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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON STYLE

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON CAPITOL HILL

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

JONATHAN DANIEL MOTT
Norman, Oklahoma
1998

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
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WASHINGTON STYLE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON CAPITOL HILL

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have always believed that no one accomplishes much of anything worthwhile in life without the help of others. And so it is fitting that, upon completion of this dissertation, I am compelled to confess that I would not and could not have finished this work without the help of a large number of people.

First, I must express my thanks to the Honorable Carl Albert, the "little giant" from Oklahoma who made his mark on the United States House and left a legacy of public service and scholarship at the University of Oklahoma. It has been an honor to be a Carl Albert Congressional Studies and Research Center Graduate Fellow for the past half-a-decade.

The Center has, indeed, been a wonderful place to study. It is difficult to imagine finding myself working with three more helpful and genuinely concerned mentors than Gary Copeland, Allen Hertzke, and Ron Peters. I owe an especially large debt of gratitude to Gary who has served patiently as my Ph.D. committee chair, spending countless hours reading drafts of this dissertation, helping me see exactly what it was that I was doing when things got murky and just talking and laughing with me when I needed to relax. He is a friend in the truest sense of the word.

As anyone associated with the Carl Albert Center knows, the lifeblood of the institution is LaDonna Sullivan. Since my first trip to Norman, she has been a friend, a confidant and a guide. Her presence made my graduate sojourn much smoother and enjoyable than it would have otherwise been. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Kellye Walker who has, despite my incessant bad (corny) jokes and sarcasm, helped me out of more pinches than I care to remember.

I also owe great deal to the other Carl Albert Fellows who have come both before and after me. Their friendship and support have made graduate school a lot of fun, not something one generally thinks of when they hear the words "graduate school." In particular, I want to thank Karen Kedrowski, Robin LeBlanc, Dave Rausch, Bill Granstaff, Cindy Simon-Rosenthal, Nancy Bednar, Lauren Cohen, John Meiers, Lesli McCollum and Craig Williams for their friendship, advice and patience. Many of the ideas in this dissertation were refined in conversation and friendly debate with my "fellow Fellows." Thanks guys, especially Lauren, the little sister I never had.

I am not a believer in coincidences. There was a reason that Jeff Fox and Shad Satterthwaite arrived in Norman to begin their Ph.D. work in political science at the same time that I did--they have kept me sane. Shad is perhaps the nicest person on the planet and Jeff is the most down-to-earth. Their friendship is one of the greatest rewards I will take with me from graduate school.

The research I completed for this dissertation would have been impossible without the financial support of the Carl Albert Center and the institutional support of the American Political Science Association. Just as importantly, I could not have conducted the research I did if I had not worked as a Congressional Fellow in Congressman J.C. Watts' office. Partisanship, ideology and politics aside, J.C. is one of the most caring, genuine people I have ever met. Pam Pryor, J.C.'s Deputy Chief of Staff, and Jack Horner, his Legislative Director, taught me the ropes on Capitol Hill and opened doors for me that I could not have broken down with a battering ram. As a long-time (and I mean a *really* long-time) Hill veteran, Jack has been especially helpful in providing historical and institutional perspectives I would have otherwise missed.

I have always maintained that my relationship with God is the most important thing in my life, followed closely by my relationship with my family. I have grown spiritually during graduate school in ways that I probably would not have anywhere else. Through it all, my family has stood by my side, cheering me along and propping me up when I was too weak (or discouraged) to take another step. I am fortunate to have not one but two sets of loving, supportive parents. My own mother and father and my in-laws have provided encouragement, very timely financial support, and a great deal of love and friendship. Thank you for all you have done for me and for all that you are.

Finally, and most importantly, I must thank my wife. She is my best friend, my greatest cheerleader and the source of my strength. We have been in school our entire married life. It has not been easy, financially, emotionally, or otherwise; but, Kim has never complained. She has picked me up when times have been tough and she has reminded me what matters most in my life. That our four children, Alex, Vallerie, Stephanie and Emilie, are as well-adjusted and happy as they are is in large part due to the love and compassion of their mother. I owe Kim more than I can express in words.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Each member of the United States House of Representatives comes from a different "home" and represents a different people and place. Consequently, each must respond to a unique combination of personal, electoral and political influences. It is precisely the diversity of circumstances under which House members come to Washington that prompted Tip O'Neill to declare that "All politics is local." By the very definition and nature of their positions, members of the House of Representatives are *local* representatives of constituencies that have *local* interests. The paradoxical challenge members face though, is that they must balance their responsibility to represent the local interests of home against the need to act as legislators in a national policy-making body. Given the inherent tension between these roles, it is sometimes a wonder that the House functions as well as it does. One congressman, new to the House in 1994, observed:

> The United States Congress is a fascinating place. You snatch one person out of every 500,000 across the population, come up with 435 representatives of that population and put them in one little room together and expect them to get something done. Some observers of the Congress have likened the floor of the House to a beehive because of its level of activity, but it's not like a beehive at all because in a beehive all of the bees look alike. Members of the House are anything but clones of each other; but, notwithstanding all of their differences, there is a lot of common ground in the House--at least enough to govern a vast and extended republic. They manage to do so because, at the end of the day, all of the members of the House, each of them 500,000 people apart, somehow manage to work together.[1]

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[1] Throughout this dissertation, I refer to interviews I conducted with members of the House of Representatives and congressional staffers. Where appropriate, I will give some indication of the interviewees' status in the House, e.g. party affiliation, seniority, committee membership, etc.. However, I will deliberately avoid giving enough detail to identify the members or staffers I interviewed. In return for ensuring members and staffers that I would use their comments anonymously and for academic purposes, I was

As this representative suggests, the House is a place where local and national interests must be weighed in the balance. By this slightly romanticized view of congressional representation, each House member interacts with other members on Capitol Hill, engages in deliberation, participates in coalition-building, and, through cajoling and compromise, helps establish national public policies that, to the extent possible, reflect the interests their constituents back home.

As they perform their balancing acts on Capitol Hill, the obvious inclination of most House members is to tip the balance toward home as much as possible. The strength of the link between an individual House member and his or her constituents often rests on such an inclinations. As Nelson Polsby has argued, "it is as a *representative body* that Congress finds its ultimate justification in our political system" (1970, 483, emphasis added). More forcefully, the drafters of the Constitution declared that House members "will represent *the people*, they will be *the people*,... [they will be] ourselves; the men of our own choice, in whom we can confide; whose interest is inseparably connected with our own" (Wood 1969, 545). In Madison's words, House members were to have "an immediate dependence upon, and an intimate sympathy with, the people" (*The Federalist* No. 52). First and foremost, House members were meant to be representatives of the people. Juxtaposed against the need to represent local interests, however, is the need to legislate reasonably and responsibly, for the good of the whole nation. This second purpose of the legislative branch was, in fact, the primary motive behind the Framers'

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afforded more candor than I would have otherwise been. For a more lengthy description of my methodology and interviews, see Chapter 2.

creation of a "republican form" of government. They recognized the need to temper the will of the people so that sound public policy could be debated and created in a body one or two steps removed from the passions of the majority. As Madison declared, a republican form of government, based on representation, should:

> . . . refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the same purpose (*The Federalist* No. 10).

In spite of Madison's lofty view of representative government, there is ample evidence of members of the United States House of Representatives shirking their "refining" and "enlarging" duties in the Congress. Likewise there are numerous examples of House members who have drifted away, sometimes intentionally, from their constituencies, ultimately failing to reflect their interests accurately. The process of balancing local and national interests, often against personal goals and preferences, is complex and difficult. On its face, it seems as likely to fail as it is to succeed. Notwithstanding the steady supply of examples of "bad" representation, however, Madison would probably be pleased that most House members seem to find a style of work and representation on Capitol Hill with which both they and their constituents are comfortable. While comfort is not the ultimate measure of effective representation, it is an important indicator of the quality and stability of the relationships that are developed between the people and their representatives in the federal government. As Richard Fenno has argued, representational relationships becomes comfortable when there is a

good "fit" between a House member and his or her constituency (see Fenno 1996, Chapter 1). For the most part, representatives establish their fit with their constituencies by *linking* them to governmental decisions and actions in a manner acceptable to them. The reward for House members who do so comes every other November when they are sent to Washington for another two years.

Given the high reelection rates enjoyed by congressional incumbents, it seems reasonable to suggest that congressional representation works fairly well. That is, House members seem to do a good job of balancing local and national interests, at least in a way that meets with constituent approval. The contemporary Congress, however, is not without its critics. From gridlock, to check-bouncing, to campaign finance abuses to the often sordid politics of "revelation, investigation and prosecution" so prevalent on Capitol Hill (Ginsberg and Shefter 1990, 26-31), the Congress today is widely perceived as an institution that does not do its job well. While individual members seem to be well-liked, the Congress as a whole is the object of pervasive public scorn. While this is not a particularly new phenomenon, some observers have suggested that there is a troubling new twist to the Congress's low popularity ratings. There is growing concern that representatives and the institutions they populate are becoming less representative, less responsive, and less dependent upon the will of the people. The decline of parties, the rise of the personal vote and the escalating costs of elections and the centrality of political action committee dollars in congressional elections have, the critics contend, insulated incumbents from the real concerns and interests of the people. The net result of this state of events, Seymour Martin Lipset has argued, is a systemic "breakdown of respect for

authority," of which the United States represents a "striking example" (1996, 282). Surging disrespect and low popular support of the Congress, Lipset argues, is problematic in a system completely dependent on popular consent. Whatever satisfaction individual voters may express in their particular representatives, Lipset contends that there exists a wider gap between the American people and their government than at any other time in history (283).

It was at least in part with the question of the Congress's competence in mind, both individually and institutionally, that the research reported in this dissertation was devised and conducted. If there is, indeed, a large and growing gap between members of Congress and their constituents, political scientists ought to pay attention to it and determine its origins. Scores of congressional scholars have, in fact, spent countless hours pondering, researching and writing about this very question. The literature is replete with examinations of House members' elections, careers, roll-call and committee behavior and the congruence between members' actions in Washington and the opinions and interests of their constituents back home. These efforts notwithstanding, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the connections between various member attributes and perceptions, their behavior in Washington and the kinds of representational linkages they provide their constituents. A better understanding of members' styles of work on Capitol Hill might bring clarity to these centrally important aspects of congressional representation.

It is against the backdrop of persistent questions about the effectiveness of the Congress as a representative body, then, that I analyze and assess House members' perceptions as they do their jobs as representatives on Capitol Hill, balancing their

responsibilities as local representatives and as national legislators against their own views of what is best for them, their constituents and the nation. As members perform this balancing act, there are three distinct and identifiable *Washington styles* they adopt--constituent style, policy style and partisan style. Based on interviews and observations of House members at work on Capitol Hill, I provide a members-eye-view of each of these styles and the implications of choosing one over the other for the practice of representation. In particular, I explore members' perceptions of themselves, their constituents, their jobs as representatives and their environments in Washington and the influence of these perceptions on their Washington styles. The way members see things in Washington and the patterns of behavior they adopt have an immediate and significant impact on the kinds of representational linkage they provide for their constituencies. Together with Richard Fenno's analysis of the nature and importance members' "home styles" (1978), the view of Washington style presented in this dissertation will provide the reader with a clearer view of the current status of congressional representation and, perhaps, a better feel for its health and its future.

In this introductory chapter I first analyze the theoretical and practical dimensions of members' efforts to balance their personal interests with the demands of Washington and home. I then review the literature on members' balancing efforts, focusing first on treatments of member behavior in Washington (inside the legislature) and then on studies of member behavior at home (outside the legislature). Based on this review, I argue that Washington style is an critically important concept in our efforts to understand and evaluate congressional representation. I further argue that, while the work of Fenno and

others has provided a consistent theoretical framework for the study of members' home styles, there is no corresponding analytical framework in the literature for the examination and assessment of members' Washington styles. Although congressional scholars have amassed a "large inventory of facts about Congress and the legislative process," the literature still lacks "parsimonious ways to understand what motivates members" and influences their behavior as representatives (Parker 1992, 4). The view of Washington style I provide in this dissertation is intended to provide just such a parsimonious way of viewing congressional representation as it is practiced in Washington.

I. BALANCING WASHINGTON & HOME: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Perhaps the most central theme of political science is the connection between people, their governments, and public policy and who it is that exercises power within those relationships. From Plato's philosopher king, to Locke's supreme legislature, to Burke's entrusted and wise representative, political philosophers have struggled to develop a normatively acceptable and positively practical vehicle for linking the will and interest of the people to the actions of their governments. In practice, virtually every contemporary democracy has adopted some form of legislative representation to provide such a link[2]. While there are numerous competing theories of legislative representation, most are built on the notions of popular sovereignty, accountability and responsibility.

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[2] In much of the literature, democracy and representation are treated as synonymous or, at least, mutually dependent concepts. See, for example, Schmitter and Karl (1993).

For representative institutions to be perceived as legitimate, they must in some way reflect the interests of the people. For members of the House of Representatives, this means that the need to represent local interests must be reconciled with the need to participate in national policy making. To understand the theoretical context in which House members seek to balance their local and national roles, we must first understand the theory or theories of representation that inspired the creation of the legislative body they belong to. Below, I briefly review the most important theoretical concepts of congressional representation, turning then to a discussion of the practical context in which those concepts are institutionalized, interpreted, and implemented.

The Theory of Congressional Representation

When the American Founders gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, their most bold and revolutionary decision was to create a new constitution that bypassed the states and linked the government it established directly to "we the people." In doing so, they sought to establish a government that protected the liberties of the people while imposing enough order on them to obviate the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation and facilitate the pursuit of the common, i.e. national, good. Much like the local and national demands of congressional representation, liberty and order are not easily reconciled values. As Madison declared:

> In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself (*The Federalist* No. 51).

Essentially, the Framers' sought to provide democratic rule while checking its potential excesses. Not coincidentally, the competing roles of House members correspond with

these competing aims: democratic rule emphasizes local representation while limiting democratic rule implies the need for wise and deliberate national policy-making. It is this very balancing act that is at the heart of the "republican form" the Framers envisioned. As the centerpiece of the Founders' bicameral scheme of representation, they established the "people's House," the House of Representatives. Therein the people would have their most direct voice in the decisions and actions of their new national government. While an indirectly elected Senate and President, and a system of "auxiliary precautions" were to check the excessive passions of the House, it was in the House that the immediate will of the people would be made known.

For individual House members, though, the problem of representation has always been ambiguous. The Founders were clear on who would be eligible for House membership, but they offered little guidance, at least in the Constitution, for House members struggling with the appropriate way to represent their constituents. At the Philadelphia Convention, it was not a forgone conclusion that the Constitution would be silent on this question. Early state constitutions, and even the Articles of Confederation, provided mechanisms by which the people could instruct their representatives explicitly. The reasoning behind such provisions was straightforward:

> [They] derived from a belief that. . .representation was to be the foundation of free government. Binding instructions compelled a legislator to represent in rather explicit terms the people who had elected him (Cronin 1989, 24).

The implications of instruction were significant. If representatives could be instructed, they would be *delegates* of the people, formally bound to reflect the will of the majority of their constituents. A provision for instructed representation was originally included

among the list of proposed Constitutional amendments from which the Bill of Rights was fashioned (Cronin 24). While it was rejected, its proposal suggests that there has long been broad public support for the idea that representatives ought to behave as delegates, formally instructed or not. Madison and others, however, in their opposition to the instruction amendment and elsewhere, declared that representation did not simply amount to mimicking the majority of one's constituents. In fact, a fundamental Federalist argument in favor of the Constitution's representational arrangements, which purposely limited the direct influence of the people on political decisions, was that a House full of instructed delegates could become a tyrannical majority that would endanger the liberty of the people. A British contemporary of the American Framers, Edmund Burke, also argued that representatives ought not be delegates, but rather *trustees* who would make informed and wise decisions about what is best for the people. With Madison, Burke held that such an approach would secure the true, but not necessarily immediate or obvious, interests of the people.

While the distinction between trustees and delegates is an important one, it is, perhaps, not the most important theoretical dilemma surrounding congressional representation. Vogler and Waldman have offered a distinction that might capture the fundamental tension of House service more accurately. They contend that congressional representation is best characterized by the conflict between "adversary democracy" and "unitary democracy" (1985, 3-4). These two views correspond with the two conflicting roles of House members I have discussed. A representative who holds an "adversarial" view of the policy process is much more likely to emphasize local than national interests.

As adversaries, members must fight for the disparate and conflicting interests of their constituencies. According to this view, there are identifiable winners and losers for almost every congressional action. Effective adversarial representatives will fight for their constituents' needs and interests even at the expense of other districts' or even national interests. In stark contrast, a member with a "unitary" view of democracy and the role of the Congress would be much more likely to emphasize consensual, compromise-based policies that forward the common good of the nation. By taking such an approach, members express a belief that the legislative process need not be a zero-sum-game--compromises built on common ground can have broad positive implications for everyone's constituents, for the entire nation.

Just as the Founders seem to have anticipated and accounted for the trustee-delegate dilemma in representation, they also anticipated the unitary-adversary conflict that was bound to exist in a national legislative body. They attempted to alleviate this tension by creating a bicameral legislature. They knew that the House, with representation based on population and its seats filled through biennial popular elections, would consistently reflect the majoritarian and adversarial side of representative democracy. To mitigate the potential excesses of the House (and to secure the support of the smaller states for the Constitution), they created the much more unitarian Senate, with each state represented equally by Senators appointed in the several state legislatures to serve staggered six-year terms. Critics of the bicameral arrangement, however, argued that the Senate would mute the voice of the people as expressed in the House. By preventing the House from acting as it pleased, the Senate would disrupt the representational linkage its

members tried to provide. Responding to this charge, Madison argued that the Senate was needed as a counterbalance to the House. It is worth noting that Madison's defense of the Senate, as it was originally constituted, addresses both the trustee-delegate and the unitary-adversary dichotomies. He declared:

> . . . There are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice and truth can regain their authority over the public mind (*The Federalist* No. 63).

The potential for a majority faction to take control of the House and exert its will was perceived to be real enough that the Framers explicitly limited the authority of the House to act unilaterally. While linking the interests of the people to their government was a central goal of the Constitutional Convention delegates, they also found it expedient to limit the direct and immediate influence of the people in order to preserve their liberty and promote the general welfare.

While the parallels between the trustee-delegate and unitary-adversary distinctions are straightforward, it is particularly important to note that both tend to emphasize substantive, rather than symbolic, evaluations of representation. People's tangible, identifiable interests are, at one level or another, the primary focus of both accounts of representation. There is, however, a third important theoretical distinction to make about congressional representation. While the theories discussed above are overtly substantive in focus, other theoretical treatments of congressional representation suggest that the

symbolism of representation is just as important as its substance. For example, Eulau and Karps, expanding on Pitkin's notion of "responsiveness," contend that, while service, policy and allocational responsiveness are important substantive measures of representational linkage, a complete understanding of congressional representation must go beyond mere policy congruence or the tangible representation of interests. They argue that symbolic responsiveness, which can convey the *impression* of substantive responsiveness, is a fourth and equally important component of representation (1978). Almost paradoxically, it is often through symbolic forms of representation that the comfortable fit House members desire is cultivated. Addressing the often symbolic or non-substantive aspects of representation on which constituent-representative trust is built, Fenno asserts:

> We shall have to consider the possibility that supportive constituents may want extrapolicy behavior from their representatives. They may want good access or the assurance of good access as much as they want good policy. They many want "a good man" or "a good woman," someone whose assurances they can trust, as much as they want good policy. They may want communication promises as much as they want policy promises. The point is not that policy preferences are not a crucial basis for the representational relationship. They are. The point is that we should not start our studies of representation by assuming they are the only basis for a representational relationship. They are not (1978, 240-1).

A complete and accurate theory of congressional representation, then, should make allowances for both substantive and symbolic representation. Substantively, representatives may behave as delegates or trustees and they may view the policy process through an adversarial or unitarian perspective; however, their interaction with their constituents may be less dependent on these behavioral emphases than on symbolic ones.

While the foregoing review is an admittedly truncated treatment of the theory of congressional representation, the issues I have addressed are, I believe, the most salient theoretical issues underpinning the enterprise. However, while the theory may be straightforward, its normative implications are not. There is no obvious "best way" to represent and each House member must deal with the theoretical dilemmas discussed above on a daily basis as he or she balances personal, district and national interests on Capitol Hill. How members of the House, in practice, deal with these issues is the subject to which I turn next.

Congressional Representation in Practice

The temptation that must be avoided in making the leap from the theory of congressional representation to its practice, centers on accepting theoretical dichotomies at face value. It would be inaccurate, for example, to assume that House members explicitly choose one of the extremes in the dichotomies I have presented, to the exclusion of the other extreme. While meaningful distinctions can be drawn between House members, a good deal of caution is in order when placing them in predefined categories. For example, although a representative might behave as a delegate when voting on most issues, he or she may behave as a trustee on personally important issues. Other members may mirror that behavior acting primarily as trustees, but taking on a delegate role in particular cases. There are also, as the literature has noted, members who balance the two approaches to representation and behave as "politicos." Similarly, members vary in their "adversarial" and "unitarian" approaches to the legislative process as well as in their efforts to provide substantive and symbolic forms of representation. A

member may behave adversarially and substantively when addressing one issue only to become more unitarian and symbolic in relation to another matter. In fact, members of the House can and do emphasize different representational and legislative roles and values under different circumstances and at different times. The ideal types represented by each extreme in the dichotomies presented above are just that--categorical descriptions that any given member is unlikely to fit perfectly. However, it is possible, reasonable and useful to categorize members according to their *tendencies* in these areas.

In addition to understanding that distinctions between various approaches to representation and legislative behavior are less rigid in practice than they are in the abstract, it is also important to note that the line between the theory and practice of congressional representation is often ambiguous and implicit (rather than explicit). In the institutional and political environment of the United States House of Representatives, the men and women who serve therein make hundreds of decisions each day that impinge on the kinds of representational linkage they provide their constituents. Members must constantly decide how to allocate their scarce resources of time, energy and staff. At the same time, they also choose how to act in the Congress, choosing between proactive and reactive strategies in the legislative process, between being partisans or compromisers, between being Washington insiders or maintaining comparatively high profiles in their districts, and between a host of other competing ideals. These practical decisions sometimes obscure the philosophical choices members make about their service in the House; but, they never eclipse them. Indeed, for most members, there is significant interplay between the practical and theoretical choices they make.

In truth, though, most of the members I interviewed and observed would probably be uncomfortable making a distinction between the theoretical and practical dimensions of their jobs, as I have described them. While some members make choices about their styles of work on the Hill clearly and early on in their careers, others continue to struggle with them each new day on the job. Still other members are unaware that there are such decisions to be made. Regardless of their theoretical or practical characterizations, however, the decisions members make and the perceptions their decisions are based on have tangible implications for their relationships with their constituents back home. Indeed, at some level, even the most theoretically rooted choices members make have practical, observable consequences on their political relationships both at home and on the Hill.

For the most part, the relationships House members cultivate with their constituents tend to be more focused on balancing competing concerns rather than choosing one concern over the other. Many of the balancing choices members make are simplified by the institutional arrangements of the House. Biennial elections, for example, compel every incumbent representative who wants to be reelected to spend at least some of his or her time away from Washington, back home, trying to secure and maintain political support. No member is free to stay in Washington all of the time. Likewise, any member who wishes to cast his or her votes on the House floor must spend at least some time in Washington. The importance of money in elections also compels House members to cultivate relationships with interest groups and lobbyists who are affiliated with political action committees that are likely to support their reelection campaigns. The

choices that members must make do not center on whether or not they should spend time back home, but how much of that time should be sacrificed for time in Washington and the goals that can be pursued there. Members face similar decisions in relation to participation in their parties and their legislative agendas. Members generally do not choose *whether* to participate within their parties or to back legislation, but rather how much time and effort to accord each of these activities. While constituents are the dominant influence on members as they make such choices, non-constituency related factors, such as parties, interest groups and even members' personal goals, also play a significant role. The decisions members make early in their careers are especially significant as they try to reconcile the various and competing demands on their time and attention. As they choose *which* committees[3] they will serve on, *how* involved they will be on them, and *how much* emphasis to place on the other numerous and varied "arenas" of involvement in the House (Parker 1989, 166), they simultaneously establish patterns of behavior on the Hill that determine how it is that they will approach the practice of representation.

Influences on Members' Washington Behavior

The practice of congressional representation is a dynamic social relationship, defined by the interaction between House members and their constituencies and the representational "agreements" they negotiate. In general, House members approach their

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[3] While members have only limited discretion over their committee assignments, with variation by seniority and political circumstances, their expressed preferences for and efforts to gain seats on particular committees are an important reflection of representational focus and style.

work in Washington with an eye cast over their shoulder at the constituents who sent them there. Members' perceptions of what their constituents expect them to do in Washington have a profound impact on what they actually do when they are there. As members make behavioral choices in Washington, they are influenced by their constituents, but they also seek to influence their constituents' perceptions of their work on the Hill. Furthermore, both the representative and the constituency are influenced by a wide variety of third parties and external influences. All of this is to say that member behavior in Washington is not influenced purely be constituent sentiments in a direct, linear fashion. Rather, as Pitkin has argued, political representation is:

> . . . primarily a public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, operating in the ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people (1967, 221-2).

While the factors that influence member behavior are, as Pitkin suggests, numerous and complexly interrelated, the literature on member behavior is replete with efforts to develop parsimonious models of the influences on members in Washington and the motives that underlie their behavior there. Below, I briefly summarize and assess the most significant models of members' motives and behavior in Washington. This review will set the stage for the second half of this chapter (a review of the literature on House members' "styles" of representation at home and in Washington) and for the balance of this dissertation.

Given the obvious significance of the opinions and preferences of constituents in the decisions processes employed by House members, it is appropriate that the four most

prominent accounts of House members' motives in the literature are focused on members' connections to their districts and their constituents. The best known of these four are Mayhew's notion of members as reelection seekers (1974a), Fiorina's account of members as opportunistic ombudsmen (1977), and Fenno's account of members in committees, motivated and influenced by reelection, acquiring influence in the House, and making good public policy (1973, 1). The fourth and most recent addition to these perspectives on members' motives is Parker's account of members as discretion maximizers (1992).

In *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Mayhew argues that House members seek goals that are wholly dependent on their holding congressional office. By extension, Mayhew asserts that members are "single-minded seekers of reelection" (1974a, 5). The goal of reelection, he argues, has a "universality to it" because "it has to be the *proximate* goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained" (16). This perspective intentionally downplays other goals members might have, treating reelection as an instrumental goal so important that there is little serious treatment of any other goals. While Mayhew admits there are some members who do not conform to his reelection thesis, he contends that such members are "saints," so rare that their presence in the House does not demand a modification of the axiomatic reelection principle he established. From this generalization, Mayhew deduces and provides anecdotal evidence that, to maximize their chances of reelection, the vast majority of House members engage in the largely symbolic activities of credit-claiming, advertising,

and position-taking all of which tend to give the *impression* of responsiveness without necessarily providing substantive policy representation.

The second prominent view of members' motives in Washington, Fiorina's *Keystone* (1978), presents an even more cynical view of House members. Taking Mayhew's argument to its logical conclusion, Fiorina argues that reelection-seeking House members have purposively created complex government programs that are difficult for their constituents to understand and with which constituents are bound to have problems. Members of Congress must then be called on to intervene in behalf of their constituents and solve their problems that arise when they deal with government agencies. The result of such interventions is the building of personal relationships between representatives and their constituents which insulate members from electoral competition. Acting as bureaucratic trouble-shooters, members are, in fact, providing a direct link between their constituents and the government. This linkage, however, turns representation on its head essentially providing a *post hoc* reconciliation between people and public policies. In the final analysis, Fiorina's view of member's motives is identical to Mayhew's--members value reelection above all else. It is only in his predictions of member behavior that he differs from Mayhew.

A third view of members' motives is Fenno's assertion, presented in *Congressmen in Committees* (1973), that members are motivated not only by reelection, but also by their desires to gain influence within the House and to enact good public policy (1). This broader view allows for a wider range of behavior on the part of House members, including behavior which might intentionally reduce members' reelection

chances. Members who are also motivated by goals of gaining influence in the House and passing legislation might make self-conscious trade-offs between their electoral success back home and their success in Washington. Fenno later qualified this view of member motives, however, suggesting that "for *most* members of Congress *most* of the time, [the] electoral goal is primary. It is the prerequisite for a congressional career and, hence, for the pursuit of other member goals" (1978, 31, emphasis added). Fenno's view, then, shares Mayhew and Fiorina's emphasis on electoral goals, while leaving some room for other motives to occasionally influence member behavior.

The fourth, and most recent, view of members' motives is Parker's account of House members as discretion maximizers (1992). Discretion maximization, in broad terms, is any activity aimed at increasing individual control over the pursuit and realization of individual goals.[4] Parker's analysis "offers an alternative to the reelection motive--namely, that members of Congress act as if they were trying to maximize their own discretion" (4). This conception of members' motives takes into account not only members' reelection concerns, but all other goals they may seek, in a way that is more balanced than the strict reelection thesis. The discretion model explains the same behavior as the other models, while allowing for a broader range of goals and behavior.[5] Under the discretion-maximization model, members can seek to maximize their

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[4]In this sense, discretion maximization is not unlike utility maximization (Parker, 11).

[5] Although less parsimonious, it is more descriptively accurate, i.e. valid. While, all things being equal, parsimony is attractive, there is increasing support among methodologists for models that balance parsimony with descriptive and inferential validity (See King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 20.).

reelection discretion by creating barriers to competition and by creating personal relationships with their constituents. However, as Mayhew and Fenno suggests, reelection can be pursued for numerous and varied reasons. For example, reelection discretion might be pursued to secure discretion in the policy process, which can be facilitated by winning election by the widest possible margin. The discretion model, however, allows members to exercise their discretion as they see fit, even in ways that might jeopardize their reelection chances. Instead of maximizing reelection margins, members might actually *minimize* them by acting as controversially as possible while still maintaining his or her seat. While an admittedly risky venture, such a strategy is a reasonable one for members with strongly held policy goals. By Parker's view members may seek discretion over reelection, policy, influence in the House, personal time or a hundred other things--reelection and margin of victory being but two possibilities. In contrast to the reelection model, the discretion thesis allows for significantly broader variation in the motives and behavior of House members. As a result, it is a more descriptively accurate model.

In this dissertation, I adopt Parker's view of members as discretion maximizers because it does not require that all members be driven exclusively by reelection, a motivation which tends to obscure members' underlying representational ideals and linkage efforts. Instead, it allows for a much broader and diverse set of goals. It thereby offers a much more normatively neutral view of congressional behavior and representation. Normative neutrality is attractive because it squares with the notion that representation is a dynamic *process*, defined by the ever-changing relationship between a House member and a constituency, to be negotiated and worked out in *their* terms. As

such, the normative underpinnings of a the representational relationship can change as a member's goal and perceptions change and as his or her constituents' interests and expectations change. In this regard, the discretion thesis is consistent with Miller and Stokes assertion that "no single tradition of representation fully accords with the realities of American legislative politics. The American system is a mixture, to which the Burkean instructed-delegate and responsible-party models can all be said to have contributed elements" (1963, 56). There are, in fact, numerous ways that House members build and maintain durable representational relationships with their constituents and, as the extensive literature on the electoral advantages of incumbency[6] suggests, most members are capable of doing so in spite of adopting widely different styles over time and across congressional districts.

Discretion, and members efforts to obtain it, is a particularly useful concept as we examine House members' efforts to balance the demands of being a local representative against the need to work with other members in a national legislative body. Likewise, understanding what it is that members seek discretion over would provide significant insights into the practice of congressional representation. Members' goals, however, are not always easily discernable. The men and women who run for the House of

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[6] High reelection rates for incumbents should not lead one directly to the conclusion that House members are selfish and self-serving political entrepreneurs who have managed to avoid competition by amassing an away of formidable reelection resources. Less cynically, high electoral success rates can be taken as evidence that voters are generally happy with the way they are being represented by their individual members of Congress. Caution must be taken, though, in using reelection rates as a valuative measure of congressional representation instead of viewing it as but "one piece of a challenging puzzle" (see Eulau and Karps 1978).

Representatives are not required to divulge their motives. They must, however, convince their constituents that their motives are, at a minimum, not incompatible with their own. The difficulty faced by voters, however, is that the most basic goals members seek are often left unarticulated in this process. A congressional candidate, for example, might have no greater desire than to earn the salary paid to a member of Congress, a motive he or she is unlikely to divulge. To win election (and reelection) such a candidate is likely to instead emphasize his or her support for particular constituent goals and interests. However duplicitous the relationship may be, though, as long as representatives deliver on their promises, his or her constituents are unlikely to be concerned with their motives for doing so. Very simply, representatives who wish to be reelected must pursue their personal goals while providing their constituents with the kind of representational linkage they want.

It is here, perhaps, in the reconciliation between the goals of House members and the interests of their constituents, that the practice of congressional representation adheres most closely to the system of popular governance the Framers' envisioned. Being forced to face the electorate every two years ensures that members of the House must constantly seek and maintain the support and trust of their constituents. As Madison argued, the "most effectual" means for keeping representatives virtuous is a "limitation of the term of appointment as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people" (*Federalist* No. 57). In this sense, campaigning does not simply enhance the symbolic responsiveness of House members, as some critics have charged, but it also provides a checkpoint at which constituents can evaluate the actions of their representatives, both at home and in

Washington, and then affirm or reject them. For their part, members of the House have the opportunity to defend their actions, provide explanations of their efforts to balance district interests with national interests and share their perceptions of the representative relationship. Through mechanisms that vary significantly from one district to the next, voters listen and respond. It is in this process that representational relationships and agreements on which they rest are negotiated and fine-tuned. Even though more immediate substantive representation might be facilitated by a representative who is more active in the legislature, a member who trades legislative time for campaign time can, nonetheless, be a more responsive representative than one who stays in Washington. Responsiveness, symbolic or otherwise, is just as important to a healthy representative relationship as providing substantive public policy linkage (see Eulau and Karps 1978; Fenno 1978, 240-1).

In sum, members of the House of Representatives are influenced and motivated by numerous and varied personal, public, practical and theoretical concerns as they weigh the concerns of Washington and home in the balance of representation. As they do so, there are no hard and fast rules for them to follow. The practice of representation is informed and influenced by the theory thereof and the realities of political life, but representation is not a painting-by-the numbers enterprise. A junior Republican from the North East put it this way:

> At a town meeting once I was called into question about why I don't always make my decisions in Washington on the basis of my constituents' opinions. What it comes down to is that in this job one has to find a balance between the federal or national position and the state position. In our unique system of federalism we have to balance competing interests between levels of government as well. And sometimes it's okay to be an

> advocate of state or district interests, but sometimes you have to come down on the other side. . . . I have to change my role from issue to issue. Sometimes the issue itself the most important factor and I have to make up my mind on the basis of what I think is right or best. At other times a clear national or district interest exists that I stand behind. But it's never a mechanical decision.

Like most members, this congressman sees his job as a balancing act between the competing interests and demands of home, Washington and his personal goals. The challenge of congressional representation is to strike a balance between these competing interests that provides the people back home with the kind of representational linkage they expect.

II. HOME STYLE & WASHINGTON STYLE

Previous research and writing about member behavior is broad, covering such varied topics as campaigns and elections, interest group influence, committee behavior, parties in the Congress, constituent service and legislative procedure. The literature, however, can generally be divided into two broad categories: examinations of members' home styles--their perceptions and behaviors in their districts--and examinations of members' Washington styles--their perceptions and behaviors on Capitol Hill (see Mezey 1993).

Home Style and Representation

Before the 1970s, most of the research on the Congress was conducted in Washington, D.C. and it was largely focused on members' behavior in the context of the institution they inhabited. However, as scholars became increasingly aware of the impact of home on Washington behavior, there came an "explosion" of research on members of

Congress outside of Washington, back home in their districts (see Mezey 1993). This research was fueled by Mayhew's writings about the electoral connections between members and their constituents (1974a) and the "vanishing marginals" in congressional elections, which he attributed to a growing incumbent advantage in congressional elections (1974b). Subsequent evidence of the "personalization" of the relationship between congressional incumbents and their constituents suggested that the real "electoral connection" might be primarily negotiated back home, not in Washington (see Ragsdale 1980). This new perspective inspired a generation of scholars to focus on the behavior of representatives in their congressional districts. This research has explored such areas as constituent service, members' communications with voters, campaigning, the decline of parties in the electorate, and the sources of the advantages of incumbency.

Among the most significant contributions to the literature on members in their districts, as I have noted, is Fenno's *Home Style* (1978). By focusing on members' own perceptions of their constituents while interacting with them, Fenno forwarded several important insights about congressional representation. Perhaps the most famous of his findings is the idea that when a member of Congress sees his or her constituency, he or she perceives it as a "nest of concentric circles," consisting of the geographical, reelection, primary, and personal constituencies he or she represents (1-25). Fenno also found that members' home styles differ according to three factors: the allocation of personal and official resources, their "presentations of self," and their explanations of their Washington activities (33). Based on his observations of different members of the House in several different electoral and constituent settings, Fenno concluded that

members of Congress adopt unique "home styles" in order to better relate to their constituents and establish mutually acceptable, even comfortable, representational (and electoral) relationships with them.

Fenno's primary thesis in *Home Style*, and in his more recent work on Senators' campaigns, is the idea that representation is not confined to Capitol Hill. More specifically, Fenno has argued that when political scientists study congressional representation, understanding what members of Congress do at home is at least as important as understanding what they do in Washington. In fact, Fenno's critique has not been so much that scholars have ignored "home", but that they have failed to recognize the extent of home's influence on members in Washington. While Washington is physically separated from home, Fenno contends that the two are intimately connected in the minds of members. More broadly, he was critical of what he saw as the inappropriate separation of empirical and descriptive research and theory. The focus on the Congress as an institution in Washington produced a view of members as creatures of Capitol Hill, a view which belied the dual nature of congressional representation. From a systems perspective, Fenno contended that scholars had to get outside the Washington box to understand the form and function of congressional representation.

By focusing on members' perceptions and their relationships with their constituents, Fenno sought to bring together the theory and practice of representation. Ultimately, his work highlighted two significant characteristics of congressional representation. First, his research reinforced the view that the relationship between a member of Congress and his or her constituents is dynamic and multidimensional.

Representation is not a static concept, but a complex activity. Much of the research and writing on Congress and representation in the post-War period had been focused on the formulation of empirically testable and defensible premises or theses of representation. Furthermore, there was a tendency to treat congressional representation as an individual-level concept, rather than as the fundamentally collective concept it is (see Eulau and Karps 1978, 58). This tendency, at least in part, stemmed from the reality that voters are generally uniformed and unsophisticated, which gives rise to asymmetries in information and power between House members and their constituents. Instead of focusing in the interactions between individual House members and individual constituents, however, Fenno's work suggests that scholars should examine the more complex and dynamic interactions between members and various groups in their constituencies, and even interactions between those groups. In addition to focusing on an over-simplified version of representational relationships, many scholars had also focused exclusively on positive measures of member behavior and support. Responding to this trend, Fenno argued that "representation" and "representativeness" cannot be adequately studied and assessed by relying only on positive and quantitative measures. Fenno's "soak and poke" approach to his research demonstrated the limitations of overly-empirical examinations of congressional representation. *Home Style* also reminded political scientists that, although the most visible (and easily studied) aspects of member behavior occur in Washington, members' styles of behavior in their districts is just as important to our understanding of congressional representation. Subsequent research has, indeed, shown that what goes on in members' districts is often more important, for particular representational

relationships, than what happens on Capitol Hill. Election research, for example, has shown that the "national" factors once thought dominant in determining congressional elections are, in many cases, insignificant (Ragsdale 1980). The extensive literature on the rise of candidate-centered elections and the personal vote further suggest that, the local behavior of House members is just as much a part of their representational relationships as their behavior in Washington.

In addition to demonstrating the dynamism of congressional representation, Fenno also showed that the success of House members' efforts to balance their local and national roles is directly tied to the quality of communication and trust that exists between them and the people they represent. Fenno argued that a central component of members' "home styles" is their ability to present themselves "in ways that leave the correct impression" with their constituents (1978, 54). Research on voters' impressions of their House members suggests that while their impressions might not be complete and accurate reflections of reality, they are what matters most to their evaluations of their representatives, especially at election time (see Conover and Feldman 1989). For the representational relationship to work, House members know they must have the political support of the people they represent and that support is cultivated through effective communication (Fenno 1978,56).

Since *Home Style* was published, numerous scholars have elaborated on Fenno's findings examining, among other topics, the relationship between members' popularity in their districts and the popularity of the Congress (Born 1990; Sinclair 1990), the electoral impact of case work (Johannes and McAdams 1981; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987),

House members' perceptions of electoral coalitions in their districts (Fowler 1982), and the dynamics of the decision to run for office (Fowler and McClure 1989; Kazee 1994). Parker has more broadly examined patterns in member attention to home over time, concluding that virtually all members of Congress--both Representatives and Senators--now place a greater emphasis on home than they once did (1986; see also Bond 1985). Other scholars have sought to place Fenno's work in its larger context, examining the impact of *Home Style* on investigations of the connections between member behavior at home and their styles in Washington (Fiorina and Rohde 1989; see also Sinclair 1990).

Washington Style and Representation

While Fenno and others have spent a good deal of time and energy studying the activities of members of Congress in their districts, the fact remains that the most obvious place to study the practice of congressional representation is in the House of Representatives itself, where the representatives of the people cast their roll call votes and participate in the other business of the national legislature. The early scholarly emphasis on the Washington dimensions of congressional representation were reinforced by the larger disciplinary preoccupation with political institutions and, secondarily, the people who ran them. Consequently, there is a rich descriptive literature on the Congress and its members from the first two-thirds of this century. Classics such as *The Washington Community* (Young 1966) and *The Citadel* (Cronin 1937) are just the most famous examples of such research. After World War II, however, political scientists became more interested in the structure and function of Congress and the role that its members play in shaping the institution (Polsby 1968; see also Hertzke and Peters 1992). This new

emphasis eventually shifted the scholarly focus away from the Congress as an institution and toward the study of individual members. Political scientists began examining the correlations between members' roll call votes and the demographics (MacRae 1958) or opinions (Miller and Stokes 1963) of the people they represented. This led to more detailed observations of members at work on Capitol Hill, their patterns of behavior, and the impact of that behavior on the shape of the House (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).

After Mayhew's *Electoral Connection* was published, the literature on the Washington behavior of House members came to be almost completely based on the reelection thesis: members were assumed to be motivated by, first and foremost, the goal of reelection. Other research on member behavior on Capitol Hill added to the view that members were constantly preoccupied with their electoral chances. Kingdon found that members were concerned about every vote they cast in the House, if not because of the content of those votes, than because any vote could be used by a future opponent during a future campaign (1981, 60-1). Although voters might forgive a single unpopular vote or even a handful of them, such votes, Kingdon noted, can become electorally dangerous for House members if they are on particularly salient issues or if they become part of an unpopular "string of votes" (41-5). Additional research reinforces the conclusion that members' perceptions of their electoral situations back home have a significant impact on their behavior in Washington. For example, Davidson found that the degree to which members behaved either as trustees or as delegates depended on individual members' perceptions of their electoral safety or vulnerability (1969, 140). Members from "marginal" districts, Davidson discovered, are more likely to follow constituent opinion,

especially on sensitive issues, than members holding "safe seats." Alternatively, members who are more electorally secure tend to have more discretion in their Washington behavior, a not insignificant conclusion in light of Parker's discretion thesis (1992). Given the complexity of the legislative agenda in the House, virtually every member has at least *some* discretion. Because constituents are largely uninformed and pay little attention to the congressional agenda, they exercise little control over the daily legislative decisions of House members (Bernstein 1989; 1992). Constituency influence is further diminished in Washington because it must compete with that of powerful interests (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976) and even representatives' own ideologies (Kau and Rubin 1982, 121-3). Although constituent influence is limited by these forces, members' efforts to balance their local and national roles are, at least in part, still driven by the influences of home. Indeed, the literature suggests that virtually every member of Congress will side with his or her constituents in the face of with conflicting demands (Pomper 1980; Kingdon 1981, 67). However, the different strategies and thought processes members employ in weighing and arriving at such decisions are largely unexplored.

Beyond assessments of members' roll call behavior, political scientists have examined numerous other aspects of member behavior on Capitol Hill, including their work on committees (Cooper 1970; Fenno 1973; Smith and Deering 1990), the influence and importance of seniority (Hinckley 1971), political parties (Rohde 1992; Cox and McCubbins 1993), congressional staff (Malbin 1980), leadership (Sinclair 1992), norms and folkways (Asher 1973; Rohde 1988), and the rules of the House (Oleszek 1989). A smaller number of scholars have attempted to study the Washington experiences of House

members in their totality, focusing primarily on the idea of the House "career." One of the most significant conclusions from this research is that members of the House have continually shaped and reshaped the institution in ways that have brought stability and durability to their careers as representatives. Polsby, for example, found that increasing staff sizes, better pay, and specialization in the House simultaneously eased members' work loads in the House while setting them up to benefit more directly back home from their work in Washington (1968). While Fenno concluded early on that there *were* discernable cycles in members' careers, others have more recently argued that, because of members' ever-present concerns about reelection, careers are now more static over time with an increasingly less clear distinction between the legislative and electoral phases or aspects of a career (Jacobson 1983; Hibbing 1991).

III. WASHINGTON STYLE AND REPRESENTATION

While the literature on members' activities in Washington offers several important insights about congressional representation, there is nothing that approaches a consensual understanding or model of Washington style that corresponds with the well developed and explored notion of home style. Home style is a useful concept for understanding congressional representation because it allows scholars to consistently examine the representational relationships between different members of Congress and their constituents. The concept of home style provides an umbrella under which concepts such as constituent service, policy and extrapolicy representation, support, trust, fit, and durability can be systematically examined across congressional districts and

representatives. Washington style, as a conceptual framework, has similar promise. However, as Fenno noted nearly twenty years ago, "political scientists have not produced any consensus as to precisely what might be meant by a 'Washington style'" (1978, 225). For example, while scholars generally agree that members can choose between a trustee, delegate, or a politico approach (which balances the two) to representation, there is little agreement in the literature about the context under which different members will adopt different approaches and the effects of such decisions on other aspects of their Hill work. While Davidson (1969) and other have given us some guidance on representational roles, their relationship to other aspects of Washington work has not been systematically addressed in the literature. In short, a theoretical framework for studying Washington style coupled with the extant literature on home style, would provide a more comprehensive framework for studying and assessing *representational* style--the combination of a member's home and Washington styles.

Given that congressional representation occurs both in Washington and at home, more attention to members' styles of representation in Washington is merited, especially in light of growing concerns that what goes on in Washington is increasingly detached from the concerns and interests of average citizens. If anything, the relative lack of attention to the broader context of representation in the literature has contributed to the current over-emphasis on the district and election campaign-related aspects of congressional representation. While members' district-based representational efforts cannot and should not be ignored, a sophisticated home style and communication strategy are not usually sufficient to maintain the support of voters. The things members of

Congress do--and do not do--*in Washington* are also a critically important to their relationships with their constituents. For example, the Republican freshman class in the 104th Congress knew that they could not change their images as "radicals" and "revolutionaries" merely through skillful presentations of themselves back home (Barnett and Loomis 1997, 5-6, 14). In order to convincingly portray themselves as "common sense legislators" they also had to adopt different approaches to their Washington work. Their attempts to soften their images by changing their actions in Washington was reflected in their efforts, both individually and as a class, to be less rigid and less confrontational in their legislative work in the months leading up to the November 1996 elections. Their behavior reminds us that, while members' reelection efforts are primarily focused on home, members' actions in Washington are never far from the consciousness of their constituents. The work members do in Washington shapes the relationships they have with the people they represent, the amount of discretion they are able to acquire in the pursuit of their own goals, and, ultimately, the particular balance each House member strikes between his or her local and national roles as a representative and as a legislator.

The generally overlooked connection between a member's style of work in Washington and his or her home style is a crucial piece of the puzzle of congressional representation. A member's behavior in Washington is an integral part of who the member is, not only on Capitol Hill, but also back home. While there are some members who try to be two different people in Washington and at home--with varying degrees of success--the reality is that the two worlds in which they function are ultimately and intimately connected. If there is a substantial disconnect or inconsistency between the

Washington and home behavior of a member of Congress, the member is likely to have problems convincing the people back home that they are being represented effectively and honestly. The likely outcome of such a dysfunctional representational relationship is the election of a new representative who promises to do better at balancing the work of Hill and home. House members are universally aware of this reality.[7]

In sum, a well-developed understanding of members' styles of work in Washington, i.e. their styles of balancing their own interests against their local and national responsibilities, holds significant descriptive and inferential promise. First, and foremost, a view of members' styles in Washington that compliments the existing literature on home style might facilitate the development of a more complete and unified view of congressional representation. Second, examining members' Washington styles in a broad, exploratory fashion, as I do in this dissertation, will lay the ground work for future scholars to focus on more particular (and, I hope, better defined) aspects of Washington style in order to refine its explanatory and inferential capacity. Furthermore, a focus on members' representational styles in Washington, as well as at home, will allow for more and better comparative legislative research. Where institutional and political variables make functional and roll-call comparisons difficult, a focus on representational linkage and style, as well as legislators efforts to balance personal, local and national interests, would offer new and important perspectives for comparing legislative bodies and their members (Mezey 1993, 336, 342).

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[7] Given its centrality to the normative aspects of congressional representation, it is a topic to which I will return throughout this dissertation.

Quite simply, the behavioral styles of House members on Capitol Hill have significant implications for the theory and practice of representation and popular governance. However, the current literature does not offer a clear understanding of the kinds of styles members adopt, much less the influences on the development and maintenance of these styles. As Mezey has argued, "although widely gathered, role orientation data have not been linked with actual legislative behavior. That is, the consequences of different role perceptions for what the individual legislator does are not clear" (Mezey 1993, 343). An well-constructed model of Washington style promises to provide the clarity that is lacking. This dissertation represents an initial attempt to develop such a model.

IV. THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

Having established the importance of an examination of Washington style, I turn in the next chapter to a description of my research methodology. The arguments and conclusions of this dissertation are based largely on interviews with House members and staff. The information gathered from these interviews is supplemented by participant observation and analysis of news publications and other publicly available documents. In addition to providing a detailed account of each data gathering method, I also describe the samples of House members and congressional staffers I interviewed. I further address the difficulties associated with interview-based, qualitative research and the efforts I made to overcome them. Given my focus on members' "styles," I also comment on the ways my research is similar to and different from Richard Fenno's research for *Home Style*.

In Chapter Three, I present my research findings, focusing first on the perceptions of House members on the Hill. These perceptions form the critical building blocks not only for the patterns of behavior members adopt in Washington but also for the development of a model for categorizing and analyzing those patterns or styles. To lay the groundwork for a discussion of the three styles of Washington work I have identified, I describe and discuss members' perceptions of themselves, their constituents, their roles as representatives, and of work on Capitol Hill. Additionally, I examine the relationship between these perceptions and members' perceptions of their own pragmatism, their roles as political strategists or legislative tacticians, their representational philosophies, and the levels at which they are attached or connected to the House. This discussion of members' perceptions precedes a more thorough assessment of members' Washington styles both to emphasize the temporal order of stylistic development as well as to emphasize the importance of perceptions in their own right. Members' perceptions from the Hill do, in fact, provide significant insights into the way representatives reconcile competing demands and approach their jobs in Washington. When the connection between these perceptions and discernable patterns of Hill behavior are established, though, the implications are more significant and broadly applicable.

In Chapter Four, it is precisely this connection to which I turn, the connection between members' perceptions and their Washington styles. Each member I interviewed and observed has adopted either a constituent style, policy style, or partisan style as they approach their Hill work. These styles are not adopted haphazardly. There are identifiable patterns between members' personal and political circumstances, their perceptions and

the styles they develop and maintain. These styles become the mechanisms by which they balance personal, local and national interests in their legislative work.

The information presented in Chapters Three and Four support the notion that congressional representation and the relationships between representatives and their constituents are significantly influenced by House members' perceptions and the patterns of behavior they adopt on the Hill as they reconcile their perceptions with the realities they face in Washington. Perceptions and styles, however, are not static--they are subject to numerous changes over the course of a member's career. In Chapter Five, then, I examine the development and maintenance of members' Washington styles at various stages of their careers. At each distinct career phase--the developmental, adjustment and mature career phases--each member is influenced, to varying degrees, by personal, district and national influences, influences that change in relative importance throughout members' careers.

Finally, in Chapter Six, I explore the connection between representational style, constituent linkage and trust. Each of the three styles I discuss in Chapter Four implies a distinctive balance between a members' local and national roles and, hence, a distinctive manner in which constituent interests are linked to governmental decisions and actions in Washington. As House members adopt unique styles and link their constituents to the decisions and policies of their federal government, they engage in a process of negotiating and refining a representational "fit" with their constituents. Perhaps the most coveted reward for establishing a good fit with one's constituents is the discretion to act independently when making decisions members care most about. Members' Washington

styles embody these efforts to represent, to fit and to realize personal goals on the Hill. It is because they encompass such a broad range of motives, perceptions and activities that members' Washington styles can also provide the basis for a more accurate and complete analysis of the practice of congressional representation than is currently available.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

When Richard Fenno set out to study members of Congress "at home," he determined the best way to do so was to travel to their districts and "follow them around." His observations of and conversations with House members did, in fact, yield unique and insightful notions about members' styles of work, constituent interaction, and representation back home in their districts. It is difficult to overstate the influence of Fenno's work on the literature on members of Congress (see Polsby 1984). Any scholar who examines congressional representation, in particular, and members' styles, in particular, would be remiss if her or she did not address both Fenno's substantive conclusions as well as his research methodology. In this chapter, I highlight those areas in which my research mirrors Fenno's approach, as well as those areas in which I diverge from his method. First, I briefly review Fenno's methodology, placing it in the context of elite-focused research more broadly. On the basis of this review, I then provide a detailed account of my own research, including explanations of each data collection method I employed as well as descriptive statistics about the group of House members I interviewed and observed. Finally, I describe the process by which I compiled, distilled, and assessed the data I present in this dissertation.

I. STUDYING THE PERCEPTIONS & BEHAVIOR OF POLITICAL ELITES

Access is usually the primary obstacle researchers must overcome when they study political elites. Most political elites are, practically and by choice, difficult to observe and or interview. In fact, some elites are so unapproachable that they cannot be

studied directly at all-- scholars must instead rely on secondary sources to study them. While not all members of Congress are equally accessible, Fenno demonstrated through his research that an ample number of House members are willing to "be studied." If they had not agreed to Fenno's request to be observed and interviewed, he would clearly not have been able to assemble the kind of information he did and reach the conclusions he offered. Very simply, access was critical to his work. In fact, the primary question he asked demanded it: "What does an elected representative see," Fenno asked, "when he or she sees a constituency?" and, more importantly, "What consequences do these perceptions have for his or her behavior?" (Fenno 1978, xiii). The answers to these questions, which he sought by looking "over the shoulders" of House members, provided the foundation for his observations and conclusions about congressional behavior and representation. However, despite the significant insights to be had through detailed examinations of political elites, it remains an under-utilized approach in political science. Writing nearly a decade-and-a-half after the publication of *Home Style* Fenno declared:

> Political scientists ought to learn about politicians by talking to them, watching them and following them around. Some research can be done by bringing politicians--aspiring, active or retired--to the academic work place. But most of it must be done in the setting in which politicians operate, in their natural habitats. The aim is to see the world as they see it, to adopt their vantage point on politics. For it is precisely this view, from over the politician's shoulder, that is now missing from academic research (Fenno 1990, 2).

Fenno is not alone in his assertion that important insights are to be gained by observing and talking with politicians in order to "see the world as they see it." Research based on interviews and observations of political elites has provided invaluable contributions to the literature in several subfields. Among the more intensive of these

endeavors is Robert Putnam's investigation of civic traditions and democracy in Italy, which was largely based on interviews with dozens of political elites over the course of several years (1993). Others have focused explicitly, and in some cases intensively, on elite perceptions and behavior in their examinations of, among other things, the decision processes of potential congressional candidates (Fowler and McClure 1989; Kazee 1994), presidential leadership (Skowronek 1984), and the influence of elite perceptions and decisions on electoral outcomes (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). While these scholars utilized a wide variety of data gathering and analytical techniques, they share an interest in and respect for the role of elites in the political arena. Indeed, a focus on elites, given the quality and depth of the data it tends to uncover, is especially useful where a phenomenon has been previously unexplored (or under-explored), where significant changes have altered the parameters of the phenomenon, or where the subjective judgements of political actors influence particular outcomes (Leedy 1989, 144; see also Apter 1977, 35).

While the study of political elites has a long tradition in political science, efforts to systematize the endeavor are rare. Given the wide variations that exist in the environments in which various political elites are situated, identifying a common logic or set of standards that applies to the approach more broadly is difficult. Lane, however, has identified five core components of an elite-focused research method she terms "concrete theory" (1990). This method is characterized by (1) a focus on decision makers (usually political elites) instead of mass publics, (2) an expanded notion of self-interest not circumscribed by purely economic motives, (3) careful attention to the environment in

which elites interact with other political actors and make decisions, (4) the use of a "strong logical quality" to explain the "action" the researcher observes, and (5) an overriding emphasis on specificity rather than generalizability[8] (928). Lane's articulation of "concrete theory"[9] is innovative in that she provides several examples of this approach in the literature, even though the scholars employing the approach did not consciously design their research to adhere to the standards she identifies.

Support for the several characteristics in Lane's concrete theory method can be found throughout the broader political science and, more particularly, in recent methodological treatises. Perhaps most notably, King, Keohane and Verba have sought to place qualitative research on equal scientific footing with more traditional quantitative research (1994). Above all else, they argue that the same logic of inference so familiar in quantitative research ought to be applied more consistently and explicitly in qualitative research:

> Researchers committed to the study of social phenomena who choose not to use formal quantitative procedures cannot afford to ignore sources of bias and inefficiency created by methodologically unreflective research designs. . .To make valid inferences, qualitative researchers will need to be more attuned to methodological issues than they have traditionally been (229).

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[8] In more formally scientific terms, concrete theory is more concerned with internal rather than external validity. Accuracy and detail about the particular events, people and circumstances in a study are accordingly given greater weight than the applicability of the study's findings to broader populations outside the study.

[9] While many of the components of concrete theoretic research can be seen in isolation throughout political science research, it is their existence as a "cluster" in one research design, Lane suggests, that places a scholar's work under this heading.

This charge to qualitative researchers is consistent with Lane's support for qualitative analyses that have a "strong logical quality," which makes possible valid inferences about the phenomena being examined.[10] Elsewhere, the emphasis on specificity Lane prescribes in elite research has been noted for its ability to provide rich, sometimes unexpected detail (see Manheim and Rich 1986, 133). There is, however, a corresponding drawback--an interview technique that varies across respondents and is conducted with small, sometimes unrepresentative, samples make generalizations problematic. The trade-off that is made, i.e. between internal and external validity, however, is one that is made consciously and intentionally. Finally, other methodologists have supported Lane's emphasis on environmental issues, arguing that elite-focused research is most effective and valid when scholars pay attention to context (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 275-6; Brown 1986, 167-9).

Although Lane does not cite Fenno's work as an example, a review of his research in *Home Style* reveals a surprising amount of congruence between his methodology and Lane's notion of concrete theory. Most obviously, Fenno's research was explicitly focused on a particular group of political elites— members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Second, he applied a slightly expanded notion of economic self-interest to his assessments of the politicians he observed. As I discussed in the preceding chapter,

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[10] It is important to note that King, et. al strongly object to the last component of Lane's concrete theory. They maintain that generalizability is the primary purpose of studying individual cases and that sacrificing generalizability in order to gain more detailed and perhaps trivial knowledge about those cases is "unscientific." I agree with Lane, however, that critically important information about the nature of political phenomenon lies in the details, details which can only be seen if one emphasizes the particular and, sometimes, sacrifices the generalizability of their findings in the process.

Fenno suggested in *Home Style* that House members pursue reelection as an "instrumental goal," the realization of which would facilitate the pursuit of other goals they might have (1978, 217-22). Third, Fenno not only *talked* to members in their districts, but he also *observed* them by following them around, paying careful attention to various environmental factors that seemed to influence member behavior. At speeches, rallies, debates, parades, picnics, strategy and policy sessions, and even during personal "down time," Fenno observed House members interacting with others in their "natural environments." As an outsider, he tried to understand the relevance and impact of various contextual influences by talking to members, staffers and even constituents about the things he observed. Fourth, Fenno based his conclusions about members' home styles not on rigorous statistical models, but on careful and logical interpretations of his observations. His research, although more qualitative than quantitative, did not yield purely normative findings. His research and conclusions were empirical in every sense of the word. Finally, Fenno's is an example of Lane's "concrete theory" because of its overt focus on specificity rather than generalizability. Given his small non-random sample of eighteen House members, Fenno was careful not make broad generalizations about the home behavior of all House members. He was able, however, to make detailed significant observations about the influences that effect particular members' behavior in their districts and the stylistic patterns that emerge from their various responses to those influences.

While Lane's articulation of concrete theory came more than ten years after Fenno conducted and reported his research, the methodological typology she offers is an

accurate description of the kind of work done by scholars like Fenno. More broadly, as she has argued, this kind of research can be identified in the work of numerous political scientists. Given my interest in House member behavior on Capitol Hill, it is a particularly useful approach for my examination of members' Washington styles. Most obviously, my focus is on members of the House of Representatives. Additionally, as I noted in Chapter One, I apply an expansive notion of self-interest to House members, namely Parker's view that members seek to "maximize discretion" (1992). In addition to my formal interviews and informal conversations with members and staffers, I also paid careful attention to the context in which members seek to balance the influences of home and the influences of Washington as they work on the Hill. I also rely on a logical interpretation of my data, rather than rigorous statistical analysis, to make inferences about the behavior I observed. Finally, I am much more focused on providing specific details about individual members' styles of behavior in Washington than I am in providing generalizations about member behavior more broadly.[11] As I discuss below, however, my research differs from Fenno's methodology in *Home Style* in that I place a greater emphasis on interviews than on intense observation.

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[11] In the end, I believe that most of my findings about the members included in my study are, in fact, generalizable to all members of Congress. However, the extent to which they are will have to be determined by future research, based on the concepts and categorizations I present below.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As I began my research on the Washington styles of House members, my first objective was to devise a strategy for observing House members at work on Capitol Hill. If, indeed, there are particular aspects of representation and representational linkage that must be examined in Washington, from "over the shoulder" of House members, I had to put myself in a position to observe them. Fortuitously, I was afforded a unique opportunity, beginning in November of 1995, to work on Capitol Hill as an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow. For nine months, I worked in a congressional office as a legislative assistant, observing members of Congress at work, in some cases literally "over their shoulders." During that time I had the opportunity to interact with members of Congress, staffers, lobbyists and other political actors on the Hill in both formal and informal settings. For the better part of a year, I had extensive access to members of Congress, in their "natural habitat." It proved to be the ideal opportunity to examine the question at hand.

Fenno emphasized the importance of *observing* members in their districts as he studied their home styles. Given the very different research contexts of Capitol Hill and members' districts, however, I determined that I would not be able to gain the kind of intimate access to members in Washington that Fenno did in their districts. On the Hill there are numerous times and places at which a researcher would not be welcome. The Cloak Room (where members often gather for informal discussions), party caucus meetings, and other member-to-member strategy sessions are closed to the public. Consequently, I decided that I would observe House members in as many different

contexts as possible. but in order to gain insights about their interactions and conversations with other members behind closed doors. I would have to talk to members and their staffs. Recognizing that the observations I made would be incomplete and that the responses members made to my questions in interviews were potentially biased (and therefore somewhat invalid), I employed a multi-dimensional research strategy. To overcome the problems of incomplete and potentially biased data, I made every effort to measure members' behavior from multiple perspectives and by using multiple methods.

The research I conducted while working on the Hill was. in fact, comprised of three distinct components.[12] First, I observed the behavior of House members as a participant in the Congress, working on the Hill for ten months as a legislative assistant.[13] Second. I conducted thirty-six, thirty to ninety minute interviews with members of Congress and congressional staffers. Third, and finally, I regularly and consistently examined the written records, documents, and published periodicals distributed on

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[12] Assessing the same phenomenon through multiple perspectives is often referred to as triangulation, a process by which a researcher examines a problem from serval different frames of reference in such a way that the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective and method compliment each other (see Leedy 1989, 143-4).

[13] As a congressional staffer, I had numerous opportunities to interact with and observe House members, both Republicans and Democrats, and their staffers at work in committee meetings, on the floor and in other more informal settings. While my observations of these members were not systematic, i.e. I did not consciously observe multiple members in the same setting or the same members in multiple settings in order to compare and contrast their behavior, I was nonetheless able to glean numerous insights by watching and interacting with members under various circumstances. These observations informed my interviews with members and guided me in my efforts to understand members' Washington styles.

Capitol Hill.[14] While I did not subject these documents to a rigorous contents analysis,[15] they nonetheless provided numerous additional insights which supported and enhanced both my participant observation and interview data. Each of these methods and sources of data served as check points at which I was able to compare, contrast, and critically assess the sometimes conflicting information I gathered about members' Washington Styles.

Because of my focus on individual House members, I faced practical limitations on the number of representatives I could interview and observe. Additionally, the literature on members Washington styles is largely undeveloped. Consequently, I was unsure about which questions were most important to ask of which members. The small number of cases I would be able to study and the exploratory nature of my research moved my research in a decidedly qualitative direction. Like many scholars who study elites, my focus would also be more on the internal validity of my observations than on their reliability or generalizability. As such, I will make inferences about the behavioral styles of particular House members throughout this dissertation, but any extension of these inferences to the membership of the House as a whole will be suggestive. By establishing the relevant and most important aspects of members' Washington styles in this dissertation I will, perhaps, set the stage for more systematic and methodical investigations in the future. The kind of research I report in the pages below is not the "normal science" of hypothesis testing. Instead, it is hypothesis *generating* research. The

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[14] These publications include *Congressional Quarterly's Weekly Report, Congress Daily, Roll Call, The Hill*, and internal memos, letters, and other documents.

[15] The sheer volume of written material on the Hill would render such a task a life-long pursuit.

hypotheses or "generative ideas" born out of qualitative research are "essential to our rational, intelligent ability to understand what goes on around us" and are, as such, an important part of political science (Apter 1977, 35; King, et. al 1994, 37-8). Given the kind of data I gathered, my analyses and conclusions are rooted in an intimate familiarity with the members I observed and their environments. As I have made my inferences about member behavior and the influences on that behavior, I have strived to adhere to the standards of scientific research and inference; but, I have based those inferences more on theory and logic than on quantitative analyses.[16]

Research Context

When I arrived in Washington, D.C. in November of 1995, the 104th Congress was in the midst of a budget battle with the President that ultimately resulted in a temporary government shutdown. Ten months previous, in January of the same year, the Republicans had officially assumed majority leadership status in the House and eagerly gone to work on the ambitious legislative agenda spelled out in their "Contract with America." Not a year later, House Republicans were on the brink of losing a major public relations battle to the President and their Democratic colleagues in the Congress. Opinion polls showed them getting most of the blame for the budgetary impasse. Widely publicized gaffes by the Speaker of the House only made matters worse. My tenure on the Hill, then, began at a difficult and unsettled time for many House members. The most

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[16] Apter has suggested that political science ought to accord greater respect to theoretical and logical analysis instead of "scientific" statistical analyses that yield statistically valid findings which are often "theoretically misleading or unimportant" (1977, 35).

interesting story of the second half of the 104th Congress, in my estimation, was the series of transitions and adjustments being made by both parties in the Congress as they came to grips with their new roles, as well as the adjustments made by individual members struggling to develop or maintain a politically acceptable balance between their roles at home and their roles on the Hill.

There are several factors about the 104th Congress that set it apart from the Congresses that have been convened in the several decades immediately preceding it. Most significantly, it was the first Congress in which a new majority party organized the House since 1954. Additionally, there was a substantial partisan undercurrent in the 1994 elections that spilled into the 104th Congress. In 1994, not a single Republican incumbent lost a reelection bid to the House, while several Democrats were defeated. The large freshman class, though smaller than the one elected in 1992, also had an obvious partisan slant– 75 of the 83 new members in the class were Republicans. By most accounts, the result was that the 104th Congress was one of the most partisan Congresses in recent memory. Furthermore, the change in majority party control in the House disrupted long-standing traditions and power balances within the House. Legislative Service Organization (official House caucuses) were de-funded and de-institutionalized. Personal and committee staff allowances were cut dramatically. And Democrats, accustomed to chairing committees and running the business of the House on the floor, now found themselves responding the Republican agenda.

Given the unique events and happenings of the 104th Congress, one might surmise that it represents an "outlier" case, the observation of which would produce interesting yet

not very representative information about the House of Representatives. Indeed, the quality of the kind of research I have conducted is dependent upon making observations of people and their behavior in their appropriate sociopolitical contexts.[17] However, while I do not deny the uniqueness of the 104th Congress, I maintain that the very things which made it unique also made it the perfect Congress in which to study members' Washington styles. In a Congress in which the pressures of party and ideology were heightened, members were more likely to have a particularly difficult time balancing personal, district and national interests in their work on the Hill. Furthermore, the Republicans that signed the "Contract" were even more likely to experience tension in their efforts to represent their local constituencies while remaining loyal to their party, its members and its goals. Additionally, studying members' styles in a time of institutional upheaval provided a rare opportunity to observe members adjusting and refining their Washington styles in response to the changing political environment on the Hill. Members attempting to preserve long-held styles were more keenly aware of what it takes to maintain a stable Washington style. Moreover, the heightened competitiveness for majority party control of the House expanded the importance of the parties' electoral activities, as well as the electoral and legislative activities of interest groups busily adjusting to the new order of things in Washington. Throughout this dissertation, then, I will note those instances in which the more peculiar aspects of the 104th Congress seemed

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[17] The research presented here is probably best termed ethnographic or phenomenological research, which is focused on understanding individuals' perceptions and the interplay between the context of those perceptions and the resulting behavioral patterns of the persons being observed (see Moustakas 1994, 11-6).

to exert influence on members' perceptions, behavior, and or styles and members' responses to those influences. As I do so, I hope to provide insights not only about the factors that shape members' approaches to their Washington work under normal circumstances, but also about their responses to significant political change.

Interviewing Members of Congress

Ideally, research on the behavior of any group, or population, should be based on an examination of a scientifically random, and therefore representative, sample of that group. As any experienced survey researcher knows, however, drawing a good sample and actually securing interviews with everyone in that sample are two very different things. If some of the individuals in the sample a researcher draws refuse to participate, the results can be biased and, therefore, nongeneralizable. This is especially true if the rate of nonresponse is high or if those who refuse to cooperate are somehow systematically different from those who agree to be surveyed (see Fowler 1993, 40). Since a high response rate tends to compensate for the problems caused by a small group of unique nonresponders, it is critical for researchers to get the highest rate of cooperation they can from the individuals in the samples they draw.

As problematic as nonresponse can be for survey researchers, it is even more serious for those conducting interviews with political elites. While it is relatively easy for researchers to draw a good sample of elites to interview (because comprehensive population lists are more readily available), it is far more difficult to secure and complete interviews with elites. This is at least as true with members of Congress as it is with other elites that political scientists might be interested in studying. Members of Congress

are busy people. Consequently, they are very jealous of their time, especially their time in Washington. In fact, virtually every House member has a full-time scheduler who keeps track of his or her obligations in Washington, keeping unimportant and unnecessary things off of their schedules. In a typical day, a member of Congress casts votes on the floor, attends committee hearings and bill "mark-ups", participates in party and other caucus meetings, meets with constituents, lobbyists, and other members, takes calls from the press, attends a handful of receptions, and, if time permits, spends some time raising money for his or her upcoming election campaign.

All of this is to say that when members of Congress are at work in Washington, amenable though they might be to academic pursuits, they do not have a lot of time to spend talking with political scientists. Scheduling and completing interviews with members in Washington, then, is not a simple thing to do. In fact, interviewing a scientifically random sample of House members is next to impossible. The reality, and primary obstacle, for those conducting interview-based research on the Hill is that there are literally thousands of individuals and groups with whom they must compete for time with members of Congress. The best a researcher can do is send out multiple requests, be persistent in following-up on those requests, and complete interviews with a sample of members that roughly mirrors the House as a whole. There are things one can do to make sure his or her sample is representative, such as flexibly targeting subpopulations that are under-represented as their research progresses, but there is no feasible way to draw and interview a completely random sample of House members.

Once an interview is secured, researchers must still worry about the quality of the access they will get. For the purposes of my research, I needed to spend at least thirty minutes with each member I interviewed. The quality of a thirty-minute interview, however, can vary dramatically from one interview to the next. In each case, I had to compete with distractions--the telephone, staffers, other visitors, floor votes, etc.--that threatened pull the member's attention away from the interview. Additionally, members' moods and comfort levels with academics can significantly influence the amount and kind of information a researcher is able to glean from them. Members who are skeptical of academics or who, for some reason or another, are in the middle of a bad day, are likely to be less forthcoming than they might otherwise be.[18]

While the problems associated with conducting interview-based research on the Hill are significant, the fact remains that members of Congress can serve as insightful windows to the inner-workings of the House of Representatives, both individually and collectively. They are, after all, the people who make the institution run. They are the women and men who organize and run the House, draft and introduce legislation therein, and cast votes that establish the policy positions of the House. More significantly, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is each individual House member who must react to various political influences and strike an acceptable balance between their local and national responsibilities. As they do so, they are assisted and advised by their staff and other members. The decisions they make , though, are theirs and theirs alone.

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[18] Even under such circumstances, however, important details about members' Washington styles can be observed, such as how members respond to stressful, uncomfortable, or simply unusual circumstances on the Hill.

Consequently, the perspectives of individual House members are invaluable pieces of the intricate puzzle that is congressional representation. To be valid, then, an account of Washington style must be based, at least in large part, on members' own accounts of their activities on the Hill.

Securing the Interview

The key to securing an interview with a member of Congress is his or her scheduler. The scheduler's job, usually performed in consultation with the chief of staff, is to make sure that the member of Congress does all that he or she *must* do during a given day, while working in as many of the important, but not essential, things as possible. In virtually ever office, there are decision rules about who and what gets on the member's schedule and who and what does not. For example, in more than one instance, I was told by a scheduler that the member "doesn't participate in research projects." Other schedulers informed me that their members simply do not meet with people who are not from their districts. Assuming that an interview request is not eliminated on the basis of some such rule, the scheduler then ranks the request according to its relative importance, given all other requests that have been made for the member's time. Some members have standing orders to their schedulers to work in academic interviews wherever possible (this is especially true of members who have advanced academic degrees).[19] In most other

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[19] A potential problem associated with interview-based research on the Hill is that scholars may end up interviewing the same subset of members, or at least kind of members, who are willing to be interviewed. The most overwhelming source of bias in such research efforts, then, stems form the non-participation of a consistently large group of members who cannot be bothered by academics. I attempt to control for this bias, at least in part, by asking members not only about themselves, but about other members they know. This is, however, an admittedly imperfect solution. The best remedy is the same

instances, though, persistence is all that prevents the scheduler from constantly putting a request at the bottom of the pile.

In my efforts to secure interviews with House members, I was nothing if not persistent. I made my interview requests by first hand delivering a letter, on academic letterhead, to the schedulers in the offices of the members I wanted to interview. In order to keep my correspondence with schedulers manageable, I made my initial requests in several "waves." The first wave was a trial run, consisting of only three letters. In all, I delivered ninety-six letters in nine waves. In the letter, I explained that I was doing dissertation research on members' Washington styles and that I would like to speak with the member for fifteen minutes[20] on that subject (see Appendix 1 for the full text of the letter). I created a database of the offices and schedulers of whom I had made interview requests and began making follow-up calls, usually three or four days after delivering the letter. On average, it took four follow-up phone calls to a scheduler before I was able to schedule an interview. I was eventually able to interview all three of the members with whom I requested interviews in the first wave. The second wave of requests, which I delivered to ten offices, produced four interviews. A summary of each request wave and the success rate of each is summarized in Table 2-1.

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one used by survey researchers--patience and determination in securing interviews with "sampled" individuals.

[20] I requested only fifteen minutes because, based on conversations with a handful of schedulers and other scholars who have done interviews with members in Washington, I found that requests for more time are routinely rejected. Once a fifteen minute appointments is scheduled, however, interviewers are almost always able to spend thirty or forty minutes with the member.

Table 2-1.
Interview Request Waves and Success Rates

Wave	Date	Number of Requests	Number of Interviews	Success Rate (%)
1	January 22, 1996	3	3	100
2	January 26-30, 1996	10	3	30
3	February 7-13, 1996	11	7	67
4	March 5-15, 1996	3	1	33
4	March 18-22, 1996	9	2	22
5	April 30-May 1, 1996	14	3	21
6	May 15-28, 1996	2	1	50
7	June 10-19, 1996	21	4	19
8	June 26-28, 1996	17	4	24
9	July 11, 1996	6	0	0
ALL	TOTAL	96	28	29%

Out of the ninety-six interview requests I made, I was able to complete twenty-eight interviews. In eight other cases, where I was not able to meet with the member, I was able to interview a senior staffer in the member's office. With each new wave of letters I delivered, I focused on particular groups of members in order to make my sample as representative as possible. For example, I focused on African-American members in one wave and on women in another. At first glance, the chart seems to suggest that my success in securing interviews was higher the earlier I made the interview request. This makes some sense because, in those cases, I was able to make more follow-up phone calls and eventually secure interviews. However, the frequency of follow-up calls was not the only factor related to the success of scheduling an interview. This became evident because of a mistake I made early on in my research. In my first interview requests, I asked to meet with the House members any time during the several months I was to be on the Hill. In retrospect, this encouraged several schedulers to put my request on the bottom of the pile, thinking they would try to fit me into the member's schedule in a couple of months. Alternatively, when I requested interviews "as soon as possible," as I did in the latter stages of my time on the Hill, I promptly received an appointment or a definite "cannot be scheduled" message from the scheduler. Overall, however, I was satisfied with my success rate, which was comparable to that experienced by two other congressional fellows who were conducting interviews with members on the Hill during the same time frame.

In the end, the twenty-eight members I interviewed represent a broad and fairly representative cross-section of the House as a whole (see Table 2-2). My sample,

Table 2-2.
Comparison of Interview Sample with Entire House

	Sample	**House of Representatives** (At End of 104th Congress)
Number of Members	28	435
Republicans	17 (60.7%)	236 (54.3%)
Democrats	11 (39.3%)	198 (45.5%)
Women	5 (17.9%)	48 (11.0%)
African-Americans	6 (21.4%)	38 (8.7%)
Freshmen	6 (21.4%)	83 (19.1%)
Committee Chairs or Ranking Members	3 (10.7%)	40 (9.2%)
Subcommittee Chairs or Ranking Members	8 (28.6%)	192 (44.1%)

however, differs from the House in a few significant ways. For example, during my last month on the Hill, I completed several more interviews with Republicans than with Democrats. Consequently, in spite of my best efforts, my sample is slightly Republican heavy. The Republicans in my sample, however, include one member who switched parties during the 104th Congress. Without that member, the percentage of Republicans in my sample is only 57.1%, much closer to the actual House percentage of 54.3. Additionally, my sample contains a higher proportion of women and African-Americans than are actually in the House, as well as a lower proportion of subcommittee chairs and ranking subcommittee members. The disproportionate number of women and African-Americans, however, allows for a more careful examination of the Washington styles of different subsets of members in the House. Furthermore, the slight under-representation of subcommittee chairs and ranking members is not profound enough to be worrisome. In spite of being in Washington during a very hectic Congress, which saw, in addition to frequent recesses, a blizzard and two government shutdowns, I was able to complete a sufficient number of interviews with a sample of members that is representative and diverse enough to allow valid inferences about different members' Washington styles and their origins.[21]

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[21] Every researcher who undertakes small-n qualitative research is bound to be asked: "Do you have enough observations to accurately describe and explain the relationships you observed?" The answer to this question, however, is not straightforward. In fact, it varies from one research effort to the next, "depend[ing] greatly on the research design, what causal inference the investigator is trying to estimate, and some features of the world not under control of the investigator" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 213). At a minimum, an investigator must have more observations than inferences he or she wishes to make. However, time and money constraints often pose insurmountable dilemmas to scholars' efforts to increase their sample size. Given the

Interview Quality

As noted above, the most important aspect of elite interviewing, beyond securing an interview and gaining access, is gaining *quality* access. While there are several ways to evaluate quality of access, the two most important factors are probably the amount of time allowed for an interview and the candor of the interviewee. The first measure is straightforward. As I had hoped, my "fifteen minute interviews" lasted, in all but one case, at least twice that long. While one interview lasted just under half an hour, most members spoke with me for about forty-five minutes. Four members spoke with me for an hour or longer. Only a handful seemed impatient and rushed during the interview. In each of these cases, the members were either interrupted several times--by phone calls and staffers--or they were forced to leave during the interview to vote on the floor. Even in these cases, however, the members were generous and accommodating with their time.

While accounting for the amount of time spent with a member is a simple matter of watching the clock, the question of candor much more difficult to evaluate. Upon the conclusion of each interview, I recorded, along with my interview notes, my general impressions of the member and the quality of the interview. In two cases, I felt very strongly that the member was on his or her guard and that I got little more from them than I would have from a press account of their Washington behavior. In one case this was due to the presence of a reporter from the congressman's district who was "shadowing" him for the day. Beyond these two interviews, however, I felt that the members I interviewed

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duration and nature of the research I conducted and the sample sizes of other similar research efforts (Fenno observed fourteen House members for *Home Style*), I am satisfied with my sample of twenty-eight members and eight staffers.

were being open and honest with me. For some members that meant sharing some confidential anecdotes about their own Hill work while for other members that meant candidly assessing the legislative prowess and intellectual capacities of their fellow members. The data I gathered from my interviews provides a rich and detailed account of members' perceptions and styles of work in Washington. In fact, several of the members I spoke with had obviously thought about the issues I addressed. Accordingly, they offered thoughtful insights about both their own perceptions and behavior on the Hill, as well as the perceptions and behavior of other members.

The Interview "Instrument"

As I began my research on the Hill, I knew, in broad terms, what I needed to know to say something interesting about members' styles of work in Washington and their representational behavior. For example, I needed to know how members perceived their roles in Washington, who they relied on to help them do their jobs, how they felt about the different activities they engaged in while in Washington, and how and when they interacted with other members. The precise manner in which to address these questions, however, was unclear. I had few, if any, preconceived notions about what a Washington style looked like. My research, then, was much more inductive than deductive. In the first interview I conducted, with a Midwestern Democrat, I asked several broad questions: What are your perceptions of representation? Is there a difference between your perception of representation at home and your perception when you are in Washington? Why did you run for Congress? What are your reelection goals? What is a successful day in Washington? Are their different styles of work in Washington? What is your style?

While the core of my interview instrument remained unchanged, the answers to the questions I asked in the first several interviews I conducted shed light on dimensions of Washington style that I explored in greater detail in subsequent interviews. (For a more detailed description of the evolution of my interview questions, see Appendix 2.) In particular, the first few members I interviewed consistently placed their comments about their Hill behavior in the context of their relationships with their constituents. Consequently, as my interviews progressed, I focused more on these relationships, asking members about the tensions between their work in Washington and their work back home and the things they did to cultivate their constituent relationships through the things they did in Washington. In addition to refining the focus of my questions about members' perceptions and Hill behavior, my earlier interviews also equipped me with information and insights on which I was able to base more detailed and specific questions to members in later interviews. For example, in more than one instance, I was able to ask a member about particular incident during which he or she had interacted with another member I had interviewed. By asking two or more members about the same event and their perceptions of it, I was able to gain insights about how differently members perceived themselves and approached their work on the Hill. In general, then, the follow-up questions I asked in each succeeding interview were informed by the information I gained in previous interviews. This approach proved very effective as a device for helping members to assess their own styles more thoughtfully.

While the interviews I conducted with staffers were generally focused on the same themes, they were much more tailored to specific aspects of their particular members'

styles and their experiences working with other members. I also engaged in numerous informal conversations and discussions with several staffers throughout my time on Capitol Hill. The fluidity of the interview instrument in my interviews with members and staffers and my more informal discussions with them allowed for much more precise and careful interrogation of specific aspects of Washington style. While the lack of consistency across interviews makes some generalizations impossible, the trade-off in detail is, I believe, well worth it. Based on the interview data and the other information I gathered, I can offer a detailed and accurate account of House members' Washington styles, something that has eluded researchers who have taken more quantitative approaches to the subject. While the generalizability of my categorizations must be established through additional and more systematic research, I provide a much needed starting point for such efforts.

Participant Observation

While the primary focus of my research efforts in Washington was my interviews with members and congressional staffers, I was also able to observe the behavior of members at work on the Hill from the vantage point of a congressional staffer. Working in a congressional office, I became immersed in the intricate interactions and processes of the House, observing members and their staffs at work on a daily basis for nine months. In order to make the most of my first hand research experience, and effectively supplement my interview-based research, I participated in every aspect of congressional work that I could. I also frequently asked questions of other staffers about the behavior of the members I observed and the context in which that behavior was situated. Each day I

kept a journal of my observations, thereby compiling a data base on my observations of members' Washington work.

For the duration of my stay on the Hill, I worked as a legislative assistant in the office of Congressman J.C. Watts, Jr., a freshman Republican from the district I lived in before going to Washington. I chose to work in his office for several reasons. First, and foremost, the legislative director in the office expressed interest in my project and promised that I would be afforded the flexibility to pursue my research on the Hill. Second, since I was already familiar with Congressman Watts' constituency, I had a relatively short learning curve as I plunged into the work I did in his office. This allowed me to quickly become involved in several substantive, even high-profile, projects in the office which gave me excellent exposure to the legislative process and other members and their offices. Finally, I chose Representative Watts office because doing so offered me the opportunity to observe a new member of Congress dealing with the complexities of work on the Hill, trying to sort out a pattern of activity and a style of representation in Washington that was comfortable both to him and to his constituents. While I would not be following several members around on the Hill, I would at least be able to see the Congress from over the shoulder of one member, early in his career.

As it turned out, my selection of offices was even more fortuitous that I realized. Congressman Watts, although a member of the often controversial Republican freshman class of 1994, was one of the best liked members in the 104th Congress. Members of both parties seemed to appreciate his demeanor and personality. In several instances, members from both parties told me that the only reason they agreed to an interview with me was

because I was working in J.C. Watts' office. The Congressman's good rapport with other members opened numerous doorways not only in my quest for interviews but also in my efforts to observe members at work in a variety of different contexts and settings in the House. While working in Congressman Watts' office, I engaged in a wide variety of activities, including answering the telephone, responding to constituent mail, writing bill summaries for the Congressman, monitoring activity on the floor, attending party caucus meetings, participating in strategy sessions with other members and staffers, drafting correspondence between the Congressman and other members, giving speeches and participating on panels in the Congressman's place, attending receptions, meeting with constituents (and sometimes giving them tours), assisting the Congressman with his preparations for speeches on the House floor and giving testimony at hearings, drafting dear colleague letters, and preparing, drafting, and submitting legislation. These activities gave me an intimate awareness of the contours of the job of member of Congress. In a very real sense, I became, along with other staffers in the office, an extension of the member for whom I worked. The perspective I was thus afforded influenced and guided my interview questions and significantly added to my understanding of Washington style and its relevance for congressional representation.

Document-Based Research

As noted above, I recorded my observations as a congressional participant in my research journal along with the insights and anecdotes I gleaned from my conversations with staffers and other Hill actors. I also drew on various news publications, newsletters, and internal House documents, to which I had access on a daily basis. While the Congress

receives a significant amount of attention in the mainstream media, there are several specialized publications in which congressional coverage is amazingly detailed. The best known of these is the *CQ Weekly Report*. Additionally, there are two bi-weekly newspapers distributed on Capitol Hill--*Roll Call* and *The Hill*--as well as several daily legislative and political newsletters, including the *Congressional Monitor* (published by Congressional Quarterly) and *Congress Daily* (published by the *National Journal*). Beyond these publicly accessible periodicals, there are hundreds of other documents, letters, schedules, and briefings that pass through House members' offices each day. These range from personally addressed letters sent between members (but usually written and read by staffers nonetheless) to correspondence from important, i.e. high-profile, constituents, to internal party and House documents.

In conjunction with my first-hand observations, the published and printed material I studied each day in the Congressman's office provided a detailed view of the House and the activities of its members. Through these documents I gathered an abundance of information--not only about the legislative calendar and the status of various legislative proposals, but also about members' personalities and activities on the Hill--that supplemented and enhanced my interview data. . In several instances, I was able to ask very detailed questions about particular aspects of members' Washington styles based on information I had gleaned from these publications and documents. My observations as a congressional staffer, then, dovetailed quite well with the more formally collected and recorded data from my interviews, allowing me to assess the same data from multiple perspectives, just as I had hoped to be able to do.

III. ORGANIZING AND ANALYZING THE DATA

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of qualitative research is saying something meaningful and relevant about the data after it has been collected. The researcher must be able to skillfully split the difference between anecdotal overload and, alternatively, presenting a too sterilized account of the object of his or her research. As much as any other methodology in political science, the success of qualitative research rests squarely on the ability of the researcher to use the detail-rich data they collect in a way that provides a theoretically compelling interpretation of the political phenomenon they have examined. Additionally, qualitative research must be presented in such a way that the strengths of the method are underscored without overreaching. As I have noted, qualitative research is an excellent way to uncover detailed information about a subject, producing valid descriptive data, but it is less appropriate as a means for collecting reliable information that would allow a researcher to make generalizations across an entire population. Interpretations of qualitative data, then, must focus on the patterns that emerge among the observed sample and the implications of those patterns in their sociopolitical contexts without attempting to directly extrapolate those findings to the entire population. To the extent that a researcher uses multiple methods and data sources to analyze a phenomenon, however, reliability issues become less of a concern. Ultimately, the researcher bears the burden of establishing, for his or her readers, the amount of validity and reliability that should be ascribed to the research he or she presents (see Goldenberg 1992, 340).

As I present my research findings on the Washington styles of members of Congress in the pages that follow, I am acutely aware of the challenges of effectively presenting qualitative research. The obvious first step in developing such a presentation is to make sense of the data I had collected, not through a purely empirical search for patterns in my data, but rather by assessing the accuracy of hypothesized relationships in light of the data assembled. The validity of the observed patterns can be further evaluated by checking it against data collected from other sources and through different means. Sorting through an enormous amount of qualitative data is an intensive and time consuming process. Consequently, it is appropriate that this process began my first day at work on the Hill, rather than at the end of my last day there. Each day as I recorded my observations in my research journal and transcribed my interview notes, I brought together, in my mind and in my notes, the loose ends that appeared during the day. If I observed new behavioral patterns, I found a place for them in the framework or model I was developing. During this time, I also made it a habit to read Fenno's *Home Style*, Mayhew's *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, and other books about Hill life to keep my theoretical focus sharp. By so doing, I constantly poked and prodded not only my data but my own understanding of it. As I developed new concepts of Washington style and dimensions within those concepts, I incorporated them into my interviews and my less formal observations and conversations with other actors on the Hill. As I did so, it was helpful to constantly come back to the same questions, again and again: What is Washington style? and Why does it matter? The resulting process amounted to a gradual,

i.e. more evolutionary than revolutionary, refining of my model and the variables of which it consists.

Still, by the conclusion of my time on the Hill, I had not completely made sense of all the data I had collected. This was, I think in large part, due to the fact that, as a participant, I was too involved in the daily intricacies of the House to see the larger contours that were manifesting themselves before me. With time and distance, I was able to revisit my observations (as recorded in my research journal) and my interview notes and identify patterns that I had not noticed while I was collecting my data. The information I collected amounted to three large data bases--my transcribed interview notes, my research journal, and a large stack of clippings and documents relating to Washington style, all compiled during the nine months I worked on the Hill. Building on the framework that I had developed while in Washington, I began to refine its various components, developing, expanding, and contracting where necessary. This was not, however, a straight forward process. Unlike the quantitative statistician, I did not rely on mathematical model to derive summaries of my data. This kind of analysis has drawbacks I wanted to avoid. As Fiorina has argued:

> Too often it seems that the increasing availability of electronic computing facilities, data banks, and canned statistical packages has encouraged a concomitant decline in the use of our own capabilities. Rather than hypothesize we factor analyze, regress, or causal model. We speak of empirical theory as it if miraculously grows out of a cumulation of empirical findings, rather than as a logical structure one must carefully construct to explain those findings. (Fiorina 1974, 24).

As Lane urges in her defense of concrete theory, scholars who engage in the qualitative study of elites should rely on their logic and reasoning more than on statistical modeling.

As I sought to logically analyze my data, one of my tasks was the categorization of various observations of the variables in which I am interested. As I have conceived and reconceived my coding schemes, I have kept in my mind Almond's views on the enterprise: "The scientific approach to categorization is the modest approach of the coder, rather than that of the philosopher. . .There is constant revision of the code as it is used to organize data. . .[O]ur categories. . .have a short and instrumental life, and we avoid becoming their prisoners" (Almond 1966, 879). In essence, I have sought to develop exhaustive and mutually exclusive categorizations for each variable I observed, but I have tried not to be so tied to any one operationalization that my creativity and flexibility are limited. Rather I have sought to maintain an open approach to my classifications an my analyses thereof.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although it does not account for every nuanced difference between members' styles of work in Washington, the framework presented below provides a positively accurate and theoretically consistent account of the perceptions and behavior or members or the U.S. House of Representatives when they are on Capitol Hill. Not only does this framework provide a basis for understanding House members' Washington styles and the implications of those styles for congressional representation and linkage, but it also, I believe, provides the basis for future examinations of legislative behavior that are more systematic and readily comparable to examinations of legislators in other representative bodies.

Indeed, the data I present below form the basis for a multi-faceted model of the Washington styles of the twenty-eight House members I interviewed and observed. This model suggests that House members adopt distinct behavioral patterns as they balance local, personal and national goals on Capitol Hill. By approaching the question of Washington style from an adaptive and qualitative perspective, I have uncovered previously misunderstood or unrealized aspects of members' work in the House of Representatives.

CHAPTER 3: THE VIEW FROM THE HILL

Every man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world.
Arthur Schopenhauer

In *Federalist* No. 52, Madison wrote: "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on and an intimate sympathy with, the people." This statement implies that, in their efforts to balance personal, local and national interests, House members should, at a minimum, give careful consideration to the will and interest of the people they represent. Madison and the other Framers sought to encourage such considerations by establishing biennial elections. Electoral outcomes, by themselves, however, tell us little about the amount of sympathy members of the House have for their constituents and the degree to which they feel dependent on them. Although election campaigns and victories form the basis of the representational relationships between members and their constituents, the character of those relationships is determined by things that are less easily observed.

Not only do members' perceptions play a central role in shaping their relationships with the people back home, but they also have a direct impact on their behavior in Washington. Members perceptions of their electoral circumstances, the expectations of their constituents, the political climate in Washington and even of themselves influence the ways they approach their work on Capitol Hill. The extensive discussion and analysis of various member perceptions presented in this chapter, then, provides the foundation for the introduction and discussion of members' Washington styles in the chapter that follows. Even more fundamentally than their impact on

discernable patterns of Washington behavior. however, members' perceptions influence the full breadth of their everyday activities in the Congress.

I. THE VIEW FROM THE HILL

A campaign for a U.S. House seat tends to be an emotionally and physically demanding undertaking. A successful candidate is likely to have spent several months' worth of long days talking to constituents, knocking on doors, making fund-raising calls, debating, participating in town hall meetings. riding in parades, holding press conferences. and numerous other campaign-related activities. For the most part, campaign-related activities are confined to a House member's congressional district–they are things done at home. Once an election is won, however, the same person who devoted untold hours of time and energy to local concerns and local relationships must go to Washington and participate in a national legislative assembly. Of course, when members of Congress leave their districts and head to Washington, they do not forget about their constituents and their concerns. On the contrary, as members commence their work in the Congress, there is no more uniformly powerful influence on their behavior than the people they represent and the local interests they have promised to defend. Although physically separated from Washington, the concerns of home are intimately connected to the concerns of Capitol Hill in the minds of House members.

What do members of Congress see when they are in Washington? And, what are the implications of their perceptions for their Washington behavior?[22] The answers to these questions are important pieces to the puzzle of congressional representation. For example, we know that House members are supported by individual constituents for a wide variety of reasons.[23] But how do members perceive their support back home? Some research indicates that House members, especially new ones, routinely misperceive the sources of their electoral support (Fowler 1980). New members are particularly susceptible to the illusion that every voter who supported them simultaneously endorsed the policy agendas they ran on. More than one member of the House has been elected, however, not because his or her platform was overwhelmingly popular but because his or her opponent was overwhelmingly *un*popular. Newly elected House members also leave the campaign atmosphere of home for the interest group atmosphere in Washington where most of the political action committees that contributed to their campaigns have

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[22] Some scholars have suggested that members' "personality differences" have more influence on their behavior in Washington that political scientists have been willing to concede (Payne 1980). While I agree with this assertion, I believe that a focus on members' perceptions captures the effects of personality without getting bogged down in psychological analysis.

[23] Historically, the literature on congressional elections suggested that voters' support for House candidates was almost exclusively driven by "national factors," such as partisan affiliations, presidential popularity and the state of the economy (see Niemi and Weisberg 1984, 199). The current literature, however, provides evidence that a candidate's "image," comprised of party affiliation, issue stances, electoral status, on-screen presence, pre-election popularity, and a hundred other factors, is what voters judge on elections day (Wattenberg 1990, 1991; Ragsdale 1980). True enough, some voters place greater emphasis on some components of a candidate's image than others (most notably party affiliation); however, a candidate's district-wide support cannot accurately be said to flow from one, two, or even three components of his or her image.

full-time lobbyists at work. Consequently, members must decided how they will interact with these interests in the legislative process. As they do so, most members are likely to consider the ties between these groups and their constituencies and the congruence between the goals of each group and their own personal goals on the Hill. However it is that members perceive their relationships with their constituents, interests and others back home and on the Hill, these perceptions have a significant impact on what they do in Washington.

One new House member I interviewed, for example, believed that his constituents supported him because, during his campaign, he expressed unwavering support for the Republican "Contract with America." He perceived that his constituents wanted him to emphasize a "national" agenda in Washington and not worry so much about home. Throughout the 104th Congress, this member devoted the vast majority of his time and energy to the enactment of the "Contract." In 1996, after he was defeated in his bid for reelection, local press accounts in his district attributed his loss to his failure to take care of his district. He had misperceived the source of his support in 1994 and struck a balance between Washington and home of which his constituents did not approve. There are, in fact, numerous opportunities in Washington for members to misinterpret and, as a result, do injury to their relationships with their constituents. Some members allow themselves to get too cozy with interest groups that have interests different from those of their constituents, some focus almost exclusively on their own policy goals without consulting their constituents enough while others simply take their relationships with their constituents for granted and fail to return home as frequently as their constituents expect.

In all such cases, the representational relationship becomes strained and, if it is not repaired, voters will give their support to someone who promises to do better.

While there have been, and certainly will be in the future, House members who inaccurately perceive their relationships with their constituents, it is evident that the vast majority of those in the Congress--especially those who have been around for awhile--have fairly accurate perceptions of what their constituents expect from them. Indeed, most members are able to strike a workable balance between their own goals, their constituents' expectations and party and interest group influences in Washington, at least a balance with which their constituents are satisfied. They are able to do so, in large part, because they accurately perceive what their constituents want from their representative and, perhaps more importantly, what they will not tolerate. If most members did not base their Washington activities on such perceptions, turnover rates in the House would be much higher than they are. It follows, then, that an understanding of the stability and durability of representative-constituent relationships must be based on, at least in part, an understanding of members' perceptions of their support back home and the influence of those perceptions on their work on the Hill.[24]

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[24] It is worth noting that perceptions and reality are never exactly the same. Any given view of the world is, necessarily, a simplification of its inherent complexities and intricacies. To the extent that a members' perceptions facilitate good decisions, i.e. ones that win his or her constituents' favor and facilitate the realization of personal goals, their view of the world has positive utility. However, if perceptions and reality diverge, members are likely to pursue goals or adopt behavioral patterns that are incompatible with constituent and, perhaps, their own interests. No perception, however, is set in stone. In fact, because perceptions are never *exact* reflections of reality, the perceptions on which representational relationships are built (both those of House members and their constituents) are subject to constant challenge, renegotiation, and adjustment.

In addition to members' perceptions of home and Hill, it is also important to understand how members perceive themselves as political actors. In fact, members' perceptions of self have implications both for their relationships with their constituencies as well as for aspects of their Washington work that are not obviously part of their representational relationships. Members of Congress have personal lives and personal goals that, to varying degrees, are not directly related to their formal responsibilities as representatives. They also have personal traits and preferences that influence how they work with other members and how they approach the legislative process. While some of these differences between members effect the way they seek to balance home and Hill, some of these differences are irrelevant to the relationships members have with their constituents. A members'-eye-view from the Hill, then must also include an introspective dimension by paying attention to members' perceptions of themselves.

As I examine members' perceptions in this chapter, I will also pay attention, where appropriate, to the goals House members pursue. There are, however, three important points that need to be made about members' goals. First, while they may be difficult to discern and measure, virtually every House member has goals that he or she pursues while serving in the House. These goals vary widely, ranging from self-interested, short-term goals to altruistic, far-sighted ones. Second, it is possible for a House member to pursue purely "selfish" goals *and* be an effective representative, i.e. one who links his or her constituents' interests to decisions and policies made in Washington. A member motivated by maintaining his or her congressional salary, for example, is likely to make every effort to accurately and effectively represent the people's interests in

order to win and maintain their electoral support. Third, the instrumental goal that members seek as they pursue their substantive goals is political discretion (Parker 1992). Not only does discretion provide members with the flexibility to pursue their goals as they see fit, but, in the context of their highly dynamic and complex relationships with their constituents, discretion provides members with a semblance of control, if not certainty. Whether it be policy discretion, roll-call discretion, or discretion over how much time they spend in their districts, virtually every member seeks some sphere of autonomy in his or her congressional work.

While interviews with members provide the primary basis for the analysis presented below, there are, in some cases, secondary measures or indicators of the things I observed directly. For example, members' perceptions of themselves as either pragmatists or ideologues can be compared and contrasted with their roll call behavior. Instances where members' perceptions are inconsistent with objective measures of their behavior deserve particular attention. However, not every member perception has a corresponding objective counterpart against which it can be checked, primarily because many of the perceptions and behaviors relevant to members' Washington styles have not been adequately studied. As Hibbing has noted, the preoccupation with roll-call analyses in the literature on congressional behavior has led to a corresponding lack of attention to other aspects of congressional activity. "Much of the research," he contends, "seems to deny the basic fact that there is more to the legislative process than the final vote" (1991, 109). Consequently, the perceptions discussed in this chapter suggest a view of members'

Washington work and representative-constituent relationships that is more complex and dynamic than is apparent in much of the extant literature.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF SELF AND CONSTITUENCY

While members of the House of Representatives hold a wide variety of perceptions about themselves, their "me-in-the-Congress" perceptions are centrally important to their styles of work in Washington. These perceptions of self on Capitol Hill, however, are intimately connected with their perceptions of themselves *outside* the Congress and their perceptions of their constituents. Given the diversity in House members and their personalities, goals, and circumstances, one would expect to find members with dramatically different perceptions of themselves and the people they represent. Members' perceptions, however, were not wildly dissimilar. In fact, the most striking similarity among those I interviewed was a general reluctance to make a clear distinction between their personal and political selves. One senior representative even declared that, at least in his experience, it was not possible to make such distinction and remain an effective representative. For him, the job of "Congressman" is one that encompasses both the personal and public realms of his life:

> [A]s a representative . . . I'm always on the job, even when I'm sleeping. Constituent concerns are my concerns. Constituent concerns are *always* at the front of my mind. This job is all consuming. . . . I am one of the people I represent. I'm a good representative because I'm like the people.

While one might expect all House members to express such sentiments, several members, especially more junior members, were much more willing to define themselves in terms other than "congressman" or "representative." These members were quick to observe that

the strain of being in Washington, often apart from friends and family as well as other aspects of the job, make it more personally costly to serve each passing year. Indeed, more than one House member has retired citing the increasingly unbearable burdens the job has placed on his or her family and personal life. A young Democrat's chief of staff confided that the member he worked for, having married after becoming a House member, is now much less excited and enthusiastic about his political work than when he first arrived on the Hill. In fact, the Congressman has indicated that he would never have run in the first place had he been married at the time.[25] This member's new family has made continued congressional service much less attractive to him than it once was. For this and other members, it is difficult to overstate the importance of members' perceptions of self and the personal costs (or benefits) that attend their service in the House. These members' comments remind us that representation is not simply about reconciling local interests with national ones. The private interests of the representatives play a significant and independent role in shaping the character of the representation that is provided.

In the 104th Congress, there was a vocal and concerted effort, on the part of several party leaders and members, to lessen the personal costs of political service. These efforts were, in part, manifest in the call to make the House schedule more "family friendly" by reducing workloads and cutting back on late night sessions. As these efforts failed to fundamentally change the way the House does its business, several members

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[25]As Fowler and McClure have documented, many potential candidates choose not to run in the first place because of the potential strains a campaign and ensuring political career might bring to their family and personal lives (1989; see also Kazee 1994).

acted on their own, choosing to give priority to personal concerns even when political duty called. One young member unapologetically skipped several votes to go on a hunting trip with his son during the second half of the 104th Congress (Oaks 1996, 1, 18). He argued that ignoring one's family was not part of his job description. Another young member told me that, although he valued congressional service, he minimized his time spent on legislative business so he could spend time with his family.

> Some members like to socialize a lot. They get into the receptions and the cocktail parties. Other members fly around the country campaigning for other members. I don't get into those things because I have a young family. When it's not essential for me to be at work in Washington, I go home to be with them.

Clearly, this member perceives his personal self and his personal life as distinct from his political duties and obligations. In contrast, senior members expressed much less concern about the toll of congressional service on their families and personal lives. While this may be due to the fact that senior members are more likely to have adjusted to the strain of Hill work by relocating their families or by seeing their children grow and leave home, there were clear perceptual differences between junior and senior members' accounts of the personal and political spheres of their lives on the Hill. While younger members more consistently held that their personal lives were distinct from, and even of greater importance than, their political roles, more senior members tended toward a more balanced perspective. Without suggesting their personal lives were less important than their official congressional duties, senior members expressed a greater willingness to pay personal costs, even passing them on to their families, to serve as they wanted to (or thought they should) in the House. One of the more seasoned representatives I

interviewed explained that he moved his family to Washington without giving it a second thought when he was first elected. Having his family back in his district, he believed, would hinder his ability to stay in Washington on weekends and be "an effective legislator." Other senior members arrived at similar decisions after a few years of being apart from their families. One member, serving in his eighth term, declared that public service requires personal sacrifice, including being apart from or putting pressures on one's family. He tersely concluded: "That's what members of Congress do."

Moving one's family to Washington, however, does not imply that a member is giving politics equal or greater emphasis than his or her personal concerns. As one committee chair argued:

> I used to go home every week. Now I go home twice a month. My family moved here after the first year. That was a very major decision because it has made it easier to stay in Washington instead of going home on the weekends. Most of the freshmen [in the 104th Congress] have made some principled statement about keeping their families in their districts. At least one freshman, however, said to hell with his district and moved his family out here anyway. I think that's ultimately a family decision that shouldn't have a lot to do with politics.

Members' perceptions of how their personal and political lives ought to be balanced and reconciled on Capitol Hill are not trivial. These perceptions have profound influence on members' efforts to balance their local and national roles as members of the House, impinging on, among other things, their decisions about the frequency of their trips home, the extent and nature of their involvement in the House, and the duration of their service in the body.

In addition to differences in members' perceptions of the personal costs of congressional service, the members I interviewed also varied in their perceptions of

themselves and of their constituents. The two most pronounced differences are also the most relevant to members' styles of work in Washington.[26] First, there were distinct differences in members' perceptions of themselves as ideologues or as pragmatists. Members also differed in their perceptions of the amount and kind of discretion they have in Washington, although these differences are less pronounced. Again, these perceptual differences are significant because of they influence members as they adopt their Washington styles. Because these styles are driven by the perceptions and preferences of individual members, they may or may not be exactly what constituents expect or want. This is, perhaps, the central difficulty members face when deciding how to behave on the Hill. While a failure to accurately perceive what one's constituents want can cut short a congressional career, accurate perceptions--and the subsequent adoption of an appropriate Washington style--can solidify a House member's fit with his or her district and prolong his or her congressional career.

Pragmatism

Some perceptions, such as how pragmatic members believes themselves to be, influence not only their standing back home but also their status on the Hill, among their fellow House members. Each member I interviewed, as they talked about their participation in the legislative process, indicated that their approach to working with other members was generally ideological or pragmatic. While the terms "ideologue" and

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[26] Again, while members' personalities (and aspects of them) vary widely, my focus was explicitly on member perceptions that directly impinged on the *political* behavior in Washington. Consequently, I spoke with members *broadly* about their personal lives, but I did not dwell on particular personal traits.

"pragmatist" were seldom used by members, they nonetheless portrayed themselves as such. Self-perceived ideologues, for example, expressed a great deal of wariness about other members' efforts to work out "compromises." They emphasized the importance of "doing the right thing" and standing by their "core values" and "principles." As one ideological member explained:

> My opinion is that doing the right thing in Washington, D.C. is what the people sent me here to do. The member of Congress who comes here with no philosophy, with his finger in the wind, watching the polls, isn't concerned with doing what's right. They're concerned about pleasing their constituents. You can survive here a long time doing that, but "the right thing" isn't your primary objective. Those with a moral compass, on the other hand, are constantly concerned with getting their philosophy enacted into law.

In contrast, pragmatic members spoke positively of compromise as the vehicle for "finding common ground" and developing "solutions that work" in the legislative process. This second group of members emphasized the importance of "good policy" and "common sense" over partisanship and "politics." As one pragmatic Midwestern Democrat simply stated, "I try to find common sense, compromise solutions." Another pragmatic member described the kind of member she aspired to be:

> Some members, especially those who have been around for a long time, know the art of legislative compromise and they realize that their belief systems should be focused on results, on getting something done that moves in the direction they want to go.

In general, most ideological members suggested that it was permissible to compromise, but never "on principle." Their definitions of principle, however, tended to be more stringent than those offered by pragmatists. For example, an ideologue and a pragmatist might agree "in principle" that the federal government should provide

assistance to impoverished mothers with children. The ideological member, however, is is more likely to condition his or her support for such programs on a set of specific, often ideological, criteria. The roles of ideologues and pragmatists, however, are not set in stone. A member might behave ideologically with regard to abortion policy but pragmatically when dealing with budgetary matters. In the end, however, each of the members in my sample clearly categorized him or herself as being *predominantly* pragmatic or *predominantly* ideological. Of particular use in making this distinction were members' accounts of the pragmatic and ideological behavior of *other* members. Some of the most negative comments members shared with me were made by self-perceived pragmatists about colleagues whom they perceived to be too partisan or too ideological. One pragmatic member argued that, in a body where compromise is so common, ideologues seem out of place:

> I have a hard time working with ideologues on either side because they tend not to be honest about their opinions and beliefs. Everyone has something to offer. You should listen to liberals, conservatives, Democrats, Republicans. You can adopt people's ideas without selling out on your own beliefs. You've go to work together.

A member of the Republican leadership similarly complained that:

> Many of the freshmen came to Washington with little or no previous legislative experience. Consequently, they don't understand the concept of a team in the legislative process. They want to be fiercely independent, and yet they want everyone else to support their particular point of view. . . . If they can't get everything they want now, they'd rather take nothing. That was what the government shutdown was all about. The biggest problem with these inexperienced freshmen is that they think they know all the answers, but they don't even know the right questions.

In spite of such negative assessments of ideological purity, there are members who are self-consciously ideological and who make no apologies for the rigidity of their

policy stances. In the words of a senior Republican committee staffer, these are the members in the House who, "the closer they get to a real compromise on an issue, the deeper they dig in their heels and refuse to budge." One such senior member, perhaps one of those to whom this staffer referred, bluntly asserted that, "When you have a conscience, you can't simply do what's politically expedient." Because they hold such sentiments, the ideologues in the House are the most consistent voices in the Congress. They provide the votes in committees and on the floor that are not in doubt. The more pragmatic members, on the other hand, make often unpredictable voting decisions, thereby interjecting uncertainty into the legislative proceedings of the House. Consequently, pragmatists are often the focus of intense lobbying by ideological members on both sides of the aisle. As a senior Republican suggested, the competition for the middle is often the decisive battle in the legislative process:

> The absolute pragmatists in the House are the swing votes. The ideologically inclined vie for their support and the Democrats have been able to get these people on board better than the Republicans sometimes during this Congress, and it's our own fault. Ideological purity loses the middle every time. We have learned that lesson the hard way.

Pragmatism and Member Characteristics

Of the twenty-eight members interviewed, eighteen perceived themselves as pragmatists while the remaining ten perceived themselves as ideologues.[27] The most

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[27] My categorizations were primarily based on my assessments of the way members portrayed themselves in my interviews with them. Where possible, I also referred to other member comments about their approaches to the legislative process (in newspapers, the *Congressional Record*, or elsewhere) and to their staffers' perceptions. It is important to remember that these are categorizations of members' *perceptions* and or *self-presentations*, and not actual behavior, which I discuss below.

striking distinction between those who perceive themselves as ideologues and those who portrayed themselves as pragmatists in my sample is party: all ten of the self-described ideologues are Republicans. While the infrequency of changes in majority party control of the House make comparisons difficult, if not impossible, one reasonable hypothesis is that the current congressional Republican party's new-found majority status has made its members more self-consciously ideological. This supposition is supported by my interview data. One senior Northeastern Republican admitted that he has taken a more pronounced ideological approach to his legislative work in the 104th Congress. This change, he argued, has stemmed as much from Democratic opposition to the Republican agenda, in the current and previous congresses, as it has from the ideological nature of the agenda itself:

> Part of the Democrats' problem is that they don't quite understand what it means to be the minority party. They're still trying to figure out what their role should be. They think that just because the Republicans don't go along with everything they propose that we're not being bipartisan. The only reason they think this way is because they're used to getting everything they wanted from when they were in the majority. The Republicans, on the other hand, are used to getting rolled by the majority and now we're the majority, there's a few things we'd like to do, whether the minority wants to go along with us or not.

For their part, many Democrats believe that the change in majority party control in 1994 destroyed the middle-ground in the House. One moderate Democrat asserted that: "the Contract with America effectively destroyed the bipartisan style in the House because it presented everything in terms of Republicans versus Democrats." A senior Democratic staffer concurred, arguing that, for some Democrats, the Republican agenda left little room for pragmatism:

> There's been a lot of talk about toning down the partisanship in the House and being more pragmatic. For many Democrats in the House, though, partisanship and pragmatism have already merged because Democrats disagree with almost everything the Republicans have tried to do during this Congress.

Some Democrats, though, are willing to accept part of the blame for the ideological approach of the Republicans in the 104th Congress. The chief of staff for a Democratic House leader stated:

> I think the Democrats are at least as much to blame for the level of partisanship in the House as the Republicans. When the Democrats controlled the House, they were very abusive of the minority. We made it harder for moderate, deal-making Republicans to play a role in the legislative process. We marginalized and radicalized the House Republicans and weakened the moderate wings of both parties. The rigid partisanship of the Republicans during this Congress is of the Democrats own making. I don't want to equate the Republican party to *Hamas*, but it's a similar situation to the Israelis' efforts to get rid of Arafat--in the process they created *Hamas* and the *infitadah*. If you push people away from the middle, there's going to be a backlash.

Beyond partisanship, there are some additional variables across which members who perceive themselves as either ideological or pragmatic differ, although the differences are much less striking. A summary of these variables is presented in Table 3-1. First, members who *perceived* themselves as ideologues (all of whom were Republicans) tended to be more senior members[28] (six out of ten) who held safe seats[29]

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[28] "Senior members" are defined as those who had served three or more terms before the 104th Congress. This distinction is based on both the significance of the "sophomore surge" (and the stabilization of congressional careers that attends it) as well as the nature of my sample--roughly half (sixteen of the twenty-eight) of the members I interviewed had served two or fewer terms before 1995.

[29] A "safe-seat" is defined as a congressional seat won by 60% or more of the two-party vote in the previous election.

Table 3-1.
Perceptions of Pragmatism and Member/District Characteristics

Member Characteristics	**n**	**Pragmatists** (n=18)	**Ideologues** (n=10)
Republican	17	7	10
Democrat	11	11	0
3 or More Terms	12	6	6
0-2 Terms	16	12	4
Leader	13	6	7
Non-Leader	15	12	3
Female	5	4	1
Male	23	14	9
District Characteristics			
Safe-Seat	18	10	8
Marginal	10	8	2
Minority Majority	5	5	0
White Majority	23	13	10

(eight out of ten). They were also more likely to hold leadership positions[30] in the House (seven out of ten)[31]. Not surprisingly, the patterns among *pragmatic* Republicans almost exactly mirrored those found among ideologues. Republicans who portrayed themselves as pragmatists were more likely to be junior members (four out of seven) from marginal districts (four out of seven).[32] Only three of the seven pragmatic Republicans I interviewed held leadership positions. What can be made of these differences? While a good deal of caution is in order in making generalizations from my sample to the entire House, it is clear that differences do exist. Furthermore, my interview data suggest that members' perceptions of themselves as either pragmatists or ideologues may be influenced by their partisanship, their membership in the majority party,[33] seniority, electoral security, and leadership status.

Pragmatism and Washington Behavior

Given the broadly reported ideological nature of the 1994 Republican Freshman class, these results seem counter-intuitive. In fact, an examination of members'

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[30] Leadership positions include elective party, House, and caucus positions.

[31] Recall, however, from Chapter Two that there was a greater percentage of leaders among the Republicans in my sample.

[32] While the freshman Republicans elected in 1994 were famous for their ideological stridency, two of the five I interviewed portrayed themselves as pragmatists. The apparent tendency for younger members to be more pragmatic was also driven by the overwhelming tendency of members in their second and third terms to portray themselves as pragmatists--nine out of ten in my sample did so.

[33] As I noted in chapter Two, Republicans were, on average, more likely to be leaders than were the Democrats I interviewed. Consequently, Republicans were, on average, more senior than the Democrats in my sample. Neither of these differences, however, are statistically significant.

ideological *behavior* (not perceptions) in the 104th Congress reveals that most House members, both Republicans and Democrats, were ideological in their roll-call behavior. While no single indicator of House members' ideological/pragmatic behavior is readily available, numerous interest groups and media organizations rate the "liberalism" or "conservatism" of House members based on selected roll-call votes. Statistical analysis suggests that the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score is among the most valid and reliable indices of roll-call liberalism (Smith, et. al, 1990). It is not surprising, then, that House members' conservativism scores, from the 104th Congress, compiled by the American Conservative Union (ACU) are almost perfectly negatively correlated with the ADA scores (-.965). Because these indexes measure members' positions on a two-dimensional ideological scale, they are not useful, by themselves, as measures of ideological behavior. However, the absolute value of the difference between the two indices can serve as a reasonable measure of ideological extremism. For example, a member with an ADA score of 100 and an ACU score of 0 would have an "ideological" score of 100. On the other had, a member with an ADA score of 50 and an ACU score of 50 would have an ideological score of 0. Such a member could clearly be called a moderate and, therefore, could also reasonably be termed a pragmatist as well.

The average "ideological score" for all House members in the 104th Congress was 70.9. While the mean score in my sample is a statistically indistinguishable 71.4. In general, the self-identified ideologues had higher ideological scores than the pragmatists I interviewed. The mean score for ideologues was 86.4, compared to 63.1 for pragmatists, placing them in the top 26% and bottom 37% of the House, respectively. At the

individual level, however, there are some discrepancies between members' perceptions and their behavior, as indicated by their ideological scores. Of the eighteen members I interviewed who perceived themselves as pragmatists, seven had ideological scores of 87 or higher, suggesting that their *roll-call behavior* is just as ideological as those members who portray themselves as ideologues. There are two significant implications that can be drawn from of this disconnect between members' perceptions (portrayals) of themselves and their behavior. First, many members who behave ideologically may be sensitive enough to the social desirability of cooperation and compromise on the Hill that they will perceive and or portray themselves as pragmatists even when they behave otherwise. Second, some members' exaggerations of their own pragmatism may be an important aspect of the way they present themselves to other political actors in Washington and to their constituents back home. Goal-seeking, discretion maximizing members may find it useful to leave their options open by portraying themselves ambiguously.[34] In some cases, members with high ideological scores might not recognize that they are, in fact, ideologues. For at least some of the self-described pragmatists I interviewed, this was the case. One member with an ideological score of nearly 100 was particularly insistent in portraying himself as a pragmatist. As the following discussion should make clear, members' perceptions of their own pragmatism, perhaps especially when they diverge from reality (actual behavior), are worth examining because of their impact on member behavior on the Hill.

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[34] For an excellent discussion of the circumstances under which congressional candidates might want to be ambiguous and those under which they might choose to "eschew obfuscation," see Franklin 1991.

Members' views of themselves as pragmatists or as ideologues do, in fact, have a direct and significant impact on their legislative behavior. The pragmatists I interviewed, not surprisingly, expressed a greater willingness to compromise and accommodate others' positions. A moderate "Blue Dog" Democrat, speaking for his fellow moderate Democrats, declared:

> We'll even vote for bills that aren't perfect if they'll get us closer to where we want to be. The Welfare Reform bill wasn't perfect but it's an improvement on the current situation.

More ideological members are, on the other hand, less willing to compromise. Several self-perceived ideologues indicated that they were not as pragmatic as some of their colleagues, unapologetically declaring that they placed rigid limits on their willingness to compromise. A senior Republican described his approach to the legislative compromise:

> Doing what is right has served me well. I've been in political office for [more than thirty years]. . . I simply decided a long time ago to do what's right and I don't care what people think. I don't try to hide my beliefs. I tell it like it is and if people disagree, that's fine. A reporter once derisively said that I was the most predictable guy he'd ever covered. I took it as a compliment. . . . [My] values aren't going to change. You know where I stand.

While there are some indications that ideological positions solidified in the House during the 104th Congress, there is still broad support among many of the members I interviewed for the norms of cooperation and consensus building. While these norms have been threatened, and even ignored, in the wake of the 1994 Congressional elections they remain as important ideals held by most House members. The existence of these norms, in fact, go a long way in explaining why members who behave ideologically might nonetheless perceive and or portray themselves as pragmatists. Even seven of the ten

ideologues I interviewed went out of their way to emphasize the importance of civility, collegiality, and compromise under the right circumstances[35]. There is also a very practical facet of House service that underscores norms of cooperation in the House which might mitigate the ideological steadfastness of some of the more junior members of Congress in the coming years. A particularly ideological (both in perception and behavior) freshman Republican noted that the Republican freshmen learned--through some painful defeats--that ideological steadfastness is not always the most effective strategy for pursuing legislative goals:

> We've all learned, I think, that we have to be willing to give a little to get the things we want. I've been impressed with the wisdom of the Founding Fathers as I've participated in the system they created. It was designed to facilitate compromise and it works.

A more senior self-described ideologue echoed similar sentiments:

> In a Republican budget meeting the other day we were having this same argument again. We were debating whether we should try to accomplish some of the things we wanted to while conceding to the President on some points. There were some in the Caucus that wanted to draw another line in the sand. I told them not to make the perfect the enemy of the good. You can never get 100% of what you want in the legislative process. Politics is the art of compromise, but ideological purists see that as selling out. The most effective members of Congress come to Washington with a firm identity and a sense of direction, but they aren't unwilling to negotiate to get 85% of what they want, instead of everything they want.

Although the circumstances of the 104th Congress may have encouraged ideological behavior, ideology is likely to be tempered in the House in future Congresses.

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[35]Some of these members avoided using the term "compromise," referring instead to "finding common ground" or "working out differences." While the net result is the same, the perceptual distinction is worth noting because it underscores ideological members' aversion to anything that sounds like "selling out" on their principles.

given the inherent tendency toward and necessity of compromise in the legislative process. Although some Republican leaders have indicated hesitancy to abandon the staunchness that was part of the energy behind the "revolution" of 1994 (Koszczuk 1996, 979), the reality of legislative work is that success requires allies and allies are usually made through compromise. There are, however, influences outside the legislative process which also influence members' ideological and or pragmatic approaches to their Hill work. The most obvious of these influences is a member's personal preferences and beliefs. A member strongly predisposed to steadfastly defend a particular agenda might not waver under any circumstances. In contrast, some members might calculate that a particular ideological or pragmatic approach is best suited to the realization of their goals, and choose a strategy in light of that calculation. On this count, it is again important to remember that not all members seek roll-call discretion. In fact, some members might purposely choose to commit themselves to specific roll-call positions early and clearly, thus determining their votes long before they arrive on Capitol Hill. For these members, strong issue stances might bring discretion in other areas that are more central to the goals they seek. The reverse might be true as well. For example, a member motivated to hold office because of its rewards (financial or otherwise) might consciously choose the pragmatic or ideological style that best "fits" the district he or she represents. One self-style moderate I interviewed admitted that he behaves pragmatically in Washington not because it is his preference to do so, but because he represents a moderate district.

Clearly, the way members' perceive themselves, their constituents, and their goals impinge on their perceptions of their own pragmatism. While most members think of

themselves as naturally ideological or pragmatic (if they think about it at all), there are some members who actually make a conscious choice to act and or portray themselves as either pragmatists or ideologues in light of the districts they represent and the goals they seek. These perceptions and choices are significant not only because they are intimately related to the relationships members establish with their several constituencies, but also because they influence member behavior in the legislative process. As I discuss in Chapter Four, these perceptions and choices contribute to the development and implementation of a Washington style, by which each House member balances Hill and home and links his or her constituents to Washington. It is to members' perceptions of that relationship that I turn in the sections below.

III. PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE AS A LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE

One senior House member suggested that it was impossible to think of himself in Washington without simultaneously thinking about his constituents. As a Congressman, his identity is interwoven with the identity of his constituents. "I am," he observed, "one of the people I represent." Not all members, however, feel so intimately connected to the people they represent. Indeed, many members perceive their constituents in a much more businesslike fashion. For these members, the voters are more like customers to be satisfied than they are partners to be consulted. As one such representative explained:

> Being a good representative requires a lot of time, especially time reading. Most importantly, you have to pay careful attention to everything around you . . . My job is to come to Washington, vote, and then tell the people back home what happened.

The degree of intimacy members attributed to their relationships with their constituents had a clear impact on their comfort levels as representatives of their districts. Members who were comfortable in those relationships frequently talked about how well they "fit" their districts. Some members talked about being a "good match" with their constituents, some about being "one of the people," and others about being "like [their] constituents." In contrast, members who expressed a less personal attachment to their constituents were not as comfortable with their constituencies. Strikingly, a handful of these members, such as the one quoted above, had little interest in cultivating a comfortable relationship with the people they nominally represented. Such a relationship was unnecessary, they believed, so long as they effectively represented their constituents' interests. The lack of a powerful personal connection with one's constituents, however, can have profound implications for the way a member balances his or her personal interests against local and national concerns in Washington. In the absence of such a connection, communication with constituents is likely to be less of a priority and members are prone to lose touch with their districts.

The lack of a personal connection to one's constituency can arise out of several different circumstances. For example, among those I interviewed, representatives who were members of the opposite party of the majority of their constituents perceived their relationships with their constituents to be more tenuous. One junior Republican from a strongly Democratic leaning district described his situation:

> I'm from a very marginal district. . . . Obviously, I don't emphasize party a whole lot with my constituents. Instead, I talk about things in terms of conservative and liberal, not Republican or Democrat. . . . [B]efore my first term, I faced a very powerful opposition coalition. I can't associate

> myself with a group or cause that would mobilize that coalition against me. I can't appear to favor one group of my constituency to the exclusion of any others.

The lack of a comfortable fit with his constituents clearly compels this member to behave cautiously on the Hill. Members who perceive their fit to be good, however, are more secure in their abilities to act in Washington without constantly looking over their shoulders. A junior Democrat from a very safe Democratic district described her fit with her district with a great deal of confidence:

> Obviously, a majority of the voters agreed with me on [the salient] issues because I was elected. On issues that are less visible or issues that aren't matters of conviction, where I'm not constrained by a campaign promise, I might vote differently than a majority of my voters would like me to. As a representative, I'm new to the game, but I'm in touch because I'm a lot like my constituents.

The not so subtle implication of this member's statement is that holding a safe seat and holding the same core beliefs as the majority of her constituency gave her some autonomy or discretion in Washington. In practical terms, one of the most significant perceptions members hold about their constituents has to do with the amount of discretion they believe their constituents have afforded them in the conduct of their Washington work. Because members perceptions of discretion might diverge from actual discretion, it is important to explore this aspect of House members' "me-in-the-congress" perspectives and its impact on congressional representation.

Perceptions of Discretion

As Parker asserts, House members are discretion maximizers, i.e. they seek as much control and autonomy over the pursuit of their goals that they can acquire. But they

do not uniformly seek the same kinds of discretion.[36] Some members might want roll-call discretion, while others might want discretion to pursue particular policy agendas. Members might also seek discretion over their partisan activities, the frequency of their travel home, or the levels at which they become involved in the legislative process. There may even be some members who seek little or no discretion with regard to their Washington work--the discretion they seek may be related to goals they seek *outside* of Washington. For such members, discretion might be maximized by doing exactly what one's constituents request in Washington. Whatever the kinds of discretion they seek to maximize, House members base many of their behavioral decisions in Washington on their perceptions of the amount discretion they think they have been afforded by their constituents. These perceptions are, in turn, clearly influenced by the amount of fit they perceive in their representational relationships. Most members, though, want more discretion than they believe they have and they engage in activities in Washington that they think will win them more discretion. Several of the members I interviewed and observed manifested behavior specifically aimed at enhancing their personal goal-related discretion. These members indicated that they felt they could earn discretion over particular aspects of their congressional work by providing their constituents with whatever it is that they wanted most. One Southern Democrat observed:

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[36] To be clear, by discretion I mean a House member's ability to act and make decisions independently without serious repercussions back home. A member is always free to defy constituent wishes, but a member who has won discretion is able to do so, at least on occasion, without alienating and angering the people back home. When members are afforded Washington discretion, it is because constituents trust them and, within limits, will give them the benefit of the doubt.

> There were a lot of people after I was elected who didn't think I could service my district, but I proved them wrong. I set up an excellent staff to take care of the people back home. At first I set up four offices, but I've since reduced that number to three. Soon we'll have it down to two, where it will stay. I wanted to really establish my presence in the district at first and then I could withdraw a bit because people would know they could contact my staff and get the help they need.

This member's efforts to "establish a presence" in the district and then delegate constituent service to staff was a conscious effort to maximize her Washington discretion. Similarly, former Congressman Richard Nolan (D-MN) reportedly pursued and secured his seat on the Agriculture Committee to appease his constituents and thereby win discretion for the pursuit of his social policy goals in Washington (Weber 1989). Members can also win and exercise discretion on a smaller scale. In fact, some degree of discretion comes with the job--constituents cannot possibly follow every decision made in Washington every day. How members use that discretion, and what they try to do to expand it, depends on their assumptions about how constituents will respond to particular actions or decisions. One moderate Democrat, almost precisely re-stating Kingdon's "string-of-votes" thesis, explained the limits of his roll-call discretion:

> . . . [Y]ou can cast controversial votes every now and then and get away with it. In fact, your constituents might even respect you for doing so if you have a good explanation for why you did so. But when those kinds of votes begin to pile up, your constituents begin to rightly believe that you're not interested in representing them. That's when incumbents get beat.

This congressman argued that he was a successful representative because he knew the limits of his roll-call discretion. He further argued, though, that his discretion could be expanded by establishing a record of "good decision making" and effective communication:

> The people want their representatives to come here and deal with the issues, not duck them. . . . Members gain credibility with their constituents when they make informed decisions, especially if their constituents feel like they've been listened to. They don't necessarily have to be agreed with all the time, but if you really listen to and consider the input of your constituents, they respect you and your decisions. You'll never succeed if you're constantly trying to appease every competing group in your constituency. In fact, you lose credibility when you try and do that.

Another member suggested that paying attention to his district and constituency service provided him with enough Washington discretion that he could stay out of the legislative process almost completely. Given his preference to do so, he eschewed committee and other tedious legislative work, limiting his "legislative" work to casting roll-call votes. Attention to home has won this congressman Washington discretion, but not in the traditional Kingdonian sense of the word. Still others indicated a desire for more personal-time discretion, discretion over campaign timing and style. These members all engaged in behavior which was calculated to maximize the kind of discretion they sought. Members seeking personal discretion have sought to make the hours of legislative business more "family friendly," leaving free time in the evenings. Members seeking the balance of home-Washington time they desire have appealed to either House leaders, constituents or both to win approval for their preference (or choice). Members with an aversion to fund-raising and campaigning (a sizeable majority of House members) often try to develop low-cost campaign strategies (such as constituent-service) that strengthen personal ties to their constituents, thereby obviating the need for costly and exhausting mass-communication campaigns.

Discretion and Member Characteristics

Only two of those interviewed indicated that they perceived themselves as having little or no discretion in their Washington work. While it was possible to distinguish between those who perceived that they had "some" discretion and those with "broad" perceptions of discretion, it is striking that twenty-six of the twenty-eight representatives were confident that they had at least some discretion in Washington. Fourteen members perceived that they had some discretion, depending on the issue before them, while twelve believed that their constituents had extended them broad or very broad discretion as in most or all aspects of their work in Washington. A comparison of members' characteristics and their perceptions of discretion is summarized in Table 3-2. Once again, the most obvious difference is between Democrats and Republicans--ten of the twelve members who perceived that they have broad or very broad discretion in Washington were Republicans. This pattern, though, is reinforced by the tendency among more senior members and House leaders to believe they have more discretion.[37] Fifty percent of senior members perceived themselves as having broad discretion (compared to 37.5% of junior members) as did 61.5% of leaders in the House (compared to 26.7% of non-leaders). Members holding safe-seats, though, were equally likely to believe they had either some or broad discretion.

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[37]Recall again that the Republicans in my sample were both more likely to be leaders and to be more senior.

Table 3-2.
Perceptions of Discretion and Member/District Characteristics

Member Characteristics	**n**	**Very Little Discretion** (n=2)	**Some Discretion (Depends on Issue)** (n=14)	**Broad Discretion** (n=12)
Republican	17	1	6	10
Democrat	11	1	8	2
3 or More Terms	12	0	6	6
0-2 Terms	16	2	8	6
Leader	13	0	5	8
Non-Leader	15	2	9	4
Female	5	1	4	0
Male	23	1	10	12
District Characteristics				
Safe-Seat	18	1	9	8
Marginal	10	1	5	4
Minority Majority	5	1	3	1
White Majority	23	1	11	11

Again, the most significant finding here is that almost every House member I interviewed felt that he or she arrived on Capitol Hill with at least some discretion about how they would go about their work in the Congress. Making the sometimes nuanced distinction between "some" and "broad" discretion is interesting, but not as significant as the larger finding that a large majority of members appear to believe they have autonomy in Washington. Where I was able to draw subtle distinctions between members who perceive that they have the freedom to act on their own in Washington, my interview data suggest that members of the majority party, more senior House members, and those in leadership positions tend to have broader perceptions of discretion. Not surprisingly, both of the members who perceived that they had little or no discretion were in their first or second terms in the House and neither held a leadership position. The tendency for majority party members to have heightened perceptions of discretion makes sense in light of the popular support for their party in the recent election, especially when majority party control changes as it did in 1994. Likewise, one would expect more senior members and those in leadership positions to perceive that they have broad discretion. My conversations with members suggest, though, that discretion probably grows *with* seniority and usually *precedes* taking on a leadership role.

Discretion and Washington Behavior

Members' perceptions of discretion are relevant to their styles of Washington work for two reasons. First, members conscientiously engage in behavior aimed at maximizing their discretion. Members who perceive that they have little or no discretion, then, might be more inclined to be responsive and attentive to constituent interests.

Second, given that most members believe they have at least some discretion, it is probable that some House members over estimate the amount of discretion they have on Capitol Hill. Whether such perceptions are accurate or not, members base significant representational decisions on them. For example, one Congressman from a very marginal district, one of the two with "very little" perceived discretion, admitted that his tenuous electoral situation limits what he can do on Capitol Hill:

> Maybe after I've developed a more secure relationship with my constituents, over the course of a couple of elections, I'll have more leeway to define myself and be more involved in Washington. Right now, I just can't afford to do that.

In his efforts to balance Hill and home, his lack of discretion limits the extent of his involvement in Washington because of his perceived need to first shore up his support back home. While this member hoped that his discretion would expand over time, some senior members perceive themselves to be similarly constrained even after serving many years in the House. A former House subcommittee chair was reportedly so worried about the potential electoral backlash he could face from opposition groups in his district that he was virtually immobilized on issues relating to them (Mayhew 1974, 41). Similarly, members with significant ideological congruence with their districts can also feel constrained by a lack of discretion at particular times and on particular issues. Several conservative Republicans with strong labor presence in their districts have struggled with free-trade votes. Representative Mark Neumann (R-WI) has indicated a willingness to keep an "open mind" on such issues, but district opinion often runs heavily in the unions' direction (Wiseman 1997). Under such circumstances, members often feel that they have little choice but to back constituent sentiments in the House. For the most part, though,

seniority and ideological fit brings greater discretion. One senior Republican, who has consciously worked for many years to solidify his support back home and, thereby, his discretion on the Hill remarked:

> My electoral safety back home give me *a lot* of independence here in Washington. I have [a substantial amount of money] in my campaign fund back home. No one's going to run against me. I can tell the occasional constituent to go to hell. Having a safe hold on my seat doesn't make me arrogant, though. It lets me be a better representative, in the Burkean sense of representation.

Perceptions of discretion also influence the amount of time members spend in Washington. One senior member from the West explained that he feels connected enough to his district that more frequent trips home would make him neither a better representative nor win him more discretion:

> I have averaged about 16 to 18 trips a year to the district. I try to get back at least once a month, but not every weekend. . . . I cover my district very well. . . . I have plenty of contact with the district without living there. If I lived there I'd see my constituents at the grocery store, in line for tickets to the movies or whatever. But 90% of them I'd never see anyway. I don't need to be there to understand the people I represent.

This member is comfortable with his fit with his constituents and the discretion that fit accords him. While he goes home far less than most of the other members I interviewed, he believes that the time he spends in his district is sufficient. Members with lower perceptions of discretion feel compelled to spend much more time in their districts. A member who has climbed high on the seniority ladder in a prestigious committee reflected on the lack of discretion he had as a new member:

> When I was a freshman, I had to keep a much higher profile in the district. I met assiduously more with constituents than I do now. . .Now my committee responsibilities come first. . .I can do what I do, both on my committee and in the party, because of [the support I have back home].

IV. PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE AS A NATIONAL LEGISLATOR

The stylized view of House members is that they are overwhelmingly representatives first and legislators second. From Mayhew's *Electoral Connection*, to Fenno's *Home Style* to more current treatments of congressional elections, the dominant view is that "all politics is local." Members are portrayed as being primarily interested in shoring up their electoral support back home, an aim which requires most of their time and resources with the remaining time and energy available to be devoted to "legislating." This portrayal, however, grossly oversimplifies representatives' priorities and behavior. In truth, House members do not uniformly sacrifice legislative goals and concerns for electoral ones. House members are intimately aware of and concerned about what goes on back home and how it effects their relationships with their constituencies; however, most members are also deeply concerned about and involved in the legislative business of the House. It is, a rare member who chooses to and gets away with ignoring (or at least downplaying) his or her Washington work. In truth, the local constituencies that members represent generally *expect* House members to be engaged in legislative activity--they expect their representative to link their interests, ideas, and beliefs to the nation's policy making process.

Among the more well-known examinations of members' role perceptions is Davidson's *The Role of the Congressman* (1969). Davidson asserted that the roles members assume are centrally important to understanding their representative behavior. A "role," he further contended is "an expected pattern of behaviors associated with an actor who is in a particular relationship to a social system. The role constitutes, in turn, a

behavioral method of defining his place, or status, within that system" (1969, 73). In the House, members' perceptions of their roles directly influence their behavior and their relationships with other actors on Capitol Hill. While Davidson's focus was more narrowly on the impact of members' role perceptions on their voting decisions, role perceptions are also critically important to understanding member behavior on the Hill more broadly. House members provide the most immediate linkage their constituents have to the government in Washington. Their role orientations as they provide that linkage determine how much weight they will give to their constituents' interests and opinions not only when they cast their votes on the floor, but throughout every stage of the legislative process and in every aspect of their Washington behavior.

A overwhelming and taxing as the job of a representative can be, the vast majority of the members I observed and interviewed seemed to enjoy their jobs. However they performed their roles as representatives, they perceived their opportunities to serve in the House as an honor and a privilege. Each was, after all, chosen as *the one* person to represent a half million of his or her fellow citizens. For most of members that represents a singularly profound honor. As one moderate Democrat described it:

> Being a member of the United States House of Representatives is the greatest honor of my life. Throughout this nation's history, there have only been about 10,000 men and women who have served in this body, so it's clearly a great honor to be here, especially for someone of my background. My mother and father were both public school teachers, so we weren't rich when I was growing up. My being here is evidence that the American system of democracy really works. It really is a great honor for me to serve here.

Similar perspectives were shared by many of the members I interviewed. Some expressed a sense of awe--and an almost reverence--for the job they do in Washington. The

comments of a prominent Western states Republican are representative of these sentiments:

> I don't really think of what I do as a job. It's a privilege. I get a tingle down my spine every day when I walk out of my apartment and see the Dome. I'll leave Washington when I fail to get that tingle. I don't plan on being here the rest of my life, but I love being a legislator.

Role orientation studies of House members have generally focused on two dimensions of legislative behavior: (1) how members decide to cast their roll-call votes and (2) members' levels of legislative work or involvement. The first body of research, focused on assessments of members' representational philosophies, has generally categorized members as trustees, delegates, or politicos. The second body of work, based on various measures of legislative activity, has categorized members as either workhorses or showhorses. Below, I describe members' perceptions of their roles in the national legislature with regard to these two distinctions as well as variations in these perception across members.

Representational Philosophy

Members have broadly different perceptions of the representational relationships they have established with their constituents. These perceptions, in turn, influence their conceptions of their roles as representatives. Broadly speaking, members' philosophical views of representation yield three distinct representational roles: trustees, delegates, and

politicos[38] (see Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Wahlke 1978, 16-8). My research bears out the relevance and utility of these categorizations.

Representational Philosophy and Member Characteristics

Almost every member I interviewed volunteered, without being prompted, an assessment of his or her orientation as a trustee, a delegate, or a politico[39]. Sixteen of the twenty-eight members in my sample perceived themselves as trustees, while only three perceived themselves as pure delegates (see Table 3-3). The remaining nine members saw themselves as politicos. Once again, the three most obvious relationships between members who perceive themselves as trustees, delegates, and politicos are party affiliation, seniority, and leadership. Twelve of seventeen (70.6%) Republicans, 8 of 12 (66.7%) senior members, and 10 of 13 (76.9%) leaders perceive themselves primarily as trustees, compared with 4 of 11 (36.4%) Democrats, 8 of 16 (50%) junior members, and 6 of 15 (40%) non-leaders. This is consistent with Davidson's finding that members in leadership positions are more likely to behave as trustees (1969, 134). However, Davidson also found House leaders more likely than non-leaders to be politicos. The difference between Davidson's focus on behavior and my emphasis on articulated roles

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[38] Trustees are generally defined as representatives who base their decisions on their own judgement and wisdom, while delegates are defined as representatives who base their decisions on the will of a majority of their constituents. Politicos are those members who attempt to balance the two representational philosophies, behaving at different times as both trustees and delegates. These orientations have generally been ascribed to members on the basis of interviews or surveys that probe members' representational philosophies.

[39]Most members, with a few notable exceptions, were not familiar with these terms. Instead, they described their representational behavior and thought processes in other terms which made apparent their representational philosophies.

Table 3-3.
Perceptions of Representational Role and Member/District Characteristics

Member Characteristics	**n**	**Trustee** (n=16)	**Delegate** (n=3)	**Politico** (n=9)
Republican	17	12	0	5
Democrat	11	4	3	4
3 or More Terms	12	8	1	3
0-2 Terms	16	8	2	6
Leader	13	10	1	2
Non-Leader	15	6	2	7
Female	5	1	1	3
Male	23	15	2	6
District Characteristics				
Safe-Seat	18	9	2	7
Marginal	10	7	1	2
Minority Majority	5	1	2	2
White Majority	23	15	1	7

is, no doubt, at least partially responsible for discrepancies in our findings. In fact, Davidson suggests a possible source of this phenomenon. As House members attempt to balance their roles as local representatives and national legislators, Davidson contends that all members ultimately *behave* "at least to a degree as politicos" (181).

It should not be surprising, then, that stated role-orientations, what Davidson calls a "role-cognitions" (which I measured through my interviews), are different from members' actual behavior or "enacted roles." Similarly, it is natural for leaders, who tend to be more senior and partisan than non-leaders, to *perceive* themselves as trustees, even if a large number of them *behave* as politicos. Among those I interviewed, politicos were equally as likely to be Democrats as Republicans. They were, though, less senior and less likely to be leaders in the House. Women and representatives from minority-majority districts also seem more inclined to be politicos than trustees. Curiously, while members holding safe-seats were about equally likely to be trustees or politicos, members holding marginal seats were more likely to perceive themselves as trustees (seven out of 10). Marginal members' emphasis on a trustee style may, however, stem from the difficulty associated with staking out common groung or consensual positions in marginal (and usually heterogenous) congressional districts. Without a clear majority opinion to follow, marginal representatives may be forced to base their legislative decisions on their own wisdom.

Representational Philosophy and Washington Behavior

What is the significance of these perceptual distinctions between members? The most obvious and important influence of members' perceptions of their representational

roles is on the way they arrive at their roll-call decisions. One trustee declared that, "My philosophy happens to be the same as [my] district's. I don't try to adjust [my views] to match how my constituents feel." Another trustee made it equally clear that public opinion was not an important factor in his voting decisions. "I don't try to represent my constituents by polling them," he declared. "I don't believe in government by referenda. That's not the way our system was designed and that's not what representation means." In a "representative democracy," he asserted:

> [Y]ou have to have good representatives, and you don't need representatives if they're merely going to reflect what the majority of their constituents think, according to some opinion poll, on every issue we vote on in the Congress. Representation requires a more careful examination and analysis of the particulars of the questions the Congress addresses than the average citizen is able to conduct. That's why we have representatives--they're people who can devote the time and energy to these difficult questions so they can make informed, wise decisions.

A senior Western member, who represents a safe-seat, similarly stated:

> I reflect the views of the people I represent, but as Edmund Burke said in 1894, a representative owes the people "not his industry only, but his judgement also." And even though I am a representative, my judgement shouldn't be subjugated to the opinion of the people. I don't govern by polling. I don't think that's out of arrogance, I simply believe that the role of the representative is to make good decisions.

Although few in number, the members I interviewed who perceived themselves as delegates were equally clear and passionate about their commitment to representing their constituents as delegates. The chief of staff for a moderate Democrat explained his boss's approach to representation as follows:

> She really sees herself as a delegate, not as a trustee. She considers every issue before the House to be a referendum and she strives to achieve that. She actively solicits the views she needs to understand exactly what the majority of her constituents want. She reaches out to those who disagree

> with the positions she decides to support after listening to the people. She is open to other ideas and welcomes disagreement. She tries to balance the competing concerns she hears when making her decisions, but it ultimately comes down to doing what the majority of her constituents want.

Some of the delegates I interviewed explained their delegate-like congruence with their constituents' opinions as a natural phenomenon. A "good representative," they assert, is like the people he or she represents. Indeed, one of the members Fenno interviewed underscored this notion, asserting that "If your conscience and your district disagree too often you're in the wrong business" (1978, 142). The difference between trustees and delegates, however, is that when personal views and constituent views collide, delegates almost always support their constituents' position. Almost paradoxically, the delegates I observed and spoke with tend not to be proactive legislators. Instead of working to enact their own legislative agendas, they try to reflect their constituents' opinions as they vote on the measures that come before them. They are, therefore, cautions in their legislative behavior, wary of "getting ahead of thee curve" on their constituents.

The politicos in my interview sample were, not surprisingly, more equivocal about the "right" approach to representation than trustees and delegates. Many of these members were genuinely unsure which approach they preferred. One member explained the difficulty and frustration sometimes associated with making decisions in the legislative process:

> I always think of the voters first and do what they want. Sometimes my personal beliefs differ from what they want and sometimes my personal beliefs might not even help them. I have a strong religious background that makes it difficult for me sometimes. It's very hard. As a public servant, I often end up being ambivalent about issues like abortion. In the end, I base my votes both on what my constituency wants and my convictions. It's a difficult balancing act. I bring my personal views with me to Washington

> and I weigh them carefully when I vote, but I really struggle with it. It's a challenge balancing my values with the values of others more broadly.

Just as this member, many politicos feel conflicted as they attempt to reconcile their personal beliefs and preferences with those of their constituents. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter Four, politicos also tend to feel more limited in their discretion than do trustees.

Members' perceptions of their representational roles also influence the amount of importance and time they give to listening to constituents' views, both at home and in Washington. As one trustee explained, he sees little need to communicate with his constituents in between elections:

> The way I see it, my constituents give me a two year period of time to represent them the way *I believe* is best for my district and for the nation. They give me those two years because they believed in the things I talked about during the election. When the two years are up, they have a chance to mark my report card and decide if they like the way I represented them or not.

Politicos, on the other hand, tended to stress the importance of extensive two-way communication with their constituents whenever and wherever possible. As one politico from the South explained:

> I spend a lot of my time, both at home and in Washington, trying to make sure that people understand where I'm coming from. Communication is very important to balancing my work in Washington with what I do back home. I don't play up the partisanship angle when I communicate with people. I focus instead on what I think is best for people.

Once again, while I am able to draw some distinctions between members' perceptions and other various member characteristics, the most important finding may be that there are, in fact, differences in members' perceptions of their representational roles.

As members balance their local and national roles, their perceptions of how they ought to make legislative decisions, in light of their constituents views, are clearly an important piece of the puzzle of Washington Style. As will be shown in later chapters, these perceptual differences influence the patterns of behavior members adopt on the Hill.

Political Strategists and Legislative Technicians

Research on members' levels of legislative activity has generally been based on narrow, empirical measures of work on Capitol Hill. For example, members have been categorized according the number of legislation-related speeches they give on the House floor, the number of amendments they offer, and the number of bills they introduce (see Hibbing 1991, 111-3). Elsewhere, measures of non-legislative activity have been employed to distinguish between "work horses" and "show horses" in the House (Payne 1980). While using empirical measures for "work" and "show" might be insightful, I once again remain focused on members' perceptions. The contemporary Congress is one in which almost every member has something to do or somewhere to be every waking moment on Capitol Hill. Distinguishing between the amount of work members do, then, does not hold a great deal of utility. However, it is possible to distinguish between the *kinds* of work members do in Washington. These distinctions can be made readily by focusing on members' perceptions and portrayals of their Hill work.

While the "work horse-show horse" distinction holds some analytic utility for distinguishing members according to the kinds of work they do on the Hill, is not normatively neutral distinction. Sam Rayburn, who has been credited with first making the work-show distinction, expressed a clear preference for work horses (Price 1992, 39).

For most House members the term "showhorse" has significant negative connotations--none of the members I interviewed used the term positively. As it stands, the distinction implies a normative superiority to the behavior of work horses in the Congress. Indeed, the long and deep-rooted history of this negative stereotype is reflected in House norms of specialization, apprenticeship, and deference (Price, 39; see also Payne, 447). Congressional norms notwithstanding, show horse behavior is readily observable on Capitol Hill. One member I interviewed referred to those who engage in such behavior the "press-release, photo-op, reception crowd," noting also that there were far too many of these members on the Hill. The importance of such behavior has long been downplayed by more work-oriented House members. A member who served in the late 1940s observed that the influence of show horses in Congress "is vastly less than would appear from a reading of the *Congressional Record* or the morning papers" (Voorhis 1947, 32). Its lack of "importance" notwithstanding, Mayhew found that almost every member of the House engaged in some show horse behavior, in the form of advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking (Mayhew 1974, 49-73). More recently, even "self-effacing work horses" have learned that they must "pay attention to courting the media and building public attention" to be effective House members (Price, 39). While some show horse behavior has become more acceptable in Washington there are still some aspects of "show" that are viewed negatively by other members. One member remarked derisively that the most dangerous place on the Hill was between one of his colleagues and a television camera. Another senior member echoed these sentiments, observing that:

> [Some members] go *way* overboard. They make themselves too visible in Washington--they're self-promoting show horses. [A particular member]

> is a good example. . . . She's very unpopular in the House, especially among her fellow [party members]. She talks and talks and doesn't listen *at all*.

Without denying the existence of self-serving show-horses on Capitol Hill, focusing on this kind of behavior obscures a more substantive difference in members' Hill styles. While most members ridiculed traditional "show horse" behavior, they expressed a great deal more tolerance for "show" behavior that focused on building political or public support for policy ideas or for specific legislative proposals, as opposed to behavior focused exclusively on aggrandizing the member engaged in it.[40] While traditional self-promoting show horse behavior can and does influence the way members are perceived by their colleagues, such behavior is more closely tied to members' home styles than to their Washington styles.[41]

Again, while the terms work horse and show horse have some purchase, given their wide use, it was necessary to re-frame these two legislative approaches in order to elicit more valid responses from members in my interviews.[42] One alternate distinction

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[40] Not insignificantly, the three kinds of show horse behavior Mayhew identified are of this second type.

[41] Technological advances that have narrowed the distance between members and their districts have made it increasingly possible and ordinary for members to engage in such home-focused behavior *from* Washington. This has led to a blurring of the distinction between home and Washington styles, a topic I will address at length in Chapter 5.

[42] Like the other categorizations of members' perceptions presented in this Chapter, the distinction between "show horses" and "work horses" discussed below are, in fact, based on perceptions or *portrayals* of self, and not necessarily indications of actual behavior. While a careful operationalization of show horse and work horse behavior would be insightful, such a effort is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

that seemed to resonate with members was to categorize members as either political strategists or legislative technicians. In the broadest terms, political strategists in the House tend to emphasize the "big picture" more than they do on the legislative details required to realize what that "picture" entails. Legislative technicians, on the other hand, are much more involved in the "nuts and bolts" of the legislative process, a proclivity which prompted one member to deem himself one of the "mechanics of the House." When the House's political strategists speak about the "big picture," they often do so in terms of broad visions for the future, which tend to be provocative and controversial. Consequently, strategists often catch the attention of the media, which they eagerly capitalize on to present and defend their ideas in the public arena. It should not be surprising, then, that strategists are seen on television and quoted in the print media more than legislative technicians. The strategist-technician distinction possesses the normative neutrality the work/show horse distinction does not.[43] That political strategists have higher public profiles than legislative technicians does not mean that they work less or that they are all show and no substance. On the contrary, political strategists are often concerned about and involved in the formulation of the legislation they support. To facilitate the realization of their goals, which might include political advancement, acquiring power, enacting policy, or staying in office, political strategists often ally themselves with more legislatively skilled members who can help them transform their

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[43] Another way of conceptualizing the difference is to distinguish between members' incentives. Payne argues that members who are motivated by policy goals are more likely to be "work horses" or "program types" (1980, 456). "Status types," on the other hand, tend to be "show horses" who are more concerned about political prestige and advancement.

ideas into public policies. Newt Gingrich (R-GA, 6) is only the most striking and recent example of such a prominent strategist.

Notwithstanding Gingrich's focus on building popular support for his party's policies, he knew that publicly penning and touting the "Contract with America" would not secure its enactment. To the degree that Gingrich's "Contract" strategy was successful during the 104th Congress, victories came through the Speaker's alliances with legislative technicians, like the aggressive and savvy legislative organizer Tom DeLay (R-TX, 22), who could capitalize on the political support Gingrich believed the 1994 elections had given congressional Republicans. Without such technically skilled allies, the "Contract" strategy would have produced little more than words. Perhaps Gingrich's most significant technical ally, Dick Armey, the Republican Majority Leader during the 104th Congress, is well aware that his approach differs from the Speaker's. While noting that it was Gingrich who "proselytized" the "Contract with America," building support for it in the broader polity, it was Armey who crafted the legislation that embodied the Contract's policy agenda. It is a division of labor that Armey prefers. Noting that Gingrich is a "good visionary," he admits, "I have had much more of a penchant for legislation. I can do the politics, but I don't like it. I'm much more comfortable in this role of managing the House."

Both political strategists and legislative technicians perform critically important functions in the legislative process. The process would come to a halt if there were *only* strategists or *only* technicians in the House of Representatives. For the Congress to act, some members must generate ideas and speak out in favor of them while others must

draft and secure passage of legislation that enacts those ideas into law. Both types of members are important and necessary. And while political and legislative behavior are not mutually exclusive, most members have a clear preference for one over the other. As one technically oriented Democratic member explained:

> Some members are "torch carriers" who are worried more about the "message" of the policies we create. They're also more interested in the rhetorical arguments and defenses of our policies. These people are important because they understand the political environment and what's required to win in that dimension. I'm just not very interested in that part of the legislative process.

Another member concurred that both kinds of members are vital to the legislative process:

> The mix of members in the House makes it possible to function. Not everyone can be a general. There are some members whose legislative work is limited and that's okay, maybe even necessary for the institution to function. If every member had a specific idea on every policy question, the process would be constantly mired down in petty debates.

As these members' comments suggest, both strategists and technicians recognize the need for the other's contributions to the effort to legislate. In one situation I observed, two members, one a political strategist and the other a legislative technician, teamed together as the primary sponsors of a bill. The synergy was undeniable. The strategist courted the media and the public while the technician fine-tuned the legislation. As the worked together, the technician passed technical information to the strategist, thereby equipping him with the air of expertise necessary to be a convincing public spokesman for the bill. Likewise the strategist's extensive interactions with various interested groups and individuals allowed him to appraise the technician of potential pitfalls in the wording, scope, and timing of the legislation. Ultimately, the bill did not pass (at least during the

104th Congress). However, the bill very likely made it much closer to final passage that it would have if either one of the two members had pushed the bill by himself.

Characteristics of Strategicians and Tacticians

Given the differences between these two approaches to legislative work, understanding members' perceptions of this distinction is crucial to a broader understanding of members' Washington styles. Of the members I interviewed, six perceived themselves as political strategists while sixteen perceived themselves as legislative technicians. The remaining six members perceived themselves as both strategist *and* technicians, working both to secure political support for their ideas and to enact them into law. All six of these members, however, indicated that their true passion was in the public realm, conveying a political vision and building support for it. The more technical aspects of their House work was necessary, but not as enjoyable to these members who, almost routinely, had gained substantial legislative skills early in their careers, before acquiring the prominence and skills to be effective strategists.[44] Consequently, while these members are unique in their approach to the legislative process, they are much more like pure strategists than they are like pure technicians. Unless otherwise noted, then, future references to strategists will include both kinds of politically-focused members. It is worth noting, though, that in my sample, members who perceived themselves as both political strategists and legislative technicians tended to be more senior than the pure strategy or technical types I interviewed. The hybrid members

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[44]Speaker Gingrich would clearly *not* be counted among this group--he delegated most of the day-to-day, i.e. tactical, aspects of leading the House to Majority Leader Dick Armey during the second half of the 104th Congress.

had served an average of 5.2 terms before the 104th Congress, compared to the average of 3.5 terms the other members had served.[45]

Among the members in my sample, there are no obvious demographic explanations for why particular members portrayed themselves as political strategists while others portrayed themselves as legislative technicians. A summary of member traits and their orientations as either strategists or technicians is presented in Table 3-4. Of the twelve strategists in my sample, half were leaders in the House, compared to seven of the sixteen technicians, a statistically indistinguishable difference. There is also no discernable difference between Strategists and technicians by seniority, although the differences across this variable are in the expected direction. The two variables that appear to have some explanatory power are partisanship and members' electoral security. Of the twelve strategists, nine held safe seats and eight were Republicans. Almost half of the Republicans I interviewed portrayed themselves as strategists while only 36% of Democrats did. Furthermore, of the three strategists who did *not* hold safe-seats, two were freshman during the 104th Congress and the other was a sophomore. All three won at least 58% of the vote in 1996, making all but one of their seats "safe" by the 60% standard. All three of these members were also Republicans. It is a reasonable speculation then that both partisanship and electoral security influenced these members' perceptions of themselves as political strategists.

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[45] In each of the cross-tabulations summarized in Table 3-4 (below), there are no substantial differences apparent when the table is expanded to include the hybrid status-program types. In every case, status-program types are much more like status-types than they are program-types.

Table 3-4.
Perceptions of Strategic/Tactical Focus and Member/District Characteristics

Member Characteristics	**n**	**Strategicians** [a] (n=12)	**Tactician** (n=16)
Republican	17	8	9
Democrat	11	4	7
3 or More Terms	12	5	7
0-2 Terms	16	7	9
Leader	13	6	7
Non-Leader	15	6	9
Female	5	2	3
Male	23	10	13
District Characteristics			
Safe-Seat	18	9	9
Marginal	10	3	7
Minority Majority	5	1	4
White Majority	23	11	12

[a] As noted, this category includes members who perceived themselves either as strategicians or as both strategicians and tacticians.

There are reasonable explanations for both the pattern in partisanship and electoral security and members' perceptions of themselves as strategists or technicians. First, Republicans elected or reelected in 1994 became part of the first GOP majority in the House since 1952, at least in part because of "The Contract with America," the strategic document around which Republicans rallied during the first half of the 104th Congress. In response to the unified strategic front of the GOP, House Democrats were put in a position of legislatively (technically) reacting to the Republican agenda. Instead of a Republican-Democrat distinction, though, the variable driving this difference may be majority party control of the House. Previous research, conducted when Democrats were in the majority in the House, found that *Democrats* were more likely to be "show horses" (political strategists) (Payne 1980). The partisan differences between strategists and technicians then, are not surprising. Secondly, members who hold safe seats are more likely to enjoy broader discretion to act as political strategists if they choose. While the mean vote total of strategists in 1994 was only slightly more than that of technicians (respectively 68.9% and 65.6%[46]), only one strategists won less than 55% of the vote in 1994, compared to five technicians who did so. Furthermore, five of six members from highly marginal seats[47] portrayed themselves as legislative technicians. While gender appears to have little to do with members perceptions of themselves as strategists or

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[46] Although these numbers appear close, they are very nearly statistically distinct. The mean 1994 vote share of the members I interviewed is 65.5% with as standard deviation of 2.5%. The upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval (plus and minus two standard deviations) are 70.5% and 60.6%.

[47]These seats are defined as those won by 53% or less of the two-party vote.

technicians in the House, there is some indication that members who represent minority-majority districts are more likely to be technicians, perhaps because of their more pragmatic focus on constituent service. However, given the limited generalizability of my sample, the most significant finding here is, once again, that House members can be clearly categorized according to their preferences to behave as strategic (show horses) or as technical (work horses) in the legislative process.

Strategic and Tactical Roles and Washington Behavior

There is not a perfect correlation between members' preferred or perceived roles as strategists or tacticians and their behavior or abilities. For example, several younger members I interviewed perceived themselves as strategists in the House although they do not appear to be either active or effective strategy-setters. One such freshman member, who probably lacks the visibility, reputation and prestige to be an influential strategist on Capitol Hill, nonetheless portrayed himself as such. Not insignificantly, his desire focus on legislative and political strategy is driven by his goals as a member of the House. His legislative agenda, he explained, is focused on strategic macro-policies, not on the details of any particular piece of legislation:

> My vision as a representative has to do with the restructuring of American society. I believe that our society is in need of fundamental change . . . I believe it may take us ten years to turn things around the way we really want to. . . Our focus [as a freshman class should be] on American society and the ways we can make it better, not simply on reducing the size of the federal government.

Most members, though, expressed perceptions of themselves that were more in harmony with their actual behavior and abilities. One junior Democrat's comments suggest that

this congruence grows out of simply recognizing and acting in accord with one's preferences:

> I am much more of a technocrat than I am a bureaucrat or a politician. I don't get caught up in the political games that are played in Washington. I'm much more concerned with--and I know this might sound quixotic--I'm more interested in making good public policy. I really get into the details of public policy problems, so much that I don't think a whole lot about their political dimensions. I'll scour the 16,000 pages of detail in search of that one deficiency that I can correct to make a policy more effective.

A very senior Republican similarly observed that he is a technician because that is the kind of work with which he is most comfortable:

> Some members really are show horses--they're grandstanders, publicity hacks. I don't do one-minute [speeches]. I think they're a waste of time. . . . I'm much more of a back-room dealer. There's nothing dirty about that. It's just plain old do your work kind of stuff.

Members' perceptions of their roles as strategists or tacticians do, in fact, influence the way they work on Capitol Hill and, in turn, they way they relate to their constituents back home. Perceptions drive the amount of mental, emotional, and physical resources members accord each type of work in the legislative process and, in turn, their political strategy and or legislatively technical behavior becomes an important part of their styles of representation. Highlighting the connection between members' perceptions and their representational behavior, a very senior technician concluded:

> Some members spend all of their time trying to do what they need to do to win. At least they think they are. For example, [a particular member] *never* leaves the floor. He wants to be seen on TV back home on C-SPAN. He could be a much more effective representative if he would attend to his committee responsibilities, but there his sits on the floor. . . . I think the key difference between members is their motivations. Some don't put their energy into their job because it's *having* their job, not doing it, that gets them excited.

While the ultimate judgement of whether a representatives' behavior amounts to "good representation" or not rests on the people he or she represents, members' perceptions of themselves as either political strategists or legislative technicians profoundly shape and influence the relationships members have with their constituents.

V. PERCEPTIONS OF WORK ON CAPITOL HILL

As the foregoing discussion suggests, House members have distinctly different perceptions of themselves, their constituencies, their local and national roles and the goals they seek. These perceptions, in turn, have significant implications for the ways members orient themselves to and participate in the legislative process. The focal point of members' legislative work, though, is Capitol Hill. Consequently, a clear understanding of members' perceptions of the Hill and the work they do there is necessary to complete our view of Washington style. As they attempt to balance their local and national roles, maximize their discretion and achieve the goals they pursue, members must reconcile their personal and local perceptions and objectives with what they perceive to be the realities of work in Washington. For example, a member who perceives him or herself to be an ideological trustee with broad discretion might also perceive him or herself as a political strategist. However, the norms of apprenticeship and specialization may limit a member's ability to be an influential political strategist early in his or her career. In this and a dozen other ways, House members are forced to reconcile their perceptions of themselves, their constituencies, their representational roles, and, ultimately, their Washington styles to the environments in which they find themselves in Washington.

As new House members arrive on the Hill, especially those with little political experience, the transition can be overwhelming. Members must prioritize a seemingly endless barrage of requests for meetings and appearances, squeezing as many as they can into an already full agenda of committee meetings and floor votes. On a typical day, members must decide how much time to spend with constituents visiting from their districts, which lobbyists to meet with and for how long, which receptions to attend and which interview requests to honor. The environment in which such decisions are made is quite different from the different environments back home in which members ran for and won their seats. On the Hill, staff, interest groups, other House members and party leaders all vie for the support and attention of each member. The pressures to support this cause or that now come from more numerous and varied directions than were even imaginable back home. These influences tend to have a disproportionate impact on members' Washington styles early in their careers when their perceptions and preferences are comparatively more malleable. Even the political circumstances under which members come to the Hill can shape the trajectories of their careers. Such was the case for the "Watergate Babies" and, in all likelihood, so will it be for the 1994 Republican freshmen.

In the midst of all this tumult, one of the first and most important perceptions members develop of Hill work is a view of the House itself, as an institution. Most members are initially overwhelmed by the sheer size of the House of Representatives, both spatially as well as in terms of the number of people employed by it. As one member observed, it is difficult for new members to become too involved in the legislative process when they "can't even find the bathrooms in the Rayburn [House Office]

Building." However, while the House of Representatives is a physically large institution, which covers the east half of Capitol Hill, filling five sprawling House Office Buildings, it is a fundamentally intimate institution. Most members know each other, at least by name, and they interact with each other regularly and frequently on the floor of the House, in the cloak room and Speaker's Lobby, in their committee meetings, and at numerous other formal and informal gatherings, receptions, and meetings. The members one does not know personally can be learned about quickly enough through one's colleagues. In spite of its physical size, the House is a socially intimate institution, Consequently, it is impossible to be an unknown quantity on Capitol Hill. While there are members who are more complex and enigmatic than their colleagues, and even some who take pride in being elusive, every member of the House is a public figure who is regularly seen and heard by his or her colleagues on the Hill. Consequently, members have numerous opportunities to see other members at work and to compare their representational efforts to theirs.

Not only are members, in general, careful observers of one another, but they also tend to be keenly aware of how they are perceived by others on the Hill. For example, Republican Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) has characterized himself as a fiercely competitive House member; but, he also recognizes that other members' perceptions of him as such might limit his ability to wield more influence in the House (Koszczuk 1996, 979). While asserting that he is simply fighting for what he believes in, DeLay has self-consciously sought to change the way others perceive him on the Hill. By his own account, he is attempting to remake himself as a "middle-ground" member of the House, a member who

can legitimately say that "a lot of his ideas are similar to President Clinton's" (979). The trick for DeLay, and any member who seeks to change the way he or she is perceived on the Hill, is to appear credible and sincere in the process. Members' perceptions of each other, then, establish the boundaries of what is acceptable and effective behavior on the Hill.

In contrast to these more personal perceptions, which are largely unformed before coming to Washington, members bring with them to Washington some notion of the role of the House in the broader polity. These perceptions, though, are also subject to change as members work on the Hill. In general, though, members of the House of Representatives have profound respect for the institution in which they serve and the function it serves in the American political system. Members tend to view the House as a collection of the best the nation has to offer. This is especially true of the more senior members I interviewed. A senior Democratic member argued that the business of the House should not be taken lightly, as it is by many members:

> The fundamental objective of the Congress in Washington, D.C. is to build consensus. At Gettysburg, Lincoln asked "shall a nation divided endure?" That question remains important today. Can the Congress build a consensus in the midst of all the seemingly overwhelming problems we're called on to deal with?

A prominent senior Republican similarly expressed his dismay at his younger Republican colleagues who do not share his perspective of the House:

> I'm sometimes frustrated . . . by the freshmen who attack the institution I've worked so hard to make better. I even worked hard to get them elected. I gave money to almost every Republican freshman elected last year.

The perception that they are the caretakers of the institution and its role in American government is a perception widely shared by senior members, Republicans and Democrats alike. The disrespect that younger members have for the institution produces behavior that worries more senior members. One member of the Republican leadership observed:

> The freshmen are very idealistic. They don't concede that others in the Congress have wisdom that they don't. They're inexperienced and they have a lot to learn. They have to learn that not everything in Washington is black and white. They're very genuine and great believers in their cause, but they're too absolute about things. Some of the freshmen are immature. In some cases that's been made worse because they've hired inexperienced staff. It's a very heady experience being elected to Congress. It's a very tough adjustment for them to make.

With regard to members' perceptions of the role and function of the House there is a discernable difference, especially among younger members, between those who have had previous legislative experience and those who do not. A junior Democratic member who had served as a state legislator for nearly fifteen years before coming to Washington observed:

> My experience in the state legislature made my transition to Washington more smooth than it is for a lot of new members. I came to the Congress knowing legislative procedure and I had an understanding of how government and political parties function.

Another experienced legislator similarly observed:

> Serving in the state legislature for eight years before coming to the Congress helped make the transition smoother than it might have otherwise been. I was familiar with the process and the dynamics of a legislative body, so I didn't have to do as much "on the job training" as some other members.

In contrast, a freshman Republican with no previous political experience described his less than smooth transition into House membership:

> I'm very much an outsider. . . . I was naive enough to think that my business experience qualified me to be on the Ways and Means Committee, but, as I learned quickly, that's not how it works around here. My committees were chosen for me--I was assigned to them. . . . Last year was a trial by fire for the freshman. It was sort of like trying to get a drink from a fire hydrant for those of us who had never held political office before. We were pulling all-nighters every night the first 100 days and we were dealing with complicated issues that we weren't familiar with. It was really a wrenching adjustment.

The perceptions of Hill work discussed above clearly have the potential to influence members' behavior on Capitol Hill. Members' views of other members, the role and status of the House in the current political environment, and the importance of their congressional work alter the ways members orient themselves to legislative work. These perceptions, however, are difficult to categorize and, hence, their influence (both in scope and direction) is difficult to ascertain. There are, however, member perceptions of Hill work that are more easily categorized and analyzed. Among those I interviewed, each member was able to articulate his or her perception of where they fit in the House and where they were most comfortable and effective in the House. In broad terms, the members in my sample indicated that they were attached to or involved in the House at one of three levels: personal, informal, and formal. Below, I discuss members' varying perceptions of the different levels at which they are connected to the House and the possible sources of their differing perceptions and preferences. I also provide evidence of the influence of these perceptions on members' efforts to balance Hill and home and be effective representatives.

Level of Attachment to the House

Almost every House member has at least some involvement at the personal, informal, and formal levels of the House. At the personal level, members interact one-on-one or in very small groups, often as much socially as legislatively. Unlike informal or formal attachments, personal interactions and attachments are unstructured and spontaneous. These are the most natural kinds of relationships in which members engage. It is not surprising then that most members have and enjoy personal relationships with others on the Hill. It is striking, however, that not all members emphasize personal attachments more than other kinds of associations in the House. Personally-connected House members are, in fact, distinct in the amount of emphasis they place on cultivating personal relationships in Washington. As one told me: "I just believe you catch more flies with honey than you do with vinegar . . . I recognize the importance of personal relationships in this town."

Members who are attached to the House at the informal level spend a much greater portion of their time on the Hill with other members in issue caucus meetings or other organized but unofficial working groups, outside the formal legislative process. Personal relationships are cultivated in these groups, but interaction is more structured and planned. In general, these caucuses and working groups tend to be bipartisan and policy focused, providing members with opportunities to form coalitions that cut across party lines, which tend to rigidify the formal organizations and relationships between members in the House. Members who associate with others at the informal level, then, tend to be both less formal and less personal than their colleagues.

At the formal level, members interact with each other in their committees and on the House floor or in official meetings of their party's leadership or rank-and-file. These members also care about and cultivate personal relationships, but their interactions with others on the Hill are even more structured. Formally attached members simply choose to associate with their colleagues in the context of their organized party caucuses, committees, and the House of Representative as an institution.

In spite of each member's involvement at all three of these levels, most members have a preferred level at which they relate to others as they conduct of their Washington work. And, unlike some of the other perceptions presented in this chapter, members' perceptions of the levels at which they are most comfortably attached to the House are highly correlated with their behavior. Given that a member who is comfortable at one level is likely to do most of his or her work at that level, this congruence is not surprising. Some members, however, do not spend all or even most of their time working at their most comfortable levels in the House because they are constrained by institutional or electoral circumstances. For example, a member who prefers to work at the personal level might, at some point in his or her career, become a committee chair and be forced to spend more of his or her time at the formal level. The pressure for a personally or informally attached member to seek a chairmanship might come from his or her constituents who may have an interest in the business of a particular committee. Similar pressures might come from an interest group from which a member has received campaign contributions. Other less formally-disposed members might feel compelled to seek a chairmanship--and then to devote time and energy to the position--because doing

so might bring them the power and influence they need to maximize their discretion over other areas of their lives as House members. A powerful committee chair who takes care of his or her constituents, influential interest groups and other House members is well-positioned to have others do favors for them. Whatever the case, as members interact with others on the Hill, the levels at which they do so are significantly related to other aspects of their Washington behavior, their Washington styles and, ultimately, the kinds of representation they provide their constituents.

Level of Attachment and Member Characteristics

Of the twenty-eight members I interviewed, sixteen had a clearly preferred level at which they perceived themselves or preferred to be attached to the House.[48] Of these sixteen, six were attached at the personal level, three at the informal level, and seven at the formal level. The remaining twelve members perceived themselves to be equally attached at more than one level. Four indicated that they were most comfortable at the personal and informal levels, another four at the personal and formal levels, one at the informal and formal levels,[49] and three who perceived that they were attached at all three levels. A summary of these preferences and various member traits appears in Table 3-5. Unlike previously discussed relationships between member traits and their perceptions,

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[48] As my interviews proceeded and this distinction became more apparent, I presented these three categories to members more explicitly. Some of the responses to my questions about attachment, then, include specific references to these three distinct levels.

[49] Although these two levels seem mutually exclusive, one member specifically indicated that his preference was to work at these two levels. It is instructive, however, that only one of 28 members are in this perceptual category.

the figures in the table suggest that there is no relationship between partisanship and members' levels of attachment to the House. Seniority, though, is a factor, and for obvious reasons. Given their greater likelihood to hold formal leadership positions, more senior members, for obvious reasons, are more likely than other members to be attached at the formal level. Nine of thirteen (69.3%) leaders were attached, at least in part, at the formal level, compared with only five of fifteen (33.3%) non-leaders. Two of the three members who indicated that they felt comfortable at all three levels were more senior members in leadership positions. All three held safe-seats. Due to the sparseness of each sub-group, additional patterns are difficult to identify. Members who hold minority-majority districts, however, appear more likely to be attached at the personal and or informal levels than they are at the formal level, a pattern which can reasonably be traced to the prominence of the Congressional Black Caucus and the proclivity for African-American members to join it and work within it on the Hill.

Additional patterns in the differences between members' perceptions of their levels of attachment to the House can be seen more easily if the perceptual categories are collapsed from seven to two: members who perceive themselves to be attached, at least in part, at the formal level and those who do not. A summary of this categorical distinction and various member characteristics is presented in Table 3-6. When members' perceptions of their levels of attachment to the House are categorized in this way, party affiliation becomes a relevant factor--Republicans (58.8%) in my sample were more likely to be attached at the formal level than were Democrats (45.5%). This relationship, however, is again inflated by the even greater likelihood of senior members in leadership

Table 3-6.
Perceptions of Level of Attachment to the House and Member/District Characteristics (Collapsed Categories)

Member Characteristics	n	Attached at Formal Level (n=15)	Not Attached at Formal Level (n=13)
Republican	17	10	7
Democrat	11	5	6
3 or More Terms	12	8	4
0-2 Terms	16	7	9
Leader	13	9	4[a]
Non-Leader	15	6	9
Female	5	2	3
Male	23	13	10
District Characteristics			
Safe-Seat	18	10	8
Marginal	10	5	5
Minority Majority	5	1	4
White Majority	23	14	9

[a] Includes three mid-level party leaders (assistant or deputy whips).

positions to perceive themselves to be attached at the formal level.[50] Eight of the twelve (66.7%) senior members and nine of the thirteen (69.2%) leaders in my sample were attached at the formal level, compared with only seven of sixteen (43.8%) junior members and six of fifteen (40%) non-leaders. This relationship is further underscored by the fact that three of the four leaders who did not feel attached at the formal level were mid-level party leaders, and not in formal positions in the House.

Levels of Attachment and Washington Behavior

As with the other perceptions I have discussed, members' perceptions of the levels at which they are attached to the House of Representatives influence and shape their Washington behavior. The effects of attachment on member behavior on the Hill is perhaps most strikingly illustrated by a case in which a member feels little or no attachment to the House. For this reason, it is, perhaps, once again more significant that the members I interviewed made clear distinctions between these three levels of involvement in the House and expressed preferred levels of attachment than it is to show why members differ across these categories. My interview data, though, provides evidence of both the impact of these perceptions as well as the sources of members' preferences. The previously mentioned member from the very marginal district, expressed such sentiments:

> In terms of my level of involvement in the House, I'm very much a maverick, a loner. I don't give up too much, even to my staff. I don't feel comfortable associating myself or my office with anyone or any group but myself right now.

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[50] Recall that the Republicans in my sample are somewhat more senior and more likely to be leaders that were Democrats.

What connections this member has in the House are at the personal level. Consequently, his involvement in the legislative process is quite limited. For some members, however strong personal attachments to others in the House can mean that a member is very involved in the business of the House. As one member explained:

> I feel pretty comfortable at all three levels, but I would have to say that I'm especially comfortable at the personal level. I have lots of friends on both sides of the aisle. I can talk to and work with just about anyone in the House. I enjoy the personal relationships I have with other members.

This member was among those who perceive themselves as being attached to the House at both the formal and personal levels. These members recognize the importance of their formal connections in the House, but they also value the personal relationships they have as they pursue their goals in Washington. In spite of their formal commitments, these members will take the time to build and maintain good personal relationships with others in the House.

While some members cultivate personal relationships to maximize their goal-seeking discretion in Washington, other members do so by establishing themselves at the informal level. One caucus chair I interviewed suggested that his influence in the House might be multiplied by the membership of the caucus he chairs, provided he can lead it effectively. Very simply, members will devote most of their time and energy at the level they believe will yield the greatest return for their efforts. As one informally attached member observed:

> I'm very active in the caucus and on my committees, much more than I am on the floor. I work well with the other members of the caucus and the other minority members on the committee. . . . I'll get involved on the floor if there's a particularly important issue, but it's usually in the caucus

> or in my committee work that I feel I can accomplish the most by taking an active role.

Some members, especially junior ones, are capable of only limited attachments at the formal level. One option for maximizing their abilities to pursue and realize their goals is to affiliate themselves with like-minded members in issue caucuses. This was the most important reason behind the formation of the Congressional Black Caucus. While the black members I interviewed were less senior, on average, than the other members in my sample, their tendency to be unattached at the formal level supports this argument. These members' behavior suggests that factors other than seniority can make members less likely to participate at one level or another in the House. For example, moderate Democrats, many of whom feel powerless within their own party caucus, have joined other moderate members in issue caucuses that provide a platform for the pursuit of their policy goals. One pragmatic moderate Democrat suggested that he prefers to work in settings where their bipartisanship and "good policy" are valued:

> At which level am I most comfortable? It depends. I enjoy my work on the Science Committee because we're able to do a lot of bipartisan work there. I also enjoy my informal work with the Coalition, working on balancing the budget and different things.

Ideally, most of the members I spoke with would like to be active and effective at all three levels in the House. Given the fact that only three members perceived themselves to be attached at all three levels, however, suggests that such an ideal is difficult to attain. Members that manage to do so are highly adaptable. As one such member commented:

> I don't know that I'm any more comfortable or effective in any one sphere than another. I'm more of a chameleon. I switch between spheres almost seamlessly. You almost have to develop multiple personas because the

> different spheres require such different skills and approaches. I have to constantly shift gears to adjust what comes before me.

Another such member emphasized the importance of committee work, but only because that is where he believed most of the opportunities were.

> Committees are really where the action is in the House. That's where things begin, where things are alive and happening. I'm also comfortable on the House floor, amending legislation, giving speeches. I'm comfortable working in all aspects of the legislative process, at all the levels you mentioned.

Members who are able to connect themselves to the House at all three levels of activity have the most opportunities to influence the legislation the House produces. That is not to say, however, that they are the most effective or influential members in the House. A member who is attached at the formal level, perhaps as a committee chair, is likely to wield far more influence than a member with modest attachments at all three levels. As members seek their goals in Washington, they must choose the level of activity in the House with which they are most comfortable and at which they believe they can be most effective.

House members' perceptions of their levels of attachment to the House also have important implications for the kind of linkage they provide their constituents. For example, one member explained, "I move millions of dollars in federal projects to my district every year. My success in doing so depends on my relationships with other members of Congress." This member has utilized his personal connections, as well as his formal connections as a senior committee members, to channel tangible benefits to his district. In contrast, other members think of their levels of involvement in the House in

terms of the policy linkages they can provide their constituents. A committee chairman I interviewed described one such member:

> There's a stereotypical view of members of the House as out to get whatever they can for their districts so they'll be reelected. Not all members are like that, though. [A particular congressman], in the entire time I've been here, has never asked for anything for his district, even while I've been [involved with the leadership of a major committee]. I've got members lined up outside my door all the time asking me for things for their districts, but [this congressman] believes that the member's role is *not* to bring home the bacon. Instead he believes his role is to change the shape of government.

Finally, some members have little concern for the kind or quality of connections they have in the House. Members who are highly focused on their districts and their constituents, tend to be less preoccupied with their levels of involvement on Capitol Hill. Ironically, this lack of attention to their Washington relationships may limit their abilities to solidify their relationships back home, a subject I address in Chapter Four.

As members pursue the goals in the House, their perceptions and preferences of the levels at which they are connected to the body shape linkage they provide between their districts and Washington, D.C. As I will discuss in Chapter Four, these perceptions also shape members' Washington style and , therefore, their broader representational relationships with their constituents.

VI. CONCLUSION

The ways House Members perceive themselves, their constituencies, their roles as local representatives and national legislators influence their Washington behavior and, in turn, the representational relationships they establish with their constituents. These

perceptions, however, are not formed in a vacuum. Members' personalities and personal characteristics, party affiliations, seniority, electoral security, and institutional positions guide and shape their perceptions. Further more, while each of the member perceptions discussed in this chapter influence the relationships between representatives and their constituents, no single perception is obviously the most important to the practice of congressional representation. Most of the House members I interviewed, especially those who had served more than two or three terms, believed that they "fit" their constituencies and that the people back home generally supported them. Members were slow, however, to attribute that support to one or two specific things about them or their work as representatives. Rather, House members tend to view their relationships with their constituents as rich, contextual, and complex. Because members' goals and perceptions--and the context in which they pursue their goals and develop their perceptions--are subject to constant change, member behavior in Washington is also fluid and dynamic. In this chapter, however, I have identified some patterns in members' perceptions and behavior that seem to be fairly stable across different House members and over time. By taking a step back from this focus on perception and behavior in the next Chapter, I identify and discuss the stylistic patterns of Washington work that can be identified among members of the House.

CHAPTER 4: WASHINGTON STYLE AND ITS DIMENSIONS

When Tip O'Neill declared "all politics is local" he might just as easily have said "no two House members are alike." Indeed, individual representatives vary widely in their perceptions, goals, and behavior in Washington. Given this diversity, it would be easy to conclude that no two House members approach their Washington work in the same way. While at one level such a conclusion would be accurate, House members adopt discrete, discernable patterns or styles of behavior in Washington, just as they do back home in their districts (Fenno 1978). Furthermore, the adoption of either a constituent, policy or partisan style has significant implications for the kinds of representational linkage House members provide their constituencies. Each member's style in Washington represents his or her efforts to balance personal, local and Washington influences and interests as they do their work on the Hill. Consequently, the kinds of styles House members adopt, the reasons they adopt them and the ways they adjust them in the face of changing circumstances are at the core of the practice of congressional representation.

This chapter provides an overview of three distinct styles of Washington work--the constituent, policy and partisan styles--and the members that adopt them. In the discussion of each style, I further examine the relationships between various member and district characteristics, member perceptions and the Washington styles they adopt.

I. WASHINGTON STYLE

Each of the twenty-eight House members I interviewed has adopted either a constituent, policy or partisan style. While it is possible, even ordinary, for members to be simultaneously aware of and attentive to constituent, policy, and partisan concerns when they are in Washington, each member has adopted a Washington style that emphasizes one of these dimensions of congressional representation more than the other two. A member's Washington style reflects his or her personal and representational preferences and priorities. The adoption of one style does not preclude interest in or attention to concerns that are typically associated with the other two styles. Members do, however, have clear stylistic preferences. As one member asserted, it is "only natural" for members with different abilities and priorities to adopt different styles:

> Part of a member's approach to the job is defined for them by the talents and skills they bring to it. Most people have finite talents and you have to go with your strengths. Some Members are good legislators, some are good at the political stuff, and others are good constituent people. You can't really do all of these different things and do them perfectly well.

Of the twenty-eight members in my sample, eight have adopted constituent-focused Washington styles, ten have policy-focused Washington styles, and ten have partisan Washington styles.[51] While we cannot know if these proportions hold for the

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[51] I categorized each member's Washington style primarily on the basis of my interviews with each of them. Additionally, my categorizations were facilitated and confirmed through an examination of each member's congressional track record (compiled from a variety of resources, including *Politics in America*, Washington based newspapers, Congressional Quarterly's *Weekly Report*, and the *Congressional Record*), and, wherever possible, interviews and discussions about them with their staffers and other members. Where relevant and appropriate, I will provide supporting evidence for my categorizations of particular members. The difficulty that arises however, is that providing too much information might jeopardize the anonymity of the members I

House as a whole, my interviews and observations suggest that virtually every House member can be placed into one of these three categories. Nonetheless, these stylistic categories should be taken as ideal types rather than precise descriptions of individual members' actions in Washington. As with any ideal type, my categorization of Washington styles is a simplification of an otherwise complex reality. With perhaps a very few exceptions, every member of the House must pay attention to the constituent, policy, and partisan dimensions of his or her Washington work as they balance their duties on the Hill and at home. Although I did not find strong evidence of such behavior among the members I interviewed, it is even possible for members to adopt mixed styles in their Washington work.[52] In general terms, however, House members orient themselves toward their work in Washington in one of the three ways I have identified.

With each of the three Washington styles, there is an associated pattern of Washington behavior, which I will describe in detail below. There are also identifiable patterns between various member and district characteristics and the styles representatives adopt in Washington. These patterns are summarized in Table 4-1. As was the case with many of the member perceptions discussed in Chapter Three, majority party status or party affiliation appears to have the strongest influence on members' styles in

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interviewed. Consequently, I will err on the side of caution while endeavoring to provide substantive secondary support for my categorizations.

[52] Five of the members I interviewed suggested that they had a secondary stylistic emphasis. All five, however, clarified that these secondary emphases were outgrowths of their primary or dominant style. For example, one constituent-focused member told me that there might be some elements of a policy style in his Washington work because he fought for legislation that benefitted his constituents. His style, though, was much more constituent than policy-focused.

Table 4-1.
Washington Style and Member/District Characteristics

Member Characteristics	**n**	**Constituent Style** (n=7)	**Policy Style** (n=12)	**Partisan Style** (n=9)
Republican	17	0 (0%)	9 (53%)	8 (47%)
Democrat	11	7 (64%)	3 (27%)	1 (9%)
3 or More Terms	12	3 (25%)	3 (25%)	6 (50%)
0-2 Terms	16	4 (25%)	9 (56%)	3 (19%)
Leader	13	2 (15%)	4 (31%)	7 (54%)
Non-Leader	15	5 (33%)	8 (53%)	2 (13%)
Female	5	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	1 (20%)
Male	23	5 (22%)	10 (43%)	8 (35%)
District Characteristics				
Safe-Seat[a]	18	5 (28%)	6 (33%)	7 (39%)
Marginal	10	2 (20%)	6 (60%)	2 (20%)
Minority	5	4 (80%)	0 (0%)	1 (20%)
Majority[b]	23	3 (13%)	12 (52%)	8 (35%)
White Majority				

[a] As discussed in Chapter Two, a "safe-seat" is one which the incumbent won by 60% of the vote or more in the previous election.

[b] As discussed in Chapter Two, a minority-majority district is on in which African-Americans, Hispanics, and or other minority groups constitute a majority of voters.

Washington. While none of the Republicans have adopted constituent styles, seven of the eleven Democrats have. However, the greater tendency among the Republicans in my sample to be leaders and to be more senior members in the House once again skews these results--more senior members were more likely to adopt partisan styles than they were to adopt constituent or policy styles. The same was true of members in leadership positions in my sample. Other interesting patterns include the tendency for members representing marginal seats to adopt policy styles--six of ten such members did, compared to six of eighteen members holding safe seats. Small sub-sample sizes are once again a hindrance, but my categorization suggests that women are more likely to be either constituent or policy (rather than partisan) focused and members representing minority-majority districts are most likely to adopt constituent styles in Washington. Significantly, four of the seven members in my sample with constituent styles hearken from majority-black districts. All four of these members represent poor urban neighborhoods. In the discussion of each Washington style that follows, I explore the possible reasons for these patterns.

Constituent Style

Every member of Congress, by the nature of the position he or she holds, must be aware of and concerned about the needs and interests of his or her constituents. It seems redundant, then, to speak of a "constituent-focused" House member. However, while every member of the House is concerned about his or her constituents, there are some members who are more explicitly focused on the immediate and tangible interests of their constituents than others. These members weigh the balance between Washington and home heavily toward their districts. Not surprisingly, these representatives consistently

cited constituency service among the one or two most important parts or their jobs--both at home and in Washington. As one very senior Democrat with a constituent-focused Washington style explained:

> When I think of my job as a Congressman, I think first and foremost of people. . . . Governing always comes second to serving people. The people always come first. "Legislation" is sometimes a natural extension of my focus on serving people--I work hard to bring things to the district that will help the people I represent, especially programs that build the community and contribute to economic development. It just happens that these programs are created and administered in Washington. My real focus is not on *this* town but what happens back in my *home* town.

For this Congressman, whom another senior member identified as one of the most constituent-focused members in Washington, legislation and politics are not the primary vehicles through which he pursues his representational and individual goals. For the most part, this Congressman and other members with constituent styles would rather be back home, in their districts, with the people they represent. Many of these members even assert that legislative or "programmatic" work in Washington is electorally dangerous to them because such work is risky--it is as likely to produce negative results as it is positive ones. In contrast, fighting for their districts' "fair share" of federal dollars provides what constituent-focused members perceive as "pure profit" (see Fiorina 1989, 43).

Indeed, many of the members with constituent styles I interviewed expressed only passing interest in legislation that was not directly aimed at securing specific resources for their districts or addressing specific constituent problems back home. As one member with a constituent style explained, policy making is not as important to him as taking care of his constituents' immediate needs:

> The more important part of the job is establishing a relationship with the communities in your district. Representing those communities primarily involves getting them federal assistance, addressing their needs, such as building roads and bridges or providing legal services. You have to know what those needs are before you can address them, though, and you can't know their needs unless you have a good relationship with them.

This orientation toward the legislative process, or rather the lack of one, makes members with constituent styles more *re*active than *pro*active in their Washington work. Another constituent-focused member reinforced this supposition arguing that, in the pursuit of his representational goals, *preventing* legislation from passing is sometimes as important as *passing* it. He explained, "I see my work in Washington as the primary extension of my efforts to be a good representative. I fight hard not just to get things done for the people I represent, but also to prevent things that would be bad for them." Many constituent-focused House members in the 104th Congress were especially conscious of this dimension of their Washington work. Fighting Republican cuts in social welfare programs became the major legislative priority of most constituent-focused Democrats in 1994 and 1995. It is ironic, however, that while constituent-focused members are likely to win policy discretion in Washington through their constituent service efforts, they are not generally inclined to capitalize on it. They are content to be advocates and protectors of their constituents when they participate in the legislative process, rather than be proactive legislative entrepreneurs.

All seven of the members with constituent styles are Democrats (see Table 4-1). The much greater likelihood for Democrats to be constituent-focused in their Hill work was at least reinforced by factors unique to the 104th Congress, most notably the policy-specific contract with America and the Republicans' emphasis on balancing the budget,

even at the cost of reduced constituent service and pork-barrel spending. Four of the seven constituent-focused members in my sample represent minority-majority districts and four are in their first three terms of service in the House. Only two are elected or appointed House leaders, and only two hold marginal seats.[53] These patterns are probably an artifact of the tendency of members from minority-majority districts to adopt constituent styles. Such members are less likely than others to be leaders in the House (20% compared to 52% of all other members in my sample) and more likely to hold safe seats (100% compared to 61% of others in the sample).[54]

While it is possible to identify characteristics that seem to predispose some members to adopt constituent styles, the more significant finding may be that there are, in fact, House members who do not perceive and present themselves as having a constituent focus in Washington. This finding--which contradicts much of the conventional wisdom about congressional representation--is particularly relevant to the broader question of how members balance their local and national roles as representatives and legislators. Members with constituent-focused Washington styles behave quite differently from

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[53] The lower comparative percentage of leaders among those with constituent styles is also partly due to the lower proportion of leaders among the Democrats in my sample.

[54] Three of the four constituent-focused minority-majority representatives held safe-seats (defined as one won by at least 50% of the vote) during the 104th Congress, while the fourth, after winning 58% of the vote in 1994, was reelected with a very safe 61% of the vote in 1996. Electoral safety in minority-majority districts, however, cannot simply be measured by general election outcomes. The more relevant measure of electoral safety in such districts is often the percentage of the primary vote won by the incumbent. Of the four constituent-focused members from such districts, the lowest primary vote total in 1994 was 67%, and three were unopposed.

others in the House. They tend to travel home more frequently, place less emphasis on working with their Washington staffs, and spend more time meeting with constituents and constituent-related groups in Washington. Constituent-focused members are also much less engaged in the intricacies of the legislative process and the inter-workings of their political parties. For one member, this lack of focus on Washington was so pronounced that when I asked about how he "fit in" with other members in Washington, he spoke instead about how he "fit in" back home:

> Fitting in and developing a style in Washington is similar to developing a good fit back home. The more you communicate back home, the more comfortable you become with your district. When I was in the state legislature, I started having meetings every Friday morning in my district to meet with community leaders and whoever else wanted to attend. Those meetings help you develop positions on just about every issue you can think of. The longer you serve, the more adept you become at addressing a broader range of issues.

Fitting-in in Washington, for this member at least, has more to do with fitting one's constituency and their views than it does with developing relationships and acquiring legislative skills on Capitol Hill. A general lack of interest in and emphasis on the legislative business of the House is one of the most distinctive and significant traits of members with constituent styles. One manifestation of this tendency is the frequency with which these members delegate their Washington work to staffers. For example, through several comments made by other members and staffers, it became apparent that one of the members I interviewed delegates his legislative work almost completely to his staff. Of this congressman, one policy-focused asserted:

> Too much attention to home can kill you when you really need to get something done *in Washington* to help your constituents. It's very rare that some members participate at all, like [the congressman], for example.

> Members like him are out of the loop. They aren't engaged enough to be effective representatives of their constituents.

Many non-constituent focused members are, in fact, critical of members with constituent styles, especially when constituent-focused Hill behavior produces a competition for pork-barrel spending. Dick Armey, the GOP Majority leader in the 104th Congress, has repeatedly argued that an over-emphasis on local concerns can produce national problems (i.e. burgeoning debt) that ultimately have a negative impact on every congressional district (see Gugliotta 1996, 10). For their part, however, members with constituent styles contend that serving their districts does not require extensive involvement in the legislative process nor is it necessarily contrary to national interests. In fact, some of the constituent-oriented members I interviewed went so far as to ridicule their highly policy-focused colleagues. One member, who represents a minority-majority district, declared that:

> [Policy-focused members] aren't necessarily here to serve the people they represent. Instead they are here, primarily, to govern and to pass laws. Their focus, for better or worse, is more on public policy than it is on people. They view solving policy problems as a technical problem and sometimes forget that all policy problems begin and end with real people.

From this constituent-focused member's perspective, policy making and representation are not synonymous. Instead, most of the constituent-focused House members I interviewed contended that their primary motive for being in Washington was to "help people" back home. One minority-majority district representative explained, "I think of myself more as a community builder than a national legislator. I consider my trips to Washington as opportunities to gather information about how to better build my community back home."

Together with their comparative lack of legislative focus, constituent-focused members' emphasis on "serving people" sets their Washington work apart from that of their colleagues. Some even asserted that their commitment to serve their constituents superceded their drive for reelection, an assertion which runs counter tot he common interpretation of the motives behind constituent service. One North Eastern member declared that his primary goal as a representative was to serve, not to be reelected:

> If I should be voted out of office, I wouldn't be too upset. I accept the voice of the people as final. And I have something else to do if I'm not reelected. Politics is not my life. It's simply an effective way of serving people. If I don't remain in the Congress, I'll still serve people, just in some other capacity.

Other constituent-focused members I interviewed similarly contended that Congress is but one of many good places they could choose to pursue their larger goal of serving and helping people. One such member, who had announced his retirement at the time of my interview with him, explained that his House membership had merely been a tool for serving others. He simply observed, "This job is really about helping people. I see government as a framework for helping people and that's my job." Quite simply, members with constituent styles do not think of their jobs as a balancing act between home and Washington but rather one of *protecting* or *forwarding* the interest of home while in Washington. Being a member of Congress is one way for members with such perspectives to maximize their discretion as advocates of their communities. For better or worse, the "balances" they strike between home and Hill are skewed heavily toward the interests of home.

Policy Style

Representative Linda Smith (R-WA. 3),[55] first elected in 1994, has made a name for herself in Washington as an outspoken proponent of campaign finance reform. In fact, her undying commitment to her congressional reform agenda has often pitted her against the leaders of her own party. In her efforts to enact her own campaign reform agenda, Smith has worked closely with Common Cause and Ross Perot's United We Stand, actions that earned her the scorn of House Speaker Newt Gingrich and other Republican leaders (Keller 1997; Niedowski 1996). In 1997, she forever declared her independence from her party's leadership by joining with six other House Republicans in opposing Newt Gingrich's re-election as Speaker. Indeed, because Smith's approach to her Washington work is policy oriented, and very specifically so, she has shown little concern for the partisan ramifications of her actions. She also seems to place greater emphasis on implementing her policy goals than she does on being responsive to particular constituent requests or demands. Very simply, Rep. Smith's Washington style is focused more on policy than on either constituents or politics. It is a style that emphasizes her legislative objectives above all others, and it is a style through which she believes she can provide good representational linkage for her constituents.

Members with policy styles, like Representative Smith, seek to balance their roles as local representatives and national legislators by pursuing specific policy agendas. They

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[55] I did not interview Representative Smith. These observations about her Washington style are gleaned from my observations in the House and conversations with staffers. Where appropriate, I have also provided citations for information gathered from published references.

justify this balance by making the case that their policy efforts simultaneously serve both local and national interests. For example, Rep. Smith consistently argues that congressional reform will serve both local and national interests by enhancing congressional accountability. So long as her constituents accept such an argument, as Representative Smith's reelection in 1996 suggests they have, the balance she strikes between home and Washington is a successful one. Regardless of the issue they emphasize, whether it be congressional reform, welfare reform, balancing the federal budget, or something else, members who focus on their Washington efforts on the pursuit of their policy agendas must convince their constituents that the enactment of that policy agenda serves their interests as well. However, making such a case is not always easy. In sharp contrast to the legislative goals pursued by members with constituent styles, policy-focused members have broader, i.e. less constituency specific, goals and objectives as they pursue their policy agendas. The people back home might even believe--accurately or not--that an aggressively pursued policy agendas is evidence that their representative is too wedded to special interests in Washington. Consequently, policy-focused members must often spend more time than other members communicating with constituents, justifying their Washington behavior.

To avoid the constant need to explain their every move in Washington when they return home, members with policy styles seek discretion over their work on the Hill. The most direct approach to winning that discretion is to convince voters that one's policy goals are desirable. Once the goals are agreed to, defending the means to realize them is much easier. Like Rep. Smith, most policy focused members of the House come to

Washington after election campaigns in which they have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to particular policies. When candidates make such frequent declarations and are subsequently elected to office, they can reasonably assume that they have been given the discretion to go to Washington and implement the policy positions they extolled during the election campaign. Indeed, many of the policy-focused members I interviewed, on the basis of their campaign rhetoric, believed they were sent to Washington to supporting specific policy changes. As one freshman Republican recounted, the way he ran his 1994 campaign defined what he would do when he arrived in Washington:

> I ran on only one issue: balancing the budget. I didn't even talk about anything else. I didn't campaign on education, crime, the environment, or anything except balancing the budget. The only tension I'd have between what I do in Washington and what the people think of me back home is if I don't do all I can to balance the budget. That's my only obligation, so far as I can tell.

While such obligations can bind members to particular behavior in Washington, they can also give members broad discretion within given issue areas. As this member further observed, he has sometimes ignored constituent opposition to particular measures he has supported in pursuit of his primary policy objective of balancing the budget:

> I've made some hard choices as a freshman. I was one of the fifteen members who voted not to end the shutdown. I've had some heated meetings back in the district about that--one in particular at a Veterans' hospital. I was very openly committed to balancing the budget when I ran, though, so that's what I've worked hardest at doing.

For the most part, this member has not lost electoral support by emphasizing the same issue in Washington that he did during his first campaign. At the time of our interview, he perceived that his constituents generally respected and supported his efforts on the Hill. This perception was validated by a comfortable margin of reelection in 1996.

As he balances home and Hill, this new House member believes that he has little discretion when it comes to balancing the budget; however, he also believes that he has very broad discretion with regard to virtually every other issue, including *how* he tries to balance the budget.

Of the twelve members in my sample who had adopted policy styles, nine were Republicans, nine were in their first three terms of service in the House, and only four were elected or appointed House leaders (see Table 4-1). The most apparently significant member characteristic which contributes to the adoption of a policy style in Washington is, once again, party affiliation. Indeed, the Republicans I interviewed were decidedly more likely than the Democrats to be policy-focused in their Hill behavior (by a margin of 53% to 27%). This tendency is, at least in part, due to the Republican emphasis on national issues in 1994. Additionally, lack of seniority and holding a marginal seat also makes members more likely to adopt policy styles. Given that tenure and electoral security are strongly and positively correlated, it is not surprising that they have approximately the same amount of influence and in the same direction. Why might House members holding marginal seats, especially early in their careers, be inclined to adopt moderate, policy-focused Washington styles? One possible reason is that policy-focused styles are better suited to marginal districts comprised of moderate voters. Indeed, several Republicans from moderate districts de-emphasized their support for Republican Party's "Contract with America," focusing instead on the policy content of the Contract. Other Republican members from moderate, or even Democratic-leaning districts, including giant-slayer George Nethercutt, refused to sign the Contract, in the first place,

emphasizing their policy similarities with their *constituents* rather than with their parties (CQ 1994, 2711-12). Jones, in an examination of House Agriculture committee members in the early 1960s, similarly found that members influential "policy constituencies" in their districts gravitated toward committees with narrow policy jurisdictions that corresponded with the interests of those constituencies (1961). In the process, these policy focused members established an undeniable connection between their policy goals and their constituents. Indeed, every policy-focused member I interviewed de-emphasized the relevance of partisanship in their jobs as representatives focusing instead on their policy congruence with the people back home. Indeed, this has the strategy of choice among members hailing from moderate districts. One moderate Democrat I spoke with explained that his policy focus stems, in large part, from electoral circumstances: "I'm from a very marginal district. . . . Obviously, I don't emphasize party a whole lot with my constituents. Instead, I talk about things in terms of conservative and liberal, not Republican or Democrat." Beyond the differences across tenure and electoral security, members representing minority-majority districts also appear less likely to adopt policy styles than other House members. While the small sub-sample size once again makes conclusions tenuous, it is worth noting that while over half (twelve of twenty-three) of the members in my sample who represent white-majority districts have adopted policy styles, none of the five members from minority-majority districts have.

The most significant finding with regard to members with policy styles is that they behave differently than other House members, primarily because their policy goals matter most to them. Given their emphasis on policy goals, policy-focused members' behavior

on Capitol Hill differs from that of their constituent or partisan-oriented colleagues. First, policy-focused members spend more of their time and energy on their legislative work and correspondingly less time on constituent concerns or in their party caucuses. One junior policy-oriented Republican explained how his emphasis on policy influences his Hill work:

> I like to get into the details of the legislative process, the impact of particular amendments, and the like. I give my staff a great deal of leeway in dealing with constituent issues. I only get involved when it's a real crisis situation. I do this because I want to spend most of my time working on things of substance that matter--that matter for governing.

This member, like others with policy styles, emphasizes the pursuit of policy goals in the balance he strikes between Hill and home. Many of these members, as the preceding quote indicates, seek policy discretion by delegating constituent work to their staff. As long as constituents are taken care of, they are unlikely to complain that their representative works too hard on his or her policy agenda. Some members with policy styles are so policy driven that they view congressional service in purely instrumental terms. For these members, membership in the House is secondary to the goals they seek. One policy-focused freshman asserted that his decision to run was based largely on his belief that he would not be elected. His only purpose in running was to highlight his policy goals:

> I decided to run, but I didn't think I had even the slightest chance of winning. I come from a very Republican district and there was already a crowded primary contest brewing. I decided to run not to win, but to shape the debate and try to get the other candidates to focus on the federal budget. If I managed to get them to commit to a balanced budget, I'd have counted my campaign a success. To my surprise, I won.

This member would probably have sought other avenues to continue pursuing his policy goals had he not be elected to the House. Having won, however, his focus on the Hill is decidedly on his policy agenda. For similar reasons, policy-focused members are also much less partisan in their Washington behavior. In response to the independent votes they cast, partisan members often refer to members with policy styles as "mavericks" or declare that they are "not team players." For their own part, policy-focused members call themselves "common sense," "bipartisan" legislators. Whatever the labels attached to them, members with policy styles almost uniformly wish they could get along better with their more partisan colleagues. They are generally unwilling, though, to "go along to get along." They would rather be outcasts than abandon their policy goals.

Members with policy styles do, in fact, relate differently to others in their party. While partisan ties are important to policy-focused members, their loyalty is to their policy goals--and sometimes the interests that share those goals--rather than the parties to which they nominally belong. This prioritization led several moderate Democrats during the 104th Congress to switch parties in order to, in their estimation, better pursue their policy goals. Other policy-focused moderate Democrats, stopping short of switching parties, have joined together as a coalition of moderate Democrats in order to express their displeasure with the policy positions of their party. Similarly, during the latter half of the 104th Congress, policy-focused Republicans, at both extremes of the party, staged "rebellions" against their party's leaders. Some of these insurgencies came to a full boil in the 105th Congress, rising to the ranks of Gingrich's once loyal allies in the GOP House leadership.

While House members run the risk of losing prestige or influence in the House when they burn partisan bridges, they may actually enhance their positions among other members with policy styles and, more significantly, among voters back home. Representative Lindsey Graham (SC), one of the GOP freshmen elected in 1994 is, according to a state party official, "approaching sainthood" in his district because of his public opposition to Gingrich (Van Dongen 1997). Graham, who supports the *policies* outlined in the "Contract," represents a district that had been in Democratic hands for twenty years before he won it in 1994. His focus on policy rather than party, then, is consistent with the political environment in which he seeks to balance his roles in Washington and at home. That the disloyal behavior of such Republicans may jeopardize their party's majority status in the House is of, at best, secondary importance to policy-focused members.

In spite of their sometimes strained relations with fellow party members who complain that they are not "team players," those with policy styles are the most likely members to be found bringing opposing sides together, sometimes within their parties and sometimes across party lines. Indeed, as one moderate Democrat explained, it is his capacity to broker compromises and his unwillingness to "toe the party line" that sets him apart from the more "loyal" members of his party:

> The Blue Dogs are largely conservative Democrats who don't feel real welcome in the larger Democratic Caucus. We don't want to be partisan--we want to be issue oriented and solution oriented. We try to vote for things without regard for party politics.

Very often, however, the "compromise" solutions put forth by moderate groups like the Blue Dogs put both parties in the awkward position of fighting for the loyalties of their

own members. Consequently, policy-focused members are frequently criticized by others in their parties. One Midwestern Democrat complained:

> I get criticism in Washington, especially from within my own party, for being a moderate Democrat, and that's where the real tension arises for me. It's very difficult to be a moderate Democrat in this Congress.

Given their strained relationships with members of their parties, and their sometimes unbending commitment to policy goals, members with policy styles are often perceived as being less concerned with the norms of civility and comity in the House. A senior Northern Democrat complained that most policy-oriented members are rude and impersonal. In particular, he singled out many of the highly policy-focused members of the 1994 freshman class:

> There's no sense of collegiality among them. We're truly a House divided. I'm friendly person, by nature. I like to talk to everyone--Democrat or Republican, conservative or liberal. This group won't even respond to a "Hey, how ya doin'?" It's very disheartening.

Several Republicans also expressed concern about this lack of collegiality among younger House members. However, not all policy-focused members sacrifice collegiality for their policy goals. On the contrary, good personal relationships with others in the House are the currency of many policy-focused members. However, such relationships are not easy to forge. A senior policy-focused Republican complained that partisanship often gets in the way of his efforts to reach out to others in the House:

> There's so much competition in the House that a lot of members never let their guard down. . . . There's a members-only buffet in the Cloak Room every day where there's a lot of opportunity for interaction and networking. Even there, though, a lot of members let partisanship or personality differences prevent them from connecting with other members. I try to broach those differences.

> Things have become much more partisan on the Hill, and not just during this Congress. . . . We need to put some of the petty differences aside and work together better.

Less policy-focused members, however, often complain that when members with policy styles attempt to be bipartisan, they tend to show indifference or even disdain for the procedures and processes of the House. A senior Democrat, who is the ranking member of a prestigious committee, complained that the highly policy-focused Republican freshman, in consort with Speaker Gingrich, made several "end-runs" on the legislative process during the 104th Congress, most notably ones which diminished the importance of committees in the House:

> [C]ommittees have been marginalized in the process. The legislative "process" has become very informal, secretive, and *ad hoc*, especially for the most important bills. The less consequential legislation comes through the traditional channels. There's been a true institutional revolution. . . . I'm not sure how laws are made around here any more.

The Republican freshmen, in cooperation with the Speaker, however, have not been the only policy-focused members with an interest in diminishing the centrality of committees in the legislative processes. As one policy entrepreneur observed, creativity and flexibility and a willingness to work both inside and outside traditional legislative process are critical to moving one's agenda forward in the House:

> I recognize that the agenda in the Congress is the product of both institutional forces and the successful efforts of "agenda setters." Issues get hot and move up the agenda because people make them. I work hard to understand the institutional agenda so I can take advantage of opportunities to move my own agenda. I aggressively try to shape the agenda when opportunities arise.

Legislative opportunism, often outside the formal legislative process, allows policy-focused members to influence the policy agendas and decisions of the House

earlier in their careers, before they acquire institutional or partisan clout. Doing so also allows members with policy styles to provide the policy linkages they believe their constituents want sooner than would otherwise be possible (see the final two chapters for a lengthier discussion of this point). Beyond representational concerns, members who adopt a policy style in Washington also perform an important function in the House, one at least that is valued by their colleagues. As issue specialists, usually focusing on one or two policy areas that matter most to them, policy-focused members are capable of providing other members with accurate information and analyses when the House considers technical or complicated issues. A seasoned congressional staffer noted that he has seen numerous "bad votes" avoided in the House because of the wisdom of such policy experts. These members are respected and turned to because they offer what is perhaps the most valuable commodity in Washington: accurate information. Policy-focused members recognize the value of the information they possess and use it wherever they can to help them accomplish their goals. As the chief of staff for a senior policy-focused member simply stated, "If you are smart enough and hard-working enough to acquire [accurate information], you'll be able to accomplish the things you want." A policy-driven Democrat concurred:

> I have friends in both parties and I get support on my legislation from across party lines. I spend a lot of time giving information to people. If people come to rely on me for useful information, I can become their ally and they'll be my ally when I need help.

When members with policy styles gain leverage with their colleagues by being information brokers, they enhance their influence in the legislative process and, thereby, the influence of their constituents on the decisions made on Capitol Hill. Policy-focused

members, then, tend to balance their local and national roles by emphasizing their work and efforts on the Hill more compelling and influential voice they give their constituents in Washington.

Partisan Style

The third Washington style, partisan style, is born out of the existence and purpose of the political parties themselves. Members with partisan styles orient themselves toward their jobs as representatives, the legislative agenda of the House, other members and every other aspect of their Capitol Hill work from the perspective of the political party to which they belong. Like members who adopt constituent or policy styles, members with partisan styles are not unidimensional in their Washington work. They simply choose to pursue their constituent, policy and other goals within the framework of their political parties. Adopting a partisan style to pursue one's goals is much like joining a team.[56] A new committee chair in the 104th Congress explained, "As a member of the Republican party, I recognize that I'm part of a team. This requires me to

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[56] To understand the partisan style, it is perhaps most effective to use an analogy from the game of football. When a football team takes the field, its members have two very simple goals: score points while preventing the other team from returning the favor. To accomplish these two goals, the team must work together, it must be unified. To facilitate this togetherness, there is a coaching staff that establishes a unified strategy for the team. The strategy establishes the formations and plays the team will run as they try to accomplish their offensive and defensive goals. Sometimes the individual players might disagree with the coach's decisions, but they execute those decisions to the best of their ability. For example, no running back is going to run the ball the opposite direction and score a touchdown for the other team because he believes the coach was foolish to call a running play in a particular situation. The team will continue to work together to score more points than the other team, in spite of whatever disagreements they might have, because they want to win.

pursue my own objectives in the context of the party's goals and objectives." A more junior party-focused member similarly observed:

> Members who perceive themselves as being part of a team will be more loyal to the party. When I make decisions I consider what's best for my district and what my conscience tells me is right. But I also recognize that running under a party banner brings some obligations with it. It provides a framework for me to work in and I have to support that framework wherever I can.

As these two members suggest, those who take on partisan styles are generally team players, willing to bend and compromise with the other members of their team to accomplish the team's goals. As a rule, they are very loyal to the positions taken by their party, at times sacrificing some of their hard-won policy discretion in Washington in order to be "good" party members.[57] This is not discretion won from, then surrendered back to, one's constituents. Rather, it is discretion surrendered to one's political party. At the end of the day, the commitment and consistency of members with partisan styles makes party leadership in the House possible. In return for sacrificing some of their personal discretion in Washington, partisan members may hope to gain greater discretion as they pursue other goals, such as reelection, policy implementation, or the maintenance of stable, rewarding careers. In the present, a partisan member might cast a vote contrary to his or her immediate interests or beliefs, or even those of his or her constituents, if he

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[57] Parker has noted that discretion-seeking and discretion-exercising House members may "shirk" their party duties (perhaps by being disloyal) and "free-ride" on the efforts of their fellow partisans (1992, 12-3). The ideal type of a member with a partisan style, however, does not allow for such behavior.

or she calculates that doing so will promote the realization of these other more highly valued goals.[58]

Of the nine members in my sample who have adopted partisan Washington styles, eight were Republicans (see Table 4-1). While party again appears to have a significant influence on members' styles, the disproportionate number of more senior members and those in leadership positions among the Republicans in my sample once again might exaggerate the relationship between party and Washington style. Seniority and leadership status do, in fact, seem to make House members more likely to adopt partisan styles on the Hill. Six of the nine partisan-focused members were in at least their fourth House terms and seven held elective or appointive leadership positions. These variables are, no doubt, highly correlated. Among those in my sample, senior members were significantly more likely to hold leadership positions in the House. As members gain seniority and acquire leadership positions in the House, they are also highly likely to become more formally involved with their political parties. These members are, in turn, more likely to adopt partisan styles in Washington.[59] Members with partisan styles are also more likely to hold safe seats (seven of nine); while those holding marginal seats are less likely to adopt partisan styles (only two of ten were partisans). With regard to gender and race, small sub-sample sizes once again make conclusions about the relationship between

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[58] Of course members will rarely jeopardize their electoral security intentionally. All things being equal, though, members with partisan styles will tend to put party interests before constituency and policy interests.

[59] While it is clear that holding party leadership positions and adopting partisan styles, the direction of causality between party leadership status and Washington style can run in either direction.

gender and Washington style difficult. However, women and minorities are less likely to hold leadership positions in their parties and in the House, which might make it less advantageous and or natural for these members to adopt partisan styles. This supposition is tentatively supported by my findings.

The Washington behavior of members with partisan styles is distinct from that of other members in several important ways. First, and most obviously, partisan members are more involved with the leadership and organization of their parties than are constituent or policy-focused members. Their loyalty to their parties also spills over into their interactions with other members. Partisan fervor was behind several verbal and physical altercations on the House floor during the 104th Congress, although that is hardly a new phenomenon. The broader demise of personal civility among House members, though, is a new trend, at least in the scope of its current manifestation. From the cessation of bipartisan new-member orientations to the more frequent "taking down of words" on the House floor, the partisan acrimony in the House during the 1990s has troubled many observers of Congress. By the end of the 104th Congress, partisan tensions had become so pronounced that House members from both sides of the aisle were calling for a political cease-fire, culminating with the organization of a "civility retreat" aimed at improving personal relationships between members (Schiavone 1997).

In contrast to the rancor that exists *between* opposing partisans, partisan members are generally quite loyal to their fellow partisans.[60] Most obviously, members who share

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[60] A notable exception to this tendency materialized in the 105th Congress when a "renegade" group of Republicans attempted an ouster of Speaker Gingrich. After the attempt failed, however, party leaders and other Republicans rallied around the Speaker,

the same party affiliation are prone to vote similarly to others in their party. Party unity among members with partisan Hill styles is as one would expect, stronger than it is among their constituent and policy focused colleagues. On average, the partisan members in my sample supported their parties positions 96% of the time, compared to 85% for policy-focused members and 75% for constituent-focused members in my sample.[61] Another significant manifestation of party-focused Hill behavior and partisan loyalty has been the establishment of national party congressional campaign committees and "leadership" PACs. Instead of merely focusing on party solidarity after elections take place, members now aggressively foster party solidarity by supporting their fellow partisans' campaigns. The most basic objective of these kinds of efforts is to give the party "team" enough members in the House to gain or maintain majority status. Virtually every House leader in 1994 gave money, through leadership PACs, to vulnerable incumbents and promising challengers and open seat candidates in a effort to maximize their parties' presence in the House (Gelbart 1996, 4). One party leader contributed money to nearly one hundred of his party's congressional candidates in 1994. These efforts, he argued, were not wasted in that much of the new Republican majority's legislative energy and unity stemmed from these electoral efforts. Incumbents also use campaign contributions as a tool for gaining support within their parties, support which they hope will propel them into leadership positions in their parties and in the House.

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declaring their party solidarity.

[61] Party unity scores were obtained from the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1996, 246-7).

This is, in fact, an effective strategy. Several Republican members and staffers I spoke with indicated that Tom DeLay's election as whip was largely due to his campaign efforts on his colleagues' behalf. When party members are unified behind a common policy agenda or party leader when they run for office, as most House Republicans were in 1994, the connection between electoral and legislative politics is made stronger still. Members' connections to their parties, in turn, have significant implications for the kinds of representational linkages they provide, a topic to which I turn in Chapter Five.

II. MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS AND WASHINGTON STYLE

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the characteristics of individual members--such as the goals they seek, their party affiliations, seniority, and the nature of their congressional districts, influence the Washington styles they adopt. As members adopt and implement their Washington styles, they are also influenced by the perceptions I discussed in Chapter Three: their perceptions of themselves, their roles as local representatives and their roles as national legislators. The relationship between member perceptions and their Washington styles is summarized in Table 4-2.

Ideologues & Pragmatists

As I discussed in Chapter Three, each of the House members I interviewed portrayed him or herself as either an ideologue or a pragmatist. Comparing these

Table 4-2.
Washington Style and Member Perceptions

Perceptions of Self	**n**	**Constituent Style** (n=7)	**Policy Style** (n=12)	**Partisan Style** (n=9)
Pragmatic	18	7 (39%)	10 (56%)	1 (5%)
Ideological	10	0 (0%)	2 (20%)	8 (80%)
Perceptions of Constituency				
Very Little Discretion	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0 (0%)
Some Discretion	14	4 (29%)	8 (57%)	2 (14%)
Broad Discretion	12	2 (17%)	3 (25%)	7 (58%)
Perceptions of Role				
Trustee	16	2 (12%)	7 (44%)	7 (44%)
Delegate	3	3 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Politico	9	2 (17%)	5 (56%)	2 (22%)
Political Strategist[a]	12	2 (17%)	6 (50%)	4 (33%)
Legislative Technician	16	5 (31%)	6 (38%)	5 (31%)
Perceptions of Washington Work				
Formal Level[b]	15	2 (13%)	5 (33%)	8 (53%)
Not Formal Level	13	5 (38%)	7 (54%)	1 (8%)

[a] As in Chapter Three, this variable has been collapsed from three categories into two--members who perceive themselves to be pure legislative technicians and those who perceive themselves to be either political strategists *or* political strategists and legislative technicians.

[b] As in Chapter Three, this variable has been collapsed from seven categories into two: members who perceive themselves to be attached to the House, at least in part, at the formal level and those who do not.

perceptions with the Washington style each member has adopted reveals an interesting, but not unsuspected, relationship between members' perceptions of themselves and their Hill styles. Of the eighteen members who perceived themselves as pragmatists, only one had adopted a partisan style. Conversely, eight of the ten ideological members had adopted partisan styles. Most strikingly *all seven* of the constituent-focused members and ten of the twelve policy-focused members perceived themselves as pragmatists.

It should come as no surprise that members who perceive themselves as ideologues are more likely than other members to adopt partisan styles. Partisan-focused members, almost by definition, support their parties' agendas, which tend to be ideologically based. Furthermore, party loyalty and solidarity is built on unanimity, not individual deal-making or compromising. Indeed, partisan and ideological behavior are, at some point, indistinguishable--eight of the nine partisans I interviewed portrayed themselves as ideologues. It is similarly unsurprising that constituent and policy-focused members tend to perceive themselves as pragmatists. These members tend to be driven more by tangible results--even incremental ones-- than by philosophical principles. They also tend to operate outside of the strictures of their party organizations, leaving them much more legislative discretion than their party loyalist colleagues. Naturally, compromise comes much easier to these members. While the relationship between perceptions of pragmatism and Washington style are fairly clear, the direction of causality between the two variables is not. A member who adopts a constituent or policy style, for example, may find that pragmatic behavior is better suited to such a style than ideological behavior. They may, therefore, self-consciously behave pragmatically *because of the style*

they have adopted. Alternatively, a member who is naturally pragmatic, or one who represents a moderate district, may assume a Washington style that is conducive to pragmatic behavior, i.e. a constituent or policy-focused style.

My observations of the direction of this relationship provide a mixed picture. Among the members I interviewed, I found that some members' styles are influenced by their pragmatism while others' levels of pragmatism are influenced by their styles. Many of the constituent and policy-oriented members I interviewed indicated that their pragmatism has dictated their approach to their work in Washington. An Eastern member, now serving in her second decade in the House, maintained that her naturally pragmatic disposition has led her to adopt a policy-focused style in Washington. Both her style and her pragmatism have influenced the way she interacts with members of her party. Instead of working exclusively with her party, she instead emphasizes the importance of good relationships with members of both parties, members who can be her policy allies. That has often meant she has taken a low-key approach to disagreements with others in her party:

> I'm an easy person to get along with. I respect and trust other people and think they afford me the same courtesies in return. I saw very much the human side of the shut down, but I wasn't confrontational about it with those in my party who allowed it to happen. I don't insult other members on the floor. I think my [pragmatism] gives me credibility because I can get along with, and work with, others even when we completely disagree.

In contrast, other members I interviewed asserted that their pragmatic or ideological behavior in Washington was born out of the styles of work they have adopted. One constituent-focused member, for example, observed that taking care of his district requires him to be pragmatic:

> Part of being a representative means that you keep your campaign promises. This often requires me to work with others in the Congress that I don't always agree with. For example, I maintain a good working relationship with [the Republican Senator from my state] because without his help I would be unable to give [a particular constituent group] in my district the help they need. I couldn't keep my campaign promises without an ally like the Senator.

Similarly, a Republican with a partisan style observed that his style and, notably, the political environment of the 104th Congress have led him to behave ideologically, something with which he is not personally comfortable: "[A]s we have moved from the minority to the majority, this has made my own politics a bit more partisan. However, that's part of being an effective legislator and an effective member of the party team in Washington."

Discretion

Virtually every member of the House of Representatives perceives that he or she has discretion to do their work on Capitol Hill as they see fit. And while the extent of that discretion can vary dramatically from one member to the next, the vast majority of the members I interviewed perceived that their constituents had granted them at least some discretion in Washington (see Table 4-2). While generalizations must, once agin, be made with caution, it is striking that only two of the twenty-eight members I interviewed portrayed themselves as having "very little" discretion (see Table 3-2). My findings suggest that most House members perceive that they are free to make substantial decisions in Washington without checking in with their constituents.[62] Of the two

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[62] Keep in mind that, as I noted in Chapter Three, discretion, in this context, is not limited to roll-call discretion. On the contrary the discretion I speak of ranges from the members' flexibility on floor votes to the legislation they sponsor to their staff allocations

members who believe they have little or no discretion, one has adopted a constituent style and the other a policy style in Washington. Both members contend that their lack of discretion has guided their approach to their Washington work. The constituency-focused member contended that her constituents' demands for assistance have limited her ability to pursue a different agenda or style of work in Washington: "I'm from a *very* poor district. . . . My constituents want me to give them more, to deliver more to them than they get now. They want better housing, better or more jobs, whatever." Meeting her constituents needs, then, is the primary focus of her Washington work. The policy-focused member similarly argued that conditions in his district, specifically his tenuous electoral circumstances, have limited his discretion in Washington:

> I'm very much a maverick, a loner. I don't give up too much, even to my staff. I don't feel comfortable associating myself or my office with anyone or any group but myself right now. . . . That stems from the fact that before my first term, I faced a very powerful opposition coalition. I can't associate myself with a group or cause that would mobilize that coalition against me. I can't appear to favor one group of my constituency to the exclusion of any others.

This member, because of his perceived lack of discretion, has adopted a pragmatic, policy-focused Washington style which will, he hopes, win him respect and support back home without alienating any significant portion of his constituency. Clearly, members who perceive themselves as having "very little" discretion are few in number in Washington.

Although the distinction is imprecise, there are important stylistic differences between members who perceived that they have "some" or "broad" discretion. Of the

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to their frequency of travel home virtually every other aspect of their work on the Hill.

remaining twenty-six members in my interview sample, fourteen indicated that they have "some" discretion while the final twelve perceived their discretion to be "broad." Members who portrayed themselves as having "some" discretion were slightly more likely than their colleagues to be policy-focused (eight out of fourteen) while those who believed they had "broad" discretion were more likely to adopt partisan styles (seven of twelve). The strength of these patterns is not overwhelming. In fact, if one member in each group had a different style, there would be no relationship to discuss. The possibility that such a relationship exists, though, is intriguing. For example, the difference between policy and constituent-focused members' perceptions of discretion bears further examination. It seems somewhat paradoxical that members with policy styles, who often have broad or aggressive policy agendas, would perceive that they have less discretion than members with partisan styles. As I have noted, partisan members tend to surrender at least some of their legislative discretion to their parties. Consequently, given their focus on policy goals in Washington, members with policy styles might be expected to have more, not less, discretion on Capitol Hill than their partisan counterparts. There are, however, variables that shape this relationship. First, recall that policy-focused members tend to be less senior than their more partisan colleagues. On average, the members in my sample with policy styles had served an average of 2.7 terms in the House, compared to the 5.4 terms served by the average partisan-focused member.[63] Among those I interviewed, more senior members tend to be more optimistic about their Washington

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[63] In spite of very small sample sizes, this difference is still statistically significant at the .056 level.

discretion. Second, members with perceptions of broad discretion also tend to be ideologues. Eight of the twelve who portrayed themselves as having broad discretion were ideologues while twelve of the fourteen members with only "some" discretion perceived themselves as pragmatists. Discretion, then, appears to be positively correlated with perceiving one's self as an ideologue which is, in turn, associated with adopting a partisan Washington style. Finally, policy-focused members are more likely to represent marginal congressional districts (see Table 4-1) which has the likely result of reducing members' perceptions of discretion while increasing the appropriateness and efficacy of a pragmatic, policy-focused Washington style.

While members' perceptions of discretion are marginally related to their styles of Washington work, this relationship is based on other aspects of members' personalities and political circumstances. In fact, one of these factors, electoral security, is the most apparent distinguishing characteristic between members with policy styles and those with partisan styles. Recall that while half of the twelve policy-focused members I interviewed held safe-seats, more than two-thirds of the partisans did. Electoral security should be, for obvious reasons, positively correlated with members' perceptions of the amount of discretion their constituents have given them. Indeed, my interviews with members provide evidence of this. One partisan-focused member I spoke with suggested that his electoral security provided him broad discretion in Washington, including discretion to serve as a party leader:

> I ride on my success that I've had building constituent relations. That's why I've been here long enough to become [a leader in the House]. I can do what I do . . . in the party because of that support. . . . My dedication to

> home has kept me strong at home *and* given me room to maneuver out here.

Another partisan member similarly suggested that holding a safe-seat left him broad leeway on Capitol Hill to be an aggressive leader in his party without worrying excessively about a backlash among his constituents:

> My electoral safety back home gives me *a lot* of independence here in Washington. I have [more than a million dollars] in my campaign fund back home. No one's going to run against me. I can tell the occasional constituent to go to hell.

The policy-focused members I interviewed, on the other hand, tended to be less electorally secure and, therefore, much more cautious in describing their Washington discretion. As one policy-focused member explained, his lack of electoral security makes him careful to involve his constituents in his decisions as much as possible. This member believes that adopting a policy-oriented style on the Hill and communicating openly and frequently with his constituents is the most effective way he can increase his limited discretion in Washington:

> Members gain credibility with their constituents when they make informed decisions, especially if their constituents feel like they've been listened to. They don't necessarily have to be agreed with all the time, but if you really listen to and consider the input of your constituents, they respect you and your decisions.

These members' electoral situations clearly influence their perceptions of discretion and, more importantly, the various ways they balance their roles as local representatives and as national legislators.

Trustees, Delegates, and Politicos

Not surprisingly, members' perceptions of their representational roles are also related to their styles of Washington work. Of the twenty-eight members in my sample, sixteen perceived themselves as trustees, three as delegates, and nine as politicos (see Table 4-2). Of the sixteen trustees, only two had adopted constituent styles while seven each had adopted policy or partisan styles. In contrast, all three of the delegates had adopted constituent-focused Washington styles. A majority of politicos (five of nine) had adopted policy styles while two each were constituent and party focused in their work on the Hill. None of these patterns are unexpected. The tendency for delegates to adopt constituent styles, for example, makes sense given the immediate attention and emphasis they give to the interests of the people they represent. It is somewhat surprising, however, that a greater proportion of members with constituent styles did not portray themselves as delegates. The explanations offered by the four constituent-focused politicos and trustees, though, are instructive. While these members, like their delegate counterparts, emphasized the importance of their constituents' interests and opinions, they do not behave as delegates because they do not believe that their constituents' opinions are well-enough informed to be a reliable guide for their voting decisions. One constituent-focused trustee explained that while he is inclined to consider his constituents' opinions as he makes his voting decisions, he often discounts their views because they are not "informed":

> The problem . . . is that there's a huge gap in knowledge and understanding between policy makers and citizens. Often that gap isn't as much due to the knowledge you have as it is to the sources you get it from and the way it's presented. . . . Because of the disparity in our sources of

> information, it's very difficult to bridge the gap to communicate and build consensus. . . . People think that there are easy solutions to problems if we would just implement them. . . . They're grasping for simple solutions to complex problems.

Other constituent-focused members I spoke with similarly eschewed the delegate role because they believe part of their job is to make "tough decisions." One politico with a constituent style argued, "When I have a decision to make, I have my staff brief me extensively on the alternatives. I seek constituent input and weigh the pluses and minuses of the policy. But ultimately, it's my decision."

These members' comments suggest that, although their Washington styles are constituent-focused, their legislative behavior is not necessarily driven by their constituents' opinions. In their efforts to balance home and Hill, because of the advantages in information and perspective they believe they have, these members choose to behave more as trustees than as delegates. They believe that doing so is the best way to "deliver" for the people back home.

The relationship between the representational roles and Washington styles of policy-focused members offers additional insights about members' efforts to balance their local and national roles. Seven of the twelve members with policy styles perceived themselves as trustees while all of the remaining five portrayed themselves as politicos. Those that portrayed themselves as trustees tended to have well-defined policy preferences and expertises and were, therefore, more likely to rely on their own judgements when casting their votes. One policy trustee, well-known for his hard work and legislative prowess, maintained that his abilities and resources in Washington make him a better decision-maker than his constituents:

> Representation requires a more careful examination and analysis of the particulars of the questions the Congress addresses than the average citizen is able to conduct. That's why we have representatives--they're people who can devote the time and energy to these difficult questions so they can make informed, wise decisions.

Like this member, the other policy-focused trustees I interviewed similarly argued that, because they knew more about particular issues than their constituents, it was in everyone's interest for them to make their decisions on their own.

In contrast, the five policy-focused politicos emphasized the importance of balancing constituent interests and opinions with their own beliefs. These members tended to have broader policy agendas, and therefore, less specific knowledge of and preferences for particular policies. Additionally, they were much less likely to be leaders in the House than their trustee counter-parts (zero out of five compared to four out of seven). While the reasons behind this relationship are less than obvious, seniority and electoral security provide some clues. The policy-focused politicos in my sample were more junior and from more marginal districts than the policy trustees. This has the likely result of making them both more cautious in their policy positions and less likely to be leaders. In sum, as members with policy styles balance their competing roles on Capitol Hill, they are not uniformly predisposed to behave as trustees, delegates, or even politicos. Rather, their representational roles hinge on their electoral security, seniority, and other aspects of their relationships with those they represent.

Of all the members, those with partisan styles were the most uniform in their representational roles. In fact, seven of the nine partisans in my sample portrayed themselves as trustees while the remaining two were politicos. By taking cues from their

parties. they largely preclude the adoption of a delegate orientation in their efforts as representatives in Washington. The balance these members strike between home and Hill, then. is much more profoundly influenced by their parties and what goes on in Washington than are the balances other members strike.

Political Strategists and Legislative Technicians

As I discussed in Chapter Three, members of the House of Representatives, in addition to their perceptions of their representational roles, also have distinct perceptions of their legislative roles. Twelve of the twenty-eight members perceived their roles in the legislative process to be. in whole or in part as political strategists, while the remaining sixteen saw themselves as legislative technicians. The clearest distinction that can be drawn between the Washington styles of members in these two groups is that members with constituent styles are more likely than the others to be legislative technicians (five of seven). Constituent-focused members tend to be more concerned with addressing the immediate problems and demands of their constituents than other members. This concern yields an emphasis on timely, discrete results, not programmatic legislative agendas. When constituent-focused members become involved in the legislative process it is usually in a reactive and technical, rather than a proactive and strategic, fashion. Moreover, members with constituent styles tend to pay less attention to the political dimensions of Hill work than do their colleagues. In fact, in addition to portraying themselves as legislative technicians, most of the constituent-focused members in my sample placed greater importance on their work outside of Washington than their work inside it. Instead of portraying themselves as political strategists, or even as skillful

lawmakers, they tended to portray themselves as effective "brokers," "coalition-builders," and "community builders," *in their districts*. When asked about the importance she places on the legislative process in her efforts to provide effective representational linkage, a constituent-focused member from the South suggested that building relationships with political leaders back home was a more effective way to serve her constituents than pursuing a legislative agenda on the Hill. As the following anecdote suggests, she spends most of her time cultivating and worrying about local concerns and relationships, not grand partisan or national agendas, as a political strategist might:

> I recently got a call from a mayor in my district informing me that he'd been promised something by a member of Congress from the other party. That really disappointed me because I've tried very hard to have the kind of relationship with the mayor that would encourage him to come to me first in a situation like the one he's in. I want to have a direct relationship with all of the local leaders in my district and I'm going to have to do better with that mayor.

Delivering for one's district begins with knowing what it is that constituents and constituent leaders want delivered. Members with constituent styles, then, are generally more concerned with communicating with and building support among their own constituents than they are with those in the broader polity, as a political strategist would be. Another member with a constituent style concurred that focusing on constituent service often requires a narrow tactical focus, and not a broad strategic one. Such a focus, he admitted, "has nothing to do with my constitutionally defined role as a congressman, but it's an important part of my job."

Unlike constituent-focused members, members with policy and partisan styles showed no tendency to be either legislative strategists or legislative technicians. Policy-

focused members were split evenly (six of each) between political and legislative roles, as were partisan-oriented members (four were political strategists and five were legislative technicians). While there is no apparent pattern among these members with regard to emphasizing politics or legislation, the differences between political strategists and legislative technicians in both categories deserve some attention. First, policy-focused political strategists are often recognized as leaders within particular policy areas on the Hill. Consequently, they are often the leaders of informal issue caucuses and coalitions, frequently working with issue-oriented think tanks and foundations. They are more likely than other members with policy styles to be involved in courting and building popular political support for their policy agendas. Legislative technicians, on the other hand, are more likely to be found working to implement policy changes, sometimes just as passionately as their strategic colleagues, behind the scenes, in the legislative trenches. One such member simply admitted that, while he worries about how the policies he supports will be received by the broader public, he focuses his energies elsewhere: "Personally, I'm more of a legislator. I like to get into the details of the legislative process, the impact of particular amendments, and the like."

Among members with partisan styles, the political strategists are the visionaries of the parties who provide political direction and set the agendas for their "teams" of loyal legislative technicians, whom they count on to fight in the legislative trenches to implement the strategies and platforms they create. The partisan political strategists were also, on average, slightly (about one and a half terms) more senior than were the legislative technicians. While this indicates that the longer partisan-focused members

serve, the more likely they are to be involved in the political aspects of Hill work, it is important to remember that political strategists and legislative technicians share a symbiotic relationship. Neither can accomplish their Washington goals without the other. The Republican "Revolution," led by Gingrich, his party's chief political strategist, would have been little more than words on paper without the support and help of the legislative technicians in the party. Even more significantly, neither politicians or legislators can establish the kind of relationships they want with their constituents without working with the other. While a members's political or legislative focus might not be as obviously related to a member's representational relationship with his or her constituents as are other aspects of Washington style, members' behavior as a strategist or as a technician clearly influences the way they pursue their goals in Washington and, therefore, the kind of representational linkage they provide. This is a topic to which I return in the final two chapters.

Level of Attachment to the House

One of the clearest correlations between members' perceptions and their Washington styles is between the styles members adopt and their perceived or preferred levels of attachment to the House (see Table 4-3). Almost by their nature, members with constituent-focused Washington styles are attached to the House at the personal level. Of the eight members with constituent styles in my sample, four are attached at the personal level, one at the formal level, one at both the personal and informal levels, and one at all three levels. The one constituent-focused member attached at the formal level is the

Table 4-3.
Perceptions of Attachment to the House and Washington Style

Level of Attachment	**n**	**Constituent Style** (n=7)	**Policy Style** (n=12)	**Partisan Style** (n=9)
Personal	6	4 (67%)	2 (33%)	0 (0%)
Informal	3	0 (0%)	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
Formal	7	1 (14%)	2 (29%)	4 (57%)
Personal & Informal	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	0 (0%)
Personal & Formal	4	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
Informal & Formal	1	0 (0%)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
All Three	3	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	0 (0%)

ranking minority member on a full committee, which, by his own admission, precludes less formal involvement in the House. In contrast, members with partisan styles are much more likely to be attached to the House at the formal level. Eight of the nine partisan members are connected at the formal level--four exclusively at the formal level and four at both the formal and personal levels. Unlike constituent and party-focused members, though, the members with policy-focused Washington styles in my sample showed no preference for one level of attachment over another. Of the twelve members with policy styles, there are two each attached at the personal, informal and formal levels. The remaining six are attached at two or more levels.

Some of the reasons behind the patterns that exist between members' levels of attachment to the House and the Washington styles are obvious. Partisan members, for example, tend to be more involved with the organization and leadership of their parties and, hence, are more likely to hold formal positions in the House. Only one of the members in my sample with a partisan style is attached to the House at the informal level, largely because he is closely affiliated with an informal (but very partisan) caucus. Similarly, constituent-focused members are less likely to seek and emphasize the importance of leadership positions in the House as they balance their local and national roles. It is also natural that their emphasis on providing representational linkage at the individual level back home would carry over to an emphasis on people (and not policies or parties) in Washington. As one particularly constituent-focused member declared:

> In my mind, there's no difference between Washington and home. The two are seamless. The interests of constituents are just as important in Washington as they are at home. The economic interests of the district and nation are vital and I have to defend them. It doesn't matter where I am.

It is not surprising that members who place such a clear emphasis on the personal components of representation back home also emphasize the personal components of the work on the Hill.

While the levels of attachment identified by partisans and constituent-focused members make intuitive sense, the absence of a trend or tendency among policy-focused members with regard to the levels at which they are attached to the House is puzzling. The expectation might be for such members to be primarily attached at the informal level. They are in fact, more likely to be attached at the informal level than both their constituent and partisan-oriented colleagues. However, policy-focused House members as a group, are no more likely to be attached at the informal level than any other level (or combination of levels). Some of the policy focused members shed light on the reasons behind this diversity. For example, one such member contended that he seldom thought about the level at which he was participating in the House as he went about his work on the Hill. His pragmatism as a policy-focused member of Congress yields adaptability and flexibility in his associations with others on the Hill:

> I don't really think there's a clear distinction between different levels of involvement in the House. I move interchangeably between the personal, informal, and formal levels without really thinking about it. The comfort level required to do so comes with time and experience, I suppose.

Other policy-focused members expressed similar sentiments, noting that their often strained relations with others in their party requires them to be more flexible with regard to when and how they interact with other members. The patterns between members' preferred levels of attachment to the House and their Washington styles become more clear when the categories of attachment are collapsed from seven into two,

as in Chapter Three. By examining the relationship between members who are attached, in whole or in part, at the formal level with those who are not, it is easier to identify the underlying differences between members who adopt different Washington styles (see Table 4-2). First, only one of the thirteen members in my sample with no perceived attachment at the formal level has adopted a partisan style. In contrast, eight of the fifteen members who perceive themselves to be, at least in part, attached to the House at the formal level are partisans. More significantly, eight of the nine partisans are formally attached while only two of the seven constituent-focused members are. Still, members with constituent styles are about equally as likely to feel attached at the personal and or informal levels of the House as they are to have some attachment at the formal level.

While the collapsed categories make the tendencies of constituent and party-focused members more clear, the pattern or tendency among members with policy styles remains comparatively less clear. Again, the diversity of policy-focused members' preferred levels of attachment stems from their pragmatic and flexible approaches to the pursuit of their goals on the Hill. Quite simply, they maximize their goal-seeking discretion by connecting and participating at multiple levels of involvement in the House. While some of the policy-focused members I interviewed admit that they have been "forced" by their institutional positions to emphasize their formal attachments to the House, their preference is, for the most part, to be free to move from one level to the next, as the situation dictates. Consequently, a policy-focused member's level of attachment is not as tied to his or her style as it is for members with constituent or partisan styles. As one policy-oriented member, attached at all three levels, declared:

> I don't know that I'm any more comfortable or effective in any one sphere [of the House] than another. I'm more of a chameleon. I switch between spheres almost seamlessly. You almost have to develop multiple personas because the different spheres require such different skills and approaches. I have to constantly shift gears to adjust to what comes before me.

This member believes that being able to work effectively at all three levels in the House, makes him a far more effective legislator and representative, at least according to his own criteria. Based on his secure hold on his House seat, it is an evaluation with which his constituents agree. The patterns between the Washington styles House members adopt and the levels at which they are most comfortably connected to the House are also influenced by exogenous factors, such as tenure, institutional position, and even pressures from constituents. In the end, though, the deciding factor behind a member's level of attachment to the House may simply be his or her personal preference. Whatever the case, the levels at which members interact with others in the House have important implications both for their styles of work in Washington as well as for the kinds of representational linkage they provide. I turn to a discussion of these implications, as well as the implications of the other aspects of Washington style discussed above, in the next two chapters.

III. CONCLUSION

The findings presented in this chapter provide evidence that there are identifiable patterns or styles of House member behavior on Capitol Hill. Moreover, the Washington styles members adopt are influenced by their personal goals and preferences, the interests and concerns of their districts, the political environment in Washington and the various

ways in which members perceive all of these realities. That disparate perceptions, goals, relationships and activities can be accounted for by placing categorizing House members as constituent, policy or party-focused in their Hill work affirms the assertion that Washington style is a complex yet analytically useful concept for evaluating the behavior of House members in Washington and, in turn, the kinds of representation they provide for their constituents. Members' Washington styles are heavily influenced by people and events back home. However, representatives' perceptions, personal goals and preferences and the environment in which they pursue them in Washington also have significant and independent influences on their styles.

Understanding the different styles members adopt as they do their jobs in Washington is an important first step in building a model of the practice of congressional representation. To give these styles more substantive and contextual meaning, however, we must also know something about the factors that influence members' styles and the processes by which they adopt, refine and maintain their styles in Washington. An account of this process is presented in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER 5: THE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON STYLE

In January of 1995, House Republicans were faced with a task they had not known for forty years–they had to interpret an electoral victory and begin to govern. However, these were tasks with which they had little experience. This inexperience, combined with the combative legislative and electoral posture they had assumed in the years and months leading up to the 1994 elections made the transition a difficult one (Fenno 1997). While it is not surprising, nor unexpected, that institutionalized parties adjust awkwardly to new arrangements after decades of stability, such an awkwardness raises questions about the health and vitality of representative democracy, both at level of political parties as well as the level of individual representatives. For example, within the political parties, how responsive are individual House members to local and national electoral sentiments? How do members or minority parties adjust to majority party status? And what of members making the opposite adjustment? Richard Fenno has argued that, in 1994, most House Republicans had serious difficulties in making their transition, difficulties which resulted in frequent growing pains, even governing errors (1997).

The awkward transition made by members moving from the minority party to the majority and from the majority to the minority party witnessed during the 104th Congress highlights the significance of institutional and national political influences on the behavioral styles of individual House members in Washington. The 1994 elections did, in fact, lead many members to make significant changes in their styles of work on the Hill, some of which I have discussed in previous chapters. Furthermore, a majority of the members I interviewed during this tumultuous time on the Hill expressed a great deal of

discomfort both with their new roles on the Hill as well as with the way their colleagues in the other party were adjusting to theirs. Indeed, the adjustment appears to have been difficult for all House members, both young and old, Republican and Democrat. While senior members benefitted from their years of electoral and political experience as they struggled to come to grips with the sea-change in Washington and, more broadly, the nation, their strength often turned to their weakness--much of their experience about politics and power in Washington was turned on its head. The new Hill environment was foreign to them in many ways as old arrangements of power were being dismantled and news ones built in their place. Similarly, new members (especially freshman members), for their part, may might have benefitted somewhat from a lack of an anchor in the traditional ways of politics and power on the Hill; but, their transition from campaigning to legislating was doubly plagued by the difficulty of making that transition in the midst of upheaval in the House, much of which they did not comprehend. Not only were these new members trying to decide how to allocate their resources and balance their new legislative responsibilities against the messages they had communicated during their campaigns, but they were also trying to establish their positions and roles in the still unfolding political environment of the Hill, an environment in which senior members in both parties were scrambling to fill power vacuums and minimize political losses.

Placing the upheaval and uncertainty of the 104th Congress in the context of the foregoing discussion of Washington style is, on its face, not a simple task. In preceding chapters, I have discussed the impact of members' perceptions, preferences, and circumstances on their styles of work in Washington. For the most part, my analyses have

suggested that members are slow to change their Washington styles. After all, a behavioral or stylistic decision made during the previous Congress is usually just as appropriate for the current Congress, as well it might be for the next two or three Congresses, perhaps even longer. Indeed, when House members make changes and adjustments in their styles, the changes tend to be made gradually and at the margins. Over the course of a congressional career, each House member makes hundreds, even thousands, of such decisions and adjustments in the way he or she balances local and national priorities and concerns and the way in which he or she links the people back home to the government in Washington. In general, these changes and adjustments are subtle rather than dramatic and, on balance, tend toward normalcy and a "routinized" congressional career (see Hibbing 1991). Furthermore, virtually every House member I spoke with maintained that stability and consistency in their relationships with their constituents are indicative of a "good" fit between the member and his or her constituents--stability is almost always a product of both parties' general satisfaction with relationship they share.

In the midst of seeking and maintaining routinized careers and stable representational relationships, the 104th Congress and its tumultuous changes might seem to present an aberrant or "outlier" time frame or series of events, making it an inappropriate time to examine how members of the House develop, adjust and maintain their styles of work on the Hill. However, the day-to-day activities of representation and legislation on the Hill can often obscure the significance of the representation choices on which they rest. While stability tends to be the product of hard work on the part of a

representative, with stability can also come complacency and the tendency to take things for granted. After the 1994 congressional elections, however, few if any House members were complacent or taking things for granted in Washington. The transition from minority to majority party status, or *vice versa*, by itself forced most House members to reevaluate every aspect of their roles as representatives and as legislators. Perhaps never before have so many members of the House been forced to evaluate and reevaluate their positions in the House, in their parties, their relationships with other members, the way they allocate their resources, and, most importantly, the way they balance their roles at home and on the Hill.

The 104th Congress, then, far from being merely a deviating case which bears no special attention, provides a unique opportunity to study the development and maintenance of members' Washington styles over the course of their careers. In this regard, it is precisely the dramatic disruptions of stable patterns of Hill life that make the 104th Congress such an opportune time to study member behavior on the Hill. If nothing else, the congressional elections of 1994 remind us that nothing is quite so stable as it seems in politics. Congressional representation is, in fact, a process, not a static relationship or arrangement. Constituent-representative relationships change frequently and sometimes dramatically. If they did not, the only turnover that occurred in the House would be the result of voluntary retirement or death while in office. The dynamics of representational relationships do, however, change, and often in ways that cannot be predicted. When dramatic changes occur in congressional politics, whether the changes were anticipated or not, House members must respond and adjust accordingly. During the

104th Congress, virtually every House member found him or herself in just such a situation, that of reevaluating and adjusting their styles of work in Washington to new realities. Given the profound and pervasive nature of these changes, House members became uniquely aware of and, therefore, capable of talking about the process of adjusting one's Washington style in the face of a changing political environment. By observing and analyzing House members during the Congress immediately following the 1994 elections and the changes they produced, we can learn a great deal about the factors that lead to stability and instability in the American system of political representation. More importantly, we can also gain significant insights into the process by representational relationships are renegotiated and updated in response to changes in the political environment.

In this chapter, I explore the development of House members' Washington styles and the adjustments that members make in their styles over the course of their Hill careers. While I have already discussed some the various factors that lead House members to adopt particular styles in Washington, I present below a more systematic and cohesive analysis of the dominant influences on members' Washington styles and the interplay between those influences. In developing this general model of style development and maintenance, I will focus on the significance of personal, district, and national influences on member behavior on the Hill. After developing this model, I then examine the conditions and circumstances under which members choose to--or are forced to--adjust their Washington styles to establish or maintain stable and or personally satisfying representational relationships with their constituents. I conclude with a brief

analysis of the impact of the Republican "Contract with America" on members' Washington styles. This discussion will set the stage for an assessment Washington style, representational linkage, and trust in the final chapter.

I. THE CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON STYLE

Although not always on the same scale as the events surrounding and following the 1994 midterm congressional elections, a wide range of variables influence members of the House of Representatives as they adopt and maintain their styles of Washington work. While a Washington style is primarily developed in Washington, it is not shaped solely by Washington influences. On the contrary, members' styles are shaped by their personal preferences and goals and the interests of the local constituencies they represent in the context of the political environment of Washington. Washington influences can be and often are critically important to the styles members adopt; however, they are usually secondary to members' personal and district priorities.

Whatever the relative importance of personal, local and national influences on their Washington styles, no member can afford to make decisions about one sphere of interests without considering how they will impact the interests of the other two. Such judgements, however, are usually difficult to make. It is not always clear, for example, where personal interests end and district or national ones begin. Many of the activities that primarily relate to one sphere are even conducted in another--campaign funds are raised not only at home but in Washington, legislative business is increasingly conducted back home and personal concerns follow members wherever they go. Consequently, the

distinction between personal, district and Washington influences becomes blurred. There are no clear rules to follow, then, as members attempt to accurately assess and balance the competing demands on their time and energy. In many instances, choices are limited by circumstances or prior behavior. Campaign promises, public opinion, their relationships with interest groups and other members, the partisan composition of the House, committee assignments, family considerations, personal goals, or even an already well-developed Washington style can strictly define the range of realistic alternatives members have before them. Moreover, these influences on members' styles are not constant--they can change frequently and dramatically during a congressional career. A member with a firmly constituent-focused Washington style might be forced to pay more attention to policy or partisan concerns later in his or her career as circumstances at home or in Washington change. Personal goals and ambitions might also prompt a member to change course. One Southern member admitted that he consciously shed his constituent style in favor of a more partisan one in order to vie for power within his party in the House. While this change has required him to spend an increasingly greater share of his time on the Hill, he has been careful to avoid "losing touch" with is constituents."My relationship with my constituents is paramount," he contended. "I never lose sight of the reality that all politics is local."

House members can and do make changes in their Washington styles as their careers progress. As this member suggests, however, the influences of home never abate. When a member decides to spend more time in Washington, he or she must consider the consequences of that decision for his or her standing back home. However, the comments

shared by this member and others like him also serve to remind us that members' Washington styles are not always exact reflections of constituent expectations and interests. Although district influences are the most significant and consistent influences on member behavior, personal goals and priorities and the political environment in which they are pursued on the Hill can be just as important for some of the decisions members make. In some cases, personal and Washington influences might even be much more important than district considerations. It is so that such decisions and changes can be made more freely that members seek discretion over their Washington behavior.

While every member seeks discretion, not every member has won the same amount or kind of discretion on the Hill. Different members have earned different degrees of trust from their constituents. They also balance pressures of different kinds and of different intensities. Nonetheless, every member must strike a balance between their personal interests, those of their districts, and the influences they face in Washington. Members' Washington styles ultimately define the various ways that they do so. Styles, however, are not permanent. Indeed, given their basis on member perceptions and the changing nature of personal, local and national influences, members' styles can and do change. While perceptions and interests can fluctuate during a single congressional term, the more significant changes come over the course of a career. While Hibbing has convincingly argued that the "life-cycle" of congressional careers has flattened considerably and that the "routinized" career is now the norm in the House (1991), there remains a considerable degree of dynamism and change in the focus and direction of member behavior on the Hill. Indeed, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest


that many dimensions of member behavior in Washington are not static. Members do, in fact, as Hibbing contends, learn very early in their careers that they must pay consistently high levels of attention to their constituents if they want to stay in office. However, as they simultaneously pursue their goals in Washington and seek to build and maintain electoral support back home, they must frequently adjust both their styles of Washington work and the *kinds* of attention they pay to their districts. For example, the member referred to above has had less time to spend meeting with constituents and dealing with their service requests as he has taken on a more active partisan role in Washington. To compensate, he has relied more on his staff to perform constituent service. He has also been more aggressive in advertising the projects and funds he has secured for his district. While the amount of attention this congressman pays to his district has remained fairly constant, it is attention--and representational linkage--of a different kind.

While all House members can and do make adjustments in their Washington behavior, members are more likely to make significant changes early in their careers. Ironically, more junior members tend to be both more aware of and less prepared to make the stylistic choices they do during their first few months as House members. In the earliest stages of a member's career, he or she is, relatively speaking, most aware of his or her own personal interests and goals. Having lived, presumably for some time, in the district in which he or she runs for office, a member also has some knowledge of local concerns and interests. Most members, though, have fairly unsophisticated views of the political dynamics of their districts during their first and maybe even second campaigns. Consequently, their earliest decisions about representational style and Washington work

tend to be driven more by personal preferences and concerns than constituent ones. The longer they represent their districts and the more times they face election, however, the deeper a member's knowledge of his or her district becomes. As district knowledge increases, so does the relative importance of constituent interests and preferences and, as a result, the relative dominance of personal goals and interests is tempered. Similarly, the longer a member works on the Hill, the more important the influences of Washington--other members, institutional norms and positions, seniority, interest group alliances, etc.--become. Members arriving on the Hill for the first time, then, generally do not have a the detailed knowledge of local and national interests required to strike stable, workable balances between private, district and Washington interests. Consequently, members are likely to pay more attention to the ramifications of their behavioral decisions and, therefore, make adjustments as needed.

The dynamic nature of the influences on members' Washington styles throughout their careers is illustrated in Figure 5-1. As is also depicted in this figure, there are three distinct phases in members' careers during which these forces influence their styles on the Hill. During the developmental stage, which begins with the decision to run, continues through the first campaign, and culminates with a member's first term in office, House members make their initial attempts at establishing a comfortable relationship with their constituents and an effective approach to their Washington work. The adjustment stage, which begins during the second half of the first term and extends through the second and sometimes third terms, members modify and fine-tune their Washington styles, adjusting their approaches to Hill work to reconcile inconsistencies that arise during the sometimes

Figure 5-1.
The Context & Development of Washington Style



difficult transition from campaigning back home to legislating or governing in Washington. The third and usually longest phase, the mature career stage, begins with a member's third or fourth term in the House and lasts until their congressional careers come to an end. It is during this stage that relationships with constituents become stabilized, perhaps for all but those representing the most marginal districts, and members' activities in Washington become "routine." Members of Congress, then, mature and develop representative "résumés" incrementally, in a "step-by-step process" over the course of their careers in the contexts of both home and Capitol Hill (Fenno 1996, 20-1). Below, I examine the importance of personal, district, and national influences on members' Washington styles during these three career phases, focusing again on the dynamic yet increasingly stable nature of House members' Hill careers.

Personal Influences

The most obvious influences on members as they develop and implement their various Washington styles are their own inclinations and preferences and those of their closest associates. These influences are disproportionately influential in the formative phases of members' careers. In fact, personal influences are generally the decisive factor behind members getting into politics in the first place (See Kazee 1994). One new member I interviewed explained that his plunge into electoral politics shaped almost exclusively by personal, and not district or Washington, influences:

> I [was] scared to death about the national debt and the apocalyptic future of our country it was leading to. I couldn't stop thinking about it. Once I was having dinner with some friends and one of my buddies said, "If you're so worried about it, why don't you run for Congress?" At first I found the idea of running very presumptuous, almost arrogant. Who was I to think I could be a congressman? But the idea just wouldn't go away. I

> tried to keep it to myself, hoping it would go away. I finally mentioned it to my wife and she told me that maybe I had to run for office to get it out of my system.

This member ended up running for Congress not because of a grounds well of support in his district or because of relationships with others in Washington[64]. He ran because of his commitment to a personal policy preference and the support of his family and friends. As his campaign progressed, those in his "personal constituency" continued to dominate his political thinking. However, the more involved he became with his future constituents and then, after his election, with others on the Hill, personal influences became comparatively less important. This transition is not always easy for members who bring strong personal preferences and unbending attitudes with them to Washington. Rep. Linda Smith of Washington, the aforementioned member who has had strained relations within her party, was no stranger to such problems before she was elected to the House. In fact, she ruffled the feathers of her Republican colleagues in the Washington State Legislature by taking stances out of the mainstream of her party on several controversial issues. A local county Republican chairwoman even resigned during Smith's 1994 campaign after calling Smith a radical, right-wing, "anti-woman" candidate (Duncan and Lawrence 1995, 1402). Smith's ideological and policy-focused style seems to stem as much from her personality and personal preferences as anything else. In the developmental and adjustment stages of her career, she has continued to be driven by personal and district influences more than by what goes on in Washington.

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[64] Note, however, that his personal motives were influenced by a national issue, i.e. the federal deficit and debt.

Clearly, members' personalities have a significant impact on their Washington styles. Another manifestation of this phenomenon can be seen in the decision to behave as a political strategist or legislative tactician in Washington. One member I interviewed even contended that members' styles might not be self-consciously determined. Instead, he argued, they are often outgrowths of individual members' personalities:

> Member's Washington styles are personality driven more than they are based on a conscious decision to act a particular way in Washington. For example, I'm not comfortable in large crowds. When I attend dinners or large public events back home, I'm much more comfortable sneaking in the back door and sitting at a table in the corner than I am sitting on the podium. I try to avoid big blown up public appearances both at home and in Washington. I'm more introverted than most members, so I'm not really in competition for the spotlight like some of them are.

As the member who spoke about "torch carriers" in Chapter Three noted, some members simply do not want to be out front on things--they prefer to work behind the scenes. His preference to be more of a "technocrat" than a "politician" in the legislative process is one that stems from his personal preferences and abilities more than it does district or Washington influences. Personal experience can also shape members approaches to their jobs as pragmatists or ideologues. One of the members with prior legislative experience I interviewed contended that those with more political experience in the legislative process tend to be more pragmatic:

> [When I came here] I was familiar with the process and the dynamics of a legislative body, so I didn't have to do as much "on the job training" as some other members. There were some new issues I had to learn about, but my previous experience really helped. Members who come to Washington with no previous legislative experience have a bumpier transition. They have to learn the art of compromise here--they have to learn that you can't get everything you want all at once. Not a single member of this body was elected to be a king. They're members of a legislative body that has to make decisions together. That means they have to compromise.

As significant as members' personalities, abilities, and preferences are to the development of their Washington styles, members can and do change overtime. A House member who is a near mirror-image of Rep. Smith, Rep. Helen Chenoweth of neighboring Idaho, was also first elected in 1994. Although Chenoweth behaved at least as ideologically as Smith during the first phase of her career[65], the adjustment stage of her career has seen her make significant changes to strengthen and stabilize her relationship with her constituents. For Rep. Chenoweth, the influences of home have begun to temper and moderate some of her personal preferences (Mercurio 1997). While many members are forced to make such adjustments early in their career, in order to maintain electoral support in their districts, others do not have to make any such changes. Indeed, several members I interviewed suggested that it was because their personal preferences match their constituents so well that they chose to run for Congress.

As House members move into the mature, stable career phase, personal and district influences are increasingly weighed in the balance of Washington influences. As opportunities arise and situations change on the Hill, members often change their focuses, even their styles of Washington work:

> The question of focus is the most important to you as a representative. Some people are just more comfortable focusing on home more than on leadership or legislation or committee work. The [constituent-focused] style was me in my early years in the House, buy my "mission" to change things philosophically led me to abandon that single-minded attachment to my district in order to effect those changes.

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[65] Although both women are ideologues, Chenoweth would probably be better described as having a partisan style, in contrast to Smith's policy style.

Indeed, in the last few years he has been in the Congress, this member has spent less of his time back home and more of his energies in the legislative process in Washington. His style has changed not because his district has changed, but because his position in Washington and his representational and policy preferences have changed. Doubtless, his personal outlook has been altered by his tenure on the Hill. Indeed, Washington tends to change more rapidly than one's district. Members in the developmental and adjustment stages of their careers must come to terms with this reality. One young member in his third term recognized that others' styles changes less than his, but perhaps not the reality that his style was frequently changing because of the career stage he was in at the time of our interview:

> Some members have styles that are stable, while others have styles that are constantly changing. My style is always developing. I'm always seeking change and development, looking for ways to be a better representative and a better legislator. I'm eager to grow through the conflicts I face in the Congress. Stagnation isn't fun. I don't want to have a cemented style. I don't think I'd be effective that way.

This member's preference for changeability is doubtless an extension of his desire to maximize his Washington discretion. It is a preference which clearly shapes his approach to his Washington work--he is very much a pragmatist with a policy focused style on the Hill.

The personal influences on members' Washington styles are the most constant influences on their careers. While the relative importance of personal influences diminishes as members pay increasing attention to district and national influences over the course of their careers, personal preferences, perceptions, and influences remain the underlying motives and forces behind members' careers. Beyond the fact that personal

influences are often *influenced* by district and national forces, however, it is striking that personal influences can be and often are, on occasion *eclipsed* by district and national influences. The willingness and ability of House members to sometimes give greater weight to such considerations is a critically important dimension of congressional representation and linkage.

District Influences

Somewhere early on in the development most House members' Washington styles, the influences of their constituents begin to shape their perceptions of themselves and the representational relationships they are attempting to forge. Indeed, the political contexts in which members of the House come to Washington play an important part in shaping members efforts to balance their local and national roles. For example, a member from a very marginal district might want to avoid affiliating too closely with a potentially controversial group, or even his or her own political party. One Congressman representing a district in which the majority of his constituents are registered in the opposing political party believes that, to avoid alienating his constituents, he has to be a "loner" on Capitol Hill:

> That stems from the fact that before my first term, I faced a very powerful opposition coalition. I can't associate myself with a group or cause that would mobilize that coalition against me. I can't appear to favor one group of my constituency to the exclusion of any others. I'm from a hugely [opposite party] district. Maybe after I've developed a more secure relationship with my constituents, over the course of a couple of elections, I'll have more leeway to define myself and be more involved in Washington. Right now, I just can't afford to do that.

This Congressman has adopted a very constituent-focused Washington style and he is attached to the House almost exclusively at the personal level, and only cautiously so. His

style is very much a reflection of the political realities he faces in his district, and clearly not his personal preferences. As one of his constituents[66] explained, however it is the most appropriate style for this congressman's situation:

> More than anything, the Congressman is a constituency builder. He's new in office so he's still proving himself. He's non-paralleled as a constituency builder. He's always there, where he needs to be. He's very attuned to his constituents. I don't think he's been in Washington long enough to define himself, but it's really too early for that. He's focusing his energies where he ought to right now--on his district. He's very well hooked in back home and that's a base he'll be able to build on in the future.

This member was very clearly in the adjustment phase of his career at the time of our interview. He was consciously seeking to develop a strong relationship with his constituents, one that would subsequently allow him to win enough discretion to define himself in Washington and develop a stable congressional career both at home and on the Hill.

Members' policy agendas and, therefore, their Washington styles, are also driven by district influences. One senior member explained the overwhelming influence of economic interests back home on committee service decisions and ambitions:

> I very consciously chose my committees in light of my constituency. There are a lot of [workers employed in a particular industry] in my district and sitting on the [A] and [B] Subcommittees is an important part of my efforts to represent them. There's also a lot of [another particular industry] interests in my district, hence my seat on the [C] committee. It's especially valuable to [another business] community in my district to have a representative that chairs the [D] Subcommittee.

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[66] I spoke with this prominent constituent from the Congressman's district while I was visiting his office to interview him.

Another Congressman explained that his district's moderate stance on most issues leads him to particular kinds of behavior on the Hill:

> I bring qualities from home to Washington with me that affect my Washington style. First, I take a common sense approach to representation. I represent a marginal district so I can't be driven by partisanship or ideology--I have to be driven by common sense. I have worked hard on bipartisan welfare reform, budget reform, and balancing the budget. I try to find common sense, compromise solutions. That's who I am and I think it works well with my marginal district.

Another member, one who represents a very different, electorally secure and ideologically homogenous district, concurred that his district shapes his Washington style. Specifically, he asserted that his fit with his constituents and the safety of his seat allow him to pay less attention to home than many members do:

> I don't do town hall meetings back home. . . . I don't take a lot of trips through the district. I don' t really need to because my district is very homogenous. In that sense, I think it's easier to represent a rural district than it is an urban one, at least for me.

In contrast to senior members who, like this one, represent safe districts and who have developed mature, stable careers, more junior members, whether they recognize it or not, have a greater need to spend time at home, especially during the developmental and adjustment phases of their careers. As one member making the transition form adjustment to stability in his Hill career contended:

> Some members, especially when they're new, have to spend more time in their districts than they do in Washington. This is important because members have to make sure they establish a good relationship with their constituents. The problem with a lot of the freshmen is that they don't understand this.

In addition to the political influences originating from members' constituents, things that members themselves say and do back home can commit them to specific

Washington behavior. For example, a members' campaign promises might require him or her to be pragmatic in working with other House members. A senior Northeastern Democrat explained how such a situation might unfold:

> Part of being a representative means that you keep your campaign promises. This often requires me to work with others in the Congress that I don't always agree with. For example, I maintain a good working relationship with [the senior Senator from my state, who is a member of the opposing party,] because without his help I would be unable to give [certain interests] in my district the help they need. I couldn't keep my campaign promises without an ally like the Senator.

This member would clearly prefer not to work with the senator, but he is compelled to do so because of constituent interests and the commitments he has made to those interest back home. Indeed, what members say or emphasize in their campaigns can have very real and direct implications for the Washington styles they adopt. A member who makes absolute commitments on particular policies during his or her election campaign will have little room to negotiate or moderate those positions once he or she gets to Washington. At least with regard to those particular issues, their Washington styles are determined before they even leave home. This was very clearly the case for most of the Republicans in the 1994 Freshman class who, having signed the GOP's "Contract with America," felt compelled to pursue the enactment of its provisions by adopting partisan Washington styles. I discuss the impact of the "Contract" on members' styles in greater detail below.

Just as members' personal priorities and perceptions can change, so too can members' districts. For the most part, House members are capable of and willing to adjust to those changes, even during the latter stable-career phases of their careers. Sometimes,

however, the changes in a member's district out-strips his or her capacity to change. I interviewed just such a member, a Hill veteran who was retiring in part because he found it increasingly difficult to relate to his district, seemed to have grown weary of keeping pace with his constantly changing district. With obvious exasperation in his voice, he admitted that he has recently only "averaged about 16 to 18 trips a year to the district. I try to get back at least once a month, but not every weekend. . . . I don't know exactly what wins elections back home [anymore]." For most of his career, he ran for reelection to a traditionally safe-seat, regularly winning more than two-thirds of the vote. However, he won less than 55% of the vote in 1994. The combined forces of redistricting, a highly mobile constituency, and general social change have rendered his district something far different than the one he first ran in over two decades ago. Instead of dramatically changing his home and Washington styles to compensate for these changes, he made the choice to leave public life. In instances like this, we are reminded, once again, that no political arrangement is permanent. Every representative-constituent relationship will eventually dissolve, sometimes on members' terms and sometimes not. Even for members in the latter stages of their careers, the need to adapt and adjust to new realities at home is relentless. The willingness and capacity to adapt to political change is an almost absolute requirement for an effective representative. This aspect of congressional representation is at the heart of what Fenno has called the "negotiation" of representational "fit." It is a subject to wich I will return, in the concluding chapter.

Washington Influences

As members progress in their Washington careers and move from the developmental through the adjustment and, ultimately, to the routine or stable phases of their careers, they must increasingly reconcile their usually growing responsibilities in Washington with personal and district influences on their Washington styles. In some instances, the influences of Washington are powerful enough to lead members to not only modify their styles but to change them altogether. For example, a member that once had a constituent style with a personal attachment to the House might become a member with a partisan style and a formal attachment to the House if he or she becomes the chairman of a committee chair. Dan Rostenkowski underwent such a change in style as he made the transition from Democratic party whip to Ways and Means Committee Chair (See Strahan 1992). As one fairly senior Democrat observed, "Where you sit in the power structure in the House can change your style dramatically. If you don't have any institutional clout, you have to be a lot more aggressive in your efforts to move your agenda forward." Indeed, as members' progress in their careers and gain experience and influence on the Hill, the tendency is to become more Washington-focused. Whether members actually change styles or not, it is rare for a member's style to be unchanged by what happens in Washington. At a minimum, enhanced institutional status, which usually comes with tenure on the Hill, expands members' opportunity to play a more influential role in the legislative process (Hibbing 1991, 57), an opportunity which most are not willing to forego, even if it means adjusting or changing their styles.

While increased tenure generally makes members' styles more Washington-focused, not all members are equally inclined to change their styles in such a manner. Some constituent-focused members make little or no effort to enhance their positions and opportunities on the Hill--they simply choose to keep focus of the representational efforts back home. Members with policy styles and partisan styles, in contrast, gain directly from increased tenure as they pursue their goals in the Congress.

Speaker Newt Gingrich is a striking example of a member who has sought to maintain his style in spite of changes in his status on the Hill. The Speaker's well-documented rise to power has seen him do everything he could to avoid changing his Washington style, including the creation of a network of organizations outside the House and outside the formal legislative process which have allowed him to pursue his own agenda in his own way. Now that he is the Speaker, though, this unwillingness to alter his style and be a more "traditional" party leader might be fueling some of his political problems. One senior member complained about Gingrich's style, noting that:

> The Speaker has to decide what his job is. Carl Albert thought his job was to pass legislation. Newt Gingrich is not like a Speaker in any ordinary sense. For a start, he's not here. He's delegated the floor activity to Armey, and he sees himself not as a legislator but as a political leader shaping the national agenda. Carl Albert would sit down at the beginning of the legislative day, and he was still there at the end. He was always on the floor and a stream of members would go up and talk and visit with him. You never see Newt Gingrich sitting on the floor. You don't see that any more.

Some members are limited by factors beyond their control with regard to how much they can accomplish by being more Washington-focused. Women and minorities in the House, despite serving as long or longer than many House leaders, are under-

represented in leadership position in the House, especially withing their parties. It may be less advantageous, then, for these members to focus their energies on acquiring party clout in order to pursue their goals.

The general partisan environment in Washington is another dimension of Hill life over which individual members have little control but which nonetheless shapes and influences their Washington styles, sometimes yielding behavior contrary to personal or even district preferences. As one southern pragmatic Democrat bemoaned, "I don't concern myself with party when I'm trying to get things done. But, this style doesn't always work well in Washington because some people expect you to be more partisan." Partisan tensions in the House have been exacerbated during recent Congresses by the increased competitiveness of majority party control of the Congress. That competition has spilled over into the legislative business of the House as well as the styles of its members. One Republican freshman argued that every dimension of his work on the Hill has been colored by party, especially his party's efforts to maintain its majority:

> I was naive enough to think that my business experience qualified me to be on the Ways and Means Committee, but, as I learned very quickly, that's not how it works around here. My committees were chosen for me--I was assigned to them. The plumb committee assignments went to freshmen who were narrowly elected or who won important victories. That was the case for the three new members who were put on Ways and Means.

Indeed, the party a member belongs to often plays a decisive role in his or her decisions about their styles of behavior on the Hill and, therefore, the way they relate to their constituents. In the case of the member quoted above, party concerns limited his committee service options. Party can just as easily, though, expand members' opportunities to pursue his or her personal and representational goals. There may come a

time when a member believes his or her party does not offer such opportunities. In such cases, members sometimes choose to switch parties to more effectively pursue their goals and maintain the representational relationships they have established with their constituents. One of the more policy-focused members who switched parties during the 104th Congress asserted that his decision was based on his determination to pursue his policy agenda and make it easier to represent his constituents on the Hill in the way he believed they want him to:

> When I switched parties, I did it back home, not in Washington, and I did it only after extensive consultation and communication with my constituents. I gave people plenty of time and opportunities to participate with me in the decision. The initial response was that I should give the Democrats one more chance, so I did. Almost to the person, though, the voters recognized the Democrats failure to take me in. I made a strong case that my voice was being muffled by the Democratic leadership, which muffled the voice of my constituents in Washington. . . . Essentially, they said, "We don't care where you sit, we care where you stand." The early returns on my decision to switch are very positive. The consensus is that I made the right choice and I've become much more effective because of it.

The political environment in Washington exerts increasing influence on House members styles over the course of their careers. Either an un-willingness or a failure to adapt one's Washington style to changing political realities in Washington can have serious repercussions for a member's status both in the House as well as back home. What members do in Washington and, to a lesser extent, how they do it directly effects the kind of representational linkage they provide for his or her constituents. The manner in which House members respond and adjust to changes on the Hill and balance their work there with their roles back home is the third and final piece of our puzzle of congressional careers and Washington styles.

The "Contract with America," Congressional Careers and Washington Style

In the context of this discussion of personal, district, and national influences on members' Washing styles and careers, the absence of some special attention to the importance of the 1994 congressional elections and the Republican "Contract with America" would be glaringly obvious. Indeed, as I have just argued, the parameters of members' styles of work in Washington and the ways they adjust them in the fact of political change are largely defined by the environment in which they find themselves on Capitol Hill. In this regard, there are few events in recent memory that have influenced so many members of Congress so significantly as the Republican "Contract with America" in 1994. Almost every Republican congressional candidate in 1994 signed the Contract, pledging his or her support for the policies detailed within it if they were elected. Most, if not all, of the victorious candidates who signed the "Contract" felt compelled to do just that when they arrived on the Hill in January of 1995. As a consequence, Republican unanimity and resolve was at its peak during the first half of the 104th Congress. This unanimity, in turn, strengthened solidarity amongst Democrats, effectively polarizing the two parties in the House.

In this midst of this heightened partisan environment, political circumstances did, in fact, influence members' approaches to their jobs as representatives, even prompting some members to change their styles of work on the Hill altogether. The most common influence of these forces was that numerous otherwise pragmatic members were prompted or, by some self-accounts, even compelled to behave as ideologues and to be more supportive of their parties. As a result, the 104th Congress was the most partisan

Congress in decades. What precisely was the role of the "Contract with America" in all of this? It is almost too obvious to answer that it drew the battle lines between the two parties, but in a real sense that is exactly what it did. While there were Democrats who voted to support some of the GOP's "Contract" legislation and Republicans who occasionally did not go along them, the "Contract" did more to starkly define the differences between the parties than it did to muddy them. A Democratic member I interviewed declared that, "the Contract with America effectively destroyed the bipartisan style in the House because it presented everything in terms of Republicans v. Democrats." By this member's account, the middle ground was left a lonely place during the 104th Congress. According to some House members, these tensions have been further heightened by conflict between the new majority party and the President:

> The work of [a particular committee the member is on] is more partisan than I've ever seen it. The highly charged partisan atmosphere is partly due to a difference in philosophy between Republicans and Democrats . . . These philosophical tensions are not just apparent in the Congress. These philosophical tensions are more pronounced than in the past because of a particular policy disputes between Republicans and Democrats in the Congress and between the Congress and the President.

The unique influence of the "Contract," in contemporary political settings, was that it nationalized the 1994 congressional elections, at least temporarily focusing members' attentions on Washington and national policy goals more than on local political concerns. Even more during the first year of the 104th Congress than during the second, the "Contract with America" and the 73 Republican freshman elected in 1994 produced a party agenda in Washington that was, in the words of one observer, "at long last, more national than parochial" (Grann 1996, 26). As members in all three career phases adjusted

to this new development, they were forced to reassess the balances they had established (or in some cases the balances they were still establishing) between personal, district and national influences on their Washington behavior. In particular, many of the more inexperienced members in the House, several of whom I interviewed and admitted as much, underestimated the importance of home in that balancing act and, at least for the first half of their first terms, placed too much attention on national politics and not enough attention on local politics. Consequently, many of them were scrambling to establish strong electoral ties in the months just prior to the 1996 elections as the importance of home became more apparent to them.

Part of the tendency among Republicans, especially its large freshman class in 1994, to pay relatively too much attention to national political trends and forces stemmed from the party's inexperience with interpreting electoral victories. Without the experienced guidance of party leaders, many of whom were also caught up in the heady talk of "revolution" and "mandate," these young members had little reason not to believe that their election should be interpreted as a charge to focus on national policy problems first and worry about local political concerns second. However, as one senior Republican observed of his freshman colleagues, the real reasons behind the Republican victory in 1994 may have had more to do with a negative reaction to Democrats than it did with a ringing endorsement of the Republican policy agenda:

> Any time you have a large freshman class, you have to deal with the perception of that class that they were elected to fulfill some mandate. This particular class thinks they were elected to push some very conservative causes. They believe that their presence in the Congress is evidence that the country has taken a sharp turn to the right. I don't think, however, that these freshmen were elected because of the Contract with America. That

> might have had something to do with it, but more importantly, voters were simply dissatisfied in 1994. The Republicans were the alternative to something they didn't like anymore so they chose them.

House members in the 104th Congress were required to deal with a strikingly unique set of circumstances as they balanced personal, district and national influences in their approaches to their Washington work. However, the introspection and resulting adjustments brought about by the political upheaval caused by the 1994 elections are noteworthy not by their mere occurrence but by their pervasiveness and depth. Members of Congress face new realities and adapt to them every two years. The new realities in 1994 simply happened to be more dramatically different from the old realities than any of the previous changes most members had experienced. However, even in the face of those changes, most members, in spite of some difficult and awkward moments, made the transition successfully and were rewarded for doing so by being reelected in 1996. That the vast majority of House members adapted to their new surroundings in a way that was acceptable to their constituents is evidence that congressional representation remains a flexible, accommodating institution for linking people to their government, even in a dynamic political system. In the next section, I examine this question more specifically by focusing on changing Washington styles in the context of congressional careers more broadly.

II. ADJUSTING STYLES: CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS AND CHANGE

To survive politically, House members must adapt to the changes that regularly confront them. The adjustments members make are often tenuous reconciliations between

private, district and national interests. Members can spread themselves very thin as they constantly adjust and readjust to these competing interests as their careers progress. The members I interviewed routinely suggest that the ability to consistently make such adjustments depends on a Washington style and a home style that are based on good communication with one's constituents. House members who, during all three phases of their congressional careers, communicate frequently and effectively with the people back home are unlikely to make career changes that are out of step with their constituents, primarily because they know what their constituents think and how they will react to the particular votes they cast or actions they take. Indeed, the ability to adapt appropriately to change is perhaps the most important skill a House member can learn as he or she develops and maintains a relationship with his or her constituency. To stand still in an ever-changing political environment is a sure way to end one's political career.

But what of the assertion, forwarded by Hibbing (1991) and others, that House members' careers have become increasingly stable over the last twenty years, with virtually all House members paying high levels of attention to their constituents throughout all stages of their careers? Indeed, the "life-cycle" career of a House member, in which he or she gradually climbs the ladder of power in his or her party, pays increasingly less attention to home and becomes increasingly moderate in his or her roll-call behavior, seems to be a thing of the past. Instead, as Hibbing asserts, House careers have increasingly become an "essentially unvarying stint in the Congress" (Hibbing 1991, 182-3). With regard to the amount of time and energy members devote to their Hill work--as opposed to their districts--Hibbing's assertions are accurate. However, at least two

significant additions to the stable careers thesis are in order. First, when the full range of member behavior is considered, member behavior is not as consistent as the general model suggests. There are, across different Washington styles and career phases, significant differences in the kinds of work members emphasize in Washington and the ways they believe that work "represents" their constituents. Furthermore, the constituent, policy and partisan styles that members adopt in Washington are developed and maintained in the context of inherently dynamic relationships with their constituents and with others on the Hill, relationships that are subject to constant change. Second, the stable-careers thesis should allow for the distinction between members' constituency careers and their legislative careers. While members may be fairly routine in the amounts of attention they pay to their constituents, the kinds of campaigning they do and, to a lesser extent, the kinds of home styles they develop, there is less uniformity and consistency in members' styles of work in the legislature. Together, these two additions to the stable-careers thesis provide a view of congressional careers that is much more dynamic and susceptible to change than the routine career model, at least on its face, might suggest. Below, I discuss each of these proposed additions to the disciplinary view of congressional careers in more detail.

Consistent Behavior, Dynamic Relationships

Although all House members pay roughly the same amount of attention to home, not all House members reap the same benefits from their efforts. Not all House members enjoy stable, predictable relationships with their constituencies. In fact, the most common perspective held by the members I interviewed was that, although most of them perceived

their electoral relationships to be good, their relationships could not be taken for granted or left untended. In fact, with the possible exception of the newest members of the House who, as I have suggested, are not always immediately aware of the importance of cultivating their constituencies, almost every House member I interviewed was actively concerned about and engaged in "taking care" of his or her district. Indeed, members' behavior with regard to their constituents does not become "routinized" because their representational relationships have become etched in stone, but because House members have discovered successful patterns of behavior that keep those relationships strong. The reason there is very little fluctuation in members' attention to their districts over time is because virtually every member has come to the realization that a healthy representative-constituent relationship, which is the precondition for a stable electoral career, demands consistent attention to home.

Notwithstanding the broad recognition among House members of the importance of paying attention to the people who are responsible for sending them to Capitol Hill, and potentially refusing to send them there again, particular members in particular circumstances seem to defy the wisdom behind this political truism. For example, one of the members I spoke of in Chapter Four openly admitted that she had pursued a strategy of paying excessive attention to her constituents during the first few years of her career so that she could pay less personal and direct attention to them later on. At the time of our interview, she was, in fact, making the transition from a constituent-focused to a policy-focused Washington style. Her measurable attention to home had not noticeably decreased or diminished because she had maintained the same level of constituent service

by delegating those tasks to responsible staffers and she continued to make frequent trips home to her district. Her *style* of balancing home and Hill, however, had shifted substantively from a constituent to a policy focus. As she moved from the developmental through the adjustment and into the stable phase of her career, she was finding a balance between personal, district and Washington influences with which she was comfortable. It is a balance, though, that could have only been discovered at this later stage in her congressional career because only then did she have enough experience with and knowledge of each sphere of influence to balance them against each other in an informed way. It is worth noting that the balance she was settling into was apparently consistent with her constituents' expectations--she was reelected in 1996 by one of the widest margins in her congressional career.

Some members are able to be consistent in the *ways* they relate to and communicate with their constituents while changing the nature and character of the linkages they provide for them. For example, a handful of members, admitted that early in their careers--perhaps near the beginning of their stable-career phases--made a conscious decision to pay less attention to their constituents and more attention to their Washington work. Again, it is during the earliest stages of a career that such changes are most likely to occur. Indeed, during the developmental phases of their careers, members often make critical, career-pattern establishing changes in the way they think about their jobs as representatives. Consequently, the first one, two, three or even four years of House members' careers are, generally speaking, the most dynamic and important years in the

development of members' Washington styles and their styles of representation on the Hill.

While the early part of a member's career is full of change, stability usually comes quickly. However, that stability is not easily won. Most new members, even those with prior legislative experience, have limited understandings of the political and legislative workings of Hill life. The first months on the job, then, can be as one freshman described it, "like getting a drink from a fire hose." Virtually every new member must go through this trying period of information overload and steep learning curves as they adjust to their new jobs on Capitol Hill and begin to develop their Washington styles. One freshman member explained some of the difficulties associated with his first year on the job in Washington:

> I think the first year is probably the hardest as a member of Congress. You can really wear yourself out if you're not careful. It's especially tough to make the transition from the business world to the political world because there are no clear-cut goals in politics. In business you're objective is to make a profit. There's no equivalent of that in politics. It's very difficult to establish priorities during your first year because everything's important until you know enough about it to put it where it belongs on your list of priorities.

As unsettled as the first year might be, however, this same member suggests that members generally adjust quickly to their new environments:

> During the first year, you have to meet with *everybody*, because you haven't met anyone. You don't know which people you can have meet with a staffer. Now that I'm in my second year, however, things are much less hectic. I've been able to implement systems and structures that make the office run much more smoothly. I know which people I have to meet with and which one's I can pop my head in the door and say 'hi.' It's a steep learning curve, but it levels off quite a bit after the first year.

Most of the more senior members I interviewed agreed that, while the adjustment period can be difficult, it passes fairly quickly, primarily because most members are able to get a good grasp on their jobs after the first year or two. After that first term, members' tend to enjoy increasingly high comfort levels with their roles in Washington and with the ways they balance them with their local roles. A senior southern Democrat asserted that this was a natural byproduct of growing into his job:

> This job gets easier over time. You get to know more members and more people and it becomes easier to get the information you need to make good decisions. You also get to know how people are going to react to different twists and turns in the process and you become more adept at positioning yourself to take advantage of that knowledge. Your overall awareness of the process and of people develops over time in Washington, D.C. You might not become closer to or more familiar with your constituents by getting to know the ropes in Washington, but doing so will help you take better care of your constituents.

Stable Constituent Careers, Dynamic Legislative Careers

In addition to the view that House members' relationships with their constituents are not as stable over time as are their strategies for establishing good constituent relationships, the stable careers model should also be expanded to reflect the dichotomy in members' careers that has seen a routinization of members' constituency careers without the concomitant routinization of legislative careers. As members progress in both careers, they gain the experience and knowledge necessary to balance personal, district, and national influences against one another with a realistic and usually nuanced understanding of how the three are interrelated. The implications of this process are that while House members may, early on in their careers, establish healthy and stable electoral relationships with their constituents, their legislative careers are likely to continue to

evolve, thereby changing the substance, but not necessarily the strength, of their relationships with their constituents.

In whatever phase members finds themselves in their legislative careers, change, be it large or small, is essential. There is a paradox of political change, however, that confounds politicians as they make the adjustments the are compelled to make on Capitol Hill. One senior Republican reflected that, while the ability to change and adapt to new circumstances on the Hill is critical,

> You also have to be consistent in Washington. Members will remember you if you're inconsistent. There was one member who was always standing up on the floor, harping on this pork-barrel project or that, offering amendments to cut this or that offensive spending provision. Later when he tried to get support for a project in his own district, he ran into a brick wall. Very few members were willing to support him.

Furthermore, as another senior member explained, the contours of a successful congressional career are not only defined by the stylistic changes a member makes at different stages in his or her career, but also, and perhaps more importantly, by his or her ability to "bring along" his or her constituents throughout that process:

> It's a maturing process to get where I am in the House. I've gradually become more comfortable with my responsibilities in the House. . .One of the most difficult things to reconcile about being a congressman is that you should learn and grow on the job, but if you change your mind, people accuse you of being inconsistent. You have to be able to take the people along with you as you learn.

Members can and do change their approaches to their Washington work over the course of their congressional careers. Most frequently, these changes are made at the margins; however, sometimes members change their styles dramatically. An important distinction, one which members do not often think about explicitly, though, is the

distinction between changing one's representational style (at home or in Washington) and changing one's position on an issue or even one's ideology or party affiliation. For the most part, constituents are much less aware of and concerned about stylistic changes than they are substantive policy or political changes. These kinds of changes, however, are often the most important in a member's career. Members uniformly understand the dangers of changing positions, but they also tend to wish they had more discretion in the face of change. Indeed, one Midwestern Democrat, while concurring with his colleagues that change is usually viewed politically, contended--that the risk of being viewed as inconsistent should be ignored:

> The two politicians I admire more than any others are Lincoln and Kennedy. They had the capacity to change and grow in politics. Too many politicians think that consistency is more important than doing the right thing. I'm always open to change and new ideas. Just because we've done something a certain way doesn't mean that's the only way it should be done. My conscience drives my decisions in Washington more than my concern for reelection. Someday when my kids are grown and I have grandkids, I want to be able to tell them what I did in the Congress. I want to explain to them what I did without having to apologize. I'm concerned about my place in history. I want to be someone who stood up for what was right, not someone who did what was politically expedient.

Again, however, it is striking to observe how much one member in the House can differ from another. While the member quoted above holds policy, and even ideological, adaptability as a hallmark of his stature as a representative, other members wear their issue and ideological consistency as a badge of honor. A senior Western Republican declared:

> I do what I think is right and that doesn't result in a lot of changes. I have firm beliefs. I believe in traditional family values. I believe in an adequate defense. And I believe in multiple usage of public lands. These values aren't going to change. You know where I stand.

While members may vary in their views about the importance and acceptability of change with regard to both their representational styles and their issue positions, there was unanimous agreement among those I interviewed that *some* level of consistency is required of all members. No one can change constantly or without justification and expect to maintain political support and respect back home or on the Hill. This reality often puts members preparing to pursue higher office in uncomfortable positions as they shift their positions to appeal to a new set of voters (see Francis and Kenny 1996). House members making the jump to a Senate race often feel that they must moderate or broaden their congressional agendas. In the process, they may change their official positions on a host of issues. The members and staffers I observed and interviewed, however, suggested that doing so must be viewed as a calculated risk. Candidates who shift positions are likely to lose some support among their primary constituencies, just as Bob Dole probably did in his 1996 presidential bid by running a campaign that was ideologically inconsistent with his legislative record in the Senate. House members who shift positions also run the risk of alienating themselves from traditional allies in the House as well as their core, i.e. primary, supporters back home. Change, although essential, then, must be balanced against the need to maintain the trust one has one from his or her constituents. This is a topic that I will address more explicitly in the concluding chapter.

As I spoke with members about their styles on the Hill and their relationships with their constituents, the more senior members tended to describe their House careers as a mellowing process. One member recounted that a close friend on the Hill, a Republican committee chair, once confided in him that, "When I first came to the Congress I was

determined to change the world. Now I'm just trying to get out of here with some respect." The origins of such sentiments among senior members are numerous and often personal. However, senior members share a common experience in and perspective on the work of the House that tends to remind them of the ephemeral nature of politics and the fleeting nature of any balance they strike between home and Hill, between the personal, district, and national influences on their congressional work. They have, for example, seen the high price some members have paid for becoming overconfident in those balances and the relationships that rest on them. Over their careers, to maintain comfortable linkage relationships with their constituents, members must go through periods of adjustment. It is one of the facts of congressional life. The unrelenting nature of the process of change, several senior members explained, brings with it a degree of perspective and humility that they did not possess as new members of the House. For better or worse, one result of a length Hill career is a moderation, if not of policy preference and ideology, of members' estimations of the importance of any given bill and, perhaps, even their own importance in the House and in history.

III. CONCLUSION

A House member's ability to pursue his or her goals in Washington is dependent upon his or her ability to adapt maintain constituent support back home and acquire power and influence in Washington. To do so, a member must be able to effectively recognize and adapt to changes in both places--at home and on the Hill. For the most part, members of Congress are successful in their efforts to do so. However, every

congressional election there are a handful of members who are forced to leave office because they have not made the adjustments they needed to. We generally expect politically savvy Hill veterans to be better at making such adjustments than more junior members; but, now and again, even senior members fail to make the "right" adjustments, highlighting once again the ever-present and always difficult dilemma of balancing the duties and of home against the responsibilities of the Hill. Occasionally, experienced representatives allow their Washington styles and their Washington images to get out of sync with their constituents' interests and expectations. In their preoccupation with Washington work, they sometimes forget that the power they wield on the Hill is preconditioned by the support of the people from whence they came. This is a lesson that former Speaker of the House Tom Foley probably understood all to well, one he should have understood as well as any member several years into the stable phase of his congressional career. And yet it was a lesson which he learned again with crushing finality through his own defeat in 1994. Perhaps Foley believed he had accumulated so much political capital, in the form of electoral support, that he could pay less attention to his constituents' opinions and interests than other members. As it turned out, the oft-repeated maxim of the Speaker who replaced Tom Foley, "listen and lead," was echoed in the campaign slogan of Foley's victorious challenger: "We need a listener, not a speaker."

One final note is in order with regard to the balance members strike as local politicians working in a national legislative body. Politics is largely about local issues and local people. It is appropriate, then, that developing an appropriate and effective style in one's district is natural and usually requires little in the form of superlative effort. In

contrast, developing an appropriate and effective style on the Hill is less natural and requires a considerably greater amount of time, attention and effort. It is, perhaps, because of this reality that members have a tendency to focus more time and energy on Washington concerns than on the concerns of home later in their careers. As we consider the potential tensions that can arise between home and Hill in a member's career, the utility of different Washington styles in establishing and defending that balance becomes more clear. Some members strike a balance decisively in favor of home by adopting constituent styles while others adopt policy or partisan styles, thereby emphasizing the Washington dimension of their jobs as representatives. As members adjust and refine the balances they strike over the course of their careers, they may finally come to a point, usually in the latter part of the stable phases of their careers, when their relationships with their constituents and their styles in Washington become both stable and durable. It would be a mistake, however, to view that stability and durability as evidence of complacency or stagnation. A healthy, mutually agreeable relationship between a representative and his or her constituents is based on anything but such characteristics. While the first year or two of a career can bring a comparatively very steep climb, the development of a Washington style that dovetails with one's home style and solidifies one's representational relationships back home is a gradual, work-a-day process, marked by frequent communication, relentless negotiation with one's constituents, and calculated, effective change. As one freshman Democrat observed, it is learning process with multiple dimensions that cannot even be fully understood by a new member:

> How do you lead in a group of 435 members? I'm still very influential in the [state government], but I'm not very influential in the Congress. There

> I'm still uncomfortable, but that's a precondition of growth. I'm learning on the job about how to gain the respect of other members of Congress, how often I should speak up, and things of that nature. It is very much a learning process.

It is one, though, that must also be weighed constantly in the balance of what goes on and what matters back home. It is not glamorous and it is rarely marked by events so memorable or significant that they stand out above all others. However, it is through this tireless process of daily interaction and work, both on the Hill and back home, that members of the House link their constituents to the decisions made in Washington and provide congressional representation. It is to a more careful analysis of the kinds of representational linkage that representatives give their constituents that I turn in the concluding chapter.


CHAPTER 6: WASHINGTON STYLE, LINKAGE AND TRUST

"Representation takes time." Richard Fenno concluded near the end of his recent study of Senators "on the campaign trail" (1996, 238). This parsimonious assertion about Senators is an equally fitting conclusion for an examination of House members at work in Washington. Indeed, it is no simple task to win and maintain the political support of half-a-million people. Far more difficult still is it to turn that political support into political trust, the kind of trust that provides a representative with the discretion he or she desires on Capitol Hill. Developing a durable representational relationship, one characterized by constituent trust, well-earned representative discretion and, ultimately, good representational "fit," does, in fact, take time. It requires attention to home and Hill and a balance between the two that is comfortable for both the representative and those who are represented. Such a balance cannot be established quickly or permanently. The substance of that balance is, in large part, defined by the styles of work House members adopt in Washington. Understanding the balances different members strike between their roles as local representatives and national legislators, then, is inexorably dependent upon an understanding of their Washington styles.

In the preceding pages, I have explored and analyzed the Washington behavior of House members in order to better understand the dynamics of congressional representation. Throughout, I have primarily focused on what members do in Washington. However, as the discussion of members' careers in the previous chapter reminds us, every House member begins his or her career at home, not in Washington. Members of the House generally progress through phases in their careers in which the

relative importance of personal influences gradually give way to the influences of home which both, in turn, give way to the influences of Washington. Washington and its influences, then, come second, not first as much of my discussion of member behavior may have implied. In fact, most of the House members I interviewed were careful to note the political dangers associated with allowing the interests and influences of Washington to subsume or obscure the influences of home. Instead of eclipsing those interests and influences, then, members generally spoke of the influences of the Hill as *encompassing* their personal and district lives, not unlike the outer-rings of the concentric circles of constituency Fenno described in *Home Style*. This notion of circles of influence is illustrated in Figure 6-1. At the core of members' representational relationships are the personal influences on their political lives. The next circle, which encompasses but does not supercede those influences, is comprised of the influences of their congressional districts, the places they call home. Finally, the outermost circle is defined by the influences, opportunities and experiences of Washington. It is worth noting again that these three influences are dynamically related and are subject to change both in direction and relative importance. However, if House members allow the influences of Washington to eclipse the influences of home, they might seriously jeopardize the representational relationships they have worked so hard to develop in their districts.

Figure 6-1.
Circles of Influence on Member Behavior



Representation, then, not only takes time but also consistent attention and responsiveness to constituents, even (or perhaps especially) as a congressional career matures. As House members talked to me about the balances that they strike between their roles at home and their roles in Washington, they almost uniformly stated their belief that no amount of power or influence in Washington could compensate for a weak and deteriorating relationship with their constituents back home. Members at all stages of their careers agreed that the best remedy or, better yet, vaccine against such a deterioration is open and consistent communication. Communication offers representatives the opportunity to engage in an interactive evaluation and negotiation of the linkage they provide for their constituents. Through that process, they are able to adjust and refine their fit with their constituencies. When a House member and a constituency fit each other, the representational linkage provided through their relationship is, by definition, acceptable to both parties.

In this concluding chapter, I examine the relationship between House members' Washington styles, the kinds of representational linkage they provide for their constituents, and the strength of their representational relationships. I will also discuss in greater detail members' perceptions of how well they fit their districts and the degree to which their relationships with their constituents are based on trust. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of trust, discretion and representation and a broader assessment of the health of congressional representation at millennium's end.

I. REPRESENTATIONAL LINKAGE

Throughout this dissertation, I have presented a view of congressional representation as linkage. Specifically, I have explored the kinds of behavior members of Congress engage in on Capitol Hill to link their constituents' opinions and interests to the decisions and policies made there. But how do particular Washington styles effect the kinds of representational linkage constituents are afforded by their House member? To answer this question it is first necessary to establish more clearly what is meant by representational linkage. Loewenberg and Patterson have defined the linkage between a legislator and the people he or she represents in terms of the geographic constituency they share, legislator-constituent contact and communication, accountability, representativeness and representational clout (1979, 44-51). The first component of this model of representational linkage, a shared geographic constituency, seems uncomplicated--every member of the House formally represents a congressional district with legally defined boundaries. However, as Fenno found in *Home Style*, members of Congress do not relate to every group in their constituency in the same way (1978, 1-27). Consequently, in the analysis I present below I pay careful attention to the different constituent groups members seem to be emphasizing by adopting different Washington styles. To further evaluate the relationship between style and linkage, I also assess the different ways the members I interviewed characterized the frequency and quality of their communication with their constituents. I will assess members' efforts to understand what

things matter most[67] to the voters back home and how they translate that understanding into representative behavior in Washington. Finally, I discuss what members think about representational accountability, representativeness and Washington clout in terms of the linkages they provide the people of their congressional districts.

Which Constituency is Linked?

While members of Congress are not required by the Constitution to reside in the districts they represent, virtually every representative does so, because calling the same place home is perhaps the most basic component of a representational relationship. Determining who it is that is linked by a member's behavior in Washington, however, goes far beyond identifying the people residing within the boundaries of his or her congressional district. Members do not spend the same amount of time with or give as much attention to every constituent group back home or on the Hill. When members cast their votes or engage in other activity on the Hill, they tend to be more concerned with providing linkage for their primary and reelection constituencies than they are for their less supportive constituents. In large part partisan, ideological, and other political factors in members' congressional districts determine which constituent groups will be afforded with most attention. As the model of Washington style and careers I presented in Chapter Four suggests, though, other personal and national influences can also play an important role in determining the people House members seek to provide linkage for. Indeed, the

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[67] Loewenberg and Patterson refer to this dimension of representational linkage as "salience." I treat it together with communication in my analysis.

group or groups of voters who are linked by different representatives may vary widely, even in the same district as time passes, different issues arise and preferences change.

Given the difficulty associated with identifying members' various constituencies and their commitment to reflect the values of those constituencies in Washington, determining who it is that a member provides representational linkage can be difficult. However, examining the question of "who is linked" through the model of Washington styles I have presented in this dissertation, the task is considerably more tractable. Members with constituent, policy, and partisan styles tend to emphasize different components of their constituencies in their representational activities in Washington. In fact, the members I interviewed conveyed very different focuses of linkage that varied according to the Washington styles they have adopted. One member with a constituent style asserted that her linkage efforts are focused on all of the people in her geographic constituency. To provide such a broad group with representational linkage, she engages in "frequent, constant and consistent two-way communication" with them. As she explains, the linkage she provides is very "people-focused," and not party, ideology or issue-focused:

> I'm not a very partisan person. It doesn't matter to me what party I'm from--it's the people I represent that matter most. I always think of the voters first and do what they want. . . . I'm from a *very* poor district. There are some very poor [ethnic] sections in my district that are even poorer than the poorest black neighborhoods in America. Even I can't help them as much as I'd like to because I have to deal with too many competing concerns in Washington.

This member's focus on "people" broadens the circle of constituents she actively tries to provide representational linkage.

In contrast, another House member, one with a policy style, maintained that the primary connection she has with the people she represents are the policy goals she shares with them. Instead of emphasizing constituent service, she believes it is her job to link her constituents to their federal government by pursuing those goals:

> I see myself as an advocate for the people who sent me to Washington. I'm an advocate for their positions when I cast votes, participate in discussions in the legislature, introduce bills, or contribute to legislation. I stick with my stances on issues that I campaigned on. When I ran, I was very clear with the voters that I supported the "right to choose" and I was opposed to the gun lobby. Obviously, a majority of the voters agreed with me on these issues because I was elected.

Given her more narrow focus of representation, this House member explicitly provides linkage for those who share her policy preferences and objectives. Another member suggested that his focus on policy pushes his view of linkage beyond his local constituency:

> The question of focus is the most important to you as a representative. Some people are just more comfortable focusing on home more than on leadership or legislation or committee work. The Representative Jones[68] style was me in my early years in the House, but my "mission" to change things philosophically led me to abandon that single-minded attachment to my district in order to effect those changes. . . . Even members who don't make the same shift that I did can survive, however, because they make the system work for them and their constituency, but not in a sphere any bigger than that.

In contrast to members with either constituent or policy styles, members with partisan styles tended to emphasize the ideological linkages they provide their

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[68] Not the member's real name–the member was referring to a notoriously constituent-focused House member. As was the case with most of the members I interviewed, however, this member requested that, wherever possible, any references to specific members be omitted.

constituents. One particularly partisan member I interviewed explained that he was an effective representative, because of the ideological affinity he has with his district:

> My philosophy happens to be the same as [my] District's. I don't try to adjust to match how my constituents feel. I couldn't get elected to the Congress in Chicago or maybe even in the [neighboring] District in [my state]. But in [my] district, I'm a natural match for the voters.

This member's linkage constituency, then, consists of those who belong to his political party.

These comments represent the general tendencies I observed across members with different Washington styles. The constituency or constituency group that is linked by a representative varies with that representatives' style of work on Capitol Hill. Members with different Washington styles do, in fact, link different components of their various constituencies. This conclusion suggests that all House members do not invariably focus their attentions on their primary or reelection constituencies, as Fenno and others have argued. While members' Washington styles reflect their electoral concerns, they also act as the vehicle for the other goals they pursue as House members. Members with constituent-focused Washington styles, for example, tend to emphasize all those living within the boundaries of their districts, or their geographical constituencies, not withstanding the reality that not every voter in their district will support them on election day. Partisan members, on the other hand, tend to be more focused on their constituents with whom they share a party label, i.e. those in their primary and reelection constituencies. Partisan members, then, conform most nearly to the traditional model of constituent linkage. Members with policy styles, however, are more complex than both their partisan and constituent-focused colleagues. The constituency they link to

Washington can be simultaneously narrow and broad. While the immediate and obvious group that is linked are those constituents who share the members' policy goals, many policy-focused representatives emphasize their belief that the policy linkage they provide often reaches beyond even their geographic constituencies to the nation as a whole.

Linkage and Communication

All House members, regardless of their Washington styles or the constituency for whom they provide linkage, must interact and communicate with their constituents in order to learn and understand their needs and concerns. Furthermore, every House member, when he or she returns home, is called upon to explain his or her behavior in Washington. Being constantly in such a position can be very stressful for House members. One junior member I interviewed expressed his concern about a scheduled appearance on a local news program in his district. His goal was to be so prepared that he could adequately explain *everything* he had done in Washington during the previous year:

> I have to know a lot about a lot of issues. Before going on the show, my objective is to know virtually every issue well enough to give an accurate answer to any question I'm asked. If I can speak on any issue, in an informed way, for about two minutes, that will be sufficient for the program I'm on. I have to know more than anybody else to do a good job on the show. I'll do the work to get there. I'll utilize my staff to find new information on every topic I can so I'll be armed with an array of information that no one else has.

This member very clearly held his explanations of his Washington work to be a critical component of the linkage he provides for his constituents. Other members further argued that, even beyond providing satisfactory explanations of votes and other actions on the Hill, good representational linkage also requires education. One senior Democrat explained:

> Educating people is my job. I have to be a leader on the hard votes because I have better information than the voters do. After I make the hard choices, though, it's my responsibility to be as open as possible and explain my position to whoever wants an explanation. I try to anticipate some of the concerns out there. I have a "blast fax network" that I use to communicate with about five hundred people in my district that are the opinion shapers in their communities. If these people understand where I'm coming from, they can get the word out.

A freshman House member elaborated on the importance of educating one's constituents, observing that education is essential if a member wants to make sure the linkage he or she provides is based on a shared understanding of both policy facts and policy politics. He believes that his constituents have to understand what is at stake almost as well as he does, especially when tough decisions need to be made:

> Being a representative also requires good communication with the people of your district. I tell you, I'd take well-informed constituents over uninformed and poorly informed voters any day. Well-informed voters are an asset to you as a member of Congress. Part of my job is to make sure they are well-informed, by communicating with them about what's going on in Washington. That's essential because poorly informed or uninformed voters can be a real liability.

As House members balance local and national concerns, maintaining the same perspective as their constituents is difficult, if not impossible. Virtually every member I spoke with, however, asserted that establishing as shared a perspective as possible is the key to a good representative-constituency relationship. Members' efforts to foster such relationships, however, are substantially hindered by the usually large "gap" between the wisdom of home and the wisdom of Washington. It is because of this gap, one senior Democrat argued, that good linkage rests so heavily on good communication:

> Because of the disparity in our sources of information, it's very difficult to bridge the gap to communicate and build consensus. In Washington, the gap is usually centered on policy differences, but back home it's political

> and perceptual. People think that there are easy solutions to problems if we would just implement them. For example, they think the answers to spending problems in Washington would be solved with a Balanced Budget Amendment, that crime can be stopped through more extensive use of capital punishment. They're grasping for simple solutions to complex problems. Because of the knowledge and understanding gap that's out there, members of Congress have to educate their constituents.

While virtually all members recognize the need to explain their votes from time to time, they have different perceptions of how far they must go in doing so. As the two proceeding quotes suggest, some members feel compelled to give as much information as they can about the decisions they make to whoever is interested for as long as it takes to give a satisfactory explanation. Other members, however, have a very different perspectives on their roles in the representational linkage process. The comments of several "trustees" in Chapter Three suggest, in fact, that many members believe that their jobs as representatives do not involve what they characterize as excessive pandering to public opinion. Instead, they believe they are adequately performing their roles if they state their positions clearly and then stand by them. No surprisingly, such members, as I demonstrated in Chapter Four, are much more likely to adopt policy or partisan than they are constituent-focused Washington styles. Most members, even many of those with policy or partisan styles, however, portrayed the linkages they provide in a less rigid light, leaving room for discussion and negotiation with the people they represent. One policy focused member explained that the linkage he provides requires a good deal of "give-and-take" with the people back home and frequent communication with community leaders:

> In Washington I've tried to focus on issue areas that make a difference for my constituents. . . . When I'm in Washington I really try to speak up for the interests I represent. . . . No matter what the issue is, my approach in Washington is dictated by the communication I have with the leaders and

> voters in my district. I try to be an active voice on the important national issues so I can represent the people who sent me here.

By balancing constituents' opinions and preferences against his own, he is able to strike what he believes is an effective and appropriate balance between his local and national responsibilities as a member of Congress.

Often times as members of Congress consider how and how frequently they need to communicate with their constituents to provide them good representational linkage, they recognize that voters may want communication *promises* as much as they want actual communication or even more substantive promises (Fenno 1978, 240). Consequently, House members can be responsive to their constituents' expectations simply by creating an environment of openness and offering frequent communication opportunities. It is through their more substantive explanations and justifications of their Washington styles and the kinds of linkage they provide, however, that members are able to negotiate their fit with their constituents. If these efforts are successful, the distance between home and Hill, between what members do in Washington and what is expected of them, is narrowed. Members utilize an increasingly diverse compliment of communication channels to engage in these negotiations. From telephones, to letters, to fax machines, television, radio and the internet, House members are more accessible today than at any time in history. Competition for viewers in local news markets has even improved the visibility of the Congress and its members. Indeed, even in the face of significant technological advances in communication, the press remains a focal point of representative-constituent communication. One junior Republican explained:

> It's very important that you develop a good relationship with the press. You've got to get reporters to where they'll let you tell your side of the story about what's going on in Washington. Now don't get me wrong. I don't want the media, or anyone, to carry my mail for me. I just want them to allow me to tell my side of the story accurately.

By relying on the press and other more direct communications resources, members are increasingly engaging in home-focused behavior from Washington. The opposite is also true--members can do many aspects of their Washington work from their districts. Members frequently hold "field hearings" in their districts to highlight local issues. Members have even participated in a handful of "virtual" House committee hearings, conducted via the Internet. The constancy amidst this change, however, is that communication is the foundation of responsive and effective representation. Although technological advances may narrow the physical distance between home and Hill, the political and perceptual gaps must be closed by people, representatives and their constituents.

Accountability, Representativeness, Clout and Linkage

Constituents can be, and are, linked to the decisions and actions of their government in many different ways. A constituent with a particular policy preference is "linked" if his or her representative works for the implementation of that policy. Alternatively, a liberal constituent is linked by having a liberal representative in Washington, not necessarily because that representative supports any particular policy but because the representative has the same ideological disposition as the constituent. A constituent can also be linked by a representative who provides him or her with services or benefits through case-work, constituent service, and pork. All of these satisfied

constituents could be the same person. A constituent who is happy with a constituency oriented representative might be equally happy with a member who provides policy linkage. Moreover any given representative is likely to provide all three kinds of linkage, in some form or another, for different constituents. The primary kind of linkage a constituent is afforded, be it some tangible benefit, an ideological agenda, or a set of partisan policies, however, depends, in large part, on the behavior of his or her representatives in Washington. In the final analysis, the *quality* and effectiveness of the linkage provided by a representative is judged and evaluated by individual constituents. A House member that provides the "right" kind of linkage for a majority of his or her constituents is likely to win their support and, perhaps, even their trust.

In the broadest terms, the kinds of representational links members provide can be categorized as service links, policy links and ideological or partisan links. This categorization is similar to that forwarded by Eulau and Karps. They suggested that representatives can be responsive to their constituents by providing them: (1) constituent service, (2) policy representation, (3) allocational responsiveness, or (4) symbolic responsiveness (1978). While the categories are not perfectly complementary, constituent service and allocational responsiveness fit well in the category of service links and policy representation is clearly centered on policy linkage. Symbolic responsiveness, however, is not obviously the same thing as providing partisan or ideological linkage. Perhaps partisan linkage is more appropriately categorized as a variant of policy responsiveness. Indeed, Eulau & Karps seem to suggest that symbolic responsiveness is not primarily focused on linkage at all, but rather on providing the illusion or impression of

responsiveness, whether substantive linkage is actually being provided or not. Symbolic responsiveness is probably best epitomized by the advertising, credit-claiming and position taking Mayhew identified in his study of members trying to build their "electoral connections" (1974, 49-77). While the members I interviewed did not volunteer as much, most, of not all, members engage in this kind of behavior to maximize the benefits of their linkage efforts and, in some cases, to compensate for weaknesses in providing the kinds of linkage their constituents want.

As I have discussed in previous chapters, however, some members simply choose to spend less time on the Hill than others. A more senior southern member suggested that his balance is tilted a bit more toward home than some of his colleagues:

> I can . . . do my job in both places. Some members stay here all of the time, but I go home every week. I have regular office hours in [my district]. . . . I delegate a lot of the day-to-day stuff to my chief of staff, but I do what I can to stay in touch with the people.

There is an obvious parallel between constituent, policy and partisan links and the three Washington styles I have identified. House members' styles of work on Capitol Hill are, in fact, directly related to the kinds of representational linkage they provide. Ultimately, being accountable as a representative requires House members to find an acceptable balance between their Washington styles and their constituents' linkage expectations. In striking such a balance all members must pay at least some attention to Washington. Almost every member I interviewed acquiring clout in Washington allowed them to serve the people back home better. One member I interviewed was particularly critical of his colleagues who do not, in his mind, spend enough time on their Washington work:

> Too much attention to home can kill you when you really need to get something do *in Washington* to help your constituents. It's very rare that some members participate at all, like [a particular Congressman], for example. Members like him are out of the loop. They aren't engaged enough to be effective representatives of their constituents.

But as one moderate Republican observed, as important as Washington may be, one's efforts there must always be weighted in the balance of what goes on back home:

> Some members don't have the skills that it takes to be successful in Washington. Any lack of effectiveness in Washington might not hurt you in the short-term, but in the long run it will hurt you both in Washington *and* at home. You ultimately have to balance your efforts in Washington against your efforts back home. You can't afford to ignore one to the exclusion of the other.

Whatever the standards a members' constituents apply to his or her responsiveness to them, their Washington styles are central components of the representational linkages they provide for the people back home. A member's Washington style effectively sets the parameters for the ways he or she can reposed to constituent concerns, interests, and demands. Some stylistic choices might even preclude members from providing particular kinds of linkage. Very simply, one moderate member observed, "It's hard to throw bombs *and* build bridges" in the legislative process. This may be even more true for a growing member of representatives who eschew the traditional "send-home-the-bacon" mentality of representation in the House. While they may be providing policy linkage in the form fiscal responsibility, they may find it difficult to get support for projects in their districts and, therefore fail to provide substantive allocational linkage. Indeed, the "universal coalition" strategy described by Mayhew (1974) saw significant challenges in the 104th Congress, as the number of "deficit hawks" in Congress ballooned after the 1994 elections. If this is, indeed, the case, members'

traditional "presentations of self" (Fenno 1978) and their advertising and credit-claiming behavior in their districts will change as well. Future research should focus on this question. At a minimum, the stylized account of members as entrepreneurial and ambitious politicians, operating completely outside traditional party structures with reelection as their single instrumental goal needs to be reconsidered. If the newest members of the House are, as they profess to be, less concerned with electoral politics than many of their predecessors, then a members' Washington styles should be given at least as much attention as their generally more constituent- and campaign-focused home styles.

II. BALANCING HOME AND HILL: TENSION OR COMFORT?

Every member I interviewed had won a majority of the votes cast in his or her congressional district at least one time, providing evidence that, for at least one Tuesday in a previous November, he or she had political support back home. Political support won once, however, can be lost just as quickly (or even more so) as it was gained. In fact, two of the members in my sample, one a freshman and the other serving in his third term, were defeated in 1996, underscoring this reality. There were also among those I interviewed three members who were serving in their last terms in the House, having voluntarily made the decision to retire. These members' decisions further remind us that, in a world of mortals, no political relationship lasts forever, no matter how good it may be. In between the few members who are either defeated or retire each election cycle, the vast majority of House members can be found doing their Washington work in a way that

allows them to pursue their own goals while building and maintaining strong relationships with their constituents back home. Whether it be a constituent, policy or partisan style, each member has developed a pattern of Washington work meets with the approval of his or her constituents. Members develop and maintain Washington styles that are responsive to their constituents' expectations because they need their constituents' support if they are to say in Congress. The need to constantly campaign back home, to defend, refine and renegotiate their Washington styles and the linkages they provide, however, directly diminishes the amount of time and energy available for Washington work. As members' opportunities and responsibilities in Washington expand, the temptation to spend less time at home and, perhaps, abandon a constituent style in favor of a policy or partisan one, can become pronounced. Each member must decide, though, if he or she is willing to pay the price for making such a trade off. Some members, in the face of this tension, may choose to provide symbolic, rather than substantive, responsiveness back home to maximize his or her discretion on the Hill. Such a member might even, consciously or not, project a different image and behave differently at home than he or she does in Washington. This strategy, however, is generally not a far-sighted one. As one senior member observed:

> A member of Congress is one personality projected in two places. . . . You're the same person in Washington and at home, but the opportunity is there to be two different people. You can only get away with that for awhile, though.

However it is that members reconcile their styles of Washington work with their constituents' linkage expectations, they must somehow address the constant tensions associated with balancing personal, district and national interests on Capitol Hill. For

most House members, this tension plays a significant role as they adopt, adjust and maintain their Washington styles. One freshmen Republican's comments highlight the both the taxing nature of these tensions and the difficulties associated with dealing with them:

> Sometimes the roles members fill in Washington and at home are complimentary. Problems that arise back home can often be addressed through the legislative process, by passing laws. Also, knowing your constituents and their problems helps you better understand the weaknesses of the policies the Congress has passed. At other times, though, what your constituents *want* conflicts with national interests. In those cases you have to find a balance, you have to work it out.

Members of the House are well aware of the reality that any balance or compromise they strike between the interests of home and national interests will be evaluated, for better or worse, by their constituents. They also know that, to a lesser extent, the ways they go about their work on the Hill will also be scrutinized back home. Consequently, the obvious tendency is to tip the scales more toward home than toward Washington. Even members with policy or partisan styles are quick to head home when legislative business is done so that they can keep abreast with developments in their districts. As one senior partisan Republican observed, "People's interests change with time and so does your effectiveness. . . . Because things change like they do, you have to stay in touch with your constituents." Although this member's style is primarily focused on what goes on in Washington, he consciously seeks to reduce the potential tension between home and Hill by paying as much attention to his constituents back home as he can. By effectively using every opportunity he has to go home and meet with his constituents, he is able to devote a

great deal of time and energy to his Washington work without jeopardizing the representational relationship he has established.

Beyond the need to make sure their Washington styles are consistent with what is expected of them back home, tensions can arise in member's work simply because of the distance between Washington and their districts. Simply having to traverse back and forth between one's district and Capitol Hill can bring stress and tension to the job of a House member, especially when a family is left behind in one place or the other. One member, serving in his third term, contended that while the competing demands of home and Hill do not necessarily produce an "opposite direction pulling" tension,

> The real tension stems from conflicting demands on my time. As a member of Congress with a family and church commitments, I have to prioritize my time. I have to be responsive to voters. I have to listen to as many of them as possible as frequently as possible and that's time consuming. Campaigning actually relieves some of the tension because it provides lots of opportunities to receive input from voters. It's the input that helps me be a good representative. It's a constant struggle, though, trying to balance the different demands on my time.

Another member similarly asserted that, even though he has pledged to serve only three terms in the House, the need to be reelected also causes strain in the balance he has tried to strike between the interests of his district and his work in Washington:

> My biggest concern is doing what's best for the people--both at home and across the country. I don't worry that much about reelection because this isn't what I'm going to do with the rest of my life. Even in my case, though, I have to worry about raising money and running a campaign. That tension, between election campaigning and governing, is a fact of life for a Congressman.

In contrast to members who constantly feel tension between the Washington styles they have developed and the expectations of the people they represent, some members

claimed to feel little or no tension in their work as House members. One such member declared that:

> There's no tension at all [between the work I do in both places]. The nice thing about a democracy is that it actually works. If the people get to know their member of Congress and he gets to know the district, you can have a good working relationship. If you look at the members of the House, you'll find that we're a very representative bunch of people. We reflect the morality and mortality of the people. Members of the House, by and large, very naturally fit in with their districts no matter how they don't fit in Washington. Almost every member of the House is more comfortable back home than they are in Washington.

Indeed, several of the members I interviewed suggested it was their "fit" with their districts that made their relationships with their constituents comfortable. They spoke of "naturally matching" their districts or of being "like the people back home." For such members, developing and defending a style with which their constituents approved has come naturally and easily. One senior Northeastern member with a policy style explained that her perceptions of her constituents' interests were accurate because she had lived among them and paid the price to get to know them. Consequently, she asserted, she is able to pursue a policy agenda that is consistent with her constituents' interests: "My work in Washington and my work back home dovetail quite well. This is especially true of my work on the [committees I'm on]."

Why is it that some members feel the tension between their styles of work on the Hill and their relationships with their local constituencies? On the basis of my interviews and observations, it does not appear that the style a member adopts has anything to do with how comfortable they are in their roles as House members. As the member quoted

above suggested, however, members' perceptions (or misperceptions) seem to play an important role in the amount of tension or comfort they feel:

> Some members of Congress are obviously more conflicted as they do their Washington work. Why it is that these members face a greater tension, however, I'm not quite sure. It probably has something to do with the kind of district they represent, but it has more to do with how they perceive their constituents' opinions and how they perceive their own roles as representatives.

Not surprisingly, then, more senior members from more homogenous districts, i.e. members who able to easily identify common constituent interests, were the most at ease in their relationships with their constituents. Members with more confident perceptions of the amount of discretion they had been afforded by their constituents also tended to feel less tension. As a senior member from a very Republican district explained, "Whether or not a member feels tension between Washington and home has a lot to do with what kind of district they're from." A member who fits his or her district well, he maintained, "shouldn't have a lot to worry about." It is when a member has to constantly work to fit a district and maintain electoral support there that the tensions can become pronounced:

> The margin of your victories also make a big difference in how much tension you feel. . . . Frank Riggs (R-CA, 1) has a really tough district--the party registration in his district is about 50-50. Because of the competitiveness of his district, he probably feels quite a bit of tension. My district, on the other hand, is very homogenous, so I have a lot easier time. I'm a good match with my district, which means I'm a good match with a large percentage of the voters in my district.

When a member fits a district well, he or she is more likely to adopt a Washington style and provide the kind of linkage that his or her constituents are happy with. Indeed, as another senior member explained, his partisan style in Washington is appropriate for the people he represents because it allows him to pursue shared goals, common beliefs and

interests. Furthermore, the partisan hegemony in his district allows him to behave as a partisan in Washington without the fear of being criticized for doing so. He is, he believes, a natural fit for his constituents:

> I'm very philosophically conservative and so are my constituents. . . . After [about two decades], it's natural for me to be in touch with the people. I know them and they know me. I'm always on the level with them--they always know what they're getting from me.

The relationships this member and others like him share with their constituents are so comfortable for them that they may not feel then need to continually maintain and strengthen them. It is easy for members with policy and partisan styles from such districts to go to Washington and do their work without thinking much about home. One member even asserted that he has been able to move his residence to Washington without paying a political price for it because he is so in touch with his constituents:

> I have plenty of contact with the district without living there. If I lived there I'd see my constituents at the grocery store, in line for tickets to the movies or whatever. But 90% of them I'd never see anyway. I don't need to be there to understand the people I represent.

It is worth noting again, however, that complacency in a fundamentally dynamic relationship can be politically fatal. However, so long as House members do not lose touch with reality back home, feeling comfortable with the Washington styles they have adopted and the linkages they provide through them is a good indication that members have achieved a good fit with their districts. In the end, the quality of the relationships House members have with their constituents is most immediately their own responsibility. If a House member is able to pursue his or her own goals without frequent consultation with or attention to the people back home and still be reelected, the

relationship is, by definition, acceptable to his or her constituents. The vast majority of House members, however, do not have the luxury of developing Washington styles and pursuing Washington goals without justifying their actions back home. In fact, some tension is required for the practice of representation to work as the American Founders intended. The need to frequently and consistently defend their Washington styles when they go home forces most members to provide their constituents with the kinds of representational linkage they want. A junior Republican from the South concurred: "The tension between Washington and home is good for representation. It keeps you on your toes."

If a House member hopes to remain in the Congress where he or she can pursue personal and representational goals, he or she must first pay constant attention to the sources of tension between they styles of Washington work and the expectations and interests of their constituents. Members who are not careful to minimize the most negative effects of a Washington style inconsistent with their constituent interests are likely find themselves out of a job. In contrast, by effectively responding to constituent demands and expectations, a House member can adjust his or her Washington style in such a way that he or she is simultaneously able to pursue personal goals and maintain electoral support. The amount of discretion a member has over his or her Washington work can be measured by the size of the gap between what they actually do in Washington and what is explicitly expected of them by the people the represent. A member may, because of extraordinarily good fit or superlative effort, win substantial

discretion over his or her activities on the Hill. Such a member may be said to have won, although not absolutely or permanently, the trust of his or her constituents.

III. FIT, TRUST AND REPRESENTATION

Fenno has argued that the "ultimate response" members seek from their constituents is political support, but that the "instrumental response" they seek is trust (1978, 56). If House members have the trust of their constituents, they not only have their support on election day but also *in between* elections, as they go to Washington and represent them. Member with such support are generally trusted to do their Washington work as they see fit. Because they trust them, constituents defer to their wisdom and judgement. Such trust, however, is not easily won. If representation takes work and time, winning trust requires more. It is won by consistently representing the interests that constituents want represented, by consulting with them, listening to them and making tough decisions which ultimately meet with their approval. A representative also wins trust by adopting a Washington style and pursuing Washington goals that are consistent with constituent expectations and preferences both in terms of their representative's behavior on the Hill as well as in terms of the kind of linkage he or she provides.

Throughout their congressional careers, as House members become more aware of their constituents' interests and the opportunities to pursue them in Washington, efforts to fit, to represent, to link and to win trust become indistinguishable. They become wrapped up in a pattern or style of behavior, both in Washington and at home, that reflects the will of the people who are represented by it. Even in such a relationship, however, there are

bound to be instances where a something a member does, be it casting a controversial vote, behaving too combatively (or not combatively enough), allying with an unpopular interest group or committing some ethical lapse, that angers and alienates a key constituency. Senior members who have worked hard to win the trust of their constituents, though, often weather such storms because of the political capital they have built up through years of service. This view suggests there may be a far less pernicious explanation for the incumbent advantage than money and the manipulation of political images. Perhaps incumbents win because the have developed styles of Washington work that allow them to provide their constituents with the kinds of representational linkage they want. Perhaps incumbents win because providing effective linkage has helped them win the trust and political support of their constituents. This is, indeed, how one senior member explained his secure hold on his House seat:

> All the power of incumbency is an established record of representativeness. If you establish a record of responsiveness and service to your constituents, you become a known commodity. You have to stay close to your voters and represent them, but if you can do that consistently, they trust you more and more. That's all the incumbent advantage is.

Members of Congress seek political support in order to win elections. They appeal for that support on the basis of a wide variety of claims--their fit with their districts, their experience, their ability to get things done. An appeal for support based on a consistent record of "good" representation, i.e. representation that constituents approve of, is perhaps the most powerful appeal of all. It is when members are given support because they are trusted that they can be said to fit their constituencies, and it is when they fit and are trusted that they are granted the discretion they seek over their Washington work.

Trust, then, provides members with both electoral and goal-seeking benefits. Consequently, trust is perhaps the most cherished prize of a House member. What kinds of things do members of the House believe they need to do to win their constituents' trust? One member I interviewed argued that trust is first and most importantly won by being honest:

> If you're honest about your representational relationship with your constituents, you simply tell them during the campaign what you'll do if you're elected, then you go and do it. I've kept promises my whole life, so this concept is pretty easy for me to grasp.

Consistent with this claim, this member is an ideological partisan in the House, standing firmly behind his campaign rhetoric. Another senior member emphasized the importance of frequent communication in his efforts to maintain a comfortable fit with his constituents and earn their trust:

> I work very hard to be a good representative. That means I hold lots of town meetings--60 or more a year. I work very hard to understand what my constituents believe and feel about the issues I'm dealing with in Washington. I don't just talk at my constituents, I communicate with them. And it has paid off. The lowest vote total I've ever received was 74%. . . . I think I'm a natural fit with my constituents. The reason I fit so well, I guess, is due to my philosophy, but also to my hard work. I give people lots of opportunities to meet with me, talk with me, and I listen to them.

Not surprisingly, this member has adopted a constituent style in his Washington work, a style which allows him to meet and talk frequently with the people he represents. Members with constituent styles are not the only ones who care about communication, though. Indeed, negotiation of fit and explanations of Washington behavior are critical components of every member's efforts to reconcile his or her Washington style with the demands and interests of his or her constituents. As one policy-focused trustee explained,

trust won back home can alleviate tension in Washington, but even members who have earned their constituents' trust must always be ready to explain what they have done on Capitol Hill:

> The presence or absence of tension between what members do at home and in Washington comes down to trust. If the voters trust you, there's not really any tension. But if you feel like you're not trusted, you have to be on your guard every time you take a step and that can clearly cause some tension. What members need to realize, though, is that they were elected because the people believed they shared a value system with them. Nine times out of ten, if they're given a chance to explain their votes, their voters will recognize those shared values and they'll support them.

In addition to developing appropriate Washington styles and then defending them when they go home, House members engage in a wide variety of other activities in their districts aimed at winning the support and trust of voters. It is in Washington, though, that members have the formal ability to act on behalf of their constituents as legislators, investigators and ombudsmen. It is because they can do these things in Washington that they emphasize "any Washington activity that [was] relevant to winning and holding support at home" when they are in their districts (Fenno 1978, 137). While the findings presented in this dissertation suggest that House members still engage in such "credit claiming" behavior, that they generally do so in a manner consistent with the Washington styles they adopt and the kinds of linkage that correspond with those styles is a significant new insight on the practice of congressional representation. In its most basic form, the practice of congressional representation, then, amounts to frequent discussions or negotiations with one's constituents about the kinds of representational linkage they expect, the development of a Washington style that allows a representative to provide the agreed upon linkage and then consistent communication, renegotiation and adjustments in

that relationship to assure that the linkage being provided is acceptable. Throughout this process it is entirely possible for a House member to seek personal, even selfish, goals and remain an effective representative. The burden of balancing the pursuit of private goals with the pursuit of national and local interests on Capitol Hill falls squarely on the shoulders of the elected representative. A House member who consistently strikes a balance acceptable to his or her constituents will win their support and, ultimately, their trust.

Once trust and discretion are earned, a whole new set of circumstances arise. Now a House member must decide what to do with the trust he or she has won. Should it be used to pursue personal interests? Should the member focus on what is best for the nation, sometimes sacrificing the interests of his or her district in the process? One of the members I interviewed asserted that without discretion and trust, a body of 435 local representatives could never hope to govern a vast, extended republic:

> When you get to know your constituents, you build up political capital that can be used in the legislative process. Even when you disagree with your constituents, if they trust you, you can vote the way you believe you should because they respect you. It's that political capital that makes the tough decisions possible. Some of your constituents, and even other members, won't like you for it, but that's the price you have to pay.

It is precisely this perspective that Fenno declared is essential for good representative government, and I concur. The trust members win from their constituents can either be used as working capital to make good public policy, or it can be hoarded for personal, i.e. electoral, benefit (Fenno 1978, 246). The discretion and trust members win by communicating and negotiating a comfortable fit with their constituents presents them with profound pubic obligations. However, it is entirely possible for members to use that

trust solely to pursue their private agendas. My interviews and observations, though, in contrast to much of the literature on congressional behavior, suggest that not all members do so. Ultimately, members are accountable only to themselves for how they balance such weighty matters, because congressional history demonstrates that both public-minded and selfish representatives can maintain political support. House members might all be well-served, though, by an occasional reminder of the philosopher's dictum: "We are all born into obligations we did not ask for and opportunities we did not earn." Part of enlightened citizenship is to exercise what Tocqueville called "self-interest rightly understood" as we balance private interest with the broader and public interest. To the extent that members of Congress remember these doctrines of democracy, popular government, in the form of congressional representation, can effectively link people to their government.

IV. CONCLUSION

In the end, representational linkage is just as much about explanation, negotiation and communication as it is about roll-calls and legislative activity. While the worlds of Washington and home are geographically and otherwise distinct, they are never far apart in the minds of the representative for, as Fenno notes, "the theory and practice of a representative form of government links them one to another" (1978, 214). The vehicles by which the two worlds are connected in the practice of representation are the Washington styles of House members. When a representative casts vote, participates in a committee meeting, meets with a constituent or a lobbyist, attends a fundraiser, writes a letter or makes a phone call, he or she does so in the context of a pattern of Hill behavior

that defines the way he or she represents the people back home. A member's Washington style also embodies the private goals he or she seeks and the amount of discretion they believe they have over their Washington work. In every case, House members must consider the possibility that any aspect of their Washington behavior will have to be explained when they go home. By adopting styles of behavior in Washington that are more or less internally consistent, members' explanations of their Washington behavior are more consistent and, if the linkages they provide are acceptable, more easily defendable.

It is through their Washington styles that House members reconcile the competing personal, local and national demands on their time and energy as representatives. As the views of the members discussed in this dissertation suggest, developing and maintaining such as style is not a simple task. Even when members develop styles that allow them to provide the linkages their constituents want, the complexities of the work on the Hill and the legislative process are often misunderstood by voters. Consequently, a member acting in good faith to represent his or her constituents can be misjudged. For example, members with policy styles who compromise in Washington to incrementally forward the interests of their constituents might be perceived as "sell-outs" instead of as skillful legislators. When one member tried to explain that he was better positioned to make such sophisticated decisions, a constituent declared, "We didn't send you to Washington to make intelligent decisions. We sent you to represent us" (quoted in Davidson and Oleszek 1996, 9). Members with constituent styles can also incur the wrath of their constituents, despite their best efforts to be effective advocates of their interests. A member who

spends his or her time settling constituent disputes with the bureaucracy and taking care of local problems may be criticized when he or she is not well-enough positioned legislatively to influence and important policy vote.

Congressional representation does not work perfectly. Its practice, however, remains remarkably true to the vision of American Framers. Through a representative form of government, they sought to balance majority rule and popular sovereignty against the need to forward the common good. While the House of Representatives was to be the focal point of popular opinion in the Framers' scheme, they hoped that the "public views" would be "refined and enlarged" by filtering them through the representatives of the people (*The Federalist* No. 10). The Framers were concerned, though, that the people's representatives not feel *too* insulated from the popular will. To ensure that House members would always have "an immediate dependence upon, and an intimate sympathy with, the people" (*The Federalist* No. 52), the Framers instituted biennial elections. In practice, members of Congress have adapted to the system in which they serve, developing Washington styles that balance their local and national roles so they can provide representational linkage for their constituents, pursue their own goals as representatives and still maintain political support back home. While judgements of the quality of congressional representation are best made by particular constituencies about particular representatives, the fact that most members are able to maintain the support of their constituents is a powerful indication that congressional representation still serves its primary purpose--connecting the people, residing in distinct constituencies, to their national government in ways of which they approve.

It is, in fact, this reality that is most powerfully reinforced by the findings I have presented in this dissertation. Congressional representation was intended to be and remains still a set of relationships between representatives and their constituencies that are, individually, more powerfully shaped and influenced by local concerns than by national ones. What goes on in Washington heavily influences member behavior, but representational relationships begin and end in 435 different "homes." The view of the Congress and the behavior of its members I have presented, then, is not tied to any particular view of how the Congress should behave as a body or the kinds of policies it should produce. Such things are best regulated by the aggregation of individual constituent-representative relationships that define it. Indeed, the ability of the Congress as an institution, and the constitutional system within which it is situated, to adjust and respond to individual and district-level influences has been strikingly manifest, once again, by the changes brought about by the 1992, 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.

The best and last assessment of congressional representation maybe, after all, that attempts to nationalize it notwithstanding "all politics is local." As one moderate Democrat appropriately concluded:

> People approach things differently to get similar results. Different members can be successful and effective using different approaches to their Washington work. Members, and the people they represent have to be comfortable with their style of work, not me. I wouldn't criticize the style of another member because they don't represent me, they represent their constituents. It's up to their constituents to decide if their style is appropriate or not. Only their constituency can judge them.

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APPENDIX 1
Interview Request Letter
(Letters were printed on Carl Albert Center letterhead)

Dear Scheduler, {Date}

My name is Jonathan Mott. I am a Ph.D. candidate from the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma. I am currently in Washington as an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow. As of this writing, I am working as a legislative assistant in Congressman J.C. Watts' office.

While on the hill, I am doing research on how members of Congress approach their work in Washington, D.C. Consequently, I am interviewing several House members to learn how different members perceive their roles as representatives and legislators. To date, I have interviewed seventeen House members. I need to interview thirty or more to complete my research.

When it is convenient, I would like to meet with your boss for about 15 minutes sometime durning the month of {insert month here}. The results of the interview will be confidential and will be used with discretion. My motives are completely academic in nature.

I will be calling you within the next few days to schedule an appointment. Please ask your boss if a short interview would be possible.

Thank you very much for your time. If you have any questions, please contact me at 56165.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Mott

APPENDIX 2

Interview Instrument Description

As discussed in Chapter 2, my investigation of House members Washington styles was an inductive rather than deductive process. I tried, to the extent possible, to avoid applying preconceived notions of what I thought a Washington style might be to my interviews and observations. If I had any expectations for the kinds of styles I would find, they were tied to what I had read about "workhorses" and "showhorses" and, to a lesser extent, trustees and delegates. The three styles I eventually identified, constituent style, policy style and partisan style, emerged from my conversations with and observations of House members.

Given my initial uncertainty about the definition and nature of Washington style, I was not entirely sure what kinds of questions to ask of the members I interviewed. Consequently, the first interview was the least structured of any of the twenty-eight I conducted. In that interview, I asked the following specific questions.

1. What are your perceptions of representation?
2. Is there a difference between your perception of representation at home and your perception when you are in Washington?
3. Why did you run for Congress? What are your reelection goals?
4. What is a successful day in Washington?
5. Are their different styles of work in Washington?
6. What is your style?

In response to these questions, the House member I was interviewing answered virtually every question about Washington style by talking about the relationship between his Washington activities and his job as a representative. Based on the importance he placed on representation as he spoke about his style of work on the Hill, as well as the styles of other members, I focused more on members' perceptions of their constituencies and their behavior in Washington. In the second and third interviews I conducted, I asked the following questions:

1. Describe your job for me as a representative. Who do you have to work with to be effective? What role do your constituents play in determining what you do here?
2. Do you think of your work on the Hill as complimentary to the work you do in your district or are there tensions between the two?
3. Do members have different styles of doing their jobs as representatives in Washington? What are some of the styles you can think of?
4. What is your style? Why?

The responses I received to these questions further underscored the importance of the representational dimensions of member behavior in Washington. At the same time,

all three of the members I had interviewed were quick to acknowledge that Washington was very different from home and that there were dimensions of their jobs on the Hill that had little to do with what went on back home. In order to capture the district or representational dimensions of members Washington styles without obscuring the importance of Hill-specific influences on their behavior, I asked the following set of questions in the remainder of my interviews:

1. What does it mean to you to be a representative?
2. How important are your relationships with other members, staff, lobbyists and others on the Hill as you do your job here?
3. Do you sense that there is a tension between doing the work of governing in Washington and campaigning back home? Does each activity require a different style or do both involve the same kinds of work?
4. Speaking of styles, would you say that there are distinct styles of work on the Hill? What are they? What is your style?


The responses to these questions were broad enough that the members I interviewed were free to talk about a wide range perceptions and activities. At the same time, the questions were narrow enough that I was able to compare members' responses to a core of key questions, questions which got at the heart of members' efforts to be representatives and to pursue their goals on the Hill.


While I asked these same questions in the balance of my interviews, I noticed, after my seventeenth interview, a common thread in all of the previous interviews--the notion of representational "fit." While I had only addressed the notion explicitly in a handful of interviews, every member I interviewed to that point had addressed the degree of comfort they felt with their "match" or "fit" with the people they represented. In order to ensure continuity between these interviews and the remaining eleven, I explicitly asked members to talk about their "fit" with their districts in the context of their roles as representatives and their work in Washington.


In addition to these specific changes in my interview instrument, I spent progressively more time talking about the temporal dimensions of Washington style as my interviews progressed. Given my unfamiliarity with the specific dimensions of members' Washington styles early on in my interviews, I did not ask members to explicitly talk about the process by which they developed their specific styles of Washington work. Nonetheless, even in the earliest interviews, most members spoke at some length about the process of making the leap from their first successful House campaign to working in the Congress, as well as the adjustments they have had to make since then. By the time I had interviewed ten or twelve members, I began asking members to talk explicitly about the evolution of their styles of work on the Hill.


As noted at the outset, my investigation of Washington style has been much more inductive than it has been deductive. By allowing members to define their styles in their own words, according to their own perceptions, I was able to construct a valid model of Washington style. The groundwork has been laid, I believe, for future researchers to more deductively evaluate this model to assess its generalizability to the membership of the entire House and, perhaps, to members of other legislative bodies as well.


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












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