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A NARRATIVE INQUIRY INTO AN ARMY SCHOOL
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND POLICY STUDIES

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This work is dedicated to Astrid, Burke, and Cimarron.

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Abstract

The focus of this study is to reconstruct meaning through an interpretation of change on who I am and what I am becoming, navigating through a pervasive space that encompasses temporal, personal/social, and place creating knowledge from the lived experience (Clandinin, 2013). The personal stories explored permit the reader an ability to construct broader frames of reference and discover important assumptions and theories that guide leadership actions (Mattingly, 1991). As the primary researcher, I sought to contribute to the body of research surrounding Army educational leadership practice, particularly by exploring gaps along the Army leader development model in relation to school leadership preparation, selection, education and fractured purpose.

I reviewed critical events that guided my past as both an Army leader and more recently, as an Army educational leader situated at a Center of Excellence containing two branch/proponent schools. I collected data primarily through field texts, calendar events, recollections, white papers, and recounting my own lived experiences. Findings explored my professional development as an Army leader, educational leader, and researcher along leadership and policy issues encompassing Army school leadership gaps. Theory is weaved throughout the study explaining what is going on in the practice. A rich account of my experience creating knowledge from the lived experience is described narratively to inform those attempting similar changes.

PROLOGUE

Critical Moments

Progressing beyond traditional leadership models constrained by institutionalized thinking continues to shape the Army's attempted efforts in transforming Army education. Winston Churchill offered, "The further backward you look, the further forward you can see" (Cohen, 2002). Leadership and policy constructed specifically for developing successful Army schools has long been a neglected practice. The Army continues standing upon an organizational leadership model designed to ensure that those in charge execute missions in accordance with doctrine, orders, and training (Department of the Army, 2015a). Over the course of several years, Army leadership has struggled to implement a new Army learning model (ALC 2015). Answers to the Army's struggle may be discovered within associated K-12 studies demonstrating successful education reform and district strategies. For example, the successful district and school leadership preparation element distinguishes itself by offering a critical component driving and influencing institutional change (Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993). Driving and influencing institutional change requires educational leaders who perform functions congruent with both leadership and management roles. Studies further suggest that making informed decisions entails educational leaders acquiring appropriate knowledge and skills through education and experience.

My lived experience as a career Army man, navigating compliantly across space and time from 1985 to 1999, in many respects documents this problem; while I rose through the ranks, I was unaware of what good leadership entailed and how to inspire it (Etzioni, 1975). In 1994, one lieutenant colonel triggered my curiosity, and by 1999,

encouraged me to investigate critical thinking in leadership. In turn, I enrolled in a Master's degree program in adult education. It was then that I began realizing how Army leadership could be taught to emerging leaders. I have spent the remainder of my career attempting to implement reflective and critical thinking toward improving educational and training experiences for officers attending Army schools. Reading history is one of many traits common among senior Army officers; therefore, a narrative inquiry taking the reader through my story should accentuate leadership's role in transforming Army branch/proponent schools. The stories presented in this study offer my experiences growing as an Army leader, coupled with pockets of exploration into leadership's role associated with Army institutional learning. Through an increased awareness developed in a non-Army-sponsored educational leadership course about effective educational leadership practices, policies, and procedures, I discovered critical insights suggesting some new approaches in which Army schools can better meet the goal of developing agile, adaptive leaders.

Observing the Army's struggle to implement ALC 2015 over the past several years suggests that the Army could improve its approach developing, educating, preparing, and stabilizing leaders who supervise its Centers of Excellence (CoEs) and run its branch/proponent schools. In their report on successful school leadership, Leithwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, and Hopkins (2006) explain that, "what leaders do depends on what they think and feel" (p. 8). This helps explain why branch schools and Centers of Excellence are constructed and run like hierarchical, military organizations, and not as learning organizations (Webster-Right, 2009). Additionally, this supports an apparent gap in the Army's leader development process for those selected to supervise

Centers of Excellence and run branch proponent/schools. Considering components associated with what successful school leadership looks like and what it takes to lead successful school change is an integral part of the narrative.

Background of the Study

The concept of Army education reform can be traced back to Elihu Root, Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904; "Roots formula for officer development called for rotation of duty assignments and intermittent periods of professional schooling" (Coumbe, 2010, p. 2). Some of the reforms included changes to the Army school network and significant upgrades to the branch schools. Education, training, and experience have defined U.S. Army officer development since the beginning of the last century (Coumbe, 2010), and continues to remain a prominent theme today as outlined in the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS, 2013). Post World War II, the Department of the Army Board on the Educational System for Army Officers developed a progressive educational system designed to prepare officers to effectively execute those duties associated with war and the art of command (Eddy Board Report, 1949). Today, the Army desires to develop agile, adaptive leaders who can win in a complex environment (Dempsey, 2009).

Need for the Study

Understanding the Army leadership requirements model, along with how the Army develops leaders, facilitates the study by allowing the reader to become aware of gaps in leadership requirements associated with implementing Army school change (Department of the Army, 2013a; Department of the Army, 2015a). For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which exposes gaps in competencies and behaviors. Exploring these gaps while navigating through a pervasive space of commonplaces encompassing temporal, social/personal, and place reconstructs meaning of my transformation, therefore, creating knowledge

from the lived experience (Clandinin, 2013). Later chapters demonstrate how Army leadership's relational and consequential role nests within the struggle to fully implement a new learning concept with a particular focus on one Center of Excellence containing two branch schools.

Supervising a Center of Excellence or running a branch proponent/school poses a different organizational experience for those few Army leaders who are selected based on their potential to lead large, complex, Army organizations (Department of the Army, 2014b; Department of the Army, 2005). Unlike their civilian counterparts, Army school leaders do not spend their career in a school-centered environment. In a sense, these senior leaders who begin their journey at the Colonel and general-officer-level are at a significant disadvantage. The Army recognizes a need to reshape its approach to the growth of emerging leader development as a result of a changing environment shaped over more than a decade of protracted war (Cerami, 2015). A large part of change is driven by the inherent value behind critical thinking and problem solving applicable to leaders positioned from small units to large complex units (Department of the Army, 2013).

When faced with solving a complex problem in an unfamiliar environment, leaders fall back on what they know. It is no surprise that Army leaders placed in charge of a school lack appropriate knowledge and competence promoting effective school leadership. Furthermore, Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest that leaders are merely robbed of the metacognitive ability to realize that their decisions are not congruent. Thus, it is with some risk that I venture to challenge the Army's antiquated methodology of structuring, resourcing, and running its center-level schools. By

narrating my experiences, I hope to gain advocates and help readers understand the complexity of the task at hand while offering a means to allow the reader to develop his/her own explanation.

Significance of the Study

While the importance of leader development in building progressive growth of an Army officer throughout a professional career (Department of the Army, 2015a) has been researched and documented, the process that the Army selects and prepares those chosen to supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools is not well-documented. As the Army continues to focus on learning as a competitive advantage over its adversaries (Department of the Army, 2011b), it is clear that leadership overseeing CoEs and running branch proponent/schools should comprise a high level of educational leadership expertise. Experiences narrated in this study may offer insights to optimize selection, preparation, education, and sustainability of those chosen to supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools. As my story unfolds, the knowledge gained from a study of educational leadership is intended to inform transformational change in the Army's institutions by improving the professional practice.

Procedures

As earlier noted, this study employs narrative inquiry to explore my lived experiences of my development as an Army leader and emerging scholar. Narrative inquiry "seeks to elaborate and investigate individual interpretations and worldviews of complex and human-centered events. It is more concerned with individual truths than identifying generalizable, and repeatable events" (Webster & Mertova, 2007, p. 89). A narrative framework provides a unique approach to organizing a vast amount of data in

relation to critical events, therefore, "making it a powerful research tool" (Webster & Mertova, 2007, p. 23). Narrowing the focus to "critical events revealed within the stories of experience" (p. 71) provides a rich account of significance demonstrating what is important in the research. More analysis of this methodology and reasoning is described in chapters four, five, and six where narrative acts as the theoretical lens of understanding through which I deliver my story.

Common places of temporality, sociality, and place support a conceptual framework to help justify research purpose through "what we might find or come to understand differently" (Clandinin, 2013, p. 35). This study chronicles my awakening of educational leadership and policy creating new knowledge gained by what Clandinin (2013) describes as "experiential knowledge." Human beings continuously narrate their lives as they move forward. Stories change as time goes along, informed by different perspectives gained from education, experience, and training. This study honors those who wish to remain anonymous while carefully crafting events and places so as not to expose anyone carelessly. Ownership of the content belongs to both participants and inquirer viewed more specifically by Clandinin and Connelly (2000) as a responsibility in question to those that the inquirer interacts with through the experience with an awareness of how the study is interpreted by the reader.

Summary

A storm is brewing causing tension in the environment while Army senior leadership searches for answers as to why seven subordinate Centers of Excellence and fifteen branch/proponent schools continue to struggle implementing Army Learning Concepts 2015 (ALC 2015; Department of the Army, 2011b). Army senior leadership

recognizes that an implementation struggle exists and has already began working to find out why. Clearly, this is evident from three recent efforts sanctioned to determine the state of implementation across seven Centers of Excellence and fifteen branch/proponent schools. Despite three directed investigations into the effort, none, thus far, have taken a look at the role that school leaderships have in directing and influencing change (Fullan, 2011). Therefore, a study following a narrative inquiry methodology situating leadership as the centerpiece within the struggle provides experiential knowledge derived from storying critical events, rather than a presentation of data sets, methods, and conclusions (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).

A narrative design allows an observation of practice into the Army's leadership development and program policy encompassing a school environment. Chapters four, five, six, seven, and eight of this study weave relational theories derived from successful public school leadership to resonate transferable experiential knowledge to the reader. A certain finesse navigating around the egos and strong personalities involved supports a methodology which avoids perception of any kind of direct criticism upon the Army's leadership development model. For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new knowledge that I hope resonates and transfers information to transform Army education.

CHAPTER ONE

Unfolding Leadership Development

The Army's leader development approach, as explained in the Army Leader Development Strategy (2013) and supported in Leader Development Field Manual (FM) 6-22 (2015), defines people as the competitive advantage against the nation's adversaries. Like many business organizations, the Army holds experience to be a foundational component of its leader development model (Schirmer, Crowley, Blacker, Brennan, Leonard, Polich, Sollinger, & Varda, 2008). Army careers follow a series of assignments increasing in responsibility and scope while progressively building experience derived from operational assignments. Army commanders at echelon are responsible for developing their subordinates along leader attributes and competencies described in the leadership requirements model (Department of the Army, 2013a, p. 7).



Figure 1. As Depicted in ALDS (2013, p. 7)

Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, and keynote speaker for the Army's premier Senior Service College graduating class of colonels, stated, "The U.S. Army has historically been in the business of building leaders" (Odierno, 2013, p. 1). Here, the Army's top leader suggests that the Army's leader development model reasonably and

adequately prepares leaders for any Army leadership assignment. A study sponsored by the Bush School and supported by the U.S. Army Senior Service College in addressing the topic of gaps in military and civilian education in preparing emerging leaders noted, "Leadership development endures at the core of the Army profession" (Cerami, 2015). Development of a professional force remains paramount to leader development and reflects the attributes and competencies of which Army leaders must be capable. The Army is designed organizationally around a team construct focused along a set of collective missions. Another contributing factor supporting the Army leader development model is mission command (Department of the Army, 2012). Mission command is "the authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent" (Department of the Army, 2012, pp. 1-3). Because Army leaders experience transitions in their careers across organizational levels of the operational force, those few selected to run branch/proponent schools lack experience and exposure leading school-like structures. (Department of the Army, 2015a).

A key component toward understanding the Army leadership requirements model lies within the constructs of Ends, Ways, and Means (Department of the Army, 2013a). In short, the ways include methods for developing leaders such as school, training, and self-development. The means comprise the resources such as will, time, people, and funding to achieve the ends. The ends represent the objectives to be achieved, and thereby suggests a place to explore potential gaps along the Army leader development model in relation to school leadership preparation, selection, education, and fractured purpose (Cerami, 2015). The ends is constructed around two elements.

The first element consists of the attributes that describe the leader's internal characteristics. The second element describes what competencies become the observable behaviors and actions, which leaders must perform (Ceramis, 2015). Skills derive from competencies listed in Figure 1 (above), building knowledge and increasing abilities along values represented in attributes, which comprise key components of the Army's leadership building strategy. The Army focuses on the development of its human capital who can think critically about the nature of conflict and adapt rapidly under austere conditions while understanding strategic implications in the broader sense (Army Human Dimension Strategy, 2015). Since descriptive components outlining key competencies form a foundational leadership development approach, it seems appropriate to discover leadership through lived experiences. Reflecting on the Army leadership requirements model objectives while studying key competencies and behaviors required for leading and managing successful school practices provides for an interesting journey. Army school leadership preparation, education, experience, selection, and stability affected by current policy becomes situated actions, which are described by Daiute and Lightfoot (2004), positioning how leaders are perceived through my lived experience and observed findings.

A Neglected Domain

The Army's model for developing leaders who can think critically, solve problems, and function in complex environments stems from a framework encompassing components of education, training, and experience where each is embedded individually into three domains defined as institutional, operational, and self-development. The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) interconnects the

components into the domains as such: 1) education in Army schools, units, and self-development; 2) experience gained from a variety of developmental assignments, shared in the school and acquired from self-development; and 3) training through rigorous scenarios, whether simulated or real in the field (Department of the Army, 2013a). The ALDS lists a set of stipulations as guideposts for leaders serving in a given domain; "Leaders in the institutional domain create the conditions for quality leader development by:

- Having clear plans to promote achievement of desired learning outcomes.
- Active monitoring, evaluation, and feedback to guide and refine leader development systems and practices.
- Assessing individual readiness to learn before a classroom experience and facilitate "sense-making" afterwards.
- Providing qualified, inspirational instructors who have been prepared to teach/facilitate in an adult learning environment.
- Crafting current and relevant curriculum that promotes critical and creative thinking, interpersonal skill development, and communication skill development.
- Providing access to information and technologies that can provide leaders with relevant practice in the classroom and in the field.
- Providing individuals in resident Professional Military Education (PME) and Civilian Education System (CES) an opportunity to reflect and put into context what they have learned and experienced.

- Providing a robust capacity to create, archive, and deliver digitized learning products to individuals at the point of need, creating a continuum of learning opportunity that is available in all three domains" (p. 19).

The portfolio of Army leadership requirements demanded from the leaders supervising CoEs and running branch/proponent schools strongly advocates exploration into the relational and consequential roles of the Army leadership's struggle to implement the Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a). The Army leadership development model suggests that leaders gain "training, education, and experience" (ALDS, 2013; p. 8) in each of the three domains described above. Yet, there appears to be a lack of acknowledgement or recognition for specific educational leadership requirements relating to education, preparation, experience, and selection to prepare those selected leaders for duty supervising and running branch/proponent schools, which frankly, is long overdue.



Figure 2. ALDS (2013, p. 8)

Army senior leadership recognized that there is an implementation struggle existing and began working to find out why, as is evident from three recent efforts sanctioned to determine the state of implementation across seven Centers of Excellence

and fifteen branch/proponent schools. Despite three directed investigations into the effort, none thus far have taken a look at leadership's role of directing and influencing change (Fullan, 2011). Storytelling is what human beings do: stories connect people to each other and serve a central part in communication (Lieblich, Mashiac, & Zibler, 1998). The Army utilizes history found in published stories within its school courses to inform emerging leaders of successful and failed practice by reading shared experiences. Narratives in research can contribute to traditional scientific analysis, yet remain distinctly separate from the impersonal approaches found within traditional research (Lieblich et al., 1998).

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General Martin Dempsey, spent four years crafting, socializing, and publishing a new learning concept designed to ensure that people would remain the Army's competitive advantage (Dempsey, 2011). Army leadership tenure measured by a mark in time meant that Dempsey would not remain in the driver's seat to direct and influence his plan for educational change (Liethwood et al., 2006). On April 29, 2011, Dempsey relinquished ALM 2015 implementation to new leadership with General Robert Cone assuming command of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC news.org, 2011). By the summer of 2011, many of the CoEs and branch/proponent schools also changed leadership including the particular CoE and two branch/proponent schools that had been included in the study. That new leadership came on board soon after ALM 2015 was published in June of 2011. Over the next two years, very little movement occurred toward implementation. Four years after they published this new learning model, the

Army continues to struggle to fully implement educational change described in the Army Learning Concepts 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a).

The new educational model was unveiled to senior-level Army leaders at a conference in October 2009 under the auspice of "Our Army's Campaign of Learning," followed by the formal release in January 2011 as "The Army Learning Concepts 2015" (Dempsey, 2009, 2011). The objective audience included all Army schools, but especially focused on lieutenants and captains attending Professional Military Education (PME) at their branch/proponent schools. As the branch/proponent schools located within the Centers of Excellence (CoE) began to apply components of the Army Learning Concepts 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a), the concept itself merged under the guise of Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a), and senior leaders soon realized that the complexity of such a large task required more time and resources to implement. Thus, the Army adjusted the goal of full implementation to a revised date of 2017.

The initial timeline projected full implementation of the Army Learning Model as 2015. Yet, in May 2014, the 2015 date appeared to be slipping further away into as much as two years into the future. It then became uncertain whether even 2017 could produce a desired end state. Thus, in February of 2015, senior leaders across the Army gathered for a week-long conference to discuss a multitude of issues surrounding the progress of ALM 2015, as well as a recent addition labeled Army University.

In an effort to raise executive-level leadership awareness, the Army Learning Coordination Council (ALCC) was created as a semi–annual forum, so that executive-level leadership could monitor the progress of ALM 2015's implementation across the

CoEs. ALM 2015 at some point became referred to among the executive ranks as simply the Army Learning Model (ALM) and the name stuck. Fifteen branch proponent/schools positioned among seven Centers of Excellence reported varying levels of implementation (Hicks, 2015). The ALCC approved three formal studies beginning late in 2013 and concluding in early 2015. The Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted two studies: The first study focused on technology supporting ALM. The second study focused diffusion of innovation (Barnieu, Morath, Bryson, Hyland, Tucker, & Burnett, 2015). The third study was conducted by the ALM Task Force which reflected a summary of notes collected during individual visits to each CoE. Although each study noted some positive reform practices among the branch schools, there has been a lack of research focused on the center-level and branch/proponent school leadership's capacity to drive change. Essentially, the outcome of this study demonstrates the Army's leadership struggle to move them from concept-level to action-level implementation of ALC 2015.

Although numerous studies exist which dissect Army leadership development in the operational (warfighting) domain, none to date examine the Army's leadership development role in the institutional domain. How the senior leaders that supervise Army Centers of Excellence and run branch/proponent schools relationally and consequentially impacts successful school leadership. The Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS) directs leader responsibilities across three professional fields: 1) operational domain relates to units and organizational structures formed to conduct Army missions, 2) institutional domain comprises the Army schools, and 3) self-development is the individual officer and soldier. The ALDS suggests that learning

takes place across all three domains, each supported by three designated components: training, education, and experience.

The Army Leader Development Strategy states, "Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process—founded in Army values—that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of character" (Department of the Army, 2013, p. 3). ALDS further explains, "Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships" (p. 3). A descriptive summary of the Army's leadership development model reveals a program designed to support leaders serving in the operational force (combat units). Unlike corporate America where senior leaders can be recruited from outside of the organization, the Army model is designed to develop and grow emerging leaders from within its ranks (Department of the Army, 2015a).

Unlike institutions serving public education, the Army does not require institutional leaders to demonstrate professional standards such as those developed by the American Association of School Administrators (AASA, 2010). Furthermore, Kowalski suggests, "all superintendents should have an adequate level of competency in all areas allowing them to transition among five roles as necessary" (2013, p. 25). Role conceptualizations relevant to those individuals in public education which serve in the position of superintendents have evolved over the past hundred and fifty years (Kowalski, 2013). Army culture, on the other hand, remains an organization fixed upon following orders from higher authorities, as explained in Etzioni's (1975) analysis of

complex organizations, where he associates the military with compliance theory. Often staffs, in response to multiple priorities, create multiple methods and tools tracking progress along assigned objectives. The Army builds leaders to fight and win America's wars and serves as one of the instruments of power available to the President of the United States (Obama, 2010). When faced with difficult change, people tend to fall back to what they know (Levin, 2010) and Army institutional leaders know how to manage large organizations to win America's wars, but rarely are equipped to run learning institutions.

Conclusion

History paints the Army as very successful in its ability to perform traditional Army missions, as is evident from its conception centuries ago on June 14, 1775. However there is very little comprehensive research published focusing on successful school leadership at the Centers of Excellence or Army branch proponent/school levels. Observing the Army's struggle to implement a new learning model since the model's conception in 2010 provides a foundational platform to explore Army leadership development and policy and to relationally and consequentially distinguish successful school leadership practice. Therefore, research exploring what successful school leadership looks like could provide a roadmap for educating professional practice. It would be an excellent way to develop, educate, prepare, and stabilize leaders selected to supervise Centers of Excellence and run branch proponent/schools.

Uncovering a leader development framework, informed through successful school leadership practice, provides a model towards which Army leaders can drive and influence change across Army schools. Since running a school is not the norm for Army

leaders, a look into what successful public school leadership looks like acts as a guidepost, enlightening Army leaders. A human centeredness situated along events as critical parts of people's lives provides valuable data for the research (Webster & Mertova, 2007), weaving a path that describes successful school leadership practice. Some of these will include: understanding learning concepts, implementing new learning concepts, and the capacity to drive and influence change (Kowalski, 2013). Further support derives from Slayton and Mathis (2010), who suggest that leader development programs should stem from "three core ideas of presence, creating positive learning conditions and the skills necessary to teach adults" (p. 26). Army leaders tend to focus on gaining tactical and operational expertise, which often overshadows the balance between education and training (Coumbe, 2010). Although the Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a) describes bridging the gap between education and training, it does not address school leadership.

Understanding the Army's leader development model and policy more deeply in a relational and consequential role associated with successful school leadership practice becomes what Clandinin (2013) describes as a research puzzle: "We begin in the midst, and end in the midst, of experience" (p. 43). My experience living alongside the professional relationships, the associated projects, the gained knowledge from graduate school, and daily work inside of the Army institutional complexity continues to shape an acute awakening in me of who I am and who I am becoming. It is the rich discovery of successful school leadership practice that grounds my journey focused on leadership and policy. Understanding why the Army leader development model was constructed around the building of teams to achieve operational outcomes guides an exploration of

potential gaps in Army educational leadership. Thus, exploring lived experiences uncovers common components between both public school and Army leader development, such as leader preparation, education, experience, selection, and stability of leaders. These components provide commonplaces along temporality (past, present, and future), sociality (inward/outward, backward/forward), and place (physical boundaries and sequences) woven into a story of leadership and policy (Clandinin, 2013).

CHAPTER TWO

Methodology

The proposed study utilizes narrative inquiry as a research methodology which is non-traditional in that it does not require the standard five-chapter format: introduction, literature review, methodology, results, and conclusion (Creswell, 2014). Narrative inquiry follows a more skills-based format progressing through the use of story, organization of character, design, and situation. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) explain the design of narrative inquiry as connecting experience and story as the research approach. The dominant influence on their work was influenced by Dewey's belief that "examining the experience is the key to education" (p. xiii). The research approach and design used for this study supported an Army school leadership experience through narrative inquiry to answer the research question, how does my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing educational change?

Data is collected from multiple sources to look for patterns, narrative threads, and themes embedded within my story as well as across the community setting (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Leavy, 2009). Generating and analyzing life experiences causes the writing to take on different forms, traversing details of the inquiry as well as the academic life of the inquirer. Friction naturally occurs as retelling of the stories located within field texts, blueprints, and documents seamlessly weaves literature and theory throughout the study from beginning to end in an attempt to create smooth connections between experience, literature, and theory (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).

This study explores the awakening of an Army school leader searching to discover how successful school leadership drives and influences educational change. The lived experience accentuates new knowledge discovered in research of successful school leadership requirements alongside Army leadership requirements while reinforcing Dewey's (1981) pragmatic view of knowledge. As the narrative unfolds in the following chapters, a story exploring the Army's quest to transform its approach to education provides a wonderful opportunity to learn, and examine the raw data and unintentional experiments just waiting to be discovered. Experience gained and shared through such a study distinguishes the unique value of a narrative study toward informing the profession (Clandinin, 2013). People enjoy a good story, and the Army lives on history containing re-lived, retold stories as is evident in the rich tradition from its devotion to history, so narrative provides a viable method to offer Army leadership a look at itself in relation to educational leadership change at Army Centers of Excellence and branch/proponent schools.

When designing a narrative inquiry around implementation associated with The Army's Learning Concept 2015, accounts of all of the characters in the narrative, the organization, and the researcher share a necessary role in the experience. Chronicle guideposts and accounts are described to create appreciation and provide substance to activities within the story as it unfolds (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Positioning myself at the center of the story demonstrates how the other characters are understood. Looking both inward and outward, my field texts describe experiential knowledge along personal and social aspects explained from theory supporting what Connelly and Clandinin express as: "the principal attraction of narrative as method is its capacity to

render life experiences, both personal and social, in relevant and meaningful ways" (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, p. 10).

Thus, narrative inquiry begins with lived experience and life accounts (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). In describing the story the researcher must labor through natural barriers considering how to present a problem or argument, how to integrate the literature review, and how to illustrate the methods, while at the same time weaving an exploration of time and lives through experience. Initially, the prologue explores the purpose of the Army leader development model in relation to K-12 leadership development, framing the Army's struggle to implement educational change. Next, to better situate the reader, chapter one condenses the key concepts behind the desired attributes and competencies required by the Army leadership requirements model. The art and science behind telling my story includes blending the problem (that my story documents from 1985 to 1999 in chapter three) within the narrative while keeping the researcher up front. Chapter three exists to document the problem exploring my first ten years in uniform, narrating a professional frustration experienced in both Army education and Army leadership development. Chapter four begins to describe an awakening, which occurred as part of earning a Master's degree in Adult Education coupled with a maturation of leadership through practice. Chapter five finds me in the first year of an educational leadership and policy studies graduate program at the University of Oklahoma; while at the same time beginning a new job as the deputy director of education and instructional programs situated at one of the Army's seven Centers of Excellence. Chapter six provides a defining moment (in my second year, 2014) where I come to understand the complexity and rigidity associated with Army

education budgeting and resourcing policy and procedures. Chapter seven explores my third year (2015) creating lines of effort to support the Center of Excellence strategy. Finally chapter eight explains reflections and implications from the journey while discovering the impact of becoming a resolute leader through a continuous exploration of learning and practice, ultimately becoming an expert in the field. The conceptual framework evolves as the inquirer uses continuous analytical reflection to question and make connections as the tale unfolds. The reflective process, moves the narrative from the present to the past tense and back again on numerous occasions. The "forward/backward" reflection (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 49) is complemented by a corresponding "inward/outward" reflective process (p. 49). Through this reflective process, the reader is permitted entry into the believed journey of the researcher as he ponders and analyzes the events described within the narrative.

Positioning a Narrative Beginning (A Place to Start)

I began with pondering the problems that evolved through a process of writing scores of drafts. Thoughts connecting past to present while unfolding future possibilities caused me some restless nights as the stories of my own uniformed service reappeared and I began to see them through a new perspective. Most of the memories were pleasant and I embraced them knowing that the Army was always in a state of change. Some, on the other hand, were frustrating as I wanted to blame leadership's role as relational and consequential to the struggle implementing educational change. The tales disturbing my sleep are not the actual occasions, but memories sifted through years of practice lived over the course of three decades. The tales told now resemble well-constructed metaphors (Leavy, 2009) for the actual events as I recall them. As representations or

depictions, these stories allow me and the reader to bring his or her aptitudes and knowledges to the interpretation (Leavy, 2009).

While writing my life as it illustrates the topic, other voices emerge from the various sources of data I collected, such as collected field notes, blueprints, and documents. Together, all create the research puzzle, the larger context within which my expedition exists. Perchance, others may make their own connections. Key issues relate to leadership education, preparation, training, and selection accentuated by my awakening of experiential knowledge reinforced through observed practice. My professional career spanning 30 years serves as the narrative setting of this study, flashing back to episodes from my past alongside events reconstructed from the data. Hence, my experiential knowledge begins to unfold supporting what Maxwell (1992) describes as "descriptive validity" (p. 285). The narrative further explores and serves as an interpretation of current Army leadership development practice as it relates to educational leadership requirements. Written reflections reinforce potential gaps in the Army's leader development strategy. Crafted with single-minded purpose, the Army leader development strategy connects training, education, and experience derived from the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. These domains inherently link with leading Army units not schools. Therefore, a cross examination exploring K-12 institutional leadership competencies and attributes provide unique insights on education, preparation, certification, training, selection, and stability of successful school leadership (Carter et al., 1993).

Situated at one of the Army's Centers of Excellence, my office serves, as what Leavy (2009) refers to as a proximate reality, aiding a connection across multiple

episodes to support the story while weaving in scholarly literature. The events written into my study reflect factual episodes etched from the data, field notes, blueprints, and documents. Through the use of narrative elements of plot, character, and setting, I weave an illustrative tapestry of an Army leadership experience relational to an educational leadership experience. Knowing how to effect change is dependent upon knowing precisely what one is faced with and understanding the consequential outcomes associated with educational change (McCauley, Moxley, & Van Velsor, 1998). Although constructing a collection of parts, categorizations, and practices claimed during the data collection, "… by themselves, facts do not give us reality" (Cowan, 1988, p. 195). Therefore, events will not be documented and described in sequential order, the field notes represent syntheses of multiple interactions or truths during the study, merging to form categories and themes revealed in the data (Banks & Banks, 1998).

Informed by Dewey's idea of experience being temporal, Clandinin and Connelly (2000) write, "There is always a history, it is always changing, and it is always going somewhere" (p. 2). Walking the trails at lunch, strolling or riding along the creeks and pastures of my ranch, or sitting upstairs at my desk away from activities of the home; all provide me a special place where I meditate and remove myself from the people, places, and things; comparing my observations and recordings against my own past experiences and knowledge. In these special places removed from the hectic day-to-day turmoil, I search for arrangements and relations between the present and the past that might yield fresh understanding surrounding the relational and consequential role of Army leadership. Narrative inquiry is designed to develop increased

understanding of self while gaining experiential knowledge in addition to the social context (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). The complexity of processes, policy, and organizational structures that influence leadership serve to inform the threads that are woven into the study.

The struggle writing this narrative was deciding which critical events to utilize due to the enormous amounts of information available from both theory and my collected data. Therefore, I selected data which best informs answering the question: how does my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing educational change? Reflecting upon this question time and time again, I realize that much is at stake. While now acting as the researcher, I have formally served many times as a military student where I wrestled to find relevance in what the Army school was teaching. When I became an instructor at an Army school as a captain and later as a lieutenant colonel, I was exposed to two very different instructional methodologies. Now in my current position, serving at an executive level of administration where I am responsible for curriculum development across 176 programs of instruction, faculty and professional development, program evaluation, and educational strategies, perfectly situated me to explore the problem proposed in the study. For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new knowledge. I remained committed, learning with my faculty and staff as we work to progress towards operating as a professional learning community. Therefore, we moved our staff and faculty along theories derived from DuFour et al. (2002, 2004), Marzano (2001), Lambert (2003), O'Hair et al. (2005), as

well as others whose research continues to inform our practice. We work hard to study and learn to improve our professional practice to deliver education so that our Army students benefit. The study includes interpreted stories of those efforts connecting leadership's process and consequential role to learning.

Finally, the stories connecting leadership's ability to drive and influence change while improving the student experience at the Center of Excellence and branch/proponent schools remains paramount to the research. Exploring how leadership drives and influences change through daily processes and practices within the school exposes gaps in current practice. Optimistically, my narrative connects processes and outcomes demonstrating leadership decisions and decision making relevant to how particular events and occasions are interlaced with the facts and interpretations. Thus, my attempt to produce a "sense of how things go, have been going, and are likely to go" (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 6) within the focus of the research topic.

Sources of Data

Data for the study included detailed field notes, blueprints, and documents obtained from both theory, and observed practice characterizing a thirty-year career building on experiential knowledge. Field notes capture and explain commonplaces discovered within narrative inquiry, specifically as Connelly and Clandinin (2006) explain, "Events under study are in temporal transition" (p. 479). That is, the story "points the researcher toward the past, present, and future of people, places, and things, and events under study" (p. 479). Field notes become field text revealing data through stories, capturing the essence of my lived life, retelling, and revising the narrative as I go along (Carr, 1986). In order to narrow the vast amount of data available, critical

events composed through stories of experience provide what Webster and Mertova (2006) explain as “narrative sketches” (p. 71). Recalling critical events that contribute to understanding or influencing change further supports narrative as an “event-driven tool” (p. 71) combining a series of sketches into a coherent storyline. Field notes recording shared experience “collected through participant observation in a shared practical setting is one of the primary tools of narrative inquiry work” (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, p. 5). Hogan (1988) writes, “empowering relationships develop over time and it takes time for characters to recognize the value that the relationship holds” (p. 12). Fortunately, I have spent the past ten years in senior-level positions, developing close, professional relationships with executive-level leaders linked to the topic of the study.

Blueprints represent a collection of my personal presentations, professional forum presentations, and frameworks mapping processes for executive-level leadership. I am often asked by executive-level leadership to review new strategies, seek to optimize programs and processes, and find innovative ways to resource our programs. Most of the products I build to communicate these efforts consist of sketches, charts, diagrams, and tables. I rarely write a descriptive paper addressing the problem and recommended solutions. The old adage that a picture is worth a thousand words is often validated when two to three charts can tell a story and get a decision. Blueprints save time up front with a quick, somewhat detailed sketch framing the problem and identifying viable solutions to receive guidance or a decision. Ideally, following the blueprint, a team of experts collaborate writing a detailed document to implement the strategy (Ewy, 2009).

Documents include; published scholarly material, white papers, published meeting minutes, published Army education concepts, leader development strategies, Army policy publications, professional journals, books, and research studies such as those from the RAND Corporation and the Army Research Institute (ARI). These documents serve to explore unique relationships between researcher and critical events experienced. None of the material is privileged or confidential.

The path is open and I am free to walk knowing that I am situated with such an assortment of rich data, so that narrative inquiry leads me to the backroads of my mind allowing me as the researcher to generate and analyze my stories (Schwandt, 2007). As the researcher serving as Associate Dean for Education and Instructional Programs at one Center of Excellence (CoE) containing two branch/proponent schools, I am well-positioned to identify critical events that contribute toward a storyline while reflecting on the past (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Because I am personally situated in the middle of the educational transformation, bias was lessened by my ever-present visibility within the community of practice. Detailed field notes translated to field texts scribed my experience of Army leadership relationally to educational leadership practice along competencies and attributes described in The Army Leader Development publication forming a foundational sketch of Army leadership requirements (Department of the Army, 2015a). Theory, coupled with my graduate coursework, provided a foundational sketch of K-12 educational leadership practice. Critical reflection of both the theory and practice served as guideposts while exploring potential gaps in the Army's leader development model. I received personal invitations to present best practices to a larger Army audience. By narrating my experiences, I hope to gain

advocates and help senior Army leaders understand gaps in leader preparation, selection, education, and the fractured purpose associated with school leadership while offering a means to allow the readers to develop their own explanation with my storied experience as your escort.

Data Analysis

Data from the field notes translate into field texts becoming stories of my experience; blueprints navigate the complexity inherent with leadership, policy, and process; and documents support evidence of consequences revealing friction between rigid systems and requirements. The threaded tales relating theory alongside critical events of practice become "important to making meaning" (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000, p. 78). Narrative inquiry causes the researcher to endlessly engage in critical reflection about the accounts collected (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Ellis, 2004; Leavy; Lincoln, & Guba, 1985, 2009). Experience is both personal and social (Dewey, 1938) complimenting narrative inquiry, which holds that people can only be understood in relation to social context. Documenting and reflecting upon critical events and how they fit together helped me construct an analysis framework bound by the following conceptual Army educational leadership themes: preparation, selection, education, and a fractured purpose. Connecting past and present in my quest for new understanding revealed an awakening of my own shortcomings as an Army leader. While reviewing critical events, I constantly compared them to my own beliefs (inward) while maintaining some conscious thought as to the values of the characters themselves alongside current theory (outward). Somewhat resembling what Merriam (1998) espoused as constant comparative analysis.

In narrative research, attention is drawn toward trustworthiness and authenticity of the data collected through observable means such as study groups, focused interviews, and characters, as well as reviewing student/faculty journals, field notes, board meetings, and email correspondence, all of which the researcher codes and themes. The auditing process associated with the collection of data from multiple types of instruments and sources provides data reflecting dependability and conformability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Narrative inquiry allows the researcher to look at variables in a natural setting. Variables in this narrative study include: 1) practitioner direction, and influence; 2) studied leadership attributes, characteristics, and values; and 3) field texts. The study reveals interactions between variables described along critical events providing a rich assortment of data where strengths increase and weaknesses are overcome (Yin, 2003). The strength of observations describing what the characters actually do as opposed to what they say they do helps negate the weakness of published reports interpretive validity.

Trustworthiness and Commonplaces

Narrative inquiry requires the researcher's story to correlate with other characters' stories and documents described earlier while constructing effective (trustworthy) expression for the research (Clandinin & Connelly, 2004; Lincoln & Guba 1985). Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose meaning or congruency as a test of trustworthiness. Meaningful analysis more closely associates "individual truths than generalizable and repeatable events" (Webster and Mertova, 2007, p. 89).

In narrative-based research, validity is more concerned with the research being well-grounded and supportable by the data that has been

collected. It does not provide results that produce generalizable truth, "prescribing" how things are or ought to be (p. 90).

The research should yield results and explanations congruent and trustworthy to the degree to which personal values, truisms, theories, logical foundations, and methodology connect in the narrative. The phenomenon explored in narrative inquiry relates people's experiences and understanding those experiences while thinking narratively (Clandinin, 2013). As the researcher, I wrote through my professional voice, my teacher voice, my administrator voice, and my human voice. When I read and edit what I write, I incorporate the voice of the reader balancing the inward/outward reflection on my part. When I reflect outward, I step back from my individual participation and grasp the experiences from a larger perspective. Stepping out allows me to distance myself during the reflection process, therefore decreasing the risk of becoming too involved, which could cause me to lose objectivity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Conducting research, I travel a narrow path congruent with my association of impartiality, maintaining a relation close enough to appreciate the lives discovered while remaining objective. Moving with confidence between characters while maintaining a reflective stance (inward/outward) permits me to reliably interact with leaders and colleagues with whom I have earned a trusted reputation. The regarded position of narrative inquiry allows me as the researcher to serve as the primary instrument in the study rather than some lifeless device (Eisner, 1991; Frankel & Wallen, 1990; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988). Fairness and consistency remain critical with the researcher seeking credibility constructed upon logic, insight and influential utility (Eisner, 1991) and trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) "through a

process of verification rather than through traditional validity and reliability measures" (Creswell, 2014).

Part of what distinguishes narrative from other methodologies lies with understanding the narrative interpretation of the viewed phenomenon (Clandinin, 2013). Clandinin suggests thinking along three commonplaces: temporality, personal/sociality, and place. During the construction of the study, each commonplace requires careful navigation in, around, and through the complexity of space. Vaughn (2016) suggests, "the space of narrative is pervasive while the temporal, social/personal, and place issues move around as the larger space issue changes." Temporality deals with the concept of backward/forward recalling events as they relate to now and the future. Personal/social, connects my lived experience with theory in terms of what a transformation the study might infer upon the practice, "we tend to our emotions, reactions, moral responses in settings familiar to us such as school, family, and culture" (Clandinin, p. 40, 2013). Place is what Connelly and Clandinin (2006) define as "the specific, concrete, physical, and topological boundaries of place or sequences of places where the inquiry takes place" (p. 480). As my story unfolds, in subsequent chapters, piecing together parts of the research puzzle, the reader should come to understand what Clandinin (2013) describes as "living in the midst, and ending in the midst, of experience."

Conclusion

The overarching goal of the study is to share experiential knowledge gained through exploring the Army leadership's relational and consequential correlation in the struggle to drive and influence educational change and while answering the following research question: how does my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which

Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing educational change? For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new knowledge that I hope will resonate and transfer to strengthen Army educational leadership.

The Army Learning Concepts 2015 (ALC, 2011a) serves as a foundational document upon which to posit underlying assumptions that translate into educational leadership actions. Multiple theoretical lenses are woven into the study surrounding leadership development models with a particular focus on the preparation, selection, and education of successful district- and school-level leadership, highlighting a fractured purpose discovered within Army equivalents (Cerami, 2015). As I begin the journey to discover leadership's effect in the struggle, it is my hope to clarify and increase my own understanding of the complexity associated with the problem and share results of the exploration with the reader throughout the study (Connelly, 2007).

CHAPTER THREE

A Decade of Discovery and Disappointment

I still remember the excitement in 1984 as I was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry, fulfilling my early pursuit of adventure yet knowing that it could springboard into a career or provide entry-level experience in another profession. After all, my ROTC faculty described the Army experience as building leaders with character that would easily migrate to industry if I decided that a career in the Army was not my chosen profession. Thus, I began my Army career as a young man navigating through terrain that would prove both difficult and rewarding. Little did I know then that those often-felt sensations of inadequacy were contributed to by leadership development gaps early in my career. Finally, through reliving the experience, telling, retelling and returning to experience (Clandinin, 2013), I began to appreciate the larger context of Army leader development. Essentially, I discovered that the Army ill-prepared me as an emerging leader with the necessary knowledge to navigate the multitude of leadership positions in which I would serve during the first ten years of my military career (Cerami, 2015).

Wrestling with Transformational Change at an Army School

Reflecting back on training, education, and experience episodes during my career, the best learning experiences, those where I truly internalized the concept most often came with much hard work. This is why I particularly like Doyle's (2011) simple yet meaningful description, "The one who does the work does the learning" (p. 7). Doyle's research indicates that connections in the brain are reinforced causing increased learning with longer memory retention when you engage the learner in activities such as listening, writing, discussing, and reviewing content. Preparing captains to learn

adaptive problem-solving requires that institutional instructional practices become responsive to individual need, appropriately attuned to leader development within a constructive and social learning context. Today, the Army desires its institutions to produce adaptive and agile leaders who can perform within an environment of uncertainty and complexity (Department of the Army, 2011a). The key to introducing critical thinking and problem-solving came with a new learning concept designed by top brass for implementation at the school level.

In 2009, the Army was going through a base realignment and closure (BRAC) process and many Army posts were in the middle of absorbing an additional branch/proponent school, which would become one of two branch/proponent schools co-located on a single installation. The Army was transforming its schools along a new organizational construct of multi-branch/proponent schools called a Center of Excellence (CoE). The organizational change across the once single-branch/proponent school posts was influenced with a promise of efficiencies through a business model structured around an enterprise concept. Coupled with this organizational change, the Army was simultaneously transforming its educational approach toward a new model described as ALM 2015 (ALC, 2011).

As early as 2002, the mid-level schools that taught majors and the senior-level schools that focused on lieutenant colonels already practiced adult learning theories attributed to Kolb, Dewy and Knowles. It seems that the organizational culture of the military institutions at the lieutenant- and captain-level of the Army required a major paradigm shift to accomplish this new approach—one from a tradition-focused

curriculum based on teaching “what to think” to one teaching leaders “how to think” (Army Leader Development Panel, 2003).

Although learner-centered teaching is not a new concept among professional practitioners (McCombs & Miller, 2009), the concept offers a fresh approach for the Army as it begins to adopt and place emphasis on the learner as the centerpiece of professional military education. With this approach began a transformation among the Army institutions tasked with developing innovative solutions for improving leader development along a learner-centric professional military education approach (Dempsey, 2009). Tailoring instruction toward the individual learner offers a fresh perspective in Army education. In other words, past practice involved Army schools generally instructing skills followed by standardized exams resulting in limited long-term retention of topical material. This antiquated methodology failed to produce leaders with aptitudes such as critical thinking, adaptability, and collaboration, therefore neglecting development of the very survival skills that these future leaders would need to succeed (Wagoner, 2010).

The Army Learning Concepts 2015 describes the importance of learner-centered teaching in the development of agile, adaptive leaders who can effectively navigate a complex operating environment. Although a clearly recognized requirement by the Army (Department of the Army, 2011a), three primary obstacles appear to inhibit effective implementation of the concept. First, educational leadership selection, preparation, and sustainability fails to provide qualified executives to run a school-like organization. Second, Army policy establishes such a rigid system filled with prescribed formats, processes, databases and timelines that the mere thought of an adaptable, agile

resource-enriched curriculum meeting operational requirements is just not feasible. Finally, the Army has a hierarchical military type organizational structure led by commanders who, although they may be qualified to lead large complex military organizations, are not educational experts. Amidst the vast literature surrounding successful educational leadership, there is much that the Army leadership development model does not yet recognize about effective educational leadership.

Broad understanding of how the Army operates its center-level institutions along current practice while attempting to transform along new learning strategies is not well documented. The vision behind the Army Learning Concept is simply creating change within our learning environment while transforming our organizations to develop leaders who can prevail in a competitive environment. The change must occur in both content and method of instruction. During the Kermit Roosevelt Exchange Lecture the following year, Dempsey once again addressed a need for rational and progressive tools to deal with complexity to help us understand indicators of change and to comprehend the problem before we look to solutions (Dempsey, 2010). This new environment required traits among young leaders who could demonstrate adaptive, resilient, and networked abilities to progress, move forward, and accomplish strategic outcomes established by the U.S. government. Thus, the Army began to develop an educational strategy that would transform its approach to education and training from a system structured around a course-based, quantity-oriented model to one that is outcomes-based and learner-centric.

Despite Army transformation, the branch schools at the center-level institutions continue to struggle with fully implementing tenets described in Army Learning

Concepts 2015. Recent statistics indicate that the Army trains and educates over half-a-million individual learners every year with fluctuations of up to 10 percent, placing extreme resourcing challenges on the schools (Department of the Army, 2011a). Augmenting this is the complexity surrounding criteria for leadership selected to run the schools and an education policy that fails to support the education strategy. Therefore, a rigid education policy prevents development of the agile, adaptive curriculum.



Figure 3. Army Education Concept Versus Army Education Policy

Tension between Army education policy and Army education strategy exists because the education strategy is designed to create and deliver education at the point of need for self-development and improved relevancy at the branch proponent/school along with guidance described in Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011b). Senior Army leaders want curriculum that can turn on a dime, representing the most up-to-date trends from the field, yet the policy and process driving the resourcing of branch proponent/school courses is tied to the Army's budgeting process and policies. Therefore, there exists a tension between concept and

reality. This is where the hard work resides and where the generals and politicians must work to fix the bureaucracy cutting through the red tape and making the policy and process associated with resourcing education more agile and adaptive.

A Place to Begin

My field notebook stands ever ready for opportunity, where my present career as Associate Director of Education and Instructional programs fits nicely within my pursuit of a post-graduate degree. The layers discovered between educational leadership and Army leadership provides an abundant domain of professional opportunity transforming my professional knowledge along a complex web of change. Friction is sure to follow the discovery of change heightened by higher learning while grappling with current Army policy and process. Conducting this study, I discovered that somewhere between the stars and the bars there lies a problem of understanding and implementation. The policy, the programs, and the initiatives become at times so overwhelming that the chance of quality learning appears very distant, at best, unless senior leaders in the Army institutions embrace the tenets described in the Army Learning Concepts 2015 (TRADOC Pam, 525-8-2, 2011). What I mean here is that the higher headquarters continue to outpace and out-staff the lower headquarters where the institutional schools exist. Army institutions must find the resources and time to implement the tenets within ALM 2015 (ALC, 2011) which consist of 1) learner-centric instructional methodologies, 2) curriculum and instruction which engage the learner, 3) adaptive, agile instructors and curriculum which meet future learning requirements, 4) increased rigor and relevance through routine assessment, and 5) leveraging

technologies while increasing a realistic learning environment both in the schoolhouse and in the field.

Looking Back

Basic Officer Leaders Course

My journey begins at the University of Oklahoma ROTC in late 1984, where several young, aspiring second lieutenants raised their right hands and swore an oath to serve and protect the United States of America. I was set to graduate from college and begin a seventeen-week-long Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC). The curriculum at that time was built around large group lecture and delivered through what was called "death by VGT" (Viewgraph Transparency). Today, that would be the equivalent of death by PowerPoint®. The classes were large and boring, reminding me of a university freshman psychology class. Clearly this was not following any of the adult learning methods just beginning to be popular among scholars, such as Knowles, et al. (1984), who described adult learners in an andragogy approach. Knowles (1984) emphasized that adults are self-directed and expect to take responsibility for learning decisions. Adult learning programs must accommodate this fundamental aspect. Andragogy makes the following assumptions about the design of learning: 1) adults need to know why they need to learn something, 2) adults need to learn experientially, 3) adults approach learning as problem-solving, and 4) adults learn best when the topic is of immediate value. The Army's basic officer leader course trained me at a very rudimentary level of tactics to lead small units as part of a larger Army unit structure against a conventional threat. Instruction was built upon large classroom methodology focusing lieutenants on what to think, not how to think.

Teaching what to think relates to task-oriented training where a learning solution follows a set path along established tasks to be trained, under specific conditions, along verifiable standards to achieve a particular skill. Leaders observe training along a rigid, checklist of tasks requiring little more than a robotic response following prescribed procedures to achieve a desired training outcome. For example, a commander observes his unit execute lane training while looking for specific individual critical leader tasks and unit collective tasks to accomplish the scenario. This results in a train-to-task approach of following repeated actions until the performance reaches the desired standard. The prescribed task, condition, and standard results in little to no critical thinking and becomes a battle drill, a standard reaction to a given condition. The problem with this type of learning solution is that when the conditions change as they can in combat, and as they did in 2003 for the Army's 5th Corps Commander, General Wallace, who admitted that he was fighting a fight against an enemy scenario which he had not practiced against (Blitzer, 2003).

Army leadership doctrine at the time was revamping along a "Be, Know, Do" philosophy (Department of the Army, 1983) as part of the Army's larger effort labeled "A Decade of Modernization and Reform" (Romjue, 1993). At the same time, the Army was working to change its post-Vietnam image and structure toward meeting two predominant strategic challenges. The first challenge was the defense of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe. The second challenge was that the United States was simultaneously providing deployable forces that could defend United States interests worldwide. Thus, the Army was evolving toward an "Army of Excellence" (Wickham, 1987), demanding transformation of its leadership development to meet

demands along a more complex operating environment. Foss (1985) summarized changes to his Infantry Basic Officer Leaders Course (IBOLC) as adding one week to the course, making it seventeen weeks. Changes also included more field training that would now comprise 80 percent of the course. Of particular interest was the addition of a tactical leadership course aimed at teaching lieutenants "how to train, how to lead, and how to build teams" (p. 2). This was achieved by providing individual lieutenants multiple opportunities at various leadership positions while in a field environment. IBOLC students were placed in the traditional light infantry organizational structure built upon a nine-man squad with three to four squads comprising a platoon, four platoons comprising a company, followed by four companies comprising a battalion. Generally, an infantry lieutenant's first assignment was as a platoon leader. IBOLC predominately focused training on light infantry, only one of five types of infantry organizations to which a lieutenant could be assigned.

In 1985, my first unit assignment was to a highly decorated World War II (WWII) unit, which proudly kept a lineage of heroes such as Audie Murphy, the highest decorated soldier of WWII (Brokaw, 2001). Just a year before my arrival, the unit had fielded the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). This was the Army's newest high-technology weapon system platform that would serve as the main mechanized combat vehicle over the next 20 plus years. The officer leader course from which I had recently graduated did not include any information or training on this vehicle. As a new platoon leader, I was not fully prepared to perform my core competencies in this type of unit. Although the Army introduced me to training exercises reinforcing *what* to think, it had not taught me *how* to think, which Wagner (2008) describes as the first survival skill.

Moreover, the Army had not trained me to employ, operate, or maintain this particular fighting system. The Army usually addresses such a training gap through a functional course, which is an additional course to learn a specific system or piece of equipment. Because the system was new in 1984, a functional course was not available at the time.

Another method the Army utilizes to instruct soldiers how to operate new equipment is through a process called new equipment fielding, but I missed this as well. By the time I finished all of my courses at my training duty station and arrived at my new unit, fielding was complete. The Army to this day still wrestles with when to send an officer to train on a new system or piece of equipment at the institution once the field receives a new piece of equipment. Part of the issue stems around when the institution will receive the new system or new piece of equipment, which usually follows a year after the first unit is equipped. The impact to the organization was that it had to spend money to send me to southern Germany for two weeks to attend a transition course. My lieutenant course did not even introduce me to the system, nor did the curriculum teach me how to employ it in combat. In fact, at the time, the Army did not have any written doctrine (how to fight) written for this new system. The gap in Army training meant that the school was not focused on outcomes-based learning. This caused me to lose valuable time with my unit and cost the Army extra money to train me because the school did not offer assignment-oriented training. The course instead remained focused on light and airborne operations (Kirkpatrick, 1950, 2008).

First Assignment/The Cold War

Upon graduation from the university receiving a bachelor's of science degree, I was also commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. The Cold War was in full

swing with a newly-elected President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, who was gearing up to dominate the Soviet Union. In fact, my first assignment as a new lieutenant was at the Audie Murphy Battalion in Kitzingen, Germany. This was my first trip outside of the United States, and it was somewhat intimidating to be immersed within a foreign country where I could not pronounce the names on street signs, *einbaunstrasse* (one-way traffic) let alone understand German.

The United States clearly defined the Soviets as a threat so my unit began preparing for a mission supporting West Germany in monitoring the border between West Germany and East Germany near Coburg, West Germany. Because the Soviets controlled East Germany, we, in essence, were fighting the Soviets. My basics officer leaders course did not teach me how to patrol borders and work with foreign law enforcement or military services. Nor did the foundational leader course I had taken explain the culture, politics, or sensitivity of diplomatic relations.

The Captain Years

Returning to the United States from Germany in 1988, I was one of two infantry officers selected to attend the Field Artillery Officers Career Course at an Army post. This course was delivered mostly in moderate sized groups yet remained highly technical, focusing on manual gunnery with a small bit of fire support added for good measure. Although this course did not fully prepare me to lead at the next higher level of command, as a captain it did provide valuable knowledge that would prove useful as a brigade- and division-level staff officer. In a follow-on course at another Army post, I experienced one of the Army's premier technical schools. This 5-week course was a maintenance officer's course which prepared officers to lead and manage the

maintenance operations of large Army combat units. The course actually taught us how to supervise the repair of vehicles, conduct recovery operations of stuck vehicles, and order and track repair parts to fix broken or damaged vehicles and weapon systems. This was the first Army course that really prepared me to perform a specific job.

In 1992, after spending a mere seven years learning my profession, I was specifically selected by Army leadership to join a program called Project Warrior. This program selected rising stars to serve at one of the Army's elite Combat Training Centers to be followed by a tour teaching at a Captains Career Course. Initially, I was sent to the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California, in the heart of the Mojave Desert. With Desert Storm, August 1990 through March 1991, fresh in the minds of the country's civilian and military leaders, the combat training centers (CTCs) became the Army's premier training grounds for large Army combat units. These centers provided Army leaders to practice force-on-force tactical maneuver where two opposing forces would fight each other under an austere set of rules. The engagements were fought with laser devices serving as kill instruments for the force on force while actual live-fire maneuver was performed against an array of enemy plywood targets. This was the first time in my early, Army career that I found myself exposed to an intellectual side of the Army, and it was invigorating to say the least.

During this assignment, I became a novice research scientist studying the intricacies of battle, leadership, culture, human capital, environment, and a very adaptive enemy. During the unit's rotation (force on force and live fire maneuver over a 14-day period), I collected data from observations, one-on-one interviews and focus groups consisting of unit leaders and soldiers (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013). As a

Lieutenant and Captain, I was a product of the institutions antiquated model which taught me *what to think,* not *how* to think. As I gained experience serving in numerous leadership positions, I did learn how to critically think. I discovered through the personal observation of over 250 force–on–force battles over a thirty month period that those who succeeded in leading soldiers in battle were those who could adapt and critically think through complex problems.

My new discovery, that the profession of arms could include intellectual stimulation, further reinforced the utility derived from a community of practice shared among observer controller teams (Wenger & Snyder, 2002). One afternoon, our senior trainer joined one of my teams professional discussions where he started to draw on a white - board explaining Bloom's Taxonomy (Bloom, 1984). This caused us to think about the unit's experience during a rotation as a deliberate learning experience. We could actually determine a unit's training level through data collected prior to the unit's arrival. Based upon leadership's goals, our teams would focus on lessons learned and on coaching to help the rotational player unit attain a higher level of learning through cognitive learning goals (Bloom, 1984). It was the first time I associated learning outcomes, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness with individual and organizational performance (Joint Publication, 2011). This impact on the organization is referred to in Kirkpatrick's (1994) model of training and evaluation as level four.

The experience gained during almost three years in the desert of southern California at the Army's premier battle lab would prove useful when I was reassigned to the Infantry School, at Fort Benning, Georgia, to teach the Captains' Career Course. At Fort Benning, I attended the Army's Basic Instructor Course (ABIC), where I was

taught how to mechanically present material through a method of talk, pause, and call. This was supported with the use of viewgraph transparencies (VGTs) covering subjects studied the previous evening. All of a sudden, it was dawning on me that all of the goodness I had learned with the discovery and application of Bloom's Taxonomy, as well as learning to coach officers and soldiers in how to think versus what to think at the National Training Center, was being lost in the ABIC instruction at Fort Benning.

Fortunately, many of the instructors assigned to my team had also served at a combat training center, so we took the collective experiences we learned and began to apply the techniques of critical thinking and Blooms to our classes. Simply, we had discovered how to infuse learning outcomes with the learning objectives and tied these to a learning level described by Blooms (1984). Blooms referred to here, classifies six competency levels. The model is most often labeled on a triangle with the first level beginning at the base comprising Knowledge, followed next by Comprehension, working up levels to Application, to Analysis, to Synthesis, and finally Evaluation. This caused us to further refine our instructional methods from VGT-heavy utilization migrating to the utilization of white board sketching and facilitation. This evolution caused a more in depth topical discussion resulting in increased learning. The students began to take more ownership for their own learning following a learner centric instructional methodology (Armstrong, 2012).

The knowledge acquired through this experience began to replace an emptiness felt earlier in my career but, there had to be more out there, and I was determined to find it. But what was it? During my second year teaching at Fort Benning, I was selected for promotion to major and nominated to attend the Army's Command and General Staff

Officer Course CGSOC). This meant that I was on glide path to serve in higher levels of responsibility and leadership. I was now a corporate man adopted by the organizational leadership and would be professionally managed differently than sixty percent of my peers. Less than 50 percent of a year group of officers were selected to attend CGSOC, so resident attendance became a discriminator for promotion to the next higher grade. Another discrimination against those who did not attend resident CGSOC occurred in their non-selection of lieutenant colonel-level command, which meant no chance of promotion to colonel. If I could maintain course, unlimited opportunities awaited in terms of assignments and promotions.

Despite a successful career up until that point, I was still searching for that promise of leadership development in the institution followed by strong mentorship in the field. It be some time before I realized that the Army heavily depended upon field units and self-development as the primary means of leadership development. Leadership instruction was only cursory, at best, with very few academic hours devoted to the subject in the lieutenant or captains courses. The 1983 capstone leadership manual, FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1983) described leadership as the key component bringing together, people, organization and doctrine together to make the Army function. Three primary focus areas included: 1) learning what a leader must be, know, and do; 2) how to coach, mentor and teach subordinates; 3) and how to develop cohesive, disciplined and well-trained units for combat. Understanding the focus areas meant that the leader must demonstrate sound character and beliefs (corporate man), must know the duties associated with the assigned job thoroughly, and provide direction and motivation to his subordinates (Department of the Army, 1983). Now, with this bit

of background I want you to picture the uniform of an officer during this era. I will narratively sketch a picture of an infantry lieutenant arriving at his first assignment.

The uniform is the Battle-Dress Uniform or BDU. Sewn on the right collar is the rank, second lieutenant. On the left collar is the branch insignia, infantry. On the right sleeve of the uniform is sewn a combat patch of the unit served with in combat; on the left sleeve is sewn the current serving unit patch. Above that patch is sewn a Ranger tab and on the left front above the pocket of the uniform blouse is sewn a U.S. Army name tape. Above the U.S. Army tape is airborne wings, combat infantryman's badge and above the right breast pocket is sewn a name tape. Foreign jump wings is above the name tape. With this sketch you begin to understand how the Army posits a compliance (Etzioni, 1975) authority from the mere uniform worn by its leaders. The uniform, alone, symbolizes the Army leader creating a persona that with the badges, awards and rank comes an appropriate level of experiential knowledge to lead. At senior levels, even the branch insignia can play important roles letting everyone at the table know which members represent the combat arms. After all, combat arms, particularly the Infantry branch, containing four, four-stars and Armor branch with three, four-stars together they represent 80 percent of the four-star population (Army General Officer Public Roster by rank, 2012). Three stars, denoted in the same roster, suggests twenty Infantry and six Armor branch officers making up more than one third of the fifty listed. Needless to say, those that serve careers within the combat arms are likely to lead the Army enterprise level.

Reflecting on my days as a lieutenant and captain, I now begin to realize what Fullan (2011) described as a 10-year period to become an expert. Most of my

assignments were less than 18 months, each lasting nowhere near the necessary time to develop expertise. This idea of time in practice to build expertise is explored in my later chapters as I unfold potential gaps in Army leadership development relating to Army school leadership practice.

CHAPTER FOUR

A Second Decade Transformed by Practice

The Major Years

After three years teaching tactics and operations to captains as a career course instructor, I was selected to attend the Army's Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), a graduate-level, one-year course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was during CGSOC that I was first exposed to adult learning theories, such as Kolb's (1984) Experiential Learning Model. Kolb's model was, incidentally, the instructional method that the Army had begun to employ at the mid-grade institution. CGSOC faculty were beginning to apply this adult learning model across the courses, however, the faculty which I was exposed to only gave it a cursory mention. Here again was another Army school that told us *what* to think. I was beginning to wonder why the Army seemed to struggle in its efforts to transform education.

During my attendance at CGSOC, I also applied and was accepted into Kansas State University's (KSU) Adult Education Master's Program. The KSU program revealed true adult education methods, techniques and approaches, which began to open my mind and would soon change how I thought about and designed training for my soldiers. At the time, I could not have envisioned the incredible influence that the KSU program would have forging transformational change in how I approached training and education in the Army. In fact, I became increasingly critical of the Army touting discovery learning while practicing didacticism. I saw first-hand that change can take years to implement, if it does at all (Fullan, 2011). Even so, my Master's program

would serve me well as both a senior leader in the operational force and later as an instructor and Director of a graduate-level program at CGSOC.

While attending CGSOC I was heavily recruited by two divisions, (Army 2-star-level organization) one at Fort Carson, Colorado and the other at Fort Riley, Kansas. I would eventually decide to go to the latter, where I would serve two years and have my first born son. It was a tremendous time in my life both professionally and personally. Graduation found my wife and I moving to our next assignment, transitioning to what the Army leader development field manual describes as organizational level four, "leading functions" (Department of the Army, 2015b, pp. 1-9). Because senior leadership at Fort Riley recruited me, I received a pinpoint assignment as a battalion operations officer moving past several majors already positioned at the fort. Of course, this was not popular with many of the majors and did not resonate well with the gaining colonel as he had someone else in mind. This was all transparent to me and I eagerly joined the 956-man combat organization (battalion), which was beginning a year-long training cycle in preparation for a replicated combat exercise at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. I was beside myself with excitement as I was freshly armed with new knowledge in adult education based upon Knowles' five assumptions of adult learners (1984) and was excited to apply this new knowledge to our training strategy. Plus, I would get to prove the value behind quality learning at my beloved NTC. The NTC was renowned as the Army's premier training center and there was no better environment available to test my experiential knowledge. Looking back I was experiencing what Clandinin (2013) described as "the nexus of a person's personal practical knowledge, and the landscapes, past, and present, on which a person lives and

works" (p. 53). My story was evolving, telling who I was and who I was becoming from over ten years of experience, training, and education.

The year of training and preparation came with long, exhausting hours in garrison coupled with weeks of extended training in the field. Our rotation date was set for March, so that meant that our field exercises would begin in the heat of summer culminating in the Kansas winter. The home station training went extremely well and I was put in charge of one of three training lanes where I earned recognition by the general as having the top training lane in the division. Of course, I related this to my former experience as an observer controller at the NTC, instructor at the career course, and mostly to my application of adult education methodologies which I incorporated into the design of my training lane (Kolb, 1984; Knowles, 1984). Operationally, I was beginning to demonstrate expertise explained by Fullan (2011) where he suggests that it takes "ten years of deep development to become an expert in anything" (p. 46). Fullan further explains that people learn through practice, having experienced a variety of scenarios over time and should continue to seek growth in themselves as well as others (Colvin, 2008; Dweck, 2006). I found myself at a turning point in my career where I began to apply components of theory acquired from education, expert knowledge learned from years of experience, and valuable lessons learned from years of training. I finally felt like I was contributing to the professional practice.

Although I did not realize it at the time, reflecting back on the collective events culminating in a pivotal episode of a successful training rotation, the organization was experiencing four facets of trust explained by Forsyth, Adams, and Hoy (2011): reliability, competence, honesty, and openness. Reliability grew out of our sense of

teamwork, as we depended upon each other to perform individual and collective tasks making the unit successful as a whole. Competence was demonstrated in soldiers and leaders performing their assigned duties to established standards. Honesty resulted from shared values and character telling soldiers where they needed to improve while always seeking to improve myself. I never asked a soldier to do something that I had not already done. A lot of times that meant going first on the live-fire range letting soldiers see leadership perform the task. Or sometimes that meant going through the chow line last, so that soldiers could go first. It also meant that soldiers knew that I remained consistent holding people accountable against high standards of conduct. Open communication and shared decision making improved performance. It represented timely, accurate information resulting in better moral and soldiers who understood what was expected of them. Sincerity came in the form of a leader walking the unit perimeter at night, going out to the lone pair of soldiers on guard duty and simply having a conversation or bringing them a warm cup of coffee. All of these facets were what good leaders were supposed to do. I was building collective trust (Forsyth et al., 2011) before I knew such a concept existed.

New Army leader development doctrine was published in 1999 (Department of the Army, 1999) changing leader development from a focus at the battalion and lower units toward addressing all three organizational levels. Army organizational levels include: tactical, operational and strategic. My education, training and experience were collectively maturing causing a fundamental change in how I approached my professional practice. I was becoming a; *Be, Know, Do* leader described by Army leadership doctrine. *Be* and *know* represent attributes such as, *Character* found within

prescribed Army values, discipline and warrior ethos; *Resilience* derived from fitness, and bearing; *Intellect* gained through demonstrating judgement, and expertise. *Do* demonstrates skills, and competencies defined within leading, developing, and achieving individual and organizational goals. Returning to support an earlier statement from the Prologue on Army leadership: For, it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders which exposes gaps in competencies and behaviors. The gaps do not address those leaders chosen to head tactical-, operational- or strategic-level Army organizations. For Army leadership doctrine makes it plainly clear that the purpose of leadership development is to prepare those chosen, to lead traditional Army organizations and not tailored for those chosen to supervise Centers of Excellence or run branch/proponent schools. Although I was at a point in my career where I began to appreciate the value of education and understanding how adults learn I was still wrestling with the Army education system.

Why weren't other leaders who attended the same Army schools that I did seem to lack an appreciation for how soldiers learn? Looking back now on previous assignments leading up to this experience, coupled with graduate school, it was as if the Army had groomed me for the very purpose of leading a mechanized infantry battalion in a combat-like experience. Was this the proof that I needed to know that the Army leadership development model was working? While I was at the top of my game, none of my peers came close to my skills and tactical knowledge. My Bradley crew was a top gun in the brigade, the battle plans which I constructed earned me notoriety from within the tight circles of the post's senior leadership. So what could explain what was happening at this moment in my career, which resulted in so much success? I was

demonstrating the facets described in the Army leader development model while at the same time exhibiting a growth mindset (Dweck, 2006), embracing challenges, and working hard to overcome setbacks. I wanted to make a difference in the lives of my soldiers, I wanted to provide them the most challenging training experience possible ultimately improving their chances of survival in combat. Leadership influenced by education, experience, and training began to show consequential and relational results toward improved unit performance.

My unit's performance at the NTC was noted by the observer controllers as well as the senior leadership of Fort Riley where I earned numerous accolades and awards. In short, our rotational exercise was so impressive that I found myself in a new job shortly after returning from the National Training Center experience. My new office was positioned just outside of the Commanding General's office where I served as his Secretary to the General Staff. During the next year, my first son was born and I began to have a new perspective on life, career, and priorities. The new job would last a year and I would be asked if I wanted to serve as a brigade executive officer which was a lieutenant colonel position and I was only a major. It was a hard decision as I knew if I decided not to take the highly prestigious position I would find myself in transition to another career field to remain competitive.

One Friday afternoon, shortly after my first son was born, the Commanding General asked me to go home and discuss the opportunity with my wife and let him know my decision on Monday. I returned to work on Monday and told the general that I was honored, but would like to, instead, go to Fort Leavenworth, KS fulfilling my desire to teach. Needless to say, he was not happy, but eventually supported me in the

transition to Fort Leavenworth, KS. Of course, my branch assignments officer and other senior leaders were concerned that it was not a good career decision, but I had made the decision and it would not change (Department of the Army, 214b). As fate would have it, I reported to Fort Leavenworth and found that my teaching position was traded for an executive officer position to the Dean of Academics. Although I was initially upset, the assignment became a blessing in disguise, and would provide a necessary experience and increased knowledge about education administration and policy that I would use some twelve years later (Kruger, Dunning, 1999). The assignment introduced me to Army education administration and policy and I found it extremely fascinating.

During this time, the school at Fort Leavenworth was in transformation, virtually changing its instructional approach following Kolb's experiential learning model (Kolb, 1984). The school was reconstructing the major's course, and leadership were in the planning stages of creating a brand new school structure. Needless to say it was a busy two years. During my assignment I was introduced to yet another faculty development course which was much different than the one I had attended years earlier at Fort Benning. The faculty development course taught at Fort Leavenworth reinforced the theory I learned four years earlier in my adult education program and I was excited that Fort Leavenworth was migrating to this adult learning model. Finally, an Army course was being constructed around grounded adult learning theory (Dewey, 1938; Knowles, 1990; Kolb, 1984). The year-long CGSOC that I had attended in the late 1990s was transforming to an adult educational experience. It would take two years of pilot courses followed by several more years of hard work to evolve into a steady state.

Due to the long war, even the faculty that had once been predominately military were beginning to become predominately civilian.

After September 2011, I would depart Fort Leavenworth taking an assignment as a human resource director for the United State Army Europe (USAREUR) Finance Command. Talk about learning to be creative, agile, and adaptive: the assignment would prove rewarding and open doors that I could not have imagined. In the job I found myself exposed to higher levels of leadership and culture. Germany had changed in the fourteen years since I had last been assigned. My previous assignment fifteen years earlier was in the predominant farmland of Bavaria while this assignment found me in the big university town of Heidelberg. I began to get interested once again in going back to school to work toward a doctoral in education. However, with the possibility of deployment coupled with incredibly long hours associated with war planning and preparation I decided to wait.

The assignment as a human resource director made me get into the Army regulations where I studied Army personnel policy from promotions, career tracks, selection boards, and more. It was eye opening to say the least and I learned the intricacies of what it took to get promoted up to the colonel level. Career tracks, timing, capturing the right language in performance reports, and general officer support began to contribute to selection at the major level and became essential at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. Again this assignment would come with a hard decision as I was hand-picked to go to work for a general officer, assuring promotion to colonel. But at the same time, a friend from the Pentagon called and asked me to compete for one of the Army's new career fields as a strategic plans and policy officer. The decision would

upset some commanders in Germany making for a somewhat rough departure, but a departure none-the-less. In May of 2005 I was heading for new and rewarding challenges.

The Lieutenant Colonel Years

Soon, I found myself moving a family of four from Hockenheim, Germany to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania to attend the prestigious, Strategic Arts Program, at the Army's Senior Service College. For the first time in 20 years, I was experiencing an Army course, which was modeled along the most current adult learning theories. This tough and highly demanding program was offered to less than 150 students a year. The process for selection required an application reviewed by an Army-level board approved by a senior flag officer. This school reinvigorated my enthusiasm for learning and demonstrated that the Army, at least at the senior levels, understood quality education (Matheny, 2005).

Upon graduation from The Strategic Arts Program at Carlisle, I was assigned to be an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations. The first year on the faculty, I served as a Division Chief of the Special Operations Division and Instructor. This same college, which I had attended just six years earlier was now fully embracing adult education methods of instruction. Of course, there were still small pockets of resistance where a few instructors utilized vast quantities of slides as crutches to facilitate learning. In my second year at the college, I was selected to serve as the Director of Strategic Studies, which was an Army-level resident program housed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas within the Command and General Staff Officer's Course

(CGSOC), a year-long resident course primarily for selected Army Majors, other branch services, foreign military officers, and a few other federal agency officers. The method of instruction was built upon small groups comprising at least one of the top mentioned attendees. The student groups were taught by a team of five instructors representing each of the five college departments. These departments included: Department of Joint Multinational Operations (DJIMO), History, Tactics, Logistics, and Leadership.

Transition to a Department of the Army Civilian

As the Command and General Staff College unveiled its premier Land Power University in 2007, I, too, transitioned from a uniformed service member to a coat-and-tie service member as a new Department of the Army Civilian. Fortunately, I kept the same responsibilities as director of strategic studies and faculty member. The Command and General Staff College opened the doors to a new campus named after the famous Captains Lewis and Clark. The Army's change in direction demonstrated a move toward supporting improved education for its mid-grade leaders, which was clearly demonstrated through the investment of resources building this new campus. The Lewis and Clark Center cost approached $159 Million dollars, which included state-of- the-art world class rooms, digital capabilities, and instructional technologies consisting of 410, 000 square feet of space containing 96 classrooms, 800 faculty and staff, an auditorium seating 2,000 and the capacity to hold 1,500 students (Roberts, 2010). Additionally, the faculty comprised a permanent, civilian faculty, many of whom had doctorate degrees, integrated into a faculty consisting of a number of uniformed military officers representing all of the services and numerous foreign countries. The Army recognized the utility of creating a civilian faculty base that was selected for its experience and

education which brought a new level of maturity and continuity to the college's programs. Finally, after 24 years affiliated with the Army I was beginning to observe and actively participate in quality learning.

My professional experience while serving as the Director of Strategic Studies and faculty member provided me with a strong foundation of what quality Army education could look like. The school at Fort Leavenworth actually resembled a university-like construct. The campus supported both structure and good organizational leaders who understood education. This experience would later prove useful as I was offered an opportunity to impact change at one of the Army's Centers of Excellence where initial military training and professional military education are trained and taught. Interestingly transparent to me as I departed Fort Leavenworth's premier learning institution whose cutting edge instructional methodologies, technology and professional development which I had come to appreciate would prove useful in my new job. The Army's senior leadership was beginning in 2009 to message transformation such as that implemented years earlier at CGSOC into its foundational-level schools situated across seven Centers of Excellence (CoE) and sixteen branch/proponent schools.

Army in Transformation

During a November 2009 Association of the United States Army's Chapter President's Dinner in Washington DC Martin Dempsey, described his vision to infuse a new educational approach across all 17 Center of Excellence Army schools. The concept behind the change addressed a competitive learning environment where leaders adapt to change, learn faster than the competition, and fully understand the scope of the problem (Dempsey, 2009). The basis of this fresh thinking spawned a study that would,

in three short years, produce the creation of the Army Learning Concepts 2015. The vision behind the concept is simply creating change within our learning environment while transforming our organizations in developing leaders who can prevail in a competitive environment. The change must occur in both content and method of instruction.

During the Kermit Roosevelt Exchange Lecture the following year, Dempsey once again addressed a need for rational and progressive tools to deal with complexity, to help us understand indicators of change, and to comprehend the problem before we look to solutions (Dempsey, 2010). This new environment required traits among young leaders who could demonstrate adaptive, resilient, and networked abilities to progress strategic outcomes established by the U.S. government. Thus, the Army began to develop an educational strategy, which would transform its approach to education and training from a system structured around a course–based, quantity oriented model to one that is outcomes-based and learner-centric.

The new approach to learning offered a model designed to deliver professional military education built around five major components:

1) Learner-centered approach

2) Engaging curriculum and instructional delivery

3) Adaptive curriculum which incorporates the newest ideals and techniques from applications discovered in the field and in industry

4) Relevant topics with increased rigor

5) Networked design that offers opportunity to learn beyond the brick and mortar of the schoolhouse.

Even as the Army mandated change across its training and educational institutions leaders at the institutional level continued grappling with two major Army transformation initiatives effecting both organizational structure and educational theory.

The first of these efforts was the Army Learning Concept 2015 (Dempsey, 2009; 2011) followed closely by the Army's transformation toward a University Construct (Braverman, 2012). Simply, this new approach consisted of transforming from instructional methodologies that were course based and quantity oriented, to one that is outcomes-based and learner centric (Dempsey, 2011). In the face of sequestration, dwindling budgets, and force reductions it is imperative that institutions demonstrate that their product provides value to the Army's mission. Despite Army transformation, the Centers of Excellence continues to practice instructor led, predetermined length courses ignoring individual learner need. Recent statistics indicate that the Army trains and educates over half of one million individual learners every year with fluctuations of up to 10 percent placing extreme resourcing challenges on the schools (TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 2011). Augmenting this remained the complexity and myriad of mandatory subjects embedded within the programs of instruction (POI) which became overloaded, leaving little time for reflection and necessary repetition to master core competencies.

Fresh on the heels of a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC, 2005) effort, the Army published a plan to transform education and training at its CoEs and branch/proponent schools. Late winter of 2009 I found myself transitioning from instructor/director at Fort Leavenworth to lead strategist located at one of the Centers of Excellence. The Army CoE and branch proponent schools were in the midst of transformational change as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts were

underway causing a number of installation closures and realignments across all military services. One of the purposes of BRAC associated with education and training resulted in significantly reducing the footprint of Army schools (Defense Report, 2005). Not only was the Army in organizational transition consolidating schools while closing some installations the CoEs and branch/proponent schools hardly had time to reset and would find themselves wrestling with implementing educational change while in the midst of moving to another installation or preparing to receive another school within the same installation footprint which traditionally served only one school. The consolidation of branch/proponent schools would surface equality issues among both military and civilian employees. Although the effect of BRAC is not the purpose of the study it is relational to employee perceptions, leadership decisions and contributed somewhat to concerns of trust between two merging communities and a desire to find a single identity resulting from the consolidation (Forsyth et al., 2011). Although the BRAC report was presented to the President of the United States in May 2005 with an implementation date mandated by 2011 effects of trust are still felt today.

CHAPTER FIVE

Year One

My first year in the position of deputy director for education and instructional programs at one of the Army's seven Centers of Excellence, I faced three extraordinary challenges. The first was a scheduled Army Enterprise Accreditation System (AEAS) visit just eight months away. Second, involved both branch/proponent schools implementing phase one of the new Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011). Finally, I was to ensure the development of training and education course resourcing requirements and integrate and synchronize along procedures described in Army policy (TRADOC Regulation 350-18, 2010; TRADOC Regulation 350-70-9, 2012). The Army links several key systems at scheduled intervals during the fiscal year as part of budgeting and resourcing branch/proponent school's programs of instruction (POI). The Army's fiscal year begins in October and runs through the end of September. So the third challenge was already four months along with deadlines approaching over the next two months. Since a path along this challenge was pretty much set I decided to spend any effort here just learning roles, responsibilities and procedures. This challenge will be described in more detail in the next chapter as I learned how to affect it during the second year.

Although creating vision and associated objectives to drive and influence change was not new to me, leading instructional change was new territory. I was about to discover that implementing change in a school was much different than implementing typical Army organizational change. After all, the Army, as a practice, constantly task organizes adapting structure based upon mission requirements (Department of the

Army, 2012a). Like any new leader, I had to learn the organization get to know the people and discover what if any processes were in place to track work and determine efficiencies. Therefore, my first 75 days were dedicated to what I will call "onboarding" that is understanding the situation before me. Or more famously addressed by coach, Vince Lombardi who said, "The will to win is not as nearly important as the will to prepare to win" (Bradt, 2012).

This chapter explores an educational awakening encouraged by a return to higher education where I enrolled in one of the University of Oklahoma's Education, Administration, Curriculum, and Supervision (EACS) courses in Visionary Leadership with Mackey. The course would reinforce the thought, before changing anything, I needed to understand the organization and listen to the people. By that I mean I had to get to know the employees, discover the processes and programs in place, determine accountability and explore what was working and what was not working and why (Kotter, 1996; Fullan, 2011; Begley, 2003).

As I begin crafting the pages of this study, reflecting inward/outward (Clandinin, 2013) upon my memories coupled with the multitude of field notes collected over the last several years I find it fascinating how the Education Administration Curriculum and Supervision (EACS) program design purposefully contributed to my awakening of instructional leadership and policy. It is my hope that this chapter creates a clear sketch connecting studied theory and application of practice (Kowalski, 2013) while exploring gaps in Army leadership preparation for those senior leaders selected to supervise Centers of Excellence (CoE) and run branch/proponent schools.

Seeking Knowledge

As an active participant, I began my exploration trying to understand why the Center of Excellence was struggling to implement components of the Army's Learning Model methodology (2011). Just a few months prior to my arrival in this position, I began a post graduate program at a tier one university. Although excited to begin this program, I was not sure that I could take on earning a terminal degree, so I entered the program under the auspice of the superintendent certification program. I began with a single course in the fall of 2012 and by mid spring of 2013 I found myself wanting to increase knowledge and understanding in the subject area of educational leadership. One of my professors encouraged me to apply for the Educational Administration, Curriculum, and Supervision doctoral program believing it was more appropriate for my area of need and interest. By mid-June of 2013 I submitted my application, interviewed with the faculty, and was accepted. I quickly discovered that the graduate program, which I began in the fall of 2012, provided exactly what I needed to build a foundational construct supported by research and underlying principles found in transformational leaders of change (Fullan, 2011).

Exploring Commonplaces: First 75 Days

January, 2013: Getting to Know the People

As I began formulating a plan to prepare for the Army Enterprise Accreditation System (AEAS) visit, improve implementation of the Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011), and improve integration and synchronization of course resourcing requirements, I went to visit one of my senior mentors. I remember the first item that I shared with him was the overwhelming sense of responsibility, coupled with the enormous task of

implementing change (Kotter, 1996). Leading 138 employees responsible for 178 programs of instruction containing over 30,000 resident academic hours serving an annual student load of 20,000 officers and soldiers was a tremendous responsibility. Although I was delighted to take on the challenge, I could not shake from my mind the weight of responsibility placed upon my shoulders. When I shared these thoughts with my senior mentor, he grinned and told me that is exactly why we chose me. He added that he was delighted that I took the responsibilities associated with the position so personally and the gained stature with such humbleness. We closed the discussion with some small talk and he wished me well in my new endeavor while reminding me that he would stand by my side, advising me to always take care of the people and they, in turn, would take care of me.

Returning to my office, I began to schedule meetings with my subordinate first line supervisors and their leads so that I could begin to learn what their organizational structure looked like, and what roles and functions each employee performed. Over the next few weeks I would also begin to schedule external stakeholder meetings with school leadership, branch/proponent leadership and other agencies on post. I had to get to know the stakeholders which my organization served. I wanted to understand their expectations, concerns, and how I could improve our service. Essentially, information gathered from across the organization and stakeholder engagements would prove helpful in determining where to focus my attention. This process would span incremental assessments along thirty, sixty and ninety day blocks where I kept detailed notes of discussions highlighting common concerns. The collective list of topics written

into my green book would later serve as objectives along a three-year action plan (Ewy, 2009).

The Army routinely changes leadership positions in key developmental billets every twelve to 24 months. My observations and first-hand experiences with Army leadership transitions over the past 30 years demonstrates that newly assigned leaders come into the leadership position with a deliberate plan to assess the state of the organization. Once the assessment is completed the leader develops an action plan to achieve the new or revised vision and supporting goals. To assist leadership transitions the Army published the "Army Leadership Transitions Handbook" which describes a five phased transition model (Leadership Transition Handbook, 2008). My goal during the first thirty days in the new assignment was to determine the health of the organization, how good were the relationships between management and employees, and how good were the relationships outside of the organization. I wanted to know what kind of reputation the organization had with the schools and branch/proponent leadership. As part of my transition plan I developed a few questions which I would use to spawn conversation during my daily walks through the facility. The questions included: what are the organizations priorities? What role do you play in the organization? What is the organizational vision? What processes or procedures does the organization follow? How many programs of instruction is the organization responsible for? How good are the products that are produced? Is the workload balanced? Do people follow policy? Do you receive clear guidance? Is the organization effective? How often do you visit the classroom? Do you have enough people to do the work? Do you have the right talent in your workforce? Of course I would not ask all fourteen

questions every time that I spoke with an individual but rather would ask three or four questions each day over the course of a week. I would take careful note of responses and I began to annotate the frequency of responses against each category. Over time, this resulted in a pattern distinguishing the highest frequency of responses creating a list of top categories. With 138 employees to get to know, I spent an incredible amount of time each day trying to personally get to know every employee and as I did so I began to identify my list of twenty to twenty-five key people that would later serve as part of my coalition supporting change. Kotter (1996) describes building a "coalition, people with a commitment to improved performance" (p. 6) as a successful part of driving change.

The second week in the new position my boss confided in me that executive-level leadership was pressuring him to drive and influence change because they believed the organization was ineffective (Thies, 2000). He told me that I was hired because I had a proven track record of fixing problems in complex organizations while creating and driving necessary processes to influence change (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 1996). With high expectations from executive-level leaders, I began to formulate a plan to determine what was broken. As part of collecting the necessary information, I would find myself spending a lot of time among the employees asking Socratic questions, such as; what evidence do you have to support your argument?, can you give me an example of that?, another way of looking at that is…., does that seem reasonable?, and listening to individual responses.

A typical day during the first thirty days began with a walk through the organization visiting with individual civilian and military employees. I would listen to

their stories while learning the names of my 138 employees. By noon, I was back in my office sorting through gathered field texts (Clandinin, 2013), eating a sandwich at the desk and quickly scanning twenty to thirty new emails for any critical requirements and checking appointments. After lunch at my desk, I would go see the director and give him a quick update and see if he had anything that needed my immediate attention. Next, I would go back to the office and spend a couple of hours reading Army policy, spanning sixteen associated regulations that govern Army educational practice and budgeting. I also spent time studying the Center of Excellence organizational governance and structure. So, my first thirty days were spent getting to know people in the organization, exploring internal and external procedures and learning who could serve as my champions to drive and influence change (Kotter, 1996: Fullan, 2011). This idea to get to know every employee came at a great cost, as I found myself spending nights working as late as 10:00 p.m. just to catch up on email and other work related requirements.

Initially, my long-term goal for improving the organization included the following efforts. Year one: pass accreditation, fix lesson plans, and improve relations with stakeholders. The second year, mature processes, balance the workload fixing accountability, and improve external stakeholder relations. The third year, attain a cyclic methodology to review, and revise our curriculum over a 3-year period and continue managing priorities while improving organizational efficiencies. Little did I know that numerous mandated directives such as staff reductions (Staff and Faculty development), mandated restructure of the Center, and Army University would take center stage during the third year.

During my first thirty days, I failed to uncover any evidence of established operating procedures. It was also at this time that I began to take a hard look at the competency level of my lead instruction training and education division chief. He was one of those people that could recite policy verbatim by paragraph and line number which I must admit, in the beginning, was quite impressive. However, he could never demonstrate or provide information on the status of any program of instruction, or any other projects for which he had oversight responsibility. In fact, when asked, he could not tell me how many programs of instruction (POIs) existed between our two branch/proponent schools, let alone the priority of work or status of curriculum. I would later find out that he was the primary obstacle against implementing educational change. Although I made him insignificant, he would later become a cancer in the organization constantly festering trouble. I should have followed Fullan's (2011) formula and fired him, exercising "the moral imperative realized" (p. 30). Dealing in the past with soldiers following a more compliant model, this obstacle would have been handled with Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which provides leaders with a judiciary tool for disciplinary actions. Department of the Army civilians, on the other hand, must be dealt with a different set of rules and a union. Needless to say, it takes a concentrated effort, lots of paperwork and enormous amounts of precious time to deal with disciplinary actions, especially when the civilian is smart enough to work the system doing just enough to get by. With goals to meet and most of the organization excited with new direction, I made the individual insignificant by simply moving him to another division with much less responsibility and gave him a new boss. With accreditation just nine months away, I had to establish formal processes to review our

curriculum and finish analyzing why our organization was seeming to fail (Thies, 2000). Once constructed, the data would reveal the need to address several key issues as well as realigning our organizational structure, balancing workload and responsibilities while distributing accountability across the workforce.

February, 2013: Analyzing Findings

The next 15-days would be spent analyzing data, developing processes and assigning specific work providing a better distribution of work away from those few who had been working hard shifting a balance of responsibility and workload across the force holding mid-grade leaders accountable. While researching scholarly business articles, I found a particularly interesting one which suggested explanations as to what causes structures to be ineffective (Thies, 2000). As I studied the interrelated components explained in the article, I decided to place my assumptions into Figure 4, below, and found the results quite interesting at the time. I knew that the data lacked a scholarly approach, but it was in a rudimentary way connecting some variables to symptoms. Developing a research study to look at Army schools as effective structures might prove a worthy study of Army educational leadership.



Figure 4: When Structures are Ineffective (Mercer Delta Consulting, 2000)

A good research study could validate findings while meeting the "standards of quality or verification" outlined by Creswell, (1998, pp. 193-215). I would learn in the fall of 2014 in a course with Urick, further explained in the summer of 2015 with Crowson, that my thoughts of such a method could be supported through a good research design. I was in the midst of chaos with multiple explanations suggesting solutions to the problems at hand. I had to get the organization moving forward. What I had uncovered thus far clearly demonstrated that the organization was far behind schedule in workload and the people were not happy.

I began to understand Kahneman's (2011) book "Thinking, Fast and Slow" where he asked a question to a recognized brilliant scholar at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, "Are people good intuitive statistician"? The brilliant scholar replied "yes." Kahneman describes a debate which ultimately revealed "that a qualified no was a better response" (p. 5). He and the scholar further pursued the conversation at lunch which evolved into years of study on the "pervasive influence of intuitive impressions on our thoughts and behaviors" (p. 4).

Mid-February to March 1, 2013: Building the Coalition

The next fifteen days I continued to walk the building every morning spending time talking and listening to people, but now my purpose was beyond getting to know the individual employees. Every time I had casual conversation with people, I would share my ideas for change while figuring out who was really on board and who might become my key leaders in the center: the leaders that would motivate and help drive a new vision (Fullan, 2011). Additionally, I would find those change agents within the workforce to champion the evolution of change along Kotter's 8 - Step Change Model (Kotter, 2012). I needed a forcing function to bring together branch/proponent school leadership along with the Director of Academics to review the status of curriculum, provide guidance and make decisions.

Every day while out amongst the workforce I carried my trusty little green book along carefully noting concerns that I heard. Soon my notes would reveal two important items. First, they would reveal my coalition of 21 employees those who shared my enthusiasm for excellence. This core group of employees, my coalition, I would soon find myself spending more time listening to what they thought the organization needed to improve. Their thoughts and discussion created the necessary energy and products to get the organization moving. Eventually I would use these same 21 employees to socialize my vision and drive change in the organization (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 1996). Second, my field notes brought to light and narrowed my list of fourteen questions to ten reoccurring topics I labeled as categories. I knew that I could not adequately address all ten topics so I began to search for ways to narrow the list of topics to a manageable few.

I decided to ask a close colleague of mine for some ideas to help me focus on the most important topics but, how could I determine what was the most important. He immediately grinned leading me to Pareto's 80/20 rule (Juran, 1975). He explained that what I had to determine was the significant few over the trivial many. Basically identifying 80 percent of the trouble comes from 20 percent of the problems. Since I had kept detailed field notes, I decided to give it a try and to my amazement a short list of topics which I renamed categories emerged. I quickly realized that focusing on the top two categories actually supported generating solutions to achieve all three challenges identified earlier during the first two months: accreditation, implementation of phase one of ALM, and updating POI for submission into the Army budgeting and resourcing forums. As I began exploring the organization seeking way-points and indicators suggesting problems, I relied upon new knowledge gained from EACS courses, past experience, and scholarly research to inform proposed solutions. Searching the pages within my field notes collected, I was able to determine eleven recurring themes. Following procedures from Pareto and looking again into my notes taken from discussion and recollection I was able to score the categories to come up with the significant few. This would allow me to graphically show the impact of the top concerns. Once populated with data, the Pareto chart postulates that focusing on 20 percent of the complaints results in fixing 80 percent of the problems. It is the significant few that need to be addressed.

Pareto is typically used in problem solving to help identify choices that can be made and can help prioritize efforts. When faced with a problem that can be categorical broken into pieces the Pareto model can be useful to determine the frequency of

occurrence among the categories. The process helps identify the significant few to focus resources against.

Method/Results

Once I decided to utilize the Pareto model, I listed the ten topics labeled categories into the Pareto chart. Next I placed the frequency of each category recorded during numerous conversations associated with each of the twenty-one individual's responses. This resulted in recording ten categories in rank order into a column beside each individual scored. Once all of the individual responses were recorded, I sorted the data in descending order. Next, I calculated the cumulative count, followed by the cumulative percent. Once the data was ready to build a chart I followed procedures building and labeling both the vertical and horizontal axis. Measuring the frequency of each category I plotted the bars, added a title, and analyzed the data. The Pareto chart (below) clearly demonstrates the top two categories, 1) lack of process, and 2) lack of prioritization. The discovery of the significant few (two) led to several whiteboard sessions refining my key contacts from twenty-one people to a focused group of five trusted subordinate leaders forming the core of my coalition.



Figure 5: Trended Topics Demonstrating Significant Few (Juran, 1975)

Leveraging information derived from the Pareto model I was finally able to put some science behind what my intuition was telling me needed to be fixed. I was beginning to build an appreciation for theory while applying it toward practice. Both theory and practice were coinciding along two very important topics. Now I had the evidence necessary to show executive leadership what needed to get fixed. Next, I would focus on marketing a plan to get the school brigade commanders and branch/proponent commandants on board (Fullan, 2011) before delivering an action plan to the Center of Excellence (CoE) commanding general for approval (Ewy, 2009).

March 4, 2013: The Final Stretch

With my sights set on process and prioritization I still needed to understand the workload capacity of my organization, and how much work could we get accomplished over the next eight months. I did not want to write checks I could not cash, so I took the Army's estimated time values (ETVs) which is fair market value for labor performed (TRADOC Pam 350-70-9, 2012). The calculation for curriculum development results in man hours against three possible categories: 1) review is seven hours of work estimated

per academic hour, 2) revise is ten hours of work estimated per academic hour, and 3) developing new curriculum equates to eighteen hours of work estimated per academic hour. Once I built charts sketching the workload capacity to meet new or updated requirements for each targeted POI the workload calculations provided me a means to explain to executive-level leadership the man years it would take to get the workload accomplished. I would find out later that the branch/proponent generals previously did not understand the workload capacity and their effect to it when they directed change in the POI.

Since I was already short a year heading into the accreditation visit in October, I set a goal for one year to get all of the resident officer programs of instruction revised to meet the Army learning model requirements. When I presented this to my boss he asked me something to the effect of, "how does this all relate to getting after process and prioritization." I told him, "That is a great question. Mapping progress of the process will be presented during monthly school board meetings to demonstrate the work aligned to priorities set by the branch/proponent generals and approved by the CoE general." My boss again said, "That is great, but the schools do not have published priorities." I further explained, "That is why we are going to take an educated guess at each branch/proponent general's priorities, align them to our organizational priorities and show them all how we are going to achieve the workload in just fifty-two weeks."

The next thing that I had to do was create a formal board process along approved priorities and get all of the generals to agree on the plan. Why didn't a board already exist? Reflecting on the work three years ago I now find it odd that no such system existed within the CoE. After all, the Army is famous for accountability and

reporting. A person only has to review the Army publishing directorate to see evidence of 533 Army regulations archived (Army Publishing Directorate, 2016). Mature organizations generally follow established procedures along true and tried processes matured by time. At least this was what I was familiar with and had experienced throughout my 24 years on active duty and nine years as a Department of the Army civilian. I could hardly believe the disarray in which I found the current state of affairs.

Part of the leadership's distraction from educational leadership was caused by the incredible amount of work generated by outside agencies such as the higher headquarters. The higher the headquarters the higher the number of people assigned to the organization. More people assigned meant more work generated. The higher headquarters was simply creating work quicker than the lower headquarters to get it done. It seemed that every new leader wanted the organization to take a new direction almost as though they wanted to see how much work they could get other people to do, as if they were creating work for the sake of work (Hewitt, 2002). Focusing on the large amount of work influenced previous leadership to ignore the fundamental processes fundamental to running and maintaining the branch/proponent schools.

What I discovered in my audit of the organization was the absence of management tools holding people accountable for work. People were simply doing what they thought was important, not necessarily what was important to the organization. There was no vision, no leadership driving a collaborative effort (Fullan, 2013). It was suddenly clear why the organization was not progressing the vision of the new Army learning model. Thus, my work began creating a plan to transform the organization toward implementing the new learning model (ALC, 2011).

March 15, 2013: Leveraging Education and Opportunity

The program at the University of Oklahoma began to change how I understood and approached problems. My ability to solve complex problems began to mature as I applied what I learned. As I began to frame an action plan for the two branch/proponent schools I leveraged knowledge gained from my studies, seminar engagements and novice research. The plan included the creation of teams consisting of subject matter experts, curriculum developers, instructors and assessment experts to revise the officer courses over a 52-week period. I presented the overall plan among all the stakeholders garnering support from each school commandant (superintendent), aligning my priorities to theirs, and culminating in March 2013 with a decision brief to the commanding general.

At 1500 hours (3:00 pm) on the 15th of March 2013 I entered the private office of the commanding general where I sat next to him, surrounded by other executive-level leaders who anxiously awaited my presentation. The mood was light, and the general was finishing a can of Vienna sausages with only juice remaining in the can. He looked at me with a grin, paused and offered me a sample to which I replied, "thanks, sir, I just finished my own can prior to coming over." The ice was broken, and he asked what I had to show him. I carefully laid out a meticulously crafted, ambitious plan to get at the revision of his officer PME over the next 52 weeks while infusing the content with this ALM (ALC, 2011) methodology. In just a little over an hour, he approved the plan that had taken me almost five weeks to construct. "Now, it was approved by the commanding general, so who was going to stand in the way?" I thought.

May 2013: First Board

In May of 2013, we conducted our first monthly school board to determine the progress of the programs of instruction in accordance with the plan presented in March to the Center of Excellence commander. In attendance was the colonel in charge of the branch school and the colonel in charge of the directorate responsible for curriculum development. The rest of the board members included course managers, lead curriculum developers, chief of assessments and a few instructors. For the first time school leadership was presented with a status of the courses. The meeting began with a review and confirmation of the branch/proponent generals published priorities. Next the programs of instruction (POI) following the published priority laid out in detail lesson by lesson how the teams were revising the curriculum. For example, the captains career course POI contained 146 lessons spanning twenty-four weeks of instruction at over 900 academic hours. In order to manage the large amounts of information, a tracking system was devised, demonstrating progress along each lesson. Additionally the name of each instructor and curriculum developer who was responsible for the lesson plan was placed on the charts, providing ownership and placing accountability to each product. The monthly forum provided senior leadership visibility and the status of lessons and offered leadership the ability to contribute guidance and make decisions in a formal setting.

In the following months, I experienced only minor impediments from a small cluster of employees who were content doing nothing under the old regime. Now they found themselves uncomfortably facing a process of accountability with regular forums requiring a demonstration of progress. As part of the new leadership team I began to

focus on performance indicators while reducing challenges associated with transformational leadership (Fullan, 2013). By mid-summer, as I continued to dialogue with external agencies, I began to hear a different message sounding. It was not the old message that contained a lack of trust asking, what are you guys doing for me? It was a message that brought confirmation that we were moving in the right direction. I began to hear compliments and observe positive reinforcement from subordinate leadership toward their employees. Fullan (2011) describes this activity as "Helping people accomplish something that they never accomplished before causes motivation to increase deeply" (p. 52). I was actually watching intrinsic motivation (Etzioni, 1975) at work. Through application of practice the experience resulted in what Jacobs (2010) describes as, "creating an environment that selects for the behavior we desire" (p. 90). Put another way, the lesson plan surge increased frequent interaction against desired results, evolving a sort of group identity. But there was no time to rest and enjoy the moment. The Army accreditation visit was less than four months away.

October 2013: Army Accreditation

Every three years the Army requires branch/proponent schools to receive an accreditation visit from a composite team of evaluators (TRADOC Regulation 11-21, 2014). The team spends a week on the ground at each branch school, inspecting 28 categories designed to assess the quality of the institution's ability to meet the needs of the operational force (Army Regulation 350-1, 2014). At the end of the site visit the team provides a preliminary report of findings highlighting any significant issues to the CoE senior leadership. The accreditation team has up to sixty days to analyze collected data, write formal reports and assign one of four levels of accreditation to each branch

school: 1) level one, candidate for accreditation, 2) level two, conditional accreditation, 3) level three, full accreditation, 4) level four, learning institution of excellence. If a school receives less than a level-three rating, the school is placed on probation and gets to receive another visit within twelve months.

The accreditation site visit occurred toward the end of October, and the lesson plan surge naturally supported the school's preparation. One of the by-products of the lesson plan surge was a stabilization of priorities from the branch/proponent generals, supported by the CoE commander, which allowed the branch schools to remain focused. Stabilized priorities encouraged the curriculum teams to progress, updating lessons against the Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011) while at the same time meeting AEAS standards. The two efforts seamlessly intertwined, resulting in both schools receiving a level-four rating. The Pareto analysis proved effective, resulting in unintentional outcomes from the lesson plan surge placing the schools in a situational advantage for the scheduled accreditation evaluation. The efforts of my team were mentioned in senior leader sessions by the accreditation evaluators, and the reputation of the organization was quickly turning upward. I could not have experienced a more triumphant moment. The hard work during my first sixty days was paying off quicker than I could have imagined. Without time to soak in the glory, the Army began to ramp up efforts on implementation of the Army Learning Model (ALC 2015).

November 2013: Optimizing Organizational Performance

Over the summer I began to realize that the organizational structure was not optimally designed to adequately support requirements. Subordinate divisions and branches within the organizational structure were out of balance, and talent was either

misplaced, untapped, or overstretched. Despite proof in our success I had some subordinate leaders that were still not on board with the new direction, and I knew that I had to move them out quickly. Fortunately we had a new colonel in charge who shared my vision for driving excellence and creating accountability. He knew that he had two years on the ground to keep the momentum of positive change while progressing the organization toward greater achievement (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 1996). Coming out of a successful accreditation evaluation, the director and I enjoyed a period of time where we had earned a strong reputation for driving and influencing positive change. This reputation afforded us an ability to continue improving the practice as we saw fit.

Before the dust even settled on the accreditation evaluation I had begun sharing ideas to optimize the organizational structure with the new director. Simultaneously, he was crafting a strategy map (Ewy, 2009), designing his vision and mission for the organization. He knew that although positive change was occurring, the organization was vulnerable to what Fullan (2011) describes as an "implementation dip" (p. 61). The colonel also was tracking our one "derailer" (p. 64) and was very supportive when I moved that individual from one of the top positions in the organization, which had the largest population of employees, to the least important position with the smallest group of employees in the organization. Reflecting back on that action I should have realized the individual's true toxicity and helped him find other employment away from people, as he would later fester as a cancer in the organization.

I wasted little time after the accreditation visit at the end of October to reset my organizational structure. Although we had been constructing some of the ground work toward optimizing our structure prior to accreditation, I knew that any significant

structural change before the accreditation evaluation would be risky. I was not willing to gamble on making adjustments to structure, so I decided to be patient (Kotter, 1996). Gathering my front line subordinate supervisors in November, I wanted to address our ineffective structure with a goal of resetting before the holidays. Timing was important so that we would not lose the momentum gained from the lesson plan surge and the accreditation evaluation. Most of our civilian employee's ratings ended in October, so adjusting structure now would actually facilitate changes in supervisory positions. Surprisingly, my subordinate leaders all agreed that the organization was not optimally structured and that the time to make the adjustments was now (Bolman & Deal, 2013).

Recalling my Pareto results, prioritization was the number one category followed by processes, so optimizing structure became the next effort. The lesson plan surge crystalized the fact that the organizational structure supporting curriculum development was ineffective. The employees were lumped under a single organizational leader who was not capable or qualified to lead such a diverse and complex organization. The organizational structure responsible for education and instructional programs was constructed around three primary divisions: 1) requirements division, 2) individual training division, and 3) strategies and integration division. The requirements division contained three branches; unit training; analysis; and new systems. The individual training division contained five branches; officer education; education technology; training requirements analysis; and two branch enlisted subdivisions. Strategies and integration division contained two branch lessons learned sections; and a strategies branch. The foundational approach was fragmented at best, causing friction among the division chiefs as everyone owned a portion of the process. There were no

clean breaks, and it was difficult placing accountability on any one part. Bolman and Deal (2013) suggested that "Structure needs to be designed with an eye toward desired ends, the nature of the environment, the talents of the workforce and the available resources" (p. 56). With this in mind we set our efforts toward crafting a new structure that would improve priorities and processes in the mix.

The preponderance of the workload was associated with the individual training division that was responsible for training requirements analysis system (TRAS), where they built and maintained the curriculum for 178 programs of instruction along a three year cyclic program. The division had one lead over three subordinate branch chiefs, each responsible for an entire branch/proponent POI. This is where my derailer was previously postured as the division chief. One branch chief was responsible for ten officer education POI; one branch chief was responsible for four enlisted branch/proponent POI; one branch chief was responsible for the other four branch/proponent POI. The education technology branch provided on-site video, individual multi-media instruction and Blackboard service. Not only was the workload off balance, but the grade plate did not support the level of responsibility assigned to the division chief nor the subordinate branch chiefs. Immediately we recognized an imbalance between workload, manpower, and grade.

The requirements division worked on training products nested within the joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) where the workload was much more predictable and steady. The analysis branch contained instructional systems designers who provided examination of individual and collective tasks and associated products to help the curriculum developers build programs of instruction. The unit

training branch provided branch/proponents collective training products. The new systems branch was tied to the training component of Army material development. The strategies and integration division was a kind of catch-all organization and provided the directorate a link into the Center of Excellence level governance.

The organization contained all of the necessary ingredients to meet Army requirements with adequate manpower and grade available. The problem was that key ingredients were separated by a stove-piped structure (Bolmann & Deal, 2013). Thus, I began to work designing the organization around our core functions: training requirements analysis system (TRAS), program evaluation, joint capabilities integration and development system (TRADOC Regulation, 71-20, 2013), Leader development and governance. After a month of deliberation with the division chiefs everyone agreed that what we needed was a concept built around the idea that each AOC (area of concentration for officers) and each military occupational skill (MOS) would comprise a team led by a GS-12 (military major equivalent) LPM (lead program manager). The rest of the team would comprise military subject matter experts, a civilian instructional systems design specialist, and a couple of civilian instructor writers. In order to build the teams we had to dismantle the requirements division as well as the strategies and integration division that would later become my officer education division. Now, the structure built upon expert teams was further refined into three divisions, each led by a GS-13 civilian (lieutenant colonel-equivalent), and we placed an active duty lieutenant colonel with each division to act as a liaison officer to the branch/proponent general. Now we had three balanced teams responsible for curriculum development across the two branch proponent schools. Remember that the previous organizational structure was

one GS-13 and three GS-12s responsible, where the new organizational contrast distributed workload and responsibility across three GS-13s, three lieutenant colonels and a team of GS-12s. The new Lead Project Management (LPM) individuals were each given responsibility for training development products for a military occupational skill (MOS). The training products include supporting new equipment development, software upgrades, force structure changes, doctrine changes, and revision to classroom instructional materials. The LPM teams develop training products from conception of a material solution as part of force modernization, and continue until the products are delivered and taught in the institution, the operational force or through self-development (ALDS, 2013).

Conclusion

The new director and I spent the rest of the November and December continuing to improve and mature the monthly POI boards with the school commanders while establishing organizational priorities nesting with the commanding general's priorities. Additionally, the director and I began to spend more time and energy participating in external governance forums covering topics along education and instructional programs convened by our three-star and four-star headquarters. As I reorganized the structure internal operations began stabilizing. I could now afford to turn my energy and attention toward external requirements. The timing would prove vital as the Army was introducing its own restructuring efforts in the creation of Army University and the realignment of the two-star-level Centers of Excellence directly under the three-star Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

CHAPTER SIX

Year Two

Evolutionary or Revolutionary: Transforming Competent Educational Leaders

Riding on a high from the momentum gained during my first year, I came off a two week holiday break the first week of January full of myself. I had big plans to get the new organizational structure set, mature the institutional processes, and continue improving the quality of lesson plans within the scope of ALM (ALC, 2011). What I would soon realize was that I lacked the necessary knowledge and experience to effectively navigate the Army education budgeting and resourcing policy and process beyond a beginner level (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980). While I exploited success the previous year through brute force and ignorance, I did manage to gain vital experience in the practice.

Although I created new knowledge, the coming year would once again demonstrate there was much to learn in the profession of Army educational leadership. I found that I was living the perfect experiment: allowed to study educational leadership and policy while practicing the profession. I began to compare and contrast studied theories against what I was observing while following what Fullan (2011) describes as, "treating your own practice as your crucible for learning" (p. 150). As I increased in understanding, I began to critically approach problems until suddenly I progressed from blaming the Army leadership development model to seeing it for what it was designed to achieve. I knew that I had to create new knowledge if I was going to advance toward any level of expertise in educational leadership. Consequentially, un-forecasted requirements both internal and external to the Center of Excellence (CoE) became a

forcing function driving me deeper into learning necessary components of the practice. Three critical events during the second year drove astonishing change across the Center of Excellence and propelled my maturation as a budding educational leader (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980). These included: the Army's management system documenting training and education resourcing requirements, a complete change of CoE and branch/proponent-level leadership, and the creation of a CoE-level strategic plan.

Understanding the need to maintain a sense of stability across the workforce, I remained on course transforming the organizational structure to better meet workload requirements. I was unaware that the Army was in a struggle against other branches of service, which were all attempting to garner precious national-level resources as part of a larger budgeting and resourcing cycle called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) described in Army Regulation 1-1 (1994). In regards to budgeting and resourcing training and education the Army recognized that it could creatively build an argument tying people to budgeting and resourcing requirements. One of the projects to accomplish this included capturing the workload capacity and utilization from the training development capacity (TDC) data base. The thought behind the project suggested that the data base would capture actual workload (inputs) executed along cyclic requirements (outputs) demonstrating the number of people required to accomplish projected workload.

I soon realized that the second year promised to be as tumultuous as the first year. Ultimately, I realized that success for educational leadership relies upon building expert skills and knowledge which results in acquiring necessary budgeting and resourcing for the branch/proponent schools programs of instruction. Those

branch/proponent leaders who understand this vital role and leverage their educational experts tend to outpace their counterparts. Later in this chapter, I provide an example of one CoEs success on a particular program of instruction.

January 9, 2014: Introduction to the Army Training and Education Enterprise

Sequestration in 2013 as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011 created an environment conducive to substantial reductions across all services. While other services cut high-cost weapons or platform programs the Army being people centric focused on its human capital comprising; civilians, soldiers and officers who often bear the brunt of cost reductions. That said, risk in reductions usually focus toward the generating force structure where branch/proponent schools reside. Meaning that structure supporting Army schools (generating force) tends to lose people while the combat and combat support structures (operating force) remain at higher levels of manning. One way that the generating force was posturing to defend its people numbers was through a resourcing model which proved requirements through workload capacity. It was a mathematical formula calculating estimated time values assigned to specific categories of effort to a product.

Understanding the larger picture of budgeting and resourcing where the Army has to compete against other services for precious resources helps the reader gain an appreciation as to why the Army would want to demonstrate cost in terms of workload capacity. Thus, the Army began work in 2013 to gain resource recognition for our curriculum development capacity while maturing course resourcing models into the training development capacity (TDC) data base. On January 9, 2014 the team that built the program descended upon the Center of Excellence and introduced us to this new

management tool. The team spent a week on the ground engaging leaders demonstrating how the program served as a management tool and provided users hands-on training. The diagram below, designed by CAC-T (2013) modified by Smith (2014) presents a sketch explaining the complexity of process and policy faced by those "experts" selected to serve in positions advising branch/proponent level educational leaders.



Figure 6: Curriculum Development Model (CAC-T, 2013; Smith, 2014)

The barrel in the upper left of the diagram represents an automation tool supporting the development and storage of specific products (outputs) listed in the box on the upper right. The outputs make up essential training and education materials necessary for the enterprise to function. The products capture the essential units measuring workload production of training and education development. The process is designed to capture a predictable workload based on the programs existing within the branch/proponent schools associated with a standardized maintenance frequency

outlined in Army policy documents (TP 350-70-9, 2012). Established maintenance cycle actions are classified as: review, revise, and new each of these categories are assigned an estimated time value that it would take to accomplish the work against one academic hour. Highlighted in the tan background, center left titled, Drivers, depicts those things which can influence modification to programs of instructions. For example, a new commandant placed in charge of a branch/proponent school may desire to change or add substance to a particular program of instruction. Other examples include doctrine changes, force structure changes, and new equipment or software development and fielding. These drivers result in either un-forecasted requirements or out-of-cycle requirements that can cause extra work that was not programmed against a predicted workload resulting in the creation of new products at the risk of creating a backlog.

Adding the new work to the programmed work produces the total requirements that may indicate a workload capacity shortfall. The tool provides a holistic understanding of the products available/required guiding appropriate prioritization criteria from the branch/proponent level and applied across the center level. In a perfect world, this should result in CoE-level guidance to branch/proponent leadership on where to focus efforts. The grey box at the bottom of the slide describes a planned workload (based on standard descriptions of work and estimated time values) identifying resources for completion, or as critical shortfalls. Work programmed and performed supports informing the Institutional Training Resource Model (ITRM), which provides quantifiable, verifiable, and auditable plans to aid senior leader decision making up through Department of the Army level (TP 350-70-9, 2012). The reporting and recording capabilities of the automation tools can produce quantifiable, verifiable,

and auditable reports for the workload completed within any given Fiscal Year, which began with the closeout of FY14. It would later dawn on me that part of the Army educational leadership gap resided within the absence of knowledge and skills associated with Army training and education policy and procedures driving budgeting and resourcing.

Wrestling with new information in how the Army budgets and resources education exposed not only a knowledge gap but an experience gap as well. I thought that the Army did a pretty good job preparing me to lead complex organizations by the time I was promoted to lieutenant colonel. As I began learning functions associated with managing programs of instruction along constraints established by the Army training and education budgeting and resourcing policy, I began defining a new role. I would become an effective educational leader and advisor for branch/proponent leadership ensuring that their programs of instruction were developed with the science behind learning while meeting Army requirements for resourcing.

Soon I realized that I was performing somewhere along Dreyfus's (1980) five-stage model of skill acquisition between the beginner level and the competent level in terms of knowledge, standard of work, and autonomy relating to the core functions of my job. What I began to understand was that my past experiences and education helped me achieve a certain level of performance, thus far, in my career. But, if I wanted to reach higher levels of expertise while increasing performance within the field of educational leadership I knew that I must commit time, effort, study, and practice with a willingness to accept some failures along the way (Fullan, 2011).

The visit from the team left more questions than answers as is typical when starting up a new Army program. Building proficiency navigating the data base would take our users and leaders a few iterations over the course of the year. Accurate data input while working within established governance forums helped identify numerous discrepancies between inputs and outputs. Later in this chapter, I address the first results and implications associated with implementing this new program. We placed the information provided in our kitbags and began leaning forward toward our next hot project titled Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) outlined in TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-7 (2012).

March 2014: Army Training and Education Budgeting and Resourcing – Gaining an Appreciation for the Process

By early March we began gearing up to meet requirements stipulated by the Army's Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS) outlined in TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-9 (2012). The goal of TRAS is that learning product development links with resource processes ensuring that resources meet program of instruction requirements at the right time and place (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70, 2011). Army policy suggests that it is "critical for institutional leaders and managers to understand the process" (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70, 2011, p. 30). In my tenure, only one of six branch/proponent leaders came into the position with some skill or knowledge related specifically to this process. Consequentially, branch/proponent leaders enter the position without fully comprehending the TRAS process and further lack understanding of their role as described in Army Regulation 5-22 (2015) and TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (2012). Both publications list and describe key functions for CoE commanders and branch/proponent (institutional) leaders. CoE commanders are charged with

supervising 16 key functions ranging from manpower and budgetary resource acquisition, to ensuring the management of curriculum development along the analysis, development, design, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE)model, to establishing and maintaining a staff and faculty development program. Branch/proponent leaders are charged with learning product requirements, implementing the Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011), promoting social learning through "push and reach-back" (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70, 2012, p. 25), and developing career-long learning continuums and other learning products serving the Army's three training domains of: institutional, operational and self-development. Sounds a lot like educational leadership tied to superintendent-like management described in Kowalski (2013).

Evidence discovered while exploring a sample of institutional leader biographies suggests that little to no relational preparation, experience or education served to inform the selection of branch/proponent leaders. Kowalski (2013) finds the subject of defining practice and discussing the requirements to enter the practice of superintendent important enough to place it as the beginning chapter of his book on *The School Superintendent: Theory, Practice and Cases*. It is my hope that this narrative causes Army leadership to address identified gaps in skills, knowledge, and competencies associated with educational leadership (Carter et al., 1993). Thus, providing a deliberate program better preparing leaders with appropriate experience, focused education, and formal preparation. Helping those Army leaders selected to run branch/proponent schools perform along the Army leader development model competencies, "leads, develops, achieves" (FM 6-22, 2015, pp. 1-4) adapted for educational leaders. The figure below adds a descriptive component adding clarity to the complexity and

newness associated Army training and education budgeting and resourcing responsibilities and scope.



Figure 7. Training Analysis Requirements System, (TP 350-70-9, 2012, p. 31)

While writing this narrative, I cannot help but experience what Clandinin (2013) refers to as "entering into the midst: moving into living alongside" (p. 43). Moving through the commonplaces of temporality, sociality and space I relive the experiences from events three years ago placing the experiences into new light and perspective given my awakening of educational leadership. With renewed understanding I begin to recognize and somewhat appreciate the difficult situation in which the Army places these bright, energetic, and resilient leaders who become commandants running branch/proponent schools. The sheer complexity of policy and process fractured against a system building Army leaders to serve a purpose distinctly unlike an educational leader. It is not my aim to poke holes in the Army leaders who are selected to run branch/proponent schools, but simply to highlight what Clandinin (2013) explains as, "Our hope is to create research texts that allow audiences to engage and resonant remembering as they lay their experiences alongside the inquiry experiences to wonder

alongside participants and researchers who were part of the inquiry" (p. 51). The purpose of translating my field notes to this study serves to fulfill what Clandinin goes on to explain that they "are intended to engage audiences to rethink and reimage the ways in which they practice and the ways in which they relate" (p. 51). It is not my intent to make an audience experts or thoroughly explain the Army budgeting and resourcing for training and education, but merely help the reader discover the complexity outlining the new experiences which our branch/proponent leaders encounter when they step into an educational leadership position.

April 1, 2014: Exploring the SMDR Milestone Requirements

The goal of the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) is to shape the institutional Army's annual training and education requirements within realistic resource projections. Each branch/proponent school participates in the SMDR process through the submission of TRAS products along established suspense: new programs of instruction no later than January 2, 2014; any program with projected growth or increased resources due April 1, 2014; and required cyclic reviews without growth or increased resources no later than May 1, 2014. In mid-July, Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA) provides the branch/proponent schools a summary sheet of submitted actions and the school has five days to identify errors and submit recommended corrections. The rest of the summer is spent arbitrating summary sheets and answering questions from TOMA. Additionally, schools must submit consolidated planned/programmed facility resources describing requirements in a prescribed format to the Army Training Support Command (ATSC). Finally, by August 15, 2014 schools must:

> Submit a course constraint information paper for each constrained course to HQ TRADOC/TOMA (ATTG-TRI-MP) NLT 5 days after the final summary sheets are released describing the constraint with recommended solutions. Review training requirements against their equipment, facility, training device, range and land capabilities and prepare bottom-line information papers that outline the problem, analysis of options to eliminate the problem, and resource bills for the additional resources necessary to train the training requirement. When reviewing the training requirement impacts, plan for an uneven training flow during peak training periods (Summer Surge).

Although branch/proponents approve programs of instruction (POI) at their level, the POI is not validated and resourced by the Army until Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCS G-3/5/7) until Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA) validates the POI. The validated POI receives attention in the annual SMDR determining training and education requirements. This annual SMDR "validates proponent training and education requirements for the third POM [Program Objective Memorandum] year, records validated requirements for the second POM year (the primary focus of the SMDR), and fine-tunes requirements for the first POM year" (TRADOC Pamphlet, 350-70-9, 2012, p. 51).

Somehow during the first year, distracted by fixing an ineffective structure and establishing processes and prioritization, I missed the relevance of this thing called SMDR. In fact, my new boss was beginning to ask me what our organizations role was in the SMDR process. Frankly, I told him that we had a supporting role to the schools and that the TRAS products which our teams collaboratively built was our contribution to the process. Soon I would learn the vital role which the SMDR serves inside the Army training and education resourcing. Returning to the colonel's question of our role

in the SMDR process, I began asking my subordinate leaders questions as to what role we engaged in the past or what role we should engage in the future. Surprisingly, everyone was quiet; you could have heard a pin drop; they were willing to leave well enough alone and continue to stay out of the SMDR process. Somehow this just did not seem to be the right answer, so two colonels and myself ordered pizza (no beer on duty) one evening and spent the next several hours laying out the requirement of the SMDR against the timeline. We gathered all of the published documents and orders relating to the SMDR which we could get our hands on and when we finished the evening we were quite proud of our work. What we produced that evening would later that summer find its way into part of a resourcing brief to our new commanding general. The result provided senior leadership with a holistic sketch of necessary products along a series of submission windows. At the time, I did not realize that what we were doing was contributing to what Kotter (1996) refers to as "anchoring a new approach" (p. 145). Eventually we would blast through an old culture stuck on ways of the past and began to demonstrate improved performance linked to the new change. People began to get excited about the new path to which the organization was headed.

The sketch we constructed became informative across the Center of Excellence and all of a sudden agencies who should have owned the process were trying to give it to us. Our contributing role in the SMDR process was finally defined providing our curriculum development team's clear understanding as to the importance of timeliness and accuracy of their submitted products. The sketch provided a map linking multiple Army efforts across time allowing branch/proponent leadership to better predict and prioritize which programs of instruction they wanted to focus toward updating during

the fiscal year. Additionally the sketch linked critical forums along the year, so that leadership could get ahead of Army decisions. The tool was designed to provide branch/proponent leadership the right information, on time, to shape engagements with higher headquarters ensuring that the schools were postured early for resourcing future courses.

May 29, 2014: Implementation Dip

The programmed senior leader changes during the late spring into early summer of 2014 would produce some unforeseen consequences. Reflecting back, I find it hard to believe that we did not adequately prepare for the turnover. We took for granted that the new leadership would adopt the action plans put in place by the previous leadership over the last year. Additionally, we felt like after a year of practice, the workforce would continue to perform at or above previous levels without a lot of attention or supervision. I was about to make three change leader mistakes: first, I almost declared victory too soon (Kotter, 2012); second, the workforce culture had not had enough time to mature; and I quit being an "engaged leader" (Fullan, 2011, p. 85). I let the urgency surrounding change push aside my inward focus toward long-term school improvement. I was about to experience the power behind what Fullan (2011) describes as looking inside oneself for thinking and action decision making. According to Fullan (2011), "you can't find the answers outside yourself – you have to start inside and look for the best external connections to further develop your own thinking and action" (p. xii). This experience of inward/outward that Clandinin (2013) explains as "understanding of the relational between past, present, and future" (p. 23) perfectly situates my lived practice temporally placed alongside experience and theory. Thinking relationally allows me to

unfold some pivotal episodes which collectively led me to seek congruence from within my lived, and relived experience and change theory.

As I write from my current vantage point, recalling the events annotated in my field notes, I find it difficult to believe that those situated close to the problem failed to see the pending storm. With new leadership comes new priorities, but who would have thought that the goodness associated with the lesson plan surge would tapper off. I thought that we had enough evidence that the program worked that we did not need to socialize it completely with the new leadership. I was wrong. That is exactly what we should have done. We should have followed the same procedure that we charted when we stood the program up. We should have continued to communicate the vision with our workforce, while at the same time showing the new leadership that is how business is done. I was learning a hard lesson in what Fullan (2011) describes as "building a collaborative culture" (p. 91). Although the Army typically changes leadership every two years I could have leveraged the two components that remained in a steady state: the workforce and the structure. I could have sustained a "coordinated, focused organization" (p. 93) staying the course and adapting the plan. This might have achieved a more efficient and effective result from what Kotter (2012) explains as, "anchoring the new approach" (p. 166). Staying the course regardless of external distractions would have set the people at ease and kept the organization on track toward improving the quality of the programs of instruction. Instead, the change of top leadership came with a new set of priorities, and agendas supporting those priorities. In turn, the schools received new colonels, and generals over the summer, changing attention from the lesson plan surge to meet their own set of goals. This would be a

lesson not soon forgotten and one which would drive my focus in 2016 as a similar scenario began to unfold again. I will share reflections and implications in the final chapter in an attempt not to relive the past experience associated with previous results of the senior leader turnover.

The previous year had not been a complete loss, as I learned valuable lessons in driving and influencing change and learning first-hand what it took to sustain improvement over the long haul. During the year, time was invested through building capacity, earning some short-term wins, removing a few barriers, and demonstrating results to those operating the branch/proponent schools (Kotter, 2012). Building capacity came through the establishment of lead program management (LPM) teams and teaching these subordinate leaders about the budgeting and resourcing process. Earning short term wins came through the higher headquarters validation of our new programs of instruction. Foundationally organizing our structure along the LPM construct increased communication and broke through previous barriers. The teams were set, people were excited, more people were beginning to understand the processes and branch/proponent leadership began to appreciate the work involved to get their programs staffed, approved and resourced. Despite improvements across the content of the programs of instruction, late May of 2014 brought about what Fullan (2011) labels "a lowering of performance" where the hard work associated with pulling together the lesson plan surge began to dwindle, resembling an "Implementation dip" (p. 71). I was learning to become what Fullan (2011) refers to as a "resolute leader" (p. 46), continuing the course no matter what, and remembering that it takes "ten-years to become an expert in anything – including change management" (p. 47).

June 4, 2014: New Resourcing Models

As a result of a 2011 Government Accounting Office (GAO) workforce study on military training, several items were identified as needing improvement. One such area defined was in determining the number and type of personnel who were needed to conduct Army training within the branch/proponent schools (GAO-11-845, 2011). The report found that the model used to calculate instructor student ratios was last reviewed in 1998. Since that time, the Army had begun to use instructional methods aimed at small group instruction, therefore increasing the number of instructors required to teach a predicted annual student load. In June 2014, the Army began testing a series of new course resourcing models, one of which included the validation of the instructor requirements model (IRM). Once again, I was about to confirm that although I had been in and around Army schools for almost 30 years, even teaching in Army schools for over eight of those years, I still had a lot to learn when it came to Army training and education budgeting, and resourcing process and policy. I begin to wonder if I would ever learn everything that I needed to know in the area of training and education budgeting and resourcing.

Finally, the Army was ready for us to test the new resourcing model against three courses and gave us a short suspense, I quickly picked three quality curriculum developers who would serve as my front-line, testing the new models and providing me with candid feedback. I found myself returning to my three trusted agents who helped me build the lesson plan surge. I called them together and gave them the mission to represent our Center of Excellence among the larger Army forum. We picked three distinctly different programs of instruction to provide us a broad spectrum of variation

in hopes of putting the new model to the test. The experiment would last approximately six months beginning early summer and ending late fall. Eventually, the Army would end up constructing five resourcing categories into the course resourcing model, including: Instructor, Training Development, Instructional technology, Direct Support to Training, and Ammunition. These categories would capture the requirements for each program of instruction. The legacy instructor model (1998) relied upon calculating the number of instructors to teach an annual student load against an optimum class size. The model relied on inputs and assumptions rather than valid data. The old model did not account for indirect work associated with teaching, such as grading papers, lesson preparation time, throughput of particular simulations, simulators, or other training devices. The new Course Resourcing Model (CRM)/Instructor Resourcing Model (IRM) known as the IRM/CRM promised to account for direct work, such as teaching, as well as indirect work, such as grading papers or preparing instructional material, etc. It would take the Army until the spring of 2015 to let Centers of Excellence begin submitting programs of instruction applied against the new IRM/CRM model.

June 18, 2014: Workload Capacity and Utilization

On the heels of the CRM project came more requirements from higher headquarters who directed Centers of Excellence to begin work capturing training development workload capacity and utilization. The tool utilized was a relatively new data base labeled Training Development Capability (TDC). The database was constructed to capture lesson plans and programs of instruction and served as a medium transferring instructional material from the branch/proponent schools to the TRADOC Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA) for staffing and validation. Not

only did we have to start trying to review and submit programs of instruction along the new IRM/CRM, but now we had to account for everyone's predicted workload capacity, actual utilized workload, and next years predicted workload. Although work may be conducted at the user level in a particular fiscal year, the work is not calculated toward workload accomplished (utilization) until the products are staffed through TOMA and validated. Often times, if the employee completed work toward the middle or end of the fiscal year, the work would not have adequate time to staff; therefore, the work would not be validated. Thus, the work does not contribute toward workload capacity of the current fiscal year. In short, work conducted and submitted into the TDC from the curriculum developers may not represent true work accomplished during the year. Past practice demonstrates that utilizing such an approach to justify resourcing human capital is an inaccurate accurate account of workload accomplished (citation needed here). On December 9, 2014, we would experience our first report results, and discussion of the workload management process. I will further explain the issue in my final chapter while exploring a potential bridging solution.

August-September 2014: Center of Excellence Strategic Plan

The summer of 2014 marked significant leadership changes across the Center of Excellence, starting with the top general, through both branch/proponent generals, following down to their respective school brigade, colonel, and commanders. Passing the thirty year mark as a career member of the Department of the Army, it was not until I began this study that I begin to question the frequency in which the Army schedules routine leadership changes, particularly at the Colonel through two-star General level

commands. Had I become so accustomed to a culture of change that I had grown numb toward the consequence of change on units?

The Army transitions colonels through two-star-general-level leadership with regularity every twelve months to two-years. An Army board selects those officers best qualified through a competitive process, selecting those best qualified based upon potential. Successful officers selected continue to climb the ranks gaining increased levels of responsibility throughout a career. The process takes into account end-state requirements (ceilings) by grade competing adequate numbers of officers against requirements so that the best candidates rise to the top (DA Memo 600-2, 2006). One of the ways in which senior leaders try to mitigate change is through a deliberate transition process which often times includes the development of a strategy to implement desired change.

By August 2014, the new commanding general was nearing his 90-day mark in office, and would soon deliver his overall assessment of the state of the Center of Excellence. During his address, he provided guidance to shape his two-year tenure, and charged his planners to begin development of a strategy along three lines of effort. The procedures actually followed close to one described by Ewy (2009), where he outlines strategic planning as, "The process for creating a long-range mission, vision, goals, and strategies" (p. 2). The three lines of effort were each comprised of a series of major objectives with subtasks and supporting tasks. Line of effort number one focused on the future force beyond 2025. Line of effort number two focused on developing leaders for our future force, updating our doctrine, and modernizing our schoolhouses and instructional components. Line of effort number three focused on management of the

garrison or post components associated with the senior mission commander role and functions. The commanding general stood up a tiger team (select group of planners) to develop major objectives for each line of effort which he would approve in early October. Line of effort number two would end up with five major objectives, and my team would spend much of October and November gathering stakeholders to construct subtasks, and supporting tasks for each of the five major objectives.

October 6, 2014: Trip to Fort Benning

The Commanding General had a son who was attending an officer course at Fort Benning, GA, where the general would occasionally drop in, and visit when the general was in the vicinity. While visiting with his son, the Commanding General would also find time to socialize with leadership at the post. During one of his visits, he became intrigued with how Fort Benning was delivering small group instruction. The Fort brought together two distinct branch/proponent schools for deliberate learning opportunities. Additionally, he was interested in how the schools at Fort Benning were organizationally structured to support the students, faculty, and two branch/proponent commandants. The Generals enthusiasm would translate into me and my boss boarding a plane in early October to visit Fort Benning.

Being a former Infantry Officer, and Career Course Instructor at Fort Benning in the mid-1990s, I was looking forward to reconnecting with some old friends. The Infantry School and Center had gone through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) procedures in 2010 bringing the Armor School from Fort Knox to co-reside with the Infantry school at Fort Benning. Fort Benning, like many other Army centers and schools, became a Center of Excellence comprised of two branch/proponent schools. I

made some phone calls to set up the trip, and my boss and I would spend two-days on the ground at Fort Benning learning what we could to answer the General's questions. Despite a very hectic schedule with a visit from the Chief of Staff of the Army, my friends at Fort Benning constructed an agenda to meet our request.

Arriving mid-morning at Fort Benning, we began immediately receiving briefings on how the Infantry school had gained some growth in their Infantry Officer Basic Leader Course to better align with the Armor Basic Leader Course. The purpose of the alignment of the two courses was aimed at combining the end of course exercises together. They described the process where their general officers had socialized the change with the higher headquarters generals, gaining approval before following the routine bottom up staffing required by the Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA). The Infantry school was able to work smartly within the system by circumventing the rigid policy and process which bottlenecks branch/proponents' ability to create agile/adaptive curriculum.

Next on the agenda, we traveled to a couple of organizations where we received excellent presentations on how they were staffed, how they scheduled courses, and how instructors fit into the process. For example, they described the relationship between the command structure and the Director of Training structure. The captains teaching at Fort Benning belonged to the Director of Training not the brigade-level command structure. After a long day we headed back to the headquarters for a couple more briefs. As we began discussing our two organizational similarities and differences, the door opened and a familiar looking face, with colonel's rank on his uniform, came strolling in the

door. I could not help myself, but to call the colonel by name, and ask how he'd been. Looking at me with a somewhat puzzled face, he grinned and said, "You were my small group instructor back in the late 1990s." I replied, "Yes, and I guess that I did not mess it up too bad if the Army promoted you to colonel!" Everyone around the table got a big laugh out of the exchange, and I enjoyed seeing a former student who had experienced such a successful career.

The next morning we sat through a video teleconference with the higher headquarters, and it was fun to sit with our Fort Benning friends. Usually, my boss and I would have joined the video teleconference from our own location, so it was real treat to have two Centers of Excellence in the same room sharing conversation. After the morning video teleconference, we met a few more folks and finished gathering what we needed to answer the Generals questions. We headed back to the Atlanta Airport, where our flight was delayed, putting us home well after midnight. My boss and I considered the trip a success, and had more than enough information to share when we got back to work.

The following week we got to provide the General with a trip report, and I found the discussion refreshing as the General demonstrated a genuine curiosity toward improving instruction. He was actually exhibiting growth across leadership levels described by the Army Field Manual 6.0 (2015). I was surprised because most of my experiences around general officers resulted in their demonstrating what Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) would refer to as overconfidence in their abilities because of a lack of expert knowledge. This relates back to the purpose of the Army leadership development model which prepares leaders to supervise and operate organizations in combat. Expert

knowledge also relates back to how the Army selects, educates, prepares, and trains its future leaders for assignments. The Army Leader Development doctrine describes a fifth transition level where leaders of large organizations are no longer the expert, but must rely upon experts for sound advice. The discussion with the General peaked his interest toward improving instruction, and would eventually center on improving one particular course which becomes a critical event that I will describe in chapter seven.

October 15, 2014: Establishing the Workgroup and Weekly Forums

The standard weekly forum was established as a result of coordination amongst stakeholders and various other schedules. We met every Wednesday afternoon from 1430 to 1600. To our surprise the first meeting was well attended with members from each of our stakeholders. During the first session, my aim was two-fold: establish core team membership and convey to them what I knew about the task ahead. I explained to the group that the tiger team had built a foundation of the commander's strategy by describing the general's vision along four themes, overlaying three lines of effort geared toward achieving an end-state. I explained that our project was to construct subtasks, supporting tasks, recommend lead, and supporting agencies to each of the categories. Additionally, we had to determine and make a recommendation to the commanding general in terms of the frequency of the board. Our first board to the commanding general was already set for January 28, 2015. That gave us little more than two months with two holidays in between. Almost immediately the group began trying to place the brunt of the work on my organization. I knew that I would have my hands full spreading the balance of work across all of the participants. As a former Army strategist I couldn't help but be excited with the opportunity to apply my old craft coupled with theory that I

was learning in graduate school. I would find myself leveraging both while steering this motley crew. I politely reminded the group that they were the ones at the point of impact where the rubber meets the road. This was their opportunity to shape their organizations priorities and highlight their success to the top levels. Also the work that they would provide would keep their bosses efforts routinely in front of the general. The governance board allowed branch/proponents to demonstrate how well things are going or to ask for help where they needed flag officer assistance. The rest of the first meeting was spent outlining three to four broad subtasks against each major objective, and we set the goal for the next meeting to finish the subtask work and come prepared to discuss lead and supporting agency relationships.

October 22, 2014: Creating Subtasks Supporting the Major Objectives

The second meeting, a week later, I was pleased to see a return of all of the members from the first meeting, and they came prepared to discuss and finish work on the subtasks. Each member had developed a list of lead and supporting agencies. By the end of an hour and a half we had structured 22 subtasks, roughly three to four for each major objective. As we worked through the assignment of lead agencies and supporting agencies it became clear that we had to go back and better define the subtasks. The homework for the next meeting was to finish the assignment of lead and supporting agencies and begin working on crafting the supporting tasks for each of the 22 subtasks. I asked that each member keep their leadership informed of our progress and for the members to bring any concerns or questions from their leadership back to the group for discussion. During the early stages of the process, communication vertically and horizontally proved invaluable as members brought valid concerns back from their

leadership. The group's collective ability to handle objections and clarify meaning to the stakeholders early in the process kept our group on a straight and narrow azimuth (Kotter, 2012, Ewy, 2009). This early work to keep lines of communication open would result in collective pay off down the road. Being the first line of effort scheduled to brief the Executive level board meant that we did not have time to waste nor did we have the luxury of learning from other's mistakes. We had to get it right the first time, and so we set our goal to establish the standard for others to follow.

October 29, 2014: Assigning Lead and Supporting Agencies

The third meeting brought the core members back with renewed interest and enthusiasm about the project. People were beginning to get excited about showing the executive-level board how far we had come and the results accomplished in such a short period. We set to work finishing the assignment of leads and supporting agencies to subtasks and began work on the supporting tasks when an interesting note of debate started within the group regarding lead assignment to a couple of subtasks. Two individuals, each representing their respective branch/proponent, clearly, in their own minds, felt one agency should lead two of the subtasks in lieu of their branch/proponent. Although this was not the general consensus of the group writ large, it was a good point, so the group tabled the decision.

Over the course of the next several weeks we would experience a few more episodes where one or two of the members would strongly argue what organization should lead the work or want to debate defining a particular task. However, the group as a whole remained strongly committed to finalizing the structural content of the presentation material. The aim was to create presentation material which would provide

executive-level leadership a tool demonstrating progress along our line of effort. The group's commitment would later prove invaluable as the products and processes matured through business process management (Spanyi, 2010). To keep the meeting in order and move along, the group reached consensus with a decision that we would let them present their arguments to the council of colonels for a decision before going to a higher board. It was during this meeting that we realized we needed to formally construct a charter, validate council members, list board members, and establish the governance along a routine schedule. With work still needed to shape the supporting tasks, we adjourned until the next week when we intended to finish the supporting task work and begin building the governance.

November 5, 2014: Constructing the Framework and Content

When the new general came on board he began a practice of bi-monthly updates with his subordinate directorates. The purpose was two-fold; first, it allowed him to gain understanding of the roles, and functions of the subordinate organizations, and second, it provided him necessary information as he built his assessment of the larger organization. Our bi-monthly updates had been useful in building a foundational relationship with the new general. We used the forum to show the general projects that we were working, and where we needed his assistance with higher headquarters. We had been conducting these routine updates since early summer, and had placed a lot of effort into making continuous improvements in the construct and content of packaging and delivering information. By early fall our products had evolved into the generals most favored format, and soon the format became the standard that other agencies would have to follow.

By November the group was settling into their respective roles as process owners representing the interests and equities in which their respective organizations would serve within the larger strategy (McCoy, 2011). We worked surprisingly efficiently through the construction of 45 supporting tasks, and with a few minutes to spare we began discussion on writing the charter. The charter would need to describe the purpose of the board, list executive-level membership, and the council-of-colonel-level membership. Additionally, we wanted the charter to include inputs, throughputs, and outputs relational to the general's objectives and end state. As the time wound down, we closed our fourth workgroup session. I reminded everyone that our timeline was closing in on the first board date, January 28th, 2015. Staying on course, we all knew that we would need to finish the charter and begin work on the governance of it all during the following four sessions.

November 12 & 19, 2014: The Charter and Board Framework

The charter was sketched into a single presentable chart built around a simple structural concept that would be easy to communicate. I would actually present the sketch in the first board to gain consensus and drive the process. Components of the charter were orchestrated from the top, starting with the title where we added a frequency in parenthesis. Below the title, a single sentence defined the purpose. Below the purpose was a list, by title, of the executive board membership. The council membership (at large) was listed just below the executive board members. Below the members, a red line bordered a box which outlined the parts required to make the board work. Starting at the upper center, on the left side of the box was a smaller red box

labeled input moving to the right were listed three titles in order, higher headquarters meetings, internal meetings, and organizational objectives.

We outlined these forums populating topics in a manner in which they would demonstrate contributions, as well as surface friction. For example, if a branch/proponent wanted to increase resources in a particular course but did not have the internal means they would have to ask the executive board for assistance. I remember stressing to the group that the executive-level board exists to address critical issues affecting our branch/proponent schools. It was the charter of the board's executive-level leadership to give guidance to shape the future, and make important decisions along resourcing streams. The anticipated contributions from multiple forums as well as surfaced friction would ultimately feed the output mechanism through a lens situated along the two branch/proponent schools priorities. As the process matured it would result in critical Center-of-Excellence-level feedback to inform and improve our practice. The charter would become the foundational document driving change and influencing stakeholders (Kotter, 2012; Fullan, 2011).

My team had cracked the code on packaging information for the general, and we capitalized on that knowledge, building a set of standard chart templates that would be used by presenters during the board. Presenting the templates during this meeting, I met very little resistance, and the templates were approved. I had learned earlier with this group that if I provided a clear format that was easy to fill out they would use it.

December 3 & 10, 2014: Final Preparations

The first order of business for December was to nominate five to six topics for presentation. This included laying out the recommended frequency for the executive

board meetings within the larger governance structure. One constraint that we were up against was a time limit for the executive board. We were told that the general did not like sitting through meetings that lasted longer than one and one half hours. As we began constructing the frequency, we took into account the vast number of topics associated with five major objectives, 22 subtasks, and 45 supporting tasks. Our goal was to show the executive board progress, providing touch-points across of all five objectives over the course of a year. Knowing that we only had an hour and a half, we decided that five topics would be optimal, with six maximum. Five topics allowed a presenter fifteen minutes each, followed by fifteen minutes at the end for guidance and discussion. The short presentation time caused me to dictate the number of slides at three to no more than five.

I began to lay out the requirements described above when it dawned on me that we needed to orchestrate a trial run of a compressed implementation schedule in January 2015. I had to set up and schedule the first action officer workgroup, followed by a council of colonels, and finally host the executive board. That meant coming off of a two week vacation around the 5th of January 2015 and gathering the action officer workgroup on January 14, 2015. Next we had to schedule the council of Colonels on January 21, 2015 to allow the group some time to make any final product adjustments before the executive-level board. The executive board was scheduled for January 28th, 2015. I had to get the group re-organized and moving to wrap up the work by December 17th, 2014. Not only did I have to finalize the list of topics, draft products, and set the three boards, but I had to plan for pre-briefs to the executive-level leadership as well.

The urgency of the project actually caused me to realize that a routine of monthly meetings would become unmanageable besides, no one wanted to repeat this effort every month. A frequency of quarterly board meetings was established with the first month comprising the action officer level. The second monthly meeting comprised the council of Colonels. The third monthly meeting would host the executive-level board. Setting the frequency of executive board meetings quarterly, we devised a chart depicting all of the major objectives, subtasks, and supporting tasks over the course of the General's two-year tenure. The goal underlying the methodology was to provide touch-points along every major objective and all supporting tasks at least once annually. The chart depicted all of the major objectives down the left hand side with time depicted by quarter across the top. The quarters were depicted by columns containing proposed supporting tasks that would be presented in the future. The chart became a map by which we could show progress of each major objective over time.

Finally, before taking a much needed vacation, the workgroup came to agreement on five topics for the first board. The lead presenters prepared their material and submitted them to my lead action officer. I verified appointments made with executive-level leaders for the new-year and made final adjustments to the presentation. On December 19th, 2014, I attended an organizational luncheon and departed for vacation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Year Three

January 22, 2015: Final Preparation for the Board

The meetings and pre-briefs leading up to the executive board went without a hitch. Everyone had provided excellent products on time with everyone pulling together to make this maiden voyage successful. As I made final coordination with the presenters and was reviewing the read ahead packets for the executive board members, my Colonel delivered me a bit of shocking news. He told me that he was really pleased and had already received laudatory comments from the executive-level leadership on our efforts thus far. He further explained that everyone was excited to get this first forum off the ground and that expectations were running high that we would hit the ball out of the park. By this time, I could tell that he was up to something because we had discussed these topics several times before, and he was delighted in how I had progressed on the project.

I decided to ask him what was up, and he told me that he had to go on a trip. He could not say where or for what but that he would be gone for about a month or so. I remember that I quickly replied, "Great! You are going to be gone for the first board so the success or failure rests entirely upon my shoulders?" My boss said something to the effect of, essentially yes, and you'll do great. He further explained that since I was the one that put it all together, it was actually fitting that I run the first board and receive credit where credit was due. I asked one more time, "Okay, where are you going on such short notice?" He really could not tell me, but I quickly figured out that he had been nominated to sit on an Army promotion board. His trip was legitimate, and I had to

get on my 'A' game quickly as I had less than five business days to make final preparations.

January 28, 2015: The First Executive Board, On My Own?

The time leading up to the board seemed like a blur, and there never is enough time to get everything done, and in perfect order. The room was set; the slides were loaded on the media projection device; we had binders containing hard copies of the presentations set out on the conference table for the executive board members; and the presenters were all gathered and ready to go. We were about eight minutes out from the start time when the General's aide-de-camp came in to verify that we were ready to go. I told him that we were waiting on a couple of the colonels who we expected to arrive anytime. The aide-de-camp departed and we anxiously awaited executive board members arrival. At five minutes till the hour, the aide-de-camp appeared and announced the Commanding Generals arrival followed by the remaining executive board members. As they filed into the conference room with everyone at the position of attention the Commanding General told everyone to have a seat.

As the General sat down he looked around the room and noticed that some of the colonel-level commanders were missing. He made a comment to his Chief of Staff who made a quick note. I welcomed the General and board members to the first line of effort number two executive board reminding the general that my boss was on a temporary duty assignment out of town, and that I would host the forum. I began the forum by bringing the general's attention toward his overall strategy map focusing him on line of effort number two. I had learned from years of briefing executive-level leaders that they always appreciated an upfront orientation bringing them back to

previous guidance that they issued or a plan which they approved. In this case it was taking the general back to his strategy and demonstrating how this forum would provide routine updates, specifically along line of effort number two. Once he saw his strategy map on the projection screen, his posture eased; he sat back and listened intently.

I followed the strategy map orientation with a slide showing our proposed charter, where I spent about seven minutes walking the general through the sketch explaining the recommended frequency, purpose, members, and paused for discussion before moving to the process piece. A small discussion surrounding the membership ensued, and it was clearly noted that some of the key members were not present. Next I moved to describe how this governance forum would migrate inputs through a variety of external and internal processes through the governing body resulting in outputs leading to center-level feedback to inform improved practice (Markus & Jacobson, 2010). Next I showed the board a proposed cycle of governance which laid out an action officer workgroup the first month, followed the next month by a council of Colonels, and in the third month conduct the executive-level board.

The General made one minor note of concern with the recommended frequency where he asked why he couldn't receive more frequent touch-points. I reminded the General that we already conducted bi-monthly forums covering associated topics which would continue. I further explained that during this particular cycle, we had conducted all three levels of forums in a single month, and that it caused the group to continuously work the six topics without rest. I convinced the General that the tempo would be too hectic trying to conduct monthly executive board engagements. He asked the leadership

at the table what they thought, and everyone agreed that a quarterly board would offer a good start point.

Next, I covered the agenda items for the current meeting and proceeded to show the board members our single chart which mapped the objectives down the left hand side; moving across time to the right were listed projected subtasks within columns by quarter. The chart showed the board a long-term plan to touch each subtask over the course of the year. I explained that this was a projection based upon current priorities with those highest receiving attention first. The chart also provided the group an ability to check the pulse of each major objective every quarter. The board approved the charter, frequency, and proposed mapping of topics; and with that, I introduced the first presenter.

Each presenter stayed on que, and tried hard to follow the 15-minute rule, but the General was so enthusiastic with questions that the meeting lasted over two hours. When the last presenter was finished, I quickly reviewed due-outs captured during the discussions and proposed a way ahead for the next quarter. The General gave some final thoughts and paused looking intently around the room; he finally spoke, saying, "Well done, team. You have hit the ball out of the park and set the standard for others to follow." We had accomplished what we set out to do and we did it with style. Our forum became the model which the General would refer to over the next three iterations during the year. Our line of effort board process is to this day recognized among executive-level leaders as the standard of excellence. My team continues to make improvements to the process and products with each delivery moving past what

Hammer and Champy (1993) refer to as "analysis paralysis" (p. 109). We plowed through hard topics keeping the process simple and content relevant to the audience.

April 15, 2015: Outcomes-Based Approach

The work which started with the trip to Fort Benning in the fall of 2013 finally began to take shape into the form of major project that would become one of many pivotal episodes in my current position. Although the Army began demonstrating interest modernizing its instructional approach at the CoE levels in 2011, we had not completed implementation of the concepts described in the Army Learning Concepts (ALC) 2015 (ALC, 2011). On short notice, the General called one of his two branch/proponent leaders and subordinate school leaders along with myself to discuss how to modernize one of the captain's career courses. The meeting took only an hour and basically consisted of the General asking a few questions that we would have to come back and answer in a week. The General told us that he wanted to increase the rigor and make the instruction relevant to the officer's next assignment while capitalizing on the officer's field experience. He wanted to track talent and place those officers demonstrating the most potential into a specially tracked course. He wanted to increase the officer's ability to think critically, and he wanted instructors and lesson plans that would support the desired outcomes.

I remember walking out of the meeting not believing what I had just heard, finally a senior officer who appreciated quality learning. We had a week to get back to the General and give him a plan of what it would take to achieve success. I gathered a small team of my best curriculum developers, my staff, and faculty chief along with the course manager, and a couple of instructors. I explained to the group that we were about

to venture into new territory where no other Center of Excellence had traveled. We were about to completely revamp 10 weeks of a 20 week course comprising of over 400 hours of instruction. I knew that to establish realistic expectations with the General, we had to sketch out the details step-by-step demonstrating how we were going to re-construct the course along tracked venues, capture all resourcing requirements, and show a timeline of how long it would take the team to develop the program of instruction with quality lesson plans.

New course content comprised 401 academic hours. The Army's estimated time value (ETV) to construct a new academic hour was 17 hours of work to one academic hour. With 401 hours, we estimated the work at 4 person-years to complete. Basically the math was telling us that it would take four people and one year to construct the 401 academic hours. Next, we took a look at what courses would be starting within that timeframe that we could recommend as piloting the new material. We found a course starting in late November 2015 with the tracks containing the content of the new courseware in late February 2016. That would give the team only ten months to construct the material for the new course. Next, we had to revise the existing course map and reconstruct it along an outcomes-based approach (Senge, 1990). Beginning with the end in mind we crafted a course outcome to get the general to focus on the product (the graduates) that he wanted to produce. The team packaged all of the products into a well-designed presentation where we explained the products and processes to the general the following week. He approved our methodology and told us to keep up the good work. In the meantime, he would start to discuss this new approach with the Generals in charge of our higher headquarters. We would spend the rest of the

summer analyzing and designing the curriculum from an approved course outcome and nested learning objectives that sequentially connected lessons to the larger course. Within the lesson plan construct, we followed the Experiential Learning Model (Kolb, 1984) that the Army had adopted as its preferred learning framework.

April 28, 2015: Training and Education Enterprise Conference

Two weeks following the session with the General, I headed to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where I had been invited to participate in an education conference. The conference pulled together members like those responsible for education and instructional programs from each Center-of-Excellence-level for a first-time-ever conference. The purpose of the three-day event was to bring stakeholders together, identify problem areas experienced within the educational and the educational policies and processes, and work toward determining viable solutions which could be presented to executive-level leadership (Kohlbacher & Reijers, 2013). Finally, the higher headquarters was going to entertain subordinate criticisms relating to the rigidity of the Army's educational and instructional practice.

A shift in organizational relationships in 2014 caused the Centers of Excellence to change direct reporting from the four-star headquarters (TRADOC) to our three-star headquarters, Combined Arms Center (CAC). As part of this relational change, the three-star headquarters began a monthly forum with the Centers of Excellence labeled the Policy and Guidance Oversight Committee (PGOC). The forum's charter was to begin revising the education and instructional policies and find workable solutions to problems identified in the practice. The forums over time began to resemble what Wenger and Snyder (1999) described as Communities of Practice. Each month we had

the same "group of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise" (Wenger & Snyder, 1999, p. 139). I was actually experiencing a management theory in practice, and it appeared to be working! The monthly sessions were scheduled for two-hours, and an agenda was published leaving some open space for anyone to propose a topic. Soon there was so much demand for topics that the group had to devise a system to vet and limit the number of topics that could be addressed in a particular session.

Over time, group members raised attention to several user-level issues. Finally the CoEs were gaining some traction toward improving the process. Policy, on the other hand was, and still is, slower to evolve as approval of new policy requires more agencies to agree. For example, resourcing and budgeting policy remains structured along a very rigid system following a timeline mandated by federal law. Policy is a hard nut to crack, and I will address some implications in the final chapter. Changing policy will require senior leaders with sustainability who clearly understand how policy interacts and affects educational transformation in order to begin an evolutionary change toward an adaptive, agile policy environment. The difficulty associated with policy change is explained by Pierson (2000) as "path dependent where institutions are sticky and actors protect the existing model" (p. 4). In the meantime, I must do my best to maneuver within the constraints of policy finding loopholes and work-arounds within the system to provide our students the best possible learning experience.

The conference began Phase Two of a Five-Phase process where five groups were built and populated with members from across the seven Centers of Excellence and two higher headquarters organizations. Each group was aligned with a topic

previously chosen from the stakeholders. I had volunteered for group one and the conference organizer accommodated my request. The group demographics included a balance of key members from the Centers of Excellence, and key staffers from our three-star and four-star-level headquarters. Thus, the groups comprised both the user-level product design and input leadership, and the oversight output key staffers. The topic of my group was to determine if schools had the human capital required to perform the curriculum development process consisting of Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation (ADDIE) model. I was teamed up with my colleagues from Fort Benning and a couple of other schools. The group members included a couple of budget people from the four-star headquarters and the top civilian representing the Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA). TOMA is the agency which is responsible for staffing schools programs of instruction for validation of resources.

Through video teleconference and other technology platforms the group had conducted multiple sessions in March 2015 and early April 2015 crafting a problem statement and eight guiding questions in preparation for the conference. On the first morning, it took the group about two hours to re-acquaint themselves to the problem statement, make adjustments to the guiding questions, and outline our project for the next couple of days. Next, the group began working down the list of questions with the first question addressing the number of assigned people to perform curriculum development. Immediately two issues surfaced: one included defining the expertise required to perform the Army's curriculum development process of ADDIE; second, a suggestion by TOMA to simply throw more experts at the problem. This was the first

indicator that the people working at the higher level did not understand what it took to really perform ADDIE at the branch/proponent schools.

The Army has a professional training and education career program field (CP-32) consisting of seven skill series with each series containing designated competencies to perform their job (CP-32 ACTEDS Plan, 2014). The series responsible for curriculum development along the Army model is GS-1750, which is a general schedule (GS) Department of the Army Civilian assigned to the professional series of 1750, Instructional Systems Specialist. The 1750 series is considered a professional educational series and requires specific educational requirements to serve in the series. For example, a minimum of "full four-year course of study leading to a bachelor's degree or higher which included or is supplemented by at least 24 hours appropriate to the work of the position to be filled" (CP-32 ACTEDS Plan, 2014, p. 26). The coursework must include four out of five specific categories associated with learning theory, psychology of learning, educational psychology, instructional design, education evaluation, instructional product development, and computers in education. The 1750 series civilians are critical to the branch/proponent schools in the construction of quality learning products. Those of us who work every day with this professional series appreciate the value which they bring to the process and understand the time it takes to build quality curriculum. Those who are not as closely associated with the day-to-day work of the 1750 careerist rarely possess the requisite understanding of what it takes to build quality curriculum. Corroboration of this issue was recently cited in a TRADOC study utilizing both a survey and numerous focus group sessions with leadership, as

well as instructors at the branch/proponent schools and those involved with instructional systems (Hicks, 2015).

The TOMA representative would quickly find the conversation difficult to follow because he was not familiar with the user-level problems associated with the policy and process experienced at the branch/proponent level. The group, supported by representatives from three Centers of Excellence, tried to further explain the rigidity of the system and the friction caused by trying to accommodate a system that was not agile or adaptive in nature. By the middle of the first morning, the TOMA representative and my friend from Fort Benning were exchanging some strong words, resulting in the facilitator's boss asking the TOMA representative to ease up. The TOMA representative departed the work group and would not return until the next morning. The argument stemmed from my colleague describing a particular problem with the Training Development Capability (TDC) tool and the TOMA representative refusing to understand the problem. The TOMA representative could not understand the problem because he did not use TDC as a development tool, but relied on the output of data that the tool provided. The TOMA representative, being an end user, did not care about the effort it took a training developer to manipulate and find work arounds to input required documents into the system. He was simply stuck on process supporting policy.

The group was assigned a facilitator from the Army's esteemed Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG). The AWG is a group designed to "identify, and develop Army solutions for capability gaps" (Loos, 2016, "United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group," para. 4). The facilitator from AWG provided the group an unbiased representative who would help guide the group through the development of a

constructive solution set supporting the identified problem area. The next day our group would spend all day, and half of the next day building a blueprint addressing the problem so that we could gain the three-stars approval to proceed along a proof of principle (PoP). By the end of day two, the group had crafted a problem statement, a proposed solution, a timeline, and a set of metrics to measure our progress. We packaged the information in a quad chart for presentation to the three-star. My friend was designated to present the groups information to the three-star.

On day three, group one was first to present its plan to the three-star. Starting in the upper left quadrant of the slide, my friend clearly articulated the problem statement: "The Army's educational and instructional processes exceed TRADOC's human resource capacity to efficiently execute to standard." Next, he presented the two proposed solutions, describing how we would optimize current human capital and identify unnecessary elimination requirements caused by the rigidity associated with current policy and requirements driven by the Training Development Capacity (TDC) tool. The first objective, was to address mandated standardization of lesson plan development requirements against unique lessons that are branch/proponent specific, and shareable lessons which other schools could use. Second objective was to streamline lesson plan development, determining which of the 27 steps within the TDC tool is really required. That is, we do not want to lose resources or compromise quality. Moving to the upper right quadrant the presenter laid out the timeline of major milestones. The presenter moved to the lower left quadrant and explained four metrics we would use to measure our progress. The general applauded the groups' work, asked if any of his staff had questions, and approved the proof of concept for group one. The

rest of the four briefing concluded, and we all adjourned with a feeling of accomplishment. Our group would follow up in the next two weeks with the higher headquarters staffers to flush out the details of the plan.

In May of 2015, our group hosted two teleconferences with the higher headquarters specifically addressing the second requirement of our pilot. TDC as the tool was identified as too cumbersome and too complex for our training developers. The TDC contained 27 major steps with over 100 minor steps associated with inputting a single lesson. The group had determined that to maintain lesson plan quality and not lose resources, we had to utilize three of the 27 steps. Almost immediately we received pushback from the TDC owners as if they were protecting their own fiefdom. They argued that each step was necessary and that it did not take that long to input the data. Because the server was situated at their location, of course they had fewer delays with the system; however, they would not even entertain a compromise. They simply told us that they could not overwrite the software to allow us to work around the 27 steps. Although we had received permission from the three-star general, his own staff became a major obstacle to our proof of principle.

By the end of June 2015, I had my team disregard TDC requirements, building lesson plans without the constraint of TDC. My team had never done this, so it took me a couple of weeks to walk them through building a lesson plan from scratch along an outcomes-based approach. The instructional design team immediately endorsed the new instructional design methodology and asked why we had not been doing it this way as it supported the Army's Learning Model (ALC 2015). I explained that the Army wants

and agile/adaptive curriculum but fails to adjust its policy and systems to support such an agile/adaptive instructional model.

July 10, 2015: Another Crack at the Workload Capacity Model

As previously discussed in chapter six, one of the most complex components associated with the Army's programs of instruction (POI) is understanding all of the moving parts encompassing how the Army resources the branch/proponent instructional programs. The resourcing and budgeting includes: facilities, equipment, instructors, material, ammunition, and the workforce who is responsible for creating and sustaining the products required to teach the programs of instruction. In 2014, a group of staffers at Fort Leavenworth got the brilliant idea to leverage the Training Development Capability (TDC) as a tool to demonstrate resourced workload, identify critical shortfall, fiscal year workload completed, and capacity utilization. The first outcome of the process demonstrated a workload capacity utilization of 145 percent. The model was demonstrating that we were far exceeding expected output. The model was showing that we had 138 people performing 167 peoples worth of work. I suspected that meant that we produced a lot of products resulting in a lower quality. It turned out that there was a little bit of truth to my suspicion. Prior to my graduate studies I would not have questioned data, but now going into a second iteration of capturing workload capacity against workload utilization I was better informed about quantitative methods. I had learned some things to watch for like validity, reliability, sample size, population, and data analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2014). The first year I was exposed to this process I was awed by the large amount of data. Besides, it looked like we were performing really well, working hard to produce a lot of products. At 145 percent

capacity utilized, the data was showing the Army that we had more than adequate people assigned to perform the required work. The data was demonstrating that we had surplus people who could be assigned elsewhere. The data was beginning to paint a false picture of work accomplished against number of people assigned. As I began to get familiar with the program capabilities, I asked our higher headquarters to query some reports to demonstrate the quality of products produced. What I found out was that we had a lot of products submitted, and they contained a lot of mistakes.

I was beginning to question the higher headquarters motives: Did they have a specific purpose or research design in mind? Were they were simply collecting data to fill out neat looking pie charts, and graphs to satisfy their own desires? The perception among Center of Excellence peers was that the higher headquarters was pulling data from the data base that resembled more of a pseudo-study than a non-experimental study (Ravid, 2011). This was the first flag that the data pulled was not providing good evidence of work accomplished. Another interesting fact was when I asked if I could pull the same reports at my level, I was told "no", only the higher headquarters had the privileges to pull the data in such a manner. Now I was really beginning to get suspicious with the data and what the higher headquarters were trying to use it to prove.

Going into the second evolution of the workload management process, I was now better equipped with information that I learned in courses from Dr. Urick, Dr. Frick, and Dr. Crowson. Through their coursework, projects, and discussion, they had taught me to be a better consumer of data, and how data is used to demonstrate results with various confidence levels. This time I was prepared to challenge the team of staffers with some hard questions about the relevance behind what they were utilizing

the data to demonstrate. The higher headquarters produced a how to guide explaining six required reports and the submission process of each. The collective reports were then submitted through multiple staff agencies resulting in validation of human capital requirements against required and predicted end products. The Army utilizes an Army availability factor (AAF) of 1,740 man-hours per authorization described in Army Regulation 570-4 (Manpower Management, 2011). In the absence of a descriptive research study (Ravid, 2011) to explain the logic behind their work, I constructed an evaluation critique of their project based upon documented evidence, and my experience as a participant in the process. The outline I chose to critique the workload management study was provided in Dr. Frick's Policy Evaluation Course, in the spring of 2015. My purpose here was to apply gained knowledge and understanding of theory-based evaluation to uncover strengths and weaknesses and to explore a path for articulating better approaches in capturing workload capacity and utilization.

Mini Program Evaluation Critique

In lieu of a descriptive research design, the staffers wrote a tasking order and a how to guide describing six reports and the process for submitting the reports. A tasking order is a recognized document that the Army uses to direct organizations to perform prescribed tasks. The contents of the tasking order followed a loose arrangement of goals to define the training development functions against requirements to determine the workload. The absence of a formal design predicates that the desired results would follow what Ravid (2011) suggests as "action research conducted by practitioner-researchers in their own settings to solve a problem by studying it, proposing solutions, implementing the solutions, and assessing the effectiveness of these solutions" (p. 4).

The workload management study examined differences between total work years reported complete, capacity (people hired), and capacity utilization (products completed) within the current fiscal year, against projected workload, projected capacity, and any predicted shortfalls forecasted out to three fiscal years. The staffers who created the workload management study claimed that their collective data would provide an accurate account of human capital expenditures against products produced to justify resourcing the associated workforce producing training development products.

Sample

A Center of Excellence comprised of two branch/proponent schools situated in a middle-sized community with 205 employee authorizations represented the human capital selected for the study. Fourteen products comprised the workload requirements; four tools were utilized to create, staff, and manage the products. Ten of the products utilized one tool labeled the Training Development Capacity (TDC). Lesson plans and programs of instruction represented 115 person-years of work, which comprised the majority of products produced. The remaining 25 person-years calculated produced the remaining twelve products. The vacancies (33), and misalignments (32) comprised the remaining 65 person-years represented. A total of 140 person-years represented the workload capacity population for the study at $n = 140$.

Validity and Reliability of Measures/Dependability and Conformability of Accounts

Staffers performing as researchers utilized a variety of reports with the data from those reports placed into Microsoft Excel or Access type instruments to measure work plans completed, capacity utilization, and critical shortfalls. Both quantitative and qualitative data were represented through three sources: training development capacity

(TDC), focused interviews, and surveys. The quantitative data represented a mathematical model supporting the logic of the training and education development program objective memorandum (TED-POM) requirements. The TED-POM model was explained as: total requirement = end product + non end product adjustment + indirect work adjustment. The data was collected through the Training Development Capability (TDC) data base and various surveys designed along a mathematical scale looking toward confirmability rather than objectivity in establishing the value of the data.

Further investigation proved noteworthy as I began to look at the data to support various types of validity such as; multiple data sources, methods, and theoretical schemes (Lather, 1991). The study failed to demonstrate credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability along trustworthiness and authenticity discussed by Lincoln & Guba (1985). For example, response bias was not accounted for in the survey data which asked employees to fill out their own workload accomplished. Employees, based upon their own memory, filled out an excel spreadsheet with their accomplished workload against a list of specific products. When I asked employees and their supervisors how they accounted for their accomplished workload, they told me that they recorded a best guess. Employees also knew that an annual individual workload equated to 1,740 hours. Knowing the annual workload the employees would try to balance the total available hours against the number of products that they were responsible to produce.

The instruments utilized in the study were not described in detail nor supported through accounts found within scholarly literature. The collection of data also included site assistance visits conducted at the beginning of the collection process, followed by

another visit in the middle of the reporting period, and finally an out brief at the end to the reporting period. Instrumentation that was applied to measure the workload accomplished was lower than the previous year, indicating a lower worker performance. The existing model does not calculate work performed. Rather the model calculates work against end products which may take more than one fiscal year to complete. The current business rules lack adaptive, agile models which can calculate work accomplished during the fiscal year in the absence an end product (Ravid, 2011).

Internal and External Validity of Study/Credibility and Transferability of Study

The study was administered over a twelve-month period with untrained research technicians unfamiliar with employee and leadership work requirements which competed against the end products recognized by the model. The model did not adequately capture work performed if the product produced was not listed as a product in the models output. Employees were told that they were participating in a project about their work experience, workload, and capacity utilization. Uniqueness of the setting, and the timing of the experiment were not considered to raise concern of quantitative external threats described by Creswell (2014), such as generalizing beyond the group at our Center of Excellence to groups located at other Centers of Excellence. Internal validity was threatened by both the selection of participants and the instrumentation which evolved during the twelve-month period. The population sampled represented seven job series who were all lumped into a single workload category. The categories of work are measured against an estimated time value (ETV). Work involved with the construction of programs of instruction, and lesson plans are well described in the workload management process. For example, creating new

curriculum accounts for 17 hours of work for every one academic hour; revising new curriculum accounts for ten hours of work for every one academic hour; reviewing curriculum accounts for eight hours of work for every academic hour. The mathematical formula calculating the remaining twelve types of products are the same as the curriculum, yet writing a doctrinal manual is not equal in terms of work required to produce a product. The study did not reference technical tools (Davis, 1983) or sources of literature supporting the science. The nature of independent and dependent variables were not described, therefore accurate accounting of work performed lacked further support by descriptive statistics delivered in an analytical table. External validity was threatened by people knowing that they were part of the study as well as the ability to record their own workload accomplished. Additionally employees recorded their own projected workload for the next fiscal year. No specific cause and effect relationships were established.

Results

The staffers failed to acknowledge that the study they conducted did not account for all variables, different population demographics, and a single workload calculation applied against all fourteen products. Another highlight is the fact that workload accomplished was not calculated in the model until the product was validated at TOMA. This meant that tens of hours or more could have been spent on a product, but because the product was not finished in the fiscal year, that product did not count as workload accomplished. Reviewing the last two years of data confirmed the gap caused by the manner in which workload was calculated as workload accomplished. In first fiscal year, 2013, in which the Army ran the program, our organization only produced a

workload capacity utilization of 56 percent. During the second fiscal year, 2014, our record books indicated a tremendous workload capacity increase, particularly in our lesson plans and programs of instruction. Our organization workload capacity yielded an amazing 145 percent. In the third year, the focus of this study, the workload capacity utilization yielded a lowly 76 percent when the models were run at the higher headquarters.

With two years under my belt, I decided to keep my own data of work performed, and was prepared to argue our numbers with the higher headquarters. When we received our out brief in December of 2015 demonstrating a 76 percent yield, I had enough. When I challenged the data in terms of reliability, validity, and inquired as to the standard calculation across the products, the higher headquarters told me that we had a 23 person-year short fall. They even indicated that since we weren't using everybody that we could utilize some of the extra people to perform some of our un-resourced requirements. The staffers proposed that their efforts and data demonstrated promise, despite shallow empirical evidence supporting the study's findings. I beg to differ, and will explore some of the issues in my discussion of limitations.

Limitations

Although no limitations are offered from the people comprising the study, I will offer four of my own identified limitations of the study. First, analysis at the individual employee level even though all employees were selected, conditions surrounding work required of a particular product as well as the skillset of the employee were not taken into account. This limits causal inferences to be drawn from the initial study. The simple mathematical calculation of the model does not adequately account for all types

of products. Second, despite a one-size fits all model, significant differences between work accomplished on-site versus work, recognized as accomplished at the higher headquarters causes false reports. The problem is that work accomplished does not count at the higher headquarters until the product is validated. Third, with regard to the model algorithm, because of its rigidity the model fails to account for all categories of work associated with each individual product. Additionally, it does not account for indirect work. For example, support to training development, administrative work, supervising projects, a new branch/proponent requirement, or a commanding general requirement, and mandatory employee training just to name a few. Fourth, the system itself continues to change and receive updates to the software, changing procedures, and adding requirements, yet failing to provide an agile, and adaptive tool to meet the needs of the user while providing valuable resourcing data for those who stand before Army leadership trying to acquire educational and instructional resources.

September 21, 2015: Formally Withdrawing from the Proof of Principle

My instructional design team along with a select group of instructors were making wonderful progress on the course we had chosen as a pilot earlier in the spring. I did, however, want to receive confirmation from the higher headquarters that we would receive full support for our project. I contacted a different agency at Fort Leavenworth where a former colleague and close friend of mine worked. His agency would actually staff our finished products later in the process. I set up a teleconference between him and my curriculum development team to discuss our project. As we laid out our project, my friend at Fort Leavenworth expressed full support of what we wanted to achieve. He told me that if we were able to get the project done, that we

would be the first branch/proponent school to construct and teach a tracked curriculum. He said that what we were doing was what was described in the Army Learning Concepts (ALC 2015) and that all CoEs should be creating such projects. I talked to him about the obstacles encountered with another agency on his post and he said that he would champion our effort with the higher headquarters. This was great news and really lifted the spirits of the design team, who had been receiving a lot of negative feedback from both within and without to the CoE. The support of my friend located with the outside agency, as well as my colleague at Fort Benning enabled us to tell the other organization at Fort Leavenworth that we were going to pull the plug on the proof of principle.

The three-star headquarters was in transition, organizing into a University-like structure titled Army University. The change meant that over 100 people would be moved to new locations, under a new structure, with new bosses, and a new approach to business processes…or so we hoped. With the looming change, the staffer who had hosted the TED-E conference in the spring of 2015 was getting anxious about the progress of the work groups. Although my colleague from Fort Benning and I had already told the forum organizer that we were going to stop further work on our project, the leadership at the higher headquarters somehow failed to hear what we had been telling them all summer. The higher headquarters refused to help us work around the rigidity of the TDC tool, so we did not see any use in continuing the study.

In anticipation of the higher headquarters receiving the first ever Provost, the staffers wanted to ensure that the subordinate organizations were put on the hook to present their work group proof of principle projects. The word on the street was that the

new Provost would be on the ground and ready to take presentations by November 2015. Concentrating on the present, I built and presented a brief to the higher headquarters, demonstrating that we had conquered the enemy, and the enemy was them. Actually, I constructed a single slide sketching our revised project with a timeline of our key events listed in the center of the chart. Highlighted in the upper left corner was a revised set of proofs of principle questions, and labeled TDC input as streamlined versus 23 steps. In the upper right of the chart I laid out the estimated time values (ETVs) against the total number of academic hours which we were creating. Eight minutes into my presentation I asked if there were any questions. There was a long pause, no questions, only a small compliment from the staffers, and they proceeded to the next presenter. I had gotten through the first gate.

The presentation of the workgroups to the new Provost would end up being postponed until February 2016. On February 16, 2016, I was asked to present our group's findings to the Army Learning Coordination Council (ALCC). The ALCC members included all seventeen branch/proponent school leadership and all seven Centers of Excellence Commanders. When I connected to the forum utilizing a video teleconference, I introduced myself and presented our group's findings and recommendations to the ALCC forum. In an effort to be polite, I began by thanking the team at Fort Leavenworth for their patience while our group worked through our desired path to fix the data collection tool. Next, I took the group back in time to the April 2015 conference and reiterated our group's established problem statement, recommended solutions, timeline, and metrics. I paused for just a moment to let the audience soak up the information which was supported in my presentation chart then

began talking again gently adding that this was our delivered contract with the three-star who had approved us to move forward. I concluded with the number of person-years spent between two of the Centers of Excellence teams and told the forum that due to the constraints associated with TDC, we would no longer pursue the project.

There was a moment of silence before the Provost asked the larger audience if anyone had any questions for me. With no questions from the audience, the Provost thanked me for the presentation and our team for the work performed. Later in the presentations I was delighted to see that the staffers responsible for TDC had a presentation in which they had been directed to resolve the rigidity of TDC and make it more user friendly. The staffers presented their case as trying to achieve a balance between usefulness to the user and it's adaptability as a tool for capturing resources for programs of instruction. The staffers appeared bent on keeping the status quo despite all of the users demanding change. It will be interesting to see how the project turns out over the next several months; it will be one in which all of the CoEs will remain heavily engaged in order to resolve. Fullan (2011) explains this situation wonderfully in his sixth chapter, *Know Your Impact.* He suggests that "learning confidently requires knowing what is going on, and what impact you are having" (p. 127). This is an item which I address further in chapter eight.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Reflections and Implications

This chapter represents my own explanation of personal and professional development as an emerging scholar and educational leader. The paths I pursued were not always clear and often I encountered obstacles. Early in my career I learned to overcome challenges with brute force and ignorance. In my continued service as an Army leader, I was exposed to higher levels of education. With time, my own reliance on brute force and ignorance was conquered by learning and improved practice. I started to think differently and approach situations with a more mature, reasoned purpose. My mind wrestled with theory while observing the day-to-day practice demonstrated by our Army school leaders. I began to wonder why there was such a discrepancy between theory and practice. Why were these leaders not acting like educational leaders? How could my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing educational change?

I knew that I had to write my story, one which I hope captures the interest of senior Army leaders. I also understood that I had to gain attention and demonstrate my value both at the local CoE-level as well as the enterprise-level. By enterprise level, I mean the organizational headquarters comprising the three star, four star headquarters, and the Army. The enterprise level contained several forums which offered me a platform to present exemplars of practice. I quickly re-established former relationships while building new ones vertically and horizontally, both internally and externally to the Center of Excellence. During the first year, I earned a strong reputation within a

core group of practitioners participating in the enterprise-level forums, where I was often asked to present my work. The experience opened a door, and exposed me to higher levels of the enterprise, and helped me to establish a voice for our local Army schools.

Three years ago, when I began my tenure at the Center of Excellence as deputy director of education and instructional programs, I was asked to assess the current state of instructional programs in the two branch/proponent schools and provide CoE leaders with a plan for improvement. I began by looking for data points, evidence of measurable results that would demonstrate the quality of our instructional products, student benchmarks, and teacher effectiveness. What I discovered was an absence of business process management (BPM) which I explained at some length in chapter six. No evidence of metrics could be found, which contributed to leadership making uninformed decisions, such as random changes in the curriculum. Initially, the data collected would serve to build a phased strategy, driving and influencing educational change across the Center of excellence over the next three to five years.

In Chapter five I explained phase one, beginning with the lesson plan surge with a transition into phase two, organizing around lead program management teams. The project immediately resembled scattered pieces of a complex puzzle where even the picture on the puzzle container was so distorted you could not tell what the assembled pieces would sketch. The absence of any source of data points caused me to spend the first 30 days exploring multiple avenues to collect information and build my own database. I started my exploration with the employees, where I found myself engaged in wonderful conversations and both collecting information while at the same time

building collective trust (Forsyth, et al., 2010). Eventually, I discovered that the total number of programs of instruction during fiscal year 2013 was 178. The lesson plans contained in those programs of instruction (POI) accounted for over 30,000 academic hours of classroom instruction. Now that I knew how many POIs existed, I devised a way to determine the quality of each POI. Next, I determined the workload associated with reviewing, revising, and creating new material from each program of instruction.

Anecdotally, I received some feedback: most POI issues centered on poor management, lack of trust, and the fact that there were no accountability measures in place. No one was keeping the branch/proponent leadership informed on the status of programs of instruction. Therefore, branch/proponent leaders lacked good visibility on their programs and were not tracking the requirement to implement tenets of the Army Learning Model 2015 (ALC, 2011). Priorities were not clear and the organization lacked direction from both branch/proponents as well as the person in charge of managing the cyclic maintenance of the programs of instruction. I had walked into a real mess that would take a lot of time and effort to correct.

The Army's policy established a POI cyclic maintenance schedule which directed that branch/proponents review each POI once every three years. Changes or maintenance to the programs of instruction fall within three categories of work: Review, Revise, and New. Each category of work is assigned work hours following an estimated time value. Naturally, I wanted to know what the forecasted cyclic schedule would look like against each category for both branch/proponent schools. Once I could see the cyclic maintenance schedule sketched against each category I could accurately determine the workload against the required review of POI. As I write this final chapter,

my team is still working to create a cyclic POI maintenance schedule. The products resulting from this effort will form the foundational products used to inform the newly assigned Center of excellence and branch/proponent leadership in the summer of 2016.

Studies of successful school leadership such as those done by Carter, et al. (1992) support sustainability as one of the key ingredients that drive successful educational change. A survey of current literature indicates that the Army policy surrounding the tenure of Center of excellence and branch/proponent leaders will remain status quo. Since leadership turnover is predicted to remain frequent, one way to mitigate instability across the branch/proponent programs of instruction is to enforce the Army's prescribed cyclic maintenance schedule. This is easier said than done, as anyone familiar with Army generals knows; they cannot simply come in and leave well enough alone. The Army is rich in tradition and one of those unwritten traditions, until recently, included making the unit better and leaving it in good shape for the next person.

In 2009 the Combined Arms Center located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published a "Leadership Transition Handbook" which describes a standard procedure for leaders to follow when they assume a leadership role in an organization. The transition model comprises four distinct phases: 1) preparation to assume the leadership position, 2) conducting a 30-day initial assessment during the first month in the position, 3) alignment and team building during the second month, 4) the third month consists of socializing, forming the new vision, and goals. During this study, two new Center of Excellence leaders and five branch/proponent leaders have come and gone, all of whom applied portions of the prescribed transition model.

The two Center of Excellence leaders, at the end of their 90-day assessment, gathered a group of their local colonels and conducted an off-site to formulate a strategy framework consisting of a vision statement, mission, and end-state. The strategy framework was handed off to a group of planners who formed an operational planning team (OPT). The planning team generally followed procedures described in Field Manual 6-0 (Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 2014). Details of the process and results were previously described in chapter six of this study. Although the strategy explained the new leadership's direction for the next two years, it did little to alleviate the turmoil felt deeper in the organization (Forsyth et al., 2011).

Organizationally, the employees were dealing with multiple tasks driven by Army requirements, branch/proponent leadership desires, and a new Center of Excellence strategy. Numerous priorities emerged and began stacking up and overriding core requirements, creating a backlog against our primary products. The ingredients of change driven from the top without the top understanding the consequences in relation to how programs of instruction are built, staffed, resourced, and implemented, can cause long-lasting effects. Some of the evidence discovered from those effects can be found in thousands of backlogged curriculum products; curriculum that cannot be worked on because of competing demands against dwindling recourses.

In 2014 senior leaders began inquiring into the CoEs product backlog, going as far as outsourcing to reduce the backlog. The effort had good intentions but was not getting at the root cause of backlogged products. Next, the leadership attempted to tie backlog to training gaps, quality of products, and the numbers of people assigned to do the work. Leadership either failed to recognize or elected to ignore the competing effect

of their priorities against cyclic requirements. The cyclic management of required products is designed to facilitate the routine updates and maintenance of branch/proponents programs of instruction. When demand exceeds capability, only a select number of programs of instruction receive the requisite attention to meet ALM 2015 standards, incorporate new doctrines, account for new equipment, or integrate new interactive multimedia instruction. Those programs that fall outside of the priorities tend to stagnate and become backlogged curriculum. Over time this translates to poor quality lesson plans and outdated facilities, which could result in a downward turn of performance in the field. If we could only produce some real data to demonstrate the connections between good curriculum, great delivery, and state-of-the art facilities!

Efforts beginning in 2014 and continuing into the present find branch/proponent leaders continuing to seek ways to be more efficient while failing to see the problem before their very eyes. Fullan (2011) describes one theme in his research using this comparison, "we don't see the obvious things unless we are looking for them. That's why we run over bicycles and cut off motorcycles, more than cars" (p. 128). Fullan (2011) further described the famous experiment by Chabris and Simons (2010) where they filmed two teams, one dressed in white the other in black, passing a basketball. They asked participants to count the number of passes. Most participants guessed the number of passes yet they failed to notice a girl dressed in a gorilla suit pass through the middle of the two teams. Too many things were competing for their attention. Fullan (2011) refers to this as the "disease of distraction" (p. 131) suggesting that leaders focus on fewer measures of impact as they craft strategies to move their organizations forward. As I stated earlier in this study, the Center of Excellence and branch/proponent

leaders only remain in their positons from twelve to twenty four months. The short tenure leaves very little time for these leaders to drive or influence educational change on their watch. This is where good data could help inform the leadership as they develop their priorities and determine places where their influence is critical.

When I arrived on this job, measuring student performance in the classroom was haphazard at best with some data collected by instructors and course managers who were not formally trained. The instruments they used included after action reviews which mirrored focus group techniques, and surveys. A training and analysis branch (TAB) was working for me, and they conducted a few quasi-studies from 2009 to 2011. Their efforts attempted to measure recent graduates and determine how well they were performing in the field. The instruments that they employed were web-based surveys constructed along a Likert type scale. The team had good intent, but like the Quality Assurance Office (QAO) team, were not formally trained in conducting research studies. What was missing was the science behind genuine research design. People were trying to do the right thing, but the efforts were fragmented at best. No standard survey tool existed, and no formal design or method guiding evaluation existed. Course authors, those responsible for programs of instruction, maintained student test scores on every student and subject, yet the data was not analyzed to improve learning. As part of a continuing effort to produce evidence and raise the awareness of branch/proponent school performance, I decided to run a multiple regression test during the fall of 2014 as a project for Dr. Urick's Applied Quant course assignment to run a multiple regression test. The test would determine success factors for predicting the pass rates of one of our toughest branch/proponent courses. I pulled a sample of data from one course to

determine *x* controlling for student-background; *x* does academic engagement (module/block), race, gender, college degree, or commissioning source predict [influence] *named module* achievement, Hyde, J. S., Fennema, E. H., and Lamon, S. J. (1990)? The Null [H0]: suggested that there is no influence and does not predict academic engagement on *named module* scores. H1: There is a positive influence of academic engagement on *named module* scores.

The study utilized multiple variables to predict one criterion variable to determine if significance existed among the variables. The statistics were collected from an archived data-base maintained by *named school* (Montoya, 2014). Independent variables included; gender, race, commissioning source, college degree, *module test 3*. Since the *named* module recently changed in both content and structure starting with class 6-14 it was deemed necessary to study the five preceding classes. Therefore, classes 1-14 to 5-14 served as a foundational sample for future comparison with the implemented change of structure and content in class 6-14. Included in the study was a short descriptive of the necessary steps utilized to clean the data prior to running the multiple regression test. The purpose of the study was on lieutenant achievement in a specific *named module* to demonstrate value as a foundational study relating variable effects which contributed to pass rates and improved achievement of the specific *named module*. Subsequent studies focused on improving course design and content could benefit knowing which variables best predict improved student achievement. This is another area where those selected to supervise Centers of Excellence and operate branch/proponent schools could benefit from understanding responsibilities inherent within educational leadership.

The final area that leadership asked me to study surrounded instructor certification which, at the time, fell under the CoE quality assurance office (QAO). The QAO programs were recognized as strong programs, but had some room for improvement. The director was narrowly focused on an upcoming Army accreditation visit while ignoring the absence of rubrics associated with implementing the new Army Learning Model 2015. The Army did not develop rubrics to measure how well Centers of Excellence would implement ALM 2015; instead they left that task to the subordinate CoEs to wrestle with. The Army stipulates that each QAO office evaluates branch/proponent school courses in accordance with accreditation standards described in the Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards (TRADOC Regulation 11-21, 2014). The AEAS contained 28 standards which included areas surrounding implementation of ALM 2015 principles. The absence of rubrics to measure the implementation progress of ALM 2015 would continue to cause friction between the CoEs and the higher headquarters. The QAO director refused to take on the role of developing the metrics, so I added the task of building rubrics for ALM 2015 implementation to my team of curriculum developers who were involved in my lesson plan surge.

In the second year at the situated CoE, I could not get any traction with the new leadership to regain efforts toward accomplishing ALM 2015 goals. The new leadership began their tenure seemingly unfamiliar with the Army's transformation efforts following ALM 2015. We were not the only Center of Excellence struggling to fully implement ALM 2015, and the higher headquarters finally recognized that numerous friction points were slowing down progress across the six Centers of Excellence. The higher headquarters initiated three efforts to determine why CoEs were struggling to

fully implement ALM 2015. The first included two separate Army Research Institute (ARI) studies and nominated an ALM task force, from its own staff, to explore ALM implementation accomplishment across all CoEs. The ARI team designed two research studies with both collecting data in 2014 producing a final report in late 2015. One study focused on collecting data to identify the accomplishments and challenges of employing technology to meet the goals of the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015. The second study focused on determining factors which contributed to pockets of successful ALM 2015 implementation at the branch/proponent level. Both studies identified pockets of success across the Centers of Excellence and described familiar gaps. The studies did not reveal any new evidence. I already knew that we did not fully perform ADDIE in our curriculum development. I was tracking resource constraints in both people and money; I was fully aware of the lack of formal evaluation programs and, of course, the turnover of key individuals was no surprise. I found it interesting that the ARI studies seamlessly skipped over what I had discovered as a root cause in the struggle to implement ALM 2015.

One of the gaps discovered was the absence of any program evaluation plan exploring strengths, weaknesses or limitations within the Army's leadership development model. Therefore, a study structured to investigate Center of Excellence and branch/proponent leadership's relational and consequential role implementing educational change should occur. Such a study could offer new insights into preparation, education, selection, and sustainability of leaders supervising Centers of Excellence or operating branch/proponent schools. Literature supporting assessment of education is described as systematic gathering and review of information concerning

educational programs in order to improve learning and development (Palomba & Banta, 1999). Surprisingly, a common thread found among assessment literature describes the single notion that, to know how well and to what extent something is occurring, there must be a metric. The metric then demonstrates a measured level of output comprising tasks that generate reliable assessment of a student's knowledge, skills, and abilities to demonstrate mastery (Pearson, 2014). Interestingly, studies from higher education, training communities such as Vo-Tech and Army sanctioned research institutes provide a cross-fertilization of ideas well suited to evaluate and assess Army education.

Literature stemming from the education community generally comprises collecting, synthesizing, and interpreting of data whose findings aid instructional decision making. The collection of data typically describes six different assessment types: diagnostic (assesses a student's strengths, weaknesses, knowledge, and skills prior to instruction), formative (assesses a student's performance during instruction and usually occurs regularly throughout the instruction process), summative (measures the student's achievement at the end of instruction), norm–referenced (compares a student's performance against a national or other "norm" group), criterion–referenced (measures a student's performance against a goal, specific objective, or standard) and interim benchmark (evaluates student performance at periodic intervals, frequently at the end of a grading period; can predict student performance on end–of–year summative tests) (Lepi, 2013).

Literature discovered from the training community demonstrate evaluation models moving from intellectual learning measured in the classroom toward evaluation of individual performance of those competencies demonstrated on the job. The

individual performance is then measured against impact on the organization (Kirkpatrick, 1994). This training evaluation methodology includes assessment of individual performance, yet focuses on the bottom line of accomplishment and its relevance to organizational output. The ultimate outcome for training evaluation is to measure the return on investment. That means how much revenue is spent training the workforce relative to the profit demonstrated from increasing knowledge or skills (Kirkpatrick, 1994). Although such a model includes the human dimension, it also connects the organization making this an ideal concept when assessing professional military education. The institution is concerned with both genuine learning and increasing organizational effectiveness.

Material garnered from the senior officer orientation course demonstrates that executive-level leadership recognizes that those leaders, newly assigned to supervise, Centers of Excellence or operate branch/proponent schools are not fully equipped to perform educational leadership functions. Currently the Army is working to restructure and improve the weeklong course called the Senior Officer Orientation Program (SOOP). Numerous engagements from the higher headquarters continue asking, "What can be done to improve leadership understanding of the Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, Evaluation (ADDIE) approach associated with the curriculum development process?" Given the current environment we would be better served by constraining the designated leadership to a proven model which they would not be allowed to disrupt. Instead, make the new leadership work within the model and rely upon the educational experts in the organization. Current Army practice does not leverage the knowledge, experience, education, and certification of civilians assigned to

the organization. The civilian workforce also provides continuity of effort as most civilian employees serve for many years in the same position. It is time for the Army to take a hard look at its current policy and practice of selecting those leaders to supervise CoEs and operate branch/proponent schools. The ARI or RAND Corporation could conduct a research study in this area, evaluating the Army leader development model and requirements against successful K-12 leadership development programs and studies.

This year, my third year in position at the Center of Excellence, we continued refining previously established structures and processes and focused more on instructor, and student performance. We felt that we had found a way to assess the delivery of instruction and improve student learning. I hand-picked a gifted team from within my organization and by summer they were in place. We began to formulate a program evaluation study based upon Kirkpatrick's four levels of training and evaluation (Kirkpatrick, 2006). We identified one of our officer courses which was going through a complete redesign allowing us to start on the ground floor. Focusing on a single course also allowed us to start evaluation on a small scale, where we hope to demonstrate the value of such a program to both Center of Excellence and branch/proponent leadership as well as the stakeholders positioned in the operational units. Proving the value behind such a program remains paramount in sustaining a workforce in the years to come. With success hinging on the hope that, after a year of implementation, we may be able to use the model to reach a broader array of courses at the CoE while proving value to the Army writ large and ultimately demonstrating a "return on expectations" as described by Dr. Jim Kirkpatrick (2010).

Fortunately, the director of QAO resigned in the late spring of 2014, bringing the program under my direction in the fall of 2014. I was delighted that my colleague and mentor, Dr. Casey Blaine, would join my team, where he would find a new freedom to finally move his program forward. Instructor certification included a basic instructor course (ABIC) for general instructors, a small group course for those selected to teach small group, and a unit certification requirement for all instructors. The basic instructor course focuses on creating a foundational understanding of the experiential learning model (Kolb, 1984), classroom management, student assessment, an introduction to instructional technology, and facilitation skills. Next, the small group instructor's course teaches more andragogy, an introduction to developing and writing lesson plans. With the departure of the CoE quality assurance director, our staff and faculty professional development division, led by Dr. Casey Blaine, is recognized by top Army leadership as representing the Army's 'gold standard' for like programs.

In the fall of 2015, we hosted Dr. Kirkpatrick for a two-day seminar, and to our delight it was attended by our top civilian, a two-star equivalent. Other attendees included one colonel, four colonel-equivalent civilians, the deputy to the chief of staff, a hand-picked team of top curriculum developers, and a representative from both branch/proponent schools. In January 2016, we hosted Dr. Kirkpatrick for an advanced application of his training and evaluation program. Our project now is to develop an implementation plan to ultimately demonstrate the return on expectations. We will finish and deliver a plan in early June 2016 focused on the program evaluation of one course over the next year. Following the Kirkpatrick model, we will also employ sound approaches to educational research such as those described by Ravid (2011), Creswell

(2014), and Maxwell (2013). Finally, as the CoE allowed us to continue to implement new accountability measures with little or no cost to support these new control mechanisms, we have gained tremendous traction for a more thorough way to analyze student learning and performance. In the summer of 2016, I intend to unveil a program evaluation plan to demonstrate how well our schools are preparing students to perform in their jobs.

For the first time in thirty years associated with Army training and education I began to appreciate the foundational architecture underlying the Army's leadership development model, and understand the purpose it was designed to serve. In my search for answers as to why the Army seems to struggle with transforming education my third year in the job, finishing my graduate-level coursework, the pieces of the puzzle began to come together leading to an increased understanding. Attending and participating in a variety of events from the classroom to the board room, observing various training and educational forums, I began to connect a list of skills and competencies required of successful school leaders. The experiential and theoretical connections began to resonate in my daily practice as I recognized actions or the absence of actions which helped me to frame gaps in the Army leader development model.

Army regulation and policy clearly establishes roles and functions for those supervising Centers of Excellence and operating branch/proponent schools. So why is educational transformation so hard for the Army to implement at the CoE, and branch/proponent levels? The answer may lie within a study created by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) demonstrating "A five-stage model of the mental activities involved in directed skill acquisition" (p. 1). The researchers describe the evolution of skill levels

from novice to expert, where at each stage of training the learner must acquire knowledge related to the tasks involved in enabling advancement. Studies relating to successful institutional leadership demonstrate the validity behind the Dreyfus skill acquisition model. Further details explaining school leadership theory may be found in the literature review of this study located in Appendix 1. A.

With the combination of forces in my professional life spanning 30-years in the practice and almost four-years in graduate school, I found myself growing in understanding through experiential learning (Clandinin, 2013). I quit blaming leaders for not knowing or understanding educational and instructional programs. I began to open my own eyes toward the complexity of Army education and training budgeting, resourcing policy, and process. I began to appreciate the Army's Leadership Development Model (FM 6-22, 2015) for what purpose it serves, and not for the gaps created in how the Army selects and prepares those senior leaders to supervise CoEs and operate branch/proponent schools. I discovered how exposed I was placed into the unfamiliar territory of Army training, education budgeting, and resourcing. Despite having over twelve of my 30 years serving in the Army's school system from captain to lieutenant colonel, and senior civilian, it was not until I began deliberately exploring the practice and studying the theory that my eyes were opened as to why the Army seems to struggle with transforming education.

The concept of Army education reform can be traced back to Elihu Root, Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904; "Roots formula for officer development called for rotation of duty assignments and intermittent periods of professional schooling" (Coumbe, 2010, p. 2). History paints a very successful Army in its ability to perform

traditional Army missions, as is evident from its conception on June 14, 1775. As I began to understand Army education budgeting and resourcing policy and process, it became clear that I must become the subject matter expert who guides the branch/proponent-level leadership. I must play an instrumental role providing them the right information to manage their programs of instruction. Advising the branch/proponent leadership along informed recommendations empowers them to fulfill their office responsibilities. I must be the resolute leader who knows what matters most, which Fullan (2011) described as the practitioner who over time, and with continuous learning, becomes the expert.

Conclusion

Change in a large organization takes time and persistence neither of which the uniformed leadership has. Leveraging my increased knowledge and earned relationships I have influenced small changes, thus far, to a few of the branch/proponent programs resulting in local policy change, improved management of courses, and improved administration of budgeting and resourcing. Through partnerships with colleagues situated at other Centers of Excellence throughout the Army, the Army University staff, and local community we will continue to share a vision aimed at improving our products and processes leading to enhanced student performance. In order to accomplish these goals, those supervising the Centers of Excellence and operating the branch/proponent schools must learn to rely upon their educational leaders. Those few educational leaders must expertly navigate Army leaders through the Army training and education budgeting, and resourcing policy, and systems. A relationship of collective trust (Forsyth, Adams, & Hoy, 2010) jointly places transformational leadership, and

educational experts in a better position to maintain the operational needs of the schools, meet the demands directed by Army policy, and improve accountability requirements. Army regulation 600-20 stipulates that "commanders are responsible for everything that their command does or fails to do" (Command Policy, 2014, p. 6). Yet there remains an absence of deliberate preparation, education, and selection, resulting in a fractured purpose of the Army leadership development model. The Army should take a measured approach to better prepare, educate, and select CoE, and branch/proponent leaders. For example, programs focused toward building specific skills that could help better prepare those Army leaders selected to supervise Centers of Excellence or operation branch/proponent schools to navigate the hurdles involving educational leadership skills, and competencies (Fullan, 2011; Kowalski, 2013).

It is important to note that the stories that make up a narrative inquiry are just that. They are stories; they are not the actual event. The stories stand as virtual realities, metaphors for the real thing (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Leavy, 2009). Leaders supervising Centers of Excellence or running branch/proponent schools face data on a daily basis in the form of charts, spreadsheets, and graphs demonstrating results in numbers. Taken independently, this data could influence decisions affecting change in the schools. Exploring the relationships among the various data points and explaining the connections narratively provides a more comprehensive sketch of what the data collectively means. The clue to the struggle may be found within the Army's own prescribed formula for command and supported in its own policy and programs.

My experience through the narrative continues to demonstrate that the path is always open and I am free to walk knowing that I have made meaning from experience

having traveled the backroads of my mind. The reflection and implications in this chapter refer to what Clandinin (2013) discusses as "making meaning through experience" (p. 46). "In narrative inquiry, the story itself stands, shifting the focus of the inquiry to understand the many stories it stands on, beside or among, to render an account of life as it is lived" (Downey & Clandinin, 2010, p. 387).. The clue to the struggle may be found within the Army's own prescribed formula for command and supported in its own policy and programs. Thus, the time might be appropriate to again state: For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new knowledge. Standing on a new frontier shaped by my previous experiences and knowledge gained through an incredible graduate program led by exemplar faculty, I better understand what Fullan (2011) described as the "most effective leaders use practice as their fertile learning ground" (p. xii). The results of these efforts will be fulfilled when the stakeholders embrace the value of a training and evaluation program that ultimately improves student performance. The Army should seek a more agile, adaptive approach in its command and key billet policies and processes, and at a minimum, stabilize those who supervise Centers of Excellence and operate branch/proponent schools beyond the typical one- or two-year term. There is a need to build a stronger leader preparation course that exceeds the current one-week senior officer orientation program. Finally, the Army should establish a superintendent-like certification process, require a degree in education, and seek those who have demonstrated success serving in Army schools and Centers (TRADOC). Adopting the *Be, Know, Do* model will better support the achievement of an effective Army educational leadership development program (FM 6-22, 2015).

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Appendix 1.A. Literature Review

The concept of school leadership development can be traced back to the early 1900s as school superintendents began to transform from an instructional focused role toward a more administrative focused role (Kowalski & Brunner, 2011). Although numerous studies exist on the topic of school leadership development, it was not until superintendents began to come under scrutiny in the 1980s that caused experts to examine the practice more closely (Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993). In their research they present data specifically on selecting, preparing, and developing those who serve as a school superintendent. Interestingly, chapter nine is dedicated to describing the "changing role requirements and new demands placed upon the shoulders of those who are to spearhead necessary restructure and reform" (Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993, p. 132). Army leader development on the other hand, has a much longer history born out of tradition and the necessity to develop people to lead large and small organizations into harm's way. A review of scholarly literature grounding the practice of school leadership provided a foundational base for this study. Literature surrounding the Army leadership requirements and development model, exposes gaps in Army leadership practice for those Army leaders who find themselves, out of the norm, supervising Centers of Excellence and running branch/proponent schools. It is here where my study examines new territory situating Army leaders in charge of schools.

Army leaders who assume responsibilities to supervise Centers of Excellence (CoE) and run branch proponent/schools enter unfamiliar territory. Leader Development (Department of the Army, 2015a) suggest that leadership at this level operates outside of their practiced experience leading subordinates operating outside of their past

practice, as well. The Army relies upon leadership to provide the organization a competitive advantage over its adversaries (Department of the Army, 2015a), yet the very essence of a leadership's role directing and influencing school change continues to escape a measureable study. Despite various executive-level efforts to determine why the Army is struggling to implement the Army Learning Model (Department of the Army, 2011b), none to date have tackled relational and consequential effects associating leadership development as a variable linked toward implementation.

Studies surrounding successful public school leadership development trend toward a central theme suggesting leadership as the critical component driving and influencing positive change (Leithwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). Teachers contribute to students' learning by sharing what they know and believe while district leadership supports student learning enforced through what leadership knows and believes about teaching (Knapp, Copland, & Talbert, 2003). Army leaders chosen to supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools represent a very elite group of selected senior officers who demonstrate the capability to supervise and run large complex organizations (Department of the Army, 2015a). Army schools resemble large complex organizations, suggesting that the Army leader development model adequately supports leader development and preparation to supervise a Center of Excellence and run a branch proponent/school. However, transformational school leadership depends largely upon the understanding and appreciation of learning. Slayton and Mathis (2010) contend,

> The leader is the authority in the school system or school. If he or she is intent on facilitating significant change or transformation within his or her organization, he or she must be knowledgeable about and be able to foster positive learning conditions that will facilitate the learning of adults (p. 36).

> Therefore, a study designed to inform improved practice along selection, preparation, training and stabilization of Army leaders who supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools could bridge a gap between research and practice.

Today, the Army desires to develop agile, adaptive leaders who can win in a complex environment (Department of the Army, 2011a). Successful education reform rests upon effective leadership and the capacity to understand how to create the conditions to promote student learning (Hallinger & Heck, 1998). Strategic planning formulation and implementation requires competent leadership. Strategic planning simply serves leadership as a mechanism to create and drive a long-range mission, vision, and goals within a framework to reach a desired end state (Ewy, 2009). It is through comprehensive leader development programs where aspiring candidates get exposed to concepts of mission, vision, goal setting, and relationship building that form a foundation upon which to practice effective school reform (Leithwood, Seashore, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004). A thematic analysis exploring theoretical concepts around the triad of: 1) school leadership, 2) policy, and 3) strategic planning provides a foundational approach to uncover successful school leadership practice. A review of leader development programs synthesized these three basic concepts which appear both valuable and consistent while illustrating a distinctiveness in purpose between public schools and the Army. Uncovering the complexity associated with implementing educational transformation once again distinguishes professional practice.

School Leadership

For the purpose of this study school leadership includes the principal (school level) and superintendent (district level) of public schools with equivalent positions situated on the Army side comprising a branch school (principal) run by a colonel,

commander; a branch proponent (district) run by a brigadier general, commandant; a Center of Excellence (state superintendent) overseeing multiple branch proponent/schools, run by a major general, senior mission commander. Army school commandants serve as a branch proponent/school leaders responsible for implementation of leader development, training, and education for their designated branch (Department of the Army, 2009). Commandants hold the rank of brigadier general with a time in service computation at around 28 years. A branch comprises both areas of concentration (AOC) for officers and military occupational skills (MOS) for enlisted. When referring to an Army branch proponent/school in this study it represents leadership and administrative responsibilities for both officer, enlisted training and education representing one Army branch.

Much of the literature surrounding successful school leadership does not focus on practice rather it studies leader's values, beliefs, skills or knowledge in relation to what is understood for leaders to act in an effective manner (Liethwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). School reform efforts generally focus toward improved learning and teaching along some innovative instructional methodology or new curricula, "However they all depend for their success on the motivation and capacities of local leadership" (Leithwood et al., 2014, p. 2). The Army leader development model (Department of the Army, 2015a) reflects a single purpose formed along a progressive and sequential program of experience, training and education with one end in mind; developing leaders who can successfully navigate the security challenges of tomorrow (Department of the Army, 2013).

While the Army leader development model may prove sufficient for those leading both small and large organizations into armed conflict, keeping the peace, or humanitarian assistance, there is very little evidence that it is designed to improve schools and student learning. Recent Army studies fail to show more than a few small pockets of limited success implementing education reform (Department of the Army, 2015b). As of this study, no branch proponent/school has yet to achieve the Army's goal to fully implement the 2015 Army Learning Model (Department of the Army, 2011a). It appears timely that a study exploring effective school leadership may contribute ideas toward improved Army school leadership and implementing successful education reform implementation. Understanding education professional standards and role conceptualizations (Kowalski, 2013) may provide a key ingredient missing from Army leader development programs. However, potential enhancements may exist through adopting elements explaining "role conceptualization and defining the practice of learning" (Kowalski, 2013, p. 26-27). Education, training, and experience forms a shared common thread recognized in both school/district leader development and Army leader development. Therefore, an explanation surveying differences across education, training and experience suggests the Army's leader development model adequately prepares Army leaders to run large complex organizations to face uncertainty. Yet, the model may not adequately prepare the same leaders to run schools. Thus, begins a journey exploring differences between leader development serving leaders who successfully spend a career running educational organizations versus those who successfully serve in assignments leading large organizations to preserve the peace (Department of the Army, 2015c).

The body of literature associated with leader development is extensive, complex and controversial with many forms described using adjectives which can often mask the generic functions associated with leadership (Leithwood et al., 2004). Persuasive evidence suggests many professions share a basic set of practices supporting leader development models and "rarely are such practices sufficient for leaders aiming to significantly improve student learning" (Leithwood et al., 2004, p. 8). Army leaders often face and successfully navigate complexity while overcoming tremendous odds as was recently recognized by President Obama (2015) when speaking of General Martin Dempsey, stating, "Over the last four years, Marty's wisdom, his vision and his character have helped lead the greatest fighting force the world has ever known." Sufficient evidence exists supporting the process by which the Army builds leaders. The Army's leadership model is not in question or on trial as it serves a very specific purpose. However, Army leaders charged with running Army schools who mature in an Army environment focused on warfighting could benefit from supplemental education, training, and experience practices found among successful school leaders.

The Army leader development strategy describes three pillars; training, education, and experience as the means associated with career-long leader development (Department of the Army, 2013). A comparable construct is suggested in chapter one, defining the practice (Kowalski, 2013), where requirements for entering the practice include academic preparation, certification, and experience. It is within this conceptual framework where, although similar, in nature a difference reflecting the purpose between Army leadership development and successful school leadership models begin to emerge. Two additional contributing factors worthy of study include: how school

leaders are selected for the position and how long a successful school leader remains in the selected position, demonstrating stability. Thus, leveraging Army Leader Development Strategy (2013) and Kowalski's (2013) narrative of role conceptualization and requirements for entering the practice, five leader development descriptive components emerge: 1) education, 2) preparation, 3) experience, 4) selection, and 5) sustainability (Kowalski, 2013; Department of the Army, 2015a).

Although each domain serves both professions each remain quite unique in their intended purpose. Mixing the five ingredients builds and integrates particular skills, knowledges, and attributes associated with leading along increased levels of responsibility. Describing each individual element followed by relational examples to school leadership combines the necessary ingredients into formulating successful school leader requirements and roles, which demonstrate exemplary practice.

Education

Kowalski et al. found in his 2010 Decennial Study that most superintendents continued to follow a typical professional path of teaching, building principal, and superintendent. All states require a bachelor's degree to teach following a traditional subject area study or through an alternative certification. Many state programs follow a state-approved college or university teacher training program. National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) reports thirty-nine states adopted NCATE standards with twenty eight states receiving accreditation by the Council for the Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAPE) (NCATE, 2015) and twenty-two states conducting their own program accreditation. Slayton and Mathis (2010), suggest that leader development programs for school leaders must focus on very specific skill

sets that go beyond the basic attributes of good leaders and effective school leaders. They continue to posit that a leader development program surround "three core ideas of presence, create positive learning conditions and having the skills necessary to teach adults" (Slayton & Mathis, 2010, p. 26). This is particularly interesting for the Army since no such documented requirements or practices exist for those running Army schools.

Instructional improvement demands that school leadership understands learning and can guide performance along learning strategies (Guthrie & Schuerman, 2010). Considering the school leader as educator, Murphy (2002) states that leaders "will need to be more broadly educated in general and much more knowledgeable about the core technology of education in particular" (p. 187). Reading the words Dempsey crafted in the forward of Army Learning Concept 2015 he states, "We live in a much more competitive security environment. This means that we have to learn faster and better than our adversaries. Stated a bit differently, we must prevail in the competitive learning environment" (Department of the Army 2011a, p. i.). The Army suggests education primarily occurs at the professional military education (PME) level which begins with the captain's career course and courses serving higher ranks on the officer side and sergeant first class rank and above on the noncommissioned officer side (Department of the Army, 2014b). Education defined within Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management (DA Pam 600-3, 2010), "is the process of imparting knowledge and developing competencies and attributes Army professional need to accomplish any mission the future may present" (DA Pam 600-3, 2010, p. 5).

Learning is vital to the very success of the Army's ability to prevail in war, sustain the peace and provide services such as humanitarian assistance across the globe. How can the Army ignore such a critical role which the public school leaders already know and practice? Slaton and Mathis (2010) agree that, "It is the leader who has the primary responsibility for creating conditions for the adults in any organization. The leader is the authority in the school system or school" (p. 36). Clearly it is the school leader who is instrumental in facilitating change and who must be practiced and capable of fostering positive learning conditions (Slaton & Mathis, 2010). Unmistakably, learning educational subjects plays a vital role associated with successful school/district leadership.

Preparation/Certification/Training

Professional preparation programs provide another realm distinguishing Army leader preparation from that practiced in public school leader programs. The Army's agenda remains focused on a history marked by a wide array of missions, from small wars, regular wars, humanitarian assistance, and support to civil authority (Department of the Army, 2012). Training to build skills and capacity improving individual's abilities to perform in operational situations (Department of the Army, 2013) is a respectable order; however it does little to match the preparation and certification rigor found within many of the formal school leader preparation programs across the country (Carter & Loredo, 1994). The Army simply does not focus time, money, and other resources preparing its leaders for assignments to run a school (Department of the Army, 2014a; Department of the Army, 2014b). Other than a handful of Army career fields, most follow a very distinct path closely associated to the operational

environment in which they will serve; For example, professional credentialing such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Department of the Army, 2014b). The Army differs from a public school approach where advanced degrees and certification form a foundational platform on which aspiring education administrators progressively advance along a professional career, from teaching to building principal and beyond (Glass, 1994). The Army's absence of an instructional leadership preparation and certification program distinguished a key difference from public school practice.

Preparation of school leaders includes standards established by The American Association of School Administrators (AASA), which provides general professional standards for superintendents guiding preparation programs (Kowalski, 2013). Another contributor to the knowledge base is the Educational Leadership Constituent Council (ELCC) (2011), providing scholarly studies standards in empirical research contributing to the body of knowledge. In spite of good education administration programs, the environment continues to place burdensome requirements upon the profession. The learning environment in the Army is changing; demanding that students know more than in the past. Army officers and soldiers are expected to act more critically than before. These expectations have significant implications for those supervising Centers of Excellence or operating branch/proponent schools. In an analysis of leadership standards report, the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) describes a transformation in framework for school leaders: "Mounting demands are rewriting administrator's job descriptions every year, making them more complex than ever" (CCSSO, 2008, p. 3). Leading change requires hard work, persistence, a willingness to improve yourself, and most of all, takes time. Fullan (2011) suggests that "it requires

ten years of deep development to become an expert at anything – including change management" (p. 47). The advantage of public school leadership goes to the people that gain experience practicing leadership theory within the school environment.

Experience

Examination of professional experience which contributes toward a leader's successful performance must consider the environment in which the practice occurs. Army leaders and school/district leaders practice their professions in very different environments. The Army leader development model describes experience coming from time spent performing a variety of missions in ambiguous, global security environments that cross borders (Department of the Army, 2013a). The Army Field Manual on leadership describes tough conditions awaiting to challenge maturing leaders along their careers.

> The Army depends upon itself to develop adaptable leaders able to achieve mission accomplishment in a dynamic, unstable, and complex environments. A robust, holistic leader development program is essential. Through a mix of education, training, and experience, Army leader development processes produce and sustain agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, complex situations to execute missions according to doctrine, orders, and training. Furthermore, it also produces leaders that possess the integrity and willingness to act in the absence of orders. (Department of the Army, 2015a, p. 1-1)

The Army actually publishes a Department of the Army Pamphlet (Department of the Army, 2014b) which describes typical career paths for each area of concentration (AOC) or branch in which an officer serves. School administrators, on the other hand, face a very complex environment that can situate their school/district anywhere from a large metropolitan district to a small rural district. Each environment contains its own challenges, but the fact remains that the school leader grows, matures and is nurtured in

a school environment where the Army leader is not. Department of the Army (2014b) states that "Experienced gained through on-the-job training in a variety of challenging assignments and additional duties prepare officers to lead and train soldiers, both in garrison and ultimately combat" (p. 6). No reference was discovered demonstrating any path available for officers to serve in a typical school career route such as teaching, leading or serving in school administration.

In a study to identify exemplary superintendents, Glass (1992) pulled data from a 1992 American Association of School Administrators (AASA) survey of 2,500 superintendents out of a population estimated around 15,500 and identified 410 exemplary superintendents. Some of the measured characteristics from the 1992 survey included: 1) preparation, 2) training, and 3) experience (p. 71). Earlier studies included successful traits such as a vision to guide the school as well as solutions aimed at reaching the goals (Glass, 1987). School administrators are expected to lead by relying on professional knowledge to make school-improvement recommendations (Marzano, 2005), but they are at the mercy of their higher headquarters and the operational force requirements. When the school leadership is competent teachers are affective and parents take an interest in the school. Leadership requires engaging the community, civic meetings and is further described by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (2010) as "Leadership is complex. Teaching and learning take place in the context of complex interdependent human organizations, requiring a leader who possesses deep knowledge of education and sophisticated relationship skills" (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, 2010, p. 13). The Decennial 2010 Study indicated that teaching experience of surveyed superintendents averaged around six to

ten years (Kowalski, McCord, Peterson, Young, & Ellerson, 2011). Those leaders serving in public school positions average two to five times longer tenure than their Army counterparts.

Selection

Although both Army school leaders and public school leaders get selected for their position by a board, the selection, like the previously discussed categories, provides an interesting contrast between the professions. The Army officer promotion selection system is governed by statute (Title 10, United States Code), Army regulation (AR 600-8-29) and policy established by the Secretary of the Army (Department of the Army G1, 2015) to select those officers who demonstrate the professional and moral qualifications to serve at the next higher grade (Department of the Army, 2014b). Memo 600-2, "Policies and Procedures for Active-Duty List Officer Selection Boards" (Department of the Army, 2006) describes a centralized selection list of key billets/positions by type or position that fall into four categories for lieutenant- and colonel-level commands (leadership positions). General officer selection is a bit more rigorous, political, and secretive. Army branch school leaders, colonels, fall into the recruiting and training command category. Typically, this category does not attract the Army's most competitive officers, commonly attracting those officers who do not think they are competitive for field commands or may be looking for an assignment that will help them after their service ends. Essentially, selection as a branch school commander withers any hope of reaching flag officer-level (Department of the Army, HRC, 2014).

The Human Resources Command (HRC) presentation to Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, shows that promotion to colonel in 2014 from the Army

competitive category (ACC) shows a 40-percent-selection-rate to colonel (p. 8). That said DA Pam 600-3 (Department of the Army, 2014b), table 5-2 depicts promotion opportunity to colonel represents 50 percent best qualified with the potential to serve in the higher grade and the whole person concept (p. 37). Of those selected for promotion to colonel, less than 1 percent get selected to command (Department of the Army, HRC, 2014). Needless to say, the selection to command at the colonel-level is very competitive. Neither the branch school commander nor the branch proponent commandant requires certification or formal preparation to lead a branch school (Department of the Army, 2014b). Despite argument that those selected for command at the colonel-level are proven leaders chosen for their demonstrated ability to lead large complex organizations, they do not receive formal preparation nor certification, raising questions as to their qualifications to run a branch school.

Carter et al. (1993) presents a combined effort of several researchers describing the preparation, selection, and development of school superintendents. Glass describes responses from superintendents surveyed explaining why the school board hired them. One of the principle reasons they were selected was their proven ability as an instructional leader. Another trait was the right chemistry and personal characteristics. Interestingly, the selected exemplary superintendents were active in state- and national-level organizations, providing a familiarity with higher level policy and process, which made the school board comfortable.

Sustainability

The Army branch school commander will serve a two year tour and the branch/proponent commandant will serve anywhere from 12 to 24 months. The senior

mission commander serves a standard two year tour (Department of the Army, 2014b). No wonder implementing educational change proves difficult for the Army. Statistics from the 2010 Decennial study indicate superintendents serve an average of five to ten years. In a 1992 study of twenty four Oklahoma superintendents, the noted national average was around five years with some successful Oklahoma superintendents in the study averaging eighteen years (Chance, 1992). Studies suggest that school leader's sustainability rests upon their ability to perform, allowing them to stay the course of educational change.

Strategic Planning

Categorizing strategy up front affords common understanding, providing focus on educational strategic planning as developing a plan toward school improvement (Ewy, 2009). Grand or national strategy is defined by the Army as: "A countries broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system" (Dorff, 2001). Army strategic planning falls within operational art, where consideration of future military action is designed to support national-level objectives (Bartholomees, 2014). Military strategy when thought in the context of grand strategic follows a very complicated path described by Clausewitz as "continuation of policy by other means" (Howard & Peret, 1976). The Army represents merely one of many elements of power which the President may employ in the interest of executing policy (National Security Strategy, 2015). As the Army develops education and training strategy (concepts), the construction follows an "ends, ways, means" framework taught at the Army's Senior Service College (Yarger, 2014). The ends, ways, means model easily supports

components described by Ewy (2011) in his explanation of a long-range plan construct of education strategy development.

Much like strategy creation, education reform begins with a long range mission, vision and goals to achieve the end state. Comparing Army strategy creation and leader development against public school strategy construction and leader development further provides a foundational platform upon which to explore the Army's struggle implementing education reform. This review begins with a comparison of how two very distinct professions, public schools/Army create and implement education strategy.

Conclusion

Leadership remains at the core of debate and research determining what makes a successful school/district leader. Much of the research focuses on "internal states," values, beliefs, knowledge or skills rather than observed practice (Leithwood et al., 2006). Narrowing the scope toward leadership practice while exploring key ideas and best practices in comparing leadership studies and literature from both civilian and Army leadership development programs offers a bridge between the two professions. The importance of the study is to contribute to my experiential knowledge providing a lived story for Army leadership to consider as a benchmark toward improved branch/proponent school leadership practice. Therefore, addressing a gap in literature surrounding how the Army prepares, educates, trains, and stabilizes those selected to supervise Centers of Excellence and operate branch/proponent schools seems timely.

Supervising a Center of Excellence or running a branch proponent/school poses a different organizational experience for those few Army leaders who are selected on their potential to lead large, complex, Army organizations (Department of the Army,

2014b; Department of the Army, 2005). Unlike their civilian counterparts, Army school leaders do not gain experience and get promoted within a school centric environment. So, in a sense, these senior leaders begin their journey at the colonel- and general officer-level at a significant disadvantage. Informing a broader audience of what successful school leadership looks like and how such a model could apply to Army leadership practice may provide some answers to the Army's struggle implementing a new learning model.

Appendix 1.B. Theoretical Lens

Multiple theoretical frameworks will be woven into my story as part of the narrative inquiry exploring Army leadership's relational and consequential role in the struggle to fully implement ALM 2015. For the purpose of this study, I will abridge two theories which may contribute to the proposed study: 1) collective trust and 2) compliance theory. Part of the gap in studies about successful school leadership is due to the fact that literature does not focus on the actual practice of leadership (Leithwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). Leithwood et al. (2006) suggest that:

> [Leadership practice] It is all about leader's values, beliefs, skills or knowledge that someone thinks leaders need in order to act in an effective manner, which may be inferred from observation of leader's work, or which may be reputed as contributing to leader effectiveness by a range of people who experience leadership. (p. 8)

The theories of collective trust and compliance were chosen because each one uniquely contributes toward building a collective description of Army leadership's unique contribution associated with implementing school change. A study exploring Army leadership's relational and consequential practice toward running a school begins a journey into uncharted territory. Therefore, theoretical approaches supporting cognitive, interpersonal, and organizational interactions provides a natural direction supporting a story following Army leadership through narrative inquiry.

Collective Trust Theory

Collective Trust Theory contributes toward understanding phenomena beyond simply interpersonal trust; providing predictors of organizational outcomes, and forming along existing social property (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). In other words when organizations acting with and among interdependent groups which collectively determine the success of the larger organization. Scholars suggest that trust plays a role

in how organizations function, demonstrating that individual transactions become something that is, to some degree, a social phenomenon. Collective Trust depicts a logic model displaying the very nexus of individual influence during repeated exchanges amongst group members enveloped in the core of shared trust beliefs within interdependent groups of an organization (Forsyth, Adams, & Hoy, 2011). Additionally, it is the shared trust belief that defines the group's disposition vulnerability to others. The theory describes how collective trust can vary according to strength related to interpersonal trust.

Individual beliefs can reflect a more normative facet (understood preference of action rewarded if followed, punished if not followed). For example, listening to what people say they like and do not like about a principal is normative. Socialization towards normative behaviors influences action so people do not need to experience it personally. For example, some teachers may offer what they think about the principal to their colleagues, which may or may not reflect the truth of the situation. This stems from the socialization of the group whose norms a person adopts if they want to be part of the group. Individuals tend to become more like those who they associate with, thus, they could be labeled an institutional property.

Indications toward a degree of trust and the level of agreement between group members provide a level of measure connecting trust and the cohesion of that group. The indicator must have a measure demonstrating teacher perception of dependence. Strong school communities rely on strong relational bonds that embrace similar values. Trust is a socialization process where individuals see the group norm in relation to trust, against the potential to sanction and punish. Collective Trust, therefore, describes a

theory of groups which although are measured individually reflect a larger composite of trust. Forsyth et al. (2011) explains, "Trust enables cohesion to form through its effects on interactions and the flow of communication within all structures of the relational network" (Forsyth et al., 2011, p. 129). For example, the reflection of trust from the group itself sets up a normative understanding of whether the principal is trustworthy. Schools will have principals who have different relational trusts from the teacher norm group as a unit of analysis. This means that a new teacher may have a positive experience with a principal which does not reflect the teacher group norm. Forsyth et al (2011) discuss the following three facets that shape trust:

First are items that shape and/or constrain, items that people bring in with them, such as a set of beliefs or values reflecting the environment from which they derive. In a rural setting, people generally tend to understand with a degree of certainty that they know what other people in the community think. A newcomer to this rural environment will have to adjust to the group norm if they want to reach an amount of acceptance within the group structure.

Second are those contexts internal to the institution. Various groups are led from a different collection of teachers and students. Experiences may reflect social exchanges within the group or observed behavior of group members. Trust criteria forms a collective comparison between expected and observed behavior. The teacher's perspective determines the structure. For example, are rules viewed as suggestions rather than absolute?

Third is the complexity of the task, those non-standard inputs and outputs, that increase the complexity of an assignment possibly resulting in constraint on the level of

autonomy. If autonomy is constrained beyond the point where one can act independently, then the ability to be successful may be limited. Autonomy may reside in the group, not in the individual. For example, a new teacher may have a very positive experience with the principal, yet, the positive experience may be found contrary to the group norm where the group experience is not a positive one.

Theoretical Map

Bryk and Schneider (2002) describe a collective trust theory from the perspective of relational trust as a foundational component supporting the social organization of schools. The authors introduce relational connections among teachers, students, parents, and principals where they describe interdependent actions occurring along levels of conceptualization; cognitive, interpersonal, and organizational. Cognitive actions explain a complex domain with an origin of perceiving others intentions. Interpersonal actions relate how judgements play out within a set of role relations. Organizational actions are where the other two levels climax in significant effects. Positive interactions from the various levels formulate a constructive demonstration of respect, competence, personal regard and integrity.

Disruptions within the various levels can result in unmet conditions and can undermine a discernment for the overall relationship between group members (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). Increased relational trust plays a positive role resulting in improved consequences such as reduced cost, clear understanding of roles and a clear ethical imperative to advance the best interest of children. Implementation of the model causes a continuous calculation of risk and vulnerability which plays a pivotal role in the success or defeat of relational trust. The figure below was derived through small group

discussion from assigned readings. The box on the left side of the figure demonstrates possible relationships between characters. Moving to the right those relationships filter through met or unmet components of respect, competence, personal regard, and integrity. Unmet components drive back to the levels of cognitive, interpersonal or organizational relationships. Met components flow result in reduced costs, clear understanding of role obligations, and advancing in the best interest of children.



Figure 8. Sketching Collective Trust Theory

Relevance Toward Army School Policy & Practice

Studying a theory of Collective Trust continues to reinforce the importance that motivation plays in the quality of an organization's output. Change is no stranger to the military and fostering innovative change is something that Army leadership often wrestles with. Army organizations seem to take people for granted while assuming that people will optimally perform because motivation is inherent within the intrinsic values shared by the collective group. Thus, people responsible for projects or programs, sometimes, fail to take into account the factors that motivate people. Senior leaders get so consumed with the urgency of the present that they fail to recognize people are the organization's greatest asset. Unfortunately, leadership often miss opportunities to raise

the bar along innovative practices which could optimize the people factor. Army level policy supporting an enterprise approach tends to support a system constrained by projected resources. In its various publications and policies, the Army mentions the importance of human capital on one hand, yet fails to recognize the importance of individual relational ties. However, it is the individual relational ties that comprise the social network necessary to build trust. Interestingly, the Army values contain descriptions of character similarly listed in the readings with regard to: respect, competence, personal regard and integrity. Although the Army recognizes these values, it is difficult in the current environment to find evidence of personal regard. The Army has an interesting saying: "mission first, people always." The saying implies that the mission must be accomplished and to the best possible means consider people also. Of course, people come at the expense of accomplishing the mission. The current school environment places work accomplishment at a higher priority than the human capital performing the tasks. The Army is beginning to demonstrate improved practice investing in its human capital through certification programs, educational opportunities and improved job recognition. Time will tell whether an institution built upon a hierarchical structure can really invest in its people while building strong social ties and trust.

Compliance Theory

Etzioni (1975) selects compliance for his comparative study because it represents a fundamental element of organizational structure related to numerous essential organizational variables. Utilizing the organizational structure as a central hub, Etzioni (1975) outlines a methodical taxonomy of organizations based upon the

distinctive compliance of lower participants. He then classifies organizations into three major categories of compliance; arranged according to the prominence given to the principal pattern (Etzioni, 1975). He also suggested that compliance associates behaviors between actors and shares power among the actors relational to compliance patterns. Three categories of compliance (coercive, utilitarian, and normative) were labeled. Typical organizations were assigned within each category: 1) coercive organizations included concentration camps, prisons, correctional facilities, custodial mental hospitals, prisoner–of–war camps, relocation centers, and coercive unions; 2) utilitarian organizations included blue-collar and white-collar business unions, farmers' organizations, and peacetime military; and 3) normative organizations included religious groups (churches, monasteries, orders, and convents), ideological and political societies, hospitals, universities, social unions, and voluntary associations.

Three styles of power discussed include: coercive power where the threat of physical infliction of pain or denying basic human needs. Remunerative power addresses the control of material items such as salaries, rewards and services. Normative power is explained as manipulative power. Associated with these kinds of power, Etzioni (1975) suggests three types of involvement: enlisted men in basic training experience an *alienative* involvement. Inmates in prison demonstrate a *calculative* assertiveness toward those in authority. Moral involvement such as a parishioner in his church and loyalist. Etzioni (1975) packaged a relational diagram along each of the three types of involvement connecting the type to the style of power. Connecting these variables, he described nine possible variations of compliance and three congruent types which proved more effective than the other six. One limitation

offered in the categorization of each organization is that the sheer number of possible variances makes it difficult in such a study to list them all. The author also states that a common – sense approach to classification of organizations are of little use, the example offered is the military where he distinguishes between combat units and peace-time units. He spends a couple of pages each describing coercive and utilitarian organizations in a more detailed analytical classification. Here, he discussed blue-collar and white-collar workers and some of the distinguishing rationales along variations in morale. For example, he disproves previous social science beliefs which advocated increased output with higher incentives was not valid.

Etzioni indicates tasks and people are important if you want an effective organization. While making a comparative study of relationships among ideas, his theory suggested that several critical acts could explain the phenomenon. To be able to determine the connections, he demonstrated the requirement to have some comparative basis which led him to say that we need to understand how some people talk about organizations naturally, but not necessarily matched. For example, trying to mix different boxes with content that is different does not work. Each box has to have some content that are the same. Many dimensions are different, like peace-time and war-time armies. Compliance is essential to any organization, so Etzioni begins to think about this and evolve his theory. He was able to classify organizations in such a way that they are stable, so that knowledge was generalized.

Compliance theory helps us think about by providing three systems of knowledge: personal from experience; technical; relevance of a general theory to negotiate a real world problem. One could start with the technical, then migrate to self-

experience, then to gut feeling. Conceptual lenses can inform us. When people suggest irrational requirements your ability to argue against those is stronger the higher up you go from personal knowledge to the technical with evidence against what they are suggesting. Etzioni attempted to bring sociology out of the Ivory tower and into the wider arena of politics, policy and social reform (Forsyth, 2015).

Theoretical Map

Compliance theory delineates the classifications of organizations into three primary categories of compliance. Associations and systematic within each grouping according to the prominence given the principal pattern (Etzioni, 1975, p. 65). The first task is to define an analytical base to classify the organizations. In order to do this, Etzioni (1975) describes three kinds of power, followed by three kinds of involvement, culminating in a relational aspect between the kinds of power and the types of involvement which organize compliance relationships. The powers represented include: 1) Coercive power reposes on the application or the intimidation of application of physical sanctions such as pain, or death; generation of frustration associated in depriving one of basic needs. 2) Remunerative power derives control from material resources and rewards through allocation of salaries, wages, commissions or fringe benefits. 3) Normative power associates manipulation of symbolic awards such as titles, prestige, and esteem.

The three types of involvement include: 1) Moral which represents a high force and devoted member such as typically found in a church leader. Two types of moral are described: first, pure moral with a foci along norms and authority; second, social moral relies upon commitments and pressure of primary groups and their members. 2)

Calculative involvement encompasses either a positive or negative aspect of low intensity resulting from a steady business contact or permanent customers. 3) Alienative involvement prescribes an intense negative orientation where competition is high between traders who seek optimum results for their organization at the expense of the others.

Etzioni (1975) describes a complex environment encompassing relationships associated with recruitment to compliance. Variations in organizational size and classification combine to provide disparities. Small recruit populations provide management less choice to hire talent. Whereas larger recruit populations result in fewer constraints or restrictions allowing a broader selection of applicants which could result in increased talent. Figure 9, below, describes the types of organizations along the left side of the chart and flows along lanes associated to each organizational type. The lanes depict key items related to recruitment, from initial entry to established entry within the organization type along a continuum of socialization. Normative organizations tend to attain particularly high commitments that stress both selectivity and socialization. For example, when a higher degree of selectivity is achieved the result is high compliance. On the other hand, when a lower selectivity is achieved, then the organization must rely more on socialization to attain compliance. Coercive organizations with little commitment require neither selectivity nor socialization. Utilitarian organizations undergo a lot of pressure due to expectations and, therefore, depend upon efficient matching of individual characteristics to role requirements to attain and retain a high quality workforce.

Scope refers to the "number of activities the participants carry out in groups composed of participants. Pervasiveness is defined as the number of activities inside or outside the organization for which the organization sets its norms" (Etzioni, 1975, p. 277).



Figure 9. Organizational Environment

The relationships between scope and pervasiveness vary by type of organization. Pervasiveness includes activities inside or outside of the organization that resemble the norm (Etzioni, 1975). Utilitarian organizations tend to be narrow in scope and low in pervasiveness; coercive organizations resemble broad in scope, low in pervasiveness; normative organizations demonstrate high in pervasiveness combined with board or narrow scope.

Relevance Toward Army School Policy and Practice

Compliance theory in its description along three classification types of organizations resembles much of the human capital process found within the policy and

practice of the current peacetime Army. Thus, Etzioni (1975) provides a strong foundational environment from which to explore current Army practice. Through a generalization of experience, I will provide short narratives of practice supporting each of the organizational classifications. First, normative practice is demonstrated in the fact that large sums of money and resources are invested to attract and recruit young men and women into the officer and enlisted ranks. Further supporting the normative organization is the socialization of Army members once they join the ranks. The concept of team, buddy, and the mere strength found within the Army structure formulates strong social ties among the members. Second, coercive organizations also exist within the Army, particularly at the initial entry of enlisted soldiers. New studies should evolve addressing potential changes in initial recruitment where selectivity is growing. As the Army downsizes, it can be more selective in who it wants to join the ranks.

Army systems are becoming more technical and complicated, requiring new skill sets and more intellect to operate and manage. Yet, the current recruiting model casts a broad net aimed at gross total numbers in the hope that a few good ones will be caught. Special-forces on the other hand applies a highly selective screening process followed by intensive training that washes out many candidates, so, the commitment remains extremely high unlike an older, outdated model which Etzioni suggested. Finally, utilitarian traits resemble many of the characteristics found within the highly competitive nature of officer recruiting, selection and commissioning followed by competitive promotions, career paths as well as those recruiting and selection processes found among special operations forces.

Conclusion

The significance of this study rests upon a clearly articulated story, connecting theory alongside practice exploring Army leadership's consequential and relational role in the struggle to fully implement a new learning concept with a particular focus on one Center of Excellence containing two branch proponent/schools. Requirements placed upon leadership supervising Centers of Excellence and running branch proponent/schools today are pushing the envelope beyond reasonable expectations. Comparing civilian school Leadership capacity framed in terms of education, preparation, training, selection and sustainability may provide a valuable framework in which to link shared experiences to bridge obstacles constraining professional practice. People know or understand what to do, yet fail to apply it broadly simply because change in organizational practice requires both will and skill (Levin & Fullan, 2008).