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TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE, 1884-1929

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UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN THE
TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE, 1884-1929

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PREFACE

This is not the first study of the Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru, as a glance at the bibliography of this dissertation will indicate. It is, however, the first history of United States diplomacy connected with that disagreement. And more important, it is the first work of this nature made essentially--almost exclusively--from primary sources.

The basic purpose of this dissertation is to examine the functioning of United States diplomacy during the Tacna-Arica dispute. It makes no pretense of giving a complete history of the controversy. Several phases of the argument have been omitted because of the limitation placed upon the subject. For example, the attempted plebiscite is dealt with only in so far as it affected the eventual results of American diplomacy. A complete history of the plebiscitary attempt from manuscript sources remains to be done, and there is available in the National Archives of the United States ample material, conveniently arranged, to write such a study. Likewise, no attempt is made here to recount the interesting but futile effort of Bolivia to be included in the many discussions of the settlement of the dispute since

her interests involved little more than sentimentality and since her position was one which can best be described as extra-legal. The documentation available for this phase of the settlement is also voluminous and unused, although scattered within the official Department of State files in the National Archives.

There is available in the Tacna-Arica dispute an excellent case history in United States diplomacy. United States interest in the quarrel began with a particular act and ended after a satisfactory settlement was arranged. The task of studying the problem resolved itself into one of examining all the pertinent documentation lying between the terminal dates. Although few generalities can be made to describe American diplomacy during the myriad phases of the dispute, it is possible to say that United States interest ran the gamut from complete unconcern to active participation and back to mere "official interest." Perhaps the most consistent policy of the Department of State was that of conciliation. By examining this rather long period, one is able to derive not only an indication of how United States foreign policy was formulated during the 1920's but also of how that policy was implemented.

Acknowledging the help which one has received in a task such as writing a dissertation is always a pleasant experience even though words cannot possibly relay the gratitude which the author actually feels. Former United

States Ambassador to Chile William Smith Culbertson was most generous to me with both his time and his personal records. Dr. Culbertson is one of those rare diplomats who has a sense of history, as his personal records on the Tacna-Arica dispute indicate. From him I received many valuable insights into the topic. Dr. E. Taylor Parks in the Historian's Office of the Department of State deserves special thanks for suggesting the topic to me. I freely used his patience, his time, and his knowledge of diplomatic history that afternoon when we discovered that a previous topic which I had selected for a dissertation had recently been completed. Dr. Joseph Vance of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress was of great aid in getting permission for me to use various personal manuscript collections. Mr. Arthur Gropp, Librarian of the Columbus Memorial Library, greatly sped up the research by allowing me the privilege of freely using that fabulous collection of Latin Americana in the Pan-American Union Building. Mrs. Judy Carroll and Mrs. Dowling in the Foreign Affairs Section of the National Archives with their tremendous knowledge of the records available solved more than one knotty procedural problem for me.

Dr. Max L. Moorhead, my major professor, receives a personal kind of thanks for his careful reading of the manuscript and for the valuable suggestions which he made regarding it. The sense of exactness which he instills in


his students is a good quality for all doctoral candidates to be exposed to. And finally, I express my gratitude to Joyce Volts for her valuable help in proofreading the manuscript with me and correcting the typographical errors. By now she surely knows how much I appreciate all that she has done for me in this and other matters.

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NORTHERN HALF OF CHILE

UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN THE
TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE, 1884-1929

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND FOR UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT
IN THE DISPUTE

Latin America has been so plagued with revolutions, coups d'etat, military juntas, and suspensions of constitutional guarantees that more stable areas of the world make light of the situation. North Americans laugh at the revolutionary process and characterize it as something similar to comic opera. Indeed, they regard Latin-American revolutions as little more than the means for one group of scheming politicians, also conveniently stereotyped, to get a "dishonest" administration out of office. That this characterization is inaccurate need not be proved here. The important point is that this lack of understanding of Latin-American political problems is carried over from domestic issues to the international disputes between the various governments.

North Americans generally find it difficult to understand the reasons for the international conflicts and

diplomatic crises which occur "south of the border." To them some of the worst disputes are caused by what appears to be an uninspiring boundary line which gives one country a larger portion of an apparently worthless jungle or of a barren mountain range or of a sun-bleached desert. Although these territorial disputes often appear senseless, they nevertheless many times extend over long periods of time and are far from being humorous to the participants. For example, the Belize dispute between Guatemala and Great Britain covers at least a century and is still a long way from settlement. Argentina and Great Britain have been arguing over the ownership of the Falkland Islands for a similar period, and the solution of that problem seems unlikely in the near future.

Likewise, these disputes vary in intensity from perfunctory exchanges of diplomatic notes to the outbreak of bloody and tragic warfare. Under the present circumstances it is not likely that the Belize dispute will degenerate into an armed conflict, nor will Argentina attempt to wrest control of the Falkland Islands. Yet no rule can be formulated for these disputes and their likelihood to cause a war. Belize and the Falkland Islands are in their own way more important than the seemingly valueless Chaco Boreal, dispute over the ownership of which was the basis of an exhausting war between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930's.

When these international disagreements threaten the

peace of the Western Hemisphere, the United States has generally demonstrated a policy of showing concern for their peaceful settlement. On occasions outright military occupation of some of the southern republics has resulted. But the "Big Stick" has not been the only tool of diplomacy of the United States. Far more frequent has been the prosaic offering of good offices for an amicable solution. The reasoning behind these offers has varied considerably throughout history. At times the United States has regarded the Western Hemisphere as its exclusive domain where, as Secretary of State Richard Olney declared in 1895, "its fiat is law upon subjects to which it confines its interposition." But more often there is a genuine concern for the peace of the hemisphere. This is not to say that United States mediation has always been successful. Looking at the entire history of Latin America, one can say that it has probably failed more times than it has succeeded in resolving international altercations.

At least one settlement of a dispute has caused disagreement among historians as to the effectiveness of United States good offices, namely the disagreement between Chile and Peru over the provinces of Tacna and Arica. Sober Americans can see no reason for its extending from 1884 to 1929 since the issues involved were really quite simple and the area concerned was of little economic value. But more was at stake than a mere re-drawing of boundaries in a

sterile desert. While it is difficult and dangerous for a historian to generalize about the qualities of a race of people, it does seem that Latin Americans are more emotional and volatile than North Americans. And herein lies a significant aspect of the Tacna-Arica dispute. Sentimentality, national honor, dignity, and pride all entered into the settlement of the problem, and all are difficult to explain --and almost impossible to deal with.

In order to discuss the Tacna-Arica dispute with understanding, it will be necessary to examine the geography of the area to learn what was at stake. Then a look at the historical causes for the dispute followed by an examination of United States diplomatic activity will prove useful. Finally, a brief look at the attempts of Chile and Peru to settle their disagreement by themselves before asking for outside help will furnish a background for United States involvement in the Tacna-Arica dispute.

Geographical Setting and Early Boundary Disputes

The provinces of Tacna and Arica together comprise an area, mostly desolate desert, of about 10,000 square miles on the Pacific coast of South America. The northern boundary of Tacna is the Sama river, which enters the Pacific Ocean at 17° 57' S. Lat., and the southern boundary of the province of Arica is the Camarones river at 19° 11' S. Lat. The boundary between the provinces is difficult to place. When they were under the control of Peru, they were of ap-

proximately equal size. But after Chile occupied them in 1883, they were incorporated into one administrative district called Tacna province. On no less than three occasions the boundary between the departments of Tacna and Arica was redrawn so that in 1929 Arica occupied about two-thirds of the area.¹

By far the greater part of Tacna-Arica is barren sub-Andean plateau, destitute of both animal and vegetable life, sloping from the Cordillera Occidental to the ocean. The only regions capable of cultivation are a few narrow valleys which are watered from streams seeping out of the Andes mountains. The Lluta valley, watered by a small stream which comes out of the volcanic cordillera, is moist and enables crops to be raised in a limited area north of the port of Arica. The Azapa valley, about five miles south of the Lluta valley, is less productive. The Tacna valley, the largest in the territory, lies along the course of the small Tacna river, located in the central portion of Tacna district. Three or four other very narrow valleys, a few miles back from the coast, complete the area on which crops may be grown by means of irrigation. Growing crops without benefit of irrigation is impossible since there is almost no rainfall. The cool Peruvian Current, sometimes

¹This dissertation will refer to the Chilean province of Tacna as Tacna-Arica to distinguish it from the towns and separate departments of the same name.

referred to as the Humboldt Current, moves northward along the northern coast of Chile, all the coast of Peru, and the southern coast of Ecuador, and keeps the temperature mild and makes the area one of the driest in the world.² Natives and foreigners alike regard the climate as salubrious and comfortable. The Bolivians use Arica as a year-around beach resort.

About the only part of Tacna-Arica which is of any economic value is the port of Arica, the only green spot along 1,500 miles of barren coastline. In 1925 the town had a population of nearly 4,000. The port can be easily located on a map of South America since it corresponds to that point of the western coast which changes direction from almost due north to north-west. The port may be more accurately described as a roadstead than a harbor since the water is not deep enough near the shore to accommodate deep-draught steamers. Nevertheless, virtually all the commerce of both provinces passes through Arica, as does a large part of Bolivia's coastal trade.

² An excellent résumé of the geographical features of the provinces of Tacna and Arica may be found in Chile, Tacna-Arica Arbitration, the Appendix to the Case of the Republic of Chile Submitted to the President of the United States as Arbitrator [Washington? 1923], pp. 733-62. This part of Chile's case was not contested by Peru. International Bureau of American Republics, The Great Nitrate Fields of Chile (Washington, 1909), pp. 1-45, contains a good geographical description of Antofagasta and Tarapacá. Chile, Tacna-Arica and the Washington Negotiations: Chile-Bolivian Relations (Washington, 1922), pp. 1-16, contains a succinct account of the geography of Tacna-Arica.

The city of Tacna is situated in a fertile oasis about forty-miles from the coast and thirty-three miles north-east of Arica. It is the largest town of the two provinces. In 1925 it was the trade and financial center of the fertile agricultural region with a population of about 12,000.

The provinces have two railway systems. A line about thirty-nine miles long connects the towns of Arica and Tacna. The principal line, however, is the Arica-La Paz railway connecting La Paz with the ocean. The line is 273 miles long and was built by Chile at her own expense. The portion of it lying within Bolivia was given to that country in accordance with treaty obligations. The railroad gives an important outlet for minerals produced in the western part of Bolivia.

The mineral production of Tacna and Arica provinces is negligible. Some deposits of sulphur have been found, but not enough to make extensive and expensive mining operations profitable. In addition, small quantities of common salt, lime, borax, and molybdenum were known to exist in 1925. Nitrates are not found in the area.

The provinces of Tacna and Arica, therefore, are for all practical purposes economically worthless. Nature bequeathed the area only a few minerals, and these are not of great value. Exportation of farm products to the nitrate fields further south was carried on to a limited scale in

the 1920's, but most of the foodstuffs were consumed within the territory. The economic value of the area, therefore, hardly justified the forty-five year quarrel between Chile and Peru over the ownership of the territory. The explanation must be sought elsewhere: in the strategic location of the port of Arica and in national honor.

Indeterminate Boundaries and the Struggle for Nitrates

Until 1883 Peru owned the two provinces of Tacna and Arica as well as the province of Tarapacá directly to the south. The southern boundary of Tarapacá was drawn at the twenty-first parrallel, at which point began the Bolivian province of Antofagasta. The southern boundary of Antofagasta, more difficult to determine, lay somewhere between the twenty-third and twenty-fifth parallels. It will be observed, therefore, that Bolivia had an extensive coastline on the Pacific Ocean and acted as an unintentional buffer between Peru and Chile, whose northern frontier corresponded to Antofagasta's indeterminate southern boundary.

When the republics of South America won their independence from Spain, their frontiers were not well defined. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, when the entire region acknowledged the sovereignty of a single king, there was little reason for provincial boundaries on the Pacific coast of South America. This was especially true for the desolate, almost uninhabited land stretching for about six hundred miles between the port of

Arica and Copiapó, a struggling hamlet in the north of Chile. A boundary in this area could amount to little more than a nicety. After independence, the republics agreed that the rule of uti possidetis in 1810 should determine their boundaries. Spain, never over scrupulous in delineating provincial limits, had drawn a reasonably definite southern boundary for what was to become the Republic of Bolivia, as will be shown.³

Many claims have been made by partisan writers as

³This chapter is to a large degree based on secondary material and purports primarily to summarize the activity of the United States leading up to its formal re-involvement in the Tacna-Arica dispute in 1910. The sources pertaining to related topics are gathered into single general footnotes wherever possible; however, facts important enough to warrant identification of their primary sources are footnoted individually. For information relating to the early difficulties between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru arising out of the nitrate discoveries and the boundary uncertainties, the following references should be consulted: Clements R. Markham, The War between Peru and Chile (London, 1882) is useful on the boundary disputes but has a pro-Peruvian bias; Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacífico, I (Santiago, 1911) is the classic account of the War of the Pacific and is an excellent counter-balance to Markham's work just cited; Manuel M. Salinas, Derecho de Bolivia a la soberanía del desierto de Atacama (Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1860) rounds out the three-sided argument by reprinting many of the royal cédulas pertaining to the Atacama boundary; Francisco J. San Roman, Estudios i datos practicos sobre la cuestiones internacionales de límites entre Chile, Bolivia i República Argentina (Santiago, 1896) is important for succinctly putting forth the Chilean claims in the Atacama region; Miguel Luis Amunátegui, La cuestión de límites entre Chile i Bolivia (Santiago, 1863) traces the historical antecedents giving favor to Chile; Rafael Egaña, The Tacna-Arica Question: Historical Antecedents, Diplomatic Action and Present State of the Affair (Santiago, 1900) is an official Chilean history of the growth of the boundaries northward.

to where the exact boundary between Chile and Bolivia originally lay. Disinterested scholars, however, have been fairly well able to reconstruct the general situation as it existed at the time of independence. When Bolivia, as the province of Charcas, was transferred from the authority of the viceroy at Lima to that of the newly-created viceroyalty at Buenos Aires in 1776, its authorized boundaries were those delineated by the ninth and twelfth laws of title fifteen of the second book of the Laws of the Indies. This established its southern limit--the northern boundary of Chile--at 25° S. Lat. Other official enactments prior to the wars of liberation confirmed this limit. However, all five constitutions of the Republic of Chile drafted between 1822 and 1833 were less precise, asserting merely that its northern boundary was the desert of Atacama.

The desert of Atacama extends roughly from 27° to 23° S. Lat. It is composed of a series of dry salt basins at an altitude of about 2,000 feet. There is practically no vegetation, and in some places rain has never been recorded. Bolivia regarded this entire region as its province of Antofagasta while Chile nominally exercised jurisdiction to 25° and sometimes claimed as far north as 23°. The area between 23° and 21° fell within the unquestioned authority of Bolivia. With the exception of an occasional valley watered by a stream tumbling down from the slopes of the Andes, the whole region was barren, sun-bleached

desert, barely able to sustain its own meager population. The question of boundaries, therefore, remained wholly an academic one until about 1840 when the discovery was made that the rich nitrate and guano deposits of the region were commercially valuable.

Alexander Cochet, a French adventurer, was responsible for altering the amiable indifference of the governments concerned regarding their boundaries in the desert of Atacama. In 1826 General Agustín Gamarra, later President of Peru, encouraged Cochet to conduct scientific experiments and exploitation of the natural resources of the country. On concluding his work, Cochet confined his report to the Peruvian government to two substances found in the area: guano and caliche (salt peter). His was the first formal statement attaching commercial significance to the tremendous guano deposits. The Incas had long used these accumulations of bird droppings for fertilizer, and Cochet felt that the substance could now be exploited on a grand scale. Of more importance were his findings on the extensive caliche beds in the province of Tarapacá. He demonstrated the practicality of converting this into nitrate of potash, the basic substance required for both fertilizers and explosives, and proposed, for a proper consideration, to reveal the details of his discovery to the Peruvian government. But to his every request the government turned a deaf ear. Duped by a dishonest partner in his attempt to

exploit the substances himself, Cochet published his findings in 1841. This disclosure produced immediate results. The Peruvian government began licensing private companies to exploit the natural resources of the region.

Peru's good fortune did not escape Chile's notice. As President of Chile, General Manuel Bulnes took steps in 1842 to make certain that his country overlooked no opportunity to exploit what guano might be found within the national domain. He sent an expedition in that year to explore as far north as Mejillones, at 23° S. Lat., in search of guano, and when it returned, he made a report to Congress which indirectly laid claim to all territory south of 23° 6'.⁴

The Chilean Congress gave validity to Bulnes' claim by nationalizing all guano deposits as far north as Mejillones, thereby claiming jurisdiction to 23° S. Lat. Bolivia immediately protested this act. Intermittent diplomatic exchanges followed until finally in 1846 Bolivia sent an armed force which dislodged the Chilean contingent occupying Mejillones. For the next ten years Bolivia was left unmolested in its control of the territory lying between the twenty-fifth and twenty-first parallels. During this period the Bolivian government itself, sufficiently distracted by a quick succession of "barracks Presidents," did nothing to

⁴Bulnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, reprints General Bulnes' speech and the nationalizing act passed by the Chilean Congress.

exploit the riches of the area. However, it granted licenses for this purpose to all applicants, and these concessions usually involved a combination of English capital, Chilean labor, and Yankee ships.

In 1857 Chile took advantage of a period of civil strife within Bolivia to reoccupy Mejillones with another small force of troops. The Bolivian government once again protested strongly and drew from Chile promises of a quick settlement. Chile did not withdraw its forces, however, and in 1863 the Bolivian Congress authorized the President to declare war on Chile whenever he saw fit. Despite the offers of mediation by Peru and the United States, Bolivia persisted in her course, and war seemed imminent. A conflict was prevented for the time being by Spain's effort to reassert her authority on the Pacific coast of South America.

A united front of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru now faced Spain in its quixotic attempt to seize the Chincha Islands. Old bitternesses were submerged for the common cause of defense, and Chile and Bolivia reached a boundary understanding in the Treaty of Santiago, ratified by both governments in 1866. This agreement specified that: (1) the boundary would be fixed at 24° S. Lat.; (2) both countries would share the proceeds from the export taxes on guano and minerals in the zone between 23° and 25°; (3) the Bolivian customs house at Mejillones would handle all ex-

ports from this zone, with provision for free inspection of its accounts by Chilean agents; and (4) the two governments would agree on a joint policy respecting the marketing and taxation of guano and minerals.⁵ In effect, a condominium was created.

Even with good intentions such an agreement would have proved difficult to administer, for a basic tenet of international law had been broken, that is, the sovereignty of an area had been divided. But good intentions did not exist in either of the two countries. Bolivia felt that it had given up a legitimate claim to its own territory; Chile felt that the joint customs arrangement was an inadequate quid pro quo for the forfeiture of her claim to 23° S. Lat., and complications over the implementation of the treaty arose almost immediately.⁶

Rich nitrate deposits were found near the Bolivian town of Antofagasta, and Chilean capital and labor exploited the discovery. The treaty failed to define clearly the

⁵Recopilación de tratados y convenciones celebrados entre la República de Chile y las potencias extranjeras, (6 vols.; Santiago, 1894-99), II, pp. 142-48. Hereinafter cited as Recopilación de tratados. Chile, La línea de frontera con la República de Bolivia (Santiago, 1910) is primarily concerned with boundaries after 1866 and presents documents to substantiate Chilean claims.

⁶For information on the diplomacy leading up to the War of the Pacific, see further Bulnes, op. cit.; Markham, op. cit.; Egas, op. cit. Gonzalo Bulnes, Las causas de la guerra entre Chile y el Perú (Santiago, 1919) purports to be impartial but builds a strong Chilean case. Pedro Irigoyen, Counter-Manifest of the Government of Peru (New York, 1879) is a justification of Peruvian activity.

meaning of the term "minerals," and now Bolivia wished to tax this new product at will. Furthermore, in 1870 a rich lode of silver was discovered by Chilean prospectors at Caracoles, in the interior near the twenty-third parallel. Several thousand Chilean miners descended upon this region and thereby complicated the task of determining whether the mines were north of the twenty-third parallel and thus under the exclusive control of Bolivia.

The Treaty of Santiago in 1866, therefore, did not settle the boundary question between Chile and Bolivia but rather raised new issues. It did, however, provide Chile with the opportunity to cover its economic penetration of the disputed zone with an aura of legality.

While Chile and Bolivia were virtually at the brink of war, Peru was enjoying a period of prosperity. From 1842, when the guano deposits were nationalized, until 1861 the sale of guano gave Peru 18,000,000 pounds sterling, a truly princely sum for so poor a country. It amounted to approximately three-fourths of the government's total revenue. A peak was reached between 1861 and 1875 in the sale of guano, giving Peru an aggregate income of 33,383,628 pounds sterling. Regardless of this apparently favorable development, Peru's financial situation deteriorated to such an extent that the government faced bankruptcy. The explanation, briefly, of this anomalous condition lies in the waste and corruption within the government, the over-

extension of public works, and the almost total neglect of development of other natural resources. And to make matters worse, by 1875 the guano market faced impressive competition from Bolivian nitrates.

Peru owned large undeveloped deposits of nitrates in the province of Tarapacá, but nevertheless looked longingly to the south at the huge Bolivian fields in Antofagasta which were being developed under Chilean auspices. So great was the production from this region that Peru could never hope to monopolize the world market as it had done with guano and was officially considering with respect to nitrates. When difficulties arose between Bolivia and Chile over the Treaty of Santiago, Peru drew closer to Bolivia, anticipating a better opportunity to dominate the Antofagasta deposits under the nominal control of a lethargic and disorganized Bolivia than under an energetic and centralized Chile. But as matters stood in 1870, Chilean capital had a firm grip on the destinies of the Bolivian littoral.

Not only were Chilean capitalists dominant in the region, but they had the Chilean army behind them to enforce their claims. In 1872 Chile alleged that proper distribution of the customs receipts was not being made in accordance with the Treaty of Santiago. Representatives of the two countries attempted a settlement of the problems which arose out of the treaty by concluding a new agreement which retained the twenty-fourth parallel as the boundary. However,

Chile surrendered her rights to a share of the customs from production to 25° S. Lat. in exchange for a guarantee that Bolivia would levy no more than the existing taxes on Chilean enterprises in the area for twenty-five years. The Chilean Congress approved the agreement readily, but the Bolivian Congress did not. The Bolivian government felt that its sovereignty still was compromised.⁶ Even though the treaty was thereby nullified, its importance lies not in that fact but rather than Chile seemed willing to settle a longstanding problem.

That a weak Bolivia dared to equivocate in the matter is not difficult to understand. In 1872 the Bolivian Congress gave President Adolfo Ballivián discretionary power to propose a treaty of alliance with Peru. Such a treaty, signed in February, 1873, stipulated that each signatory guaranteed the territorial integrity of the other. Additional states were to be invited to adhere to the alliance, which was to be kept secret.⁷ Argentina was asked to join

⁶Lucas Palacios, Chile y Bolivia, el protocolo diplomático de 5 de diciembre de 1872 (La Paz, 1873) reprints the treaty and is a good study of the reasons for its failure.

⁷Colección de los tratados del Perú, publicación oficial hecha de orden suprema por el oficial mayor del ministerio de relaciones exteriores (Lima, 1876) does not list the treaty. Its text appeared officially in Colección de tratados, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos y políticos celebrado desde la independencia hasta el día (14 vols.; Lima, 1890-1919), II, pp. 440-45. Hereinafter cited as Colección de tratados. For a complete history of the treaty, see J. M. Echinique Gandarillas, El tratado secreto de 1873, su documentación (Santiago, 1921).

the agreement at a time when its boundary disagreements with Chile in Patagonia seemed likely to deteriorate into war. There is evidence to support the contention that Peru during this period sought to precipitate a general war against Chile and thereby terminate Chile's preponderant position in Antofagasta. When Argentina refused to join, Peru soon lost interest in the alliance. This loss of interest coincided not only with Argentina's refusal to enter into the agreement, but also with the addition of two iron-clads to the Chilean navy. Peru and Chile were for the first time numerically equal in ships of the line.

In consequence of these developments Bolivia in 1874 signed a treaty with Chile which supplanted that of 1866. The terms of agreement were substantially those reached in 1872. Bolivia agreed to levy no additional taxes on Chilean enterprises between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth parallels for twenty-five years. Chile surrendered the joint benefits arrangement to 25° S. Lat.⁸ Obviously the bête noir of divided sovereignty remained.

President Hilarión Daza of Bolivia in 1878 challenged this limitation on his absolute control by levying a ten-centavo tax on each quintal of nitrate exported, a challenge directed primarily at the privately-owned Antofagasta Nitrate Company. Chile immediately protested this

⁸ Recopilación de tratados, II, pp. 101-07.

act as a contravention of the Treaty of 1874, but the Bolivian government assured Chile that the whole matter was one which should be confined to the courts, regardless of the fact that Article II of the treaty provided for the submission of such disagreements to the arbitration of the Emperor of Brazil. The company, Daza declared, was a private concern and did not legitimately fall within the exempted category given to publicly-owned businesses in the specified zone. Chile maintained that all Chilean businesses were included in the stipulation, public as well as private, and demanded arbitration of the misunderstanding.

Daza, one of the most reprehensible and irresponsible of all the Bolivian dictators, not only refused arbitration but ordered public sale of a sufficient amount of property of the Antofagasta Nitrate Company to settle its arrears in taxes.⁹ The date of the sale was fixed for February 14, 1879. Chilean authorities remained calm and offered to settle the disagreement by peaceful means. Behind the scenes the Chilean army and navy were mobilized and made ready to seize the treaty area from Bolivia, for Chile, like Peru, coveted the nitrate fields. War with Bolivia was not feared. An encounter with Peru, however, was a more serious undertaking.

⁹For a vindication of his motives see Hilarión Daza, Manifiesto del general don Hilarión Daza a sus conciudadanos (Paris, 1881).

Hostilities with Peru were not inevitable, the Chilean government felt, regardless of the "secret" treaty of 1873. That a confidential arrangement had been made between Bolivia and Peru was known almost immediately after it was effected. Peru desired that Argentina obligate itself to defend Bolivian integrity at the time Chile was negotiating with Argentina over their Patagonian boundary. In these latter negotiations Chilean diplomats learned of the existence of the treaty. The government in Santiago, however, did not inform the Chilean people, but rather kept it from them to be effectively used at a later date. While the people of Chile were kept in ignorance about the diplomatic maneuvers made by their government, they eagerly applauded its military activities.

On the date set by Daza to confiscate the property of the Antofagasta Nitrate Company, a contingent of Chilean troops landed at Antofagasta and occupied the town with no resistance. Cobija, Tocopilla, and Mejillones likewise surrendered with little opposition. Daza's plans were thus foiled by Chile's military deployment. Instead of acquiescing in the high-handed demands of the Bolivian dictator, the Chilean government acted with equal high-handedness and thus precipitated the War of the Pacific.¹⁰

¹⁰For information on the War of the Pacific, see further Bulnes, op. cit., I-III. Anselmo Blanlot Holley, Historia de la paz entre Chile y el Perú, 1879-1884 (Santiago, 1910) concentrates primarily on diplomatic maneu-

Daza asked Peru to honor the Treaty of 1873. Peru was reluctant to enter a war with Chile and possibly could have been dissuaded from coming to Bolivia's aid. Even when Chile demanded that Peru renounce the treaty, the latter hesitated either to do Chile's bidding or to enter the war. On April 5, 1879, Chile declared war on Peru.

There is no need to detail the War of the Pacific at this juncture. The Bolivian army, a pitiful display of a nation's armed might, was quickly routed by the superior Chilean ground forces. On the sea, the Peruvian navy put up a stout but brief fight. The Chilean navy soon was master of the coast and was able to transport the army onto Peruvian soil. The Peruvian army, even though it put up a heroic defense, was thoroughly crushed. Lima fell to the enemy and was looted.

Even before the war began, foreign powers offered their good offices for a settlement. Great Britain and Germany made simultaneous overtures to Washington offering joint mediation, which Secretary of State William M. Evarts rejected. Evarts feared that such a union with European

vers through the Treaty of Ancón in 1883; Diego Barros Arana, Historia del Pacífico (4 vols.; Santiago, 1881-85) is a Chilean account but important for its thoroughness; Gerardo Vargas Hurtado, La batalla de Arica, 7 de junio de 1880 (Lima, 1921) is important for the understanding of the sentimental attachment which Peru had for Arica and the promontory with fortifications called El Morro; José Manuel Balmaceda, The Circular Which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile Addressed to the Diplomatic Agents of the Republic Abroad (Santiago, 1881) is a well reasoned pamphlet defending Chile's demands for Tarapacá.

powers would appear to be dictation or coercion in disparagement of the recognized belligerent rights of the contestants. Nor was the Secretary planning unilateral intervention in the war on the part of the United States. He had formulated no program for official United States mediation to prevent the outbreak of war. Even after the beginning of hostilities in 1879, the Department of State remained inactive. In the meantime, Chile prosecuted the war with full vigor, finding itself everywhere victorious.

In addition to the material predominance of Chile over the allies, there existed in the Chilean diplomatic corps a superiority which enabled them to achieve success in their aim to annex the nitrate lands of the Pacific coast which belonged to their neighbors. With great determination the Chileans pushed their demands for territorial annexation rather than for a cash indemnification, and in so doing thwarted the desires not only of Peru and Bolivia, but also of the United States. The Chileans proved to be astute negotiators who knew how to get what they wanted for their country. There was never any doubt or equivocation in their desires. When the United States sought to intervene in the war, the Chileans used the proffered good offices only in so far as they were in accord with the annexation aims of their country. The American negotiators on the ground proved to be no match for their Chilean counterparts. On six occasions the United States was defeated

in its efforts to end the war on an anti-annexation basis.

When the United States took upon itself the burden of mediator--a role neither expected nor desired by Chile--it thereby became directly involved in the Question of the Pacific. After the sixth rebuke of its efforts, the United States ceased all active interference in the dispute and maintained a thirty-five year silence which was interpreted as either disinterestedness or acquiescence in the settlement. It will be necessary to examine United States diplomatic activity during the war in more detail to explain why the United States later felt obligated to help settle the dispute which arose out of the treaty which ended the war between Chile and Peru.¹¹

¹¹There are several competent monographs on United States diplomacy during the War of the Pacific. Chief among these is Herbert Millington, American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific (New York, 1948) which contains an excellent bibliography on the subject. Kenneth W. Crosby, "The Diplomacy of the United States in Relation to the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Hist., The George Washington University, 1949), is a scholarly description of United States diplomacy of the period and has a bibliography of no less value than the first work cited. For years the standard monograph on all phases of the Tacna-Arica dispute was William J. Dennis, Tacna-Arica (New Haven, 1931). This book is an excellent résumé of the history and all phases of the dispute. It is well written and sound in its conclusions, but the author did not have important Department of State documents at his disposal; indeed, his work refers to few documents published or unpublished. Graham H. Stuart, The Tacna-Arica Dispute (Boston, 1927) is shorter than Dennis' book and suffers from being published before the dispute was completed; but its summary of events is excellent. Alice F. Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, Minn., 1927) must be consulted for that portion of the disagreement.

United States Diplomatic Maneuvers, 1879-1884

Even though Evarts in 1879 desired to keep the United States out of the War of the Pacific, events seemed to conspire against him. The United States minister to Bolivia, S. Newton Pettis, made an unauthorized representation to the government of Chile. In July he proposed that Chile return to a status quo ante bellum in order that the causes of the war could be mediated. When questioned closely by the Chilean Foreign Office, Pettis confessed that his proposal was without sanction from his government. The Chilean government did not appreciate his efforts, and, indeed, felt that the United States was meddling in an affair not of its concern. The press in Chile was particularly vehement in its attacks against the minister and the United States. It was soon generally agreed that Pettis' activities had been to the detriment of peace.

The Pettis episode was but the first in a series of diplomatic blunders which illustrated the lack of direction characterizing United States diplomacy during the War of the Pacific. And the particularly distressing fact is that this deficiency was present on both levels--ministerial and secretarial. If the results had not been so tragic and harmful to the prestige of the United States, the activities of the diplomatic corps could well be described as high comedy. From the beginning, United States negotiations were marked by ineptitude and ignorance.

Chile's offensive brought heavy losses to foreign private concerns in Antofagasta and Tarapacá. Evarts saw a possible European demand for mediation to indemnify the losses sustained by neutrals. To forestall any such demands he issued instructions to the United States ministers in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru to bring the belligerents together to discuss the possibilities of ending the war.

On July 29, 1880, Evarts sent a message to the United States minister in Santiago, Thomas Osborn, which read, "Press upon Chilean Government our desire to aid in restoring peace on honorable terms between nations to which we are sincerely and equally friendly. A like instruction is sent to Lima." Osborn immediately contacted Foreign Minister José Manuel Balmaceda and arranged a meeting in which the three United States ministers would act as mediators, a scheme which was in accord with the desires of the Chilean Cabinet. No mention was made of the cession of Tarapacá to Chile by either the United States minister or Balmaceda. The Foreign Minister felt that the United States had agreed to the cession of the province to Chile and had arranged for the transfer. Osborn believed that the matter could be worked out once the belligerents were face to face in conference. On July 31 he sent identic notes to his colleagues in La Paz and Lima telling them to prepare for the conference.

In the meantime Minister Isaac P. Christiancy at

Lima, not having received Osborn's letter relating the arrangement of a mediation conference, heard disturbing news. Competant sources told him that European powers were about to offer mediation in the war and that General Nicolás Piérola, then "strong man" of Peru, had agreed to accept the overtures. Fearing that his country's prestige was at stake, Christiancy sailed for Santiago the day before Osborn's letter arrived to confer with Chilean authorities. If any mediation were accepted, he desired that it should be that of the United States. Christiancy left too hastily to discover under what terms Piérola would mediate, but he assumed that Tarapacá would be ceded to Chile. Osborn reluctantly allowed Christiancy to meet with Chilean officials, who treated him with much the same disdain as they had accorded Pettis. For the second time the United States blundered in the negotiations because of an over zealous minister.

After Christiancy's return to Lima, Osborn carried through with the plans which he had made earlier in the month. On October 20 in the harbor of Arica representatives of the three belligerents gathered aboard the USS Lackawana for mediation offered by their respective United States ministers. There could be little hope for anything but failure. The conference got underway, and the belligerents quickly discovered that they had been duped into attending a meeting in which there was no unity of purpose. Christiancy had not informed Piérola that Chile would demand the cession

of Tarapacá as a price for peace. Furthermore, Bolivia had accepted an invitation to the meeting with the understanding that if it failed, the United States would offer arbitration, an eventuality which Evarts wanted to avoid. Nevertheless, arbitration was offered, and Chile refused it with as little reluctance as Peru refused to cede Tarapacá. The conference, therefore, ended in complete failure.¹² The United States made no further effort to mediate the dispute between the belligerents so long as Evarts remained Secretary of State.

The United States demonstrated that it was not completely inept in diplomacy on but one occasion during the war. Through the efforts of the United States ministers in Santiago and Buenos Aires, Chile and Argentina ended a long-standing boundary dispute. But the United States hardly received accolades for its effort. Peru felt that more than ever the United States was obligated to end the war between the allies and Chile since a potential threat had been removed from Chile's flank. Chile, with the help of United States mediation, shifted the bulk of her forces on the Argentine border into the actual theater of war.

A more forceful and better planned policy in regard to United States mediation of the war began when James G.

¹²For an interesting primary account of the conference at Arica see Juan C. Carrillo, Mediación de Estados Unidos en la guerra del Pacífico (La Paz, 1880). P. José Zilveti, Circular a los agentes en el exterior (La Paz, 1882) is an unfavorable review of United States diplomacy from the Conference of Arica to the Protocol of Vña del Mar.

Blaine entered the Department of State upon the inauguration of James A. Garfield. Blaine replaced the United States ministers to the belligerent nations. Simultaneously he made a direct offer of United States mediation, which was refused, in an attempt to save Peru from ceding territory. The ministers to Peru and Chile, Stephen A. Hurlbut and Hugh Hudson, proved to be unwise choices since both became rabid partisans of the countries to which they were accredited. Their repeated indiscretions led to their reprimand by Blaine and finally to his announcement that a special mission would handle the problem of a restoration of peace.

To this special mission Blaine appointed William H. Trescott and Walker Blaine, the Secretary's son, both capable diplomats. To these agents Blaine gave the most comprehensive instructions thus far issued in the direction of United States activities in the war. Specifically, he deprecated the transfer of territory on the basis of outright conquest. To avoid the forceful annexation of Tarapacá by Chile, Blaine directed the agents to offer the good offices of the United States. If mediation were rejected, then the United States would feel free to appeal to the other nations of Latin America to avert the consequences. His offer, therefore, amounted almost to an ultimatum. On the other hand, if Chile accepted a cash indemnity instead of territorial conquest, then the agents were to do all in their power to see that the agreements were kept. But in no case were they to involve the

United States officially. Blaine was hesitant to declare that the United States would act as an umpire in the negotiations.

Armed with these positive instructions the United States special mission arrived in Santiago in January, 1882. It took Trescot little time to ascertain Chile's terms for accepting the good offices of the United States to end the war. On January 23 he telegraphed Chile's demands: (1) absolute cession of Tarapacá; (2) 20,000,000 silver pesos indemnity, with the occupation of Arica to guarantee payment; (3) cession of Arica if the indemnity were unpaid after ten years; (4) appropriation of the guano on the Lobos Islands; and (5) no further interference by the United States if Peru refused these terms. Clearly, Chile was not in a generous mood. And just as clearly Trescot could not negotiate under the instructions Blaine had given him.

But new instructions were on the way. Blaine's retirement from the Department of State brought Frederick T. Frelinghuysen to office on December 20, 1881. The new Secretary, fearing to pursue the positive policy of Blaine and seeking to discredit his predecessor, responded to a Congressional resolution and submitted all correspondence relating to the War of the Pacific to Congress. Included in the documents was Trescot's telegram which stated Chile's five demands listed above. In the meantime, Frelinghuysen sent additional instructions to the special agents which directed

them to "extend friendly offices impartially" to both countries. But there was no hint of a complete change of orders. Nor was there any evidence that a complete change was contemplated when the Secretary told his representatives that the United States would not negotiate on the basis of the cession of Tarapacá coupled with an indemnity of 20,000,000 pesos.

Trescot was exasperated at the equivocation which his chief displayed. In order to shock him out of his lethargy, Trescot negotiated with Foreign Minister Balmaceda the Protocol of Viña del Mar on February 11, 1882. In this way, the agent felt, the Department of State could formally be shown how extensive the Chilean demands were. The terms of this protocol were substantially those reported by Trescot in his telegram of January 23. On February 21 further instructions arrived from Freylinghuysen stating that Trescot was to negotiate on the basis of an indemnity only, thus repudiating any validity which the protocol may have had.

Almost simultaneously came the news that Trescot's telegram of January 23 had been published.¹³ Balmaceda immediately declared that he would accept nothing less than the terms stated in that message. To do otherwise would make it appear that Chile was withdrawing from her previously

¹³Senate Executive Document No. 79, 47th Congress, 1st Session, 1882, contains in 662 pages the papers of the Department of State relating to the War of the Pacific.

announced position because of United States pressure. Trescot promptly disavowed the Protocol of Viña del Mar. Balmaceda published the whole exchange at once. Another Chilean diplomatic victory was sealed.

With the failure of the Trescot mission, Frelinghuysen made his own overtures in an effort to end the war. To do this he appointed new ministers to Chile and to the allies with fresh instructions. Dr. Cornelius A. Logan was sent to Santiago in 1882 with the assurance that the Department of State would not oppose the cession of Tarapacá and, if there were no way out, the cession of Tacna and Arica as well. But in the latter event, Peru was to receive an indemnity. The cession of the three provinces without an indemnity to Peru was regarded as exorbitant, Freylinghuysen told Logan.

Logan began negotiating with President Francisco García Calderón of Peru, who had long been a Chilean prisoner of war. The minister's maneuvers are complicated and are not worth minute study here. Only two of his proposals to García Calderón bear mentioning. First, he proposed that Peru cede Tarapacá to Chile and then divide the provinces of Tacna and Arica so that Peru would retain Tacna and Chile would take Arica. Both García Calderón and Balmaceda rejected the division. The proposal was not heard again for nearly forty-five years when, in a modified form, it proved to be the solution to the Tacna-Arica dispute.

Second, Logan proposed--at Chilean insistence--cession of Tarapacá and Chilean occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of five years, after which time a plebiscite would be held to determine with which country the population desired to unite. After the people made their choice, the winner of the election would pay the loser \$10,000,000. García Calderón rejected this proposal as well. Slightly changed, it was later incorporated into the Treaty of Ancón.¹⁴

Logan, despairing to treat with García Calderón, sought a more agreeable source of negotiation in Vice President Lisardo Montero of Peru. To that end on November 18 he wrote a note to Montero in which he realistically outlined the military situation. There was no longer any hope that the allied forces could defeat Chilean arms, nor was there a chance that the United States would actively intervene on behalf of Peru. Also, Logan knew that Chile was on the verge of making a separate peace with Bolivia. If Bolivia were removed from the war, Chile would be in a position to demand even harsher terms from Peru. Therefore, he suggested that Montero cede Tarapacá to Chile and sell Tacna and Arica for \$10,000,000.

Montero could not publicly agree to the dismember-

¹⁴Francisco García Calderón, Mediación de los Estados Unidos de Norte América en la guerra del Pacífico (Buenos Aires, 1884) is a first-hand and highly critical account of Logan's mediation attempts. It reproduces several important documents relating to the subject.

ment of his nation even if he had wanted to, which he definitely did not. Chile, by this time eager to end a war in which it was already totally victorious, now resorted to less subtle means of shocking the Peruvians to their senses in order that a treaty of peace could be signed quickly. The Chilean military authorities in Lima obtained a copy of Logan's note to Montero and issued a manifesto which contained a reprint of it. Cleverly worded, the proclamation emphasized the futility of further resistance to Chile. It declared that there was no longer hope that the United States would intervene to aid Peru, this by the admission of a United States minister. When the note became generally known, a treaty ending the war was speedily written.

James R. Partridge was Frelinghuysen's choice for the United States legation in Lima. Although Partridge was sent to Peru with instructions to aid Logan's attempt to negotiate a sacrificial cession by Peru, enmity developed between the diplomats. Partridge became a strong Peruvian partisan and urged that the United States step in to stop the war, using force if necessary. His proposals were ignored in Washington until Frelinghuysen learned that the minister had proposed joint intervention with the ministers of England, France, and Italy in January, 1883, an action which stirred an otherwise complacent Department of State into immediate action. Partridge was ordered to withdraw his statements as being unauthorized and was granted the

extended leave of absence which he had requested at the beginning of his tour of duty. The United States was once more embarrassed by an unauthorized action by one of its foreign representatives.

A disillusioned Frelinghuysen made a final effort to redeem United States prestige in March, 1883. He authorized Logan to offer United States arbitration on the basis of cession of Tarapacá to Chile with an arbitrator empowered to dispose of the Tacna-Arica issue. The entire arrangement was predicated on the assumption that Chile would recognize García Calderón as President of Peru just as the United States had. García Calderón had long been in a Chilean prison and had proved unwilling to listen to Chilean offers. There was little reason to believe that he would change his mind at this point. Besides, a new leader had risen in Peru, General Miguel Iglesias, and he seemed far more amenable to Chilean demands. Chile, therefore, rejected Logan's offer to allow the United States to act as arbitrator in the War of the Pacific and proceeded to deal directly with Iglesias.¹⁵

It cannot be said that Peru negotiated with Chile for the terms of the Treaty of Ancón. Rather, the treaty was presented to Iglesias as a fait accompli and as a con-

¹⁵For official transcripts of important United States letters regarding mediation during the war, see Colección de tratados, IV, pp. 295-655.

dition of recognition of his government. In a preliminary protocol with Iglesias the Chilean agent, Jovino Novoa, presented his government's ultimatum: immediate end of the war and cession of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. The Peruvian representative, José Antonio Lavalle, trying to make the best out of a difficult situation, urged Chile not to annex the provinces of Tacna and Arica but rather to occupy them for only ten years, after which time a plebiscite would be held to determine the future nationality of the area. The winner of the election would pay the loser \$10,000,000. Except for the extended period of occupation, these were the same terms Logan had suggested to García Calderón. Since the original suggestion for the arrangement had come from Chile, there was little reason to doubt that the proposal would be accepted. President Domingo Santa María of Chile wrote to Novoa that the arrangement was necessary because the negotiators dared not sell outright two provinces heavily populated with Peruvians. The agreement was, he felt, little more than a "disguised sale." Lavalle's feelings, on the other hand, were quite different. He really believed that this was a method of eventual retention of the provinces by Peru.

The Treaty of Ancón, deriving its name from a suburb of Lima, gave Chile all it demanded: annexation of Tarapacá; occupation of Tacna-Arica for ten years with a subsequent plebiscite to determine its sovereignty; no obliga-

tion to honor Peru's indebtedness based on the resources of Tarapacá; and various articles on the disposition of the guano deposits. The treaty was signed by Iglesias on October 20, 1883, and ratifications were exchanged on March 10, 1884. The war between Chile and Peru was over, but the bitterness had just begun.¹⁶

The ratification of the treaty resulted in much official protestation, primarily from France, Italy, England, Holland, Belgium, and Spain. These nations objected on behalf of their citizens who held Peruvian bonds and who were called upon to receive 50% of their mortgages from the future sale of guano.¹⁷ Secretary Frelinghuysen, who had judged the cession of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica as "exorbitant" a year earlier, instructed his representative to make only unofficial complaints. It is with these ineffectual protestations that United States diplomacy ceased in the War of the Pacific. But the imbroglio dubbed the "Question of the Pacific" continued for another forty years. The United States had early shown interest and concern over Peru's plight. A call would come for the United States to show further concern, and the call could not be ignored.

It should be pointed out here that Chilean interest in Tacna-Arica was incidental to that in Tarapacá. The

¹⁶Recopilación de tratados, II, pp. 158-66.

¹⁷For official transcripts of these protests, see Colección de tratados, IV, pp. 646-55.

region with its port at Arica would serve Chilean military interests in that it was easily defended and in turn provided an excellent defense against possible future invasion of the newly conquered nitrate-rich provinces to the south. Also, it was not known whether nitrate deposits existed in Tacna-Arica. If they were present, a threat to Chilean monopolization of the market would exist. And, finally, Chile realized that if Bolivia were to be kept out of Peru's camp as a perpetual ally, an arrangement would have to be reached whereby the port of Arica would be available for Bolivian use on favorable terms. Otherwise, there would be constant conspiracy between the defeated allies to regain their lost territory from the victor.

Chile had already taken steps with an end in view of placating Bolivia over the loss of her littoral. In April, 1884, a few weeks after the Treaty of Ancón was ratified, Bolivia signed a truce giving Chile the right to govern Antofagasta province. In all but name this was a formal cession of the Bolivian coast. The truce, a generous one, made Antofagasta a free port for Bolivian goods and allowed Bolivia to share in the tax receipts collected at Arica. In addition, Chile agreed to build a railroad from Arica to La Paz. At the end of fifteen years that section of the tracks which was in Bolivia would be turned over to the Bolivian government without charge.¹⁸

¹⁸Recopilación de tratados, II, pp. 167-75.

In summary, the War of the Pacific was a vastly one-sided affair, both in victories and in spoils gained. The Chilean army and navy emerged strengthened after their experiences, while Bolivia and Peru were not to recover their military power for years. In booty Chile gained all the coastal territory from the twenty-fourth parallel to the Sama river at 17° 57' S. Lat. This included the immensely rich nitrate fields of the Bolivian province of Antofagasta, the equally valuable nitrate holdings of Peru in the province of Tarapacá, and the two sterile provinces of Tacna and Arica --important primarily as a naval and army bastion of defense. No nitrate deposits were found in Tacna-Arica, but the area's militarily strategic position gave Chile an important excuse for maintaining control well after the time for the plebiscite stipulated in the Treaty of Ancón had passed. Little wealth accrued to Chile because of its occupation of the provinces, but profit was not Chile's primary intention.

Chilean-Peruvian Negotiations, 1884-1909

Article III of the Treaty of Ancón provided that the plebiscite agreed upon was to be held ten years after ratification, that is, in March, 1894. When that date arrived, the election did not occur. Chile offered a variety of reasons for not holding the plebiscite, the most impressive being that Peru was unable to pay the \$10,000,000 indemnity within thirty days. Peru offered to pay in installments, but this was not acceptable to Chile. Diplomats of the two

nations wrote numerous protocols, agreements, and draft election rules only to scrap them because every detail of a plebiscite could not be agreed upon.¹⁹

Internal conditions within Peru were not conducive to a plebiscitary election in 1894. Iglesias had left the country several years earlier, but political stability had not come as a result. Nor had economic stability entered into the domestic scene. Peru's debt was staggering, and her natural sources of income had been taken away by Chile. Little wonder, therefore, that in 1894 Peru did not press the holding of a plebiscite to the point of a diplomatic rupture.

Chile's internal situation was dissimilar to that of Peru. Unparalleled commercial growth was the order of the day. With seemingly limitless sums available from the revenue of the conquered nitrate provinces, the Chilean government indulged in an orgy of spending on internal improvements, which in turn spurred private commercial growth. In 1891 Chile underwent its most jarring revolution. Balma-
ceda, then President, was ousted from office in a civil war

¹⁹For information on diplomatic relations between Peru and Chile relating to the Tacna-Arica dispute after the War of the Pacific, see further Dennis, *op. cit.*; Maurtua, *op. cit.*; Stuart, *op. cit.*; Chile, "Rose Book" of Chile, Communications Exchanged between the Chancelleries of Chile and Peru Regarding the Question of Tacna and Arica (1905 to 1908) (Washington, 1918); Santiago Carlos Gómez, El epílogo de la guerra de 1879 (Santiago, 1925); Jaime de la Lastra Bernaldes, "Historia diplomática de la cuestión de Tacna y Arica," Memorias de Licenciados, XIX (1951), pp. 547-602.

which disorganized the economy and altered the political structure of the government. It is understandable, therefore, that Chilean political leaders were not eager to bring another crisis upon the government by holding a plebiscite in Tacna-Arica, an election which Chile probably would have lost.

These domestic conditions partly explain why Chile procrastinated in holding the required plebiscite. No Chilean public official was willing to stake his career on the outcome of voting held in Tacna-Arica. The population of the provinces was composed predominantly of Peruvians who nurtured an affection for their motherland. It would be foolish to appeal to patriotic Peruvians to keep the area under the Chilean flag. Under the circumstances, Chile, having everything to lose and nothing to gain, did the expected: it tried to ignore the question.

But to Peruvians the matter was quite different. Tacna-Arica became a "Peru Irrendento," an obsession with Peruvian political speakers on all occasions. The most popular theme of these speeches was a characterization of Tacna-Arica as South America's Alsace-Lorraine. Peru never ceased to press its claim on a reluctant Chile. As can be easily seen, redemption of Tacna-Arica provided a perennial issue in Peru sufficiently potent to cloak more important domestic problems. Thus the Tacna-Arica dispute remained an open sore in relations between Peru and Chile.

In 1897 the Patagonian boundary dispute between Chile and Argentina arose again. Matters reached such a delicate state that Chile was willing to settle the Tacna-Arica dispute with Peru in order to rob Argentina of a potential ally in the event of war. In 1898 the Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol was signed by Chile and Peru in which the Queen Regent of Spain was to be asked to arbitrate the question of whether a plebiscite was to be held or whether Chile had forfeited its right to a plebiscite by not holding it in 1894. By the terms of the arrangement Peru was to pay the indemnity to Chile over a ten-year period. The Peruvian Congress quickly ratified the protocol, but Chile did not, for in September, 1898, Chile reached an agreement with Argentina relieving pressure from that quarter. Once more an impasse had been reached.

Chile cut negotiations short in 1898 not only because an external threat had been removed but also because she felt that she would lose the plebiscite. However, she actively tried to alleviate this latter condition. According to Peruvian charges, Tacna-Arica was being "Chileanized." It was popular politics in Peru after 1894 to regard any Chilean activity in Tacna-Arica as illegal. The Peruvians interpreted the Treaty of Ancón as not transferring sovereignty of the provinces, but rather only subjecting them to "Chilean legislation and authority" for ten years. Chile colonized, built a railroad, and subsidized factories.

In the attendant difficulties Peruvians saw their schools closed, their priests removed, and their press silenced. Regardless of Peruvian claims, Chile was never more than nominally successful in colonizing Tacna-Arica before about 1920 because there were no large nitrate fields to attract great numbers of Chilean laborers as in Antofagasta.

This conscious effort of Chile to submerge Peruvian nationality met with many protests from the Peruvian Foreign Office. Several times the protests were vehement enough to cause a break in diplomatic relations, a popular development with the Peruvian masses. In 1901 a diplomatic rupture occurred; relations resumed in 1905. On March 25, 1908, Chile proposed to Peru that a plebiscite be held with the terms of the Treaty of Ancón slightly modified. Peru indignantly refused the offer, primarily because voting would have been under the control of the Chileans, and threatened to break off diplomatic relations, but did not.²⁰

No satisfactory arrangement could be made; so the matter was held in abeyance. The ill feeling which festered in Peru against Chile erupted in January, 1909, when Presi-

²⁰Memorandum left at the Department of State by the Chilean minister, Washington, undated, Department of State Central Files, Record Group 59, in the National Archives of the United States, Washington, D. C., serial number 944, document number 13. These files are hereinafter cited as DSCF, followed by the serial number separated from the document number by a slash, thus: 944/13. John Hicks to Philander C. Knox, Santiago, Apr. 14, 1908, DSCF, 944/23-24; Hicks to Knox, Santiago, Apr. 16, 1908, DSCF, 723.2515/16.

dent Augusto B. Leguía refused to allow the Chilean ambassador, José Echenique, to place a bronze wreath on the tomb of Peruvians killed in the War of the Pacific. President Pedro Montt of Chile immediately recalled Echenique and conditions became even more serious.²¹

Peru was desirous that the United States facilitate a settlement by arbitration, but United States Minister Leslie Combs offered no encouragement.²² The United States was not yet ready to become involved in the question again. In May, 1909, the shield of the Chilean consul-general's office in Callao was removed by a mob of Peruvians causing a further degeneration in relations.²³

The United States Again Drawn into the Dispute

On October 27 Foreign Minister Agustín Edwards of Chile handed to United States Ambassador Thomas C. Dawson a four-point proposal to hold the plebiscite. He requested Dawson to urge the Peruvians to accept the offer, even though he admitted that it was designed to insure Chile's winning the plebiscite.²⁴ Leguía refused the proposal by

²¹Hicks to Knox, Santiago, undated [received Jan. 18, 1909], DSCF, 944/39.

²²Combs to Knox, Lima, Apr. 6, 1909, DSCF, 944/65.

²³Hicks to Knox, Santiago, undated [received May 6, 1909], DSCF, 944/66.

²⁴Dawson to Knox, Santiago, Nov. 1, 1909, DSCF, 944/93-95; Combs to Knox, Lima, Nov. 4, 1909, DSCF, 944/98-101.

saying that no Peruvian government which accepted it "could live a day."²⁵

The official United States attitude toward the widening split between Peru and Chile was one of neutrality, just as it had been for twenty-five years. But early in 1910 the point was reached whereby the United States could no longer blandly look at events which might plunge the two nations into war at any moment. As a part of its "Chileanization" process, Chilean authorities demanded that every new ecclesiastical appointment in Tacna-Arica should be approved by them. The Vatican had earlier resolved that the Bishop of Arequipa in Peru should maintain his prerogatives until the question of the political sovereignty of the provinces was definitely settled. The Peruvian priests in Tacna-Arica refused to submit to the Chilean demands; whereupon the Chilean government declared the parishes vacant and closed the churches.²⁶ Peru strongly protested this action, and it seemed that a diplomatic rupture was imminent. Matters continued in this unsatisfactory vein until March when Edwards transmitted to Peruvian Foreign Minister Melitón F. Porras a recommendation for holding the plebiscite which would end the common problem of the two countries. Edwards this time spelled out his suggestion for a plebiscite pro

²⁵Combs to Knox, Lima, Nov. 17, 1909, DSCF, 944/103.

²⁶William P. Cresson to Knox, Lima, Jan. 29, 1910, 944/108.

forma "with the appearance of a popular vote [effecting] a cession or annexation agreed upon before hand, thus avoiding . . . the wounding of the national pride" of Peru.²⁷ This blatant offer so enraged Leguía that he ordered the Peruvian ambassador to return to Lima.

The following day the Peruvian Chargé d'Affaires in Santiago requested the United States minister, Seth L. Pierrepont, to take charge of the archives of the Peruvian legation. Reluctantly Secretary of State Philander C. Knox granted the request, a usual one in such diplomatic breaks.²⁸

The United States, after a twenty-five year respite, was again involved in negotiations relating to Tacna-Arica. The Question of the Pacific had arisen once more. An answer had to be found.

²⁷Edwards to Porras, Santiago, Mar. 3, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/145.

²⁸Pierrepont to Knox, Santiago, Mar. 20, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/113; Knox to Pierrepont, Washington, Mar. 26, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/113.

CHAPTER II

RE-ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE QUESTION OF THE PACIFIC

With the breaking off of Chilean-Peruvian diplomatic relations in 1910, United States involvement in the settlement of the Tacna-Arica issue slowly revived. As early as July, 1909, United States Minister Thomas C. Dawson in Santiago urged the Department of State to take an active interest in the dispute. He felt that the United States was obligated for two specific reasons to step in and help settle the matter. First, in 1881 Secretary of State James G. Blaine had refused to allow Great Britain and France to mediate the affair, offering in explanation a statement indicating that their intervention would be disagreeable to the United States. And second, Minister Stephen A. Hurlbut had declared in 1881 that the United States would never consent to Chile's depriving Peru of territory. This declaration, Dawson felt, had encouraged Peru to continue fighting Chile after all hope of victory had vanished. When the settlement was made separating Peru from her important provinces, the United States

offered only feeble and informal objections.¹

Secretary of State Philander C. Knox felt none of the obligation expressed by Dawson and had good precedent for his feelings. He was inspired by the consistent United States policy of offering aid in settling disputes only when both parties requested it, and Chile refused to make the request. Peru, on the other hand, was more than willing to accept any kind of diplomatic assistance from the United States.² It was not until the Baron do Rio Branco, Foreign Minister of Brazil, made overtures for joint Argentine, Brazilian, and United States mediation of the dispute that Knox responded.³ In the event, Knox wrote the United States ambassador to Brazil, that both Chile and Peru requested Argentina, Brazil, and the United States to mediate the dispute, he would be willing to help find a satisfactory solution.⁴ He did not feel, however, that the Department of State could properly enter into mediation at the invitation of only one of the nations concerned. The United States, therefore, took no initiative in the matter and

¹Dawson to Knox, Santiago, Jul. 16, 1909, DSCF, 944/77.

²Cresson to Robert Lansing, Lima, Mar. 14, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/127 for a summary of Peruvian sentiment regarding assistance from the United States.

³Irving B. Dudley to Knox, Petropolis, Brazil, Mar. 17, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/110.

⁴Knox to Dudley, Washington, Mar. 24, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/110.

expressed only the most guarded interest in it.

During the early months of 1910 the United States made no further statement concerning mediation. Chile distrusted United States intervention in the dispute either singly or in conjunction with Argentina and Brazil because she felt that the United States favored Peru. Very much American capital was invested in Peru, said Chilean Foreign Minister Agustín Edwards, and for that reason it was understandable that the United States would have a pro-Peruvian bias.⁵ Also, Chile was not willing to consent to any arbitration which would not beforehand guarantee her sovereignty in Tacna-Arica. Peru, however, was willing for the three powers to mediate in any manner they desired. She was especially desirous of having the United States plead her cause and, in accordance with Knox's desires, formally requested the good offices of the United States. But the Department of State took no action because Chile did not make a similar request. Peru then asked Brazil to take charge of her Chilean problem.⁶

Argentina and Brazil attempted to plead Peru's cause throughout 1910, much to the annoyance of Chile, but were unsuccessful.⁷ Chile remained intransigent. She

⁵Pierrepont to Knox, Santiago, Apr. 5, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/145.

⁶Cresson to Knox, Lima, Apr. 6, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/131.

⁷Robert W. Bliss to Knox, Buenos Aires, Nov. 17,

would do nothing which might cause her to lose the provinces. Early in 1910 Chile offered Peru three million pounds sterling if she would sell the disputed territory outright and indicated that the offer might possibly be raised to any reasonable amount.⁸ Peru countered Chile's offer by suggesting a division of the provinces with Peru getting the port of Arica. Chile refused, and over the months the acrimony between the two countries grew.⁹

Near the end of 1910 the United States had not moved from the position announced by Knox in March. The Peruvian minister to the United States, Felipe Pardo, called upon the Secretary of State and discussed the boundary problem which his country had with Bolivia. It was possible, he told the Secretary, that war might break out at any time over the situation. In view of this fact, Pardo wanted to know "without delay and openly and explicitly, what aid [Peru] may expect from the United States in regard to the Tacna-Arica question. . . ." Knox simply expressed his hope that Peru and Chile might be able to find a basis for settlement consistent with their national honor and interest.¹⁰ Knox was determined not to repeat the error

1911, DSCF, 723.2515/266.

⁸Pierrepoint to Knox, Santiago, Apr. 5, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/145.

⁹Pierrepoint to Knox, Santiago, Apr. 2, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/125.

¹⁰Alvey A. Adey to Combs, Washington, Nov. 18, 1918,

committed by his predecessors in the 1880's. The United States would not offer her good offices unless both governments requested them. This, succinctly stated, was the official United States policy toward the dispute, and there it remained for several years.

In November, 1910, a mysterious diplomatic conference occurred between the Peruvian President, Augusto B. Leguía, and a "Sr. Alfonso," who, although he had no diplomatic credentials, was regarded in Lima as the personal representative of President Emiliano Fernández Larrain of Chile. Just why the Peruvian Foreign Office accepted this person as a bona fide Chilean envoy is difficult to determine. Even though diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru were suspended, Peru was still ready to negotiate over Tacna-Arica--as she always was. Leguía quickly reached an agreement with Alfonso simply because the latter acquiesced in practically all the demands of the Peruvians. They reached a compromise whereby the disputed provinces would be divided so that Peru would receive Tacna and the port of Arica while Chile received the remainder of Arica province.¹¹

The Peruvians rejoiced and thought that at last the dispute was settled. Chilean Foreign Minister Edwards, however, quickly disavowed any knowledge of "Sr. Alfonso"

DSCF, 723.2515/194.

¹¹Combs to Knox, Lima, Nov. 19, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/195.

and said that Chile had sent no such mission to Peru. Nevertheless, in confidence he told the United States minister, Henry P. Fletcher, that a division of the provinces would be acceptable to Chile providing the Arica-La Paz railroad and the port of Arica went to Chile.¹²

Who was Alfonso and what was his mission? No one has ever determined him to have been anyone more than a private citizen on a mission to clear up a long-standing disagreement. No further mention of him or of his work is found in subsequent negotiations. The event is recited here only to show that Peru was willing to negotiate under any pretext and also to show that a division of the provinces was not completely foreign to Peruvian thinking prior to 1929 when the final solution was brought about by that arrangement.

There was little reason for Chile to take the initiative in settling the Tacna-Arica problem. She was already in control of the provinces and to parley with the Peruvians might jeopardize her control. Besides, as President-elect Ramón Barros Lucos indicated, it was the Peruvians who had withdrawn their ambassador from Santiago. If they wanted to talk the matter through, then they should return him.¹³ In the meantime Chile continued her process

¹²Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Dec. 1, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/199.

¹³Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Dec. 24, 1910, DSCF, 723.2515/209.

of "Chileanization" of Tacna-Arica by occupying the city of Tacna with troops to put down riots, by encouraging Chilean colonization through funds advanced for the purchase and improvement of land, by extending the draft law to Tacna, and by allowing the provinces to send representatives to the Chilean Congress. To all these measures Peru objected strenuously and complained bitterly when Chilean forces quashed riots of Peruvians in Iquique, Arica, Tacna, and Antofagasta who were demonstrating against anti-Peruvian acts of the Chilean government. Chile was determined throughout 1911 to conclude the thorny question gradually, but definitely on the basis of Chilean ownership,¹⁴ and was almost successful in November, 1912.

Peru in 1912 took the initiative and began an exchange of telegraphic notes with Santiago in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Chileans. Neither United States minister in the two countries was informed of the exchange and Fletcher in Santiago was understandably excited when he reported on November 10 that an agreement had been reached.¹⁵

President Guillermo Billinghurst, whose position as head of the Peruvian government was not secure, asked the

¹⁴Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Nov. 27, 1911, DSCF, 723.2515/265.

¹⁵Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Nov. 10, 1912, DSCF, 723.2515/271.

United States to approve the terms of settlement so that Congressional ratification would be expedited.¹⁶ He felt that United States pressure on a recalcitrant Peruvian Congress would extricate him from a difficult position since his agreement with Chile was not popular in Peru. But Knox refused to commit the United States, saying that this country would not place itself in a position to influence such important legislation, especially since he had not been officially apprised of the exact terms. Rather, he confined his answer to the expression of gratification that an agreement had been reached and offered the usual stilted diplomatic congratulations.¹⁷

The arrangement, referred to as the Huneeus-Valera Protocol, failed to be adopted by either Congress. In essence it would have delayed the plebiscite until 1933, would have given control of the election board to Chile, and would have renewed diplomatic relations immediately.¹⁸ The Peruvian Congress refused to ratify the protocol because it felt that Peru was asked to agree to a plebiscite in which there was no hope of its winning. Billinghamurst saw the agreement as a means to settle an outstanding diplomatic

¹⁶H. Clay Howard to Knox, Lima, Nov. 27, 1912, DSCF, 723.2515/277.

¹⁷Knox to Howard, Washington, Nov. 30, 1912, DSCF, 723.2515/277.

¹⁸Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Nov. 18, 1912, DSCF, 723.2515/282.

problem as well as to consolidate his shaky position. The scheme was rejected and Billinghamurst was shortly thereafter deposed in a revolution. The Chilean Congress likewise failed to ratify the measure, primarily because of political jealousies and bitter clashes of personalities, but also because it did not proceed administratively through the respective Congresses pari passu as required.¹⁹

Although the Huneeus-Valera Protocol was not ratified by the Chilean Congress because Foreign Minister Antonio Huneeus' political enemies sought to embarrass him, it was Chile that warily made the next move in negotiations. In 1915 Eliodoro Yáñez, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, went to Lima as an unofficial representative to talk about renewing diplomatic relations. Peru felt that an agreement on Tacna-Arica should be made first, however. While Chile was taking the initiative in this instance, it was generally recognized that she would agree only to terms which would guarantee her possession of the provinces.²⁰ Her main objective in thus starting the talks was simply to rid herself of a long-standing problem. However, the conclusion which Peru wished to reach was very much different; therefore, it was only natural that the

¹⁹Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Dec. 23, 1912, DSCF, 723.2515/288; Fletcher to Knox, Santiago, Apr. 29, 1913, DSCF, 723.2515/291.

²⁰Fletcher to Lansing, Nov. 27, 1915, DSCF, 723.2515/303.

Yáñez mission failed.

After Yáñez returned home, there were no more formal efforts to renew diplomatic relations or to settle the problem of the unredeemed provinces until after World War I. By the end of the war relations between Peru and Chile had grown so hostile that Chile was hard-pressed to explain or restrain her internal popular demonstrations against Peru. Because her consul at Iquique was abused by a mob of Chileans, Peru ordered all her consuls in Chile to return home, and Chile retaliated in kind.²¹ Diplomatic relations had been suspended since 1910; now the two countries had severed consular relations.

This latter development was sufficient to cause President Woodrow Wilson some concern shortly before he left Washington for the Paris Peace Conference. In identic notes to the Presidents of Peru and Chile, Wilson chided them about the ill feeling which existed between their countries at the very time that a lasting peace for the world was about to be written. He concluded his message with an offer to tender "all possible assistance" to bring about an equitable solution to the outstanding problems which confronted the two South-American republics.²² Wilson

²¹ Stewart E. McMillin to Lansing, Lima, Nov. 25, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/33; Joseph H. Shea to Lansing, Santiago, Nov. 25, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/332.

²² Frank L. Polk to Shea, Washington, Dec. 4, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/345a.

gave a second thought before he sent his mild rebuke and deleted a warning that the United States would not tolerate war in the Western Hemisphere and would be ready to place moral and economic sanctions against the aggressor.²³

Wilson's message was circulated in the chanceries of Ecuador, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay with the request that those nations also counsel moderation to Chile and Peru in their actions. Wilson had in a matter of hours reversed an eight-year policy--from neutrality in the dispute to one of active interest.

The Chilean President, Juan Luis Sanfuentes, immediately replied to the offer of assistance, saying that while he appreciated it, he felt there was no cause for alarm. Chile's record of peace with her neighbors was impressive, he said. In any event, Chile could settle the matter satisfactorily within the terms of the Treaty of Ancón.²⁴ Peru, however, gave the wrong meaning entirely to the despatch, for less than a week later she accepted the mediation of the President!²⁵

Before Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk could correct this misapprehension, Argentina offered mediation

²³Ibid.

²⁴Shea to Lansing, Santiago, Dec. 9, 1918, DSCP, 723.2515/359.

²⁵Manuel de Freyre y Santander to Polk, Washington, Dec. 10, 1918, DSCP, 723.2515/365. Said Ambassador Freyre's acceptance in part: "El gobierno del Perú acepta sin vacilar y agradecido la mediación de Vuestra Excelencia."

offices to Chile in conjunction with what she thought were those of the United States.²⁶ Mediation was precisely what Wilson had not offered; therefore, Polk immediately informed the Peruvian ambassador of this fact and sent identic telegrams to Santiago and Lima instructing the United States representatives there to clear up any misunderstanding which might have arisen. Polk wanted it made clear that the President had offered "assistance," that is, his good offices only, and no more.²⁷

Wilson's offer, therefore, was not dissimilar to the one made by Knox in 1910. Once more, both disputants would have to request that the United States aid them in their negotiations. Sanfuentes, reluctant to subject the problem to any form of discussion which might endanger his country's hold on the provinces, acknowledged but refused Wilson's offer. Peru, ready to discuss her Chilean problem with anyone who would listen, eagerly accepted the offer of assistance, but interpreted that assistance to mean active mediation. The United States had again shown an interest in the South-American problem and would soon be asked to show real concern. But in the meantime Wilson, the United States, and

²⁶ Henry L. Stimson to Polk, Buenos Aires, Dec. 12, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/367.

²⁷ Polk to Shea and McMillan, Washington, Dec. 19, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/365; Lansing to Polk, Paris, Dec. 18, 1918, DSCF, 723.2515/379 for Wilson's clarification of the matter.

the world turned their eyes to Paris and the conference underway there.

Shortly before Wilson left to go to Paris, the minister from Peru, Manuel de Freyre y Santander, asked Polk to clarify his attitude toward Peru's submission of the question to the Peace Conference, or at a later date possibly to the League of Nations. Polk felt that Peru was trying to press the United States into active mediation, but nevertheless thought enough of the situation to confer directly with Wilson about it. Polk told Wilson that he preferred to urge Peru and Chile to select one or more arbitrators, which might include the United States and two others or possibly even three European countries.²⁸ Wilson emphatically concurred with Polk's recommendation and felt that the United States "ought to pursue it with considerable energy and persistence. If Chile knows what is best for her, she will accept it."²⁹

But when Wilson returned to Paris in March, 1919, his idealism got the better of him, and his policy regarding the settlement of the dispute between Peru and Chile became erratic and unpredictable. He suggested first that the United States, Great Britain and France arbitrate the

²⁸Polk to Wilson, Washington, Feb. 28, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/450.

²⁹Wilson to Polk, Washington, Mar. 3, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/450.

matter, but Polk dissuaded him from this course by saying that in view of the extremely cordial relations existing between Chile and Great Britain, the latter would probably seize the leadership in the matter.³⁰ Then at the end of April, Wilson suggested that the entire problem be left up to the League of Nations.³¹ Polk again induced the President to change his mind when he reminded him that such action would very likely cause Chile not to join the League and would certainly be poorly received by the United States Senate, which had not yet ratified the treaty.³² Wilson seemed to have forgotten for the moment Polk's original suggestion, which he had said should be pursued "with considerable energy and persistence."

In the meantime wealthy former Foreign Minister Edwards had been appointed Chilean ambassador to Great Britain. In 1919 while on his way to London to take up his post, Edwards stopped in Washington and had extensive discussions with Polk over possible solutions to the Tacna-Arica problem. Chile was still opposed to any settlement which would see her relinquish the port of Arica to Peru, but she was not unwilling, Edwards indicated, to let Peru

³⁰Lansing to Polk, Paris, Mar. 14, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/459; Polk to Lansing, Washington, Mar. 19, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/460.

³¹Lansing to Polk, Paris, Apr. 30, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/480.

³²Polk to Lansing, Washington, May 8, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/480.

have the province of Tacna.³³ And since relations had grown somewhat cordial between Bolivia and Chile, primarily because the latter dangled the possibility of cession of Arica to the former, there was a real possibility that Bolivia might be given a neutralized Arica which would act as a buffer between Chile and Peru.³⁴ It is not difficult to determine why Chile tempted Bolivia in this way. Certain acts of the Peruvian government at the insistence of Leguía had given Chile cause for alarm. There was the possibility that Chile would need an ally in a war against Peru which might occur at almost any time--or at least to be able to count on Bolivia's neutrality.

After Leguía was inaugurated President for a second time in October, 1919, one of the early acts of the Congress was to declare the Treaty of Ancón null.³⁵ Technically this action could be considered legitimate grounds for Chile to declare war against Peru, for the treaty dealt with more than the provinces of Tacna and Arica. There are indications that Peru began mobilizing troops on her southern border as well as along the Bolivian frontier. But the reports of

³³This was his personal feeling and accounts in large measure for the obstruction which Edwards placed in the way of the Plebiscitary Commission in 1925.

³⁴Johnson, Dept. of State, "Memorandum," Washington, May 1, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/552.

³⁵El Peruano, Diario Oficial, Lima, 13 de octubre de 1919, pp. 1349-52.

these movements are conflicting. Leguía himself, as could be expected, denied all such activity, and United States Chargé d'Affaires ad interim William W. Smith reported that he knew of no Peruvian mobilization.³⁶ The reports of Chilean retaliation are more definite, for Chile quickly moved cruisers to Arica to take care of any emergencies which might arise in that area. Officially the move was justified by "labor unrest."³⁷ While Chile and Peru were rumbling at each other, sounds of unrest also came from Bolivia.³⁸

Bolivia fell in step with Chile because Chile had practically agreed to give Arica to Bolivia as a port of entry if the final settlement of the dispute were made in Chile's favor. On the other hand, if Peru won, Bolivia could expect nothing.³⁹ The Bolivian Congress passed a resolution in favor of accepting the port, and the anti-Peruvian policy was accelerated by daily deportations of Peruvians.⁴⁰ Peru retaliated against her neighbor's

³⁶ Smith to Lansing, Lima, Oct. 28, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/532.

³⁷ Shea to Lansing, Santiago, Oct. 30, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/520; Shea to Lansing, Santiago, Oct. 27, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/517.

³⁸ Samuel A. Maginnes to Lansing, La Paz, Feb. 10, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/544.

³⁹ Smith to Lansing, Lima, Nov. 19, 1919, DSCF, 723.2515/536.

⁴⁰ Maginnes to Lansing, La Paz, Feb. 10, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/544.

activities by deporting Bolivians, all of which intensified the ill feeling in both countries.⁴¹

Mobs of Bolivians attacked and badly wrecked the Peruvian legation and consulate in La Paz, whereupon the Peruvians in Lima threw stones at the Bolivian legation.⁴² The outbreak of war between Bolivia and Peru was regarded as almost certain, and it was felt that if war occurred, Chile would join the side of Bolivia.⁴³

This, briefly described, was the international situation in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in March, 1920. The tenseness stemmed directly from the Tacna-Arica dispute. There was the distinct possibility that a second War of the Pacific could break out momentarily, involving the same participants, but this time with a different alignment. If a war were to be avoided, decisive and immediate action had to come from a strong, respected third power. That power was the United States, and this time it stepped into the dispute forcefully.

⁴¹Maginnes to Colby, La Paz, Apr. 28, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/628.

⁴²Smith to Sec. of State, Lima, Mar. 15, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/567; Smith to Sec. of State, Lima, Mar. 17, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/569. There was no Secretary of State, either Acting or Ad Interim between March 15 and March 21. Polk's commission as Acting Secretary of State expired on the former date and Bainbridge Colby did not enter upon his duties until the latter. Polk continued to direct Department of State affairs in his capacity as Undersecretary of State.

⁴³Shea to Sec. of State, Santiago, Mar. 17, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/564.

On March 17 Polk forwarded to the United States legation in La Paz a strong representation approved by Wilson against the war-like activities of Bolivia. The United States minister, Samuel A. Maginnes, was ordered to inform Foreign Minister Carlos Gutiérrez and President José Gutiérrez Guerra that the United States would "deplore" a mobilization of their country's armed forces. "The world," Maginnes was to say, "would resent any action on the part of a South American country which would cause the breaking out of hostilities in South America." The firm note ended with a stated desire--tantamount to an order--that the United States expected to be informed immediately that troop movements were not under way and that the peace of the hemisphere was not going to be disturbed.⁴⁴

No foreign office could have expected more complete acquiescence in a similarly veiled ultimatum. Wrangling between Bolivia and Peru ceased at once. It was as if a bucket of water had been used to put out a candle flame. An identic telegram was sent to Lima. In both Lima and La Paz the messages were quietly received, and Bolivia quickly assured the United States that she would do nothing to provoke hostilities. The immediate danger of an outbreak was over.

The reception received by a similar note in San-

⁴⁴ Polk to Maginnes, Washington, Mar. 17, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/568.

tiago, however, was another matter entirely. Polk told Ambassador Joseph H. Shea that the United States viewed the Bolivian-Peruvian situation with apprehension and counted upon Chile not to mobilize or to do anything which would disturb the peace.⁴⁵ The Chilean government regarded the message as directed at Bolivia and Peru; therefore, it also deprecated the threat of mobilization in those two countries. Said the Chilean note in reply: "The government and people of Chile are absolutely tranquil and had not for a moment thought of the extreme measure of mobilization."⁴⁶ Shea believed that Chile's answer, written by Foreign Minister Alamiro Huidobro, "was a manifest exposition of the pro-Bolivian sentiment entertained by Chile" which laid the blame for the disturbance entirely on Peru.⁴⁷ The Chilean press, both official and unofficial, initially greeted the note to Chile with calm and forbearance, but on March 23 cast off any cloak of friendship and attacked the United States vehemently for directly interfering in South-American affairs. Shea admitted that he was unable to discover any one reason for the attack. He attributed it to a variety of occurrences, such as Edwards' poor recep-

⁴⁵ Polk to Shea, Washington, Mar. 17, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/564.

⁴⁶ Shea to Sec. of State, Santiago, undated [received Mar. 22, 1920], DSCF, 723.2515/578.

⁴⁷ Shea to Colby, Santiago, Mar. 29, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/632.

tion in Washington, Chile's inability to float a railroad loan in the United States a few months previously, and a hostile press which railed against what was described as the "officious and unwarranted act of the American government espousing the cause of Peru." Also, he felt that the ill will which Chile had harbored toward the United States for years at last had a pretext for bursting into flame. But the most likely reason for the outburst, Shea believed, was that prompt United States action had disturbed Chilean plans of aiding Bolivia in an attack against Peru.⁴⁸

Regardless of the reasons for vituperation expressed against the American government, the Chilean Foreign Office was alarmed at a possible degeneration of United States-Chilean relations. On March 30 Foreign Minister Antonio Huneeus, who had recently succeeded Huidobro, issued a conciliatory note in which he thanked the United States for informing Chile of the Bolivia-Peruvian unrest. But Huneeus felt obligated for political reasons to insert the following paragraph, which amounted to a rebuff of United States activity:

Chile has never accepted interventions, and is able without boasting . . . to say now as she has always said that she will neither accept them in the case of Tacna-Arica nor in any other, on the part of any power or powers.

Although Shea's answer to the Huneeus statement was cor-

⁴⁸Ibid.

dially phrased,⁴⁹ for several years official relations between the United States and Chile were not as warm as before the Bolivian episode.

The United States, by directing Bolivia and Peru to stop their war-like activities and at the same time slapping Chile's wrists for aiding Bolivia, had entered the Tacna-Arica dispute with the ostensible purpose of preserving South-American peace.

Additional correspondence on the matter occurred more rapidly within the next two years than in any period of American involvement in the dispute since 1883. But it should be noted here that there is no evidence in the files of the Department of State archives to suggest that the United States favored Bolivia, Chile, or Peru in bringing about a settlement of the dispute. There is considerable evidence, however, to indicate that the Department of State was impartial and disinterested in the outcome. Its primary objective was a satisfactory settlement arranged between the nations concerned. What the details of the settlement were and how they were arrived at did not concern the United States. This point is made here because at least until the Arbitrator handed down his decision in 1925, Chile tended to be distrustful of United States

⁴⁹Shea to Colby, Santiago, Mar. 31, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/610; Shea to Colby, Apr. 14, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/643.

mediation, and this suspicion can be traced directly back to the Bolivian crisis in 1920.

One of the reasons for Chilean antagonism was that Peru openly boasted that she had received promises from the United States which guaranteed a settlement in her favor. How Peru arrived at that conclusion is difficult to determine. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby and other Department of State officials on several occasions informed the Peruvians that the United States could not and would not give them guarantees for a favorable settlement.⁵⁰ But Peru persisted in her delusion, and Chile continued to doubt United States impartiality.

Overnight Peru's international situation changed for the better. On July 12, 1920, a golpe de estado forced from office the pro-Chilean President of Bolivia, Gutiérrez Guerra. As if by magic official anti-Peruvian feeling ceased. Bolivia and Peru in 1920 lined up against Chile. For the second time in less than a half century Chile stood alone against her two northern neighbors.

The revolution came as a complete surprise to Gutiérrez Guerra. It was not a revolution brought about by the people, but was a clever and successful coup d'etat

⁵⁰ John W. Davis to William E. González, Washington, Jan. 18, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/708a; González to Colby, Lima, Jan. 21, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/709; Shea to Colby, Santiago, Jan. 26, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/710; Colby to Shea, Washington, Feb. 2, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/710; González to Colby, Lima, Feb. 16, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/717.

planned by four civilians and three army officers in La Paz, all prominent members of the Republican party. The change in governments was made possible by dissatisfaction in the army among the lower-ranking officers and extreme antagonism toward the administration among Republican party leaders because of Gutiérrez Guerra's high-handed methods at elections. The Republican party had been formed as a party of opposition in 1914, and one of its primary aims while sitting in opposition to the Liberals in the National Congress was the "revindication" of Antofagasta from Chile.⁵¹ The party felt that the province had been unjustly taken from Bolivia in the War of the Pacific and used it as a rallying point around which their supporters could gather. But when the Republicans found themselves in power in mid-July, 1920, they immediately declared that all existing treaties, including the treaty of peace of 1904, which surrendered Antofagasta to Chile, would be honored. Doubtlessly a hostile Chile, concentrating troops in Arica as a "pre-cautionary measure," precipitated the volte-face.⁵²

There were indications that Peruvian money was behind the Bolivian comp. This point is significant in the Tacna-

⁵¹Maginnes to Colby, La Paz, Jul. 20, 1920, DSCF, 824.00/55; Maginnes to Colby, La Paz, Jul. 19, 1920, DSCF, 824.00/67; Maginnes to Colby, La Paz, Jul. 24, 1920, DSCF, 824.00/78.

⁵²Aramayo to Colby, Dept. of State, "Memorandum," Washington, undated, DSCF, 824.2515/116.

Arica dispute because the anti-Chilean Republicans immediately ceased talking about the "revindication" of Antofagasta and began indicating that a "practical solution" had to be found to the Question of the Pacific, a solution in which Bolivia, Chile, and Peru were parties. Bolivia felt that a port was absolutely necessary and essential to her economic well being. The Republicans, therefore, had not given up the idea of gaining an outlet to the sea, and with Antofagasta out of reach, Arica was the only port in which all three countries had a direct interest.⁵³ Peru soon realized that although she successfully helped to alienate the Bolivian and Chilean governments, Bolivia would be a burden if she began clamoring for the port of Arica. The old Gutiérrez Guerra government had adopted that line. There would be small improvement if the new Bolivian government under Bautista Saavedra continued in the same vein.

Bolivia after 1920 became a third factor in settling the Tacna-Arica dispute, and although her attitude and claims were not mentioned when the final settlement was rendered, her persistence in demanding a settlement favorable to herself must be considered for its nuisance value if nothing else. A great deal of literature was published declaring that Bolivia was the key to the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute. Much of it said that if Chile

⁵³Maginnes to Colby, La Paz, Aug. 14, 1920, DSCP, 824.00/111.

and Peru would grant the province to Bolivia, a two-fold purpose would be served. First, Bolivia would gain access to the sea, and second, Chile and Peru would have a buffer zone between them which would lessen the possibility of armed conflict. Regardless of how simple and practical the scheme of granting the provinces to Bolivia may now sound, it must be remembered that Bolivia had no legal claim to a port on the Pacific. And in the Tacna-Arica dispute moral and "natural" rights counted for nothing. Only Peru and Chile had firm legal grounds to discuss the ownership of Tacna and Arica provinces. But the real problem of the Pacific was underscored after the Bolivian revolution in July, 1920: a port which was claimed by Peru, was held by Chile, and needed by Bolivia.

Once again Bolivia stood with its old ally, Peru, in all matters pertaining to Chile. Peru did not accept this new Bolivian attitude whole-heartedly because it complicated an already involved situation. Nevertheless, the two countries marched to the League of Nations to present their grievances against Chile, much to the consternation of the United States.

The Peruvian-Bolivian coalition desired more than merely to force Chile to hold the required plebiscite in Tacna-Arica. While a plebiscite would satisfy Peruvian aspirations, Bolivia would remain without a port. It was Bolivia's intention to go before the League of Nations

in hopes of having Arica awarded to her. Peru wanted to retain Bolivia as an ally but was not enthusiastic about her designs on Arica. Therefore, to placate Bolivia it was necessary to offer her something other than Arica. To do this Foreign Minister Melitón Porras sent a note to Foreign Minister Carlos Gutiérrez in La Paz which said in part:

We cordially repeat our invitation to Bolivia to accompany us in the great fight for restitution of lost territory that we are to begin in the League of Nations against the common usurper, and to abandon definitely her intention of soliciting, before the League, the adjustment of Arica to Bolivia.⁵⁴

In other words, Peru would support Bolivia in the League of Nations in a move to get back all the territory lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific if Bolivia would stop pressing for Arica, which had never belonged to her.

In April, 1919, Wilson had favored allowing the League of Nations to resolve all phases of the dispute. Yet his attitude changed completely a year later when Bolivia, without Peruvian encouragement, submitted the problem to the Council of the League. Some of the officials of the organization, fearing to irritate the United States, questioned the wisdom of entertaining Bolivia's motion and desired to be relieved of the embarrassing

⁵⁴ Porras to Gutiérrez, Lima, Mar. 5, 1920, in Luis Barros Borgoño, The Problem of the Pacific and the New Policies of Bolivia (Baltimore, 1924), p. 161.

situation. Even though Colby felt that a League inquiry would not violate the "peculiar interest" of the United States in Latin America, he feared it would be misinterpreted by Americans, giving them an unfavorable attitude toward the League. Since Brazil was the only Latin-American country which was a member of the Council, Colby believed that her ambassador, as a favor to the United States, would intimate that America felt it "inadvisable for the League to take cognizance of the question at this time."⁵⁵

Wilson approved both the recommendation and the reasons by which Colby justified it, and the Brazilian ambassador indicated American feelings on the situation.⁵⁶ Council members privately urged Bolivia to withdraw her motion, but she refused. The matter was held in abeyance until the next meeting of the Assembly later that year.

It is apparent that the vigorous and positive steps taken by Polk in March, 1920, to avoid a conflict between Bolivia and Chile were not duplicated in the Wilson administration later that same year. Other than declaring that he did not want the League to intervene in the dispute, Wilson took no action regarding Tacna-Arica. His interests

⁵⁵ Colby to Wilson, Washington, Apr. 15, 1920, General Correspondence, File II, Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁵⁶ Wilson to Colby, Washington, May 3, 1920, General Correspondence, Colby Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

were too much involved in the fight with the Senate, and his health was too much vitiated to allow for extensive interest in a South-American territorial disagreement.

Bolivia and Peru alike realized this, and on November 1, 1920, their delegates presented similar notes to the Assembly requesting the League of Nations to declare void the treaties which resulted from the War of the Pacific. No protest came from Washington. Chile quickly challenged the grounds upon which the requests were made, declaring that such action was not within the competency of the Assembly. Peru withdrew her request in early December, fearing that an invitation to European powers to discuss a purely American dispute would antagonize the United States. She urged Bolivia to follow her lead, but once more Bolivia persisted in her course of action.⁵⁷

For the representatives at Geneva to re-open a treaty on the grounds that it was made under duress, or that it was unfair, or for any reason, would have been like opening Pandora's box. The Treaty of Versailles stared them in the face, as did scores of "unfair" treaties. Considering this, it is understandable why the delegates filibustered against Bolivia's motion all day September 6, 1921. Bolivia, obviously defeated in its attempt to enlist the aid of the League of Nations, withdrew her proposal shortly

⁵⁷Barros Borgoño, op. cit., pp. 161-78.

thereafter.⁵⁸

It is doubtful whether the Assembly would have passed favorably on the motions made by Bolivia and Peru if they had come up for a vote. Warren G. Harding had been elected to the Presidency in the United States and his administration was openly disdainful of League activity. His Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, indicated that the United States government was not pleased that the motions were even being entertained.⁵⁹ Actually, the League was embarrassed over the whole situation and dropped the matter as quickly as it appropriately could.

Chile's reaction to the activities of her northern neighbors in the League of Nations was forceful. In the first place, she formally challenged the grounds on which the motions were presented, and secondly, she attempted to open direct negotiations with Peru in an effort to settle once for all their common problem. It would be far better, the Chilean government reasoned, to settle the matter directly than possibly to have uninvited powers force a decision upon the republic. But the technical

⁵⁸ Edwin V. Morgan to Frank B. Kellogg, La Paz, Sept. 16, 1921, DSCF, 724.25/3½; Morgan to Kellogg, La Paz, Sept. 30, 1921, DSCF, 724.25/4½; Maginnes to Hughes, La Paz, Oct. 21, 1921, DSCF, 724.25/6½. Three three lengthy despatches give the complete history of Bolivia's move to get the League of Nations to consider the problem.

⁵⁹ Kellogg to Maginnes, Washington, Aug. 26, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/742.

aspect of presenting her views to Peru was involved. To resolve the dilemma of negotiating directly but at the same time not resuming diplomatic relations, Chile resorted to an expedient vaguely similar to the "Sr. Alfonso" episode.

President Sanfuentes sent Dr. Federico Puga Borne, an elderly and respected former Foreign Minister, on a confidential mission to discuss the settling of outstanding differences between Chile and Peru. Chile took the initiative in the negotiations but refused to admit it, for in Puga Borne's commission, Sanfuentes indicated that Leguía had said that he was eager for an opportunity to open negotiations respecting the differences between the two countries. Leguía, who examined Puga Borne's credentials before receiving him, said that he had never so expressed himself and that he would not talk to Puga Borne under those terms.⁶⁰ Leguía later refused point-blankly Sanfuentes' offer of direct negotiations, this time not so subtly phrased but still sent through Puga Borne. The Peruvian President not only felt that no good result could come from negotiation, but he also feared a Chilean trap. In the event Peru agreed to direct discussions, Leguía believed that Chile would deliberately prolong the talks, making it virtually impossible to secure her consent to submit the question to some tribunal for settlement.⁶¹

⁶⁰González to Colby, Lima, Sept. 21, 1920, DSCF, 723.2515/694.

⁶¹Ibid.

Puga Borne's mission to Lima is discussed here because this was Chile's first effort to open direct negotiations with Peru on the Tacna-Arica question after severance of diplomatic relations in 1910. Up to this point her attitude had been one of resenting and rejecting intervention, feeling that she was able to manage her own affairs without interference. For these reasons she accepted neither the offices of a friendly power nor entertained Peruvian requests for a plebiscite.

With the failure of Puga Borne's attempt to negotiate directly with Peru came the realization that arbitration was the only answer. Chile wanted to conclude a knotty and bothersome problem. The extra expenses incurred in moving large numbers of troops north to the Bolivian and Peruvian borders after the July revolution in Bolivia aggravated an already serious financial situation. Besides, a disputed Presidential election and a possible coup d'etat within Chile caused concern among political leaders. With the internal situation unstable, it would be far better to remove the Tacna-Arica problem through arbitration, which--even if unfavorable to Chile--would not be so apt to cause a revolution. And Leguía had already indicated that he was willing to arbitrate.

However, the kind of arbitration which Leguía desired was that done by a nation or group of nations which had the moral and material strength to enforce the

decision rendered. Clearly he wanted to have the entire question of the unfulfilled provisions of the Treaty of Ancón arbitrated with the United States as either the sole arbitrator or at least represented on the board. Indeed, he felt there was no possibility of a satisfactory arbitration other than through the leadership of the United States.⁶² Leguía, therefore, was looking for a fair arbitration. Chile wanted a decision from the arbitrator which would recognize her sovereignty in the disputed provinces. But the point remained that Chile was not averse to settling the dispute according to the terms of Article III of the Treaty of Ancón.

By the time Warren G. Harding became President of the United States, the situation in South America regarding the Tacna-Arica dispute can be summarized thus. Peru, led by a strong President, was ready to submit the entire matter to the arbitration of any nation which could enforce its decision, but preferably to the United States. To leave the settlement up to any one or several Latin-American states was unsatisfactory to him. Neighboring countries were too much involved in South-American politics to render a perfectly objective decision. Arbitration by friendly European powers was, he felt, out of the question. This was strictly an American problem and to invite Europeans

⁶²González to Hughes, Lima, Apr. 20, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/730.

to settle it would antagonize the United States, and in 1921 Leguía felt it was better politics to curry the favor of America than to alienate her.

Chile, under the leadership of a new President, the popular Arturo Alessandri, was contemplating the idea of submitting the problem of the Pacific to arbitration, preferably to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Alessandri himself was in the forefront of this change of attitude.⁶³ He was aware of the huge deficit largely brought about through the maintenance of an over-sized army. And he also was aware that the cost of being constantly prepared to defend the possession of the provinces from a possible Peruvian or Bolivian revanche was greater than their value.⁶⁴ Chile's seeming about-face was real in one respect only, that is, she was willing to arbitrate, but remained unwilling to consider the loss of the provinces through arbitration.

Bolivia's position can be dealt with more briefly. Hers was an entirely extra-legal situation. She could lay claim to no part of the Pacific coast or a port on that coast. Any claim she put forward was based on nothing more than sentiment and morality.

⁶³Fletcher, Dept. of State, "Conversation between the Chilean Ambassador and the Undersecretary of State," Washington, Jul. 9, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/1255.

⁶⁴Shea to Colby, Santiago, Feb. 1, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/713; González to Hughes, Lima, May 2, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/732.

Finally, the position of the United States must be considered. The Department of State announced as early as 1910 that it would not take the initiative to set the machinery in motion to bring about a final, permanent solution, nor was it desirous of having European influence injected to settle an American question.⁶⁵ It refused to impose its will on either country in any way. Peru was willing, even eager, for the United States to take the lead in deciding the question in any manner it desired. But Chile, on the other hand, distrusted mediation by the United States, doubtlessly because of its admittedly pro-Peruvian attitude in the negotiations of the nineteenth century and also because of unfounded Peruvian claims of United States favoritism. On the specific question of ownership of Tacna-Arica, the Department of State was not sure whether the area belonged to Chile or Peru and probably would have liked to have made it possible for Bolivia to have an outlet to the sea, but did not have a fixed notion of how this could be done. And, finally, it was felt that regardless of which nation lost the territory through a binding and fair judgement of a tribunal, both nations would eventually profit. After such a judgement, they would then be free to undertake internal developments without being in a continual state of preparedness for

⁶⁵Hughes to González, Washington, Aug. 26, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/742.

war.⁶⁶ There existed in the United States, then, an attitude of impartiality as to how the question was to be resolved--except that it preferred not to appeal to Europe for a solution. It was an impartial United States which soon had an opportunity to render a decision on the matter.

In July, 1921, Undersecretary of State Fletcher, former United States ambassador to Chile, told the Chilean ambassador to the United States that the Department of State had received requests from Peru for good offices, but that they were not offered since Chile had not made a similar request. Fletcher told the ambassador that the United States was not ready to depart from its traditional policy, but felt that Chile should know that the United States was her friend and was always ready to bring about an amicable and satisfactory settlement.⁶⁷ A few months later Chile took the United States into her confidence and informed Hughes of her future actions in regard to settling the dispute. On October 12 Ambassador Beltrán Mathieu left with Hughes an unsigned and undated statement of Chilean intentions. The document declared that Chile proposed to extend an invitation to Peru to carry out the plebiscite called for in the Treaty of Ancón with the election procedure

⁶⁶González to Hughes, Lima, May 2, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/732.

⁶⁷Fletcher, Dept. of State, "Conversation between the Chilean Ambassador and the Undersecretary of State," Washington, Jul. 9, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/1255.

to be that described in the Billingham Protocol of 1912. The stipulations of the agreement had been proposed by Billingham of Peru but were not ratified by the Peruvian Congress. The protocol called for a five-man election commission to supervise the plebiscite. It was to be composed of two members each from Peru and Chile presided over by the president of the Chilean Supreme Court. In the event that Peru rejected Chile's new offer, the government of Chile would agree to allow the United States to determine equitable bases for the plebiscite. However, Chile declared that only Article III of the Treaty of Ancón was open for discussion and said that the unfulfilled plebiscite was the single outstanding question between the two countries. If Peru refused this second offer, Chile felt that her old enemy would thereby forfeit all claims to sovereignty of the disputed area, whereupon Chile would annex the provinces outright.⁶⁸

Immediately after the interview with Mathieu, Hughes wrote an aide-mémoire in which he said that he had informed the ambassador that the United States was willing to facilitate an adjustment of the controversy in any way it could.

⁶⁸ [Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, undated (received Oct. 12, 1921)], DSCF, 723.2515/761; [Mathieu] to Fletcher, Dept. of State, "Memorandum Handed to the Undersecretary by the Chilean Ambassador," Washington, Sept. 22, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/1257; [Fletcher], Dept. of State, "Conversation with the Chilean Ambassador and Mr. Carlos Castro Ruiz," Washington, Sept. 28, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/1329.

The Department of State would "lend its aid toward such a settlement," Hughes added. Furthermore, no mention of Chile's intentions would be made to Peru until the Chilean government so advised the United States.⁶⁹

Knowledge of this very important statement of Chilean intentions and of Hughes' reply goes far in explaining the Secretary's fetish for absolute neutrality in the months to come. United States ambassadors to Chile and Peru urged Hughes to take the initiative and invite the disputants to accept United States good offices, but he replied briefly ordering them to maintain strict impartiality and to say nothing which would indicate that the United States had any concern for the dispute except a general desire for its amicable solution. There is no indication that Hughes allowed the information which Mathieu gave him to be transmitted further than his own office. When the time came to use the information, he did so with great effectiveness. But in the meantime he patiently waited for events in South America to reach the right stage before he broke both the Department's silence and its well defined policy of offering good offices only when all nations involved specifically requested them.

On December 13 Chile offered to negotiate with Peru on the bases mentioned in Mathieu's statement to Hughes.

⁶⁹Hughes, Dept. of State, "Aide-Mémoire," Washington, Oct. 13, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/761.

Foreign Minister Alberto Salomón summoned United States Chargé d'Affaires ad interim F. A. Sterling to ascertain the authenticity of the telegram sent by Foreign Minister Ernesto Barros Jarpa of Chile. Without diplomatic relations, the receipt of a direct offer of negotiation on the matter of the plebiscite was extraordinary but not unprecedented. An exchange of telegrams under a similar situation created the unratified Billingham Protocol in 1912. If the offer were genuine, said Salomón, Peru could do nothing but reject it, because a fair plebiscite was now impossible since so many Peruvians had been deported from the area. The only course left open to Peru, the Foreign Minister felt, was a complete revision of the treaty through arbitration, preferably under the auspices of the United States. Since the invitation contained no features of an ultimatum, Sterling suggested that Peru not issue a "flat refusal" to negotiate. Instead, he urged Salomón to delay a reply until the views of the Department of State were known.⁷⁰

Events in Santiago moved with equal rapidity. United States Ambassador William Miller Collier was called to the Foreign Office where the motives behind the offer were explained to him. Barros Jarpa assured him that the message "was sent with friendly feeling and good intent." Chile was prepared to consider any reasonable modifications in

⁷⁰ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Dec. 13, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/774.

the arrangements set forth in the Billingham Protocol regarding the plebiscite. There were no ulterior motives behind the offer; Chile would not mobilize if it were rejected. Concluding his statement of good intentions toward Peru, Barros Jarpa requested that United States diplomatic channels be used to convey the information to Peru.⁷¹

Hughes answered Barros Jarpa's request by instructing Collier to refrain from any action which could be construed as showing partiality for one of the parties.⁷² And to make sure there was no departure from this attitude of impartiality, he sent similar instructions to Sterling in Lima.⁷³ The day previously Hughes forbade Sterling even to transmit Salomón's reply to Barros Jarpa. The Secretary of State preferred that the answer find its way to Santiago by some route other than the American embassy. The reason which he gave was the same as had been presented many times before: the Department of State in such situations maintained an impartial attitude and preferred not to act for one party without the consent of the other.⁷⁴

⁷¹Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Dec. 14, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/776.

⁷²Hughes to Collier, Washington, Dec. 17, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/776.

⁷³Hughes to Sterling, Washington, Dec. 17, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/780.

⁷⁴Hughes to Sterling, Washington, Dec. 16, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/781.

Peru considered Chile's offer for a week. Salomón in reply sent a strong refusal to hold the plebiscite in the manner decided upon in 1912. He pointed out that the deportations of Peruvians, the intimidation of voters in the area by Chilean authorities, and the doubtful validity of an honest vote in a plebiscite supervised by Chile made an election at that time impossible. And in a bold stroke Salomón seized upon Chile's denial of League of Nations jurisdiction in the differences between Chile and Bolivia. On that occasion Chile maintained that the question was solely an American political problem. Chile, he felt, had admitted that American problems should be settled within the hemisphere. Since that was the case, he urged Barros Jarpa to submit the entire Question of the Pacific to arbitration arranged by the United States.⁷⁵

Barros Jarpa's reply to Salomón's telegram did not entirely repudiate the possibilities of arbitration. It said that the bases on which the plebiscite was to be taken should be settled before submitting the problem to an arbitrator. (Mathieu's note to Hughes said that Chile would not object to the United States' determining suitable bases for arbitration.) Salomón pointed out that that particular matter was the legitimate concern of an arbitrator.⁷⁶ The

⁷⁵Federico A. Pezet to Hughes, Washington, Dec. 20, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/790.

⁷⁶Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Dec. 22, 1921, DSCF, 723.2515/792.

tone of the communications exchanged clearly indicated that both governments desired to continue the negotiations.

Chile and Peru by the beginning of 1922 had reached a point which made United States mediation appear favorable. Chile had made her offer to negotiate with Peru on the basis of the 1912 telegrams--just as Mathieu had indicated to Hughes in October--and had been turned down. Peru had countered with an offer to submit the entire question to United States arbitration, and Chile had not refused entirely, but rather seemed to be waiting expectantly for a diplomatic break. Since this was a matter of national pride, Chile could not make a firm offer to arbitrate. But she could accept an offer made by the right nation. It was now time for Hughes to speak the lines based on the script handed him two months previously. The Secretary of State in the name of President Harding sent a skillfully drawn invitation, worded in such terms that it was acceptable to both parties, for Chile and Peru to send representatives to Washington so that they could settle the existing difficulties between them, or, if they were not successful, to arrange a settlement by arbitration.⁷⁷ The statement appealed to Chile because it invited her to discuss the unfulfilled parts of the Treaty of Ancón, and it appealed to Peru because it provided for eventual arbitration in the event

⁷⁷Hughes to Sterling and Collier, Washington, Jan. 13, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/805a and 805b.

direct negotiations failed.

But before he formally issued the invitations for Chile and Peru to send representatives to Washington, Hughes wanted to be sure that the governments would accept. When the proposition was placed before them, the Foreign Ministers of both governments indicated that they would accept the offer without qualification.⁷⁸ The invitations were thereupon issued, but the over-zealous acceptance by Peru nearly caused them to be withdrawn.

In Barros Jarpa's acceptance of Harding's invitation the Foreign Minister said simply:

My government will be represented at Washington as soon as possible by plenipotentiaries ad hoc who will bear full powers to agree with the representatives of Peru for solution of the difficulties to which [the] invitation of the United States government refers.

The only condition which he attached to the acceptance was the statement that only the unfulfilled provisions of the Treaty of Ancón would be discussed, and this was consonant with the invitation.⁷⁹ But the wording of Peru's formal acceptance caused Hughes some concern. Salomón not only accepted the offer but went one step further. He said

⁷⁸ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Jan. 14, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/806; Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Jan. 17, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/807; Fletcher, Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Carlos Castro Ruiz, Counselor of the Chilean Embassy," Washington, Jan. 17, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1263.

⁷⁹ Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Jan. 19, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/811.

that Peru would appoint a representative to go to Washington "on the understanding that, if necessary, there shall be an arbitration adjusted by the Government of the United States which shall, ultimately, decide all differences arising from the Treaty of Ancón."⁸⁰ [Italics supplied.]

This was quite another matter. Harding had not invited Peru to submit the problem to his arbitration, but had merely asked that she send representatives to Washington in the hope that they could reach an understanding with the Chilean representative, or, if not, in the hope that they could call for arbitration. Salomón was two steps ahead of the President, and the Secretary of State wanted Peru back in line before further progress was made in the discussions. Therefore, he ordered Sterling to inform both Leguía and Salomón that Harding had not offered "an arbitration adjusted by the . . . United States." The phrase introduced a new and unnecessary complication and placed an obligation upon the United States which she did not want to discuss at that stage of the negotiations. Unless the phrase were removed, Hughes said, "it would be necessary to reconsider [the] whole subject."⁸¹ Leguía and Salomón complied with Hughes' demands and deleted the phrase "adjusted by the Government of the

⁸⁰ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Jan. 19, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/810.

⁸¹ Hughes to Sterling, Washington, Jan. 19, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/810; Hughes to Sterling, Washington, Jan. 24, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/817.

United States" from the acceptance.⁸²

Except for one matter, significant for its nuisance value primarily, the plans for a conference had been laid. On January 21, 1922, President Saavedra cabled Harding that Bolivia desired an invitation to the conference of plenipotentiaries to be held in Washington. Harding explained to him that the meeting was not a hearing before the President of the United States, but was a discussion of questions at issue between Chile and Peru.⁸³ Since it was a matter of their exclusive concern, Harding said he was "precluded from taking the initiative" in issuing an invitation to Bolivia.⁸⁴ Chile refused to invite the Bolivians, and Peru, relieved to have an easy way out, apologized for not being able to include them because of Chile's action. Bolivia was excluded from the preliminary discussions, from the arbitration, and from the final settlement. Her "rights" did not enter into the resolution of the Tacna-Arica dispute at any time.

⁸² Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Jan. 28, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/830.

⁸³ This reply was written by Undersecretary of State Fletcher, former United States ambassador to Chile. Fletcher to Harding, Washington, Jan. 27, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/887a.

⁸⁴ Harding to Saavedra, Washington, Jan. 27, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/821; Fletcher, Dept. of State, "Conversation with the Bolivian Minister," Washington, Jan. 19, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1264.

CHAPTER III

ARBITRATION BY THE UNITED STATES

Preliminary Negotiations

Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes remained impartial in the negotiations in Washington between Chile and Peru in their effort to settle the Tacna-Arica dispute in 1922. He doubtless realized that the plenipotentiaries would be unable to come to a satisfactory solution, but until that time the United States government must do nothing which would indicate that it was biased. Hughes succeeded in maintaining United States neutrality. Chilean and Peruvian diplomatic representatives failed to resolve their problems and agreed to accept the further good offices of the United States to extricate themselves from their positions.

Desiring to maintain perfect impartiality and actually maintaining it are two different things. For two nations which had no direct diplomatic contact with each other to arrange the details of a conference as important as the one held in Washington was clumsy at best. Hughes urged that the Chilean and Peruvian ambassadors to the United State arrange the details, and if they were unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution,

he could see the United States properly acting to get the conference started. He did not object to the United States scheduling the meeting dates and arranging the number of official representatives to the conference, but, of course, none of the plenipotentiaries were to be directly accredited to the United States in any way.¹ Further than this he was unwilling to go.

Chile, so long opposed to United States "intervention" in her dispute with Peru, quickly appointed representatives to the conference. President Alessandri chose the highly respected Carlos Aldunate Solar, a former law professor, senator, and recently-elected president of the Conservative party; the crafty and skilled politician Luis Izquierdo, former Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior.² Chile was ready to begin negotiations by the middle of March. But she reckoned without the Peruvians.

Peru, long an advocate of United States mediation, procrastinated in appointing representatives and in suggesting a date for the beginning of the sessions. Dissension was apparent in the Cabinet, which could agree on neither the number of delegates to be appointed nor when

¹Hughes to Collier, Washington, Jan. 30, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/823.

²Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Feb. 10, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/872; Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Jan. 31, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/833; [Huntington Wilson] to Dana G. Munro, Dept. of State, "Memorandum," Washington, May 5, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1067.

the conference should begin.³ Nearly a month after Alessandri had made his selection, Leguía appointed the Peruvian members. He chose Dr. Melitón P. Porras, who had been president of the Council of Ministers, former Foreign Minister, and former minister plenipotentiary to several countries; and Hernán Velarde, Minister of the Interior during the José Pardo administration and, at the time of appointment, ambassador to Argentina. As technical assistant Leguía named Dr. Solón Polo, Foreign Minister under Presidents Oscar Benevides and Pardo.⁴

Peruvian inaction delayed the opening of the conference. The Chilean delegates were in Washington ready to negotiate on April 19.⁵ But at that time instructions had not yet been written for the Peruvian delegates.

Setting a firm date to begin the conference was difficult. At first Foreign Minister Salomón felt that Hughes should announce the date for the meeting and said

³Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Feb. 9, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/844; Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Feb. 11, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/846.

⁴Pezet to Hughes, Washington, 24 de febrero de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/857. Porras' appointment was hardly calculated to encourage Chilean good will toward Peru since it had been he, as Foreign Minister, who encouraged Bolivia to appeal to the League of Nations in an effort to void the Treaty of 1904. For official Chilean reaction to his appointment see [Mathieu], "Memorandum Informativo," Washington, 21 de febrero de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/866.

⁵Embajada de Chile to Department of State, Washington, 19 de abril de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/905.

that the last half of March would be acceptable to Chile.⁶ Leguía also felt that Harding should fix the date, but, since the Peruvian delegates had not been appointed as of February 11, he suggested that the conference begin sometime between April 15 and April 30. The prospective appointees were at the time out of the country and would have to return home for instructions. But on March 14 Salomón intimated to Chargé d'Affaires Sterling that it would be impossible for the Peruvian delegates to reach Washington before May 1.⁷ Therefore, whatever notions either country had of allowing Hughes to set the date quickly vanished. The date of the opening session depended entirely upon when the Peruvian delegates would arrive.

After experiencing further Peruvian delays, the opening date for the conference was set for May 12, later moved to May 15. Hughes was embarrassed by the delays which had caused the Chileans to wait in Washington for nearly a month. Aldunate and Izquierdo had definite feelings on the matter and considered it an affront to Chile. Hughes felt that an explanation was in order, and he instructed Sterling to make an informal suggestion to the Peruvian Foreign Minister to that effect. Leguía took the hint and

⁶Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Jan. 31, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/833.

⁷Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Feb. 11, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/846; Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Mar. 14, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/882.

at a press conference made the desired explanation.⁸

One reason for Peru's incongruous action in not reacting quickly to the invitation from the United States is not hard to find. Foreign Minister Salomón saw in the meeting no chance to gain personal political magnification. And since Leguía had entrusted him to arrange the details of the conference, his dilatory action was important. Had it not been for the President's strong position, Salomón would have been a threat to the conference.⁹

The Board of the Pan-American Union offered the facilities of the Union to Peru and Chile while they were in Washington searching for a solution to their problems. Hughes delivered the welcoming address in the Hall of Nations on May 15, and the conference began with considerable good will on both sides.¹⁰

A few words, but no more, must be said about Bolivia's attempt to be included in the Washington Conference. Peru had indicated that when the conference began, she would support Bolivia's claims to a seat, which she did briefly.

⁸Hughes to Sterling, Washington, Apr. 28, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/908; Sterling to Hughes, Lima, May 1, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/912.

⁹Sterling to Hughes, Lima, May 1, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/912.

¹⁰Leo S. Rowe to Hughes, Washington, Feb. 16, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/852; Middlemiss to Wilson, Washington, May 26, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/957 for an official verbatim transcript of the speeches delivered at the opening meeting.

But the Chilean delegates refused to invite Bolivia. Hughes, after consulting with Harding, reiterated to the Bolivian government that the United States had no initiative in the matter.¹¹ Bolivia was not invited to the conference, and her claims were not discussed in the negotiations.

So soon as the conference was underway Peru nearly scuttled it by insisting upon the return of Tarapacá, the province which she had ceded outright to Chile in the Treaty of Ancón. Her demands were clearly outside the scope of Harding's invitation. Hughes cabled Sterling to inform Leguía that the United States did not look with favor upon the claim, and if it were not withdrawn immediately, Peru would have to suffer the consequences of a disrupted conference.¹² Leguía replied that the Peruvian delegates had not been instructed merely to demand the return of Tarapacá but to treat on all matters concerning the Treaty of Ancón, which Peru considered no longer in effect.¹³ Clearly the

¹¹ Ballivián to Hughes, Washington, May 24, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/944, containing Salomón to Sainz, Lima, 3 de febrero de 1922; Ballivián to Hughes, Washington, 24 de mayo de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/952, containing Aldunate to Ballivián, Washington, 22 de mayo de 1922; Hughes to Jesse S. Cottrel, Washington, May 31, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/943.

¹² Hughes to Sterling, Washington, May 20, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/931a.

¹³ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, May 21, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/933. For a complete copy of the instructions issued to the Peruvian delegates see the enclosure of Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Feb. 7, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1124. This document was obtained by Sterling in a confidential

Peruvian Foreign Minister had agreed not to discuss the re-opening of the treaty before Harding extended the invitation to meet in Washington. Hughes felt that if the Peruvian government persisted in its course, then the success of the conference would be jeopardized and that further United States good offices to end the dispute could not be expected.¹⁴

Hughes had his way. Urged by Leguía, a meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Diplomatic Committee of Congress instructed the Peruvian delegates not to press the claim that the Treaty of Ancón was nullified, but to confine their arguments to the unfulfilled provisions of Article III. In any event, the Foreign Minister felt that Chile and Peru would not agree even on this smaller issue and arbitration of all claims of violations of the treaty by Chile would be brought up eventually.¹⁵

manner and is of real academic interest. Leguía's rubric is in the margin of each page of the original. The instructions were comprehensive and called for the return of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica, a settlement concerning the fiscal revenues collected by Chile in those provinces since 1894, a discussion of war indemnities due to Peru, settlement of the claim of Peru against Chile for the guano from the Lobos Islands, reparations for expelled Peruvians, neutrality of Chile on questions which Peru had with other countries, and reparations due Peru for financial assistance given Chilean military units interned in 1891. These were some of the items which the Peruvians were to discuss in reply to Harding's invitation to examine the "unfulfilled sections of Article III"!

¹⁴Hughes to Sterling, Washington, May 23, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/933.

¹⁵Sterling to Hughes, Lima, May 25, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/945.

What explanation can be found for this flagrant violation of previous promises? To understand Peru's policy of pressing for a complete re-opening of the Treaty of Ancón, one must recognize that the problems of the unredeemed provinces, of the postponed plebiscite, of fear of momentary Chilean invasion, and of Peruvian deportations from Chile had for years been the basis of an emotional disturbance for the Peruvians. Politicians used these problems to unite the masses behind them. For years they told the people that Peru had justice on her side and would not give an inch to further Chilean encroachments. To have gone before the Chilean delegation in Washington and voluntarily and publicly renounced Tarapacá would have been a reversal of a policy which Peruvians were convinced was justified. Regardless of what Leguía may have said in his acceptance of Harding's invitation, he doubtlessly had the mental reservation that all the treaty must come under an arbitrator's eye. Leguía tried to keep secret the decision to discuss no more than portions of the famous third article. An impartial observer realized that the renunciation of Tarapacá, which was a tacit admission that all the treaty was still in force, was the stuff revolutions were made of.¹⁶ Leguía knew it, too; but he also knew that

¹⁶"Extract from Weekly Report of Commercial Attaché Dunn at Lima, Peru, for Week Ended June 12, 1922," DSCP, 723.2515/988.

Peru's position was untenable. Lest the entire conference fail, he had to give in on this point.

By instructing the Peruvian delegates to confine themselves to the discussion of Article III only, Leguía implied recognition of the remainder of the treaty. This was a great concession for him, and one which caused him much difficulty in his Cabinet.¹⁷ He would not again be so generous in the negotiations.

Peru, after giving up her attempt to subject the entire treaty to review, made two further demands of Chile. The first was a face-saving device which had no chance of being accepted. In it Peru called for the outright award of Tacna and Arica, saying that Chilean violations of Article III made this the only course possible. The second, made after the Chilean delegates quickly rejected the first, was more involved. The Peruvians felt that Chilean inaction for thirty years had voided the right to hold a plebiscite in the area. Therefore, they wanted an arbitrator to decide if a plebiscite should be held in view of the long lapse of time. If an arbitrator felt that Chile had violated the treaty and thereby caused the plebiscite clause to be voided, then Peru wanted him to dispose of the provinces directly and in any manner he saw fit.¹⁸

¹⁷ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, May 27, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/971.

¹⁸ Embajada de Chile to Hughes, Washington, 15 de junio de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/968.

Immediately it will be recognized that Peru's second demand was no less a move to revise the treaty than her request for Tarapacá. The treaty said that there should be a plebiscite, now Peru was asking for an arbitrator to decide if this provision were still in effect. Chile held out against this revision as being outside the scope of Harding's invitation and of her acceptance. Chile was willing to discuss arbitration of the unfulfilled clause but no more than that.¹⁹

The situation, briefly, was this: Peru wanted an arbitrator to decide if the plebiscite should be held and Chile wanted him to decide how it was to be held. Neither would retreat, and negotiations came to a standstill. The successful outcome of the conference was threatened.

Even though the United States did not have a delegate at the meetings in the Pan-American Building, Hughes knew that an impasse had been reached. In order for the negotiations to continue, some effort had to be made to resolve the difficulties. He undertook to do this through a series of informal conferences lasting nearly a month between June and July.²⁰ He talked separately with the

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰[Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Chilean Ambassador," Washington, Jun. 17, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1335; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Peruvian Ambassador," Washington, Jun. 21, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1336; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Chilean Ambassador,"

plenipotentiaries and in a real sense guided them out of their dilemma. The results of these meetings was a Solomonic compromise acceptable to both parties.²¹ He suggested that an arbitrator be given the duty to decide whether to hold a plebiscite in view of the length of time which had expired since it was scheduled. If the arbitrator decided that a plebiscite was in order, then he was to write the conditions under which it would be held. But if he decided that no plebiscite was required, then he would refer the matter back to the disputants and at another conference they would decide the final disposition of the

Washington, Jun. 22, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1337; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Peruvian Ambassador, Dr. Porras, and Dr. Velarde, Delegates to the Peruvian-Chilean Conference," Washington, Jun. 27, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1338; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Ambassador of Chile," Washington, Jun. 28, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1339; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Chilean Ambassador," Washington, Jun. 29, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1341, containing "Memorandum of Suggestions Made by Secretary Hughes," Washington, Jun. 28, 1922; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with Dr. Porras," Washington, Jul. 6, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1344; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with Dr. Carlos Aldunate, Chilean Delegate to the Tacna-Arica Conference," Washington, Jul. 10, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1345; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Chilean Ambassador," Washington, Jul. 6, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1343; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with the Chilean Ambassador," Washington, Jul. 14, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1346; [Hughes], Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with Señor Aldunate, Chilean Delegate, and Dr. Porras, Peruvian Delegate," Washington, Jul. 17, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1347.

²¹Martin to Hughes, Santiago, Jun. 13, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/964; Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Jul. 6, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/983

provinces. In this way Hughes denied the arbitrator the power to pass on the ultimate fate of the provinces. In the meantime, Chilean control over the area was not to be diminished regardless of the arbitrator's decision. Chile insisted upon retaining civil and military control of Tacna-Arica until the final disposition, agreed to by Chile and Peru, was effected.

Hughes' compromise was incorporated into a Supplementary Act, which was declared a part of the Protocol of Arbitration, and both these instruments were signed in Washington on July 20, 1922. Ratifications were to be exchanged in Washington within three months.²² The Arbitration Protocol provided simply that only the unfulfilled provisions of Article III of the Treaty of Ancón would be submitted to the arbitration of the President of the United States, who was empowered to arrange all the administrative details of the arbitration conference. Hughes personally was opposed to naming the President as Arbitrator; he preferred a panel of international jurists. But Chile insisted upon having the President as the sole judge, and Hughes reluctantly consented.²³ The Supplementary Act was longer

²²Pezet to Hughes, Washington, 22 de julio de 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/991, containing the "Protocolo de Arbitraje" and the "Acta Complementaria."

²³Hughes, "Memorandum of Conversation with Mathieu, Nov. 20, 1926," Hughes Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. These files are hereinafter cited as Hughes Papers.

and included, in addition to Hughes' compromise already described, a provision that if the Arbitrator declared that a plebiscite was unnecessary and the subsequent conference between Chile and Peru failed, they were to request the further good offices of the United States in order to reach an agreement. And, finally, it was agreed to submit to the Arbitrator the problem created by the provinces of Tarata, which Peru claimed was part of her national domain and not part of the old province of Tacna, and Chilcay, which Peru held was not part of the ceded province of Tarapacá. Both had been occupied by Chile since the end of the War of the Pacific.

The delegates left Washington in high spirits. Their agreements had to be submitted to their respective Congresses for ratification, however, before their work would be completed. In Peru approval presented no problem. Leguía, because of his tremendous power, quickly pushed the Protocol and Supplementary Act through Congress by September 12.²⁴ As soon as Chile ratified the agreements, President Harding would be named Arbitrator. But Chile's consent was longer in coming.

In accepting the compromise presented by Hughes, Chile reversed a forty-year old policy. By agreeing to allow an arbitrator to decide if a plebiscite were still

²⁴ Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Sept. 12, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1034.

in order, the Chilean government had allowed a revision of the treaty. Alessandri was in the forefront of this change in policy. It took all the influence that the popular President could muster to see the agreements approved by the Chilean Congress. Alessandri, it was later discovered, wanted a liquidation, complete and final, of the War of the Pacific. Whether the outcome gave the provinces to Chile or Peru did not concern him. He felt that once a settlement was obtained, the renewal of relations, especially commercially, would more than adequately reward Chile for any loss in territory.²⁵

The Chilean delegates to the Washington conference supposed that there would be no considerable opposition to their work in Chile, and after the conference adjourned, they wen to Europe on a pleasure visit. They greatly erred in their supposition. A ministerial crisis was the opening shot in the race to get the Protocol ratified within the three-month deadline. On August 4 the Senate overwhelmingly (20-7) censured Foreign Minister Ernesto Barros Jarpa personally for his role in the negotiations and the Cabinet generally, thus causing him and the entire ministry to resign.²⁶ The Senators felt that Barros Jarpa had surrendered Chile's traditional and strategic position when he

²⁵Henry H. Sest to J. Butler Wright, Santiago, May 17, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1150.

²⁶Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Sept. 10, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1031.

consented to revise the plebiscite portion of Article III of the Treaty of Ancón. His actions were interpreted by the Congress and the press as a complete renunciation of his previously announced position. Collier felt in September that the Protocol did not have the slightest chance of being approved, even though Alessandri desired ratification to the extent that he confidentially told the ambassador that he would resign if the protocol were rejected.²⁷

Alessandri in a public meeting denounced the opponents of the protocol and asserted his determination to see the agreement ratified. His statements so angered the Senate that it called itself into special session and very nearly caused another Cabinet crisis. It soon became apparent that the Senate would impose reservations on the protocol before consenting to it.²⁸ A battle was shaping up strangely similar to the one which faced Woodrow Wilson in 1919.

By a 17-12 vote the Senate approved the Protocol of Arbitration and Supplementary Act, but imposed three reservations upon them. First, Chilean sovereignty in Tacna-Arica was not to be altered during the plebiscite; second, the agreements were not to affect the existence

²⁷ Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Sept. 9, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1031.

²⁸ Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Sept. 20, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1037.

and permanent effect of acts passed by Chile regarding the provinces, nor would they affect the efficacy of the Treaty of 1904 with Bolivia; and third, the customs and usages of 1883 regarding plebiscites were to be adhered to if a plebiscite were required.²⁹

The Chilean Constitution of 1833 required all treaties to be approved by a majority vote of both houses of Congress, and either house could overrule the action of the other with a two-thirds vote. By a complicated system of checks, the Constitution provided that if the Chamber of Deputies by a two-thirds vote passed a treaty already approved by the Senate, but by a two-thirds vote rejected the reservations imposed on the treaty by the Senate, the treaty and reservations would be returned to the Senate. There a second vote would be required. If the Senate sustained the treaty and reservations by a two-thirds vote, the measure was passed. But in the event that the Senate upheld its previous action by only a majority vote, the measure would then be returned to the Chamber. There, if by a second vote representing a two-thirds majority, the treaty were upheld without reservations, it was declared passed and the President was empowered to ratify it.³⁰

²⁹ Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Oct. 17, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1054.

³⁰ Article 42, Constitución de la República de Chile, promulgada en 25 de mayo de 1833, con modificaciones hasta de 1 de mayo de 1899 (Santiago, 1899).

The Washington Protocol travelled just such a tortuous route toward ratification. The Senate passed the agreement with the three reservations by a majority on October 16. The Chamber of Deputies approved it but struck out the reservations by a vote of 78 to 26, well over the two-thirds vote necessary to override the Senate, a month later. On November 27 the Senate again sustained the protocol with reservations by a majority vote. Two days later the Chamber for a second time approved the measure without reservations by more than a two-thirds majority. The same day it was submitted to the Senate for a last attempt to defeat the Chamber's move. But again the protocol with reservations was passed by only a simple majority. The Senate could not muster the required two-thirds vote to overrule the Chamber. The Washington Protocol and Supplementary Act without reservations were therefore approved on November 29.³¹

One technicality remained. According to the protocol, ratifications were to be exchanged in Washington no later than October 20. The Chilean ambassador to the United States asked his Peruvian colleague to arrange for an extension of time for the exchange. The latter contacted

³¹Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Nov. 15, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1075; Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Nov. 27, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1079; Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Nov. 29, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1081; Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Nov. 29, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1082.

the Foreign Minister of Peru, who requested Congress to give him a blanket authorization to extend the time limits, which was granted. Ratifications were exchanged January 15, and the ambassadors requested Harding to accept the office of Arbitrator. Harding agreed and the United States was once again on its way toward resolving the Tacna-Arica dispute.³²

The account of Chile's ratification of the Protocol and Supplementary Act is set down in detail to indicate that arbitration was not a universally popular move in Chile in 1922. Alessandri was forced to use every political expedient at his disposal to keep the popularly-elected Chamber of Deputies in line during the voting. It would have been far simpler for him to have ignored a solution to the Tacna-Arica dispute. That he did not and that he was forced to fight a difficult parliamentary battle to end the altercation redounds to his credit--and makes his future obstructionist tactics more difficult to explain.

Presentation of Cases

Ernesto Barros Jarpa and Carlos Aldunate Solar were appointed Chile's advocates in the presentation of the case before the Arbitrator. Leguía chose Melitón Porras and

³² Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Dec. 2, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1083; Sterling to Hughes, Lima, Dec. 5, 1922, DSCF, 723.2515/1084; Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, 16 de enero de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1099; Pexet to Hughes, Washington, 20 de enero de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1144.

Solón Polo.³³

The representatives devised an arrangement whereby each party was allowed six months after March 13 in which to prepare its case. In the event that one party needed more time, a two-month extension would be granted. After the cases were completed, they were to be handed over to the other party, who would have three months in which to reply in the form of a counter-case. If more time were needed, a two-month extension would be granted.³⁴

The commissioners worked in Washington throughout the summer preparing their cases. By the first of September the Chilean delegates felt that they needed more time and requested the two-month extension. The Peruvian counselors thereupon indicated that they would present their case at the same time, November 13. On that date both delegations gave their cases to the Secretary of State.³⁵

³³ Collier to Hughes, Santiago, Jan. 29, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1107; Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, 1 de marzo de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1129; Pezet to Hughes, Washington, Mar. 14, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1137.

³⁴ Pezet to Hughes, Washington, 2 de marzo de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1130; Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, 2 de marzo de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1131; Hughes to Collier and Sterling, Washington, Mar. 21, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1138a and 1138b.

³⁵ Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, Sept. 1, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1160; Joseph E. Davies, Hoke Smith, and Wade H. Ellis to Hughes, Washington, Sept. 10, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1161; Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, 13 de noviembre de 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1174; A. González Prada to Hughes, Washington, Nov. 13, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1175.

Harding's death on August 2, 1923, placed the task of Arbitrator on Calvin Coolidge in accordance with the Protocol of Arbitration. On November 13 he authorized Hughes to exchange the cases and to notify the delegates that their replies in the form of counter-cases would be due within three months, unless a two-month extension were requested.³⁶

The cases presented by Chile and Peru were well written and contained a judicious selection of historical documents to substantiate their contentions. Both cases were lengthy, Chile's being 187 pages with a 764-page appendix and Peru's having a 254-page case with an appendix of 819 pages. While a detailed analysis of the two cases is uncalled for in a study of this nature, a brief comparison of them is felt to be in order.

The work of the Chilean delegates was decidedly the shorter and scrupulously adhered to the announced purpose of the arbitration, namely, the determination of whether a plebiscite was required. It centered around three questions. First, shall a plebiscite be held? Second, can the conditions be met for holding a fair plebiscite? Third, are Tarata and Chilcaya to be considered a legitimate part of the cession if Peru wins a plebiscite?

On the first question the Chileans asked simply that the Arbitrator find that a plebiscite still should

³⁶ Coolidge to Hughes, Washington, Nov. 13, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1176.

be held regardless of the time lapse. Besides, it was Peru's fault, said the case, that a plebiscite had not been held on schedule. Realizing that if the answer to this first question were in the affirmative, the Chileans maintained that the only consideration which should be entertained in writing the bases for holding a plebiscite was that the people of the area should be guaranteed the right to express their opinions freely. And on the matter of Tarata and Chilcaya the delegates recommended that the Arbitrator delay his decision until he had reports from a boundary survey commission. The Chilean case concluded with a statement that if the people of the area, after a fair plebiscite, wanted to reunite with Peru, then Chile wished them Godspeed. To prove their case the delegates included a documentary résumé of diplomatic correspondence and negotiations, treaties and agreements, and a miscellaneous section containing items of varying importance such as the electoral laws of Chile and Peru, a description of Tacna and Arica, a chronology of events, and maps of the area.³⁷

The format of Peru's case was more complicated than that of Chile. Francis White, who at the time of presentation was Chief of the Division of Latin-American Affairs

³⁷The official Chilean case and appendix are found as the enclosure of Mathieu to Hughes, Washington, 13 de noviembre de 1923, DSCP, 723.2515/1174.

in the Department of State, later declared that while Chile presented her case ably, "Peru's presentation was miserable."³⁸ The case is divided into nine sections and essentially is an effort to win the decision on moral grounds. Covered are such topics as the antecedents of the War of the Pacific, the war itself, the peace negotiations, the questions of Tarata and Chilcaya, the negotiations for the plebiscite, the Pan-American Congresses' efforts toward arbitration, intervention of Chile in the relations of Peru and other countries, "Chileanization" of the disputed provinces, and concluding with a statement of the moral issue involved. Peru's ten requests of the Arbitrator can be summarized by saying that it was felt that Chile had forfeited her rights in the provinces by not holding the desired plebiscite in 1894, and, in recognition of this fact, the Arbitrator should declare that Peru had gained "unencumbered sovereignty in Tacna and Arica."³⁹

Five months were required by both parties to formulate their replies in the form of counter-cases, and on April 12, 1924, they submitted their cases with appendixes and counter-cases to the President for his decision. They

³⁸ Francis [White] to Herbert [Stabler], [Washington], Nov. 19, 1925, Pershing Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. These files are hereinafter cited as Pershing Papers.

³⁹ The official Peruvian case and appendix are found as enclosure of González Prada to Hughes, Washington, Nov. 13, 1923, DSCF, 723.2515/1175.

waited eleven months for his reply.

Opinion and Award of the Arbitrator

Coolidge signed the Arbitrator's Opinion and Award on March 4, 1925, his inauguration date and Hughes' last day as Secretary of State. The decision was made public March 9. The award, written through the joint efforts of Hughes and William C. Dennis,⁴⁰ is a lengthy judicial finding rendered after a careful sifting of the facts. In form it is coldly legal and minutely covers a limited number of topics in a hair-splitting manner. While it is herein considered unnecessary to examine in detail the cases presented by Chile and Peru to the Arbitrator, it is felt to be altogether proper to give the Arbitrator's decision more than a cursory glance.

In the opening paragraph of the award the Arbitrator limited the scope of his work to those points covered in the Protocol and Supplementary Act of July 20, 1922. The first question which had to be answered was whether a plebiscite was still required. If it were, then the

⁴⁰In Folder 1(a), Box 178, of the Hughes Papers are extensive handwritten notes by Hughes outlining certain portions of the award. Former Undersecretary of State Henry P. Fletcher praised the award saying, "... the arrangements you [Hughes] have prescribed completely cover all points in the carrying out of the award and make it impossible for either party to adopt evasive or dilatory tactics. . . ." Fletcher to Hughes, Rome, Mar. 28, 1925, Hughes Papers. In the file labeled "Memorabilia" in the Pershing Papers there is a birthday greeting to Pershing from Hughes in the latter's handwriting. It says in part: "The President and I signed the Award; Dennis and I wrote it."

bases for holding the vote had to be formulated. This last problem was the essential reason why Chile and Peru had not held the plebiscite. The Treaty of Ancón provided that a plebiscite be held, but stated that the two governments at some future date were to write the election rules. It was this latter matter, the Arbitrator noted, which had kept the countries apart for so long. And, finally, the Arbitrator was required to dispose directly of the matter of the two provinces of Tarata and Chilcaya. These were the only questions on which a decision was required. Tacitly the Arbitrator indicated that Peru had presented too much in her case. Chile's presentation was for the Arbitrator's purpose a much better organized plea.

Should there be a plebiscite? Clearly Article III of the Treaty of Ancón called for one. Nowhere did its makers indicate that there was to be a time limit which entailed a forfeit if not obeyed. The makers said that the administrative processes of the provinces should be in the hands of Chile for ten years, and "after the expiration of this time," a plebiscite should be held. There was no indication in the treaty of a specific length of time after the ten years, and the Arbitrator interpreted the clause as not taking into consideration the resulting inordinate lapse of time. Who was to blame for the delay? The Arbitrator felt that both parties had earnestly attempted to write a plebiscitary protocol in the past. Peru had not presented

sufficient evidence to prove that Chile had ever acted in bad faith. Therefore, paragraphs two and three of Article III had not been abrogated and Peru was not absolved from the obligation to proceed with the fulfillment of the article.

Had Chile lost the right to a plebiscite in the area because of maladministration of the provinces? The treaty made the provinces "subject to Chilean laws and authority." Perhaps this phrase was not the same as a grant of full sovereignty over the provinces, but the Arbitrator felt disinclined to discuss the matter. The important fact was that Chile had all administrative authority and could do as she pleased to a degree. Besides, the Arbitrator declared, Peru had not presented enough evidence to prove charges of "Chileanization" of Tacna and Arica.

Therefore, the answer to the first question was that a plebiscite should be held. It could be safely and fairly conducted with the interests of both parties safeguarded if the protocol for voting were properly written. And to that problem the Arbitrator next addressed himself.

The problem of who should vote and who should supervise the voting had divided the two countries and thwarted the holding of a plebiscite since 1894. The nations could not agree on details. The Arbitrator resolved their problems by setting voting qualifications and calling into being a Plebiscitary Commission to oversee the voting.

The Arbitrator declared as eligible to vote all literate males who were twenty-one years old or above and who fell into certain categories. Those who had been born in Tacna-Arica, those Chileans and Peruvians who had resided there for two years prior to July 20, 1922, those foreigners who were eligible for naturalization and who had made application, and owners of real estate--regardless of literacy qualifications, were eligible to vote in the plebiscite. Denied the ballot were members of the army, navy, carbineers, government police, secret service, gendarmerie, and civil service. However, military personnel who were born in the area were eligible to vote.

The Plebiscitary Commission which the award set up was devised to satisfy the problem of superintending the plebiscitary process. It consisted of three members, a Chilean, a Peruvian, and a United States citizen who was designated president. The Commission was given the power to establish its own rules of procedure with all motions passed by majority vote. Importantly, the Arbitrator declared, "The Plebiscitary Commission shall have in general complete control over the plebiscite and shall have authority to determine all questions as to the registration of voters. . . ." The duties of the Plebiscitary Commission included the power to promulgate rules and regulations for procedure of the Registration and Election Boards, to give notice of time and place of election, to register the

voters, to scrutinize the election lists, to insure secrecy of the ballot, to print the ballots according to the specific instructions of the Arbitrator, to receive and count the ballots, to tabulate and scrutinize returns, and to entertain appeals from the Registration and Election Boards. And in the event of a dispute among the members of the Plebiscitary Commission, "The Arbitrator also reserves the power and right to entertain appeals from decisions of the Plebiscitary Commission, and for contest."

On the final two questions concerning Tarata and Chilcaya, the Arbitrator declared that Tarata was in fact part of Peru and must be returned to her immediately. Chilcaya was ordered to be returned to the old Peruvian provinces of Arica and thereby included in the plebiscitary territory.

At first glance the award appeared to be a complete vindication of the Chilean stand, and in this spirit the Chileans warmly received the announcement that a plebiscite would be held. In Santiago the archbishop ordered the church bells rung in celebration. Solemn high masses were recited in thanksgiving. There was a military review in the presence of the diplomatic corps. Everywhere the Chileans displayed strong pro-American sentiments.⁴¹ Alessandri, who had left Chile rather than resign in September, 1924,

⁴¹Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 10, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1354.

when a military junta ousted him, was lionized and declared to be Chile's greatest statesman. His return to Santiago on March 21 coincided with the continuing spirit of celebration over the award. But a closer examination of the decision showed that the Chileans were premature in their exultation.

The award denied the ballot to the military, the police, and the civil servants, who in normal circumstances would have been eligible to vote. To a man these people were Chileans. And in addition, those Peruvians who had been born in the provinces and who had been expelled could now return. "Chileanization" efforts presumably were thwarted in this manner. It was the duty of the Plebiscitary Commission to see that this class of people was allowed to re-enter the provinces and to vote freely. A jubilant Chile had not yet paused to consider these adverse ramifications of the award, but shortly she would do so.

In Peru the situation was reversed. The award precipitated a general strike. Angry crowds paraded through the streets of Lima openly demanding Leguía's resignation. It was the President, his opponents argued, who for so long sought United States mediation in the dispute. It was he, they said, who declared that the Treaty of Ancón was valid after Congress had voided it. In short, it was he who was responsible for Peru's disgrace. But Leguía was ready for the demonstrators, and with a heavy hand he brought the

capital back to order. Through brute force of troops against civilians he broke the general strike and dispersed the roaming mobs. Peace prevailed in Lima within a few days.⁴²

Leguía carefully refrained from criticizing the award, and Foreign Minister Salomón in a speech to the Senate said that the government was satisfied with Coolidge's decision. He praised its construction and declared that "in truth no one can affirm that this decision is unfavorable to Peru."⁴³ But while the administration did not openly criticize the award, Polo, who not only was one of the delegates who prepared Peru's case for the Arbitrator but who also was president of the official Peruvian Defense Commission, objected strongly. His protest was forwarded to Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg by the Peruvian ambassador with an indication that it represented the opinion of his government.⁴⁴

Polo's criticism of the award centered around three

⁴²Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 10, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1352; Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 12, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1360; Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 16, 1925, DSCF, 823.00/486.

⁴³Rowe to Kellogg, Washington, Apr. 10, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1450, containing "Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, the Honorable Alberto Salomón, in Reporting to the Peruvian Senate on the Terms of the Tacna-Arica Award (March 9, 1925)."

⁴⁴Velarde to Kellogg, Washington 2 de abril de 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1416, containing Polo to Coolidge, Washington, Apr. 2, 1925.

points. First, Coolidge's translation of espirado este plazo was, he declared, completely incorrect. That the Arbitrator used an official Peruvian translation of the clause was irrelevant since it was translated differently by Peru in several places. Second, it was unbelievable that Coolidge felt insufficient proof had been offered establishing beyond a doubt that Chile had abused her right to govern the provinces. Numerous official complaints concerning deportations of Peruvians had in the months previously been forwarded to the Department of State citing names and giving dates of deportations. All these protests had been duly acknowledged by the Secretary of State. Finally, after Polo assured the Arbitrator that the award would be obeyed by Peru, he requested additional guarantees be given Peru insuring that a fair plebiscite would be held. Specifically, he felt that the Arbitrator should expel all Chilean forces in Tacna-Arica and introduce United States troops to maintain order.

Polo's letter to Coolidge is examined here in some detail because admittedly it represented the official attitude of the Peruvian government toward the award even though Leguía never criticized the decision publicly. He always maintained that it was satisfactory to Peru. However, he undoubtedly knew of Polo's letter and approved it. For that reason Kellogg drafted a fourteen-page reply for Coolidge which answered in detail all of Polo's objections.

Considering the erroneous translation of the Spanish phrase espirado este plazo, Coolidge declared that the use of any particular qualifying English word such as after, at, on, or upon was purely academic. He said that he found the problem which confronted him to be one of substance rather than translation, and in his opinion he fairly interpreted the meaning of the sentence. Concerning the alleged proofs submitted by Peru showing Chilean intimidation of the Peruvians in the area, Coolidge said that sufficient evidence had not been presented to him to indicate that a fair plebiscite was impossible to hold at the time. In the Arbitrator's opinion he had provided proper and sufficient safeguards to hold an honest plebiscite. As for additional guarantees to insure a fair plebiscite by withdrawing Chilean troops and replacing them with Americans, this was out of the question. That action would be in violation of the Protocol of Washington which provided specifically that Chile should remain in administrative control of the provinces preceding and during the period of balloting. Coolidge closed his letter with a promise that as Arbitrator he would do everything within his power to insure a fair plebiscite.⁴⁵

Some Questions and Observations

A probing inquiry into the award is warranted at

⁴⁵Coolidge to Velarde, Washington, Apr. 9, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1416.

this juncture. One cannot but wonder, even without a knowledge of subsequent events, if the arbitral award was perhaps an expedient political decision rather than an impartial finding made after weighing the facts.

The portion of the award which rushes to the forefront and clamors for an explanation concerns the retention of administrative control of the provinces by Chile. In the Arbitrator's reply to Polo, Coolidge refused to entertain any notion that a neutral should assume civil and military control of the provinces. But this one aspect of the award more than any other made even a reasonably fair plebiscite impossible. The peculiar arrangement of allowing an interested party to retain civil and military control of an area during a plebiscite was unique in the annals of plebiscitary history. Sarah Wambaugh, author of A Monograph on Plebiscites and one of the world's noted authorities on the subject, correctly prophesied that this one feature ruined the chances of a fair plebiscite and condemned the proceedings to failure.⁴⁶ However, for Hughes to have declared that Chile's administrative control was at an end with the arrival of the Plebiscitary Commission clearly would have been a violation of the expressed grounds of the Supplementary Act of Washington. Without attempting to ascribe prophetic power to the Chilean

⁴⁶Raymond E. Cox, Dept. of State, "Memorandum to Mr. White," Washington, Mar. 27, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1414.

delegates to the Washington conference in 1922 who carefully insisted upon retention of control of the provinces through the balloting, one can say that they knew what they were about. In this respect Hughes met his betters in negotiations, for he did not insist upon Chile's giving up control of the provinces to a neutral; instead, he seconded their retention by Chile. It would have been far better for Hughes to have refused arbitration rather than to accept it under such crippling terms. General John J. Pershing, who was appointed American Commissioner, criticized the award from the beginning. Dennis and Hughes, he said, knew absolutely nothing of the existing conditions when they wrote the decision, and they settled the problem "from conclusions drawn after reading a mass of testimony purely from a legal standpoint as they saw it." After he arrived in Arica, it soon became apparent to him that the stipulation to hold a plebiscite with Chile in control of the military may have been in agreement with theoretical political progress, but in South America it was "next to impossible to get a free expression of opinion where one side is left in control."⁴⁷

Was Hughes justified in looking to the substance of the sentence when he translated espirado este plazo? This author thinks that he was. Straining at the transla-

⁴⁷Pershing, Journal, I, p. 29, Pershing Papers.

tion is felt to be, as Hughes indicated, purely academic. Besides, it is inconceivable that the Peruvian makers of the treaty could have imposed a forfeit upon the Chileans if a plebiscite had not been held within the ten-year period. In fact, no forfeit is mentioned or implied in the treaty; this is a later invention of the Peruvians. It was their way of giving a precise translation to a vague Spanish phrase.

What would have happened if the United States had made a decision adverse to Chile? Very likely that government would not have accepted it. If this had happened, United States prestige would have tumbled in Latin America, and Hughes realized this. Early in 1922 he pointedly remarked to the delegates assembled in Washington to write the Protocol of Arbitration that he preferred that they choose a panel of jurists as arbitrators, or even perhaps a board on which the United States was but a member. The delegates turned down his suggestions, and reluctantly Hughes approved the idea of allowing the President to become sole arbitrator. Peru had early expressed her desire for an arbitrator, whether the United States or another country, with sufficient "moral and material strength" to enforce a decision. Clearly this was a call for United States troops, not an uncommon occurrence in Latin America in the 1920's. But Hughes deprecated the use of troops to enforce any decision in the dispute, just as his successor

did. And with good reason, for the Chilean navy in 1925 was one of the strongest in Latin America, and her army was large and well trained. The United States could doubtless have defeated Chile, but nothing could have been worse than a United States-Chilean clash of arms.

An adverse decision, therefore, probably would have been forceably rejected by Chile, and the United States was in no mood to enforce any decision in Latin America by the use of troops. While Chile was powerful enough to defy the United States in the event that the plebiscitary clause of the treaty had been declared invalid, Peru would not forceably object to its being found still in effect.

Did Hughes really believe that the Peruvians had presented insufficient proof to substantiate their claims of wholesale deportations from the provinces? If he did, one who reads the documents of the Tacna-Arica dispute in the Department of State Central Files cannot help but be amazed. The energetic and verbose United States consul in Arica, Edgmont C. von Tresckow, wrote no less than twenty-five long despatches on the subject during the three years before the rendition of the award. Von Tresckow went into elaborate detail relating how the deportations were accomplished, who was marked for them, and what the sorry results were. He told about actual murders, dynamiting of Peruvian homes, and how the agricultural areas had suffered because farmers had been deported. Often his

observations were corroborated by European consuls stationed at Arica. Not only von Tresckow but also the United States consul at Iquique in Tarapacá province told of similar events. The Peruvian ambassador, though as a source of impartial information open to question, systematically reported the deportations, many by name, until the time of the award.

Chile consistently denied all reports of "Chileanization." The central government in Santiago and the Chilean ambassador in Washington reiterated their assurances to the Department of State that the unrest in the provinces was natural, being brought about through unemployment.⁴⁸ At no time, these authorities said, had orders been given to expel Peruvians. If this were true, and it undoubtedly was, then obviously the local authorities were operating independently from the capital--not an unheard of procedure in Latin-American history.

But the irrevocable fact remained that wholesale misery was visited upon the inhabitants of Tacna-Arica by the Chileans. That Hughes could have believed the Chileans had not maladministered the provinces to the degree that a fair plebiscite was impossible is truly astounding. Within a year it was proved to him beyond a doubt.

Did Hughes really believe that a fair plebiscite was possible? Here this author feels that the Secretary of

⁴⁹ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 31, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1413.

State put faith in Chilean promises for an honest plebiscite. But if he did not believe them, he certainly made every effort to write an election protocol which precluded dishonesty. In this respect his award was completely successful, for an unfair plebiscite was prevented primarily through the honest obstinacy of the United States Commissioner, but also through reliance on the mechanism of a well written protocol.

In summary, therefore, one can say that Hughes made the best of a delicate situation. That his plans failed was not his fault, for his decision successfully withstood the attacks leveled against it. Only one factor could cause it to succumb: an act of bad faith on the part of one of the parties concerned. Chile played that role.

It was obvious to anyone who had read the decision with understanding that the United States Commissioner would cast the deciding ballot on all important matters. Therefore, it was necessary to choose an American of outstanding ability, of unimpeachable integrity, and of great prestige--preferably someone who was not involved in the politics of the problem. Coolidge found such a man in America's great war hero General of the Armies Pershing, who had retired from active duty on September 13, 1924.⁵⁰

It will now be necessary for us to turn to the

⁵⁰Kellogg to Pershing, Washington, Apr. 30, 1925, containing the appointment of Pershing, Pershing Papers.

work of the Plebiscitary Commission and examine the functioning of that body as the next phase of United States diplomacy in the Tacna-Arica dispute.

CHAPTER IV

A FAIR PLEBISCITE DEMANDED

Appointment of Members of the Plebiscitary Commission

In addition to General John J. Pershing, who in accordance with the Arbitrator's award was president of the Plebiscitary Commission, the American delegation included two legal advisers and about fifteen other administrative personnel. The two legal advisers were William C. Dennis and Colonel Edward A. Kreger. Dennis' career as an attorney of international law was impressive.¹ Kreger had been the Assistant Provost Marshal General and Acting Judge Advocate General of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during the First World War. Jordan Herbert Stabler was named secretary general of the Commission. His experience in the Department of State was extensive, having been at one time chief of the Division of Latin-American Affairs.

The Chilean delegation was no less distinguished.

¹Department of State Central Files Name Card Box 150 shows Dennis closely associated with such international disputes as the United States-Venezuelan Arbitration, 1910, in which he acted as United States agent; also, he was American agent in the El Chamizal Arbitration between the United States and Mexico, 1910-11; and he was United States agent on the Norwegian ship claims, 1921-22.

The post of Chilean Commissioner went to Agustín Edwards, former Foreign Minister and former ambassador to Great Britain. He had served one term as president of the Assembly of the League of Nations. He was the author of several popular histories and the owner of a chain of newspapers in Chile. His legal advisers were Samuel Claro Lastarria, eminent international lawyer and former Foreign Minister; Manuel Foster Recabarren, lawyer and former assistant Foreign Minister; Ernesto Barros Jarpa, Foreign Minister at the time of the adoption of the Washington Protocol; and Harry Van Dyke, an American attorney.

As in the appointment of a delegate to the meetings in Washington in 1922, Peru was slow in naming a commissioner to negotiate the end of the Tacna-Arica dispute. The award was grudgingly accepted with some indication that it would be rejected completely. Few aspiring Peruvian politicians cared, or even dared, to accept the position as Peruvian Commissioner, so unpopular was the decision to hold a plebiscite. If Peru emerged successfully from the plebiscite, then the delegate would be the most popular man in the republic. But if Peru failed, as was likely, his political career automatically was at an end. The gamble was a great one, great enough to scare many of the most prominent candidates. There were rumors that Leguía would appoint Foreign Minister Alberto Salomón, with whom he was greatly displeased because of his conduct of negotiations during the

formulation of the Washington Protocol. But the unenviable job landed on Manuel de Freyre y Santander, an experienced Peruvian diplomat, who was chosen largely because of his perfect command of English.² However, Salomón became the unquestioned director of policy on the Peruvian delegation in his position of legal adviser to Freyre.³ For this reason Pershing usually contacted him on important matters instead of Freyre. The second legal adviser was Anselmo Barreto, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Peru.

Freyre's appointment was not made until the Peruvian government engaged in a final outburst at the Arbitrator's award. The thesis of this second official complaint was that Peru could not hope for justice in the plebiscite if Chile retained military control of the provinces. Nor did Peru feel that the removal of Chilean troops was outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, for Peru interpreted the Protocol of Washington to mean that Chile retained control of the provinces only if the Arbitrator declared there should be no plebiscite.⁴ In short, Peru demanded more protection for its nationals than the Plebiscitary Commission could

²Velarde to Kellogg, Washington, Jun. 18, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1547, containing Velarde to Coolidge, Washington, Jun. 18, 1925.

³William Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Feb. 5, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1909.

⁴Velarde to Kellogg, Washington, Jun. 18, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1547, containing Velarde to Coolidge, Washington, Jun. 18, 1925.

provide.

Dennis, who assisted Hughes in writing the Arbitrator's award, drafted Coolidge's reply to the Peruvian complaint. It was brief and to the point, saying that the Arbitrator had nothing further to add to his decision; the Plebiscitary Commission had full authority to protect Peruvian voters.⁵

The matter of Chilean military control of the provinces was not easily disposed of, however. It became not only a contributing factor for the defeat of the plebiscite, but more important it became a central emotional issue in Chilean politics. No good purpose would be served here to trace in detail every Peruvian complaint against intimidation of voters brought about by the harassment of Chilean police, carbineers, and army. Both the number of complaints and harassments are legion. Peru correctly foresaw that this one aspect of the award would cause it to fail. There is, however, a legitimate purpose in examining Chile's refusal to withdraw her forces.

Alessandri, eager to dispose of the dispute before he was forced to quit the country in 1924, returned with his ardor for the plebiscite somewhat dampened. While he still desired to see the election held, he was not as unmindful

⁵Kellogg to Velarde, Washington, Jun. 30, 1925, DSCP, 723.2515/1547, containing Coolidge to Velarde, Washington, Jun. 29, 1925.

of the results as previously. He had obtained passage of the Washington Protocol only after promising that the Arbitrator would never assume control of the provinces. Alessandri felt that if he suggested the withdrawal of the army in 1925, he would be driven out of the country as a traitor.⁶ A matter of national pride was at stake, and there is no reasoning with pride. Peru persisted in her demands for the withdrawal of the Chilean army, and even threatened not to participate in the plebiscite if this were not done. With an obvious challenge to their authority the Chileans became more entrenched in their position, completely unwilling to yield to Peruvian pressure. Ambassador Collier felt that Alessandri had no choice in his decision, for if he complied with the Peruvian demand, "It would almost certainly mean instant resignation or exile of the President of Chile and resultant grave disorders."⁷ The matter was held in abeyance until the Plebiscitary Commission could meet to dispose of it properly.

The Plebiscitary Commission Begins Work

The Plebiscitary Commissioners began their work with considerable cordiality on August 5. All the delegates gave reserved speeches declaring their hopes for a free and

⁶Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, May 2, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1475.

⁷Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jun. 1, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1518.

fair plebiscite.⁸

The first session of the Commission was probably the only one in which there was anything approaching friendliness among all the members, for the meetings soon became stormy. Within two weeks Pershing felt compelled to give Kellogg a candid estimation of the situation. Through the use of Spanish interpreters obtained from the United States Army in the Panama Canal Zone he gathered conclusive proof that the Chileans were oppressing and intimidating the Peruvians. He cabled Kellogg that a "fair plebiscite under the existing circumstances [is] quite impossible and it will be difficult to bring [the] parties together so bitter is [the] hatred between them."⁹ And his first full despatch to the Secretary of State was a sad one which set the tenor of many of his reports and complaints afterward. Quotation of part of it will serve to point out the difficulties which faced him in future months.

My impression the day of my arrival was that everything was pretty much Chilean. There was not a Peruvian flag in site [sic] and none have appeared since. Peruvians in town are few and far between, and these few make themselves scarce.

A number of Peruvian women . . . say that their men are afraid to leave home . . . they are liable to be seized and put on an outgoing boat. Many of these women do not know where their men are.

⁸Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Aug. 15, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1605½; Pershing, Journal, I, pp. 11½-14½, Pershing Papers.

⁹Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Aug. 14, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1585.

The Chilean representative is loud in his protestations that Peruvians can meet in public gatherings and carry flags, . . . and be protected, but no Peruvian would for a moment risk security or deportation by undertaking to do any of these things.

This is about as near a reign of terrorism as I can imagine, and it is going to be most difficult to alter it, just because the internal administration must under the Award remain in the hands of one of the parties, which is a condition that has not prevailed in any plebiscite that I know of since the World War.

The actual situation is far different from what it appeared to be in reading over the Case and Counter Case in Washington. I am sure that no one could have understood the conditions of government here as they really exist.

Finally, it is clear that we shall have to move slowly, and in fact there are so many points of disagreement that much time will have to be spent in getting the parties on any sort of common ground.¹⁰

Even though Edwards told Pershing the first day he was in Arica that the election could proceed immediately, Pershing disliked what he saw and delayed committing himself. He was convinced that the Chileans had used intimidation and felt that an immediate election would be an injustice to the Peruvians. The more he studied the situation the more certain he was that a plebiscite for the present was impossible. In his second despatch to Kellogg, Pershing wrote as follows:

Mr. Secretary, it is a situation which almost surpasses comprehension, and in the face of all this our Chilean friends stand up and declare that there is and has been freedom of action for all people living in this territory.

¹⁰Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Aug. 15, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1605½.

Of course we cannot be a party to holding a plebiscite under any but fair conditions, and my action will probably be along the lines indicated, but based on underlying facts clearly established.

In other words, to undertake to conduct this election under the present conditions would make us the laughing stock of the world, for I have no doubt that all the countries of South America understand the conditions as they exist here better than we do . . . now.¹¹

By the beginning of September Pershing had enough information to make certain demands of the Chileans. Through his own impartial investigators he learned of the existence of intimidation, oppression, and the deportation of Peruvians by Chileans. Even American investigators were often shadowed and stopped on the road, regardless of Chilean claims of free circulation. To explain these abuses the Chileans offered "the most flimsy and shifty excuses." The Plebiscitary Commission, however, did not have sufficient material force to stop the abuses or to guarantee a free plebiscite. It could but request cooperation from the Chileans and hope that they complied, which they did not. Therefore, Pershing felt that the Commission had to demand the following administrative changes within the plebiscitary territory: the removal of a certain proportion of the troops; a reduction in the number of police; the suspension or removal of certain civil officials who were guilty of direct intimidation; and the revocation of locally

¹¹Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Aug. 26, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1608½.

imposed restrictions of less importance.¹² He realized that these changes would be unpopular with the Chileans, who already were looking for some other way to settle the dispute outside the plebiscite. But he felt that they were absolutely necessary for a fair election.¹³ He was soon more convinced than ever.

After the Arbitrator's award, private patriotic civic groups organized in Arica to insure Chile's victory in the plebiscite. Many of Pershing's complaints legitimately can be laid to those organizations, which operated independently of the government but with its tacit blessing.¹⁴ On September 6 the civic organizations openly began persecuting Peruvians in Arica. The local authorities seemed completely incompetent or unwilling to handle the situation. Pershing ordered all American investigators to cease work, and he cabled Edwards, who was in Santiago attending the reception for the Prince of Wales, to have the Chilean government take immediate remedial action before the situation was entirely beyond control.¹⁵ Alessandri himself

¹²Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Aug. 17, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1607, containing copies of the various decrees restricting travel.

¹³Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Sept. 3, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1621½.

¹⁴Seymour McConnell to Pershing, Arica, Sept. 26, 1925, McConnell Papers in the Columbus Memorial Library, Pan-American Union Building. These files are hereinafter cited as McConnell Papers. [McConnell was one of the clerks of the American delegation.]

¹⁵Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Sept. 6, 1925, DSCF,

replied, ordering the local authorities to protect the members of the Plebiscitary Commission and their authorized agents.

For a few days events quieted down, but they did not stop. Generally, the Americans on Pershing's staff felt that a fair plebiscite was impossible because of flagrant Chilean intimidation of Peruvian voters. At least one American noted that Chilean sentiment was confined primarily to the urban areas, while the rural sections, much depopulated through deportations, preferred a Peruvian victory at the polls.¹⁶ This helps to account for the fact that Arica and Tacna were in turmoil during the attempted plebiscite while the outlying districts remained relatively calm. In any event, Pershing realized that a plebiscite was impossible. He wrote, "The people [the Chileans] will not permit it. We must have neutral control no matter how many troops etc. are removed, nor how many officials are suspended."¹⁷ In short, the issue of the Commission's authority as opposed to Chile's power in the provinces had to be settled finally.

Pershing and Edwards discussed all facets of the

723.2515/1606, containing Pershing to Edwards, Arica, Sept. 6, 1925; Pershing, Journal, I, pp. 109-13, Pershing Papers.

¹⁶McConnell to Pershing, Arica, Sept. 26, 1925, McConnell Papers.

¹⁷Pershing, Journal, I, p. 117, Pershing Papers.

dispute when the latter returned from Santiago. Edwards felt that registration should begin immediately so that the Chilean government would know whom they were supposed to protect. If the Commission should later find that the plebiscite was impossible to hold, then the good offices of the United States could be requested.¹⁸ But Pershing maintained that no Peruvian would dare to register under existing conditions. The area first had to be made safe for a plebiscite. And to do that the Commission must be given more power in the administration of the territory. Edwards without hesitation told Pershing that if he thought for a minute that Chile was going to surrender any of the privileges given her by the Arbitrator, he was sadly mistaken. He said that Chile would not yield an inch in the control of local administration.¹⁹ On this point Edwards was backed by Alessandri.²⁰

Despite the almost sure rejection of any resolution designed to transfer supervisory power from Chilean local authorities to the Plebiscitary Commission, Pershing framed an eleven-point proposal upon the advice of Dennis and Kreger. Briefly summarized this important resolution demanded the following changes: (1) removal from plebis-

¹⁸Pershing, Journal, I, p. 141, Pershing Papers.

¹⁹Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Sept. 18, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1630½.

²⁰Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Sept. 14, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1630.

citary territory of the army in that territory except for a force approximately equal to the number of Peruvian soldiers stationed north of the area; (2) transfer of the carbineers and replacement by those who had not served in the area; (3) transfer of the secret police and replacement by those who had not served in the area; (4) removal of all army, carbineers, and secret service personnel from civil functions; (5) removal of any official who in the opinion of the Plebiscitary Commission had abused his office; (6) the departure from the plebiscitary area of those officials so removed; (7) removal of all travel restrictions into and out of the plebiscitary area; (9) equal protection of individuals of both parties; (10) removal of censorship from all news media; and (11) return of all eligible voters who were detained by Chile at Chilean expense.²¹ Before submitting the resolution to the Commission, Pershing presented it to Kellogg for comments.

These were sweeping demands, too extensive for Kellogg with his imperfect knowledge of the situation to consider. He admitted that he was uninformed on the entire Tacna-Arica question and bemoaned the fact that there was "absolutely no one here who is familiar with the case."²²

²¹Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Sept. 24, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1624.

²²Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Sept. 23, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1629a.

Consequently, he began the practice of submitting all correspondence relating to the dispute to his predecessor, Hughes, who had returned to private law practice in New York City. He followed this procedure throughout his term. Hughes, therefore, to a large degree continued to direct the negotiations for the Department of State, at least through the attempted plebiscite. Kellogg, who was much too busy with the affairs of the Debt Commission then meeting in Washington to give deep consideration to the Tacna-Arica problem, parroted Hughes' advice to Pershing.²³

Hughes, it should be pointed out, was emotionally involved in the Tacna-Arica dispute since he had written the Arbitrator's award. For this reason he gave considerable time to advising Kellogg on Department of State policy regarding the attempted plebiscite. Not until practically all hope evaporated for the successful conclusion of the plebiscite did Hughes advise other than holding the election. When it became apparent that Chile would not hesitate to use her privileged position to thwart an honest vote, he said that if the plebiscite failed, then the blame must be placed squarely where it belonged--on Chile. But until that time the American Commissioner must leave no procedure untried which indicated to the world anything

²³Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Sept. 29, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1625; Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Sept. 25, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1624.

but American impartiality. In Hughes' opinion Pershing's eleven demands were far-reaching but perfectly within the power of the Commission given by the Arbitrator. He made a few suggestions which tightened the construction of Pershing's sentences, but otherwise concurred in the proposed resolution.²⁴

Pershing revised his eleven-point proposal slightly in wording but not in substance and presented it to the Commission on October 8 with the understanding that an immediate vote was not necessary. Edwards asked for time to study the motion and promised that Chile would not appeal to the Arbitrator if the Commission adopted it. Pershing thought that if the resolution were adopted, the Chileans would simply withdraw from further discussion of the plebiscite. If they did not do this, he felt that they would interpose delays in adopting the resolution aimed at causing either the Peruvian or United States delegation to withdraw first. Though he granted Edwards additional time to discuss the move with his government, Pershing refused to consider an extended delay.²⁵

The reaction to Pershing's measure was explosive in Santiago. The Foreign Minister, Jorge Matte, found it

²⁴Hughes to Kellogg, New York, Sept. 27, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1636½; Pershing, Journal, I, pp. 164-70, Pershing Papers.

²⁵Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Oct. 11, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1638.

completely unacceptable. He said that any civil government in Chile which agreed to the demands could not last twenty-four hours. Even if the government ordered a decrease in the size of the military in the territory, the army would not obey and would probably seize the government. He maintained that the demand for replacement of civil authorities was the most insulting proposition ever made by one nation to another, for it amounted to nothing more than a universal condemnation. If Pershing named specific civil or military administrators who had violated the laws of Chile, Matte said, the government would happily remove them, but a semblance of fairness had to be displayed even in that action. Ambassador Collier, who reported the opinion of the Foreign Minister, felt that because the political situation in Santiago was very touchy, Matte was particularly vehement. An expected army coup two days previously had not come off. The government was so unsure of itself that it dared not give publicity to Pershing's resolution.²⁶

The intransigence of the Chilean government was somewhat lessened the same day Matte delivered his tirade to Collier against Pershing's proposal. Former Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa, who had engineered the negotiations leading to the Washington Protocol and who had been forced from office by an adverse vote of the Senate in 1922,

²⁶ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 16, 1925, DSCP, 723.2515/1634.

replaced Matte. Barros Jarpa was quick to assure Collier that all eleven of Pershing's points would be accepted, but in a way which allowed Chile to save face. For example, instead of removing the carbineers immediately, their numbers would be reduced gradually by allowing enlistments to run out. The Intendente of Arica, who personally had created much mischief, would be removed and replaced with someone more sympathetic to the aims of the plebiscite. In any event Barros Jarpa ordered Edwards to accept the proposal without change.²⁷

Chilean diplomacy at this point in the negotiations becomes intricately intertwined with personalities. Before his appointment as Foreign Minister, Barros Jarpa was Edwards' assistant on the Plebiscitary Commission. Edwards was a more experienced and better known Chilean political figure than Barros Jarpa. Consequently, when the Foreign Minister ordered Edwards to accept the proposition, Edwards' ego was affected. In a backhanded manner he complied with his new superior's wishes, but only after he was threatened with removal.²⁸ After this point in the negotiations, Edwards became a negative force in the settlement of the

²⁷ Francis White, Dept. of State, "Memorandum of a Visit and Conversation with Ambassador Mathieu, Oct. 19, 1925," Washington, DSCF, 723.2515/1643½; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 19, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1644; Kellogg to Pershing, Washington, Oct. 19, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1644a.

²⁸ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 13, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1644.

dispute and was important primarily for the stumbling blocks which he put in the way of the Commission. Chilean Ambassador Beltrán Mathieu openly admitted to Kellogg that he was disappointed in Edwards' conduct, saying that he had not comported himself at all well during the proceedings. Yet he was so wealthy, well known, and influential that it was nearly impossible for him to be removed.²⁹

On November 2 the Commission passed Pershing's motion with a vote of 2 to 0, Edwards abstaining. He said that although he refrained from casting a vote, his government nevertheless would abide by the decision and not appeal to the Arbitrator. On subsequent resolutions designed to carry out the details of the resolution, Edwards also withheld his vote. Pershing had won a Pyrrhic victory and he realized it. He knew that the Chilean government would continue to place every obstacle in the way of a fair plebiscite. Lawlessness continued as before, and the local government made no effort to prevent the acts or to punish the offenders.³⁰ Nothing substantial was gained from Pershing's proposal, for it soon became apparent to him that the Chilean government was unable to control the local authorities in Arica.

²⁹White, Dept. of State, "Memorandum of a Visit and Conversation with Ambassador Mathieu, Oct. 19, 1925," Washington, DSCF, 723.2515/1643½.

³⁰Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Nov. 6, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1677.

Unrest within the Central Government at Santiago

An involved internal political situation existed in the Chilean government when Barros Jarpa became Foreign Minister, and it became more confusing as the plebiscitary proceedings progressed. The conditions existing in Santiago must at least be noted better to understand the indecisiveness of Chilean conduct of negotiations at Arica.³¹

In his 1920 campaign Alessandri called for basic constitutional reforms, especially the abolition of the parliamentary system of government in Chile. He wanted a new constitution which would provide Chile with the traditional Latin-American strong executive. But in 1924 he was forced to leave the country when a military junta became disgusted with the activities of Congress. His re-entrance on March 20, 1925, corresponded with a reversion against the junta, which had governed Chile in his absence. Since Alessandri believed that the Constitution of 1833 was out of date and was the basic cause for Chile's trouble in a fast-moving twentieth century, he quickly went about writing a new fundamental law for the nation.

On August 20 the public voted upon the acceptance or rejection of a new constitution which created a stronger executive and a somewhat weaker Congress. It was accepted

³¹The information in this section is taken from Clarence H. Haring, "Chilean Politics, 1920-1928," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XI (Feb., 1931), pp. 1-26.

and was promulgated on September 18.

During the intervening time between September, 1924, and November, 1925, however, there was no Congress and either Alessandri or his supporters actively ran the government by issuing more than eight hundred decreto-leyes. This period represented the most active government in Chile for over a decade.

In August, before the new constitution was presented, Alessandri proposed that a "national" candidate, agreed upon by all parties, be elected President. The public responded with the suggestion that Minister of War Carlos Ibáñez run for election, and on September 30 he announced his candidacy but refused to resign his Cabinet position as custom demanded. Since he would not leave, all the other members of the Cabinet presented their resignations to Alessandri. Ibáñez thereupon ordered Alessandri to sign no laws without his counter-signature since he was the only member of the Cabinet remaining. Rather than to submit to Ibáñez, Alessandri appointed Luis Barros Borgoño, who had run against him in 1920, as Minister of the Interior and then resigned the Presidency. This maneuver placed Barros Borgoño in the position of Acting President.

Reaction set in against Ibáñez' activity, and the press clamored for his resignation. Ibáñez thought the matter over for a few days and said that he would resign if the political parties could unite behind a single candi-

date within two weeks. Two days later Ibáñez was surprised to learn that the major parties had agreed upon Emiliano Figueroa Larrain. On October 6 Ibáñez said that he would accept Figueroa's candidacy but urged a postponement of the elections until politics could be purified. A civil war seemed imminent for no one knew how far the military would back Ibáñez. The navy, the Inspector General of the army, and the new Cabinet rejected a postponement, and Ibáñez went along with them. On October 18, however, an army coup d'etat over the postponement was barely averted. On October 25 Figueroa was elected with 70% of the votes over José Salas, Minister of Hygiene, and took office on December 24.

Figueroa was associated with the oligarchy and the vested interests and did not understand the new order imposed by the Constitution of 1925. The Minister of Interior, Maximiliano Ibáñez--no relation to the Minister of War--continued to act as the Prime Minister as before. During his tenure political conditions were allowed to slip back again to a situation bordering on anarchy. The Congress refused to pass the budget while factions within and outside the government schemed to regain their positions. By November, 1926, a Cabinet crisis in the old style could no longer be avoided.

These are merely the high points of Chilean politics during the formative months of the Plebiscitary Commission,

but they give an indication of the hectic condition within the central government. That there could be nothing approaching a firm, consistent policy toward carrying out a fair plebiscite in Tacna-Arica is not surprising. These chaotic events must be borne in mind when estimating the actions of the local officials in Arica during the attempted plebiscite.

Beginning of the Movement for Direct Negotiations

It will be convenient at this point to depart from the description of the plenary sessions of the Plebiscitary Commission and the diplomacy connected with them. They ceased to be a contributing factor in the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute after November. Recriminations with sarcastic and bitter denunciations marked the proceedings until their final failure. Instead of a careful analysis of the work of the Commission, a study which has already been expertly done,³² a subtler movement of far more

³²Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War, with a Collection of Official Documents (2 vols.; Washington, 1933). Wambaugh's work includes a scholarly eighty-page discussion of the attempted plebiscite. She held the position of Expert Adviser to the Peruvian government on plebiscites and as such had at her disposal many of the documents of the proceedings of the Commission, reproducing many of the more important ones in the second volume of the work cited. Considering the fact that she was on the scene at the time of the plebiscite, was in the pay of the Peruvian government, and was herself subjected to physical attacks by Chileans, her account of the attempted plebiscite is remarkably impartial. She did not have all the documents at her disposal, however, and a history of the plebiscitary attempt written from primary material--which is voluminous--is yet to be done.

importance to the eventual conclusion of the dispute must be examined. Regardless of how interesting the work of the Plebiscitary Commission may be, accentuated as it was by the personalities involved, the lurid phrases used to describe one another, and the desparateness which characterized Chilean activities, one must remember that the attempted plebiscite was but another futile attempt by the United States to end the Tacna-Arica dispute. It cannot legitimately be given a disproportionate amount of emphasis merely because it was more interesting than other phases of the settlement. Instead, the growth of direct negotiations must primarily concern us now while the proceedings of the Plebiscitary Commission are relegated to a secondary position. The work of the Commission will be discussed in the future only in so far as it bears directly upon the development of direct negotiations aiming at a political settlement.

Even the Chileans realized that a fair plebiscite was impossible. On August 14 Edwards approached Pershing with the proposition that since a plebiscite was going to be difficult to hold, it would be better if another agreement were reached. He said that Chile would be willing to give Peru \$20,000,000--or perhaps more--give her the northern boundary which she claimed, and would be willing to make the port of Arica and the territory free to both. Chile would in such an arrangement retain sovereignty of

the area. The idea appealed to Pershing, and he said that he would take it up with the Peruvians, but doubted that they would accept.³³ When he broached the idea to Salomón the next day, the latter seemed interested enough to consider going to Lima to talk to Leguía about it. Barreto refused to entertain the move on the grounds that if it were accepted, Leguía would be overthrown immediately.³⁴ The fact remains, however, that the Commission had not yet been in session two weeks, and already overtures were being made and considered for a political settlement without regard to the Arbitrator's award.

Freyre next approached Pershing with a similar plan, also confidentially. Pershing did not reveal the bases which were suggested, but he felt that "with a little more time and patience and further evidence of the serious obstacles to be overcome, . . . there is a possibility of finding some common ground which might form the basis of negotiations."³⁵ The benefits from a direct arrangement would augment United States prestige, just as the failure of the plebiscite, as seemed apparent, would have the opposite effect. While Edwards was on leave at Santiago for the reception of the Prince of Wales, he talked about a

³³Pershing, Journal, I, p. 35½, Pershing Papers.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 37-39.

³⁵Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Sept. 3, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1621½.

direct settlement to Alessandri, who was "not only willing but anxious to settle the matter outside of a plebiscite."³⁶ Pershing felt that since Peru had in the first place opposed a plebiscite, she probably would not be antagonistic toward some other method of settlement.

Why should there have been an effort to supersede the plebiscite by direct negotiations so soon after the Arbitrator's decision? Answers to this question are not difficult to find. First, for domestic political reasons neither government could afford to lose the plebiscite for fear of revolution. If Chile complied with the wishes of the Commission, it was generally agreed that Peru would win easily. But Chile would not allow a free and fair vote to be taken, and Pershing was obstinate enough to insist upon an honest election. If Chile declined to comply with the demands of the Commission, the only alternative would be to declare that a plebiscite was impossible. The situation would then be where it was before the Washington Protocol of 1922. Second, Peru early saw that if an election were held, she would lose it through Chilean fraud. Rather than to be a party to an unfair election, Peru would withdraw from the proceedings. But if she did that, the election probably would be held anyway with Chile's victory being disproportionately large. A plebiscite held under existing conditions simply was not the answer to the

³⁶Ibid.

Question of the Pacific.

If direct negotiations were the only answer, how were they to be brought about? Only the Arbitrator could suggest them, because if the move came from either of the other principals, it would be rejected. But to suggest that his own decision be side-stepped would place the Arbitrator in an embarrassing position unless he had received sufficient encouragement to do so from both parties. It was up to Pershing to engage in further conversations with the other two commissioners to explore the possibilities of another solution. It should be remembered that the conversations which Pershing had with Edwards, Salomón, and Freyre were strictly confidential and in no way represented the feelings of their respective governments. Nevertheless, the original attitudes which the governments had adopted toward the Arbitrator's award had changed considerably.

The Peruvian government made no attempt to hide its early dissatisfaction with the Arbitrator's award, just as Chile openly showed great jubilation over it. But so soon as Pershing arrived on the scene and made clear his stand regarding a fair plebiscite, the two governments changed positions. Peru entered into the work of winning a plebiscite whole-heartedly. Spontaneous public subscriptions running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars partially relieved the government of the heavy financial burden connected with the plebiscite. If Pershing continued

to insist upon a fair vote, the Peruvians felt that they could win. Chile, on the other hand, believed that Pershing demanded too much for the Peruvians, that he unjustly asked the Chileans to give up privileges which the Arbitrator had purposefully given them. Chileans high and low, Edwards among them, openly admitted that the plebiscite was supposed to be "fixed" in favor of Chile. There was no intention, they felt that it should be "fair" in the North-American sense.³⁷

When Edwards returned from Santiago, he was convinced that his government would not consent to a diplomatic settlement calling for the division or neutralization of the territory which that kind of adjustment would entail. Freyre also doubted that his government would consent to a division of territory, so engrossed was it in the preparations for the plebiscite. Leguía at last had the people of the nation united behind him in a single patriotic cause. This was more important to him at the time than gaining a small bit of additional territory. In fact, it was to his advantage to stretch the discussions over a long period thereby gaining as much publicity from them as possible. This fairly well summarizes his tactics for the next few years. Consequently, both sides ceased talking about a political settlement after mid-October.³⁸

³⁷Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Oct. 2, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1647.

³⁸Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Oct. 27, 1925, DSCF,

No further mention of direct negotiations was made by either of the delegations for over a month. Foreign Minister Matte broke the silence surrounding the subject shortly after Pershing submitted his eleven-point proposal. He instructed Edwards to reassure the Commission that Chile desired a free and fair plebiscite, but he also informed Edwards not to refuse any advances which Pershing might make regarding a political settlement which included Bolivia as well as Peru. Yet he was not to do this at the expense of interrupting or delaying the plebiscite.³⁹

When Pershing received this information through the Department of State, he peremptorily replied that neither party had spoken of the matter of a political settlement outside the plebiscite in over a month. He felt that apparently the idea had been entirely abandoned, at least that was the situation so far as he was concerned.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Pershing personally felt that a direct settlement was the best way out of an unhappy situation. He believed that Chile would not relinquish enough control of the territory which jeopardized her control of it, and even if the Arbitrator ruled against her in a particular decision, she would manage to maintain her hold over the area by one

723.2515/1660.

³⁹ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 13, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1641.

⁴⁰ Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Oct. 17, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1643.

means or another. Peru, on the other hand, had little chance to gain anything material out of the dispute except by a diplomatic settlement. Even though thoughtful Peruvians recognized this fact, the government was in no position to enter into direct negotiations until the plebiscite had been declared impossible. But such a decision would directly challenge Chile's claim to the provinces. She would be all the more eager to retain them in that event. The situation, however, was not completely hopeless, in Pershing's mind.

There were three formulae which might appeal to both parties in helping them to agree to a direct settlement. First, the expense of carrying out the plebiscite had been very much underestimated. Instead of a few hundred thousand dollars estimated by the Arbitrator, it appeared to Pershing that the final figure would more nearly approach the total amount set aside for the indemnity, about \$10,000,000.⁴¹ Second, regardless of who won the provinces, there was the possibility that the financial condition of the two countries would be worse than ever. And third, through a direct settlement calling for a

⁴¹In his estimate Pershing greatly erred. Between July 3, 1925, and June 9, 1926, Chile and Peru paid out \$341,000 respectively for the attempted plebiscite. When the account was audited, there was a balance of approximately \$126,000, making the plebiscitary attempt cost about \$556,000. S. Frank Levy, Washington, Nov. 9, 1926, "In the Matter of Plebiscitary Commission, Tacna-Arica Arbitration," Pershing Papers.

division of the provinces, each would receive a substantial portion of territory instead of a chance of losing all the area. These three points were possible bases for the two parties to come to an outside agreement; however, Peru would not consent to further discussions unless Chile offered in the beginning to discuss terms which would keep Tacna from being isolated.⁴² This meant that the port of Arica would figure prominently in any discussion. In any event Pershing felt that the plebiscite was doomed, and if the Arbitrator could find a basis upon which to abandon it and initiate a diplomatic settlement, everyone concerned would benefit.

Santiago quickly agreed to negotiate with Peru for a solution to the problem outside the plebiscite. As a matter of record, it is very important to underscore the fact that Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa personally put forward the proposal to find a solution to the dispute other than through the plebiscite. He said that Chile would accept such an offer if the suggestion came from "a government which would exercise its good offices." But under no condition would Chile take the initiative in the matter since it would place her in a position of weakness. At the same time Barros Jarpa maintained that Chile still desired to face the plebiscite under honorable and impartial conditions. He authorized the Chilean ambassador in Washington to treat

⁴²Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Oct. 27, 1925, DSCP, 723.2515/1660.

with the Secretary of State in the event that the United States offered its good offices, and he included comprehensive directions regarding the division and demilitarization of the territory with provisions for a corridor for Bolivia.⁴³ These directions must be remembered when studying the development of the growth of direct negotiations because when Kellogg later asked Chile to accept his good offices, Barros Jarpa roundly criticized him for initiating the move.

Into this seemingly harmonious chain of events Hughes interjected an opinion which temporarily put the quietus on further United States activity regarding an outside settlement. In a lengthy letter to Kellogg, Hughes expounded his philosophy of the procedure of offering good offices, especially as related to the Tacna-Arica dispute. He felt that the President should confine himself to the role of Arbitrator and all the world must be made to understand that he had fulfilled his obligations in every respect. Moreover, the blame for having an unsuccessful issue from a requested arbitrator's decision must be placed where it belonged. In that way the President would have the credit for doing what he could appropriately do as Arbitrator, and no one would hold him responsible for conditions beyond his control. As for coming to an understanding outside the

⁴³ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 28, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1661.

award, Hughes felt that the President should not engage in any action which would obscure the purposes of the United States, meaning a peaceful and impartial solution to the dispute. Regardless of expediency, he must not make a proposal which appeared partisan. Therefore, Hughes suggested, as could have been predicted, that no action be taken on the movement to settle the dispute outside the Arbitrator's decision unless both countries asked the President to present some method other than the plebiscite as a solution. If neither country felt that it could properly bring itself around to making the proposal, then the plebiscite should continue. If the Commission declared the attempt a failure, the party responsible should receive the blame.⁴⁴

There was little doubt in Kellogg's mind as to who was responsible for thwarting the plebiscite. In order better to prepare the exoneration of the United States in the event that the plebiscite failed, the Secretary of State requested Pershing to send the Department full reports on Chilean indiscretions during the proceedings. He wanted to have an iron-clad case to present to the public, if necessary, exposing Chilean malpractices.⁴⁵ In the

⁴⁴Hughes to Kellogg, New York, Oct. 29, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1667½.

⁴⁵Kellogg to Pershing, Washington, Nov. 24, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1689a.

meantime vituperations were heaped on Pershing's head by the Chilean press. He was called the interpreter of the award instead of the executor. Along with Pershing were placed Alessandri, grown cold to the idea of a free plebiscite after visiting the plebiscitary territory, and Barros Jarpa. These two men were criticized for submitting the question to arbitration in the first place. And the fickle press also criticized Edwards for antagonizing Pershing! Collier reported that the desire for a political settlement in Santiago was growing, obviously the only way out of an awkward position.⁴⁶

It is difficult, however, definitively to pin down the growing sentiment for a political settlement. Many prominent Chileans were eager to arrange an outside settlement, but the government itself was too unstable or unwilling to make a public pronouncement of a change of policy. With each new crisis faced by the Plebiscitary Commission the realization became stronger that a political agreement was the only way out. For example, on November 28 Edwards made a highly inflammatory speech against the work of the Commission and against Pershing personally, an action which Pershing had prophesied months earlier.⁴⁷ The Chilean press

⁴⁶ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Nov. 24, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1688.

⁴⁷ Agacio to Kellogg, Washington, 9 de enero de 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1827½, containing "Chilean Member's Address Delivered at the Meeting of November 28, 1925"; Pershing, Journal, I, p. 124, Pershing Papers.

carried a verbatim report of the Edwards tirade. To Pershing this represented "a very, very serious and unwarranted breach of the very positive rule adopted unanimously by the Commission."⁴⁸ When Edwards' denunciation of Pershing and the proceedings became generally known in Santiago, Collier was approached by several high-ranking politicians close to President-elect Figueroa urging him to suggest that the United States take the initiative in offering further good offices to end the plebiscitary stalemate. Figueroa himself was more disposed to a settlement which would involve greater Chilean concessions than was Acting President Barros Borgoño.⁴⁹

Collier realized that he could not suggest to the Chileans a remedy to the problem outside the plebiscite. Officially it was his position to adopt the attitude of maintaining the neutral position of the Arbitrator at all times and to see the plebiscite through. Nevertheless, in his official despatches to the Department of State, Collier, in whom the Secretary of State placed a great deal of confidence and whose opinion on the situation he valued highly, propounded elaborate plans for dispensing with the

⁴⁸Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Nov. 30, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1703; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Nov. 30, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1702; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 7, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1734.

⁴⁹Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 5, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1727.

plebiscite.⁵⁰ He advised his chief that there were several ways in which the Arbitrator's award could be legitimately circumvented. The most logical way was to censure Leguía for a speech in which he advised Bolivia that Peru would come to the former's aid in regaining her conquered provinces just so soon as Tacna-Arica was under the Peruvian flag. Collier felt, with justification, that this was in violation of the spirit of the award, and that it had inflamed Chilean passions making negotiations impossible. He believed that a method could be devised whereby both Presidents could be indicted for their impolitic utterances and the United States could dispense with the plebiscite but still maintain control of the general situation. In this manner the countries could be "virtually summoned" to Washington to settle the matter directly, and the United States could save face and prestige in Latin America. Besides, only a diplomatic settlement offered the possibility of lasting peace and harmony between the nations. A plebiscite might transfer the disputed territory to one power or the other, but it would not heal the deep wounds of stepped-on pride and defeated national aspirations.⁵¹

⁵⁰Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Dec. 3, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1711; Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Dec. 4, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1713; Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Dec. 4, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1714; Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Dec. 5, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1722.

⁵¹Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 5, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1727; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 12, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1746; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jan. 11, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1835.

It was folly to talk of a political settlement so long as Chile had nothing more than a care-taker government. President-elect Figueroa, as eager to be rid of the problem as Alessandri was in 1922, was not destined to take office until December 24, and until that time negotiations in Arica had to proceed on their stormy course. And hectic they were.

Pershing had consistently refused to set a specific date for registrations and election because he felt that the situation in the territory was such that Peru would be discriminated against. Edwards accused Pershing of deliberate procrastination and offered a Chilean proposal setting registration and election dates.⁵² After careful consideration of Edwards' motion, Pershing offer a substitute measure postponing the election further, without formally defeating the previous one.⁵³ The substitute motion was passed, and Edwards immediately announced an appeal to the Arbitrator, who sustained the Commission's action.⁵⁴

Chile's position at the end of 1925, briefly stated, was that every indication pointed to a willingness to find

⁵²Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Nov. 25, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1741.

⁵³Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Dec. 10, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1743.

⁵⁴Kellogg to Pershing, Washington, Jan. 15, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1756, containing the Arbitrator's Opinion and Decision.

some agreement outside the plebiscite. However, she could not properly suggest another solution to Peru for two reasons. First, this would be an admission of weakness. Chile, with its complete control of the territory, maintained all along that she was in a position of strength and intended to keep it. An about-face at this point would be inexplicable to a patriotic and alert public. Second, it was highly doubtful whether Peru would accept such an offer coming from Chile. Every indication pointed to Peru's intention of carrying out the plebiscite if it could be fairly arranged. And so long as Pershing maintained his attitude, there would be nothing but a fair plebiscite.⁵⁵

The Peruvian position in relation to an outside settlement is easier to describe. While Peru was at first disappointed with the Arbitrator's award, she quickly entered into the business of winning the plebiscite when it became obvious that Pershing championed her cause, that is, an honest election. Leguía would not request the Arbitrator to set aside the award unless it became a settled fact that a plebiscite was impossible and that Peru would lose the election through fraud. There was another reason, equally important, why Leguía was not willing to consider a compromise offer outside the plebiscite. Ambassador Miles Poindexter succinctly described the situation when he

⁵⁵Miles Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Dec. 1, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1744.

wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:

Feeling is so high in Peru that were the government through diplomatic pressure or otherwise to accept a compromise however favorable, it would almost inevitably be overthrown. I do not believe that President Leguía will run this risk.⁵⁶

This factor should be borne in mind in judging the subsequent recalcitrance of Leguía toward a political settlement.

That the United States was in an embarrassing position goes without saying. She had offered her good offices to two nations which sought an end to an old dispute. After careful consideration the President offered a juridical opinion which both countries accepted. But when the time came to implement it, one of the parties balked because of the award's apparent fairness and impartiality. The bitterness which resulted was so intense that even if the plebiscite were carried out, old animosities would remain and would be intensified. But if the plebiscite were not held, a rabid press with a few manipulations of fact, could place the blame on the United States, which would consequently lose prestige in Latin America. And just as important, the good name of peaceful arbitration in general would suffer. The course left open to the United States, if it wanted to maintain a perfectly unblemished reputation for impartiality in the case, was to let events proceed as they would

⁵⁶ Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Jan. 9, 1926, DSCP, 723.2515/1830.

until both governments saw the futility of the plebiscite and were forced to return to the United States for further mediation. The drawback in this attitude was that war might break out between the countries in the meantime and the United States would be involved in that, too.⁵⁷

The Uruguayan minister to Chile must have sensed the discomfiture of the United States over the turn of events in Arica. He suggested to Collier that perhaps Uruguay and Argentina could take the initiative and informally advise Chile and Peru to request the further good offices of the United States for a political settlement. Collier gave him a non-committal reply but thought enough of the situation to cable the "novel suggestion" to the Department of State.⁵⁸ And Kellogg was impressed sufficiently to relay the idea to Hughes, who in turn gave it an immediate answer--one of the quickest he gave to any Tacna-Arica problem--stating that there was no reason why the United States should object to such a proposal.⁵⁹ The primary consideration remained, however, that the United States must protect its neutral position regardless of all else. Kellogg so instructed Collier and related the same information to

⁵⁷ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 28, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1863.

⁵⁸ Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 15, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1752.

⁵⁹ Hughes to Kellogg, New York, Dec. 18, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1757½.

Poindexter in Lima.⁶⁰ The United States was obviously looking for a way out. But this was a question in which neither the Argentine nor the Uruguayan governments desired to become involved, and after careful consideration, both decided not to make representations to Peru and Chile.⁶¹ The United States was left to its own devices in finding a solution to the dilemma.

In the midst of the haranguing into which the sessions of the Plebiscitary Commission had degenerated, a new development occurred. Pershing was ill and had to return to the United States for medical and dental treatment. This was no diplomatic sickness. He had been suffering from an increasingly rising blood pressure since his arrival in Arica, brought about partly by the strain placed upon him by the negotiations and partly by infected teeth. He had been in pain for months, a fact known in Washington.⁶² His personal physician disclaimed any responsibility.

⁶⁰Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Dec. 22, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515/1760; Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Jan. 4, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1760.

⁶¹Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jan. 2, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1793; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jan. 4, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1798; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jan. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1818; Ulysses Grant-Smith to Kellogg, Montevideo, Jan. 10, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1836; Jay to Kellogg, Buenos Aires, Jan. 11, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1834; Jay to Kellogg, Buenos Aires, Mar. 24, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2051; Jay to Kellogg, Buenos Aires, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2060.

⁶²Merritte W. Ireland to Pershing, Washington, Aug. 20, 1925, Pershing Papers.

ity for Pershing's future health and longevity unless he returned to the United States for extensive and prolonged treatment and observation.⁶³

Though Kellogg preferred to have a civilian follow Pershing as president of the Plebiscitary Commission, Coolidge appointed Major General William Lassiter, Commanding General of the Panama Canal Zone. Pershing highly recommended Lassiter, saying that he was more conversant with the problems than any person outside the Commission. Dennis and Kreger were reluctantly passed over because Kellogg felt that they had been too intimately connected with the proceedings and personalities in Arica. In the most literal sense this familiarity brought contempt upon them, and they were regarded with a great deal of prejudice by the Chileans.⁶⁴

Pershing stayed in office until his successor relieved him on January 27, 1926. It was now Lassiter's turn to wrestle with the perplexing problems.

⁶³Jones to Ireland, Arica, Dec. 22, 1925, DSCF, 723.2515PC/319½; Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Dec. 27, 1925, 723.2515PC/319.

⁶⁴Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jan. 2, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1792; Joseph C. Grew to Pershing, Washington, Jan. 3, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515PC/343a; Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Jan. 4, 1926, 723.2515PC/346a; Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Jan. 4, 1926, 723.2515PC/330; Kellogg to Kreger and Dennis, Washington, Jan. 9, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515PC/333.

CHAPTER V

FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPTED PLEBISCITE

Kellogg Proposes a Diplomatic Settlement

With Major General William Lassiter's appointment as American Commissioner a new phase began in the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute, for not only did the Plebiscitary Commission receive a new president, but Chile got a new Foreign Minister. Elderly Beltrán Mathieu, who had been Chilean ambassador to the United States for more than seven years and who was known to be frankly pro-American, received the appointment from the President-elect to replace Barros Jarpa, who had not been able to carry the opinion of the Barros Borgoño government his way.¹ It was believed that Mathieu, older, more experienced, and well respected, would be more successful and would bring Edwards into line. In a conversation with Undersecretary of State Stabler before Mathieu left Washington for Chile, the ambassador said that he felt Edwards was responsible for the failure of the plebiscite and that he had antagonized Pershing from the start instead of cooperating with

¹Pershing to Kellogg, Arica, Jan. 11, 1926, DSCP, 723.2515PC/338.

him.²

Lassiter took no longer than Pershing to surmise that a plebiscite under existing conditions was impossible. Nevertheless, he continued the investigations but was eventually forced to come to grips with specific questions concerning the eligibility of certain classes of voters. When he voted with Peru that government-paid teachers and employees of the postal and telegraphic service could not vote, Edwards appealed. And when he voted with Chile that the railroad employees could vote, Freyre appealed. In both instances Coolidge backed the general's stand; nevertheless, Lassiter persistently claimed that the plebiscitary proceedings had become a farce and that there was no possibility whatever of an election. To him the only solution was a political settlement.³ And he believed that Salomón would urge Leguía to adopt the expedient. At least Freyre intimated that Peru was tiring of the heavy expense of maintaining the Peruvian voters in readiness to move to Arica for the election.⁴

But heavy expenditures were not the sole basis for

²Stabler, "Conversation with Mathieu, Nov. 20, 1926," Folder 1(b), Tacna-Arica Controversy, Hughes Papers.

³Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Feb. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1911; Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Feb. 25, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1967a, containing the Arbitrator's Opinion and Decision.

⁴Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Feb. 10, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1928.

the Peruvian government's discontent. The day after the registration and election regulations were promulgated, Freyre told Lassiter that Peru preferred to postpone the proceedings until suitable guarantees were given for the protection of Peruvian voters. The government felt that Peru was being hurried into the plebiscite with undue rapidity and that a lengthy postponement should be declared in order that tempers might cool. If a delay were not granted, there was a possibility that Peru would withdraw from the discussions.⁵ What actually had happened, however, was that Peru saw clearly for the first time that regardless of Pershing's and Lassiter's activities to insure a fair plebiscite, there was little hope of a Peruvian victory in the face of increased Chilean intimidation of voters.

Kellogg had watched every detail of the plebiscitary proceedings with great care and anxiety. After carefully weighing Lassiter's reports, nearly all of which called for an end to the plebiscitary attempt and the initiation of direct diplomatic negotiations, the Secretary of State offered the good offices of the United States to supervise additional political discussions between Chile and Peru aiming for a diplomatic settlement. In the offer he stated that the authority of the Plebiscitary Commission

⁵Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Feb. 16, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1935.

and all aspects of the award should be unimpaired during any period of direct discussions.⁶ This was essentially the offer which Barros Jarpa had requested in October; so there was little doubt that Chile would accept. Kellogg had every reason to believe that Peru would accept because he had recently talked with the Argentine ambassador to the United States who told him that Peru was ready to withdraw from the proceedings.⁷ Kellogg cleared his course of action with Coolidge, for in effect he was proposing the abandonment of the Arbitrator's award.⁸ But the offer did not follow the cautious procedure in which Hughes indulged in 1922 when he invited the disputants to Washington. Kellogg did not sound out both parties to see if each would accept before the formal offer was tendered; instead, he ordered the United States ambassadors to present the invitation and to wait for a reply. It was not what he had expected. Instead of two nations falling over themselves to accept the hospitality of the United States, Kellogg received an effective and stinging rebuke for his efforts.

⁶Kellogg to Poindexter and Collier, Washington, Feb. 16, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1936a and 1936b. On the background of this offer see Robert E. Olds to Kellogg, Dept. of State, "Tacna-Arica," Washington, Feb. 13, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2964; [Olds], Dept. of State, "Tacna-Arica Confidential Memorandum of March 10, 1926," Washington, DSCF, 723.2515/2965.

⁷Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Feb. 12, 1926, Hughes Papers.

⁸Kellogg to Hughes, Washington, Feb. 13, 1926, Hughes Papers.

Clearly he had not laid his groundwork carefully enough.

Although near the end of 1925 Chile had favored a diplomatic settlement, by February, 1926, sentiment had changed. Entertaining Kellogg's invitation meant serious opposition in the press and in the Congress; nevertheless, Figueroa, eager to be rid of the Tacna-Arica question, accepted the offer.⁹ The answer from Peru was unexpected. The Foreign Minister deferred to the President, and Leguía personally replied to Kellogg's offer. He said that Peru could not accept an offer of direct negotiations with Chile unless the United States gave satisfactory assurances that the terms reached would be carried out. He believed that Chile would make war on Peru "regardless of any agreement she might make unless she were restrained by some outside influence. . . ." This danger was magnified since, the President felt, the Civilista party in Chile was losing ground and a satisfactory solution to the Tacna-Arica dispute could not be expected from the military party. Ambassador Poindexter assured him that the United States would enter into no such agreement, but Leguía was adamant in his stand.¹⁰

⁹Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Feb. 18, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1944; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Feb. 18, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1945; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Feb. 19, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1948.

¹⁰Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Feb. 24, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1958; White, Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Interview with Doctor Hernán Velarde, Ambassador of Peru," Washington, Mar. 4, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1988½, containing "Memorandum from the President of Peru," Lima, Feb. 26, 1926.

To Kellogg, Leguía's reply was a definite rejection of his offer of good offices. The United States under no foreseeable circumstance would enforce with arms any political settlement reached by the two nations. However, Poindexter was instructed to inform Leguía that the offer was open under the same conditions anytime he wanted to accept.¹¹ There was one consolation in this rebuff. The United States no longer ran the risk of being blamed for disorders which might ensue from carrying through the plebiscite. Peru had been given the chance to avoid future dangerous clashes and had "rejected it and deliberately chosen to go ahead with her eyes open to the danger. If trouble should occur, responsibility for it cannot fail to rest upon Chile and Peru."¹²

Trouble occurred--serious trouble. On March 5 a large number of Peruvians arrived in Tacna by rail, and those Peruvians already there met them at the train station. The entire group, about four hundred, marched in procession down the main street carrying the Peruvian flag and singing the national anthem. Included in the body were Peruvian members of the Registration and Election Boards. A gang fight resulted. The Chileans along the way stoned the marchers and

¹¹Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Feb. 25, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1958.

¹²Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Feb. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1971.

in a few instances used knives, resulting in many wounded Peruvians, some of them seriously. The civilian officials were vigorous in trying to stop the mêlée, but the police did little.¹³

The following day Freyre read a long report of the incident to the Plebiscitary Commission and offered a resolution calling for the postponement of registration and all other acts connected with the plebiscite until such time as conditions in the territory were reformed sufficiently to permit a fair vote to take place. Freyre privately informed Lassiter that if the motion were defeated, he had instructions from his government to withdraw. Voting on the matter was delayed for a few days until Edwards could communicate with Santiago.¹⁴

The Department of State regarded the Tacna fight and similar occurrences as mere incidents. It felt that there had to be demonstrations of official Chilean opposition after registration had begun in order to insure that world opinion would support the Arbitrator if he declared the plebiscitary attempt a failure. Hughes was largely responsible for this attitude.¹⁵

¹³Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 6, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1988.

¹⁴Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 9, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/1994.

¹⁵Pershing to Lassiter [Washington], Mar. 12, 1926, Pershing Papers.

Both Kellogg and Hughes contended that the Commission did not have adequate proof which would stand up in the court of world opinion. To them acceptable evidence must be in the form of legal affidavits. Pershing, who had long conferences with both Kellogg and Hughes after his return to Washington, kept Lassiter privately informed of Department of State feelings. He told Lassiter that the Department's position was "very evidently one of international political expediency with little regard for the actual conditions. . . ." Kellogg, Pershing felt, really knew "little whatever about the situation" and felt that "the plebiscite must be carried out one way or another." Hughes was of the same opinion. And if negotiations failed, both were "bent on pushing the plebiscite through regardless of conditions."¹⁶ Although Pershing may have received these impressions from his conferences with the two men, in actuality their opinions were very much different. Kellogg and Hughes were looking at the overall campaign while Pershing saw only the immediate battle at Arica.

Kellogg's attitude of massive conciliation prompted him for the second time within ten days to offer the good offices of the United States to end the deadlock. Although his method of renewing the offer was devious, his motive was commendable. He instructed Poindexter and Collier to

¹⁶Pershing to Lassiter, Washington, Apr. 16, 1926, Pershing Papers.

renew the offer by defining what he meant by the terms "good offices" in his previous message. By way of explanation Kellogg said

It was and is the purpose of the Secretary of State to give the term its widest possible intendment. Consequently, it is the Secretary's view that if the offer were accepted by both parties the Government of the United States should be prepared to exercise its good offices to any extent reasonably consistent with the main object of effecting a genuine and lasting settlement of the differences referred.¹⁷

The results were as before: Leguía refused the offer unless there were firm commitments that the terms of an agreement would be enforced by the United States; Chile accepted with the stipulation that the plebiscite continue during the direct negotiations.¹⁸ In a later telegram to Kellogg, Leguía explained that since the United States was not disposed to guarantee peace, there was no better solution than to continue the proceedings of the Commission and to wait for the Arbitrator to bring about conditions conducive to a free and honest plebiscite.¹⁹ For the second time Leguía had dared to defy Kellogg.

Leguía's faith in the effectiveness of the Commission and the Arbitrator was not shared by Lassiter and the

¹⁷Kellogg to Poindexter and Collier, Washington, Mar. 11, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2003.

¹⁸Craig W. Wadsworth to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 12, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2012; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 16, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2022.

¹⁹Wadsworth to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 20, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2040.

Department of State. The Department was acutely and uncomfortably aware that a fair plebiscite, regardless of the good intentions of the Arbitrator, was impossible. But a consideration higher than an honest plebiscite had to be taken into account, and that was an eventual and peaceful solution to the dispute. For the American Commissioner to vote that the plebiscite was a failure would antagonize Chile, and it would be difficult to engage her in direct diplomatic negotiations. The situation would be back at the starting point. If Peru withdrew from the proceedings, which was highly doubtful, the Arbitrator would be in a better position to declare the plebiscite a failure, and he could at the same time lay the blame on both parties. United States prestige before all South America was at stake. With Lassiter's cooperation the Department could maneuver the situation to the advantage of the Arbitrator without placing the entire blame on either of the contending parties. Then if Lassiter felt that the proceedings had to be suspended, the action could be taken in such a way to leave the possibility that they could be led to accept a diplomatic settlement.²⁰

The matter of Peru's motion to suspend further meetings of the Commission was pending during the second offer of good offices. On the morning of March 25 the Commission

²⁰Pershing to Lassiter [Washington], Mar. 19, 1926, Pershing Papers.

rejected it.²¹ Orally Foreign Minister Pedro José Rada y Gamio told Poindexter that if the plebiscite continued, many Peruvians would be killed. Consequently, he said that Peru accepted the good offices with the understanding that the proceedings of the Plebiscitary Commission were automatically suspended.²²

Kellogg's original offer of good offices had not included a suspension of the meetings of the Commission, even though the Secretary of State personally regarded that action as essential to the success of a direct exchange in Washington. Nevertheless, he was stretching a point when he cabled Santiago that in view of Peru's acceptance a temporary suspension of the plebiscitary proceedings would be in the best interest of both countries.²³ This was not at all what Mathieu had contemplated, and, although he reiterated his acceptance of Kellogg's original offer, he flatly rejected any proposal to suspend preparations for voting.²⁴ This meant that in so far as Chile was concerned the registration of voters scheduled for March 27 would begin as planned. To Peru acceptance meant that the proceedings were

²¹Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 25, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2054.

²²Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 24, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2052.

²³Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Mar. 25, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2052.

²⁴Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2070.

suspended, and Freyre ordered Peruvians to absent themselves from the registration booths.²⁵ Lassiter correctly characterized the situation as a "farce." Pershing felt that the Department of State was "in a terrible mess" over the affair and could not "be brought to look the situation squarely in the face." Its only thought, he believed, was "to get out without loss of prestige, which I think is impossible."²⁶

Position of the American Commissioner

A few words are called for concerning the relationship of the American Commissioner to the Secretary of State. Technically and legally the Secretary could do no more than advise the president of the Commission. And so long as Pershing was in Arica, this attitude was consistent with reality. On several occasions Kellogg indicated to Pershing that his was strictly an advisory position. He could not command the general to do anything regarding the proceedings of the Commission. He was available merely to offer expert advice and opinion to the Arbitrator's representative. His sole concern, he claimed, was for the good name of the Arbitrator and of the United States.

This arrangement was only a legal fiction. In fact

²⁵Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2072.

²⁶Pershing to Stabler [Washington], Apr. 16, 1926, Pershing Papers.

the Secretary of State and the Department of State guided the activities of the American Commissioner rather closely throughout the proceedings, because Chile's unexpected behavior turned a relatively simple task into a complicated diplomatic situation. Neither Pershing nor Lassiter was trained as a diplomat, even though their handling of the matter received high praise from professionals in the field. Consequently, the help and encouragement which they received from the Department of State was usually welcomed. In all fairness to Pershing, however, it must be said that Kellogg showed great deference to him. There is no evidence to indicate that he ordered Pershing to adopt any specific course. One explanation of this attitude may be found in the fact that the proceedings at Arica had not evolved into an unmanageable situation by the time Pershing left for the United States. The situation during the incumbency of Lassiter, however, was somewhat different since it was evident that the plebiscite had failed and since delicate direct negotiations were going on in Washington.

Lassiter, who had been military attaché in London during World War I, was highly recommended for the job by Pershing, and Coolidge himself indicated that he had confidence in Lassiter's judgement and ability. Despite the fact that nearly every one of Lassiter's early despatches indicated his desire to declare the plebiscitary effort a failure, an opinion not held by Kellogg, the Secretary of

State politely answered all his objections. Under the circumstances this politeness must not be considered as the "expected" thing for Kellogg to display. Many of Lassiter's cables were carping to a degree about events within the plebiscitary territory. On several occasions Lassiter declared that the Secretary of State was not on the scene and did not know the seriousness of the situation; that Dennis and Kreger agreed that the meetings should be declared a failure; and that the proper course of action was to name Chile as the culprit and end a ridiculous farce.²⁷ Kellogg patiently answer Lassiter's comments saying that the general did not see the overall picture, and he explained it to him.²⁸ On March 27 Kellogg minutely detailed the attempts to get Chile and Peru into direct negotiations. To do this, he said, it would be necessary for them to talk in the meetings of the Commission until they realized that the United States offer of direct negotiations was the only solution remaining.²⁹ Yet Lassiter the same day again insisted upon

²⁷Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 19, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2037; Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 21, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2042; Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 20, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2043; Dennis to White, Mar. 20, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2044; Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 22, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2044; Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 25, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2054.

²⁸Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 20, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2037; Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 22, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2042; Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 26, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2054.

²⁹Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2065.

the abandonment of the proceedings.³⁰ And once more Kellogg explained why they could not be terminated. He said, "Chile claims we have no right under [the award] to suspend the proceedings without her consent, and I think there is very serious question whether we have such a right." He concluded his cable by saying that he had shown Coolidge the last despatch from Lassiter and "it is his desire that you should go ahead with the registration at present and if necessary he will make an order to that effect. I hope that you will not oblige him to do so."³¹ Lassiter, far from daunted, again challenged the wisdom of Kellogg's decision and urged the liquidation of the existing situation as soon as possible.³² An exasperated Kellogg curtly replied, "My [cable of] March 27, 6 P. M. is a complete answer to your March 27, 3 P. M. [and] there is nothing to add."³³ Clearly the Secretary of State had begun to direct events at Arica.

What Kellogg demanded of Lassiter would have taxed the abilities of an experienced diplomat. Even though the general almost daily pleaded with Kellogg to allow him to end the proceedings, the Secretary wanted him to maintain

³⁰Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2067.

³¹Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2067.

³²Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2072.

³³Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Mar. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2072.

the status quo within the plebiscitary area. Also, he wanted the registration machinery kept intact so that if Peru decided to reconsider, there would be a possibility for her to register her voters. Moreover, Kellogg wanted Lassiter to secure guarantees from Chile for Peruvian voters which would encourage them to participate in the plebiscite. And finally, he wanted Lassiter to do nothing which might interfere with the negotiations in Washington.

In April direct negotiations formally began in the United States. It will be necessary, however, to dispose of the attempted plebiscite before considering the conferences, which shall be examined in detail in the following chapter. At Washington the plenipotentiaries of Chile and Peru began the business of settling the dispute without a plebiscite while Chile maintained that the proceedings of the Commission were to continue and while Peru considered them suspended since March 27. By the middle of May it was apparent that there could be no plebiscite. Several of the high-ranking members of the Commission had left Arica and daily many of the Peruvian voters drifted out of the territory back to Peru.

The Plebiscite Fails

Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was called in to write a complete report on the situation in Arica and to offer his suggestions on the conclusion of the attempted plebiscite. After careful investigation of the facts, he

placed the blame for the failure of the plebiscite entirely on the Chileans and suggested that the Commission cease its work at once.³⁴ Kellogg was firmly convinced that an honest plebiscite was impossible. He realized that Lassiter could not pursue his Fabian policy longer without grave consequences and that he had just about reached the limit beyond which he could not go.³⁵ On no less than three occasions Edwards had presented motions to the Commission demanding that it fix the date for the election even though the Peruvians had boycotted registration.

On June 7 a meeting of notables in Santiago failed to decide upon a specific policy for the Chilean ambassador in Washington and could think of no better solution to the impasse than to order Edwards to press for a definite election date. Collier considered a diplomatic settlement hopeless.³⁶ With the arrival of this information Kellogg cabled Lassiter to use his own discretion about concluding the sessions of the Plebiscitary Commission.³⁷ Kellogg had forewarned Chile that the proceedings would be terminated unless there were both some prospect of a settlement in the

³⁴Henry L. Stimson, "Memorandum on the Evidence Bearing on the Question Whether a Plebiscite Can now Be Held in Tacna-Arica," New York, May 28, 1926, Hughes Papers.

³⁵Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 1, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2380.

³⁶Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jun. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2415.

³⁷Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Jun. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2415.

negotiations at Washington and a request to delay a show-down in Arica; so there was no reason for Lassiter's actions to have surprised them.³⁸

In the meeting held June 9 Lassiter introduced the motion for dissolution and specifically charged that the action was necessary because of the obstructionist tactics of the Chileans. Edwards protested, saying that the Commission did not have the authority to adjourn its sessions sine die, and asked for a few days delay in order to consult with his government over the new development.³⁹

On June 14 Lassiter called the Commission into session, Edwards having received instructions from Santiago. Freyre voted with Lassiter to terminate the proceedings. Edwards refused to participate. When the resolution passed, Edwards adopted the novel position, suggested by former Secretary of State Robert Lansing--one of the Chilean counselors in the United States--that he was the only legitimate member left on the Commission, the other two having voted themselves out of office.⁴⁰ At this session Lassiter delivered a lengthy speech outlining in elaborate detail why the plebiscite had failed. The fault was placed solely

³⁸Kellogg, "Conversation with Señor Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, Ambassador of Chile, June 2, 1926," Hughes Papers.

³⁹Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Jun. 9, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2428.

⁴⁰Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Jun. 14, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2447.

with Chile.⁴¹

Edwards was given until June 21 to appeal, although he earlier indicated that an appeal was impossible "because the action of the Commission was a nullity."⁴² On that date the final liquidating session was held. Immediately afterward Lassiter embarked on the cruiser USS Denver for the Panama Canal Zone.

The Tacna-Arica plebiscite had failed.

⁴¹Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Jun. 14, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2450. This speech is of basic importance to the history of the Plebiscitary Commission and should be read by all serious students of the period. It is reprinted in Wambaugh, op. cit., II, document number 128.

⁴²Lassiter to Kellogg, Arica, Jun. 14, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2447.

CHAPTER VI

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS END THE DISPUTE

The Washington Conference

There is little doubt that Kellogg realized by January, 1926, that the plebiscite was completely out of the question. However, he was persistent enough to see every avenue of conciliation exhausted before a formal break was made in the discussions at Arica. He knew that if an open rupture occurred, Chile would bear the blame for it, and this would make future negotiations even more difficult. Someone with less tenacity than Kellogg very likely would have earlier moved for the cessation of the meetings of the Plebiscitary Commission in Arica, regardless of the ramifications involved. By so doing the Department of State could have washed its hands of the entire problem and said, correctly, that the United States had carried out its obligations under the Protocol of Washington. However, the Question of the Pacific would have remained unanswered, and the peace of the hemisphere would still be threatened.

Even though the news from Arica was irritating, Kellogg resolved not to allow the problem between Chile and Peru to slip back to where it had been before 1921.

Too much progress had been made simply to cast the matter aside because it had become irksome. This is what prompted Kellogg to offer the further good offices of the United States in the middle of February. It is to his credit that when Peru rejected them, he offered them again. A less determined Secretary of State of the United States, which had long been accustomed to having its recommendations acquiesced in without question, would never have made the second offer. Kellogg knew that Leguía was playing politics with United States diplomacy; notwithstanding this, he never lost sight of the eventual goal of the United States--the re-establishment of peace in South America. Leguía's acceptance of the good offices on March 24 paved the way for direct negotiations to end the plebiscitary impasse.

On April 1 Kellogg invited Chile and Peru to designate their respective plenipotentiaries to meet with him in Washington not later than April 6. He wanted the conference to begin so quickly because the registration of voters in Arica was in progress. Since there would not be time for representatives to come from South America, he suggested that the governments give full power to settle the dispute to their ambassadors to the United States. And to get matters underway, he indicated in his invitation that he would submit for their consideration concrete bases of adjustment at the first meeting. As soon as the parties accepted the bases in principle, the plebiscitary proceedings

could be suspended for as long as necessary to reach an agreement.¹ His offer was not in any way an ultimatum or command. Rather, the delegates were to be completely free to make any counter proposals they desired. Kellogg simply wanted the meetings to get underway without lengthy delays.² The Arbitrator's award had been minutely judicial. Now was the time for practical suggestions on how to end the dispute.

Both governments accepted Kellogg's offer and appointed their respective ambassadors to Washington as plenipotentiaries, Hernán Velarde for Peru and Miguel Cru- chaga Tocornal for Chile. At the first meeting, held on April 6, Kellogg suggested that the two countries accept in principle an equitable division of the territory between them. As soon as this proposal was accepted, he said, then both governments should agree to a suspension of the pleb- iscitary proceedings.³

Kellogg was surprised to learn that Velarde was unable to answer his suggestion, but would have to refer it to Lima. This meant, in effect, that he was not a pleni- potentiary empowered to settle the outstanding problems

¹Kellogg to Collier and Poindexter, Washington, Apr. 1, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2088b and 2088c.

²Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Apr. 2, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2088c, suppl.

³Kellogg to Poindexter and Collier, Washington, Apr. 6, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2103a and 2103b.

upon his own authority. Kellogg had hoped that the delegates would reach a quick decision thereby relieving the United States of an embarrassing predicament in Arica by suspending the plebiscitary attempt. In actuality, however, the situation at Washington was no different from that which had existed when the "plenipotentiaries" acted in their capacity as ambassadors.⁴

Chile accepted the principle of division of the territory but stated that the formula would have to be more concrete before it could be regarded as a sufficient basis to permit a suspension of the plebiscitary proceedings. Peru rejected it, saying that the question to be decided was one of national honor instead of territorial adjustment, and "national honor . . . is intangible . . . and indivisible."⁵ It became immediately apparent that this type of attitude from Peru would end all hope of a speedy solution to the problem.

Neither of the delegates seemed much disposed to offer a program of settlement; consequently, Kellogg continued to take the initiative in the proceedings. It was he who was called upon to frame suggestions which might be acceptable to both parties. This was, of course, what he

⁴Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Apr. 7, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2107a.

⁵Kellogg to Poindexter and Collier, Washington, Apr. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2115a and 2115b; Velarde to Kellogg, Washington, 8 de abril de 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2124½.

had expected when he asked them to sit in conference. His program was well formulated, and on April 15 he presented an alternative solution.

Kellogg's second suggestion called for either (a) a neutralized state, independent or under the protectorate of other South-American countries, or (b) the transfer of the provinces to a South-American state not a party to the negotiations.⁶ Peru promptly accepted the neutralization of the territory. Chile never replied. Most of the Chilean sullenness during the period of direct negotiations in Washington stemmed from Maximiliano Ibáñez' opposition to the use of good offices for a settlement of the dispute. Ibáñez' brother-in-law was Luis Barcelo, who had been dismissed from his position as Intendente of Tacna province at the insistence of Pershing.⁷

While Kellogg waited for Chile's answer, he engaged in informal discussions in which the idea of a Bolivian corridor to the ocean was brought up. The corridor idea called for a distribution of territory, which Peru had firmly rejected previously. Kellogg pressed Leguía to agree in principle to a division, then the details of draw-

⁶ Kellogg to Collier and Poindexter, Washington, Apr. 15, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2138a and 2138b.

⁷ Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [with] Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché, American Embassy, Santiago," Washington, Aug. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2618½.

ing a boundary which would include or exclude Arica and the Morro could be decided in the give-and-take of negotiations.⁸ Faced with what amounted to a demand from the United States, Leguía agreed to the principle of division, "notwithstanding how painful for Peru is . . . the mutilation of one of the provinces," with a Bolivian corridor as the dividing line.⁹ However, Leguía said that Peru would not make the suggestion for a division. That would have to come from the United States.¹⁰

Progress at last seemed afoot. Chile had earlier agreed to "an equitable division" of the territory, but on May 21 the Chilean Foreign Minister gave his definition of the term. Chile's idea of an equitable division would be to distribute the large Chilean province of Tacna along its departmental lines. Under this plan the department of Arica, which contained the port of Arica, the Morro, and the Arica-La Paz railroad, would be retained by Chile.¹¹ The corridor idea under such terms was completely illusory since a passage to the sea would amount to hardly more than a worthless

⁸Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, May 12, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2276.

⁹Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, May 14, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2293; Poindexter to Kellogg, Lima, May 15, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2299.

¹⁰White, Dept. of State, "Conversation [with] Dr. Hernán Velarde, Ambassador of Peru," Washington, May 17, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2322½.

¹¹Kellogg to Collier, Washington, May 21, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2332.

ribbon of territory using the existing departmental lines as an axis. In order for it to be of any value to Bolivia, a railroad would have to be built parallel to the existing Arica-La Paz railroad, and a port on the barren Pacific coast would have to be constructed. After five weeks delay, Chile had done nothing more than to reiterate her earlier demands for all of Arica, a proposal which had been rejected many times by Peru.¹² It seemed as though negotiations had again failed.

Nevertheless, the proposition to provide Bolivia with a corridor was formally put to the delegates in Washington on June 4 as Kellogg's third attempt to offer a satisfactory solution.¹³ Velarde promptly accepted the idea of a corridor as a dividing line of the territory, the area to the north going to Peru and the area to the south going to Chile. Cruchaga refused to accept the division even in principle because the boundaries were not sufficiently defined, but he declined to make a substitute proposition.¹⁴ The reasons for Chile's sudden about-face were immediately apparent to Kellogg.

¹²Kellogg to Collier, Washington, May 22, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2339a; White, Dept. of State, "Conversation with Sr. Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, Ambassador of Chile," Washington, May 22, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2341½.

¹³Kellogg to Lassiter, Washington, Jun. 4, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2406a.

¹⁴Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 7, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2408.

On June 6 Cruchaga requested postponement of further meetings of the plenipotentiaries until June 10. The obvious reason for the request was that a decision regarding the one-sided registration going on in Arica was supposed to be made on June 9. Apparently Chile had no intention of negotiating for a diplomatic settlement but preferred to push the plebiscite to its conclusion. Since the Peruvians had refused to register, a Chilean victory at the polls was a foregone conclusion, providing Lassiter allowed the election to take place. This Chilean attitude pained Kellogg, and he wrote to Collier in these words:

I am beginning to believe Chile has never intended to accept any solution whatever except the plebiscite. I regret this situation more than I can tell. I have struggled for months to prevent such a decision by the Commission as is now impending.¹⁵

Kellogg had reason to be discouraged over the course of events. Every proposal which he made was rejected by one of the parties without either of them attempting to make constructive suggestions themselves. When Chile finally put forward a proposal, it was neither original nor acceptable. A meeting of members of the Chilean Cabinet, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and the President on June 9 decided upon a three-point program. In it Chile reiterated her preference for fulfilling the arbitral award through the plebiscite. If this proved impossible, then a

¹⁵Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 7, 1926, DSCP, 723.2515/2408.

division of the provinces along departmental lines would be acceptable. Failing to obtain this, the ambassador was authorized to accept a solution based on a Bolivian corridor, the border of which would not come closer than ten kilometers from the Arica-La Paz railroad.¹⁶ All of these proposals had been advanced in informal conversation, and all of them had been rejected by Peru.

But before any formal consideration was given to the Chilean suggestions, Lassiter's motion to terminate the proceedings of the Plebiscitary Commission was passed on June 14. The Chilean government, in a fit of pique, quickly broke off the negotiations in Washington.¹⁷

It did not take Chile many days to determine that its action had been hasty. On June 24 in a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Robert E. Olds, Cruchaga said that his country wanted the discussions with Peru to continue regardless of the fact that Chile had formally withdrawn from them. He said that the sentiment for a direct settlement daily was growing in Santiago. Cruchaga and his government were afraid that the Arbitrator would certify as correct both the motion abandoning the plebiscite as well as the reasons for the abandonment. If this

¹⁶Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 9, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2415.

¹⁷Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 16, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2453; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jun. 17, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2472.

were done, then Chile's position in world opinion would be worse than ever. It would be a great aid to the eventual settlement of the dispute if the Arbitrator would merely accept the decision that a plebiscite was impossible but make no effort to pass upon the issue of responsibility for frustration. And, finally, Cruchaga believed that if the Secretary of State would summon him in his capacity as ambassador rather than as plenipotentiary, he could continue the discussions.¹⁸

Kellogg did not call the ambassadors for further conferences. In the middle of August, Cruchaga again came to the Department of State and repeated to Jordan Herbert Stabler, Chief of the Division of Latin-American Affairs, what he had told Olds previously. Chile was still interested in arranging a settlement through direct negotiations, but in order to consider a proposal, it would have to come from the Secretary of State.¹⁹ Chile feared that any step which it might take to initiate the resumption of negotiations "would be interpreted by Peru as weakness or admission of guilt."²⁰

¹⁸Olds, Dept. of State, "Memorandum of Conversation with the Chilean Ambassador, June 24, 1926," Washington, DSCP, 723.2515/2510%.

¹⁹Stabler, Dept of State, "Conversation with Señor Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, Ambassador of Chile," Washington, Aug. 14, 1926, DSCP, 723.2515/2615%.

²⁰C. Van H. Engert to Kellogg, Santiago, Aug. 21, 1926, DSCP, 723.2515/2597.

Kellogg, ever patient, continued the negotiations in private conversations with the ambassadors. For the next three months the entire Tacna-Arica question received a complete reappraisal. The Secretary of State called upon each of the ambassadors to submit their solutions to the problem, but they were reluctant to do so. When Kellogg broached the possibility that he might have to offer further concrete suggestions, both parties firmly stated that their governments would consider any offer coming from him.²¹

The attitude of Leguía toward settlement during this three-month period can be characterized as deceptive. The Peruvian President claimed on numerous occasions that he was desirous of reaching a settlement, that he was willing to grant great concessions to Chile, and that he would accept any proposal made by the United States which did not "hurt Peruvian sensibilities."²² But when Kellogg made suggestions--which ran the gamut from a Bolivian corridor, to a free port of Arica, or a joint occupation of the port

²¹Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [of Kellogg] with the Peruvian Ambassador, Mr. Wade Ellis, [and] Mr. González Prada," Washington, Aug. 27, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2617½.

²²Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [with] the Peruvian Ambassador, Dr. Hernán Velarde," Washington, Sept. 2, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2622½; Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [of Kellogg] with the Peruvian Ambassador, Dr. Hernán Velarde," Washington, Sept. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2626½; Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [of Kellogg] with Mr. Wade Ellis, Counsel for Peru," Washington, Sept. 23, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2637½.

area--Leguía rejected them all.²³ Peru simply did not want Arica in Chilean hands. The only solution which Leguía seriously considered other than a division of territory in which Peru received the port, the railroad, and the Morro was neutralization of Tacna-Arica. He envisioned the area as an independent, demilitarized state whose independence would be guaranteed by other Latin-American countries.²⁴ On the surface he pretended to seek an outside solution to the dispute, but actually he was happy with the moral victory which Lassiter's motion had given Peru.²⁵ It gave strength to his regime, and he was an astute enough politician to utilize areas of good fortune wherever he found them.

Chile's position during the three months after she withdrew from direct negotiations was not much more savory than that of Peru. After he had been forced from the Foreign Office because of confidential negotiations with Bolivia concerning the cession of all Tacna-Arica, Mathieu admitted that his country was rendering only lip service to direct negotiations. The government, he said, was too much involved

²³Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [of Kellogg] with Mr. Wade Ellis [on the] Tacna-Arica Situation," Washington, Sept. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2625½.

²⁴Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation with Dr. Alberto Salomón, Peruvian Legal Adviser," Washington, Oct. 15, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2677½.

²⁵Stabler, Dept. of State, "Memorandum," Oct. 16, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2663½.

in internal politics to give great attention to Tacna-Arica.²⁶ All the proposals which Chile had made during the period had been previously discussed and rejected. Leguía's plan of internationalization and neutralization of the area was concretely and definitely rejected by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and by a group of notables composed of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Committee on Foreign Relations, and the President.²⁷ Yet they offered no practical substitute solution.

It was practical solutions which Kellogg sought, and if no one else would frame them, he stood ready to do so.²⁸ He was particularly disturbed over the fact that Velarde would take none of the responsibility for originality himself, but rather acted only as a "mouth-piece" for Leguía, who in turn did not see the necessity of settling the dispute as quickly as possible for the sake of hemispheric peace.²⁹

²⁶Engert to Kellogg, Santiago, Oct. 23, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2666.

²⁷Engert to Kellogg, Santiago, Nov. 12, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2687; Engert to Kellogg, Santiago, Nov. 13, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2694.

²⁸Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [with] Señor Don Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal and Mr. Samuel Claro," Washington, Oct. 6, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2659½.

²⁹Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Oct. 8, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2652a.

Faced with a situation in which both sides privately assured him of their good intentions, but would agree on nothing practical, Kellogg was left to his own devices in finding a solution. In the middle of October, Charles Evans Hughes visited the Department of State and suggested the cession of Tacna-Arica to Bolivia.³⁰ While this idea had been mentioned on other occasions, it was apparently Hughes' effort which caused Kellogg to offer it as his fourth and last proposal.

On November 30 Kellogg sent identic notes to both governments calling for, among other things, the cession to Bolivia "in perpetuity, all rights, titles and interests which either might have in the provinces of Tacna and Arica."³¹ Chile agreed to the cession "in principle," and an ecstatic Bolivia, although not called upon to do so, immediately agreed to the proposition without reservation.³² Peru hesitated to give a firm answer; instead, the Peruvian ambassador asked Kellogg to clarify the point of whether the United States desired the area to be transferred to

³⁰Stabler, Dept. of State, "Conversation [of Kellogg] with Mr. Charles Evans Hughes," Washington, Oct. 19, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2678½.

³¹Kellogg to Poindexter and Engert, Washington, Nov. 30, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2713a and 2713b.

³²Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Dec. 7, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2830, containing Jorge Matte, "Memorandum," Santiago, 4 de diciembre de 1926; Jesse H. Cottrell to Kellogg, La Paz, Dec. 3, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2741.

Bolivia without consulting the people of the region.³³

Kellogg felt that his offer had been clear on the point when it stated that the two nations should make adequate provisions for the safety and welfare of citizens remaining in the area.³⁴

During the month of December little information regarding the attitude of the Peruvian government was sent forward. The Department was forced to wait on Leguía's decision, but it encouraged other South-American nations to urge Peru to accept the proposal. On January 11, 1927, Foreign Minister Pedro José Rada y Gamio formally rejected Kellogg's offer.³⁵ He contended that his reply did not aim at obstructing subsequent discussions. Rather, it repeated the bases on which further negotiations could continue, namely, internationalization of the provinces or the granting of a corridor to the ocean to Bolivia. In fact, Peru was willing to listen to any settlement which included the return to Peru of the port of Arica and the Morro promontory.

But Kellogg considered the reply an absolute rejection of his offer. He was not eager to make further sugges-

³³Velarde to Kellogg, "Memorandum," Washington, 3 de diciembre de 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2749.

³⁴Kellogg to Poindexter, Washington, Dec. 11, 1926, DSCF, 723.2515/2749.

³⁵Rada y Gamio, "Memorandum," Lima, 12 de enero de 1927, DSCF, 723.2515/2853.

tions merely for the contestants to knock down. With Peru's rejection of Kellogg's fourth proposal, this phase of the negotiations came to an end.

Revolution in Chile

On November 18, 1926, a new governmental crisis occurred in Santiago when the Maximiliano Ibáñez ministry failed to receive a vote of confidence from Congress.³⁶ Figueroa asked Manuel Rivas Vicuña to form another Cabinet, which he did. It was this government which tentatively accepted "in principle" Kellogg's offer of November 30 calling for the cession of Tacna-Arica to Bolivia. Whether it could have weathered a storm of public protest if Peru had accepted the offer is conjecture, for in February, 1927, Carlos Ibáñez told Figueroa that he believed Rivas was conspiring with the navy against him. When charged openly with this information, Rivas resigned, and Figueroa asked Ibáñez to form a ministry in the style of the Constitution of 1833.

Ibáñez as Minister of the Interior began immediate deportations of political opponents lasting throughout the months of February and March in defiance of the spirit of the new Constitution of 1925. In effect Ibáñez led the government while Figueroa rapidly submerged to the position of a figurehead. In April, Figueroa began a two-month

³⁶Haring, "Chilean Politics, 1920-1928," Hispanic-American Historical Review, XI, pp. 1-26, is the basis for the information in this section.

vacation for his health, and on May 4 he resigned, thus elevating Ibáñez to the position of Acting President. National elections on May 22 overwhelmingly elected him to a full term as President. To a real degree Ibáñez soon became chief of state with an obedient Congress to do his will. He continued his policy of exiling "trouble makers." Included in this category were such personages as Agustín Edwards, Arturo Alessandri, and José Salas, former Minister of Hygiene and Presidential aspirant. Under the leadership of a new President the Chilean government was shocked out of its listlessness. Social, labor, economic, and political reforms were instituted under the regime. And it was this energetic, totalitarian administration, headed by a strong man whose will would brook no interference, which took over the direction of the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute.

Renewal of Diplomatic Relations

There were few bright spots in United States diplomacy relating to the settlement of the dispute in 1926. All the proposals which Kellogg made that year had been rejected. The year was typical of many of those which had preceded it. Since 1921 the United States had been hospitable to any effort aimed at resolving the Question of the Pacific, and for five years had patiently explored every avenue which could bring about an amicable settlement. But all its efforts came to nothing. The decision to hold

a plebiscite had been accepted, but when the time came to implement the election, Chile thwarted it. During the negotiations in Washington beginning in April, 1926, Kellogg had diligently presented measures designed to settle the controversy through compromise, but on each occasion his suggestions were rejected by one of the disputants. It should be borne in mind that the reason United States good offices were necessary at this time was that Chile and Peru had not renewed diplomatic relations, which had been broken for nearly seventeen years. Since neither country could theoretically have formal relations with the other, an intermediary was necessary. On the other hand, if diplomatic relations were resumed, then direct negotiations could take place and the United States could be relieved of what had become a tiresome burden.

On January 16, 1928, the Sixth Pan-American Conference opened in Havana. There everyone noticed and commented on the strange manifestation of cordiality between the Chilean and Peruvian delegates. The sudden change of feeling between the two countries is difficult to explain, for while the conference was in session, each government accused the other of preparing for war. Very likely these charges were little more than nervous manifestations by governments uncertain of the course of future events. The delegates at Havana openly regretted the lack of diplomatic relations and said that when they returned home, they would

suggest renewing them. Kellogg was aware of this new spirit and was determined to take advantage of it.³⁷

By June the Secretary of State was once again ready to enter into the field of resolving the Tacna-Arica dispute, this time by getting Chile and Peru to exchange diplomatic representatives so that they could deal directly with each other. But before such a proposal came from the United States, Kellogg wanted to make sure that it would be accepted. The plan to renew relations was presented to the governments, and both eagerly agreed to it. Soon thereafter relations were renewed with the exchange of ambassadors, thus raising the legations to embassy status.³⁸

Kellogg felt reasonably sure of the acceptance of his suggestion for the renewal of diplomatic relations. Even before feelers were sent out regarding the matter, Kellogg believed that a new phase in the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute was approaching. The United States, he felt, should do something equally dramatic to demonstrate

³⁷Kellogg to Culbertson, Minneapolis, Minn., Aug. 2, 1930, Culbertson Papers, Chile: Tacna-Arica, 1928-29, in possession of William Smith Culbertson, Washington, D. C. These files are hereinafter cited as Culbertson Papers.

³⁸Kellogg to Alexander P. Moore, Washington, Jun. 28, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/6a; Moore to Kellogg, Santiago, Jul. 1, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/7; Kellogg to Conrado Ríos Gallardo and Rada y Gamio, Washington, Jul. 9, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/7a and 7b; Collier to Kellogg, Santiago, Jul. 10, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/9; Moore to Kellogg, Lima, Jul. 12, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/12; Kellogg to Coolidge, Washington, Jul. 9, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/14a.

that it, too, had a renewed interest in settling the problem. Alexander P. Moore had been appointed ambassador to Peru in March, 1928, thus giving the United States a new representative in that country. Ambassador Collier had been in Santiago since 1922, and, while he had done an excellent job, in his later years he had alienated several high-ranking Chilean political figures. Therefore, Kellogg believed that Collier should be replaced to indicate an official desire by the United States to end the dispute.³⁹ He was asked to resign, and William Smith Culbertson, who was on leave in Washington from the legation in Rumania, was ordered to proceed immediately to Santiago as Collier's replacement.⁴⁰

With the two governments now able to negotiate directly, United States participation in the settlement subsided from the high point reached between 1921 and 1928, but did not end. Leguía believed that the entire dispute remained in the hands of the Arbitrator, who was still competent to call for another plebiscite or to declare one impossible. Indeed, he maintained that the primary reason he had resumed diplomatic relations with Chile was that the Arbitrator urged him to do so, and he felt that Peru

³⁹Conversation with Culbertson, Washington, Apr. 15, 1958.

⁴⁰Kellogg to Collier, Washington, Jun. 8, 1928, DSCP, 123 C 691/184a.

was obligated to follow any request of the Arbitrator in order to end the dispute successfully.⁴¹

Settling the Dispute

Leguía sent César Elguera, then a senator and formerly Foreign Minister, to the newly opened embassy in Santiago, and Ibáñez sent former President Emiliano Figueroa Larraín to Lima. It will perhaps seem odd that Ibáñez chose Figueroa, whom he had in effect deposed fifteen months previously. But Figueroa was the ideal choice, a trained diplomat with tremendous prestige who had served his country well in the past. He received much praise for accepting the appointment in a final effort to end the long-standing dispute, and Ibáñez was likewise congratulated for making such an excellent selection.⁴²

Leguía and Figueroa began a series of conferences aimed at settling the Tacna-Arica dispute in late 1928. Two considerations became apparent at once. First, practicality rather than sentimentality would be the basis of a settlement. And second, only a settlement based on a division of territory with Bolivia being ignored had any chance of being arranged.

⁴¹Moore to Kellogg, Santiago, Jul. 17, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/35; Moore to Kellogg, Santiago, Jul. 21, 1928, DSCF, 701.2325/25.

⁴²Conversation with Culbertson, Washington, Apr. 15, 1958.

It will be well to summarize these four meetings in which each side had an opportunity to make known the bases for negotiations, even though all the proposals will have a familiar ring.⁴³ The first conference was held in October, and Leguía suggested, first, that all negotiations take place in Lima; and, second, he presented as a sine qua non the proposition that Chile return both provinces to Peru. Figueroa accepted the first offer, and Lima became the scene of discussions. As for the return of both provinces to Peru, this was out of the question, and Figueroa managed to get Leguía to modify his position when the latter suggested a division of the territory with Peru getting Tacna, the city of Arica, and the Morro, "the remainder for Chile." Leguía said that he did not oppose leaving Chile a strip of ground on which the railroad ran from Arica to La Paz. Figueroa said an understanding on such terms would be impossible. But the important point of this interview was that Leguía indirectly agreed to a division of the territory. He had reluctantly done this previously when Kellogg pressed him on the matter. On that occasion he said that the formal suggestion would have to come from the United States. Later in the discussions he made a similar request. The division idea became a necessary

⁴³ Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Sept. 11, 1930, DSCF, 723.2515/3530; Felix Nieto del Río, "Memorandum," Santiago, undated, Culbertson Papers.

consideration in future negotiations.

At the second interview Leguía insisted upon his previous terms but as an alternative offered to turn the territory into a common protectorate in which the United States should participate, that is the neutralization of the territory. Figueroa rejected this proposal.

At the third meeting Figueroa presented his government's offer to divide the territory by placing the boundary ten kilometers north of and parallel to the Arica-La Paz railroad. All territory to the north of the line would go to Peru; all south to Chile. This would give Chile the port of Arica, the Morro, and the railroad. In return Chile would grant generous port privileges to Peru. No consideration at all would be shown to Bolivian claims. Leguía rejected this offer because he insisted that the port should go to Peru. Figueroa's offer is important because it eventually became the basis for settlement.

Finally, at the last meeting, held on November 8, Leguía returned to his plan that the area should be neutralized. If it were not, he said, the situation would be worse than before, "since, upon the understanding of this principle, he had acceded to the renewal of diplomatic relations in accordance with assurances advanced by the American Ambassador in Lima."⁴⁴

⁴⁴Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Sept. 11, 1930, DSCF, 723.2515/3530.

It seemed that Leguía's adamant refusal to take less than the port of Arica had caused a deadlock. Figueroa was discouraged and said that a solution on any basis other than the port's being retained by Chile was impossible.⁴⁵ But Leguía insisted that Arica should go to Peru in order that Tacna would not be cut off from the sea.

Since Chile would not part with Arica, the idea arose that Tacna should have a separate port. Authorship of the plan for a new port was claimed by United States Ambassador Moore in Lima. There was no economic reason for any such port, in fact, the entire plan from a practical point of view was entirely ridiculous. Nevertheless, the scheme sounded good to Leguía. He could let Chile build one, call it Arica, and then announce to the public that his persistent policies had been a success at last.⁴⁶

After Moore convinced Leguía of the efficacy of having a port constructed near Arica at Chilean expense, Leguía asked Figueroa if there would be any objection from Chile. The Chilean Foreign Office accepted the idea in general but said that the port would have to be north of the Lluta river, about seven kilometers north of Arica. Notwithstanding this admonition, the Chilean government

⁴⁵Matthew E. Hanna to Kellogg, Santiago, Nov. 9, 1928, DSCF, 723.2515/3221.

⁴⁶Moore to Culbertson, Lima, Feb. 27, 1929, Culbertson Papers.

allowed an American engineer appointed by Peru, Ralph Cady, to study the terrain around Arica. Cady gave Leguía a favorable report for the construction of a port five hundred meters north of the mouth of the San José river, a dry river bed with a subterranean flow 1,200 meters north of the wharf of the Arica-La Paz railroad.⁴⁷ The idea of a port so close to Arica was not acceptable to Ibáñez, but he did not reject it because negotiations had just gotten underway. He knew that Leguía had tacitly accepted the division of the territory, and once this principle was firmly fixed, the entire question could be divided, and the construction of a port could be discussed separately.⁴⁸

On February 28, 1929, Figueroa pointed out the sheer folly of building a port on the San José, saying that it probably would not handle more than about 45,000 tons a year. This traffic could easily be taken care of by the port facilities which Chile was willing to grant Peru in Arica. Leguía persisted, however, indicating that the matter was strictly a political move as far as he was concerned.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Moore to Kellogg, Lima, Feb. 26, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3287, containing complete reports from the Snare Corporation together with photographs of the proposed port site and maps of the area.

⁴⁸ Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Sept. 11, 1930, DSCF, 723.2515/3530.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

When Cady's report was generally known, the Chilean President and Foreign Office felt that discussion of a port on the San José would have to be completely ended. Leguía insisted violently upon the plan, as did Moore, who told Figueroa that if the negotiations failed, then Chile would be to blame. Chile, however, remained firm. That government never considered the proposal as real diplomacy, but rather as a "political caprice" of Leguía "without practical support, without the aid of economic reasons and without a technical base."⁵⁰ On March 9 the Chilean Cabinet refused to consider a port construction project on the San José. This action by the Cabinet, rather than by the President alone, gave the decision an overtone of finality. But with the rejection came an alternative proposal.⁵¹

Peru was offered ample wharf facilities at Arica, a \$2,000,000 award, and a division of the territory with a line starting at the coast at Escritos, fourteen kilometers north of Arica and following a mean distance of ten kilometers north of the railway. In case Leguía did not accept this plan, then Figueroa was to offer to build a port north of the river Lluta. This was to be the maximum offer. Leguía maintained that Peru demanded a port of its own and to accept a \$2,000,000 gift instead "would fall as

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Culbertson to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 9, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3281.

a slap upon the Peruvian cheek, because this is not a question of money but of dignity." Exactly where the port was constructed on the Tacna-Arica coast was immaterial so long as Chile guaranteed its construction. New surveys of the coast then began with American and Chilean engineers doing the work.⁵²

The Chilean government gave various reasons for not wanting Peru to have a port near Arica, such as fear of friction, a limitation on Arica's development, and difficulties of construction. The government hinted at the possibility that Peru might extend the Tacna-Arica railroad to connect with the La Paz railroad at a point beyond the frontier, thus making a Peruvian-Bolivian agreement possible and thereby destroying Arica's trade. But the real reason for Chile's refusal of the port was less subtle, according to Culbertson; she simply was not willing to share the sovereignty of Arica with Peru nor was she willing to permit Peru to have territory on the Bay of Arica.⁵³

Until the end of March, 1929, Leguía and Moore continued to say that Peru must have a port constructed at the mouth of the San José river or immediately north

⁵²Moore to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 17, DSCP, 723.2515/3303. The American engineers were in the employment of Peru and did not represent the United States government.

⁵³Culbertson to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 6, 1929, 723.2515/3278.

of it. Yet the negotiations had already taken on a new character and direction, and in the diplomacy of Leguía a "port for Tacna" assumed a new role. The Department of State, while showing an active interest in the negotiations, neither interfered in the discussions going on in Lima nor offered advice. The prevalent opinion of the Department and its representatives was that any solution would do so long as it was a peaceful one. Notwithstanding this official attitude, there is considerable evidence that Moore delayed the final settlement of the dispute several months by his insistence upon the separate port project. Although he disclaimed any "pet" plan, he angered the Foreign Office in Santiago sufficiently for Figueroa to receive orders not to talk with him.⁵⁴ That Moore was emotionally involved in a particular solution is revealed by the fact that he referred to the dividing line which was to become the international boundary as the "Moore Line."⁵⁵ Moore must be given credit for originating the port plan, which became the key to the final settlement; nevertheless, it was his intransigence which delayed the eventual solution, for Leguía had given up the new port project long before Moore did.

⁵⁴Culbertson, "Memorandum," Santiago, Jun. 7, 1930, Culbertson Papers; Culbertson to Kellogg, Santiago, May 6, 1929, Culbertson Papers.

⁵⁵Fred M. Dearing to Stimson, Lima, Feb. 27, 1931, DSCF, 723.2515/3540.

While Chile refused to build a port for Peru on the San José river, two points north of the Lluta river were designated as satisfactory. These were Caleta Las Yaradas, north of the mouth of the Molles river 29,730 meters from Arica; and Escritos, sometimes called Punta Chacota, north of the Lluta river and 14,000 meters from Arica bay. Las Yaradas was preferred by Chile.

American, Chilean, and Peruvian engineers minutely examined the coastline for eighty kilometers north of the river Lluta and reported to the Chilean and Peruvian governments that they found the coast straight and without any real indentation for a proper port, and with a complete lack of natural protection. Neither of the places suggested by the Chileans in their original report was really suitable. All the areas required the construction of various lengths of railroad, and since they were all in the desert, also required the construction of a new town with water works, electrical power plant, and the like.

The Frederick Snare Corporation, employed by the Peruvian government, maintained that a port could not be built at any point along the coast north of the Lluta which would have the least chance of proving successful. The Chilean engineers agreed with this report. They admitted that a port could be built for about \$8,000,000 to \$9,000,000 but even then it would not have the right amount of protection from storms from the north and northwest. In brief,

George P. Seeley, vice president of the Snare Corporation believed that while there was a remote possibility of a port's being constructed, his company would not undertake the project.⁵⁶

An observation on the port plan can well be interjected at this point. When, on March 9, the Chilean Cabinet refused to consider the construction of a port on the San José, the entire scheme of a new port ceased to be anything but a bargaining factor. Diplomacy became a subtle game with each country using a port north of the Lluta as a gambit. Chile wanted Peru out of Arica; Peru wanted more money if she accepted a port away from the immediate confines of Arica bay. Culbertson knew what Leguía was doing and felt that this was good diplomacy--the real way to success. Therefore, he suggested to Foreign Minister Conrado Ríos Gallardo that Chile raise her original offer of \$3,500,000 just to be rid of an old question. Even though the port remained a factor in the negotiations until the last, Chile carefully worded her notes so that Peru would be in a position to accept either a port or cash.⁵⁷

Here is the way in which Chile used the port idea as a bargaining factor. Leguía had committed himself to

⁵⁶ Seeley to Leguía, Lima, Apr. 1, 1929, Culbertson Papers.

⁵⁷ Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Sept. 11, 1930, DSCF, 723.2515/3530.

settle the dispute if Chile could build a port for Tacna. Actually he was not particularly interested in a port per se, but wanted to extend Peruvian sovereignty as near to Arica as possible.⁵⁸ Since he could not openly state this purpose, he was trapped when Chile offered to build a port for Tacna at Las Yaradas.⁵⁹ When he said that it was impossible to construct such a port--and showed Figueroa a certified report from the Snare Corporation to prove it--the Chileans countered with an offer to guarantee its construction, either by an American or a Chilean firm. Three American companies quickly declared that they would construct a suitable port at Las Yaradas. Leguía's position was therefore forced. So rather than risk being checkmated, he ended the game by declaring that he would just as soon take the construction cost of \$6,000,000 in cash.⁶⁰

Later, in June, 1930, Culbertson asked Figueroa what had induced Leguía to change his mind. Figueroa told him that Chile could not agree to a port at the mouth of San José. But since Leguía had been insistent upon having a port, Chile offered to build one north of the Lluta, even

⁵⁸ Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, May 7, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3423.

⁵⁹ Moore to Stimson, Lima, Apr. 10, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3329.

⁶⁰ Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Apr. 17, 1929, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/337; Moore to Stimson, Lima, Apr. 17, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3340; Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Apr. 17, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3342.

though it would cost more and would be less secure than the one on the San José. Figueroa pointed out to Leguía the absurdity of spending, or better said, of wasting at least \$6,000,000 for the construction of such a port in a place where the maximum movement of cargo during a year could not possibly be 10,000 tons. He convinced Leguía that the whole world would laugh at such an agreement. The \$6,000,000 original estimate was a minimum one and actually much more would be required. The true price would probably be around \$12,000,000 to \$15,000,000. Chile felt that she simply could not endanger her credit by spending this much and would not, therefore, undertake any obligation which exceeded \$6,000,000. Hence it would be more advantageous for Peru to accept the cash and do with it what she would.⁶¹

Leguía accepted the money instead of an impossible port, thus settling the primary argument in the Tacna-Arica dispute. Only the details needed to be settled before a definitive treaty could be written.

Hoover Makes the Final Proposal to End the Dispute

When Chile and Peru had found it impossible to agree on a port at Las Yaras, they came to an impasse. Leguía indicated that he would be willing to accept a compromise if it were suggested by President Herbert Hoover. But the

⁶¹Culbertson, "Memorandum of Conversation with Figueroa," Santiago, Jun. 6, 1930, Culbertson Papers.

Department of State was not eager to step into the negotiations and maintained a discreet silence. When the deadlock was broken and a settlement finally reached, Leguía again insisted that Hoover formally offer the compromise which had been agreed upon to the two governments. This could be done with better grace and with a chance for less opposition in Santiago than if the proposal were issued under a Lima dateline.⁶² Since Hoover had recently toured Latin America where he was enthusiastically received, he was the logical person to announce the terms of settlement. Besides, he was the official Arbitrator of the dispute.

The preamble which Leguía insisted upon read as follows:

Having been informed of the cordial progress of the negotiations between the Government of Chile and the Government of Peru, with reference to the direct agreements reached on nearly all the questions involved in the solution of the problem of Tacna and Arica, and having also been informed of the decision of both Governments to submit to him the only difficulty that has arisen with reference to the respective viewpoints relating to the projected port of Las Yaradas, the President of the United States summarizing the points agreed upon proposes to the two governments in the exercise of good offices as the final bases of a solution the following stipulations:

The Department of State wanted to remove the reference to the port at Las Yaradas, but Leguía said that its elimina-

⁶² Conversation with Culbertson, Washington, Apr. 15, 1958; Moore to Stimson, Lima, Apr. 24, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3348.

tion would take the heart out of the whole agreement. He felt that it was essential to him in order to get the proposition past his people. The Department agreed to leave it in rather than to cause Leguía trouble at home and possibly jeopardize the ratification of the agreement.⁶³ Consequently, as a historical curiosity there survives in the preamble of the Memorandum a references to the "projected port at Las Yaradas." By leaving it there Leguía was able to declare that he had given up his separate port grudgingly in the interests of peace and at the suggestion of the United States!⁶⁴ The reference to Las Yaradas is all that is left of the idea of a port for Tacna under Peruvian sovereignty--an idea which a few months previously had been regarded in Lima not only as a solution, but as the only possible solution of the Tacna-Arica question.⁶⁵

The Department of State received the completed arrangements on May 14 and three days later the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute was made public.⁶⁶

⁶³Stimson to Moore, Washington, May 8, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3370a; Moore to Stimson, Lima, May 9, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3371; Stimson to Moore, Washington, May 10, 1929, 723.2515/3371.

⁶⁴Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, May 7, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3423.

⁶⁵Culbertson to Kellogg, Santiago, Mar. 15, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3297; Moore to Kellogg, Lima, Mar. 11, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3282.

⁶⁶"Memorandum que los gobiernos de Chile y el Perú acuerdan pener en manos del Presidente de los Estados Unidos, Excmo. Señor Herbert Hoover," Washington, undated [received

Terms of Settlement

The Treaty of Lima which was agreed upon by Chile and Peru is summarized here. First, the territory was divided into two parts, Tacna for Peru and Arica for Chile. The dividing line began at a place named "Concordia" for the purpose, situated ten kilometers to the north of the bridge over the Lluta river, and continued at that same distance parallel to the Arica-La Paz railroad following as far as possible the topographic features to make for easier demarcation. Certain irrigation canals were to remain the property of Peru, regardless of their extension into Chilean territory. The Laguna Blanca was divided into two equal parts. In the event there was a disagreement over any part of this new boundary, the President of the United States was given authority to appoint a third person to settle the matter and his decision would be final.⁶⁷

Second, the government of Chile granted to the government of Peru within the Bay of Arica a wharf (malecón), a customhouse, and a station for the railroad from Tacna to Arica, all constructed at Chile's expense. In addition, Peru was to enjoy free port privileges.

May 14, 1929], DSCP, 723.2515/3391; Press Release: "Tacna-Arica," Washington, May 17, 1929, DSCP, 723.2515/3394.

⁶⁷ Enrique Brieba, Límites entre Chile y Perú (3 vols.; Santiago, 1931), containing maps and measurements of the final settlement.

Third, the government of Chile agreed to pay to the government of Peru the sum of \$6,000,000.

Fourth, all public works already constructed, together with all government-owned real property, in Tacna were to be delivered over to the government of Peru without cost.

Fifth, Chile retained the franchise to operate the Tacna-Arica railroad, granted by Peru in 1852.

Sixth, the province of Tacna was to be turned over to Peru within thirty days after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.

Seventh, all private rights legally acquired would be respected.

Eighth, the governments of the two countries were to commemorate the consolidation of their friendly relations by erecting a monument on the Morro promontory at Arica.

Ninth, children of Peruvians born in Arica were to be considered as Peruvians until they reached their twenty-first birthday, at which time they could chose their nationality; the same provision held for Chilean children born in Tacna.

Tenth, Chile and Peru reciprocally released each other from all debts whether derived or not from the Treaty of Ancón.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Leguía insisted upon this last stipulation in order

For no very clear reason the parties, at least Chile, wanted to agree to several provisions which they did not wish to embody in the main treaty. Therefore, a Supplementary Protocol was written. A few comments on the Protocol will be necessary, and for convenience its three provisions will be examined in reverse order. Article III declared that the Morro was to be disarmed. Chile preferred to have this understood with an oral agreement, but Leguía insisted that it be placed either in a protocol or in the treaty itself. The fortifications were of little use in a modern war, and it was mainly sentiment that wanted them to remain. Article II provided for the free transit of persons, merchandise and armaments. This visualized trouble with Bolivia. The Foreign Office of Chile interpreted this clause in August, 1930, when the revolution broke out against Leguía, that "persons may pass, armaments may pass, but persons carrying armaments (troops) cannot pass." Article I said that the territory involved in the settlement of the dispute would not be ceded to a third party nor would a new international railroad be constructed by one party without the approval of the other.⁶⁹ The United States had not been

to release Peru formally from an old debt amounting to \$30,000,000. See also, Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Apr. 29, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3357.

⁶⁹Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Jul. 8, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3474, containing the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima.

apprised that a Supplementary Protocol would be written. As a matter of fact, Assistant Secretary of State Francis White called for the Bolivian Chargé d'Affaires, George de la Barra, immediately after word arrived of the definitive settlement and told him that the provision regarding the disposition of the territories and question of the railways about which Bolivia had protested had, at the insistence of the Secretary of State, been eliminated in the final settlement.⁷⁰ Evidently White could not pass up an opportunity to needle de la Barra, because he chided him in a rambling metaphor as follows:

. . . he [White] hoped that the Bolivian Government would remember this service rendered to it by the United States because Bolivia had, more or less behind its back and over its head, gone to the League of Nations not only in this matter but also⁷¹ in the Bolivia-Paraguay boundary matter.

When it was rumored that a Supplementary Protocol was going to be signed, the Department of State was mystified and not a little chagrined that it had not been informed of the move and ordered Culbertson to inquire into its existence. Only Article I of the Protocol interested the Department, and when Culbertson went to the Foreign Office to see if he could get it omitted, Ríos Gallardo told him

⁷⁰ Stimson to Moore, Apr. 26, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3342.

⁷¹ White, Dept. of State, "Conversation [with] the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Bolivia, Señor Don George de la Barra, Tacna-Arica Settlement," Washington, May 17, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3387.

that there would be no protocol. In any event, he said, he could not commit his government beforehand. Nevertheless, the Protocol was signed and became a binding feature of the treaty. To this degree the Chileans and Peruvians played loose with United States good offices.

Culbertson did not have the apprehension about the matter that the Department did for two reasons. First, the Protocol recognized that Bolivia had an interest--a moral one only--in the provinces; therefore, the bare mention of a third party "leaves the inevitable implication that that third party has some sort of claim to consideration." Second, the protocol made it impossible for Bolivia to play Chile and Peru off against one another. He felt that the purpose of the United States was to establish peace on the west coast of South America, "and that was the sole interest which she had."⁷²

Ratification and the Arbitrator's Final Ruling

Leguía called a special session of Congress to consider the Treaty of Lima, and in a joint session held on July 2 the Congress approved it with only one dissenting vote. On the same day the Chilean Senate overwhelmingly passed the treaty and three days later the Chamber of Deputies likewise assented to it by a large margin.⁷³ The

⁷²Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Sept. 11, 1930, DSCF, 723.2515/3530.

⁷³Moore to Stimson, Lima, Jul. 2, DSCF, 723.2515/

formalities of implementing the details of the treaty were carried out with no incidents. An amicable discussion of the style of a suitable memorial began in late 1929. After forty-five years of argument, the Question of the Pacific had been resolved.

Only one administrative detail remained for the Arbitrator. Lassiter's motion adjourning the Plebiscitary Commission and the reasons justifying it had been pending since June, 1926. Purposely no decision had been made on the matter during the direct negotiations in Washington and Lima. In a final ruling the Arbitrator transmitted to the Chilean and Peruvian ambassadors a brief history of the negotiations since the signing of the Washington Protocol in 1922 and concluded by acknowledging that the dispute had finally been settled through direct negotiations. Therefore, he held that the controversy between Chile and Peru over Tacna-Arica no longer existed and all proceedings which had emanated from the Washington Protocol were terminated.

Hoover formally thanked Pershing and Lassiter for their services to the cause of peace, and then he expressed to the two governments his "grateful appreciation of the cooperation and broadminded statesmanship" which they had

3448; Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Jul. 2, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3447; Culbertson to Stimson, Santiago, Jul. 5, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3451.

displayed in the direct negotiations.⁷⁴ This statement formally concluded nineteen years of United States diplomacy connected with the Tacna-Arica dispute.

⁷⁴Stimson to Velarde and Cruchaga, Washington, Aug. 2, 1929, DSCF, 723.2515/3477, containing the final ruling of the Arbitrator.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Involvement of the United States in the Tacna-Arica dispute after the Treaty of Ancón in 1884 lasted for a period of about nineteen years. During this time United States diplomatic activity went through three stages. The first was one of displaying little interest in the years between 1910 and 1921; the second was a period of active interest from 1921 until 1927; and the last was a period of concern but little activity from 1927 until 1929.

Even though the dispute and its many ramifications do not afford the luxury of sweeping generalizations, there are questions which have to be answered concerning United States activity. Among these are the following: Why did the dispute extend over such a long period of time? Could the dispute have been settled more quickly than it was? What influence did United States diplomacy have on the final settlement? And, can United States diplomacy be termed a success in ending the dispute?

A superficial explanation for the delay in resolving the Question of the Pacific lies in the fact that

neither the Chilean nor Peruvian government could agree on the bases for the plebiscite prescribed in the Treaty of Ancón. A cynical attitude could be interjected at this point by saying that it is doubtful whether either government really wanted to reach a conclusion to the problem, considering the excellent subject matter it offered to cloak nearly any domestic problem. Basically the delay was an inborn thing, the cause of which is to be found in the mere fact that a plebiscite was required to settle a territorial issue. Moreover, until the question was resolved through the prescribed plebiscite, one party, Chile, legally claimed administrative control of the territory. Herein lies the true cause for the delay in settling the problem. It was not the type of political question which can be settled conveniently and easily by appealing to voters.

Could the dispute have been settled more quickly than it was? Any answer to this question must be predicated on the assumption that a plebiscite was the legal requirement for a settlement as devised in the Treaty of Ancón. The Arbitrator correctly interpreted Article III of the treaty when he found that the authors of the plebiscitary clause did not make provisions for a subsequent course if a plebiscite were not held within ten years. Peru's contention that Chile had forfeited its right to an election was a latter-day invention by political leaders.

The process of resolving the controversy was always known to both parties, namely, the plebiscite. Writing the bases for holding the plebiscite was, of course, the essential problem. The nearest that the diplomats came to framing an acceptable election protocol was in 1898 when a national emergency over the Patagonian boundary with Argentina caused Chile to be interested in settling the problem. When the issue with Argentina was resolved, Chilean interest in a settlement with Peru rapidly waned.

To have written an acceptable protocol after 1898 required basic compromises, as was seen in the Coolidge award of 1925. That either of the two governments could have voluntarily agreed to all the provisions of that award—as imperfect as they were—is difficult to believe.

Considering the political conditions in both countries concerned, the natural tendency of demagogues in each government to take advantage of the problem for purely personal political reasons, and the unreasoning sentimentality attached to Tacna-Arica by both peoples, but especially the Peruvians, it is doubtful whether a successful settlement could have been arranged sooner than it was. Graham H. Stuart and Sarah Wambaugh in their works on the dispute are primarily concerned with the failure of the plebiscite. They bemoan the fact that Chile thwarted the attempt and suggest that the question of the unredeemed provinces should have been submitted to the International

Court of Justice or directly to the League of Nations.

There is little reason to think that the results of League of Nations supervision of the plebiscite would have been different from that done by the United States. What could have been accomplished by the use of force during the plebiscitary attempt either by the League of Nations or by the United States was limited. A neutral army might very well have supervised an impartial plebiscite in which Peru almost certainly would have emerged the victor, but the Question of the Pacific would not have been resolved. The next logical step would have been for Chile to have declared war on Peru to retake the provinces. No one desired to see that eventuality; therefore, the slightest consideration of force to resolve the dispute was out of the question.

An often overlooked consideration might well be mentioned at this juncture. Chile had legal control of the territory. Her people were firmly convinced that title to it had been gained honorably after defeating an aggressor. It was unreasonable to them that Chile should be asked to relinquish either territory or privileges for any purpose. Although the analogy is a lame one, a better understanding of the Chilean position can be obtained by Americans when they reflect upon the probable attitude of the people of the United States if their country were called upon to return parts or all of the territory taken from Mexico in 1846-48. The Chilean attitude when considered in this light

is not altogether reprehensible. Besides, there is little evidence to lead one to conclude that Peru's actions would have been greatly different under reversed conditions.

It seems doubtful, therefore, that the Question of the Pacific could have been settled at any time other than the months between July, 1928, and May, 1929. During this period both Chile and Peru had strong Presidents leading them. Both men were forceful enough to effect a reasonable compromise of the Tacna-Arica dispute. And just as important, each was powerful enough to suppress political criticism within his respective government and to disregard sentimental appeals concerning the area. Culbertson summarized well the position of Ibáñez and Leguía when he wrote as follows:

These two men should be given the chief credit for the settlement of the Tacna-Arica question. They had the power to compel the acceptance of the agreement and they used this power in the interests of peace.

That these men came along when they did was fortunate for the settlement of the dispute. So long as Leguía did not have his counterpart in Santiago, there was little hope that it could be settled. But when Ibáñez arrived on the scene, a satisfactory compromise agreement was quickly arranged.

What influence did United States diplomacy have on the final settlement? America's primary activity in the settlement of the altercation came between 1921 and 1927.

The two figures which emerge as the leaders of reconciliation are Hughes and Kellogg. It was Hughes who wrote a hair-splitting judicial arbitral award which placed the United States in the position of having to see the dispute settled peacefully one way or another. But the burden of implementing the award fell on Kellogg. That this task was left to him was no less fortunate for the settlement of the dispute than the presence of Leguía and Ibáñez. Without Kellogg's patient persistence the disagreement undoubtedly would have extended over a longer period of time.

The primary influence which United States diplomacy exerted was one of pacification. Either Hughes or Kellogg, or both, constantly and quietly used their country's great influence for a peaceful conclusion.

Finally, can United States diplomacy be termed a success in ending the dispute? At first blush a negative answer appears to be the only one possible. Every proposed solution which came from the Department of State was either thwarted or rejected by one of the parties. In this sense American diplomacy was a failure. But a closer look is warranted. If each decision or suggestion is regarded as a step on a stairway, then it becomes obvious that they all had to be encountered before reaching the landing, and in the Tacna-Arica dispute the landing represents a peaceful solution. The ultimate conclusion of the problem had to

have the history of the attempted plebiscite behind it in order for both parties to know that a plebiscite was impossible. The same may be said for succeeding proposals such as a corridor for Bolivia, outright cession to Bolivia, neutralization, internationalization, and the sale to one of the claimants. With these matters disposed of, then the discussions, held either under the direct auspices of the United States or merely with its tacit approval, could proceed along new courses.

The United States did not settle the Tacna-Arica dispute. Credit for that action goes primarily to Ibáñez and Leguía. However, Kellogg's conciliatory diplomacy made the settlement possible.

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723.2515PC	Ten archival boxes
723.25	Scattered references
823.00	Scattered references
824.00	Scattered references
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