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BARZEGAR, Ali, 1941-
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IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

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PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

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ALI BARZEGAR
Norman, Oklahoma

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PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

APPROVED BY

John R. Benjamin
Fred B. Iversen
Hugh L. Macpherson
Donald E. McGervey
Stephen Sloan

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

PREFACE

This study is being carried out in an era when the underdeveloped areas of the world are in a constant state of flux. Thus, while the conclusions reached in any study of this nature may only be considered tentative, the approach must be a dynamic one which would take into purview the nature as well as the direction of such change.

The topic of this study concerns Southwest Asia, a region whose limits are, on the East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the West, the continents of Africa and Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, on the North, the Soviet Union and the Caspian and Black Seas, and on the South, the Indian Ocean. In Western countries the term 'Middle East' or 'Near East' is often used synonymously to refer roughly to the same area. But the latter terms, aside from being from a Western perspective, are at times used to include North and East Africa as well as certain areas of South and Central Asia. Thus, the terms 'Middle East' or 'Near East' are used sparingly in this study--and only in reference to the larger Islamic cultural milieu.

Aside from the personal interest, the region was chosen for study because of its strategic location in respect to the

three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe, and the volatile state of its politics which deserves closer examination. In order to make this topic more manageable, the study primarily concentrates on Iran, Iraq and Turkey--with the focus being on Iran. The choice of the latter three polities, particularly Iran, was governed by the familiarity of the writer with their culture, history and traditions, in addition to the availability of comparable data in the various aspects of political modernization. However, wherever possible, comparisons are also made with other polities within and outside the region.

The fact that Afro-Asian countries are often compared with the European and North American models is disturbing to some since such comparisons entail comparisons of polities with totally different historical as well as socio-political settings. Here, although we make occasional references to Western countries, we have primarily chosen Japan as a highly advanced polity for comparison. Although the Japanese socio-cultural environment also differs markedly from that of Southwest Asia, Japan by virtue of being an Asian polity gives us another point of reference in placing the regional patterns in perspective.

The subject of this study is brought into focus at various ranges, from the regional to the national, hoping that this would give a clearer view of the general as well as the particular. Consequently, the opening and the concluding

chapters are devoted to general conceptual and methodological questions and an overall appraisal of the dynamics of the region. Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six--which deal with the geo-demography, the human resources, the integrative processes, and economic growth respectively--are primarily devoted to a comparative study of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Chapters Two and Seven, on the other hand, focus on Iran and are respectively concerned with the socio-political structure and the role of the government in modernization.

I am deeply grateful to Professor Oliver E. Benson, my dissertation advisor, whose keen interest and intellectual endeavors in the area of comparative politics has been a source of inspiration in this study. I would also like to express my appreciation to Professors Hugh MacNiven, Fred Silberstein, Donald Secrest, and Stephen Sloan, members of the dissertation committee who patiently read and criticized the preliminary draft of the present dissertation.

My growing interest and concern with the political during the past seventeen years of my life I particularly owe to a prime minister, an engineer, a worker, and a university professor who were men of commitment and belief in human dignity.

A.B.

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PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

I. A CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Some Problems Of Contemporary Comparative Politics

In recent years, much has been written in the area of political change--especially with regard to the processes going on in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Most of these works have been theoretical in nature, dealing primarily with modes of description and analysis in a systematic context. Among the contributors to this movement are Gabriel Almond, Karl Deutsch, Harold Lasswell, Manfred Halpern, David Apter, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, as well as many others.¹

¹Amongst the works in this area are: Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 1963); Almond & Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Little Brown, 1967); Harold D. Lasswell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford University Press, 1952); Karl Deutsch, National and Social Communication (New York: Wiley, 1953); "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514; "Towards an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54, (March, 1960), pp. 34-57; Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Little Brown, 1966); (ed.), Communication and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1958); Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton University Press, 1963); David Apter, The Gold Coast (Princeton, 1956; The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton, 1961); and

Comparative politics may ultimately prove to be the most trying and challenging area of politics as a discipline. If the 'scientific' contentions of political science to universal truths are to be proved, its most meaningful and significant crucible is here. Because it is here that political science must shed all its parochial ambitions and colourings.

In fact, the most revolutionary discovery of the political scientists in the West, since the Second World War, has been some degree of realization of the parochial self: In their study of the Afro-Asian societies, they have discovered environments in which the formal political structures, as found in the West, are either non-existent, or if they do exist they fulfill different functions. Thus, the need for a less rigid and less parochial mind in the study of formal and informal political structures, as well as functions, has begun to be felt. The recognition of the significance of political functions and the diversity of political structures, coupled with a more interdisciplinary approach in comparative politics constitute the most dynamic leap in the discipline.

It is too early to expect a highly disciplined and formalized approach with quantitative sophistication from any of the general theories of comparative politics. The field is still

Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

barren. Much work remains to be done. Most of the theories developed are the result of country studies (Apter's based on Ghana, Pye's based on Malaya and Burma, etc.). There are only a few who have ventured to take a large number of countries and attempt to study the process of social and political change in depth. Amongst the latter two are particularly worthy of note: Daniel Lerner's The Passing of the Traditional Society² and Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa.³ They are both based on study of several polities in the Middle East. The former is important for its attempt to relate the process of modernization to an increase in one's sense of empathy with a larger number of roles. The more roles, and the more distant roles, that an individual can have a sense of empathy with the more modern he is. Of course, by 'a sense of empathy' here we mean a sense of general familiarity with roles rather than professional expertise which certain roles might require in actual performance. Along the same line, one's perception of oneself is changed from a subjective one to an objective one. Professor Lerner's points of departure are general information and communication theories.

²Lerner, op. cit.

³Halpern, op. cit.

Professor Halpern, on the other hand, devotes most of his efforts to in-depth analysis of political and social structures. His focus of the study of modernization is on traditional and modern political structures, especially as they relate to social stratification of the old and its crumbling before the forces of modernization. The latter study particularly focuses on the rise of the new middle class as the most revolutionary force in the underdeveloped societies.

The impact of the structural-functionalist approach is readily apparent in the works of Professor Almond and his students. They have in turn borrowed somewhat heavily from people like Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and Malinowski.⁴ However, Parsons seems to be much more 'action' oriented than his political science following. Nevertheless, the works of Almond and Easton, particularly in defining and analysing the various political 'functions', are very useful for understanding the political processes.

⁴Parsons and Merton are both sociologists, Malinowski is an anthropologist. For their contribution to functionalism see: Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.) Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied (New York: The Free Press, 1959) and The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951); Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957); Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1954).

Despite all the theoretical work done in comparative politics, most of the area studies have not followed the theoretical modes of analysis. Modern comparative studies have mainly been concerned with comparing only certain aspects of one polity with that of another. Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture is a good example in that the focus of the book is on the cognitive and affective orientation of mass population of Mexico, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, towards their politics.⁵

Although any evaluation concerning the overall level of advancement of any society would not be adequate pursuant to a one factor analysis, the means for multi-factor analysis are not yet at hand. It may be possible to develop mathematical schemes for multi-factor analysis--and much effort has been expended in this direction.⁶ However, the problems in this respect are manifold: All the factors are not quantitative in nature and consequently not reduceable to numerical values. Also, not much is known about the inter-relationship between and amongst the variety of factors at hand. Thus, it is not

⁵Almond and Verba, op. cit.

⁶For reference on the factor analysis approach see: Harry H. Harman, The Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); and O. Stanley Eitzen, "The Use of Bank and Textor's "A Cross-Polity Survey" for the Ranking of Nations: A Methodological Note, "Social and Economic Studies, 16, 3, (September, 1967) pp. 326-329

always possible to enter each of the factors into mathematical operations. Further, even with regard to the readily quantifiable data (such as birth rates, death rates, automobiles per capita, etc.), the main problem, in the area of comparative politics, remains the lack of availability of reliable data.

The argument, here, is not that political and social scientists will never be able to arrive at a meaningful and valid means of over-all quantitative analysis of politics. The point is rather that within the present limitations of the discipline such studies would not produce definitive results. Thus, the more modest and less ambitious studies would be more successful in achieving their goals.

The Total and Cataclysmic Nature of Social and Political Change

The main task in devising a comparative study of modernization would be to move away from the traditionally hardened boundaries in the social sciences and adopt an interdisciplinary approach which would attempt to take into consideration, as far as possible, the variety of natural and human environmental factors. Of course, this does not mean that such a study would not have any political focus. Any study of political modernization must be firmly anchored in a comprehension of the political structures, functions, culture, etc., of the given polity.

However, a single discipline approach is still very prevalent. Many social scientists, who are also men of political influence, such as Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, Walt Rostow, Hirschman, etc.,⁷ in writing about the process of modernization have placed almost exclusive emphasis on economic growth. Although economic growth is a major aspect of the process of modernization, it ought to be remembered that modernization is a multi-faceted process, with each aspect having an influence on, as well as interacting with, every other aspect. In fact, if the process of modernization is ever to be understood, it can only be understood as a whole. The major shortcoming of the purely economic development approach, as well as any other single discipline approach, has been its narrowness and lack of concern with other aspects of human life, such as the political, which have a tremendous impact upon how and what kind of decision are made and how they are enforced.

The single disciplinarians are not the only ones who are bewildered by the enormity of social change. The revolutionary changes occurring in the underdeveloped areas of the world are so complex and cataclysmic that even the leaders of such revolutionary movements don't have any clear notion of where the

⁷See: W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, 1966); Gunnar Myrdal, Development and Underdevelopment (National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration Lectures (Cairo, 1956); Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale University Press, 1958); and Raul Prebisch, "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principle Problems," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, (February, 1962)

events are leading them. They are so impressed by the forces of history that all they can chart are general directions.

Gamal Abd al-Nasser expressed this feeling when he wrote:

I feel that I stand before a boundless world, a bottomless sea - and a trepidation restrains me from plunging into it since, from my point of vantage, I see no other shore to head for.⁸

Julius Nyrere, expressed a similar feeling when he stated:

We in Tanganyika do not believe that mankind has yet discovered ultimate truth - in any field. We do not wish to act as if we did have such a belief. We wish to contribute to man's development if we can - but we do not claim to have a solution; our only claim is that we intend to grope forward in the dark toward a goal so distant that even the real understanding of it is beyond us - toward, in other words, the best that man can become.⁹

What Is Modernization?

Sooner or later in the study of this kind, one must come to grips with the question of the meaning of the term 'modernization.' The process of political modernization (or development) has been described in a variety of lights, such as: the political prerequisites of economic development; the politics typical in industrial societies; political modernization; the operation of a nation state; administrative and

⁸Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of Revolution (Washington, 1955) p. 7.

⁹Julius Nyrere, from an address on the opening of Kivukoni College, Dar es Salam, July 29, 1961.

legal development; mass mobilization and participation; building of democracy; stability and orderly change; mobilization and power; and finally one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change.¹⁰ The variety of possible approaches indicated above are sufficient to point out the context within which political forces are at work.

However, every researcher and student of politics must attempt to narrow-down, in conceptual terms, this multi-faceted phenomenon called modernization. He must develop definitions of modernization which, tentative as they may be, would show, at least, general directions. In this respect, we must clarify here some of the assumptions which underly this study's concept of modernization.

From a purely political point of view modernization means the democratization of the basis of political power. By democracy, here, we don't mean any particular brand, but rather a widespread sharing of political power--which must consequently be reflected in a broad distribution of economic resources and the equality of opportunity for all members of the polity. This general definition of democracy is best understood when contrasted to polities where political decisions are made by, and in the interests of, an elite or ruling class at the expense of the rest of the populace. The particular procedure

¹⁰See Lucian Pye's Aspects of Political Development, op. cit.

through which political participation on a large scale takes place may vary. It may be through regular elections, through a party apparatus, via cooperative type organizations, or pluralist structures.

Also, what is important about the modern man in his participant character--i.e. his orientation towards input structures and processes, and actual or potential engagement in the articulation of demands and making of decisions.¹¹ Here again, the participant character of the modern man can be understood better when juxtaposed to the character of the traditional man whose relationship vis à vis the political is that of a subject rather than an active participant.

Viewing the process from a juristic vantage, modernization would be a movement away from a society where human relations are based on familial or status grounds, and towards a society where human relations are governed by contract. Sir Henry Maine was one of the first people to develop this concept as a measure of political modernization. Late in the nineteenth century, in his book Ancient Law, he presented in detail the characteristics of a contract, as opposed to a status, society.¹² In a society where relationships are contractual not only family, cast, clan, class considerations do not

¹¹The term 'participant' is used in somewhat of a different and more individualistic sense by Almond and Verba, op. cit.

¹²Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London, 1884)

govern institutions, but every man is free to affect the formulation of such laws which govern his life.

So far as the socio-economic structure is concerned, modernization means the development of a predominantly middle-class society. This is bound to occur with a more just distribution of resources and the gradual disappearance of the very rich and the very poor. By 'middle class' here, we don't mean a duplication of the middle classes, as they exist in the West, in the less developed areas of the world. The nature, traditions and values of the new middle class in the developing areas differs from that of the West by the virtue of the fact that they come out of different cultural and historical settings. In the final chapter we shall examine more closely the role of the new middle class in the modernization process.

However, in the traditional societies the bulk of the population is composed of peasants who are engaged in technologically primitive (by modern standards) forms of agriculture. With increased economic development and the democratization of the allocation of resources, a modern middle class--initially composed of professional personnel, white collar workers and intelligentsia--begins to develop which ultimately will embrace the bulk of the population, including the proletariat and the peasantry. This tendency seems to have been the rule in the economically more advanced societies, regardless of the ideological contexts within which such developments have

occurred. Of course, the initial states of industrialization and capital investment have required much sacrifice, in the form of lower consumption levels, on the bulk of the population both under capitalism and socialism. However, after the necessary period of austerity has elapsed and industrialization has taken root, the economy becomes increasingly consumer conscious.

Thus, another necessary step in the direction of modernization is industrial growth. Without industrialization, it would be impossible for a polity to modernize, since a primitive technology would not permit any degree of differentiation to develop and the majority of the population is involved in agriculture producing just enough to keep itself alive.

The human resources are the most dynamic measure of modernization. A society whose population is healthy, literate and skilled is naturally more advanced than one which has neglected the improvement of its human resources. Literacy is the most popular indicator in evaluating the human resources since it reflects the level and nature of human involvement with communication flows. In the study of human resources formal education assumes varying significance. While the formal primary education pattern is a fairly reliable measure of sustained literacy, the extent of the secondary and higher education systems have more to do with the development of specialized roles. The quality of the labour force--i.e., the age pattern, level of skill, sex, etc.,--tells much about the

level of human development. What is also important is human mental and physical fitness and the degree to which other resources are mobilized to serve this end. The mode and the level of differentiation in occupations within the polity tells about the pace of increasing complexity in social relations, which seems to be an unavoidable by-product of the process of modernization.¹³ In order to understand the significance of such differentiation one must pay equal attention to its impact upon the human personality, the changing nature of values, the mobilization patterns, and the uncertainties that all such changes entail.

In fact, much of the work in the area of revolutionary change has something to do with the concept of alienation; which briefly means the old political structures are incapable of relating meaningfully to the increased number of roles created by the forces of modernization. The term 'alienation' is used in the West to refer to the feeling of estrangement that an individual in a modern society has towards the impersonal industrial society and its institutions which encompass him. In this study we use the term in its broadest sense to also include such individuals within the more traditional societies who, by virtue of their education, skills and

¹³For notes on differentiation see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," American Sociological Review, (June, 1964). pp. 375-387; and Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review (June, 1964) pp. 339-357.

values, find themselves estranged from the highly personalized traditional structures. It is often such alienated individuals who play the key role in transforming the sociopolitical structure. In the concluding chapter we shall deal in more depth with the dynamic nature of human resources and its functional and dysfunctional character in the process of modernization.

Demographically, modernization has often been identified with urbanization. Though there is no inevitability about this, historically city life has been identified with civil life. The process of industrialization in the last two centuries has created the large urban proletariat, which has been vital to the modern life. With increased automation, presumably the need for a large manual labour force, and with it the large population clusters, may be reduced. But that is yet to be seen.

Integration is also a hallmark of modernization. An increase in transportations and communications would not only bring people together physically, but also psychically. An indication of integration is the increased level of empathy exhibited by the population in the sense that the modern man is capable of performing, or imagining himself perform, a much larger number of roles than his more traditional counterpart.¹⁴

¹⁴See Daniel Lerner, op. cit.

A further consequence of integration has to do with a common way of life and the acceptance of common values by the members of the polity. This is what some have called the development of 'a secular ethic' or a 'secular culture.'¹⁵ The major impact of political integration would be to diminish dualism by involving all the population, urban and rural alike, in the political processes.

A Dynamic View of Modernization

Since modernization in a traditional setting means change, and often revolutionary change, equally dynamic approaches and contexts are necessary for its comprehension. The danger with the more rigid and static view of modernization is its too simplistic and binary vision of the world. Some authors have even gone as far as suggesting stability and order, the very antithesis of revolutionary change, as being the hallmark of modernization.¹⁶ By this yardstick, every despotic state like Haiti, Saudi Arabia, or Ethiopia would be a modern state; as opposed to France and the United States which might be classified as traditional or transitional due to the prevailing social and political upheavals. Thus, while lack of chaos and stability is essential to implementing

¹⁵For a detailed discussion of 'secularism' see S. P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics (April, 1965)

¹⁶See Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit.

the progressive policies of a modern leadership, in polities whose leadership remains traditional stability can only mean the stability of the traditional order.

A dynamic view of modernization would see the process as a perpetually unfolding one. In this sense, there is no finality about political development or modernization. Polities may be more or less developed but they are all developing¹⁷ and change is a part and parcel of this ever unfolding process.

What political science, more than any other discipline, can contribute to the understanding of modernization is to study the changes in the nature and the mode of political power: Who holds the monopoly of coercive powers? How is the power distributed? How is it used? What or who constitute the power elite? What are the challenges to the power elite? What are the new sources of political power? How does revolutionary social change affect the distribution of political power and the allocation of economic resources? The asking of these and many similar questions is vital to the understanding of the process of modernization.

Since we are dealing with change, one important variable of a dynamic approach must be the time factor--i.e., change

¹⁷the terms 'modernization' and 'development' are used synonymously in this study.

over time. In case of most, if not all, underdeveloped polities this aspect is so crucial that change is often defined in terms of a race 'with' or 'against' time. Thus, in any study of political development, one must pay particular attention to the change, as well as the rate of change, which has occurred over time. It is in this respect that the rate of growth in different sectors of a polity becomes such an important indicator of modernization.

In a similar vein, any of these changes are meaningful only in perspective. This can be done by comparing such changes in one polity with those in other polities. The comparative approach is not only useful in interpolity analysis, but also in trying to comprehend the nature and manner of intra-polity differentiations. This approach could be a major key to explaining the style as well as the level of performance of various sectors within the system.

Significance of Dualism in the Process of Modernization

After all is said and done, the most significant aspect of the study of political and cultural change is dualism. Dualism basically means that in every society, regardless of the level of modernization, there are two sectors: the modern and the traditional. Of course, the size of each sector with respect to the other sector varies from society to society, depending on the overall level of development. A dualistic

approach to the study of comparative politics makes the discipline much more dynamic and much less parochial.

From a dualistic vantage point all societies are developing constantly. Thus, it is not proper to use the term 'developed' with regard to the industrial nations of the world, since it implies a finality about the process. In the United States as well as the Western Europe and the Soviet Union, there are certain sectors or regions which are traditional from a political, a legal, a social, or even an economic point of view. Thus, overall affluence, though important, does not warrant wholesale labels. A familiar development is the movement of the poor and black people in America. The awakening on the part of the poor and the underprivileged has brought the United States face to face with one of its most critical crisis in recent times. An understanding of this problem is only possible when the dynamics of the dualistic nature of the problem is closely studied. If the civil rights movement in the United States was focusing on the juristic aspect of dualism, the black power movement is dealing with the economic and political implications of dualism.

A purely static view of the polity on the basis of per capita statistics (income, consumption, education, health, etc.) would leave the total dynamics of society wholly unexplained. In the same vein, one could not apply such purely statistical analysis (on the basis of per capita) to the less

developed parts of the world since such areas also exhibit a dualistic nature. For instance, Kuwait, on the basis of her per capita income is the most affluent in the world. Yet from a dynamic dualistic approach the crisis of modernization in Kuwait has hardly begun in the sense that the human resources still remain predominantly underdeveloped and political structures strictly authoritarian and traditional.

Another lesson of political dualism is to move away from certain prevalent chronological limitations. Many authors tend to naturally think of the past as traditional and future as modern. This automatic assumption would rob history of much possible insight and contribution in understanding the dynamics of the process of modernization. If we consider political modernization as the acceptance of certain modern political values, then any study of history would show that in the past there have also been individuals, as well as institutions, espousing modern values concerning the legal, the social, the economic, and the political relations. Similarly, one may expect that traditionalism not be merely a prisoner of the past or present, but rather to continue in the foreseeable future, in the sense that there may still be individuals or institutions which may continue to uphold the traditional values and structural patterns.

Hedging Against Parochialism

In recent years much has been written about the necessity of a 'value free' political science. Whether such a thing is ever possible is open to debate. What is obvious is that the meanings which a political scientist, as any other human being, attributes to the various phenomena are partially determined by his socialization--i.e., the kind of values he has learned to associate with the said phenomena. No man is completely free of such biases. Even if he were totally free, he would not be of much use as a social scientist since the internalization of a large portion of these values is essential in order for one man to be able to relate his understandings to another.

Cultural biases are only harmful if they block one's view in grasping the social and political reality. One such kind of a bias, which we have mentioned before, is parochialism in the traditional approach to comparative politics, where political processes were only seen as emanating from certain formal political structures as they had developed in the West.

Another form of parochialism is to identify modernization with the acceptance of certain specified ideologies, institutions, or ways of life such as 'Democracy' or 'Communism.' This kind of parochialism is oblivious of the world which includes people from a distinct variety of cultures, religions, traditions, and histories.

One means of avoiding the pitfalls of parochialism, in one's study of political modernization, would be to become thoroughly familiar with the culture and traditions of the polity or polities under study. In this sense, the investigator does not only need to be a political scientist; but he must also be an area specialist par excellence, thoroughly familiar with the history, the geography, the economy, and the culture of the region. Such demanding qualifications perhaps explains the absence of really comprehensive and outstanding works in the area of comparative politics. Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa¹⁸ perhaps comes closest to such a work. In the final chapter we shall examine Halpern's approach in contrast to that of escalating expectations used by Oliver Benson.¹⁹

Finally, stating one's biases and value orientations at the outset of any study, in the form of definitions, is a good way of informing oneself as well as other readers about the general orientation of the work, and thus hedging against parochialism.

In this chapter, aside from pointing out certain problems of comparative politics and the study of social and political

¹⁸Halpern, op. cit.

¹⁹Oliver Benson, "Escalating Expectations," Symposium on Great World Problems of the Next Decade, Department of State, April 25-27, 1966. Unpublished.

change, we have attempted to present certain broad characteristics of the process of 'modernization.' We have briefly identified 'modernization' with the democratization of the basis of political power, appearance of a participant personality, development of contractual relationships, rise of a predominantly new middle class society, economic and industrial growth, improvement of the human resources and their mobilization, urbanization, and integration. Of course, the above characteristics are not exhaustive of the process of modernization. However, they provide a general direction and the guidelines so far as this study is concerned. What we have attempted to do here is to move away from a single definition of modernization by indicating a variety of the manifestations of the process. Aside from pointing out the significance of dualism, we have further suggested that modernization could be better understood if it is observed as a whole and from a dynamic universalistic vantage point.

2

II. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE

From a political point of view, in Iran status and wealth have traditionally been a function of power rather than vice versa. In Western Europe and North America traditionally it has been the propertied classes who controlled the bulk of the political power. Even the right to vote has been dependent on ownership. However, in Southwest Asia in general, and in Iran in particular, it has been the military which has played the crucial role in shaping the socio-political structure. Prior to the twentieth century the tribal elements constituted the bulk of the military power. Even if we consider the most recent dynasties in the Iranian history--such as the Safavid, the Afshar, and the Qajar--they were all based on tribal power.¹ It is only in the twentieth century that we observe the challenge of the tribal power by the rise of the modern military.

In the Iranian context, the ownership of land, as well as the exercise of local power, is very much dependent upon who governs. Thus, to try to generalize from the traditional socio-political patterns in Europe, and to extrapolate into

¹Exceptions from the Safavid to the present century were like the Zand dynasty which rules Shiraz. But such dominions were local rather than national and very short lived.

the Iranian situation would be a serious, nonetheless common, mistake. Neither Marxist patterns nor other stereotypes in the West seem totally adequate in explaining the traditional power patterns, or the kind of change which is taking place in this part of the world. Although not much has been written about the structures of social power in Iran, among the work which has been published there are at least two extremely valuable contributions by Ann Lambton and Manfred Halpern.²

The problem in utilizing only socio-economic structures as the basic tool of analysis is its rigidity and lack of dynamism. It is when one introduces the concept of power that the picture becomes clearer and exhibits its proper dynamic qualities, explaining the shifts and changes in relations of influence as well as modifications in structures. Since those who have had power have been historically those high in the socio-political structure, changes in the patterns of influence can historically be seen through a study of shifting alliances among the upper classes. This, of course, is the traditional pattern. The major crisis in twentieth century Iran has been

²See A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London, 1953); and Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. 41-118. Also worthwhile are: Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 150-226; and James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Autumn, 1963), pp. 400-418.

an unprecedented shift in potential power relations resulting from the rise of the new middle and working classes.

Although the middle classes, and to some degree the working classes, have risen to challenge the power of the upper classes, the challenge, as we shall see, has not been completely successful as yet. The rise of modern armies and the advent of bureaucratic organizations have complicated the process. These institutions, which are basically modern in structure and composition, have ironically helped to bolster, at least temporarily, the control of the socio-political relations by the upper classes.

The Lower Classes

The Tribal Population

Nomadic tribes constituted about 22 per cent of the total population of Iran at the beginning of this century.³ By 1962 the proportion of the tribal population of the country had declined to about 15 per cent.⁴ A large proportion of the tribal population are Kurds (just over a million according to the 1966 national census, or about 4 per cent of the total population). Other major tribes are the Lors of Western and

³Comprehensive works are lacking with reference to the Iranian tribes. References to the available sources are given in L. P. Elwell-Sutton's A Guide to Iranian Area Study (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962).

⁴See Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965) p. 548.

Central Iran, the Baluchis of the Southeast, as well as Turkoman and Afshar tribes.

The tribesmen have traditionally owed their allegiance to their tribal khan. Thus, the pattern of allegiances of a modern state is something quite new to them. Politically, the tribes played a very important role before the advent of modern armies, since they supplied much of men and weapons which were used for or against the central government.

In this century the power of the tribal elements has gradually declined. This has come about because of two factors: First, the weapons and the military capabilities of the tribal forces have proved not to be a match to that of the modern army. Second, the tribal leaders, and others high in their ranks, have mostly left the tribes and settled in urban centres--especially the capital. Their sons and daughters have studied abroad and they themselves have often accepted positions in the government.

To be sure, either for personal reasons or questions of public policy, some tribal leaders are not in agreement with the government. During the last fifty years there have been several uprisings especially by the Kurds, the Lors, the Bakhtiaris, and the Qashqa'i, the tribes in the Province of Fars whose leaders are in exile and are generally pro-Mossadegh.⁵ In 1963 the number of the tribesmen participating

⁵Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was the leader of the National

in one such uprising was estimated at 30,000.⁶ However, in general the tribesman is out of modern political life. With a few exceptions, his leaders have acquired new interests and ways of life. The traditional pastoral life of the tribe has no place in the new society. Thus, many of the tribal elements, with their customary rights of migration dwindling due to new government regulations, are turning into landless peasants. This is particularly true since their main source of income which is livestock has been undermined through the limitation of grazing rights. Their recourse would be either to turn into agricultural workers or to migrate into the cities as unskilled 'lumpen proletariat.'

The Peasants

It is generally popular in the West to use the term 'feudalism' to refer to the peasant-landlord relations in the underdeveloped areas. However, at least in the case of Iran

Front and the Prime-Minister of Iran during 1951-53. He led the struggle for the nationalization of Iranian oil industries. He is probably the most important figure in the twentieth century Iran in that he symbolized the spirit of political modernization: i.e., the democratization of the basis of political power. Elwell-Sutton writes that the basis of Mossadegh's popular admiration was "his refusal to compromise with Reza Shah's dictatorship, his longstanding campaign against inherited privilege, and his resolute determination to rid Persia of corrupting foreign influence." Elwell-Sutton gives a detailed account of Mossadegh's background and career from his birth in 1879. See Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London, 1955), pp. 191-194. Dr. Mossadegh died in March, 1967.

⁶See Tehran Mossavar (February, 1963).

as well as most North African and Middle Eastern countries, feudalism never existed as it did in Europe. The institution of landlordism developed out of the custom of the rulers to give certain areas of the country to their adjutants or friends for the purpose of overseeing and the collection of taxes. Since the rulers often changed, the landlords also changed. Even if the rulers persisted for some time, they preferred to shift the landlords, many of whom were military leaders. These shifts were made fairly often in order to prevent the development of any kind of base which might be used against them. The point is not that the peasantry in Iran has fared better under this form of 'shifting feudalism' than the European peasant did under the 'established' form of feudalism. So far as the peasant in Iran is concerned, the pressures from the above are very real. However, there are fundamental differences, in the social structure and the value system, between the traditional patterns in Iran and those in Europe which are reflected, among other things, in attitudes towards the ownership of land, property, as well as socio-economic mobility.

The peasants were also different from those in Europe since they were not tied to the land and could move freely, so far as their aspiration or economic condition permitted. Thus, the kind of feudalism which developed in Europe never came about in Iran.⁷

⁷For more, see Lambton, op. cit.

In Iran the landless peasants are in the same predicament as the tribal forces. Their number is large. The 1956 National Census lists over 1,400,000 of the population as agricultural workers. However, since a large proportion of them are unemployed, the number of landless peasants must in fact be much larger.

The main form of farming is share-cropping. This is not only true for Iran, but also of all Southwest Asia and North Africa.⁸ The division of crops differs from area to area and the share of the tenant oscillates between one-third to one-tenth depending on a variety of factors including the mercy of the landlord.

Most of the peasants, unless they can supplement their income by the produce of a garden, a small flock of sheep, or other live-stocks, cannot subsist. The landlords have traditionally feared these supplemental efforts since prosperity makes the peasant independent.⁹

The condition of the peasant in Iran is that of "grinding poverty; the landowner, although he enjoys a comparative influence, is in constant fear of being despoiled of his wealth by intrigue, or of being cheated of it by a discontented peasantry; and the government official, often inadequately paid, finds it difficult to support himself

⁸See Halpern, op. cit., p. 81.

⁹See Lambton, op. cit., p. 302.

and his family unless he has some source of income other than his pay. Distrust, insecurity, and intrigue prevails on all sides."¹⁰

The tribal masses have only recently come to share the lot of the landless peasantry. Thus, psychologically, even they are better off than the peasantry. The following comment concerning the lot of the agricultural worker in Iraq is also expressive of the condition of the Iranian peasantry:

It is not exaggerating to state that the average agricultural worker (fellah) is a living pathological specimen, as he is probably a victim of anklylostomiasis (hookworm, leading to abdominal pain, intermittant fever, progressive anemia, and emaciation), ascariasis (an intestinal parasite causing diarrhea), malaria, bilharzia (blood flukes producing urinal discharge of blood and dysentery) trachoma (an infectious disease of the eye), hejel (a non-venereal form of syphilis) and possibly tuberculosis also.¹¹

Under such conditions of exploitation and ill-health it is not surprising that the Middle Eastern peasant is often described as fatalistic and passive.

Of the whole population of the peasantry in Iran only very few own land. The 1956 National Census put the number of the small peasant proprietors at 1,786,075. It is very

¹⁰Lambton, op. cit., pp. 394-395

¹¹A. Michael Critchley, "The Health of the Industrial Worker in Iraq," British Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol. 12, 1955. As quoted by Halpern, op. cit., p. 85.

popular to refer to the peasantry in the underdeveloped areas as politically conservative. But as can be seen from the above figures, only the very few, who are in some sense property owners, have any kind of a share in the status-quo which they might want to conserve. The only way to describe the political attitude of the Iranian peasantry, under such conditions of life described previously, is apathy, fatalism, insecurity and mistrust.

With such a small number of peasants as property owners, if the masses of the landless peasants were to overcome their sense of fatalism and aspire to land ownership, they could be potentially a revolutionary force. In the early 1960's with all the propaganda that the government put out, to bring over the peasants as a supporting element, and the fiery anti-landlord speeches of Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, Minister of Agriculture, there seems to be a gradual inroad in erradicating the fatalistic outlook of the peasants. The introduction of the Literacy Corps in recent years, which sends high school and college graduates into the villages, small as it is, has also helped to combat fatalism and raise the aspiration of the peasants. Of course, the most revolutionary occurrence has been the transistor radio and its impact on peasant life, which we shall take up in the fifth chapter.

The purpose of the government is to gain allies among the peasants, as well as to destroy the economic base of some

landlords who could be potential adversaries. The propaganda campaign of the government against landlordism has undoubtedly increased the aspiration level of the peasantry in the sense that they expect to own their land and cooperatives, which would in turn bring them a better life. However, indications are that as yet the government has fallen far short of delivering its promises.¹² The increased level of frustrations due to unfulfilled promises could backfire and become a potential threat to the government.

The Working Classes

As we shall see in the forthcoming discussion of the demographic setting, urban life is the centre and focus of

¹²Such indications have been plentiful in the past few years: The Christian Science Monitor (May 28, 1963) stated: "In March, H. Arsanjani, Minister in charge of land reform resigned. Reportedly he had come to the conclusion that the reform would be a flop because the Shah vetoed the planning and expenditure needed to make it effective."

The New Statesman (September 20, 1963) wrote: "Some 43,000 Iranian villages are owned by absentee landlords and less than a fifth of them have been taken over by the government and distributed to the peasants. In fact, less than 10% of the country's total rural population have benefited directly from land reform."

The Christian Science Monitor (March 16, 1964) again states: "Land reform from which so much had been hoped, has bogged down. Funds are not at hand to press forward with it. A correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde estimated that of the 10,000 cooperatives needed to make land reform a success, only 2,000 had been set up--and only a few of them were working well."

Also see Hossein Mahdavi, "The Coming Crisis in Iran," Foreign Affairs (January, 1966).

modernization. The modern elements are basically political as opposed to the predominantly apolitical mentality existing in the rural hinterlands. Thus, generally, as one moves from rural sectors into the larger and larger urban population centres, there is a parallel rise in political awareness. The basic change brought forth by the forces of modernization in the social structure of the developing areas is the creation of a new working class and a new middle class.

By far the largest group of urban workers are the unemployed and the unskilled. At the bottom of the working classes are the new immigrants from the countryside, or what Leonard Binder calls "a kind of Eastern urban 'lumpen-proletariat'."¹³ They are basically landless peasants, who sometimes move into the edge of the city with their whole family living in small shabby rooms or cave-like huts dug in the ground and covered with boards and tin cans. However, mostly it is only the male member of the family who comes into the city to earn some money to send or take home. This move into the city is sometimes temporary. Nevertheless, the destruction of the rural life and economy has created more attraction for the rural immigrant to stay permanently in the cities, despite the dim chances of employment.

¹³See Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 170

However, workers are much more plentiful than are the available jobs,¹⁴ and what little the worker earns (between 50 and 80 cents per day) he may spend due to the high cost of living in the city. City life also has a tremendous destructive impact on the value system of the peasant.¹⁵ The destruction of moral controls coupled with low income and heightened material expectation, resulting from urban life, have been generally responsible for an increased rate of crime and frustrations amongst the peasant-workers. The urban peasant is at present still basically a-political. But due to his heightened expectations and status as 'would-be-skilled-worker,' he might be susceptible to attempts in the future for political organization.

Above this lowest category are the workers who are involved in unskilled service jobs such as in transportation, peddling, or as house servants, etc. These workers are about half or one generation away from the farm. Their level of political awareness is somewhat higher than the previous group.

¹⁴Although there are no definite figures available, the unemployment figures are expected to be fairly high in the urban centres. A conservative estimate was that of the New York Times on December 4, 1961, which wrote: "...unemployment in Tehran is believed to be about 50,000 to 60,000 now. It runs much higher this winter when peasants drift in from the fields seeking work not knowing that work is not to be had."

¹⁵Among those who have been interested in the impact of technology and urban life on rural mentality, the keenest observer is Jalal Aleahmad in his Gharb Zadegi (Tehran, 1961).

But in general their attitude is basically 'lumpen.' A good illustration of this is the fact that during the last decade or two they have often been too ready to play the role of a mob for little pay, on behalf of a declining elite whose ultimate ends were contrary to the interest of the working classes.¹⁶

A higher group in the working classes is composed of the unskilled workers in oil and manufacturing who have learned to do just one thing, such as pressing a lever, or filling oil cans, etc.. This category's level of political awareness, as well as income, is much higher than the previous categories. The aspirations of this group are also higher. Since 1940 there have been attempts to organize the workers both by Communists and Nationalists. Although the Communists produced isolated hard core cells amongst the workers in some small industries in the North, the bulk of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers in major oil industries of the South remained with Mossadegh during crucial days of the nationalization of oil industries.

However, despite attempts to win over the workers psychologically, the government has not been very successful in the last decade since the realities of economic and social life of

¹⁶See David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, Random House, 1964) pp. 110-114. Also, Andrew Tully, CIA, The Inside Story (New York, Morrow, 1962), especially the chapter entitled "King-Making in Iran," pp. 88-99.

the worker dictate against such a marriage. During the riots of June 5-6, 1963, for instance, in addition to the religious groups there were large numbers of workers involved in the anti-government demonstrations. The government alleged that the riots were incited by reactionary religious leaders who were opposed to government reforms in favor of workers and peasants. The New Republic, in an article commenting on this allegation, ironically states: "This leaves open the question of how the religious leaders succeeded in inciting large numbers of working class Iranians to take to the streets to demonstrate against reforms which are very much in their interests."¹⁷ To be sure, some of the lumpen proletariat have at times been bought by the upper classes for a variety of reactionary causes. Those religious scholars who were accused of (or credited with) leading the demonstrations were amongst the most progressive.

Somewhat above the previous group in social structure, due to their skills, but nevertheless on the decline, are the workers for artisans who produce goods which no longer find many customers due to the advent of cheaper mass-produced commodities. Among these are the basket weavers, the carpet weavers, the potters, the glass blowers, etc.. Due to their skills which has had traditional utility, they are generally

¹⁷The New Republic (June 29, 1963).

on the retreat from the larger cities. They are basically traditional in outlook.

A more dynamic group are the semi-skilled factory workers, drivers, apprentices to mechanics, the janitors of schools and government offices, apprentices in Bazars, bakers, fruit-sellers, etc.. They are more politically conscious due to their contacts with the middle classes as well as because of their literacy.

Highest in the working classes are those with modern skills such as mechanics, truck or bus drivers, low-grade civil servants, plumbers, etc.. Members of this category have the highest level of aspiration for advancement and many of them may be considered among the lower middle classes. Their education is often better than the previous groups. Their political participation is often hampered by the fears and insecurities of possible economic reprisals which might be taken against them especially if they champion causes which are unpopular with the government.

THE IRANIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The Upper Classes

Foreign Capitalists
Industrial Aristocracy

The Royal Family
Large Landowners
Tribal Nobility

Military Leaders

The Middle Classes

Small Landowners
The Ulama

Professional Personnel
Middle Retailers &
Small Wholesalers

White Collar Workers
& Intelligentsia
Small Retailers &
Guild Craftsmen

The Lower Classes

The Working Classes

Skilled Workers
Semi-skilled Workers

Craftsmen
Unskilled Workers in
Manufacturing

Unskilled Service
Workers
'Lumpen-Proletariat'

The Peasant Classes

Small Peasant Proprietors
Landless Peasantry

The Tribal Population

The Middle Classes

In Iran, as well as in most less developed areas, the middle classes, as a proportion of the total population, are much smaller than in the more developed areas. The traditional approach to a definition of the middle classes has been based on the traditional British and American middle classes as prototypes. However, a look at both Western and Non-Western historical experience suggests that the American and British cases were special cases.¹⁸ Manfred Halpern argues convincingly that the present age is one of bureaucratic organization and that the majority of the new middle classes are now salaried rather than propertied.¹⁹

At the bottom of the Iranian middle classes are the small retailers and guild craftsman. This group is basically on the defensive due to the increasing pressures in society in the direction of mass production and distribution by the upper classes, particularly the industrial aristocracy.²⁰ The

¹⁸Halpern, op. cit., pp. 51-78.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 52.

²⁰I have borrowed the term 'industrial aristocracy' from James A. Bill (op. cit.). In the sense that I use it, it refers to the landowners who have transferred some of their capital into the cities investing it in restaurants, cafes, pastry shops, etc.. Some of them have also gone into partnership with such international concerns as Coca Cola, Canada Dry, Firestone, etc.. Belonging to the same category are also government officials and military officers who come into some cash, by virtue of their position, and want to invest it into legitimate business with quick returns.

industrial aristocracy and foreign capitalists, whose investments have basically been in areas of the production of consumer goods, which have quick return, have put this group on the defensive by the introduction of modern techniques such as standardization of goods, packaging, as well as more efficient distribution networks. Culturally, this group is tradition oriented. Politically, however, it is more in line with the salaried middle class since its very existence is being threatened by the upper classes.

At somewhat of a higher position are the white-collar workers and the intelligentsia: government clerks, school teachers, most of the Ulama (religious scholars), and lower rank army officers basically constitute this class. They are fundamentally modernist in outlook.

A further example of stereo-typing by some Western scholars, Marxist as well as non-Marxist, is to put all of the Ulama in the traditionalist and reactionary column. The upper-class elements in Iran have also used this Western stereotype as a propaganda weapon against the Ulama. Although there are traditionalist elements among the Ulama, those who are attacked by the upper classes are the modernists. The role played by the modernist Ulama (such as Shirazi, Behbahani, Tabataba'i, Khyababi, Moddarress, Kashani, and at present Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Milani and others) in defense of constitutionalism, popular government and anti-colonialism

during the last century is of vital significance in Iranian history.

However, the level of organization of this class is fairly low. Since white-collar workers and intelligentsia belong to the lower middle class economically, they are among the would-be-middle class, and consequently they constitute the most alienated sector of the middle classes. They are generally salaried, and barring their considerations of economic insecurity, are most susceptible to new ideologies and political movements.

Of higher economic status are the small wholesalers and middle retailers. They have less education than the previous group and consequently are more traditional in outlook and somewhat passive politically. Since they constitute the small businessmen class, their income fluctuates drastically in accordance with the general condition of the economy.

A category which is both economically and educationally in a higher level is composed of professional and technical government employees, those with university degrees, engineers, doctors, lawyers, etc.. The level of prestige and influence of this category, as in all other categories, varies depending on their family connections. This class, whose composition we shall examine in more detail in the final chapter, is composed of individuals with the highest level of skills necessary for modernization. Thus, potentially, they are the hard-core

modernists whose co-operation is indispensable for the successful operation of a modern or modernizing society.

Close to the above group are the small landowners who are basically urban dwellers but have a farm close to town which they visit and manage regularly. At certain points the members of the previous group are indistinguishable from the small landowners since many doctors or engineers, in order to supplement their regular income, move into agriculture.²¹

Manfred Halpern has developed the concept of the new middle class as the principle revolutionary and stabilizing force. His new middle class excludes the property owning middle class. However, it includes both those who are now drawing salaries, and a far larger group--a 'would-be new middle class' which resembles this class in every respect except that it is unemployed.²² Thus, from the urban categories the managers, the administrators, the teachers, the engineers, the journalists, the scientists, the lawyers, or the army officers belong to the new middle class due to the above shared characteristics.

Halpern's approach is consistent with the realities of social structure in Iran, which has traditionally underscored the importance of power as opposed to ownership. However,

²¹Binder, op. cit., p. 74.

²²Ibid., pp. 51-78.

assuming that the new middle class is basically modernist in attitude, and that such attitudes are incompatible with traditional political patterns, the question would be: how is it that in studying the traditional power structure in Iran (as well as in other countries) we often meet with a deluge of doctors, engineers, lawyers, and even social scientists who act as the defenders of the traditional establishment?

Halpern's answers seem to be twofold: First, there are always opportunists who represent no one but themselves. "Some sell their skills as political brokers; some come close to selling their country."²³ Second, he rationalizes the cooperation in the following manner:

In the Middle East (as in other rapidly changing, underdeveloped societies) the new intelligentsia acts in behalf of the older ruling classes only until it is strong enough to win control of the government. When this occurs, however, the intelligentsia no longer remains socially unattached but acts in the interests of the new middle class of which it is an integral part. It cannot preserve the privileges of the older ruling classes if it hopes to propel any Middle Eastern country into the modern age.²⁴

In Professor Halpern's analysis there seems to be an inevitability about all of this. A more cynical and pessimistic outlook would be one from Roberto Michel's point of view.²⁵ Namely, that the cooperation of certain sectors

²³Halpern, op. cit., p. 53.

²⁴Ibid., p. 57.

²⁵See Roberto Michel's Political Parties.

of the intelligentsia with the older ruling classes can only be interpreted as an attempt to utilize modern talents and symbols in order to perpetuate the same oligarchical patterns.

The Upper Classes

Regardless of the degree or the nature of political consciousness, as one rises in the socio-political structure of Iran and comes close to the centre of power, political participation, in the Machiavellian tradition, sharply increases.²⁶ This pattern is perhaps true of all authoritarian states with totalitarian ambitions. Shaykh Mohammad Khyabani, the Iranian revolutionary nationalist, on June 15, 1920, described the situation well when he said:

There was no unity among the ruling classes. This led to constant political quarrels among them. The orientation of the landed aristocracy was towards the imperialist protectors. Part of the trading class was seduced by the markets of the rich metropolis, while the rest considered that independence was the only way out.²⁷

The Iranian upper classes have been described as being composed of the large landowners, tribal nobility, the wealthy members of the Qajar dynasty and members of the royal family.²⁸ This probably best describes the traditional

²⁶Some aspects of this problem are examined by Demorgny in his La Question Persane et la Guerre (Paris, 1916).

²⁷Nasrullah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923 (New York, 1952), p. 251.

²⁸See Binder, op. cit., p. 175.

pattern. The picture has somewhat changed during the last fifty years. The tribal nobility has lost much of its power due to its long absence from the tribal environment, as well as the breakdown of the tribal armed forces which were once a potent element in Iranian politics. Thus, although being known as a member of tribal nobility still carries with it some weight, the power that this group exercises is dependent upon the pattern of its political alliances in the capital as well as its position vis à vis the tribe. The very fact that some members of tribal nobility such as the Qashqa'is or the Sanjabis are in exile or diminished in influence, and on the other hand that some others are cabinet members or Ambassadors attests to the above mentioned trend.

The wealthy Qajar nobility is also in the same position since Qajars are no longer ruling Iran. Consequently, they have to play the game of political intrigue in the same manner as the rest of the upper classes.

Wealth in Iran is generally in two forms: land and capital (money, commodity or capital goods). Thus, from an economic point of view men of means in the upper classes are either large landowners, or capitalists, or both. The latter case is fairly often. In fact, the upper classes are so interwoven that one person could be an industrial aristocrat, a large landowner, a military leader, a member of the tribal nobility all at the same time. Thus, although classifications

are essential to the understanding of the structure, too rigid an adherence to them might hinder their dynamic comprehension.

So far as the industrial aristocracy (or native capitalists)--who are basically in import-export business, food processing, or textiles--are concerned, the Establishment can exercise a great deal of influence in deciding which ones get import or export licenses, whether they get government contracts, or whether their projects get the proper financing. Thus, only those who are closely aligned with the power structure are permitted to survive.

With the increased concentration of the power at the top, there is a perpetual mistrust by the core of the rest of the power structure, which manifests itself in constant changes and shifts in the position of the senior government officials, including the leaders of the military and the security forces. This is done in order to prevent any possible coalition by the forces in the periphery against the core. The prevalence of this element of mistrust in the power structure has created an atmosphere of opportunism, where all elements of the power structure, in order to prove their loyalty, often attempt to discredit, or inform upon, other members of the power structure. This prevailing atmosphere, which makes survival hazardous for the people close to the core, is consistently

expected and encouraged by the centre of the core for obvious reasons.²⁹

Some have included amongst the upper classes the foreign capitalist, or the companies or individuals of foreign nationality which have investment, as well as a say, in Iranian affairs. The position of this group has become increasingly important in the last decade due to its increased involvement in the Iranian economic life. This class is particularly important not only because it is not susceptible to the pressures that the power structure can bring to bear upon other classes but also because the core is often dependent upon it for survival on an international as well as on the domestic scale.³⁰

The high Ulama have also often been included among the upper classes.³¹ However, since the Ulama economically belong to the middle classes and at present do not exert much influence within the power structure, they have not been included here

²⁹For more on internal politics of the power elite in Iran see James A. Bill, "The Politics of Modernization in Iran-A Group-Class Analysis", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton, 1962.

³⁰The role played by the foreign capitalists in Iranian political life is exceedingly important. However, its consideration in the present context would take us too far out in the area of international politics. For detailed discussion of this topic see Fatemi, op. cit. & Elwell-Sutton, op. cit.

³¹James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran," op. cit.

among the upper classes. However, the potential power of the Ulama upon their following remains in tact and is something that the power structure must deal with and attempt to suppress fairly often. Ayattollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the foremost religious scholar with widest following, has been sent into exile in Iraq. Other major figures such as Milani, Shariat-maderi, and others are under constant surveillance.

The socio-political structure of Iran reflects the particular historical predicament of the polity. On the one hand, at the top of the structure is the traditional elite determined to preserve its power base. Due to the changing nature of political power, the nature of the traditional power elite is also changing somewhat, from one based on familial ties and traditional landed aristocracy to one which is dominated by the military-capitalist elements. On the other hand, this leadership is being challenged by the rise of a new middle class which in its broadest form would include actual and potential (unemployed) salariat: all of those whose modern skills, in administration, education, science, technology, communications, military, etc., are essential for the successful operation of any modern or modernizing society. This new middle class is heterogeneous in its origin in that its members have their origins and connections in the upper as well as the middle and lower middle classes. Also party to the struggle are the traditional middle classes, whose influence in society is diminishing very rapidly, and in the long run can survive

as a part of the middle class if they can successfully move into the new middle class. The workers and peasants are not yet politically conscious enough to form a cohesive force and the development of such a force is essential to the outcome of the crisis of modernization.

III. THE GEO-DEMOGRAPHY

The Political Significance of Geo-Demography

Aside from the socio-political structure, an important factor in the political process as well as the political setting of a region is its geographic characteristics and how human beings arrange themselves spatially with respect to each other and their environment. This in turn has an impact on the administrative structure of the polity since an administration must organize itself in order to answer the needs of such spatial arrangements of men. Lines of communications must also be established to carry messages, goods, and people between and among population clusters as well as dispersions. Thus, the economy of the region, as well as its polity, become significant targets of impact since their potency has a direct relationship to the efficiency and availability of channels of communication.

Aside from the impact of geo-demography on the manner and style of life, it can also be used as a fairly useful indicator to show the level of development and modernization of a region. A highly urbanized polity or region must be more industrial and of necessity erect minimum social institutions and political structures in order to answer the complex demands

of an urban environment. Thus, to a certain extent, urbanization has been equated with modernization. On the other hand, a population which is highly rural in character is marked by a low level of differentiation, low level of skill, with agriculture as the basic means of subsistence. Even in the area of agriculture, the traditional method of production is much different from that of the highly urban and industrialized polity. The former uses mainly primitive tools and methods of farming, whereas the latter employs highly efficient and scientific ways which makes the process much more profitable.

In understanding political modernization in terms of geo-demography one must move away from static analysis. An attempt shall be made here to show the pattern of change occurring in the geo-demography and the kinds of implications the existence of such patterns would have for the polity or the region as a whole.

The Land

Southwest Asia is a land of contrasts between rugged mountain ranges and broad plains. In Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan the mountains are the dominating features of the land form; whereas in Syria, Arabia and Iraq the plains compose the overwhelming characteristic.¹ The mountain ranges


¹Two of the best general surveys of the geography of Southwest Asia are: George B. Cressey, Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1960) W. B. Fisher, The Middle East (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1961).

of the region are comparatively young and thus subject to periodic erosion and occasional earthquakes.²

This varied panorama of the high mountain ranges, on the one hand, and the broad plains, on the other, have been a traditional barrier to communication. The geographic setting, in this respect, has thus hampered the development of a more integrated form of life within the region. This, in turn, has imposed upon the political structures and authorities, until fairly recently, a decentralized form of government. In this setting, the provincial and tribal rulers primarily played the role of the tax collectors, so far as the central government was concerned. They could otherwise do whatever they wished. It is only in the twentieth century when the natural geographic barriers begin to lose their significance and this traditional pattern of political authority starts to breakdown before the forces of the central government.

Iran, which is the main focus of this study, is a high plateau with higher mountain ranges separating it from surrounding regions. Geographically, Iran can be divided into four natural regions. First, the Zagros Mountains which, covering west and southern regions, extend in the form of an arc from Armenia to Baluchestan. Second, the Northern Highlands--the narrow but well defined Alburz Mountains which

²See Map 1.



The topographic pattern of Southwest Asia is a result of the geologic structure and the agencies which have carved the underlying rocks. (Compiled by Theodore M. Oberlander.)

MAP 1

link the Caucasus Mountains to the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. Third, the Eastern Uplands of Southern Khorassan and Northern Seistan which compose a more varied, broken region. Finally, the Central Plateau dominated by deserts and salt marshes which amount to about one-half of the total area of the country.³

The Climate

Southwest Asia has a modified Mediterranean type climate on the Mediterranean as well as the Caspian and the Black Sea coastlines. But as one moves east from the Mediterranean, the climate becomes increasingly arid with sharp distinct seasons. Extreme temperatures in winter, including snowfalls, are the rule in every country outside the Arabian Peninsula.

Precipitation is accordingly light everywhere except the regions where Mediterranean climate prevails. In fact, clear skies are the main factor in developing intense heat and cold. It is useful to note the contrast in those regions with areas nearer to the equator, where a summer rainfall and extensive vegetation protect the land from direct exposure to the sun. An average estimate for the whole region shows 50 to 70 per cent relative humidity which is well below that of Western Europe. Coastal regions, however, are very humid. A

³See Fisher, op. cit., pp. 275-287

combination of high humidity and high temperatures make living conditions unbearable during the summer months in the coastal regions of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

Aside from the variances within the region, there are also seasonal variances. For half of the year much of the area is a desert and for the other half it ranges from wet to semi-arid. Due to low absorptive capacity of the soil and the dominance of the mountain slopes, towns and villages which are situated on such slopes are often threatened with floods during early spring months.

Due to its varied geographic settings, the Iranian climate is as varied as that of the whole region. Its main features are: extremely high summer temperatures, and unusually cold winters; great contrasts in rainfall, the extreme north and west receive considerable precipitation, and the remainder of the country little or none; and the existence of high winds which intensify the effects of extreme temperatures.⁴

Water Resources

Except in the coastal regions, Southwest Asia has a strong rhythm of summer drought and winter rain, which in higher altitudes fall as snow. Most of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea areas have at least one inch of precipitation every month throughout the year, whereas each of the mountain

⁴Fisher, Ibid.

ranges receive heavy precipitation (between 80 to 100 inches a year) on their windward sides. Yet, all of the lowlands are dry and large areas average only between 1 to 5 inches a year.

While it is relevant to note the amount of precipitation, what is significant is whether this amount is sufficient to balance evaporation and accumulate enough moisture to support vegetation. Part of the highland areas of Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey receive almost enough precipitation to balance potential evaporation. But in some of the lowlands the evapotranspiration capacity reaches 75 inches which is more than ten times the amount of precipitation.⁵

Due to the low level of precipitation there are only a few rivers that are of major importance in the area and flow year around. In Iran the major rivers are the Zayandeh Rud, the Karun which flows into the Shatt-al-Arab, and the Aras and Atrak on the Irano-Soviet border. In Turkey the major river is the Menderes and in Afghanistan, the Hirmand. Further west are River Jordan in Jordan and largest of them all, the Shatt-al-Arab in Iraq. All of the above rivers flow out of high mountain streams which are fed by the stored-up snows of high

⁵Evapotranspiration is a measure of water in the ground or plants in terms of the energy available for its conversion into atmospheric moisture. See C. W. Thornthwaite, Three Water Balance Maps of Southwest Asia (Centerton, N. J.: Laboratory of Climatology, 1958).

altitudes which melt slow enough to allow year around flow. Due to this origin, all of these rivers are rapid and fast flowing, and with the exception of Shatt-al-Arab, are not navigable. Consequently, the rivers in this region somewhat differ in function from the great rivers of Europe and North America which played a significant role, as waterways and communication routes, in the developmental process.

These geographic patterns have had a great deal of impact on demography. Cities and other population clusters, in order to secure sufficient agricultural lands and water, have been formed at the foot of the mountain ranges or in the river valleys. This pattern has persisted even in recent times since the area remains predominantly agrarian in nature with fairly traditional methods of farming. Thus, technology has not yet begun to reshape the geographic setting. There is much talk about land reclamation and recently in Iran some projects have been proposed whereby sea water from the Persian Gulf is to be pumped into the central lowlands and salt marshes in order to revive vegetation and create precipitation in the surrounding areas.⁶ However, this is still a dream for this thirsty region.

⁶Talash, Vol. 1, No. 8, March 1968, p. 48.

The Demographic Tradition

By any measure the population of the region is predominantly rural. The population centres, in a classic pattern, are situated on coastal regions, river valleys, and mountain slopes which protect them from the desert.

Yet, urbanism is not something new to the region. In fact, the oldest urban areas of the world, such as Eridu, Assur, Nineveh, Khorsabad, Ur and Babylon, which go back to the fourth milenium B.C. were of Southwest Asia.⁷ A question which has interested some is why this region, which pioneered urban living, has not urbanized as rapidly as Europe and North America. The answer seems to lie in the fundamental differences between economic and technological basis of the old and new cities.

Some have sought to answer this question by exploring the cultural routes and the differences which exist in this respect between the West and the Middle East.⁸ Culturally, the major feature of the region is its Islamic heritage. Thus, the culture should have served as an impetus rather than a hinderance to urban development since Islam is basically an

⁷See Gideon Sjoberg, "The Origin and Evolution of Cities," Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3, (September, 1965), pp. 55-62.

⁸Paul English, "Urbanites, Peasants and Nomads: The Middle Eastern Ecological Triology," The Journal of Geography, Vol. LXVI, No. 2 (February, 1967), pp. 54-59.

urban religion which, from the start, pitted itself against tribal tendencies. In fact, the prophet of Islam had to migrate from Mecca, which was predominantly under the influence of the tribes, to Medina, a predominantly commercial city, in order to find supporters (Ansar).

The pivotal point in understanding the demographic pattern is that in recent times there has occurred a major revolution in city life and the qualities which are called 'urban.' The old cities of the region were basically dependent on the agrarian areas surrounding them and could survive so long as they effectively controlled the farmlands whence most of their primary products came. Traditionally, cities were centres of trade for agricultural goods, seats of military power, and little artisanship and manufacturing which kept the soldiers well armed and the commercial and ruling classes well supplied with tradeable and consumer products.

Thus, except for the military, the aristocracy, the small number of artisans, the tradesmen, and those who were house servants to the people of means, few lived in the city. Trade within the region was fairly difficult due to natural desert and mountain barriers which had to be traversed. External trade with China, India and Europe had to face similar difficulties in communication.

It is only in the last few centuries that the development of the steamship and other means of long distance navigation have begun to revolutionize the modes of communications and trade and the concepts of distance. The developments of the compass, and later the steamship, were the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution in the West. The Industrial Revolution created demand for workers who began to swell the urban centres to an extent hitherto unprecedented.⁹ By the middle of the nineteenth century, half of the population of England and Wales lived in cities of 100,000 or more. In 1926 those who lived in such areas composed more than three-quarters of the whole population. Thus, it is the industrial proletariat which begins to comprise the majority of the population in the European urban centres. This basic ingredient has been, and still is, missing in the urban centres of Southwest Asia. In this revolutionary age modern cities really began to become productive rather than consuming centres. With the increasing demand for raw materials from Asia and Africa, communications between these continents and European cities increased. However, as European ships began to arrive in Istanbul, Beirut, Basra and Mohamareh (Khorramshahr), the kind of economic boom that they brought to these ports differed

⁹See Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 41-53.


in degree, as well as in kind, from that going on in Europe. This trade did not create any industrial base for the region since the European traders were mainly interested in raw materials and local concessions. In this sense, the urban centres continued to lag and what boom came to these areas since the Second World War is of a different kind as we shall see briefly.

New Modes of Urbanism

The definition of an 'urban centre' has often been subject to much debate. The Central Bureau of Statistics of Iran has designated localities with 5,000 or more inhabitants as urban.¹⁰ This yardstick has also been used in some other countries. However, insofar as this study is concerned, centres of 100,000 or more will be designated as urban for the region.¹¹ This figure has been chosen because what interests us here is the urban atmosphere and manner of life. It may be possible for the highly mobile and differentiated polities like those of Europe and North America to maintain urban qualities of life--due to rapid transportations, communication, dispersion of cultural centres, schools, etc.,--even in areas of 5,000 population. But this is not the case in most underdeveloped areas. Thus, our yardstick must be

¹⁰See The Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: General Census of Aban 1345 (November, 1966), (Tehran: Central Bureau of Statistics, January, 1967).

¹¹See Map 2.



different. Since mobility within the region is comparatively low and channels of communications not sufficiently developed, we have chosen a much larger figure as the criterion of urbanism. A figure large enough to guarantee a minimum standard of organized urban life.

Using the above criterion of urbanism, in 1966 just over a quarter of the Iranian population was urban.¹² In Iraq the urban population of 1966 was comparatively larger than that of Iran, comprising 31.75 per cent of the total population.¹³ Whereas in Turkey the urban population in 1965 was only 14.89,¹⁴ a figure not only below Iranian and Iraqi level of urbanization of 1965, but even below that of Iran in 1955¹⁵ and Iraq in 1957.¹⁶

¹²See Tables 1 and 4.

¹³See Tables 3 and 6.

¹⁴See Tables 2 and 5.

¹⁵Taking the rate of urban growth in Iran as .965 (see Table 4) the urban population of Iran in 1955 would be 15.55.

¹⁶See Tables 3 and 6.

TABLE 1

POPULATION OF IRANIAN CITIES OF 100,000
AND MORE INHABITANTS (CITY PROPER)

<u>City/Year</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1. Tehran	1 513 164	1	2 712 944	1
2. Tabriz	290 195	2	468 993	3
3. Esfahan	254 876	3	575 001	2
4. Mashhad	242 165	4	417 171	4
5. Abadan	226 103	5	270 726	6
6. Shiraz	169 088	6	317 086	5
7. Kermanshah	125 181	7	213 275	7
8. Ahvaz	119 828	8	206 265	8
9. Rasht	109 493	9	141 756	12
10. Hamedan	100 029	10	161 944	9
11. Shemiran	---		156 154	10
12. Yazd	---		150 531	11
13. Qom	---		133 941	13
14. Kerman	---		133 941	13
15. Rezayieh	---		110 419	15
16. Dezful	---		105 381	16
17. Qazvin	---		103 791	17
18. Rey	---		102 993	18

TOTAL 3 150 122 6 466 715

TOTAL
POPULATION 19 300 000 25 500 000

$\bar{X}=315\ 012$ Md. 197 596 S=404 965 $\bar{X}=359\ 262$ Md.=159 049 s=586 630
Skewness = +0.8698 V = 1.2855 Skewness = +1.0238 V = 1,6328

SOURCES: United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, 1956 (New York: 1957). Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: General Census of Aban 1345 (November, 1966), (Tehran: Central Bureau of Statistics, January, 1967).

TABLE 2

POPULATION OF CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE
INHABITANTS IN TURKEY (CITY PROPER)
1955-1965

<u>City/Year</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>Rank</u>
19. Ankara	453 151	2	902 216	2
20. Istanbul	1 214 616	1	1 750 642	1
21. Izmir	286 310	3	335 510	3
22. Adana	172 465	4	290 515	4
23. Bursa	131 336	5	212 518	5
24. Eskişehir	122 755	6	174 451	6
25. Diyarbakır			102 624	14
26. Gaziantep			158 367	7
27. Kayseri			126 913	9
28. Konya			157 801	8
29. Sivas			109 165	10
30. Erzurum			106 301	12
31. Samsun			106 921	11
32. Malatya			105 207	13
TOTAL	2 380 633		4 639 151	
Total Population	23 860 000		31 150 000	
$\bar{X}=396\ 772$ $s=382\ 934$ $V=0.0009$	Md.=229 387 Skewness=+1.382	$\bar{X}=331\ 368$ $s=442\ 862$ $V=1.3364$	Md.=158 084 Skewness=+1.1738	

*Populations of Ankara and Istanbul include the whole urban agglomeration.

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbooks 1957 and 1966
(New York, 1958 and 1967 respectively).

TABLE 3

POPULATION OF IRAQI CITIES OF 100,000
AND MORE INHABITANTS (CITY PROPER)**

<u>City/Year</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Rank</u>
33. Baghdad	656 399	1	1 745 328*	1
34. Mosul	179 646	2	243 311	3
35. Basra	164 623	3	313 327	2
36. Kirkuk			167 413	4
37. Najaf			128 096	5
TOTAL	1 000 668		2 597 475	
Total Population	6 300 000		8 180 000	
$\bar{X}=333\ 556$ $s=228\ 724$ $V=0.6857$	Md.=179 646 Skewness=+2.0187		$X=519\ 495$ $s=133\ 213$ $V=0.3899$	Md.=243 311 Skewness=+0.6219

*Estimate comprises Karkh, Rasafah, Adhamiya and Kadhemain Qadha centres and Maamoon, Mansour and Karradah-Sharqiya Nahiyas.

**NOTE: United Nations' Demographic Yearbooks of 1966 and 1967 differ markedly in listing urban population of Iraq. 1966 Yearbook lists many more cities with population of 100,000 or more. But since the figures for both years were provisional, the data in the later edition were adopted here.

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbooks 1957 & 1966
(New York: 1958 and 1967 respectively).

TABLE 4

PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN URBAN CENTRES OF IRAN
(CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE)
1956-1966

<u>City</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Urban Population</u>		<u>Absolute Rate of Growth</u>		<u>Per Cent Annual Rate of Growth</u>	<u>Rank in Growth</u>
	<u>1956</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1966</u>		
1. Tehran	48.03	41.95	100	179	7.90	4
2. Tabriz	9.21	7.25	100	161	6.10	7.5
3. Esfahan	8.09	8.89	100	225	12.50	1
4. Mashhad	7.68	6.45	100	172	7.20	5
5. Abadan	7.17	4.18	100	119	1.90	10
6. Shiraz	5.36	4.90	100	187	8.70	2
7. Kermanshah	3.97	3.29	100	170	7.00	6
8. Ahvaz	3.80	3.18	100	184	8.40	3
9. Rasht	3.47	2.19	100	129	2.90	9
10. Hamedan	3.17	2.50	100	161	6.10	7.5
11. Shemiran		2.41				
12. Yazd		2.32				
13. Qom		2.07				
14. Kerman		1.83				
15. Rezayieh		1.70				
16. Dezful		1.62				
17. Qazvin		1.60				
18. Rey		1.59				
TOTAL	99.95	99.92				

Mean Annual Rate of Growth = 6.87 (in cities with 100,000 or more population
in 1956)

Per Cent of Total Population Urban:	1956	16.32
	1966	25.36

Absolute Rate of National Urban Growth	100	205	Annual Rate = 10.50
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Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population =

$$\frac{25.36-16.32}{10} = .904$$

SOURCE: Same as Table 1

TABLE 5

PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN URBAN CENTRES OF TURKEY
(CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE)
1955-1956

<u>City</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Urban Population</u>		<u>Absolute Rate of Growth</u>		<u>Per Cent Annual Rate of Growth</u>	<u>Rank in Growth</u>
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1965</u>		
24. Istanbul	51.02	37.73	100	144	4.40	4
25. Ankara	19.03	19.44	100	199	9.90	1
26. Ismir	12.02	7.23	100	117	1.70	6
27. Adana	7.24	6.26	100	168	6.80	2
28. Bursa	5.51	4.58	100	161	6.10	3
29. Eskisehir	5.15	3.76	100	142	4.20	5
30. Gaziantep		3.41				
31. Konya		3.40				
32. Kayseri		2.73				
33. Sivas		2.35				
34. Samsun		2.30				
35. Erzurum		2.29				
36. Maltaya		2.26				
37. Diyarbakir		2.21				

TOTAL	99.97	99.95
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Mean Annual Rate of Growth of Cities with 100,000 or more population = 6.62

Absolute Rate of National Urban Growth:	1955	100
	1965	194

Per cent of Total Population Urban:	1955	9.97
	1965	14.89

Absolute Annual Rate of Urban Growth = $\frac{194-100}{65-55} = 9.40$

Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population:

$$\frac{14.89-9.97}{65-55} = .492$$

SOURCE: Same as Table 2.

TABLE 6

PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN IRAQI URBAN CENTRES
(CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE)
1957-1965

<u>City</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Urban Population</u>		<u>Absolute Rate of Growth</u>		<u>Per Cent Annual Rate of Growth</u>	<u>Rank in Growth</u>
	<u>1957</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1965</u>		
19. Baghdad	65.59	67.19	100	265	20.62	1
20. Mosul	17.95	9.36	100	135	4.37	3
21. Basra	16.45	12.08	100	190	11.25	2
22. Kirkuk		6.44				
23. Najaf		4.93				
TOTAL	99.99	100.00				

Mean Annual Rate of Growth in Cities with 100,000 or more population = 12.08

Absolute Rate of National Urban Growth: 1957 100
 1965 259
Per Cent of Total Population Urban: 1957 15.88
 1965 31.75

Annual Rate of Absolute Urban Growth: $\frac{259-100}{8} = 10.98$

Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population:

$$\frac{31.75-15.88}{65-57} = 1.98$$

SOURCE: Same as Table 3.

In 1957 Iran was comparatively more urban than Iraq. If we assume that the urban population of Iran during 1956-57 grew at the average annual rate of .904¹⁷ per cent of the total population, in 1957 the urban population of Iran would be 17.22 per cent as compared to the Iraqi urban population for the same year which was 15.88 per cent of the total population. However, from 1957 onward the Iraqi urban population began to grow at the rate of 1.97¹⁸ per cent of the total population per year, or more than twice as fast as Iran, and over four times more rapidly than Turkey whose rate of urban growth for the decade 1955-1965 was only .492.¹⁹

In comparing the overall level of urbanization in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, one finds that in 1965-66 period Iraq is the most urban (31.75) and Turkey (14.89) the least, with Iran (25.36) which is in between--yet much closer to Iraq.

Urban Dispersion and Concentration

One measure of qualitative appraisal of urban growth may be the level of dispersion or concentration of the urban population. The larger the number of the urban centres and the more dispersed they are geographically, the more of an

¹⁷See Table 4.

¹⁸See Table 6.

¹⁹See Table 5.

impact they would make on the polity as a whole. Larger number of urban centres could reach larger sectors of non-urban population and bring to their proximity the advantages of urban life. One quick measure of this would be to divide the per cent of population urban by the number of urban centres:

$$\text{Index of Urban Concentration} = \frac{\text{Per Cent of Population Urban}}{\text{Number of Urban Centres}}$$

Or,

$$U_c = \frac{\%U}{N}$$

Using the above formula, the index of urban concentration for the following countries would be:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Uc</u>
Iran	1956	1.632
	1966	1.408
Iraq	1957	5.296
	1965	6.350
Turkey	1955	1.661
	1965	1.063

From the above indexes, one can see that the level of urban concentration in Iraq is larger than either in Iran or Turkey throughout the decade under study. On the average, it is almost four times as great as Iran and four to six times as large as that of Turkey. While in Iran and Turkey the trend has been towards dispersion, in Iraq concentration has increased. A look at the major cities of the three

countries is instructive.²⁰ In Iran Tehran's population, despite a seventy-nine per cent increase over the decade, has begun to diminish with respect to the total urban population. This is also true of Istanbul. However, Baghdad, which to begin with had two-thirds of the urban population of the country, has increased its share as a percentage of the total urban population of Iraq. Even in absolute terms, the increase of Baghdad's population (165 per cent over eight years) is phenomenal.

However, it must be noted that the index of urban concentration developed above is not an absolute, but rather a relative qualitative measure. Because although it is desirable to have the urban population dispersed enough so that they would have an impact on the population in all areas of the country, the urban centres must be large enough to make the impact possible. As an absolute measure the index shows that the urban population of Iran is less dispersed than that of Turkey. Yet, in Iran there were eighteen such centres as opposed to thirteen in Turkey. Further, the mean of such centres for Iran were larger than the mean for urban centres of Turkey.²¹ Consequently, they could be

²⁰See Tables 1, 2 and 3.

²¹Measures of central tendency used in tables were the mean ($\bar{X}$) and the median (Md.). The formula used for calculating the mean was: $\bar{X} = \frac{\sum X}{N}$. For the median the middle

expected to make stronger impact on the country as a whole. During the period under study, the mean for the population size of Iran and Iraq had risen while that of Turkey had diminished in size due to the appearance of newer and smaller centres in the urban category.

In discussing the pattern of growth of urban centres one should also pay attention to the semi-urban population, or areas with population of 20,000 to 100,000. In Iran there are sixty such towns embracing 10.51 per cent of the total population and with the mean population of over forty-four thousand.²² These are fairly important population centres

case $(N/2)+$ was adopted when N was odd. In the event that N was even the mean between the two median cases served as median. On Table 7, however, the formula for grouped data was used: $Md = 1 + \frac{N/2 - F}{f} i$

Measures of dispersion used in the Tables were:

a) Standard Deviation (s): the formula used for computing s for Tables 1, 2 and 3 was:

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (X_i - \bar{X})^2}{N}}$$

The formula for Table 7, where the computation was done by grouping the data, was

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^K f_i d_i^2}{N} - \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^K f_i d_i}{N} \right)^2}$$

b) Coefficient of Variability (V). Formula: $V = \frac{s}{\bar{X}}$

c) Skewness = $\frac{3(\bar{X} - Md)}{s}$

For a discussion of the above measures see: Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), chapters 5 and 6. W. A. Wallis and H. V. Roberts, Statistics: A New Approach (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), chapters 7 and 8.

²²See Table 7.

TABLE 7

IRANIAN CITIES WITH INHABITANTS BETWEEN 20,000 TO 100,000 (SEMI-URBAN)
1966

<u>City</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Population</u>
1. Arak	72 087	31. Masjed-e-Soleiman	76 096
2. Kashan	81 654	32. Abadeh	37 934
3. Karaj	47 819	33. Jahrom	38 419
4. Bandar Pahlavi	41 745	34. Kazeroon	39 902
5. Zanjan	82 530	35. Laar	37 198
6. Lahijan	42 566	36. Bam	21 871
7. Langrood	20 696	37. Rafsanjan	28 791
8. Amol	44 018	38. Bojnord	31 291
9. Babol	80 387	39. Beerjand	32 405
10. Benshahr	45 300	40. Torbat-e-Heydarieh	35 150
11. Dasht-e-Gorgan	40 777	41. Sabzevaar	42 364
12. Sari	44 457	42. Qoochan	29 090
13. Shahi	51 019	43. Neyshabur	39 900
14. Gorgan	88 016	44. Shahreza	44 502
15. No-Shahr	23 887	45. Golpaygan	36 359
16. Ardabil	83 548	46. Najafabad	59 084
17. Arasbaran	24 045	47. Zahedan	44 502
18. Marand	23 841	48. Sanandaj	54 412
19. Miaheh	28 237	49. Tooyserkan	20 705
20. Maragheh	88 204	50. Malayer	28 402
21. Khoi	47 719	51. Nahavand	23 880
22. Shahpur	21 694	52. Boroojerd	88 893
23. Mehabad	37 646	53. Khoramabad	66 241
24. Miandoab	31 175	54. Bandar-Abas	34 588
25. Qasr-e-Shirin	23 988	55. Boroojen	20 793
26. Bandar-e-Mah-Shahr	26 470	56. Shahr-e-Kurd	71 492
27. Behbahan	65 085	57. Bandar-booshehr	49 652
28. Khoramshahr	95 100	58. Borazjan	20 360
29. Dasht-d- Meeshan	21 270	59. Semnan	44 427
30. Shooshtar	27 032	60. Shahrood	30 551

a) Total Semi-Urban Population	2 681 155	
b) Semi-Urban Population as Per Cent of Total Population		10.51
c) Total Urban Population	6 466 715	
d) Urban Population as Per Cent of Total Population		25.36
e) Total Rural Population (Tot. Pop. - (a+c))	15 652 130	
f) Rural Population as Per Cent of Total Population		61.34
$\bar{X} = 44\ 686$	$Md. = 41\ 261$	$s = 20\ 870$ $Skewness = 0.4923$ $V = 0.4670$

SOURCES: United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).
Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: National Census of Aban
1345/November, 1966, (Tehran: Central Bureau of Statistics,
January, 1967).

since they present the future crop of urban centres if the process of urbanization is to take place in a dispersed fashion. Unfortunately at present there is not enough information available to permit closer examination of the pattern of growth in these areas and a comparison of them with the pattern and nature of growth in the already established urban centres.

The Rural-Urban Migration

Some have maintained that in most underdeveloped countries, there is not much flow of population from rural to urban areas, that the increase in population is mainly due to better health facilities in the cities which reduce infant mortality and mortality in general, as opposed to that in the countryside.²³ However, if we take the average annual rate of population increase as about 2.8 per cent for the period in Iran, the rate of natural increase for cities could not be more than twice this amount or 5.62. Even by this measure, eight of the ten population centres seem to have absorbed population from the outside. And the two cities which have not, Abadan and Tasht, have been suffering mainly due to the diversion of economic resources from them. In Iraq, on the other hand, where the average rate of annual population increase for the period is 3.15 if we make the same assumption

²³Kingsley Davis, op. cit.

(6.3% rate of natural urban population growth), of the three largest centres only Mosul fits the pattern described by Davis.²⁴ Baghdad and Basra, with the average population growths of 20.62 and 11.25 respectively, definitely point to migration from the outside.

Applying the same test to Turkey which had an average annual population growth of 2.63 for the period, however, we find that half of the urban centres fall above and half below the figure of 5.26, or assumed rate of natural population growth in cities. Thus, it may be assumed that the rate of migration to urban areas is strongest in Iraq,²⁵ being followed closely by Iran--with Turkey being slowest in this respect. The speed and the direction of this kind of migration has a great deal to do with the communication network as well as the economic forces at work in each country, something which shall be explored more in depth in subsequent chapters.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Several studies have been done in the area of population movement in Iraq, amongst these are: Doris G. Phillips, "Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. VII (1958-59), pp. 405-421. J. H. G. Lebon, "Population Distribution and the Agricultural Regions of Iraq," Geographical Review, Vol. XLIII (1953), pp. 223-228. Faud Baali, "Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban Migration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. XXV (1966), pp. 359-364.

The Implications of Urban Growth

The degree of urbanization by itself cannot be used as an absolute measure of modernization. It is very much a relative measure, particularly when one compares developed and underdeveloped areas of the world. For instance, a city of 300,000 population in Southwest Asia is not the equivalent of another city with the same population in North America. In the latter the communication lines, the sewage and water systems, the electric and gas lines are much more developed and the sophisticated technology permits a richer life.

However, urban life has certain minimal pre-requisites which must be present before an urban area can function. These have to do with education, health, communication, law enforcement, bureaucracies, the process of resource allocation, etc.. It is by the virtue of the existence of an organized life, cultural centres, industries, newspapers, cinemas, schools, paved roads, and finally the increased interaction among its citizens (which comes with having large numbers of people in close proximities) that cities become centres for change and modernization; and often come into clash with the traditional forces which have their roots in the countryside.

In fact, a close parallel may exist between the level and rate of urbanization, on the one hand, and occurrence

of political violence and instability of traditional or transitional structures, on the other hand. In fact, in Iraq during the 1950-62 period approximately 344 deaths per 100,000 of the population resulted from domestic group violence. The figure for Iran was 36 and for Turkey .9. Iraq, Iran and Turkey ranked 5th, 17th and 47th amongst the 74 countries studied.²⁶ This topic will be explored in more detail in the concluding chapter.

Thus, geographically, we find a sharp contrast in the region between the mountainous areas and the plains. The climate, except in a few coastal areas, is basically arid. The style of life is still predominantly rural--although urban population centres are growing very rapidly in size and number. This increase is not only due to a higher level of births and lower level of mortality in cities but also due to rural-urban migration. On the whole, the level and the rate of growth of urban living is much higher in Iraq and Iran than in Turkey. So far as Iran is concerned, we have also noted the semi-urban population centres, whose impact on the politics of the region is, at present, not very significant. However, if the future pattern of urbanization is to be uniformly distributed

²⁶ See Bruce M. Russett et. al.'s World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 97-100.

geographically--rather than an unhealthy overcrowding of the presently over-populated cities like Baghdad, Istanbul or Tehran--these centres which are at present semi-urban would hopefully provide healthy urban environments, particularly if a degree of planning and control is exercised in their growth.

IV. HUMAN RESOURCES

Population And Politics

The fact that the most valuable resource of a polity is its population, is a truism which bears repetition. In the field of political science, particularly in comparative politics, where often attentions seem to be predominantly focused upon institutions and events, the need for the study of human resources is still more important. Since the human element is the most dynamic aspect of any polity, it often is an integral part in considering political questions. What was the reason for the rapid recovery of Germany and Japan following the Second World War? Why has Israel been able to successfully challenge the Arab armies for the last twenty years while expanding economically and technologically at home? Why do people in the more advanced countries work hard while people in the less developed countries, who ought to in fact be working much harder, are often idle, lazy, or in more compassionate terms, 'happy-go-lucky'? In answering these questions one must invariably consider the magnitude as well as the level of development of human resources in respective societies--that is, if the answer sought is to be comprehensive, rather than being purely based on the kind of

social Darwinism of Summner¹ or geographic determinism of Montesquieu.²

To modernize rapidly, the population must be large enough to allow expansion and growth. Industrialization, rapid and efficient modes of transport, and comprehensive newspapers require a large enough population to serve in order to enjoy the advantages of economies of large scale.³ Without the large consumer market of the United States, General Motors, United States Steel, or Boeing Aircraft would not exist. Nor would it have been possible for the New York Times or the variety of national broadcasting companies to come into existence. A large population would also have more diverse needs to be fulfilled. Therefore, in answer to these needs, the variety of professions and specializations develop which further help to raise the level of differentiation of the population.⁴ This, in turn, causes development of more associations and organizations to promote the interests (economic, scientific, cultural, etc.) of the groups involved.

¹ See W. G. Summner Social Statics.

² See Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws.

³ For notes on economies of scale see Delbert A. Snider's Introduction to International Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 424-447, 35-36.

⁴ See S. N. Eisenstadt's Modernization: Protest and Change (Prentice-Hall, N. J., 1960).

It is for these reasons that the prospects for development of small isolationist polities in our day seems so grim. Considering the advantages of belonging to larger communities, some countries have begun to think in terms of regional development. The foremost, and perhaps the most successful, example of this is the European Economic Community. So far as the less developed areas of the world are concerned, despite the fact that such areas are undergoing a period of intense nationalism, the need for regional cooperation among the smaller countries is growing.

However, the large size of a population is not always a blessing since what is also important is whether the human resources present are sufficiently developed physically and intellectually, and possess the necessary skills to bring about modernization. A large population with a low level of skills and literacy, with ill health and malnutrition, is often a detriment in the process of modernization, as countries with large underdeveloped human resources such as India, China, and Indonesia are well aware.

What is considered by some to be ideal for rapid modernization (or recovery, as in the cases of Japan and Germany following the Second World War) is a highly skilled and literate population with fairly large markets to serve. However, to talk about the necessity of developed human resources is in a sense begging the question, since it does not show the possible

direction for development, but rather merely reports that the level of the development of the human resources are higher in the more advanced countries. Yet, this is precisely the route many Western political and social scientists take in analyzing the dynamics of development.

Population Growth

Despite the advantages of large economies, obviously it is much easier for smaller countries to develop rapidly since they are not faced with the enormous problems of having to deal with over-population. Southwest Asia as a whole is sparsely populated. Among the three countries under study, Iran has the least population density and Turkey the most with Iraq in between.⁵

A look at the pace of population growth shows that during the period 1947 to 1966 the population of Iraq has grown, faster than either Iran or Turkey, at the mean rate of 3.03 per cent per year.⁶ While Iran's and Turkey's populations have been expanding at fairly comparable rates of 2.66 and 2.62 respectively.⁷ The changes in population over the nineteen year period in all three countries shows that the mean rate of

⁵The density of the population within the respective countries in 1966, in persons per square kilometers, were: Iran=15, Iraq=19 and Turkey=41. See United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

⁶See Tables 8, 9 and 10.

⁷Ibid.

growth has steadily increased.⁸ This increase in the growth rate is due to a variety of causes, the most important of which are the improvement in public health systems and more easily available medical facilities. For example, the introduction of effective drugs, such as D.D.T., have virtually eliminated malaria and certain other diseases from the area. Further, aside from an increase in the total as well as the relative number of doctors, hospitals and the variety of drugs available, with an increase in the percentage of the population which now resides in the urban areas, more people can enjoy the advantages of better health facilities.

Of course, another aspect of the increase is purely statistical. With more efficient census methods, more experienced personnel, and increased mobility of the census takers, more births are recorded which might have otherwise gone unrecorded. Even in the national census of Iran in 1956 a large number of the population which was migratory (in the Southwest region) or lived in inaccessible mountain villages were missed. With improved facilities, the 1966 census was able to reach, hopefully, much of this population and account for them.⁹

⁸Ibid.

⁹See The Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: General Census of Aban, 1345/November, 1966 (Tehran: Central Bureau of Statistics, January 1967), Introduction.

TABLE 8

ESTIMATES OF MIDYEAR POPULATION
(in thousands)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1947	15 486	4 770	19 625	77 490
1948	15 802	4 900	20 056	79 500
1949	16 131	5 040	20 497	79 500
1950	16 276	5 180	20 800	82 900
1951	16 667	5 320	21 634	84 200
1952	17 067	5 470	22 219	85 500
1953	17 476	5 620	22 818	86 700
1954	17 896	5 780	23 433	88 000
1955	18 325	5 940	23 860	89 000
1956	19 325	6 110	24 771	89 950
1957	19 900	6 300	25 498	90 730
1958	20 400	6 510	26 247	91 540
1959	21 000	6 720	27 017	92 430
1960	21 500	6 945	27 510	93 210
1961	22 100	7 175	28 450	94 050
1962	22 700	7 410	29 160	94 930
1963	23 300	7 660	29 890	95 899
1964	23 900	7 910	30 635	96 906
1965	24 800	8 180	31 150	97 960
1966	25 500	8 338	32 120	98 865

SOURCE: United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, 1966
(New York: United Nations, 1967).

TABLE 9

THE RATE OF ABSOLUTE POPULATION GROWTH
(1958=100)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1947	75	73	74	84
1948	77	75	76	86
1949	79	77	78	88
1950	79	79	79	90
1951	81	81	82	91
1952	83	84	84	93
1953	85	86	86	94
1954	87	88	89	96
1955	89	91	90	97
1956	94	83	94	98
1957	97	96	97	99
1958	100	100	100	100
1959	102	103	102	101
1960	105	106	104	102
1961	108	110	108	102
1962	111	113	111	103
1963	114	117	113	104
1964	117	121	116	105
1965	121	125	118	107
1966	125	128	122	108

SOURCE: Based on Table 8

TABLE 10

THE ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE
(per cent of previous year's population)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1947 - 1948	2.04	2.72	2.19	2.59
1948 - 1949	2.08	2.85	2.19	2.26
1949 - 1950	.89	2.77	1.47	1.96
1950 - 1951	2.40	2.70	4.00	1.56
1951 - 1952	2.39	2.81	2.70	1.54
1952 - 1953	2.39	3.69	2.69	1.40
1953 - 1954	2.40	2.84	2.69	1.49
1954 - 1955	2.39	2.76	1.82	1.13
1955 - 1956	5.45	2.86	3.81	1.06
1956 - 1957	2.97	3.10	2.93	.86
1957 - 1958	2.51	3.33	2.93	.89
1958 - 1959	2.94	3.22	2.93	.97
1959 - 1960	2.38	3.34	1.82	.84
1960 - 1961	2.79	3.31	3.41	.90
1961 - 1962	2.71	3.27	2.49	.93
1962 - 1963	2.64	3.37	2.50	1.02
1963 - 1964	2.57	3.26	2.49	1.05
1964 - 1965	3.76	3.41	1.68	1.08
1965 - 1966	2.82	1.93	3.11	.91
$\bar{X} =$	2.66	3.03	2.62	1.29

SOURCE: Based on Table 8

In the same vein, more deaths are also recorded than before. The reason why mortality rates have remained fairly constant¹⁰ despite a sharp decrease in the actual number of deaths (particularly those due to infant mortality, epidemics, and malaria) seems to be that such actual decreases in mortality rates were offset by better statistical facilities which account for those which did occur. In fact, a comparison of the figures for the rates of general mortality in Iran and Iraq ($\bar{X}=7.96$ and $\bar{X}=4.3$ respectively), on the one hand, and the mean rate of mortality for the United States during the same period ($\bar{X}=9.46$)¹¹ would confirm the belief that the only reason in disparity between facts and figures is statistical. Especially since the health facilities in the United States are better and life expectancy longer, and one would expect for mortality rates to be also lower in comparison with the countries of Southwest Asia. The statistical data concerning mortality in Turkey ($\bar{X}=12.62$) which have been gathered in province capitals, where proper records are easier to maintain, as opposed to the rural areas, seem to represent a more realistic picture of things as they are (see Table 11).

In comparison with the countries of the region, Japan has a much slower rate of population growth during the period

¹⁰See Table 11

¹¹Ibid.

TABLE 11

GENERAL MORTALITY
(Number of Deaths per 1,000 Population)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Turkey*</u>	<u>United States</u>
1951	8.7	3.5	10.0		9.7
1952	7.4	3.2	8.9		9.6
1953	7.0	5.2	8.9		9.6
1954	8.4	5.0	8.2		9.2
1955	8.7	4.7	7.8	13.2	9.3
1956	7.5	4.0	8.1		9.3
1957	8.3	4.0	8.3		9.6
1958	8.6	4.1	7.5	12.9	9.5
1959	8.1	4.2	7.5	13.5	9.4
1960		4.3	7.6	10.9	9.5
1961	7.6	4.0	7.4		9.3
1962	7.0	3.9	7.5		9.5
1963	8.2	3.5	7.0		9.6
1964		4.2	6.9		9.4
1965		4.1	7.1		9.4
1966			6.8		9.5

Iran:	N = 12	$\bar{X} = 7.96$	Iraq:	N = 15	$\bar{X} = 4.13$
Japan:	N = 16	$\bar{X} = 7.84$	Turkey:	N = 4	$\bar{X} = 12.62$
United States:	N = 16	$\bar{X} = 9.46$			

*Provincial Cities which are province or district capitals.

SOURCE: United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, 1966
(New York: United Nations, 1967).

($\bar{X}=1.29$). Between 1947 to 1956 the annual rate of population growth fell sharply from 2.59 to .86 per cent.¹² From 1956 to 1966 the mean rate of growth has been less than 1.00 per cent per year. The increased economic affluence of the population coupled with the serious minded measures taken by the government in educating the public about the necessity of birth control and in birth control measures seem to account for this phenomenon. During the same period, the general mortality rates have also fallen from 10.0 to 6.8 per one thousand population in a year.¹³

However, it is not possible to foresee similar measures of population control in Iran, Turkey or Iraq since the necessary socio-economic pre-requisites present in Japan, as well as over-population, are not present. In the next decade, health facilities will probably continue to improve. Births are not likely to decline. Thus, the implication is that the growth rate in population is bound to increase at faster rates. For example, the annual rate of growth for Iran during the next decade may even become as high as about 3.0 to 3.5 per cent.¹⁴

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴See Nasser Maroufi-Bozorgi's "Population Projection for Iran, 1956-1976," Asian Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (February, 1964) pp. 257-264.

Economic Activity

While laissez-faire economists emphasize the importance of the level of consumption of the population, those who are oriented towards central planning pay more attention to the productive economic activity, which coupled with less consumption would make possible larger savings and consequently more investment in capital goods. However, since very few laissez-faire economists have survived the trials of modern economics and tendency toward central planning, the degree and the level of productive economic activity have become important indices of modernization

The more developed societies, like the United States and Japan seem to have a larger proportion of the population of the working age (59.7 and 64.2 per cent respectively).¹⁵ This is predominantly due to low rates of natality and mortality which accompanies modernization. In contrast, in the less developed societies a sharp decrease in rates of infant mortality, along with comparatively short life expectancy, have placed a large proportion of the population under the age of 15.¹⁶

Aside from the percentage of the population in the working age, what is also important is what proportion of

¹⁵ See Table 12.

¹⁶ Ibid.

TABLE 12

POPULATION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
(per cent)

<u>Country</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
	<u>Population of Working</u> <u>Age*</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>Economically Active</u>
Iran	53.8	32.0(1956)
Egypt	58.6	30.1(1960)
Syria	58.0	26.3(1960)
Lebanon	57.1	-----
Turkey	57.1	46.8(1960)
Saudi Arabia	56.0	-----
Yemen	56.0	-----
Iraq	49.9	28.3(1957)
Jordan	49.3	22.9
Japan	64.2	47.1
United States	59.7	39.0

*Working Age: 15-65

SOURCES: United Nations' Demographic Yearbooks, 1961 and 1962 (New York, 1962 and 1963 respectively).

ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1966
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1967).

that population is economically active. Again, the more modern societies generally tend to have a larger proportion of their population economically active.¹⁷ Of course, just because a country has a large number of its population economically active does not mean that it is modern. Turkey, for example, has almost the same percentage of its population economically active as Japan.¹⁸ Yet, Japan is a much more developed society. Thus, what is also important is the nature of economic activity in which the population is involved. An agrarian economy may have to use all its human resources in order to feed itself. Whereas the highly industrial societies only use a relatively small portion of their labour force in agriculture. Further, even the need in the industrial sector for labour decreases due to constant advancements in technology and automation. However, in the underdeveloped societies which are still distant from automation what can be said with certainty is that to have all the population of working age involved in economically productive activity (regardless of the degree of technological sophistication) is better than having large parts of the population remaining inactive. The Chinese effort in mobilizing all the available human resources, in the so-called Great Leap Forward, is considered by many Western authorities to have been a failure. However, what can

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

be said with certainty is that the essential idea behind it in trying to make every man economically useful is basically sound.

Thus, due to the kinds of reservations and qualifications which must be used in studying the economic activity of a population, simple, overall comparisons are not possible. The picture becomes clearer and comparisons possible only when other aspects of the polity have been studied.

So far as the structure of economically active population in Iran is concerned,¹⁹ the main reason for the low level of economic activity is the disparity in the figures for men and women. While the mean for economically active males is 56.9 per cent, for women it is only 6.20. Thus, the main reason why the figures for economically active population are larger in Turkey than in Iran (46.80 to 32.0 respectively) is that women participate more fully in Turkish economic activity (54.3 males to 39.0 females).²⁰

Nutrition and Health

Statistics about the per capita consumption of food can be as deceiving, in trying to understand the implication of such for the social and political processes, as those concerning per capita income. While it is important that a country

¹⁹See Table 13.

²⁰See ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1966 (Geneva, 1967).

TABLE 13

PER CENT OF TOTAL AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP IN IRAN
(1956)

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Per cent by Age & Sex</u>			<u>Economically Active</u>		
	<u>Tot. Pop.</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
-15	42	21	21	7.10	1.80	4.50
15-19	7.49	3.74	3.75	80.70	12.10	46.40
20-24	7.89	3.69	4.20	94.20	9.30	48.90
25-34	15.32	7.60	7.72	98.30	8.60	53.10
35-44	10.27	5.57	4.70	98.90	9.70	58.10
45-54	7.63	3.92	3.71	97.80	10.10	55.10
55-64	5.20	2.76	2.44	93.70	8.70	53.80
65+	3.96	2.07	1.89	74.10	5.80	41.40
TOTAL	99.76	50.88	49.12			
$\bar{X}$ for economically active males in all ages					56.90	
$\bar{X}$ for economically active females in all ages					6.20	
$\bar{X}$ for economically active population as a whole					32.00	

SOURCE: Based on the ILO Book of Labour Statistics, 1966
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1967)

secure enough food to feed its own population, it is not at all certain if the available food supply is evenly distributed. It is with this reservation in mind that one can proceed to compare the consumption patterns of various polities.

The three countries under study, with the exception of a few food items, are basically self-sufficient in food supply and produce what they consume. This is by and large true of Iran and Turkey.²¹ Iraq has to import half of her needs in rice and almost all of her needs in sugar.²² On the whole, Turkey which has the largest cross-section of her population in rural areas, and basically agricultural activity, has the largest calorie consumption of the three (3110 per day).²³ Iraq is well behind with 2140 calories per day. The figure for Iran is lowest of the three (2050).²⁴

Protein consumption of the three countries follow the same pattern of magnitude. However, what can be seen clearly from available figures is that the reason for the relatively high level of calorie consumption in Turkey is the readily available supply of cereals and potatoes, or starches which generally form the staple base for sustenance in that region.

²¹ See Table 14.

²² Ibid.

²³ See Table 15.

²⁴ Ibid.

TABLE 14

CONSUMPTION
Available Food Supply

<u>Commodity/Country</u>		<u>Iran</u> 1961	<u>Iraq</u> 60-62	<u>Turkey</u> 60-61	<u>Japan</u> 60-62
Rice	A	467	119	113	11846
	B%	99	50	97	82
Other Cereals	A	856	828	5512	4771
	B%	100	116	98	50
Wheat and Rye	A	3426	889	1019	4142
	B%	85	95	94	40
Potatoes, etc.	A	92	39	1400	10382
	B%	106	27	100	96
Sugar (refined)	A	388	190	471	1516
	B%	23	1	138	11
Pulses and Nuts	A	127	42	538	2068
	B%	100	92	105	39
Meat	A	326	131	393	725
	B%	99	102	100	95
Fats and Oils	A	181	25	273	713

A: Total Supply in Thousands of Metric Tons.

B: Domestic Production as a per cent of Total Supply.

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1965).

TABLE 15

CONSUMPTION
(Net Food Supplies Per Capita)

<u>Food Supplies/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u> 1960	<u>Iraq</u> 60-62	<u>Turkey</u> 60-61	<u>Japan</u> 60-62
Kilogrammes per Year				
Cereals (as flour)	144	130	223	149
Potatoes, etc.	4	5	38	69
Sugar (refined)	19	30	17	16
Pulses and Nuts	4	6	13	16
Meat	16	20	14	8
Milk:				
Fat	2	4	4	1
Protein	2	3	4	1
Fats and Oil	7	4	8	5
Calories per Day				
Total	2050	2140	3110	2230
Per Cent Animal Origin	12	14	10	9
Protein (grammes)	60	62	98	69

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

There are also certain figures available with regard to the area of health and medicine.²⁵ In this respect, figures speak for themselves and as it can be seen there is not really much difference among the three countries. The enormous contrast is readily seen when such figures are compared with those of Japan. The per capita number of physicians in Japan, for example, are about 2 to 5 times as large as those in the region.

At the same time, so far as the countries of the region are concerned, it must be noted that professionals in the medical sciences and health facilities are mainly concentrated in urban areas where still a minority of the population lives. For instance, in 1964 there were 17,256 hospital beds in Iran of which 16,389 were in urban regions,²⁶ where about six million people lived, whereas in the rural areas where close to sixteen million lived, there were only 867 hospital beds. Thus, to talk about one bed per 1,267 persons nationally does not explain the reality of the dualistic pattern of distribution of resources (in this case, hospital beds). In fact, in urban regions there were 384 persons per bed, whereas in the rural areas 17,962--or over forty-four times as much.²⁷

²⁵See Table 16.

²⁶About one half of the hospital beds listed as being in urban areas were in Tehran.

²⁷See Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965).

TABLE 16

PROFESSIONALS IN MEDICAL SCIENCES

<u>Profession/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u> (1964)	<u>Iraq</u> (1964)	<u>Turkey</u> (1964)	<u>Japan</u> (1963)
Physicians per 100,000 population	7 090 24	1 470 20	9 664 31	103 799 108
Dentists per 100,000 population	1 291 5	247 3	1 742 5	33 481 34
Pharmacists per 100,000 population	2 282 9	653 8	1 744 5	64 915 67
Midwives per 100,000 population	590 2	700 8	4 181 13	46 174 48
Inhabitants per physician	3 220	5 380	3 220	920

SOURCE: Based on United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1964
(New York: United Nations, 1965) Table 198.

The Health Corps which was formed in 1964 has been an attempt to extend the benefits of better health facilities into the rural areas of Iran. In 1964 there were over 400 doctors serving in the Corps, instead of Military Service. However, what is needed are more permanent solutions to the closing of the gap between urban and rural life: a decentralization of decision-making, as well as a more even distribution of economic resources in the rural areas which could make it possible for them to sustain such health facilities on a permanent basis. At present the opportunities, economic as well as cultural and scientific, that rural areas can offer a physician, who is a product of an urban environment, are not worth while to draw him into the countryside.

Modern Skills

The most valuable human resources of a country are those with modern skills--such skills as are necessary for the operation of a modern society. Members of this group are the bureaucrats, the scientists, the managers, the technicians, the engineers, the accountants, the physicians, the operators and builders of transportation systems, the social scientists, the artists, the writers, the entertainers, the entrepreneurs, the workers in crafts and industries, and finally those who are involved in the services.

The larger the number of people with these skills, the faster the process of modernization will be. What is also

important for a polity is to plan the training of such persons and their proper use to the best advantage of society. The latter is as important as the former. For example, to assign a physician or an engineer to an administrative position, which is, by the way, a common practice in the countries under study, is an improper allocation of resources.

Due to the pioneering stages of statistical data within the region, comparative data in this respect are not available. The National Manpower Resources and Requirements Survey carried out in Iran in 1958²⁸ resulted in some valuable data which unfortunately cannot be compared with anything else due to the lack of prior or subsequent data. On the whole, the survey reflects a low level of skill amongst females (5 per cent of the force); an overwhelming preponderance of those in crafts and production processes (55.5 per cent); a fairly high number of entrepreneurs (18.3 per cent) and those in services (10.1 per cent)--with the managerial-administrative; professional-technical; transport operations; and finally mining, in order of diminishing magnitude.

The more important amongst the above categories in the process of modernization are the professional and technical²⁹ elements, on the one hand, and the skilled workers, on the

²⁸See Table 17.

²⁹See Table 18.

TABLE 17

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE IN NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
(Iran, 1958)

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
1	<u>Professional, technical and related</u>	85 700	6.3	
10-11	Physical sciences and related	9 870		11.5
12	Biological and agricultural sciences and related	1 950		2.3
13	Medical and health sciences and related	21 730		25.3
14-15	Social sciences and related	47 630		55.6
16-17	Artistic, writing, entertaining, and related	4 540		5.3
				100.0
2	<u>Managerial, administrative, clerical and related</u>	115 820	8.4	
20	Managerial and administrative, staff	3 560		3.1
21-24	Managerial and administrative, line	15 610		13.5
25	Clerical and related	96 650		83.4
	High-level management (incl. above)	(1 610)		(1.4)
				100.0
3	<u>Sales and related</u>	250 050	18.3	
30	Retail selling	230 450		94.0
31	Wholesale selling and related	19 600		6.0
				100.0

TABLE 17--Continued

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
5	<u>Mining, quarrying and well drilling</u>	16 870	1.2	
50	Mining and quarrying	9 450		56.0
52	Well drilling, petroleum and gas	50		0.3
59	Laborers	7 370		43.7
				100.0
6	<u>Operating transport</u>	44 940	3.3	
60	Ships and boats	2 940		6.6
61	Aircraft	60		0.1
62	Railways	2 400		5.3
63	Road vehicles	39 540		88.0
				100.0
7-8	<u>Crafts, production processes, and related</u>	718 110	52.4	
70	Textile making	71 120		9.9
71	Textile finishing (except printing)	3 340		0.5
72	Garment and related textile and leather products making	100 890		14.0
73	Basketry, broom and brushmaking	4 180		0.6
74	Woodworking and related	30 180		4.2
75	Metal making and treating	19 740		2.7
76	Metal machining, fitting, assembling	48 330		6.8
77	Metal working miscellaneous	31 990		4.5
78	Electrical and electronics	15 190		2.1
79-80	Construction and related	135 730		18.9
81	Stationary engine, lifting equipment, machinery operation	13 500		1.9
82	Printing, bookbinding, and paper product making	9 500		1.3

TABLE 17--Continued

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
83	Ceramic and related	64 930		9.0
84	Chemicals and related processes	3 610		0.5
85	Felt and hide treating	5 080		0.7
87	Miscellaneous crafts	9 880		1.4
89	Laborers in crafts, production, and related	75 330		10.5 100.0
9	<u>Services</u>	138 850	10.1	
90	Protective service	13 940		10.0
91	Domestic (institutional), personal and related	122 950		89.0
99	Laborers	1 960		1.0 100.0
	Total covered:	1 370 600	100.0	100.0
	Female	68 320	5.0	
	Foremen	8 820	0.6	
	Leadmen	14 400	1.1	
	Skilled	342 180	25.0	
	Semi-skilled	116 530	8.5	
	Unskilled	238 470	17.4	

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SOURCE: Table 1, National Manpower Resources & Requirements Survey, pp. 1-2.
 Figures rounded to nearest 10 or 100 (as quoted in George Baldwin's
Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press,
 1967)).

TABLE 18

DETAILED OCCUPATIONS WITHIN THE "PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL
AND RELATED" CATEGORY

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
10-11	<u>Physical sciences and related</u>	9 870	11.5	
100	Architects	113		1.1
101	Engineers, civil	2 536		25.7
102	Engineers, electrical	1 414		14.3
103	Engineers, mechanical	1 914		19.4
104	Engineers, metallurgical	2		--
105	Engineers, mining	133		1.3
106	Engineers, chemical	547		5.3
107	Engineers, miscellaneous	964		9.8
108	Chemists	610		6.2
109	Physicists	17		0.2
110	Geophysicists	100		1.1
111	Geologists	98		1.0
112	Geographers	5		0.1
113	Physical scientists, miscellaneous	7		0.1
114	Draughtsmen and cartographers	997		10.1
115	Surveyors	402		100.0
12	<u>Biological and agricultural sciences and related</u>	1 953	2.3	
120	Biologists	166		8.5
121	Agronomists	1 252		64.3
122	Horticultural scientists	36		1.8
123	Foresters	405		20.6
124	Soil scientists	27		1.4
125	Animal scientists	67		3.4
				100.0

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TABLE 18--Continued

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
13	<u>Medical and health sciences and related</u>	21 730	25.3	
130	Physicians and surgeons	4 358		20.0
131	Medical-allied scientists	267		1.2
132	Dentists	842		3.9
133	Pharmaceutical specialists	3 904		18.0
134	Veterinarians	424		2.0
135	Nurses, professional	610		2.8
136	Midwives and nonprofessional nurses	6 334		29.1
137	Therapy technicians	16		0.1
138	Medical and health technicians	4 975		22.9
				100.0
14-15	<u>Social sciences and related</u>	47 631	55.5	
140	Economists	47		0.1
141	Accountants	814		1.7
142	Statisticians and technicians	135	(sic.)	9.3
143	Political scientists	243		0.5
144	Historians and related	12		-
145	Anthropologists	17		-
146	Sociologists	26		-
147	Psychologists	25		-
148	Personnel specialists	120		0.3
149	Language scientists	17		-
150	Teachers, nontechnical subjects	40 862		-
151	Librarians and archivists	301		0.6
152	Social welfare workers	3		-
154	Jurists, lawyers	4 213		8.9
155	Social science, miscellaneous	796		1.7
				100.0

TABLE 18--Continued

ILO code	Title	Number	Per cent of total	Per cent of own group
16-17	<u>Artistic, writing, entertaining and related</u>	4 539	5.3	
160	Painters, drawers, and engravers	465		10.0
161	Decor designers	42		0.9
162	Sculptors and modellers	134		3.0
164	Photographers	2 380		52.6
165	Authors, journalists	396		8.7
170	Theatrical directors	49		1.1
171	Actors, entertainers	186		4.1
172	Musicians	586		13.0
173	Dancers	90		1.0
174	Professional athletes	161		3.5
179	Artistic, writing, miscellaneous	50		1.1
	Total	87 723	100.0	100.0

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SOURCE: Same as Table 16.

other hand. This is particularly true since these are the builders of modern societies.

Education

The development of modern skills within a population is impossible without the proper educational institutions. Of course, all education need not be, and is not always, institutional. But in underdeveloped societies, due to the lack of technological and scientific milieu as well as the limited impact of the communication media, institutions become all the more important. A young American may learn about the mechanical intricacies of automobiles by watching his father repair his car in their garage. But a young Turk must learn about automobiles by going to a vocational school since the probabilities are that his father does not own one.

Aside from the importance of the above mentioned technological milieu and the informal processes of education in the more advanced countries, the percentage of the population which go to school is also much higher in the high industrial societies than those in the underdeveloped countries. With rapid modernization, it not only becomes possible for the more developed societies to realize universal education; but the process of education itself becomes perpetual, in the sense that people who have graduated from schools keep going back to school in order to keep pace with rapid changes of the time.

Within the region, Iraq has the largest percentage of its total population (15.3) in school, as opposed to Turkey (with 14.53)³⁰ and Iran (10.76).³¹ These figures compare with 23.96 per cent of Japanese in schools.³² In all of the countries within the region, the largest bulk of the students are in the primary schools with the second largest number in secondary schools. Technical education in Turkey is by far ahead of Iraq and Iran. In this respect, Turkey is building a much firmer base for future industrialization. Another key area is teacher training. In this area also the same pattern prevails; with Turkey far ahead, and Iran far behind Iraq. Since teacher training is of vital importance to the future supply of teachers for primary and secondary education, the impact of such disparities ought to be readily observable in all sectors of education in the very near future.

In the area of higher education, also, in proportion to the size of the respective countries, the same pattern prevails-- with Turkey far ahead and Iran far behind Iraq. However, a comparison would show that Iran, Turkey, and Iraq have all paid more attention to higher education than Japan.³³ The

³⁰See Table 19.

³¹See Table 20.

³²See Table 19.

³³Ibid.

TABLE 19

A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF NUMBER OF STUDENTS
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(1964)

<u>Institution/Country</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Pre-primary	14 665	3 018	1 060 968
Primary	957 841	3 735 512	10 030 990
Secondary	221 834	478 595	9 209 494
Technical	7 179	99 281	1 891 373
Teacher training	10 300	42 276	985 077
Higher	(1963)19 811	91 198	42 747
Total	1 211 819	4 449 880	23 220 649
Per cent of total population	15.32	14.53	23.96

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967).

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
OF IRAN

<u>Institutions/Year</u>	<u>1953-54</u>	<u>1956-57</u>	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1965-66</u>
Pre-primary	5 344	9 300	17 058	14 000
Primary	746 473	910 336	1 327 376	2 130 000
Secondary				
General	121 772	163 570	253 000	480 000
Vocational	887	3 795	7 000	14 500
Teacher Training	1 751	2 879	4 476	4 500
Agricultural	--	--	2 000	--
Higher	9 430	11 830	18 085	26 000
Total	885 657	1 101 710	1 628 995	2 669 000
% of total population	5.07	5.7	7.76	10.76
Absolute rate of growth during 1953-66:				Pre-primary 162%
				Primary 185
				Secondary:
				General 294
				Vocational 1 535
				Teacher Tr. 157
				Higher 176
				Over-all 201

$\bar{X}$ of the annual rate of student growth as a function of total population during 1953-1966 period = 0.4741 per cent

SOURCES: Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965) United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967). World Survey of Education, III & IV (New York: UNESCO, 1961 & 1966 respectively).

NOTE: The information in the above table was accumulated from a variety of sources. In order to keep the data uniform and thus comparative, wherever there were conflicts in the statistics reported, the data supplied by the United Nations was adopted.

overwhelming emphasis of the Japanese education seems to be in the area of technical education which serves her enormous industrial complex. In this sense, the Japanese educational system closely resembles that of West Germany which is also geared to producing technicians and specialists.

A look at the development of educational institutions in Iran over the period 1954-1966 shows that the over-all growth has been about 201 per cent.³⁴ Rate of growth of vocational schools although tremendous is not very impressive, especially if we compare the number of actual students to those of other countries. The rates of growth have been highest in secondary and primary schools. But, on the whole, the numbers of students enrolled in Iranian educational institutions are not very impressive, even when compared regionally. The educational system is particularly vulnerable since it is lacking in teacher training and higher education which are its main sources of feedback.

In evaluating the figures of students in higher education, it must also be noted that there are about 20,000 Iranian students abroad,³⁵ of which approximately 14,000 study in Europe and the remainder in America. However, one cannot always count on the return of these students upon the completion

³⁴See Table 20.

³⁵See Iran Almanac, op. cit.

of their education. Therefore, their inclusion in the total balance of Iranian manpower resources is somewhat open to question. The reasons for the lack of inclination on the part of Iranian students to return are involved and will hopefully become clearer in the course of this study. However, the major reasons may be said to be the lack of civil liberties in Iran, corrupt bureaucratic structures with which they would invariably have to deal, and finally inadequate jobs and financial rewards.

Hence, the development of the human resources of any polity is critical to the process of its modernization. As we have seen, the population of the three polities under study is comparatively small and consequently they must form or join a larger regional community before they can benefit from the advantages of the economies of large scale. The rate of the population growth in the region is increasing rapidly and, although the population density is still sparse, some measure of population control would in the long-run benefit the development programs. Due to the low level of skill and industrialization, as well as the poor nutrition of the working classes, within the region, productive economic activity generally remains at a fairly low level of efficiency. In the area of general, technical and higher education, Iraq seems to be ahead of Turkey and Iran.

V. THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES

The Stages of Integration

In the context of political modernization, the problem of integration deals with the extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interacting relationships.¹ In a traditional system interaction also takes place but at a comparatively slow pace due to the limitation of the communication facilities. In a traditional political system lines of communication are also very much dependent on patterns of trade and distance. The closer the distance between two population centres, or the more need two population centres have for each others' goods the more they will interact. (See Figure 1a).

As the political system moves into a transitional stage where the centre assumes certain technological superiority in the means of communication, the system becomes very much centre oriented since all the lines of communication lead to, and disperse from, the centre. This pattern of communication is often one way in the form of messages from the centre to the periphery.


¹For notes on political integration see: Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Technology Press, and New York, Wiley, 1953); Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Also, Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964).

(See Figure Ib). For example, the radio station broadcasts from the capital, major newspapers are published in the major city which often is also the seat of the bureaucracy, etc.. Although the transitional system is not totally without feedback--in the sense that the centre has to respond to the demands made upon it--the nature of these feedbacks are too small to make any substantial difference to the operation of the centre. The centre continues to reshape the periphery after its own modernistic designs. In this sense, the fight for the control of the system by rival groups is often decided in the capital. To whichever side the centre falls the rest of the polity is bound to follow.

As the polity moves into a more modern phase which would require increasing communication and mobility on the part of the periphery and its population, the lines of interaction become increasingly numerous, not only between the centre and the periphery, but also between and amongst all sectors. (See Figure Ic).


In a transitional system, such as that of Iran, the centre proceeds to lead the integration process, for example, by producing a unity of language not only through broadcasting in Persian, but also making it the language of instruction at the educational institutions. In a modernist environment such as that of the United States, on the other hand, these measures are no longer necessary in the sense that the unity of language

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM




A

THE TRANSITIONAL PATTERNS



B

THE MODERN SYSTEM



C

THE INTEGRATIVE PATTERNS

FIGURE 1

has been achieved. Further, the process of political integration has assumed such a proportion that every point in the system could be a potential centre due to the enormous facility in communication and transportation. Furthermore, in the United States every year large numbers of the population move from one part of the country to another. In this sense, the difference which once existed between a Californian and a New Yorker, for instance, is disappearing very fast since the physical mobility of the population is so great.

The Popular Media

An integral part of the process of modernization is an increase in communication and consequently increased integration. Yet, it must be noted that the process of integration does not constitute more of the same kind of interactions that took place in the traditional setting. The nature of the messages and the interaction is different due to the changes in the socio-political milieu as well as demands of the time and nature of the media itself. As Marshall McLuhan points out the use of modern media totally changes man's conception of himself and the world around him.²

In such transitional societies such as Iran, Iraq or Turkey such media as the radio, cinema, television, and the

²See Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media (New York: New American Library, 1964).

telephone have only recently (in the last twenty-five years) begun to bring a substantial impact. Of the above probably the most important is the radio. Radio as a means of communication is particularly important since it also provides entertainment. The use of radio is beginning to have a far reaching effect upon the behavior, the thought processes, and the habits of millions of people who may otherwise be considered to be in the traditional sector. Transistor radios can now be found in the most desolate places of Southwest Asia.

There are approximately ten times as many radios as there are telephones in the region³--and this is perhaps still a conservative estimate. There seems to be a direct relationship between technological level of the polity and the number of radios per capita. In Japan, for example, there are 106.7 radios per one thousand population whereas in Turkey, Iran and Iraq there are only 52.5, 65.3 and 21.2 radios per 1,000 population⁴ respectively.

So far as per capita number of telephones are concerned, Japan by far outstrips the region.⁵ Regionally, Turkey, Iran and Iraq follow one another in order of decreasing per capita number of telephones in use. However, at the present level of

³See Tables 21 & 22.

⁴See Table 21.

⁵See Table 22.

TABLE 21

RADIOS PER ONE THOUSAND POPULATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Radios</u> <u>per 1,000</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Average Annual</u> <u>Increase</u>	<u>Years</u>
Japan	106.7	1961	.9	1948-61
Egypt	65.8	1961	4.5	1949-61
Iran	65.3	1961	4.6	1948-61
Lebanon	60.8	1960	---	---
Syria	57.3	1959	4.5	1949-59
Turkey	52.5	1961	3.1	1948-61
Jordan	37.7	1960	3.2	1949-61
Iraq	21.2	1960	1.6	1950-59
$\bar{x}$	58.4		3.2	

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF TELEPHONES IN USE
(in thousands)

Country/Year	1948	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Iran	15	139	155	160	180	208
Telephones per 1,000 Population	0.95	6.29	6.83	6.87	7.53	8.39
Iraq	14	54	57	60	62	65
Telephones per 1,000 Population	2.86	7.53	7.69	7.83	7.84	7.95
Turkey	52	255	264	286	334	351
Telephones per 1,000 Population	2.59	8.96	9.05	9.57	10.90	11.27
Japan	1310	6345	7356	10682	10251	13999
Telephones per 1,000 Population	16.48	67.46	77.49	111.39	126.42	142.91

SOURCE: Based on United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966
(New York, 1967).

diffusion, telephones are not playing an important role in the overall communication patterns since their use is fairly limited to the government offices, business concerns, and upper and upper-middle classes in the urban areas.

Since cinema is a popular means of entertainment, next to radio, it is the most important media. The number of cinema attendance per capita in the region has grown very rapidly during the past two decades.⁶ Despite the growth in the popularity of movies, the movie industry of the region has been relatively stagnant.⁷ Hence, most of the movies shown are Western in origin. Thus, the messages conveyed from the movie screens do not necessarily promote national integration. They only do so when the values they project coincide with the modernistic value system of the modern sector. Western movies do tend to play an important role in integration on an international basis. A useful note of caution about the role of Western movies in the underdeveloped areas would be that it is not always functional in the sense that carefully prepared domestic movies, which deal with concrete problems of society, might be. Thus, many Western movies tend to undermine the traditional pattern of behavior without setting up new substitutes which are workable

⁶See Table 23.

⁷For figures concerning movie production in various countries of the region see United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

TABLE 23

CINEMA ATTENDANCE

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Cinemas</u>	<u>-Attendance</u>	
		<u>Total</u>	<u>Per Capita</u>
Iran	280 ¹	52 000 ²	2.5
Iraq	84 ³	8 300 ³	1.2
Turkey	285 ⁴	30 000 ⁴	1.1
Japan	4 649 ³	372 676 ³	3.8

NOTE: Years of data: ¹1964
²1961
³1965
⁴1959

Total numbers of attendance are in thousands.

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

within the given environment. Thus, so long as domestic movie industries have not developed, figures relating to movie attendance, as well as its relation to the process of national integration, should be dealt with carefully, especially if they are used as indicators for modernization.

Television is growing⁸ as a medium of communication but is not yet very important. First, because its number is limited and only at the disposal of the upper and upper-middle classes in large urban centres. Second, because television is suffering from the same limitations as the movies: a shortage of home-grown products whose messages relate to the life experiences of the populace.

The Literate Media

In order to participate in the popular media one does not need to be literate. But there are certain modes of communication --such as newspapers, books, or letter writing--which necessitate some degree of literacy. The more literate a society is the more it will participate in this kind of communication. In fact, Karl Deutsch uses figures concerning mail flow as a test of functional literacy.⁹

⁸In Iran there are three television stations, two in Tehran and one in Abadan. In addition, there is also an American television station broadcasting from Tehran for the resident Americans. A substantial proportion of all television programs shown on the Iranian television are American in origin.

⁹See Karl W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of International Communication Flows," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20(Spring, 1956) pp. 143-160.

With regards to the circulation of newspapers, we find a great disparity between Japan and the countries of the region.¹⁰ Although the total circulation of newspapers rises with increasing literacy and modernization, in the more advanced countries the number of daily newspapers is generally on the decline.¹¹ This is mainly due to the demands of large scale economies which in Western countries have produced press-lords and chain-store journalism.¹² A further reason is perhaps due to the fact that in the more industrial societies the economic interest groups and the political groups are much more crystalized than are those in the transitional societies, where the genesis of the large scale organizations (politically or economically based) have not been formed.

In a transitional society the number as well as the total circulation of papers vary. On the one hand, where there is relative freedom for various groups to compete for the attention of public opinion the number and the circulation of newspapers swells. Literate people are also encouraged to read publications of different political groups. This was

¹⁰See Table 24.

¹¹See Paul Block, Jr.'s "Facing Up to the 'Monopoly' Charge," Nieman Reports; Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1955, pp. 3-7.

¹²See Louis M. Lyons, "Chain-Store Journalism," The Reporter, Vol. 23, No. 10, Dec. 8, 1960, pp. 60-63. Also see Adlai Stevenson's "The One-Party Press," a speech delivered to newspapermen at Portland, Oregon, September 8, 1952.

TABLE 24

DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Newspapers</u> <u>per 1,000</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Papers</u>	<u>Total Circulation</u> <u>(Thousands)</u>
Japan	1965	451	172	44 134
Turkey	1961	45	472	1 299
Iran	1961	15	27	312
Iraq	1963	12	8	85
Egypt	1963	15	9	409

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

the case in Iran in early 1900s as well as between 1946 to 1953 when there was a measure of political freedom. The number of newspapers published during the latter era was more than ten times the present figures.¹³ With increasing government control of the press and the suppression of the opposition within the country, the opposition press has had to go underground or abroad, and consequently reach fewer people. Today, since newspapers are heavily ridden with government propaganda, the reading public is hesitant to buy newspapers since they reflect more of the same as the public hears from radio and television. A similar reason could be ascribed to the low level of newspaper circulation in Egypt.¹⁴

However, a note of caution is warranted in that the figures for newspaper circulation in transitional societies and Western countries are not quite comparable. This is because in the Western or the more developed societies newspapers bought are very much a private property of the individual who buys them and discards them after he is finished reading the paper. Whereas in Iran, for instance, newspapers and magazines are often read by as many as ten people per issue--in this sense newspapers are communal property of a family and their friends.

¹³See Table 24.

¹⁴Ibid.

Thus, the potential impact of newspapers is far beyond what the figures indicate.¹⁵

The limitations to book reading in the underdeveloped societies are basically twofold: one, lack of methods of cheap production and distribution of books; two, a low level of literacy. Although book reading as a habit is being challenged by such media as television in the West, in the region where such media has not yet begun to exercise a similar impact, the book reading public is beginning to grow.

Aside from the number of books, the kinds of books published are also very important.¹⁶ In Iraq and Turkey the largest category of books published is in the area of social sciences.¹⁷ In Iran and Japan the major category is in literature. But, at least the figures concerning Iran are misleading in this respect since many of the books published in the areas of literature, history or philosophy are political and social in nature. Since the government wants to keep a strong control of the materials published, many political essays are often written in forms of poems, religious essays, philosophical discourses, etc.. where the author transmits his ideas through the use of symbols and euphemisms. This preoccupation with the

¹⁵For example, see the relevant article in Tofiq, Vol. 47, No. 3, 29 Farvardin, 1347 (19 March, 1968).

¹⁶See Table 25.

¹⁷Ibid.

TABLE 25

BOOKS PUBLISHED

<u>Subject/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u> ¹	<u>Iraq</u> ²	<u>Turkey</u> ²	<u>Japan</u> ¹
Generalities	37	4	--	499
Philosophy	53	9	94	757
Religion	96	53	277	470
Social Sciences	106	89	2 027	4 132
Philology	41	8	170	1 708
Pure Sciences	53	1	--	1 912
Applied Sciences	68	13	--	3 454
Arts	15	14	1 215	1 817
Literature	422	49	948	7 522
Geography-History	94	46	433	1 932
Unspecified	--	--	580	--
Total	985	286	5 744	24 203

¹Year of data 1965

²Year of data 1964

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

social and political is expected in transitional societies where the nature of the future order is of paramount importance and subject to perpetual contests.

A further note concerning books is that an increase in books in the areas of pure and applied sciences reflects the needs and the demands, as well as the level of development, of the polity as a whole. The more technologically advanced societies naturally produce many more books in these areas.¹⁸

A look at the figures concerning the flow of foreign and domestic mail indicates that the world since 1913 has been getting more nationally minded and less internationally preoccupied.¹⁹ This pattern is an outcome of the increase in the cohesion of political communities, economically as well as socially and politically.

What Deutsch says about functional literacy--that it must manifest itself in concrete forms such as letter writing--clearly evinces itself if one compares the figures of literacy for Japan, Turkey and Iran, on the one hand, with the figures of their domestic flow of mail, on the other.²⁰

¹⁸See, for instance, figures concerning books published in Japan in the area of pure and applied sciences in Table 5.

¹⁹See Karl Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," in Philip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.) op. cit., pp. 75-97.

²⁰Sources: Rossett's World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators & United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966.

	<u>Per cent of population literate</u>	<u>Domestic Mail per capita</u>
Iran	15.0	5.1
Turkey	39.0	10.5
Japan	98.0	94.1

The number of letters sent domestically seem to vary in direct proportion to the level of literacy.

On the whole, Iran and Turkey seem to be somewhat of an exporter of mail since they send out more mail than they receive.²¹ Whereas Japan receives somewhat more letters than she sends out. This pattern is contrary to what Deutsch suggests; i.e., that the more developed and industrial societies are exporters of mail.²²

In the area of foreign mail the same pattern of direct relationship does not exist between literacy and letter writing. Turkey which has a lower level of literacy than Japan has more letters sent and received per capita.²³

The Transportation System

Aside from the vicarious or intellectual mobility provided by the communication media, what is also important with

²¹See Table 26.

²²Karl Deutsch, op. cit.

²³See Table 26

TABLE 26

ITEMS OF FOREIGN MAIL SENT AND RECEIVED

<u>SENT</u>				
<u>Country</u>	<u>Total in Thousands</u>		<u>Per Capita</u>	
	<u>1948</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1965</u>
Iran	14 300 ^a	12 416 ^b	0.74	0.55
Turkey	5 192	32 963		1.58
Japan	4 648	74 099		0.76
 <u>RECEIVED</u>				
Iran	11 361 ^b		0.50	
Turkey	4 254	33 014	0.21	1.06
Japan	4 211	84 958	0.05	0.87

Notes: - Year of data a=1956
 b=1962

- Figures for Iraq were not available.
- Figures for Iran are not comparable since they are from a different source and of different years.

SOURCES: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967) Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965).

regard to the process of political integration within a polity is physical mobility--the ease with which the population can actually move around, internally as well as internationally.

Figures in this respect are not easy to come by since the population moves by a variety of means which are not always subject to measurement. One important indicator of mobility is that of railway traffic about which definite figures are available.²⁴ In this respect, crude figures are not very meaningful. For it is not only important to know how many passengers travel how far, but also what it means on a per capita basis.²⁵ Further, another important factor is the size of the polity. In a country whose size is comparatively small shorter distances have to be travelled by its population to achieve the same degree of integration as in another country whose size is much larger. Thus, the size of the polity must also be taken into account.²⁶ Having taken all of these factors into consideration, regionally, the level of mobility is highest in Turkey and Iraq, being followed far behind by Iran.²⁷ In fact, since 1959 the

²⁴See Table 27.

²⁵See rows B, Table 27.

²⁶See rows C, Table 27.

²⁷Ibid.

TABLE 27

TRANSPORT: RAILWAY TRAFFIC

<u>Country/Year</u>		<u>1948</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>
<u>Iran</u>	A*	324	860	1 535	1 997	1 644
	B*	20	43	75	95	76
	C*	5.4	11.6	20.3	25.7	20.5
<u>Iraq</u>	A	473	658	574	656	554
	B	97	104	88	98	80
	C	97	104	88	98	80
<u>Turkey</u>	A	2 546	5 041	5 105	4 589	4 396
	B	127	198	194	170	160
	C	73.4	114.5	112.1	98.3	92.5
<u>Japan</u>	A	121 515	150 867	157 547	168 725	180 893
	B	1 528	1 663	1 721	1 824	1 941
	C	1 841	2 004	2 073	2 198	2 339
		<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
<u>Iran</u>	A	1 510	1 494	1 440	1 368	1 092
	B	68	66	62	57	44
	C	18.4	17.84	16.8	15.4	11.9
<u>Iraq</u>	A	590	530	---	---	---
	B	82	72	---	---	---
	C	82	72	---	---	---
<u>Turkey</u>	A	3 810	3 720	3 631	3 752	4 075
	B	134	128	121	122	131
	C	77.5	74.0	70.0	70.5	75.7
<u>Japan</u>	A	194 591	207 305	221 408	238 701	250 875
	B	2 069	2 184	2 309	2 464	2 561
	C	2 493	2 631	2 782	2 967	3 086

A* Passenger-Kilometers (millions)

B* Passenger-Kilometers per capita

C* Comparative Index of Mobility

NOTES: 1. Passenger-Kilometers per capita was derived by dividing A by the population of the country during the same year.

TABLE 27--Continued

2. Comparative index of mobility was arrived at by dividing the figures in rows B by the ratio of the area of the country to the area of the smallest of the three countries in the region, i. e., Iraq. Thus, the areas of the respective countries are represented by: Iraq=1 Iran=3.7 Japan=0.83 Turkey=1.73. Then rows B divided by the respective proportions would result in row C.

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (United Nations, 1967).

the level of mobility by rail has been falling off in Iran. On the other hand, the level of mobility of the Japanese by rail is more than forty times that of an Iraqi or a Turk and close to three hundred times that of an Iranian.

The number of motor vehicles in use forms another indicator of mobility. However, since the extent of their use is not known, not much can be said about their total contribution to the mobility of the population. Due to the lack of good roads in the region, it can safely be assumed that the use of motor vehicles, particularly passenger cars is mostly restricted to travel in cities and surrounding areas.

Regionally, passenger cars are highest, in per capita terms, in Iraq, being followed by Iran and Turkey respectively.²⁸ In Iraq and Iran the number of passenger cars is about twice as large as the number of commercial vehicles. Whereas in Turkey the number of commercial vehicles is substantially higher in proportion.²⁹ In this sense, motor vehicles tend to play a much larger role in the economy of Turkey. In 1960-61 there were three times as many commercial vehicles in Japan as there were passenger cars. By 1965 the number of commercial vehicles was only twice as large as the number of passenger cars due to the tremendous expansion

²⁸See Table 28.

²⁹Ibid.

TABLE 28

TRANSPORT: MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE
(thousand units)

<u>Country/ Year</u>		<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Iran</u>	A	49.3	63.4	78.3	91.8	96.4
	B	31.8	34.8	39.3	44.2	42.2
<u>Iraq</u>	A	25.9	30.1	31.9	40.1	48.5
	B	14.4	15.8	17.2	20.0	22.2
<u>Turkey</u>	A	36.8	34.2	37.6	45.8	52.4
	B	45.2	47.8	57.0	68.4	78.7
<u>Japan</u>	A	219.1	262.7	330.7	456.4	664.4
	B	949.8	1 057.4	1 192.0	1 382.7	1 740.0
		<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	
<u>Iran</u>	A	102.9	107.8	105.9	---	
	B	42.0	43.8	44.1	---	
<u>Iraq</u>	A	49.2	50.9	50.2	62.9	
	B	24.8	24.5	24.2	26.0	
<u>Turkey</u>	A	60.7	72.0	79.4	86.3	
	B	89.8	100.0	95.8	101.2	
<u>Japan</u>	A	889.0	1 234.0	1 673.0	2 188.0	
	B	2 120.0	2 845.0	3 555.0	4 283.0	

NOTES: 1. A. Passenger Cars.
B. Commercial Vehicles.

2. Figures for Iran exclude government vehicles.

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

of production by Japan of the latter category.³⁰ Hence, one may assume the the consumer role of motor vehicles is preferred to its distributive or productive role in Iran and Iraq, whereas in Turkey and Japan the reverse is true.

In the area of civil aviation, domestic flights do not constitute a major mode of travel as yet. In international scheduled services Iraq ($\bar{X}=5.15$) leads the region on per capita basis during the period under study, being followed far behind by Iran ($\bar{X}=1.02$) and Turkey ($\bar{X}=0.93$). Japan, on the other hand is far ahead of all the three countries of the region.³¹

The absolute rate of growth in travel in the international scheduled services in the region seem to be parallel with each other in their level of magnitude.³² However, on the overall basis travel on international flights seems to have grown much faster in Iraq than in Japan between 1948-1965.

On the whole the level of physical mobility and the transportation system of the region is very low compared to the advanced countries of Europe and North America. The difficulty with the growth of the transportation systems of

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See Table 29.

³²Ibid.

TABLE 29

CIVIL AVIATION: INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED SERVICES

Year	Km.* Flown (Thousands)	Passenger-Km. -----)	Absolute Rate of Growth	Per Capita Passenger-Km.
<u>IRAN</u>				
1948	1 431	11 258	100	0.71
1959	2 500	4 835	43	0.43
1960	2 545	23 191	206	1.08
1961	2 701	38 611	343	1.75
1962	1 130	17 355	154	0.76
1963	789	12 084	107	0.52
1964	910	17 698	157	0.74
1965	1 634	46 575	414	1.88
				1.02
<u>IRAQ</u>				
1948	878	7 673	100	1.57
1959	2 015	30 990	404	4.61
1960	1 999	39 398	513	5.67
1961	1 946	35 666	465	4.97
1962	2 326	44 969	586	6.07
1963	2 349	44 680	582	5.83
1964	2 361	51 596	672	6.52
1965	2 151	48 416	631	5.92
				5.15
<u>TURKEY</u>				
1948	---	---	---	---
1959	1 119	19 091	100	0.71
1960	1 668	29 935	157	1.09
1961	2 212	32 744	172	1.15
1962	1 524	19 182	100	0.66
1963	1 234	18 756	98	0.63
1964	11 528	28 275	148	0.92
1965	2 449	71 674	375	2.30
				0.93

TABLE 29--Continued

Year	<u>Km. Flown</u> (Thousands)	<u>Passenger-Km.</u> -----)	<u>Absolute Rate</u> <u>of Growth</u>	<u>Per Capita</u> <u>Passenger-Km.</u>
	JAPAN			
1959	11 592	401 224	100	4.34
1960	12 655	482 350	120	5.17
1961	15 375	754 163	188	8.02
1962	17 417	896 090	223	9.44
1963	20 508	1 211 356	302	12.63
1964	23 730	1 504 958	375	15.53
1965	30 690	1 928 129	481	19.68
				9.35

SOURCE: Based on United Nations' Statistical Yearbook,
1966 (New York, 1967).

the region is not only the overall underdevelopment of the area, but also due to the difficult terrain and the natural barriers which have to be overcome if political, economic as well as cultural integration is to be realized on a broader basis.

VI. ECONOMIC GROWTH

A major aspect of the process of modernization is that of economic growth. A variety of approaches could be taken in the study of economic growth. But in the final analysis, the success of any approach depends on the consideration of the topic in conjunction with other aspects of the developmental process such as the demographic changes, communication patterns, human resources, etc., which are also the subjects of this study. In this chapter an attempt shall be made to determine the extent of growth in agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, the level of energy production and consumption, shifts in prices, as well as to evaluate the meaning of international trade to the process of modernization in Iran.

The Agricultural Sector

Despite oil, the economy of Iran, as well as that of the whole region, is basically agricultural. Even the limited industrial sector is primarily involved in the processing of primary agricultural products, such as sugar beet, raisins, tea, cotton, wool, tobacco, etc., into consumer goods. However, the total land under cultivation embraces only 12.53 per cent of the country of which only 3.10 per cent are

actually under crops and 7.33 per cent are left fallow.¹

The yield of agricultural outputs in Iran is also comparatively low. For example, according to a report by the United Nations, the wheat output in Iran was 930 kilogrammes per hectare as compared to 2090 for Japan and 2270 for Australia. The output in rice was also low; 1570 kilogrammes per hectare for Iran as opposed to 3890 for Japan, and 4150 for Portugal.² Yet, these crops are two of the most important in the agricultural sector as well as the economy as a whole. The main reasons for low yields in agriculture generally seem to be the following: First, an out-moded landlord-peasant system which is ill suited to the modes of modern agriculture. In the Western experience, productivity has been highest in farms owned and operated by families whose members were comparatively literate and skilled in the use of modern technology in agriculture. Absentee landlordism is still fairly prevalent and tends to keep the peasant exploited, under-employed, uneducated, and in ill health.³ As we shall see later, despite certain moves in recent years by

¹0.57% fruits and nuts; 10.0% pasture; 0.67% woodlands; 0.76% villages, village roads, wasteland and other land. See Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Programme of Iran (Tehran, March 10, 1960).

²See Agricultural Products Statistics, Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations (New York, 1958).

³See Ann K. Lambton's Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London, 1954).

the government in the direction of land reform, this traditional landlord-peasant relationship continues to persist in Iran. On the whole, land reform campaigns seem to be intended more as a propaganda venture by the government rather than a serious minded effort which would demand substantial outlays of funds and resources in the countryside.

A further reason for low agricultural productivity is the primitive methods of farming, lack of mechanization of agriculture, and insufficient use of chemical fertilizers. This second reason is fairly closely tied to the first--namely the social structure of agrarian life. So long as the present system of share-cropping and landlordism prevails and the human resources of the farmlands remain underdeveloped, labour will continue to remain fairly cheap. Hence, even from a purely economic point of view, for the landlords who are mainly interested in short-range profits, it is more feasible to use cheap labour than to invest large sums in farm machinery which they may stand a good chance to loose should a revolutionary ferment take over the countryside.

Finally, as we have seen already, there is the climatic conditions and aridity of most of the country. This, again, is something that the forces of technology may overcome. The building of certain dams in the country in recent years has been a move in this general direction. However, in

cases--such as that of Karaj Dam--the need for water in urban areas has become so urgent that the dam which was originally planned for the agricultural sector is now to serve exclusively as a reservoir for the urban population of Tehran.⁴

Some have suggested that it is a mistake to build the kind of huge dams that the government seems to prefer. Admittedly, due to their conspicuous nature they serve as good propaganda for the government. However, the opposition argument is that by building smaller dams over many of the tributary rivers larger areas of the country can be brought under cultivation with much lower costs.⁵

On the whole, during 1952-1962 decade, the agricultural production of Iran has been growing at a rate of 2 to 3 per cent annually.⁶ Figures for 1960/1961-1964/1965 period reflect the same pattern.⁷ The growth rate for Turkey seems to be higher, and for Iraq to be lower, than Iran. The rate of growth of agricultural production in Japan, although somewhat below Turkey has been rather steady⁸--an indication of

⁴See George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

⁵See, for instance, Ettela'at issues of April 12 and June 21, 1962.

⁶Kayhan Yearbook, March 1962.

⁷See Table 30.

⁸Ibid.

TABLE 30

INDEX NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

1952/53-1956/57=100

<u>Country/Year</u>	<u>1960/61</u>	<u>1961/62</u>	<u>1962/63</u>	<u>1963/64</u>	<u>1964/65</u>
F o o d					
Iran	115	130	131	135	120
Iraq	100	109	121	97	104
Turkey	131	123	130	144	136
Japan	120	121	131	128	133
A l l C o m m o d i t i e s					
Iran	119	134	133	139	124
Iraq	101	109	120	99	105
Turkey	130	123	129	143	142
Japan	119	120	129	127	132

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

a fair degree of control over the forces of agricultural production. This kind of control is symptomatic of Japan as a highly industrialized and technologically advanced country.

A look at the mode of population growth of Iran during the last decade shows that the rate of growth in agricultural production has barely been able to keep up with the increase in population. Hence, from this vantage point, no appreciable improvement has occurred in the overall per capita food supply of the country.

However, growth in livestock, during the same period, has been somewhat greater in Iran.⁹ Especially if we compare this growth with figures concerning Iraq and Turkey.¹⁰ However, figures on livestock could be very misleading in the countries of Southwest Asia. Since animal husbandry and care is not at a very sophisticated level, livestock figures can fluctuate very much from year to year depending on the severities of droughts, winters, or epidemics. Thus, any kind of comparative figures can be best understood with these reservations in mind.

⁹See Table 31.

¹⁰Ibid.

TABLE 31

LIVESTOCK

(1,000 head)

<u>Country/Kind</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Horses & Mules</u>	<u>Asses</u>
<u>Iran</u>				
1947/48-1951/52	3 225	14 069	485	1 000
1962/63	6 023	31 832	630	2 034
% Increase	86.8	126.3	29.9	103.4
<u>Iraq</u>				
1947/48-1951/52	1 510	10 000	800	1 000
1964/65	1 455	11 040	194	542
% Increase	-3.6	10.4	-75.7	-45.8
<u>Turkey</u>				
1947/48-1951/52	10 121	24 282	1 240	1 696
1964/65	13 211	32 654	1 425	1 918
% Increase	30.5	34.5	14.9	30.1

SOURCES: Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965). United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

The Industrial Sector

Modern industry of Iran has its origins in the middle of the nineteenth century. But it was not really until 1929 when a notable measure of industrialization--especially in the areas of textiles, food processing, and cement manufacturing--began to take place. Most of the investment was made by the government. It was only after the Second World War that the private sector began to play an increasingly important role in the industrialization process.

In 1954, there were in Iran 1,300 industrial units¹¹ employing about 75,000.¹² By 1963 the industrial units had increased to 10,060 employing some 139,000 persons. At this time, the oil industry, tobacco monopoly, railways and fisheries employed another 85,000 persons.¹³ Thus, an overall total of 224,000 persons were employed by the industrial sector of the economy.

Although the size of the industrial sector has changed during this period, its nature has basically remained the same: light and primarily geared to the production of consumer goods, such as food, textiles, paper, chemicals, construction materials, leather products, etc..¹⁴ Further,

¹¹Excluding oil, tobacco monopoly and state fisheries.

¹²See Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965).

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴See Table 32.

the definition of a 'factory' used by the Iranian census authorities is any manufacturing shop employing ten or more workers.¹⁵ This is a far cry from the kind of industrialization which is crucial to the process of development--namely a process which would involve substantial technological change. Due to the fact that the products of the industrial sector are primarily consumer goods its impact upon the economy as a whole, as yet, have not been revolutionary. On the whole the industrial share of the Gross National Product is probably no more than 20 per cent.¹⁶

The available indices of industrial growth in Iran¹⁷ indicate that the number of mechanized units during the period 1955/1956 to 1959/1960 have grown more than twice as fast as the number of the employees, which point out to the fact that despite the prevalence of cheap labour, the tendency has been in the direction of increased automation and consequently more sophisticated technology--even though its function has been basically to produce consumer goods.

The greatest increase in the number of factories has been in the area of metal goods and repair shops, being followed by food processing, wood and paper, printing,

¹⁵Iran Almanac, 1964, op. cit.

¹⁶Richard E. Benedick, Industrial Finance in Iran (Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 9.

¹⁷See Table 32.

TABLE 32

INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN IRAN:
1955-1956 TO 1959-1960

(measured by number of mechanized units and employees)

(1955-1956=100)

<u>Industrial group</u>	<u>Factories</u>	<u>Employees</u>
FOOD PROCESSING	<u>492</u>	<u>189</u>
Flour milling	524	169
Sugar refining	150	115
Dried fruit	116	152
Vegetable oil extraction	209	279
Ice manufacturing	175	107
TEXTILES	<u>239</u>	<u>126</u>
Cotton ginning, spinning and weaving	171	192
Wool spinning and weaving	141	63
WOOD AND PAPER	<u>459</u>	<u>329</u>
PRINTING	<u>265</u>	<u>164</u>
LEATHER PRODUCTS	<u>167</u>	<u>103</u>
CHEMICALS	<u>230</u>	<u>123</u>
Plastics	560	460
Drug manufacturing	244	382
Rubber	311	244
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS	<u>169</u>	<u>192</u>
Cement	200	119
Mosaic tiles	233	352
Bricks	63	209
METAL GOODS AND REPAIR SHOPS	<u>503</u>	<u>395</u>
POWER PLANTS	<u>277</u>	<u>167</u>

TABLE 32--Continued

<u>Industrial group</u>	<u>Factories</u>	<u>Employees</u>
MISCELLANEOUS	<u>126</u>	<u>120</u>
Total	357	162

SOURCE: Ministry of Industry and Mines.

textiles, chemicals, paper plants, construction materials, and leather products respectively.¹⁸ So far as the expansion in the actual volume of industrial outputs is concerned, however, textiles seem to be in the forefront, followed by cement and sugar industries respectively.¹⁹

It is only recently that greater emphasis has begun to be placed upon such key industries as petro-chemicals or steel. As it has been noted already the impact that such key industries have upon the economy is tremendous. They create various demands upon the economy the fulfillment of which may result in the creation of a series of new industries which would tend to revolutionize the economic, the social, as well as the political and cultural life of a nation as a whole.

In late 1930's Iran ordered a steel mill with the capacity of 100,000 tons a year from Krupp-Demag of Germany. But this coincided with the start of the Second World War. Some of the machinery fell into the Allied hands and others stayed in German warehouses and rusted away. After the War, the Iranian Government invited various teams of experts from Belgium, France, Sweden, United States and Germany to investigate and report the possibilities of steel production in Iran. All

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹See Table 33.

TABLE 33

PRODUCTION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS

<u>Product/Year</u>	<u>1955-56</u>	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>Per cent Increase</u>
Cement (thousand tons)	131	810	750	473
Sugar (thousand tons)	75	110	270	260
Vegetable oil (thousand tons)	0.0	20	45	--
Soaps (thousand tons)	15	35	50	233
Cotton textiles (million meters)*	34	160	260	665
Woolen textiles (million meters)	2	2.1	6	200
Glass (thousand tons)	4	5	n.a.	--

*Does not include hand-woven textiles, which amounted to 40 million meters in each year.

SOURCE: Plan Organization for first two years; Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran for the last year.

of the reports said that a steel mill would not be economically feasible for Iran primarily due to the low level of known deposits of coal and iron, as well as the shortage of available water and the long distances across which raw materials must be carried. They argued that the limited Iranian needs of steel can be cheaper provided for through imports. Nationalists in Iran, of course, don't want to hear such discouraging reports, especially from Westerners whose intentions they have historically learned to question. True, Iranian consumption of steel may be limited at present,²⁰ but if the country is to industrialize rapidly the need will grow enormously. A comparison of per capita consumption of steel in Iran and Japan shows that during the period 1961-1965 the figures for Japan were over 12 times as high as those for Iran, on the average. Not only there is great deal of disparity in the quantity of steel consumed, but also in the modes of consumption. In Iran, Turkey and Iraq steel is primarily used for building construction whereas in Japan much of it is used to produce sophisticated machinery and producer goods.

Western companies were correct in that the supply of coal and iron ore in Iran, even in comparison with Turkey,

²⁰See Table 34. - —

TABLE 34

STEEL

(Apparent consumption expressed in terms of crude steel)

<u>Country/Year</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	
	T o t a l					
	(Thousands of Metric Tons)					
Iran	351	353	467	524	710	
Iraq	265	267	169	198	213	
Turkey	549	560	817	819	857	
Japan	25 763	22 945	24 726	31 417	28 841	
	P e r C a p i t a					
	(Kilogrammes)					$\bar{x}$
Iran	17	17	21	23	30	21.60
Iraq	36	40	25	28	26	31.00
Turkey	20	19	27	26	27	23.80
Japan	274	242	258	324	294	278.40

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

has been insignificant during the last twenty years.²¹ But as most laissez-faire economists would tell us supply is also a function of demand. With an increased demand for basic industry, raw materials could be discovered or imported. After all, Japan and Britain both import raw materials for their steel industry.

In 1966 an agreement was concluded between the Government of Iran and the Government of the Soviet Union whereby the Soviet Union would build a steel mill with the capacity of 600,000 tons a year--which may be expanded to produce as much as 1,200,000 tons of steel a year. The Soviet Union would provide all the necessary machinery and credit in the form of a twelve year loan to the amount of 286 million dollars at 2.5 per cent interest.²² Iran is to repay the loan partially by exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union. The main outlay of funds for Iran is for the building of a gas pipeline from the oilfields of the South. The steel mill which is to be situated near Esfahan, in central Iran, would be fed by a dam built on the Zayandeh Rud. Recently deposits of high quality iron ore (50-55 per cent iron) were discovered in central Iran with an estimated reserve of 100 million

²¹See Table 35.

²²Talash, Volume 1, No. 9, Farvardin, 1347 (March, 1968)

TABLE 35

PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS

(Thousands of metric tons)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Turkey</u>
	<u>Coal</u>		<u>Iron Ore</u>	
1948	150	2 669	-	121
1957	176	3 969	5	722
1958	194	4 075	74	609
1959	237	3 941	29	486
1960	230	3 653	29	444
1961	198	3 772	21	428
1962	160	3 893	5	458
1963	193	3 153	10	444
1964	274	4 449	-	545
1965	275	4 390	30	876

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistics Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

tons.²³ Meanwhile, the search for other deposits of iron is continuing. Recent reports on the availability of coal are also promising. With the readily available raw materials, the authorities estimate the cost of steel production in Iran to be as low as half of that in Europe or North America.²⁴ In the area of international politics the building of the steel mill by the Soviet Union has gained her popularity in Iran where a dream which has been nurtured for over thirty years is being fulfilled.

Energy Production and Consumption

One measure of the level of modernization may be taken as the amount of energy produced and consumed. The more modern a society is the more successful it is in harnessing the natural energies. In such societies machines free men from unskilled manual labour and give him an opportunity to develop skills and thus enhance the level of differentiation throughout the society as a whole.

A comparison in the disparity of the per capita quantity of energy consumed in Japan, on the one hand, and the countries of Southwest Asia, on the other, indicates that such consumption in Japan is 3 to 6 times as high.²⁵ Regionally,

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵See Table 36.

TABLE 36

ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

(Quantities in million metric tons of coal equivalent
and in kilogrammes per capita)

<u>Country/Year</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>X</u>
<u>Production - Total</u>					
Iran	86.51	96.68	111.10	123.44	104.43
Iraq	65.30	74.64	81.13	84.84	76.48
Turkey	5.46	6.23	6.84	7.67	6.55
Japan	65.59	64.31	63.59	62.20	63.92
<u>Consumption - Total</u>					
Iran	7.54	7.84	8.92	9.15	8.36
Iraq	3.75	4.40	4.67	4.80	4.40
Turkey	8.18	9.07	10.44	10.91	9.65
Japan	132.06	146.87	161.15	174.67	153.69
<u>Consumption - per capita</u>					
Iran	355			391	
Iraq	560			581	
Turkey	280			348	
Japan	1 391			1 783	

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

in 1965, Iraq had the largest per capita consumption--being followed by Iran and Turkey respectively.²⁶

The total production in Iran is higher than Iraq, Turkey or Japan. But this is primarily due to the enormous production of oil. In fact, when total consumption is taken into consideration, Iran consumes only about one-thirteenth of the energy it produces. This is in contrast to Japan which consumes almost two and one-half times as much energy than she produces, or Turkey which consumes one and one-half times the amount of her domestic energy production.²⁷

In the production of electricity Turkey is well ahead of Iran,²⁸ even on a per capita basis. However, the absolute rate of growth of electric energy shows that during 1958-1964 period the installed capacity of Iran has expanded by 406 per cent as opposed to Turkey and Japan with 47 and 123 per cent, respectively.²⁹

Economic Activity and Consumer Prices

The mean annual rate of change in the index of consumer prices in Iran during the decade under study has been about

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸See Table 37.

²⁹Ibid.

TABLE 37

TOTAL ELECTRIC ENERGY: INSTALLED CAPACITY

(Thousands kilowatts)

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1957	142	940	16 846
1958	156	1 031	18 366
1959	171	1 161	21 243
1960	275	1 272	23 657
1961	543	1 324	25 954
1962	727	1 369	29 153
1963	773	1 381	34 295
1964	790	1 434	38 072
1965	-	1 516	41 009
<u>Absolute Growth</u> (1958=100)			
1957	91	91	92
1958	100	100	100
1959	110	113	116
1960	176	123	129
1961	348	128	141
1962	466	132	159
1963	496	134	187
1964	506	139	207
1965	-	147	223

SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967).

3.6 per cent, much less when compared with Turkey (9.44) or Japan (4.91) but somewhat more than Iraq (2.14).³⁰

Iran's economy during the early periods of the decade experienced a boom primarily due to the high level of expenditure by the Plan Organization and the government, as well as liberal bank credit and easy access to foreign exchange.³¹ The boom created much activity in small industry and urban housing. Since the government had come into large amounts of oil revenue all sorts of means had to be devised for its expenditure. Much corruption and graft was involved in the granting of contracts as well as other allocation of funds. The well publicized trials of Mr. Nafisi, mayor of Tehran, and General Hedayat on the charges of corruption were only cases where there were conflicts of interest with higher authorities. Otherwise corruption and graft is universal and tolerated if the person involved does not step on the toes, or violate the hunting grounds of those higher and more powerful than oneself.

This somewhat chaotic and at times absurdly high level of expenditure--most of which went to construction companies, the import of luxury goods and high rise buildings--generated

³⁰See Table 38.

³¹Baldwin, op. cit., p. 40.

TABLE 38

CONSUMER PRICES - GENERAL INDICES

1958=100

<u>Year/Country</u>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1956	94.0	98.4	79.0	97.4
1958	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1959	111.0	98.7	126.0	101.0
1960	121.9	102.1	133.0	104.7
1961	125.8	103.8	128.0	110.3
1962	126.7	104.4	143.0	117.8
1963	127.3	108.5	153.0	126.7
1964	132.1	108.4	157.0	131.5
1965	134.9	107.9	164.0	141.6
1966	134.3	113.9	173.0	149.4
Annual $\bar{X}$ of Change in Index	3.6	2.14	9.44	4.91
Annual $\bar{X}$ of Increase in Index	3.48	1.9	9.44	4.91

SOURCE: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1966 (Geneva, 1967).

a rise in prices³² and a corresponding fall in foreign exchange reserves. The sharp increase in the index of consumer prices between 1956 to 1960 (94.0 - 121.9) is indicative of the trend.

When the government finally was out of foreign exchange in 1961 and asked for help from the International Monetary Fund, it had to embark on a stabilization programme (fiscal and monetary restraint) as a condition for such help. This in turn resulted in a recession that lasted until 1964 and caused thousands of businessmen to declare bankruptcy.³³ Fairly steady prices during 1961-1963 are indicative of this recession.³⁴

International Trade

Underdeveloped regions of the world, no matter how much they are concerned with their internal economic development, cannot ignore their international trade, especially with the contemporary economic giants of the world, i.e., the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European Economic Community as well as the United Kingdom.³⁵ No country is self sufficient. The nature and the size of trade carried

³²See Table 38.

³³Baldwin, op. cit., p. 41.

³⁴See Table 38.

³⁵See Table 39.

TABLE 39

DISTRIBUTION OF IRANIAN IMPORTS ACCORDING TO THE
EXPORTING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

(per cents)

<u>Origin/Year</u>	<u>1341</u> (1962)*	<u>1342</u> (1963)	<u>1343</u> (1964)	<u>1344</u> (1965)
Common Market	35.80	36.00	33.50	36.10
United Kingdom	18.60	14.40	13.70	13.30
Japan	5.50	7.20	6.30	8.20
Eastern Bloc Countries	5.10	8.50	7.70	6.80
United States	16.70	16.00	17.50	17.80
Turkey and Pakistan	.70	.20	1.70	.30
Unallocated	15.60	17.70	19.60	17.50
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total Volume (in millions of US \$)	547.80	513.50	742.30	869.50

*Iranian year begins on 21st. of March and ends on the 20th of March of the following year.

SOURCE: Yearbook of the Central Bank of Iran, 1345 (1965-1966); Tehran, Iran.

out is of vital significance. In this sense the pattern of international trade becomes a key to the understanding of the modernization process.

Iranian economy is basically geared to the production of primary goods. Consequently, the largest items on the Iranian import list are machinery, chemicals, electro-technical machines and appliances, passenger cars, iron, steel and other commodities basically produced from iron.³⁶ However, it must be borne in mind that sugar, wheat, and tea, as well as fats and oil, together also constitute a relatively large item in the import picture.³⁷

With the exception of heavy machinery, and electro-technical appliances and machines, other products which constitute the bulk of Iranian imports do not require a high level of technological sophistication for production. In fact, many such as woollens, yarns, fats and oils, tanning and dying extracts, as well as paper and glass require relatively little technical skill and industrial capability. The pattern of industrial development in Iran during the last decade shows that the attempt, consciously or unconsciously, has been basically to fulfill the consumer needs. The steel mill is, of course, an exception. This is a different approach to modernization than that adopted by the United Arab Republic, for

³⁶See Table 40.

³⁷Ibid.

TABLE 40

VALUE OF IMPORTS

\$ millions

	1962*	Share of total (per cent)	1963*	Share of total (per cent)
Machinery	98.7	18.0	79.8	15.5
Iron & ironware	59.5	10.9	54.7	10.6
Chemicals	50.2	9.2	46.7	9.1
Sugar	14.9	2.7	16.8	3.3
Wheat	15.5	2.8	11.6	2.3
Electro-technical machines & app.	39.3	7.2	30.6	6.0
Passenger cars	4.9	.9	12.7	2.5
Fats & oils	11.9	2.2	11.6	2.3
Paper products	13.8	2.5	14.5	2.8
Tanning & dyeing extracts, polish	9.8	1.8	11.3	2.2
Woolens, yarns	9.1	1.7	9.2	1.8
Tires & tubes	15.1	2.7	14.5	2.8
Tea	9.8	1.8	10.0	1.9
Vehicle parts	8.6	1.6	7.5	1.5
Glass & glassware	4.5	.8	4.4	.8
Fabrics & art. silk	17.6	3.2	9.8	1.9
Miscellaneous	164.4	30.0	167.8	32.7
Total	547.6	100.0	513.5	100.0

*Iranian year begins on 21st of March and ends on the 20th of March of the following year.

TABLE 40--Continued

\$ millions

	1964*	Share of total (per cent)	1965*	Share of total (per cent)
Machinery	118.8	16.0	184.5	21.2
Iron & ironware	78.9	10.6	110.0	12.6
Chemicals	62.5	8.4	70.4	8.1
Sugar	59.1	8.0	26.3	3.0
Wheat	40.9	5.5	14.1	1.6
Electro-technical machines & app.	39.8	5.4	53.7	6.2
Passenger cars	22.2	3.0	18.1	2.1
Fats & oils	18.3	2.5	27.5	3.2
Paper prod.	18.6	2.5	20.7	2.4
Tanning & dyeing extracts, polish	14.7	2.0	16.1	1.9
Woolens, yarns	12.5	1.7	14.7	1.7
Tires & tubes	12.4	1.7	14.7	1.7
Tea	9.9	1.3	16.9	1.9
Vehicle parts	8.6	1.2	11.2	1.3
Glass & glassware	6.3	.8	5.2	.6
Fabrics & art. silk	3.0	.4	1.2	.1
Miscellaneous	215.8	29.0	264.2	30.4
Total	742.3	100.0	869.5	100.0

SOURCE: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran; Tehran, 1966.

instance, whose emphasis has been on heavy industry which has enormous returns in the long run while, of course, on the short run it makes life a little harder for the consumer.

The European Economic Community (EEC) has been the largest exporting bloc to Iran³⁸—making up on the average, in recent years, about 35 per cent of the total Iranian imports. Next in importance is the United States with approximately 17 per cent. Closely following the United States is the United Kingdom, with about 15 per cent. However, in recent years the Japanese and the Socialist bloc exports to Iran have been expanding rapidly and are bound to overtake the United States and British exports in the next decade, if the present trends continue.

In the export sector, the Socialist countries constitute the largest bloc of customers for Iranian goods. The countries in this category have been responsible for the purchase of, on the average, 26.4 per cent of Iranian goods.³⁹ The European Economic Community follows second with the purchase of on the average slightly over 25 per cent. The United States and the United Kingdom respectively follow—so far as the ratio to total exports is concerned.⁴⁰

³⁸ See Table 39.

³⁹ See Table 41.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

TABLE 41

DISTRIBUTION OF IRANIAN EXPORTS OTHER THAN PETROLEUM
ACCORDING TO THE IMPORTING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

<u>Destination/Year</u>	<u>1341*</u> (1962)	<u>1342*</u> (1963)	<u>1343*</u> (1964)	<u>1344*</u> (1965)
Common Market	25.70	25.70	22.30	27.00
United Kingdom	11.60	12.40	8.30	8.10
Japan	1.40	3.30	1.60	2.10
Eastern Bloc Countries	27.50	26.20	29.20	22.80
United States	9.50	12.60	13.20	11.00
Turkey and Pakistan	1.30	1.10	1.30	1.20
Unallocated	23.00	18.70	24.10	21.80
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total Volume (in Millions of US \$)	114.70	128.20	153.10	180.80

*Iranian calendar begins on March 21 and ends on March 20th of the following year. For example the year 1341 begins on March 21, 1962, and ends on March 20, 1963.

SOURCE: Yearbook of the Central Bank of Iran, 1345 (1965-1966), Tehran, Iran.

The non-petroleum exports of Iran are being increasingly dwarfed by the petroleum exports.⁴¹ In 1963 only 128.2 million dollars out of a total export of 933 million dollars was attributed to the export of non-petroleum goods.⁴² This is only 13.7 per cent of the total export. This heavy reliance on a single export product has one danger and that is should anything happen to prevent the further, or even temporary, export of this commodity--as happened in Iran in 1951--the total economy of the country would collapse. The reliance on oil revenues is much more now than ever was prior to 1951. The only way out of this dilemma would be diversification in exports.

Amongst the non-petroleum exports of Iran woolen carpets, cotton and fresh dried fruits constitute the major bulk of exports.⁴³ Next in importance are hides and leather, mineral ores, wool and caviar.⁴⁴ Exports of fresh and dried fruits, as well as cotton, have been on the decrease in the years under study. Amongst the more important export commodities, only the volume of carpet exports has shown a tremendous increase. This has been primarily due to a phenomenal increase of sales in Germany and the United States.

⁴¹See Tables 42 and 43.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³See Table 42.

⁴⁴Ibid.

TABLE 42

VALUE OF EXPORTS

\$ millions

	1962*	Share of total (per cent)	1963*	Share of total (per cent)
Woolen carpets	22.1	19.3	26.4	20.6
Cotton	26.8	23.4	37.6	29.3
Dried & fresh fruits	24.8	21.6	19.2	15.0
Hides & leather	5.9	5.2	9.7	7.6
Mineral ores	3.6	3.1	4.8	3.7
Wool, soft wool & hair	4.4	3.8	5.8	4.5
Gum tragacanth	2.8	2.4	3.7	2.9
Caviar	2.9	2.5	2.6	2.0
Oil cakes	3.1	2.7	2.1	1.6
Caraway & Cummin seeds	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.3
Casings	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.1
Cement	-	-	.9	.7
Medicinal & indust- rial herbs & seeds	.4	.4	.7	.6
Other	14.6	12.7	11.6	9.1
Total	114.7	100.0	128.2	100.0

*Iranian calender year begins on 21st of March and ends on the 20th of March of the following year.

TABLE 42--Continued

\$ millions				
	1964*	Share of total (per cent)	1965*	Share of total (per cent)
Woolen carpets	36.4	23.8	45.4	25.1
Cotton	34.9	22.5	50.1	27.7
Dried & fresh fruits	19.8	12.9	23.0	12.7
Hides & leather	12.9	8.4	10.1	5.6
Mineral ores	8.7	5.7	10.7	5.9
Wool, soft wool & hair	5.1	3.3	2.7	1.5
Gum tragacanth	4.7	3.1	3.8	2.1
Caviar	3.4	2.2	3.7	2.0
Oil cakes	2.7	1.8	2.8	1.5
Caraway & Cummin seeds	1.7	1.1	1.9	1.1
Casings	1.5	1.0	1.4	.8
Cement	1.3	.8	1.6	.9
Medicinal & indust- rial herbs & seeds	1.0	.7	1.0	.6
Other	19.0	12.4	22.6	12.5
Total	153.1	100.0	180.8	100.0

SOURCE: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran; Tehran, 1966.

TABLE 43

IRAN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FOR EIGHT YEARS,
BEGINNING IN 1964^a

(million \$)

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>
A. Imports (nongovt.)	138.2	206.7	229.6	280.2
B. Exports (non-oil)	108.3	82.1	89.6	98.4
Trade deficit	29.9	124.6	140.0	181.8
C. Other foreign exchange payments (excluding debt service)				
1. Plan Organization	-	30.3	34.0	53.1
2. Net services	5.4	6.9	18.1	12.0
3. National Iranian Oil Co.	2.1	6.1	18.0	19.3
Subtotal	7.5	43.3	70.1	84.4
D. Trade deficit plus other nondebt payments	37.4	167.9	210.1	266.2
E. Oil earnings				
1. Earned tax revenues	18.5	79.8	140.2 ^c	207.8 ^c
2. Rial purchases by foreign companies	11.9	46.7	40.5	48.2
Total foreign exchange from oil	30.4	126.5	180.7	256.0
F. Foreign exchange deficit from earnings (D-C)	7.0	41.4	29.4	10.2
G. Debt repayments (govt. loans only)	-	8.8	3.2	-
H. "Earned" exchange deficit plus debt repayments (F+G)	7.0	50.2	32.6	10.2
I. Foreign aid and loans	50.0	71.8	86.8	116.3
J. Increase in reserves	43.0	21.6	54.2	106.3
Four-year totals			225.1	
Eight-year net change				-51.6 ^e

TABLE 43--Continued

	1958	1959	1960	1961 ^b
A. Imports (nongovt.)	370.7	440.5	473.7	484.1
B. Exports (non-oil)	86.3	96.8	95.7	106.0
C. Other foreign exchange payments (excluding debt service)				
1. Plan Organization	63.3	59.5	52.9	47.2
2. Net services	3.7	10.3	7.1	7.7
3. National Iranian Oil Co.	21.1	20.1	19.5	15.7
Subtotal	88.1	89.9	79.5	70.6
D. Trade deficit plus other nondebt payments	372.5	433.6	457.5	448.7
E. Oil earnings				
1. Earned tax revenues	265.8 ^d	244.9	258.7	285.0
2. Rial purchases by foreign companies	74.2	74.2	76.8	70.7
Total foreign exchange from oil	340.0	319.1	335.5	355.7
F. Foreign exchange deficit from earnings (D-C)	32.5	114.5	122.0	93.0
G. Debt repayments (govt. loans only)	77.2	39.8	53.3	29.6
H. "Earned" exchange deficit plus debt repayments (F+G)	109.7	154.3	175.3	132.6
I. Foreign aid and loans	57.2	80.0	91.8	76.2
J. Increase in reserves	-52.5	-74.3	-83.5	-66.4
Four-year totals			-276.7	

a. Excludes military imports, loans to the Ministry of Defense, and U. S. military aid. Year begins March 21.

b. Estimated

c. Includes small exports by National Iranian Oil Company.

d. Includes \$25 million bonus for concessions granted to Pan American Oil Company.

e. Finances by borrowing from IMF, increases in short term indebtedness, and exporting gold.

SOURCE: George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

This increase in demand for Persian carpets could perhaps be understood in the light of the increased prosperity of the Germans and the resultant demand for luxury goods and conspicuous consumption.

The recurring fluctuations in the amount of major non-petroleum export commodities for Iran⁴⁵ can be attributed to a variety of factors. So far as fruits are concerned, due to the variable climatic conditions of Northern Iran, especially during early Spring, it is not always possible to have the expected harvests. One unseasonable frost or snow could damage a large portion of the harvest. Cotton is also susceptible to natural disasters and pests. For example, during 1967, the cotton harvest of Iran was estimated to be 20 per cent below the original expected level due to pests. Thus, three of the most important non-petroleum exports are dependent on pests and climatic conditions. Another factor, also contributing to the fluctuation of the export of dry and fresh fruits is the frequent variation of demand for such goods on the world market.

So far as the export of carpets are concerned, fluctuations are not so severe. On the whole, the amount of carpets exported by Iran to Western Europe and North America will closely follow, and be directly proportional to, the level of economic prosperity in the respective importing

⁴⁵See Table 42.

countries. Iran's ability to produce carpets, on the other hand, seems to be inversely proportional to the level of economic prosperity in Iran--since the purely human costs (child labour, subsistent wage levels, inhuman working conditions), which make the carpet trade highly profitable, might become less tolerable, or more avoidable, as a result of increased prosperity.

The role of petroleum in the Iranian exports has been steadily growing during the past decade. What is also important in the pattern of petroleum exports is that the ratio of crude oil exports to the export of petroleum products has been increasing. This tendency basically means that Iran, by placing an increased emphasis on the export of crude oil, has put herself in a comparatively disadvantageous position. Between 1956 to 1962 the wholesale price of crude oil dropped by 8 per cent.⁴⁶ This is not only true in case of crude oil but also with regard to other primary commodities. Just to take several other export items of Iran would show that during the same period, the wholesale price of tobacco dropped by 31⁴⁷ per cent; wool by 19 per cent; and cotton by 20 per cent.

However, the wholesale prices of produced commodities had not only increased relative to the prices of primary

⁴⁶See Table 44

⁴⁷Ibid.

TABLE 44

SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES OF CERTAIN
PRIMARY COMMODITIES*

<u>Year/Commodity</u>	<u>Tobacco</u> ¹	<u>Wool</u> ²	<u>Cotton</u> ³	<u>Crude Oil</u> ⁴
1956	72.00	63.40	45.90	1.97
1957	73.30	69.90	51.20	---
1958	70.90	47.80	46.00	2.08
1959	64.20	49.00	44.60	1.92
1960	52.70	49.10	46.00	1.87
1961	49.50	50.50	43.40	1.80
1962	49.00	51.10	36.60	1.80
Price Shift	-23.00	-12.30	-9 30	-.17
% Price Shift	-31.00	-19.00	-20.00	-8

¹ Turkish Export Prices

² Australian Export Prices

³ Egyptian Export Prices

⁴ Saudi Arabian Export Prices

SOURCE: General Statistics, Statistical Bulletins, OECD,
January 1964, pp. 61-66.

commodities, but also absolutely. For example, fuel oil and gasoline, which are both petroleum products, had increased in value by 26 and 8 per cent respectively.⁴⁸ Along the same lines, the wholesale price of steel had increased by 14 per cent and that of pig iron by 15 per cent.

If the observed pattern of the decline in prices of primary commodities and the relative increase in prices of produced commodities be a continuous one, as they seem to have been historically,⁴⁹ in the long run Iran which produces primary products for export will be in a serious disadvantage. This trend can be readily observed in the relative shifts in Iranian Import-Export prices⁵⁰ during the years 1956-1965. Iranian Import-Export prices have both declined during this period. However, while import prices have only dropped by 4 per cent, the drop in export prices has been 11 per cent. Another way of looking at it is that in 1965 Iran received for an average unit of export 7 per cent (11-4) less than she received in 1956.⁵¹

⁴⁸See Tables 45, 46 and Chart 1.

⁴⁹See Raul Prebisch's "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, (February, 1962), pp. 1, 4-6. Also see "Post War Price Relations in Trade Between Underdeveloped and Industrial Countries," U.N. document E/CN. 1 Sub. 3/W5, 23 (February, 1949).

⁵⁰See Table 47, Chart 2.

⁵¹Ibid.

TABLE 45

A COMPARISON OF SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES
OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

(base year 1956)

<u>Year/Commodity</u>	<u>Crude Oil</u>	<u>Fuel Oil</u>	<u>Gasoline</u>
1956	100.00	100.00	100.00
1957	-	120.00	111.00
1958	105.00	101.00	100.00
1959 - --	97.00	103.00	101.00
1960	94.00	106.00	101.00
1961	91.00	122.00	104.00
1962	91.00	126.00	108.00

SOURCE: Same as Tables 44 and 46.
Computed on the basis of Tables 44 and 46.

TABLE 46

SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES OF CERTAIN
PRODUCED COMMODITIES*

<u>Year/Commodity</u>	<u>Fuel Oil</u> ¹	<u>Gasoline</u> ²	<u>Steel</u> ³	<u>Pig Iron</u> ⁴
1956	4.29	18.46	96.90	50.40
1957	5.15	20.59	101.90	55.20
1958	4.35	18.50	105.90	56.60
1959	4.45	18.75	105.90	56.30
1960	4.59	18.75	105.90	56.30
1961	5.25	19.37	110.30	56.80
1962	5.43	19.98	111.20	58.40
Price Shift	+1.12	+1.52	+14.30	+8.00
% Price Shift	+26.00	+8.00	+14.00	+15.00

¹United Kingdom Export Prices

²United Kingdom Export Prices

³German (Federal Republic) Export Prices

⁴United Kingdom Export Prices

*SOURCE: General Statistics, Statistical Bulletins, OECD,
January, 1964, pp. 61-66.

CHART 1

A COMPARISON OF SHIFTS IN THE WHOLESALE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ON WORLD MARKET
(1956 = 100)




TABLE 47

SHIFTS IN IRANIAN IMPORT-EXPORT PRICES*


(base year 1956)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Import Prices</u>	<u>Export Prices</u>
1956	100	100
1957	91	99
1958	85	91
1959	--	--
1960	88	85
1961	91	85
1962	93	85
1963	95	87
1964	96	88
1965	96	89
Total Shift	-4	-11

SOURCE: International Financial Statistics. The Statistics Division, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. The above chart was computed and drawn from various issues basing their price indices on the years 1953 and 1958 respectively.

CHART 2

SHIFTS IN IRANIAN IMPORT-EXPORT PRICES
(base year 1956)



One answer to the above problem would seem to be a union among those countries which produce similar primary products for export. The aim of such a union would be, through joint effort, to regulate the prices of primary products on the world market in order to insure a fairly stable source of income to the producers. However, since this must necessarily involve agreement among a large number of countries of the world, at the present time it does not seem to be a likely prospect in the near future. An attempt in this direction, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), has basically failed to accomplish its purpose due to the lack of agreement amongst the members as well as its manipulation by the large oil companies of Europe and North America which like to see OPEC remain impotent.

A more realistic approach on the part of Iran would be to place a large emphasis on industrialization and the eventual export of produced commodities.

VII. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MODERNIZATION

Any consideration of the role of government in the process of modernization must be in conjunction with an examination of the prevalent socio-political structure in Iran.¹ Until and unless one has a clear picture of the existing power structure and the processes rooted in such power relationships, the cursory study of the Iranian government would net nothing but confusion. It is because of this that a lot of observers and students of Iranian politics, who have not examined the conditions in concrete power terms, simply give up when it comes to fundamental observations: As the London Economist once observed about Iranian politics, "Anyone who really knows what is going on in Iran must be grossly misinformed."

As we have seen in the study of socio-political structure in Iran, the really revolutionary elements entering the Iranian scene are the new working and middle classes. These elements by virtue of their composition and skills make up the modern sector. Although the government is by definition a modern structure in underdeveloped settings, any discrepancy which might exist between its modern role and traditional performance in Iran may be attributed to the traditional

¹See Chapter 2.

tendencies and controls which are exercised upon and within such a structure.

The Dimensions of the Public Sector

Although few bureaucracies in the world are as old as the Iranian bureaucracy, the modern administrative structure of Iran is only about 50 years old. In this period, the activities of the government have expanded to become the biggest business in the country. The government is now the largest owner of cultivated land and forests. All important subterranean resources belong to the government. The largest insurance company and most of the major banks are state enterprises. The major communication media (post, telegraph, television and radio) are primarily state owned and operated. The controls exercised by the government on foreign trade, as well as government monopoly in certain areas of domestic trade such as tobacco, the ownership of the railways, the airlines, and the oil industry, all go hand in hand to make the role of the government vital to all aspects of economic life in Iran.²

Reliable statistics are not available about the number of government employees. In fact, Dr. Goudarzi, the head of

²For some of the problems emanating from the large size of the governmental sector in Iran see Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic Development in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers (Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1958)

High Administrative Council said: "If you ask the government how many employees it has and how many receive their salaries from the government, they will be unable to give you any information..."³ The closest thing to reliable figures are the result of 1956 National Census figures which placed the number of government employees at 207,140. By May, 1962, the number of government employees was estimated at 300,000.⁴ If we consider that the above figures represent the true picture of the situation, then between 1956 and 1962 the governmental bureaucracy has been expanding approximately at the annual rate of 7.5 per cent.

Assuming that the structure of the governmental bureaucracy has been expanding at the same rate (7.5 per centum) continuously, taking May, 1962, figure (300,000) as a base, the total number of government employees in May, 1968, would be 435,000. Of course, in all of the above calculations the employees of the Ministry of War and the armed forces generally have not been included. If we assume the size of the Iranian armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmery) and the Ministry of War personnel be about 2000,000,⁵ then the total number of government employees by

³Ettela'at, May 31, 1962.

⁴Kayhan, May 26, 1962.

⁵A 1964 estimate of the Armed Forces alone places their number at 170,000. See Statesman's Yearbook, 1967 (New York, 1968).

May, 1968, would be 635,000. That is, one out of every forty-two Iranian is a government employee.

Another indicator to the size of the government is the amount of money it spends. In 1960's the government expenditures, on the average, have accounted for about 18 per cent of the annual national income.⁶

Government As A Bureaucracy

The 1956 Census provides an interesting insight into the educational background of the government employees.⁷ The bulk of them have little or no education. This fact makes any interpretation of the role of the government in the process of modernization more difficult; since the government which is supposed to be a modern institution itself embodies individuals whom by virtue of their education can be considered traditional or parochial in outlook.

In Iran, recruitment to government jobs is often unrelated to need. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of the employees are superfluous in their present jobs.⁸ Thus, many government employees only report for pay. The rest of the time they work elsewhere. Next to the ownership of land, before the land reform in 1962, government work was considered

⁶See Table 48.

⁷See Table 49.

⁸See Herbert H. Vreeland, ed., Iran (New Haven: Country Survey Series; Human Relations Area Files, 1957), particularly pp. 78-80.

TABLE 48

NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES*

(in billion rials)

<u>Year</u>	<u>I</u> <u>National</u> <u>Income</u>	<u>II</u> <u>Gross National</u> <u>Product</u>	<u>III</u> <u>Government</u> <u>Expenditures</u>	<u>IV</u> <u>III as a Per</u> <u>Centum of I</u>
1958	-	-	40	-
1959	256	289	48	15
1960	281	381	53	19
1961	302	340	55	18
1963	333	376	56	17
1964	362	407	64	17
1965	396	446	75	19
1966	-	-	102	-
1967	-	-	123	-

*All the figures are to the closest billion.

SOURCES: United Nations' Statistical Yearbooks, 1964, 1965 & 1966 (New York: United Nations' 1965, 1966 & 1967 respectively). Also, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1962 & 1967 (Bangkok: United Nations', 1963 & 1968 respectively).

TABLE 49

THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES*

<u>Level</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Cumulative Per Cent</u>
Illiterate	38 811	21.2	21.2
Literate, but no formal education	30 000	16.4	37.6
Three years of primary school	11 000	6.0	43.6
Four to six years of school	40 000	21.8	65.4
Nine years of education	30 000	16.4	81.8
High School graduates	22 000	12.0	93.8
Bachelor's Degree or equivalent	8 000	4.4	98.2
Master's degree or equivalent	1 000	0.5	98.7
With doctorate degree	2 500	1.3	100.0
Total of employees included	183 311	100.0	

*The above table was based on the findings of the 1956 National Census. The total number of government employees, excluding the military, was 207,140.

to have the best security as one source of steady income.⁹ After the land reforms the value of government jobs could have only gone up.

The lack of necessary planning for government manpower needs, as we have seen, is indicated by the attitude exhibited by the government towards education. Since people in the centre of the power structure have always eyed education with suspicion, they have not yet begun to consider the educational system as an instrument for manpower training. Thus, for example, while government ranks are swelling with civil servants whose level of skill and productivity is low, due to the lack of attention to teacher training programmes, the Iranian educational system is desperately under-staffed.

Although according to Civil Service Law¹⁰ the minimum salary of the civil servant is 4,900 and the maximum 9,500 rials (75 rials = 1 dollar), the law is interpreted very liberally. Some civil servants only receive a third of the minimum,¹¹ while some others get more than fifty times as much as the maximum. For example, the twelve members of the National Iranian Oil Company's Board of Directors have each a salary which is not less than 120,000 rials per month.

⁹Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁰Civil Service and Personnel Codes of Iran, edited and compiled by Ahmad Kamangar, (Tehran, 1964 in Persian).

¹¹Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965), p. 560.

In 1964, some of the ambassadors received as much as 500,000 rials per month.¹²

Despite the low level of government salaries, in comparison to the cost of living, in 1958 about 48 per cent of government employees owned the houses in which they lived. This could be explained either by the fact that the employees had other legal sources of income, or used their governmental posts to acquire illegal income. In other words, many of them engaged in corrupt practices: "on lower levels, the common practice is to take sums for expediting the legitimate business of private individuals, and on the higher levels, of taking cuts on contracts between agencies of the government and local and foreign concerns."¹³

Despite the expansion in civil services, for several years Iranian civil servants have not had a period of promotion and corresponding salary increases. In 1964, a magazine reported that the government owed about 12 billion rials in back-pay for these annual increases.¹⁴ However, due to the peculiar socio-political conditions, those who most suffer economically are the lower middle classes which occupy the bulk of minor positions in the governmental bureaucracy.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Masoud Heidari, "The Present Civil Service of Iran," research paper (University of Pittsburgh, 1965), p. 81.

¹⁴Iran Almanac, 1964, op. cit., p. 562.

As the bureaucracy becomes inflated, it becomes easier to hide inefficiency. Particularly since decision making is very hierarchical, it is wiser for civil servants, minor or major, not to make any decisions. The "buck" is passed, horizontally and vertically in the bureaucratic structure, as far as it can go. Thus, the citizen who has the misfortune of dealing with the bureaucracy becomes totally frustrated, if not devastated. That is, unless one is able to get through the bureaucratic red tape by the pull of bribery or the people he knows.

The inefficiencies and injustices of the system are most evidenced in the judicial system where long and unnecessary formalities are particularly harsh on the poorer people who can neither afford to bribe the authorities nor know anyone of influence who can intervene on their behalf. Consequently, the defendants remain in prison for a long time before their case can be heard. In 1963, for example, an old man was tried by a Tehran court for a case which had been pending for 22 years.¹⁵

Between 1952 and 1959, a back-log of 255,874 cases had been accumulated in the Iranian courts.¹⁶ If we assume that of all the prior cases in the courts' history an equal number

¹⁵Ibid., p. 116

¹⁶See Table 50.

TABLE 50

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES IN IRANIAN COURTS
(Civil, Criminal, etc.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cases Opened</u>	<u>Cases Closed</u>	<u>Back-log</u>
1952-1953	316 000	301 368	14 632
1953-1954	376 060	307 220	68 840
1954-1955	346 959	320 886	26 073
1955-1956	574 025	535 781	38 244
1956-1957	647 653	610 043	37 610
1957-1958	746 811	727 991	18 820
1958-1959	892 851	859 191	33 655
1959-1960	850 000	829 000	21 000
Total			258 874

SOURCE: Based on figures in Iran Almanac, 1964 (Tehran, 1965), p. 116.

had remained unresolved, by 1959 there would have been over half a million unfinished cases in the Iranian courts. In addition to these, there were 850,000 new cases opened that year. All of this means that in that year, close to 1,400,000 cases had been tied-up in the court system. Further, if we assume that there were only two people involved in every case, then that year at least 2,800,000 people or one out of every eight Iranians, were caught in the bureaucratic web of the Ministry of Justice.

It is this kind of bureaucracy, aimless, inefficient and corrupt, which forms the machinery of the government. The primary motive of the establishment is survival. Thus, on the whole, the power elite is willing to live with all the shortcomings of the bureaucracy with the proviso that the bureaucracy would remain loyal. It is not that all the members of the bureaucracy are corrupt or inefficient. But the weight of the traditional bureaucratic patterns--i.e., where bureaucrats are the personal representatives of a personal ruler and operate at his whim--strongly militates against any kind of initiative, efficiency or honesty on the part of the civil servant. The government has no larger purpose than stabilizing political fortunes by rewarding its friends and placating its enemies through government employment.¹⁷

¹⁷See Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 341.

Thus, the prevailing condition is that of an ambiguous political regime maintaining itself in power "despite its apparent rejection by most of the educated younger generation and despite frequent predictions, over several years, of its imminent fall. There is not little corruption in public life, at all levels. Chronic instability marks the holding of public office. Ministers shuffle on and off the stage in a sort of perpetual musical chairs of personal inefficiencies, the low salaries, the low morale of a badly inflated bureaucracy. Everything, throughout the country turns on Tehran. Local government may also be said not to exist."¹⁸

Some Western scholars attribute the lack of emergence of modern and efficient bureaucracies in the underdeveloped countries mainly to the absence of know-how in administrative science. However, the problem is much more fundamental than that. It has to do with who holds the balance of power in any given country. Obviously, the creation of a talented, honest and independent civil service, dedicated to contractual, rather than familial, impersonal, rather than personal service would undermine the power structure of the traditional elite. Thus, it will not be permitted. Such a new civil service, in Halpern's words, can come into its own only with the achievement of political power by the new middle class.

¹⁸George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) p. 4.

Sharing the latter's interest in national mobilization and transformation because it is a very part of that class, its values make it a partisan of that class as well as its instrument of government.¹⁹

In most Middle Eastern countries the new middle class has attained power only since the Second World War. Exceptions are in Turkey, where the middle class came to power much earlier, and Iran, where its fortunes were reversed in 1953.²⁰

The Government As A Planner

The effects of the bureaucratic shortcomings are strongly felt in the area of planning. Following the Second World War, in order to side-step the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the regular government agencies, the Plan Organization was formed. Its role originally was to be a planning and coordinating body: supervising the execution of the Seven Year Plan.

However, in practice, under both the First and the Second Plans (1948-54 and 1955-62) Plan Organization executed most of the plans on its own, with little participation by the government ministries.²¹ The First Plan coincided with

¹⁹Baldwin, op. cit., p. 347.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 347-348.

²¹Ibid., p. 23.

the nationalization of the oil industries and thus the related funds were cut due to a sharp decline in oil exports. But this shortage of funds was not the only stumbling block. In May, 1950, even prior to the nationalization, Mr. Max Weston Thornburg, an American consultant, wrote in his private diary:

Today Plan Organization is so nearly completely dominated or victimized by either political or personal interests...that...there probably is little to choose between the Plan Organization and any government organization.²²

To be sure, the Plan Organization has accomplished certain things. Several dams have been built, elaborate plans have been made about improvement in the communication and transportation facilities of the country. However, its accomplishments have been much less than the level of expectations from it. Aside from the basic bureaucratic problems ailing the Organization, there is the lack of purpose and defined objectives. This is particularly true of the first two plans which were merely allocation of funds to be spent in various areas of the economy. A comprehensive planning had been lacking. By the time the Third Plan was being drafted, however, a more sophisticated staff had been gathered and definitions and objectives had become clearer. The planners were also more aware of some of the problems involved

²²As quoted by Baldwin, Ibid., p. 33.

with the drawing and the implementation of a plan. Thus, the objectives of the Third Plan were expressed as follows:

We want the greatest possible increase in national income which the deployment of our initial resources permits, subject perhaps to the qualification that particularly poor regions of the country would receive extra help. The "greatest possible increase in national income" leaves too much in the air however. Since the increase is non-consumable output, in inventories and in work-in-progress are counted as increases in national income, relatively high growth rates may be obtained without concurrent improvements in consumption. Under present circumstances it seems best to aim at roughly equi-proportional ²³ advances in production and consumption...

However, when it comes to actually carrying out the plans, the lack of dedication and compatibility of the whole power elite to the ideals of planning has made any kind of progress very difficult. The problem is not so much scarcity of skill or know-how, "there are many able, well intentioned men scattered through public and private life in Iran," but they are not "where it counts, at the centre of political and social power."²⁴

Mr. George Baldwin, a member of Harvard Advisory Group in Iran, after three years of study (from 1958 to 1961) came to the following conclusion concerning the future of planning in Iran:

²³"Notes on the Third Plan," August, 1959.

²⁴Baldwin, op. cit., p. 203.

...The past decade strongly suggests that the growth of constructive social values and new institutions will be disappointing until there are fundamental changes in the distribution of political power in Iran.²⁵

Governmental Priorities

Between 1958 and 1967 the government expenditure had almost increased by threefold.²⁶ The allocation of funds in the budget is perhaps one good indication of the government's order of priorities. During the last decade the major priorities, in this respect, have been allotted to the area of defence. In the years under examination, about 23 per cent of the government expenditures, on the average, have been in the area of defence.²⁷

Iran has no outstanding territorial disputes with her neighbours and the relations are generally friendly. Despite claims in 1950's about the necessity of meeting the military challenge of Communism, it is generally understood that Iran, by herself, will never be able to resist any invasion from the Soviet Union.

²⁵Baldwin, op. cit., p. 204.

²⁶See Table 51.

²⁷Ibid. According to the figures in Table 4, in the years 1958, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1966 & 1967 the defence expenditure constituted 21, 24, 25, 23, 22 and 25 per centum of the total government expenditures, respectively.

TABLE 51

GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURE IN IRAN*
(million rials)

Expenditure/Year	1958	1961	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Interest on Public debt.	249	1 632	1 419	1 636	1 406	1 350	1 327
Defence.	8 378	13 084	14 064	14 604	17 163	22 410	30 219
Grants and shared taxes.	629	428	428	--	--	--	
Subsidies for price and income stability	464	344	917	608	347	328	43 105
Contribution to government enterprises	1 563	819	292	1 347	2 543	307	
Other current expenditures	11 642	20 316	20 865	21 100	33 334	39 337	
Capital expenditure:							
Capital outlay of							
Plan Organization. . .	12 263	12 502	14 966	12 286	14 323	27 929	
Other direct capital outlays.	3 181	1 759	2 048	468	337	202	
Grants for capital purposes	1 160	1 969	723	1 102	1 614	6 714	48 208
Loans for capital purposes	130	1 908	21	--	3 657	3 690	
Total	39 660	54 761	55 743	64 151	74 725	102 266	122,859

*Years ending 10 March. Data refer to general budget, Plan Organization Account and extrabudgetary accounts. Defence: 1967 including security services. Subsidies for price and income stability: cereal administration deficit. Grants and loans for capital purposes: to government enterprises and nationalized industries. 75 rials = U. S. \$1.

SOURCE: Table 191, p. 640, United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1967 (New York, 1968).

Thus, considering the composition of the traditional ruling classes in Iran,²⁸ the heavy emphasis on defence may only be attributed to the internal insecurity felt by the power elite. Even in agriculture, where the government has allegedly assumed its most ambitious reform programmes, the allocation of funds has been insignificant: about one-twenty-ninth of that allocated to the Ministry of War in 1963 when the land-reform was supposed to be moving full speed.²⁹

Fears of internal subversion and revolution has also made the United States pour a large amount of military and economic aid in the coffers of the Iranian government. The pace of aid, during the period under study, particularly quickened following the military coup d-etate in Iraq in 1958. When, during the same year, the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Tehran, before he departed he had promised Iranian government 450 late model tanks, and more than 150 new model canons without bothering to advise the U. S. military men who complained again and again that the Iranian Army was being drowned in hardware that they could not handle and could not afford.³⁰

It is apparent that the need felt by the government in the area of defence is immediate. Of course, another way of

²⁸See Chapter 2.

²⁹See Table 52.

³⁰Harrison Salisbury, The New York Times, (December 4, 1961).

TABLE 52

FROM THE BUDGET OF 1963*

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Amount Of Allocation</u>
The Ministry of War	13 771
The Gendarmery.	2 555
The Police Forces	2 588
The Customs and Customs Polices	785
Total	<u>19 699</u>
 The Ministry of Education	 1 649
The Ministry of Agriculture	468
The Ministry of Health.	1 383

*The fiscal year begins on March 21.

SOURCE: Ettela'at, March 17, 1963.

eliminating opposition would be to eliminate their basic complaints by spending more and more on health, education, permitting greater political freedoms, and reforming the corrupt bureaucratic structures. The elite cannot take these longer term solutions to the existing problems concerned with instability, since doing so would mean a greater democratization of the distribution of political power and the eventual loss of monopoly over its exercise by the elite. A closer look at the government budget and a comparison of the allocations to defence, on the one hand, and education, agriculture and health, on the other, would further clarify the order of priorities.³¹

Reformism in Government Circles

The level of government performance being what it is, every cabinet and every minister who comes into office carries with it, or with him, even for propaganda's sake, the banner of reform. Of course, there have been, in the ruling circles of Tehran, certain men of ability and imagination like Dr. Ali Amini, Mr. Abolhassan Ebtehaj, or Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, who had wanted to emphasize the more long range road to the stability of the Establishment. But any kind of stability of the system has to be accompanied with a decentralization and

³¹See Tables 51 and 52.

dispersion of power, which itself is the anti-thesis of the system.

Mr. Ebtehaj, the head of the Plan Organization in 1950's, who was described by The New York Times as "a leading economist, a banker of international reputation and one of Iran's most distinguished servants,"³² was dismissed because in speeches and to visitors he had openly criticized "the corruption, graft and suppression of freedom in the highest levels of the Iranian government, even within the Shah's court."³³ After his dismissal, Mr. Ebtehaj was summarily arrested on charges of having "exceeded his authority and wasted funds."³⁴

Dr. Ali Amini, the Prime Minister, and Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, followed the same fate. Dr. Arsanjani had criticized the allocation of insufficient funds for the land reform program. Dr. Amini had also gone as far as saying that he had "no doubt about the integrity, honesty and virtues of Mr. Ebtehaj,"³⁵ a man who by this time was most despised within the power elite.

³²The New York Times, (January 19, 1962).

³³Time, (January 26, 1962).

³⁴The New York Times (January 10, 1962).

³⁵The New York Times (January 4, 1962).

The basic reason for the failure of such reform movements seems to be that, even though the individuals who led them were from within the power elite, they were becoming too powerful and threatened the existing distribution of power within the ruling elite.³⁶

Thus, the apparent contradiction within the existing system is, on the one hand, its authoritarian-totalitarian nature demanding an obedient, stable polity, loyal to the existing power structure. On the other hand, there are the tremendous pressures for modernization, demanding a dispersion of economic and political power, and a total change in existing structural patterns. What is working for the latter forces are the increased level of aspirations created by the expansion of communications within as well as without the polity. In turn, these escalating expectations are frustrated by the power elite which wants to maintain its privileges. What is working for the power elite are the security forces and the governmental bureaucracy which are at the same time subject to the above-mentioned frustrations. The ensuing condition resulting from the above contradictions embodies the dynamics of political and social change, which is the subject of the concluding chapter.

³⁶The New Statesman, on September 20, 1963, stated that the reason for the dismissal of Premier Amini and Dr. Arsanjani was that "they were becoming too powerful."

VIII. THE DYNAMICS OF THE REGION

Limitations of Current Studies of Political Change

Since this is a study of modernization--and modernization inherently implies change--the focus of this study has been an examination of the nature of changes in the human resources as well as the changes in the environment within which men live. Since the nature of change from a traditional to a more modern setting is so often cataclysmic, the process under study is frequently referred to as 'revolutionary change.'

We have already clarified the notions of modernization which underlies this study in the first chapter. In recent times, a large number of articles and essays have been written about the circumstances and causes of revolutions.¹ Many of these studies place a great deal of emphasis upon the acts which symbolize or dramatize revolutionary change such as disorder and bloodshed. Consequently they lose sight of the

¹See for instance Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Revolution: Nomos VIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965); Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press); James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press, 1964); and Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

important connections which exist between the various socio-economic, cultural and political forces which have been at work for many years in transforming the order. Due to these shortcomings, the resultant studies exhibit mechanistic characteristics and often lack the rigor as well as the necessary flexibility in explaining these fundamental changes. Due to this focus on outward manifestations of the polity, it is often difficult to tell the difference between a coup d'etat, a riot, a rebellion, or a genuine revolution.

However, it must be noted that comparative politics is not the only area of political science hampered by mechanistic outlooks. A large number of recent studies in judicial behavior, for instance, have adopted similar mechanistic approaches by focusing attention primarily on role playing within the court room, at the expense of ignoring the larger significance of the role of the judiciary in the larger social context.²

Thus, too much emphasis and concentration on the act (or acts) of rebellion by itself cannot tell us much about the real forces at work. The conditions precedent and

²For examples of this approach see: Glendon Schubert, "A Solution to the Indeterminate Factorial Resolution of Thurstone and Degan's Study of the Supreme Court," Behavioral Science, Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 448-458 and Samuel Krislov, "Power and Coalition in a Nine-Man Body," American Behavioral Scientist 6, 8 (April, 1963), pp. 24-26.

antecedent to a revolution must also be studied carefully.³

As we have previously pointed out, modernization, or revolutionary movements which accompany the process, are multi-faceted phenomena which don't easily lend themselves to single factor examinations. However, it has been popular in recent years in the West to attribute all such revolutionary movements to single factors such as nationalism. Chalmers Johnson, for instance, argues that it was Chinese nationalism, not the Communist ideology, that culminated in the Chinese Revolution. He argues that the same thing happened in Yugoslavia after the close of the Second World War.⁴ Even if we accept similar explanations of revolutions and civil strife, such acceptance would place a tremendous historical as well as geographic limitation upon its applicability. It is historically limited since nationalism itself is something quite new in human history and may not even survive the twentieth century. The geographic limitation upon the applicability of such a theory is that all revolutionary movements have not occurred subsequent to the occupation by foreign troops

³Crane Brinton in his Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1965) does an excellent job of comparing the various stages of the American, the French, the English, and the Russian *Revolutions.

⁴See Chalmers Johnson's Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, op. cit.

like the cases of the German occupation of Yugoslavia and the Japanese occupation of China. Modernization is a historically continuous process within the world wide context.

In the studies concerning revolutions which have appeared in American social science journals, there is an absence of references to Marx. This is particularly noticeable and surprising since Marx's writings have had, and continue to have, a tremendous impact upon the revolutionary elite throughout the world.

Another major shortcoming of a large number of studies which have come out recently is their preoccupation with the elite.⁵ This approach also has a great deal of liabilities connected with it. First, most of the studies of this kind have focused on the power elite--i.e., the government leaders. Whereas in such polities, undergoing change, often the potential power elite, who represent the newly arising political forces, but are not as yet in the control of political power, are ignored. This lack of attention to the dualistic nature of the elite (actual versus potential), robs any study of much insight and dynamism. Furthermore, a major problem with the elite-oriented studies is that they distract much attention from the fundamental socio-political processes going on throughout the polity. These revolutionary

⁵See Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit.

processes involve the totality of the human resources of the polity. The role assumed by the elite is, to a large extent, in response to the aforementioned popular forces.

This chapter in its analysis of the dynamics of the region will be concerned with basically two types of theories which consider the totality of society before coming to any specific conclusions concerning patterns of change. In this sense they are not elite oriented. The first approach is based on Professor Oliver Benson's theory of escalating expectations which views the condition of a polity as being that of a balance between pressure and power.⁶ The second approach is based on a modification of the concept of the new middle class as developed and presented by Professor Manfred Halpern.⁷

Escalating Expectations

As the title of Professor Benson's article suggests, it is in the same spirit as the communication theories of Deutsch, Pye and Lerner to which we have occasionally referred previously. In this respect it is concerned with such factors which contribute to an increase in one's consciousness such

⁶Oliver Benson, "Escalating Expectations, "Symposium on Great World Problems of the Next Decade, Department of State, April 25-27, 1966. 35 pages. unpublished.

⁷See Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in North Africa and the Middle East (Princeton University Press, 1963).

as as newspapers, cinemas, literacy, radios, books, school population, etc.⁸ However, the article is not only concerned with the awareness factors, which may categorize 'inputs'--since it produces an increase in demands placed upon the system--but also with the value distribution or the 'output' of the political system. The indicators for the latter are Gross National Product per capita, energy consumption per capita, the number of social services, daily caloric intake, steel consumption per capita, as well as the number of doctors and teachers.⁹

Thus, the study is concerned with the totality of the political processes, inputs and outputs, or what Daniel Lerner describes as the want/get ratio.¹⁰ The want/get ratio has often been used as a theoretical proposition for social and political unrest and discontent. However, Professor Benson's study is concerned with translating such a theoretical scheme into concrete mathematical terms.

⁸See Table 54.

⁹See Tables 53 and 55. The number of teachers per 100,000 population has been added here because of the tremendous demand for education within the region. For example, in Iran every year close to 100,000 high school graduates competes in university entrance examinations. Yet only a few thousand are admitted. The same high demands are observed in all other levels of education since high educational levels are universally identified with higher status and income.

¹⁰See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1958).

TABLE 53

VALUE DISTRIBUTION MATRIX

<u>Country</u>	<u>GNP per capita</u> (US dollars)	<u>Energy Consumption</u> (equi. kg/capita coal)	<u>1965 Social Services</u>
Iran	224	391	4
Iraq	250	581	4
Turkey	236	348	3
Japan	711	1 783	4
Lebanon	218	747	4
Syria (SAR)	188	303	2
Egypt (UAR)	110	301	2
Jordan	117	291	1
Israel	1 084	2 239	4
Regional MEAN	303	650	3

<u>Country</u>	<u>Daily Caloric Intake</u> per capita	<u>Steel Consumption</u> kg/per capita	<u>Doctors per 100,000</u> Population	<u>Teachers per 100,000</u> Population
Iran	2 050	30	30	290
Iraq	2 140	26	19	468
Turkey	3 110	27	32	225
Japan	2 320	294	107	779
Lebanon	2 170	111	74	598
Syria (SAR)	2 340	16	20	511
Egypt (UAR)	2 930	26	42	455
Jordan	2 280	33	19	595
Israel	2 830	187	237	1 270
Regional MEAN	2 481	57	59	555

SOURCES: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New York, 1967). The Middle East and North Africa, 1966-67 (London: Europa Publications, 1966). Britannica Book of the Year 1967 (London, 1968). Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1965 (New York, 1966).

TABLE 54

AWARENESS INDICATORS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Newspaper Circulation per 1,000</u>	<u>Annual Cinema Attendance per capita</u>	<u>Per Cent Literate</u>	<u>Radio Receivers per 1,000</u>
Iran	15	2.5	22.8	91
Iraq	12	1.2	52.0	121
Turkey	45	1.1	39.6	83
Japan	451	3.8	97.8	209
Lebanon	97	13.8	47.5	143
Syria (SAR)	21	2.0	38.4	195
Egypt (UAR)	15	2.1	26.7	166
Jordan	8	3.1	32.4	189
Israel	143	19.6	85.0	136
Regional MEAN*	45	5.7	43.1	136

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Daily Papers</u>	<u>Books, First edition</u>	<u>School Pop. per 1,000</u>	<u>Trade (Exp. & Imp. in \$ per capita)</u>
Iran	12	986	88	89
Iraq	7	286	129	160
Turkey	372	5 744	142	30
Japan	172	24 203	217	17
Lebanon	34	373	144	222
Syria (SAR)	3	458	166	70
Egypt (UAR)	10	3 478	151	52
Jordan	6	184	189	91
Israel	21	1 001	228	469
Regional MEAN	58	1 564	155	148

*In arriving at the regional mean for this table and table 53 figures for Japan were excluded from the calculations.

SOURCES: Same as Table 53.

TABLE 55

RELATIVE VALUE DISTRIBUTION MATRIX^a

<u>Country</u>	<u>GNP per capita</u>	<u>Energy</u>	<u>Social Services</u> ^b	<u>Caloric Intake</u> ^c
Iran	73.9	60.2	80	27.5
Iraq	82.5	89.4	80	32.0
Turkey	77.9	57.5	60	80.5
Japan	234.7	247.3	80	41.0
Lebanon	71.9	114.9	80	33.5
Syria (SAR)	62.0	46.6	40	42.0
Egypt (UAR)	36.3	46.3	40	71.5
Jordan	38.6	44.8	20	39.0
Israel	357.8	344.5	80	66.5

<u>Country</u>	<u>Steel</u>	<u>Doctors</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Mean Value</u> ^d
Iran	52.6	50.8	52.3	56.8
Iraq	45.6	32.2	84.3	63.7
Turkey	47.4	54.2	45.9	60.5
Japan	515.8	181.4	140.4	88.7
Lebanon	194.7	125.4	107.7	83.6
Syria (SAR)	28.1	33.9	92.1	49.2
Egypt (UAR)	45.6	71.2	82.0	56.1
Jordan	57.9	32.2	107.2	47.5
Israel	328.1	401.7	228.8	92.4

(a) per cent of regional mean.

(b) the 5 types of services reported were taken as 100%.

(c) scaled from 1500 to 3500 calories.

(d) maximum impact of an item limited to 100%.

Yet Professor Benson has gone beyond the purely want/get ratio by introducing the military power as a further factor.¹¹ In order to arrive at comparable indices, the absolute value distribution and awareness and military matrices have been translated into relative regional matrices.¹² In calculating relative matrices here, we have used the regional mean ($\bar{X}$) since the world mean for the same indices were not available.¹³ The resultant Value Satisfaction Quotient (VSQ) indicates that regionally Iran and Iraq have the lowest and Turkey the highest VSQ¹⁴--with Japan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria falling in between in the order of increasing VSQ. However, as we have pointed out previously, the ultimate measure of 'action' or 'inaction' in the polity is not the VSQ, but rather the pressure and power scales which are the mean of the relative military scale with the relative VSQ and Index of Value Distribution, respectively.¹⁵ Finally, through a Markov Matrix and a Fixed Point Vector, the probability for the polity remaining in the state of action or inaction in the more or less distant future is ascertained.¹⁶

¹¹See Table 57.

¹²See Tables 54, 56 and 57.

¹³Figures for Japan were not used in calculating the regional mean.

¹⁴See Table 58.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶See Table 59 and the related hypothesis.

TABLE 56

RELATIVE AWARENESS MATRIX^a

<u>Country</u>	<u>Daily Newspapers</u>	<u>Books</u>	<u>Radios</u>	<u>School</u>	<u>Newspaper Circulation</u>
Iran	20.7	63.0	66.9	56.8	33.3
Iraq	12.1	18.3	89.0	83.2	26.7
Turkey	641.4	367.3	61.0	91.6	100.0
Japan	296.6	1 547.5	153.7	140.0	1 002.2
Lebanon	58.6	23.8	105.1	92.9	215.6
Syria (SAR)	5.2	29.3	143.4	107.1	46.7
Egypt (UAR)	17.2	222.4	122.1	97.4	33.3
Jordan	10.3	11.8	38.2	121.9	17.8
Israel	36.2	64.0	172.8	147.1	317.8

<u>Country</u>	<u>Cinema</u>	<u>Literacy</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>Mean Value</u> ^b
Iran	43.9	52.9	60.1	49.7
Iraq	21.1	120.6	108.1	56.3
Turkey	19.3	91.9	20.3	73.0
Japan	66.7	226.9	11.5	84.8
Lebanon	242.1	110.2	150.0	84.4
Syria (SAR)	35.1	89.1	47.3	56.6
Egypt (UAR)	36.8	61.9	35.1	60.2
Jordan	54.4	75.2	61.5	46.2
Israel	343.9	197.2	316.9	87.5

(a) per cent of the regional mean.

(b) maximum impact of an item limited to 100%.

TABLE 57

MILITARIZATION INDEX

<u>Country</u>	<u>Military Personnel (1,000)</u>	<u>Population (1,000)</u>	<u>Index Mil. Person. (per 1,000)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Regional Mean</u>	<u>Relative Military Scale</u>
Iran	180	25 500	7.1	74	44
Iraq	70	8 338	8.4	88	52
Turkey	442	32 120	13.7	143	85
Japan	246	98 865	2.5	26	15
Lebanon	10.6	2 250	4.7	49	29
Syria (SAR)	55.0	5 450	10.1	105	62
Egypt (UAR)	176.0	29 673	5.9	61	36
Jordan	33	2 040	16.2	169	100
Israel	27	2 629	10.3	107	63
Regional Mean*			9.6		

*the figure for Japan was excluded in calculating the regional mean

TABLE 58

VALUE SATISFACTION QUOTIENT
AND TENTATIVE ACTION-INACTION SCALE

<u>Country</u>	<u>Value Satisfac-</u> <u>tion Quotient</u> (Table 4/Table 3)	<u>Relative</u> ^a <u>VSQ</u>	<u>Pressure</u> ^b <u>Scale</u>	<u>Power</u> ^c <u>Scale</u>
Iran	49.7/56.8 = .87	72	58	50
Iraq	56.3/63.7 = .88	73	62	58
Turkey	73.0/60.5 = 1.21	100	92	73
Japan	84.8/88.7 = .96	79	47	52
Lebanon	84.4/83.6 = 1.01	83	56	56
Syria(SAR)	56.6/59.1 = 1.15	95	78	55
Egypt(UAR)	60.2/56.1 = 1.07	88	62	46
Jordan	46.2/47.5 = .97	80	90	74
Israel	87.5/92.4 = .95	79	71	78

(a) Scaled with the highest VSQ = 100.

(b) Mean of Relative VSQ and Relative Military Scale.

(c) Mean of Relative Military Scale and Index of Value Distribution.

Hypothesis of Table 59¹⁷

A) Meaning of the Markov Matrix:

	Condition 1 (Inaction)	Condition 2 (Action)
Condition 1 (Inaction)	Probability of remaining in state of inaction at next stage if there now, presumed influenced by low pressure for change and low military resources (complement of pressure scale of Table 6)	Probability of moving from inaction state to action state at next stage, presumed influenced by high pressure for change and high military resources (pressure scale of Table 6)
Condition 2 (Action)	Probability of moving from action state to inaction state at next stage, presumed influenced by low military resources and low general resources (complement of power scale of Table 6)	Probability of remaining in action state at next stage if there now, presumed influenced by high military resources and high general resources (power scale of Table 6)

B) Meaning of the Fixed Point Vector

Probability of being in inaction state at any time in the more or less distant future.	Probability of being in action state at any time in the more or less distant future.
--	--

¹⁷Oliver Benson, op. cit., p. 27.

TABLE 59

A MEASURE OF ACTION-INACTION

	MARKOV MATRIX	FIXED POINT VECTOR
Iran--	$\begin{pmatrix} .42 & .58 \\ .50 & .50 \end{pmatrix}$	(.46, .54)
Iraq	$\begin{pmatrix} .38 & .62 \\ .42 & .58 \end{pmatrix}$	(.40, .60)
Turkey	$\begin{pmatrix} .08 & .92 \\ .27 & .73 \end{pmatrix}$	(.18, .82)
Japan	$\begin{pmatrix} .53 & .47 \\ .48 & .52 \end{pmatrix}$	(.50, .50)
Lebanon	$\begin{pmatrix} .44 & .56 \\ .44 & .56 \end{pmatrix}$	(.44, .56)
Syria	$\begin{pmatrix} .22 & .78 \\ .45 & .55 \end{pmatrix}$	(.33, .67)
Egypt	$\begin{pmatrix} .38 & .62 \\ .54 & .46 \end{pmatrix}$	(.46, .54)
Jordan	$\begin{pmatrix} .10 & .90 \\ .26 & .74 \end{pmatrix}$	(.18, .82)
Israel	$\begin{pmatrix} .29 & .71 \\ .22 & .78 \end{pmatrix}$	(.26, .74)

Using the Fixed Point Vector as a measure of action-inaction, Turkey and Jordan rank highest (.82 each) being followed by Israel, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran and Japan, respectively in the order of diminishing probability of action in the more or less distant future.¹⁸

Adopting the mean value of the Relative Value Distribution and Awareness Indices as an index of modernization, Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation yields no apparent relationship between action orientation¹⁹ and the level of modernization ($r = .3$).²⁰ This finding lends support to the previous contention of this study that modernization does not necessarily result in stability.²¹ Modernization, by definition, implies change and in more traditional contexts, which often present resistance to pressures for structural change, stability is still harder to maintain.

The shortcomings of the above approach are not in its mathematical scheme but rather inherent in the complexity of the subject matter, as well as the limited availability of data. In this study we have had to use a limited number of indices concerning which the related data were available

¹⁸See Table 59.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰The figures for Japan were not used in calculating the r .

²¹See Chapter I.

with respect to all the nine aforementioned polities. Aside from the availability of data, the designation of certain indices to either awareness or value distribution categories has to be somewhat arbitrary. For example, one could use the index of school population which has been included as an awareness indicator under value distribution, particularly considering the tremendous demand for education. In fact, we have used the index of the teacher population as a measure of value distribution.²² The same argument could be applied to many other indices such as trade, radios, technology, etc.. The point here, aside from the complexity of the subject matter, is that much of the choice in the allocation of indices is left at the, hopefully judicious, discretion of the researcher.

Professor Benson points out that the 'aspirations' ingredient of the above computations should be ideally derived from informed attitudinal survey research. It is only in the absence of such survey research that he substitutes a "crude 'information index' based on the assumption that the aspiration level of a society will vary with its access to knowledge about the outside world."²³

²²See Table 53.

²³Oliver Benson, op. cit., p. 13

A further shortcoming of the above approach, which might be overcome in due time with the availability of more sophisticated data, has to do with its lack of accountability of dualism. As it was pointed out in the first chapter, much of the available per capita statistics do not reflect the dualistic nature of polities which is to a large extent responsible for the dynamic changes that take place. For example, the per capita income for Iran has been listed as 22⁴ dollars.²⁴ Whereas, geographically, the per capita income is about 600 dollars in cities and less than 50 dollars in the countryside. Even within the cities, as well as in the countryside, there is a large degree of disparity in income. Thus, while one talks about value distribution, one must always note that it is unequal; and to the degree that there is inequity there is frustration or gratification. From this vantage point the dynamics of social change has been referred to, in simple terms in the present worldwide context, as the struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.' But it is not purely a question of 'having.' 'Wanting' and the ability of 'taking' on the part of the 'have-nots' are also very important. It is perhaps with the consideration of these points in mind that most students of revolutionary movements--Marx, Brinton, Halpern, to name only a few--ultimately tend to focus

²⁴See Table 53.

on the 'alienation of the modernists' as the basic cause of revolutionary movements.

The New Middle Class As A Revolutionary Force

Professor Halpern's approach is much less empirical, but to a certain extent lends itself to the consideration of the dualistic nature of the problem. The trouble, or perhaps the advantage, with the dualistic approach and class analysis in the area of comparative politics is that it would require an intimate knowledge of the various polities involved, before one could embark upon a comparative study. Fortunately for us, Professor Halpern is a competent scholar in the area under consideration here.

Professor Halpern's main contention is that the genesis of social change in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East is within the new middle classes who, contrary to the old middle classes, are salaried rather than propertied. Due to the fact that such a salaried middle class is composed of individuals with the highest level of skills necessary for modernization (amongst the groups composing the new middle class are doctors, journalists, artists, professors, teachers, writers, poets, students, middle ranking bureaucrats and engineers), they are the hard-core modernists whose cooperation is indispensable for the successful operation of any modern society. It is in the interaction between such

new political forces, on the one hand, and the traditional classes which are associated with a low level of skill and differentiation, as well as the old institutional structures, on the other hand, that Halpern begins to analyze the process of social change.

The traditional forces and structures either must adapt themselves to this new middle class by modifying the socio-political structures and the cultural and economic patterns, or have to face the challenges of this revolutionary class. The new middle class has the following characteristics:

1. Its members possess a modern higher education.
2. Most of their power resides in their skills or talents or in the function they perform.
3. They have been exposed in varying degrees to outside philosophies and ideas.
4. They are free of rigid religious dogmatism and obeisance to past history.
5. They possess energy and the will to act.²⁵

With the above characteristics it can readily be seen that the new middle class poses a substantial threat to the traditional structures. In this mode of analysis there is a great deal

²⁵See James A. Bill, "Iranian Middle Class Emerges as a Catalyst of National Reform" The Christian Science Monitor, (June 5, 1968), p. 10.

of merit since it deals with the more concrete socio-political -- relations amongst various groups in society. Yet, as we pointed out in the discussion of socio-political structures in Iran,²⁶ at times this approach also tends to share certain shortcomings of the elitist theories.

The fervor and significance of the peasants and the new working classes are too often forgotten in the analysis of socio-political change coming about through revolution or evolution in the Afro-Asian polities. The reality dictates otherwise. The creation of political consciousness amongst the workers and peasants in the less developed parts of the world, such as China, India, Algeria, Vietnam, has served as a tremendously dynamic force in the process of social change. In the more advanced countries, such as France and the United States, continued political socialization and consciousness of the farmers and workers is still producing shock waves which at recent times have brought the respective polities to very critical stages. In our discussion of the socio-political structure and the dynamics of the human resources in Iran, we have already pointed out the significant role that the new middle class has to play in the modernization process. The approaches adopted by Professors Benson and Halpern offer two different ways of looking at the polity and in this sense they are complimentary.

²⁶See Chapter II.

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