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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Abstract

This study reveals the two dimensions of religious freedom – religious *groups and individuals* – with empirical data, and it offers theoretical arguments on how these two dimensions are different. *Individual* rights provision is *less threatening* to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also *less visible*; *group* rights provision is *more threatening* to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also *more visible*. International forces – international law, human rights organizations, and globalization - influence the protection of the two dimensions of religious freedom differently. Globalization as a general force is fueling nationalist backlash and challenging states' authority, causing governments to impose new restrains on religious rights – particularly those at the group-level. However, the ratification of ICCPR leads to a better protection of religious rights for groups but not for individuals, because restrictions of groups are in the public and easier to be observed, thus imposing a bigger reputational cost on states under the international legal commitment. Similarly, the domestic presence of International Human Rights Organizations (HROs) improves rights protection for religious groups but not for individuals, because HROs are able to reduce the political repercussions religious groups face from social movement activism. Nevertheless, there is also a solution to the restrictions on religious individuals; naming and shaming campaigns provide new information to the international audience and expose the covert regulations on religious individuals, therefore, they increase reputational costs for rights violating states.

1 Introduction

My dissertation aims to answer this question: what explains the cross-national variation in governments' respect for religious rights? The atrocities of the Holocaust triggered a global movement to establish a universal code of conduct providing for the dignity and equality of all people. The result was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and a series of international treaties based on its principles. These documents serve as the foundation of the international human rights regime, and they commit states to protect a wide variety of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights.

There is now a significant body of research measuring and analyzing the degree to which states adhere to these international human rights norms in practice. However, a disproportionate portion of this work has focused on physical integrity rights specifically. While there is no doubt that physical integrity rights are important, this myopia in the scientific study of human rights means that we know considerably less about when, where, and why governments respect or abuse other rights that play an equally important role in ensuring human dignity.

This study focuses on religious rights. Human rights should not only be about physical integrity, but also spiritual integrity – the free practice of religious beliefs individually and collectively. Major UN human rights instruments such as UDHR, 1981 Declaration, and ICCPR all have recognized religious freedom as a human right. However, religious restrictions and discrimination have been increasing in the past decade (Pew Research Center Report 2018). Organized religions often arouse states' suspicion and pose a potential threat to the autocratic rulers, therefore, autocracies tend to have a higher level of religious restrictions (Sarkissian 2015). Religious discrimination is also widespread and exist not only in autocracies but also in

democracies. Religious minorities often become the targets of nationalist movements. Despite these trends, religious rights are marginalized in the scientific study of human rights. Scholars have not incorporated religious freedom in the framework of human rights study to examine why states restrict religions and how to better realize religious freedom.

Another oversight in the existing literature is the dual nature of human rights. Human beings do not only live as individuals, but also co-exist in a social setting. Human rights are both individual and collective. The expression of various human rights often contains a collective dimension, which is often neglected by scholars. Humans should be treated with dignity and respect both as individuals and in community. In this project, I will account for this dual nature of human rights by explicitly theorizing and examining both individual and collective dimensions of spiritual integrity rights provision.

As spiritual integrity rights have often been neglected in the scientific study of human rights, there are many potential angles from which to examine this question. In this dissertation, I look at the issue from an *international* angle, and evaluate the role that global forces play in shaping governments' respect of religious freedoms. Specifically, I isolate *international law*, *transnational human rights activism*, and *globalization* as the independent variables of chief theoretical interest. There are thus six empirical questions that are addressed in this study:

a. Does international law – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- influence states' practice in the protection of religious rights? How might these influences be different for organizations and individuals?
b. Do international human rights organizations influence states' practice in the protection of religious rights? How might these influences be different for organizations and individuals?

c. Do globalization and its three dimensions (political, economic and cultural globalization) influence states' practice in religious freedom? How might these influences be different for individuals and organizations?

I study these questions through the application of theories and methods drawn from international relations, religion and politics, and comparative politics. I see three significant contributions from this project. First, it expands human rights studies to include religious rights, thus enriching the study of human rights in theory building and empirical findings. Second, it builds a framework to bridge the literatures on international human rights and religion and politics, thus examining human rights in a more comprehensive picture. Third, this study reveals the dual nature of human rights and discovers that states have different motivation and incentives in treating individuals and organizations in term of human rights.

Over the following pages, I will make a case for the theoretical distinction between individual and collective religious freedoms, which will serve as the dependent variables in the three empirical studies comprising this dissertation. I will then discuss my focus on the role played by *global* forces and summarize the findings in the three corresponding empirical chapters.

1.1 The Dual Nature of Spiritual Integrity Rights

UHDR Article 18 recognizes both dimensions of religious rights – "everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,….alone or in community with others and in public or private…" – and the same principle is reiterated in ICCPR. Religious freedom is not only personal but also social. It is a personal right, because religion is a core element of an individual's belief system and often defines individual identities. This individual dimension of

religious freedom is related to the expressive needs of religious individuals, such as praying, worshipping in churches, etc. Religious freedom also has a social dimension, which acknowledges individuals' group identities and connections to faith communities. The social dimension of religious rights includes the autonomy of communities to worship, teach, and create institutions to provide ministry to others. Even though the social dimension of religious rights seems to be more potentially threatening to regime control, the individual and social dimension of religious rights both can happen in the public space and be in conflict with states. Therefore, it is necessary to study whether states actually conform with international law in the protection of the two dimensions of religious rights.

In the field of religion and politics, scholars have mostly focused on the study of individual dimension of religious freedom and largely neglected the social dimension. Shah defines religious freedom as "a universal human right based on the reasons that religious freedom concerns the dignity and integrity for a human person and it is a right to explore, embrace and express the truth about an unseen order" (Shah 2012). However, the social dimension is inherent to religious freedom and is the communitarian aspect of religious freedom. Even though religious belief is individual, "religion is a social institution and its practice implies the existence of more than one participant." (Scolnicov 2010, 65).

How might states treat religious individuals and organizations differently? Religious individual rights and group rights are qualitatively different; religious individual rights have an emphasis on the expression of one's belief, while the group rights are more about the group identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have a social, communitarian dimension. Therefore, the organized religions and religious expressions by organizations are more threatening to the political regimes, especially the autocracies. Religious organizations, such as churches, offer an

alternative authority to the religious believers. Churches have a great influence over religious believers through the weekly sermons, newsletters and other venues of theological and political views. Some organizations like religious schools and associations can also exert influence on the thoughts and views of religious believers. Religious organizations are advantageous in organizing and mobilizing the individuals, so they can potentially challenge the authority of the government if they wish. Most of religions are transnational, therefore the religious organizations are well connected with other international religious organizations, which can also arouse suspicion from governments. For example, the Chinese government cracks down underground churches and is suspicious of the foreign influence on these churches. Therefore, it tries to appoint clergy leadership in Catholic churches to ensure loyalty to the Chinese government. Thus, an argument can be made that governments are more suspicious and mistrustful towards religious organizations than individuals and more motivated to restrict and constrain the organizations.

On the other hand, governments are also more likely to change their practice towards religious organizations than individuals when they are under pressure from international community. First of all, religious groups enjoy higher visibility to the public, media, International Human Rights Organizations (HROs) and third-party states in comparison to the individuals. Restrictions on religious group rights are easier to be exposed and reported by the media and HROs. For example, the favoritism of the orthodox church by the Russian government is highly visible, but the persecution of the religious minorities is less visible. Additionally, the demolition of the churches, the arrest of the religious leaders, and governmental appointments of clergy in churches and religious organizations are frequently reported by media and HROs, but the reports on the persecution of the individual religious believers are rare. In

fact, the persecution of religious individuals, like the Baha'is in Iran and Yemen and Shias in Saudi Arabia, is widespread. If states' violations of human rights are more visibly reported by the media and human rights organizations, they cannot use the ratification of human rights laws as an expressive instrument to maintain a better standing and reputation on the international stage (Hathaway 2002). Therefore, states are more likely to change their practice in religious organizations because restrictions and regulations on religious organizations are more high profile and they are more pressured to take actions.

Even though states are willing to improve the protection of religious freedom, it takes more efforts for states to protect religious rights for individuals than groups. Information in domestic judicial enforcement matters for the implementation of the human rights treaties (Lupu 2013). Violations of the collective religious rights are easier to detect, and evidence is easier to gather, because the violations of religious group rights are in the public. In contrast, individual rights violations are harder to detect or collect, and states often deny such behaviors. For example, demolition of churches is easy to notice, while limitations on individual religious practice are harder to observe. Therefore, states have to pay more costs to protect religious rights for groups. In addition, religious groups represent organized interests and have more resources and influences, while individuals, plagued by collective actions problems, are less equipped to defend their rights. Organized religion also has a higher bargaining power with the government. When the government has international legal commitment to improving religious practice, religious organizations are more equipped with information, resources and bargaining leverage than individuals. Therefore, governments are more likely to change their practice for organizations under pressure.

Even if states are willing to protect human rights, the "principal-agent" problem may

cause a different level of human rights enforcement for group rights and individual rights (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Englehart 2009). The central governments may sincerely want to improve religious freedom after ratifying the human rights treaty, but they might not be able to control what their agents – local governments and police - do, especially when central governments are weak or failing. Therefore, central governments may be better able to enforce "organizational rights" standards than "individual rights" standards, as the latter are more likely to be violated at the local level by state agents acting in their own self-interest as opposed to the interests of central government.

Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual rights (Scolnicov 2010). Thus it would not be appropriate to assume that these two kinds of rights are affected by international law, human rights organization and globalization equally. Different mechanisms might take effect after the ratification of ICPPR, under the influence of HROs and globalization, on the two dimensions of religious freedom. To better understand how these forces influence states' practice in international law, it is necessary to explore the key latent dimensions of religious freedom underlying the data and the impact of the international law, HROs and globalization on the two dimensions.

The clear differences between individual and organizational freedoms warrants theoretical and empirical distinction. I thus employ two dependent variables in my empirical analyses. In constructing these variables, I rely on data from the RAS2 dataset (Religion and State Round 2). The results of a factor analysis, presented in Chapter 3, support my conjecture about the dual nature of religious freedoms. The two factors are derived from the government religious restriction index (NX) from the RAS2 dataset. The NX index is about government restrictions on all religions and majority religions, and it comprehensively covers government

religious restrictions in various dimensions (Fox 2015, 267). The results of my exploratory factor analysis indicate that there are two latent dimensions in Fox's religious restriction index (RAS 2) (Fox 2015), which is consistent with Scolnicov (2010)'s theory.

1.2 The International Politics of Religious Freedom

The international system has transformed in significant ways since WWII. The global community has made efforts to institutionalize human rights at the international level, challenging our traditional understanding of state sovereignty. The UDHR established baseline norms on which more formal international human rights laws were established. Even though states may not want to be parties to human rights treaties, international human rights organizations (IHROs) pressure governments to adopt and internalize human rights norms, and to improve human rights practices (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Globalization is an irreversible trend. It connects people and governments transnationally in goods, services and values, and influences the interactions between governments and individuals.

Studies in international human rights have identified various important domestic factors influencing states authorities' decision to respect human rights norms: democratic regime, economic development, population, civil wars and conflicts, etc. The influence of international forces such as international law, human rights activism and globalization, on the cost-benefit analysis of states on repression is less conclusive and begs more research. While human rights outcomes are determined, in many ways, by the willingness of states to adhere to human rights norms, the push for human rights improvement comes as much from without as it does from within. It is for above reasons that the study of human rights is as much about international politics as it is domestic politics. In this study of spiritual integrity rights, I am focusing more on the former. Specifically, I will build a comprehensive framework to look at the effect of

international law, IHRO activism, and globalization on how states treat religious individuals and groups differently.

Most countries have voluntarily committed themselves to the norms and values found in the UDHR. Subsequently, more and more countries have formally ratified human rights treaties to further their legal commitments in protection of civil, political, economic and cultural rights. In the study of how international law affects the protection of human rights, early works emphasized the weakness of international instruments owing to the lack of any credible enforcement mechanism, and mostly have indicated that states are insincere in ratifying international law and do not follow through their legal commitments (Keith 1999 ,Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). With the refinement of measurement and analytical methods, more studies have shown a positive effect of international law on human rights (Landman 2004, Landman 2005, Hill 2010, Neumayer 2005) (Fariss 2017).

I take up the question how international law influences the protection of individual and group religious rights in Chapter 4. The main independent variable in this chapter is Ratification of ICCPR ($\text{Ratification}_{\text{year}}$), which is operationalized as the years after ratification of ICCPR. It measures the duration of ICCPR has been in effect. The ICCPR is chosen as the only treaty that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR. Data on the ratification by country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty Collection website. The results of my statistical analysis reveal divergent effects of international law on the protection of rights of religious organizations and individuals. The ratification of ICCPR leads to better protection of religious rights for organizations, while it actually deteriorates the protection of religious rights for individuals. The longer states have ratified ICCPR, the bigger the positive effect of ICCPR on the protection of religious rights for organizations. ICCPR is useful in the protection of

religious rights for organizations but not for individual rights. States comply with international norms in religious freedom due to external pressures, but they tend to worsen their behavior in religious repression for religious individuals.

Human rights advocacy groups also play an increasingly important role in human rights improvement. Even though states might not be sincere at first when they join human rights treaties and organizations, eventually they will internalize human rights norms and change their practice to be consistent with norms under the pressure of HROs (Heather 2012, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Naming and shaming campaigns by HROs increase costs for rights violations and force states to comply with international human rights norms. Would the local presence of HROs and direct targeting by HROs influence the rights protection for religious individuals and groups differently?

I consider the question of how HROs influence the protection of religious individual and group rights in Chapter 5. HROs is measured by the number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations with a human rights focus with members or volunteers in a specific country in a specific year (J. Smith and Wiest 2005). I find that HROs have a positive effect on the rights protection of religious organizations, but do not have any effects on the protection of individual religious rights. HROs mobilize religious groups in social movements for human rights and mediate between them and the governments to reduce the repercussions from the political disruptions. Therefore, governments are forced to change their policy and practice towards religious groups with the help of local HROs. Naming and shaming by HROs have an effect on the improvement of religious right for individuals but not for groups, because direct targeting by transnational advocacy networks provide new information to the international audience about the restrictions on religious

individuals, therefore, they are able to raise reputational costs and reduce restrictions on religious individuals.

In addition to the institutional developments in human rights on the state and grassroots level, the contextual change in the global environment cannot be ignored. As globalization deepens, the world is more and more interconnected politically, economically and socially. Waves of democratization have led more and more countries to detach from authoritarianism and adopt democratic ideals and norms, which are usually beneficial to the protection of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001, Hathaway 2002, Dai 2005). As more and more countries start to trade with each other and invest in others, countries are more connected economically. Countries are also connected further through cultural ties such as communications, education and movies, thus more and more individuals share the norms in human rights. Studies have shown mixed findings about the effect of economic globalization on religious freedom (W. Meyer 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001;Hafner-Burton 2003; Hafner-Burton 2005). Overall, the effect of globalization is still not conclusive.

I grapple with the question of how globalization influences the protection of religious individual and group rights in Chapter 6. Globalization is measured by The KOF index of Globalization by Swiss Economic Institute. It conceptualizes globalization as a process that "erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence" (KOF Globalization Index codebook, 2016). The overall index includes economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. In each dimension, the index is both measured in the de jure aspect of globalization and the de facto aspect. My findings indicate that globalization actually contributes

to the increase of religious restrictions on organizations but not on individuals. When nationalist movements push back against globalization, governments are more inclined to restrict the religious activities by churches, schools, associations and parties, because religious groups are more threatening to the state authorities, and religious groups seek for more institutionalized forms to strengthen their identity in globalization.

Collectively, the results from these three empirical studies imply that there are myriad, sometimes counter-acting processes at work; and they tell us something important about how interactional forces affect not only religious rights, but human rights more broadly. I discuss the "bigger picture" implications of this dissertation in Chapter 7. But before proceeding with my original research, it is important to first root this study in the existing literature. I turn now to a review of the mainstream scientific work on human rights in both theory and practice.

2 Literature Review

With the diffusion of human rights norms in the world, most countries are parties to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human rights treaties. Human rights are universally recognized and have been evolving as human society progresses, even though the concept of human rights is derived from western thoughts, and developed as a response to the emergence of modern state and market (Donnelly 2013a). Human rights are essentially derived from the respect for the dignity of human life. The source of human rights is man's moral nature, which is only loosely linked to human nature by scientifically ascertainable needs. It is assumed that people will live a richer and fuller human life if they enjoy human rights. Based on a moral vision of human nature, human rights set the limits and requirements of social and state action (p14, Donnelly 2013a).

However, states do not necessarily behave within the limits of human rights. States violate human rights norms and engage in political violence against their citizens according to reports by international human rights organizations. It is often assumed in most studies that states repress their citizens based on strategic policies to pursue important political and military objectives. Empirical research has investigated the causes of repression, specifically the conditions and incentives that make these strategies more likely. This chapter will review factors explaining variation in human rights protections by state officials across countries. I argue that the current scholarship in human rights studies has narrowly focused on physical integrity rights, and this limitation hinders the empirical and theoretical development of human rights studies and comes with normative consequences. I propose to expand the study of human rights into religious rights, and examine how international forces influence the protection of religious rights for individuals and groups. In the following paragraphs, I will first review the current scholarship

in factors explaining variation in human rights condition across countries, then explain why it is necessary to further probe how international forces influence the protection of religious rights protection for individuals and groups.

2.1 Explaining Human Rights Variation

Since the ground-breaking study by Poe and Tate (1994), scholars have made great efforts to answer the quests of why states put limitations on rights their citizens are entitled to, and why some states tend to repress their citizens less and some others tend to repress more. Scholars have discovered some domestic and international factors contribute the governments' decision to repress. The most common approach has been taken is decision making theoretical model, which focuses on conditions which make repressive tactics costlier or more beneficial to political leaders. In this model, repression is costly, and political authorities are rational actors and their main concern is to remain in political office and power. Their most desired outcome is to continue the status quo and political quiescence in the population (Davenport 2007). Therefore, states will make an assessment of threats to their rule and a cost-benefit analysis by engaging in various policies to defeat challengers.

However, even when authorities' rule of the states is threatened, states still have different options to cope with the threat. States have a tool box to cope with political threats ranging from winning elections through the support of public opinion in democracies, granting symbolic concessions, buying off possible opposition through private side payments and social benefits, to repression or violations of physical integrity rights. Why use repression instead of other pacification? The costs are different in using different tools to handle political opposition or threats depending on the skills and expertise of repressive tools or the perceived threats which might vary in type and severity (Pierskalla 2010). Rulers conduct cost and benefit analysis and

decide whether they would apply repressive measures to stay in power. Elites decide to use repression when economic costs are lower than costs of institutional and liberal democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). "It is assumed that the larger or more significant the threat, the more likely the state will be to apply repressive measures, all else being equal" (p 928, Nordås and Davenport 2013). The type and frequency of behavioral challenge also matters, for example, ethnical or racial characteristics of perceived challengers are important for the degree of threat perceived and the likely repressive response from the state (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011).

Poe updates the decision-making model basing on the conceptual model by Most and Starr (1989), which assumes that state officials as decision makers are rational actors (Poe 2004). They are unified and value-maximizing and possess perfect information regarding all options and their consequences. There are three factors influencing whether state authorities adopt repressive measures: their perception of their regimes' political strength in domestic domain, their perception of the probability that a domestic threat will topple their regime, and the ratio of the strength to the threat (Poe 2004). When leaders perceive that the regime's strength is less than the threat or that the threat is increasing relative to strength, they are motivated to take an action to increase their strength or decrease the threat to their regime. However, since there are multiple options for state officials to choose, and it is not appropriate to assume states would always choose to repress. For example, state officials might choose to make concessions to diffuse the threat or seek foreign aid to increase their domestic strength. Using this model, Poe is able to provide an integrative assessment of the findings on repression (Poe 2004).

Another theoretical model used to explain the variation in human rights abuse is the principal agent model. This model assumes that state authorities are the agents of citizens and are

willing to prioritize human rights protections and prefer a high level of human rights protections. However, there are factors influencing to what extent the agents are motivated to do what principal wants. Repression is not a choice by states, rather it is due to state failure. When state capacity is weak with low tax revenues, corruption, and lack of law and order, state officials in central government are not motivated to protect human rights (Englehart 2009). In addition, even when central governments are willing to protect human rights, they might lose control of local officials and police, who can commit human rights abuses at a local level. Absence of restrictions on the power of authority and weaknesses of democratic institutions can be identified as enabling repression.

There seems to be two sets of principal agent relationships: citizens act as the principal and politicians and bureaucrats are the agents; politicians act as principal and bureaucrats, police and local governments are agents. Which relationship is more salient and critical? I argue that the type of principal agent relationship is contingent on the regime type. Liberal democracies are built upon the social contract theory by John Locke, which envisions the citizens as the principal and the agents as elected officials and bureaucrats. However, it is not appropriate to assume this type of principal agent relationship applies for all countries. In fact, state elites are not necessarily accountable to all citizens in authoritarian countries. They are most accountable to citizens in the majority groups. States officials and bureaucrats are willing to discriminate and repress minority citizens to gain support from the majority citizens. Therefore, they are agents to the majority citizens. The real principal agent relationship in authoritarian states is that politicians/political elites are principal, and bureaucrats, police and local government are agents.

In authoritarian states, state elite preferences are not consistent with citizens, who always prefer a better protection of human rights. In fact, state elites' primary goal is the

stability of their rule of the country. Authoritarian leaders often perceive the relationship between human rights protection and their authoritarian rule as incompatible. Local governments and bureaucrats are agents of the central government. When the bureaucrats, police and local government officials get financially compensated better by tax revenues, they might put on more efforts to repress citizens in a larger scale.

Based on the above theoretical models, scholars have conducted large N cross national studies and generated fruitful empirical research in the field of international human rights. I will discuss the main factors contributing to states' repressions.

2.1.1 Domestic Factors

2.1.1.1 Democracy

Democracy has been the most consistent predictor of human rights violations since the study of Poe and Tate (1994). The domestic democratic peace thesis states that democratic regimes are less likely to engage in the repression of personal liberties (Davenport 2007; Poe and Tate 1994b; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The common explanation is that the cost of repression is higher in more democratic societies where citizens can hold leaders accountable for and sanction repressive behavior; cost of repression is lower in authoritarian regimes. Elections offer opportunities for oppressed to remove oppressors, so democracy imposes higher costs for the repressive policy and behaviors by states. Also, democracy provides the established and nonviolent mechanisms to address grievances with peaceful contestation. However, there is not a linear relationship between democracy and repression: repression levels are high in transitioning regimes (Snyder 2000), and democratic institutions only contribute to decreased repression after a certain threshold is reached (De Mesquita et al. 2005). Transitions to and from democracy affect repression, and democratization tends to increase states repressive behavior, especially political restrictions (Davenport 2004).

However, there has been doubts over the strong correlations between democracy and lesser degree of repression. One argument is that the strong connection between democracy and human rights protection is due to how democracy is measured in most of studies. Governments that target political opposition with violence are less democratic by definition, given the way democracy is usually defined and operationalized. In the measurements of the political rights by Freedom House and the Polity score by Systemic Peace, democracy is to some extent measured by whether states adopt repressive measures and restrict the political rights of citizens. Thus, there might be endogeneity problems.

There is a need for disaggregating democracy and its effects on repression in future analyses. Studies also have done to explain which aspects of democracy are most strongly related to repression (De Mesquita et al. 2005). Some institutions of a democratic regime have greater effects on repression levels than others (Davenport 2004). Executive constraints have been identified as having the greatest effect on repression levels (De Mesquita et al. 2005) with regard to personal integrity rights. Various domestic legal institutions also have effect on state repression (Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Powell and Staton 2009). Constitutions and courts are useful for generating credible commitments on the part of the government to observe limits on its authority and refrain from encroaching on rights. Authoritarian political regimes are not necessarily bad for human right. Authoritarian elected legislatures reduce repression and the presence of opposition parties increases it (Rivera 2017).

2.1.1.2 Wars and Conflicts

Leaders perceive repression to be more useful as real or perceived threats to their position in power increase, which is consistent with the idea that repression is a response to internal or external political challenges (Davenport 1995; Gurr 1986). However, there might be a reciprocal relationship between dissent and repression. Different domestic dissent influences the

risk of state sponsored violence differently. Guerrilla warfare increases the probability of repression onset significantly (Carey 2010). Studies have found that real or imagined threats a regime consistently motivate leaders to choose repression (Poe 2004). For example, states authorities' control of the states is often threatened during civil or international wars, therefore, states resort to repression to fight back the opposite side in wars to maintain their control of the countries (Poe and Tate 1994b). Also, when there are separationist movements and insurgent terrorists exist in states, the security and stability of the states are not guaranteed and authorities can't get support of their citizens. Therefore, they will resort to repression under these circumstances (Poe and Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). New studies have found that even civil wars happening in neighboring countries will also increase the chance of repression domestically, because states anticipate contagious rebellion and preempt with repression (Danneman and Ritter 2014). The number of terrorist attacks is also positively related to the worse state repression (Shor et al. 2014). Even the signs of conflicts such as arms importation is related to worsened human rights (Blanton 1999).

2.1.1.3 Economic Development

Studies have found that poor countries are more repressive than rich countries (Poe and Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Mitchell and McCormick 1988).The explanation is that poor nations experience more competition for fewer resources, thus privileging repression as one of few options for a government intent on staying in power. For example, increases in food insecurity substantially raise the likelihood of insurgent groups committing violence against civilians, which leads to more repression (Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis, and Thies 2017). Second, others claim that a lack of resources makes repression less efficient and forces government to engage in more of it (Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, new studies have found that the abundance of resources might not necessarily reduces repression. State reliance on natural

resource rents, rather than tax revenue, affects incentives for governments to use repression (Conrad and DeMeritt 2013). The discovery of natural resources like oil actually leads to civil wars, less economic growth and more repression, because political leaders rely less on tax revenues and ballot support (Conrad and DeMeritt 2013).

However, choice of indicators and measurements has a significant impact on the reliability of results in empirical studies. Aggregate data of GNP of other components of economic development ignores possible effects of domestic distribution of wealth (Henderson 1991; Landman and Larizza 2009) and leaves questions open that seek to identify the exact mechanism linking economic development to human rights. The level of economic development is positively related to states' respect for human rights according to past research (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009). Specifically, stronger economies have fewer government religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). However, the effects of economic growth are mixed. Economic growth can expand the resource base and reduce the economic and social stress, so the governments are less likely to use repression. On the other hand, rapid economic growth also can increase instability which induce the states to resort to coercion (Poe and Tate 1994a).

2.1.1.4 Population

A large number of people tend to place a stress on resources and dissent movements (Poe and Tate 1994a) and large population growth rates are apt to be confronted with burgeoning demands (Henderson 1993). In addition, a larger population presents more of a control problem because political leaders need more social control to stay in power (Henderson 1993). Therefore, one should expect to find more repressive state action in more populous countries than in less populous ones. Scholars also argue that the real factor is not general population size, but rather the youth population, which is most rebellious portion of the whole population. States perceive

the youth bulges as a threat to their power, interests and supporters, and increase the level of repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013). Historically youth has been the leading force in social movements such as Tiananmen Square protests and Arab Spring. Youth bulge is negatively related to rights protection, because governments are proactive with respect of youth bulges and implement various policies to minimize the threat from the rebelliousness of youth (Nordås and Davenport 2013).

2.1.1.5 State Capacity

According to the principal agent theory, state leaders might want to protect human rights for their citizens, but they are not able to do so because of states failure. Agency loss and inability to implement policies effectively can lead to human rights abuses by private individuals and rogue agents of the state (Englehart 2009a). Reliance of taxes make politicians more willing to protect human rights and raises in bureaucratic compensation can help create a more accountable bureaucracy. Therefore, increased tax revenues is positively related rights protection (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014). In addition, state leaders can also be principal, and police and local governments can be agents in rights protection. In this case, police and local governments make independent contribution to the level of repression. When they are given enough financial compensation, they will be likely to avoid bribery or act for hidden motives. Empirical findings support that perceived levels of financial corruption substantially influence the incidence of torture in a political system (Bohara et al. 2008).

2.1.2 International Factors

The study of international factors in the protection of human rights is a recent trend. Scholars have made efforts to understand the international factors contributing to a better protection of human rights. Much of this work also adopts an essentially decision-theoretic

approach – various international influences affect the costs/benefits to potential leaders for using repression. Just like the domestic factors, international forces are expected to raise the perceived costs of violence and discourage states to repress, even though repression is still prevalent. External structural factors such as influence of signing and ratifying treaties (E. M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007) (Hathaway 2002), naming and shaming (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008a; Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b), and international trade agreements (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) can impose costs on repressive leaders and therefore reduce the amount of repression. However, the findings are mixed according to the large n quantitative studies.

2.1.2.1 Globalization

The empirical studies have shown mixed findings on relationships between globalization and human rights protections. Studies find that globalization and economic freedom contribute to a better protection of physical integrity rights, but no effect on empowerment rights such as religious freedom, women' rights, etc. Due to the consensus about the appropriate level of empowerment rights as compared to the outright rejection of any violation of physical integrity rights, the global community is presumably less effective in promoting empowerment rights (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012).

Based on different measurements of economic openness and integration, the results can be different. Using Foreign Direct Investment as a proxy of economic globalization, cross national studies find that multinational corporations, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are positively related with political, civil rights, and economic, social rights in the third world (Grim and Finke 2010; W. H. Meyer 1996; W. Meyer 1998) , which supports the theory proposed by the neo-liberalism. Using alternative measures of human rights practice, economic globalization, and new data analysis methods, studies finds the relationship between

economic integration and human rights record almost does not exist or negative. (Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999; Milner 1998; Sorens and Ruger 2012).

Studies in the institutions and policies promoting economic globalization find that international trade agreements transform government observance of human rights today, because they provide governments with the interests and the incentives to implement domestic human rights policies and decrease their employment of repressive practices (Hafner-Burton 2003; Hafner-Burton 2005). WTO also plays an important role in bringing trade practices in line with human rights objectives. Transnational corporations not only benefit human rights by promoting economic development, but also have the culture to conduct business with an eye toward the bigger good (Kinley 2009). Transnational mergers and acquisitions have a positive impact on human rights conditions including physical integrity rights, empowerment rights, workers' rights and women's economic rights (D.-H. Kim and Trumbore 2010).

Participation in IMF and World bank structural adjustment programs has a positive relationship with repression (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Structural characteristics are related to state repression because they alter the costs of repression for states. Overall indebtedness is related to human rights abuses, but the higher the stock of debt owed to IFIs relative to total debt, the lower the HR violations. Accumulating debt to IFIs seems to improve the level of human rights. A higher government consumption to GDP ratio reduces human rights, because government that are capable of commanding a higher share of the country's wealth are less likely to face threatening social dissent (Eriksen and de Soysa 2009).

Economic sanctions are not effective in reducing the level of human rights abuse. Imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state

by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an efforts to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent (Wood 2008). Rulers whose budget constraints are severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe due to economic sanctions, dictators are more likely to increase repression (Escribà-Folch 2012).

2.1.2.2 Human Rights Treaties

International legal agreements have effects on human rights practices (Conrad and Ritter 2013; Fariss 2017; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999; Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 2009a). Some studies find that treaty ratification seems not to be effective in reducing repression (Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999). Other studies find that the influences depend on factors such as the NGO presence (Neumayer 2005), expected tenure of political leaders (Conrad and Ritter 2013), and legal standards of proof for particular rights violations (Lupu 2013).

The early research on the effect of international law on human rights practice is rather pessimistic; the effect is either non-existent or negative (E. M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999). Some argue that the human rights treaty failed because of the weak implementation mechanism and rely too much on the goodwill of the party states (Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005). Thus, repressive states can get away with human rights violations with low costs after the ratification of human rights treaties. Others argue that states sometimes ratify treaties to avoid criticism associated with remaining outside of the regime, but they do not really comply with international law in action, since it was

an insincere ratification in the first place. Thus, the compliance often can be replaced by position taking in an international community (Hathaway 2002). The effect of a treaty on a state is determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences. States with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records, because there is little prospect that the treaties will be enforced. States with more democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records – because treaties are likely to lead to changes in behavior. Other scholars argue that authoritarian countries actually use the signing of the treaties to signal to opposition groups domestically that they will remain in power by repressive actions, thus treaty ratification is used to prolong the tenure of autocratic leaders and attract foreign aid (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). However, it is still quite perplexing why the effects of human rights sometimes are negative if not zero.

More recent works have recognized the weaknesses in the early works' methods and theories and updated our understandings of the effect of human rights treaties (Simmons and Hopkins 2005). Selection bias in estimating treaty effects do not negate the constraining effect of human rights treaties. Using preprocessing matching step, treaty effects are significant. After accounting for selection effects methodologically in their studies, scholars find that states with better human rights practices tend to ratify more human rights treaties (Von Stein 2005); so the relationship between treaty and human rights practice can be positive and more nuanced (Hill 2010; Landman 2004, 2005; Neumayer 2005). Data inflation is another problem in human rights study. After accounting for the increased accountability by INGOs human rights reports in recent years due to increased information, better data collecting methods and enhanced human rights standards, a new study reveals that ratification is positively related to the human rights

protections (Fariss 2017; Conrad and Ritter 2013). International human rights treaties are argued to increase both the likelihood of domestic mobilized dissent and judicial restraint. Mobilized challenges undermine a leader's position in power, increasing incentives to repress; courts raise the probability of litigation, decreasing incentives to repress. Politically insecure leaders, desperate to retain power, repress to control the destabilizing effects of dissent. Secure leaders are less likely to fall to citizen pressures, but the probability of facing an effective judiciary weighs heavily in their expected costs. They repress less to avoid litigation. Treaties have no effect on repression in states with insecure leaders but have a positive effect on rights protection in states headed by secure leaders.

2.1.2.3 Human Rights Activism

The global civil society, HROs, and western media activities have an impact on human rights practice (Franklin 2008a; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008a; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; A. M. Murdie and Davis 2012a). The impact of HROs presence on repression has been found to be negative, while results concerning the effects of naming and shaming are more mixed. HROs and coordinated efforts between groups and foreign governments in the form of transnational advocacy networks (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) may lead to a regime to perceive an increase in the costs associated with repression, thus leading them to be more moderate in their actions than they would otherwise be.

International human rights organizations (HROs) are useful in the protection of human rights. Domestic presence of HROs can pressure the oppressing regimes from below through the support for local social movements, and HROs can also pressure the states from above through the third party states by citing the reports of HROs (Brysk 1993). Shaming works the best when there is domestic presence of HROs within the targeted states and/or pressure by third party

states (A. M. Murdie and Davis 2012a). Shaming not only is able to directly change states' behaviors, but it can constrain states indirectly by influencing foreign direct investments (Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b). States are also expected to have better human rights practice and better compliance with international law when they have joined more inter-governmental organizations, because violation of their legal obligations in the international communities magnifies shaming effects (Goodman and Jinks 2004; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). There is also a bigger chance that violators get named and shamed on the international stage like the United Nations (Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b). In the spiral model of human rights norm diffusion, international human rights organizations are a driving force for human rights protection (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Domestic groups bring human rights issues to the attention of HROs, and HROs pressure states to ratify human rights treaties. At first states ratify treaties to make concessions and avoid criticism, but the real changes in human rights practice can happen due to the continued pressures from HROs and third parties. States go through the process of institutional changes to be consistent with human rights norms through years after ratification and, eventually, internalize those norms. Therefore, HROs positively modify the effect of ratification on human rights improvement. In other words, HROs enhance and support the effect of treaty ratification on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009a).

A new study using experiments has found that NGOs are more effective in addressing individual level discriminations than the institutional changes in the top down process. However, the NGOs activities actively engaging majority and minority groups are more effective in reducing discrimination than activities only providing aid to the minority groups (Bracic 2016a). Human rights criticism leads to governments to reduce repression of subsequent challenges in

cases where there are relatively strong economic ties to other countries. Criticism by NGOs, religious groups and foreign governments was more effective than criticism from inter-governmental organizations (Franklin 2008a). Another effective tool for human rights improvement is prosecutions of individual perpetrators. Prosecutions are associated with improvement in future human rights conditions (H. J. Kim and Sikkink 2012).

2.2 Going Beyond Physical Integrity Rights – A Case for Studying Religious Rights

Having examined factors explaining the variation in human rights, it is apparent that most studies in human rights have focused on physical integrity rights or repression. Even though violations of physical integrity rights are the most egregious kind of violation of human rights, narrowly focusing on this kind of rights hinders theoretical development in exploration of the motivation of states' violation of human rights.

Violation of physical integrity rights are also referred as state terrorism and repression. In their groundbreaking study, Poe and Tate defined these rights as the "category of coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others." These activities include murder, torture, forced disappearance and imprisonment (Poe and Tate 1994a). They justified physical integrity rights as the subject of study for human rights for following reasons: these violations of physical integrity rights are most egregious and severe crimes against humanity, and doing so can separate the concept human rights from related concepts such as democracy and economic standing (Poe and Tate 1994a). However, empirical findings indicate that predicators of human rights abuse take different effects on different kinds of human rights abuse. Hill and Jones (2014) discovered that different kinds of repressive acts might be driven by different processes, therefore human rights are not homogenous and they should be

disaggregated in measurements of human rights. The measurement of human rights abuse by PTS and CIRI focuses on physical integrity rights and might be limited in the examination of broader scope of human rights. States can have different motivations for human rights violations in different kinds of rights. The category of physical integrity rights is driven by the severity of the human rights violations, not based on the natures of human rights abuse. Therefore, motivations and causes of different kinds of abuse might be different. Physical integrity rights violation can be driven by different causes: political threat, ideological differences, discriminations based on identities such as gender, race, ethnicity and religion. Killings and disappearances can happen due to the struggles between state officials and the citizens for religious rights, workers' rights, women' rights and etc. Not knowing the nature of the repression hinders the theoretical development in the study of states motivations of human rights abuse.

There are some normative consequences too for focusing too much on physical integrity rights. Any lesser degree of human rights abuse can develop into physical integrity rights abuse if we do not study the motivations of these kinds of human rights and take preventative measures. For example, religious restrictions and discriminations can lead to religious persecutions, which is the violent forms of religious rights violations (Grim and Finke 2005). Human rights abuses are interdependent. Rights violations are generally likely to co-occur with a network analysis (Farris and Schnakenberg 2014). Therefore, these less violent violations of rights for women, children, workers, and religious population should be important subjects of study in the realm of human rights.

Study of the abuse of religious rights is an important step in this direction to address the above problem. The study of human rights should not only focus on physical integrity, but also spiritual integrity, which contains the rights of souls to freely express their beliefs individually and

collectively. Major UN human rights instruments such as UDHR, 1981 Declaration, and ICCPR all have recognized religious freedom as a human right. However, religious restrictions and discrimination have been increasing in the past decade (Pew Research Center Report 2018). Organized religions often arouse states' suspicion and pose a potential threat to the autocratic rulers, therefore, autocracies tend to have a higher level of religious restrictions (Sarkissian 2015). Religious discrimination is also widespread and exists not only in autocracies but also in democracies. Religious minorities often become the targets of nationalist movements. Despite these trends, religious rights are marginalized in the scientific study of human rights. Scholars have not incorporated religious freedom in the framework of human rights study to examine why states restrict religions and how to better realize religious freedom.

There are also philosophical grounds for right to religious freedom. Arguments for religious freedom (or at least toleration) were central to the grand liberal tradition, as embodied in such works as John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration in the 17th Century and James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance in the 18th.

Having witnessed the civil authorities enforcing religious doctrine during colonial period, Roger Williams, a Puritan minister and theologian, stood up against the Puritan authorities and argued for religious freedom and the separation of church and state. In *Bloody Tenet of Persecution of the Cause of Faith*, he argues that soul liberty is gift of God, and no one is entitled to coerce "the sacred haven of conscience" through which each person communicated with the divine. He also argues against religious discriminations: all have soul freedom and liberty of conscience because all are stamped with Imago Dei. Civil authorities are not competent judges of the spiritual, and churches are not pure if they are supported by the state, therefore, he argues for the separation of church and state to protect religious freedom (Williams 1644).

John Locke echoed William's theological themes and further developed philosophical grounds for religious freedom in *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Locke states that Church and civil laws should be governed separately as one who is competent in religious affairs is not competent in judicial matters and vice versa. He argues that civil authority should only attend civil matters, and the salvation is a matter of individual responsibility and not subject to civil authority. Religious freedom can prevent civil unrest, and society should distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion. Religious freedom is not only fundamentally good but also instrumental. He also argues for religious toleration – "every man may enjoy the same rights that are granted to others" (Locke 2013).

As an example of the successful experiment in religious freedom, framers in the U.S. have provided compelling arguments for religious freedom. Due to the belief that Christianity morality cultivates civic virtue, which is the key for the survival of the young Democratic Republic, Patrick Henry proposed a bill to provide tax-supported religious instructions for Virginians. However, a majority of lawmakers disagreed, including James Madisen. He argued that religious liberty is a natural right and no law or any government could be concerned with religious beliefs and practices in "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" (Madison 1785). He argues for the separation of church and state and how religions strive without the interference of civil authority. Limited government would promote a civil society in which people of different faiths could maintain their beliefs according to their own consciences. Religious establishment will breed corruption within the church, thus the bill violated equality which ought to be the basis of every law. Civil government and religion can operate efficiently without the other and unity between them will cause strife between magistrates and people being ruled. Madisen's argument propelled an important change in 1786 when Virginia passed the Statute for Religious Freedom, drafted by

Thomas Jefferson, the new law served as a model for the first Amendment, which established federal protection for religious freedom and a ban on government established religion.

In addition, religious freedom is also an internationally recognized universal human right. Article 18 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 declared that religious freedom is a universal human right, because "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood". Therefore, religious rights are grounded in the dignity of all human persons.

There are also instrumental reasons why the study of religious freedom is important. Religious freedom is conducive to democracy and protection other civil liberties such as women's rights. Modern liberal democracy, after all, emerged out of the wars of religion and the conscious efforts by statesmen to craft regimes of toleration that would tamp down destabilizing religious strife. According to Alfred Stepan's "Twin Toleration" thesis, liberal democracy depends on states tolerating religious institutions to operate freely and religions tolerate states' authority in civil matters (Stepan 2000). Huntington also argues that the theological embrace of religious freedom by Catholic church enabled it to catalyze the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993). The free practice of Christian missionaries also played a big role in the spread of democracy (Woodberry 2012). Studies also find religious freedom is positively correlated with women's empowerment (Grim and Finke 2010), and government and social restrictions are associated with gender inequality (Grim and Lyon 2015). Full religious freedom, including the options of "exit and voice", empowers women (R. Shah 2016).

Religious freedom also might lead to economic flourishing. Gill argues that lowering religious restrictions leads to religious diversity in a society, which facilitates trade,

entrepreneurship and growth of economic activities, and there are economic incentives for states to relax religious restrictions (Gill 2013). Freedom of religion also attracts creative, risk-taking and pioneering individuals and group who increases the rate of economic growth (Gill and Owen 2017). On the other hand, government restrictions on religion produce social hostilities, which would undermine economic growth (Grim, Clark, and Snyder 2014). Another study makes a qualification on the above research and indicates that religious favoritism is bad for economic growth, but the restrictions preventing majority religion holding too much advantages are good for economy (Alon, Li, and Wu 2017).

Religious freedom also is a strategic factor in U.S. foreign policy. Farr argues that promoting religious freedom fits America's national interests, because religious freedom addresses the problems of terrorism, fanaticism, religious conflict and despotism (Farr 2008). Religion has experienced a comeback in the twentieth first century due to modernization and globalization and exerts great political influence, thus the restrictions of religion often lead to wars and chaos (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), and persecution and violence (Grim and Finke 2010). Therefore, religious freedom is an important condition for peace and stability. Religious restrictions also lead to religious terrorism and violence, because restrictive environment facilitate radical theologies. Religious liberty is a weapon of peace to combat terrorism (Saiya 2018). Repressions promote militant political theologies, which is a key threat to stability and peace. One the other hand, various religious groups in the U.S. have joined forces together and led the faith based activism work for international human rights, and shaped American foreign policy (Hertzke 2006).

2.3 Research on Religious Freedom

Although most empirical studies in human rights have focused on physical integrity rights, there is a small body of work on religious rights. Much of this has focused on domestic factors. For instance, Political regime matters for the protection of religious freedom. Democracies have political competition based on the multi-party system. Thus, repression of religious groups will face political retribution. However, the autocracies would not worry about the repercussion from religious restrictions. Democracy has a strong predictive power to explain the variation of religious repressions across wide range of countries (Wood 2008). Older democracies have fewer government restrictions on religious freedoms (Grim and Finke 2010), thus regime duration matters for religious restrictions. Even though most of the constitutions in the nations protect religious freedom, the majority of them also other laws restrict religions (Grim and Finke 2010). The gap between law and practice is widespread not only for all human rights protection, but also for religious freedom. An independent judiciary would help to bring legislative and administrative actions in line with constitutional assurances, by upholding the protection of religious freedom (Richardson 2004).

Religious pluralism is an important factor influencing the degree of religious freedom in a society. Rulers grant religious liberties to the public based on their strategic considerations on their political and economic interests and the needs for political figures to balance competing interests in a religiously plural context are important driving forces for the religious liberty (Gill 2007). Religious pluralism is conducive to religious freedom, because it provides a market place for different religions to compete with each other for resources and motivate them to grow (Stark and Finke 2000; Gill 2007). Thus, religious liberty is more likely to be in place when there is a diversity in religious market in a society.

On the other hand, having a state religion is often related to religious repression. When

states establish one religion, other religions are necessarily in a disadvantaged place in a competition. Other religions could threaten the resources by challenging the dominant religion, the legitimacy of its institutions and the favored treatment it receives from the state or the society as a whole. In order to prevent unwanted competition and to secure more authority and resources, the dominant religion often seeks an alliance with the state. States often build their legitimacy off the established religion. Keeping the status of dominant religion is also in states' interest to their rule. In order to secure and maintain this alliance, the state often restricts all other religions and discriminates against minority religions to keep the advantaged place the dominant religion holds.

Scholars also find that religious restrictions in a society depend on the level of social tolerance of certain religions. Some religious groups can mobilize in support of a dominant religion or against selected sects and cults, thus they could sway the government to impose religious restrictions on some minority religious groups and individuals lacking cultural and social support with harsh administrative and legislative action(Grim and Finke 2010). Higher social divisions between religious groups also lead to religious repression, according Sarkissian's cross national study (Sarkissian 2015). Religious freedom can intervene in this process and stop some religious groups from pressuring the government into restrictions on others.

Current and former communist states often have higher levels of religious repression. Religions also serve as an unwanted competitor for secular states even absent an established religion. Current or former communist states often have the legacies of official secular ideologies and practices about which religions are approved and tolerated by the state. Even in former communist states, prior restrictions on religious practice may have become institutionalized and have attained a taken-for-granted quality (Breznau et al. 2011). Therefore, it is plausible that religious restrictions might be higher in the communist and former communist states.

Population size is positively also related to religious restrictions (Finke, Martin, and Fox 2017) and stronger economies have fewer government restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). Armed conflict byproduct of the larger conflicts (Grim and Finke 2010). The percentage of the religions in each country also matters. Percentage of Muslims relate to higher social restrictions, and higher percentages of Christianity are associated with lower levels of government restrictions on religion(Grim and Finke 2010). When religion and ethnicity are interwoven, a government' restrictions of religious freedoms tend to increase.

There has been very little work on how *international factors* affect religious rights outcomes. The international community has made great efforts to improve religious restrictions and discrimination just as any other human rights, but the effects of these efforts are understudied. International law, human rights activism, and globalization might all influence spiritual integrity rights practices just as they have been found to affect other human rights. Before getting into how these international forces affect religious rights, we need to first establish the different dimensions of religious rights practices – the individual and the group.

3 Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom

– Groups and Individuals

There has been an international norm that humans should be treated with dignity and respect, since the adoption of the International Bill of Human Rights. However, it has been controversial whether groups/organizations should be protected in the context of international human rights as well. The liberal tradition that originated in the western civilization argues that human rights should only be given to individuals, because the natural rights only apply to individuals. Therefore, rights to dignity only belongs to individuals, and the protection of rights to groups is almost impossible to achieve (Donnelly 2013a). Some legal analysts (Scolnicov 2010) also posed a question of protecting group rights: what if the groups infringe upon the individual rights?

I argue that groups rights should not be denied only due to the technical difficulties of protecting both dimensions of rights, and both dimensions of human rights should be equally studied and protected. There are provisions in international law on the protection of religious groups, such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In fact, Asian philosophy and culture has historically promoted the rights to groups, and even argue that group rights sometimes come before the individual rights. In reality, a right can only be protected completely if both the group and individual dimensions are protected. In the case of religious rights and workers' rights, the negligence of the group rights leads to the compromise of the individual rights. Theoretically, it hinders scholars to have a complete understanding of human rights and states' motivations of restricting human right on both dimensions. This study makes a theoretical contribution arguing that there are two inherently different dimensions of human rights and we

should take both into account in future studies.

The current scholarship in the scientific study of international human rights and religious freedom do not differentiate the individual and group dimensions of human rights (Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999; Lupu 2013; Grim and Finke 2010; Sarkissian 2015). Human beings do not only live as individuals, but also co-exist in a social setting. Therefore, Human rights are both individual and collective, and private and public. The expression of various rights often contains a collective dimension, which is often neglected. This study specifically examines the two dimensions of religious rights using religious restrictions index NX in Religion and State Data Round 2 (Fox 2015) and conducts exploratory factor analysis to explore the latent dimensions in the data. This study offers empirical evidence that states distinguish individual and group rights, and they treat the two different kinds of rights differently.

3.1 Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom

Even though there are still some controversies regarding whether international human rights regimes should protect both individual and group dimensions of human rights, there is a consensus that these two dimensions of human rights do exist. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has specific stipulations for states to protect the free expression of religious belief and the freedom to join religious associations.

Donnelly argues that the protection of the universal human rights is only for individuals, because human rights only apply to individuals, and are based on the dignity of individuals. In the interactions between the rights-holders and duty bearers, the rights holders can only be human beings. Even though groups are comprised of human beings, but they are not human beings. He also argues that it is not realistic to protect group rights. For example, there might be difficulties in protecting women's rights as a group, given women is a majority group (Donnelly

2013a).

Admittedly, there might be some policy difficulties in the protection of group rights. However, it should not be the reason why group rights are not being acknowledged. In some cases, it is not possible to protect rights for individuals without the recognition and protection of group rights. For example, the denial of labor unions' rights compromises workers' individual rights, and the denial of rights to worship in churches is a denial of individual believers' religious rights. For monotheistic religions (Abrahamic religions), acting on religious beliefs inherently includes practice both in private as individuals and in public with other fellow believers. Therefore, religious expression includes actions taken individually and collectively. The collective dimension of the free expression of religions can only be guaranteed by the legal existence of churches, schools and associations. The collective dimension of religion often intersects with other kinds civil and political rights, which makes the political authorities wary of its influence on their rule. For example, the group rights include whether religious individuals can go to religious schools to get educated with religious knowledge and form religious associations and political parties to influence public policy. The majority of the world's population are the believers of Abrahamic religions (The Global Religious Landscape Report by Pew Research Center), which have provisions for believers to attend churches/congregations and engage in community activities. Denial of religious group rights prevents individuals from fulfilling their duty to the deity they believe in. Therefore, Individual and group religious rights are inseparable and equally important.

Scolnicov also points out another potential flaw in international instruments protecting religious freedom. Because of the nature of religious freedom as both private and public, Scolnicov argues that the key to understanding religious human rights is the interpretation of the conflicts

between the group and individual rights in religious freedom. In the liberal tradition, individual religious rights emphasize an expression of their belief, and are the freedom of religion. However, the collective religious rights embody the communitarian aspect of religious rights and emphasize the group identity and the equality between religions (Scolnicov 2010). In this sense, religion is both a subject of liberty, such as freedom of speech, assembly and press, and also a subject of equality, which is protected by the laws. Scolnicov also asserts that group rights are derivatives of individual religious rights, thus individual rights always supersede the group rights. In this view the recognition of group rights results in inconsistent and unjustified determinations in religious freedom in international law. He also showed how this thesis is useful to understanding the conflicts between the individual rights of women and religious group rights; or the conflict between the individual rights of children and the group rights of family. Scolnicov also argues that groups might infringe upon the rights of individuals, even though he recognizes the individual and group dimensions of religious rights in his legal analysis. For example, the religious rights of churches might infringe upon the rights of individuals. Congregations could abuse their power and punish people who want to leave the church, and family might infringe upon the rights of free choice of children or women (Scolnicov 2010).

It is true that protection of group rights might lead to social restrictions of religious rights for individuals. However, not guaranteeing the groups rights is a denial of the religious rights for individuals in the first place, because group rights and individuals are interdependent and integral parts of religious freedom. In fact, these two dimensions of religious rights are both recognized by international human rights regimes, despite of the potential conflicts between the two dimensions. Religious freedom for groups is protected in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UHDR) (Durham, Facilitating Freedom of religion or belief). Article 18 in UHDR states – “everyone has

the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,….alone or in community with others and in public or private…" – and the same principle is reiterated in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Religious freedom is not only personal but also social. It is a personal right, because religion is a core element of an individual's belief system and often defines individuals' identities. This individual dimension of religious freedom is related to the expressive needs of religious individuals, and the group dimension acknowledges an individual's group identities and connections to faith communities.

Even though the social dimension of religious rights can conceivably infringe upon individuals' practice of religion, both dimensions of the religious right are being highly regulated and restricted all over the world. States might have different emphases on their policy and practice in religious restrictions. Restrictions on one dimension can lead to the restrictions on another due to the fact that two dimensions of religious rights are interdependent. Accounting for the two dimensions of religious freedom is important to the development of empirical work and theory building. For example, States might have different motivations or considerations to regulate the individual expressions of religion and the collective/communitarian activities of religion. The social and collective aspect of religion is what concerns states the most (Chapter 3 by Hehir, Abrams 2002). Therefore, states might be motivated to regulate the two aspects of religious rights differently based on the different natures of these two dimensions of religious rights. This dynamic might also be influenced by some domestic factors such as the regime type, and international factors such as globalization, commitments on human rights, and the presence of human right organizations. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H: *There are two distinct dimensions of religious restrictions: individual and group.*

I will then analyze the government religious restriction data in Religion and State Round

2 (RAS2) and examine the two latent dimensions of religious restrictions and discuss the distinctive natures of religious individual and group rights.

3.2 Data and Methods

3.2.1 Data

The main data source for the exploratory factor analysis is the NX index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 2015). The RAS2 dataset uses detailed indicators to measure Regulation of and Restrictions on the Majority Religion and All Religions (NX) and each indicator ranges from 0 (no restrictions) to 3 (large scales of restrictions), and it comprehensively covers government religious restrictions in various dimensions (Fox 2015, 267). Factor analysis in this study is run on 20 indicators in this data set. This dataset is an ideal one to explore whether there are two dimensions in the comprehensive data. Even though this dataset has been updated to the year 2014, this study uses the old version, because of the years (1990-2003) covered in the following empirical chapters in my dissertation study.

Religious freedom has been measured by states' violation of religious freedom norms by different researchers, such as the RAS2 dataset by Jonathon Fox, Government Restrictions Index (GRI) by Pew research center, CIRI Human Rights Dataset by David Richards and Chad Clay, and IRF dataset by Brian Grim and Roger Fink. I choose RAS2 dataset in this study because the NX index (religious restrictions on all religions) in RAS2 (Fox 2015) has the most detailed 29 indicators on various types of religious restrictions on groups and individuals. This feature is important for this study centering on the theoretical difference between individual and group dimensions of religious rights.

Even though this study only covers the years from 1990 to 2003, the newest version of RAS project has updated the data to the RAS round 3 covering the year from 1990 to 2014. Due to the limitation of the data on two main independent variables – HROs and direct targeting events - in my dissertation project, the data has been truncated to include the years from 1990 to 2003 after a list-wise deletion. Future studies can collect more data covering years after 2003 and conduct analyses to improve the external validity of this study.

3.2.2 Statistical Method: Factor Analysis

Factor analysis is a multivariate analysis which deals with the internal structure of matrices of covariances and correlations. The indicators measuring certain concepts may be clustered based on their inter-correlations, and each cluster reflects a dimension which causes the associations within the set of the variables. With the Religion and State Round 2 data, the factors which emerge within the matrices of covariances and correlations summarize the major components of the variation among the variables.

The first step I conducted in the factor analysis was to construct a correlation matrix of the NX index. I selected the principle-component technique over competing methods on the ground that it yields a mathematically unique solution in which the first factor accounts for the maximum amount of variance within the data, while each succeeding factor extracts the maximum of the remaining unexplained variance. I decided to extract two factors with the standard that all factors have an eigenvalue of >=1. Factors with an eigenvalue of 1 account for as much variance as a single variable. I also generated a scree plot, and it shows that 2 factors are appropriate, because 2 is where the slope of the curve is clearly leveling off. In order to identify the most invariant factor structure, I rotated the principal-factor solution. The factors were rotated to an orthogonal and to an oblique solution. The factors generated from "orthogonal" rotation are not correlated, while

factors from “oblique” have the minimal correlations. The orthogonal solution best fulfilled the simple structure criteria and was selected for presentation (Costello and Osborne n.d.). However, the factor loadings from both rotations are generated and included in the Table 1.

Even though there are multiple methods available to extract the factor scores, I adopted the least squares regression approach to estimate factor score. In comparison to other refined methods such as the Barlett and Anderson & Rubin factor scores, the regression scores have the highest validity, which means that the factor score extracted have the highest correlations to the factors (DiStefano, Zhu, and Mîndril n.d.). Factors scores are standard scores with a mean as 0, and variance as the squared multiple correlation between indicators and factor.

In the discussion that follows, I first present the factor loadings observed variables have on each factor, and then interpret the factors descriptively and consider what basic dimensions might be inferred. It is also necessary to examine the validity of the factors. Even though no comparable study or data on the two dimensions of religious freedom has been completed, I conducted correlation analysis between the two factors generated from the factor analysis and the indicators from the simple additive methods.

3.2.3 Model

The statistical model used to estimate the factor scores is followed:

$$\hat{F}_{1\times \mathrm{m}} = Z_{1\times \mathrm{n}} B_{n\times \mathrm{m}}$$

$$B_{n\times \mathrm{m}} = R^{-1}_{n\times \mathrm{m}} A_{n\times \mathrm{m}}$$

Where:

n is the number of observed variables/indicators;

m is the number of factors;

$\hat{F}$ is the row vector of m estimated factor scores;

Z is the row vector of n standardized observed variables/indicators;

B is the matrix regression of weights for the m factors on the n observed variables;

R^{-1} is the inverse of the matrix of correlations between the n observed variables;

A' is a pattern matrix of loadings of 20 observed variables on 2 factors.

3.3 Model Results

The findings of exploratory factor analysis indicate that religious restrictions measured by the data do not occur randomly from one polity to the next; they occur in highly associated patterns or dimensions. In other words, basic dimensions do underlie the complex religious restriction behaviors by the states. The chi square statistic is 5809.82 on 169 degrees of freedom. The hypothesis that two factors are sufficient is supported by the fact that the p-value is 0. The two factors account for 63 per cent of the total variance in the 20 observed variables, and it supports strong inferences. Most of the observed variables load relatively high on one of factors, and only 5 loaded lower than +- 0.50 by one factor. For those observed variables that have lower loadings, the gap between the loadings is larger than 0.3 in general. Hence, the solution employed yields mutually independent factors.

Even though the empirical chapters that follow use the factor scores from orthogonal rotation with a minimal correlation between the two factors, the factor loadings from both rotational methods are included in Table 1 and two methods indicate a stable pattern for the underlying dimensions. The first factor has high loadings mostly on items focusing on whether any level of government imposes limitations on religious organizations, such as churches, schools and associations. For example, items regarding government restrictions on religious parties, government restrictions on religious members and organizations not sponsored by the states, and government restrictions on religious clergy and/or organizations engaging in public political

speech all have high loadings on factor 1. I labeled this factor as "Organization restrictions" (GRR_{org}). This conclusion is further substantiated when I examine the rank order of the countries on the factor.

The second factor has high loadings on items concerned with the government restrictions on individuals' expression and practice of their religions, such as public observance of religious practices, public religious speech, and access to places of worship. For instance, items regarding restrictions on the public observance of religious practices, restrictions on access to places of worship, whether people are arrested for religious activities are all have high loadings on factor 2. Thus, the second factor is focused on the religious restrictions on individual practice of religion and is labeled as "individual restrictions" (GRR_{ind}). This conclusion is further substantiated when I examine the rank order of the countries on the factor.

I also conducted a validity test to compare the factor scores from the refined regression method with those from simple additive methods. The correlation tests results indicate that the correlation between additive measure and factor measure for religious organizations is 0.89, and the correlation for religious individuals is 0.53. In general, there is a relatively high correlation between scores from different kinds of methods. The factor measures are more refined than the additive methods, because they take account of the different correlations each observed variables have with the factors and other observed variables.

Table 3.1 The Factor Analysis Loadings for Government Religious Restrictions (NX) Index

Indicators of Religious Restrictions	Factor Loadings (Orthogonal Rotation)		Factor Loadings (Oblique Rotation)	
	GRR_{org}	GRR_{ind}	GRR_{org}	GRR_{ind}
Restrictions on religious political parties.	**0.501**	-0.109	**0.358**	-0.080
The government restricts or harasses religious members and organizations not sponsored by the states	**0.827**	-0.079	**0.799**	-0.172
Restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties.	**0.523**	0.310	**0.472**	0.321
Restrictions on the public observance of religious practices	-0.088	**0.786**	-0.132	**0.874**
Restrictions on religious activities outside of recognized religious facilities.	-0.088	**0.786**	-0.073	**0.811**
Restrictions on public religious speech.	0.365	**0.460**	0.408	**0.445**
Restrictions or monitoring of sermons by clergy.	**0.847**	-0.131	**0.742**	-0.044
Restrictions on clergy and/or religious organizations engaging in public political speech or on political activity in or by religious institutions.	**0.503**	-0.054	**0.432**	0.028
Restrictions on access to places of worship.	0.187	**0.626**	0.090	**0.684**

Restrictions on the publication or dissemination of written religious material.	0.400	**0.534**	0.343	**0.508**
People are arrested for religious activities.	-0.115	**0.956**	-0.109	**0.933**
Restrictions on religious public gatherings that are not placed on other types of public gathering.	-0.132	**0.783**	0.036	**0.485**
Restrictions on or regulation of religious education in public schools.	**0.574**	-0.249	**0.697**	-0.267
Restrictions on or regulation of religious education outside of public schools or general government control of religious education.	**0.552**	0.233	**0.698**	0.055
The government appoints or must approve clerical appointments or somehow takes part in the appointment process.	**0.540**	0.132	**0.513**	0.149
The government legislates or officially influences the internal workings or organization of religious institutions and organizations.	**0.573**	0.058	**0.677**	0.003
Laws governing the state religion are passed by the government or need the government's approval before being put into effect.	**0.320**	-0.096	**0.641**	0.015
State ownership of some religious property or buildings.	**0.392**	0.046	**0.458**	-0.053
Conscientious objectors to military service are not given other options for national service and are prosecuted.	**0.408**	0.009	**0.603**	-0.180
Other religious restrictions.	**0.409**	-0.110	**0.270**	0.004

3.4 Descriptive Exploration of the Two Factors

Because the orthogonal rotation fits more with the simple structure in the data and have the minimal correlations between the two factors, I mainly discuss the factors from orthogonal rotation in the following. The factors have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The correlation between GRR_{org} and GRR_{ind} is 0.09 ($p<0.05$).

With the deepening of globalization in the past decades, and the efforts made by the international community to protect human rights, it is imperative to know whether the average level of religious freedom is increasing or reducing. I created a figure which pictures the average level of religious restrictions across all countries from 1990 to 2003. As indicated in Figure 1, the longitudinal trends of the two factors are consistent. The mean levels of organizational and individual religious restrictions have increased. From 1990 to 1992, the individual religious rights were higher than the organizational religious rights, which might be the delayed effect of the communist rule of the Eastern European countries. After 1992, the levels of religious individual and organizational religious rights have been simultaneously rising up, and the gap between them has been changing too. From 1996 to 1999, the mean religious organizational restriction level is higher than the mean religious individual restrictions. There was a drop of the religious organizational restriction from the year of 1999 to 2000, however, it has been increasing since 2000. There was a drop of mean religious individual restrictions level from the year of 2002 to 2003, while the mean religious restriction level for organizations continued to increase.



Figure 3.1 Mean Religious Organizational and Individual Rights 1990-2003

Extant literature on religious freedom has indicated that the level of religious restrictions varies by regime types; democracies have lower level of religious freedom than autocracies (Grim and Finke 2008). Therefore, it would be helpful to see whether there are any regional or national difference in the degree of religious freedom across countries. Geographically, there are some interesting patterns too in terms of the mean levels of the religious restrictions for organizations as indicated in Figure 2. The restrictions for religious organizations are widespread all over the world, and there are relatively big variations across countries. The highest level seems to be in Middle East and North Africa. Countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria have noticeably high scores on this factor, which indicates that Middle Eastern countries tend to impose higher

religious restrictions on organizations than other countries. This could be explained by application of Islamic law in such countries, which puts restrictions on religious groups, and also how theocratic regimes control religions in general. China, Russia, certain European, African and South American Countries have a medium level of religious restrictions for organizations. The rest of the regions/countries such as North America have a relatively low level of religious restrictions for organizations.



Figure 3.2 Global Mean Organizational Religious Restrictions

The geographical pattern for religious individual rights is different. The restrictions for religious individuals are also widespread but have less variation from 1990 to 2003. Some countries have a higher level religious individual restrictions rights than the rest of regions or

countries. For example, it seems that North Korea, China, Central Asian countries, and Eastern European countries have a higher level of religious restrictions on individuals in terms of the individual expression of religious beliefs and practices than other countries or regions. It might be due to the political regimes in these countries are controlled by communist parties. This could also be explained by the legacy of the totalitarian regimes from the post-communist states that controlled all aspects of social life. The rest of regions/countries have some level of variations, but the differences are not particularly big.



Figure 3.3 Global Mean Individual Religious Restrictions

3.5 Conclusions and Implications

A controversy in the international human rights is whether human rights include the rights to groups. Scholars, advocates and legal experts are divided in this debate. Even though the

mainstream scholarship in the scientific study of international human rights has argued for the individual dimension of human rights, and largely neglected the group dimension of human rights, I argue that a complete understanding of international human rights can be developed if both individual and group dimensions of human rights are taken into account in scholarly works. Theoretically, group and individual rights are different, because the entities hold the rights are different: organizations and individuals respectively. In the discussion of the relationship between states and human rights, this distinction between groups and individuals is especially critical for us to understand states' behavior toward human rights protection. Due to the inherently different nature of human rights to groups and individuals, states might treat groups and individuals differently. Groups are social entities in the public, and also easier to be mobilized and organized. Therefore, this property is likely to arouse states' suspicion toward them. States might also feel more threatened by groups. In contrast, individuals are private and harder to be organized, so states might perceive individuals are less of a threat.

This study offers empirical evidence that states treat religious individuals and groups differently from the exploratory factor analysis, which points a new direction in the study of international human rights. The scholarship in human rights needs to take account of both group and individual dimensions to further develop theories and empirical evidence.

Scholars can test the effects of the conditions of two dimensions of human rights on some important factors in international relations. Due to the different natures of these dimensions of human rights, they might have different effects on other aspects of the society. For example, how do the protection of the two different sets of rights influence the protection of other kinds of human rights? How do the conditions of these two dimensions of human rights influence the economic

development? And would the two dimensions of rights have influence on the level of democracy in a cross-national setting?

Scholars can also test how the common factors, which have been proven to influence the protection of human rights, might impact the protection of the two dimensions of human rights differently. Some important domestic factors, such as democracy, economic growth rate, population, internal wars and conflicts, might condition how states treat groups and individuals differently. In addition, the international environment also matters. The world has become more globalized in the past a few decades. Is globalization influencing how states treat their citizens as individuals and groups? Under the international legal commitments in human rights protection, states might make some adjustments in policy and practice. But would they treat individuals and group differently under the legal commitments? More efforts in human rights protection have been made by transnational activism networks on a grass roots level. Under the pressure of the domestic presence of the HROs and the naming and shaming campaigns, states might be forced to treat their citizens better. Would states genuinely modify their behavior in human rights protection toward groups and individuals?

This study also has policy implications for the better protection of religious freedom and international human rights. A better recognition that states do treat individuals and groups differently is the first step leading to a better protection of human rights, because either groups or individuals should not be neglected in the agenda of international human rights protection. With a better understanding of the dynamic interactions between states and the citizens as groups and individuals, we are able gain more insights on whether states treat individuals and groups different in different domestic and international contexts. Therefore, the international community can make more targeted efforts to pressure the governments to treat groups and individuals better.

4 The Divergent Effects of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the Protection of Religious Freedom

The surprising resurgence of religion since the late twentieth century has been accompanied by its rising influence in political, economic and cultural aspects of the world (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). However, governmental and social restrictions on religion are also prevalent in this globalized world. Efforts in the protection of religious freedom have been made in international arenas. International law has been considered an important instrument to constrain governments, groups, and individuals to better protect religious freedom.

International legal norms in religious freedom have been forming based on the UN Declarations, ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and regional instruments, but the ICCPR is the only international law protecting religious freedom. So far 167 countries have ratified the ICCPR, which is meant to improve the civil and political rights in these countries. However, religious restrictions and persecution are still widespread and even on the rise in recent years, according to human rights NGOs' reports and governments' (Pew Research Center Report 2018).

This chapter tests whether the ratification of ICCPR restrains states' behavior in religious freedom. As a key contribution of this chapter, I examine how ratification of the international law in human rights affects states behavior on these two levels of religious freedom with different mechanisms. The results of statistical models indicate that the duration of ratification of ICCPR has a positive effect on the protection of religious freedom for organizations such as churches and schools, but ratification of ICCPR worsens the protection of religious rights for individuals.

My fixed effect models take account of the heterogeneity of country level characteristics and global time trends and estimate the effect of ratification of ICCPR on states' behavior controlling a broad series of control variables based on the extant literature in international law and human rights protection. The data used in this study comes from a panel dataset covering 118 countries across 14 years, and the dependent variables - religious restrictions for individuals and organizations - are from the RAS2 (Religion and State) dataset, which is the most comprehensive dataset capturing the different dimensions of religious restriction practice by the governments (Sarkissian 2015). I will review the literature first, then conduct quantitative analyses with fixed effect models to test my hypotheses.

4.1 Effect of Human Rights Treaty on Rights Protection

The early research on the effect of international law on human rights practice is rather pessimistic; the effect is either non-existent or negative (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). Some argue that the human rights treaty failed because of the weak implementation mechanism and relying too much on the goodwill of the party states (Keith 1999, Neumayer 2005). Thus, repressive states can get away with human rights violations with low costs after the ratification of human rights treaties. Others argue that states sometimes ratify treaties to avoid criticism associated with remaining outside of the regime, but they do not really comply with international law in action, since it was an insincere ratification in the first place. Thus, the compliance often can be replaced by position taking in an international community (Hathaway 2002). Other scholars argue that authoritarian countries actually use the signing of the treaties to signal to opposition groups domestically that they will remain in power by repressive actions, thus treaty ratification is used to prolong the tenure of autocratic leaders and attract foreign aid (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). However, it is still quite perplexing why the effects of human rights

sometimes are negative if not zero.

More recent works have recognized the weaknesses in the early works' methods and theories and updated our understandings of the effect of human rights treaties. After accounting for selection effects methodologically in their studies, scholars find that states with better human rights practices tend to ratify more human rights treaties (Von Stein 2005), so the relationship between treaty and human rights practice can be positive and more nuanced (Landman 2004, Landman 2005, Hill 2010, Neumayer 2005). Data inflation is another problem in human rights study. After accounting for the increased accountability by INGOs human rights reports in recent years, due to increased information, better data collecting methods and enhanced human rights standards, a new study reveals that ratification is positively related to the human rights protections (Fariss 2017).

In addition, states' compliance with international law is constrained by domestic political conditions, such as the presence of democratic institutions (Landman 2005), bureaucratic efficiency (Cole 2015), information in judicial enforcement (Lupu 2013), and effectiveness of their domestic legal systems (Powell and Staton 2009). Thus, it is not necessarily the states' willingness to comply with human rights treaties to some extent, but their capacities preventing them from following through on commitments.

Ratification of human rights treaties can also improve human rights due to domestic mobilization of civil society. Human rights treaties can empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state with different rights preferences and change domestic politics of states by altering the political calculations of domestic actors. Ratified treaties can influence legislative agendas of governing elites, inspire and facilitate litigation, and provide resources and galvanize social mobilization (Simmons 2009a). Even if states ratify treaties insincerely, NGOs can socialize

domestic activists to petition the UN and publicly shame the government, leading to compliance under internal and external pressures (Heather 2012, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999)

Because the effect of human rights treaties can be different based on different rights (Hill 2010, Lupu 2013), it is necessary to examine effect of ICCPR on religious freedom as a less explored civil right. One study finds that ICCPR does improve the protection of religious freedom (Lupu 2013), but it does not differentiate the two dimensions of religious rights. Thus, it is still not clear whether ICCPR is effective on both religious individuals and groups. The data used in Lupu's (2013) study also did not differentiate religious restrictions and religious discrimination, so the results indicate the mixed effect of ICCPR on religious majority groups and minority groups. Religious restrictions on majority religions are qualitatively different from discrimination against particular minority religions. Religious restrictions on all religions capture states' fear, hatred, and suspicion of religion in general rather than discriminatory attitudes towards minority religions (Fox 2015). Therefore, this study will explore the effect of international law on religious restrictions overall rather than discriminations against particular religions.

4.2 ICCPR and the Protection of Two Dimensions of Religious Rights

Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual rights (Scolnicov 2010). Thus, it would not be appropriate to assume that these two kinds of rights are affected by international law equally. Different mechanisms might take effect after the ratification of ICPPR on the two dimensions of religious freedom. To better understand the influence of international law (ICCPR) on the protection of religious freedom, it is necessary to look at the key latent dimensions of religious freedom underlying the data and the impact of the international law on the two dimensions. In consistent with Scolnicov (2010)'s theory, I find that there are two latent dimensions in Fox's religious restriction index (RAS 2) (Fox 2015), and religious restrictions are

indeed operating on individual and organizational levels based on exploratory factor analysis. The more detailed analysis will be discussed later in this paper.

Why would international law influence the protection of these two kinds of religious rights differently? Religious individual rights and group rights are qualitatively different; religious individual rights have an emphasis on the expression of one's belief, while the group rights are more about the group identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have a social, communitarian dimension (Scolnicov 2010),. Therefore, religious groups enjoy a higher visibility to the public, media, HROs and third-party states in comparison to the individuals. Restrictions on the religious group rights are easier to be exposed and reported by the media and HROs. For example, the favoritism of the orthodox church by Russian government is highly visible, but the persecution of the religious minorities is less visible. Additionally, the demolition of the churches, the arrest of the religious leaders, and governmental appointments of clergy in churches and religious organizations are frequently reported by media and HROs, but the reports on the persecution of the individual religious believers are rare. In fact, the persecution of religious individuals, like the Baha'is in Iran and Yemen and Shias in Saudi Arabia, is widespread. If states' violations of human rights are more visibly reported by the media and human rights organizations, they cannot use the ratification of human rights laws as an expressive instrument to maintain a better standing and reputation on the international stage (Hathaway 2002). Therefore, states are under more pressure from HROs and third-party countries to lessen the regulations on religious organizations after they ratify human rights treaties.

States pay less costs to improve group rights in practice. Information in domestic judicial enforcement matters for the implementation of the human rights treaties (Lupu 2013). Violations of the collective religious rights are easier to detect, and evidence is easier to gather because the

violations of religious group rights are in the public. In contrast, individual rights violations are harder to detect or collect, and states often deny such behaviors. For example, demolition of churches is easy to notice, while limitations on individual religious practice are harder to observe. In addition, religious groups represent organized interests and have more resources and influences, while individuals, plagued by collective actions problems, are less equipped to defend their rights.

On the other hand, states may want to protect human rights, but the "principal-agent" problem may cause different level of human rights enforcement for group rights and individual rights (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Englehart 2009).The central governments may sincerely want to improve religious freedom after ratifying the human rights treaty, but they might not be able to control what their agents – local governments and police - do, especially when central governments are weak or failing. Therefore, central governments may be better able to enforce "organizational rights" standards than "individual rights" standards, as the latter are more likely to be violated at the local level by state agents acting in their own self-interest as opposed to the interests of central government.

Thus, states tend to improve their practice in religious freedom for groups due to the external pressures, lower costs and better visibility. I hypothesize that:

H1: *States lower their restrictions on organizations' religious freedom after ratifying ICCPR; the effect grows with time.*

In contrast, because religious individuals are relatively less visible on the internationals stage, evidence of violations is harder to collect, so states are held less accountable for restricting individual religious rights. For autocracies, states often tighten their control of human rights after ratifying treaties to send signals to opposition forces that they still hold the power despite treaty

ratification (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Hawkins and Goodliffe 2006). Therefore, if states have made improvements and compromises on the organization level of religious freedom under external pressures, they might in the meantime tighten their control of religious freedom for individuals to maintain their general control of religions. In addition, individuals in societies suffer from collective action problems and are not able to defend their interests collectively even if they have legal ground to change the states' behavior after the ratification of international law in human rights. I hypothesize that:

H2*: States tighten their restrictions on individuals' religious freedom after ratifying ICCPR; the effect grows with time.*

This study examines not only the effect of ICCPR, but also the Optional Protocol 1 to the ICCPR. Even though ICCPR has a weak implementation mechanism (Keith 1999), Optional Protocol 1 allows individuals to petition UN Human Rights Committee on the account of the violations of any the rights set forth in the Covenant to strengthen the enforcement mechanism of the ICCPR. After the Committee receives the communications from individuals on the account of the abuse of their rights, the committee will bring the communication to the attention of the State Party, and the State Party is required to submit a written explanation to clarify the matter and remedy may have been taken by that Sate. These complaints from individuals will also be included in the annual reports of that State by the Committee under article 45 of the Covenant (United Nation Treaty Collection). Therefore, Optional Protocol 1 strengthens the effect of ICCPR on the protection of individual rights by an enhanced enforcement mechanism through naming and shaming Party States.

H3: *States improve their restrictions on individuals' religious freedom after ratifying the*

Optional 1 Protocol to ICCPR.

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Data

By aggregating the independent and control variables needed in this research, I have created a panel dataset. After performing list-wise deletion, the data includes 118 entities (countries) across 14 years from 1990 to 2003 (the time spans are shorter for some countries due to lack of data). The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations (GRR_{org}) and religious restrictions on individuals (GRR_{ind}). Those two variables are two factors derived from the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 2015) based on the factor analysis in Chapter 3.

The main independent variable is the ratification of ICCPR[1]. The ICCPR is the only treaty that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR regarding religious freedom. Data on the ratification by country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty Collection website. I operationalized ratification of ICCPR as a continuous variable ($Ratification_{year}$) , which is measured by the years after ratification of ICCPR or the duration of ICCPR has been in effect. I also included a dummy variable (Ratification), which is coded as 1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0, as a control variable. It is important to include this continuous measure of ICCPR, because the dummy variable does not take into account of the fact that states usually take some time to adopt the norms of human

[1] I also intended to include a measurement of reservation of article 18 of ICCPR, which could also influence the states' legal commitment of ICCPR. However, there are only five states have a reservation regarding article 18: Laos, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico and Qatar, and only Mexico is included due to the availability of data. Therefore, I was not able estimate the effect of reservation of ICCPR on religious freedom.

rights and eventually change their behavior in human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 173 (73.5%) countries are the parties to this treaty so far and 118 countries are included in this study based on the availability of data. There are more western democracies and former U.S.S.R countries that have ratified ICCPR than countries from other regions. Asian and Middle Eastern and North African countries have ratified it the least, and Sub-Saharan countries and Latin American lie in the middle.

Another independent variable is the ratification of the Optional 1 Protocol to ICCPR ($Ratification_{optional1}$), which takes into consideration of the level of legal commitment regarding ICCPR. It is a dummy variable. I coded the measure of $Ratification_{optional1}$ as 1 if states have ratified it, otherwise as 0.

To follow the line of research in human rights protection, I will control for the following variables in my models. The level of economic development is positively related to states' respect for human rights according to past research (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009). Specifically, stronger economies have fewer government religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). However, the effects of economic growth are mixed. Economic growth can expand the resource base and reduce the economic and social stress, so the governments are less likely to use repression. On the other hand, rapid economic growth also can increase instability which induce the states to resort to coercion (Poe and Tate 1994a). In this study, economic development is measured by the GDP and economic growth is measured by percentage growth in GDP.

Population size is positively related to repression according to studies (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko

2001). Population size is also positively related to religious restrictions (Finke, Martin, and Fox 2017). To operationalize the effects of population on the abuse of human rights through repression, I will use the total national population to measure the population size. The data for the population size for the 167 countries are from the World Bank development indicators.

The type of political regime also matters for religious freedom. Most of the research in the areas of international human rights law also find that democracy is positively correlated with better practice in human rights law compliance with different approaches (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001, Hathaway 2002, Dai 2005). Non-democratic countries repress religion more than others (Grim and Finke 2010; Sarkissian 2015; Finke and Martin 2014). Democracies have political competition based on the multi-party system. Thus, repression of religions will face political retribution. In this study the democracy variable is measured by the Polity IV score created by Center for Systemic Peace. It ranges from -10 to +10 measuring the autocratic political system to democratic political system.

Judicial independence is also an important control variable. I adopt the measure provided by CIRI Human Rights Data Project. The levels of judicial independence across countries are coded as 0 for “not independent”, 1 for “partially independent” and 2 for “generally independent”.

Regime duration matters for religious freedom too. Older democracies have fewer government restrictions on religious freedoms (Grim and Finke 2010), thus regime duration matters for religious restrictions. Newer regimes and well-established regimes may also have different tendencies to respect human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Hathaway 2005) This variable is measured by the regime durability in Polity IV data.

Scholars have also found that internal and external conflicts in countries are often related to the regimes' lower respect for human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Rasler 1986). The data for internal conflicts and external conflicts are from the Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions, 1946-2015, by the Center for Systemic Peace. International conflicts are measured by the number of international violence and wars the states have participated in; the internal conflicts are measured by the amount of the civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence and ethic war the states experienced.

States' integration into international social society is also an important factor. Global economic interdependence is also important factor influencing human rights protection in countries (Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). This variable is measured by the percentage of gross domestic product made up by trade, and the source of the data is from World Development Indicators.

Studies find that percentage of the Muslims in a country is positively related to religious restrictions (Finke and Martin 2014), while the percentage of Christians is negatively related to religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). I included two variables measuring percentages of Muslims and Christians, which are provided in World Religion Data by the Correlates of War Project.

Religious diversity is an important factor influencing the degree of religious freedom in a society. Rulers grant religious liberties to the public based on their strategic considerations on their political and economic interests. The needs for political figures to balance competing interests in a religiously plural context are important driving forces for the religious liberty (Gill 2007). Religious pluralism is conducive to religious freedom, because it provides a market place for

different religions to compete with each other for resources and motivate them to grow (Stark and Finke 2000; Gill 2007). Thus, religious liberty is more likely to be in place where there is religious diversity. I created a measure of religious diversity using the data of percentages of different religious groups by World Religion Data through the method of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure. It is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1.

Having an official state religion is often related to religious repression. When states establish one religion, other religions are in a disadvantaged place. In order to prevent unwanted competition and secure more authority and resources, the dominant religion often seeks an alliance with the state. On the other hand, states often build their legitimacy off the established religion. Keeping the status of dominant religion is also in regimes' interest to their rule. In order to secure and maintain this alliance, the state often restricts all other religions and discriminates against minority religions to keep the advantaged place the dominant religion (s) holds. I include a measure for religious establishment – Official Religion, which is from the Religion and State data by Jonathan Fox. I recoded this variable into a dummy variable; 1 means the state has established religions, while 0 means the state has no official religions.

The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Models

Statistic	N	Mean	St.Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
GRR_{org}	1,494	0.0	1.0	-1.4	-0.5	-0.03	4.0
GRR_{ind}	1,494	0.0	1.0	-0.6	-0.2	-0.1	8.2
Ratification	1,494	0.9	0.4	0	1	1	1

$\text{Ratification}_{\text{year}}$	1,494	14.0	9.7	0	5	22	36
$\text{Ratification}_{\text{optional1}}$	1,494	0.6	0.5	0	0	1	1
Judiciary Independence	1,494	1.2	0.7	0	1	2	2
POLITY2	1,494	3.8	6.3	-10	-2	9	10
Log(population)	1,494	16.2	1.5	11.2	15.3	17.1	20.8
Log(GDP)	1,494	23.7	2.2	18.9	22.1	25.4	30.1
GDPgrowth	1,494	3.2	5.3	-50.2	1.6	5.6	35.2
Trade (%GDP)	1,494	71.4	38.1	11.1	46.3	85.7	280.4
Internal war	1,494	0.7	1.6	0	0	0	10
External war	1,494	0.03	0.3	0	0	0	4
Regime Duration	1,494	22.4	31.2	0	4	30	194
Islam (%)	1,494	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.002	0.3	1.0
Christian (%)	1,494	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.9	1.0
Religious Diversity	1,494	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.7	1.0	1.0
Religious Establishment	1,494	0.2	0.4	0	0	0	1

4.3.2 Statistical Modeling

Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the "within" effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will test the following models:

Fixed Effect Models: $\mathrm{GRR_{org}}/\mathrm{GRR_{ind}} = (\alpha_i+\theta_t) + \beta_1\mathrm{Ratification_{year}} + \beta_2\mathrm{Ratification} + \beta_3\mathrm{Ratification_{optional1}} + \beta_4 Z_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

In this model, α_i is the individual effect and θ_t is the time effect. α_i captures the effects that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas θ_t captures effects that are specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. First, important international events such as the end of Cold War and the deepening of globalization happened after 1990. Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades that human rights data are inflated due to the higher of accountability and better data collection methods (Fariss 2017). Taking account of fixed effect of years helps alleviate this problem. ε_{it} is the error term in this model. Z_{it} is a matrix of control variables including political regime, judiciary independence, population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, the proportion of trade in GDP, internal war and external war and regime duration.

4.4 Findings

The effect of the duration of the ratification of ICCPR on religious restrictions for organizations, such as churches, schools, associations and etc., is quite consistent across models (Model 1, β_1= -0.016, $p < 0.01$; Model 2, β_1= -0.015, $p < 0.01$) in table 4.2. The longer states have ratified ICCPR, the less restrictions governments have on the religious rights of organizations. According to model 1, after states ratify ICCPR for 20 years, the level of religious restrictions for organization drops by 1/3 of one standard deviation on average across states (the standard deviation of dependent variables is one). This finding supports hypothesis 1. It is consistent with my theory that governments are under more pressure to improve religious restrictions for religious organizations and cannot use the ratification as a cover-up for worsening practices in religious freedom due to the fact that religious organizations are more visible and enjoy more connections

with the international non-governmental organizations and overseas religious organizations. This also supports the spiral model of human rights improvement in which states need time to incorporate human rights norms into domestic institutions and eventually protect human rights voluntarily (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

The effect of ICCPR on the protection of religious rights for individuals is different. As it is shown from Table 4.3, the duration of ratification of ICCPR has no effect on the protection of religious freedom. However, the dummy measure of ratification of ICCPR is positively related with the restrictions in religious freedom on individuals in model 4 and 5 (Model 4, β_2= 0.061, $p < 0.10$; Model 6, β_2= 0.063, $p < 0.10$). Specifically, after states ratify ICCPR, their level of restrictions for religious individuals increase 6% of one standard deviation on average. These findings partially support hypothesis 2; states increase their restrictions of religious freedom for individuals after ratifying ICCPR, but the restrictions do not grow larger as they ratify ICCPR longer. Among the countries which have ratified the ICCPR, some have a poor human rights record and severely violate international law in religious freedom, such as North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Indonesia. Ratification of ICCPR does not necessarily mean intentions and actions to better protect human rights, rather it is a tactic concession they made due to external pressures or "window dressing".

The effect of optional protocol 1 is consistent with hypothesis 3 that the level of religious restrictions on individuals decreases after states ratify the optional protocol 1 to ICCPR. That means that states change how they treat individual citizens after they ratify the optional protocol 1, which gives individual the right to petition UN human rights committee. This also indicates that naming and shaming by the UN might affect how states behave. However, the effect is

unfortunately not statistically significant (Table 4.3, Model 5, β_2= -0.078, p >0.1). That means that we cannot be confident that the effect of optional protocol 1 on individual rights protection is positive in the whole sample of all states.

Table 4.2: Regressions of Ratification of ICCPR on Organization Religious Restrictions

Model Results for Religious Organizations

	Restrictions on Religious Organizations	
	Model 1	**Model 2**
$\text{Ratification}_{\text{year}}$	-0.016***	-0.015***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ratification		-0.007
		(0.029)
Democracy	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
log(Population)	0.127*	0.087
	(0.073)	(0.075)
log(GDP)	-0.097***	-0.099***
	(0.030)	(0.030)
GDP Growth	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Trade (% GDP)	-0.001**	-0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Internal War	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)
External War	-0.015	-0.012
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Regime Duration	-0.0004	-0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Judiciary Independence	0.004	0.008
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Christianity(%)	0.108	0.081
	(0.186)	(0.186)
Islam(%)	-0.169	-0.172

	(0.366)	(0.366)
Religious Diversity	0.001	0.001
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Religious Establishment	0.360***	0.347***
	(0.092)	(0.092)
N	1494	1494
R-squared	0.045	0.049
Adj. R-squared	-0.057	-0.054

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 4.3: Regressions of Ratification of ICCPR on Individual Religious Restrictions

Model Results for Religious Individuals

	Restrictions on Religious Individuals		
	Model 3	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
$\text{Ratification}_{\text{year}}$	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ratification		0.061*	0.063*
		(0.034)	(0.035)
$\text{Ratification}_{\text{optional1}}$			-0.078
			(0.048)
Democracy	-0.006**	-0.005*	-0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log(Population)	-0.077	-0.065	-0.067
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)
log(GDP)	-0.052	-0.049	-0.048
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
GDP Growth	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Trade (% GDP)	-0.0003	-0.0004	-0.0004
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Internal War	0.002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
External War	0.046*	0.046*	0.046*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)

New Regime	0.0004	0.0002	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Judiciary Independence	0.019	0.016	0.022
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Christianity (%)	-0.148	-0.124	-0.127
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)
Islam (%)	0.462	0.536	0.525
	(0.400)	(0.401)	(0.403)
Religious Diversity	-0.023	-0.019	-0.018
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Religious Establishment	-0.048	-0.041	-0.041
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.101)
N	1494	1494	1494
R-squared	0.013	0.015	0.015
Adj. R-squared	-0.096	-0.093	-0.094

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

4.5 Conclusions and Implications

In this study, I test the effect of duration of the ratification of ICCPR on religious freedom protection for organizations and individuals with fixed effect models. The effects are proven to be different on these two dimensions. The ratification of ICCPR leads to a better protection of religious rights for organizations; the longer states have ratified ICCPR, the bigger the positive effect of ICCPR on the protection of religious rights for organizations. While the duration of ratification of the ICCPR has no effect on the protection of religious rights for individuals, the ratification of ICCPR leads to a higher level of religious restrictions for individuals. Even though groups are more threatening to the authorities, the restrictions on them are earlier to be observed. Therefore, states are more likely to change how they treat groups under their international legal commitments.

This research has great implications for the study of human rights protection. Like most other human rights, religious freedom has two dimensions - public and private - which corresponds to organizational and individual rights. When the two dimensions of rights are lumped together, the dual natures of human rights are ignored. Studies also miss a great opportunity to examine whether states show a disingenuous behavior in their compliance with human rights norm. When the dual nature of human rights is considered, studies can render a more nuanced understanding of states' behavior in religious freedom and other human rights protections.

This study also has great implications for the polices in the protection of religious freedom. Individuals seem to be more vulnerable facing states' oppression. More efforts should be made to protect the rights of religious individuals, such as public observance of religious practices and access to places of worship. Religious individuals are less visible in the society and less organized, thus more attention should be given to protect their rights. A few improvements can be made to better protect religious freedom. First of all, international communities should seek ways to better monitor state behaviors. Even though individuals can file claims against the states in terms of human rights abuse at the UN human rights committee, most of the time religious rights abuse of individuals happen without being noticed or recorded. The UN human rights committee should make more efforts to actively monitor the abuse of rights for individuals on the ground. Even though non-governmental human rights organizations have advantages in observing human rights abuse, they should try to make more efforts on the individuals' rights protection. Second, human right regimes should increase the costs of violating their international legal obligations. Current strategy of naming and shaming might not work for the less visible religious constituents – individuals. Alternative solutions, such as economic sanctions and conditions on foreign aid, should be adopted to hold states accountable for their actions in human rights abuse. Third,

religious freedom advocacy groups should also make efforts to bring the abuse of individual rights to the attention of the policy makers.

Because of the inherently different nature of the two dimensions of religious rights, more research questions can be asked. Future research can collect data in a longer time period for religious restrictions for organizations and individuals and test the effects of various domestic and international factors on the protection of the two dimensions of rights. Future research can also test how the two dimensions of religious rights might influence economic development and other outcome variables. Furthermore, the study of the two dimensions of human rights can be applied in other types of human rights, such as worker's rights, women's rights and etc. Most of the studies in human rights have focused on the individual rights.

As a step toward these promising directions, the next chapter will examine how another international factor - international human rights organizations (HROs) - influences the protection of religious freedom, and whether the domestic presence of HROs and naming and shaming campaigns have different effects on the protection of rights for religious individuals versus groups.

5 Are International Human Rights Organizations Effective in Protecting Religious Freedom?

The global community has made great efforts in the protection of human rights since the end of WWII. The International Bill of Human Rights set the protection of human rights as a common standard for all peoples and nations, and intends to promote these rights by "progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction" (page 1-2, The International Bill of Human Rights). Religious freedom, as one of the non-derogable rights, according to Article 4 in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has a special status in international human rights regimes and is broadly supported by human rights Transnational Activism Networks. However, due to the lack of enforcement mechanism by human rights regimes, the efforts in the improvement of human rights mainly are incentive and norm based. States are expected to improve rights practices under the criticism on an international stage (Brysk 1993; Hendrix and Wong 2013; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink n.d.; Sikkink 1993). International human rights organizations are powerful in the protection of human rights with their transnational advocacy networks, which transmit information in domestic rights violations and mobilize the international audience to pressure states to change their behaviors (Keck and Sikkink 1999). States are also expected to change their behavior in human rights protection in a spiral model; states eventually internalize international human rights standards and change behaviors despite of their initial denial (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Recent scientific studies have provided extensive evidence of the positive effects of HROs on rights protection. Even though the presence of HROs domestically has a limited effect

on the rights protection, naming and shaming campaigns seem to be consistently effective in the improvement of human rights (DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; A. Murdie 2014). However, there are two shortcomings in the current state of research in the study of HROs on human rights protection. First, the current literature in the scientific study of international human rights narrowly focuses on the protection of physical integrity; Second, current literature has not given enough attention to the dual nature of human rights: the individual and organizational dimensions.

This study not only expands the scope of international human rights inquiry into religious freedom, but also takes into account of both individual and organizational dimensions of religious rights. To examine the effect of HROs on religious freedom, I take into account both the presence of HROs and direct targeting with naming and shaming campaigns. I find that the mere domestic presence of HROs has a positive effect on the protection of rights for religious organizations but has no effect on the religious individuals. However, the direct naming and shaming targeting by HROs has a positive effect on the protection of rights for religious individuals with no effect on organizations.

This study adds to the existing literature in the following ways: first, this study enriches the scientific study of international human rights with religious rights, given the overemphasis of physical integrity in the current scholarship. I argue that religious rights include spiritual integrity, and are equally important as the physical integrity. Expanding the scope of the human rights enables us to have a comprehensive understanding of the factors that could help the protection of human rights, and it advances the theoretical development in the field of human rights. Second, this study recognizes and differentiates the individual and organizational dimensions of human rights. Human rights in general have the public/communal and the private/ dimensions. Without

taking account of both dimensions, the study of effects of human rights protections are not complete. The overlook of the organizational dimension of human rights also hinders the theoretical and policy development in human rights studies.

5.1 HROs Advocacy and Human Rights Practices

Early work in empirical studies provide theoretical foundations for the effects of HROs advocacy on human rights protection. International human rights organizations (HROs) enjoy advantages in transnational networks and information to better hold states accountable for their rights violations. Domestic presence of HROs can pressure the oppressing regimes from below through the support for local social movements, and from above through the third party states by citing reports generated by HROs (Peksen 2009, 2012). In reality, domestic actors often cannot pressure states directly, therefore, they seek transnational advocacy networks instead to use material and moral leverages to change states behavior(Keck and Sikkink 1999). In the spiral model of human rights norm diffusion, there is also a discursive causal process linking HRO advocacy on human rights practices. The rights violating states often first deny the abuses alleged by HROs, but repressive states will institutionalize and eventually internalize human rights norms and change their behavior under the concentrated and continued pressure from HROs and international community (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Echoing the spiral model of human rights norm diffusion, world society approach in sociology offers another theoretical perspective in how the international institutions and culture influence the behaviors of nation states and domestic actors. The expansion of HROs contributes to the extensive horizontal institutionalization in the world society, which defines the meaning and identity of various actors and appropriate patterns of activities. Therefore, HROs lead to the adoption of norms of human rights protection among nation states and domestic actors through

collective purposes and identities constructed by world culture (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008; K. Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004).

Recent quantitative cross-national studies provide extensive evidence in the relationship between HROs and human rights practices. It is important to differentiate the domestic presence of HROs and their naming and shaming campaigns, because their effects on rights protection might be different. Even though it is quite consistent that increases in HRO shaming lead to improvement in human rights (DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; A. Murdie 2014), rights violators are only vulnerable to international pressure and improve their human rights when HROs criticize them (Franklin 2008b; A. Murdie 2014). For example, when women's rights protection is examined specifically, the effect of HROs is more nuanced. Women's rights international non-governmental organizations (WROs) are effective in improving government respect for women' rights in general. However, a targeted naming and shaming publicity strategy is necessary to exert pressure on the government to enforce women's internationally recognized rights, because the mere presence of WROs does not have effect on women' rights(A. Murdie and Peksen 2015). Similarly, Murdie and Davis (2012) find that the presence of HROs alone does not improve human rights conditions, but HROs presence in pair with HROs targeting with third party pressure do. It is also to be noted that domestic presence of HROs leads to naming and shaming campaigns, and more attention and condemnation of the human rights abuses by Amnesty international (Meernik et al. 2012). This indicates that the domestic presence of HROs can influence the rights protection through naming and shaming campaigns.

More studies render nuanced findings. The effects of presence and activities of HROs might be conditional. The influence of naming and shaming is conditioned by the level economic integration in a country(Franklin 2008b); HROs criticism tends to work better when the countries

have a stronger tie with other countries. HRO activities also have different effects depending on the context and types of rights violations. Presence of HROs members in neighboring countries increases the probability of human rights improvements, but that is conditional on the ability of the groups to freely move across borders (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012). The effect of human rights advocacy might also be contingent upon regime type. HROs activity provides information, which matters more for actors engaged in covert abuses like torture but not for actors engaged in overt abuses like death penalty. Therefore, advocacy can lead to improved outcomes in autocracies, which tend to engage in covert abuses that HRO activity publicizes. Democracies, on the other hand, tend to engage in overt abuses, like the death penalty, and HRO activity does not provide new info to the public (Hendrix and Wong 2013). Hafner-Burton finds naming and shaming have negative relationship for some rights, but positive relationship for other rights (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008b). Naming & shaming improves political rights as states are publicly criticized by NGOs, the UN, and the media, but does not limit political terror such as killing and beatings, because governments' capacities for human rights improvements vary across types of violations. Governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop violations. Central governments might not have the ability to immediately improve human rights conditions happening on a local level even if they intend to (Bagwell and Clay 2017), because of the state capacity.

Studies also find that HROs can improve the condition of human rights on an individual level. The improvement of rights protection does not only rely on states action in a top down process, but also on the initiatives of individuals in a bottom up process. The improvement of rights protection is a product of the combined efforts from the states, citizens, and other domestic and international groups. HROs can provide information to individuals and mobilize them to

initiate legal claims to their human rights in domestic legal systems (Simmons 2009b). HROs can also initiate information campaigns to educate the domestic population on human rights issues (Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012). The embeddedness of a country in global civil society and international flows of human resources are important predictors for citizens' participation in human rights campaign. If citizens have a membership in HROs, they are more likely to participate in the global human rights movements(Kiyoteru Tsutsui 2006). Bracic (2016b) finds that top down rights improvement strategies have a limited effect in changing individuals' behaviors, but NGOs efforts that encourage contact between the majority population and the marginalized groups are effective in protecting the rights of minority groups by fostering inclusion.

Despite of the extensive studies done on the effect of HROs on human rights, there are two shortcomings in the current state of literature. There is a narrow focus on the protection of human rights. The extant studies have mostly focused on the protection of physical integrity rights, therefore, there is a need to explore whether the mechanism of HROs work the same for other kinds of rights. Studies have discovered that HROs have different effects on different kinds of rights (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008b; Hendrix and Wong 2013). Expanding the scope of human rights can strengthen the external validity of the results of current statistical analysis in human rights studies. As such an effort, this study focuses on the religious rights. Religious freedom, as a spiritual integrity right, is often marginalized in the scientific study of international human rights, but it is a recognized international norm in human rights, and of great importance to the dignity and wellbeing of individuals and groups with religious beliefs.

Another shortcoming in the current literature is the lack of the examination of the two dimensions of human rights. Most studies focus on the protection of individual rights, and even the definition of human rights are restricted to individuals (Donnelly 2013b). However, human

rights should include the rights for both individuals and groups. The individual dimension of the rights is private; the organizational dimension of human rights is social and collective. For some kinds of human rights, such as religious rights and workers' rights, these two dimensions are integral parts. The individual rights practice is limited without the acknowledgment and protection of the group dimension of the rights. For example, religious individuals do not have full freedom of religion when they are not allowed to have a church. And workers do not have labor rights if they are not allowed to form a union. This study makes contribution to the scholarship by taking into account of both dimensions of religious rights, and by examining the effects of HROs on the protection of religious freedom.

5.2 Theory and Hypothesis

Would HROs and naming and shaming campaigns influence how the governments treat religious groups and individuals? Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual rights (Scolnicov 2010), and it would not be appropriate to assume that HROs take the same effect on the protection of these two dimensions of rights. Different mechanisms might take effect with the domestic presence of HROs and naming and shaming campaigns. As indicated by the results from my exploratory factor analysis in Chapter 3, religious restrictions are indeed operating on individual and organizational levels.

HROs can influence the protection of religious freedom through three channels. First, the local HROs can create information (Brysk 1993) on the rights violations by the government. HROs operate on a local level in the field, therefore, they are able to collect the first hand information on the human rights abuse including religious restrictions. Second, HROs can also mobilize human rights movements for the better treatment of the citizens by the governments. HROs not only have the information, but also the knowledge on international human rights standards and states' legal

international commitments, thus, they are able to mobilize and provide resources to the religious community to fight for their rights. Third, HROs can provide assistance to human rights groups (Brysk 1993) to overcome the political barriers they face when they fight for their rights on the local level.

Because human rights social movements led by religious advocates can cause political disruptions in society, they may lead the governments to tighten their control of religious groups and even violently crush them. HROs can mediate between the governments and religious groups, and work with religious community to avoid the repercussions from the political disruption. HROs can decrease the severity of restrictions on religious groups by providing assistance and lessen the political repercussions from social movements. When individuals pursue their rights improvement, they are less disruptive, therefore, HROs presence on the local level is less effective in their rights improvement.

Thus I hypothesize that:

H1: *The domestic presence of HROs decreases the restrictions of religious groups but not of individuals.*

As indicated by the boomerang and spiral models of human rights protection, part of the influence of HROs comes from overseas. States are pressured from above by targeting campaigns of HROs and the third parties. HROs have extensive transnational advocacy networks and can engage in naming and shaming campaigns to induce material and reputational costs on rights violating states. In response, rights violating states might deny such practices at first, but will eventually improve their rights protection under pressure with reputational concerns (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Religious individual rights and group rights are different in their visibility on an international stage, therefore, naming and shaming campaigns of HROs might have different effects on them. Religious individual rights have an emphasis on the expression of one's belief, while the group rights are more about the group identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have a social, communitarian dimension (Scolnicov 2010). Therefore, religious groups enjoy a higher visibility in comparison to the individuals. Also, the restrictions of religious groups are more overt in general. For example, the favoritism of the orthodox church by Russian government is highly visible and well known. The restrictions of religious organizations are usually conducted overtly based on the claims of disruptions of social orders, subversion of state authority, etc. The public and media already have relevant information on the restrictions of religious groups, therefore naming and shaming campaigns do not provide additional information to the international audience and should exert no influence on states behavior in religious freedom for groups.

In contrast, religious individuals are relatively less visible on the internationals stage and restrictions on religious practice of individuals are more covert. The information on the restrictions and persecution of religious individuals are mostly hidden intentionally from the public and media by the authoritarian regimes to avoid the criticism. On the other hand, violation of religious rights of individuals is often conducted by the local officials and police, therefore, there is a principal agent problem due to the state capacity (Englehart 2009b). States are restricted by their capacity to monitor abuses on an individual level and evidence of violations is harder to collect on a local level. The local HROs can gather information on rights violations and then transmit overseas through transnational advocacy networks. When HROs launch naming and shaming campaigns targeting the states on religious restrictions of individuals, HROs provide new information to the public and international audience. Therefore, the naming and shaming campaigns would pressure

states to improve rights protection due to their vulnerability to moral pressure from reputation concerns.

Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H2: *Direct targeting by HROs decreases the restrictions of religious individuals but has no effect on the restrictions of religious groups.*

5.3 Data and Methods

5.3.1 Data

By aggregating data needed for all the variables in this research, I have created a panel dataset. After performing list-wise deletion, the data includes 118 entities (countries) across 14 years from 1990 to 2003.

The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations (GRR_{org}) and religious restrictions on individuals (GRR_{ind}). Those two variables are two factors derived from the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 2015) based on the factor analysis in chapter 3.

The main independent variables are the measures for the presence of HROs, direct targeting by HROs. The presence of HROs is operationalized as the number of HROs within each country. This variable is measured by the number of INGOs listed in the *Yearbook of International Organizations* with a human rights focus with members or volunteers in a specific country in a specific year (J. Smith and Wiest 2005). Naming and shaming targeting data is collected from IDEA project, which focuses on all Reuters Global News Series reports concerning HROs. HRO shaming variable is coded as the yearly count of the number of HRO conflictual events that occurred toward a government in a given year from the IDEA data.

According the previous chapter, I control the ratification of ICCPR. The ICCPR is the only treaty that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR regarding religious freedom. Data on the ratification by country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty Collection website. I operationalized ratification of ICCPR as a dummy variable (Ratification), which is coded as 1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0. In addition, I include the same control variables as the statistical models in chapter 4. I also control the indirect targeting by the third actors (Murdie and Davis 2012). The Indirect Targeting is a count of all conflictual targeting of governments or non-governmental actors where HROs are cited, but the source of the event is not the HRO but an alternative third-party actor outside of the targeted state.

The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 5.1 below.

Table 5 1. Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
GRR_{org}	1,494	-0.0	1.0	-1.4	-0.5	-0.03	4.0
GRR_{ind}	1,494	-0.0	1.0	-0.6	-0.2	-0.1	8.2
HROs	1,494	38.4	23.4	1	20.7	51	139
Direct Targeting	1,315	0.4	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.0
Indirect Targeting	491	3.1	5.9	0.0	0.0	4.0	55.0
Ratification	1,494	14.0	9.7	0	5	22	36
POLITY2	1,494	3.8	6.3	-10	-2	9	10
population	1,494	16.2	1.5	11.2	15.3	17.1	20.8
GDP	1,494	23.7	2.2	18.9	22.1	25.4	30.1
GDPgrowth	1,494	3.2	5.3	-50.2	1.6	5.6	35.2
Trade	1,494	71.4	38.1	11.1	46.3	85.7	280.4
Internal war	1,494	0.7	1.6	0	0	0	10
External war	1,494	0.03	0.3	0	0	0	4
regime	1,494	22.4	31.2	0	4	30	194
Islam	1,494	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.002	0.3	1.0
Christian	1,494	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.9	1.0

Diversity	1,494	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.7	1.0	1.0
Establishment	1,494	0.2	0.4	0	0	0	1

5.3.2 Statistical Modeling

Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the "within" effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will test the following models:

Fixed Effect Models: $GRR_{org}/GRR_{ind} = (\alpha_i + \theta_t) + \beta_1 HROs + \beta_2 Direct\ Targeting + + \beta_3\ Z_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

In this model, α_i is the individual effect and θ_t is the time effect. α_i captures the effects that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas θ_t captures effects that are specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. First, important international events such as the end of Cold War and the deepening of globalization happened during 1990-2008. Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades that human rights data are inflated due to the higher of accountability and better data collection methods (Fariss 2017). Taking account of fixed effect of years helps alleviate this problem. ε_{it} is the error term in this model. Z_{it} is a matrix of control variables including political regime, judiciary independence, population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, the proportion of trade in GDP, internal war and external war, and regime duration.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 The Effect of Domestic Presence of HROs

HROs are helpful in the protection of religious freedom, and the effects are different for religious groups and individuals. As shown in Table 5.2, HROs are related to a better protection of religious rights for organizations as indicated by model 1,2 and 3 (Model 1, β_1= -0.003, $p < 0.05$; Model 2, β_1= -0.003, $p < 0.10$; Model 3, β_1= -0.007, $p < 0.10$), which is consistent with the hypothesis 1. Substantively, one human rights organization in a country can decrease 0.3% of one standard deviation of religious restrictions on organizations; an increase on the number of human rights organization from 1 to 139 can lead to the decrease of around 40% standard deviation of religious restrictions for religious organizations on average in model. The size of effect does not change after the number of naming and shaming events are held at constant in model 2, but the effect is almost doubled in the model 3 when the indirect targeting variable is taken account. Around 139 HROs can decrease the restriction of religious organization by almost one standard deviation when both the direct and indirect targeting events are held constant. HROs are useful in pressuring states from below to change their policy and practice in religious rights towards organizations. The same result is supported by the base model in the appendix in Table 4, even though the effect size is slightly different (Model 1, β_1= -0.005, $p < 0.01$).

However, the effect of HROs is not statistically significant in their protection of individual religious rights across all three models in Table 5.3. The effect is the same in the base model in Table 5.4. This indicates that the mere domestic presence of HROs is not helpful in the protection of religious rights for individuals. HROs are not effective in pressuring states to change their treatment of religious individuals by mobilizing them to fight for their rights in legal and other

realms. This is might be due to the different nature of religious organizations and individuals: religious restrictions for organizations are public, and restrictions for individuals are more private. Therefore, states tend to behave hypocritically by changing their human rights records in the public, and not changing practice towards private citizens.

5.4.2 Direct Targeting by HROs

The direct targeting by naming and shaming campaigns towards the rights abusing states is effective in the protecting of religious rights for individuals. As shown from the model 5 (β_2= -0.004, $p < 0.05$) and 6 (β_2= -0.007, $p < 0.10$) in the table 5.3, direct targeting has a similar size of effect as the HROs. One event of naming and shaming by HROs towards country can decrease 0.4% of one standard deviation of religious restrictions on organizations when the number HROs are held constant; if the HROs name and shame the target country for 27 times, the targeting country decreases around 10% of one standard deviation of religious restrictions for religious individuals on average. The size of effects is almost doubled in the model 6, even though the effect is not statistically significant in the base model in Table 4. The results in Model 5 and 6 confirm the hypothesis 2 that naming and shaming provide additional information to the international audience about the violation of religious rights for individuals, and these campaigns impose reputational costs on targeting states and change their behavior in religious freedom. Religious rights of individuals are widely recognized as human rights in the international community, therefore, states face a great backlash when these rights violations are exposed to the international audience and are more likely to make improvements. Therefore, states are pressured from above through naming and shaming to improve their protection of religious individuals.

The effect of direct targeting on religious organizations is not statistically significant as indicated by model 2 and 3 in Table 5.2. The naming and shaming campaigns do not change states practice in the religious rights of organizations. This is consistent with hypothesis 2. Organizations are more public and restrictions of religious organizations are more overt, therefore, the naming and shaming by HROs do not provide additional information to the international community in terms of the violation of religious rights and do not impose reputational costs on the targeting states. Alternatively, religious organizations pose a bigger threat to regimes' rule domestically, and states are less likely to make compromises when named and shamed on an international stage. When facing the criticism from HROs, states also often use the disruption of the public order and subversion of the state powers to legitimate the limitation of religious organizations. Therefore, states are less likely to compromise, despite of reputational costs for the violations of religious rights.

As an important control variable, the indirect targeting by the third actors have no statistically significant effect on the protection of individual and group rights based on model 3 and 6. Naming and shaming by the third parties do not induce meaningful reputational costs for religious organizations, because the abuse for religious organizations is already public and revealed. Targeted states do not change their treatment of religious individuals after the third parties target them with naming and shaming campaigns when the number of HROs and the number of direct targeting by HROs are held constant. The indirect targeting by third parties does not provide additional information on restrictions of individuals after the shaming campaigns by HROs, and it is also not able to weaken the coercive power of the states. Therefore, indirect targeting is not effective in reducing the rights violations for individuals. However, this could also

be the result from the lack of data on the indirect targeting variable in the years covered in this study.

Table 5. 2: Model Results of Religious Organizations

	Restrictions on Religious Organizations		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
HROs	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Direct Targeting		-0.002	-0.001
		(0.004)	(0.006)
Indirect Targeting			0.0001
			(0.003)
Ratification of ICCPR	-0.014***	-0.020***	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Democracy	-0.002	-0.003	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)
log(Population)	0.085	0.317**	0.262
	(0.075)	(0.158)	(0.397)
log(GDP)	-0.098***	-0.107***	-0.140
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.086)
GDP Growth	0.003***	0.004***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Trade (% GDP)	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.001
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Internal War	-0.005	0.005	-0.008
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.017)
External War	-0.011	-0.004	-0.059
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.051)
New Regime	-0.0004	0.0002	-0.00004
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Christianity(%)	0.082	0.020	0.315
	(0.186)	(0.205)	(0.379)
Islam(%)	-0.193	0.030	1.621
	(0.363)	(0.447)	(1.364)

Religious Diversity	-0.003	0.0005	-0.083
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.127)
Religious Establishment	0.346***	0.317***	0.654***
	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.174)
N	1494	1315	491
R-squared	0.049	0.056	0.097
Adj. R-squared	-0.053	-0.059	-0.219

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 5. 3: Model Results for Religious Individuals

	Restrictions on Religious Individuals		
	Model 4	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
HROs	0.00000	-0.0005	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Direct Targeting		-0.004**	-0.007*
		(0.002)	(0.004)
Indirect Targeting			0.0001
			(0.002)
Ratification of ICCPR	-0.006	-0.001	-0.014**
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Democracy	-0.005*	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)
log(Population)	-0.073	-0.210***	-0.913***
	(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.226)
log(GDP)	-0.050	0.028*	0.022
	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.049)
GDP Growth	0.001	0.001	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.002)
Trade (% GDP)	-0.0003	0.0001	-0.001
	(0.0005)	(0.0002)	(0.001)
Internal War	0.0002	0.011***	0.037***
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.010)
External War	0.045*	0.064***	0.208***
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.029)

New Regime	0.0004	0.0002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Christianity(%)	-0.146	-0.122	-0.462**
	(0.203)	(0.082)	(0.216)
Islam(%)	0.499	0.271	1.648**
	(0.396)	(0.178)	(0.778)
Religious Diversity	-0.022	-0.011	-0.107
	(0.044)	(0.018)	(0.072)
Religious Establishment	-0.045	-0.024	0.012
	(0.101)	(0.039)	(0.099)
N	1494	1315	491
R-squared	0.011	0.057	0.211
Adj. R-squared	-0.095	-0.058	-0.066

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

5.5 Conclusion and Discussion

This study examines the effects of HROs and targeting campaigns on the protection of two dimensions of religious rights. The mere presence of HROs within a country only has an influence in reducing the level of restrictions for organizations, while no effect on the protection of religious individuals. This indicates that domestic HROs play an important role working with religious organizations to pressure the states from below to change their policies and practices in religious freedom. HROs are able to provide information and resources to the religious organizations to engage in local social movements for religious freedom.

However, the direct targeting events with naming and shaming are only effective for the protection of religious rights for individuals. The restrictions of religious individuals are more covert. Transnational advocacy networks of HROs transmit the information on the restrictions of religious individuals, and name and shame rights violating states on the international stage. In contrast, the restrictions of religious organizations are more overt, and the transnational advocacy

networks do not necessarily provide additional information to the international audience, therefore, the governments in the rights violating states do not carry the reputational costs in terms of restrictions for religious organizations.

This study has great theoretical implications. This study expands the current literature in HROs and human rights study by focusing on religious rights and their two dimensions. The findings indicate that domestic HROs and targeting campaigns are effective in the religious rights protection, which is consistent with the most current literature on other kinds of rights protection. In the meantime, there is also a more nuanced finding that both HROs and targeting campaigns influence the rights protection for individuals and groups differently. This finding supports the most important theoretical advancement in this study: the two dimensions of religious rights are inherently different; religious restrictions on groups are public and overt, and restrictions on individuals are private and covert. HROs support the religious organizations in social movements to pressure their governments from below, and the naming and shaming campaigns overseas uncover the restrictions on individuals and pressure states from top. This indicates that there is a need to differentiate individual and group rights in international human rights studies to further our understanding and advance more novel theories in human rights protection.

This study also has great implications for the policies in international human rights protection. The domestic presence of HROs is useful in protecting the rights of religious organizations but not for individuals, while the direct targeting by HROs are effective in reducing the level of restrictions on individuals. We need to acknowledge that HROs are improving the protection of human rights on the grassroots level, despite of the lack of enforcement in international human rights regimes. As moral agents, transnational advocacy networks play an important role to pressure states to change how they treat their citizens with the information,

networks and other resources. In the meantime, we also need to reflect on why domestic HROs are less effective in combating the human rights abuse for individuals, and why targeting campaigns overseas are not able to change how states restrict religious groups. HROs and other international actors need to strengthen the part of the work that current strategies are not effective, and further develop the strategies that work great to hold states accountable.

There are also a few limitations in this study which can be addressed by future studies. The first lies in the limitation of the data. First, the data only contains the data from 1990 to 2003. The results can have stronger internal validity if the years covered in this study are longer. Future studies can collect more data with longer time span and test the same theories in this study. Second, measurement on HROs and Direct Targeting can be improved. As the study by Murdie and Peksen (2015) shows, the HROs and direct targeting with a specific focus on certain kind(s) of human rights can be more effective in combating the corresponding human rights violations. A way to improve this study is to collect the data on the number of religious HROs, and direct targeting on religious freedom across years and countries. The relationships found in this study might be strengthened with these new measures and data. Third, another variable can improve religious freedom through pressuring states is international religious organizations. Most churches and other religious organizations are transnational, especially with the globalization in the past a few decades. Therefore, these organizations can also take on the similar functions as HROs to transmit information, expose rights violations and pressure the states overseas. Future studies can collect the suggested data and strengthen the findings in this study.

6 Globalization and the Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom

In recent years, there has been a rise of nationalist movements around the world. Not only have nationalist political parties and public officials been elected into office in Europe, America, and Asian countries, nationalist social groups also have surfaced. Minority religious groups are the obvious targets for the nationalists, and an increasing number of religious groups are attacked by government officials and social groups with discriminatory rhetoric and policies (Pew Research Center 2018).

As the world becomes globalized, exchanges of religious beliefs across borders have become common, but this influx of new values, ideologies and norms have posed threats to the local religious system and identities built from religions. The religious nationalist movement is a battle between the international and local culture and between the majority/local religions and the minority/new religions. The tensions between religious and national identities prompts discriminatory behaviors and policies towards the immigrants and minority religious groups. Religious restrictions are the consequences of the conflicts between globalization and nationalist movements.

Studies on the influence of globalization on governments' respect for human rights, which has mostly focused on physical integrity rights, security rights, and workers' rights, render mixed results (W. H. Meyer 1996; W. Meyer 1998; Hafner-Burton 2003; Reuveny and Li 2003; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Religion is a value system, but it is also a core identity and centers other value systems an individual holds and often mixes with national identities. When globalization threatens the identities people hold, they fight it back. That is why we witness the

rise of religious restrictions despite the efforts made by international human rights instruments, regional human rights regimes, intergovernmental organizations, human rights organizations (HROs), and western democracies. By examining the data on globalization and religious restrictions across 188 countries in the past 10 years (2007-2016), this study explores whether globalization has contributed to the rise of religious restrictions empirically while taking account of alternative explanations of religious restrictions. This study not only analyzes the influence of aggregate globalization, but also the individual influences of economic, political, and social globalization on religious freedom. Due to the dual nature of religious freedom, this study also examines whether globalization influences the religious freedom for individuals and groups differently.

I will begin with a literature review of globalization and human rights protection, then discuss the connections between globalization and religious nationalism and generate hypotheses between globalization and religious restrictions. I will use fixed effect models to analyze the data and explain the results and their implications in the study of religious freedom, human rights, and globalization.

6.1 Globalization and Human Rights Protection

Studies of globalization and human rights protections have mainly focused on economic globalization. There have been two competing camps regarding how economic development and globalization relate to the human rights protections. Neo-liberalism supporters believe that globalization and foreign investments lead to economic development, which creates jobs, improves living standards, develops technologies, provides health care, and eventually increases the size of the middle class in developing countries. The rising middle class would eventually want liberalization of thought, speech, movement, civil and political rights from the authorities.

On the other hand, environmental advocates, human rights activists, and some economists hold that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) do not contribute to the better protections of human rights, instead they might lead to more human rights violations. MNCs mainly drain natural resources and exploit labor, and not necessarily create new jobs and introduce new technologies, so developing countries continue to be poor. The capital flows also lead to the instability of the financial system. Poverty and instability can lead to social unrest, which usually brings on repression (W. Meyer 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001).

Empirical studies have shown mixed findings on relationships between economic globalization and human rights protections. Based on different measurements of economic openness and integration, results can be different. Using Foreign Direct Investment as a proxy of economic globalization, cross national studies find that multinational corporations, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are positively related with political, civil, economic, social rights in the third world (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; W. H. Meyer 1996;W. Meyer 1998) , which supports the theory proposed by the neo-liberalism. Using alternative measures of human rights practice, economic globalization, and new data analysis methods, other studies find the relationship between economic integration and human rights record almost does not exist or is negative. (Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999, Milner 1998, Sorens and Ruger 2012).

Studies in the institutions and policies promoting economic globalization find that international trade agreements transform government observance of human rights today, because they provide governments with the interests and the incentives to implement domestic human rights policies and decrease their employment of repressive practices (Hafner-Burton 2003, Hafner-Burton 2005). The WTO also plays an important role in bringing trade practices in line with human rights objectives under ITA. Transnational corporations not only can benefit human

rights by promoting economic development but also have the culture to conduct business with an eye toward the greater good (Kinley 2009).

Social and political globalization is less studied in the protection of human rights. Political and social globalization may impact human rights protections by spreading democratic norms globally (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Social integration impacts human rights through the spread of norms and ideals across space (Bhagwati 2004), and they promote the activities of NGOs and activists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms of cooperation and exchange can replace the norms of discrimination and suspicion in the process of social integration (Mousseau and Mousseau 2008). Political integration also enhances the exchanges between states through bilateral and multilateral channels. Memberships to human rights international agreements and the spread of the democratic norms also promote the protection of human rights (Fariss 2017; Landman 2005; Cole 2005). Taking account of all three dimensions of globalization – economic political, and social – on human rights protections and employing different cross national data, studies have discovered some positive impacts of globalization on the protection of human rights (Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011;Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012).

In general, there is not a conclusive relationship between globalization and human rights protection. Past studies not only have heavily focused on physical integrity, security rights and workers' rights, but also have discovered that globalization influences different aspects of human rights differently, which indicates different categories of human rights do not always move together (Milner 1998). Thus, it might not be appropriate to assume the relationship between globalization and religious freedom based on the relationship between globalization and physical integrity rights, for example.

6.2 Globalization, the Rise of Nationalism and Religious Restrictions

A recent report by the Pew Research Center finds a global uptick in government restrictions on religion in 2016, and nationalist parties and organizations played an increasing role in harassment of religious minorities. The percentages of countries with high and very high levels of government restrictions rose from 25% in 2015 to 28% in 2016. Nationalist political parties and government officials have attacked religious groups with anti-minority and anti-immigration rhetoric and policies in Europe, America, and Asia. There was a 5% increase of the cases the nationalist parties and officials verbally attacking religious groups from 2015 to 2016. At the forefront of globalization, 33% of the European countries and 12% of Asian countries saw this kind of incidents in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018), and this suggests this trend is intensifying. The phenomenon that societal forces push back against globalization as it deepens is nothing new. Karl Polanyi has already warned us in the 40s that there is a disconnection between the values and norms in human society, and the materialistic characteristics of market economy, so the society will eventually fight back against the market economy to defend its interests (Polanyi 2001). It is the reality now that nationalists have waged a war to preserve the local identity, culture and value systems.

Globalization and religion have some irreconcilable conflicts. Due to the development of the technology, there has been a fast growth of the communications between people, cultures, societies, and civilizations that were historically more isolated. The increasing pluralism of the values in a single social unit tends to attenuate the differences among different value systems and ways of life. “Globalization tends to facilitate the detachment of religion, culture and territory, thus unravels religious traditions from particular cultures and nationalities” (Roy 2006). In a plural system, no single value is “correct”, and the value systems become relative. Thus, the

social structures can be renewed in globalized communities. However, religion by nature is against this trend, because religious faith is related to a particular and absolute identity, and has immutable sacredness, which does comply with the relativism trendy in the globalization. It is not surprising, therefore, to witness the efforts by religious groups to preserve, stabilize and create particular identity to counter the tendency of the globalized system to relativize them (P. F. Beyer 1994).

However, the fights against globalization by religious groups often come in the form of religious nationalist movements. The importance of studying collective identity in international politics has been in the constructivist tradition (Abdelal et al. 2006). Religious identity is also often intertwined to national identity due to historical and cultural reasons. Religion itself can be perceived as a national identity, which is how the nation is perceived religiously. Religion as a core identity for individuals, groups and nations is hard to compromise and sacrifice. Due to the penetration of new religious ideas and groups, national identities are threatened, whether religious or secular. As a response to this threat, majority traditions/religions in these cultures will respond with a closer identification of religion and national identity which creates divisions and political fallout. This explains the rising of nationalist political parties in Europe, America, and Asia in recent years. States also are more likely to restrict the transnational religious communities as threats to national and local identities to control their presence and proselytizing activities (Banchoff 2008).

Some scholars argue that increasing religious restrictions are due to the perceived psychological threat to the majority religion from minority religions. This is a consequence of the frequent and easy contact between different religious traditions created by economic, political and social integrations. Incoming religious groups and their values systems have the

potential to challenge the majority's dominant status. Empirical findings do support that globalization has led to the worsening of religious discrimination of the minorities through religious policies (Bloom, Arikan, and Sommer 2014). This theory explains well why governmental regulations and social hostilities towards minority religions are rising, but is less effective in explaining why governmental restrictions towards all religious groups have increased and why the restrictions and discrimination sometimes come in the package of nationalist movements. I argue that it is not only majority religious groups that are threatened, but also religious and secular governments. Majority religious groups would attack and exclude the minority religious groups to preserve local and dominant value systems, while the public officials and political parties want to use nationalist movements and identity politics to strengthen their rule. Facing intense political, social and economic integrations worldwide, secular governments would try to strengthen their control of the nation and preserve the secular national identity by tightening its regulations on all religious groups.

Scholars also have examined religious nationalism as a consequence of globalization on a micro-level, in the perspective of social psychology. Globalization as a revolution disrupts the traditions and customs of a people by creating insecurity (Kurth 2009), because space and time are compressed and events are becoming localized. Individuals tend to feel uncertain and insecure about what the future holds, especially when they are left out in the process of globalization. Their value systems are frequently challenged by the new values, norms and behaviors brought in by globalization. As insecurity and anxieties grow, people tend to reaffirm their self-identity or hold onto a collective identity to provide them with some stability and security. Nationalism and religion "supply particularly powerful stories and beliefs because of their ability to convey a picture of security, stability and simple answers" (742, Kinnvall 2004)

This explains why we see national governments responding to their citizens' concerns to tighten security and close borders to immigrants and refugees with nationalist policies, and why more nationalist religious groups are popping up to harass minority religious groups. Empirical studies have found Christian nationalist ideology is an important reason that Americans voted for Donald Trump in 2016 (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018). Christian nationalist belief also relates to the anti-Muslim attitudes and opinion (Shortle and Gaddie 2015), and anti-immigration attitudes in the U.S. (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011). Muslim groups were targeted most by nationalist groups in Europe and America in the year of 2016.

6.3 Globalization and the Two Dimensions of Religious Restrictions

Globalization threatens traditional meaning systems; therefore, it has brought challenges to people's religious identities and psychological securities. Nationalist governments reach out to people with nationalist rhetoric and polices to regulate and discriminate religious groups and individuals under the name of preserving the local values, norms, identities and interests. Based on the dual nature of religious groups and individuals, would this process influence these two dimensions of religion differently?

First, governments are more likely to target religious groups, when they are prompted by the nationalist sentiments to restrict minority or new religions. The communal and social dimension of the religious expression is more threatening to the states. The private practice of religion by individuals, such as praying, reading texts and donating are less threatening to the majority religions and secular governments. However, the group dimension of religions, such as attending churches, religious schools, joining religious associations and parties, pose more threats. The group dimension of certain religion is seen as a competing force to the dominant status of the majority religion or the secular government in the public space. As the nationalist

movements proceed, secular governments and dominant religions would try to limit the public expression of these religions. However, this does not explain why the restrictions on groups increase as the globalization deepens.

The group dimension of religious expression grows as globalization deepens, thus the restrictions on groups also increase. Just as globalization has made the economic and political systems more westernized, the globalization of religion has made Christianity more or less the "imperial" standard for religion in our globalized world (P. Beyer and Beaman 2007). As one of the influences of this globalization trend, the communal dimension of religion expresses itself through organization. In the religious anti-globalization movement, religions either demand justice or defend their tradition (Beyer and Beaman 2007, 339). As religions resort to more differentiation to have a clear identity, they take on more organized institutional form. Therefore, as more and more religions resort to highly organized forms to differentiate themselves from others, they pose an increasing higher level of threat to the rulers. Restrictions on religious groups increase as globalization deepens, because the tension between religious groups and rulers becomes more heightened as religions become more globalized.

Religious groups face harsher restrictions because they are more interconnected all over the world with globalization. The development of technology in communication and transportation has facilitated the connection between religious organizations. Because of transnational networks among religious organizations, religious groups are able to transmit information on their restrictions and persecution overseas. Another development connecting religious communities further is the rapid growth of faith-based international human rights organizations (RINGOs). RINGOs both contribute to and are generated by globalization. Protestant and Catholic RINGOs are the most numerous and dominate the religious segment of

the global public sphere (John Boli and David Brwington 2007). Because of transnational networks, religious organizations can advocate for their sister organizations in countries where they are highly restricted. These religious organization and RINGOs can provide information to UN, other international human rights regimes, and western democracy to pressure the rights violating states. It is not uncommon that a third party, such as the U.S., criticizes human rights violations in certain countries. Therefore, there is an increased risk for states to get named and shamed on an international stage when religious groups are highly connected. As globalization deepens, nationalist movements heighten and transnational religious networks grows, restrictions on the group dimension of religion increases.

I hypothesize that:

H1: *Globalization increases governments' restrictions of religious freedom for groups.*

However, globalization might influence the protection of religious freedom for the individuals differently. Individual practice of religion such as praying or reading religious texts is less threatening to states, because the practice of individual expression is not in an organized setting. Also, when the particularity of religious identity is threatened by globalization, religion stresses its organizational dimension rather than the individual dimension to strengthen the differentiation of its identity from other religions. In addition, when nationalist movements push back globalization, religious individuals are less likely to be the target, since the individual practice of religion is private and not in the public sphere. Even though religious individuals can also be involved in transnational networks, states are less worried, because of the limited influence of the individuals. Therefore, as globalization deepens, states do not change how they behave towards individuals.

I hypothesize that:

H2: *Globalization does not have an effect on governments' restrictions of religious freedom for individuals.*

6.4 Data and Methods

This study uses one pooled cross-national time-series data set from the Religion and State data set round 2 containing information about 118 countries on religious restrictions and globalization from the years 1990-2003(even though the actual number of countries and observations included in this study might be less due to the missing data in the variables). Globalization is examined in economic, political and social dimensions. This data set is a panel data set and years nested within countries.

6.4.1 Dependent Variable: Government Religious Restrictions

Religious freedom is an important variable in religion and human rights research projects, but it has never been measured directly, because most freedoms can only be measured by the degree to which they are denied. Religious freedom has been measured by states' violation of religious freedom norms by different researchers, such as Government Religious Restrictions Index (GRI) by Pew research center, RAS2 dataset by Jonathon Fox, International Religious Freedom dataset by Brian Grim and Roger Finke, and CIRI Human Rights Data Project by David Richards at el.

The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations (GRR_{org}) and religious restrictions on individuals (GRR_{ind}). Those two variables are two factors derived from the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 2015). More detailed explanations of the two factors and the factor analysis are to follow. The RAS2 dataset uses detailed indicators to measure *Regulation of and Restrictions on the Majority*

Religion and All Religions (NX) and each indicator ranges from 0 (no restrictions) to 3 (large scales of restrictions). This dataset was collected upon multiple sources and has high internal validity.

6.4.2 Independent Variables:

6.4.2.1 Globalization

The KOF index of Globalization by the Swiss economic institute is used to measure globalization. It conceptualizes globalization as a process that "erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence" (KOF Globalization Index codebook, 2016). The overall index includes economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. In each dimension, the index is both measured in the de jure aspect of globalization and also the de facto aspect. De jure means the institutional characteristics, laws and policies that make globalization possible; de facto globalization is the actual amount of the exchanges of the goods, capitals, communications, information and etc. There are also 24 sub-dimension questions to evaluate the three dimensions of globalization to generate a comprehensive measure of globalization.

The KOF index defines the economic globalization as actual economic flows between countries and the level of restrictions of capital and trade flows which act as significant obstacles to market access. Social globalization is measured by the personal contacts among people living in different countries, information flows from different countries, and cultural proximity. Political globalization is measured by the degree of a country's political integration through diplomatic relations with the rest of the world and participation in peace missions and international relations. Each variable was transformed into an index on a 0 to 10 scale. Higher values denote the higher degrees of globalization. The aggregate measure of globalization is scaled as an index going from 0 to 100. The higher values mean higher levels of globalization.

The values are calculated by the percentiles of the original distribution. The weights of the sub-indices are determined by the principle components analysis for the entire sample of countries and years. This method allows the index captures more variance in the data. The three dimensions of globalization are highly correlated with the aggregate globalization variable and the three dimensions are also correlated with each other, though to a lesser extent (Table 6.1). Therefore, globalization and the three dimensions are tested individually in the statistical models to avoid the multicollinearity problem.

Table 6. 1 Correlations between the Dimensions of Globalization

Variable 1	Variable 2	Correlation	P Value
Globalization	Economic Globalization	0.80	0.00
Globalization	Social Globalization	0.81	0.00
Globalization	Political Globalization	0.74	0.00
Economic Globalization	Political Globalization	0.25	0.00
Social Globalization	Political Globalization	0.28	0.00
Economic Globalization	Social Globalization	0.82	0.00

6.4.2.2 Control Variables:

To follow the line of research in international human rights and religious freedom, I control the same variables as chapters 4 and 5. I also include a dummy variable (Ratification), which is coded as 1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0, and the presence of HROs is operationalized as the number of HROs within each country (J. Smith and Wiest 2005).

The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
GRR_{org}	1,494	0.0	1.0	-1.4	-0.5	-0.03	4.0
GRR_{ind}	1,494	-0.0	1.0	-0.6	-0.2	-0.1	8.2
Overall globalization	1,472	50.3	18.0	17.3	36.4	61.8	91.9
Economic globalization	1,442	51.3	18.7	7.8	38.5	63.0	98.6
Political globalization	1,486	60.9	22.3	3.1	41.8	81.5	98.3
Social glob	1,472	41.7	22.2	7.1	23.1	56.1	93.6
RATIF	1,494	0.9	0.4	0	1	1	1
HROs	1,494	38.4	23.4	1	20.7	51	139
Ratification	1,494	14.0	9.7	0	5	22	36
POLITY2	1,494	3.8	6.3	-10	-2	9	10
Population	1,494	16.2	1.5	11.2	15.3	17.1	20.8
GDP	1,494	23.7	2.2	18.9	22.1	25.4	30.1
GDPgrowth	1,494	3.2	5.3	-50.2	1.6	5.6	35.2
Internal war	1,494	0.7	1.6	0	0	0	10
External war	1,494	0.03	0.3	0	0	0	4
Regime duration	1,494	22.4	31.2	0	4	30	194
Islam %	1,494	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.002	0.3	1.0
Christian %	1,494	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.9	1.0
Religious Diversity	1,494	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.7	1.0	1.0
Religious Establishment	1,494	0.2	0.4	0	0	0	1

6.4.3 Statistical Modeling

Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the "within" effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity

across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will test the following models:

Fixed Effect Models: $GRR_{org}/GRR_{ind} = (\alpha_i+\theta_t) + \beta_1 Globalization + \beta_2\ Z_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

In this model, α_i is the individual effect and θ_t is the time effect. α_i captures the effects that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas θ_t captures effects that are specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. First, important international events such as the end of Cold War happened during 1990-2008. Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades that human rights data are inflated due to the higher of accountability and better data collection methods (Fariss 2017). Taking account of fixed effect of years helps alleviate this problem. ε_{it} is the error term in this model. Z_{it} is a matrix of control variables including ratification of ICCPR, number of HROs, political regime, judiciary independence, population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, internal war and external war and the regime duration, and percentage of Christians and Muslims, religious diversity and official state religion.

6.5 Results

6.5.1 Effect of Globalization on the Protection of Religious Rights for Organizations

The results from the base model and the full model estimating the effects of globalization on the protection of religious freedom support my hypothesis 1. In table 6.3, it is clear that political and social globalization are both positively related to the restrictions on religious freedom for organizations. When political and social globalization increases one unit, the restrictions on religious organization increase by 0.3% standard deviation. The effect sizes are same. When all

the control variables are included in the model, the model results from table 6.3 indicate that all dimensions of globalization and the overall globalization are all positively related to the restrictions of religious organizations. Political, social, and overall globalization have a bigger effect than economic globalization. This means that as countries become more globalized economically, politically and socially, the restrictions on the religious organizations also become more severe. Globalization establishes new ties and strengthens ties between countries through trade, political interactions, social communications, and etc. Inevitably, globalization have exposed the local religions to value systems from new religions, and religious nationalists push the government to make policies to restrict and control new minority religions, and therefore, the religious restrictions increase. Because groups are public and social, and pose a bigger threat to the local religions and the government, therefore, they are more likely to be restricted.

In addition, globalization has been enabling religious groups to connect with transnational religious organizations with the advancement of technology and communication tools. Because governments are suspicious of the foreign connections religious groups have and afraid of the exposure of their human rights violations, and the following naming and shaming events. Therefore, governments might preempt and control religious groups tightly as the globalization trends deepen.

Table 6.3 : Model Results for Religious Organizations

	Restrictions on Religious Organizations							
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
Economic globalization	0.002**				0.002*			
	(0.001)				(0.001)			
political globalization		0.004***				0.004***		
		(0.001)				(0.001)		
social globalization			0.004***				0.005***	
			(0.001)				(0.002)	
overall globalization				0.006***				0.009***
				(0.001)				(0.002)
Ratification of ICCPR					-0.059**	0.011	0.029	0.011
					(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
HROs					0.0004	-0.0003	-0.001	-0.002**
					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democracy	0.00002	-0.001	0.0002	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.00000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log(Population)	0.240***	0.292***	0.293***	0.256***	0.248***	0.294***	0.290***	0.264***
	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
log(GDP)	0.010	-0.031	-0.044	-0.048*	0.006	-0.028	-0.041	-0.037
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
GDP Growth	-0.012**	-0.009	-0.011*	-0.010	-0.015**	-0.009	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Internal War	-0.030	-0.023	-0.022	-0.020	-0.033*	-0.022	-0.019	-0.015
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
External War	-0.001	0.001	0.0003	0.0001	-0.001	0.001	0.0003	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
New Regime	-0.006	0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.009	0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Judiciary	0.192	0.207	0.140	0.179	0.207	0.197	0.117	0.128
	(0.159)	(0.186)	(0.188)	(0.187)	(0.160)	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.189)
Christianity(%)	0.067	0.007	0.155	0.040	0.137	0.004	0.135	0.082
	(0.307)	(0.366)	(0.367)	(0.367)	(0.311)	(0.370)	(0.372)	(0.370)
Islam(%)	0.016	0.017	0.003	0.013	0.024	0.016	-0.001	0.013

	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Religious Diversity	0.343***	0.345***	0.352***	0.350***	0.349***	0.343***	0.346***	0.334***
	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
N	1442	1486	1472	1472	1442	1486	1472	1472
R-squared	0.059	0.062	0.055	0.063	0.064	0.063	0.056	0.066
Adj. R-squared	-0.030	-0.027	-0.035	-0.027	-0.027	-0.028	-0.036	-0.025

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

6.5.2 Effect of Globalization on the Protection of Religious Rights for Individuals

The model results regarding the influence of globalization on the protection of religious individuals' rights mostly support hypothesis 2. The model results are quite consistent in table 6.4. The effects of three dimensions of globalization and the overall globalization are all statistically insignificant, which supports hypothesis 2. Therefore, globalization does not have a consistent and robust effect on the protection of religious rights for individuals. The null findings might indicate that governments see individual level of practice of their religions as less threatening as the deepening of globalization, and impose less restrictions on individual believers.

Table 6.4 : Model Results for Religious Individuals

	Restrictions on Religious Individuals							
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
economic globalization	0.001				0.001			
	(0.001)				(0.001)			
political globalization		-0.001				-0.001		
		(0.001)				(0.001)		
social globalization			-0.0001				0.001	
			(0.001)				(0.002)	
overall globalization				-0.001				0.0003
				(0.001)				(0.002)

Ratification of ICCPR					0.051	0.050	0.047	0.046
					(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
HROs					-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democracy	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log(Population)	-0.089	-0.075	-0.088	-0.081	-0.085	-0.078	-0.090	-0.085
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
log(GDP)	-0.069**	-0.058**	-0.063**	-0.060**	-0.057*	-0.052*	-0.057*	-0.053*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)
GDP Growth	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.00001	0.001	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Internal War	0.040*	0.038	0.040*	0.039	0.044*	0.040*	0.045*	0.043*
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
External War	0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
New Regime	0.021	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.023
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Judiciary	-0.086	-0.098	-0.089	-0.090	-0.122	-0.121	-0.139	-0.120
	(0.206)	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.206)	(0.200)	(0.204)	(0.203)
Christianity(%)	0.527	0.580	0.516	0.534	0.524	0.535	0.497	0.497
	(0.396)	(0.393)	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.402)	(0.396)	(0.397)	(0.397)
Islam(%)	-0.014	-0.017	-0.014	-0.015	-0.020	-0.023	-0.021	-0.020
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Religious Diversity	-0.033	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-0.047	-0.040	-0.046	-0.044
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)
N	1442	1486	1472	1472	1442	1486	1472	1472
R-squared	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.019	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.021
Adj. R-squared	-0.074	-0.073	-0.074	-0.074	-0.072	-0.072	-0.073	-0.073

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

6.6 Conclusions and Discussions

Despite the burgeoning studies into connections between the level of states' integration in the global system and their respect for human rights, the relationship between the globalization

and governments' respect for religious freedom is less explored. This study examines the relationship between the aggregate level and three dimensions of globalization and states' respect for religious freedom, which will contribute to the scholarship in both human rights and the religious freedom studies. This study expands the study of human rights into religious freedom, the spiritual integrity right. The key contribution this study makes to human rights studies is that it differentiates the two dimensions of human rights: individual and groups. Due to the dual nature of human rights, globalization can have different influences on the protection of group and individual dimensions of religious freedom.

This study finds that overall globalization and its political, economic and social dimensions unfortunately have contributed to the rise of religious restrictions for groups. Globalization increases the frequency of contact and exchanges between people across borders and poses threats to the local religious values and identities people hold. This in turn leads people to fight back against globalization to preserve their religious and national identities. Also, the transnational networks of religious groups make these organizations are even more threatening to the government as globalization furthers. Therefore, the governments tighten their control of religious groups with the deepening of globalization. In contrast, religious individuals are less threatening to governments in the increasingly globalized world, because religious individuals practice their religions in private.

This study has the following merits: First, this study expands the study of human rights into religious freedom, which is a less explored human rights in the scientific study of human rights. Second, this study not only examines the effects of all dimensions of globalization, but takes account of the dual dimensions of religious freedom. I use two datasets with a comprehensive measure for religious restrictions and a measure of states' integration into the

international system. The KOF globalization Index not only includes three dimensions of globalization, but also the institutional characteristics and policies.

This study also has policy implications. Facing the difficulties in religious freedom protection globally, this study might offer some insights on the new solutions to protect religious freedom. Despite the efforts to protect religious freedom since the Second World War by the United Nations, INGOs, and some western liberal states, many governments still restrict religions and persecute religious groups and individuals. Due to the lack of enforcement mechanism of international human rights instruments, states cannot easily be held accountable for their actions. Globalization seems to make states more suspicious of religious groups and tighten their control over groups. Therefore, policy makers, activists and international community should pay more attention to and come up with new solutions to better protect religious groups, and other group dimension of human rights.

7 Conclusion

As globalization has deepened in the past a few decades, states have become more interdependent and international affairs also more interwoven, but the violations of international human rights are still widespread. The international community has made great efforts to improve the protection of human rights since the end of the World War II. International norm of human rights is increasingly being internalized by states with more and more states ratifying human rights treaties. International human rights organizations are also making grass roots level efforts to mobilize dissenters, persuade powerholders, acculturate government officials, diffuse norms, and name and shame. This study explores whether states have improved their practice in religious freedom in this increasing globalized world, and whether the efforts made by the international community, including international law and human rights organizations, are effective in the protection of religious freedom.

Spiritual integrity rights have been marginalized in the scientific literature on human rights. I believe that is a serious oversight, and it is what motivated this study. Indeed, religious freedom has historically played a central role in the human rights discourse. Knowing where, when, and why these rights are violated is thus important for understanding "human rights" writ large. However, it is also important because better protection of religious freedom leads to improvements in societal well-being more generally (Hertzke 2018).

Religious freedom is conducive to democracy and the protection of other civil liberties. Even though democracy is a proven antidote to human rights violations, especially the freedom of religious institutions, religious freedom can in turn promote regime transition to democracy. Liberal democracy tolerates religious institutions operate freely, and religions tolerate states to

have authority in civil matters (Stepan 2000). Huntington also argues that the theological embrace of religious freedom by the Catholic church at Vatican II enabled the church to catalyze the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993). The free practice of Christian missionaries also played a big role in the spread of democracy (Woodberry 2012). Religious freedom is positively correlated with women's empowerment (Grim and Finke 2010), and government and social restrictions are associated with gender inequality (Grim and Lyon 2015). Religious restrictions can also lead to genocide and mass atrocity. For example, the Muslim Rohingya minority groups were mass killed because of the intolerance of their religious identity. Groups and individuals belonging to Christian and Islam communities are being targeted in genocide in Central African Republic, because of their religious identities. Therefore, religious freedom can be a preventative measure for genocide.

Religious freedom can also lead to economic development. Religious freedom of individuals and groups often leads to religious diversity in a society, which facilitates trade, entrepreneurship and growth of economic activities (Gill 2013). Freedom of religion also attracts creative, risk-taking and pioneering individuals and groups to develop businesses and increases the rate of economic growth (Gill and Owen 2017). On the other hand, government restrictions on religion produce social hostilities, which would undermine economic growth (Grim, Clark, and Snyder 2014).

Religious freedom also leads to a better security for a society. Religious freedom can address the problems of terrorism, fanaticism, religious conflict and despotism (Farr 2008). Religion has great political influence, and the restrictions of religion often lead to wars and chaos (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), and persecution and violence (Grim and Finke 2010). Therefore, religious freedom is an important condition for peace and stability. Religious restrictions also lead

to religious terrorism and violence, because restrictive environment facilitate radical theologies (Saiya 2018). Religious liberty is a weapon of peace to combat terrorism. Repressions promote militant political theologies, which is a key threat to stability and peace. When various religious groups have freedom of religion and join forces together, their faith based activism work promotes international human rights and shapes American foreign policy (Hertzke 2006).

Another contribution this study makes to the scientific literature on human rights is to theoretically and empirically differentiate between the individual and the group dimensions of rights provision. Built off the western liberal tradition, human rights are held to be universal for individuals (Donnelly 2013). Even though there are potential pitfalls of embracing group rights as human rights (Donnelly 2013), I argue that both individual and group dimensions of human rights need to be taken account for in the study of international human rights. Human rights are comprised of individual and group dimensions. The social and communitarian dimension of religious practice is integral to religious rights. Denying the practice of religion by groups can lead to the compromise of the individual practice of religion. For example, some religions mandate communal worship in groups settings such as churches. Denying and restricting the legal existence or practice of churches and other religious groups also imposes restrictions on the individuals' free practice of religion. Therefore, I take account for both individual and group dimensions of religious freedom in the empirical chapters to examine the effects of various factors on the protection of religious freedom. Empirically, the results of factor analysis of the RAS 2 dataset indicate that religious freedom indeed has two dimensions: individual and group.

Individual and group rights are inherently different. Individual rights provision is *less threatening* to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also *less visible*; group rights provision is *more threatening* to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing

these rights is also *more visible*. Because of the theoretical difference between religious groups and individuals, the international forces, such as globalization, international law and HROs, render different effects on the protection of religious group versus individual rights.

Globalization as a general force is fueling nationalist backlash and challenging states' authority, causing governments to impose new restrains on religious rights – particularly those at the group-level. Why religious groups are targeted more harshly under the backdrop of globalization? It is because religious groups are more threatening to the majority religion and state authorities. As the cross-national connections between the political, economic, and social actors grow, religious groups resort to institutionalized forms to strengthen their identities. As the perceived threat of religious groups to governments grows, states tighten their control of religious groups as the globalization deepens. However, globalization does not significantly influence how states treat religious individuals, because individuals pose less of a threat to the status of a majority religion and the government's rule of the country.

At the same time, however, there are also international solutions to the challenge brought by globalization. The international community has made efforts to better protect religious and other human rights in both top-down and bottom-up processes. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is especially effective in the protection of religious rights for groups. States improve how they treat religious groups after their ratification of ICCPR; the longer they have ratified, the better they behave towards religious groups. Because religious groups are in the public, restrictions on the groups are overt and easily to be exposed. To avoid being criticized by the UN human rights council and other third-party actors, states tend to comply with their international legal commitments and change policies and practice towards groups. However, states compensate for the concessions they make and tighten their control of religious individuals. Restrictions and persecution of religious individuals are covert and private;

therefore, they are harder to be observed and exposed. The technical difficulties involved with the protection of individual rights are also exacerbated by the principal agent problem. Local government and police force could abuse their power and endanger the individual rights such as religious freedom.

HROs are also able to address religious restrictions in a bottom up process. The domestic presence of HROs is effective in improving conditions for religious groups but not for individuals, because the domestic HROs can help the local religious groups to mobilize and pressure the governments to change their policy and also help ease the tension by mediating between the government and the groups and reducing the political repercussions from social movements. However, naming and shaming campaigns by transnational advocacy networks can reduce the level of religious restrictions on individuals but not on groups. Because the restrictions of religious individuals are private and covert, when the transnational advocacy networks transmit the information to the international audience and expose their rights violations, states are forced to change how they treat individuals due to the increased reputational costs. Because restrictions on groups are in the public, naming and shaming campaigns do not necessarily create new information. Thus, they do not influence the rights protection for religious groups.

In addition, some common predictors of human rights conditions also have divergent effects on the two dimensions of religious rights. Due to the different nature of rights of religious individuals versus groups, some factors exert significant influence on the protection of religious groups but not on individuals. The restrictions on religious groups increase when the population and GDP growth rate grow. Because population growth increases the competition for natural resources, and GDP growth rate is in tandem with the unequal distribution of wealth, groups are

in the public and more visible and more threatening to the authority and majority groups in the country, therefore, they are more likely to be the target of the government restrictions. Having a religious establishment is also related to a higher level of religious restrictions. Because of the marriage of the government with a religion, the perceived threat to the government and established religion by other religious groups is aggravated. Therefore, religious establishment especially increases the level of restrictions on religious groups but not for religious individuals.

On the contrary, some other domestic factors have an effect on the protection of religious individuals' rights, but not and effect on the protection of religious groups. For example, the size of GDP, the percentage of trade in GDP and democracy are positively related to a higher level of rights protection for individuals, but not for groups. With the bigger size of GDP, there is less competition for resources in the nation, therefore, repression is reduced for individuals. Also, with the deepening of integration into the international community, states are more likely to comply with international human rights protection norms and less concerned with political competition, therefore, the level of restrictions on individuals are reduced. After states become more democratic, they generally respect individual citizens' civil liberties more. The cost of repression is also higher in more democratic societies where citizens can hold leaders accountable for and sanction repressive behavior; cost of repression is lower in authoritarian regimes. However, groups continue to pose a bigger threat to the authority and majority factions, therefore, these factors are not able to exert significant influence on groups.

A better understanding of religious freedom has great implications for the theoretical and policy development in human rights. To better protect religious freedom, we need to have a fuller understanding of what measures are effective and what are not. Because of the different dimensions of religious freedom, almost all factors proven to be related to the conditions of

human rights work on the two dimensions differently. Due to the divergent effects of these factors, the international community needs to be more aware of these differences, strengthening the positive effects and diminishing the negative effects. Therefore, the international community can strengthen the effect of the positive factors and improve the effects of factors which are underperforming.

Due to the different natures of religious rights for groups versus individuals, it is clear that groups seem to hold a bigger leverage against the governments. Governments perceive a bigger threat from and are more suspicious of groups, but they are also under the more pressure to change their policy under the pressure of the political disruptions caused by social movements led by groups. Because of the advantages of religious groups hold, they can use their leverage to better help the relatively weaker religious individuals to bargain with the governments. However, there are also specific measures to improve religious freedom for groups and individuals respectively based on the empirical findings in this study.

Some domestic and international measures are proven to be effective in protection of religious rights for individuals, so the international community should work to strengthen their effects. First, democratization and economic development should be promoted. As the states become more democratic, they restrict religious practice of individuals less. Due to enhanced political competition and increased costs for repression, states are generally less likely to engage in repressive behaviors. As the economy develops, the competition for resources is decreased, therefore, states engage in less repressive behavior also. Second, some international solutions are proven to be effective in the protection of religious individuals. Strengthening the trade relations with other countries are helpful in the protection of individual rights. As states are more connected with international market with trade relations, they are also less likely to limit

religious freedom for individuals. Naming and shaming campaigns by transnational advocacy networks are also effective in bringing external pressure to force states to improve rights practice. Maintaining peace and stability is also crucial for the better protection of religious rights for individuals, because wars with other states increase the level of restrictions on religious individuals.

There are also some solutions to the restrictions on religious groups. Two domestic measures are especially effective in reducing religious restrictions for groups. First, a well-protected civil society is able to provide support to religious groups; therefore, it is useful in the better protection of religious groups. Second, a political system which differentiates religion from government also provides better protection for the religious rights of groups. Internationally, the norm in human rights protection should continue to be promoted and induce more states to join human rights treaties. An international legal commitment is useful in a better protection of group religious rights due to higher reputational costs from the visibility of violation of the group rights.

The dual nature of religious freedom provides new insights how the global community can better protect religious freedom, but also not only points a promising new direction in the study of human rights. This study makes contribution in the advancement of theoretical development in human rights by providing empirically grounded theoretical arguments that the two dimensions of human rights are different and the factors used to explain variations in human rights influence the two dimensions differently. The effects of international factors, including globalization, international law, and HROs, are different on these two dimensions. The effects of other domestic factors such as GDP, population and wars also have different effects on the protection of the two dimensions of human rights.

Broadly speaking, this study also provides evidence that supports the liberal and constructivism international relations traditions. Even though realists argue that power and self-interest are key factors that constraining states' behavior, liberals believe in the important roles that international institutions such as international law and NGOs play in international relations. Keohane (1984) argues that most of the international agreements are self-enforcing, and reputation can explain states' conformance to international law (Keohane 1984). This study finds that states tend to modify their behavior regarding the protection of religious rights for groups due to the higher reputational costs to them in comparison to religious individuals under the pressure of international legal commitment. This study also supports the constructivism theory that NGOs play a positive role in promoting the norm of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The norm of human rights matters, because the "norm entrepreneurs" in HROs are able to alter state behaviors in the protection of individual religious rights through naming and shaming campaigns. In addition, this study also provides support to the importance of ideas and identities in international politics. Globalization has posed threats to particularized religious beliefs and identities, therefore, there has been backlash against globalization through the tightening restrictions on religious groups.

However, we also need to be cautious to make any conclusive arguments on the applicability of the main paradigms in international relations theory. This study is limited in the temporal scope, because it covers the quantitative analysis from the years 1990 to 2003. The recent developments in international relations over the last ten years might challenge the some of conclusions I have drawn in this study. For example, there has been an anti-democracy trend in the world along with populism and nationalist movements, and democracies such as the U.S. have taken isolationist stances in international relations and are withdrawing from institutions

such as the UN human rights council. These developments might weaken the effect of international institutions and norms in human rights protection. In addition, some authoritarian regimes have adopted more advanced monitoring tools to watch citizens' behaviors. Therefore, the theoretical foundation that individual restrictions are harder to be observed than group restrictions might need to be revised if this trend is widespread among countries. All in all, it is not clear that these trends in the past ten years have altered the patterns I discovered in this cross national study, but it is necessary to collect data after 2003 and conduct further analysis to examine the protection of religious groups rights versus individual rights. This points at a new direction for future studies in religious freedom by taking account of the above trends with a longer span of time.

The future study of international human rights should also take account of the dual nature of individual and group dimensions when examining the causes and effects of human rights violations. An overlook of the two dimensions can hinder the theoretical development of international human rights study. The two dimensions of human rights is not a unique concept in religious freedom but can be applied in other kinds of human rights, such as labors' rights, women's rights, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly. A complete understanding of human rights can be gained when the two dimensions of rights are considered together. Studies can be conducted on how various domestic and international factors influence to what extent governments respect other kinds of rights for groups and individuals, which will strengthen the external validity of the findings in this study. After all, individuals' rights are less threatening, but violations are less visible, but group rights are more threatening, but violation are more visible. Governments' interactions with groups and individuals can be different, due to the altered motivations based on the dual nature of human rights. It would be a promising direction

to examine whether the results for the effects of international factors on religious freedom hold true for other kinds of human rights.

In addition, more study can be done on how the two dimensions of human rights influence factors such as democracy, economic development and protection of other human rights. It is challenging to establish the causal relationships between the protection of human rights and these factors. Due to the overlook of existing studies on the dual nature of human rights, taking account of the dual nature of human rights might be helpful in exploring the causal effects of human rights. Do the two dimensions of rights influence the level of democratization and economic development in a country differently? Liberation of group rights seems to be a bigger compromise the states make to the civil society and might be in turn more inducive to a higher level of democratization. Freedom of groups may also give individuals the freedom to participate in various group activities and promote the economic development in a society.

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