# INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.** Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**UMI**

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

# SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC FORMATION: SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By

JOHN WARREN SAFARIK
Norman, Oklahoma
1998

# SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC FORMATION: SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

Kenneth R. Merrill

Joseph W. Whitesides

Reinaldo Elugardo

F. C. Sawyer

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ETHNIC FORMATION:

SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

by JOHN WARREN SAFARIK (Norman, Oklahoma, 1998)

Dissertation Committee Chairman: Prof. KENNETH R. MERRILL

## ABSTRACT

Ethnic nationalism increasingly concerns social philosophers, who frequently deal with it either in the context of defending liberal individualism with concomitant deep autonomy, which viewpoint seems antithetical to the principle of ethnicity, or else deal with it as a version of communalism: thus the topic becomes an issue contained within the established communalist-individualist debate. The tendency is to regard the phenomenon as a refractory historical residue and focus on fitting it into normative systems proceeding from liberal political thought about rational, optimizing agendas.

At the same time, research in anthropology, history, and literature studies indicate that ethnic nationalism is a dynamic process rather than detrital. If this is so, then perhaps ethnic nationalism ought to be treated as an inevitable element of the human social situation upon which social philosophers construct their optimizing models, rather than another option to be considered for inclusion in or exclusion from such philosophical models.

I try to conform some of these empirical theories (of P. L. van den Berghe, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Edward Said) with some philosophical arguments made by Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, Charles Taylor, and Joseph Raz. I examine a conceptual distinction within the general notion of ethnic-based communitarianism (passive historical

ethnicity, and civic state-building ethnicity), and then argue for the legitimacy of epistemologically useful connections with the selected work in the social sciences.

Rather than adjudicating between communalism and individualism, I argue that, if the ethnic phenomenon is not detrital, as evidenced by empirical theory, then prescriptive measures (political policy) should be adjusted accordingly; and therefore the relevancy of normative philosophical constructs is impacted. Additionally, if the ethnic phenomenon is contingently pernicious, rather than necessarily so, then philosophical constructs intended to inform and justify politics need still more adjustment. I do not advocate any such adjustments or remedies, except through a very general implication that the neutral procedural federated state may be least unacceptable arrangement for a multicultural society.

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## SECTION I. NATIONALISM AS A PROBLEM

Nationalism and ethnicity comprise a well-established topic of study within the social sciences. Currently the topic increasingly engages the concern of social and political philosophers. Events in central and eastern Europe doubtless have helped stimulate this interest. Political philosophers have mostly dealt with ethnicity in the context of a defense of liberalism, which, since it asserts the primary importance of individualism, seems therefore antithetical to the principle of ethnicity. Many philosophers have tended to view the phenomenon negatively, as an essentially problematic version of communalism: historically detrital and refractory, and largely detrimental. They focus on the problem of fitting the phenomenon into the normative systems which grow out of liberal political thought. Philosophers' efforts here concern a group of problems focused loosely around the issue of distinctions between individual rights and those communitarian rights which arise from a persisting historical basement of nationalist and ethnic considerations. Conceived as a fixed residue of the past, the varieties of ethnic phenomena become objects for rationalizing, optimizing social theory, but generally do not form a positive part or a product of it.

A cursory review of persisting political violence in so much of the world reveals that ethnicity and nationalism pose colossal problems for normative theory, and also for any practical policy formation

which would be expected to proceed from such theory. However, I suggest no remedies, except perhaps through very general implication. Rather, I want to examine some conceptual distinctions within the general notion of ethnic-based communitarianism, in order to argue for the legitimacy of epistemologically useful connections with some work in the social sciences. I find these connections strung out, beginning from a certain observational pattern underlying the philosophical discussion, to two closely-related socio-historical theses, and back to the pattern.

Just because of this perception, that ethnicity is a refractory and harmful residue lying within an improvable social circumstance, it is important to examine the phenomenon to see if the perception is accurate. Just as it is so persistently argued that all thought exists for the sake of action (this is Collingwood's formulation; Marx and many others say much the same), it can also be argued that appropriate social and political policies require concepts which conform with the case, i.e. with the possibilities arising out of the neutral facts confronting the actors. I don't mean to suggest I believe that philosophical models which do not happen to conform closely with the world we encounter have no worth. What I do suggest is that, if the ethnic phenomenon is not detrital, then it is reasonable to claim that any prescriptive measures would need to be adjusted accordingly; and since these measures would have a normative aspect, the phenomenon would therefore impact the relevancy of normative philosophical constructs. Additionally, if the ethnic phenomenon is not necessarily pernicious, but rather merely incidentally so, then those philosophical constructs which are intended to inform prescriptive measures would need still more

adjustment.

An initial problem is the sorting out of terms: "ethnicity", "nationalism", "communalism" and several others. The social sciences have built up a massive corpus on the topics covered by these terms and related terms, but their mutual distinctiveness has only recently concerned philosophers of liberal political theory. Some social philosophers' models appear excessively spare in this respect. John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, has made a terminological conflation which seems to me oddly casual in the context of his normally elaborate precision. In his discussion of justification for conscientious refusal to participate in violent acts by the state he says:

> "[P]ersons in the original position have agreed to the principles of right as these apply to their own society and to themselves as members of it. Now at this point one may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states. . . . While they know that they represent different nations each living under the normal circumstances of human life, they know nothing about particular circumstances of their own society, its power and strength in comparison with other nations, nor do they know their place in their own society".[1]

There is a shift of terms here. Societies, nations, and states are different kinds of things. Rawls doesn't say they aren't, but he also doesn't draw any distinctions between them. Presumably, in the original position, distinctions based on the contingencies of history wouldn't apply; but then why vary the terms? At another point he equates matters of national security with threats to "citizens of the society".[2] In his more recent Political Liberalism, Rawls extends his

system to deal with social pluralism, but again he does not deal with these distinctions and instead talks sparely about incompatible doctrines within closed societies. When Rawls conflates the three concepts of society, nation, and state, we assume he does so because he has in mind a generalized situation which is idealized, where these contingent characteristics are merged. But, why should this particular idealization be part of the generalization? Some appeal must be made back to the facts underlying the whole effort, and this seems lacking.

Any project of conceptual modeling requires a suitably concise terminology. However, that terminology must be anchored in our contingency-laden reality, in order that the model described by the terms not be abstract to the point of disconnectedness. What I'm getting at here is the suspicion that a rich terminology, or one which more than covers the components selectively abstracted for a model, constitutes a more useful vocabulary than does a spare terminology, or one that (merely and purportedly) exactly covers those selected components of reality. This is so, I suspect, because with a rich terminology one has better access from the model back to the reality it models. On the other hand, a rich terminology, which will have a surfeit of terms for the model, will therefore contain conceptual overlap. This is untidy, which doesn't disturb me in the least for the purposes of this study, even though it's also a possible source of ambiguity and other confusions. But, and this is the point I'm leading to, such confusions may serve as an essential access to a component of reality often neglected in model-making: real confusion as found in a real world of porosity and interconnectedness.

The social taxonomy I'll employ is mostly derivative; and I'll

borrow freely from several writers' glossaries. I find one developed by Pierre van den Berghe particularly useful in marking out conceptual distinctions between class, race, ethnicity, and nationality. I make a few critical departures from his handling of the colonial relationship between communities. Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community is useful in relating liberal notions of rights-gained-through-membership to identity-within-narrative. Then, employing distinctions developed from this discussion of terminology, I'll argue that, on account of their interpenetration, the concepts denoted by these category terms have not been clearly enough identified by political philosophers to warrant proceeding on the normative projects to which I've referred.

Since I am concerned to sort out some elements which have gone into models constructed by social philosophers, my discussion will not be constrained to a criticism of a particular model; and nor will it be constrained to a single anecdotal instance, i.e. it will not be constrained to the United States. Additionally, while I wish to consider instances of ethnic-nationalist phenomena at the most general level, I don't wish to work at the level of a global system or a completely generalized abstraction. That is, I don't want to limit myself to either a local or a global model. I wish to remain preoccupied with examples from the world until such conclusions emerge as might be useful in the construction of such models: that is my project here.

Justifications for pointedly going beyond the American scope come easily enough to mind. Firstly, it would be poor procedure to try to understand the American phenomenon entirely from within. Here I simply contend that context is necessary for understanding. Second,

to examine just the USA would be to fall into the same ethnic posture I want to examine, by insisting that a peculiarity justifies closing off one member from the set. The American experience is uniquely American, but then too the Brazilian, or New Zealander, experience is uniquely Brazilian, or New Zealander, and so forth. Third, to claim that the American example is made more nearly unique through its relatively untrammeled and isolated development of liberal institutions is not strictly accurate even if this supposed uniqueness were clearly germane. In fact, the more nearly accurate such a contention that America is uniquely interesting, the greater the justification for assessing that characteristic in its larger context. That is to say, the stronger the justification one claims for isolating the USA (or any country) in such a study, the greater ought to be the need for examining the background in which such a justification is found. Fourth, some of the most interesting recent philosophical works found on these issues happen to be by two Canadians (Kymlicka and Taylor) and an Israeli (Tamir); and closely related work has been done by the Palestinian Edward Said.

## SECTION II. NATIONALISM AS SEEMINGLY PRIMORDIAL

All but a few tiny remnants of humanity live today in urbanized societies, and are immersed in great social collectivities. There are of course still rustics, in diminishing numbers, but they <u>are</u> rustics, i.e. they are rural components of societies organized around urbanized institutions. Humanity mostly lives in, and comprises, a world of nations. We can imagine human societies surviving so removed from

contact with all other people that they believe they are the whole human world. A few years ago one such society was supposed to have been discovered: the Tasaday, in the Philippines. Alas, it was apparently a fake. The point is that most persons know their social collectivity (whatever its taxonomic position in the classifications of anthropology or political science) is not all of humanity. Virtually all persons, within in their community identities, know now that there is an ecumene of mankind extending beyond their own society; and furthermore they know that this ecumene, or some parts of it, impinge upon their own society.

So, the world's population is mostly a mosaic of unclosed and permeable societies, overlaid by a pattern of territorial states. The contemporary ideal international system is a congeries of countries which are territorial nation states, each possessing formal (diplomatic) equality with the others. Virtually all of these states are constitutionally justified on the basis of something identifiable as the principle of ethnicity, or prior, historically determined, community. Each ought to <u>contain</u>, or to be the stipulated receptacle for, a population which is characterizable as that state's historical and particular nationality, or ethnicity. This system model is the ideal developed and expressed by the presently dominant western-bourgeois part of the real international system.

The nationalist conception of the state incorporates a collectivity which is not identical with the state structure itself. I mean, the nationalist model cannot be reduced to a purely political arrangement such as the organic model or the contractual model, because the nationalist principle stipulates a pre-political justification for the political structure. Put another way, each state is justified (in the

nation-state model) by the presence of something which is historically prior to that state: its national population. The nation-state concept is particularist: it reflects a "thisness" of historical contingency. Further, bound up in this concept is the idea that there is a plurality of them: an ethnicity, since it is an instance of distinctiveness, requires that there be another ethnicity. Further still, this plurality is not replication; nationalities are consequences of their own accidental antecedents: they are essentially their accidents, and yet there is a permeability between them which suggests the possibility of a general interrelatedness. Nationality carries some characteristics which, I want to argue initially, devalue the utility of generic political models which are closed or isolated.

Now, national identity <u>seems</u> less an intentional historical product than the state; states seem more nearly intentional consequences. Persons set out, generally through the collective actions of a sub-group within the whole population, to elaborate and perpetuate the state; however, we seem to find ourselves already within our own ethnicity. A broadly informed understanding of nationality might resemble the idea of the community of "common sympathy" described by John Stuart Mill, and for that matter also by Joseph Stalin.[3] This idea is claimed by most writers on the subject to be a necessary element of the whole concept, but it lacks sufficient complexity to deal with the specific varieties of open historical communities which pose the problems in the first place. Communities are family-like, and so we might expect Wittgenstein's problem of sorting through family resemblances to be at its most persistent here, blurring terminological boundaries. In the social models of philosophical liberalism, the autonomous individual develops a whole scheme of life

in a voluntary, uncoerced fashion. But, in the world which is itself being modeled individuals' schemes will always owe much to prior models, to off-the-shelf ideas which individuals only rarely choose, and more commonly grow into.

The tendency of liberal social philosophers in modeling society is to minimize entanglements we have with our fellows in the society in which we find ourselves. This is easily enough justified since these models are so often for the purposes of defending and promoting individual autonomy. But, of all the ready-made entanglements we encounter willy-nilly, one of the most fundamental is our own historical connectedness, within a particular culture with its accidental attributes. So, the studied construct of the state as a culture-neutral instrument of constraint (and perhaps welfare) for a generic population of rationally deliberate, self-interested, ahistorical individuals is an abstraction which has excluded, or modeled-out, exactly those social elements which I want to examine here.

I characterized the nationalist principle as western-bourgeois. It was most famously advocated by Woodrow Wilson for the political reconstruction of Europe after the final collapse of the dynastic political system there. Simply put, the principle is: "every people should have their own government". In the liberal-democratic victors' context of 1919 Europe, this might be refined to: "every people should rule themselves, and not be ruled by their neighbors". An instance would then be: "Slovenes should rule themselves, and not be ruled by Austrians". A state created on this particular appeal to principle could then justify itself by claiming that Slovenes were ruling themselves through the Slovenian state. Of course the Wilsonian

principle applies to state authority, so "people" in my simple formulation is replaced by something like "nationalities" or "national groups", and we have: "national groups should have self-government".

I'll anticipate a later discussion of terminology, and provisionally define "nationality" to mean ethnicity which has been accompanied by political autonomy, or by a broadly recognized program which has a goal of political autonomy, at some historical time. Nationalism thus becomes ethnic values politicized. The Wilsonian Principle may then be put: "every ethnicity which has had some degree of political autonomy at some time should now have political autonomy, and not be incorporated in somebody else's state". This formulation leaves out ethnicities which have suffered the historical bad luck of failing to ever achieve either political autonomy or a general sympathy for the right to political autonomy; it is roughly what was used in 1919.

I mention it here because it points to a typical problem which will be one of the first I consider: how do we pick out nationalities (as provisionally defined here) from the historical stew of population? If political philosophy is to underpin political policy then one need is to determine a way to justify a principle underlying the instances of <u>this</u> population creating <u>this</u> state. The need is to pick out <u>this</u> population, in the absence of a state, in order to claim that the population merits a state. So, what is the criterion for the identity of such a population? This question will surface in discussion of philosophical responses by Charles Taylor and others. I will note, in the meantime, that the problem of picking out legitimate claimants depends upon not only taxonomic distinctions (which are not well handled by some writers), but also relationships between groups.

## SECTION III. GOOD AND BAD ETHNICITIES

A theme runs through writings of several philosophers, social scientists and social historians: that there are two versions of ethnicity. The writers generally want to say that of the two versions of ethnicity, which can be characterized in certain ways, that one is good or at least not so bad, but the other version is bad, or worse. Different writers give different names to the two versions each of them observes; but a significant degree of congruence is obtained when comparing several writers' sets of pairings. Roughly, they identify the good version as the civic voluntarism of liberal political principles, as interpreted (with little or no consequent degradation) within idiosyncratic cultural values. The bad version they interpret as the fatalistic attitude of often-strident and violently competitive, aggressive, or irredentist nationalism. The distinction is easily spotted, in philosophy, social science, and thoughtful journalism alike. I'll argue for some uses that liberal normative philosophers might make of this. Two parallel questions grow out of my preliminary discussion. First, how is nationalism ethical, if it is fatalist (nonvoluntarist)? Second, how is nationalism situational (idiosyncratic) if it is rational? A general response, which owes much to Aristotle, is that any useful ethical theory grows out of situation; but in this case the tension between the contraries seems too disruptive.

Michael Ignatieff develops this distinction in his 1993 survey of several ethnic conflicts. Ignatieff characterizes two versions of nationalism. One, civic nationalism, arises in the participatory support of a particular political (civic) system. Under this form of

nationalism (in its idealized model) individuals define their community through participation in the development of preferred civic institutions. This collective process of civic definition will occur over a substantial period of time, perhaps generations. Ignatieff's example is French nationalism. Civic nationalism is contrasted with what he calls ethnic nationalism, under which we inherit our attachments and values; we are defined by our historical community, rather than defining it. Ignatieff's example here is Germany.[4]

Clearly these aren't tidy, exclusive categories, but rather appear to be the extremes of a continuum of attitudes and values. Ignatieff suggests that in terms of empirical sociological accuracy, the civic version of nationalism is the more realistic, because most political sovereignties are not congruent with historic nationalities. That is, while Ignatieff's ethnic model of nationalism stipulates that the sovereignty shall be "filled" precisely with the appropriate ethnic contents, this rarely, if ever, happens; and so most countries contain more than one historical ethnic group. The recurring discrepancies may be historically accidental, or there may be a systemic flaw in the model, working to mar it. Ernest Gellner colorfully suggests there is a systemic flaw, and compares the phenomenon of nationalism to a recurring decimal, wherein "every national flea has smaller fleas to plague it", meaning that there is no theoretical limit to the ways in which increasingly finer textured distinctions can be promoted as legitimizing local ethnic differences with concomitant political expressions.[5]

Will Kymlicka's finely textured arguments in his 1989 study deal with the relation between the liberal state and societies embedded within it, whereas Ignatieff describes conflicts between ethnic

groups. Nevertheless they share similar ground. Kymlicka begins by noting the difference between state and society: that the two rarely happen to be congruent. This will take him into a conceptual frame similar to Ignatieff's. Kymlicka defends liberalism against charges he attributes to communitarian critics. He never, I believe, uses the term "ethnic"; but he develops a distinction in modes of ethnic attitude to resemble Ignatieff's. Kymlicka's overall claim is that a weaker form of communitarianism advances claims already implicit in liberalism, while a stronger form implicitly condones repressive politics. It is this weak/strong distinction which corresponds to Ignatieff's civic/ethnic distinction, and this comes out in his conclusion.

Yael Tamir talks about a similar distinction in her 1993 study. She points out that nationalism is normally seen negatively, as an overall destructive force which is acceptable only when it is instrumental in conferring benefit; it is not desirable in principle, as is, for instance, free speech, and that despite the fact that free speech can be injurious as well, when used carelessly or abusively. In preparing a defense of the principle of nationalism she develops a similar distinction; her terminology is liberal nationalism and cultural nationalism. Tamir traces this version of the distinction back to differences between Mill and Hegel.

Similar distinctions appear in historical analyses. Eric Hobsbawm draws what I take to be esentially the same distinction with the terms subjective and objective criteria for nationhood, while Ernest Gellner employs a crucial distinction in his theory of nationalism.[6] Gellner does not employ his distinction in a way that closely fits the pattern outlined here, and this will require some explanation, as I attend to

his to work in my analysis. Gellner's class-related distinction figures in the emergence <u>of</u> nationalism rather than self-conceptions <u>of</u> it. Finally, Anthony Giddens examines this distinction in what he calls the "Janus-faced character of nationalism".[7]

It's worth emphasizing the symmetry of this pattern with the general structure of normative programs. What is good is what can be done; what is bad is what is permitted to happen. So, the acceptable version of ethnicity is a matter of responsible intentionality, while the undesirable version of ethnicity is a product of historical inheritance and as such is a passivity, or a fatalism. Normative theory and practical policy might then seem simply to dictate a mastery the one over the other, of good intentions over some historical residue of "bad" ethnicity. I want to note here that the phenomenon is divided up by appeal to an external scale of value devised for use in normative programs by liberal philosophers and other writers. The phenomenon is not dissected along its own observed structures, to be compared with their requirements for virtuous action.

I must settle upon a pair of terms to use for my examination of this good-bad distinction. I would prefer Tamir's pair--"liberal" and "cultural"--among the ones mentioned, except that I will make some further distinctions which I suspect would lead to terminological ambiguity. So, I am stipulating the terms "civic" and "blood" for the two forms of ethnic phenomena. The former is intended to signify the potentially constructive, communal, voluntarist tendency to mold civic institutions and cultural preferences harmoniously; and the latter signifies the potentially destructive and impassioned tendencies to act out of a conviction that an inherited past is, and ought to be, in

control of events. Having made this stipulation I will doubtlessly on occasion employ someone else's terms anyway.

The image constructed by many writers who have a normative program is of the liberal society as a melting pot of historical detritus. But, according to much recent socio-historical theory, the alternative, blood version of ethnicity is not residual circumstance, but rather a product of more recent historical process. This point is developed in the works of historical analysis by Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and others. Frequent reference to their work is incorporated in some of the philosophical discussion I've mentioned. This has led me to some extended consideration of arguments found outside of philosophy: in social history and historical theory, anthropology, sociology and literary analysis. I draw a few conclusions slightly at variance with the philosophical discussion of this material.

Benedict Anderson has argued that historical ethnic coherence is the result of a process of imagination, whereby increasingly self-informed populations imaginatively incorporate themselves and their local idiosyncratic identities into a sympathetic union-of-interests with distant populations known only indirectly through emergent social structures (e.g. state, market, academé) which have institutional authority over them. Ernest Gellner has argued at slight variance to this, that ethnic-based nationalism is an expression of a high (and coercive) culture which systematically replaces local social structures, so that, whereas the individual was previously defined idiosyncratically by his local circumstance, he becomes an interchangeable national-citizen. In these historical analyses the stronger, blood nationalism is not a naturalistic, residual feature of

a generalized human society, but rather a mind-dependent product of cultural activity. This insight allows us to revisit the original distinction, to reinterpret the extremes as more nearly dialectical components requiring each other, than as limits of a continuum.

The large-scale communities of recent times, then, are characterized not by whether they are real or not (that is, recalling Ignatieff, problematic historical residues on the one hand or possibilities for fresh social intentions on the other), but rather by what means they are imagined. They are imagined-as-limited because nations, as territorial states, are defined by their boundaries and at the same time are bounded by other nations, although some qualifications are needed here to accommodate diasporic nations and dispersed minorities. The point here is, the concept of boundary is tied up with recognition that there is a Someone, an Other, that is beyond the boundary, and typically is the occasion for the boundary. So, these boundaries and dispersals are more than juxtapositions; they are connections, and as such they have consequences. These consequences involve the self-identity of whatever is contained within the boundaries. This is a principal reason for my criticizing the closed-society approach of John Rawls.

The knowledge that there is a Someone beyond the limits of one's society leads to the problem of how to characterize that Someone. To pursue my preliminary generalizations about what has been said, many social philosophers are preoccupied with competition: its benefits, its necessary constraints and the concomitant institutional requirements. Many others, probably not quite as many, are preoccupied with concern, often as a tonic to the abrasiveness of competition. Fewer, it seems to me, are preoccupied with the question

of social identity formation in the context of having to deal with Others whom we have excluded in some manner not necessarily unkindly. This results (and here my generalization is stretching very thin) in a tendency to assume that competition and concern can be modeled in such a way as to collapse the differences between the parties, at least in respect of the objects of competition or the occasion for concern. The problem of competition between disparate groups is then recast as a problem of equal payout of a social product between them, when the issue might instead be coming to a consensus on the meaning or implication of "equality".

The problem of implementing a concern for the well-being of a profoundly different community is similar. "Our" concern for "them" (leaving aside for now the denotation of these pronouns) may involve our misconception of their concern. We may project our own upon them; or we may project one which is based upon some asserted connection between us and them which both sides would not profess. This latter idea will be developed toward the end of chapter four; for now I'll note one philosophical connection. Charles Taylor has observed that modern Western societies have developed a concern for a community which is co-extensive with the human race; but then he has also observed that these societies project a "Caliban image" onto non-Europeans, with its colonializing effect.[8] Other writers have applied theories of imaginative construction to the problems of social identity of colonial and minority populations, where there is coercive influence upon culture and an identity-distorting acceptance of this influence. This occurs across communities, whether spatially separated by imperial distances or adjacent within multicultural states. In these instances one community is imagined as the project,

task, or burden of another. The writers I have in mind here are principally Edward Said with his theory of academic-bureaucratic orientalism, and his commentators in post-colonial discourse. Taylor's concern with the identity of a culturally-defensive, colonialized Quebec places him in this group.

The connection I wish to draw between these studies and the epistemological issues of ethnicity is this: just as large-scale communities must be imagined in the Andersonian sense to become politically manageable as open liberal societies, it is necessary to imagine, as excluded, other communities (i.e. communities of Others) in order to take them up as projects. Such a project need not be control or coercion; I'll argue it may instead be the sort of sympathetic comprehension which Kymlicka, for instance, concludes we need to undertake in dealing with other communities. Both sympathy and dominance require imagination. As such, a radical post-colonialism may have a sympathetic aspect relating it directly to the problems of multiculturalism which increasingly concerns liberal political philosophy.

I mentioned that using concepts developed by Anderson and Gellner it was possible to revisit Kymlicka and Tamir. From Said and his commentators it's possible to revisit Gellner's theory of implicit conspiracy by high culture upon low culture within a society, applying this structure to processes observed occurring between societies and extending Gellner's concepts with concepts from post-colonial discourse: dominant social identity which is comfortably assumed in the ruling metropoles, and coerced (or colonialized) social identity projected upon dependent territories and societies.

From the insights offered by Said, I believe we can also revisit

Kymlicka, fleshing out his utilitarian calculus of disadvantaged minorities, where the disadvantage is, for Kymlicka, largely juxtaposition of unequally scaled efforts to preserve distinctiveness. But it's more than unequal scaling. It is a matter of domination, including domination of the myth-making process which builds up the image from which we severally draw our identity.

A further and final connection is made between, on one hand the orientalist and post-colonial idea that a whole community may be defined as an exotic problem or task of another one (the former as imagined by the latter), and on the other hand the idea that a similar task may be internalized within one culturally complex society. Remembering that these complexities depend upon imagination for their comprehension, I want to argue that the collective self-appraisal of a society by its politically responsible citizens bears a resemblance to the imaginative reconstruction of other cultures-seen-as-tasks. That is, the negative aspects of colonial and post-colonial paternalism bear similarities (structural, procedural) to the positive aspects of social self-appraisal in the liberal society, and so I'll suggest that it's more a matter of getting goals straight once we are working with an adequately discriminating set of terms and concepts.

## SECTION IV: TOWARD SOME CONCLUSIONS

In the previous section of this introduction I drew the characterization that many social philosophers wish to promote either competition or concern and so dissolve distinctions between disparate human groups. This remark may suggest that I'm preparing a defense of incommensurability. I'm not. Rather, I'm merely suggesting that a

few epistemological clarifications will aid in the preparation of a defense of the propriety of proceeding with competition, as well as concern, as well as other social relationships, in spite of the obstacle of what seem to be partial incommensurabilities between those disparate groups.

My conclusions will be a few modestly-put implications to follow from the epistemological connections established. One overall point of the series of connections is to devalue the notion that there is anything fixing individuals in particular historical communities, under either of the two interpretations of nationalism. That is, the supposedly fatalistic blood ethnicity, which has been targeted by many social philosophers as undesirable and refractory historical detritus, is a recent social artifact which is in a state of evolution. In principle, members of liberal, demographically permeable societies are free to imaginatively reconstruct cultural self-images, within reasonable bounds. This is so for several reasons. First, they have critical access to their own historical past, and in the context of the intellectual freedoms of their society they are free to reevaluate and reconstruct this past (and note that they are not constrained to do what a professional scholar would judge to be a good job of that). Since societies are demographically permeable things, they will be aware of alternative social habits and values even though they won't always have correct assessments.

As I've said, most persons don't embark upon autonomous social-identity construction, preferring instead to retain an "off-the-shelf" self-image. An important part of social identity is the knowledge that it is a consensual identity: I am not free to redefine myself entirely because I am in part a set of relationships with others, and

so my self-redefinition would impinge upon their own self-images. But these images are not fixed. This plasticity exists on more than one level. First, the image (as opposed to the historical facts which are imaged, or imagined) is changeable; it is hardly as old as the historical facts imaged (this is Anderson's point). But secondly, the imagination itself has a history, and so our reconstructed images of former self-images are as plastic. That is to say, we are not constrained to the present in evolving a self-image. Even if we are dependent upon the past for self-image, it is our contemporary understanding of that past which is incorporated into the self-image, and history is continually reconstructed.

The collective self-image of the citizenry of a liberal state will include the elements of toleration and sympathy for persons who are significantly different from that citizenry. So, if this image reflects sympathy and toleration for persons <u>not</u> matching the image, which is what liberals promote, then the consequences of the undesirable version of ethnicity will be attenuated. Intolerance need not be a necessary ingredient of a closed image.

Another conclusion is that this effect of attenuating blood ethnicity can be a result of self-interest as well as moral consideration. I noted Kymlicka's arguments for the need for responsible comprehension of other communities where their society interpenetrates ours. Kymlicka argues from ethical considerations, but self-interest may also apply. Joseph Raz's arguments for what he calls "adequacy of options" carry a similar implication; and this is especially so if we employ something like what Clifford Geertz calls "thick description" of alternative cultural values to further enhance our range of Razian options.[9] I will have several occasions to refer

to Geertz and Raz subsequently, and especially in chapter five. For now, the implication of their views here is that, while images of ethnic communities ought to be imaginatively reconstructed for normative reasons and because of ethical principles, it is further the case that they may be, for purposes of personal agenda.

This, incidentally, can be done with increasing ease, thanks to another element of the liberal agenda of materially constructive self-interest. The fixity of ethnic character becomes ephemeral today in many regions of the world. David Hume, in discussing how values arise in sentiment, related distance to attenuation of sentiment, so the more distant was the correspondingly less valued. I'll want to suggest that, if we do imagine our community, then what is far away becomes a function of sentiment rather than vice-versa, so that, for instance, the Edwardian Australians were "closer" to England than to the Orient.

In the American instance, many immigrants used to sail away from Liverpool, Hamburg or Naples forever; now they fly from Seoul, Taipei or Manila, but many fly back annually for New Year visits. And more importantly, they are in constant touch with their old homelands, both in the active sense via telephone, fax, etc., and also in the passive sense via globalized media. It seems to me likely that attachments to traditional culture will become more flexible and complexly novel as such interpenetrations increase. This 20th-century social novelty, where social identity is as often a function of antennae as of roots, has further impact on the philosophical import of the ethnic phenomenon, as I shall try to argue.

## NOTES

1. Rawls 1971, p.378; my emphasis
2. Rawls 1971, p.380
3. Mill 1872(1991), p.308; J. Stalin quoted in Hobsbawm 1992, p.5n
4. Ignatieff 1993, p.85
5. Gellner 1994, p.177
6. Hobsbawm 1990, passim; Gellner 1988, passim
7. Giddens 1983, pp.178-9
8. Taylor 1989, p.4; 1992 p.26
9. Raz 1986, p.373; Geertz 1973, passim

# CHAPTER TWO: CONVENTIONAL NOTIONS OF NATIONALISM

## SECTION I. A TRADITIONAL HISTORICAL VIEW: FRANCIS DVORNIK

Throughout extensive social-science and philosophical literature, the two terms "ethnic" and "nationalist" are not employed consistently. Neither their denotations nor the relationships of the concepts are tidy. Very broadly speaking, the older term "nationalist" is associated as much with political activism as with social analysis. The more recently coined of the two terms, "ethnic", is the more general one, in that programs and policies associated with the nationalist principle are based upon the (often presumptive) historical background of ethnicity. If nationalism is ethnicity politicized, then "ethnic" ought to carry less connotation of agenda or policy. However, the distinction between the terms isn't always made this way.

Jeff Spinner points out that the two terms, along with a third, "race", are often conflated; and he takes pains to establish a precise vocabulary; but then his own usage of "ethnicity" exhibits idiosyncratic variation. In places he limits its application to immigrants to the United States who wish to retain a distinguishable identity of their ancestry within a more general intention of assimilating into acceptability by what might be called nativists: descendants of the earlier immigrants.[1] Ethnicity thus becomes a particular project as much as an historical background, so we are back to agenda. One could argue that this usage would consistently apply

to later immigrants to other settler-countries besides the United States (e.g. Maltese-Australians, Lebanese-Argentines), but not to distinctions between historically distinct groups which are still in place, such as, say Flemings and Walloons, who have no program of assimilation. On the other hand, Spinner notes ethnic distinctions which Italians (Friulians, Neapolitans, etc.) draw between themselves, which distinction is collapsed by Americans who are insensitive to Italian regionalism.[2] His discussion lacks consistency with respect to any intentional agenda underlying claims of self-identity.

Some writers use only the older term "nationalism". Michael Ignatieff uses it as a catchall; and he distinguishes a political doctrine from a cultural model, as well as a normative program, all within the general phenomenon of nationalism.[3] Yael Tamir also uses only "nationalism", but for reasons different from Ignatieff's.[4] She argues that while nationalist attitudes and intentions are political, they don't always, or always need to, entail the intention of creating a nation-state, and so the political connotative element becomes imprecise, to include any political activity which would result in a satisfactory degree of communal separateness. Will Kymlicka uses neither term even though his discussion overlaps Tamir's. I will examine Kymlicka's treatment in detail in chapter six.

The standard distinction, however, I find compromised by writers who would be concerned to preserve it. Ernest Gellner, for instance, says of nationalism that it requires that "ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones."[5] He establishes nationalism as ethnicity politicized: the institutionalization of a cultural geography becomes a political goal, which is the connection so often drawn. But then he goes on to claim that the "political and national unit should be

congruent."[6] Given his other remark, I would have expected him to use "ethnic" where he uses "national" since, from his earlier remark, I would expect a national unit to already be political. Also, it's not clear if Gellner is making a normative claim or a conceptual point in this passage.

Eric Hobsbawm is consistent in his terms, and his discussion is rich in examples.[7] Ethnicity is the idea of commonality preserved through descent; but he questions the likelihood of its objective possibility. Most of Europe, the birthplace of these concepts, is anciently mixed demographically; and in his examples from the Balkans, of such intensely nationalist modern groups as Montenegrens, Greeks, and Rumanians, he claims the ancestral stocks are mixed and blended.[8] He's clearly skeptical about the worth of the ethnic claims of nationalists; but yet his conclusion is not that clear, which of course may be the intention: that no unequivocal conclusion follows from any consideration of patterns of descent, patterns of behavior, and patterns of affiliation. Hobsbawm suggests there is commonly a conflation of "ethnicity" and "race" in the European sense as identification of social or "ethnic" characteristics through descent, and physical characteristics.[9]

I will follow the commonly drawn but imprecisely maintained distinction, in which "nationalism" denotes a political consciousness, and frequently a resulting political intent with or without any concomitant effective program. This political consciousness is developed out of collective, or purportedly collective, values, habits, social perceptions, etc., which are ordinarily considered to be historical givens, whether or not they withstand objective scrutiny. These givens are termed "ethnic" characteristics.

Nationalist policies or ambitions thus follow from ethnic attitudes or sentiments. The importance of this distinction in my treatment is the decoupling of politics and ethnicity. I want to argue that their connection is a matter of historical contingency and not essential.

Nationalist claims for political recognition often arise within states which exercise sovereignty over ethnic groups; and they arise <u>because</u> of the fact of non-ethnic sovereignty. Country C may contain ethnic groups $E_1$ and $E_2$. The problem made so acute here is that state structures are, in recent times, typically evolved out of nationalist claims of an ethnic population group which has become dominant within a mixed population; so C's constitution may claim that C is the national state of $E_1$. C's constitutional legitimacy then arises in the prior existence of $E_1$, conjoined with a political theory, but omitting the untidy fact of $E_2$. European nationalism grew within previous systems of dynastic or imperial states; and so appeal to the nationalist principle could be made on the basis that there was an historical pattern of peoples older, hence more legitimate within the theory, than the existing dynastic or imperial patterns. In my example, what we do about $E_2$ will be deferred for the moment.

The assumption of ethnic primordiality was, until mid-century, widespread in historical explanation. It is no longer given unqualified objective credence. I mentioned a problem of objective scrutiny: whether or not the popular ideas of transmission of ethnic characteristics to descendants stand up to critical historiography. An example of this notion of primordiality, including the formation of nationalist attitudes and doctrines, is strongly put in the following observation by Francis Dvornik, in his survey of eastern European history, and which I quote in full for comparison and analysis:

> "Western European and American readers may possibly find some of my discussions too lengthy and some topics too remote from Western interests. But these problems should be viewed from the point of view of the nations concerned. To them, the medieval period means much more than it does to Western nations. It was then that most of them came nearest to their ideals of national independence and that some of them played their part in the work of civilizing Europe. And when their national individuality was absorbed into the neighboring empires of Germany, Austria, Muscovite Russia, and Ottoman Turkey, it was from those memories that they drew comfort and strength. Today, their past is their only inspiration in carrying on the struggle to preserve their national identity. Nowhere more than in Central and Eastern Europe is it true to say that modern development can only be understood in the light of medieval history."[10]

It's clear enough that Dvornik's language is literary, not literal. He uses "memories" metaphorically, in place of, say, "historical tradition", which would be more literally precise in the context. "Memories" implies more objective impressions than would, say, "interpretations of historical traditions". But, he's not suggesting that an individual remembers events of the previous six or eight centuries; and so we needn't conclude that Dvornik makes a claim for the existence of race-memory or other mystical links through time. The historical import of those events which he mentions as being "remembered" (e.g. "the work of civilizing Europe") are themselves social constructions: lessons or stories, I want to say.

There are other some other terminological choices Dvornik makes which, if we pursue them with a bland literalness, lead us to ambiguities of interpretation of his meaning. For instance, if national individuality has been absorbed into larger political units, then the (philosophical) problem of persistence of identity emerges. Dvornik is talking about centuries; so, if the members of a national

group (whether all, some, or even only a few) have no trouble identifying themselves as persisting collectively in the historical narrative, then what is the nature of the threat to the group's identity? What was it, about the nations concerned, that failed to persist such that identity itself did persist? Who is referenced in "most of them came nearest to their ideals of national independence": the medieval populations, or the modern ones reminiscing about their ancestors, or both?

Another Central-Europeanist, Karl Renner, writing at the turn of the 20th century, said that, prior to French revolution, states were properties of dynasties and peoples were "objects" of dynastic rule.[11] Dynastic states were readily and commonly fragmented territorially and demographically; thus pre-revolutionary dynastic realms contained fragmented populations. The nations were already in place as historically persisting collectives of people and as cultures, but not as political expressions. Then these national groups became political reality "through their ruling classes". These classes Renner identified as the capitalist-bourgeoisie. Renner's point here was that, at the time political power was in hands of dynasts, another sphere of potential authority existed within the bourgeois members of the ethnic aggregates which were spread and split between the mosaic of dynastic power. He then says the nation existed before its political emergence "unconsciously as national character", then "semi-consciously as national feeling"; a feeling of collective identity, through possession of a shared language and culture.

Dvornik's and Renner's assertions can be challenged. Current historical research suggests that modern notions of national consciousness had no counterpart in medieval times. Eric Hobsbawm

makes this point when he examines what he calls the "most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism", the self-consciousness of being a part of a political entity.[12] Hobsbawm virtually derides Renner's point of view as "programmatic mythology."[13] Together with Dvornik, Renner is representative of the later-19th-century idea of nationalism in a number of ways. Chiefly, they stressed the moral primacy of linguistic-cultural community which by rights should capture state control, without respect of the existing political structures or social collectivities within existing (usually dynastic) states, which action would often lead to repartition along ethnic lines. But, only a century later, we are alarmed at this very same prospect, having seen enough gruesome examples of such policy gone catastrophically awry.

Hobsbawm's objection is not, or not merely, moral. He doubts the existence of the national groups prior to their self-awareness. Many contemporary nation-states owe their constitutional cohesion to a mistaken application of the claims of historical coherence of culture, language, etc.; Hobsbawm argues that this is the case for European states in general. Even the large European states given to such extravagantly destructive nationalist programs--France, Germany, Italy--had populations which did not speak mutually intelligible languages as late as the mid-19th century; such is the nature of dialect. In a non-European context, Benedict Anderson reminds us that Indonesia is similar, with a recently fabricated nationality, and of course there are many other instances of post-colonial amalgamated states.

The problem Hobsbawm finds is that this self-consciousness is not something which has persisted, but rather is a misconstruction of

historical realities. Originally those who identified themselves as, for instances, Franks, Magyars, and Poles were the rulers over the peoples of the land conquered, garrisoned, and exploited by them. The subject populations of the regions we know today as France, Hungary, and Poland were not (it is argued) inclined to think of themselves as Franks, Magyars, or Poles until the idea that they were was invented; and this development occurred much more recently.

If Hobsbawm's observations are correct, then the national self-consciousness Dvornik describes is not what has persisted as a continuous identity. Still, Hobsbawm's point is not that nationalist movements are thus shams; rather, his point is nationalism of the whole population can adopt the features of the self-consciousness of prior elites. So for instance, 20th-century Serbians aren't just distinct from neighboring Catholics and Muslims because they are Orthodox (so, for instance, are the Bulgars); this is merely the objective distinction which would be noticed by an observer of religious practice, and of course its inadequacy is what observers in the 1990's find baffling about the carnage in Bosnia. The modern Serbians promote the history of the medieval kingdom (a mythic version of it, anyway), even though that kingdom was run by just those few who regarded themselves as the Serb rulers of a nondescript mass of peasantry. That this example, Serbian chauvinism, is emblematic in the 1990's of the most odious uses of nationalist doctrine makes the intent of my example clearer: I'm looking for motive, not justification. Hobsbawm's point has to do with the importance of adopting a certain narrative as an element of self-identity on which to base judgments and to legitimate actions of any sort, including the most odious, but of course also the most commendable.

I've said that many social and political philosophers view the ethnic phenomenon negatively. For them it's a detritus of history which is an obstacle to the application of a much-preferred, improving model for governance. This viewpoint is unsurprising. Promoting a preferred model implies a normative program. Normative prescriptions are proposed for situations requiring improvement: what else would a prescription be for? That is, if political philosophy sets itself a goal of presenting models or principles which might serve in the formulation of a real policy, then one would expect the starting point of the philosophical project to include the presupposition of real shortcomings in the situation to be modeled. Ethnic and nationalist phenomena present a persisting focus of dispute and misfortune in much of the world during much of the 20th century; hence, <u>if</u> these phenomena are accurately characterized as historically detrital, that may lend cogency to the argument that the phenomenon is to be handled by being somehow cleared away.

The examples from eastern Europe, and in particular the recent example of the Serbians, who, in their own version of their national story, guarded medieval Europe from Asiatic barbarians, turn out to be particularly obnoxious examples of the historical detritus which today most of us wish would go away. But, and this is my point, the fate of that Wilsonian creature, Yugoslavia, may simply be an example of spectacularly abusive implementation of a social institution which is, in principle, potentially as laudable as heinous. I want to return to these and similar questions repeatedly as I attempt to refine some of the conceptual distinctions needed to resolve them, in order to make my point that this historical detritus (if that's what it is), is not essentially harmful to liberal society.

## SECTION II. A TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW: JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill develops an interpretive historical discussion of the phenomenon of nationality in his Considerations On Representative Government. This brief discussion closely resembles the contemporary, western-liberal understanding of that idea; and in view of Mill's influence on the formation of modern political theory this is not surprising, probably for reasons similar to the ones why it is safe to say all those familiar lines in Shakespeare are not really clichés. I'll review Mill's discussion, noting some plainly uncomplicated problems in its literal interpretation, with the intent of justifying my contention that there is a need for a more detailed terminology than Mill apparently believed was necessary for this treatment.

Mill defines nationality as a "portion of mankind" which finds itself united by "common sympathies", which sympathies do not happen to exist also between that portion and others.[14] He finds these sympathies developing from five different circumstances, which he lists as (1) race and descent, (2) language, (3) religion, (4) geographical coherence, (5) historical antecedent i.e. political history. No one of these is either sufficient or necessary. Mill gives examples of 19th-century European states which lack one of more of each of these factors, but which are, or seemed to him, successful and stable politically: Switzerland, Belgium, and Naples (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). Mill claims the fifth of his circumstances is the strongest one: possession of a common history, and a "consequent community of recollection", and on this account he discusses the national groups of Germany and Italy, which of course were not yet politically unified.

Mill claims that common recollection results from a common history. But a familiar technical ambiguity emerges here, about which I am modestly reminding us. The term "history" has different senses: if I write a history of Norman, Oklahoma, then my book, A History of Norman, will mostly be a narrative account of a sequence of events: a description of these events, of their interrelationships, and their significance to the present. My book is about something, but which is the history: the book or the something it's about? One sense of "history" is that of an objective succession of events or, simply "what happened"; but another sense of the term (and which I believe is the one much preferred by academic historians) is of an understanding of this succession as a comprehensible sequence abstracted from the total objective sequence, and abstracted according to some criterion of significance, to become a narrative, or, "what we think happened that's worth talking about". The more concerned we are to explain the present, the more likely we are to recast our effort as "how we think we got from that circumstance to this circumstance."

Mill adopts the first of these senses as his preferred sense of "history", and finds the second to be a result of the first. This is simply enough stated, but it unpacks into a fairly complicated set of claims. First, it's claimed that there has occurred a sequence of events, a spatio-temporally localizable succession of happenings which are causally related. Second, this sequence has continued down to this moment, and the objective circumstances of a particular and particularizable congeries of people may be said to have resulted from the sequence. Third, these people share a common, communicable consciousness of that present circumstance. Fourth, they also share a consciousness of that circumstance's antecedents, i.e. they know about

the sequence of events. A fifth claim is not explicitly stated: that those persons involved in all previous steps within the sequence share a similar consciousness of their earlier circumstance, so that there is a continuity to the other four circumstances claimed. This fifth claim is necessary to establish a continuity of the sort Dvornik assumes to prevail among, at least, eastern Europeans.

Mill doesn't question whether the community of recollection will develop out of the causal sequence of events unproblematically, so that there will be a simple correspondence. The implication is that history is an objective chronology external to the mental activities which constitute an understanding <u>of</u> that chronology. The closeness of the tangle of ideas here is illustrated by the ambiguity in "chronology". The *logos* of *chronos* is the understanding of time; but "chronology" commonly means the order of events by occurrence, and was so used in the previous sentence. Mill is implying that persons have an effectively transparent observational access to those ordered events, so that all their separate recollections <u>of</u> the sequence, and the objective sequence itself, will have close correspondence. However, this is not generally so. Frequently enough, communal recollections, which contribute to the historical sense of character of a community, derive less from objective historical research and more from a mythic notion of history.

Here I'm making another observation which is modest enough, about the great difference between popular, or mythic, history on the one hand, and critical history on the other. Clearly, mythic narrative of national origins might be very different from a the results of a program of scholarly research. Hobsbawm's point about mistaken self-images of European national genealogies is an example of this. Mill

is surely correct to suggest that virtually all communities do possess elaborate narrative accounts of their past. However, they don't necessarily have a relatively transparent observational access to an objective chronology; but nor do they have a universally well-considered access to the results of critical hisrtoriography.

It is possible for the majority of members of a literate community to be mistaken about all the details of a chronological narrative which, with its explanatory frame, which would satisfy the requirements of scholarly historical analysis; and this is so even when such scholarly expertise is available to that community. I'm not suggesting here that scholarly historical analysis would result in an incontestable standard account. I believe it would be quite the opposite; and it is the popular mythic account which is normally the (popularly) incontestable one, criticized as variously as it is destructively by critical historians and other disciplined scholars, whose civic contribution becomes the laborious and often-unappreciated reformulation of that account.

Another problem with Mill's summary is the absence of reference to source, or authorship, of the mythic narrative. It's not always obvious whose mythic construction it is. Mill implicitly attributes this to the community as a whole. But, historical narrative is not always constructed by all those people, or even most of those people, as Hobsbawm points out. Further, some histories are constructed by those who claim to know, for the benefit of those who are claimed not to know. This point I will develop with respect to Edward Said's theory of imperial preemption of culture. For now, we get a taste of this in Mill's own characterization of the Celtic fringes of the 19th-century French and British states. He calls this a "relic of past

times" and suggests the unassimilated Breton or Welshman is an unreconstructed yokel who prefers to "sulk on his own rocks."[15] Subsequent historical and social research on the civilizations of Britanny, Wales, Scotland, and even Ireland, is rather less dismissive.

Mill goes on to say that national sentiment provides "prima-facie case" for political union: states should be congruent with collectivities of uniform sentiment, i.e. nation-states. By contrast, "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities", where there is subsequent lack of "fellow-feeling", and this can be exacerbated by a lack of common language.[16] Communication is required for community, and differing languages are obstacles to open communication, and this is claimed despite Mill's previously-given examples of the Swiss and Belgian nations. It's clear that when Mill says "in general the national feeling is proportionally weakened" by absence of one of these factors, he's allowing for such exceptions.[17] A confusion arises here: by other tests, Belgian and Swiss nationalism are legitimate enough; and so it would seem that "fellow-feeling" is not entirely dependent upon common language.

Mill suggests one causal relationship operating within the association between objective similarities and subjective affections. Other writers have presented different causal analyses; I'll mention two here as examples for now. One inversion of the causal relationship implicit in Mill's general claim, that a communal sentiment precedes formal community, is briefly discussed by the sociologist Merry White, who reports, in her study of overseas Japanese, that one of her research informants thought American

diversity was "a rationale for rather than an obstacle to a sense of community."[18] The suggestion here is that diversity within a population can be an occasion for the self-conscious development of community as a political project. Later I'll try to link this suggestion to my discussion of how civic ethnicity can give rise to blood ethnicity, in a population of politically and socially responsible members.

To White's example of inversion of Mill's analysis I can add an anecdote. I encountered a very similar argument among white South Africans of what would have been a relatively liberal persuasion, during the recently-ended apartheid period. By the account of these acquaintances, their country's population had been thrown together in consequence of historical vagaries of the previous three centuries, and on that account it was essential to find communal themes on which to base a workable political system for the entire population. This is a clear instance of civic-nationalist spirit at work. Defenders of the apartheid policy, then, might divide into two groups. First, there would be those arguing normatively from some exclusionary principle that no such new communal themes should be devised on novel civic grounds to dissolve the existing blood-ethnic communities. Second, there would be apartheid defenders arguing pragmatically from political pessimism (but another version of civic conviction) that none will be found to work.

Were Mill to weigh in on this issue, he would certainly side with the liberal civic-nationalists. This follows from his comments on the mixtures of peoples living in what, in his time, was the Habsburg state: that "they should reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws."[19] From this it would seem that historical

vagaries can make nationalist programs unworkable. The compromise nationalist states which succeeded the Habsburg state came apart, and the process conctinues. At our point in history, the closing years of the following century, we think immediately of the Bosnia problem.

Ernest Gellner is my second example of alternatives to Mill. Gellner has inverted Mill's reconstruction in another way. In what I earlier called Gellner's class-conspiracy theory, the dominant classes of a state promote a policy under which local culture and local dialect is replaced by, or homogenized into, a more extended high culture and its language, to achieve formal nationhood. Gellner argues that nationalism arises from the efforts of an empowered class to legitimize their power: the legitimation arises out of the promotion of a past which can be described through narration of events, and so becomes historical investiture. This approach to the relationship between subjective and objective national identity will be discussed in chapter four. The point here is that, for Gellner, a political structure does not emerge in response to a prior national sentiment as Mill suggests. The sentiment is disseminated by a prior political structure.

Language is critical in the transformation of social sentiments. Central authorities will either coerce or persuade local populations to transfer their loyalties from local traditions and institutions to central ones. Language itself will become "centralized", or standardized, as part of this process. Examples of this are common enough in the liberal democracies. In the United Kingdom, under an educational system run by the dominant English majority, Scottish nationalists complained until very recently that school teachers were insisting their children say "yes" instead of "aye", "trousers"

instead of "breeks", etc. Linguistic elitism is not uncommon in traditionally liberal states. As late as the 1860's only half of French school children were native French-speakers, if we restrict our sense of French to the sensibilities of the National Academy and the Parisian ear.[20] Primary education in the Indian reservations of America was notoriously repressive a century ago; and today Americans debate the propriety of teaching variations of English dialect in public schools. I mention these three examples--Britain, France, America--because they will be examples of cultural dominance by liberal regimes in my discussion of Edward Said in chapter four.

We should note and consider Mill's use of the compound term "race and descent". Are we to understand a significant distinction here? We generally think of nationality as partly a matter of descent, in the sense of acquisition by means of a social "inheritance", or early acculturation, of Mill's second, third and fifth common sympathies. What I mean is, we individually acquire them, initially through the societization processes we find in childhood within ordinary families, and then continuing on slightly later through an educational process which now normally occurs in the local community just beyond our family group. We each acquire our language, values, manners, civic virtues, etc., through direct exposure and example. If this is, or is part of, what Mill means by "descent", then does Mill employ a conjunctive construction to imply racist theory, to mean we also acquire cultural traits biologically, through genetic inheritance? It seems not necessarily: his use of "race" for the Belgian and Swiss populations accords with the a much looser usage of the term "race" more common outside of America.[21] I'll briefly discuss the question of how "race" denotes a social characteristic in the next chapter.

From all these difficulties, we see that Mill's discussion of the origins and character of nationality is so vulnerable to exception that it is not very useful for establishing a required methodology for nation-building. One source of trouble in Mill's account arises, I believe, with his tactic of trying to find causal relationships between the objective and subjective elements of nationality. It would not be unreasonable to object that there is a Belgian nationality and a Swiss nationality simply because there have been, for historically-significant periods of time, some people who think of themselves as Belgians and as Swiss, and behave accordingly; and because there are other people who themselves are neither Belgians nor Swiss but who also believe this, and behave accordingly; this promotes the legitimacy of the two states.

Mill's discussion of nationality carries a mood not commonly found in contemporary discussions: it has almost none of the negative mood of modern writers. Mill was more optimistic about the phenomenon, writing at a time when the tendencies of political movement in Europe were to replace dynastically-defined territorial units with nationalist ones, and also to replace autocratic regimes with democratic ones. But notice that while Mill does not develop a generally negative view of any implications of nationalism as a social force, neither does he promote a theory or policy of political action based on nationalism as an essential justification for state formation. Instead, Mill talks about nationalism as an historical organizing principle for mankind which seems expedient to use in the civic project of building good government. Populations are found already fallen into groups; it's expedient to keep those groups. His point is that national grouping is the way populations generally find

themselves both spatially disposed and self-identified; and thus a political system arranged around that fact seems appropriate and useful.

What is most germane here is that Mill implies this expedient organizing principle of nationalism doesn't always work out to advantage, because of those same vagaries of history which give rise to the national mosaic. Nationalism expressed within what he terms a "primitive" society can obstruct the improving system of liberal political activity, and so then, he says, it should be overridden in favor of the liberal program of civic improvement. Mill's examples of primitive societies are those which he observes as fringe cultures within the larger European states of his day, as I've noted. His list of examples startles (I would presume) modern readers who may more readily dismiss as primitive the Irianese than they would the Irish. The problem of what to do with these so-called "less developed" peoples can be generalized to avoid use of examples which will then trouble subsequent generations who, in their turn, are quite untroubled by their own examples; although I must note that insofar as it might seem prudent to adopt this tactic, we should therefore suspect the whole strategy of discrimination between lesser and greater degrees of historical development, as if there were an historical goal.

Joseph Raz appeals to the principle underlying Mill's unromantic progressivism and concomitant dismissal of rude Celtic tribes. In a concluding discussion Raz discusses the issue of paternalistic treatment of "inferior" cultures.[22] Raz is brief; he says he is speculating on a matter he does not intend to address in any depth. But what he does say suggests he is not far from Mill in his beliefs:

that the societies bearing such culture are essentially static, and their possibilities are to remain static or else be absorbed into the (by implication) relatively superior, and hopefully liberal, societies which have increasingly come to surround and dominate them. Raz does not incorporate the possibility that such cultures will ordinarily react to an exposure to outside cultural elements by selective absorption and subsequent transformation of these elements without losing identity. The picture here (a fragmentary one, but I think a clear-enough suggestion) is: different cultures are problems for each other. Moral liberal cultures are tasked with non-coercively improving illiberal ones, and illiberal ones are tasked with resisting the encroachments of the "superior" liberal ones. This image bears some resemblance to the one Edward Said draws in his study of imperialist culture, which I'll discuss in chapter four; and I will reconsider Raz's remarks in the context of the problem of liberal treatment of illiberal societies, in chapter six.

I conclude that for Mill nationalism is a social phenomenon of only mediate political worth. He is willing to sacrifice the principle of national self-determination if it interferes with progressive politics. The primordial ethnic community, developed by historical contingencies, appears to provide merely a handy social armature for the construction of an institutionalized order, which is capable of self-consciously implementing an improving governance. It's not clear that expression of the organization through a sorting-out of national groups is good in itself. That is, it's not clear that, for Mill, nationalism is any more than handy. So, Mill isn't proposing a nationalist politics, and is not arguing that politics ought to build on a prior order arising from some historical basement; he says the

historical order provides a handy scaffolding for the building of what is important. Mill's caveat is that the natural historical mosaic of national geography will not provide a foundation for anything good of itself; it provides expedient foundations for pursuit of policies which themselves will result in good.

## SECTION III. HOW MANY PEOPLES ARE TOO MANY, AND WHY?

Liberal fidelity to Wilsonian nationalism is much diminished since the height of its expression in the first quarter of this century. One might begin by observing that its originator was from a country which officially eschewed internal division on the ethnic principle; but this is more irony than exceptionalism. So I'll begin instead by noting that the Wilsonian principle was originally not even applied to Europe's colonial dependencies, but just to Europe. But even in Europe there was a procedural failure to push the principle to its logical conclusion of congruence between state and culture; and this became evident at the outset with a series of compromises and combinations in the construction of new states to replace the recently-defunct multinational European dynastic states. More recently, the decolonization process of the century's third quarter produced new states which are congruent with old colonial boundaries. This in turn leads to the anomaly of so-called nation-building: creating national consciousnesses which are supposed to be analogous to those political attitudes from which the procedural politics of state formation emerges, but (in these cases) after the fact of state formation instead of prior to it. Contemporary nation-building, then,

becomes Wilsonianism in reverse. This inversion resembles the inversions of Mill's analysis which I mentioned earlier, especially the case of South Africa.

Also, and more germane to normative philosophy, there was the ethical failure of the principle as policy. This latter problem is roughly summarized: claims to sovereignty based upon historical singularity, or a "thisness" of ethnicity, lead to violent efforts to realize the idealized thisness by cleansing it of what is not included in the thisness. The de-Teutonization of the non-German states of central and Balkan Europe just after World War II, and of course the ethnic carnage in the states succeeding to Wilson's Yugoslavia exemplify this.

So, Wilsonianism has very often inverted Mill's program of liberal progress. I noted that, on Mill's view, where ethnicity inhibits liberal progressive programs, it should be overridden. That is, nationalism is a political doctrine based upon ethnicity as an historical sanction; but the strength of the sanction seems an inverse function of its acceptability to the liberal philosophy of political individualism. Mill claimed that where populations are mixed together, they must severally tolerate the situation. But, from this, and from the evidence of the current century, it would seem to follow that the state which governs such a historical congeries must be legitimized on non-nationalist principles. Mill provided no cogent liberal argument for the legitimacy of a nationalist regime ruling another nationality, though of course the most successful liberal Western states did exactly that in the administration of their extensive empires. This leads to a third failure of the principle, which is most closely germane to my discussion: the logical failure of

the principle. By this I mean that, if ethnic distinctions cannot be taken up as implements within programs of liberal political organization, then nationalism and liberalism will be contradictory principles. I'll not try to refute this; rather, I'll try to defend the notion that this philosophical problem is less urgent in the context of political compromise than it is in the context of conceptual tidiness.

In this section however, I want to briefly examine the other problem: the legitimacy of a political program of limited national proliferation. Ethnic justification for state-formation must compete with other political interests; but this does not itself mean the principle itself is flawed. Any array of territorial states is built upon some prior geographical granularity, as well as upon whatever other spatial granularities are invoked by the current operative principle. The principle in this case is the nationalist one, but it might be something else: countries should be congruent with geophysical provinces; countries should be congruent with biotic provinces, etc. There is a predisposition to steer the nationalist program within limits which are procedural and politically expedient, rather than remain faithful to the principle of an objective historical granulation.

There is a common point made by many writers, that the world simply cannot sustain the multiplication of nations beyond some unspecified practical limit. Arguments for this are, I've found, sketchy; and it appears they reflect a curiously docile acceptance of what seems a simple historical prejudice. Sanford Levinson, for instance, discussing Yael Tamir, criticizes the extreme nationalist principle that every nation is entitled to a state, on grounds of sheer

political impracticality.[23] The exigencies of real-world politically activity, which must attend the formation of an actual state out of the collective desire to be nationally distinct, will too often outweigh the principle. There would be too much bloodshed in the breakup of existing states into their constituent nations, and here Levinson mentions Bosnia as an example. The irony of this example is that Yugoslavia was precisely one of the political compromises which were supposed to create composite-but-viable states out of the patchwork of politically unviable nationalities in 1919.

Even if we concede that the number of nationalities is somehow numerable, and that they deserve their own states according to some agreed-upon criterion, there are difficulties in the way of realizing the principle. Most writers who approach the issue remark that there are "too many" nationalities: the world doesn't have the geographical room for all the states: there are more potential states than viable states. Is that so? And why?

Some writers claim that relatively few of the potential nationalisms results in successful nationalist movements. Taking language as an indicator of potential national differentiation, Spinner says that there are 8,000 languages but 200 states and at most 600 national movements, so 10% of potential nations are self-expressed.[24] The assumption that each nation should have its state is problematic, mainly because so many are dispersed minorities. But Spinner claims that nationalism cannot be rejected by liberals, mainly because of the persistence of national identity through language, though many languages are disappearing. Still, he suggests that liberalism should "push states past" the historically contingent principle of nationalism because not every nation can have its state.[25]

Eric Hobsbawm criticizes subjective, self-definitions of nationalism; and, to the point here, he observes that "it can lead the incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or to create or to recreate a nation is the will to be one: if enough inhabitants of the Isle of Wight wanted to be a Wightian nation, there would be one."[26] Hobsbawm doesn't explain why the idea of an independent Wightian national state should be so summarily dismissed; but then the whole notion of summary dismissal carries the implication that explanation is superfluous, and so here it is to be taken as obvious that the Wightians are not to be accorded the consideration given by some persons to, say, East Timorese, or Corsicans or Tigreans.

Hobsbawm's dismissal probably counts as the sort of objective constraint Yael Tamir describes when she argues that a nation, in addition to being self-identified, must be something distinguishable to an outsider.[27] We may presume that even if all the inhabitants of the Isle of Wight harbored the <u>secret</u>, totally uncommunicated wish that their island sever its political connections with the U.K., there would be no real consequence. However, if they openly and collectively promulgated a list of grievances comparable to those of, say, the Catholic population of Ulster or the Muslim population of Chechnya, coupled with a persistent and violent campaign for secession, then outsiders, and I think even including Hobsbawm, would have to concede that there were objective grounds for weighing the justifications of the Wightian nationalist movement. To generalize upon this unlikelihood, it would be difficult to imagine a common, widespread and yet <u>undisclosed</u> "will to be" a nation; and so its public expression, together with public assessment of this expression,

will frequently constitute the objective criterion which Hobsbawm, Tamir, and others require. So, Hobsbawm's example is meant as a frivolous caricature, based upon a majoritarian English impression of the regional character, or lack thereof, of the population of the Isle of Wight.

In a similar vein, Ernest Gellner talked darkly about post-Soviet "fleas-on-fleas": endlessly finer nationalisms reemerging within the political rubble left by the collapse of the Soviet system.[28] In this case however, there is a recent history of political manipulation and intervention relating directly to ethnic identity. The Soviet Union was organized on ethnic principles, and the Russian Republic still is. However, the corresponding political units were repeatedly reorganized, dissolved and reformed; and Joseph Stalin's pharaonic population transfers have left complex hostilities and bitterness. Population collectivities with strident ethnic claims which are exacerbated by this treatment are what alarmed Gellner. He found this divisive post-Soviet nationalism echoed the collapse of the Habsburg state. Gellner was intellectually attached to the potpourri Habsburg system, in its terminal, proto-liberal phase, to judge from his final essays; and this despite, or because of the promotion of its successor states by the Wilsonian program.

We can briefly compare Hobsbawm's attitude toward a Wightian state to Gellner's attitude toward the successors to the Romanov-Soviet and the Habsburg states. The Isle of Wight is a peaceful, sunny sort of place. But just suppose that, early in the 18th century, a determined anti-Hanoverian movement had been resident there. It is just possible that an equally determined Parliament, frightened of possible collusion between this group and the Highlanders promoting the Stuart

cause, might have rounded up much of the Wightian population and deported them to some distant colony, where they would have sulked like Mill's Celts for a century or two, until their descendants were finally encouraged to return to the lost homeland. Nothing remotely like this happened, but this is something like the pattern for some of the populations to which Gellner refers. These are the sorts of events which go to create an ethnicity: a narrative to which people can appeal in determining their social identity. It is the absence of this which makes the Isle of Wight seem to be an example of a place which could not reasonably make nationalist claims.

Gellner claims that while non-egoistic ethnicity is not contradictory, it is also not a practicality. That is, one may concede the unobjectionable fact of nationalist pluralism, and one may even favor the principle of a very finely textured plurality of nationalisms. But as a matter of historical fact, nations exist in competition and conflict. Now from this Gellner concludes that there are too many potential nationalisms; not all potential nation-states can exist. Since politics is contention, then there is an upper practical limit to the number of countries, since they must be viable in a situation of mutual-adversary circumstance. Thus, the world "contains room for a certain number of independent or autonomous political units. On any reasonable calculation, the former number (of potential nations) is probably much, much larger than that of possible viable states." [30] Gellner, like Spinner, estimates the number of languages at 8,000. So, if we equate language with culture, then linguistic nationalism, when moderated by reasonableness, is not sufficient to drive state-formation.

This is a refrain throughout Gellner's political ruminations: that

there is competition between countries precisely because there are too many, just as there is a market because there is a shortage. This linkage inverts the anthropological argument of van den Berghe that kinship, as a communal nepotism, leads to the concept of exclusion, and thus to the institutionalized notion that there are Others, from which it follows that We must contend with Them. What I'm getting at here is that Gellner's claim implies that only after the link between the ethnic phenomenon and the political phenomenon is established, does it follow that the world cannot have an indefinitely fine ethnic texture. If there were no nationalism (by which I mean: if ethnicity were not a principle of political legitimacy, whatever else it might be), then perhaps states, being legitimized on other principles, could contain indefinitely large numbers of discrete ethnic societies. But this is confirmed, in a manner, by Anderson's theories of historically-emergent ethnicity, which I'll discuss in chapter three.

As I said, Sanford Levinson claims there are too many ethnicities for each to exist within its state, in the world as it is. But beyond this negative reason he offers another, positive, reason for constraining state formation. Self-determination for everyone would mean that every political unit would be internally homogeneous. But, he claims an ethnically diverse environment is more "interesting"; and homogeneity by contrast is "boring".[31] Levinson's choice of terms might suggest a degree of self-absorption, and an attitude of world-as-theater; but a less ungenerous reading seems as likely, in which Levinson is restating Joseph Raz's appeal to the worth of rich social context for fuller autonomy of choice. In Levinson's version, whatever needs the urge to communal exclusivity might fill must be balanced against the need for richer communal context.

Yael Tamir notes the persistence of a lack of sympathy toward secession states by existing states; she notes that the Wilsonian program "fused together" smaller nationalities into plural states; subsequently secessionist movements were not encouraged.[32] In light of the right of self-determination, what are we to make of numerous stateless national minorities throughout the purported nation-states of western Europe? Tamir also notes that both the League and the UN have had only states as members, no stateless nations, in "palpable disregard" of the principle of nationality.[33]

I noted that the claim of an upper numerical limit to nation-states is widespread in the literature, but never critically defended. Some geographical regions are a patchwork of little ethnic states; some regions have a small number of large multi-ethnic states. Some national states have successfully swallowed up ethnic groups into their own more extensive and inclusive nationality. There is no obvious and general reason why there could not be two or four or eight times as many states as there are now, since it seems clear that many states' political establishments are content to exist in a client relationship to a regional power. So, it's not clear why some global principle, failures such as Bosnia notwithstanding, should militate against increasingly finer political texture. All recent imperial systems, including finally the Russian, have disintegrated into many states. For the reasons why, for instance, France seems unlikely to break up into its former cultural regions, while the amalgamated Slavic states did, we have to examine the differences between French history and Slavic history. The limit to fine texture may be a function of the persuasiveness of local historical explanation.

But still this claim of numerical limitation has legitimacy, because

there appears to be no limit to the fine-texture of local claims to autonomy based on local ethnic difference. Linguistic difference is most often taken as the distinguishing feature of a nationality, but this is historically arbitrary, and so there could be more than the six-to-eight thousand "nations" usually mentioned as an upper limit in principle. Apart from linguistic differentiation, other distinguishing features, at ever-finer textures, are visible at closer inspection. For instance, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, where Italy is comfortably pictured as a single country by most non-Italians, very many Italians see a congeries of historically distinct regions, varying by dialect if not language; but more significantly to Italians, the historical districts of Italy vary simply by the details of their historical development. Clifford Geertz, for one, remarks on the strong regionalism of the modern Italian state.[34] The populations of some of these regions harbor separatist attitudes.

At a still finer texture (one which would probably provoke Hobsbawm's urge to dismiss), the Grand Duchy of Liechtenstein, technically sovereign, is a union of two medieval states of Vaduz and Schellenburg, with (I've been informed anecdotally) recognizably distinct local dialects of Alpine German. At the moment there seem to be no Schellenburger separatists, prepared to take the Grand Duchy's hinterland into secession from its sophisticated capital province; but should any animus develop within this country, there would already exist the sorts of historical distinctions which are employed to justify claims for national sovereignty. So, the question becomes, which regions of the world retain textures of this sort down to comparably fine granulation? Perhaps some regions are historically more suitable than others for very much finer national textures. This

suitability, or lack thereof, must be analyzed before making the general assertions I have reported here.

One could defend Gellner's conclusion, if not the misgivings which provoke it, by arguing analytically that, beyond a certain degree of multiplicity of peoples, a general appreciation of the extent of this multiplicity is not possible; and since, on the two-part definition of nationality, it requires discrimination by observers, then there would be an upper limit to the powers of objective discrimination. But the objective-discrimination requirement does not entail that every micro-ethnicity be globally discriminable. If we argue that it does, then we must note that most people in the civilized world are not aware of the details of local difference in other parts of the world. On the other hand it is quite possibly true that at least some of the inhabitants of every village in existence can discriminate themselves from at least some of the inhabitants of each of the neighboring villages, based on the fact that they come from different villages. Now, would this count as Hobsbawm's and Tamir's objective distinction? They might counter that village-to-village discrimination is local, idiosyncratic, and hence subjective rather than objective. What are the terms of identity here? Must we be satisfied with the villagers' criteria for discrimination? More radically, must the villagers be satisfied that they have adequate criteria?

Subjective criteria for ethnic identity can be as murky as objective criteria. In an ethnographic investigation of the Dutch province of Friesland, Cynthia Mahmood and Sharon Armstrong report that some Frisians are "frustrated" at not being able to define themselves in terms of the specific and traditional characteristics which, as it happens, Mill mentioned.[35] There does not seem to be a concise,

definable array of factions among Frisians on the nature of their cultural status. Not all Frisians even regard themselves as culturally distinct from the Dutch. The problem here may go beyond the simple one of interpenetrating groups which are expected to have equal ontological status in their "essences". It may translate to a criticism of the idea of ethnicity as requiring objective categorization of collections of individuals. If groups are self-identified by self-defined criteria, then their extent and constitution may be unconformable across the class of such groups: that is, there may be no class of ethnicities in the sense that there are no defining characteristics, not even an overlapping set, but rather merely a set of locally-stipulated relationships. In such a situation, self-identity may be established by means of a completely particularist technique such as inclusion in a narrative: telling the story of identity in terms of Us and Other. Identity through narrative will be the topic of chapter four.

## NOTES

1. Spinner 1994, p.25
2. Ibid., p.25
3. Ignatieff 1993, p.5
4. Tamir 1995. This point is discussed in the new preface to the paperback edition.
5. Gellner 1983, p.1
6. Ibid.
7. Hobsbawm 1992, passim
8. Ibid., pp.63-4
9. Ibid., p.65
10. Dvornik 1949, preface p.iii
11. Renner, Karl; "The Development of the National Idea"; in Bottomore & Goode 1978, p.118
12. Hobsbawm 1992, p.73

13. Ibid., p.101
14. Mill 1872 (1991), p.308
15. Ibid., p.314
16. Ibid., p.310
17. Ibid., p.309
18. White 1988, p.313
19. Mill 1991 p.313
20. Spinner 1994, p.141 reference to E. Weber 1966.
21. Mill 1991 pp.308-9
22. Raz 1986, p.423
23. Levinson p.632
24. Spinner 1994, pp.141-2; but on the number of ethnicities, note that United States UN-Ambassador-Designate Richard Holbrook estimates it at 3,000 (address to National Press Club, Washington, June 18 1998).
25. Ibid., p.164
26. Hobsbawm 1990, pp.7-8
27. Tamir 1993, pp.65-6
28. Gellner 1994, p.177
29. Gellner 1994, pp.77-79
30. Gellner 1983, p.2
31. Levinson 1995, p.631
32. Tamir 1993, p.143
33. Ibid.
34. Geertz 1973, p.315
35. Mahmood and Armstrong 1992, pp.2-3

# CHAPTER THREE: ETHNICITY AS A NATURAL PRODUCT

## SECTION I. HISTORY AS NON-DETRITAL

In this chapter and the following one I'll discuss some arguments for dynamic formation of the ethnic phenomenon. A variety of theories have been proposed by historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and literature scholars, which converge upon a general conclusion: that the ethnic phenomenon exists as the product of an ongoing process. Some of these theories are developed from consideration of social phenomena only; some develop out of naturalistic considerations. Further, insofar as one finds in these theories the social philosopher's distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of ethnicity, the forms do not have clearly separable dynamics. What appears to be the detrital version, or blood-ethnicity, can even be a product of a sensibility developed within the civic version.

My study is well-larded with anecdote. If it is appropriate to reiterate at certain points explanations, or even apologies, for the anecdotal tendencies manifested in the study, then at this point the reiteration takes the form of a reminder: that the philosophical arguments concerning the normative aspects of the topic depend heavily upon historical examples; and for so many arguments there are contrary historical data which will count against many of the general conclusions drawn. It is important, I believe, to avoid having a too-narrow repertoire of for-instances; so that the generalizations which are harnessed into use as premises will be sufficiently broad to carry

conviction.

I appeal to historical method on this point. Some philosophers think social philosophy deals with Society, in the way physics deals with the (universal, completely generalized) material world; and this construction is inadequately defended. I hasten to add that some philosophers cautiously qualify their treatments, though I'm not sure they are as careful as they are cautious. Thus Rawls says his social model is a closed system meant to apply to modern market-economy societies.[1] Societies with market economies are notably open, not closed. Joseph Raz gently dismisses primitive societies while discussing liberal tolerance.[2] History and sociology deal with societies rather than Society. If social philosophy deals with Society as essentially singular, rather than dealing with societies as a diffuse array, then it strikes me that social philosophers should demonstrate that the version they discuss is in fact the ur-society, from which particular societies can be derived. Failing this, it is possible they are dealing with one of the derivative instances and mistaking it for the essence.

Societies are historically contingent entities. Historical arguments, as such, convince through coherence: there is a narrative which explains how a human state of affairs got to be what it is, and this narrative consists of the selection that we fit which does fit: which is coherent. So, evidence about the nature of a particular social dynamic will have to depend upon the historical development of that society, and the evidence for one story about that development will be that story's internal and external coherence. But mere coherence provides only very weak cogency for philosophical generalizing, if we insist upon moving from an example to the category

of which it is a member. To say of each of several societies that the narrative describing it is coherent and so explains it doesn't assist us toward a general explanation unless the narratives conform with each other in a way that produces a super-narrative. But then we are back at the ur-society; and I began by objecting that the mass of divergent historical instance and counter-instance militates against such a handy construct.

Another way of accommodating many instances into a generalization is to fit the narratives together as parts of the super-narrative; so that rather than being instances of it, they are parts of it. There is no general category into which particular cases need be conformed; everything becomes one particularity, with its parts related by means of their relationships rather than the similarity of their characteristics. I have in mind something akin to Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, but with (I believe) an even weaker sense of legitimation, or identity, through membership. The metaphorical term I adopt here is "constellation". Constellations have components, or elements, which belong to it by virtue of their relation to the other components, but not by virtue of their internal characteristics. Examination of each component in isolation will not reveal its relationship to the other components, nor even its membership in the class of components. The relevance of this tactic of demonstration though coherence will become clearer in the next chapter, in my discussion of Edward Said's notions about projecting a social identity upon (colonialized) aliens. In general though, I want to say we do not make sense out of a set of social relationships by relating the set to a norm emanating from an ur-society. Rather, we find its internal coherence to be what makes sense.

Europe is the original model for nationalist theory and policy, as well as being the cultural origin of most of the academics to be considered here; and so provides the most common instance for social modeling. The post-war spirit of cooperation among Europe's western democratic states indicates that perhaps competitive nationalism is waning. On the other hand the current (1990's) proliferation of nationalisms emerging from the collapsed remains of central and eastern European socialist systems suggest ethnicity is a systemic persistence rather than a passive detritus. Ethnic communalism persists in some of the ex-colonial regions of Asia and Africa, which have political geographies drawn up in previous centuries by European administrators. These periods of imposed politics (Leninist and imperial, respectively) did not seem to have obliterated previous communal identities.

Social historians and social commentators have long argued that traditional societies within European-style political systems (whether capitalist or socialist) would lose this "vestigial" concept of common descent into ethnic groups and acquire new social structures based on class, market dynamics, regional or civic affiliations: whatever rational preference came to dominate. But this didn't happen. The large scale structures of imperialism and communism seemed only to suppress ethnism. Further, this regenerative ability doesn't appear to be a new phenomenon. To take one example, R. G. Collingwood noted a similar persistence of Celtic culture surviving a long submergence in Roman-hegemonous Britain.[3] It's not clear these examples of local culture persisting during submergence in some larger political structure will qualify as nationalism, and so I'll develop definitions and distinctions in an effort to establish a clearer taxonomy.

I've discussed the view that ethnic sentiment, even in its "bad" version, provides a handy social armature for the development of more laudable civic communal sentiments, so that the bad one is tolerated as a sometimes useful historical detritus, while the good one is considered to have net political worthiness. This attitude is implicit in Mill. However, and apart from the problem of persistence, there is the question of dynamic formation. If ethnicity is merely detrital, it is stubbornly so; but perhaps it is not detrital, but rather an ongoing social process. Richard Alba offers a description of what appears to be a new, white American ethnicity emerging from an amalgam of European groups.[4]

The concept of detritus I'm employing requires explanation. There is a sense in which the circumstances of the present moment are the detritus of the events of the previous moment: the present is what the past has left us. Here I appeal to a metaphor from natural science. Writers of introductory textbooks and popular expositions on geology frequently invoke a sense of endless transformation when they suggest that <u>every</u> landscape is the detritus of a former landscape, wrecked by endless geological processes. This image is derived from the 18th-century enlightenment, from James Hutton's idea of a deistically-run constant Earth. Whether or not this all-covering sense of the detrital is appropriate to geological process, it does not sit comfortably with our sense of human history.

History, as an explanatory narrative of what people have done, will have to include more than a list of the succession of events. It will include an explanation of participants' intentions, and so must include consideration of the efficacy, as well as merely the results, of intentional action. Both natural events and intentional acts have

results; but unlike events, acts are accompanied by anticipations, evaluations, etc.; and commonly culminate in satisfaction, disappointment, or a mixture of both. Thinking of the present moment as merely the detritus of the past implies that there is no telos, just process, and that strips intentional significance from the present. But then the present is identified by its occupants as a culmination, culminating in ourselves, who are laboring to make sense of how the culmination turned out to be ourselves.

By contrast, and merely as a passing observation, Hutton wrote in the same age as Gibbon, who opined that the European world had only just managed to struggle back to a qualitative state at par with that of ancient Rome. The calamitous disintegration of the classical world had produced nearly a millennium and a half of what could be called historical detritus. Augustine's reportage at the commencement of this period might be taken as a forecast of it. The image of the lost Golden Age has been much more common in social thinking than the modern conception of inevitable progress; and so the comparison between geology and history is perhaps more apt for other historical periods than for our own curious one.

Detritus, or detrital consequences, seem rather to be the part of the consequences of the past we moderns believe we can do without. Put another way, it's what we confer <u>in</u>significance, or irrelevance, upon. Castoffs as-such are discriminated from products as-such through our grasp of history-as-seen. But the distinction does not result in categories with fixed contents; because we revise our historical judgment from historical period to period. Since we like to think we are not the detritus, but rather the intention, of the past, this makes the diachronic denotation of "we" disturbingly

problematic.

Models are abstractions: a model of something is what is believed to be essential to that thing to make it as it is. Historical reconstructions are models of what we think has been non-detrital in the past: what has led to what we believe we see as the present. If we included everything in the past we would have a model of virtually infinite complexity, as it were, of scale 1:1. If we did not model our enquiry into the past as a search for the antecedents of a situation (not necessarily the present one), then we would have merely a random sampling of that past. Historians do employ cliometric techniques for collecting data to be used in assembling an image of a past situation; but this sampling is not purely random. A purely random selection of historical events might be quite interesting as a theater of trivia, but it would be literally pointless as explanation. So, it would not be practical to simply eschew model-making. The "model-eschewed model" of history leaves out all teleological import. It's necessary to select-out from the indefinitely large number of antecedents to the present.

## SECTION II. VAN DEN BERGHE'S DARWINIAN ETHNICITY

If ethnic communitarianism is autonomy-reducing and, in consequence of that, harm-producing, then if it is not detrital, proponents of the liberal social philosophy should be alarmed. In a still-gloomier scenario, ethnicity is not merely non-detrital, not merely a misjudgment systemic within some particular historical phase of social activity, but is encoded directly into the human genome. Pierre van

den Berghe's 1981 The Ethnic Phenomenon presents a theory of ethnicity which is such a materialist vision. Van den Berghe is cautionary in his approach: the phenomenon is a severe, chronic problem. But while the ethnic propensity is, he argues, biologically determined, its harmful effects may not be determined. We are doomed, as it were, to form exclusive groups, but not necessarily the groups we happen to form; so that being, say, a Serb (one of the current decade's collective villains) is not encoded. Rather, what is encoded is having the tendencies which result in the sorts of communities of which Serbian society is an example, along with the very many societies which are not noticeably villainous.

Van den Berghe proposes a taxonomy of functional social types based upon a Darwinian sociobiological theory. He argues that ethnicity and race are extensions of kinship, and so the associated ideologies of ethnocentrism and racism are extensions of an innate urge toward kinship nepotism. (Racism then becomes a curiously modern social phenomenon, epiphenomenal to ethnocentrism.) In his theory, ethnic behavior arises as a derivative of kin-nepotism which is biologically selected-for; thus it persists in contemporary society at a much deeper level than historical detritus. This however determines no other generic features of human society, nor anything about any particulars of a given society: human nature simply includes generic sociability. Behavior responds to the demands of environment, and humans can alter environment (habitat) through cultural activity. Many creatures, from termites to beavers, alter habitat by means of genetically-endowed abilities. Humans alter the habitat-altering mechanism itself: historically transformable culture. Thus it is precisely mistaken to expect any one kind of society to be the result

of human nature.

I note here that Yael Tamir is in agreement on the gist of this idea. Beginning with the observation that political liberalism presupposes a universalist view of mankind, thus legitimizing the program if not the cogency of arguing for universalist views, she then observes that there is a fundamental communal nature in humans, based on the contemporary observation of the pervasiveness of human community, which today is widely expressed as nationalism.[5] Van den Berghe is offering a biological hypothesis on a very similar observation.

Van den Berghe's Darwinian argument for dynamic ethnicity is based upon reciprocity of action as a survival trait. He observes that animals, even unrelated ones, cooperate when it increases fitness. He notes that "until a few thousand years ago, the size limits of recognition [of other individuals] were roughly coterminous with the size of human societies"[6] That is, humans lived in small functional social units, aware of other humans as individuals. Tribal existence is "characterized by internal peace, preferential endogamy, and common ancestry (real or putative)", which is what he theories is the "primeval model of the human ethnic group."[7] Van den Berghe's argument here is that human societies evolved at the population-limit of recognition of individuals by individuals. Everyone's connection to everyone else was personal. At the size-limits of societies, innate reciprocity gives rise to a free-rider problem: an advantage goes to one who does not reciprocate; and so <u>detection</u> <u>of</u> free-riding is selected-for. This becomes the historical tendency toward ethnic exclusion.

It's important to emphasize what van den Berghe does not say: that

ever more complex forms of reciprocity and cheating on it are genetically selected-for; that would be amount to racial determinism. Rather, a generic ability to create and complexify such behavior through cultural modification is selected-for. Hence the ethnic phenomenon of giving individual preference to socially-adaptive behavior arises as a means of ensuring reciprocity. This has the effect of protecting and promoting such socially-adaptive behavior as aids species-persistence, which allows the species to achieve a rate-of-adaptation which outstrips its genetic ability to adapt physically through genetic selection. That is, history has a greater velocity than evolution, and so the capacity to generate history (in the Collingwoodian sense) has been selected-for. Humans have evolved the ability to create communities based on novel and increasingly successful coping behavior, and to develop this behavior continuously so as to ensure that individuals will know when they are dealing with community members and when they are dealing with outsiders who may be intent on masquerading as members to obtain the benefits of membership.

Societies have expanded beyond the point where one-to-one recognition is possible, and so the kin-recognition required to deal with free riders must take place by means of markers other than individual identities. Van den Berghe identifies three types of these markers. One type is genetically transmitted phenotype e.g. pigmentation, stature, facial structure. This is not behavioral adaption, and van den Berghe has included it (it would seem) in order to explain (what he contends is historically recent) racism. He asserts that this marker would not have been useful in prehistoric times as there were no visible racial gradients from one tribal group

to another, and thus the possibility of racism awaited imperialism to become significant, when a metropolitan society could control a distant population beyond the immediate phenotype-gradient. We might note that though this marker may be anthropologically recent, it's historically distant: early dynastic Egyptian bas-reliefs display clearly distinct physiognomies of emissaries and captives; but perhaps this point is less relevant than interesting here.

A second type of kin-recognition marker is artifactual, e.g. costumes, adornments and body mutilations. The third type is behavioral convention which includes language, manner, and what he calls "esoteric lore": the sorts of activities which make community members comfortable with each other. The perfectly decent manners of one community are outrageous in the context of the perfectly decent manners of another community. It's not clear why these two types of markers should be distinguished, since the using (wearing, displaying, etc.) of artifacts, as well of course as their production, calls upon the correct lore.

I want to briefly interject here that this theory of recognition marker will be echoed in discussions of socially-generated ethnic distinction, in the next chapter. Ernest Gellner talks about the standardization of cultural attitudes from high-culture norms downward in order to establish a mass society which will be able to communicate and cooperate internally. Edward Said, getting at a similar point, emphasizes the use of standard bodies of literature to establish social identity, so that the body of Shakespeare-readers, or would-be Shakespeare-readers, define a national group through that particular "esoteric lore".

Van den Berghe's central point is that social structures and

behaviors which depend upon attitudes of ethnic affiliation and exclusion do not merely form an accidental historical basement. That is, the tendencies of affiliation and exclusion aren't local accidents of attitude, so that the particulars of a given ethnic group are not easily homogenized with its neighboring counterpart by a later tendency or structure, for instance by the universalizing influence of rational civic activity under liberal principles. Ethnic phenomena persist, as is seen in the fact that when one is suppressed by some process of attenuation or attempted assimilation, it reemerges, as in Collingwood's example which I mentioned. Moreover, if an ethnicity is lost, it is replaced by a new one. From this, one suspects van den Berghe would be skeptical of John Stuart Mill's program of enlightened assimilation of civilization's rude fringes of Irish, Berbers, Cossacks, etc.

Contemporary social commentators commonly remark that the world is becoming increasingly homogenized. However, at the individual level, van den Berghe claims that only "a few genuine cosmopolites" seem not vulnerable to the ethnic tendency.[8] This claim prompts a tangential observation: if we are genetically predisposed to accelerate our adaptive capability by social evolution, then if this social evolution is accomplished by the societizing influence of near kin, peers and other immediate social influences, then if we are encouraged to be rogue cosmopolitans, that will be our societizing adaptation. That is, it's inconsistent to maintain that cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with the predisposition to be culturally adaptive, unless it can be shown that this sort of personality more commonly arises by some other means.

Van den Berghe's view of cosmopolitanism can be contested. In a

contrasting view, Charles Taylor refers to the increasing concern on the part of western liberal society for the global community as approaching a generality which is "coterminous with the human race".[9] There is a subtly implicit disagreement with van den Berghe's view in the theories of Ernest Gellner and Michael Walzer, who propose variations on the concept of authority-pluralism in liberal society.[10] Gellner's modular man and Walzer's interconnected spheres represent the possibility of multiple membership, or complex banding. Is this a further consequence of the genetic predisposition to find "better" ways to band-and-exclude? And, Edward Said would be one of those "few", to judge from his self-description as falling between cultures in his 1993 Culture and Imperialism, which I'll examine in the next chapter. The apparently contrary view of van den Berghe can, I believe, be accommodated with the assistance of Said's, and Anderson's theories.

In terms of portions of total populations, however, it seems clear that van den Berghe is correct about the dearth of cosmopolites. Less clear is how this should be interpreted under liberal principles of universal concern. One possibility, not addressed by him, is that the cosmopolitan may simply be attached to a much larger community: the "West", for instance, one of Benedict Anderson's culture-ecumenes which will be discussed in the next chapter. A double distinction should be made here. First, we should distinguish two forms of what could be called null-parochialiam or non-parochialism. On the one hand there is a version of value detachment often called "cosmopolitan" in a critical sense of lack of commitment. Stephen Toulmin points out that "cosmos" plus "polis" indicates a congruence of natural and social order.[11] Van den Berghe clearly would disagree

with the idea of Toulmin's sense transformed into policy, since our natural propensities are, he fears, leading us to social catastrophe on the one hand, and universal concern on the other. Both of these are contrary to parochial focus of interest. Detachment would seem contrary to the "hard-wired" predisposition for reciprocal assistance which van den Berghe proposes. But then, universal concern would seem contrary to the concomitant predisposition of exclusion.

The second of the two distinctions I propose is that we should distinguish doubting the fact of a prevalence of either or both forms of null-parochialism, from normative criticism of either of them. Christopher Lasch admits to being "left a little cold" by Tom Paine's "humanitarianism".[12] Paine's famous claim, "my country is the world", seems an instance of enlightenment cosmopolitanism, one which Taylor would confirm is prevalent today. Lasch wants to argue for the moral propriety of a sense of local affinity, slipping in a implicit definition of the local. For both the distinctions I propose, and especially in light of what we at the end of the 20th century are told is increasing globalization, it becomes important to get very clear the question: how local is local? Earlier I argued that while John Stuart Mill was right in saying communities embody their own historical narratives, he was perhaps overconfident in thinking that access to this narrative is unfettered. The sense of the local will <u>be</u> local, and not necessarily rely upon a liberal conceptual overlay, especially one that is claimed to have global application.

In an instance of this problem--what I would call "problematic localness"-- the Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulic describes how communist Yugoslavia did not permit what she calls civil society, meaning no ethnic or religious affiliations; but permitted only a

universal polity based on the overcoming of class and other historical divisions.[13] So, being Croatian was nothing special; nationalities existed only in people's heads. But the disintegration of the old Yugoslav state brought about what she calls a robbery of the self: a rehomogenization of her identity into the Croatian population. Western liberals might question the depth of a selfhood created within a communist state; but on the other hand there is no reason to doubt that Drakulic is not accurately reporting the sense of loss of a self which was not sensitive to old ethnic affinities, but rather which valued a much more generalized sense of socialist community embodied in the south Slav state. Drakulic was obliged to flee Zagreb for Ljubljana, and reports her discomfiture at being told by Slovenes that they were being generous to Croatian refugees such as herself. Her destitution was less important than her loss of a relatively more cosmopolitan individuality as a Yugoslav.

In another contemporary example, Ulster Unionists are alarmed at the prospects of Irish Republican influence in the affairs of their province; and they talk about how being British is increasingly anachronistic, now that the parts of the historically recent (Georgian-Victorian) British state are devolving, and its remaining imperial rituals, such as Empire Day, are clearly fossilized.[14] My discussion of Edward Said in the next chapter should make this example clearer; for now I'll suggest that it can be argued Britishness is a condition of extended nationality, stipulated by the majoritarian English ruling establishment of a multi-ethnic state. This stipulated nationality has enjoyed a much more general and persistent acceptance than the stipulated Yugoslav nationality.

Van den Berghe claims that a policy of stipulative ethnicity will

not always be politically successful, and points to the failure of French policy in assimilating the populations of overseas colonies. But then sometimes it seems to work. An earlier French policy, which he does not mention, was successful: the linguistic assimilation of non-French, or less-French, populations already in the French state, in the second quarter of the last century, by a regime which also changed the royal style to "King of the French", thus overlaying an earlier, dynastic, state legitimacy with nationalist state legitimacy. Anecdotes about being socialist-Yugoslavian, imperial-British, Orleans-French, are intended to lend modest support to my speculation that van den Berghe and Lasch are overgeneralizing about the limiting boundaries of cosmopolitanism and parochialism.

Van den Berghe offers a critical historical sketch of the progress of the science of human nature. In this sketch he characterizes the contemporary liberal view as having incorrectly conflated ideological convictions with empirical observations, to arrive at an ideologically-correct view that racism and ethnocentrism are "irrational, dysfunctional attitudes"; thus, in conforming observation to ideology, these two concepts are "traditional residues of previous eras and would be eroded by the forces of urbanization, industrialism, modernization,..."[15] He notes that an essentially similar view was developed in the Marxist world.

Van den Berghe points out that concepts from social science have been grafted onto national and especially post-imperial politics. The term "nation" is often appropriated as a label for preexisting political entities to legitimate them with politically correct value-terms. This would include both preexisting dynastic sovereignties as well as dependent territories (colonies, protected states, etc.) which

recently became sovereign. Thus, since states should be nations, the dominant social elements of a princedom or an ex-colony stipulate that their state is a nation, which means any internal demographic cleavage, any granulation in population, is either residual (aboriginal), illegitimate (seditious) or a problem of discriminate porosity (immigrant); in any case it is not a neutral circumstance but rather a problem to be handled by a policy which presupposes the propriety of congruence of nation and state and which consequently promotes assimilation, repression, or expulsion. Besides the Marxist states, centralized Latin American states and newly independent Asian and African states adopted this policy, labeling internal ethnic groups as "tribalism". The instances of conflict between substantially recalcitrant "residual" ethnicities and the "legitimate" nationality then sometimes becomes the distinction between losing and winning sides, or who has the better militia.

The connections van den Berghe wants to make between genetics, behavioral sciences, and colonial politics can be sorted out. His naturalistic approach to an explanation of ethnicity is based on his operationalist vision of science as a means of obtaining useful statements, normative as well as predictive, about the world. Science is not ideological; rather it is procedural, but nor is it entirely detached from ideology. For one thing, the history of science cannot disregard the ideology of scientists, since ideology has often led scientists in the directions they have taken. That is, the way scientists do what they do may perhaps be ideologically neutral, but the choice of what they investigate, and the social consequences of their findings are not always neutral. This second connection is germane here. Ideology may be developed from scientific conclusions,

and the logic of this development may be faulty, quite apart from the accuracy of the scientific work. Van den Berghe would say that, despite this, if science is not innately ideological, then there can be no justification based on social values for leaving humans out of the list of things described by natural science.

Van den Berghe's conception of ethnicity is not racial; but the distinction he draws between the two is subtle. His definition of "race" is uncomplicated at first blush: "a social label attributed ... on the basis of inherited phenotypical characteristics".[16] It is the nature of phenotypical characteristics that they be inherited, so race is not the possession of them; rather it is a social label attributed on the basis of possession of a selection of them. So races exist in the conceptual horizons of any society where human groups are categorized phenotypically. Van den Berghe then says the phenotypes chosen for discriminating are typically "trivial in terms of fitness, abilities, aptitudes and temperament--indeed, anything of social consequence"; consequently, the theory here presented is not itself racist since it does not attempt to raise invidious distinctions.[17]

Van den Berghe's conceptual distinction between race and ethnicity has been criticized by David Goldberg, who has pointed out that the attribution of significance to racial characteristics is varies from culture to culture, hence both race and ethnicity are cultural matters, and so van den Berghe's distinction collapses.[18] But this oversimplifies; one could say politics and art are cultural, hence indistinguishable. Racial distinctions are noticeable in a value-neutral context. For instance, a population either does or doesn't have a significant incidence of sickle-cell anemia, which is transmitted genetically. Racism does not follow from this. Racists

assert the existence of characteristics based on membership in genetic groupings, rather than noting genetic traits directly. These purported characteristics have social significance, making individuals better or worse with respect to some task or virtue. Now, the same can be said about ethnic characteristics: an observer may summarize the distinctions to be observed between neighboring ethnic groups, and apply a normative judgment to that distinction.

Mill and van den Berghe both deal with ethnicity as a given. Van den Berghe promotes a naturalistic theory explaining existence of it. He argues that the characteristics of human nature can only be determined within the context of comparison with other species; and so he wants an approach to human studies which reflects this. The implication is that social science neglects those components of enquiry which recognize that human activity is an instance of animal activity. He is proposing that his genetic-based theory is a better candidate for use in an overhaul of policy than is the ideologically-tarnished notion that social behavior can be explained without reference to natural determinants. His preface on ideology and normative remarks is important. Humans are no less Darwinian, and here is a social feature explicable in Darwinian terms. But together with that, van den Berghe makes a compellingly relevant observation that ethnicity is also something for society to deal with, because it's patently hazardous. He is saying, if only as an aside to his investigation, that a solution to a social ill is wanted. He is less sanguine than Mill, for whom it's a handy, expedient feature of the world, useful as a means of organization of liberal states which can then develop and invoke their policies of social improvement.

What is potentially philosophically persuasive about van den

Berghe's theory is that, if it's accurate, it injects another natural fact into the world with which social philosophy must conform its own proposals, if they are to be germane. I'll try to flesh this out by considering the objections anti-naturalist philosophers might raise, not to the accuracy of van den Berghe's conclusions but rather to their relevancy. I'll do this by briefly discussing an anti-naturalist objection raised by Charles Taylor.

Charles Taylor faults naturalistic explanations of normative activity, or human actions which carry value. Our value concerns seem to be direct evidence for a human characteristic; but the inclination of some naturalists is to reject this conception as a socio-historical remnant. Alternately, it is argued that our concern appears as instinctive as ,e.g., our reactions to sweet taste, high places and loud noises. But the fact we can't argue our way from neutral nature to the intentions and imperatives of morality doesn't mean morality is fiction; it means rather that moral instinct more likely to be the way we get to the world.

Taylor says that moving from externalist descriptions to "the language of qualitative distinctions" is a move to Clifford Geertz's technique of "thick description" which is a descriptive method constrained within a culture. The significance of actions, feelings, values within a culture are understood in relation to each other, and are not something to be grasped by means of detached observations of externalities. Naturalism avoids exactly this required immersion, or involvement; and it seeks instead to define human experience in "terms continuous with the sciences of extra-human nature". [19]

I'll offer an example of what I think Taylor objects to here. Imagine a proponent of naturalism (on Taylor's interpretation of it),

an observer of external behavior, who is in a bank lobby recording everything he sees: people walking to and fro, standing in front of other people while separated from them by low panels of wood and glass; everyone making marks on little bits of paper and exchanging these papers. But what are the people doing? What is needed to explain what the people are doing, at the least, is the inclusion of the concept of money. That does not appear in the behavioral description of the people in the bank; and so, what has the observer described in the end? And yet there is nothing whatever in the makeup of the human animal or in the human animal's physical environment that would lead an investigator to the concept of money.

The activity seen in the bank could be anything; it could be a form of religious prayer, perhaps. The behaviorist observer could attach measuring devices to some of the people and note that changes in pulse rate or respiration during certain paper-exhanging actions suggest the activity is prayer, which is a form of fear-abatement, detectable through measurements of pulse, respiration, etc. So, there is no evidence to be found in the natural world that such things as banks exist. The problem for naturalism then becomes drafting laborious explanations of what it really is that anti-naturalists insist on describing as "going to the bank". This is Taylor's complaint, that naturalism extends the nomenclature of observational natural sciences to cover phenomena which already present more direct evidence of something else at work, with its own vocabulary.

For Taylor, naturalism can't account for moralism, but since moralism remains, seemingly as a basement of human nature, then it's moralism rather than naturalism which connects us to things. But, it connects us to persons one-on-one; and, primitively, in our pre-

scientific sensibility, moralism connects each of us one-on-one to a personalized world where events follow from the particular intentions of nature rather than from its general characteristics. In latter task, naturalism seems to be more successful. But, Taylor doesn't explain why we can't simply have two (or even more than two) senses of access-to-world. As for the problem of any presumptive epistemological tensions between two or more sources, well, we enjoy a plurality of sensory modes--vision, hearing, scent, etc.--as access to the natural, phenomenal world, together with a mental interpretive engine for resolving the occasionally contrary data from these inputs.

Van den Berghe's strong criticism of social science could itself be criticized as an attack on caricature. Apart from indicating my sympathy for such a task, I'll leave it aside here. But, in passing, we might ask: what is it that social scientists do? They limit themselves to those processes, structures, and dynamics which are, or are thought to be, social. These disciplines give varying degrees of attention to the natural background (such as ecological factors), but they generally don't concern themselves with gross genetic features e.g. bipedalism, even though cultural traits depend upon bipedalism: one reason we act like humans is that we are shaped like humans, which instance might be trivial even if the principle isn't.

It might not appear likely that Taylor's and van den Berghe's views could be compatible. However I want to suggest that they are. There is a sense in which it's appropriate to search for human nature beyond the social human. All social phenomena are bound up in natural constraints in some manner. Why, for instance, are building doorways tall oblongs, generally of similar size? Architects are free to design portals any way they wish, yet they almost always design doors

as tall oblongs; and this is simply because, as I just mentioned, people are shaped a certain way, and are bipedally erect; and this constrains the entirely social activity of architectural design. Nature intrudes. Another constraint is that architects put windows in buildings because human find their way around by means of sight, rather than bats' sonar. So the problem here is, what genetic features are appropriate to character if we are going to exclude some features of the species from the study on grounds of irrelevance or triviality? It seems to me appropriate that the social-study disciplines continually reexamine the natural background of social phenomena to update the categories of the trivial and nontrivial, and the relevant and irrelevant.

Charles Taylor would certainly approve of our technological abilities, in principle, and notwithstanding the fact that their destructive consequences must be weighed against their (clearly greater) beneficial consequences. Humans are persistent tool-makers and tool-users because it is, on the whole, a very good idea. Another reason we do these things is that we have opposable thumbs. Nature enables us to pursue our good ideas in this respect. The inventory of human tools is not genetically determined, but the possibility of having any such inventory is. Thus, while it's probably arguable that some parts of our physiology are biological "detritus", left over from adaptations which are no longer relevant to the way we get by, our thumbs certainly aren't. Similarly, the genetic hypothesis for ethnic behavior does not mean that ethnic behavior is detrital.

So, the causes of a nationalist construct such as, say, France are not genetic; the causes of nationalisms are in the social development of the tendency to elaborate cultural devices for mutual aid, and one

of those nationalisms turns out to be France. Explaining France requires the sort of thick description Geertz has argued is necessary to explain Java; the possibility of having such a plurality of thicknesses is what the naturalistic background explains. This can be turned around, against Taylor and in defense of van den Berghe. We could not explain the reasons for the existence of the whole set of phenomena of which French national character is a member by reference merely to thick description, because the whole set exists beyond those contexts which give rise to each of them.

Van den Berghe does not promote or apologize for the naturalistic foundations of human nature. He claims that sociobiology does not provide a naturalistic model for ethics; rather it reveals what ethics confronts. On the contrary he worries that our genetically-conferred tendencies will lead us to disaster and extinction. Assimilation of a more accurate sociobiological view will, he hopes, lead to a more efficacious ethical theory to be used to counter the effects of ethnicity. Ethnic affiliation is not an historical basement; and neither is it permanent in its particularities. Individuals have changed ethnicities and have failed or declined to transmit ethnicities to offspring. Ethnicities have become extinct. The basement is the tendency to form and maintain such affiliations. It persists, as seen by the fact that when one ethnicity is lost it is replaced by a new one. This replacement occurs at the individual and the collective level. We are predisposed to congregate, but, and this is van den Berghe's social concern, we presently are too readily disposed to use this toward ends which are too-often destructive.

Van den Berghe looks for naturalistic causes for the propensity for nationalism. He is not saying that a description of what people do in

their idiosyncratic variations can be reduced to a set of naturalistic claims, which is what some behaviorists would say. Whatever useful, advantageous natural characteristics we happen to carry with us into our moral, mental, intentional existence, he is arguing that we are burdened with the consequences of certain others; and so we must learn, not to excuse them but rather to deal with them. We cannot, for instance, argue away nationalism by saying it's some historical, accidental leftover which we'll educate ourselves out of, because (on his theory) the tendencies arise in a genetically-determined natural background. If we choose to modify our behavior, successful tactics will proceed from an understanding of a permanent predisposition, not depend upon the idea that an historical anomaly will, through our reasonable inclinations, become attenuated and vanish.

Given recent history, van den Berghe has grounds for alarm at the social results of the genetically-determined predisposition he describes; but not at the predisposition itself, which recognizes potentials for social bonding activity, based mostly upon behavior. It is a predisposition to behave a certain way only in a very narrow sense, that is, to place value upon some recognizable behavior pattern which itself will be completely contingent in its particular characteristics. In a broad sense it is not a predisposition to behave in a particular way. The variations in behavior among different social groups will only be limited by the general limitations placed upon humans by genetic makeup; e.g. we will (mostly) all act as if we are bipedal and have binocular color vision and the power of speech and so forth; and so these won't be among the variables which form the object of our judgments about bonding and excluding in van den Berghe's theory.

The point I am trying to approach here is that van den Berghe seems to have no reason for needing to worry about harm inevitably falling out of the natural mix, unless social bonding and social excluding are intrinsically harmful. There is no mention of this in the theory; however if it were the case, then since the theory is Darwinian the species would be evolving itself into extinction. Van den Berghe's concern must then not be that we have become genetically overspecialized, only fit to occupy an increasingly hazardous natural niche. The problem is that we have embarked on a social history which is hazardous; but then the genetically-endowed ability to make that particular historical journey appears also to be the ability to change its course, or to transform it.

NOTES

1. Rawls 1971, p.8 & p.223
2. Raz 1986, pp.423-24
3. Collingwood 1937, p.101
4. Alba 1990, pp.290-301
5. Tamir 1993, p.6
6. Van den Berghe 1981, p.9
7. Ibid., p.22
8. Ibid., pp.15-16
9. Taylor 1989, p.4
10. Gellner 1994, primarily chapter 12, "Modular Man"; Walzer 1983, passim
11. Toulmin 1990, p.68
12. Lasch 1991, pp.122-23
13. Drakulic 1994, p.33
14. As heard in news interviews during May 1998 accords
15. Van den Berghe 1983, pp.2-3
16. Ibid., p.27
17. Ibid., p.29
18. Goldberg 1993, p.75
19. Taylor 1989, p.80

# CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNICITY AS HISTORICAL PRODUCT

## SECTION I. MODELING A SIMPLE COMMUNITY OF CONCERN

I have remarked that philosophers generally do not employ a complicated terminology of social structures. Will Kymlicka, for instance, refers almost exclusively to community in his treatment of the tension between cultural minority problems and liberal principles. Kymlicka deals with the distinction between the modern liberal state and traditional aboriginal society; and he barely touches upon Quebec as a state-state issue. If I want to deal with those relationships between types of community beyond the simple bipolar relationship between politically-dominant and cultural-minority factions, I need a less spare lexicon. Still, "community" is an essential term in such a lexicon; and I'll draw a very simple model here of what I believe the term must point to at a minimum. Then, in this and the next chapter I'll try to look for the essential elements of my model in some theories of ethnicity which depend such elements of upon social dynamics as intention, imagination, problem, and task.

A community should be distinguished from an aggregation or congeries of individuals, however clearly objective inspection of that congeries reveals some categorical resemblances between its members. A community is not merely a category. A community has a focus of concern which is not always found in a simple aggregation, and which will, I believe, be found in addition to any categorical similarities which its members may display to observers. My claim is a modest

revision of the two-part, objective-subjective, requirement which Hobsbawm and Tamir place on nationhood, as discussed back in chapter two. My example, which follows, will clarify what I'm getting at here.

Imagine we are suburban commuters, riding to our city offices on a crowded morning train, silent passengers sitting shoulder to shoulder. Everyone is reading a newspaper, or perhaps lost in a reverie of private thought and looking out the window at landscape streaming past, or perhaps just staring glassy-eyed waiting for the second cup of coffee to take effect. It's likely a few of us will actually be contemplating the possibilities and risks of the day ahead. Each person assumes comfortably that everyone else is essentially similar, that each is engaged in a more-or-less similar project. These mutual assumptions take place at an extremely low level of reflective thought. It's another morning in an indefinitely long sequence of such mornings. We all appear remarkably similar to each other; and yet we have nothing to do with each other; in a radically bizarre cosmopolitan context each person in the train carriage might speak a different language and none would know, except perhaps by looking at the headlines of each other's newspapers.

In this situation we find an aggregate of persons: a specific population, defined in location and in time, and engaged in a similar project, all of this conferring an objective categorical mutual resemblance within the population. But, it does not qualify as a community in the sense in which the term is normally employed. It's clear that there is an objective similarity of description. I could refine further my example: stipulate that we might all be, in our grey suits and black wing-tips, on our convergent ways to virtually

identical activities at desks in Wall Street, or Broad Street or LaSalle Street. That is, the similarity might be extended beyond the fine texture of external details to some inner details of intention, of agenda. But notice that the members of the population have no intentions vis-à-vis other members. The similarity each has is to a description; they have no active sense of mutual engagement, no reciprocity, no "thisness". A commuter-train ride into an American or European city is unproblematic, and its participants anonymous, by design. The population of the train comprises a category of persons defined by the proximities of their home addresses to the commuter stations, the proximities of their work addresses to the metropolitan terminus, their daily schedule, and quite likely some broad details of their economic and social standings. As such, the population approximates a monadology of self-directing entities with no interconnectedness, and this despite their external linkage in a social context, despite their categoreal sameness.

But now suppose something happens: suppose that the train stops mysteriously between stations and remains motionless. After some lapse of time (a period which we can suppose might depend upon the normal expected reliability of our commuter-train system) some of us glance at each other; we take on a concern that we know involves each other here and now. We have all along been involved in the same sort of domestic and professional agenda, the same sort of life; but now we sense that we are involved with each other. It is this sort of interconnectedness which I claim is required for us to become a community. We now have a relationship and not merely a similarity; if we want to communicate, it will be about our immediate interconnectedness and not about the objective similarity of our

unproblematic daily situation. Notice that that similarity has brought us together in the train, but in a merely physical, passive way.

I want to suggest that the image of this primitive and temporary community captures essential elements which are generally described in much grander ways. For instance, Rawls suggests a community will have a "comprehensive doctrine" such as a church. Wondering why the train has stopped is nothing like that; but yet this element can be conformed, in a very primitive way, to Rawls's requirement of comprehensive doctrine. I believe Rawls did not simply meant the members of a community will be observed to possess doctrinal procedures in the way they might possess the characteristic of, say, living on barley bread rather than wheat bread. He meant, I think, that the community members will share each other's values and concerns with respect to a broad set of intentions; they will presume to know each other's minds in this matter and, importantly, they will act, and act habitually, on this knowledge, or proceed in their lives with this reciprocal knowledge as a crucial assumption, which is their assumption. They will know, or presume to know, that other people around them are about much the same projects as they are; and this knowledge will play a part in what they are about.

The train stops and after a moment I look around, not to determine why the train stopped, but to confirm that other passengers now share, with me, a mutual concern. What I'm trying to point to with my very simple illustration is that the population of the commuter train does not become a community by virtue of its categorical similarities. Persons who have been rail commuters will, I think, agree that the practice is as near to being monadic as one would like. Sitting there

I am unconcerned with our similarities. My concern arises when a problem arises: it's our problem. It's this train, the 7:12; it's not the 7:02, and it's not the 7:22. We are not the community of grey-suited clerks, not only because the people on the 7:02 and the 7:22 are also grey-suited clerks, but also because, while I assume everyone else is a grey-suited clerk, it's not my concern that they are or not.

I'm getting at what I think Hegel is getting at in The Phenomenology of Mind, when he claims, and claims in a way I believe distractingly grand, that war refreshes the nation. A concern, which intrudes upon habitual activities that themselves are perhaps exactly those establishing us as an objective category to a careless observer, is actually what connects us to each other. Such intrusions into habitual activity need not be world-historical, convulsive or catastrophic. They need merely to provoke concern, thoughtfulness, or attention; and they need to do this merely across a significant portion of a population.

This is not to say that the category of suburban commuters lies outside the possibility of communal behavior until something extrinsic to the situation provides a lure for communal behavior. That inference is precisely contrary to my point, which is that objective categorization is inadequate to pick out community in the first place. Communities arise in shared experience; experience arises in tasks; tasks arise in problems. Suburban rail commuting is not always unproblematic; and this is demonstrated, for instance, in India, by the middle-class commuters who pack themselves daily into and onto trains running into Bombay. As these overfilled trains pull away from intermediate stops, men run toward them across the station platforms, and leap onto the sides of the carriages grasping whatever

protuberance provides some security. And, to the point here, passengers inside at the windows are seen to reach out to provide additional support. An Indian journalist once quite movingly described this as resembling the petals of a flower opening and then closing about the latecomers, in a display of deeply-rooted communal empathy which he then contrasted critically with the unconcerned individualism of the West.

The simple problem of identity immediately arises as an objection to my commuter train analogy. The population of the train is the same whether or not something occurs to focus their concern; so surely if they are ever a community then they are a community every morning, by virtue of persistent identity. The amendment I might offer here is that such an aggregation, which has a history in which some such focus of concern has occurred, is to that degree communal. I'm suggesting that a community, in the sense which I'm trying to get clear, differs importantly from a mere aggregation in that it has a history of concern; and so I here shall try to briefly indicate what I mean by "history".

In another context, R. G. Collingwood conceptualized history as something going on when people were working out their problems and concerns; for him history was not merely time passing as a succession of birth-dates marriage-dates and death-dates. Moreover, for him thought was not merely internalized reflection or cogitation; the claim with which he begins Speculum Mentis, that "all thought exists for the sake of action", places him in the tradition of Aristotle and Marx rather than Plato and Hume. So, the days pass endlessly, but if there's no thought there's no (intentional, deliberate) action and since narrative, being an account of what people were noticed to have

done in consequence of their circumstance, there's no narrative, hence no history.

This is less stringent than it is made to seem by the spare description I permit myself here. The extent of possibilities for narrative content depend upon the fineness of scrutiny undertaken by the narrator: a society in which nothing novel happened from century to century would not be historical, in the Collingwoodian sense; but nor is there likely to be any such human society, in its fine details. Nothing seems to happen in the village day by day, unless the observer is sensitive to local concerns. The villagers go to their fields, to their tables, to their beds, to their graves. The commuters go to their offices, and back to their homes. There is (in slower-paced societies) a generational repetition of expected problems and familiar solutions; this is unproblematic background, to which we add whatever comes along to make people frown and pause, and of course it's up to the observer to notice the frown. The stalled commuter train will make the commuters frown.

My commuters are assessing their predicament, if indeed there is one, with their imaginations. The workings of the commuter line are beyond their immediate perceptions; and of course different persons will have different degrees of understanding, of interest, of apprehension, depending on their background knowledge of how such things work, on their inclination to trust or mistrust the familiar as well as the unknown, and on many other elements of their personalities. In <u>real</u> communities there are conventionalized and persisting attitudes and concerns.

In large communities, such as national societies, where so much is out of sight but yet important to the attitudes and concerns of the

society, imagination must be used to connect society's members with the out-of-sight. Sufficiently-imaginative social members may, or may try to, use their own imaginative powers. The rest--most--of us will live according to what I call an off-the-shelf image of what it is that's proper to do and think as social members. Some social philosophers who promote a vision of rational and strongly individualistic personal action talk about life-agendas. Personal goals will be constructed around what can be imagined to be consequences of actions taking place in a context which itself is largely imagined. What I'm claiming is that these autonomous agendas are still likely to contain much that is conventionalized within what could be called a society's collective imagination. But where does <u>that</u> come from? In the next two sections I'll discuss two other theories of imagination, in history and in literature, leading to national constructs, where we construct much of our personal situations in the context of large extents far beyond our immediate perception. Our connections within these extents become parts of ourselves, so that we become our own imaginative constructs.

## SECTION II. ANDERSON'S IMAGINED NATIONALISM

The historical theory of imaginative nationalism I'll sketch out is principally that of Benedict Anderson. I'll include some reference to Ernest Gellner's arguments and observations. The arguments of Anderson and Gellner reinforce the contention that nationality is a product of intentional social activity. Then, in the chapters following, I'll examine how the political and normative predilection

of some liberal social philosophers may have to be accommodated to theories such as these.

The aim of Anderson's study is to propose an interpretation of nationalism as a relatively recent historical anomaly. He is ambitious: he claims that both liberal and Marxist political theories are "Ptolemaic" and that a Copernican revolution is required. In an attempt to provide this he chiefly examines European political history, but also East Asian and Latin American political development. His thesis is that nations and nationalism are artifacts emerging in a late-18th-century intersection of "discrete historical forces".[1] Anderson defines this new social artifact as an imagined community which is inherently limited, not just spatially, but rather by being non-global, a portion of a collective whole of humanity and bound, or limited, by other such portions, and yet it is politically sovereign. It's imagined because no member knows or interacts with all other members. From this it would follow that all communities which exceed the size of mankind's original communities are imagined. Since Anderson will go on to argue that there are far larger, super-communities which are real and not imagined, there seems to be a contradiction. I will address this after a bit of exposition.

Philosophers don't always specify the size of the communities they discuss. When the community is larger than eye-to-eye scale, it will not be directly perceptible. Insofar as our projects and agendas involve our community, which is to say, insofar as it can be thought about, dealt with, anticipated, it will be mentally constructed. Without this construction, we would have much less diversity of option <u>for</u> our projects and agendas, and such rich option is regarded as essential by Rawls, Raz, and others.

In very small societies, relationships between their members are established and conducted eye-to-eye. This would be the case for almost all of the period during which there have been human societies. Forest hunting societies, for instance, are tiny. Anthropologists who like to tell stories have tales about the necessity of their undergoing ritual inclusion in a society in order to obtain desired data about it. Such stories become essential parts of their monographs. Civilized societies are not necessarily different, though in fact they have gotten to be. In Aristotle's model state I might know all my fellow citizens, or at least be connected in a particular way to them all: perhaps I don't know that man personally but I know he's the baker's nephew. These one-on-one relationships promote the notion of the organic state, where membership is defined in significant part by functional relationship. But, in the national state I will not connect with all my fellow nationals in such unique one-to-one bonds; rather than being idiosyncratically functional personalities they are mostly interchangeable citizens (for me), or interchangeable within sub-categories of citizenry (I mean: all the farmers, all the tradesmen, all the rich, all the poor). Are these sub-categories imagined? Are some?

Anderson's nation contrasts with Aristotle's ideal state and its ideal size: entirely visible, as it were, from the bell-tower of its civic hall. A nation is imagined because no member knows or interacts with all other members. Any national will not know or even have heard of most of his co-nationals. One reason this is so is simply that the population of modern societies exceeds human ability to discriminate so many individuals, as van den Berghe argued. Beyond this, though, there is a logical component. One could imagine an Aristotelian

organic state, where relationships are functional, one-to-one connections, growing in size until it far exceeded the limits of discrimination, yet still retaining one-on-one relations, so that while nobody knew everybody, everybody was still included by virtue of knowing whom they do and being connected to them functionally, just as in a very large family no cousin knows all the cousins even though there is no cousin not known by some cousin. But this is not how individual nationality is derived. In a nation, membership is being included categorically in something which has an imagined extent, which is the whole nation. Membership is not functional, it is (imagined as) categorical, even though of course most people will have a function and will be connected personally and functionally to many other national citizens. Those connections are not the national connections.

The modern, world-wide political consciousness is dominated by the Western model of a community of nations. Anderson claims, on the basis of historical evidence, that this pluralism is represented by a sign-pluralism of language. This is another reiteration of the principle of linguistic ethnism. In the Western model there is an equality of sovereignties, with diplomatic conventions and rituals to this effect: the world of nations is not hierarchical or segmented. But, Anderson claims that there is another, historically-determined pattern of very extensive cultural communities, overlaying the diplomats' mosaic of equal nation-states. This super-pattern is one of what he calls ecumenes, which are communities far older than the mosaic of nations, and these are signified by their own, ecumenical, languages.

The concept of an historical world comprising a small number of

distinct, massive civilizations is not novel. Anderson's contribution to this body of grand historical theory is to key languages to both the recent, national granularity and the older, civilization granularity, and hence to correlate cultural divides with a linguistic granularity of communication, imagination, and conceptualization. These ecumenical domains include the Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, and Sinic, with their respective sacral languages: Latin, Arabic, Pali, and Mandarin. Each community is what Anderson calls "cosmically central" and united through its own set of symbols, which are embedded in a "dead" (non-vernacular) language.[2] The deader the sacral language is, the better it's suited to sacral status, since it is more nearly pure sign, without contextual referent; and thus it is the language of religion and philosophy for its civilization.[3]

Anderson's speculative construct is, I think, analogous to the logical positivists' protocol sentences, which are not supposed to need any further justification or interpretation. The ecumenical societies are conceptually complete (hence closed); and each has a concept of reality which is expressed in the sacral language. An ecumenical language used to explain the world must be generalized beyond the idiosyncrasies of all its member-users. It mustn't be contextualized within any local description, explanation, or narratives, but rather only with the super-narrative of the ecumene, which is congruent with and identical to the world. It then becomes the context-for-contexts, permitting the comprehensibility of pluralism. Sacral language stands for a global truth, just as, say, logical notation is supposed to be the only objective language, standing directly in correspondence to a neutral reality.

As I remarked, Anderson's theoretical structure echoes our

conventional understanding of cultural geography: that many of the metropolitan countries of the world are in some manner members of larger cultural groupings. France and Italy are clearly European, India and Pakistan are Indic, Japan and Korea are Sinic, and so forth. Not all countries fit into categories smoothly. Europeans tend to think of South Africa as a European country; Africans obviously do not. Despite their locations Australia and Argentina are European; and the Argentines insist they are more akin to France and Italy than to Peru. But the systems aren't mutually impenetrable. For one thing, Westerners can live almost anywhere, but this is recent, and it is because the much of the world has accepted a veneer of Westernness.

Anderson's notion of a closed ecumene is in part derived from this historical observation: previous to modern western political pluralism, local persons with the talent and ambition to migrate upward socially were absorbed into the ecumenical institutions rather than local institutions. Thus (Anderson's example) an Englishman was, unexceptionally, Pope. Medieval social outside of the hereditary political hierarchy was achieved by ignoring allegiance to a locality in favor of allegiance to the whole ecumene. There was no intermediate object of possible and advantageous allegiance. The locality, i.e. the village, was real because it was directly perceived. The ecumene was real because it was the context of religious and mythic beliefs about the world. There was nothing in between. In a tentative confirmation of Anderson's contention, recall that Hobsbawm and others argue that the identities we today associate with national groups were previously associated with the small number of rulers of the anonymous populations which <u>later</u> were regarded as national ancestors.

If ecumenical communities are real, then if all communities larger than the small primordial ones are imagined, then there seems to be a contradiction. But what I think he means is that the ecumene is unimaginable as a community. A community is closed in by its surroundings, which will contain other communities. The village community is real enough, and commonly there are other villages nearby, which are real too. The villagers assume that there are more villages at greater distances, and so on, to the end of the world. But that world is not imagined as a community, since communities are bounded by their surroundings, and nothing surrounds the world: it's everything. So a philosophical or religious expression of the world's nature will emanate from the sacral language, and that is real. Thus, while Anderson does in places refer to the "sacral community", the distinction between what is imagined as bounded beyond immediate perception and the extent of what is comprehensible is preserved, despite lapses in his terminology.

This conceptual structure, of small communities arrayed within an enormous extent congruent with comprehensibility of culture, became attenuated in the West at the end of the Middle Ages. One reason was external: the empirical discovery and exploration of the larger world, beyond what was supposed to be comprehensible according to the basic texts. Europeans came into physical contact with the other ecumenical structures; and in the process they worked out the implications of abstract geographical distance and objective calendrical time, which separated them from other peoples.

Another reason for the weakening of the old closed-ecumenical structure in the West was internal: the rise of local vernaculars. Anderson emphasizes the onset of publishing in vernacular, which over

time fragmented the old Latin-literate European identity. What replaced this were fields of communication at a scale between ecumenical Latin and the local unwritten dialect, much larger than real eye-to-eye communities but still bounded by adjacent elements of Christendom, and still exclusionary (since the other vernaculars were unintelligible). Printing these languages had the effect of standardizing them, and driving out less-well-situated dialects. New linguistic communities were formed, both much larger than the old, and fixed. For instance, before this change there was no Franco-German political boundary corresponding to any population characteristic we would regard as ethnic; and anyone interested in drawing such distinctions with respect to populations living in the transition zone would be reading Latin anyway.

There is another approach to this connection between language and the reorganization of an array of communities, which I will just suggest here. If we grant that power and authority lie in the perception of them, and perception of intangibles requires a standard medium of symbolic communication, then the introduction of the vernaculars as bearers of social authority will open the social imagination to the possibility of noncontradictory and non-hierarchical multiple sources of power and authority.

Anderson contends that all of these discoveries and developments of early modern Europe meant that it was possible to comprehend distinct categories of peoples, beyond the immediately perceptible (and hence concrete) vagaries of the local. The very familiar example of costuming the figures in religious and historical paintings comes to mind here: Mary no longer resembles a Tuscan or a Fleming; and so while she is undeniably real, she dresses like no one we know.

Finally, with the development of philology, the sacral languages lost their superior ontological status, were seen to be related to the vernaculars, and in some cases to each other, while yet being the bearers of different cultures. That meant that civilizations were no longer incomparable and in some cases there had to be explication for their enormous differences.

Yael Tamir finds Anderson's notion of imagined community generally useful, but she notes one problem: on Anderson's definition how do we distinguish between nations and other cultural groups? The usual criteria of language (dialect), past sovereignty, etc., are frequently-enough irrelevant. There are other forms of association in which membership is sufficiently large and dispersed that no one knows everybody. Tamir observes that "[g]reater precision... would force us to overlook the immense variety of social phenomena laying claim to the title 'nation'."[4] This observation is a recapitulation of Mill's. Tamir requires both a subjective and an objective element to the definition of nationality.[5] The subjective element is the self-aware belief of individuals that they form a particular nation; the objective element is the recognition by outsiders of the propriety of claims made on the basis of the subjective self-awareness. This propriety is determined by checking a list of objective characteristics; but it seems the list cannot be specified with sufficient precision to guarantee that every nation will have a sufficiency of characteristics from the list. The existence of the claim of, say, the people of the Isle of Wight, or of Schellenburg or the Veneto, is not a sufficient criterion.

The intractability of this problem suggests that, as far as policy is concerned, we might abandon the idea of stipulating categorical

tests, recognize that definitions will have an element of the *ad hoc* and deal with claims one by one. Religious organizations receive specific considerations and relief from liberal governments; and so there is a recurring problem of deciding whether some organization which claims to be religious actually is. Tamir contrasted the tolerance of nationalism with the acceptance of free speech. Speaking can be harmful, and law courts must repeatedly decide whether an instance of harm-producing speech must be tolerated under the free-speech rule. I am not suggesting that the philosophical problem of tidying up a concept be abandoned, I'm just pointing to instances where practical tidiness is an ongoing project, essentially unfinishable.

## SECTION III. EDWARD SAID AND HIS COMMENTATORS

I've presented evidence that historical nationalism employs narration and imagination to inform individuals how they might be parts of such large abstract social entities, entities persisting beyond lifetimes and extending beyond individuals' geographical reach. At a still larger scale, the colonial-imperial political structures which existed worldwide until recently would also require such conceptualizing vehicles. Edward Said has argued this in a thesis which draws together some political, technological, and literary artifacts of the most successful western liberal industrial countries, which also happened to be the most successful imperial states. Said's work deals with another example of national expression which can be related, through generalization, to Mill's paternalistic-progressivist

agenda for the "less advanced" societies.

Edward Said is concerned with clarifying the cultural relationships within the imperial political structure. In 1978 his work Orientalism he argues that the Middle East has been defined by the ascendant industrial West as an enigma and a task; his later Culture and Imperialism generalizes some conclusions made in the earlier work. Said focuses on the recent imperial systems maintained by liberal western states (Britain, France, and America), and on the important consequences of a democratic metropole maintaining autocratic control of distant provinces. Here the American "empire" is an informal power structure which permeates American relations with much of the world, including many successor states of the dismantled British and French systems.

According to Said, the rule by westerners, within their liberal-industrial metropoles, of large regions of the world brought forth resistance through the emergence of local self-identification, including local nationalism. So there are two patterns emerging: imperial culture being a connection of the self-defining metropole with its colonial dependencies, and resistance to this connection by the colony. An irony here is that this resistance often assumes forms which are derived from the conceptual structures originating in the metropole. A Western nationalism embodied within imperialism brings forth a counter-nationalism modeled after the original form. This relationship of tension within dependency brings out a host of problems involving not only self-identity of societies, but also the working out of identities of others, all within the historical context of a larger task. That task is the legitimation of the whole system to the satisfaction of the liberal political attitudes of the

metropolitan populations, if not to most of the colonial populations; and so the connection with my discussion seems clear enough.

Said's argument, put very sketchily, is that in such imperial structures "they" (the colonial populations) must be ruled, and ruled differently, because they are not "us" (the metropolitan population). The imperative (they must be ruled) comes about in part, and ironically, because of the democratic nature of the metropolitan states which happened to be the successful colonial powers: their policies are open to scrutiny and criticism by an electorate (more or less) and so the obviously undemocratic nature of the imperial connections must be justified. In working out policy from such an imperative, systematic errors are made in distinguishing and characterizing who the they are, who the us are, why this rule must be undertaken, and how it will differ from the self-rule within the liberally-run metropole. Anderson argued that colonial administrators attributed "national" and ethnic distinctions using criteria that was irrelevant to the self-identities of subject peoples.[6] Said's claims are different, though not inconsistent with Anderson's.

The agreement between Anderson and Said can be seen in Said's analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.[7] The conflict grows out of the ancient confrontation between Arabs and the West, and this despite the fact there is no single West, or a single Araby. Zionism is European; its procedures are those of European colonization, reminding one of the shiploads of religious colonists sailing to Cape Cod or the Cape of Good Hope. Palestine is a focus of sanctity and historical significance; and Jerusalem was the emblematic center of the old European world, and also the physical center, being so drawn on medieval maps. And yet virtually no European saw it or imagined it

anything like correctly. So, Said must mean by reminding us of all this, a properly-imagined Palestine fits the European sensibility as a construct of Christian-European thought and self-identity, like Eden. Hence Europe and America promote Israel at the expense of the real Palestinians, who have no place in this construct.

The immediate objection to this analysis is that it omits the powerful and complex feelings of outrage, remorse, guilt, etc., on the part of Europeans and Americans over the Holocaust. Said does mention this factor, but gives it minimum attention. But Said also reminds us of Balfour's claim, in 1919, that the Great Power recognition of Zionism, "rooted in age-long tradition", is "profounder" than the wishes of the Arabs who happen to be there at the moment.[8] Said's point is that Balfour is recasting an expression of the long European dream of recovery of the Holy Land; and this project is based partly upon an arbitrary, fictional reconfiguration of cultures, nations, and historical responsibilities.

Said focuses primarily on the British system, and secondarily on the French. However, an example of colonial rule as a justified task in an American context is described by Christopher Lasch.[9] After the brief successful war with Spain, the American annexation of the Philippines presented a problem: how could a democratic republic rule over another people undemocratically? But, the American anti-imperialists confronted by their own imperial project were social-Darwinists, not Jeffersonians. The Filipinos were not "ready" for self-rule and so would be a ward of those who were. Rights thus are not universal, as Jefferson said, but rather depend upon environment and history. This policy was in accord with existing paternalistic Indian policy, and with southern racism.

Said reminds us that it's common for people to identify their culture through its narratives. Liberal regimes promote the education of their citizenry; such a literate citizenry will mirror its literature. He strings together examples showing the continuity of the western attitude toward its historical mission from literature, and occasionally film. One example with an American element is from Joseph Conrad's virtuous empire in his Nostromo. Said sees Conrad's characters, the American Holroyd and the Englishman Gould, as flush with self-congratulations.[10] They are spokespersons for a successful world order who see their interests, values, and projects as congruent with the promotion of that order.

So, Conrad's peripatetic entrepreneurs' spirit of proselytizing can be compared with George Bush's self-congratulations at the end of the Cold War. A difference is that Conrad wrote in a period of imperial enthusiasm not yet seriously challenged by colonial reaction. Today we see the "fervent innocence" of a Holroyd turned, in novels and films (Coppola's Apocalypse Now, Costa-Gavra's Missing etc.) into a source of more violent subversion.[11] The theme being traced here by Said is of persons--Westerners--who are confident in their energy and intentions, and who venture forth to implement the project of Western order, and mess things up terribly. The relevance here is that such confidence rests upon a pattern of fictional, or imagined, appraisals of the rest of the world cultures: that the world apart from the West is composed of societies which are properly dealt with as exotic tasks for the West.

Said emphasizes the important function of narrative in working out the concepts upon which state policy and other social actions are developed here. It happens that an unfamiliar place or people is

described through narrative, and this is because explorers and missionaries and merchants go there; their understanding of a place or a people is bound tightly together with their experience of being there. They use this narrative of their own encounter to describe what they have understood, and ultimately, to justify what they may have done: this, they tell us, is what happened as we were among them, and so "they" are seen to be that way: in relationship to our having been there. So to an Englishman, the story of India (opines Said) begins with the landing of the English. In his spirit of generalization, we might note the penchant of American statesmen for referring to the "new nations" of the ex-colonial regions, which are states overlaying old colonial boundaries, containing old societies. Their independence, like American independence, defines their creation. And, still more generally, this tendency contributed to the formation of the concept of the ethnographic present: the world as is was when we arrived there.

The resistance on the part of colonized populations is justified through narrative too, since, as Said puts it, "nations themselves are narrations".[12] This metaphor can be unpacked easily enough for the purpose here. Narrative describes a singularity, an idiosyncratic event, connection or relationship: how this situation is reported by me the narrator. By contrast, taxonomic sciences will characterize by pigeonholing, so social sciences will characterize social phenomena that way: anthropology classifies societies and culture. But historical description will not do this, and so the traveler's description, being the account of those people effecting this person, is nearer being historical than, say, anthropological taxonomy. This sketches out Said's approach; and exceptions come to mind. For

instance, the traveler will pigeonhole his experiences in contexts which are comprehensible to him. Thus Anderson reports the Spanish reading of Philippine social structure, with "hidalgos", etc., which doubtless was far off the mark.[13] More generally and familiarly, travelers frequently mistake what are local good manners for a version of what they know as rude manners, less often vice-versa. But these miscategorizations will go into narrative accounts as parts of systematically mistaken assessments, which is consistent with Said's point.

Said's insights are applicable to colonial experience, but they may generalize beyond that. The historical social values we interpolate in the self-model we compose for ourselves from our history, together with our culture, its conflicts and connections with others, arise in narrative. Historiography originated in large part from the need for dynasties to legitimate themselves through chronicle; here I recall Hobsbawm's claim, that the Franks are not the inhabitants of France but the conquerors of the inhabitants of France. Later the national group is explicated--or invented--by narrators, and this is based upon old legitimations of the dynastic state. This idea may be another version of Gellner's notion that nationalism arises from efforts of the empowered classes to legitimize their power: legitimation arises out of a past which can be described through narration of events, a sort of historical investiture. Those who are in the position to be heard the easiest tell their story with the most authority, which becomes the story. Note also they tell the story of Others, too. That is, whoever is not the privileged They, become the Other.

Said reminds us Westerners now face non-Western insistence on separate identity, at a time when the non-West also physically

impinges as immigrants. Our own story of the way the world's societies relate to us is contested by an increasingly immediate presence of these societies. Clifford Geertz makes a similar observation about the changing assumptions of anthropology. In the traditional image of the discipline, "we" here studied "them" there without becoming involved; but now the "we" and the "they" become problematic, because of the conceptual collapse of the intervening distance.[14] Non-westerners don't merely want a distinct identity. This was fulsomely granted them by the West. Rather, they want to regain control of their identity; they want to toss aside the constructs of sinologists, arabists, etc.

NOTES

1. Anderson 1991, p.4
2. Ibid., p.12
3. Ibid., p.13
4. Tamir 1993, p.68
5. Ibid., p.66
6. Anderson 1991, pp.167-8
7. Said 1994, chapter 17 and especially pp.158-9, pp.164-6
8. Ibid., p.166
9. Lasch 1973, chapter 6 and especially pp.72-3
10. Said 1993, pp.xviii-xix, p.323
11. Ibid., p.xix
12. Said 1993, p.xiii
13. Anderson 1991, pp.166-7
14. Geertz 1988, p.131-3

# CHAPTER FIVE: PROBLEMS WITH LIBERAL CATEGORIES

## SECTION I: CULTURE, STATE, CONTEXT

The problem of nationalism in liberal political philosophy is partly a problem of conforming, on the one hand, something which seems compulsive, and perhaps coercive, and perhaps too a bit shadowy, with a vision of life in which individuals have the autonomy and the freedom to plan their own optimalized life agendas. Those liberal political philosophers who are not inclined to peremptorily reject nationalism as inimical to the requirements of individualism often regard it as an uncomfortable anomaly, to be awkwardly conformed to their system of normative arguments. Nationalism is a political program based upon ethnicity. Why (reasonably) bother to <u>be</u> ethnic? Pierre van den Berghe, who argues for a genetically-determined tendency, and who suggests there are very few persons who do not exhibit it, nevertheless urges us toward whatever social innovation might counter the harmful excesses of ethnic phenomena. Historical theories of nationalism which are current rarely extol its virtues, but rather are more likely to try to mollify its critics. If the actions of a reasonable person are untrammeled, and if they arise in a preference to further the agenda set by that person, then it's appropriate to ask: how does the ethnic phenomenon contribute to such a program? Or we could ask, what sort of reasonable agenda would profit from this?

In this section I'll try to develop the following argument. Free

reasonable action, or autonomy, permits selection of possibilities from contingent circumstances. Such selection, whether or not fully autonomous, requires an array of choices; and autonomous selection requires that the array have certain characteristics. Its range should be as extensive as practicable, but also should include choices which are relatively closely related, and comprehensible to the agent. The array and its members should be presented to the agent in a context which provides certain features, including predictability of outcome, and reward. Such features themselves require some background context to make the decision process comprehensible. Culture provides this context.

Joseph Raz notes that modern Westerners are supposed to be responsible for the direction of their own lives. This suits what Raz calls "western industrial societies" with their "fast changing" social, technological, economic, moral circumstances.[1] In such a society autonomous choice is not a matter of selecting a life-plan from a list. In a society undergoing rapid transformation it's continually necessary to confront the need for choice. But, continues Raz, autonomy is not just this ability to cope with a continually changing circumstance; it is not merely a reactive capability; rather it is the idea of self-creation. If it were merely a fast-reactive capability for use in a peculiarly rapidly-changing social period, then we would find no autonomous persons in periods of slow change and Raz claims (though without offering examples) there have been autonomous persons in the past, during just such periods.

In passing, I observe that Raz does not see this "fast-changing" milieu as something which itself is coercive or oppressive. Gellner, by contrast, argues from a standpoint of implicit class-tension that

this is itself an intrusion, something which sweeps modern westerners along as an interchangeable population: an industrially-capable proletariat and a complacent lower-management corps. He observes that previously, when there was no pervasive notion of change as an essential of society, organic conceptions of society prevailed. In these conceptions, persons tried to accommodate to a pre-conceived, predisposed position. Clearly this model was idealized since otherwise there would have been no internal social frictions, and hence no social history. The model of a more heterogeneous population under a unified system of constraining conventions and laws is a later construct.

Autonomy opposes coercion, but it also opposes the aimless passivity of pure reactivity, and requires that we not merely expect the consequences of our acts to come about, but also want them, and plan for them. If we merely react to events, even idiosyncratically, then our reactions are just more events, lacking will. Autonomy requires that our response to events be acts, not reactions. What we seem to want is control of our second-order wants. Blood ethnicity, for instance, is an example of this passivity: being acted upon by social forces, and not making the sort of choices which are implicit in civic ethnicity. Note also that such a continual burden of choice is necessary for morality: we must be free to choose what to do in order to perform laudable (morally just) actions.

But Raz also notes that not everything about our lives which we embrace is either freely chosen or coerced. His example is the child-parent relation, which "most people willingly embrace but do not freely choose".[2] Other examples would include early-implanted and deeply-seated social conventions such as toilet manners and gender-

behavior expectations. "Coercion" is not appropriate to describe the way in which these features of our personalities become implanted because there is (usually) no sense of relief or resolution attendant to the thought that we may abandon them. My corresponding example is of course ethnicity, usually as politicized, that is, embedded in our nationality. Such features of our personalities are not passive, though we find them already present at such times as we (most of us, and eventually) acquire psychological powers of self-objectification. Typically, they are taken for granted during long stretches of time after they are recognized; though sometimes recognition of them takes place when the values or significance we place on them are challenged by novel circumstance. We become concerned about them when they are tested: when a parent, or our country, disappoints us in some sufficiently profound manner.

Raz further characterizes autonomy as only being possible within a certain range of significance and consequence. Autonomous choice requires "an adequate range of options"; and to flesh out his notion of adequacy, Raz offers two examples of inadequacy.[3] First is the "man in the pit", a captive whose permanent confinement has rendered all possible choices of action trivial; and second is the "hounded woman", who is endlessly pursued by a carnivore and so for whom all possible choices are mortal. In both of these extreme circumstances there can be no meaningful deliberative choice of action. I'll find uses for these metaphorical device in later discussion, and will refer to them as "Raz's Limits".

Another way of bringing out the point of operational limits to the use of autonomous capabilities is to characterize what it is that lies between Raz's Limits, as arranged in a scale of shadings-of-choice,

rather like a grey-scale running from darker to lighter, and representing all of an agent's options for action. In autonomous choice it must make sense to actually deliberate on the choice. If all the options are mortal (black), except for the one life-saving act; or if all the options are trivially insignificant (white), or if they are all either black or white, no deliberation is needed or wanted. The consequences of different actions must have intermediate values to keep deliberation from being pointless. Notice though, and this is the reason for my elaboration, that if the intermediate greys are too close in shade, this also renders deliberation pointless, since either will do (that is, the consequences of the options are not distinguishable).

Such a picture applies to the desirability of a having a familiar context for choice, and not merely a context. If context is unfamiliar (e.g. in a foreign milieu), so that values and consequences aren't clearly understood, then it becomes effectively all one grey. This would occur in a cultural context which appears to be completely novel and so incomprehensible, and of course in a circumstance where the novelty seemed neither a mortal threat nor a matter of no significance. In that situation and in that frame of mind we would look, and be baffled; and this would incapacitate our judgment. On the other hand, if we absolutely reject novelty or strangeness, then, given our familiar context as white, and a completely novel context as black, we choose ours, obviously, but in a non-deliberative way; and this also incapacitates our judgment. Deliberation requires its own appropriately narrow range of valued choices. Will Kymlicka talks about the apprehension of such fine degrees of choice modeled in great literature: choosing between near shades of grey is true freedom, and

the lack of certainty over the close shades makes such freedom of choice uncomfortable or even painful.

Autonomy thus requires a somewhat more elaborate notion of adequacy of option; it requires meaningful criteria of the range of option. Another way of getting at this, in the context of ethnicity and multiculturalism, is by considering the necessity of seeing alternative life styles as <u>legitimate</u> options. This requires comprehension, and sympathetic insight, with respect to those other styles. If they are mystifyingly opaque, then if they are consequently seen as threatening, they are "black" in my metaphor, while if they are consequently dismissed as insignificant, their content is all one shade of grey. In the modern world of interpenetrating national and ethnic groups, their cultural content ought not appear as a field of opaqueness, since that diminishes our chances for richer context. That is, since the fact of the Other is <u>there</u> in front of us, in our face willy-nilly, then we had better be able to comprehend it at least partially. Otherwise, our range of options in the face of the alternatives is diminished, and this diminishes our autonomy in that real multi-contextual world.

Yael Tamir makes another point about how we weave our choices into our social context, which is this: persons don't make choices which simultaneously effect all aspects of their lives.[4] Typically we pick one course of action out of an array of choices, all within a general background which does not enter into the deliberation. As an empirical matter, that's the way life comes; we live in a complicated layered manner, attending sometimes to this layer, sometimes to that. Some layers remain undisturbed all our lives, being those non-free non-coerced elements of which Raz reminds us.

There are, however, conventional options for making momentous choices which influence most if not all aspects of a life. These are transitions into new conditions of life, such as into marriage, into legal adulthood, into the church and the military. Significantly, they are accompanied by rituals which are emblematic of their momentousness. Vico pointed out that birth, marriage, and death are universally commemorated in all human societies, marking the taking up into social significance of those basic natural events, making them, as it were, social acts. The United States Army retains the practice of bringing its fresh enlistees into their first experience of the military late at night, by means of the careful manipulation of travel schedules to basic training camps, so that their "previous" life is coterminous with the day before. They go to sleep civilians, wake up soldiers.

But analytically Tamir's point entails that we will ordinarily make a choice within a larger context, and that context is a given, for that choice. We can't choose a context except in the context of choosing between contexts. We might speculate that if we could choose (to change) such that all elements of moral or social identity were changed, this might amount to a change <u>of</u> identity, not within identity, and so would bring on all expected philosophical puzzles involving personal-identity problems. This is a point to touch upon in the consideration of problems of social alienation and anomie with respect to the immigrant, the expatriate, and the cosmopolitan.

The value of social context is often made out to be operational: a means for furthering a personal plan. We need to be able to respond to circumstances in order to carry through our plans as best we can under the circumstance. But more important than that (for autonomy)

is to develop the ability of objectification, to evaluate various plans. But there is a distinction between how to further an agenda and whether we want to pursue that agenda. We may be mistaken in our evaluation of a presupposed or conventional agenda of life, into which we have found ourselves counseled. We need to consider second-order wants: what it is or should be that we want to want; and the wider the exposure to social variation, the better exposure we have to the possibility of evaluation of preferences and values.

Notice that literature and film, by emphasizing the importance of the momentous decision in a personal life, points to this distinction, since such inner struggles as they show through, are intelligible to us. We can grasp the sense of having a conviction firmly grounded in the evidence of its context (i.e. the connections and values of our social lives), and yet simultaneously be worried that the conviction fails in some broader sense. This lack of clarity in the match between our intentions and actions, and their consequences, where the future is merely adumbrated by our options, typically is not noted in philosophical constructions which dwell primarily upon the exercise of rational clarity. But in fact we live in shades of grey, very often choosing between very close shades. Given a real society, where liberal principles prevail, the main problem is discerning the adjacent shades of grey, and not in pursuing those agendas which are consequent upon such discernments. It is rather in the authoritarian repressive society, or in a condition of lawless barbarism, that we will be obliged to test Raz's Limits.

In passing I want to note a poorly-justified predisposition of liberal political writers. There is a presumption that only in an already liberal society where the condition of free action are most

closely approached, can we pursue our wants. That is, it's assumed that the implementation of plans requires a liberal environment. But in a persistently repressive society we may still be able to execute our plans to a tolerable level of satisfaction. Any real social milieu will present constraints, apart from the normal moral constraints involving harm. A repressive milieu may not thwart the sorts of self-interested agendas which proponents of individualism model. To understand this, consider what some contemporary business entrepreneurs say about conducting their enterprizes under various political regimes. The most problematic regime for them is not the repressive one, it's the corrupt one; and this is because of the unpredictability of corruption. They (that is, we) can learn to respond to a set of rules, however harsh; and if we are clever we make the rules work favorably in respect of a plan drafted in the context of that harshness, so long as the context is predictable. A strategy similar to that of the clever businessman works in the circumstance of the clever convict in a harshly-run prison too.

Another value of social membership is the comprehensibility of reward. Yael Tamir emphasizes the significant of "being acknowledged by significant others", where complete agreement or harmony is not required, just "intangible links".[5] Reward is proffered for exceptionalism or novelty, which might not be compatible with utter harmony. One does not imagine the angels complimenting each other. Tamir implies here that a situation of ethnic attachments within a liberal political regime ensures that we will be able to <u>find</u> links we wish to preserve and develop; the stronger (blood) ethnic ideology insists we are defined <u>by</u> those links. The philosophical problem is raised here: how can strong nationalism account for the value of its

own components, if everything valuable is defined in the context of them? Second order wants and the deliberation to think through the choices of what to plan are not possible, even though plans for personal optimizations may be.

An aspect of social membership closely related to reward is mentioned by Tamir: self-fulfillment, which is not possible asocially, in isolation, but which requires the context of historical society with its comprehensible range of models of fulfillment. This community need not be the nose-to-nose reality of an isolated village in the rustic fringes of a larger society, much less the more nearly complete isolation of a hunting-group which is the totality of its own self-identity: all of its culture. The possibilities of fulfillment through emulation of social paradigms may be "imagined", and probably are more easily fulfilled through the imagination than through direct imitation. We have enormously expanded our power to imagine communities in recent centuries; and in the one now ending, living in one's community becomes metaphorical. First, there are the dominating cultures: those successful western societies Said discusses, and particularly the Anglo-Saxon one, are available everywhere now; this is part of what Said means in describing their imperial influence. But on the other hand, Ireland is also available everywhere too: a mythic Ireland, perhaps preferable to the real one. And in drawing that distinction, we need to ask for the criterion to determine which one is the more real.

A primary condition of the 20th century is the separation of people from their culture in very many metropolitan societies. This has been accompanied by extensive harm. These tumultuous separations mainly occurred through displacement of millions of refugees in the world

wars, and from the subsequent political upheavals. Added to this has been worldwide labor migration. And, in addition to all this actual movement and displacement, there is what can be called a virtual isolation, by which is meant a non-spatial or cultural, disconnect, of peoples. All this would seem to count against the claim that ethnic context is important to the rich choice which liberal philosophers promote. I'll briefly argue that, in a very broad interpretation of civic ethnicity as I've defined it, the weaker version of ethnicity is compatible with no-harm provisos.

On the largest scale, and as Edward Said argued, there has been much redefinition of identity of colonial populations. This has persisted beyond formal decolonization because of the persisting economic and cultural connections. The use of metropolitan language by new ex-colonial elites is an instance of this. So (as the argument goes) the original imposition of remote rule during empire has been replaced by an emblematic distant-rule, of images which replaced the traditional local ones. This is the other side of the coin of global economy: a homogenization of social identity under a dominating economic system. At a smaller scale, there has been a redefinition of ethnic and racial groups within countries. This process is sometimes acrimonious, though often not; and so the identities in question must be assessed in light of each other's assessments.

The relevance of this to Tamir's claims about self-fulfillment is that these needs for expression within an historical social context seem to be detached from the local circumstance: they don't arise from the locality, they are adapted to the locality as it is imagined. As with the adage about power being the perception of power, belonging is the perception of belonging.

People need to be recognized by others in acceptable terms, as having the characteristics they believe they have. Charles Taylor defines the demand for recognition as proceeding from the need for social identity. A part of social identity is recognition, and so "non-recognition or mis-recognition can inflict harm".[6] The harm done is the imposition of an inadequate, distorted identity. At the outset, this claim of Taylor's is in tension with rationalist claims that the private self is the whole self. Misrepresented persons may have to tolerate such depreciation of identity. Taylor points out that women have had to do this within their male-dominated societies; germane here is that some of the populations of colonialized societies have been misunderstood--improperly imagined--by their colonizers.[7] Systematic misrepresentation is a form of denial-of-identity. The misrepresentations of labeling as uncivilized, generically-regional (e.g. "Oriental"), and the dismissal of rustic peripheral cultures as either static or derivative are examples of this. The assumption by metropolitan elites that other groups desire assimilation follow from this systematic error.

Salman Rushdie discussed a closely related issue, which is the problem of the identity of Commonwealth writers. He describes being addressed, quite good-naturedly, by a Cambridge don as a "Commonwealth writer ... on the periphery".[8] The attribution suggests to Rushdie that there exists a ghetto at the edge of English literature. The apparent definition of such a writer is anyone writing in English who is not British and white, or Irish, or American. What one does with writers in Commonwealth countries who write in other than English, is a puzzle, and Rushdie wonders a bit about Black Americans too. English is now the world language, partly because of the British

Empire and partly because of the dominating position of the United States. The British literary establishment promotes (whether deliberately, or from involuntary nostalgia) the notion of Commonwealth literature as part of a larger presupposition that literature is an expression of nationality, then conflates this with their old Imperial sensibilities. Rushdie points out that those peoples who were colonized by the British are now "remaking" and "domesticating" English as a medium for the expression of their culture.[9]

The Englishman's version of the metropolitan mind-set toward its cultural provinces can have comic overtones, as a result of the extraordinarily complicated and diffuse array of connections between Britain and its zones of influence. The dramatic actor Richard Harris tells an anecdote about how, when he won an acting award, London newspapers referred to him as a "British actor"; whereas when he was jailed for drunkenness the same newspapers labeled him as an "Irish actor".[10] This is the sort of carefully calibrated, imposed identity which Taylor and Rushdie describe.

The philosophical issue connecting these anecdotes is clear enough. If part of our social identity is the recognition others have of us, then if this recognition is defined (even if partly) by those others, then part of our identity is the responsibility of others. That is, part of my identity may be something others do as an element of their intentions and agendas. Immediately, I wonder about two concerns. First, is it appropriate that judgments or values of others are involved in my identity? And if it is, then what are others obligated to do correctly and carefully when going about this task: that is, if there is an obligation here? I will find myself having concerns about

their agendas. If I do have a claim on others, what is its nature, and are such claims similar across the range of individual differences within a culture, and how are they similar or different across the differences between cultures?

This leads immediately into a very complicated set of suggestive implications. I will only venture to answer the first question here; and I'll make some comments on the others. Referring back to Tamir's thoughts on self-fulfillment, it strikes me that if I am to depend on a context inhabited by others who will provide some of the essential elements of my self-fulfillment, then I can expect these others to entertain judgments about me. I'm not sure how their participation in my self-fulfillment could be possible otherwise.

## SECTION II: SELF-FULFILLMENT AND SELF-INTEREST

I noted that Yael Tamir compares nationalism with free speech, which is defended on principle, even though there are abuses of it with consequent harm. By, contrast nationalism is a source of violence and misery; so it should be controlled: curtailed except in cases where its exercise corrects past harm. In the comparison, free speech is defended on principle despite the damage caused by its occasional abuse, whereas nationalism is criticized on principle despite its occasional benefits. Conservative disciplinarians do grumble about the awkward necessity of free speech, when it involves the profane and the obscene, especially affecting the very impressionable (e.g. children). Free speech <u>has</u> <u>been</u> criticized, in past, and in contemporary, non-liberal societies, for being damaging. But of

course Tamir is making a point about the liberal system which she is implicitly defending. Free speech is lauded on principle, not on results, while it's the opposite for nationalism, within that same system.

My implied objection may be met easily by the rejoinder that nationalism is found wanting on comparison with free speech in respect of the relative amounts of harm and good each has been perceived to cause. However, I want to suggest that nationalism is also judged critically on account of its association with irrationality. Contrary to the pure voluntarism of free speech, nationalism has an element of fatalism and passivity. Liberal agendas emphasize the responsible self-interest of the detached actor. Our self-interest is curtailed principally by the possibility that acting on self-interest will harm others. But what other effects does self-interest have, even after proper curtailment to prevent harm to others? For this discussion I'll stipulate that free speech is saying what we want, and material self-interest is acquiring what we want, both subject to harm-constraints.

Material self-interest entails optimizing our material situation. Often enough, the progress of undertakings which instantiate such a program is measured against socially-arbitrary emblems: conventionalized consumerism. Material acquisition--property--reassures us, comforts us, satisfies us. This satisfaction commonly takes the form of optimizing our material positions with respect to others in our society who are similarly engaged in this same relative optimization. Western bourgeois liberals believe it is acceptable to become materially rich so long as no harm is done to others. We don't self-optimize by stealing from each other. If the product of the

community is finite, then what one person is taking, another is not getting, even though it may be that this productive activity contributes to overall productivity so that there's more for everybody. But this is not stealing.

Rawls makes this a proviso: the toleration for an agenda of self-aggrandizement which will include the sorts of entrepreneurial activities which themselves produce a net general benefit for a large proportion of the population. No distinction is made between getting and keeping, and this could be made; but Rawls and others neglect it. Only if we regard ourselves better off by virtue of being better producers than grander owners does the question not arise. What is the reason for this seeming neglect?

It's assumed we produce as much as we do because we want to have as much as we can, but I contend that, under appropriate circumstances, this might be a strange goal to have. Why should it be considered rational to consume at levels beyond clearly adequate subsistence? This practice does not appear internally coherent, and so needs justification by appeal to its context. There is no obvious reason why, for instance, social rewards (honorific or class distinction) could not be based purely upon superior production, setting aside retention or consumption. The conventional moral justification for relatively grander ownership being laudatory is that it is emblematic of superior skill at the creation of a generally beneficial wealth, in a situation where it's assumed that the non-stealing proviso is honored.

But we should recall that the linkage between production and retention of the product is culturally idiosyncratic. Some societies do not have this linkage, and in these, self-fulfillment arises

directly in the production, rather than in the grander scale of ownership. An aboriginal society in Amazonia, described by Joe Kane, appears to embody that attitude.[11] Kane reports that the men, who are hunters, seem bewildered by the idea of maintaining a supply of food against the time when they might be hungry. Instead, they seem to place great value in extemporaneous resourcefulness. A good hunter doesn't need to keep a larder. Obviously, by contrast the cultivator does need to keep one, because of the seasonality of cultivation, and we retain this practice, which we may speculate was introduced as a neolithic novelty. But, it is no more "natural" to be the hunter than the cultivator. So the acquisitive agenda presupposed by Nozick, for instance, but Rawls too, is just a cultural bias.

What I am contending here is that how we go about accumulating what it is we believe should be stored up, and to what purposes we believe it should be expended, are entirely contingent upon social norms, which are not notably reasonable. Large-scale examples of the apparent irrationality of instantiating material self-interest come to mind. For instance, the United States, as the hegemonous state in the post-Soviet new world order, supports a nuclear-powered naval fleet to patrol the Persian Gulf, so that its citizens (the fleet's owners) can drive twelve-mile-per-gallon automobiles 20 miles to buy a quart of milk. Such a method of gratification does not appear particularly reasonable. The social commentator Amory Lovins expressed it this way: there would have been no 1990 Gulf War, employing 0.3 mile-per-gallon battle tanks, 0.003 mile-per-gallon warships, etc., if Kuwait's principal export were broccoli.[12] No doubt normative defenses can be mounted to explain such behavior, but it is uncertain they can expunge all traces of a profound peculiarity.

My argument here, in defense of nationalism, is one of analogy. Rawls and others defend acquisitive maximization as a reasonable agenda, with provisos. Yet, there is no reason for the agenda of acquisitive maximization not being criticized as readily as that of nationalism, on grounds of a similar irrationality: that they both are historically contingent. Such irrationality is not whimsy, since both principles are observed to lead to harm in some of their instances, much more so than the harm to which the abuse of free speech leads. Yet both are beneficial: acquisitiveness encourages productivity, nationalism engenders social environments in which personal fulfillment is more readily accomplished. Notwithstanding this similarity, the evils of nationalism are held to be characteristic of it, with an occasional exculpatory proviso; whereas the benefits of acquisitiveness are held to be characteristic of it, with constraining proviso.

There are arguments for the priority of individualist projects over community-based personal values which are based on precedence. I'll just sketch out one possible rejoinder here. It's argued that communitarianism is constructed on the part of the constituting individuals, so the individual agenda, which begins with the elements which constitute the community, is more fundamental. But it can be argued the other way around, borrowing some ideas from Heidegger. The concept of the human individual is analogous to the scientific, neutral object in a found world rather than the tool or the obstruction in a used world. The concept of the individual is not simple; it's quite sophisticated. It depends upon a kind of advanced community, one so large that a possibility emerges within it: the monadic legal economic entity. This would be a person stripped of all

idiosyncratic one-on-one attachments to other individuals. There are no primitive monadic individuals, none below the community level, because the possibility of such socially-monadic behavior is a product of a relatively advanced community. Thus, the monadic individuals who might undertake the task of constituting a community are an imaginative abstraction. We each of us are thrown into the world already tied to it: certainly to our mothers, and soon enough tied to, connected with, dependent upon everyone in our horizon. As our horizon expands through imaginative construction larger and larger, then the possibility of the monadic individual living off the surplus, or the regularities, of that community becomes a possibility. At that point the acquisitive opportunistic individual described by, for instance, Nozick appears.

## SECTION III. UNEQUAL COMPETITION, OR INCOMMENSURABLE?

This brief section will introduce some discussion which follows from the content of the previous section, but which requires some elaboration to be found in the next chapter for fuller treatment. Real social tensions and problems within multicultural situations are often examined as instances of unequal competition for equitable portions of the social product. Both Will Kymlicka and Yael Tamir describe communities competing within a single polity for the substantive benefits of whatever derives from membership in that polity.[13] Kymlicka's treatment is the more detailed. This concern is, I suggest, largely prompted by the liberal-philosophical penchant for modeling generic and rational society. (Neither Kymlicka nor

Tamir promotes this program, but both find it appropriate to respond to the detailed problems of the program rather than to criticize its intent.) The ahistorical models are populated by individuals whose mutual interactions derive from calculated personal agendas for optimal extraction of satisfaction from the society's material base. The effect of this approach is that, in such a modeled multicultural polity, the internal cultural communities are then analogous to individuals within a homogeneous society: just as the model's individuals within their communities compete for the goods, the communities do.

Treated this way, the problem presupposes the multipolarity. But this is unrewarding if we want to examine the multipolarity as problematic in itself. At the same time, this treatment assumes that, even though the cohabiting cultures are distinctively different, they are in friction over competition, which is to say, redundantly, competition over the same thing. They wouldn't easily be in competition over different things. The liberal solution to unequal circumstances may be the promotion of a compensatory scheme. So in the case of a cultural distinction which is the cause of some disadvantage or burden, there would be some form of social indemnity insurance. But is this fair?

Will Kymlicka argues that cultural membership should be an important element of liberal justice. But why won't simple color-blindness take case of this? He has phrased the question variously: why should minority members have "more than an equal share to protect cultural heritage", and then, "why should aboriginal peoples have a special constitutional status...?"[14] Kymlicka also inverts it: "why is it important that individuals not be at a disadvantage?", and answers:

"we are responsible for our ends, and hence for adjusting our aims and ambitions in the light of the legitimate interests of others".[15]

The problem seems to be as follows. Under the principle of individual autonomy, persons are free to choose and seek their ends, subject to anti-harm provisos. If the procedure selected toward a freely chosen goal is harmful to someone, then, while the goal may be retained, the means to it should be modified. The means I pick for my goal may make it more difficult for others to achieve their goals; so if there is no incompatibility in the goals, the means should be adjusted. If a free-for-all in agendas results in the destruction of a minority culture (the context of choice for its members), then we may not embark on a free-for-all to achieve our ends, even if the alternative is more irksome or costly for us.

Examples make the generalization clearer. If I want to make money from the forest I own, I can cut it down and sell the wood; but if this action results in the ruin of the pasture land below my forest and the consequent ruin of the shepherds who use that land, I should modify my actions. I am not prevented from making money, which is my goal; I am prevented from doing it in a way that ruins other people's agendas. This may be broadened, from a conflict between use of two adjacent land parcels, to the collective values and inclinations of whole cultural groups. A subsistence society embedded by the vagaries of history in the midst of the territory of an industrial society will find its attitudes toward land use at odds with its surrounding neighbors; and the friction here is not merely competition.

Kymlicka's two-wrecked-ships example is a rebuttal to the neutral administration concept, as applied to less-dissimilar groups.[16] Two wrecked ship's stranded populations are spread throughout an island by

the terms of a prearranged auction of resources; but the two populations differ culturally, and one is fewer; hence that group must live as a small minority distributed throughout a majority culture, and this is a disadvantage which the auction, although conducted fairly, cannot rectify.

So, Kymlicka concludes that a minority group must expend extra energy to maintain their identity, while the majority, by setting the tone and style of the institutions which operate within the complex society simply <u>is</u> the identity. In passing, I'll note that "minority" has a technical usage here. Numerical minorities who control the social institutions may exclude numerical majorities toward this same end, so that the bulk of the population comes to have minority status. This situation would be unfair under ordinary principles of democratic rule. But more pointedly, I also want to note Michael Ignatieff's contrary (and slightly ironic) example of cultural distinction: he points out that minority Quebecois use language to exclude, while Anglo-Canadians must suffer the mistake of identification with the USA.[17] That is, it is easier for the French-speaking minority of Canada to preserve its identity within a very large Anglophone region than it is for English-speaking Canadian majority. The proportions here are probably not accidental; and so the French-Canadian advantage would not be different if they were a Canadian majority. The implications of this example, when considered in general as applied to functional minorities and majorities, should make us uneasy about accepting Kymlicka's conclusion.

Kymlicka says minorities have to work harder to be what they are, to avoid assimilation. This is the case as seen in the policies of some regimes; and van den Berghe has offered examples. But these are not

liberal regimes, and Kymlicka is not suggesting that assimilation be policy; rather he is saying that the assimilation is the unintentional result of a liberal-spirited majority who simply permit majoritarian preponderance to have its effect. On the other hand, if we accept what Said and Anderson have said about relationships between the elements of a complex society, then the problem is different. The problem of minority identity is not always that it must resist submergence in the majority, but rather that it must resist misidentification by that majority (using "majority" to mean the dominant culture in a culturally-complex society).

Charles Taylor seems to support this "extra work" thesis as a solution for the Quebec problem within a procedurally-neutral Canadian state. In his view, Quebec may properly maintain a non-neutral administration under the protection of a neutral Canadian federation. The problems here will be discussed in chapter six. Note again the importance of relative size of the populations comprising the complex society. The Afikaners of South Africa might seem to be in a situation analogous to the Quebecois, but as a dominant minority they are a functional majority.

However, even in the context of a majority committed to liberalism, Kymlicka overlooks another disadvantage: the conceptual colonialization by the dominant group, which might, in all innocence, assign characteristics to the minority. Kymlicka's concern seems to follow from a view of the neighboring and competing groups as existing independently of each other and linked only by the fact that their agendas involve the same resources; in fact they are often defined by their connections to each other; and this has been described previously in the discussion of Edward Said. Kymlicka seems to have

in mind an aboriginal minority with characteristics fixed from pre-contact, and fixed (inevitably by the majority) whether or not to the satisfaction of the minority; but the majority rarely has such accurate vision.

## NOTES

1. Raz 1986, p.369
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 374
4. Tamir 1993, p.21
5. Ibid., p.84
6. Taylor 1994, p.25
7. Ibid.,
8. Rushdie 1991, p.61
9. Ibid., p.64
10. As related on NBC "Tonight Show", date unknown.
11. As related during 1997 radio interview with an NPR journalist, date unknown. Kane has been an advocate for the rights of Ecuadorian Indians in their confrontations with oil companies, and he has lived and traveled with hunting bands of the Huaorani tribe. When he prepared to accompany them on a hunting trip by assembling preserved victuals sufficient for many days, the Indians were amused and insisted that everything be consumed communally on the spot. Kane reports that later he nearly starved before game was found, although his companions did not appear to be disconcerted by their circumstance.
12. Lovins, address to Commonwealth Club of California, date unknown.
13. Kymlicka 1989, p.182; Tamir 1993, p.55
14. Kymlicka 1989, p.182
15. Ibid., p.184
16. Ibid., p.187
17. Ignatieff 1993, p.155

# CHAPTER SIX: PROBLEMS WITH IDENTITY, STABILITY, POROSITY

## SECTION I. IDENTIFYING CULTURAL AND PROCEDURAL PLURALISM

Will Kymlicka has presented a highly detailed argument in which he tries to respond to the mutual criticisms of two opposing schools of thought: social communitarianism and individual-autonomy-based liberalism. He sets out by observing that liberalism is most often considered as a set of political concerns, and is seen as dealing with relations between the person and the state. But the concept of society, which includes but is hardly exhausted by the concept of the political state, is a much broader concept; the relevant broader issues are what he wants to consider. In addition to direct link between the individual and the state, there are indirect links. Individuals are members of social categories (religious, economic, professional, racial, and of course ethnic) which normally have some collective linkage with the authority of the state; thus there are consociational linkages as well as individual linkages connecting persons with states.

This observation confirms the essential modernity of liberalism. Classical political philosophy (e.g. Aristotle's) dealt with relations between the individual and a society which was seen more as an organism, where the position of a person within the social organism (his relative ranking, the essential function peculiar to his position, etc.) was significant. The modern conception is of a congeries of individuals living in their social relationships under

the generic and uniform constraints of a state. The peculiarly multiple linkages of political and social authority which Kymlicka characterizes awaited the emergence of the concept of the state as a part of the social structure rather than a self-conscious expression of that (whole) society. Another way of putting this is that I suspect classical political philosophers would have questioned the distinction between sociology and political science.

On this point, it's worth mentioning a closely related distinction. Classical political philosophy was self-examining and not a social anthropology which distinguished between its practitioners and its subject matter. Yet, the ancients recognized that politics may be distinguished from the whole of human concern. This is evidenced by the tragedy of Antigone, who was in the predicament of having to choose between duty to the state and to the family, so that the distinction between private (family) and civic (society), at least, is not modern. The modern division to which Kymlicka alludes is between the state apparatus proper (the government), and other principles of authority, which may be institutionalized, as the church, the schools or the professions; or which may be traditional, as the family, the tribe or other historically-determined institution. I shall retain Kymlicka's terms "political" to refer to the government, and "cultural" to refer to all non-state institutions and traditions.

Kymlicka does not note that this distinction doesn't apply to all modern societies; this is most likely because he is concerned with defending one type: liberal society. In contrast to this relatively narrow focus, Ernest Gellner theorized on a more general scale, that the non-pervasiveness of political authority in the western liberal state is absent in Islamic and Marxist interpretations of power

structure because the distinction between authority and political authority is missing. Authority-sharing by multiple centers of social power appears restricted to liberal societies, and in Michael Walzer's interpretation the state has been characterized as one member of an overlapping set of authority principles (though, with trumping privileges).[1]

These remarks foreshadow an argument I'll develop later; and I'll note it here. Formerly, and for a very long time, religious authority was thought to be essentially bound up with and even indistinguishable from political authority. Now the division between the two is permanently established, and virtually unquestioned in much of the world. On the other hand, the social authority of ethnic membership seems essentially bound up with and indistinguishable from political authority in the contemporary nationalist model. It seems clear from the theories presented in the previous chapter that this model is no more fundamental to political structure than the old theocratic model. I will return to this point subsequently in my argument, and elaborate upon it.

Kymlicka does not argue for collective rights to recognition by discrete collectivities within a state. Rather, he argues that liberal political principles entail recognition of an obligation to give due regard to minority societies, including protecting them, so that individual members of those societies will have a meaningful cultural context within which to exercise the autonomy which is their right in a liberal political environment. Kymlicka thus defends the idea that the liberal state has obligations toward communitarianism, on grounds of individual rights rather than collective rights.

This chapter contains three discussions which are related, though

not obviously so. First, in this section, there is the issue of making a meaningful conceptual distinction between what I'll call a procedural federal system, and the political arrangements which can be made for a multicultural society. The problem here is in the relationship between treating as distinct that which is distinct, and the distinction of being treated as distinct. Second, there is a question about the value of cultural context for providing rich options: the simple existence of culture, or the persistence of a particular culture. Third, there is a paradoxical problem about how a liberal society can justify the protective isolation of an illiberal society for the sake of that society's (consequently) oppressed population. On this third issue, I argue I can resolve an apparent dilemma, in which it appears we cannot avoid both oppressiveness and triviality. The point I'll try to make is that persistence of self-identity does not entail a static culture, if self-identity derives from the narrative development of a society rather than its historically-contingent present character.

Will Kymlicka has examined in great detail the tensions which arise in a situation where a majority society, which is also "advanced" (metropolitan and industrial), constitutes the controlling establishment of a state which happens to encapsulate a minority, "primitive" or "aboriginal" society. I've defined nationalist issues as essentially the politicization of ethnic distinctions, which would suggest the issues are purely political; and so on a narrow interpretation, much of Kymlicka's discussion of the metropolitan-aboriginal issue might be merely peripheral here. This is because internal societies which are labeled "aboriginal" don't commonly have political aspirations which include occupying the state establishment.

However, states have frequently-enough dealt with "primitive" societies as states; and much of Kymlicka's discussion is about the question of the political recognition of cultural distinction. By "political recognition" I mean some form of institutionalized communal autonomy such that there is a political pluralism corresponding to the cultural pluralism. This can be an arrangement of political equality, as in federal systems. Alternately it can be an arrangement embodying a profound political inequality, as is found in the aboriginal reserve systems existing in many of the countries which have developed out of permanent overseas European colonization. Also, there are countries which combine more than one mode of political recognition in a complex mixture of federal components, aboriginal reserves, and all manner of intermediate forms.

An interjection on terminology is appropriate here. I'm using "aboriginal" to refer to the original population of a region which has been occupied, settled and developed through incursion by a metropolitan society. The two populations can remain divided for a long period after the occupation for various reasons; and one of these can be an incompatibility in their two modes of production of basic needs. Typically the aboriginals do not comprise or belong to an urban society while the settlers do. (And as typically it's a simple matter of technological advantage.) This very substantial difference amplifies their incompatibility. Population displacements occur in which social distinctions persist because of other differences, such as religious differences (e.g. Muslim occupations of parts of the Balkans and India). In these cases, the original population is not usually called "aboriginal".

This is elementary anthropology; but a slightly more subtle

observation I want to make is that the term's judgmental baggage is significant here. Contrasting aboriginals with metropolitans inevitably unpacks some of the term's implicit normative content. Oliver Cromwell thought of the Irish as aboriginals in the strongest judgmental sense of the term. As I've noted, this attitude had not vanished as late as Mill's time, nor has it quite entirely vanished in our own, on some assessments of tonier London newspapers. So, modern metropolitan societies which have engulfed, subdued, and otherwise come to their own terms with respect to neighboring aboriginal societies, will no longer view them hostilely if ever they did; but yet their attitude may likely be a complex one comprising proportions of superiority, paternalism and other elements not easily distinguished from each other, and not always laudatory.

Individuals can relate to the state in different ways, of which two are relevant here. An individual may relate directly, one-on-one, which in the liberal state would be a uniform relationship for virtually all citizens. An individual may relate consociationally, indirectly, via cultural community. In the latter mode an individual's relationship to the state would vary with the structures and conventions of the cultural community. Kymlicka draws the distinction between political and social community, and observes that insofar as a state's population may contain diverse historical societies, and insofar as the state incorporates a recognition of this in its laws, then its relationships with its culturally-distinct citizens may vary.

This distinction is not meant to be the one embodied in democratic federalism, where each citizen is one-on-one with the federating, sovereign state and also one-on-one with that local state authority

which, federated with others, comprises with them the federal state. Kymlicka does not explain how these two systems (consociational relation and democratic-federalism) would be dealt with differently. This omission needn't be remedied here, but I think a brief discussion of it will further illuminate the difficulties I claim exist in the task of developing a taxonomy for the political and sociological concepts needed to lay out an epistemology of nationalism. To do this requires that I look at several examples, and I'll try not to abandon accuracy to brevity.

Federal systems empower local procedural autonomies in order to maintain local procedural authority. But this is often the case simply because there <u>was</u> local procedural authority based on local sovereignty prior to a federal consolidation; and the model was retained, in order to have an acceptable constitutional relationship with the central power structure. The distribution of duties and power is worked out at the time of federation. Many countries came into existence this way, including the USA and Australia. There is commonly, though not always, omission of reference to cultural difference among the separate federal components, because of the requirement that the various units have a uniform political relationship with the central power. So, states of the USA, many with different detail differences in legal codes which reflect different local cultural histories, are federally "equal" as I've mentioned above. But, is this constitutional equality necessary? Some federal systems have a variety of sub-units (e.g. the ex-USSR with its federated Russian republic). In fact the USA, with its system of territories and Indian nations in addition to its uniform federal system, has such a variety, though this is generally ignored when

using the country as an example of a federal system.

We might ask, then, for a distinction between a federal system and institutionalized multiculturalism. We might ask specifically how on one hand an Iowan and a Mainer relate in the USA, and how on the other a Fleming and a Walloon relate in Belgium. The conceptual distinction to be made here seems obvious enough, but the political distinctions become murkier the closer we look. The U.S. federal system lays out external characteristics of the member states by means of a federal constitution defining relationships between each severally and the central authority, but <u>not</u> between the member states individually, since these relationships are of equals. Virginia, Louisiana, New Mexico, are different internally (with, for instance, remnants of English, French, and Spanish law court procedures and concepts) but their state-statuses are virtually identical under the constitution. So, while there may be cultural differences between the states, these differences are not what is institutionalized by the fact of the federal relationship.

By contrast, the United Kingdom is not federal although it is segmented. It's a hodgepodge of territories relating in ad hoc ways, which reflects the non-systematized nature of its constitutional arrangements, which grew since medieval times. A segmented state with medieval origins <u>may</u> be more constitutionally orderly; Switzerland is as old but coherently federal; but then its circumstances are different from Britain's. It came together as a league of relative equals, and did not coalesce around the central dominating power, as with England and its Celtic fringe. Also, Switzerland has had more than one formal constitution. The U.K. was not formed democratically, and it need not have taken the form it did: a constellation of

political discernibles in a peculiar arrangement. France is a unitary democratic republic and is often mentioned as paradigmatic of its type. Nevertheless France was formed in a way similar to the U.K., from a central political power around which coalesced elements (Bretons, Provençals, Savoyards, etc.) which, if not non-French, are arguably less-French. But these traditional elements were broken up politically in the revolution quite intentionally, so that the departments of the Republic would not correspond to the old counties of the monarchy.

The point of my digression into political geography has been to try to show that the distinction between a procedurally federated state and a culturally segmented state, however easy to stipulate, does not find easy correspondence in historical examples, even though it is conceptually clear in principal. From that I want to argue that the distinction between civic and blood nationalist is, if anything, less sharply defined than is civic and blood ethnicity as I draw the distinction. Categorization is difficult, since there are few clean examples for confirming either model. I suspect one finds relatively fewer examples of a state federated for purely procedural, administrative grounds, and in which there is no prior regional granulation which is mirrored or echoed in the later federal structure. Put differently, why federate if there is no internal distinction upon which <u>to</u> federate?

The American example may approximate the principle of procedural federation. An agreeable historical pattern was established for subsequently bringing into a preexisting federation 37 states, from territory acquired by the sovereignty formed from the union of the first thirteen, which, we must recall, comprised regions sufficiently

distinct that they later fell into violent warfare with each other. Federal Australia is an instance of amalgamation for convenience of states with less regional distinction than the American ones, and this may be nearest to a purely procedural federation, which we would distinguish from the multicultural state. Subsequent British attempts to amalgamate colonies into federal entities were mostly unsuccessful, despite the appearances of regional similarities.

Kymlicka's examples of social distinctions arising in differences in culture, language and history are confined to aboriginal societies in contact with metropolitan societies, even though Quebec appears an excellent example of a minority culture with problems of identity and dominance. John Tomasi has noted that Kymlicka didn't choose to examine the distinction between procedural and cultural segmentation which I've discussed. I suggest Kymlicka didn't pursue this distinction because the distinction which engages Kymlicka at the outset is between state and society, and not those between, or rather within, hierarchies of states. That is, Kymlicka does not handle procedural federalism because he is dealing with problems arising between political structures and cultural communities. We may think the former is embedded in the more general latter: politics as an expression of culture; however this is not always the case in practice, and not in settler countries such as Canada where, as in the U.S.A, traditional native societies are embedded in larger, and more recent, political structures. French-Canadians have a federated state with constitutional protections, while Canadian Indians do not. So Kymlicka only mentions Quebec once in reference to formal federalism; otherwise he discusses Native Canadians as embedded societies.

Charles Taylor, on the subject of internal arrangements for a

multicultural state, and in the spirit of the Aristotlelian notion that politics is approximate, argues that there is no single solution, and suggests that both multicultural states and federations of monocultural states have merits.[2] This is also the moving spirit in Tamir's point that there is no just possibility of a law specifying when speech should be suppressed in the interests of preventing harm. Government is an arrangement to overcome problems; if there were no problems there would be no need for government, and if government were expected to dissolve problems, and do so without creating more problerms, then we would expect government to wither; and this expectation has itself withered.

Responding to Taylor's distinction, then, how do we assess the relative merits of the two: a unitary multicultural state or a federation of monocultural states? The federation institutionalizes the differences, but additionally fixes them as is, which will produce tension with later development. Suppose the original United States constitution made a place for the German-Americans of Pennsylvania and the Dutch-Americans of New York to live in official recognition with British-Americans. Now, the Irish arrive and there is no room for them because there is no recognition of them in the existing structure; so another provision is made. Then the Italians, the Slavs in their variety, and so forth, must be accommodated. A country which adheres to liberal forms of government and also is a significant immigrant destination and is structured around its multicultural composition rather than in indifference to it, will be stuck with this problem, so the institution will always be under attack.

In another scenario, and one more closely resembling the Canadian one which Taylor surely has in mind, suppose all the immigrant

population, without regard to origin, agree on a Rawlsian contractual procedure, except for one group. Then, this group is the only "problematic" one, and so a solution is needed to incorporate both systems in one regime. This might work if the special provision didn't come to seem attractive to some of the groups who previously accepted the Rawlsian solution. The policy of not conceding a single exception is order to prevent a tide of exceptionalism is well-established political strategy. It is implicit regional foreign policy in, for instance, post-colonial Africa, where the political boundaries were originally created in a mixture of indifference to and ignorance of local cultural loyalties.

The first model is of the strictly procedural neutral state which is generally attributed to Rawls, and also Dworkin. Apart from normative arguments against this as a "sink-or-swim" scenario, there is the problem of conceptualizing an administration which embodies no cultural coloration in its concern for the population administered. If the state is to enforce the basic liberal no-harm proviso, then a definition of harm is required. Yael Tamir reminds us that a if a liberal state is to provide an adequate level of protective benefit for its citizens, then it must have some conception of welfare, and the character of any profile of welfare is culturally contingent.[3] A policy of prevention of harm presupposes a standard minimum-acceptable existence. It can be argued that an appeal could be made to a set of needs and preventions modeled on the universal human but, then that model must be justified; and the justification itself must be demonstrably culture neutral, and so forth. So, it seems there can be no generic, cosmic notion of welfare.

But I believe that perhaps this objection to the possibility of pure

proceduralism can be met in either of two ways. First, we should realize that a minimum level of welfare will certainly be no lower than a level of creature comfort we would wish to maintain for other mammals, and this in light of the very substantial insight which the modern sciences of animal behavior have developed. All cultures accept some notion of the importance of minimal animal survival, and so a hospice pallet with a bowl of soup ought not be culture-biased. This criterion might seem distressingly insensitive; but that is exactly the point of it, if a strictly culture-neutral procedural state is the object. Culture is sensitivity. Tamir's concern over the nature of the concern is itself a concern. The second possibility for overcoming her objection is procedural: a national welfare administration could assess what is common to the various notions of adequate welfare as conceived by its diverse societies. This would be politically responsive, although it might reveal a minimum level of concern below that of the mammalian-comfort proviso.

The second model is of a society which is organized and insitutionalized around a definition of the good life which will be historically idiosyncratic. The terms and methods of personal self-fulfillment will be implicit in the law code. It is not easy to specify how this would be compatible with basic liberal principles of non-intrusiveness and prevention of harm. Such a state would have to institutionalize, or codify, this basic proviso. But this leads to the following situation. Let P stand for the collective social aims of the population of this society. The constitution of the state would then promote P; but if it were to meet the liberal provisos, it would also have to promote the tolerance of non-P. So, if P included, say, church-attendance, then the state would promote the church but

would not compel attendance. If P included real-property ownership, then the state would promote property ownership but would not compel it. If, however, we rephrase this to mean that the state would not discriminate against non-church-attendance and propertylessness, then we have to ask what it would mean to say they were being promoted. Tax incentives, for instance, would be discriminatory.

## SECTION II. VALUE, EXISTENCE, PERSISTENCE

The second matter to be discussed in this chapter is the way in which cultural context is perceived as valuable by the individual. John Tomasi has offered an interpretation and criticism of Kymlicka which I want to examine closely, because it comes very close to what I want to argue about Kymlicka's discussion of community and political rights. Tomasi concedes that Kymlicka's argument is persuasive. However, Tomasi argues that Kymlicka doesn't clearly specify what is needed for this meaningful context. The value may lie in a particular, persisting cultural community which provides a persisting set of needed characteristics; or value may lie in the simple existence of any communitarian situation will suffice. Tomasi's claim is that Kymlicka's argument is flawed on this account; but that implicit within its premises is a motivation which will provide a stronger argument than Kymlicka's explicit one.[4] It's my intention to recast this slightly. I want to extend Tomasi's argument, to say that what is required is a peculiar sort of autonomous control of social context: that members of the protected society (as with any society) must be free to specify the important elements of the context by means

of this autonomous control, and that they will be likely to do this by presenting a preferred narrative explanation of their sense of self-identity.

Briefly, Tomasi argues that Kymlicka is either defending a social attribute which is universal and hence trivial, or else he is proposing the invalidation of basic liberal values by condoning what amounts to social oppressiveness. I believe I can resolve this apparent dilemma. The core of the problem lies in the nature of social self-identity, which Kymlicka argues has intrinsic value in providing cultural context. Persistence of this self-identity, I'll argue, does not entail a static (and thus oppressive) culture, if self-identity derives from the story of how a society comes to have its character rather than from its historically-contingent present character. My slightly modified version will, I believe, in addition to removing the dilemma-like flaw Tomasi attributes to Kymlicka's position, also confirm my contention that the proprietorship of historical narrative is useful for understanding (though not necessarily reducing) intercommunal difficulties.

I noted earlier that Kymlicka argues for communal rights on the grounds that the individual requires rich context in order to exercise autonomous choice meaningfully, and community supplies this needed context. Tomasi argues that Kymlicka doesn't clearly specify what Kymlicka means by context. What is not clearly specified is whether community as a persisting set of characteristics is what is needed for this rich context, or whether the simple existence of any communitarian situation will suffice. That is, suppose I want to appeal to social context in the formation of a personal judgment or plan. Do I merely require some generic set of possibilities and

values to match against my needs? Or do I require a persistent, durable, and familiar context? I want to extend Tomasi's argument further, to say that what is required is a peculiar sort of autonomous control of that context: that we must be free to specify the important elements of the context. This is not circular, I contend, but rather dialectical. The persistence of the community is revealed in its narrative history; we need to specify the narrative of the community.

In discussing how a society may be influenced to change, Kymlicka points to a distinction between the character of the culture and structure of the culture: "In one common usage, culture refers to the character ... [so that] changes in norms amounts to loss."[5] That is, if we regard culture as a sort of artifactual inventory, then change is a taking away of what was there, in the sense that an inventory-list is invalidated. However Kymlicka uses the term differently, to refer to "the community, or the cultural structure itself."[6] He offers the example of French-Canada which, despite the great social changes of the 1960's, remained a distinctive culture. That is, the inventory of characteristics changed, but the structure persisted.

Tomasi uses "structure" for "identity", or "entity". A thing's character is distinct from the simple existential fact of it: what-it-is as opposed to that-it-is. Tomasi's distinction between structure of, and character of, a culture is summed up clearly: he says structure is "history, language and culture of the group"; character is "values, norms and attendant institutions".[7] Structure is the historical circumstance giving rise to the character. In this interpretation the distinction closely approximates Hobsbawm's objective and subjective criteria, which are, on the one hand, that a society has persisted through historical time, and on the other hand

what set of cultural, self-identifying phenomena has done the persisting.

Note that the distinction would collapse for the members of an extremely isolated society, and also for those pure rustics who survive in contemporary interconnected societies. For them the existential fact of a culture and its list of characteristics is inseparable, because for them that culture <u>is all</u> culture. Perhaps for such persons, their cultural inventory is conceptually fixed; however, and even if such societies still exist, they would lie beyond the range of our consideration here, precisely because ethnic and nationalist issues of inclusion, competition and assimilation, arise in the recognition of other social groups. (We can neglect our own rustics for the same reason.) This exclusion is implicit in Kymlicka's discussion. All liberal societies have relatively sophisticated cultures which accept at least some of the elements comprising the character of a culture as matters for autonomous choice.[8] That is, they do not have the total myopia of the isolated group. This is the distinction Tamir draws between tribes and peoples; that the latter have a sense of other peoples and conversely they are comprehended as legitimate Others, by other peoples. Tribes may be objectively distinct from other tribes, but they don't have an objective sense of being on of an indefinite array of types, because they have no sense of the array. But if there are no such peoples any more, then Tamir's distinction collapses.

Kymlicka's argument for rights of communities to maintain collective cultural distinctiveness is persuasive because he appeals to the liberal value of individualism and autonomous choice. Autonomous decision making is an individual right. Individuals require rich

context for exercise of autonomous decision making; rich context requires a community. Therefore communal rights are justified based upon individual rights.

But Tomasi claims Kymlicka isn't consistent about the nature of the primary good he is defending, and so equivocates on the one hand between the simple existential fact of any community structure which will provide rich context, and, on the other, a persisting, particular structure from which we draw. Kymlicka starts out with the notion that we (merely) require a (some, any generic) context for design and promotion of agenda, and then slips into the notion that we want a context with a persisting set of characteristics: an additional characteristic of persistence gets added to a more spare requirement of context at hand as needed. So, what Kymlicka first calls "a cultural structure" becomes "a stable context of choice", and then becomes "a secure cultural context".[9]

The philosophical problem emerges in requiring a persisting identity for liberal culture. One the one hand, culture has an inertial dampening influence on the efforts by eccentrics and gadflies to introduce novelty. This morning generally sees the same world as yesterday. On the other hand, liberal culture ought to be malleable, since autonomous freedom is no good if it's only possibility; there must be action following from the possibility of such action, and the collective effect must produce change in culture (or, history as a consequence of effort, in the Collingwoodian sense). The point here is not that all exercise of autonomous choice need entail change in culture, each choice bringing about some change; but it's likely that the net effect of widespread autonomous actions will be significant in the long term, will be ultimately transforming. So, it seems

empirically likely that a liberal culture will be changing, since action arising in autonomous choice is such that it precisely is not completely constrained by cultural rules. It follows from this that the toleration of what might be termed life-agenda-pluralism, which must exist in liberal culture, will likely lead to change, however slow.

A rich context of choice must present alternatives which are diverse but also comprehensible. We are disposed to stay inside what, in the last chapter, I have called "Raz's limits", which means that autonomous choice of action must be expected to eventuate in known distinct consequences which are more than trivial and less than mortal. In light of this, liberal pluralists who want to defend the persistence of culture must at most want a recognizability of culture throughout the changes which will result from the cumulative effect of actions of its own liberal, self-critical members. They would wish neither for a fixed permanence to all its characteristics, resulting from only trivial consequences of actions, nor would they want incessant social convulsions resulting from only mortal consequences of actions. The persistence desired here amounts to a continuity of recognizability; and what is that? I believe what is a required here is something close to a coherent history, which is to say, the narrative of development applying to a society which its members will agree is their own narrative history: the story of how they got to be the way they are now.

Options for actions must grow out of antecedents in a way which makes sense. The liberal requirement of individual action, with its consequent social effect, means there can be no social stasis; but at the same time social development does not annihilate persistence, as

long as it is development along a recognizable narrative which can preserve its identity. Indeed, if the consequences of free action were incomprehensible social alterations, then of course we would have the sort of cultural degradation Kymlicka fears befalls aboriginal societies in contact with modern dominating urban societies. Here I want to remind us what Dvornik said about memory, and how I objected to the notion that there was no continuity in eastern Europe.

Kymlicka has said that changes in norms, values, etc., within a society, would result in a "loss" of culture.[10] Tomasi counters that a society might undergo such changes and retain its identity. So, even though a culture changes, it's still that culture, in the manner of Descartes' wax. But then Kymlicka refers to examples where local cultures have been radically altered by western influences, and says the existence of these societies is thus "undermined"[11] But Tomasi objects: these are the same cultures, undergoing transitions. Still, Kymlicka points to French-Canadian society as an example of persistence-through-change; so it's not clear that Tomasi's criticism is accurate. But I don't care to adjudicate that; I find the conundrum, whoever maintains it, to be the point here. What is the nature of the distinction between a transformed society and an undermined society? Undermining is transforming after all; however in the sense of "corrupting" it echoes Aristotelian physics: corruption as the opposite of generation; and so we have a fine distinction here.

What I think is not at issue here is the idea that the society is undergoing divergence, whether or not destructive, from an observed standard condition. Neither Kymlicka nor Tomasi, I believe, are concerned here about any fixed norm such as is implied in the traditional anthropological concept of the ethnographic present. The

hypothetical society is not "supposed to be" untainted, the way it was before some wholly novel distorting effect appeared. But what may concern them is the idea that insofar as a society does change, then it can either change in response to some internal dynamic or it can change in response to an external influence. Now this distinction roughly approximates Yael Tamir's distinction between tribal and national, in the sense that her concept of tribe does not include any external recognition. So again we are led to a distinction between an essentially disconnected people and a people which are in part recognized by the nature of their connections with the surrounding world. In the context of liberal concern, a society which is connected to other societies will most likely be influenced by those societies, and this influence can be characterized by its relative position between the extremes of intentional adaptation or borrowing, and coercion.

The point is, while societies do not remain identically the same from earlier to later, they do retain the same identity. The distinction here is between being undermined and undergoing transition, where we want to say an undermined culture has somehow been damaged, diminished, or made less-than-itself; while we also want to say that a culture undergoing a transition is still that same culture. Here is another distinction where the paradigms seem clear, but yet good examples aren't abundant. How are we to adjudicate this? In non-damaging transition, members of the society presumably change what they want, either from the inside or from the outside, and are not coerced into changing this but not that. If this establishes the essential test, then we look for the difference between a change (whether original or derivative) freely adopted and so recognized by

members of the society, and a change which is coercive, or perhaps fraudulent.

How are societies improved? Yael Tamir discusses the notion of "inadequacy" of a culture as seen by its own members and proponents. She refers to Fichte's oft-quoted address to Germans on the subject of the Napoleonic threat and the need for Germany to assert its own cultural identity.[12] My point is, it's possible, and indeed likely, to be devoted to one's culture within a program of revision <u>of</u> that culture. Americans are familiar enough with the idea of self-perfectibility and its attendant self-criticism. So, nationalism has a potential role beyond the creation of a state to formalize nationality. Tamir concludes from that such nationalist obligations toward improvement are best fulfilled through the engagement of members of the society.

But then it gets more complicated. Given an internally-promoted change made to any complex society, and whether or not the change has been introduced as an external novelty, there will be some members who view it as coercion by other members, and perhaps view those other members as corrupted, as agents of the outside. Instances of this sort of process include gambling casinos run by American Indian tribes, the persistence of Edwardian manner among the Calcutta elite, and Burger King restaurants in the Champs Elysee. Resolving the problems with this distinction is not important to the discussion at this stage, but we will have to return to it later when dealing with the problems of dependent social identity in Charles Taylor's and Edward Said's arguments. For now I'll just suggest that, given external change which is either coercive or voluntary, depending upon your informant's social position, it may either undermine or enhance

that society. With respect to a so-called primitive society, or one in which continued membership clearly carries disadvantages relative to the apparent rewards of a nearby metropolitan society, we might question whether the practice of intellectual engagement of its members in the manner Fichte urged upon the Germans, is practicable. The answer may well prove to be "yes". Kymlicka seems to think it might be "no"; and Tomasi will agree with this.

To return again to my main argument, Tomasi observes that if Kymlicka meant that the mere existential fact of a cultural context-of-choice is the good of communitarianism which is to be defended, then everyone has such a ready-to-hand context, just as (virtually) everyone has the power of speech. Hence, like speech it's of no value to considerations of political philosophy, ethics, or anthropology insofar as it is an ability. Quite the contrary: it's assumed. Tomasi's point is that some cultures are so unstable as to readily fragment in the face of the westernizing avalanche, leaving their members to drift from one context into another, but without loss of <u>some</u> context of choice.

I believe Tomasi's rebuttal may involve a false dichotomy. We can concede that cultural stability is a requirement of useful cultural context for the planning and judging one does in life. But day-to-day familiarity is not the same as perpetual fixity. We require a comforting persistence of identity in our social surroundings. We must be able to act as if in tomorrow's circumstance things won't have changed <u>so</u> much that today's actions are irrelevant: just <u>that</u> much stability, at a minimum. Some judgments and actions require that circumstances be essentially the same next year, and a few judgments and actions require a longer-term stability than that. The

metropolitan vision of the traditional society is one of extremely slow change. This is not always accurate; but even if it were, it does not follow that the members of traditional societies require long time-frames for all their activities to be fulfilling. The argument hinges on relative time-frames. Our own defenses of propriety are often based upon appeals to a custom persisting from the past; but also often are based upon a rejection of the past. So we must go on to the other interpretation of the good as being the stability, not the existence of the thing.

Tomasi makes the empirical assertion that members of cultures-in-transition are typically quite aware of the transition and so, while patterns of choice are more flexible, variable, and complex, the members can, or at least are observed to, handle that, so Kymlicka "underestimates" adaptive ability.[13] Further, Kymlicka's suggested solutions (legal interventions constraining cultural dilution) actually reduce the choices members have to maintain their values. Tomasi then reminds us that a core liberal belief is in the possibility of social improvement; and this will require a "certain degree of cultural instability" to permit the necessary "individual experimentation" which Mill encourages.[14]

Here I think "instability" and "flexibility" have to be distinguished. The political axiom of the Liberal Party in Mill's time was to permit maximum beneficial change consistent with the preservation of existing institutions, thus avoiding social revolution (that is, the breakdown of institutions for guaranteeing fundamental social order) through social and political flexibility. Liberal society permits its own evolution by assimilation of individuals' ideas into institutional adaptation. "Instability" on the other hand

suggests a lack of corresponding effect to intended causal input. On the first point, the value of context is that it permits me to act as I wish for the results I desire. If the option to either reinforce or diminish a cultural characteristic is removed via "protective" legislation, then Tomasi is wondering if it is still a context for the sorts of novel action required in liberal experimentation.

Tomasi's main point is this: if what is important to Kymlicka about a society is its stability of character "values, norms and attendant institutions"), rather than the existential fact of the structure ("history, language and culture"), then he has to show that a change in the character of the society doesn't bring about a change in the basic structure (meaning a change of identity, or the extinction of what previously was); and he doesn't.[15] Tomasi's conclusion against Kymlicka becomes a dilemma: If the intrinsic value of society is its existential cultural structure, then everyone already has it in a trivial sense, and so it's not imperiled. On the other hand, if what's valuable about social membership is being immersed in a constant and predictable collective cultural character, then, since liberal values necessitate social development and improvement, core liberal principles are invalidated in favor of conservative values.

## SECTION III. ISOLATING THE ILLIBERAL

Tomasi offers another justification for a liberal recognition of cultural rights as defined by Kymlicka. Kymlicka repeatedly refers to social distinctions arising in differences in culture, language and history. But his examples are of aboriginal societies compared with

metropolitan neighbors who are in a politically dominant relationship. Tomasi will follow this and deal with the problem of assisting aboriginal societies to persist. But the suggestion here is that they should persist as aboriginal-and-distinct, and not merely distinct. The implication amounts to an empirical generalization about the fragility of such cultures: that they cannot withstand exposure to other cultures more "advanced" or urban. At this point we have to remind ourselves that this discussion is occurring within a certain normative precinct: the defense, if not promotion, of liberal society.

Aboriginal societies are also presumed to need protection against intrusive acts in which the aborigines themselves collude, such as land sales to outsiders typically from the dominant metropole. A question arises: if aborigines don't want access to or dilution by alien culture, then why do they collude? Kymlicka says they are economically depressed and susceptible for that reason, but Tomasi notes this is, or is supposed to be, addressed by existing liberal prescriptions for social equality. Kymlicka also says aborigines are "culturally ill-equipped", which Tomasi understands to mean "educationally ill-equipped"; and he notes this too is covered by existing liberal principles.[16] So Tomasi concludes the stated disadvantages of the Indians which might lead them to collude with cultural-destructive intrusions are soluble by known, appropriate liberal program which transfer resources and provide training. Thus, isolation or other special protection isn't required.

Tomasi's translation of "culturally ill-equipped" as "educationally ill-equipped" could be criticized on a narrow principle of cultural insularity. He assumes that the ill-equipped can be provided with "missing" insights or conceptual categories. Thus for instance, the

notion of the anonymous citizen as carrier of standard rights can be provided to aboriginals who have only the one-on-one conceptions of persons which I suggested was implicit in van den Berghe's vision of proto-ethnicity. But I am not sure about how easily this insight can be "added" to a cultural repertoire. If an individual must have a one-to-one idiosyncratic relation to me to be a person, then this is a conceptual barrier to my acceptance of the notion of the citizen who is anonymous yet nonetheless somehow "interchangeable" with me and the persons I do know; and so the generic citizen can't just become a useful idea; what would the use be in a one-on-one world?

Another example which comes to mind of barriers to cultural reeducation is usufructual land-use within a culture being instructed (by some well-intentioned metropolitans such as ourselves) about the concept of individual ownership and exploitation of real property. Of course, if some of the alien metropolitans can grasp the notion of usufruct, then perhaps some of the aboriginals can grasp the notion of real-property: to think of a patch of land as if it were like someone else's drinking-gourd. At this point, however, I must observe that, in a narrow sense, I have again gone beyond the topic; and this is because ethnic and nationalist issues arise precisely in the recognition of other social groups as having an external significance, a connection either adverse or not. Ethnic issues do not arise in simply being bewildered by strangers. There are probably still a vanishingly few aboriginal cultures which have not been altered by contact with metropolitan cultures. The issues which are important here will not arise until contact is followed by the intrusions of novelty. At that time we would still have to distinguish between what is undesirable (such as land alienation) and what is desirable (such

as tribal casinos).

I'll return to the question of internal collusion with external depredation; and note that this is not the same as internal collusion with the introduction of useful novelty such as plastic water-bottles, machine-made cotton clothing, and even (communally-owned) gambling casinos. Kymlicka must also realize that an aboriginal is not educationally "ill-equipped" simply in lacking a full repertoire of useful ideas, like children. Aboriginals <u>have</u> a full repertoire; and this, I contend, is the problem. Tomasi reexamines "culturally ill-equipped", and notes that liberal principles of autonomous action require education in analytical thinking leading to a capability of autonomous judgment. This is a core feature of membership in a liberal society. But members of aboriginal societies might reject such a feature in their list of desired cultural characteristics. The novel use of analytical thinking needed to preserve a society from external depredation would itself contaminate the society. So, possibly the use of existing liberal principles of social organization would introduce what was not desired. Introducing the concept of respecting the wishes and intentions of others, says Tomasi, runs contrary to the idea of respecting the wishes and intentions of others.

Mill approaches this issue with a selective paternalism: he rejects the desirability of accommodating primitive folk, and wants instead to bring them into the liberal fold. Indeed, he claims that the particular form of cultural exclusionism--nationalism--is impractical in what we would call multi-ethnic situations, so that it can't operate as a mediate instrument in the formation of a liberal democratic state. Many liberals would just dismiss this problem, in

the modernizing spirit of Mill. Even Joseph Raz, who promotes a rich context of choice, somewhat gently dismisses the "inferior" cultures of isolated aboriginal societies.[17]

It is difficult to justify the retention of anti-liberal values on liberal grounds. One possible defense for Tomasi's idea of "justification" of illiberal societies might be put together consistent with Mill's paternalism. Liberal society embodies the options of improvement through novel change; but these options must actually be pursued to be meaningful. So, if liberals accept the virtual inevitability of an evolutionary social progress, and wish to promote the propriety of non-interference, then they might accept the quarantining of an illiberal society as a pre-liberal society, which will in time work itself into acceptably liberal form. Such a defense is perhaps more hopeful than convincing. This approach would give due recognition to the collective rights of a people not to be manipulated; however it would not do (liberal) justice to the individuals in that society who, in the meantime, might be victims of its illiberalism. This defect is troublesome here, since we should remember that Kymlicka's defense of cultural separateness rests upon the claim that it is the individuals within that society who have a right to its cultural distinctiveness. Note however that it would respect the individual's desire to remain attached to that culture.

Tomasi suggests we can justify isolation... "We best respect the group members by not insisting on respecting them as individual holders of the full set of liberal rights."[18] I believe this can be put less difficultly: we can respect the individual as a holder of the full set of rights without insisting that the individual exercise that right. The tribal member may appear (to us) to submit to what appears

(to us) be an arbitrary source of harm or injustice. The obligation of the metropolitan community is to see that an alternative to this circumstance is available. Education does remain a problem: I have a right to remain a member of an oppressive society, but I have a right to leave too, and of course I can't exercise the second right unless I know it's possible to leave, so must the liberal central power insist that I be educated to learn about this possibility? That is to say, if I have a right to remain a member of a repressive society, does that entail a right to remain ignorant of its repressiveness relative to liberal society? How could I have that right, plus a right to autonomous action such as emigration?

Reserves, native lands, set-asides are consistent with the idea of sovereignty of nations: a sovereign liberal state cannot legitimately interfere in the internal matters of a sovereign despotism. But this seems to be a fatalistic version of progressiveness: we'll get it whether we want it or not. Mill, and Raz and Spinner too, therefore promote assimilation.

Joseph Raz makes a progressivist claim in the spirit of Mill: "The perfectionist principles [he espouses] suggest that people are justified in taking action to assimilate the minority group."[19] He then claims that this is not an easy policy to implement. He does not mean by this that such policies cannot be contrived and implemented; although there are many instances of forced-assimilation policies have gone awry. Rather he means that moral considerations inhibit them. Policies of rapid assimilation would clearly be coercive, but short of the problem of coercion there is another problem, which is that a too-rapid dissolution of culture leaves adrift people who have not developed the capacity for using autonomy. This recapitulates his

earlier point on autonomy not being drift.

Too-rapid assimilation would coerce persons into doing what they don't want; but beyond that, the dissolution of their society would result in their not doing properly what it is they didn't want to do anyway. Raz probably has in mind the social pattern which, in its worst-case instances, reveals the disconsolate aboriginal wandering the outskirts of the city built in the past century or two by the expanding metropole on "vacant" land, in the Americas, in Australasia, and until recently in large patches of Africa. Dissolution is not assimilation. On the other hand a sufficiently gradual transformation is more likely to be acceptable to liberal constraints. Raz does not produce a detailed account here. Perhaps he means it is ethically acceptable to permit an intrusion into the illiberal society sufficiently disruptive to loosen the coercive influences within it, so that, for instance, youthful persons are free to liberally reinterpret or even discard principles and values which work against autonomy.

Raz's only discussion of paternalism is in this section. On the issue of paternalistic treatment of "inferior" cultures Raz is brief here; he says he is speculating on a matter he does not intend to address in any depth. But what he does say suggests he is not far from Mill in his beliefs: that the societies bearing such culture are essentially static, and their possibilities are to remain static or else absorb the influences of the (by implication) relatively superior, and hopefully liberal, societies which increasingly come to surround and dominate them. That is, he does not incorporate the possibility that such cultures will <u>ordinarily</u> react to an exposure to outside cultural elements by selective absorption and subsequent

transformation of these elements. The picture here (a fragmentary one, but I think a clear suggestion) is: different cultures are problems for each other. Moral liberal societies are tasked with non-coercively improving those illiberal ones with which they are somehow connected; but then also the illiberal ones are tasked with resisting the encroachments of the "superior" liberal ones. So for each type, the characteristic of either tutelage or resistance emerges This image resembles the one Edward Said draws in his study of imperialist culture.]

Additionally, I want to point to a predisposition Kymlicka maintains which carries through to his other arguments. He is predisposed to focus on the problem of competition for social product, where the competing groups are unequal under the terms of the covering, or governing, institutions. For example, in Brazil or the USA the middle classes of Sao Paulo or Philadelphia have an unfair advantage over the Indians of Amazonia or North Dakota, in obtaining the benefits of membership in the same political community. This is shown in the way he characterizes one of the two types of community. The political community he claims reflects "rights and responsibilities" (when in a liberal framework). He then claims that the cultural community reflects "aims and ambitions".[20] I believe this is a narrow characterization, and interestingly narrow. He might have said that cultural community reflects values and predispositions, instead of aims and ambitions, in so doing emphasize that culture is a medium, rather than a field of possibility and agenda; and this despite Collingwood's dictum on thought and action.

What I'm getting at is that we find ourselves in the world, fallen into it as is sometimes said, in which very many arrangements with

other people are already made. This point was made in the previous chapter where I referred to Raz on that range of things we embrace as agreeable givens: we don't choose our family relationships and yet we normally affirm them wholeheartedly. I noted this also with respect to ethnicity. True, we needn't embrace them (not quite all of them) passively in our liberal society; we may affirm them in order to manipulate, challenge, or reject (as opposed to ignore) them. My point is that saying social community is a context of "aims and ambitions" minimizes all the reassurances of entanglement inherent in social reality, perhaps making them problems; and it focuses only on the opportunities, as if we were all merely beginning from scratch. Yael Tamir argues that the content provided by cultural membership is needed for autonomy in the sense of rich choice. Freedom of choice requires <u>choices</u>, which are coherent options rising out of that world into which we have fallen. So Kymlicka's reading becomes the modernist scenario of self-identity by means of listing wants and expectations within a minimally restraining state institution, and not realizing the connections, comforts and confirmations which that state overlays.

To accept the legitimacy of the dilemma-like tension Tomasi finds in Kymlicka's argument requires a premise which is akin to the anthropological concept of the ethnographic present: that there is, or was, a standard cultural configuration which the aboriginal society manifested. The problem then becomes keeping a possibly repugnant standard, or contaminate the standard. But this idea is discredited. Societies are not sealed off, and they undergo alteration. Now, this fact is not a sanction for assimilation policies.

Cultural change in those societies classified as traditional or

aboriginal is being equated with dilution, disjunction, diminution. Change is not equated the development of those cultures. But liberalism requires change: its comprehension, possibility, and implementation; and so we must wonder whether or not it is compatible with the retention of traditional culture. But now reconsider the notion of John Stuart Mill: that history is important to social identity. History (in the Collingwoodian sense I have presented) is the change a society undergoes in working out its concerns and problems. A contradiction appears. History is change. Yet history adds to, does not detract from, the social identity. It lengthens the narrative by which people self-identify.

So Tomasi's interpretation of Kymlicka's notion of stability is not the only possibility. What, epistemologically, would the be continuity Kymlicka says is needed? Not the stasis of a fixed set of characteristics, but merely something identifiable. We identify by narrative: this is idiosyncratically our place in ours, or their place in theirs. Narrative is what sets apart; if there were no distinctive narratives then every society would have identical histories, would be indistinguishable; and so the sense of community as something bounded by distinctions would not be possible, since, remember, ethnicity involves a sense of what is excluded, which is described. Our narrative is our own myth, not the one imposed by the colonializer, or by the dominant class upon the peasantry. This would apply even to the American myth of novelty.

## NOTES

1. Walzer 1983, passim
2. Taylor 1994, pp.62-4; Taylor's view on this is also discussed by LaForest in Tully 1994, pp.194-209
3. Tamir 1983, p.147
4. Tomasi 1995, pp.586-7
5. Kymlicka 1989, p.166
6. Ibid., p.176
7. Tomasi 1995, pp.598-90
8. Kymlicka 1989, p.168
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p.193
11. Ibid.
12. Tamir 1983, p.89
13. Tomasi 1995, p.590
14. Ibid., p.591
15. Ibid., pp.591-2
16. Tomasi 1995, p.597
17. Raz 1986, p.423
18. Tomasi 1995, p.603
19. Raz 1986, p.424
20. Kymlicka 1989, p.135

# CHAPTER SEVEN: ALTERNATIVE RELATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR NATIONALISM

## SECTION I. NARRATION, RELATION, CONSTELLATION

The objective definitions of nationality have been an intractable problem. Beginning with Mill, and continuing through recent writers such as Tamir, the question of what characteristics minimally define the phenomenon hasn't been satisfied. I have argued that the notion of nationalism is complex and ambiguous, and tangled with other social categories. This is a specific instance of a more general issue, which is this: many classificatory concepts, mostly denoted by an array of ordinary political and social terms, have not been clearly enough identified by social philosophers to warrant proceeding confidently on the normative projects which recur in liberal political thought. Societies embody all the concrete instances which such concepts are supposed to cover, but these instances, or too many of them, interpenetrate to such a degree that the closed and simplified constructs proposed by many philosophers tend to be less than usefully relevant as models for policy formation or other improving action. This does not strike me as a bad thing at all, unless one insists that the function of normative philosophizing is the creation of such utilitarian models for actual policy. It seems to me that this is more nearly within (but by no means coextensive with) the province of the appropriate social sciences; and that normative philosophy, at its best, can provide clarity and texture for these sciences.

With respect to categories and the problem of keeping their contents

isolated, Clifford Geertz claims that anthropologists have clung to universals out of fear of becoming lost in historicism.[1] I gather that what he means is, having observed the very extensive array of cultural peculiarities humankind manifests, some anthropologists set out to interpret these peculiarities collectively, as contingently disguised elements of a general human nature. Instead of taking the extensivity of the array as evidence that such a power of profound variability <u>is</u> at the base of human character, this extensivity is interpreted as an obfuscatory and particularly vexing aspect of nature: that the underlying essential bits are so well hidden. Science must then get beneath all these disguises. This positivistic image of the anthropological program may be a caricature I've read into Geertz's remark; but to whatever extent it's not, it reveals a philosophical irony. Searching for uniformity in patterns of social structure underlying apparent diversity misses the point: that the ability of groups of humans to develop behavior patterns peculiar to single historical societies, and far beyond genetically determined behavior, is itself a determining characteristic of humanity. This was van den Berghe's contention.

This irony of obfuscation has an echo in Yael Tamir's arguments. She observes that humans by nature are members-of; though she does not address the question of what might underlie all the accidents arising in all those memberships.[2] She does quote Geertz: "We are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture--and yet not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it..."[3] Compare this with van den Berghe's theory of genetic predisposition. What might be unfinished in the Geertzian human creature? Perhaps it is the fine-tuning to

specific survival needs that is accomplished, or "finished", by the ability to adapt socially instead of biologically. That is, the fine-tuning of the creature's capabilities is accomplished historically rather than genetically, and this fine-tuning is idiosyncratic from culture to culture.

David Goldberg defines "modernity" as an amalgam of 18th-century western Enlightenment plus 19th-century western domination of the world. He claims that at "the heart of modernity lies the concern with order ... classification of nature in rational systems of thought" this is combined with a manipulation of a reduced, understood, dominated nature arising in the first element of this amalgam.[4] Goldberg's point, as I understand it, is useful here: the more we categorize the contents of the world by universal principles, the more we find ourselves obliged to live inside those categories. There's less and less of an uncategorized place to live. The Enlightenment enthusiasm for reducing observation and experience to order under a universal set of laws and rules, has the unintended effect of compartmentalizing us. Of course, we do live within the "compartment" of our own horizons, but those are given by our experience. In general though, we do not always make useful sense out of a set of social relationships by relating the whole of that set to a norm emanating from an ur-society. Rather, we find its internal coherence to be what makes sense. Here I am reiterating an observation made in the previous chapter, that we fall into a ready-made world; but I add a vexing proviso. We don't fall into the <u>whole</u> world; we fall into our part of it, and come to learn, in modern times, that it is merely a part.

In chapter three I suggested that it is possible to accommodate the

descriptions of many instances of human society into a generalization by fitting together the narratives which describe them into a larger narrative. In such a situation there would be no logical requirement for a general category into which particular cases are conformed; everything becomes one particularity, with its parts related by means of their singular relationships, rather than by some similarity of their characteristics. The consequence of this would be that, rather than the several lessers being instances of a single inclusive greater, they would be components of it. A complex of singular relationships, comprising a larger singularity, is a more like a constellation than a category. Constellations have components, or elements, which belong to it by virtue of their relation to the other components, but not by virtue of their internal characteristics. A member of a category is a member by virtue of its characteristics, so that a category member remains so when detached from its category. Additionally, there are categories of one. A constellation element, however, does not remain an element when detached from the structure. Constellations of one constituent are just singularities. Examination of each component of a constellation in isolation will not reveal its relationship to the other components, nor even its membership in the class of components.

Here I'm refining my earlier suggestion: it may be useful to regard the general phenomenon of ethnicity as a set of constellational connections with respect to the ethnic groupings. We imagine ourselves members of an ethnic set, but the set itself exists as a relationship to other such ethnic sets. I am here emphasizing Hobsbawm's and Tamir's objective criterion for nationality. Ethnic membership makes no sense without the fact of other ethnicities;

ethnicities cannot exist without each other. In this respect ethnicities have functional relationships to each other, their function being to elucidate the indefinitely larger singularity of history.

Countries, societies, and the components of multicultural societies, despite the ambiguities and vagueness of their defining characteristics, are in definite relationships to each other. The objective criterion of Hobsbawm, Tamir, etc., requires a mutual perception and comprehension; although Edward Said points out that the details of what is comprehended may not be in mutual agreement. I suggest an alternative view of identity: not by means of recognition of a congruence with a set of characteristics; but rather by means of acceptance of a narrative which defines by relating to other historical groups. The metaphor here is recognition of a constellation of relationships rather than of a set of categorical descriptions. Charles Taylor gets at this by emphasizing the need for recognition as part of identity; and Said also emphasizes the importance of having the story straight.

To test my notion of explanation by means of a constellational relationship of singular connections, rather than explanation by means of a categorical inclusion and exclusion, I want to consider a curious anomaly within the American social structure which Will Kymlicka briefly discusses. He compares the situation of American Blacks and American Indians, and observes that segregation has produced inferiority for Blacks, but integration has produced inferiority for Indians.[5] That is to say, while Blacks have been excluded from the majority culture by American whites using various stratagems, the final solution for the Indian "problem" has been, until quite

recently, assimilation. We may set aside the fact that these anomalous policies have the historical dignity of being Jeffersonian. Kymlicka notes this distinction in policy and in effect, but does not attempt to reduce the anomaly. He observes that the problem is where "racial classifications harmful to a racial minority" become the basis of a policy of either forced segregation or forced integration.[6]

Later Kymlicka criticizes Nathan Glazer for assuming the American race problem is the same as for "other ethnic and racial minorities", whereas Indians are more nearly paradigmatic of groups everywhere which have been "rendered a minority."[7] In the case of American Indians, they were coerced into assimilation because they were Indians, not because they weren't already assimilated. The Chinese of California, from the time of their arrival until recently, were not assimilated; but they weren't coerced either. On the other hand, most European immigrants by and large were rapidly assimilated.

I want to argue that the two parts of the curious conjunction which Kymlicka notes, about Blacks and Indians, are true for the same reasons. The white, or Anglo-, American denial of the legitimacy of the cultural distinction asserted by the Indians is a diminution of Indian autonomy. That is, the Indians' version of self-identity is rejected. At the same time, white American assertions of significant race-based social distinctions, which are denied by Blacks, is a diminution of <u>their</u> autonomy. The problem isn't whether to segregate or to integrate; the problem is that the power to choose which of these to do lies with the dominating cultural group, which can arbitrarily act upon its own assessment of the cultural profile of non-dominant groups. This is an example of what Taylor meant, that the problem of ethnicity (and in this case race too) is the problem of

conflict over the terms of identity. Kymlicka, preoccupied with the concept of competition for the products of society, might say this is a competition for ownership of the narrative in which identity is articulated.

Who owns the narrative of a nation? Edward Said would say it's the dominant group, the colonizers, but in some cases this is the internal colonizers. In the American instance, which is a nation of immigrant settlers, Blacks and Indians, and Hispanics too, form refractory elements in conflict with the settler narrative because they didn't immigrate: they came from nowhere in terms of the mythic geography of a population abandoning its various historic fatherlands in order to construct a new civic entity. In the national creation myth, America is a congeries of settlements, virtually all British, which forms a sovereign liberal Anglophone state. The resulting society then goes through a transformation of deciding it is a mixed immigrant nation, by incorporating later immigrant groups such as the Irish, wave by wave, with what might best be called retrospective generosity.

This American self-image of adaptation to partial transformation by successive immigrations and absorptions never came to terms with the assimilation of groups not in the mythic story: Native Americans and Blacks as I've mentioned. This also applies to Hispanics; and to explain this in the context of the speculative theory I'm hastily sketching out, we must recall that there are two conflicting origin myths in America. The other foundation myth is Spanish. Santa Fe is older than the English settlements; Spanish America predates English America. Yet, in the Anglophone myth the Hispanic regions are summarily occupied and quietly digested. We may speculate on what a contemporary USA would be like if American governments of the 1840's

had promulgated an identity-sensitive policy toward its occupied portions of ex-New Spain in a manner comparable to the British policy toward ex-New France which resulted in a constitutionally recognized bicultural Canada.

The constellational concept fits Canadian society. Charles Taylor has proposed rearranging the Canadian political structure to devise what he calls an "asymmetrical and decentralized alliance" of Quebec and the rest of Canada, because of Quebec's "nature and situation in America" as a "distinct society" with a "thirst for recognition".[8] The implication is that Taylor sees French Quebec surrounded by a (cis-Rio-Grande) Anglophone North America which is essentially a cultural unity. In a generalization on this idea, Edward Said says part of the resistance to colonial status should be a tendency toward an integrative view of human community to counterbalance the other, non-constructive tendency to pull toward an isolationist nationalism within the historical identity.[9] That is, the uneven, bipolar connectedness of colonial dependency should be replaced by the connectedness of general community: national isolation is not the only alternative to colonial hierarchy.

Given that self-conscious societies emerge from narratives, and given that ethnic societies self-identify by means of discrimination from what is excluded, then national societies, being civic and ethnic, define each other as much as they do themselves, though, as Said and Taylor remind us, such collective definitions do not always proceed to the satisfaction of those who get defined. So the problem of nationalist identity on which Taylor focuses, in a whole world which has become, as Anderson tells us, imagined as being interrelated, is one of attribution of authorship of the narrative

defining the community (to reiterate Said's point). Nationalism, however it arises, can be explicated as a narrative; and a better (i.e. more interesting and perhaps even more useful) way to understand persistent nationalist problems of friction and violence is in the notion of disputed control, or, as I've put it, authorship, of the historical narrative which defines the national group, including, most importantly for political policy formation, how such groups relate to each other.

By "authorship" I mean a sense of proprietorship of the narrative, which is to say, ownership of one's own identity. If I must live under the guise of an identity which is in part assigned by someone else, then I don't control my own narrative identity. Their story of how they and I are connected within our particular, shared social or historical context will trump my version. My sense of self doesn't arise in the categories to which I am assigned, or consigned. Rather, categorization is how I am handled by others, by institutions, not how I see myself. My self-identity arises in connections I believe I have with my world; and this is described by narrative, by detail. So an ethnic group is not internally identified by its characteristics, it's identified by its story. This story relates it to everything that is excluded; and here it is important to note that "excluded" is not identical with "not included". I mean, anything not in the narrative is unidentified, not this or that, hence not included or excluded.

Yael Tamir recognizes a related distinction to which I have repeatedly alluded: she distinguishes nations from peoples.[10] In her terminology, "peoples" refer to a class of collectivities members of which need not have a self-consciousness of their own distinguishing

characteristics. Civic societies, which includes nations, are porous both in terms of their cultural content, and in terms of relation to other cultures. Part of their own characteristics is the nature of their relationship with others. But then one wonders how many Tamirian peoples survive in a situation of global porosity. This doubt further attenuates the explanatory value of the concept of the ethnographic present in anthropology, and also of the related concept of the closed monadic societies in social philosophy. More important are the dyadic, idiosyncratic relations between societies, not their categorical similarities. Ethnic groups are most commonoy related to each other in ways which peculiarly define the members of the realtionship; and so it's not a categorical scheme, but rather what I have called a constellation: the set (any set of ethnicities in a multi-ethnic society or multi-social ecumene) is given its qualifying identity by the relationships of its components.

Having refined, somewhat, the notion of constellational structure, I can briefly reconsider my discussion of cosmopolitanism, also in chapter three. Michael Ignatieff argues that historically, cosmopolitanism has grown as an elite group within the general populations of the most powerful modern nation-states.[11] His claim, which seems contrary to Charles Taylor's observation, is that there has been no historical impetus toward complete detachment from ethnic values and agendas, but rather that the largest states have fostered the growth of subgroups who depend upon state authority over multicultural societies. Cosmopolites depend upon the coercive capabilities of large metropolitan states to <u>provide</u> the needed combination of security and civility; and this capability will extend into colonialized and client territories (i.e. old imperial

structures). The underlying necessity of allegiance to those states depends, still, on nationalism, insofar as the metropolitan powers are avowedly nation-states.

Consequently, the purely cosmopolitan stance, whether one of perfect disinterest or of total absence of interest, would remain an abstraction. Ignatieff notes that now, however, there are two changes. The world-wide acceleration of communication means nearly every national region has a cosmopolitan sector in its population, in touch with the larger world. Also, and especially since 1989, there is no formal political imperial framework within this much more porous international system, and so no means of imposing civic, procedural constraints as was possible under the old hegemonous structures.

Ignatieff argues that in a post-imperial age, pure cosmopolitanism becomes possible, but at the same time it is hazardous. Ironically, he finds that the post-Yugoslavian Sarajevans comprise a paradigm of this pure cosmopolitanism. Bosnia is traditionally a mixed-ethnic province, but it no longer has the civic safeguard of protection, through procedural constraint, by a non-nationalist regime which is neutral in respect of its internal divisions.[12] So, westerners who are old-guard cosmopolitans luxuriating at national power-nodes of the hegemonous West, such as London, Paris or New York, are dismayed by the ferocity of ethnic warriors of rural Bosnia, as well as of places like Chechnya or Ulster, who are only after the same capability: the luxury of taking their identity for granted within a framework of historical relationships which they affirm. This analysis closely resembles what Edward Said argues; and it echoes what Charles Taylor observes the Anglo-Canadians can afford to do within a purely procedural state, while the Quebeçois must legislate the same level of

cultural security.

Obviously, Ignatieff offers no normative justification here; he is as appalled as other westerners. Further, he probably means that the ethnic warriors are also after the luxury of power to confer ethnic identity, or as I've put it, constellational position, upon those other peoples who contribute to the defining historical narrative. Thus, if Serbian identity entails hostility toward Muslims and Germanizing Croats, then cosmopolitanism is a seditious contradiction undermining the constellational pattern that is the preferred history. Policy stemming from this attitude has been violently repressive; but even if it were not repressive, it would still be contrary to the liberal requirement of procedural neutrality which Taylor, for instance, advocates.

## SECTION II. WHAT IT IS THAT'S DETRITAL

Notwithstanding the arguments against the notion that the ethnic phenomenon is a social detritus which the improving policies of liberal political thought will dissolve, I want to suggest the possibility that nationalism could be detrital, that it could be abandoned as some historical leftover. I want to claim that, while nationalism is a political program promoted from a basis of ethnic concepts and convictions, the linkage between ethnicity and nationalism may not be not inevitable. That is, ethnicity need not entail political ethnicity. The necessity of this connection is not demonstrated by the historical evidence, or not strongly so. Since not all authority structures are political, it needs to be proven that

ethnicity as an authority structure is inextricably political. Social philosophers discuss nationalism most often in the context of conforming it with liberal political principles. However, some comparisons can be made with other principles of social authority.

Political power principles are not historically constant. Throughout much of history, a connection was assumed between religion and politics, on the ground that the ruler enjoyed divine legitimation, earlier through identification with or participation in divinity, and later through a special divine right. Over a period of some centuries, perhaps beginning with the emergence of the principle early in the Christian era, the West has seen the disconnection of religion from politics; so that today it is not surprising but rather expected that a single modern civil society will exhibit multiple religions within a secular state. I mentioned in the previous chapter that Ernest Gellner has argued that the persisting contrast between the West and Islam arises in the absence, in the Islamic world, of this fundamental concept of bifurcation of authority.

Politics, as opposed to sheer coercion by force or fear, requires an appeal to principle. Political rulers appeal to some principle beyond the physical coercive power of their position, to legitimate this position. This principle has been variously divine, ethical, or naturalistic (e.g. "scientific" versions of historiography, racism, etc.) at various times, and then abandoned. Many aspects of personal life apart from overtly political rights and obligations are still profoundly mixed with political institutions, and here I'm thinking principally of our economic relationships. Our western sense of civic order is completely intermingled with our sense of economic order, which in turn is derived largely from our material mode of production.

Most recently one version of legitimation through appeal to economic determinism (Leninism) has been precipitately abandoned. Economics as a legitimizing principle for rule is retained for the moment in the current world order, and economic expertise is regarded as a paramount credential in any liberal politician's appeal to the electorate. But, our economics is specialized and historically contingent. How, for instance, would a state deal equitably with an array of societies embedded within it which are separately free-market industrial, subsistence-agrarian, transhumant, and hunting? The problem of equitable apportionment of land alone would be virtually impossible. But the concept is not contradictory.

So, states have appealed to different legitimizing principles at different times. Obsolete power principles do not invariably vanish, even though it may be generally true that many instances of them, often the most egregiously inept instances, are swept away violently. Abandoned political authority principles often become encapsulated and ritualized within their replacements. Thus theocracy has been generally replaced and religious authority depoliticized, while being retained as ritual in some constitutional monarchies as well as in some republican regimes. And of course, religion retains its authority outside of political structures, as a parallel power structure. Another power principle, the dynastic feature of monarchical structures, once embodying real political power, has been replaced functionally, which is to say inheritance has been depoliticized; but nevertheless it has been retained as important emblem and ritual.

The ethnic principle is only recently applied as a legitimizing device within political policy. It wasn't evident in the previous,

dynastic, period of European history; and it wasn't necessary in the final stages of those dynastic states in central and eastern Europe which adopted it; rather it was adopted as an (inadequate) expediency to preserve autocratic regimes run on the dynastic principle. Also, and perhaps unfortunately, attempts at running marginally liberal, yet dynastic and hence anti-nationalist, states failed, as Gellner and Malinowski have noted with some regret, to which point I'll return in the next section.

Van den Berghe argued that ethnic phenomena are part of the basement of human activity: the banding-with-exclusion instinctive process leads to complex tokens of recognition, and an ability to ever-complexify this as a survival tool, which becomes ethnicity. How do we detach ethnicity from politics, unless it's possible to detach politics from banding-with-exclusion behavior? But, if ethnicity is innate then it's pre-political since there are pre-political (i.e. pre-selfconsciously political, or pre-civic) societies. Van den Berghe offers a reason for the survival of ethnicity down to today when, presumably, we have more sophisticated (self-consciously self-serving) motivations and designs for government. His theory does not entail a determined political structure of the resulting society, only that there will be one in which some version of kin-nepotic activity will be found.

Many forms of community, such as churches, corporations, universities, fraternal and professional associations, claim the right to be recognized as rights-bearing entities, and this is acknowledged by the liberal state. Here I have in mind Michael Walzer's concept of interconnecting but non-congruent social "spheres", plural authority structures in liberal society.[13] There is multiple access to this

distributed form of community; there are multiple decision points and multiple criteria for distribution of membership. Without developing Walzer's idea any further, I want merely to suggest here that ethnicity is another candidate for this sort of community.

Suppose, that is, that the ethnic claim were not a political claim? I've argued in the previous chapter that ethnicity and politics may be detachable from each other. The ethnic concept emerged as a political program, but there is historical evidence that ethnicity as historical community is not necessarily linked to political action. But as I've indicated, the onset of liberal government and the onset of nationalist government need not have occurred as nearly simultaneously as they did; and while historical linkages between them can be shown, these linkages are not logically necessary, nor do they have normative weight.

## SECTION III. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE PROCEDURALLY NEUTRAL STATE

The procedurally neutral state has been suggested by Charles Taylor, among others, as an adequate guarantor of a civic order containing multicultural population. Will Kymlicka argues that there would be problems of equal share-out in such arrangements. I have tried to answer his argument; but apart from this problem, is such a state either a theoretical or a practical possibility? Such a state would have no social context to infect its neutral procedures; and so it must stipulate the absence of a defining narrative from its institutions. It cannot be embedded in a Thisness. Everything about it would be detrital; or perhaps nothing would, since the required

distinction would collapse. Is this possible? There are arguments against it as a general case.

Clifford Geertz has argued that political activity and cultural activity cannot be effectively separated out, or at least the distinction is necessarily muddled.[14] He discusses the failure of the post-Dutch Indonesian regime under Sukarno, with its Dutch-patterned central bureaucracy, to synthesize a political structure out of alien ideologies. Geertz's claim is that it was not the country's great internal diversity which was the flaw, but rather "the refusal, at all levels of society, to come to terms with it" which followed from the specious doctrine of denial of this diversity "as a colonial slander".[15] The result of this was that government on the one hand and the sentiments and values of the governing classes on the other hand came completely out of joint, so that the regime was "almost beside the point, mere routinisms" [16] Geertz points to the need for acts of the state to be seen as identifiable by the population as theirs.

Yael Tamir, in discussing the imperfections of the Wilsonian settlements of 1919 onward, suggests that a state could develop a "totally neutral structure"; but then in a detailed and closely argued discussion she objects that this could be alienating and irrelevant.[17] Tamir, too, claims that state and culture are inextricably blended, in the details of state procedures, and through the language used to conduct these procedures; and her examples are from Israeli life, while she also refers to Geertz's observations on Indonesia. I find her arguments persuasive and her examples strongly germane. I earlier attempted (in the opening section of the previous chapter) to parry one of these arguments, to the effect that any regime concerned with

the welfare of its population must apply standards of well-being, which standards in turn must derive from cultural norms, so that social self-identity will tend to leak into institutional procedures. My draconian solution to this problem was to propose a degree of solicitude toward human populations no more than fully adequate to care for them as our fellow mammals, thus avoiding all cultural distinctions.

My proposal would fall short of contemporary liberal standards, and perhaps not even meet the much older liberal standards for, say, Irish Famine relief. However, there may be a way to meet my own problem of excessive spareness, by avoiding the need to meet general standards and focusing instead on specific function. Governments are particular entities. Political systems are promoted in order to solve or minimize social problems. As I noted earlier, if there were no social problems there would be no governments, or at least no apparent need for them. In the case of many problems between cultures, one would expect the most nearly fair solution to be procedural, because such problems so often arise out of a lack of agreement on values. That is, the problem is not the failure to apply the appropriate value judgment; the problem is in the lack of a value judgment which would be appropriate to the values expressed on either side of the dispute. Now, I want to suggest that a neutral state which is constructed to deal with the particular complex, or constellation, of cultures contained in it does not have to be globally neutral as Tamir would require in her sense of procedural neutrality. There would be no practical point in its being neutral with respect to all cultures; if it were as nearly neutral as practicable with respect to its own constituent cultures, it would be effectively neutral. Admittedly, it

is not easy to assess, in a general way, whether the features of such a state would be sufficiently rich to prevent the alienation and pointlessness which Geertz and Tamir fear. My point is simply to suggest that the requisite spareness of such a neutral regime is relative and not absolute.

In passing it should be noted that the liberal proviso is implicit in these considerations: the state-in-question should operate consistent with liberal principles of government. Throughout this study, with perhaps a few lapses, I have assumed this, while not defending it explicitly. I would willingly defend liberalism, but that is another project. In discussions of aboriginal culture, for instance, the usual model proposed is a liberal state paternally encapsulating a traditional and illiberal society. A situation approaching an inversion of this is currently being attempted, in the China-Hongkong system, which illustrates the possibility that the procedurally-neutral state needn't be liberal; it just needs neutral procedures.

The neutral state, which Taylor proposes and Geertz and Tamir criticize, is defended in quite a different guise by Ernest Gellner in several passages in various works.[18] Its remoteness is not criticized as possibly alienating or irrelevant, but rather Gellner promotes it as a tactful, discreet method of indirect control which preserves a basic civic order, under which local, direct and culturally-embedded authority structures can function, seemingly undisturbed. The example Gellner offers is the late Habsburg state, in its final, proto-liberal version, and which was much denigrated as a prison-house of nations (as, for instance, by my own great-grandfather, a Habsburg subject swept into nationalist fervor of anti-Germanism according to family

reports). As I described earlier, Michael Ignatieff believes Bosnian cosmopolitanism suffers from the absence of an umbrella of state constraint; and of course the Habsburg state briefly provided such constraint, but then the destruction of this state was set in motion by Bosnian violence.

The distinction to which liberal political philosophers should here is between running the cultural details of our collective life, and maintaining an umbrella under which this cultural activity can proceed undisturbed, subject to the basic liberal anti-harm constraints. Must the political activity be part of the parcel? Or, can it be? I pose this question because I suspect there is an undisclosed premise in those arguments which place government inescapably within the cultural matrix of the governed. This premise is that the society can maintain a practical, political detachment from its concrete surroundings as easily as it can maintain a conceptual distinction between itself on the one hand, and on the other those conceptions, imaginings, etc., which constitute its idea of other societies. But, I have argued that one element of an ethnic phenomenon is precisely its interrelatedness with the surrounding ethnic phenomena. Consequently, in addition to that component of our self-identity which is our sense of distinctiveness from the ethnicity next door, there is the practical question of dealing with the neighbors. This is the problem on which Gellner dwells; and he finds the nationalist procedure too flawed.

The weakness I see in arguing for a fully-embedded politics is that, if states are organized nationally, then insofar as their cultures are closed off from each other, the means each state has for dealing with the others may well lack congruence. A solution to this need not be the abolition of ethnicity, but rather of nationalism; and this is

provided by non-nationalist political structures which preserve and promote ethnic phenomena under a system of procedural civic constraint. In the case of a relic like the Habsburg state, the origins of the political structure were bound up with the policy of preserving a dynasty, an aim irrelevant to but not necessarily inimical to liberal provisos. Modern liberal states have policies designed to preserve their social contents too; and there is no list of politically correct social contents for such states: that is the whole point of liberal tolerance.

Gellner defended what he saw as Malinowski's view on a proper solution to the inequities of the colonial system: not granting national independence to the colonized, but rather imposing political dependence upon the colonizing metropoles which, under their nationalist programs of self-rule, seemed unsuccessful at maintaining international order.[19] Thus on this view Britain, France, and the other metropoles should be subject to the sort of political umbrella they devised as a remote constraint system for their own imperial structures. This relatively bleak outlook, shared by two central Europeans who escaped that milieu to the serenity of English life, was appropriate for the equally bleak first half of the now-expiring century. Defenders of the position promoted by Tamir, and by Geertz as I've characterized him, must adjudicate between these sets of views, since they seem to proceed from contradictory premises. I'll venture to suggest that Gellner's rejection of a positive political function for the ethnic phenomenon, together with his acceptance of it as a venue for the expression and enjoyment of cultural values, perhaps marks him as drawing most strongly the distinction I set out to examine in this study.

## NOTES

1. Geertz 1973, p.43
2. Tamir 1993, p.4
3. Tamir 1993, p.16, quoting Geertz 1973, p.49
4. Goldberg 1993, p.3
5. Kymlicka 1989, p.145
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp.257-8
8. Quoted in Tully 1994, pp.199-200
9. Said 1993, pp.215 et seq.
10. Tamir 1993, p.65
11. Ignatieff 1993 p.11-13
12. Ibid., p.13. Since medieval times Bosnia has been a province within, successively, the Ottoman state, the Habsburg state, the Karageorgevich Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia; the degree of procedural protection must have varied enormously, but at least none of these were ostensibly and consistently nationalist, in the sense of the term employed here.
13. Walzer 1983, passim
14. Geertz 1973, p.311
15. Ibid., p.315
16. Ibid., p.316
17. Tamir 1993, pp.45-150
18. Gellner 1994a, pp.110-11; 1994b, pp.17, 76-7, 178; 1995, pp.12-16, 97-8, 221
19. Gellner 1994b, pp.74-80

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Alba, Richard D.; Ethnic Identity: the Transformation of White America; New Haven, Yale UP, 1990

Allen, Sheila, and Macey, Marie; "Race and Ethnicity in the European Context"; British Journal of Sociology vol 40, 1990, pp.375-393

Anderson, Benedict; Imagined Communities; London, Verso, rev. ed. 1991

Balakrishnan, Gopal, ed.; Mapping the Nation; London, Verso, 1996

Balibar, Etienne, and Wallerstein, Immanuel; Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities; London, Verso, 1991

Bammer, Angelika, ed.; Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question; Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994

Bauer, Otto; "The Concept of the Nation" and "Socialism and the Principle of Nationality"; Bottomore & Goode 1978, pp.102-117

Bhabha, Homi K., ed.; Nation and Narration; London, Routledge, 1990

Bhabha, Homi K.; The Location of Culture; London, Routledge, 1994

Bottomore, Tom & Goode, Patrick; Austro-Marxism; Oxford, 1978

Buchanan, Allen; Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec; Boulder Colo., Westview, 1991

Berlin, Isaiah; Four Essays on Liberty; Oxford, 1969

Brownlie, Ian; "The Rights of Peoples In Modern International Law"; Crawford 1988, pp.1-16

Carr, E. H.; The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; New York, Harper & Row, 1964

Carrier, James G., ed.; Occidentalism: Images of the West; Oxford, 1995

Cassirer, Ernst, The Myth of the State; New York, Doubleday-Anchor, 1946

Chambers, Iain & Curti, Lidia, eds.; The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons; London, Routledge, 1996

Chatterjee, Partha; Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse; University of Minnesota, 1993

Chatterjee, Partha; "Whose Imagined Community?"; Balakrishnan 1996, pp.214-225

Chow, Rey; Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention In Contemporary Cultural Studies; Bloomington, Indiana U.P., 1993

Clifford, James; The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art; Harvard UP, 1988

Cobban, Alfred; The Nation State and National Self-Determination; London, Collins, 1969

Cohen, Gary B.; The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans In Prague, 1861-1914; Princeton, 1981

Colley, Linda; Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837; New Haven, Yale UP, 1992

Collingwood, R. G.; The Idea of History; Oxford, 1946

Collingwood, R. G., and Myers, J. N. L.; Roman Britain and the English Settlements; Oxford, 1937
Crapanzano, Vincent; Waiting: The Whites of South Africa; New York, Random House, 1986
Crawford, James, ed.; The Rights of Peoples; Oxford, Clarendon, 1988
Drakulic, Slavenka; Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War; New York, Harper Perennial, 1994
Dvornik, Francis; The Making of Central and Eastern Europe; London, Polish Research Centre, 1949
Dvornik, Francis; The Slavs in European History and Civilization; New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers, 1962
Fredrickson, George M.; White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American & South African History; Oxford, 1981
Geertz, Clifford; The interpretation of Cultures; New York, Basic Books, 1973
Geertz, Clifford; Local Knowledge; New York, Basic Books, 1983
Geertz, Clifford; Works and Lives; Stanford, Stanford UP, 1988
Geertz, Clifford; After the Fact; Harvard UP, 1995
Gellner, Ernest; Nations and Nationalism; Ithaca, Cornell, 1983
Gellner, Ernest; Relativism and the Social Sciences; Cambridge, 1985
Gellner, Ernest; Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals; New York, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1994 [a]
Gellner, Ernest; Encounters With Nationalism; Blackwell, 1994 [b]
Gellner, Ernest; Anthropology and Politics: Revolutions In the Sacred Grove; Oxford, Blackwell, 1995
Gellner, Ernest; "Reply to Critics"; New Left Review; #221 (Jan-Feb 1997) pp.81-118
Giddens, Anthony; "Nation-States and Violence" in his Social Theory and Modern Sociology; Stanford, Stanford UP, 1983
Glazer, Nathan, and Moynihan, Daniel P., eds.; Ethnicity: Theory and Experience; Harvard UP, 1965
Goldberg, David Theo; Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning; Oxford, Blackwell, 1993
Habermas, Jürgen; "The European Nation-State: Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship"; Balakrishnan 1996, pp.281-94
Hall, David. L.; Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism; Albany, SUNY, 1994
Hobsbawm, Eric J.; Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality; Cambridge, 2nd ed. 1992
Hobsbawm, Eric J; The Age of Extremes; New York, Pantheon, 1995
Hobsbawm, Eric J.; "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today"; Balakrishnan 1996, pp.255-66
Hobsbawm, Eric J., & Ranger, Terence, eds.; The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge, 1983
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Berkeley, U Calif., 1985

Hroch, Miroslav; "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: the Nation-building Process in Europe"; Balakrishnan 1996, pp.78-97
Hume, David; A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge; Oxford, 1988
Ignatieff, Michael; Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism; New York, Farrer Strauss Giroux, 1993
Ignatiev, Noel; How the Irish Became White; New York, Routledge, 1995
Kamenka, Eugene; "Human Rights: Peoples' Rights"; Crawford 1988, pp.127-140
Kaplan, Robert D.; Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History; New York, Vintage, 1994
Kiernan, V. G.: Imperialism and Its Contradictions; London, Routledge, 1995
Kohn, Hans; Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology; New York, Vintage, 1960
Kymlicka, Will; Liberalism, Community, and Culture; Oxford, Clarendon, 1989
LaForest, Guy; "Philosophy and Political Judgement in a Multinational Federation"; Tully 1994, pp.194-209
Landmann, Michael; Philosophical Anthropology, transl. David J. Parent; Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1974
Lasch, Christopher; The World of Nations: Reflections On American History, Politics, and Culture; New York, Knopf, 1973
Laurence, Patrick; The Transkei: South Africa's Politics of Partition; Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1976
Levinson, Sanford; "Is Liberal Nationalism an Oxymoron? An Essay for Judith Shklar"; Ethics 105:3 (April 1995) pp.626-45
Lingis, Alphonso; The Community of Those Who Have Nothing In Common; Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994
McNeill, William H.; Polyethnicity and National Unity In World History; Toronto, University of Toronto, 1986
Mahmood, C.K., & Armstrong, S.L.; "Do Ethnic Groups Exist?: A Cognitive Perspective on the Concept of Cultures"; Ethnology, 31-1 (Jan 92), pp.1-14
Mann, Michael, ed.; The Rise and Decline of the Nation State; Blackwell, 1990
Margalit, Avishai, & Raz, Joseph; "National Self-Determination"; Journal of Philosophy, 87-9 (Sept 90), pp.439-461
Massey, Doreen; "Double Articulation: A Place In the World"; Bammer 1994, pp.110-121
Mendus, Susan; Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism; Humanities, 1989
Mill, John Stuart; Considerations On Representative Government; Buffalo NY, Prometheus Books, 1991
Mill, John Stuart; On Liberty; New York, Library of Liberal Arts, 1956
Mosse, George L.; The Nationalization of the Masses: Political

Symbolism and Mass Movements In Germany From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich; New York, Howard Fertig, 1975
Nadel-Klein, Jane; "Occidentalism as a Cottage Industry: Representing the Autochthonous "Other" in British and Irish Rural Studies"; Carrier 1995, pp.109-134
Nash, Gary B.; "The Hidden History of Mestizo America"; Journal of American History 82-3 (Dec. 1995) pp.941-964
Patterson, Orlando; Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse; New York, Stein & Day, 1977
Prott, Lyndell V.; "Cultural Rights as Peoples' Rights in International Law"; Crawford 1988, pp.93-106
Rattansi, Ali, & Westwood, Sallie, eds.; Racism, Modernity and Identity: On the Western Front; Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994
Rawls, John; Political Liberalism; New York, Columbia UP, 1996
Rawls, John; A Theory of Justice; Harvard UP, 1971
Raz, Joseph; The Morality of Freedom; Oxford, 1986
Renner, Karl; "The Development of the National Idea"; Bottomore & Goode 1978, pp.118-124
Rich, Roland; "The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?"; Crawford 1988, pp.39-54
Roosens, Eugeen E.; Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis; London, Sage, 1989
Rorty, Richard; Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity; Cambridge, 1989
Rorty, Richard; Objectivity, Relativity, and Truth; Cambridge, 1991
Said, Edward W.; Orientalism; New York, Random House, 1979
Said, Edward W.; Culture and Imperialism; New York, Knopf, 1993
Said, Edward W.; The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination; New York, Pantheon, 1994
Sandel, Michael J.; Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Cambridge, 1982
Seton-Watson, Hugh; Nations and States; London, Methuen, 1977
Shain, Yossi; "Multicultural Foreign Policy"; Foreign Policy v.100 (Fall 1995) pp.69-87
Smith, Anthony D.; Theories of Nationalism; New York, Holmes & Meier, 2nd ed. 1983
Smith, Anthony D.; The Ethnic Revival; Cambridge, 1981
Smith, Anthony D.; The Ethnic Origins of Nations; Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986
Spinner, Jeff; The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality In the Liberal State; Johns Hopkins, 1994
Tamir, Yael; Liberal Nationalism; Princeton, 1993
Taylor, Charles, &c.; Gutman, Amy, ed.; Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition; Princeton, 1994
Taylor, Charles; Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity; Harvard UP, 1989
Thompson, Leonard; The Political Mythology of Apartheid; New Haven, Yale, 1985

Thornton, Robert; "The Colonial, the Imperial, and the Creation of the "European" in Southern Africa"; Carrier 1995 pp.192-217
Tilly, Charles, ed.; The Formation of National States In Western Europe; Princeton, 1975
Tomasi, John; "Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities"; Ethics, 105:3 (April 1995), pp.580-603
Tully, James, ed.; Philosophy In an Age of Pluralism: the Philosophy of Charles Taylor In Question; Cambridge, 1994
van den Berghe, Pierre L.; Race and Racism; New York, John Wiley, 1967
van den Berghe, Pierre L.; Race and Ethnicity: Essays in Comparative Sociology; New York, Basic Books, 1970
van den Berghe, Pierre L.; The Ethnic Phenomenon; New York, Praeger, 1987
van Zyl Slabbert, F., & Welsh, David; South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power; Cape Town, David Philip, 1981
Wallerstein, Immanuel; The Capitalist World-Economy; Cambridge, 1979
Wallerstein, Immanuel; After Liberalism; New York, New Press, 1995
Walzer, Michael; Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship; Cambridge Mass., Harvard UP, 1970
Walzer, Michael; Spheres of Justice; New York, Basic Books, 1983
Walzer, Michael, Kantowicz, E., Higham, J., & Harrington, M., eds; The Politics of Ethnicity; Cambridge Mass., Harvard UP, 1980
White, Merry; Cultural Transition: Human Experience and Social Transformations in Third World and Japan; London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1986
White, Merry; The Japanese Overseas: Can They Go Home Again?; New York, Free Press, 1988
Young, Robert J. C.; Colonial Desire: Hybridity In Theory, Culture, and Race; London, Routledge, 1995
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth; The Anatomy of Prejudices; Cambridge Mass, Harvard UP, 1996

# IMAGE EVALUATION
# TEST TARGET (QA-3)



















APPLIED IMAGE, Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989