found to be associated with policy role expectations. The one exception is the reasons cited by council members for running for a council post. As indicated in Table 3.9, there appears to be a relationship between a council member's reasons for running for office and his policy role expectations for the manager. Those council members whose reasons can be classified as "group representative" were those whose major reason for running for the council was to represent some sort of group interest or who were simply encouraged to run by a community group. Those council members citing specific grievances, specific issues or problems, an ability to be more effective as legislators, or a desire to perform

TABLE 3.8

DEPARTMENT HEADS' EXPECTATIONS FOR CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLES, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Expectations for City Managers' Main Policy Roles	Department Heads' Characteristics						
	Education Level		Education Field		Experience as Department Head		
	No College	College	Specialized-Technical	Non-Technical	5 years or less	6-10 years	over 10 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Manager should be:							
Policy Administrator	43.5	38.6	40.0	38.7	34.3	58.8	35.3
Policy Partner	56.5	61.4	60.0	61.3	65.7	41.2	64.7
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (17)

	Appointment Type		Prior Government Service		Years Government Service		
	From outside city	From city ranks	Yes	No	15 years or less	16-20 years	over 20 years
Policy Administrator	50.0	38.9	28.6	45.3	30.0	28.6	47.6
Policy Partner	50.0	61.1	71.4	54.7	70.0	71.4	52.4
	100.0 (14)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (42)

TABLE 3.8-Continued

Department Heads'	Department Heads' Characteristics (Continued)				
Expectations (Continued)	Age			Partisanship	
	21-50 Years	Over 50 Years		Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent		percent	percent
Policy Administrator	35.1	44.8		42.3	31.3
Policy Partner	64.9	55.2		57.7	68.7
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)		100.0 (52)	100.0 (16)

	Conservative-Liberal Index		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Policy Administrator	41.0	39.3	42.5	40.0	45.0	34.5
Policy Partner	59.0	60.7	57.5	60.0	55.0	65.5
	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (29)

TABLE 3.9

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLES, BY COUNCIL MEMBERS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Council Members' Expectations for City Managers' Main Policy Roles	Council Members' Characteristics						
	Age			Education Level		Education Field	
	21-40 Years	41-50 Years	Over 50 Years	No College	College	Prof./ Business	Other
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Manager should be:							
Policy Initiator	53.5	54.8	58.6	60.3	52.8	54.7	55.4
Policy Non-Initiator	46.5	45.2	41.4	39.7	47.2	45.3	44.6
	100.0 (43)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (106)	100.0 (74)

	Occupation		Prior Community Service		Council Experience		
	Managerial, Business, or Professional	Other	Political or Govt.	Other or none	2 years or less	3-4 years	Over 4 years
Policy Initiator	50.9	63.0	54.5	56.6	59.5	53.3	54.5
Policy Non-Initiator	49.1	37.0	45.5	43.4	40.5	46.7	45.5
	100.0 (106)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (74)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (55)

TABLE 3.9-<u>Continued</u>

Council Members' Expectations (Continued)	Council Members' Characteristics (Continued)						
	Length of Residence			Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	10 years or less	11-20 years	over 20 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Manager should be:							
Policy Initiator	64.0	53.7	56.0	55.5	56.1	59.8	52.2
Policy Non-Initiator	36.0	46.3	44.0	44.5	43.9	40.2	47.6
	100.0 (25)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (109)	100.0 (146)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (97)	100.0 (82)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index		Reasons for Running for Council Post	
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive	Represent Group	Represent Issue, Service
						Q= .44, ps
Policy Initiator	57.4	56.8	60.2	51.8	73.9	56.9
Policy Non-Initiator	42.6	43.2	39.8	48.2	26.1	43.1
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (81)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (160)

their civic duty as citizen-politicians[13] were classified as "issue or

service representative." Group representative council members were

more likely to allow the manager a policy initiation role than were

council members oriented toward issues or community service. Perhaps

the first type of council member is more interested in representing an

interest in the halls of government as the Delegate whose constituents

determine his substantive policy positions. The issue-oriented or

service-oriented council member, however, may be the equivalent of the

Burkean Trustee whose conscience and self-perceived expertise precludes

sharing the policy shaping role with any appointed official.[14]

Department Heads as Policy Partners

Community Background. Department heads, like city managers,

are oriented toward some kind of role for themselves in the policy-

making process. Table 3.10 illustrates the relationship between this

orientation and community background characteristics. Department head

policy orientations appear to be unrelated to such community attributes

as size, density or rate of growth. Of the four indicators of community

socioeconomic status, only one appears to have some explanatory value.

Policy Partner oriented department heads are somewhat more likely to be

found in the better educated communities. Perhaps policy roles for

department heads are a bit more tolerable to higher status communities

having a more sophisticated understanding of how council-manager govern-

ments really operate. In general, however, the relationships displayed

in Table 3.10 indicate that differences in department head policy role

orientations are only slightly related to community characteristics.

TABLE 3.10

DEPARTMENT HEADS' MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS AND ALTERS' EXPECTATIONS
FOR THAT ROLE, BY COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

| | Community Characteristics | | | | | |
| | Population Size[a] | | Population Density[c] | | Population Change | |
Actor Attitudes[b]	25,000-49,999	50,000 and over	Less than 2250	2250 and over	Under 15% gain[d]	15% gain or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations:						
Policy Implementer	43.5	47.8	43.8	47.6	48.7	41.9
Policy Partner	56.5	52.2	56.3	52.4	51.3	58.1
	100.0 (46)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (37)	100.0 (31)
Managers' Expectations:						$Q= .56,$ ps
Policy Implementer	78.9	60.9	64.0	76.5	80.0	52.9
Policy Partner	21.1	39.1	36.0	23.5	20.0	47.1
	100.0 (19)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)
Council Members' Expectations:						
Policy Implementer	47.0	39.5	39.5	50.7	45.8	43.9
Policy Advisor	-53.0	60.5	60.5	49.3	54.2	56.1
	100.0 (100)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (119)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (82)

TABLE 3.10-Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Community Characteristics (Continued)					
	Proportion of Foreign Born		Proportion Negro		Median Family Income	
	Less than 5%	5% or more	Less than 10%	10% or more	Less than $8000	$8000 or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations:						
Policy Implementer	38.5	48.8	38.6	56.0	55.0	40.8
Policy Partner	61.5	51.2	61.4	44.0	45.0	59.2
	100.0 (26)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (49)
Managers' Expectations:						
Policy Implementer	75.0	66.7	70.8	66.7	84.6	62.1
Policy Partner	25.0	33.3	29.2	33.3	15.4	37.9
	100.0 (12)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)
Council Members' Expectations:						
Policy Implementer	44.4	43.1	41.8	46.9	40.4	44.8
Policy Advisor	55.6	56.9	58.2	53.1	59.6	55.2
	100.0 (63)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (122)	100.0 (64)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (134)

TABLE 3.10-Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Community Characteristics (Continued					
	Proportion of College Graduates		Proportion High School Graduates		Proportion of White Collar Workers	
	Less than 15%	15% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations:	Q= .50, ps					
Policy Implementer	52.0	26.3	50.0	43.4	47.8	43.5
Policy Partner	48.0	73.7	50.0	56.6	52.2	56.5
	100.0 (50)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (46)
Managers' Expectations:						
Policy Implementer	75.0	50.0	75.0	66.7	81.3	61.5
Policy Partner	25.0	50.0	25.0	33.3	18.7	38.5
	100.0 (32)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (26)
Council Members' Expectations:						
Policy Implementer	45.9	37.7	46.7	42.6	47.0	41.7
Policy Advisor	54.1	62.3	53.3	57.4	53.0	58.3
	100.0 (133)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (141)	100.0 (66)	100.0 (120)

TABLE 3.10-_Continued_

[a]For department head respondents, the categories are: "less than 75,000 population," and "75,000 population or more."

[b]Based on policy roles A and C of Table 2.6.

[c]Per square mile.

[d]Including cities having lost population.

A large majority of city managers interviewed in this study were opposed to a role for department heads in policy making. This phenomenon, however, appears to depend to some degree upon the nature of the community in which the manager operates. The data in Table 3.10 indicate that managers in faster growing communities are somewhat more tolerant of Policy Partner department heads than are managers from less rapidly growing communities. Managers facing rapid growth and change may feel the need to rely more heavily on the expertise of department heads than is normally the case. While cultural and racial diversity appear to have no affect on manager expectations, community status appears at first glance to relate to managerial attitudes toward department head policy roles. The pattern of responses in Table 3.10 indicate that managers from wealthier, better-educated and white collar communities are a bit more tolerant of Policy Partner department heads. Yet, none of these relationships stand the test of statistical significance. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that rapid growth is the only community condition examined here which relates to toleration by managers of policy-oriented activities by department heads.

The overwhelming majority of council members oppose a Policy Partner role for department heads (See Table 2.8), but they are divided on whether or not department heads should be able to make recommendations to the council on matters concerning departmental operations. Council member expectations for department head policy roles, therefore, are measured here on the basis of an advisory rather than a partnership role to be played by department heads. As indicated in Table 3.10, however, no apparent relationships exist between the community characteristics

examined here and council member expectations for the policy advisory role of department heads.

Personal and Professional Background. The personal and professional background characteristics of department heads are only slightly more explanatory than community characteristics of differences in department head policy role orientations. Department heads whose experience and credentials mark them as "professionals" are those with college training in specialized or technical fields of study and many years of governmental and department head experience. The data, however, indicate only a partial relationship between these marks of professionalism and Policy Partner role orientations (Table 3.11). Those department heads with fewer years of experience in government and as department heads are more policy role oriented than their older, more experienced counterparts. This pattern is indicative of the traditional clash between "young Turks" whose disdain for role anchors matches their eagerness to solve problems and the "old Guard" whose expertise comes with experience and whose battle wounds, suffered from past policy clashes with the manager or council, have become tender with age.

The explanatory power of individual background characteristics declines further upon examination of manager expectations for department head policy roles (Table 3.12). The only indicator of professional credentials or experience relating to policy role expectations is years of managerial career experience. Managers with less than 10 years of experience are less likely to oppose a policy role for department heads. The newer manager is perhaps more dependent upon the expertise of his department heads than is his more experienced counterpart.

TABLE 3.11

DEPARTMENT HEADS' MAIN POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Policy Role Orientations	Department Heads' Characteristics			
	Department Head Experience		Education Level	
	5 years or less	Over 5 years	No College	College
	percent	percent	percent	percent
		Q = .51, ps		
Policy Implementer	31.4	58.8	52.2	38.6
Policy Partner	68.6	41.2	47.8	61.4
	100.0 (35)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (44)

	Education Field		Appointment Type	
	Specialized-Technical	Non-Technical	From Outside City	From City Ranks
Policy Implementer	36.0	51.6	42.9	46.3
Policy Partner	64.0	48.4	57.1	53.7
	100.0 (25)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (54)

	Prior Government Service		Years Government Service	
	Yes	No	15 years or less	Over 15 years
			Q = .80, ps	
Policy Implementer	50.0	43.4	10.0	50.0
Policy Partner	50.0	56.6	90.0	50.0
	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (56)

TABLE 3.11-Continued

Department Heads' Role Orientations (Continued)	Department Heads' Characteristics (Continued)			
	Age		Partisanship	
	50 years or less	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent	percent	percent
Policy Implementer	35.1	55.2	48.1	37.5
Policy Partner	64.9	44.8	51.9	62.5
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (16)

	Conservative-Liberal Index		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Policy Implementer	53.8	35.7	50.0	36.0	47.5	41.4
Policy Partner	46.2	64.3	50.0	64.0	52.5	58.6
	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (29)

142

TABLE 3.12

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLES, BY CITY MANAGERS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Expectations of Department Head Main Policy Role	City Managers' Characteristics						
	Education Level			Education Field		Career Experience	
	No College	Bach. Degree	Grad. Degree	Prof. or Business	Other	General Pub. Admin.	Specialized Technical
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads Should Be:							
Policy Implementers[a]	60.0	80.0	58.8	67.6	75.0	72.7	55.6
Policy Partners	40.0	20.0	41.2	32.4	25.0	27.3	44.4
	100.0 (5)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (9)

	Government Experience			City Manager Experience		Present Tenure	
	15 years or less	16-20 years	Over 20 years	10 years or less	Over 10 years	5 years or less	Over 5 years
Policy Implementer	76.5	53.8	75.0	56.5 $Q= .58,$ ps 83.3		72.0	62.5
Policy Partner	23.5	46.2	25.0	43.5	16.7	28.0	37.5
	100.0 (17)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (16)

143

TABLE 3.12-Continued

City Managers' Expectations (Continued)	City Managers' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Appointment Type		Age		Partisanship	
	From Outside City	From City Ranks	21-40 Years	Over 40 Years	Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Policy Implementer	78.3	57.9	71.4	68.0	73.7	63.6
Policy Partner	21.7	42.1	28.6	32.0	26.3	36.4
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (22)

	Conservative-Liberal Index		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Policy Implementer	81.0	61.1	77.3	57.9	61.9	75.0
Policy Partner	19.0	38.9	22.7	42.1	38.1	25.0
	100.0 (21)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (20)

[a]Based on Policy Role A in Table 2.6.

Finally, the explanatory power of individual background variables disappears upon examination of the expectations of council members (Table 3.13). As indicated earlier, municipal legislators overwhelmingly oppose a policy "partner" role for department heads, and virtually no associations can be found between policy "advisor" roles and community characteristics. A similar pattern appears here. Council member expectations for department head policy advisor roles are unrelated to all of the council member background characteristics.

Sources of Tenure Politicking Attitudes

Although the primary concern of this chapter is to examine the impact of personal background and community characteristics on the policy role attitudes of municipal officials, several relationships between background factors and "politicking" role attitudes have been uncovered and are worth noting here.

City Manager Attitudes

Community status—as measured by proportion of white collar workers and median family income—appears to be related to the politicking role attitudes of city managers (Table 3.14). Managers from higher status cities are less likely to favor recruiting or campaigning roles for themselves. Managers with many years of governmental and city manager experience tend to accept a campaigning role for themselves more readily than do their less experienced colleagues (Table 3.15). Experienced managers are also more likely to accept campaigning roles for department heads, but not candidate recruitment or tenure politicking roles.

TABLE 3.13

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLES, BY COUNCIL MEMBERS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Council Members' Expectations of Department Heads' Main Policy Roles[a]	Council Members' Characteristics						
	Age			Education Level		Education Field	
	21-40 years	41-50 years	Over 50 years	No College	Some College	Prof. or Business	Other
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads Should Be:							
Policy Implementer	41.9	50.0	35.7	45.4	41.5	60.4	48.6
Policy Advisor	58.1	50.0	64.3	54.1	58.5	39.6	51.4
	100.0 (43)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (70)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (106)	100.0 (74)

	Occupation		Prior Community Service		Years Council Experience		
	Managerial, Business or Professional	Other	Political or Govt.	Other or none	2 years or less	3-4 years	Over 4 years
Policy Implementer	42.3	44.4	45.3	41.4	41.1	49.2	40.7
Policy Advisor	57.7	55.6	54.7	58.6	58.9	50.8	59.3
	100.0 (106)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (74)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (55)

TABLE 3.13-Continued

Council Members' Expectations (Continued)	Council Members' Characteristics (Continued)						
	Length of Residence			Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	10 years or less	11-20 years	Over 20 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Policy Implementer	52.0	47.1	39.4	42.5	46.2	39.6	49.4
Policy Advisor	48.0	52.9	60.6	57.5	53.8	60.4	50.6
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (146)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (97)	100.0 (82)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index		Reasons for Running for Council Post	
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive	Group Represent.	Issue/Service Represent.
Policy Implementer	44.0	43.8	40.8	45.7	47.1	43.1
Policy Advisor	56.0	56.3	59.2	54.3	52.9	56.9
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (81)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (83)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (160)

[a]Based on Policy Role C in Table 2.6.

147

TABLE 3.14

CITY MANAGERS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE ATTITUDES BY THEIR COMMUNITY
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Attitudes	Community Characteristics			
	Proportion White Collar Workers		Median Family Income	
	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than $8000	$8000 or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q = .61, ps			
Manager as Recruiter[a]	50.0	19.2	46.2	24.1
Manager as Election Neutral	50.0	80.8	53.8	75.9
	100.0 (16)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)
			Q = .71, ps	
Manager as Campaigner[b]	30.8	20.7	43.8	11.5
Manager as Election Neutral	69.2	79.3	56.3	88.5
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (26)

[a]Based on Recruiting Role Statement, Table 2.11.

[b]Based on Campaigner Role Statement, Table 2.11.

TABLE 3.15

CITY MANAGERS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE ATTITUDES,
BY THEIR EXPERIENCE CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Attitudes	City Managers' Characteristics			
	Government Experience		City Manager Experience	
	15 years or less	Over 15 years	5 years or less	Over 5 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q = .59, ps		Q = .78, ps	
Manager as Campaigner	11.8	32.0	8.7	44.4
Manager as Election Neutral	88.2	65.0	91.3	55.6
	100.0 (17)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (18)
			Q = .72, ps	
Department Head as Campaigner[a]	17.6	25.0	9.1	38.9
Department Head as Neutral	82.4	75.0	90.9	61.1
	100.0 (17)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (18)

[a]Based on Campaigner Role Statement, Table 2.11.

Community status and governmental experience, then, appear to have opposite effects on the politicking role attitudes of managers. In higher status communities, politicking roles for managers may be constricted by strong citizen attachments to the ideal of a non-political councilmanic administration, and by the attitude of higher status residents that they are sufficiently well-equipped to select their elected officials without "help" from other quarters. The greater willingness of experienced managers, however, to accept certain politicking roles for themselves and their department heads may signal a recognition that these community ideals often do not fit reality. Experience has taught them that some politicking by "neutral" administrators is inevitable, possibly useful, and perhaps even necessary.

Department Head Attitudes

Characteristics of community complexity and diversity (population density and proportion of foreign born) appear to have an impact on the politicking role attitudes of department heads (Table 3.16). In communities having higher population densities and larger proportions of foreign born residents, department heads tend to prefer a neutral role in candidate recruiting, election campaigning and in tenure,support for the manager. The richness of political life and the abundance of political talent in these complex and socially diversified communities may make it unnecessary and often unwise for councilmanic administrators to play politicking roles.

Age and political philosophy also appear to affect department head politicking attitudes (Table 3.17). Older department heads are

TABLE 3.16

DEPARTMENT HEADS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE ATTITUDES,
BY THEIR COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Attitudes	Community Characteristics			
	Population Density[a]		Proportion of Foreign Born	
	Less than 2250	2250 and over	Less than 5%	5% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q= .56, ps		Q= .41, ps	
Department Head as Recruiter	43.8	15.0	48.0	27.9
Department Head as Neutral	56.3	85.0	52.0	72.1
	100.0 (48)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (43)
			Q= .53, ps	
Department Head as Campaigner	18.7	9.5	25.0	9.3
Department Head as Neutral	81.3	90.5	75.0	90.7
	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (33)
	Q= .57, ps			
Department Head as Manager's Tenure Supporter	77.1	47.6	65.4	69.8
Department Head as Tenure Neutral	22.9	52.4	34.6	30.2
	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (43)

[a]Persons per square mile.

TABLE 3.17

DEPARTMENT HEADS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE ATTITUDES,
BY THEIR PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	Department Heads' Characteristics			
	Age		Conservative-Liberal Index	
Department Heads' Attitudes	50 years or less	Over 50 years	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent
Q = .51, ps				
Manager as Recruiter	27.0	53.3	30.8	50.0
Manager as Election Neutral	73.0	46.7	69.2	50.0
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)
Q = .54, ps				
Department Head as Campaigner	8.6	24.1	20.5	7.7
Department Head as Election Neutral	91.4	75.9	79.5	92.3
	100.0 (35)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)
Q = .54, ps				
Manager as Campaigner	13.5	34.5	25.6	21.4
Manager as Election Neutral	86.5	65.5	74.4	78.6
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)
			Q = .52, ps	
Department Head as Manager's Tenure Supporter[a]	75.7	58.6	59.0	82.1
Department Head as Tenure Neutral	24.3	41.4	41.0	17.9
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)

[a]Based on Tenure Supporter Role Statement, Table 2.11.

152

more likely to allow themselves and their managers to engage in election politicking than younger department heads. Age as it relates to political awareness may be the crucial factor here. Older department heads may have learned over the years that the makeup of the council has an impact on their own successes and failures. As a result, a boost for the right candidate at the right time may be necessary on occasion. Philosophically liberal department heads are more likely to allow tenure supporting roles for both themselves and managers than their conservative counterparts.

Council Member Attitudes

Although council member politicking attitudes do not appear to cluster around personal or philosophical attributes, a relationship was uncovered for community characteristics. Population size appears to be related to electoral politicking attitudes (Table 3.18). In larger cities, council members expected managers to refrain from both candidate recruitment and campaign activities. In larger cities a more formalized process may prevail for choosing candidates from an abundant pool of talent without the "help" of the manager.

Community social status also affects council members' politicking expectations (Table 3.19). Council members in communities with larger proportions of white collar workers and high school graduates are more likely to expect neutral politicking behavior from department heads than council members in other cities. The same expectation is held for managers in at least those communities with high proportions of white collar workers. In higher status communities, however, council

TABLE 3.18

COUNCIL MEMBERS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE EXPECTATIONS,
BY THEIR COMMUNITY'S SIZE

	Community Characteristics	
	Population Size	
Council Members' Expectations	25,000 to 49,999	50,000 and over
	percent	percent
	Q = .39, ps	
Manager as Recruiter	32.0	17.0
Manager as Election Neutral	68.0	83.0
	100.0 (100)	100.0 (88)
	Q = .46, ps	
Manager as Campaigner	19.0	8.0
Manager as Election Neutral	81.0	92.0
	100.0 (100)	100.0 (88)

154

TABLE 3.19

COUNCIL MEMBERS' TENURE POLITICKING ROLE EXPECTATIONS,
BY THEIR COMMUNITY'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Council Members' Expectations	COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS					
	Proportion of White Collar Workers		Proportion of College Graduates		Proportion of High School Graduates	
	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 15%	15% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q= .49, ps					
Manager as Campaigner	22.7	9.0	14.6	12.2	14.0	12.3
Manager as Neutral	77.3	91.0	85.4	87.8	86.0	87.7
	100.0 (66)	100.0 (122)	100.0 (97)	100.0 (82)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (81)
	Q= .36, ps		Q= .46, ps		Q= .38, ps	
Department Head as Campaigner	26.2	14.0	22.1	9.3	28.9	14.9
Department Head as Neutral	73.8	86.0	77.9	90.7	71.1	85.1
	100.0 (65)	100.0 (121)	100.0 (132)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (141)
	Q .36, ps				Q .38, ps	
Department Head as Manager's Tenure Supporter	56.3	73.3	63.6	77.4	61.2	77.9
Department Head as Tenure Neutral	43.8	26.7	36.6	22.6	38.8	22.1
	100.0 (64)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (131)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (116)	100.0 (68)

155

members are also more willing to tolerate department head support for the manager's tenure than in lower status communities. As previously suggested, a more sophisticated citizenry may hold to the non-political administrator ideal while recognizing the existence of and perhaps the need for political support building within the municipal bureaucracy.

Summary Note

Many of the policy role orientations and expectations uncovered here are of sufficient strength to cut across any differences in background variables. Then too, the impact of background variables on policy attitudes may be too indirect to have much explanatory power. Other factors may intervene that have far greater ability to explain why municipal officials think as they do. These intervening variables may include the intensity of the actor's feelings toward specific policy issues, his assessment of the competence of fellow officials or his immediate superiors, or whether or not he looks to his immediate community or to a wider and often national professional community for approval and support.[15] One such factor may be the degree of community group pressure brought to bear on and perceived by the actor. The predispositions of the municipal official to accept or reject such pressure (the subject of the following chapter) may be an intervening factor of extreme importance.

Notes

1. For a concise statement of the explanatory powers of environmental and system variables, see Brett W. Hawkins, _Politics and Urban Policies_ (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

2. Heinz Eulau and Robert Evestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," _American Political Science Review_ 62 (March 1968): 126.

3. Daniel J. Elazar, _Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics_ (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

4. See Appendix A for a list of the cities.

5. Ronald O. Loveridge, _City Managers in Legislative Politics_ (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), Table 4-1, p. 47.

6. Gladys M. Kammerer, et al., _City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination_ (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962).

7. Robert Crain and James Vanecko, "Elite Influence in School Desegregation," in James Q. Wilson, ed., _City Politics and Public Policy_ (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 127-148.

8. Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," _American Political Science Review_ 52 (March 1958): 27-45.

9. Responses to the statements based upon agreement or disagreement (See the questionnaire in Appendix B) are given numerical values ranging from "1" for strong agreement to "4" for strong disagreement. Each respondent's responses were summed and compared with the summed scores for all other respondents. The possible scores range from "4" for extreme conservatism to "16" for extreme liberalism.

10. Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, _The Political Beliefs of Americans_ (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

11. The Ideology and Government Operations indexes are scored in the manner described in footnote 9.

12. Loveridge, _City Managers_, pp. 72-73. Loveridge used a single indicator of SES—medium family income. No association between managerial policy orientation and medium family income is found in this dissertation.

13. See Kenneth Prewitt, _The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians_ (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), Table 7-1, p. 157.

14. See John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Role Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 272-282, passim.

15. The effects of a "local" or "cosmopolitan" orientation by city managers is explored in Timothy Almy, "Local-Cosmopolitanism and U. S. City Managers," Urban Affairs Quarterly 10 (March 1975): 243-272.

CHAPTER IV

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICY ROLES FOR COMMUNITY GROUPS

The primary purpose of an interest group in the American
political process is to influence the shape of public policy. Pluralist
and Elitist theorists of democracy have been debating a variety of
issues regarding interest or "pressure" groups: the degree to which
group influence is clandestine or above-board, dependent on popular
representation or on status and economic power, and consisting of domi-
nation of the policy process or a much milder advisory involvement in
the policy arena. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to
examine how interest groups become involved in the policy process and
affect the substance of policy. Rather, the concern here is with the
views of official actors in council-manager government of the policy-
making influence of community groups and the extent to which such groups
are perceived as legitimate policy-making partners in the governing
process.

The Policy Advising Role of Community Groups

If we presume that actors share roles and that community groups
as "significant others" have an impact on how those roles are shared,

then community groups themselves become actors in the policy system. They become the third side of a legislative-administrative policy formulating triangle. The crucial elements determining the "shape" of that triangle are the angles or links between the three sides. In the context of the role model, these links are role relations among legislative, administrative, and interest-group actors. As Betty Zisk points out, we can examine the links between official actors and interest groups from either the perspective of the activities of interest groups or from the perspective of the official actors in the policy system. This chapter employs the second approach. It examines the predispositions (orientations and expectations) of official city actors (council members, city managers, and department heads) toward the legitimacy of policy-shaping relationships between themselves and community groups.[1]

Just as the policy-process roles played by official actors are linked to role anchors, so too are the relations between these actors and community groups. As a reform model, council-manager government was designed in part to curtail the "corrupting" influence of private interests in the operation of city government. The role anchors of council-manager government attempted to structure interest group influences out of the administration of city government and limit the policy activities of groups to that of giving advice in the open public forum. Proponents of the manager plan hoped that "politicking" could be taken out of the election process by steering candidate recruitment, campaigning and policy promotion away from the clutches of party and privilege and toward rational control by the public and its public-spirited leaders. As diagrammed in Figure 4.1, traditional councilmanic

160

FIGURE 4.1

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF POLICY PROCESS ROLES FOR NON-OFFICIAL COMMUNITY GROUP ACTORS
IN COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENT

Policy Process Category	Functional Policy Roles	Extra-Structural Actors	Structural Actors
Politicking	Campaigning / Recruiting / Promoting		
Policy Making	Shaping / Advising	Community Groups	Council Members
			City Managers
Administering	Translating / Implementing / Maintaining		Department Heads

NOTE: Role Anchors ━━━━

role anchors allow for only one role for interest groups—expressing opinion and giving advice in public sessions of the council. Today, however, increasing recognition has been given to the reality of interest group participation in many phases of policy making.[2] The degree of participation is to be measured on a case by case basis.

The task of this chapter is to examine the degree of politicking, policy determination, and administrative involvement of community groups perceived as legitimate by official actors in councilmanic government. The willingness of official actors to hear the views of community groups before making formal policy proposals constitutes a mild degree of (or at least a prelude to) legitimate policy activity by community groups. A stronger degree of involvement would be represented by the willingness of actors to establish frequent contact and close working relations with groups in the community. The appeal of actors for the support of community groups in backing council policies represents a still stronger degree of tolerated involvement. The willingness of official actors to allow the views of community groups to help influence matters of policy implementation reflects an even deeper penetration of group influence into the policy process. Finally, the proclivity of actors to enter into policy relations with community groups in the face of opposition by the manager or the council constitutes the ultimate in group policy influence. The actor who chooses "group" over "peer," perhaps to build an independent base of policy support, becomes closely allied with interest group politicking. Such an alliance is generally frowned on (at least formally) in the municipal political arena. The general hypothesis to be tested here, however, is that official actors

162

in council-manager government are willing to openly allow active community group participation in policy shaping, advising, promoting, translating, and implementation.

The cultivation of community group support by council-manager officials is also of concern here. In Chapter II, politicking was conceived of as including campaigning, recruiting, and policy promotion. For purposes of analysis here, cultivating group support for policy reasons (with or without council or managerial backing) will be considered a form of policy politicking. Seeking the support of community groups for the protection of one's own job or the jobs of other actors, however, will be classified as forms of tenure politicking. It is accepted practice for council candidates to cultivate some type of community and/or group support, either for policies not currently favored by council or public, or for an electoral bout with a challenger. Tenure politicking within the interest group arena by municipal administrators, however, is generally at odds with traditional council-manager role anchors. The hypothesis here is that official actors are not willing to legitimize relations between city managers or department heads and community groups that give these administrators a base of political support (whether for policy or tenure reasons) independent of the council. In short, we wish to determine if the cultivation of "clientele" support is too far removed from traditional manager plan role anchors to be tolerated.[3]

Policy and Politicking Role Conceptions

Policy Roles for Community Groups

Council Members and Community Groups. The evidence presented in this chapter clearly points to a series of active policy relationships between official actors in council-manager government and community groups. In fact, the dominant pattern of predispositions is one in which all three sets of target actors feel they and their official alters must bring community groups into some kind of working policy partnership. This situation prevails regardless of the structural positions in which the actors find their roles anchored in the council-manager system.

Strong agreement exists among the target actors that council members should have active policy relations with community groups. As indicated in Table 4.1, the respondents substantially agree that council members should develop close working relations with community groups, consider the views of groups on both substantive and implementative policy matters, and appeal for group support of council-backed policies. Council members, however, place a limit on their group policy relations. This limit concerns the choice a council member must make between his relations with community groups and rapport with other members of the council. Council members, managers, and department heads are far less willing to hear policy suggestions from groups or appeal for group support of their own proposals when these suggestions are opposed by the majority of the council. And, council members are expected to advocate policies even in the face of stiff opposition from powerful groups in the community.

164

TABLE 4.1

COUNCIL MEMBERS' POLICY RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF COUNCIL MEMBERS, CITY MANAGERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Community Groups as:	Council Members Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	Department Heads Percent Agree
	(N = 189)		(N = 42)		(N = 69)
Working Partners					
Relation A	99.5	(0.5)	100.0	(3.8)	95.7
Relation B	93.7	(1.5)	95.2	(0.5)	94.2
Policy Advisors					
Relation C	96.8	(3.9)	92.9	(0.3)	97.1
Relation D	96.3	(1.1)	95.2	(0.8)	97.1
Relation E	43.9[b]	(1.0)	42.9[b]	(2.5)	46.4[b]
Relation F	85.7	----	85.7	(4.5)	81.2
Policy Supporters					
Relation G	96.8	(3.2)	100.0	(1.1)	95.7
Relation H	45.0	(5.0)	50.0	(5.7)	50.7

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 4.1-<u>Continued</u>

Community Groups as Working Partners: Attitudinal Statements

Relation A: A council member should make it easy for community groups to contact him.
Relation B: A council member should establish good working relations with representatives of community groups.

Community Groups as Policy Advisors: Attitudinal Statements

Relation C: A council member should take the views of community groups into account before proposing policies to the council.
Relation D: The views of community groups should be taken into account when the council is considering how to implement policy.
Relation E: A council member should resist policy suggestions from groups when they disagree with policy decisions already made by the council.
Relation F: A council member should advocate policies even when they draw opposition from important groups in the community.

Community Groups as Policy Supporters: Attitudinal Statements

Relation G: A council member should appeal to community groups for support of policy proposals backed by the council.
Relation H: A council member should appeal to community groups for support of his policy proposals when they are opposed by a majority of the council.

[a]Difference compared to department head percentages.

[b]Negatively worded statement opposing group contact.

While few council member respondents can really be typed as antagonists toward community groups playing policy roles in municipal politics, some council members apparently see no limit to their policy relations with such groups. Those council members willing to consider group-generated policy suggestions even in the face of majority council opposition (Table 4.1, Relation E) we will classify as Pluralists, and those who would resist group recommendations under these circumstances as Consensualists. The term "consensualist" is chosen to describe those council members for whom council solidarity becomes more important at some phase of the decision-making process than hearing recommendations from community groups that are contrary to the council bias. In these terms, the council member who opts for ignoring group viewpoints that are contrary to the council's decisions (made in either the distant or immediate past) feels that consensus on the council (and perhaps even unanimity) is of a higher priority. The Pluralist believes in the reverse of the Consensualist attitude--that hearing community groups is more important than council solidarity on past or present decisions. As indicated in Table 4.1, approximately 44 percent of the council member respondents can be classified as Consensualists. Most Consensualists, furthermore, reject the notion that council members should cultivate group support for proposals opposed by the council majority (Table 4.2). There are also relationships between the orientations of council members toward the limit on their policy relations with community groups and their expectations of such a limit for managers and department heads. The data exhibited in Table 4.2 indicate that such a relationship exists for expectations of managerial orientations but not

TABLE 4.2

COUNCIL MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD CULTIVATING GROUP POLICY SUPPORT,
BY COUNCIL MEMBER ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THEIR OWN GROUP
POLICY RELATIONS

Council Members' Orientations Toward Cultivating Group Support[b]	Council Members' Orientations Toward Policy Relations with Groups[a]	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	percent	percent
	Q = .48, ps[c]	
Don't Cultivate Support	67.9	42.6
Cultivate Support	32.1	57.4
	100.0 (81)[d]	100.0 (101)
Council Members' Expectations that City Managers Should Be:[e]		
	Q = .56, ps	
Consensual	79.5	52.4
Pluralist	20.5	47.6
	100.0 (83)	100.0 (103)
Council Members' Expectations that Department Heads Should Be:[f]		
	ns[g]	
Consensual	69.5	61.2
Pluralist	30.5	38.8
	100.0 (82)	100.0 (103)

168

TABLE 4.2-<u>Continued</u>

[a]Based on Group Relation Role E in Table 4.1.

[b]Based on Group Relation Role H in Table 4.1.

[c]See Chapter 1 for an explanation of Q. ps = statistically significant.

[d]Number of cases.

[e]Based on Group Relation Role E in Table 4.3.

[f]Based on Group Relation Role D in Table 4.5.

[g]ns = not statistically significant.

for the orientations of department heads. Consensualist council members expect managers to adopt similar orientations toward their community group role relationships. The data do not support the same expectations for department heads, possibly because council members do not see their activities as bearing directly on the process of decision-making in the council.

  City Managers and Community Groups. The traditional role anchors for city managers in council-manager government call for little or no contact between the manager and community groups. However, the role anchors must be modified if the evidence gathered here is indicative of the attitude held by target actors toward the manager's policy relations with groups. It is obvious that all three sets of actors see as legitimate the building of frequent contact and close working relations between the manager and community groups (Table 4.3). Likewise, managers are expected to consider group views before proposing policies to the council, and they are expected to help the council to cultivate group support for council-backed policies. There are limits, however, to the manager's relations with community groups. The manager is expected to present even those policies that draw fire from influential groups; although the slightly lower proportion of council members expecting this behavior may indicate a desire on their part to be the primary "flak catchers" in municipal politics. Analysis also reveals that manager-group relations which threaten to come between the manager and the council create uncertainty in the attitudes of the respondents. While a majority of all three sets of actors agree that the manager should consider group views when implementing council decisions (Table

TABLE 4.3

CITY MANAGERS' POLICY RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF CITY MANAGERS, COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Community Groups as:	City Managers Percent Agree (N = 42)	(Difference)[a]	Council Members Percent Agree (N = 189)	(Difference)[a]	Department Heads Percent Agree (N = 69)
Working Partners					
Relation A	100.0	(2.6)	97.4	---	100.0
Relation B	95.2	(6.8)	88.4	(0.5)	95.7
Policy Advisors					
Relation C	92.9	(0.3)	92.6	(5.7)	98.6
Relation D	61.9	(1.6)	63.5	(4.8)	66.7
Relation E	47.6[b]	(17.0)	64.6[b]	(6.0)	53.6[b]
Relation F	78.6[b]	(10.9)	67.7[b]	(2.6)	81.2[b]
Policy Supporters					
Relation G	85.7	---	85.7	(0.2)	85.5
Relation H	7.1	(3.9)	3.2	(5.9)	13.0

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

171

TABLE 4.3-<u>Continued</u>

Community Groups as Working Partners

    Relation A: A city manager should make it easy for community groups to contact him.

    Relation B: A city manager should establish close working relations with representatives of community groups.

Community Groups as Policy Advisors

    Relation C: A city manager should take the views of community groups into account before proposing policies to the council.

    Relation D: A city manager should take the views of community groups into account when implementing council decisions.

    Relation E: A city manager should resist policy suggestions from community groups when they disagree with his council's policies.

    Relation F: A city manager should advocate policies even when they draw hostility from important groups in the community.

Community Groups as Policy Supporters

    Relation G: A city manager should appeal to community groups for support of policy proposals backed by the council.

    Relation H: A city manager should appeal to community groups for support of his policy proposals when those proposals are opposed by the council.

[a]Difference compared with department head percentages.

[b]Negatively worded statements opposing group contact.

4.3, Relation D), a sizeable minority (a range of 33.3 to 38.1 percent) do not. If community groups can possibly negotiate a change in policy when the manager is translating or implementing policy, the council's dominance in policy making may be seen as threatened.

A potential conflict between the manager and his alters also appears in regard to relations with community groups that go against the council's policy wishes. A bare majority of department heads, and nearly two-thirds of the council members, feel that the manager should resist group policy suggestions under those circumstances. Yet a majority of managers do not feel they must "tune out" group policy suggestions that differ with council policies. The manager, as the council's chief source of policy alternatives may wish to gather all possible alternatives whether they are relevant to the moment or not. Managers agree with alters, however, that they should not appeal for group support of their own policies when those policies are opposed by the council (Relation H). It appears that substantial agreement exists among the target actors for (1) an active working relationship between manager and community groups, and (2) a definite limit on that relationship when it begins to interfere with the council's predominance as policy maker. Uncertainty appears in the middle, however, in regard to the extent of the manager-group policy relations. Should it extend to policy positions opposed by the council, or to matters of policy implementation? The answers are not clear.

As was true for council member respondents, city managers may be typed according to their willingness to accept limits to their policy relations with community groups. Using the reasoning previously

established for classifying council members, we can classify city managers as either Consensualists or Pluralists. The Consensualist manager, like his council member counterpart, decides at some point in the decision-making process that consensus on the council has become more important than hearing group views that go against the council's bias or decisions (Table 4.3, Relation E). He will refrain from inter- jecting outside opinions or recommendations that may divide the council. The Pluralist, of course, values the continued expression of community group interests more highly than council solidarity. Approximately 48 percent of the city managers adopted the Consensualist perspective (Table 4.3), and there is a strong relationship between the manager's perspective and his expectations that department heads should adopt the same perspective (Table 4.4).

Department Heads and Community Groups. The predispositions of the three sets of respondents in this study point to a rejection of the traditional presumption that the roles of line department heads should be anchored in isolation from community politics. It is clear that department heads are expected to make administrative recommendations deemed necessary regardless of the level of hostility to those sugges- tions by community groups (Table 4.5, Relation E). The department head is expected to be an apolitical professional able to withstand the heat of political pressure. Yet, there is also common and substantial agree- ment that department heads are to develop active policy relations with community groups through frequent contact and consideration of group views when it's time to make recommendations to the city manager (Relations A and B). If the bulk of the department head's recommendations

TABLE 4.4

CITY MANAGERS' ORIENTATIONS TOWARD GROUPS AS POLICY IMPLEMENTING ADVISORS,
AND THE MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS OF DEPARTMENT HEAD POLICY RELATIONS
WITH GROUPS, BY THE MANAGERS' ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THEIR
OWN GROUP POLICY RELATIONS

City Managers' Orientations Toward Policy Implementing Relations with Groups[b]	City Managers' Orientations Toward Policy Relations with Groups[a]	
	Policy Consensual	Policy Pluralist
	percent	percent
	ns	
Implementation Pluralist	68.4	59.1
Implementation Consensualist	31.6	40.9
	100.0 (19)	100.0 (22)
City Managers' Expectations that Department Heads Should Be:[c]		
	$Q = .57$, ps	
Policy Consensual	64.7	33.3
Policy Pluralist	35.3	66.7
	100.0 (17)	100.0 (21)
City Managers' Expectations that Department Heads Should Be:[d]		
	ns	
Implementation Pluralist	72.2	68.2
Implementation Consensualist	27.8	31.8
	100.0 (18)	100.0 (22)

TABLE 4.4-<u>Continued</u>

---

[a]Classification based on Group Policy Relation Statement E of Table 4.3.

[b]Based on Group Policy Relation D of Table 4.3.

[c]Based on Group Policy Relation D of Table 4.5.

[d]Based on Group Policy Relation B in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.5

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS: ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
OF DEPARTMENT HEADS, CITY MANAGERS, AND COUNCIL MEMBERS

Community Groups as:	Department Heads Percent Agree (N = 69)	(Difference)[a]	City Managers Percent Agree (N = 42)	(Difference)[a]	Council Members Percent Agree (N = 189)
Working Partners					
Relation A	97.1	(6.6)	90.5	(10.9)	86.2
Relation B	85.5	(18.8)	66.7	(15.7)	69.8
Policy Advisors					
Relation C	89.9	(4.2)	85.7	(9.5)	80.4
Relation D	71.0[b]	(28.1)	42.9[b]	(6.4)	64.6[b]
Relation E	82.6[b]	(3.1)	85.7[b]	(1.1)	81.5[b]
Policy Supporters					
Relation F	13.0	(13.0)	---	(56.8)	69.8

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 4.5-Continued

Community Groups as Working Partners

  Relation A: A department head should make it easy for community groups to contact him.
  Relation B: A department head should establish close working relations with representatives of community groups.

Community Groups as Policy Advisors

  Relation C: A department head should take the views of community groups into account before making recommendations to the city manager.
  Relation D: A department head should resist recommendations from community groups when they have not been approved by the manager or council.
  Relation E: A department head should make administrative recommendations even when they draw hostility from important groups in the community.

Community Groups as Policy Supporters

  Relation F: A department head should appeal to community groups for support of his recommendations when those recommendations are opposed by the council or the city manager.

[a]Difference compared with department head percentages.

[b]Negatively worded statements opposing group contact.

are concerned with matters of implementation rather than general policy, then the department head is clearly not insulated from either substantive or implementative policy contact with community groups.

Uncertainty and disagreement begin to appear, however, when department head-community group policy relations are pinpointed a bit more precisely. For example, large majorities of all three sets of respondents agree that department heads should work closely with community groups (Relation B). Two-thirds of the council members, however, want department heads to resist recommendations from community groups (D) that have not been approved by the manager or the council. One possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that council members are willing to tolerate close department head-community group relations only as long as those relations follow pre-set council guidelines. Yet, council members appear quite willing to allow department heads to establish independent bases of group support for their policy proposals (Relation F). Although this contradiction may seem to defy explanation, it is possible that council members do not view this form of support cultivation as a threat to their control over policy making. Concerned primarily with implementing policy, the department head serves as a link between council policy making and citizen feedback. The council member may come to expect support building between department heads and community groups as a means by which the impact of policy may be assessed. Council members may recognize the importance of such assessment to their ability to modify policy in the light of changing community circumstances, especially if the policy in question is highly controversial.

179

The conjecture made in Chapter II that city managers may fear council-department head policy relations because they might usurp his role as translator of policy appears not to hold true for policy relations between community groups and department heads. Two-thirds of the managers agree that department heads should work closely with community groups (Table 4.5, Relation B), and a majority (57.1 percent) do not feel it necessary for department heads to resist group policy suggestions not meeting with the manager's approval. Apparently, city managers do not regard policy relations between their subordinates and community groups as a threat to their own leadership in the administration of municipal government. Managers, however, are unanimous in their opposition to allowing department heads to establish independent bases of policy support among community groups (Relation F). The explanation probably lies in the degree of involvement. For the department head simply to hear the views of community groups without first obtaining the approval of the council or the manager is one thing. Actively lining up group support as a prelude to doing battle with the manager over policy differences is quite another matter. Managers may wish to draw the line of policy relations between department head and community group somewhere between listening to group recommendations and the outright cultivation of group support.

The department head orientations illustrated in Table 4.5 indicate a view of their policy relations with community groups that is even more restrictive than that taken by city managers. The line cutting off department heads from group contact is drawn at the point of considering group policy recommendations not approved by the manager

or the council (Relation D). There appears to be, however, a difference of opinion between police and fire chiefs as to how firmly that line should be drawn. Fire chiefs are far more likely than police chiefs to draw the line firmly, and a majority of them are willing to do so for city managers and even council members as well as for themselves (Table 4.6). Police chiefs, given the more politicized nature of their role as discussed in Chapter II, are far more likely to draw the line flexibly for themselves and even more flexibly for both managers or council members.

By borrowing the typology developed in this chapter for both council members and city managers, we can classify department heads as either Consensualists or Pluralists. As illustrated in Table 4.5 (Relation D), 71 percent of the department head respondents can be classified as Consensualists. Pluralist department heads may be those whose desire to consider the views of community groups outweighs their wish not to upset the policy-making partnership between manager and council. The Consensualists, however, adhere much more closely to the traditional role anchors for line department heads. The Consensualists' priority may reflect less concern for protecting concensus politics on the council and more concern for maintaining his role as an apolitical professional. For them, policy matters are best left to the council, and the implementation of policy is not to be tainted by the influence of community groups. Evidence for this attitude is presented in Table 4.7. Consensualist department heads wish that the city manager also be Consensualist.

TABLE 4.6

POLICY RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS: ORIENTATIONS
OF POLICE AND FIRE CHIEFS

Policy Relations with Community Groups by:	Orientations and Expectations[a]		
	Police Chiefs Percent Agree	(Difference)	Fire Chiefs Percent Agree
	(N = 32)		(N = 37)
Council Members	34.2	(23.9)	58.3
City Managers	43.8	(18.4)	62.2
Department Heads	56.3	(27.5)	83.8

[a]Based upon the statement: "A council member (manager) (department head) should resist recommendations from community groups when they have not been approved by the manager or the council."

TABLE 4.7

DEPARTMENT HEADS' EXPECTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS' ORIENTATIONS
TOWARD GROUP POLICY RELATIONS LIMITS, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
ORIENTATIONS TOWARD GROUP POLICY RELATIONS LIMITS

Department Heads' Expectations of City Manager Orientations	Department Heads' Orientations	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	Percent	Percent
Consensual	$Q = .55$, ps	
Consensual	63.3	30.0
Pluralist	36.7	70.0
	100.0 (49)	100.0 (20)

Tenure Politicking and Group Support

As demonstrated in this chapter, the traditional policy role anchors of council-manager government must be modified to include some kind of policy relationship between official actors and community groups. Yet, traditional anchors for the politicking roles of campaigning, electioneering, and the cultivating of group support by bureaucrats for their tenure in office appears largely to have survived the onslaught of pressure politics. City managers and department heads both expect themselves and are expected by council members to follow strictly limited roles in tenure politicking. As indicated in Chapter II, campaigning and electioneering by municipal administrators in behalf of favored council candidates are regarded largely as taboo. This prohibition also holds true for the cultivation of group support for favored candidates. As indicated in Table 4.8, all three sets of target actors emphatically deny managers and department heads the opportunity to join the campaign trail.

Yet, lending one's support as an administrator to one's superior when his job tenure is in jeopardy is not considered an illegitimate act. As revealed in Chapter II, council members, managers, and department heads alike agree that department heads should lend their support to respected managers under such circumstances. That support, however, must be "moral" rather than political--it must not take on the odor of tenure politicking. The target actors overwhelmingly reject the notion that managers and department heads might cultivate group support in order to save their own or each others' jobs. Of these sets of actors, department heads are slightly more likely to tolerate group

TABLE 4.8

TENURE POLITICKING ROLE RELATIONS BETWEEN NON-ELECTED OFFICIALS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS:
ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS,
CITY MANAGERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Politicking Roles	Council Members Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	City Managers Percent Agree	(Difference)[a]	Department Heads Percent Agree
	(N = 189)		(N = 42)		(N = 69)
City Managers Cultivating Group Support for:					
Council members	12.2	(2.7)	9.5	(3.7)	15.9
Self	7.9	(7.9)	0.0	(15.3)	23.2
Department Heads Cultivating Group Support for:					
Council members	14.8	(7.7)	7.1	(3.2)	11.6
Self	4.8	(4.8)	0.0	(15.5)	20.3
City Managers	7.4	(2.6)	4.8	(24.5)	31.9

NOTE: The questionnaire statements for each of the policy roles are as follows:

TABLE 4.8-Continued

Community Group/Actor Politicking Role Relation Statements for both city managers and department heads:

    Cultivating Group Support for Council members: A city manager (department head) should encourage community groups to support candidates he respects in council elections.

    Cultivating Group Support for Self: A city manager (department head) should appeal to community groups for support when the council (or manager) becomes dissatisfied with the manager's (department head's) job performance.

    Cultivating Support for the City Manager: A department head should encourage community groups to support a city manager he respects when the council becomes dissatisfied with the city manager's job performance.

[a]Difference compared to council member responses.

activity for fellow bureaucrats than are managers or council members
(Table 4.8). Those department heads willing to cultivate group support
for themselves are also inclined to allow city managers to do the same
(Table 4.9). Department heads, then, are strongly opposed to a poli-
ticking role for themselves in policy matters or in the electoral arena.
They appear to be a bit less wary of tenure politicking within the ranks
of the bureaucracy. However, a heavy majority of department heads appear
to stick close to traditional role prohibitions against any form of
politicking by civil servants.

Intra-City Role Conceptions and Norm Expectations

In Chapter 2, an analysis of the policy role attitudes of
municipal officials interacting within the same organizational structure
was presented. An identical analysis of community group role concep-
tions is presented here. Comparisons of the attitudes of council mem-
bers with those of their own managers and department heads are illus-
trated in Tables 4.10 through 4.13 while the results of examining norm
expectations utilizing arithmetic Means and Coefficients of Variation
are exhibited in Tables 4.14 and 4.15.

Shared Role Conceptions

As indicated in Table 4.10, the community group policy role
conceptions of council members, managers, and department heads do not
appear to be interdependent influences on each other's attitudes.
Council members find that their managers tend to be Pluralist regardless
of their own role conceptions. While slightly less than half (38) of
the council members have managers who adopt the same views, whether or

TABLE 4.9

DEPARTMENT HEADS' EXPECTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS' ORIENTATIONS TOWARD
SELF-SUPPORT GROUP CULTIVATION, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
ORIENTATIONS TOWARD SELF-SUPPORT GROUP CULTIVATION

Department Heads' Expectations that City Managers:	Department Heads' Orientations	
	Cultivate Support	Don't Cultivate Support
	percent	percent
	$Q = .84$, ps	
Cultivate Support	64.3	13.0
Don't Cultivate Support	35.7	87.0
	100.0 (14)	100.0 (54)

TABLE 4.10

GROUP POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS,
BY THE GROUP POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR COUNCIL MEMBERS

Orientations of Council Members' Own City Manager[d]	Council Members' Expectations	
	Manager as Consensualist	Manager as Pluralist
	percent	percent
Manager as Consensualist[a]	30.9	32.3
Manager as Pluralist	69.1	67.7
	100.0 (55)	100.0 (31)
Orientations of Council Members' Own Department Heads[e]	Department Head as Consensualist	Department Head as Pluralist
	percent	percent
Department Head as Consensualist[b]	31.6	60.0
Department Head Divided[c]	55.3	35.0
Department Head as Pluralist	13.1	5.0
	100.0 (38)	100.0 (20)

NOTE: Measures of association are not calculated for this table.

189

TABLE 4.10-Continued

[a]Based on Community Group Role Statement E, Table 4.4.

[b]Based on Community Group Role Statement D, Table 4.6.

[c]Department heads are divided in their community group role orientations. In the other two categories, both department heads agree.

[d]Based on respondents in 21 target cities.

[e]Based on respondents in 14 target cities.

not that view should be Consensualist (17) or Pluralist (21) is divided

fairly evenly between them. Likewise, council members find that their

own department heads tend to take the opposite view. Of the council

members who feel that their own department heads should be Consensualists,

68.4 percent find that their heads are either divided on the issue or

take the opposite view. At the same time, 95 percent of the council mem-

bers who would allow their department heads a Pluralist relationship are

faced with heads who are either divided or adopt the Consensualist view.

Evidence of fairly widespread agreement between council members

and their own administrative officials in regard to the role of community

groups in tenure politicking is presented in Table 4.11. It appears

that no relationship exists since the council members' own managers and

department heads overwhelmingly reject group cultivating roles regard-

less of the council member's views. Yet, council members are themselves

overwhelmingly non-cultivators. A glance at the lower right-hand cell

of both sub-tables in Table 4.11 indicates that the vast majority of

council members have administrators who share their view that appointed

officials should not engage in the cultivation of group support for

favored council candidates.

<center>Potential Community Group Role Conflict Between
A Manager and His Council</center>

An analysis of differences between a manager and his council

with regard to group policy role definitions resulted in support for

findings described earlier in this chapter. As indicated in Table 4.12,

a difference of 1.00 or greater was found in 12 of the 21 cities

examined here. Eight of those 12 cities contain managers favoring

<center>191</center>

TABLE 4.11

COMMUNITY GROUP TENURE POLITICKING ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS
AND DEPARTMENT HEADS, BY COMMUNITY GROUP TENURE POLITICKING
(COUNCIL RECRUITING) ROLE EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR
COUNCIL MEMBERS

	Council Members' Expectations	
Orientations of Council Members' Own City Managers[c]	Manager as Group Support Cultivator[a]	Manager as Non-Cultivator
	percent	percent
Manager as Group Support Cultivator	8.3	9.1
Manager as Non-Cultivator	91.7	90.9
	100.0 (12)	100.0 (77)
Orientations of Council Members' Own Department Heads[d]	Department Head as Group Support Cultivator[a]	Department Head as Non-Cultivator
	percent	percent
Department Head as Support Cultivator	0.0	0.0
Department Heads Divided[b]	18.2	6.5
Department Head as Non-Cultivator	81.8	93.5
	100.0 (11)	100.0 (46)

NOTE: Measures of association are not calculated for this table.

TABLE 4.11-<u>Continued</u>

[a]Based on the statement: "A city manager (department head) should encourage community groups to support candidates he respects in council elections.

[b]Department heads split over their orientations. In the other two categories, both department heads agree on their orientations.

[c]Based on respondents in 21 target cities.

[d]Based on respondents in 14 target cities.

TABLE 4.12

GROUP POLICY ROLE "KEY QUESTION" SCORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITY MANAGERS AND THEIR COUNCILS

City No.	Conceptions of Group Policy Roles for City Managers[a]			Conceptions of Group Policy Roles for Department Heads		
	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference[b]	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference
1	1.66	3	1.34	3.00	2	1.00
2	3.00	4	1.00	3.00	4	1.00
3	2.00	1	1.00	2.33	2	.33
4	2.00	3	1.00	1.75	3	1.25
5	2.33	4	1.67	1.16	4	2.84
6	2.80	4	1.20	2.00	4	2.00
7	2.75	2	.75	2.50	2	.50
8	2.33	4	1.67	3.00	3	0.00
9	2.60	2	.60	2.40	3	.60
10	2.80	3	.20	NA	NA[c]	NA
11	2.50	2	.50	1.25	1	.25
12	1.25	3	1.75	1.50	2	.50
13	2.50	3	.50	1.66	4	2.34
14	2.75	3	.25	2.75	3	.25
15	2.33	3	.67	2.33	2	.33
16	1.33	2	.67	3.33	3	.33
17	1.75	3	1.25	2.50	4	1.50
18	2.60	4	1.40	2.20	3	1.80
19	2.33	1	1.33	NA	NA	NA
20	1.75	2	.25	2.50	2	.50
21	1.00	3	2.00	2.25	3	.75

[a]A low score in the range of 1-4 indicates opposition to a group policy role relationship.

[b]A potential for conflict is indicated by a score difference of 1.00 or greater.

[c]Not available. Actor(s) did not respond to the question.

active group-manager policy relations while their councils did not. Differences of definition in regard to department head-group relations, however, indicate a different conclusion. The difference was 1.00 or greater in only 8 of the 21 cities. Department head-group policy relations appear to be subjects for disagreement in fewer cities than for manager-group relations. Yet, in 6 of the 8 cities with important differences, managers disapprove of department head-group policy relations while their councils do not. Managers, then, do not necessarily oppose department head-community group policy relations. Yet, managers oppose any such relations that result in the development of independent bases of support for administrative subordinates that might jeopardize managerial policy prerogatives. Council members apparently see such community support building by department heads as necessary to the assessment of the impacts of policy.

Opposition to interactions of a politicking nature between community groups and municipal administrators, however, appear to be widespread (Table 4.13). In 17 of the 21 cities, the attitude difference between the manager and his council was less than 1.00. In all 17 cities, both manager and council oppose the encouragement of group candidate recruitment by either managers or department heads.

Norm Expectations

Analysis of the Means and Standard Deviations of each city's collective responses does not alter the conclusion about shared group policy attitudes. As indicated in Table 4.14, the Consensualist role conception for either the manager or department head appears to predominate in most of the 14 cities. Yet, high coalescence is found in 8 cities

TABLE 4.13

GROUP RECRUITING ROLE "KEY QUESTION" SCORE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CITY MANAGERS AND THEIR COUNCILS

City No.	Conceptions of Group Recruiting Roles for City Managers[a]			Conceptions of Group Recruiting Roles for Department Heads		
	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference[b]	Council Position ($\bar{X}$)	Manager Position (Score)	Difference
1	3.33	3	.33	4.00	3	1.00
2	4.00	4	0.00	3.33	4	.67
3	4.00	4	0.00	4.00	4	0.00
4	4.00	4	0.00	3.75	4	.25
5	3.83	4	.17	3.66	4	.34
6	2.80	3	.20	3.40	2	1.40
7	3.50	4	.50	3.25	3	.25
8	4.00	4	0.00	3.50	4	.50
9	2.60	4	1.40	3.00	4	1.00
10	3.40	1	2.40	3.41	1	2.40
11	4.00	4	0.00	4.00	4	0.00
12	3.00	4	1.00	3.00	4	1.00
13	3.16	4	.84	3.16	4	.84
14	4.00	3	1.00	4.00	4	0.00
15	3.00	3	0.00	3.33	4	.67
16	3.00	3	0.00	4.00	4	0.00
17	4.00	4	0.00	4.00	4	0.00
18	3.40	4	.60	3.20	4	.80
19	3.33	4	.67	3.66	4	.34
20	3.75	4	.25	3.75	4	.25
21	3.75	4	.25	3.75	4	.25

[a]A low score in a range of 1-4 indicates opposition to a group recruiting role relationship.

[b]A potential for conflict is indicated by a score difference of 1.00 or greater.

TABLE 4.14

COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INTRA-CITY
COMMUNITY GROUP POLICY ROLE RESPONSES OF TARGET ACTORS
IN FOURTEEN CITIES

City[c]	City Manager's Community Group Relations[a]		Department Head's Community Group Relations[b]	
	$\bar{X}$[d]	S	$\bar{X}$	S
City 1	2.00	.81	2.33	1.25
City 2	3.33	1.11	2.83	.91
City 3	2.16	.70	2.16	.70
City 4	2.42	.91	2.00	.92
City 5	2.44	.96	1.77	1.23
City 6	2.75	.96	2.00	1.05
City 7	2.57	1.18	2.57	1.40
City 8	2.33	1.06	2.88	.76
City 9	2.37	.87	2.12	1.06
City 10	2.87	.94	2.71	.89
City 11	2.57	1.05	1.42	.74
City 12	1.85	1.13	1.85	.84
City 13	2.22	.97	2.33	1.16
City 14	2.20	1.07	2.20	1.32

[a]Based on Community Group Policy Role Statement E of Table 4.4.

[b]Based on Community Group Policy Role Statement D of Table 4.6.

[c]Only the 14 cities were included in which the manager, both department heads, and at least a majority of the council members responded to the statements.

[d]The lower the mean value in a score range of 1-4, the greater the acceptance of the Consensualist role conception.

[e]A score of less than 1.00 indicates a tendency toward high coalescence, while a score of 1.00 or greater indicates a tendency toward low coalescence.

for manager-group policy expectations and in 7 cities for department

head group policy expectations. Low coalescence for managers' roles is

found in 6 cities, and for department head roles in 7 cities. This

indicates considerable variation in the extent to which attitudes

coalesce around the mean and, therefore, an absence of norm expectations.

Evidence presented in Table 4.15, however, points to the estab-

lishment of norm expectations in most cities in regard to tenure

politicking role relations with community groups. The Consensualist

role conception for both managers and department heads predominates in

all 14 cities. This conception leans toward being a norm expectation

in 10 cities for both managers and department heads.

Summary

The evidence presented in this chapter points to the need to

make some modifications in the traditional council-manager policy role

anchors (See Figure 4.2). The analysis presented here clearly supports

the hypothesis that all official actors in council-manager government

willingly legitimize some kind of policy relationship between themselves

and various community interests. That policy relationship involves not

only a role for groups in advising the council as to the shape of

policy substance, but the implementation of policy as well. To be sure,

allowing groups to give advice as to how policy ought to be implemented

more accurately constitutes a role in translating policy into programs

rather than the actual carrying out of specific tasks and activities.

But, the independence of government bureaucracy in carrying out public

policy might become severely curtailed. This is not simply because the

TABLE 4.15

COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INTRA-CITY
COMMUNITY GROUP TENURE POLITICKING (COUNCIL RECRUITING)
RESPONSES OF TARGET ACTORS IN FOURTEEN CITIES

City[b]	Manager's Community Group Politicking Relations[a]		Department Head's Community Group Politicking Relations	
	$\bar{X}$[c]	S	$\bar{X}$	S
City 1	3.33	.76	3.33	1.11
City 2	3.83	.41	3.50	.76
City 3	3.50	.76	3.66	.51
City 4	4.00	0.00	3.71	.48
City 5	3.88	.41	3.77	.47
City 6	3.12	1.06	3.37	.87
City 7	3.42	.76	3.42	.76
City 8	4.00	0.00	3.66	.70
City 9	2.87	.97	3.12	.94
City 10	3.00	1.00	3.12	1.06
City 11	4.00	0.00	4.00	0.00
City 12	3.28	1.04	3.42	1.07
City 13	3.22	1.14	3.33	1.06
City 14	3.85	.42	4.00	0.00

[a]Based on the statement: "A city manager (department head) should encourage community groups to support candidates he respects in council elections."

[b]Only the 14 cities were included in which the manager, both department heads, and at least a majority of council members responded to the role statement.

[c]The lower the $\bar{X}$ value in a score range of 1-4, the greater the acceptance of a Group Support Cultivator role for the manager and department heads.

FIGURE 4.2

PERCEIVED POLICY PROCESS ROLES FOR NON-OFFICIAL GROUP ACTORS
IN COUNCIL-MANAGER MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Policy	Functional	Extra-Structural	Structural
Process Category	Policy Roles	Actors	Actors

Politicking

Campaigning
Recruiting
Promoting

Policy Making

Shaping
Advising

Administering

Translating
Implementing
Maintaining

Community Groups

Council Members

City Managers

Department Heads

NOTE: Roles perceived as legitimate ————

200

advice of interest groups as to how to implement policy is heeded, but because criticism by specific interest groups of how policy is being carried out often results in policy or program changes in their favor. The ability of bureaucracy to apply clear standards without favoritism becomes severely hampered when bargaining between groups and official actors occurs about the very rules by which decisions are made. An interest group able to control the rules of the game controls the game. As Theodore Lowi points out in his indictment of interest-group Liberalism, "participatory democracy has been applied to the implementation as well as the formulation of law. . . ."[4] Lowi charges that bargaining has replaced democratic formalism in contemporary policy making:

> Liberalism promotes popular decision-making but
> derogates from the decisions so made by misapplying
> the notion to the implementation as well as the for-
> mulation of policy. . . . Delegation of power has
> become alienation of public domain--the gift of
> sovereignty to private satrapies. . . . Liberalism
> weakens democratic institutions by opposing formal
> procedures with informal bargaining.[5]

The extent to which interest-group liberalism allows private interests to triumph over the public good is not the subject for this analysis. The evidence here, however, illustrates that the kind of implementative bargaining Lowi describes is legitimized in the municipal as well as national policy arenas.

There are, however, limits to the relations between community groups and official actors. Those limits appear to revolve around the degree to which cultivating group support for tenure purposes is legitimized, and the congruence of policy positions between community groups and the council. As the evidence presented in this chapter indicates, the cultivation of group support for electoral or tenure

purposes is regarded as illegitimate. Indeed, there appears to be a fairly strong norm expectation against such activity--at least on behalf of candidates to council posts. In other words, actor-group relations are based on policy making rather than politicking activities.

Policy position congruence, then, appears to be the major determinant of how far non-elected actors are willing to go in legitimizing their group relations. While city managers appear to be more willing than department heads to push out the limits of their own group policy relations, none of the actors here are willing to sanction the kinds of group relations that would drive a wedge between them and their alters. The attitude seems to prevail that group relations must be curtailed if they result in upsetting "consensus" politics on the council. This lends support to Betty Zisk's conclusion that most council members in council-manager government view the political process from a "managerial" point of view. That is, they themselves adopt the view that council activity is largely apolitical, consensual, noncontroversial and devoid of bargaining and group struggles.[6] According to Zisk, council members are largely resistant to group influence--". . . for most councilmen, the group struggle takes place on a one-way street."[7] The official actors examined here cannot be said to be resistant to group influence. Nor do they appear to act as passive vessels to be shaped by community groups at their own pleasure. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that city managers, department heads, and even some council members engage in policy relations with community groups within self-imposed limits.

Notes

1. This analytical perspective is essentially that used by Betty Zisk in her examination of the predisposition of council-manager council members in the San Francisco Bay area. See Betty H. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), pp. 2-3.

2. See, for example, Grant McConnell, *Private Power in American Democracy* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1966); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); and Henry Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961).

3. The importance for bureaucrats of cultivating client group support for their bureau's continued survival has been documented by many scholars. Among them is Anthony Downs who argues that generation of external support is vital to a bureau's ability to "impress those politicians who control the budget that its functions generate political support or meet vital social needs." In essence, we are looking for evidence in council-manager government that such bureau-interest group relations are sanctioned by the official actors of that government. See Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 7.

4. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, p. 75.

5. Ibid., pp. 288-289, 291.

6. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics*, pp. 75, 143.

7. Ibid., p. 143.

CHAPTER V

COMMUNITY AND PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS AS SOURCES
OF COMMUNITY GROUP POLICY ROLE ATTITUDES

In Chapter 3, the reader was reminded that certain characteristics of the socio-political environment in which a policy actor finds himself may have an impact on his policy role orientations as well as on his substantive policy maps. Environmental factors might also have an effect on other kinds of attitudes held by the actor, such as his orientations and expectations toward the role interest groups ought to play in the policy-making process. On the one hand, the actor's attitudes towards interest groups in general and their proper policy-making roles are in themselves environmental (and thereby independent if not necessarily antecedent) variables impinging on the actor's policy role attitudes. On the other hand, his attitudes toward interest group policy roles may be partially shaped by his awareness of the nature of interest group influence in his community or by his affinity to some groups and antipathy toward others. Interest group orientations, then, become the dependent rather than the independent variables. Figure 5.1 illustrates the dual role played by interest group orientations. Chapter 6 will be concerned with the relationship between boxes B and C.

FIGURE 5.1

A SCHEMA OF COGNIZANT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ATTITUDINAL
VARIABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS

This chapter will attempt to (1) describe the degree of cognizance held by municipal officials of the nature of community group influence, and (2) analyze the relationship between other environmental factors (box A') and interest group attitudes (box B).

Cognizance of the Nature of Community Group Influence

The notion of cognizance as used here refers to the actor's awareness of the existence and nature of community group influence. More specifically, it refers to the actor's perception of which groups are influential in his community, the nature of that influence, the modes of contact between himself and community groups, and the positive or negative response of groups to his policy actions. The measurement indicators for these factors are based on several open-ended questions to which city managers, council members and department heads were asked to respond (see Appendix B). The response rate was disappointingly low. The two questions asking respondents to identify those groups in the community that were either the most critical or most supportive of the job the respondent was doing drew less than a 50 percent response rate and were excluded from analysis. Of the remaining three questions, 23.3 percent of all respondents did not list those groups they felt to be the most influential, 31.6 percent failed to give any reasons for why they felt these groups were influential, and 40.5 percent declined to list the ways in which groups go about enlisting the actor's support. Because of the rather low response rate for these questions, analysis of the relationships between boxes A and B of Figure 5.1 was not attempted. Yet, analysis of some of the indicators of box A has shed

some light on the respondents' cognizance of the nature of group influence in their communities.

Identifying Influential Community Groups

The first measurement indicator of the actors' cognizance of group influence is a ranking of influential groups. The respondents were asked to list in order of importance those community groups they perceived as being the most influential. The number of cases (N) appearing in Table 5.1 reflect the number of times a group was ranked by respondents as being the most influential. These groups were then classified by the author according to their common characteristics and placed in specific categories.[1] This method was used for analysis of the three measurement indicators displayed in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.

The classification scheme for the first four categories listed in Table 5.1 is based on the common sense notion that economic interests tend to be important interests in community politics. The "general interest" categories include those community interests concerned primarily with boosting the general economic, social or political health of the community. General economic interests would include the Chamber of Commerce, Jaycees, downtown development associations, etc. ,General civic interests would include the League of Women Voters, beautification committees, good government associations, etc. The "special economic interest" categories include those community interests such as labor unions, manufacturing or commercial establishments, realtors, taxpayer groups, etc., that often have specific interests to advance or protect when they participate in the policy-making process. The "other special interest category is made up of non-economic groups--racial groups,

TABLE 5.1

COMMUNITY INTEREST GROUPS RANKED AS MOST INFLUENTIAL BY CITY MANAGERS,
COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Community Interests	All Respondents	City Managers	All Council Members	Mayors	Other Council Members	All Dept. Heads	Police Chiefs	Fire Chiefs
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
General Economic Interests	58.9	61.5	58.3	60.9	57.9	61.7	52.6	67.9
General Civic Interests	10.0	7.7	10.9	21.8	9.0	8.5	5.3	10.7
Special Economic Interests	13.0	15.4	11.5	4.3	12.8	17.0	21.0	14.3
Other Special Interests	8.2	7.7	7.7	8.7	7.5	10.0	15.8	7.1
News Media	1.3	0.0	2.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Public Employees and Other Officials	4.3	7.7	5.1	4.3	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Party Officials, Elites and Other	4.3	0.0	4.5	0.0	5.3	2.1	5.3	0.0
Total	100.0 (231)a	100.0 (26)	100.0 (156)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (133)	100.0 (47)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (28)
No Responseb	23.3	39.5	17.5	25.8	15.8	31.9	40.6	24.3

aNumber of cases.

bThe percentage of respondents not responding to this question.

neighborhood preservation associations, etc. Categories five through seven of Table 5.1 were included primarily because the news media, municipal employee groups, and elites are often perceived as having policy interests which they attempt to advance at times in ways similar to those used by organized lobbying or pressure groups.[2]

General economic groups were named most often as having the most influence in community affairs. This pattern holds true for council members, city managers and department heads. Special economic interests come in a distant second in rank. Two other patterns are worth noting. First, there is a slight tendency for department heads and especially police chiefs to be a bit more likely than any other actor to name special economic and civic groups as being the most influential. While this may be a result of the small number of cases under examination, it may also be possible that the police are more cognizant of particularized interests in the community since the police deal more commonly with the problems of specific groups than they do with generalized policy questions. Also, as policy implementers, department heads may be more likely to come into contact with the problems of specific groups than they do with generalized policy questions. Also, as policy implementers department heads may be more likely to come into contact with specific interests in the community than with the generalized groups with which the manager and council must deal. The second pattern is that mayors seem a bit more likely to name general civic groups as being influential than do other members of the council. The added ceremonial and social duties of the mayor may influence him to perceive that civic organizations are important agents in community politics.

The responses depicted in Table 5.1 also indicate that the influence of the news media, municipal employees or other extra-municipal government officials, party officials or individual elites is perceived to be virtually nonexistent. The wording of the question[3] may have led the respondents to deliberately focus on the conventional definition of an interest group and thus consciously leave media or employee interests out of their calculations. On the other hand, the respondents may have perceived the media and employee interests as being group interests but with no influence at all or with influence that differs in kind from that exercised by the traditional pressure group.

The Reasons for Group Influence

A second important cluster of indicators of the cognizance of group influence is the "reason for influence" perceived by the actors.[4] The categories in Table 5.2 indicate a fairly broad range of reasons why groups are influential. "Objective strength" indicates that groups are seen as influential because certain organizational attributes they have are key contributors to and have an impact on the health of the community. For example, this category includes groups which are powerful because of the number of votes it is perceived they can withhold or deliver (labor unions), the size of their membership (organized ethnic groups), their economic impact on the community (dominant industries), or the extent to which they can either support or challenge the power structure (most well organized groups united and adamant in their purpose). The category "stake in the community" includes those groups whose influence is seen as coming from some kind of vital tie between their own self interest and community policy

TABLE 5.2

REASONS FOR COMMUNITY GROUP INFLUENCE RANKED AS MOST IMPORTANT
BY CITY MANAGERS, COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Reasons for Group Influence	All Respondents	City Managers	All Council Members	Mayors	Other Council Members	All Dept. Heads	Police Chiefs	Fire Chiefs
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Objective Strength	48.5	67.9	41.3	15.8	45.4	60.0	52.6	66.6
Stake in Community	10.2	10.7	8.7	0.0	10.1	15.0	15.8	14.3
Respect	37.4	17.8	46.4	78.9	41.2	20.0	26.3	14.3
Other	3.9	3.6	3.6	5.3	3.3	5.0	5.3	4.8
Total	100.0 (206)[a]	100.0 (28)	100.0 (138)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (119)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (21)
No Response[b]	31.6	34.9	27.0	38.7	24.7	42.0	40.6	43.2

[a]Number of cases.

[b]The percentage of respondents not responding to this question.

211

(realtors, homeowners, downtown merchants). They can be said to have a "stake" in community policy making. This category is based not so much on the impact of the group's actions on the community as on the impact of the community's policy decisions on the group—these groups must be influential in order to survive. A third category contains groups whose perceived influence is based on a special respect they enjoy in the eyes of public officials. For example, those groups which demonstrate a special concern for the community's general well being have reputations for fair-mindedness, are well informed, or have a special competence needed by the policy makers are often perceived as having influence. Civic improvement groups, the League of Women Voters, academic groups, etc., often fall into this category.

These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, the community that refuses to appropriate funds for drilling a new water well may clash head on with a manufacturing concern whose need for a new water supply is critical. The city is the only source of water and the company employs one-half of the town's labor force. In this case, the company is influential because it has a vital "stake" in community policy and because its economic well-being is crucial to that of the community. Yet, these categories may be mutually exclusive to the extent that they reflect a perception by the respondents of the primary reason for a group's influence (e.g., the company employs one-half of the town's work force but can obtain alternate supplies of water).

As indicated in Table 5.2, a majority of city managers and department heads chose objective strength reasons for the influence of

community groups. Council members, on the other hand, tended to divide their choices fairly evenly between objective strength and respect reasons. Police chiefs were a bit more likely to choose respect characteristics than fire chiefs, and mayors were much more likely to do so than other members of council. Two possible explanations for council member attitudes can be offered here. One is that the council member as politician is more likely to give generalized rhetorical responses, while the non-elected official is more likely to forego political rhetoric and "tell the truth" about why groups have influence. The other more plausible reason is that interest groups often have multiple reasons for being influential. Most interest groups can be said to have both altruistic and selfish motives for attempting to influence policy. The council member-politician (and especially the mayor) may come into contact more frequently than the bureaucrat with the altruism expressed by groups over broad policy matters. The non-elected official, as a policy implementer, however, comes into greater contact with behavior of groups that reflects day-to-day self-interest and impact on the community. This is probably true for both police and fire chiefs, even though the slightly higher response rate for respect characteristics among police chiefs may be due to a somewhat great politicization of their jobs.

The Nature of Group Contact

A third indicator of the cognizance of group influence is concerned with how community groups come into contact with these actors in order to influence policy decisions.[5] The categories presented in Table 5.3 are based on the distinction between public and private

213

TABLE 5.3

THE NATURE OF ACTOR-COMMUNITY GROUP CONTACT AS PERCEIVED BY CITY MANAGERS,
COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND DEPARTMENT HEADS

Nature of Group Contact	All Respondents	City Managers	All Council Members	Mayors	Other Council Members	All Dept. Heads	Police Chiefs	Fire Chiefs
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Informal	8.9	18.2	7.0	4.3	7.6	10.3	18.2	5.6
Moderately Formal	73.2	63.6	79.7	78.3	80.0	51.7	36.4	61.1
Formal	17.9	18.2	13.3	17.4	12.4	37.8	45.4	33.3
Total	100.0 (179)[a]	100.0 (22)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (105)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (18)
No Response[b]	40.5	48.8	32.3	25.8	33.5	57.4	64.5	51.4

[a]Number of cases.

[b]The percentage of respondents not responding to this question.

214

contact that either bypasses or follows proper channels. Informal
methods of contact involve completely behind-the-scenes, unofficial,
social gatherings and events exemplified by ear-bending over a Friday
afternoon beer or a Saturday morning round of golf. Moderately formal
methods of contact are usually private but are carried on during working
hours using conventional means of communication--phone calls, private
meetings with the manager, lunch with the mayor, etc. Formal techniques,
however, are conducted strictly through channels and almost always
before the public eye (especially today with the advent of sunshine laws
in many states). The Rotary luncheon address, the official letter to
the Tuesday night council meeting, and other formal measures exemplify
this approach.

As indicated in Table 5.3, managers and council members over-
whelmingly choose the moderately formal methods as those most often
used by groups to gain access to policy makers and to influence their
decisions. While a majority of department heads choose the same cate-
gory of techniques, they appear to be less likely to do so than the
other actors. Police chiefs are especially likely to indicate formal
techniques as those most often used by community groups, possibly
because of the sensitive nature of their jobs and their greater need
for good publicity and community relations.

Sources of Community Group Role Attitudes

Cognizance of the nature of group influence in community
policy making is but one factor of the environment determining atti-
tudes toward the legitimacy of community group participation in the
making of policy. The remainder of this chapter examines the relationships

between the interest group role attitudes of municipal officials and certain background attributes of the actors and the communities in which they perform.

City Managers as Pluralists

Community Background. The data examined here reveal few important relationships between the community group policy role orientations of city managers and community characteristics. As defined in Chapter 4, Consensual city managers are those who decide that council solidarity becomes more important than interest group access to policy makers at some point in the policy process. Pluralists, however, award interest group access a higher priority than council solidarity. As indicated in Table 5.4, Pluralist managers are more likely to be found in more densely populated cities. If density can be taken as a measure of complexity, then perhaps managers in these more complex cities serve as power brokers attempting to balance the conflicting claims of many groups for scarce resources. This conclusion, however, must be framed with caution. Indicators of community diversity and status that we would expect to point to the presence of active group competition—high proportions of "ethnics" and racial minorities, and lower educational and occupational levels among the population—do not appear to relate to managerial interest group orientations.

There also appears to be no relationship between department head expectations of the manager's interest group orientations and community characteristics. Although the patterns of percentages presented in Table 5.4 indicate some relationships, they were not found to be statistically significant. Similarly, no relationships were found

216

TABLE 5.4

CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS AND ALTERS' EXPECTATIONS
FOR THAT ORIENTATION, BY COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

Actor Attitudes	Community Characteristics					
	Population		Population Density[a]		Population Change	
	25,000-50,000	Over 50,000	Less than 2250[a]	2250 and over	Under[d] 15% gain	15% gain or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent $Q= .57$, ps[b]	percent	percent
Managers' Orientations						
Consensual	57.9	39.1	60.0	29.4	40.0	58.8
Pluralist	42.1	60.9	40.0	70.6	60.0	41.2
	100.0 (19)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (17)
Department Heads' Expectations						
Consensual	58.7	43.5	54.2	52.4	51.4	61.3
Pluralist	41.3	56.5	45.8	47.6	48.6	38.7
	100.0 (46)[c]	100.0 (23)[c]	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (37)	100.0 (31)
Council Members' Expectations						
Consensual	60.4	70.1	65.8	63.2	63.5	61.9
Pluralist	39.6	29.9	34.2	34.8	36.5	38.1
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (68)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (84)

217

TABLE 5.4-Continued

Actor Attitudes	Proportion of Foreign Stock		Proportion Negro		Median Family Income	
	Less than 5%	5% or more	Less than 10%	10% or more	Less than $8000	$8000 or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Managers' Orientations						
Consensual	58.3	43.3	50.0	44.4	61.5	41.4
Pluralist	41.7	56.7	50.0	55.6	38.5	58.6
	100.0 (12)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)
Department Heads' Expectations						
Consensual	57.7	51.2	73.5	54.5	55.0	53.1
Pluralist	42.3	48.8	26.5	45.5	45.0	46.9
	100.0 (26)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (49)
Council Members' Expectations						
Consensual	64.1	65.3	63.7	67.2	59.6	66.9
Pluralist	35.9	34.7	36.3	32.8	40.4	33.1
	100.0 (64)	100.0 (124)	100.0 (124)	100.0 (64)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (136)

Community Characteristics

218

TABLE 5.4-Continued

	Community Characteristics					
	Proportion of College Graduates		Proportion of High School Graduates		Proportion of White Collar Workers	
Actor Attitudes	Less than 15%	15% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Managers' Orientations						
Consensual	46.9	50.0	44.8	53.8	43.8	50.0
Pluralist	53.1	50.0	55.2	46.2	56.3	50.0
	100.0 (32)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (26)
Department Heads' Expectations						
Consensual	50.0	63.2	37.5	58.3	60.9	50.0
Pluralist	50.0	36.8	62.5	41.5	39.1	50.0
	100.0 (50)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (46)
Council Members' Expectations						
Consensual	65.9	62.3	58.7	66.9	61.2	66.9
Pluralist	34.1	37.7	41.3	33.1	38.8	33.1
	100.0 (135)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (46)	100.0 (142)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (121)

TABLE 5.4—Continued

[a]Persons per square mile.

[b]See Chapter 1 for an explanation of Q.

[c]The cutting point for these respondents is at 75,000 population.

[d]Including cities having lost population.

between community characteristics and the expectations of council members for the manager's interest group orientations. As indicated in Table 5.4, in all categories of community characteristics, the majority of council members expected the manager to adopt the Consensual orientation.

Personal and Professional Background. The hypothesis can be advanced that the personal, professional and philosophical backgrounds of city managers play a role in determining their attitudes toward the legitimacy of interest group activity in the community policy-making process. The data exhibited in Table 5.5 indicate few relationships between the interest group orientations of managers and their personal attributes. Professionalism, whether measured by credentials or experience, does not appear to affect--with one exception--whether the manager adopts a Pluralist or a Consensualist orientation. The question seems to equally divide managers regardless of their professional differences. The lone exception is level of education. College educated managers appear to embrace the Pluralist orientation much more readily than do their counterparts without college degrees. College educated managers may sympathize with the legitimacy of a role for groups in policy making. Because of their educational exposure, they also may be more confident of their ability to play the group brokerage "game."

There appears to be a fairly strong relationship between the manager's partisanship and his interest group orientations. Non-partisan managers tend to be Pluralists while their older and partisan counterparts tend to be Consensual. Perhaps the nonpartisan manager

TABLE 5.5

CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS, BY CITY MANAGERS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	City Managers' Characteristics					
	Education Level		Education Field		Career Experience	
	No Degree	College Degree	Prof. or Business	Other	General Pub. Admin.	Specialized-Technical
	percent Q=.68, ps	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	80.0	43.2	50.0	37.5	45.5	55.6
Pluralist	20.0	56.8	50.0	62.5	54.5	44.4
	100.0 (15)	100.0 (57)	100.0 (32)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (9)

	City Manager Experience		Present Tenure		Government Experience		
	10 years or less	Over 10 years	5 years or less	Over 5 years	15 years or less	16-20 years	Over 20 years
Consensual	52.2	44.4	48.0	50.0	41.2	46.2	58.3
Pluralist	47.8	55.6	52.0	50.0	58.8	53.8	41.7
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (12)

TABLE 5.5-Continued

City Managers' Interest Group Orientations (Continued)	City Managers' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Appointment Type		Age		Partisanship	
	From outside city	From city ranks	21-50 years	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	43.5	52.6	37.9	60.0	68.4	31.8
Pluralist	56.5	47.4	62.1	40.0	31.6	68.2
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (22)

	Conservative-Liberal Index		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Consensual	52.4	38.9	50.0	42.1	47.6	45.0
Pluralist	47.6	61.1	50.0	57.9	52.4	55.0
	100.0 (21)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (20)

sees the need to enlist the aid of organized community interests in developing alternative policy solutions. The partisan manager may be more attached to traditional manager role anchors that leave policy determination to council members and party activists where experience and custom have taught him it properly belongs. Finally, philosophical attitudes appear to have no relation to interest group orientations.

As revealed in Table 5.6, professionalism among department heads does not appear to relate to expectations for managerial interest group orientations. The only indicator of professionalism of consequence here is field of education. Technically trained department heads are less likely to approve of Pluralist managers than their generalist trained counterparts.

Finally, one relationship between interest group expectations and political philosophy is exhibited in Table 5.6. Department head attachment to political conservatism goes hand in hand with a Consensual interest group expectation for the manager.

The expectations of council members for managers' interest group orientations appear to relate to only a few of the council member attributes examined here. As indicated in Table 5.7, occupation, political philosophy and ideology are related to interest group expectations. Council members from "higher-status" occupations appear to adopt the Consensual position as do Conservatives and those who feel that government involvement in private affairs should be limited.

Department Heads as Pluralists

Community Background. In Chapter 4 it was noted that the vast majority of department heads consider their proper orientation toward

224

TABLE 5.6

DEPARTMENT HEADS' EXPECTATIONS FOR CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS,
BY DEPARTMENT HEADS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Expectations of City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	Department Heads' Characteristics						
	Education Level		Education Field		Department Head Experience		
	No College	College	Specialized Technical	Non-Technical	5 years or less	6-10 years	Over 10 years
Manager Should Be:	percent	percent	percent $Q = .48$, ps	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	56.5	52.3	64.0	38.7	51.4	58.8	52.9
Pluralist	43.5	47.7	36.0	61.3	48.6	41.2	47.1
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (17)

	Appointment Type		Prior Government Service		Years Government Service		
	From outside city	From city ranks	Yes	No	15 years or less	16-20 years	Over 20 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	-57.1	53.7	57.1	52.8	40.0	64.3	52.4
Pluralist	42.9	46.3	42.9	47.2	60.0	35.7	47.6
	100.0 (14)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (42)

TABLE 5.6-Continued

Department Heads' Expectations (Continued)	Department Heads' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Age		Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	21-50 years	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
					Q= .36, ps	
Consensual	56.8	44.8	51.9	56.3	61.5	42.9
Pluralist	43.2	55.2	48.1	43.7	38.5	57.1
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Consensual	55.0	48.0	60.0	44.8
Pluralist	45.0	52.0	40.0	55.2
	100.0 (40)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (29)

TABLE 5.7

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS OF CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Council Members' Expectations of City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	Council Members' Characteristics						
	Age			Education Level		Education Field	
	21-40 years	41-50 years	Over 50 years	No College	College	Prof./ Business	Other
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
City Managers should be:							
Consensual	69.8	63.9	62.9	58.1	68.3	67.9	58.9
Pluralist	30.2	36.1	37.1	41.9	31.7	32.1	41.1
	100.0 (43)	100.0 (72)	100.0 (70)	100.0 (62)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (106)	100.0 (73)

	Occupation		Prior Community Service		Council Experience		
	Managerial/ Prof./ Business	Other	Political or Government	Other or none	2 years or less	3-4 years	5 years or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q= .30, ps						
Consensual	70.8	56.2	65.5	58.9	68.9	63.3	61.1
Pluralist	29.2	43.8	34.5	41.1	31.1	36.7	38.9
	100.0 (105)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (74)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (54)

TABLE 5.7-Continued

Council Members' Expectations (Continued)	Council Members' Characteristics (Continued)						
	Length of Residence			Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	10 years or less	11-20 years	Over 20 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Managers should be:						$Q = .35$, ps	
Consensual	76.0	59.3	64.8	64.1	65.9	72.7	55.6
Pluralist	24.0	40.7	35.2	35.9	34.1	27.8	44.4
	100.0 (25)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (145)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (97)	100.0 (81)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index		Reasons for Running for Council Post	
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive	Represent Group	Represent Issue, Service
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	$Q = .43$, ps					
Consensual	74.0	53.1	64.1	65.9	52.9	66.0
Pluralist	26.0	46.9	35.9	34.1	47.1	34.0
	100.0 (100)	100.0 (81)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (82)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (159)

228

interest group policy activity as Consensual. They do not wish to upset the policy-making partnership between the manager and the council by allowing groups to influence their own actions without manager or council approval. This attachment to the Consensualist position is true of department heads regardless of the nature of the communities they serve. As indicated in Table 5.8, department head orientations toward interest groups appear to be related to only one of the community indicators-- college educated population. Department heads from communities with high proportions of college graduates among their populations are less likely to adopt the Consensualist orientation. Community interests in these cities may be more politically active and knowledgeable than elsewhere, thereby forcing department heads to pay closer attention to group demands. Finally, manager expectations of department head interest group orientations also appear to be unrelated to all community characteristics.

Council member expectations appear to be related to only two community characteristics (Table 5.8). Council members from higher status communities, as measured by high school graduates in the population, are more likely to recognize the need for a Pluralist orientation among department heads. The same is true for council members from cities with higher population densities.

The Consensual orientation is demanded of department heads in all communities except for those higher-status communities whose citizen interests may be politically sophisticated. In such cities, the ability of community interests to attract the attention of department heads is recognized by council members as well as middle-management department heads.

TABLE 5.8

DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS AND ALTERS' EXPECTATIONS
FOR THAT ORIENTATION, BY COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

	Community Characteristics					
	Population		Population Density[a]		Population Change	
Actor Attitudes	25,000-74,999	75,000 or more	Under 2250[a]	2250 or more	Less than 15% gain[c]	15% gain or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations						
Consensual	76.1	60.9	68.8	76.2	75.7	67.8
Pluralist	23.9	39.1	31.3	23.8	24.3	32.2
	100.0 (46)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (48)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (37)	100.0 (31)
City Managers' Expectations						
Consensual	37.5	54.5	45.5	50.0	50.0	43.8
Pluralist	62.5	45.5	54.5	50.0	50.0	56.2
	100.0 (16)[b]	100.0 (22)[b]	100.0 (22)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (16)
Council Members' Expectations	$Q = .30$, ps					
Consensual	69.3	59.8	70.0	55.9	62.4	64.3
Pluralist	30.7	40.2	30.0	44.1	37.6	35.7
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (120)	100.0 (68)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (84)

TABLE 5.8–Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Community Characteristics (Continued)					
	Proportion Foreign Stock		Proportion Negro		Median Family Income	
	Less than 5%	5% or more	Less than 10%	10% or more	Under $8000	$8000 or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations						
Consensual	65.4	74.4	66.7	75.0	80.0	67.3
Pluralist	34.6	25.6	33.3	25.0	20.0	32.7
	100.0 (26)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (49)
City Managers' Expectations						
Consensual	36.4	51.9	50.0	43.8	63.6	40.7
Pluralist	63.6	48.1	50.0	56.3	36.4	39.3
	100.0 (11)	100.0 (27)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (27)
Council Members' Expectations						
Consensual	64.1	65.3	67.5	60.0	72.5	62.0
Pluralist	35.9	34.7	32.5	40.0	27.5	38.0
	100.0 (64)	100.0 (124)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (137)

TABLE 5.8—Continued

Actor Attitudes (Continued)	Community Characteristics (Continued)					
	Proportion of College Graduates		Proportion of High School Graduates		Proportion of White Collar Workers	
	Less than 15%	15% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 50%	50% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads' Orientations	Q = .39, ps					
Consensual	76.0	57.9	81.3	67.9	65.2	73.9
Pluralist	24.0	42.1	18.7	32.1	34.8	26.1
	100.0 (50)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (46)
City Managers' Expectations						
Consensual	48.3	44.4	50.0	41.7	53.3	43.5
Pluralist	51.7	55.6	50.0	58.3	46.7	56.5
	100.0 (29)	100.0 (9)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (23)
Council Members' Expectations	Q = .32, ps					
Consensual	66.4	61.1	75.6	61.5	70.1	62.0
Pluralist	33.6	38.9	24.4	38.5	29.9	38.0
	100.0 (134)	100.0	100.0 (45)	100.0 (143)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (121)

232

TABLE 5.8-Continued

aPopulation per square mile.

bThe cutting point for these respondents is at 50,000 population.

cIncluding cities having lost population.

Personal and Professional Background. If professionalism among

department heads is defined as policy making through the application of

expertise, then young professionals with college degrees might be ex-

pected to be anti-group Consensualists. If, however, professionalism

is also characterized by governmental experience and a sophisticated

awareness of political reality, the older "professional" department head

should exhibit pro-group attitudes. The data exhibited in Table 5.9,

however, indicate that these two profiles of professional attributes not

only face in opposite directions but also face in directions opposite

those hypothesized. Three indicators of professionalism--one from the

credential dimension and three from the experience dimension--appear to

be associated with group orientations. College educated department heads

are likely to have Pluralist orientations and so do those department

heads with no prior governmental service, and those with 15 years ser-

vice or less. Two personal attributes--age and political philosophy--

also relate to interest group orientations. Older and more conservative

department heads are most likely to be Consensualists.

Those older, politically conservative department heads with

many years of government service but without college educations are

definitely Consensual in their orientations toward community groups.

Their perspective may be that of implementers rather than policy makers;

and they may resist group pressures that clash with council or manager

decisions. They also may reject group pressures as being at odds with

their own experienced judgment or their perceived right to give the

council advice based on their years of experience and expertise unencum-

bered by "political" considerations. By contrast, the stereotypical

TABLE 5.9

DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations	Department Heads' Characteristics					
	Education Level		Education Field		Department Head Experience	
	No College	College	Specialized/ Technical	Non- Technical	5 years or less	Over 5 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads Should Be:	Q = .46, ps					
Consensual	82.6	63.6	64.0	67.1	68.6	73.5
Pluralist	17.4	36.4	36.0	32.3	31.4	26.5
	100.0 (23)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (34)

	Appointment Type		Prior Government Service		Years Government Service	
	Outside this city	Within this city	Yes	No	15 years or less	Over 15 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
					Q = .51, ps	
Consensual	64.3	72.2	85.7	66.0	54.2	78.6
Pluralist	35.7	27.8	14.3	34.0	45.8	21.4
	100.0 (14)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (42)

235

TABLE 5.9-Continued

Department Heads' Orientations (Continued)	Department Heads' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Age		Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	21-50 years	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q = .65, ps				Q = .69, ps	
Consensual	56.8	86.2	75.0	62.5	84.6	50.0
Pluralist	43.2	13.8	25.0	37.5	15.4	50.0
	100.0 (37)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (28)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
Consensual	72.5	64.0	72.5	69.0
Pluralist	27.5	36.0	27.5	31.0
	100.0 (40)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (29)

young, politically liberal, and college educated but inexperienced department head is Pluralist in his orientations. He not only rejects a role confining him only to policy implementation, but he also rejects the notion that group contact must only come at the level of council deliberations. This department head may need the experienced advice of some community groups. He may also wish to demonstrate his "sensitivity" to community needs by listening carefully to the expressed concerns of community groups.

Professionalism also helps account for the expectations managers have for the group orientations of their department heads. Both dimensions of professionalism point in the same direction (Table 5.10). Relatively inexperienced, highly educated, and politically liberal managers trained as generalists and appointed from outside their present cities are more likely to tolerate a Pluralist orientation among their department heads.

Finally, personal attributes do not appear to explain the expectations of council members for department head group orientations (Table 5.11). Council members consistently expect department heads to adopt Consensualist positions viz-a-viz community groups.

Group Support for Tenure Politicking Attitude Sources

As indicated in Chapter 4, the cultivation of group support for politicking reasons is overwhelmingly regarded as an illegitimate activity for managers and department heads. This taboo is especially true for managers regardless of their personal or philosophical backgrounds or the features of the community in which the managers work. The same

237

TABLE 5.10

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS,
BY CITY MANAGERS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

City Managers' Expectations of Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations	City Managers' Characteristics						
	Education Level			Education Field		Career Experience	
	No Degree	Bach. Degree	Grad. Degree	Prof. or Business	Other	General Pub. Admin.	Specialized/ Technical
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:	$x^2 = 7.25$, ps[a]					Q= .55, ps	
Consensual	75.0	58.8	29.4	48.5	40.0	41.9	71.4
Pluralist	25.0	41.2	70.6	51.5	60.0	58.1	28.6
	100.0 (4)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (7)

	City Manager Experience		Present Tenure		Government Experience		
	10 years or less	Over 10 years	5 years or less	Over 5 years	15 years or less	16-20 years	Over 20 years
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
					$x^2 = 5.95$, ps		
Consensual	45.0	47.1	45.5	53.3	35.3	45.5	70.0
Pluralist	55.0	52.9	54.5	46.7	64.7	54.5	30.0
	100.0 (20)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (10)

TABLE 5.10-Continued

City Managers' Expectations (Continued)	City Managers' Characteristics (Continued)					
	Appointment Type		Age		Partisanship	
	From outside city	From city ranks	21-50 years	Over 50 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q = .78, ps					
Consensual	27.3	75.0	40.7	60.0	53.3	40.9
Pluralist	72.7	25.0	59.3	40.0	46.7	59.1
	100.0 (22)	100.0	100.0 (27)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (22)

	Conservative-Liberal Index		Ideology Index		Government Operations Index	
	Conservative	Liberal	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
	Q = .53, ps					
Consensual	60.0	31.3	55.0	35.3	47.4	44.4
Pluralist	40.0	68.8	45.0	64.7	52.6	55.6
	100.0 (20)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (18)

[a]See Chapter 1 for an explanation of X^2.

TABLE 5.11

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Council Members' Expectations for Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations	Council Members' Characteristics						
	Age			Education Level		Education Field	
	21-40 years	41-50 years	Over 50 years	No College	College	Prof./ Business	Other
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:							
Consensual	72.1	64.4	62.3	63.5	65.6	71.4	56.8
Pluralist	27.9	35.6	37.7	36.5	34.4	28.6	43.2
	100.0 (43)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (69)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (122)	100.0 (62)	100.0 (74)

	Occupation		Length of Residence			Prior Community Experience	
	Managerial/ Professional/ Business	Other	10 years or less	11-20 years	Over 20 years	Political or Govt.	Other or none
Consensual	66.7	61.6	76.0	59.3	64.8	68.2	61.2
Pluralist	33.3	30.4	24.0	40.7	38.2	31.8	38.8
	100.0 (105)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (98)

240

TABLE 5.11-Continued

Council Members' Expectations (Continued)	Council Members' Characteristics (Continued)						
	Council Experience			Partisanship		Conservative-Liberal Index	
	2 years or less	3-4 years	Over 5 years	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Conservative	Liberal
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	64.4	58.3	72.7	62.1	75.6	66.0	63.0
Pluralist	35.6	41.7	27.3	37.9	24.4	34.0	37.0
	100.0 (63)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (55)	100.0 (145)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (81)

	Ideology Index		Government Operations Index		Reasons for Running for Council Post	
						Represent Issues, Service
	Limited	Activist	Active	Passive	Represent Groups	
	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent	percent
Consensual	68.3	63.8	58.8	72.3	70.6	63.1
Pluralist	31.7	36.3	41.2	27.7	29.4	36.9
	100.0 (101)	100.0 (80)	100.0 (102)	100.0 (83)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (160)

is true for department heads with one exception—experience as measured by time on the job.

Department heads with more than five years of experience in their positions are more likely than their less experienced counterparts to allow managers to encourage group support for favored council candidates (Table 5.12). Yet, the experienced department head appears to be less willing to encourage group support for the manager's tenure. The experienced department head appears to recognize the existence of and perhaps a need for managers to cultivate group support for favored council candidates. The same department head, however, appears to eschew group cultivation activities by himself for council candidates or tenure support for the manager.

Council members also overwhelmingly reject group cultivation roles for managers and department heads (Table 4.9). This appears to be true regardless of the personal characteristics of council members or, with the exception of community status, community characteristics (Table 5.13). In those communities with highly educated populations, council members are less tolerant of group cultivation activities by either managers or department heads.

Summary Note

It was expected that Consensualists among appointed officials in municipal government (and their alters who expect them to be Consensual) would most likely be found in smaller, less densely populated, wealthier cities having homogeneous, and perhaps high social status populations. Their Pluralist brethren and their alters were more likely to be found in large, culturally diverse, complex cities.

TABLE 5.12

DEPARTMENT HEADS' TENURE POLITICKING (GROUP SUPPORT) ROLE ATTITUDES,
BY DEPARTMENT HEADS' PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Department Heads' Attitudes	Department Heads' Characteristics			
	Department Head Experience		Prior Government Experience	
	5 years or less	Over 5 years	Yes	No
	percent	percent	percent	percent
Department Heads should:			$Q = .57$	
Encourage Group Support of Manager's Tenure	17.4	23.8	16.7	37.7
Not Encourage . . .	82.5	76.2	83.3	62.3
	100.0 (35)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)
City Managers should:	$Q = .73$, ps			
Encourage Group Support of Council Candidates	8.6	38.1	14.2	20.7
Not Encourage . . .	91.4	61.9	85.8	79.3
	100.0 (35)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (53)

TABLE 5.13

COUNCIL MEMBERS' TENURE POLITICKING (GROUP SUPPORT) EXPECTATIONS,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Council Members' Expectations	Community Characteristics			
	Proportion of High School Graduates		Proportion of College Graduates	
	Less than 50%	50% or more	Less than 15%	15% or more
	percent	percent	percent	percent
City Managers should:	Q = .68, ps		Q = .41, ps	
Encourage Group Support of Council Candidates	28.3	7.0	21.1	10.0
Not Encourage . . .	71.7	93.0	78.9	90.0
	100.0 (46)	100.0 (132)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (150)
Department Heads should:	Q = .39, ps		Q = .93, ps	
Encourage Group Support of Council Candidates	23.9	12.0	47.0	2.9
Not Encourage . . .	76.1	88.0	53.0	97.1
	100.0 (46)	100.0 (141)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (136)

However, little evidence was found to support this hypothesis. While one of the indicators of community status (citizen education) bears some relationship to actor attitudes, only one other indicator of community complexity and diversity (density) does so, and then only under some circumstances.

The analysis of this chapter has also revealed that department heads with much experience but lacking some of the credentials of professionalism are not tolerant of a Pluralist relationship between themselves and community groups. Managers who expect department heads to shun a Pluralist orientation also have experience but lack professional credentials. The evidence leads to the conclusion that experienced managers and department heads who do not possess the "necessary" credentials wish to keep community groups at arms length. Inexperienced appointed officials, however, armed with what are often thought of as the "proper" credentials appear more willing to share some type of policy-making role with community groups.

Notes

1. This categorization is similar to that used in Betty H. Zisk, <u>Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street</u> (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 23.

2. See Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, <u>City Politics</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), Chapters 15 and 21.

3. The question was: "Of the community groups in your city that are active in community affairs, and sometimes appear before the council, which would you say are the most influential? (Please list as many as you can in their order of influence.)"

4. The question asked was: "What would you say makes these groups influential--what are the main reasons for their influence? (Please list as many reasons as you wish in their order of importance.)"

5. The question asked was: "If any of these groups contact you personally, how do they go about doing it? (Please list as many ways as you can think of in their order of importance.)"

CHAPTER VI

POLICY ROLE ATTITUDE MAPS

In Chapter 5, interest group policy attitudes were examined
as dependent variables in relation to their degree of association with
certain environmental variables. In this chapter, the relationship
between boxes B and C of Figure 5.1 will be examined. Since causality
is not presumed here, we will treat both policy role attitudes and
interest group attitudes as independent and dependent variables. The
schematic diagram in Figure 6.1 reflects this modification of the schema
presented in the last chapter.

In 1968, Eulau and Eyestone found it useful to conceive of
the attitudes of municipal officials towards the substance of policy as
perceptual "maps" which these officials developed in the course of
their public careers. As these authors view it, a policy map results
from the "policy-makers' perceptions of problems, policy positions and
policy images."[1] The present study adapts this concept to the analysis
of policy role orientations and expectations. We can conceive of this
study as an analysis of the components of a "policy role attitudinal
map" each actor develops in the course of his public career. The

FIGURE 6.1

A MODIFIED SCHEMA OF COGNIZANT, ENVIRONMENTAL,
AND ATTITUDINAL VARIABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Actors' **A**
Cognizance of
Interest Group
Influence

Interest Group **B**
Policy Role
Orientations and
Expectations

Actors' **C**
Policy Role and
Politicking
Orientations and
Expectations

Other **A'**
Environmental
Variables

preceding chapters described some of these components: policy role
conceptions, interest group attitudes, and some elements of the environ-
ment in which these attitudes are found. As the last step in our
analysis, this chapter fills in the final outlines of the actors' "role
attitude" maps. Here we examine direct relationships among policy role
attitudes, interest group role attitudes, and politicking orientations
and expectations.

Three questions need to be asked about each group of respondents.
First, do the actor's policy role orientations have an association with
his interest group orientations or with his expectations for the
interest group orientations of his alters? Second, do the actor's
interest group orientations relate to his expectations of the policy
role behavior of his alters? Third, do the actor's interest group
orientations relate to his politicking orientations or his expectations
of the politicking orientations of the other actors?

Council Members' Attitude Map

As indicated in Tables 6.1 through 6.3, there is little rela-
tionship between council members' policy role attitudes and their
interest group orientations and expectations. The policy role orien-
tations of council members, for example, appear to have little relation
to their interest group orientations or their expectations for the
interest group relations of city managers. Regardless of whether
council members wish to dominate the policy-making process or share it
with other actors, a slight majority take the Pluralist orientation
toward interest groups (Table 6.1). Likewise, council members regard-
less of their own policy role orientations feel managers should be

TABLE 6.1

COUNCIL MEMBERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Council Members' Interest Group Orientations and Expectations	Council Members' Policy Role Orientations	
	Policy Dominator	Policy Partner
	percent	percent
Council Members should be:	ns[a]	
Consensual	48.4	44.1
Pluralist	51.6	55.9
	100.0 (31)[b]	100.0 (152)
City Managers should be:	ns	
Consensual	58.1	66.2
Pluralist	41.9	33.8
	100.0 (31)	100.0 (154)
Department Heads should be:	Q = .53, ps[c]	
Consensual	83.9	61.0
Pluralist	16.1	39.0
	100.0 (31)	100.0 (154)

[a]ns = not statistically significant.

[b]Number of cases.

[c]See Chapter 1 for an explanation of Q. ps = statistically significant.

Consensual. At some point in the policy-making process the manager is to stress council solidarity over interest group access. If managers are to be Consensual, so too are department heads. Council members who wish to dominate policy making are especially concerned that department heads should choose council solidarity over interest group access at some point in the policy-making process.

Even if the interest group attitudes of council members are little affected by policy role attitudes, do these interest group attitudes themselves affect other attitudes? As indicated in Table 6.2, they apparently do not. Regardless of their interest group orientations, council members feel city managers should not become embroiled in policy disputes among council members, nor should department heads assume policy leadership in departmental operations.

Likewise, the interest group orientations of council members seem to have no effect on their expectations toward the recruiting and supporting roles of city managers and department heads (Table 6.3). Consensual and Pluralist council members alike feel both department heads and managers should remain neutral in the recruitment process, but department heads should support the manager when his continued employment is at stake.

City Managers' Attitude Map

As indicated in Table 6.4, no relationship exists between (1) city managers' policy role orientations and their interest group orientations, and (2) city managers' expectations for the interest group orientations of department heads. Likewise, no relationship exists when the interest group orientations of city managers are

TABLE 6.2

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS OF ALTERS' POLICY ROLES,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

Council Members' Expectations of Alters' Policy Roles	Council Members' Interest Group Orientations	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	percent	percent
City Managers as Policy Disputants should:	ns	
Remain Neutral	71.1	69.6
Take Sides	28.9	30.4
	100.0 (85)	100.0 (102)
In Departmental Operations Department Heads should:	ns	
Assume Policy Leadership	42.7	46.5
Reject Policy Leadership	57.3	53.5
	100.0 (82)	100.0 (101)

TABLE 6.3

COUNCIL MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS OF ALTERS' POLITICKING ROLES,
BY COUNCIL MEMBERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

Council Members' Expectations of Alters' Politicking Roles	Council Members' Interest Group Orientations	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	percent	percent
City Managers should be:	ns	
Recruiters	20.7	29.1
Neutral	79.3	70.9
	100.0 (82)	100.0 (103)
Department Heads should be:	ns	
Recruiters	25.6	28.2
Neutral	74.4	71.8
	100.0 (82)	100.0 (103)
In supporting the manager in his job, Department Heads should:	ns	
Provide Support	70.0	61.8
Remain Neutral	30.0	38.2
	100.0 (80)	100.0 (102)

TABLE 6.4

CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS,
BY CITY MANAGERS' POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	City Managers' Policy Role Orientations	
	Administrator	Policy Partner
	percent	percent
City Managers should be:	ns	
Consensual	46.2	48.3
Pluralist	53.8	51.7
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)
Department Heads should be:	ns	
Consensual	61.5	40.0
Pluralist	38.5	60.0
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (25)
Council Members should be:	ns	
Consensual	46.2	41.4
Pluralist	53.8	58.6
	100.0 (13)	100.0 (29)

treated as the independent variable (Table 6.5). There is no association between the managers' interest group orientations and their expectations for the policy role attitudes of department heads.

The interest group orientations of managers also appear to be unrelated to politicking role attitudes with only one exception—department head recruiting roles. Consensual city managers are more likely to demand that department heads remain neutral in the candidate recruitment process (Table 6.7). This, however, is the only point at which Pluralist managers might allow department heads to cross the line between policy making and politicking.

Department Heads' Attitude Map

There appears to be a strong relationship between the policy role attitudes of department heads and their interest group orientations. As indicated in Table 6.8, department heads who feel their primary role is to implement rather than make public policy also feel that their relations with community groups should be secondary to their duty to carry out the dictates of the manager or the council. Policy Partner department heads are more likely to permit community groups to influence the policy making process. Department head policy role orientations, however, do not appear to be related to expectations for the interest group attitudes of other actors.

When the interest group orientation of a department head is made the independent variable, no relationship between that orientation and policy role expectations can be established (Table 6.9). Consensual department heads are no more likely than Pluralists to want the manager to be merely an administrator or to want council members to

TABLE 6.5

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLES,
BY CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

City Managers' Expectations of Department Head Policy Role Orientations	City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:	ns	
Policy Implementers	65.0	77.3
Policy Partners	35.0	22.7
	100.0 (20)	100.0 (22)

TABLE 6.6

CITY MANAGERS' RECRUITING ORIENTATIONS, BY CITY MANAGERS'
INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

City Managers' Recruiting Orientations	City Managers Interest Group Orientations	
	Pluralist	Consensual
	percent	percent
City Managers should be:	ns	
Election Recruiters	40.9	20.0
Election Neutral	59.1	80.0
	100.0 (22)	100.0 (20)

TABLE 6.7

CITY MANAGERS' EXPECTATIONS OF DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLITICKING ROLES,
BY CITY MANAGERS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

City Managers' Expectations of Department Head Politicking Orientations	City Managers' Interest Group Orientations	
	Pluralist	Consensual
	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:	$Q = .75$, ps	
Election Recruiters	27.3	5.0
Election Neutrals	72.7	95.0
	100.0 (22)	100.0 (20)
In Supporting the Manager in his Job, Department Heads should:	ns	
Provide Support	75.0	55.0
Remain Neutral	25.0	45.0
	100.0 (20)	100.0 (20)
Department Heads should be:		
Election Campaigners	23.8	20.0
Election Neutrals	76.2	80.0
	100.0 (21)	100.0 (20)

TABLE 6.8

DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS,
BY DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations and Expectations	Department Heads' Policy Role Orientations	
	Policy Implementers	Policy Partners
	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:	$Q = .66$, ps	
Consensual	87.1	57.9
Pluralist	12.9	42.1
	100.0 (31)	100.0 (38)
City Managers should be:	ns	
Consensual	64.5	44.7
Pluralist	35.5	55.3
	100.0 (31)	100.0 (38)
Council Members should be:	ns	
Consensual	53.3	42.1
Pluralist	46.7	57.9
	100.0 (30)	100.0 (38)

TABLE 6.9

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS, BY DEPARTMENT HEADS'
INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

Department Heads' Policy Role Expectations	Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations	
	Consensual	Pluralist
	percent	percent
City Managers should be:	ns	
Administrators	42.6	36.4
Policy Partners	57.4	63.6
	100.0 (47)	100.0 (22)
Council Members should be:		
Policy Leaders	76.1	81.8
Policy Sharers	23.9	18.2
	100.0 (46)	100.0 (22)

share the initiative in shaping policy with others outside the council.

There does appear to be a relationship between the interest group orientations of department heads and one politicking attitude (Table 6.10). Consensualists are far less likely than Pluralists to become involved when questions of the manager's tenure arise--only a slight majority would support a manager they respect when his job is on the line.

Interpretation

The findings reported above indicate that neither policy role attitudes nor interest group orientations have much of a reciprocal impact. They are independent of each other as influences on policy decisions. The primary exception appears to be for department heads. When policy role orientations are treated as the independent variable, the inclination of department heads to be Policy Implementers or Policy Partners has an impact on whether this actor is Consensual or Pluralist in his group orientations.

One plausible explanation for these findings is that the department head has far more daily contact with community interests than does the manager or council member. Citizens tend to react rather than act--they provide feedback about policy decisions at the point of implementation. This feedback is aimed at the most directly responsible, and often the most immediately accessible, "street-level" bureaucrat[2]--the department head through his staff. It is small wonder, then, that the department head sees community interest groups as either important participants in the decision-making process or as antagonists to avoid when at all possible.

TABLE 6.10

DEPARTMENT HEADS' POLITICKING ROLE ORIENTATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS,
BY DEPARTMENT HEADS' INTEREST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

Department Heads' Politicking Orientations and Expectations	Department Heads' Interest Group Orientations	
	Pluralist	Consensual
	percent	percent
Department Heads should be:	ns	
Election Recruiters	47.4	30.6
Election Neutrals	52.6	69.4
	100.0 (19)	100.0 (49)
City Managers should be:	ns	
Election Recruiters	50.0	31.9
Election Neutrals	50.0	68.1
	100.0 (22)	100.0 (47)
In Supporting the Manager in his Job, Department Heads should:	Q = .86, ps	
Provide Support	95.0	57.1
Remain Neutral	5.0	42.9
	100.0 (20)	100.0 (49)

As pointed out in Chapter 4, managers and council members are oriented positively toward considering the views of community groups when making policy decisions. The absence of a link between interest group and policy role attitudes for these actors, however, leads to the conclusion that two separate dimensions are in view. For the manager and council member, considering group views when making policy is legitimate, but including groups as full members of the policy making process is not. Managers and council members do not appear to modify their orientations in order to accommodate groups as members of the governing system. In essence, the policy role "attitudinal" maps of all three actors do not include interest groups as equal members. The department head's map does accept greater participation by community interests, but this is only a matter of degree. The conclusion, then, is the same as that reached by Betty Zisk--interaction between community groups and government officials occurs on a one-way street.[3]

Notes

1. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 126.

2. Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 6 (June 1971): 391-409.

3. Betty H. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), pp. 142-143.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Two Definitions of Policy Making

This study has revealed that the traditional policy making role anchors of council manager government are still largely intact. Yet, a potential for role conflict and, therefore, a challenge to these role anchors has been uncovered at several points in the system of policy role relationships. That potential for conflict, however, does not take the form of a complete polarization of views whereby each actor sees the other as engaging in a completely unwarranted intrusion into his sovereign domain. A difference of opinion as to who rightfully dominates the policy making process appears simultaneously with a fundamental agreement that policy making is a shared task. One key to understanding this seeming contradition is a recognition that council-manager actors continually jostle for position on the continuum of policy role attitudes discussed in Chapter II. The degree to which each actor engages in policy initiating/promoting versus policy administering actions determines the degree of role conflict. The contradiction discovered here can also be explained by tying the definitions of policy functions to the key actors' perceptual definitions of these functions. These perceptual

265

definitions result in a perspective of policy roles that is quite different from the continuum examined in earlier chapters.

The continuum developed in chapters II and IV are based on an academic perspective composed of (1) functions that must be performed in the decision-making process, (2) structures in which these functions are to be carried out, and (3) actors performing the functions within their proper structural contexts (or role anchors). The notion of policy explored here, however, focuses on two opposing views of policy decision-making. Decision-making functions are conceived of by some actors as primarily value-setting in nature. Other actors view the making of policy decisions as being primarily an exercise in technical problem solving. The first conception defines policy in terms of relations between citizens as human beings with individual values, biases, fears and prejudices. In this dimension of policy making, policy is concerned with making hard choices between conflicting values in the community. Trade-offs and compromises in regard to the attempt to apply limited resources to the Benthemian goal of "the greatest good for the greatest number" are at the heart of the policy. Tapping sources of political power for support of policies, or neutralizing them in order to prevent policies and programs from being blocked or disfigured, becomes the key element in policy-making. The elected council member defines policy in these terms and regards policy activities as his exclusive sphere of activity. As long as the manager and/or department heads do not encroach on this territory, policy making cannot be usurped by non-elected officials.

The second conception defines policy in a much different sense. Policy is conceived of as the result of making rational decisions. Those decisions are to be based on the facts of a given situation, the application of technical expertise and the principles of professional management. The steps and procedures of rational decision-making are applied to political questions as well as technical concerns. As a result, both daily administrative tasks and questions of political value and power are treated as though they are all questions of policy. The parameters of policy action, therefore, are not to be regarded as the exclusive domain of the elected official. The technical bureaucrat comes to define policy making of any type as rational decision making in which he should be rightfully involved.

These dimensions of policy are not mutually exclusive. They overlap depending upon who is doing the defining. By the council member's definition, elected officials make policy while appointed administrators and experts only administer. The extent to which bureaucrats share in policy making is remote--only as technical advisors to those who make the real policy decisions. As long as the manager or department head defines his role within these parameters there is no potential for conflict.

In similar fashion, the unwarranted intrusion of council members into the domain of the bureaucrat is determined by the bureaucrat's definition of what constitutes rational decision making as opposed to politically oriented policy. Council members who make "political" decisions about events and conditions that bureaucrats define as needing treatment by technical experts may be accused of meddling in

administrative affairs or becoming self-styled technical dilettantes. The extent to which the manager or department head accepts this intrusion without conflict depends greatly on his respect for the council member's personal and professional judgment. It may also depend on the council member's willingness to subordinate his political judgment to the bureaucrat's professional judgment.

Likewise, the manager who extends his professional judgment into what council members define as the realm of value-oriented policy making may be accused of pressuring a council into rubber stamping his own value judgments, or going over their heads by becoming a self-appointed interpreter of the peoples' wishes. The council members' acceptance of expert advice or actions which they deem to be political depends largely on the manager or department head's willingness to subordinate technical advice to value judgments made by elected officials. In both cases, crossing the line into each other's self-defined policy territory appears to be a permissible form of policy partnership as long as each actor feels superior in his own sphere of operations. The following summary profiles the policy roles of managers and department heads and well illustrates this point.

Policy Role Profiles

City Managers

The evidence presented in this study clearly points to a policy-shaping role for city managers that is conceived of by managers as being stronger and more encompassing than the managerial policy-shaping role perceived by council members. Council members and managers

agree that council members should leave administrative matters to the manager and cooperate with him on policy matters. There is also agreement that council members are to take on the role of policy promoter. There is disagreement, however, as to who should take the initiative in shaping policy changes and whether or not the manager should remain neutral in council disputes. While council members see themselves as initiating policy and wish to see the manager refrain from entering council disputes, the manager takes the opposite view in both cases. In short, the council member is expected by both actors to dominate the value-oriented aspects of policy, but disagreement exists as to the manager's role in what the council member defines as policy. The manager, then, is expected by council members to play a subordinate role when crossing the line. He is also expected to keep his community group relationships--another form of crossing the line into value-oriented policy making--subordinate to the policy relationships between himself and the council.

The evidence uncovered in this study points to an explanation of why managers appear to push their orientation toward policy into the realm of value-oriented decision making. Their attachment to policy making through expertise is a product of both professional training and community problems. It is the young, liberal, general careerist manager who identifies with the Policy Partner orientation. It is the manager from high status (education) communities who is able to adopt the Policy Partner orientation, perhaps because of a greater awareness among citizens and council members that solving tough problems requires a professional "teamwork" approach. It is also the manager

"teamwork" approach. It is also the manager from "complex" cities (at least as measured by high population density) that appears to include community groups as part of the policy-making team. Managers faced with tough problems define policy as an increasingly broader concept having both value and practical dimensions, and this contributes to making the traditional policy-administration dichotomy less meaningful as either an analytical model or a practical guide for action.

Department Heads

While the potential for conflict between managers and council members arises in respect to conflicting definitions of proper policy-making roles, conflict between managers and department heads centers around the extent to which department heads should be considered as equal to managers as primary occupants of the policy-expert advisor role. Department heads do not dispute the manager's role as policy partner. Nor do they appear willing to go over the manager's head to the community on policy matters. And, department heads seem to have a more restrictive view of their relations with community groups than do the manager or council members. Thus, they clearly see themselves as subordinate members of the manager's team. There appears to be no desire by department heads to enter the value or power dimensions of policy making. Yet, department heads see themselves as offering policy advice directly to the council--especially on matters within their sphere of expertise. Managers and council members, however, do not see department heads as policy advisors who bypass the manager's office. The potential for conflict, then, centers around the degree of subordination department heads must accept in the expertise dimension of policy making.

270

As was true for Policy Partner managers, department heads seeking policy-shaping roles and those who are willing to include community groups as part of their policy advisory team tend to be the younger, more liberal, educated and inexperienced department heads. And in higher status communities the dichotomy between policy and administration appears to give way in favor of an expert team approach to problem solving. Paradoxically, department heads in lower status communities are more likely to look to the manager to expand his conception of policy partnership to include value-oriented policy leadership. Department heads in these cities may perceive that the manager's expertise and political experience is needed because policy-making experience is lacking on the council due to a lack of sophisticated leadership in the community at large.

Further Research

Further research is needed to pinpoint how and why potential conflict occurs at the point where the two perceptual definitions of policy overlap. One focus of this research should be on the kinds of policy circumstances under which expertise and value-oriented policy making are combined by council-manager actors, and whether such action produces effective policy or destructive conflict. Another point of examination should be the circumstances under which citizen and council member involvement in the technical aspects of policy making leads to conflict or productive results. Such circumstances might include, for example, (1) judgments by lay politicians of the competency of appointed officials, (2) the personal career goals of all actors concerned, and (3) the desire or need for citizen involvement in policy implementation.

271

Both foci need to be used in order to find ways to defuse potential conflicts, produce better policy, and better understand the complexities and interrelatedness of policy-making functions and activities.

Likewise, a more complete examination of the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms for securing conformity to shared norm expectations is needed. Actor perceptions of council-manager role anchors will continue to fluctuate. Current community problems will continue to generate demands that council-manager government meet those needs. If we can document that norm securing mechanisms exist and are effectively utilized, we may be able to project what new role anchors will evolve out of fluctuating perceptions and community needs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Major Sources

Books

Alford, Robert R. Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Cities. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

Banfield, Edward C. Big City Politics: A Comparative Guide to the Political Systems of Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Seattle. New York: Random House, 1966.

Banfield, Edward C., and Wilson, James Q. City Politics. New York: Vintage, 1963.

_____. "Organized Labor in City Politics." In Urban Government. Rev. ed. Edited by Edward C. Banfield. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Biddle, Bruce, and Thomas, Edwin Jr., eds. Role Theory: Concepts and Research. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. Social Statistics. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.

Booth, David A. Council-Manager Government in Small Cities. Washington, D. C.: International City Management Association, 1968.

Buechner, John C. Differences in Role Perceptions in Colorado Council-Manager Cities. Boulder, Col.: University of Colorado, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, 1965.

Carrell, Jeptha. The Role of the City Manager: Views of Councilmen and Managers. Public Affairs Monograph Series No. 2. Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies, Inc., 1962.

Crain, Robert, and Vanecko, James. "Elite Influence in School Desegregation." In City Politics and Public Policy, pp. 127-148. Edited by James Q. Wilson. New York: Wiley, 1968.

Cunningham, James V. Urban Leadership in the Sixties. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1970.

Davies, James C., III. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Elazar, Daniel J. Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier in American Politics. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Eulau, Heinz, and Prewitt, Kenneth. Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.

Free, Lloyd, and Cantril, Hadley. The Political Beliefs of Americans. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967.

Gross, Neal; Mason, Ward S.; and McEachern, Alexander W. Explorations in Role Analysis. New York: John Wiley, 1958.

_____. "Role Conflict and Its Resolution." In Role Theory: Concepts and Research. Edited by Bruce Biddle and Edwin Thomas, Jr. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Hawkins, Brett W. Politics and Urban Policies. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

Jewell, Malcom E., and Patterson, Samuel C. The Legislative Process in the United States. New York: Random House, 1966.

Kammerer, Gladys M.; Farris, Charles D.; DeGrove, John M. Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure. Gainesville, Fla.: Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida, 1961.

Kweder, James B. The Role of the Manager, Mayor, and Councilmen in Policy-Making: A Study of Twenty-One North Carolina Cities. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina, Institute of Government, 1965.

Loveridge, Ronald O. City Managers in Legislative Politics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

Model City Charter. 6th ed. New York: National Municipal League, 1964.

Prewitt, Kenneth. The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.

Ridley, Clarence E. The Role of the City Manager in Policy Formulation. Chicago: International City Management Association, 1958.

Sayre, Wallace S., and Kaufman, Herbert. Governing New York City. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960.

274

Stillman, Richard J. The Rise of the City Manager: A Public Professional in Local Government. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974.

Thomas, W. I. Primitive Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.

Volkart, Edmund I. "Social Behavior and the Defined Situation." In Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research. Edited by Edmund I. Volkart. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951.

Wahlke, John C.; Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; and Ferguson, Leroy. The Legislative System. New York: Wiley, 1962.

White, Leonard D. The City Manager. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

Wildavsky, Aaron. Leadership in a Small Town. Totawa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964.

Williams, Oliver P., and Adrian, Charles R. Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.

Wilson, James Q. Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Wood, Robert C. Suburbia: Its People and their Politics. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959.

Zeigler, Harmon, and Baer, Michael. Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislatures. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1969.

Zelditch, Morris, and Anderson, Theodore R. A Basic Course in Statistics. 2nd ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

Zisk, Betty H. Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.

Journals and Periodicals

Almy, Timothy. "Local-Cosmopolitanism and U. S. City Managers." Urban Affairs Quarterly 10 (March 1975): 243-272.

Bates, F. L. "Some Observations Concerning the Structural Aspect of Role Conflict." Pacific Sociological Review 5 (Fall 1962): 78-82.

Betz, Michael. "On the Measurement of Norm Diversity: A Reply." Social Science Quarterly 54 (December 1973): 647-49.

Blank, Blanche D.; Immerman, Rita J.; and Rydell, C. Peter. "A Comparative Study of an Urban Bureaucracy." Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (March 1969): 343-54.

Booth, David A. "Are Elected Mayors a Threat to Managers?" Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (March 1968): 581-85.

Bouma, Donald H. "Issue-Analysis Approach to Community Power: A Case Study of Realtors in Kalamazoo." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 29 (July 1970): 241-52.

Boynton, Robert P., and Wright, Deil S. "Mayor-Manager Relationships in Large Council-Manager Cities: A Reinterpretation." Public Administration Review 31 (January/February 1971): 28-35.

Crain, Robert L. "Executive Leadership and Community Innovation: The Flouridation Experience." Urban Affairs Quarterly 1 (March 1966): 39-57.

Crain, Robert L., and Rosenthal, Donald B. "Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of the Flouridation Decisions." Journal of Politics 28 (February 1966): 16-95.

Eulau, Heinz, and Eyestone, Robert. "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes. A Developmental Analysis." American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 124-43.

Francis, Wayne L. "A Profile of Legislator Perceptions of Interest Group Behavior Relating to Legislative Issues in the States." Western Political Quarterly 24 (December 1971): 702-712.

Goode, William J. "A Theory of Role Strain." American Sociological Review 25 (August 1960): 483-96.

Hebert, F. Ted, and McLemore, Lelan E. "A Comment on Operationalizing the Norm Concept." Social Science Quarterly 54 (December 1973): 647-49.

"HEW: The Department that Lost Its Head." Science, June 19, 1970, pp. 1432-34.

Kammerer, Gladys M. "Role Diversity of City Managers." Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (March 1964): 439-440.

Kloman, Erasmus H. "Citizen Participation in the Philadelphia Model Cities Program: Retrospect and Prospect." Public Administration Review 22 (September 1972): 402-408.

Koehler, Cortus T. "Policy Development and Legislative Oversight in Council-Manager Cities: An Information and Communication Analysis." Public Administration Review 33 (September/October 1973): 433-441.

Kolaska, Bernard D. "Lobbying in the Non-Partisan Environment: The Case of Nebraska." Western Political Quarterly 24 (March 1971): 65-78.

Liebman, Charles. "Electorates, Interest Groups, and Local Government Policy." American Behavioral Scientist 5 (January 1961): 9-14.

Lipsky, Michael. "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform." Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (June, 1971): 391-409.

Lockard, Duane. "The City Manager, Administrative Theory, and Political Power." Political Science Quarterly 67 (June 1962): 224-36.

Lyons, Schley R. "Labor in City Politics: The Case of the Toledo Auto Workers." Social Science Quarterly 44 (March 1969): 816-28.

McCloskey, Herbert. "Conservation and Personality." American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958): 27-45.

Paltez, David L.; Reichert, Peggy; McIntyre, Barbara. "How the Media Support Local Government Authority." Public Opinion Quarterly 35 (Spring 1971): 80-94.

Patterson, Samuel C. "The Role of the Lobbyist: The Case of Oklahoma." Journal of Politics 25 (February 1963): 72-92.

Peterson, Paul E. "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program." American Political Science Review 64 (June 1970): 491-507.

Pope, H. G. "Is the Manager a Political Leader?--No." Public Management 44 (February 1962): 30-33.

Reynolds, Harry W., Jr. "The Career Public Service and Statute Lawmaking in Los Angeles." Western Political Quarterly 18 (September 1965): 621-39.

Salisbury, Robert H. "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties, and Governmental Structure." Western Political Quarterly 13 (June 1960): 498-507.

_____. "Urban Politics: The New Converbence of Power." Journal of Politics 26 (November 1964): 775-97.

Saltzstein, Alan L. "City Managers and City Councils: Perceptions of the Division of Authority." Western Political Quarterly 27 (June 1974): 275-288.

Savitch, Harold V. "Powerlessness in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Political Bias and Differential Access in New York City." Polity 5 (Fall 1972): 19-56.

Sigel, Roberta S., and Pindur, Wolfgang. "Role Congruence and Role Strain Among Urban Legislators." Social Science Quarterly 54 (June 1973): 55-62.

Teune, Henry. "Legislative Attitudes Toward Interest Groups." Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (November 1967): 489-504.

Steinman, Michael. "Low Income and Minority Group Participation in Administrative Processes: Mexican-American Orientations to Health Care Services." Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (June 1976): 523-543.

Walter, Gary. "The Effects of the Hatch Act on the Political Participation of Federal Employees." Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (December 1972): 723-729.

Wahlke, John C.; Buchanan, William; Eulau, Heinz; Ferguson, Leroy C. "American State Legislators' Orientations Toward Pressure Groups." Journal of Politics 22 (May 1960): 203-227.

Yule, G. Udney. "On the Methods of Measuring Association between Two Attributes." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 75, Part 6 (May 1912): 579-642.

Zisk, Betty H.; Eulau, Heinz; and Prewitt, Kenneth. "City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations." Journal of Politics 27 (August 1965): 618-46.

Dissertations

McLemore, Lelan E. "The Structuring of Legislative Behavior: Norm Patterns in a State Legislature." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1973.

Government Documents

U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book: 1972. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.

U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. United States Census of Population, 1970. Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 1, United States Summary.

Secondary Sources

Books

Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S., eds. The Politics of
      Developing Areas. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
      1960.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Powell, G. Bingham. Comparative Politics: A
      Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.

Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of
      Chicago Press, 1965.

Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government: A Study of Social
      Pressures. Bloomington, Ia.: Principia Press, 1908, 1949.

Campbell, Alan K., and Sacks, Seymour. Metropolitan America: Fiscal
      Patterns and Governmental Systems. New York: The Free Press,
      1957.

Cleaveland, Frederick N. Congress and Urban Problems. Washington,
      D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969.

Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.
      New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Farkas, Suzanne. Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena. New
      York: New York University Press, 1971.

Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, Ill.:
      Row, Peterson, 1957.

Gosnell, Harold F. Machine Politics: Chicago Model. Chicago: Univer-
      sity of Chicago Press, 1937.

Herring, Pendleton. Group Representation Before Congress. Baltimore:
      Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929.

Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision-Makers.
      Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954.

Kaplan, Harold. Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of
      Metro Toronto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

Kariel, Henry. The Decline of American Pluralism. Stanford, Cal.:
      Stanford University Press, 1961.

279

Latham, Earl. The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-point Legislation. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952.

Lowi, Theodore J. The End of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1966.

Martin, Roscoe C.; Munger, Frank J.; Burkhead, Jesse; Birkhead, Guthrie S.; Herman, Harold; Kagi, Herbert M.; Welch, Lewis P.; Wingfield, Clyde J. Decisions in Syracuse. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1965.

Merriam, Charles E. Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1929.

Milbrath, Lester W. The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951.

Ricci, David C. Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis. New York: Random House, 1971.

Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Dutton, 1971.

Schriftgiesser, Karl. The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers. Boston: Little, 1951.

Steinberg, Alfred. The Bosses. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

Truman, David B. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1951.

Warren, Robert. Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization. Davis, Cal.: University of California Institute of Public Affairs, 1966.

Zeigler, Harmon. Interest Groups in American Society. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1964.

Zink, Harold. City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1930.

Journals

Dye, Thomas R. "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis." Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (December 1968): 141-65.

Froman, Lewis A. "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities." Journal
of Politics 29 (February 1967): 94-108.

Vose, Clement E. "Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and Local Govern-
ment." Western Political Quarterly 35 (Spring 1971): 80-94.

APPENDIX A

THE FIFTY-SIX COUNCIL-MANAGER TARGET CITIES*

<u>Kansas</u>: 7 Cities

Hutchinson	Overland Park
Lawrence	Salina
Leavenworth	Wichita
Manhattan	

<u>Oklahoma</u>: 10 Cities

Bartlesville	Norman
Del City	Oklahoma City
Enid	Ponca City
Midwest City	Shawnee
Muskogee	Stillwater

<u>Texas</u>: 39 Cities

Abilene	Killeen
Amarillo	Kingsville
Arlington	Longview
Austin	Lubbock
Baytown	McAllen
Beaumont	Mesquite
Big Spring	Midland
Brownsville	Odessa
Bryan	Port Arthur
Corpus Christi	Richardson
Dallas	San Angelo
Denton	San Antonio
Fort Worth	Sherman
Galveston	Temple
Garland	Texarkana
Grand Prairie	Tyler
Haltom City	Victoria
Harlingen	Waco
Hurst	Wichita Falls
Irving	

*Recognized by the International City Management
Association as having the council-manager form of
municipal government.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

NOTE: This questionnaire was used for city managers,
council members and department heads. Information
regarding personal history and professional
background was altered where relevant.

Please Note: Your answers to the following questions will not be identified with your name in any way, and your name will not appear anywhere on this questionnaire.

FIRST, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL HISTORY AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.

1. What is your age?_____

2. What is your educational background?   (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

   1. high school graduate   _____
   2. special non-college training _____   In what area of study?_____
   3. some college   _____   In what area of study?_____
   4. Bachelors degree   _____   In what area of study?_____
   5. graduate degree   _____   In what area of study?_____

3. How many years have you worked in city government?_____; as a city manager?_____

4. How many years have you been the city manager in your present city?_____

5. Type of appointment to your present position:

   1.____appointed from outside this city.
   2.____appointed from within this city's government.

6. In your career in public administration, has your experience been primarily in: (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

   1.____general public administration?
   2.____technical or specialized public management (such as municipal law or finance, engineering, public utility management, etc.)?
   3.____other? (please specify)_____

7. How would you generally describe your political party identification?

   1.____Democrat   3.____other party (please specify:_____)
   2.____Republican   4.____Independent (no party identification).

NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO INDICATE WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING GENERAL STATEMENTS. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

   1. I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas.
          1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
   2. The Federal government is interfering too much in state and local matters.
          1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
   3. The Federal government should increase its financial efforts to rebuild America's cities.
          1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
   4. If you start trying to change things very much, you usually make them much worse.
          1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

5. Government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

6. The Federal government should develop a national health care program.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

7. We must respect the work of our forefathers and not think that we know better than they did.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

8. Social problems could be solved more effectively if government would let people in local communities handle their own problems in their own ways.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

9. The Federal government has a responsibility to try to solve the problems of poverty in this country.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

10. It's better to stick by what you know will work than to try new things you really don't know about.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

11. We should rely more on individual initiative and ability and less on governmental welfare programs.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

12. The Federal government should increase its financial support for national mass transportation systems, even if it means less money for highways.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

NEXT, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO INDICATE IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT WHAT THE POLICY MAKING ROLE OF THE CITY MANAGER SHOULD BE. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

1. A city manager should take the initiative in shaping and advocating major changes in city policies.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

2. A city manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

3. A city manager should maintain a neutral stand on issues over which the council is divided.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

4. A city manager should consult with the council before drafting his own budget.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

5. A city manager should freely give his point of view even when, he knows it will be opposed by the council.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

6. A city manager should carry out the decisions of the council even when he believes them to be unsound.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

7. A city manager should carry out the policies of the whole council rather than those of only one councilman or the mayor.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

8. A city manager should appeal to the community at large for support of policy proposals he believes are sound, even when they are opposed by the council.

        1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

9. A city manager should encourage people he respects to run for the city council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

10. A city manager should give a helping hand to good councilmen who are up for re-election.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH WHAT YOU THINK THE POLICY MAKING ROLE OF CITY COUNCILMEN SHOULD BE. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

1. A councilman should cooperate with the city manager in policy making matters as much as possible.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

2. Councilmen, rather than the city manager, should try to gather public support for council proposals and actions.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

3. Councilmen should leave the administration of city government to the city manager.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

4. Councilmen should take the initiative in shaping and advocating major changes in city policies.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

5. A councilman should stick to his stand on issues, even when opposed by the majority of the council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

6. A councilman should appeal to the community at large for support of policy proposals he believes are sound, when those proposals are opposed by the majority of the council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

7. A councilman should listen to the views of department heads even when those views differ from the city manager's views.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

8. A councilman should actively seek the views of department heads before proposing policies to the council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

THE NEXT SERIES OF STATEMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH WHAT YOU THINK THE POLICY MAKING ROLES OF CITY DEPARTMENT HEADS SHOULD BE. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

1. A department head should stick to implementing policy and leave policy making and decisions as to how to implement policy to the city manager or the council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

2. A department head should assume leadership in making recommendations to the council about changes in personnel policy.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

3. A department head should assume leadership in making policy recommendations to the council about changes in departmental operations.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

4. The views of department heads should be considered by the city manager before he recommends policy to the council.
   1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

5. A department head should appeal to the council for support of his recommendations when opposed by the city manager.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

6. A department head should appeal to the community at large for support of recommendations he believes are sound, even when those recommendations are opposed by the city manager or the council.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

7. A department head should be free to make recommendations to the manager about matters outside of his department.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

8. A department head should encourage people whom he respects to run for the city council.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

9. A department head should give a helping hand to good councilmen who are up for reelection.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

10. A department head should support a city manager he respects when that manager's proposals are opposed by the council.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

11. A department head should support a city manager he respects when the council becomes dissatisfied with the manager's job performance.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH WHAT YOU THINK YOUR RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS SHOULD BE IN MAKING POLICY IN YOUR CITY. BY COMMUNITY GROUPS WE MEAN ALL GROUPS THAT ARE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED IN YOUR COMMUNITY AS HAVING SOME IDENTIFIABLE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, OR ECONOMIC SIMILARITY OF INTEREST. THESE GROUPS MAY BE ACTIVE OR INACTIVE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ORGANIZED OR UNORGANIZED, LARGE OR SMALL IN MEMBERSHIP, INFLUENTIAL OR NOT INFLUENTIAL. EXAMPLES OF THESE GROUPS MIGHT INCLUDE: CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, LOCAL PRESSURE GROUPS, TAXPAYERS OR HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS, LABOR UNIONS, SERVICE CLUBS, CHURCH GROUPS, REALTORS ASSOCIATIONS, CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS, ETHNIC OR RACIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ETC. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

1. A city manager should advocate policies even when they draw hostility from important groups in the community.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

2. A city manager should resist policy suggestions from community groups when they disagree with his own council's policies.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

3. A city manager should be willing to schedule appointments with any member of the community on any legitimate community issue.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

4. A city manager should make it easy for community groups to contact him.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

5. A city manager should take the views of community groups into account before proposing policies to the council.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

6. A city manager should take the views of community groups into account when implementing council decisions.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

7. A city manager should establish close working relations with representatives of community groups.

      1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

8. A city manager should appeal to community groups for support of policy proposals backed by the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
9. A city manager should appeal to community groups for support of his policy proposals when those proposals are opposed by the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
10. A city manager should encourage community groups to support candidates he respects in council elections.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
11. A city manager should appeal to community groups for support when the council becomes dissatisfied with his job performance.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

NOW WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO RESPOND TO SOME STATEMENTS REGARDING WHAT YOU THINK THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY GROUPS AND CITY COUNCILMEN SHOULD BE. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

1. A councilman should advocate policies even when they draw hostility from important groups in the community.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
2. A councilman should resist policy suggestions from community groups when they disagree with the policy decisions already made by the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
3. A councilman should be willing to schedule appointments with any member of the community on any legitimate community issue.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
4. A councilman should make it easy for community groups to contact him.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
5. A councilman should take the views of community groups into account before proposing policies to the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
6. A councilman should establish close working relations with representatives of community groups.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
7. A councilman should appeal to community groups for support of policy proposals backed by the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
8. A councilman should appeal to community groups for support of his policy proposals when they are opposed by a majority of the council.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
9. The views of community groups should be taken into account when the council is considering how to implement policy decisions.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
10. A councilman should attempt to gain the support of community groups when he is running for reelection.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH WHAT YOU THINK THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY GROUPS AND DEPARTMENT HEADS SHOULD BE. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU: (1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) SOMEWHAT AGREE, (3) SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR (4) STRONGLY DISAGREE.

1. A department head should make administrative recommendations even when they draw hostility from important groups in the community.
    1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____

2. A department head should resist recommendations from community groups
   when they have not been approved by the city manager or the council.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
3. A department head should be willing to schedule appointments with any
   member of the community on any legitimate departmental issue.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
4. A department head should make it easy for community groups to contact
   him.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
5. A department head should take the views of community groups into account
   before making recommendations to the city manager.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
6. A department head should establish close working relations with representatives
   of community groups.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
7. A department head should appeal to community groups for support of his
   recommendations when those recommendations are opposed by the council or
   the city manager.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
8. A department head should encourage community groups to support candidates
   he respects in council elections.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
9. A department head should encourage community groups to support a city manager
   he respects when the council becomes dissatisfied with the manager's job per-
   formance.
     1.____ 2.____ 3.____ 4.____
10. A department head should appeal to community groups for support when the
    council or the city manager become dissatisfied with the department head's
    job performance.
      1.____ 2.____ ·3.____ 4.____

THE LAST GROUP OF QUESTIONS IS CONCERNED WITH HOW YOU PERCEIVE COMMUNITY GROUPS
AND HOW YOU ACTUALLY INTERACT WITH THEM. PLEASE CAREFULLY FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN IN PARENTHESES.

1. Of the community groups in your city which are active in community affairs
   and sometimes appear before the council, which would you say are the most
   influential? (PLEASE LIST AS MANY AS YOU WISH IN THEIR ORDER OF INFLUENCE)
   1= MOST INFLUENTIAL

   1._____ 4._____
   2._____ 5._____
   3._____ 6._____

2. What would you say makes these groups influential--what are the main reasons
   for their influence? (PLEASE LIST AS MANY REASONS AS YOU WISH IN THEIR
   ORDER OF IMPORTANCE)

   1._____ 4._____
   2._____ 5._____
   3._____ 6._____

3. If any of these groups contact you personally to seek your support, how do they go about doing it? (PLEASE LIST AS MANY WAYS YOU CAN THINK OF IN ORDER OF THEIR IMPORTANCE)

1._____   4._____
2._____   5._____
3._____   6._____
   _____

4. Please list the groups in your city which are consistently critical of the job you are doing. (YOU NEED NOT RANK THEM IN ANY PARTICULAR ORDER)

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

5. Please list the groups in your city which consistently support you in disagreements between you and the council. (YOU NEED NOT RANK THEM IN ANY PARTICULAR ORDER)

_____   _____

_____   _____

_____   _____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

James A. Visser

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS   DH-_____

Please note: Your answers to the following questions will not be
────── ────   identified with your name in any way, and your name
               will not appear anywhere on this questionnaire.

FIRST, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL
HISTORY AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.

1. What is the official title of your department?_____

2. What is your age? _____

3. What is your educational background?   (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

    1. high school graduate   _____   In what area of study?_____
    2. special non-college training_____   In what area of study?_____
    3. some college   _____   In what area of study?_____
    4. Bachelors degree   _____   In what area of study?_____
    5. graduate degree   _____   In what area of study?_____

4. For how many years have you been the head of your department?_____

5. How were you appointed to your present position?

    1. _____appointed from outside this city.
    2. _____appointed from within this city's government.

6. Did you have any governmental service before becoming head of your
    present department? _____YES _____NO   If YES, please indicate
    what kind of service:_____

7. How many total years of municipal government service do you have?

    ──────────

8. How would you generally describe your political party identification?

    1._____Democrat   3. other party (please specify:_____)
    2._____Republican   4. Independent (no party identification)

291

Please Note: Your answers to the following questions will not be iden-
tified with your name in any way, and your name will not
appear anywhere on this questionnaire.

FIRST, WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL
HISTORY AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.

1. Are you a: (1) mayor_____, (2) councilman____? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

2. What is your age?_____ 3. What is your occupation?_____

4. What is your educational background? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

    1. high school graduate   _____
    2. special non-college training_____ In what area of study?_____
    3. some college   _____ In what area of study?_____
    4. Bachelors degree   _____ In what area of study?_____
    5. graduate degree   _____ In what area of study?_____

5. How long have you been a resident in this city? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

    1.____1-5 years   3.____11-15 years   5.____more than 20 years
    2.____6-10 years 4.____16-20 years

6. How many years have you served as a city councilman or mayor?
    (PLEASE CHECK ONE)

    1.____1-2 years   3.____5-6 years   5.____9-10 years
    2.____3-4 years   4.____7-8 years   6.____More than 10 years

7. Did you have any community or governmental service before becoming a
major or councilman? ____YES ____NO If YES, please indicate
what kind of service:_____

8. How would you generally describe your political party identification?

    1.____Democrat   3.____other party (please specify:_____)
    2.____Republican 4.____Independent (no party identification)

9. Please briefly describe the single most important reason why you
decided to run for mayor or the city council:_____

APPENDIX C

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR DEPARTMENT HEAD REPRESENTATION
BY POLICE AND FIRE CHIEFS

The following criteria were used in the choice of police and fire chiefs to represent the views of all department heads in council-manager government.

Criteria:

1. In many smaller council-manager municipalities, department heads tend to have multiple implementative roles. In order to avoid tapping role orientations due to multiple roles, police and fire chiefs were chosen as the actors most likely to perform single implementative roles.

2. In keeping with the "professional" spirit of council-manager government, those department heads usually regarded as the most "professional" were sought for analysis. Although department heads other than police and fire chiefs (e.g., public works and water utility directors) are often professionals, they may not be able to meet the other two criteria.

3. The opinions of both the most and the least politicized department heads were sought in order to gain a cross section of opinion. The term "politicized" is used here to mean those department heads commonly perceived by the community to generate controversy as a result of their daily implementative activities. Although police and fire chiefs may not necessarily be the most or least politicized, other department heads may not be able to meet the first two criteria.

It was concluded that Police and Fire Chiefs were best able to meet all three selection criteria.