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GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND SATIRICAL CONTEXT
OF THE SUEÑOS OF QUEVEDO

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Norman, Oklahoma
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND SATIRICAL CONTEXT
OF THE SUEÑOS OF QUEVEDO

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF MODERN LANGUAGES,
LINGUISTICS & LITERATURES

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Chapter One:

Introduction

Although the five Sueños of Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas may certainly be read and enjoyed as independent artistic creations, the works do present a number of interpretive challenges that can only be resolved by placing them in their larger context. Quevedo begins delineating that larger context on the first page of the first Sueño with references to Homer, Propertius, Claudian, and others. However, such direct references are atypical; Quevedo only offers occasional indications within the text of the Sueños as to his literary and philosophical influences. In order to get some indication of what Quevedo thought of such writers as Lucian, Juvenal, and Dante--all of whom have been suggested as significant models for the Sueños--one must look to what he says about them in his other works. One of the principal methods of interpretation in this present study is to allow Quevedo to comment on Quevedo, to find passages in the Sueños in need of some explication and to investigate what Quevedo has to say about the issue elsewhere in his extensive and varied corpus of extant writings. By placing the Sueños within the context of Quevedo's writings as well as those of his influences, a clearer picture emerges with regard to the philosophical doctrines of the works as well as the exact nature of their satire, the two chief focuses of this study. Of course, along the way, some reference will be made to the

socio-political context as well, since the Sueños are as much a product of their age as they are of Quevedo's genius.

Quevedo was born in 1580 during the reign of Philip II. His father, Pedro Gómez Quevedo had served in a number of capacities at court, including the position of secretary to Anne of Austria, Philip's fourth wife. Quevedo's mother, María Santibañez, had served Anne as lady-in-waiting.¹ Enrique Ortenbach refers to the prestige enjoyed by Quevedo's father at court (14). It was in part due to that familial prestige, in addition to the attention he attracted as a talented young poet, that Quevedo would later have access to the court of Philip III. Unfortunately Quevedo would not be able to count on the guidance of his father in such situations; when he was just a boy of six, his father died. A few years later, his older brother, Pedro, also died, leaving him the heir, but still a boy in the care of his mother.

In addition to these personal losses at an early age, Quevedo would soon see death on a much larger scale, as the plague that struck Spain in 1596 reached its height in 1599-1600, "ravaging in its passage the densely crowded cities of Castile" (Elliot 294).² In 1601 Quevedo's mother would die.³ It is probably no coincidence that in the years immediately following these events, Quevedo began to show an intense interest in the works of Justus Lipsius and the

¹ A number of biographies have been written about Quevedo. I have consulted those of Enrique Ortenbach, Quevedo (1991), and L. Astrana Marín, La vida turbulenta de Quevedo (1945).

² "The great plague of 1599-1600 probably wiped out in a single blow the 15 percent population increase of the sixteenth century, and opened a new era of Castilian demographic history: an era of stagnation and perhaps of demographic decline" (Elliot 294).

³ Some place the date of her death as 1605. Cf. Ortenbach (26).

teachings of the Neostoics, since the most important of those teachings have to do with the nature of death, especially its inevitability. The subject of death suffuses much of Quevedo's prose and poetry, including the Sueños. He returns to the theme again and again, but normally, he does so in a philosophical and didactic fashion, rather than reveal his feelings about his personal losses. Even his less didactic poems on death tend to look forward to contemplate his own passing or that of a loved one, rather than dwell on the losses of his childhood or youth. Still, those early, difficult experiences probably played a significant role in the formation of Quevedo's philosophical and theological interests.

Little is known of Quevedo's early childhood until 1592, when he began his studies under the Jesuits in the "Estudio de los Teatinos" that would later become the "Colegio Imperial." He remained there until 1596. Jesuit instruction and Tridentine Catholicism have at times been considered important contributing social factors to the development of the Baroque (see Maravall, Culture 9). Of course, as with any attempt to define the Baroque, any such connections require a great deal of qualification. Even with reference solely to Spain, it is an oversimplification to define the Baroque as the art of the Counter-Reformation. Nonetheless, these social factors are entirely relevant when studying the work of Quevedo. His denunciations of Jews, Protestants and Moslems, as well as his apparent hatred of most foreigners should be understood within the larger context of the religious intolerance and xenophobia that had become widely institutionalized in Spain. Such sentiments in

Quevedo are indicative of his education and the socio-political environment in which he was raised and later worked.

In 1596, Quevedo enrolled in the University of Alcalá, where he studied logic--for which he would later express tremendous disdain--, metaphysics, and several languages, both classical and modern. He graduated "bachiller" in 1599, and then "licenciado en Artes" in 1600. In addition to knowledge gained through formal studies, Quevedo also experienced and observed many facets of the typical life of a student, information he incorporated into his famous picaresque novel, El buscón, published in 1626, but generally believed to have been written just a few years after leaving Alcalá.

In 1601, Quevedo did leave Alcalá for Valladolid, where the court of Philip III had recently relocated. The new king, unlike his father who had died in 1598, had little interest in the duties of governance, and had handed over the reigns of his kingdom to favorites and ministers, *privados* and *validos*. As a result, where Philip II had largely remained apart from the nobility of the realm, the court of Philip III teemed with nobles who had left their estates in order to curry favor with those in power. Not only did this lead to imprudent opulence and extravagance in which each noble tried to outshine the others, many living well beyond their means, but it also lead to widespread corruption in which favor and advancement were not only curried, but were also bought outright. It was in this environment that the Sueños began to take shape, since the earliest manuscript for El sueño del Juicio final dates from 1605, the year before both Philip's court and Quevedo returned to Madrid.

Quevedo continued to work on the Sueños in Madrid, and by 1608, he had finished the second and third in the series, El alguacil endemoniado, and El sueño del Infierno. In 1609, an important event occurred in his life; he met Pedro de Alcántara Téllez-Girón y Guzmán, the third Duke of Osuna. The two men very quickly developed a great admiration for one another, and their relationship would very soon become significant to Quevedo's literary career, since Osuna would be appointed Viceroy of Sicily in 1610, and in 1613, he would call Quevedo to Italy to serve as his secretary. In the meantime, Quevedo left Madrid to spend some time at his property, Torre de Juan Abad, where, in 1612, he finished the fourth Sueño, El mundo por de dentro, which he dedicated to Osuna.

From 1613 to 1619, Quevedo devoted himself to a political career in Italy. His duties in the service of Osuna left him little time for writing. He claims to have written the first part of the Política de Dios during those years, and he undoubtedly wrote some poetry, but the period essentially represents a gap in his literary production. Traveling in the service of the Duke throughout Italy and France, he acted as emissary and negotiator in many difficult situations. To all indications, he performed his duties successfully. On a number of occasions, he returned to Spain to deliver monies and reports from Osuna to Philip III. During these trips, Quevedo saw himself forced to engage in an activity that he must have found particularly distasteful, giving not only official funds to the king, but also distributing large cash gifts to nobles who were in a position to further the Duke's career and ambitions. As much as Quevedo deplored the corrupting power of money, he could not avoid taking

part in such corruption as long as he was so deeply involved in politics. His efforts, and the duke's expenditures, were rewarded, as Osuna was named Viceroy of Naples in 1616. Good fortune, however, would soon turn to disaster.

The historical details surrounding the episode that has come to be called the "Conjuración de Venecia" still remain unclear. It has generally been suggested and assumed that, during a private audience with Philip III, Quevedo gained approval for Osuna's ambitious plan to invade and overthrow the Republic of Venice. Relations between Spain and Venice had become strained, but Philip did not wish to declare war openly. If he did indeed give his approval, it was only with the condition that Osuna take full responsibility, allowing the king to maintain credible deniability. The date was set for May 19, 1618. Osuna had his galleys, spies and insurgents in place. According to Ortenbach, Quevedo himself entered Venice in disguise (58). However, the Venetian police, at the last moment, learned of the duke's plans. Arrests were made; the plot was foiled, and Quevedo was forced to flee. He returned to Spain and attempted to plead Osuna's cause at court, but to no avail. Osuna's star had fallen, and, forced to return to Madrid, the duke was eventually placed in jail and died there. Quevedo was exiled from court, and in 1621, still under house arrest at Torre de Juan Abad, he wrote El sueño de la muerte, the fifth and last in the series.

Quevedo begins El sueño de la muerte with an imitation of Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy, an influence that is discussed in Chapter Two. Boethius wrote the Consolation in prison and was executed not long afterward. So disastrous had been Osuna's fall that

Quevedo may have thought an end such as that suffered by Boethius to be imminent, hence the description of Death herself approaching the dreamer in the last Sueño. However, Quevedo would live until 1645, and his fortunes would change briefly with the death of Philip III in 1621. The change in monarch ended Quevedo's exile, but not his troubles. His acerbic wit and satiric writings had gained him many enemies in addition to the political ones. Even during Quevedo's time in Italy, his early writings, including the first Sueños, had continued to circulate in manuscript form, maintaining his literary reputation with some, but provoking negative reaction from others.

The contrast between Quevedo's admirers and detractors can be seen in the reaction to the first published edition of the Sueños in 1627. On the one hand, the book was so popular that it went into several editions in both Barcelona and Zaragoza, but on the other, it gave Quevedo's enemies the material with which to accuse him of heresy in a tract written against him entitled Tribunal de la Justa Venganza, erigido contra los escritos de D. Francisco de Quevedo, maestro en errores, bachiller de suciedades, catedrático de vicios y protodiablo de todos los hombres (see Ortenbach 85). The popularity of the works is a testament to the success of Quevedo's satirical humor; the scandal seems primarily a reaction to his decision to take the very serious notion of Divine Judgement and turn both Heaven and Hell into vast stages for his comedy and buffoonery.

Many readers from the beginning have apparently not been able to find a positive moral message within the works, as is attested by a comment from one of Quevedo's more famous contemporaries,

Baltasar Gracián. Gracián seems to refer to the Sueños when he says, "...estas hojas de Quevedo son como las del tabaco, de más vicio que provecho, más para reír que aprovechar" (724). To a certain extent, Gracián's comments are accurate. Quevedo, in his satires, does describe and depict vices and sins rather than beneficial examples of moral conduct, and his purpose in doing so does seem at times to be nothing more than an attempt to provoke laughter. However, this initial impression merely indicates how successfully Quevedo's work reflects the traditional characteristics of satire, whose models for the comedic ridicule of vice date back to Antiquity. What Gracián's comment does not acknowledge is that beneath the laughter, beneath the depiction of vice, Quevedo consistently suggests a higher moral goal throughout the Sueños, both implicitly and in explicit comments of moral exhortation.

Perhaps the longest passage of moral exhortation occurs at the beginning of El sueño del Infierno, where large and diverse groups of humanity march along the two allegorical roads of life, one leading to Heaven, the other to Hell. At one point, a soldier on the road to Heaven calls out to some comrades who have chosen the easier path leading to damnation, and he urges them to cross over and return to the path of righteousness:

Soldados, por acá! esso es de valientes, dejar este camino de miedo de sus dificultades? Venid, que por aqui de cierto sauemos que sòlo coronarán a quien legitimamente pelear. Què vana esperanza os arrastra tras las antizipadas promessas de los Reyes? No siempre con almas vendidas es bien que temerossamente suene en vuestros oydos, Mata o muere.

Reprehended la hanbre del premio, que de buen varón es seguir la virtud sola, y de cudiciosso los premios de ella. Quien no sosiega en la virtud, y la sigue por el interes y merçedes que se le siguen, màs es mercader que virtuosso, pues la haze prezio de perezaderos bienes. Ella es don de sì misma: quietaos en ella. Y aqui alzò la voz diziendo: Auertid que la vida del mundo es guerra consigo mismo, y que toda la vida nos tienen en harma los enemigos del alma, que nos amenazan màs dañosso venzimiento. Y aduertid que ya los Principes tienen por deuda nuestra sangre y vidas, pues perdiendolas por ellos, los màs dizen que los pagamos y que no seruimos. Volued! Volued! (Sueños I, 163-64).⁴

Although some of the comments are specific to those involved in military campaigns, others apply equally well to all of humanity, such as the teaching that virtue should be sought as its own reward: "de buen varon es seguir la virtud sola." Moreover, there is a redefinition of warfare in moral terms: "la vida del mundo es guerra consigo mismo," meaning the most important struggle in one's life is against one's own desires and passions, the true enemies of the soul.

In spite of such readily apparent moral sermons in the Sueños, there has been a tendency, even among more modern critics, to reduce the works to essentially a satire of types, and to characterize

⁴ As the texts for both the Sueños and the Política de Dios, I will cite the editions of James O. Crosby, generally the most accurate editions available, neither of which has modernized spelling or accentuation. For the Obra poética, I cite the edition of José Manuel Blecua. Elsewhere, when citing the works of Quevedo, I will use the Obras completas prepared by Felicidad Buendía.

Quevedo as a witty but malicious and negative social critic. The comments of Ernest Mérimée are typical of this perspective:

Nothing could be funnier than the procession of odd fish that Quevedo's comic muse discovers in the Infernal Regions. He presents a highly malicious caricature of society, outwardly so solemn and stiff in the days of Philip III and Philip IV. The satirist takes a malign pleasure in laying bare all its blemishes, vices and hypocrisy. (277)

Mérimée's use of the words "malicious" and "malign" serves to indicate the extent to which he focuses on the satirical denunciations and either overlooks or discounts the positive moral content.

That positive message can admittedly become lost amidst the horrific descriptions of piemakers who use human flesh in their meat pies, and the word plays in which Quevedo shows his hatred for tailors by linking the words "sastre" and "desastre." These witticisms and grotesque presentations of humanity have caught the attention of readers and critics more than any other aspect of the works, and with good reason, since these features fascinate and entertain; they grab the reader's attention, evoking imagery and amusement, whereas moral sermons do not. In spite of this, in spite of the negative, pessimistic representation of humanity and human society, in spite of the tremendous preoccupation with death and the damnation of souls, the Sueños still provide substantial indication that Quevedo was in many ways morally, philosophically, and socially, an idealist. This thesis contravenes much of the traditional wisdom about Quevedo. The suggestion that he denounces in the hope of reform rather than to merely provoke laughter, that he

offers positive philosophical and social alternatives to the decadence and corruption he decries, is, at the very least, a shift away from the traditional avenues along which the Sueños have been approached and interpreted.

In order to identify and discuss the idealism of the Sueños, much of which is merely implied, it will be necessary to set aside, to a large degree, the more readily accessible caricatures and focus first on the philosophical content of the works, then on the larger social and political concerns reflected in them. This is not to say that the depiction of characters and types will be entirely unhelpful in this endeavor. In his presentation of those on the road to Heaven, Quevedo breaks with the normal constraints of satire to present idealized portraits, clearly indicative of his own idealism and social concerns. And even in negative caricatures, an ideal may at times be inferred, since by showing how society should not be, Quevedo suggests the inverse.

A necessary part of establishing the philosophical and satirical context of the Sueños naturally involves correctly identifying Quevedo's sources and influences. Among the possible satirical influences, Quevedo is widely known to have admired Juvenal, Persius, and Martial. And yet, there has been a widespread tendency on the part of critics to identify Lucian as the primary model for the Sueños. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, but a representative passage taken from Ortenbach will suffice to indicate the extent to which Lucian's influence has been taken for granted. Ortenbach refers to the period 1599-1601, during which time he believes Quevedo began to formulate the Sueños: "...Quevedo lee a

Luciano de Samosata e, inspirado por éste, comienza a idear una serie de obras en las que, por medio de imaginados sueños, pueda reprender y criticar a sociedad tan corrompida y lamentable" (36). This type of assertion is typical, despite the lack of evidence to support it. Critics associate the Sueños with Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead because of a few similarities in setting, theme, and subject matter, questions having to do with genre, not because of any textual references, direct parallels, or expressions of admiration for Lucian on the part of Quevedo. The fact that both writers satirize types from their society in an underworld setting can hardly be taken as positive proof of influence, yet it has been traditionally. The issue deserves to be revisited.

The question of genre itself presents a number of problems in identifying Quevedo's sources. Although he brings together a variety of elements from different traditions, and different genres, Quevedo refers to the works simply as "sueños." The term at times may seem either nondescriptive, or even inaccurate, since only three of the five works contain the word "Sueño" in their title, and only two of them describe the narrator falling asleep and dreaming, but they were envisioned as a unified series, as Quevedo affirms in the introduction to El sueño de la muerte:

He querido que la muerte acaue mis desuorios, como las demas cosas; quiera Dios que tenga buena suerte.

Este es el vltimo tratado al Sueño del Juicio, al Alguazil endemoniado, al Infierno y al Mundo por de dentro: no me queda ya en que soñar. (216)

Even though El mundo por de dentro contains a perplexing reference to falling asleep and resting *after* the narrator's stroll along the street of Hypocrisy with the allegorical Desengaño as his guide, Quevedo here refers to that episode, and all the rest, as having been dreamt.

The presentation of these works as dreams initially creates a feeling of tension, or incongruity between content and context. Traditionally, literary visions have been used as a means of conveying serious lessons to the dreamer and consequently the reader, whether the subject matter be philosophical, theological, or even political. Quevedo reflects this tradition as well as the seriousness of his subject when, at the beginning of El sueño del Juicio final, he cites Homer, stating that dreams are divinely inspired and should be believed. He then proceeds to present farcical scenes that seem to have no other intention than to provoke laughter, in which resurrected bones try to find their mates, and ridiculous characters, heading toward their judgement, offer every type of inane excuse for their sinful behavior in life. The comic contents seem to contradict the serious presentation. More than one critic has attempted to resolve the contradiction by simply denying the sincerity of Quevedo's opening comments and asserting that he has begun with a parody of Homer.⁵ However, this type of resolution seems unnecessary, and the contradiction nonexistent, if one takes into account Quevedo's actual views on satire. He read, for example, the satires of Juvenal as political documents which he cites as supporting texts in his ascetic works Virtud militante and Providencia de Dios. In his own introductions to the Sueños, he

⁵ This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.

reiterates that he presents "desnudas verdades" that are to be believed. The reference to Homer is but the first attempt to urge the reader to look beneath the laughter in order to receive instruction on more weighty matters.

The dream as a literary device, then, helps provide a certain measure of seriousness to the overall comic tone. Similarly, Quevedo's decision to use aspects of the Christian afterlife as well as allegorical realms also places the comedy in a context that should indicate to the reader the need to be aware of larger issues. The allegorical realms and characters evoke the medieval dream-visions that trace many of their characteristics back to Boethius, and the use of the Christian afterlife evokes another tradition, that of Dante. Although Quevedo is the only major figure in seventeenth century Spanish literature to have been substantially influenced by Dante, that influence still represents a significant revival of interest in the Florentine poet. During the fifteenth century, Dante had heavily influenced Spanish men of letters, most notably the Marqués de Santillana and Enrique de Villena. By the early sixteenth century, the Commedia had been translated into Spanish and Catalan several times (see G. Amezúa 31-33). However, as the Renaissance progressed, interest diminished in medieval works that had religious themes as their primary focus, and accordingly, Dante seems to have had very few Spanish readers during much of the sixteenth century. The limited revival of interest during the seventeenth century is a reflection of the religious intensity that existed during the Counter-Reformation. Emilio Orozco Díaz makes the following comment about the relationship between the Middle Ages and the Baroque: "Hay,

pues, una corriente de medievalismo que sustancializa aspectos de nuestro arte y que en lo referente a la esfera religiosa viene a representar lo que después se producirá con el movimiento contrareformista" (56). With the Counter-Reformation, there came a renewed interest in medieval poetics that allowed art to exist in ugliness, whereas the Renaissance had sought beauty and perfection (see Orozco Díaz 58). Quevedo's use of the Christian afterlife, his interest in Dante, his grotesque representations of humanity, all reflect wider trends in the Spanish Baroque.

In addition to these aesthetic questions, the Baroque was also accompanied by a number of changes in philosophical trends relevant to Quevedo and the Sueños. During the sixteenth century certain brands of fideistic scepticism gained many adherents, among them the French essayist Montaigne. With the spread of scepticism, some of the Renaissance emphasis on human beauty and perfection gave way increasingly to a distrust of outer appearances. Appearance vs. reality became one of the great themes of the Spanish Baroque, and it is certainly one of the principle themes of the Sueños. At its core, however, the central purpose of scepticism is to deny the validity of knowledge. Of course, during the Renaissance, most Sceptics carefully qualified their views in order to take by faith the validity of divine revelation. Still, the Church tended to disapprove of scepticism even when accompanied by fideism. So, in Spain, while the topos of appearance vs. reality is widespread, philosophical works that defend the doctrine that forms its basis appear far less frequently. Quevedo only makes a few openly sceptical remarks in his works, making his sources and influences

difficult, though not impossible, to trace. He does say enough to indicate the important role this branch of philosophy has in his thought, with a number of those remarks appearing in the Sueños, particularly El mundo por de dentro.

Maureen Ihrle refers to Quevedo's scepticism as "nihilistic," and "a destructive tool" (27). The characterization is, in part, correct, since Quevedo uses scepticism to declare invalid any knowledge gained through logic, dialectic, or natural philosophy. In general, he distrusts any information purportedly gleaned through the study of nature or natural phenomena. This may partially explain why he repeatedly satirizes astronomers and alchemists in the Sueños, although the regular condemnations of those groups by the Church would have been sufficient justification. However, once Quevedo's scepticism has done its destructive work, it does leave positive alternatives, ideals of knowledge and instruction that Quevedo does not assail, moral philosophy and Christian doctrine.

While some question exists as to the sources of Quevedo's satire, and scepticism, there is no doubt with regard to his moral philosophy; his admiration of Lipsius and the Neostoics is well known, as is his devotion to the Stoic doctrines of Classical writers, particularly Seneca. However, Quevedo's use of Stoic doctrines still presents significant challenges in interpretation, since it has become common to read Quevedo's Stoicism as a nihilistic complaint against life rather than a positive tool for dealing with the inevitable injustices and suffering that accompany all mortal life. For example, in one of his better known sonnets entitled "Representase la brevedad de lo que se vive y cuán nada parece lo que se vivió"

(Obras poéticas I, 149-50), Quevedo provides the following verse: "soy un fue, y un será, y un es cansado." Elias Rivers, relying principally on this verse, has described the sonnet as both Stoic and yet an existential protest at the same time:

Personally, we may not like the baroque world view, the Counter-Reformation Stoicism, implied by this sonnet; as a matter of fact, the poet himself seems to be rebelling and protesting against such a harsh reality or way of representing reality. But we must at least admit that Quevedo somehow anticipates in his metaphysical sonnets certain aspects of L'Etre et le néant, Sartre's Being and Nothingness, and this is no mean poetic accomplishment. (25)

The words "rebelling" and "protesting" in this context simply cannot be squared with the tenets of Stoicism as taught by the ancients and espoused by Quevedo. When Quevedo speaks of life ending, and dwells on death, he is following traditional Stoic teaching regarding the need to think on death as a positive means to prepare for it and deal with it. The preoccupation with death in his philosophical texts and the Sueños, rather than reflecting a morbid nihilism, actually leads to the Christian doctrine that one should be aware of the inevitability of one day facing God in the afterlife, and accordingly live this life justly.

Quevedo is one of the great figures of the Spanish Baroque. His reputation and popularity through the centuries has rested primarily on his poetry, El buscón, and the Sueños. However, even these more popular works, which have been sufficiently entertaining and accessible to reach a wide audience, give ample indication of

Quevedo's complexity and difficulty. At times in the Sueños--because of that complexity, and because he attempts to reconcile such a variety of literary and philosophical traditions--certain ideas, statements, and presentations appear in the texts that seem to contradict what he has said elsewhere. However, by placing these apparent contradictions within their larger context, by establishing the true nature of Quevedo's satire and its sources, and by similarly examining the philosophical doctrines of the Sueños, many of the contradictions can be resolved. The clarity that comes with context then begins to reveal the positive moral and social message, an idealism that at times even seems to approach a utopian vision, hidden amidst the grotesque deformations of humanity, and the damned souls in Hell.

Chapter Two:
Dream Theory and Convention in the Sueños

Quevedo presents the Sueños to the reader as his own dreams, and, following the classical and medieval models of literary visions, his dreams take the form of spiritual journeys.¹ His use of this literary form lends support to the general assertion of E. R. Curtius that "Spanish 'Baroque' is descended from medieval Latin theory and practice" (282), for, as Helen Phillips notes, "No other literary genre, with the possible exception of the romance, was more popular than the dream narrative with medieval writers, and none employed with more versatility and creativity" (3). In spite of this rich and important tradition, little scholarship has been devoted to analyzing the many conventional dream-vision elements in the Sueños. Typically, commentators have referred to the Sueños as "prose satire," and not even considered the designation "dream-vision."² Some, such as Joan Estruch Tobello, have considered it only to just as quickly dismiss it: "Observemos que el sueño es difícilmente clasificable dentro de los géneros literarios establecidos por la preceptista de tradición grecolatina, codificada en la Italia

¹ A. C. Spearing makes this point with regard to the nature of literary visions: "Meanwhile I wish to look more closely at the tradition of visions which as medieval poets were aware, lay behind their dream poems. The tradition in question is one not specifically of dream but of spiritual adventure" (6).

² See for example, P. E. Russel (333), or F. W. Muller (225). The latter uses the expression "obra satírica en prosa."

renacentista" (10). This comment passes over the Middle Ages, precisely the period when the dream-vision became firmly established as a literary form.³

Admittedly, Quevedo has written Baroque, not medieval dreams. The social-political satire of the early seventeenth century does tend to overshadow the more medieval experience of the dreamer on a metaphysical journey of enlightenment. As a result, the oneiric elements may seem nothing more than a "frame" established by Quevedo as a "requisite for indulging his fantasy" (Iffland 20). R. M. Price briefly comments on the "features of the medieval dream poem" in the Sueños and recommends the book by A. C. Spearing for general information on the genre (53). Yet Price sees these dream features primarily as "scene setting devices" (52) and concludes that "for Quevedo the dream convention was not much more than a known satirical device" (53). Quevedo arguably took the tradition of the literary vision more seriously. He frequently moves away from the social satire--which does indeed dominate the works--into moments of serious enlightenment for the dreamer, who ostensibly represents Quevedo himself and yet a medieval everyman at the same time. In these moments, the dream features and motifs serve as a means of introducing serious philosophical and theological issues.

³ Some debate exists as to whether the dream-vision should be considered a genre in and of itself. Spearing seems reluctant to do so (see Spearing 2). More recent writers on the subject argue that it is. According to Kathryn L. Lynch, "The literary vision, then, is properly a genre, defined by the external form of the dream or vision that provides its structure" (Lynch 7). See also Steven F. Kruger (124).

Quevedo consciously strove to include serious philosophical matters within his satire, as he acknowledges in the introduction to the last dream, El sueño de la muerte: "Ni entre la risa me he olvidado de la doctrina" (Suenos I, 216). These words, in addition to reflecting the maxim of Horace, well known to Spaniards of the period as "deleitar y enseñar," also reflect the tradition of the satirical dream of the Middle Ages. Helen Phillips explains:

Dream literature began as a religious and philosophical genre, and even when medieval writers use it for satire or amusing and amorous subjects, it carries still the potential for serious purpose and enlightenment, which makes it particularly amenable for parody and satire.... (3)

Phillips makes these general comments with Chaucer and his French models in mind, but they no less applicably indicate the traditional nature of Quevedo's satire which incorporates serious elements. Ilse Nolting-Hauff, perhaps more lucidly than any scholar to date, acknowledges the satirical-philosophical nature of the Sueños at the same time that she refers to the works as examples of the dream-vision genre:

El género de la visión satírica, ya existente, aunque aún orientado muy unilateralmente hacia Luciano, enriquecido por Quevedo con adquisiciones de las poesías serias de visiones de la Edad Media, se muestra como el medio especialmente apropiado para su estilo conceptista. (295)

The "poesías serias" to which Nolting-Hauff refers are primarily the philosophical dream-visions that trace their roots back to the Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius. As in these works, Quevedo

incorporates classical authorities to support his serious ideas, beginning with his dream theory.

I. Classical Dream Theory

Quevedo appropriately gives the fullest statement of his dream theory at the beginning of the first dream, El sueño del Juicio final. He begins with a reference to Homer: "Los sueños, Señor, dice Homero que son de Jupiter, y que èl los inbia; en otro lugar dice que se a de creer que esto es asi quando tocan en cosas importantes o los sueñan Reyes o grandes señores..." (Sueños I, 131). The first words regarding the divine origin of dreams come from the Iliad I. 62-64. The second reference regarding their believability, or truth, comes from Iliad II. 76-83, the first passage spoken by Achilles, the second spoken by Nestor concerning a specific dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon. Strangely, Homer indicates that the dream sent by Zeus was a false and evil one, meant to deceive Agamemnon. Quevedo makes no mention of this, choosing instead to emphasize the general principle given by Nestor that the dreams of kings should be heeded. In order to include his own dream under this principle, Quevedo conveniently adds to the dreams of "Reyes o grandes señores" those dreams that "tocan en cosas importantes," and he supports the addition with a passage from Propertius: "Nec tu sperne piis venientia somnia portis / Cum pia venerunt somnia pondus

habent"⁴ (Sueños I, 131). The serious nature of the subject, then, adds to its believability.

Quevedo opens with these lines, he explains, because of his conviction concerning the divine nature of a recent dream he experienced: "Digolo a proposito de que tengo por caydo del cielo vno que tuue estas noches passadas..." (131). These first lines give no indication of the satirical nature of the material to come. On the contrary, Quevedo insists on the seriousness and the truthfulness of his dream. James Crosby comments on the irony of this insistence:

En un sentido literal, el sueño del poeta se tiene por *caydo del cielo* porque trata de un asunto de supuesta providencia divina. Sin embargo, es una ironía muy fuerte presumir atribuir a la disposición divina el origen de una sátira tan irreverente como la presente. De la misma manera, es una parodia comparar la fuente de este Sueño con el origen divino de los de la épica de Homero (Sueños II, 929).

Crosby in his comments, however, does not mention the serious nature of Quevedo's subject, the Last Judgement, and far from being a parody of Homer, the references to the Iliad serve as a true homage to Homer, likely inspired by Justus Lipsius.

Quevedo began corresponding with Lipsius in September, 1604. By that time, the Belgian humanist had gained a reputation as a serious hispanophile because of his works on Seneca and Lucan,⁵ and

⁴ From the Poems, Book IV, poem 7. "And pay good heed to dreams that come from the Gates of Duty; when dreams of duty come they carry weight." From the translation of Guy Lee (121).

⁵ Because Seneca and Lucan had lived in the Roman province of Hispania, they were frequently thought of as part of the Spanish heritage. Quevedo and others commonly referred to Seneca as "nuestro Séneca."

had corresponded extensively with many Spaniards. In his letter to Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, dated July 30, 1601, Lipsius refers to a polemic that would become an important part of Quevedo's early intellectual life:

Delectavit me autem epistola tua & scite scripta (rem dico;) & in ea iudicium de summo virorum, que fuerunt aut erunt, & cuius magnitudinem non nisi magni capiunt, nec plane etiam ipsi. Is Homerus est, o apex ingeniorum, o fastigium & culmen scientiae, prudentiae, sapientiae, que peryngere homini quidem datur. [...] Et aliquem huic conferemus? aut Virgilium aliquis anteponet? (Ramírez, Epistolario 310-311)⁶

"Summo virorum" Lipsius calls Homer, the greatest of men, and toward the end of his remarks asks with derision who will put Virgil before Homer. Lipsius alludes to Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) who, in his Poetica, gives Homer a secondary place to Virgil, primarily out of a bias for Latin. Quevedo also speaks of Scaliger with derision, although he does not limit himself to allusion, terming Scaliger and his followers "abominables idiotas"⁷ in his philosophical work Defensa de Epicuro (Obras I, 1095).

⁶ I shall leave the correspondence of Lipsius and Quevedo in the original Latin, as well as any Latin texts inserted by Quevedo into his Spanish works. In all other instances, when citing supporting texts originally in Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, I shall cite them in translation provided that an adequate translation exists.

⁷ The passage in context is as follows: "En todo tiempo ha habido hombres infames que han tenido en más precio infamar a los famosos que hacerse famosos siendo infames. En Epicuro ya lo hemos visto; en Homero ya se vio en Zoila, que hubiera sido el más vil ignorante, si Julio Escaligero, siguiéndole, y a Escaligero otros abominables idiotas, no hubieran excedido su afrenta" (Obras I, 1095).

In the correspondence between Lipsius and Quevedo, the latter first broaches the subject of Homer in his letter written from Valladolid on November 22, 1604. He mentions that, at the urging of their mutual friend, Bernardino de Mendoza, he intends to vindicate Homer in the Spanish language against the insults of Scaliger: "Cuius patrio sermone (id fortasse haut maturo consilio) iniurias Homero illatas a Scaligero vindicare fuit animus: occasione sumpta a tuis in Velleium notis" (Ramírez 400-401). Coincidentally, Quevedo in the same letter asks Lipsius for his opinion regarding a difficult passage from Lucan that deals with Cerberus and the underworld. Quevedo would soon be writing about such topics in the Sueños. Lipsius responded January 25, 1605. He thinks even more of Mendoza because of his advice that Quevedo defend Homer, and he adds his own encouragement: "Ille mihi hoc nomine maior est, quod te hortatur Homerum tueri, & defendere; o fac, non potes dignius, & sapientibus gratis, argumentum tractare" (Ramírez 412). This was to be the last contact between Lipsius and Quevedo, judging from the still extant correspondence. Lipsius died in March, 1606, but a few months before, sometime in 1605, Quevedo wrote El sueño del Juicio final, beginning the project at a time in which Lipsius and the defense of Homer occupied his thoughts.

The promised defense of Homer--written in Latin rather than Spanish--is not among Quevedo's extant works, but the desire to defend Homer and attack Scaliger continued to manifest itself in Quevedo's writings. In El sueño del Infierno, Scaliger appears as one of the damned, tormented by the lies that he wrote about Homer:

Julio Çessar Escaligero le estaua atormentando por otro lado con sus Exerçitaziones doctissimas, mientras penaua las desuergonçadas mentiras que escriuiò de Homero y los testimonios que leuantò por levantar a Virgilio Aras, hecho ydolatra de Maron. (Sueños I, 186)

Also, in one part of his commentary to his Anacreón castellano, Quevedo writes "... como yo probaré en la defensa de Homero contra las calumnias de Julio Scaligero y otros de esta secta, apóstatas de la buena fama del padre de todas las ciencias..." (Obras H, 738). In light of this continued preoccupation, there seems little room for doubt that Quevedo had the defense of Homer in mind when he wrote the opening lines of El sueño del Juicio final, and that he meant the references to Homer as a serious tribute, not a parody, of the classical authority whom he considered the father of all sciences.

After all, Quevedo could have easily appealed to some classical authority other than Homer to begin his dreams. For example, he knew the work of Macrobius and could have referred to the Commentary on the Dream of Scipio. Of the five types of dreams that Macrobius defines in his commentary, the *somnium*, *visio*, *oraculum*, *insomnium*, and *visum*, the first three are said to have some type of prophetic value and are to be believed. This would certainly have suited Quevedo's purpose since he wishes to insist on the veracity of his dream. In addition, Quevedo employs a great many of the features and characteristics described by Macrobius as standard parts of true dreams. Even his reference to Homer regarding the believability of the dreams of great men has a similar precedent in the commentary of Macrobius (Macrobius 91). However, Quevedo

nowhere in the Sueños appeals directly to Macrobius, quite probably for his own ideological reasons relating to Cicero and Epicurus.

Although the dream theory of Macrobius can stand on its own, its association with the name of Cicero is inevitable for the simple reason that Macrobius developed his work around the last book of Cicero's Republic, which relates Scipio's dream. During the Middle Ages, the entire text of the Republic had not been available, only that portion preserved in Macrobius. By the seventeenth century, the humanists had recovered a great many Ciceronian texts not known to medieval readers (see Kristeller 25-26). Quevedo had read those texts carefully, but he had little regard for Cicero as an intellectual. In his Defensa de Epicuro, Quevedo notes that Cicero frequently tries to impugn Epicurean doctrine and praise it at the same time. In Quevedo's opinion, this demonstrates more Cicero's ability as a lawyer than as a philosopher: "Y es cierto que en los libros de filosofía mostró Cicerón más su oficio que su seso" (Obras I, 1101). Quevedo also expresses surprise that Cicero should fail to understand things that could be understood by "cualquier ignorante," such as the Epicurean and Homeric descriptions of the nature of the gods (Obras I, 1101).⁸ Even in his philosophical works, Quevedo regularly employs such caustic and satirical remarks against his ideological enemies, demonstrating just how passionately he felt about debates of a philosophical, religious, political, theological, or aesthetic nature. He carries this passion into his satire, and such strong convictions make any prominent appeal to Cicero or Macrobius seem unlikely in this context, especially since Macrobius, in Chapter II of his

⁸ See Ettinghausen (48-53), for more on Quevedo's attack on Cicero.

commentary, refers to "the whole sect of Epicureans, consistently misapprehending the truth..." (Macrobius 83), a sentiment not shared by Quevedo.

Quevedo undoubtedly began with Homer for serious ideological reasons, then. Homer's authority for Quevedo and Lipsius is easily understandable, since he had been christianized since the time of Clement and Origen (see Lamberton 78-82). In the Renaissance, many humanists, including Lipsius, had continued the ancient tradition of conscripting pagan poets and thinkers to expound Christian truths. Quevedo no differently christianizes Homer. First he indicates the divine nature of dreams in general, saying they are from "Júpiter," then he applies this to his own dream, affirming that he considers it "caydo del cielo," which the reader understands to mean that it originates from the Christian deity, especially in light of the subject. However, he seems to contradict himself in the second half of the same sentence:

Digolo a proposito de que tengo por caydo del cielo vno que tuue estas noches passadas, huiendo cerrado los ojos con el libro del beato Hypolito, del fin del Mundo y segunda venida de Christo, lo cual fue causa de soñar que veyra el Juicio final.
(Sueños I, 131)

The reference to falling asleep over a book is conventional, an important motif in some medieval dream-visions, but Quevedo's use of it implies that his dream has a psychological rather than a divine origin. He says as much, naming the book of blessed Hypolitus as the cause that made him dream he was seeing the Last Judgement.

Such psychological and physiological explanations of dreaming had become more prominent during the late Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance as medical learning disseminated Aristotelian teaching regarding the cause and nature of images seen in one's sleep (see Kruger 83-89). In two works in particular, De somniis and De divinatione per somnum, Aristotle argues the absurdity of thinking that dreams might be sent by God, and develops his doctrine of images produced in the body by the sense organs and normal bodily functions. He reduces the nature of dreams to nothing more than a response to external and internal stimuli. As the influence of this doctrine grew, so did the distrust of dreams as possible vehicles for prophecy and truth.

A certain amount of distrust had always been present. In the Odyssey XIX. 562-65, Homer presents the notions of the Gates of Horn and Ivory; through one passed true dreams, through the other, false ones. Writers such as Macrobius had added further explanation, describing certain dreams of a physiological cause that were not to be trusted, but never discounting the true and prophetic nature of some dreams. In contrast, Aristotle presents an almost unilateral doctrine that allows for little but scepticism and distrust. Because of this, as Kruger observes, "[F]ull acceptance of Aristotelian positions [...] was the exception, not the rule. The denial of divine dreams clashed with biblical and patristic authorities and thus presented difficulties for Christian writers" (87). And while Aristotle may have been the prevalent authority on the physiological causes of dreams, Quevedo, based on the supporting texts he gives, actually seems to derive his idea of "book as cause" from Epicurean doctrines.

He refers first to Claudian: "... por la raçon que da Claudiano en la prefation al tercero libro De Raptu, diciendo que todos los animales sueñan de noche cosas como sombras de lo que tratan de dia" (Sueños I, 131). Claudian makes this comment not in the preface to the third book of the Rape of Proserpine, as Quevedo says, but rather in the opening lines of the Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship of the Emperor Honorius. Crosby has shown that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of editions of the De raptu were published which included the preface from the Panegyric. Quevedo's copy was doubtless one of those editions.⁹ The minor confusion seems thematically fortuitous for the Sueños, however, since the De raptu contains many scenes set in the underworld, indicating yet another probable influence on the infernal themes in the Sueños. The original passage from Claudian is as follows:

All the desires that our waking minds ponder by day,
these does friendly sleep bring back to us when once our
spirits are lulled in slumber. When the huntsman lays down
his weary limbs upon his bed, all the same his mind returns to
his familiar coverts and the woods. Judges dream of lawsuits,
and the charioteer of his chariot as with his horses of the night
he steers safely past a phantom turning-post. In stolen
delights the lover finds his joy, the merchant barter his goods,
and, on waking, the miser seeks in vain the riches that have
slipped from his grasp, while to poor mortals stricken by thirst

⁹ See James O. Crosby's essay, "The Poet Claudian in Francisco de Quevedo's 'Sueño del Juicio Final.'"

sleep streaming in lavishes--but all in vain--pleasing draughts
from cool springs. (Claudian 3)

For Claudian, one's professional occupation has much to do with the nature of his dreams, but he does provide other possibilities, such as the lover and the miser, to support the general principle that waking concerns dictate the images that haunt one's sleep.

Quevedo gives the principle with the reference to Claudian, then supports it with a quote from Petronius: "Et canis in somnia leporis vestigia latrat"¹⁰ (Sueños I, 131). The quote comes from poem XXX, according to the traditional numbering of the fragments of Petronius. J. P. Sullivan, in his notes to his edition of the text, observes that the poem is based on Epicurean doctrines (Petronius 205). A very similar passage occurs in the De rerum natura of Lucretius, another of the noted Epicureans produced by Rome:

Hunters' dogs often in soft sleep all at once jerk their legs and suddenly give tongue, and often sniff up the air, as though they had and were holding the track of a wild beast; and if awakened they often chase the empty images of stags, as though they saw them in flight, until they dissipate their delusions and come to themselves. (De rerum 4. 991-97)

The De rerum, as noted by Inwood and Gerson, "should be read in its entirety as crucial evidence of Epicureanism" (65). Quevedo, refers to both Lucretius and Petronius positively in the Defensa de Epicuro as faithful disciples of Epicurus, and cites Lucretius in El sueño de la muerte when discussing the attitude men should have toward death

¹⁰ "And the hound in his slumbers bays at the hare's tracks."
Translation by J. P. Sullivan (171).

(Sueños I, 217). Epicurean doctrine regarding death coincided in many ways with that taught by the Stoics, and Christian writers such as Quevedo could easily adapt those ideas to their own beliefs. On the subject of death, Quevedo could juxtapose passages from Lucretius and the book of Job with no difficulty. Dream theory was much more problematic.

The Epicurean doctrine regarding dreams is perhaps most succinctly stated in the Vatican Sayings, number 24: "Dreams have neither a divine nature, nor prophetic power, but they are produced by the impact of images" (Inwood 37). Of course, the Vatican Sayings were not available to Quevedo, having only been discovered during the nineteenth century. Quevedo relied on the passages from Epicurus that had been transcribed by Diogenes Laertius as well as the doctrines repeated and reflected in the works of writers such as Petronius and Lucretius. Nonetheless, Quevedo did have the entire doctrine in these writings. In the first lines of the poem which Quevedo cites about the slumbering hound, Petronius clearly states that dreams do not have a divine origin: "Dreams, / The fleeting shadow-play that mocks the mind, / Issue from no temples, / No heavenly power sends them- / Each man creates his own" (Petronius 171). Lucretius repeatedly states that the gods have no interest in the affairs of men and do not involve themselves,¹¹ and he indicates that dreams come as a result of the mind's own activity.¹² As a

¹¹ See De rerum, 1. 44-49, 150-158; 2. 167-183, 646-651, 1090-1104; 4. 1233-1239; 5. 76-90, 110-234, 1194-1240; 6. 58-89, 379-422.

¹² As Elizabeth Asmis explains: "Whatever the mind most strained for during the day, he [Lucretius] points out, is what it generally experiences in its dreams; the reason is that passages remain open in the mind at night to receive the same images that were received during the day. The mind, then, focuses on certain images rather than on others during sleep because the state

Christian familiar with the many biblical examples of divinely sent dreams, Quevedo could not wholly accept this part of Epicurean dream theory. He knew that Epicurus, though admirable, was not the "father of truth" as his followers called him, and that his teachings must be rejected where they differ with the teachings of the Church:

Yo bien sé que no halló la verdad, y que sólo la halla quien halla a Cristo nuestro Señor, que es verdad, camino y vida. Bien sé que no fue padre de la verdad; porque sé que Dios es sólo verdadero. Y sé por las palabras del Apóstol: "Que Dios es verdadero, y todo hombre mentiroso, como está escrito." Condeno en Epicuro todas las palabras y opiniones que condena la santa y sola verdadera Iglesia católica romana. (Obras I, 1104)

Such a disclaimer, typical of the period, could have been made by any Christian about a pagan source, but in this instance, it genuinely seems to describe Quevedo's method of appealing only to those Epicurean doctrines not inimical to his faith.

Still unresolved remains the question of the ambivalent and seemingly contradictory nature of Quevedo's assertion that his dream came to him from Heaven, and yet was caused by the reading of a

of tension that it experienced during the day persists during the night. When awake, the mind is likewise in a certain state of tension, which causes it to admit certain eidola rather than others out of the large number that are continually bombarding it from outside. This state of tension may be conditioned by previous experiences just as much as the state of the mind during dreams; hence the act of selection is deliberate only when the mind has, in addition, made a resolve to make the selection. Lucretius is quite emphatic that the effort made by the mind in selecting images is an act of self-preparation, undertaken of its own accord. What he stresses here, however, is not that the mind is acting deliberately, but rather that it is an agent that makes a response of its own to forces that come upon it from the outside. This response, Lucretius insists, is not imposed by external forces, but is due to the nature of the mind itself" (Asmis 123).

book. The first part of the answer lies in the passage from Claudian to which Quevedo refers. After Claudian states with supporting examples that waking preoccupations dictate the dreams of sleep, he applies this principle to himself, describing how he, as a poet, saw himself standing before the gods singing a story. Then he connects the dream with the poem he has just written, "See how confirmation is now granted me, and my vision has not played me false, nor has the deceitful Gate of Ivory sent me dreams that come to nothing" (Claudian 3). Claudian clearly ascribes prophetic weight and truth to his dream. In spite of the fact that the dream may initially have a psychological cause, it will still proceed either through the Gate of Ivory or the Gate of Horn; it will be either true or false according to the dictates of Heaven. For Claudian, no contradiction apparently exists between the notions of divine origin and psychological cause. Similarly, Macrobius in his analysis never describes the dream of Scipio as anything but true and prophetic, in spite of the speculation on the part of Scipio that his dream was caused by the long conversation he had with the King of Massinissa about his grandfather the prior evening. According to the general rules outlined by Macrobius, dreams caused by waking concerns are of no value and not worth interpreting (see Macrobius 88). Apparently, the tandem of daytime concerns and what he considers clearly prophetic characteristics poses no problem.

One more classical author should be mentioned who provides more closely than any other the ambivalent model of dream theory adopted by Quevedo in the Sueños, Lucian of Samosata. Lucian wrote most of his satires as dialogues, but one work in particular, variably

entitled Lucian's Career or My Dream, contains a dream purportedly of the author himself. As the work begins, Lucian describes how, as a boy, he was apprenticed to his uncle to learn the craft of stonecutting. During a disastrous first day on the job, the young Lucian unwittingly destroyed an expensive piece of stone and received a severe beating from his uncle. He returned home distraught, determined not to work again with his uncle, and had a dream. As he begins to tell the dream, he insists that it is a serious matter, "not something to be dismissed lightly; it deserves, gentlemen, your closest attention" (Lucian 4). He continues with a reference to Homer, and quotes from Book II of the Iliad:

For, to put it in Homer's words, there "came unto me as I slumbered, a dream sent by heaven / Through ambrosial night," so clear it was all but real. Even now, after so much time has passed, the shapes that appeared to me then still remain before my eyes, and the words I heard still echo in my ears. That's how vivid it was. (4-5)

In his dream, two allegorical figures visit him, female figures, offering him two different career choices. One of the figures calls herself the Lady of Statue Making, the other Education.¹³ After hearing their respective proposals, Lucian in the dream, makes his choice: "[W]ith joy in my heart, I crossed over to Lady Education..." (8). Only at the end of his story does Lucian add an interesting comment: "This is the vision I remember came to me when I was

¹³ Lucian apparently modeled this dream on "The Choice of Hercules," a brief piece from the sophist Prodicus, preserved in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 2. 1. 21-34, in which two allegorical female figures, Vice and Virtue, offer the young Hercules a choice on which path his life will take.

still a boy—perhaps because I was so emotionally disturbed by the beating I had received" (9).

Quevedo knew the work of Lucian, although he had little regard for him (see Chapter Six). Lucian's account of his dream, however, presents intriguing similarities. Like Quevedo, Lucian begins with a reference to Homer, stating that his dream came from Heaven and should be taken seriously. Like Quevedo, Lucian then adds a psychological explanation, the beating he received. Kruger has difficulty reconciling the two ideas:

After Lucian has recounted his dream, however, he abandons the notion that its source is divine.... [...] Lucian calls the status of his dream into question by framing it with these conflicting explanations of origin. Is the dream to be trusted as "god-sent," or disregarded as the meaningless product of psychological disturbance? (Kruger 17)

Contrary to Kruger's stated opinion, Lucian never at any moment abandons the notion that his dream's source is divine. His acknowledgement of the role played by the beating in causing his dream should not be interpreted as a *de facto* denial of his earlier assertion that the dream came from Heaven. For Lucian, no conflict or contradiction apparently exists between divine origin and psychological cause any more than it does for Claudian or Quevedo. Modern readers may find it difficult to reconcile the two ideas, but it was a commonplace for many classical and medieval writers who recognized both the spiritual and physical natures of mankind.

Certainly, even those who espoused the truth and divine nature of dreams frequently expressed the scepticism of those who did not.

The words *imagination* and *fantasy*--in contrast to their modern connotations associated almost completely with personal creativity--in the Middle Ages tended to evoke a certain wariness of the images received and stored in the mind, and of the dreams caused by those images. Quevedo reflects this tradition when he briefly again takes up the subject of dream theory at the beginning of El sueño del Infierno: "...como sè que los sueños las màs vezes son burla de la fantasia y oçio del alma..." (Sueños I, 160). Nevertheless, these writers also viewed the imagination as the possible receptacle of divine inspiration.¹⁴ Immediately after dismissing most dreams as false, Quevedo asserts the truth of his particular dream of Hell because of what he considers the involvement of Providence: "...vi guiado del Angel de mi Guarda lo que se sigue: particular prouidençia fue enseñarmelo para atraherme con el miedo a la Verdadera Paz." Just as poets have always sought to couple their intellectual gifts with the divine inspiration of the Muses, dreamers like Quevedo have also invoked the divine to attribute truth to their dreams at the same time that they acknowledge the participation of their own faculties.

Although Quevedo refers to Homer to support the notion that dreams come from Heaven, he knew very well the correlating biblical passages, especially as it finds expression in one of his favorite works, the book of Job:

¹⁴ Lynch makes this point of Dante in particular referring to a passage in the Commedia in which he apostrophizes the imagination: "O imagination, that do sometimes so snatch from us from outward things that we give no heed, though a thousand trumpets sound around us, who moves you if the sense affords you naught? A light moves you which takes form in heaven, of itself, or by a will that downward guides it." From Purgatorio XVII. 13-18. Lynch uses Singleton's translation (Lynch 33).

For God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth it not. In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed; then he openeth the ears of men and sealeth their instruction, that he may withdraw man from his purpose, and hide pride from man. (Job 33:14-17)

Quevedo's dream theory attempts to remain true to biblical tradition at the same time that it closely follows classical models, ultimately reflecting the philosophical tradition of Epicurus. If anything, Quevedo, as a Baroque writer, could follow those models more closely than his medieval counterparts, since he had at hand the texts of Homer, known only indirectly in the Middle Ages, as well as the texts of the other authors to whom he refers or quotes. An analysis of the dream conventions in the Sueños will reveal a similar adherence to tradition and philosophy.

II. Dream Convention

Most of the conventions of literary dreams in some way revolve around the idea that the dreamer needs to learn something.¹⁵ Consequently, in those dreams that present the author as protagonist, the author describes a version of himself either ignorant of essential truths, or in need of the philosophical and moral consolation necessary to overcome a spiritual crisis. The difference between author and narrator may seem one of mere chronology, since the narrator, describing the experience of the dream in the past, needs

¹⁵ "The visionary goes to the other world in order to learn something; that is the usual pattern, and it is an important feature of medieval dream-poems" (Spearing 18).

instruction, while the author, contemporaneous to the writing of the dream, has presumably already learned the lessons taught. However, any direct association between author and narrator must be made with great caution. The "I" of the dream-vision may indeed refer to the historical author, and the experience of the dream, a genuine life-changing revelation, but the narrator may also speak as a representative of mankind.¹⁶ In the latter instances, the ignorance of the dreamer becomes the ignorance of mankind, and the lessons taught obviously intended for the reader. Thus the voice of the dim-witted first person narrator is frequently nothing more than a fiction, while the true voice of the author reveals itself in the events and characters that appear to disabuse the dreamer of his illusions. The dream, then, may either be a personal journey, an interior pilgrimage that redefines the writer's interior life (see Lynch 48), or an elaborate fiction created as a means of portraying transcendent truths to the reader; or it may be both.

The predominantly social and satirical message of the Sueños may seem to preclude a reading of them as personal pilgrimage. In the first two dreams in particular, the dreamer serves as little more than a witness to the satirical condemnation of many segments and members of his own society. However, the passive nature of the dreamer at the beginning of the Sueños results not so much from its social emphasis as it does from the apocalyptic and biblical models Quevedo follows as he begins this series of visions. El sueño del

¹⁶ Michael Means mentions this with regard to medieval literature in general (19), and refers to the article by Leo Spitzer, "Note on the Poetic and Empiric 'I' in Medieval Authors," Romanische Literaturstudien 1936-1956 (Tübingen, 19): 100-112.

Juicio final relates a prophetic vision of a future event, the Last Judgment. In accordance with tradition, the visionary merely observes and does not take part in the future events revealed. With El sueño del Infierno, the narrator begins to take a much more active role in his dreams, wandering through Hell as a pilgrim in a manner reminiscent of Dante. In El sueño de la muerte, the depiction of the dreamer as individual becomes much more sharply drawn, as the narrator describes the crisis he has experienced during his imprisonment--an historical event for Quevedo--, and the subsequent consolation he receives from the personified image of death, modeled after the consolation given by Lady Philosophy to Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy. Quevedo draws on a variety of traditions for the Sueños, and as a result, the depiction and involvement of the dreamer vary from dream to dream.

Quevedo's use of other dream conventions also varies considerably, not following a particular pattern for the five works. For example, in only the first and the last dreams does the narrator tell us that he fell asleep after reading literary texts that in some way deal with the subject matter of the dream that follows. In Juicio, he mentions the book of blessed Hypolitus which deals with the end of the world and the second coming of Christ. In Muerte, he cites passages from Lucretius and Job that deal with death. He probably arrived at this innovation independently, using it as a way of referring to authoritative texts at the same time that he adheres to classical theory regarding the connection between waking concerns and dreams. However, the practice of leading into literary visions with descriptions of the narrator reading books seems to have begun

in the Middle Ages. Chaucer does so in The Book of the Duchess and The Parliament of Foules. Although Quevedo did not know these particular works, he does follow the tradition of the medieval dream-vision which begins with classical models and then incorporates the author's own innovations.

Another characteristic typical of medieval literary visions involves the creation of intertextual relationships within the dream. Helen Phillips describes how Chaucer places "embedded stories" in his dream-visions to create an intertextual narrative (16-18). Quevedo never employs the technique to the extent that Chaucer does, choosing to rely more heavily on his own fictions. Still, he employs this literary device to great effect, especially in Juicio in which the narrator begins his dream with a description of the Resurrection of the Dead, initially very similar to events foretold in I Corinthians, Chapter 15. Quevedo the narrator says he thought he saw a young man in the air sounding a trumpet, and in obedience, the dead began to rise physically from their graves, each bone looking to join its match (Sueños I, 131). The description becomes increasingly comic as the narrator relates how some sinners, realizing they were facing the Last Judgment, began to flee from those parts of their reanimated bodies that they had used to commit their sins: "Los ladrones y matadores gastauan los pies en huyr de sus mismas manos" (Sueños I, 132).

Because of such comic passages, as well as the denunciations of parades of innkeepers, tailors, shoe makers, book sellers, lawyers, doctors, and other groups from early seventeenth century Spanish society, it becomes easy to focus on the social satire and think of the

biblical referents and apocalyptic tradition as nothing more than an artistic recourse used to establish a scenario of condemnation. However, Quevedo provides lists other than those made up of members of his own society, describes other groups passing before the Throne of Judgment, indicating something other than a purely comic intent.

The judgment begins with Adam, and Quevedo mentions the rigorous questioning that ensues on account of a certain apple. By doing so, he creates an intertextual relationship with the passages from Genesis that relate the Fall of man. As the judgment continues, Judas, Herod, and Pontius Pilate soon appear. With the inclusion of these three biblical figures, Quevedo "embeds" the stories of Christ's betrayal, the persecution of the Christ child that caused Joseph and Mary to flee with the babe into Egypt, as well as the death sentence given Christ by a Roman governor who was more interested in politics than justice. Why would Quevedo bring these events into his text if his purpose were merely to satirize his own society? Clearly, he wishes to demonstrate how evil he considers the vice and decadence he observes around him on a daily basis. These biblical episodes establish a frame within which to view and understand the comedy of the dream, a serious frame of sin, rebellion against God, and rejection of Christ. Quevedo presents this denunciation of his own society as a comic panorama; he eagerly displays his wit and skill as a satirist, but he does so within the larger, much more serious theological framework established by his intertextual approach.

While intertextuality may be a typical feature of the medieval dream-vision, there is nothing particularly oneiric about allusions to

biblical or historical characters. What is oneiric, is the spiritual setting provided by the dream, which allows the dreamer to see these characters as they supposedly were in life. The dream setting also allows for other impossibilities. For example, the dreamer may see and even interact with allegorical constructs. In Juicio, Quevedo makes use of allegorical personification to add to the intertextuality of his work, mentioning first the appearance of the Ten Commandments, then that of the New Testament (Sueños I, 134) as characters participating in the vast spectacle observed by the dreamer. These characters receive only passing mention in the text, but they add significantly to the larger theological framework of the satire, the Ten Commandments associated with the proper moral conduct of individuals, and the New Testament with the Christian faith. Such personification of texts may, for Quevedo, represent an ingenious substitution of the ecphrastic passages much more typical of medieval dream visions. Rather than describe another piece of art within his own, he personifies literary texts, allowing them to take part in the action. However, personification of abstractions, rather than texts, represents a far more common feature of the dream-vision genre. Among those taking part in the Last Judgement as envisioned by Quevedo are "Locura" (133), and then "las Desgracias, las Pestes y las Pesadumbres" (134)¹⁷, the latter three groups giving witness against doctors.

Personification plays a relatively small role in Juicio, which would be called a *visio*, a prophetic dream, according to the

¹⁷ Later in his life, Quevedo wrote at length about "las cuatro pestes del mundo" in his ascetic work, Virtud militante, composed during 1634-36 (Obras I, 1364-1423).

categorization of Macrobius. Allegorical personification becomes increasingly important, however, in the later Sueños. In El mundo por de dentro, an old man called *Desengaño* serves as guide and teacher to the narrator. In El sueño de la muerte, a female character called *Muerte* performs a similar function. These two dreams represent what Macrobius calls an *oraculum*, a dream "in which a parent, or a pious or revered man, or a priest, or even a god clearly reveals what will or will not transpire, and what action to take or avoid" (Macrobius 90). This definition does not specifically include personifications, but during the Middle Ages, personifications related to specific subjects increasingly took the place of revered or divine messengers such as saints or angels in oracular dreams.¹⁸

An angelic guide does almost make an appearance at the beginning of Infierno, where the narrator states that he saw the subsequent infernal vision guided by his guardian angel. Quevedo may have initially intended to follow the models of apocalyptic works, or even the satirical sixteenth century work El Crotalón, which included angelic guides, but he appears to have abandoned the notion, since nowhere else in Infierno does he again mention his guardian angel. Instead, the narrator wanders through Hell without any type of guide, conversing with demons and the damned in order to learn the truth of what he observes. Other examples occur in the

¹⁸ Means comments on the possible reasons for this: "For one thing, using personification is strategically safer than using angels or saints: these poets strive for more profound, hence less safe, meanings than do most pious legends. More importantly, though, personifications enable the poet to particularize the area of absolute truth being discussed. The revelation of angels or saints should be all-encompassing since in perceiving God they perceive all knowledge, but characters named Philosophy, for example, or Daunger, or Imaginatif could hardly rise to such expectations" (13).

Sueños that might seem to correspond more closely to the Macrobian notion of characters who are, if not divine or revered, at least famous, such as the conversation that takes place between the narrator and the "Marqués de Villena" in Muerte (see Price 45), but that scene is primarily a comic episode. The scenes that specifically relate to the dreamer's need to learn philosophical or moral truths are those in which personified abstractions play the part of the instructor-guide.

For Franz W. Muller, the depiction of realistic personae alongside personified abstractions in the Sueños represents part of an unresolved tension between the medieval and the modern (Muller 225). He refers to a "dialéctica del alegorismo y el realismo moderno..." (226), defining the latter concept primarily by the presence of realistic personae:

Sus personificaciones alegóricas de conceptos religiosos, morales y psicológicos se mueven en medio de una abigarrada muchedumbre de tipos profesionales contemporáneos, entre jueces, abogados, zapateros, sastres, cocheros, pasteleros, comediantes, políticos, ramera y pícaros. (227)

This "dialéctica," according to Muller, provides the explanation as to why "en los Sueños, la alegoría no es total" (226). The implication is that a truly medieval allegory would be total, or pure, and that any impurities must be due to Quevedo's modernity. However, without diminishing the Baroque, or modern, aspects of the Sueños, it should be mentioned that many works from Antiquity onward contain both personifications and personae; Lucian's Dream, cited earlier in this chapter, is but one example. In the Middle Ages, pure, or total

allegory was somewhat more the exception than the rule (see Van Dyke 65-67). The inclusion of personae, then, should not be taken in and of itself as a sign of modernity, especially in those scenes that depict one persona, the narrator, interacting with one personification, the allegorical instructor.

Such scenes follow firmly in the tradition established by Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, a seminal work of tremendous influence throughout the Middle Ages. Van Dyke refers to it as "allegorical instruction" (66). Muller, in his analysis, mentions neither Boethius nor the traditional nature of Quevedo's construction of these scenes. Rather than recognize the tradition, he refers to the originality of Quevedo's allegories: "Lo que los destaca es la originalidad con que transforma Quevedo los lugares comunes alegóricas, renovándolos, conforme avanza su labor en los Sueños, por medio de visiones alegóricas únicas" (Muller 228). He supports his thesis with reference to Quevedo's description of Death that appears in Muerte:

En esto entrò vna que pareçia muger mui galana, y llena de coronas y de çetros y oçes y abarcas y chapines y tiaras y caperuzas y mitras y monteras y brocados y pellexos y seda y oro y garrotes y diamantes y terrones y guijarros y perlas, y vn ojo abierto y otro çerrado, vestida y desnuda y de todos colores; por el vn lado era moça y por el otro vieja; vnas veçes venia de espaçio y otras apriesa, y pareçia que estaba lexos y estaba çerca, y quando pensè que començaba a entrar, estaba ya en mi cabecera. (Sueños I, 222)

For Muller, the originality of this character lies in the fact that Quevedo does not describe a skeletal figure, "...dejando a un lado por primitiva e inadecuada la tradicional representación del esqueleto con su guadaña y su reloj de arena, la reemplaza por una figura de su propia invención..." (Muller 229). Had Quevedo followed tradition, in other words, he would have simply described the Grim Reaper. Since he did not do so, his figure must be original and of his own invention. This conclusion, however, only considers one tradition, that which stems from the Danza de la muerte and other works that provide a skeletal description of Death. Quevedo does pay certain homage to that tradition when he mentions the "oçes" in the hand of his Death, but he clearly has another tradition in mind, a philosophical one that must be taken into account before addressing his originality.

At the beginning of Muerte, the narrator describes how he suffers, anguished and imprisoned, thinking about death. He reads passages from Lucretius and Job that provide him with some consolation, and then he sleeps. He begins to dream and see figures from his society passing by him. Shortly a strange looking figure of contrasting and opposing characteristics approaches his bed, a figure who will speak to him about the nature of death and how men should view it, a figure who will provide him with philosophical consolation. Already this sounds much like the situation described by Boethius at the beginning of the Consolation, where the narrator lies in bed, imprisoned, anguished, distracted by the Muses, when the figure of Lady Philosophy approaches to provide him the consolation he needs. These similarities, though significant, only partially represent Quevedo's debt to Boethius.

When reading Quevedo's description of Death, it is the conflicting nature of the figure that stands out. She has one eye closed, and one open. She is both dressed and naked and of many colors. On one side she is young, the other old. At times she moves slowly, then very quickly, seeming both far away and very near. This nature, that encompasses opposite extremes, has a clear precedent in Boethius' description of Lady Philosophy (Boethius 28)¹⁹ who seems both young and old, "her colour fresh and cheerful, and yet discovering so many years," who sometimes had "the common height of men" while at others she was so tall "she pierced the very heavens." She wears clothes of the finest threads, workmanship, and "ever-during stuffe," and yet they are faded and torn in places. In contrast to the many crowns, miters, tiaras, scepters and jewels on the person of Death as described by Quevedo--indicating her ultimate power over even the most powerful of mortals--, Lady Philosophy carries only one scepter, but the royal and authoritative nature of each figure is clear. Each, within the limits of her nature, and the realms over which she rules allegorically, may speak infallibly, authoritatively, and thus take on the role of the divine messenger of the oracular dream.

Of course, Boethius never explicitly presents or describes the Consolation as a dream. Nevertheless, the work established the pattern for a great many of the dream-visions that followed in the Middle Ages. Lynch, when discussing the development of the philosophical dream-vision, refers to the Consolation as "the genre's

¹⁹ Nolting-Hauff (275) makes some of these same comparative observations postulating the influence of Boethius.

prototype" (Lynch vii). For Quevedo, certainly, the influence of Boethius must be understood within the context of the dream-vision tradition that perpetuated the practice of using personifications as instructor-guides. While the Sueños themselves can not be strictly called "philosophical" dream-visions, they clearly exhibit a tremendous amount of influence from that tradition. The originality of Quevedo's work lies in his skillful adaptation of that tradition to his own message, and the way in which he so thoroughly assimilates it into his satire.

Quevedo extends the juxtaposition of realistic and allegorical even into his scenography. In Infierno, the narrator describes how, at the beginning of his dream, he found himself in a natural paradise from which flowed two separate paths:

Hallème en vn lugar faborezido de naturaleza por el sosiego amable, donde sin malizia la Hermossura entretenia la vista (muda Recreacion), y sin respuesta humana platicauan las Fuentes entre las guixas y los Arboles por las ojas; tal vez cantaua el Pajaro, ni sè de termino si en competencia suya, o si agradeçiendoles su harmonia; ved quàl es de peregrino nuestro desseo, que no hallè paz en nada de esto. Tendì los ojos cudiziossos de ver algun camino por donde buscar compania, y veo (cosa digna de admirazion) dos sendas que nazen de vn mismo lugar, y vna se yua apartando de la otra, como que huiesen de acompañarse. (Sueños I, 160)

Initially, Quevedo merely provides a conventional description of the *locus amoenus*, a peaceful place of trees, fountains and birdsong. This type of description appears in texts representing many different

genres following both biblical and classical models. It figures perhaps most prominently in pastoral works, but it also belongs to the series of conventions used by authors of literary visions who employ it to describe the otherworld to which dreamers often travel.²⁰ Although exaggerated and idyllic in its peacefulness and beauty, it does represent here a realistic setting that serves as the starting point for what will turn into an allegorical journey.

After the conventional but unremarkable description of place, Quevedo incorporates an oneiric innovation with his addition of the two paths, oneiric because of the ease with which the dreamer moves from a realistic to an allegorical landscape. As he continues the narrative, it soon becomes apparent that the paths represent the two choices of human earthly existence: one path, narrow and difficult with few people, leads to Heaven, the other, broad and easy with many travelers leads to Hell. The biblical model comes from Matthew 7:13 where Christ describes as narrow the way that leads to life, and broad the way that leads to destruction. Quevedo had earlier alluded to this biblical passage in Juicio when he described the Ten Commandments standing as guards at the extremely narrow gate entering Heaven. Notably, the narrator of Infierno finds no

²⁰ "The *locus amoenus* or 'beautiful place', which became the heavenly landscape of literary visions and dreams, is basically a Mediterranean landscape, an ideal originating in Greece, Italy, and Palestine. It is typically set in bright southern sunlight (perhaps augmented by or transformed into the jewelled brilliance of the Apocalypse), but it also provides shade against the sun, and is therefore furnished with a tree or trees, often fruit-trees. The trees will be in a flowery meadow, which will provide fragrance as well as bright colours, and there will probably be birds singing in them (though in some cases the place of birds is taken by human or angelic song). In the meadow there is almost invariably a spring or brook, often rising from a fountain, and there will usually be a breeze, both features being necessities for comfort in a hot country" (Spearing 17-18).

peace in the paradise that he initially observes, and he chooses to leave it in order to follow the paths. Quevedo may wish to draw some parallel between his Everyman narrator and Adam and Eve, who were not content with the life and rules given them in the Garden and had to leave it. Thereafter they had to choose between good and evil, since they learned the difference with their first sin. The narrator's own discontent with paradise seems to lie with the lack of human companionship, the solitude in which he finds himself. So, not surprisingly, he chooses the easy, crowded path, and soon finds himself in Hell. With regard to Quevedo's use of dream convention, the most notable feature is perhaps the progression from the realistic to the allegorical to the spiritual destination of the afterlife. The progression demonstrates the ease with which Quevedo adapts both the traditional conventions and the oneiric setting to his purpose, making plausible what would seem impossible in any other context.

The first words in the first Sueño were of dream theory, the source and cause of dreams, the workings of the human mind. The last words of the last Sueño provide a reflective analysis of the narrator's experience:

Con esto me hallè en mi aposento, tan cansado y tan colerico como si la pendencia huiera sido verdad y la peregrinacion no huiera sido sueño. Con todo esso me pareció no despreciar del todo esta vision, y darle algun credito, pareciendome que los muertos pocas vezes se burlan, y que gente sin pretension y desengañada, màs atiende a enseñar que ha entretener. (Sueños I, 251)

In his final comment, the narrator characterizes his dream in a typically medieval fashion calling it a pilgrimage. Quevedo may have taken this from Dante, who regularly refers to himself as a pilgrim during his journey to the otherworld. The term frequently appears in allegorical texts referring to the broader journey of human life, but here it connotes a journey of spiritual enlightenment, the dream. In his prologues to the reader, Quevedo the author speaks of pointing out social vices and opening the eyes of the reader; in the text itself, the narrator remains consistent to the dream convention, presenting himself as an individual in need of "desengaño," with whom the reader is obviously meant to identify.

Had Quevedo lived and written the Sueños two hundred years earlier, medieval scholars would undoubtedly categorize them as satirical dream-visions. Baroque scholars have been reluctant to do so, perhaps because the Sueños incorporate so many other important traditions related to their satire and moral philosophy. Perhaps another reason for the avoidance of the term "dream-vision" has to do with the scant representation of the genre in medieval Spanish literature in comparison with the many literary visions belonging to the canon of medieval French and English literature. Because of the lack of a strong medieval Spanish tradition, Quevedo naturally relied more heavily on classical sources and models, something he would have been likely to do anyway because of the Renaissance rediscovery of so many classical texts. In something of a contrast, although Chaucer's dream-visions do contain many references to classical authors and stories, they also seem to have been greatly influenced by literary visions of medieval France. Chaucer and

Quevedo had some common influences, such as Boethius, but there is definitely a medieval component to the tradition which Quevedo lacks. However, Quevedo did possess a vast general knowledge of medieval texts written in Latin, Spanish, and Italian. The many dream conventions represented in the Sueños clearly indicate some familiarity with the characteristics that developed in the dream-vision genre during the Middle Ages. Quevedo utilizes those characteristics not only to make possible a journey to the otherworld, but also as a means to establish the serious context of his humor.

Chapter Three:

The Neostoic and Sceptical Dynamic in the Sueños

The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy lists Francisco de Quevedo as "the most noteworthy exponent of Spanish Neostoicism" (Schmitt, Cambridge 372). Stoic doctrine, particularly as transmitted through the writings of Seneca, had been influential in Spain since the late Middle Ages, but Neostoicism as a European philosophical movement began in 1584, when Justus Lipsius published his De constantia in publicis malis (Cambridge 370). The movement sought to reconcile Stoic doctrines of moral philosophy with those of the Christian faith. In particular, the book of Job, with its examples of fortitude and resignation, served as the most important source of biblical compatibility with Stoicism.¹ Quevedo wrote a number of works that stand primarily as expositions of Neostoicism, the most significant of them including: De los remedios de cualquier fortuna. Nombre, origen, intento, recomendación y descendencia de la doctrina estoica (to which he appended the Defensa de Epicuro), La cuna y la sepultura, La constancia y paciencia del Santo Job, y Providencia de Dios. Manuel Durán has referred to

¹ In pursuit of that compatibility, Quevedo even perpetuated the medieval misconception that the Stoics derived their doctrine directly from the book of Job: "No pudieron verdades tan desnudas del mundo, cogerse limpias de la tierra y polvo de otra fuente que de las sagradas letras. Y osó [Pedro Comestor] afirmar que se derivan del libro sagrado de Job, trasladadas en precepto de sus acciones y palabras literalmente. Probarélo con demostraciones y con la cronología de los primeros profesores" (Obras I, 1085).

these works as "un necesario contrapeso a sus escritos satíricos" (157). He admits that the satires and philosophical works contain many of the same characteristics, but he refers to their "pesimismo, nihilismo, y visión negativa de la vida humana" (157) as their ideological commonalities. The Neostoic ideas, which he describes as the "clave elevada" (157) of the philosophical works, he contrasts with the "visión del hombre como fante" (157) in the satires. The characterization, although accurate in some respects, fails to sufficiently acknowledge the extent to which Quevedo's philosophical convictions permeate his humor in a manner wholly consistent with the ostensibly more serious works.

The tendency to view Quevedo's satires separately from his philosophical works unfortunately has ample precedent in Quevedo himself. In response to the attacks and accusations he suffered after the publication of the first edition of the Sueños (1627), he prepared a new edition, with significant revisions and a new title: Juguetes de la niñez y travesuras de ingenio (1631). Many of the revisions were meant to remove any possibility of theological controversy and avoid problems with the Inquisition, but the new title clearly represents an attempt to characterize the satires as nothing more than innocent and youthful mischievousness. Such a characterization can only be regarded as disingenuous, a capitulation to pressure and criticism, for while Quevedo did indeed begin to write the Sueños as a young man in 1605, he did not finish the last one until 1621, some sixteen years later when he had already reached middle age. The composition of the Sueños spanned a considerable part of his adult life, and the influence of Lipsius and the ideals of Neostoicism manifest

themselves from the beginning. Quevedo's other philosophical interests, principally Epicureanism and classical scepticism, also occupy his thought and his works to a considerable degree.

It runs somewhat contrary to traditional criticism on Quevedo to suggest that his philosophical interests as expressed in his works remained consistent throughout his career. Américo Castro, K. A. Bluer, and George Mariscal, among others, have all commented on the contradictory nature of Quevedo's thought.² However, frequently more apparent than real, many of Quevedo's contradictions disappear when read within the context of the larger body of his work.

For example, toward the beginning of El sueño del Juicio final, Quevedo briefly, and in a very negative fashion, mentions the appearance of philosophers as a group, standing before the Throne of Judgement: "Fueron juzgados los Philosophos, y era de ver ocupadas sus ciencias y entendimientos en hacer silogismos contra su saluacion" (Sueños I, 136). One could infer from this statement, as well as from similarly negative comments made elsewhere, that Quevedo had a general dislike for philosophers and thinkers. At the same time, he continually expressed a deep admiration for men like Seneca, Zeno, Epictetus, Epicurus, and many others. There might appear to exist a contradiction, but, when reading Quevedo, one must

² According to Castro, "Quevedo es un campo de contradicciones." He makes this comment in his article "Escepticismo y contradicción en Quevedo" (43), in which he argues that Quevedo's philosophical scepticism is at odds with Christian doctrine. Bluer's comments on apparent contradictions arising out of Quevedo's use of both Stoic and Christian doctrine will be addressed at length in the next chapter. Mariscal comments that, "It should not surprise us, therefore, that Quevedo's texts have consistently refused to be totalized into a harmonious whole and that since the end of the seventeenth century the image of Quevedo the man has been that of a contradictory and insoluble figure" (101).

always keep in mind that he often did not bother to qualify his statements. As a result, many comments appear categorical when they are, indeed, not. In the passage above, he merely says, "los Philosophos," appearing to denounce them all because no adjective or relative clause follows to provide some qualification, to limit the referent to a certain type or group of philosopher. He does, however, provide one clue with the word "silogismos." A passage from the Defensa de Epicuro provides some significant clarification:

Oigamos voz elegante, doctísima y sagrada. San Jerónimo, sobre la epístola de San Pablo a Tito: "Los dialécticos, de quienes Aristóteles es príncipe, suelen tender redes de argumentos y concluir la vaga libertad de la Retórica en las zarzas de los silogismos. Si esto hacen aquellos de quienes la contención es arte propia, ¿qué debe hacer el cristiano, sino huir la contienda?" (Obras I, 1094)

The anti-Aristotelianism reflected in the commentary from St. Jerome would become an important current in Renaissance scepticism, but more importantly, the passage describes an entire class of philosophers, the dialecticians who, with their "redes de argumentos" and "silogismos," claim to be able to arrive at certain knowledge regarding reality. These are the philosophers whom Quevedo mentions with such disdain in Juicio, always to be considered separately from the moral philosophers whom he so greatly admired.

Quevedo's predilection for moral philosophy derives as much from the age in which he lived as from personal inclination. He was a humanist. The *studia humanitatis* that formed the core of

Renaissance Humanism consisted of *grammatica*, *rhetorica*, *poetica*, *historia*, and *philosophia moralis*. It stands to reason, therefore, that when Quevedo wrote moral satires such as the Sueños, moral philosophy would comprise a significant part of the works, and indeed such is the case. In addition, the Renaissance generally preserved the tripartite division of moral philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics, a division established by Aristotle and continued by writers throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Cambridge 303ff.). The three areas dealt with governance of self, of one's household, and of the state. R. M. Price has commented on the lack of any real political satire in the Sueños (74). Clearly, the primary philosophical concern of the Sueños is governance of self, the conduct of individuals and classified groups of individuals, not the state. For the latter, Quevedo wrote his famous two volume work Política de Dios, which concerns itself with the proper role and conduct of a king in light of Christ's example taken from biblical passages. This is not to say that the Sueños reflect none of Quevedo's political concerns. As will be seen in Chapter Six, some important parallels exist between certain passages in the Sueños and ideas expressed in works such as Política de Dios and España defendida. However, these passages are few when compared to the many that reflect Quevedo's moral philosophy.

Quevedo's preoccupation with moral philosophy by no means indicates ignorance of the other areas of philosophical study, such as metaphysics.³ He merely possessed an intense distrust of conclusions

³ Quevedo apparently follows the teaching of Seneca on this matter: "The lyric poets are avowedly frivolous; but the dialecticians believe that they are engaged upon serious business. I do not deny that one must cast a glance

based solely on logic, hence his ridicule of the dialecticians in Juicio, an early indication of the sceptical stance that he declares much more directly in the fourth Sueño, El mundo por de dentro. His scepticism, based primarily on classical doctrines, but also influenced by the sceptical revival that took place in the sixteenth century, has important implications for his moral philosophy. Quevedo's decision to introduce sceptical philosophy into his moral satires has yet to be discussed sufficiently among scholars. Once certain sceptical elements in the Sueños have been established, however, the Neostoic elements, that focus on doctrines regarding the passage of time and human mortality, become more understandable within the broader philosophical scheme of the satires.

The Sceptical Sueño: El mundo por de dentro

In her 1982 study on scepticism in Cervantes, Maureen Ihrie devoted some brief comments to Quevedo, and observed at the time that his scepticism had not "been submitted to systematic critical analysis" (27). Little has changed in the intervening years. That portion of Quevedo's thought still presents significant problems in need of analysis if not resolution. Ihrie raises one of those problems when she comments that Quevedo "does not at any time seek, espouse, or attempt to maintain a skeptical attitude (which seeks to balance all extremes) and provoke ataraxia, his use of skepticism-as-tool is an incomplete interpretation of the philosophy..." (27-28). Of

at dialectic; but it ought to be a mere glance, a sort of greeting from the threshold, merely that one may not be deceived, or judge these pursuits to contain any hidden matters of great worth" (Epist. ad Luc. XLIX. 6).

course, the last part of the comment applies to all of Quevedo's philosophy. He never fully accepts the doctrines of any of the classical philosophers on whom he bases his own views, even those of his beloved Seneca; he takes only those views that he both needs and considers reconcilable with Christian doctrine. Admittedly, he goes to considerable lengths to reconcile some ideas, but others, such as the Stoic notion of noble suicide, he rejects out of hand. However, rather than regard his assimilation of classical doctrine as "incomplete interpretation," a more accurate description would acknowledge his limited application of the philosophy. The distinction between "limited" and "incomplete" may seem subtle in this context, but it is nonetheless important because the former term suggests a coherent plan on the part of Quevedo, while the latter may suggest that he had an incomplete understanding of the concepts with which he was working.

Ihrie raises another issue in her comment regarding Quevedo's failure to provoke *ataraxia*, or imperturbability. With this, she refers obliquely to the moral philosophy developed by Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 B.C.), whose teachings form the basis of Pyrrhonism, one of two separate currents of scepticism that arose in Antiquity, the other being Academic scepticism, so called because it developed among a number of teachers in Plato's academy in Athens. Although Ihrie indicates some differences between Quevedo's thought and that of Pyrrho, she does not provide any definitive answer as to his sceptical influences. Did Quevedo assimilate the scepticism of the Pyrrhonists or the Academics, and to what extent? Did he even know both philosophies? Were the ancient texts available to him?

The answers to these questions become a necessary part to the analysis and interpretation of El mundo por de dentro.

Quevedo opens the dream with a brief prologue containing a clear expression of epistemological scepticism:

Es cossa aueriguada (asi lo siente Metrodoro Chyo, y otros muchos) que no se saue nada y que todos son ynorantes; y aun esto no se saue de çierto, que a sauerse ya se supiera algo: sosphechase. Diçelo assi el doctissimo Françisco Sanchez, Medico y Philosopho, en su libro cuyo titulo es *Nihil scitur*: No se sabe nada. (Sueños I, 195)

Such a statement appears incongruous from one so devoted to Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. Neither school admitted this type of scepticism, both teaching that truth and certainty were attainable, particularly the latter group, who called Epicurus the father of truth because they believed that he had found it and shared it with the rest of mankind. The Roman Epicurean Lucretius, although he specifically mentions neither Metrodorus nor any other sceptic, directly attacks the sceptical doctrine to which Quevedo refers, denying in almost the exact same terms that which Quevedo affirms: "Moreover, if anyone thinks that nothing is known, he does not even know whether that can be known, since he declares that he knows nothing. I will therefore spare to plead cause against a man who has placed his own head in his footsteps" (De rerum natura 4. 469-473). Quevedo cites and refers to Lucretius as an authority on a number of occasions dealing with moral issues, but he rejects Epicurean theories of knowledge in favor of scepticism.

No ambiguity exists concerning the Stoic and Epicurean sources of Quevedo's moral philosophy. The same may not be said of his scepticism, since he scrupulously avoids mentioning either the Academics or the Pyrrhonists. His references to Metrodorus and Francisco Sanches (sometimes spelled Sanchez) provide little help since neither thinker can easily be associated with either of the classical schools.

All of the works of Metrodorus (d. 277 B.C.) have been lost apparently since late Antiquity; only those fragments repeated by others remain. Quevedo probably cites the sceptical fragment from Diogenes Laertius's The Lives of Eminent Philosophers (IX. 58). The name of Metrodorus has been associated with that of Democritus,⁴ whose atomic theory includes some sceptical aspects since he considered the human senses too weak to perceive reality (see Groarke 52-53). Even so, the nature and extent of Metrodorus's scepticism remains unclear. If his works were still extant, if his sceptical fragment were placed in a context, a very different perception of his sceptical words might emerge. According to Cicero, Metrodorus made his famous remark at the beginning of his lost book On Nature (Academica II. 73). One can only speculate about the contents of that book, but it appears that Metrodorus wrote sceptical remarks at the beginning of a book on natural philosophy. A true sceptic, who believed that nothing could be known, probably would not have written such a work. Indeed, Quevedo attacks natural

⁴ Although Metrodorus is generally considered a follower of Democritus, Diogenes Laertius leaves some room for doubt on that issue: "...while Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessas of Chios, though some say that he was taught by Democritus" (Lives IX. 58).

philosophy in La cuna y la sepultura, associating it with the dialecticians and their "silogismos."⁵ Barring the recovery of a manuscript, the difficulties in Metrodorus's philosophy may never be resolved. The only certain thing is that he made a succinct and categorical statement about the impossibility of knowledge, and Quevedo apparently chose to quote him for that very reason.

Quevedo probably chose to refer to Francisco Sanches (1552-1623) for the same reason. Nothing could be more succinct and categorical than the title of Sanches's 1581 book Quod nihil scitur. Because of that book, he holds a place as one of the most important figures in the sixteenth century revival of Greek scepticism, second perhaps only to Michel de Montaigne.⁶ But unlike Montaigne, who openly espouses Pyrrhonism in his essay, Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Sanches never appeals directly to either of the two classical schools, leaving some doubt as to his philosophical influences. The only clear trend in Quod nihil scitur is its anti-Aristotelianism. However, as Richard H. Popkin has observed, the categorical nature of Sanches's scepticism much more closely resembles that of the Academics: "By and large, Sanchez's totally negative conclusion is not the position of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the suspense of judgment as to

⁵ "Quien te ve fatigar en silogismos y demostraciones, no pudiendo, si no eres matemático hacer alguna; fatigar en lógicas mal dispuestas y menos importantes; y en filosofía natural (así la llaman ellos siendo fantástica y soñada..." (Obras I, 1343).

⁶ Regarding Sanches's importance, Otis H. Green observes, "The one Spanish writer who holds a place of esteem in the history of European skepticism is the physician Francisco Sánchez, long regarded as a Portuguese, but now known to have been born in Tuy, in the Spanish province of Galicia. His portrait hangs in the auditorium of the University of Toulouse" (III, 303).

whether anything can be known, but rather the full-fledged negative dogmatism of the Academics" (39).

Since the two authors referred to at the beginning of Mundo provide no definitive help in identifying Quevedo's sceptical formation, the question arises concerning his possible knowledge of other classical and Renaissance sceptics. Greek scepticism was known in the Renaissance through three principle works: Cicero's Academica, which, as the name implies, deals with the scepticism of Arcesilas, Carneades and others of the Academy, Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and Diogenes Laertius's Life of Pyrrho, (actually Book IX, chapter 11 in the Lives).⁷ Quevedo frequently refers to and cites other parts of the Lives of Diogenes Laertius, and on occasion, refers to Sextus concerning matters other than scepticism, but he never mentions or apparently cites the Academica, leaving open the question as to whether he knew it at all.

Because of Quevedo's definite knowledge of Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus, one could infer that he must have been influenced by the Pyrrhonist brand of scepticism, but never once does he refer to Pyrrho or Pyrrhonism any more than he does the Academics. It could be that he did not bother to distinguish between the two groups, and simply developed an anti-Aristotelian scepticism much like Francisco Sanches. According to Charles B. Schmitt, such an approach was typical in the Renaissance:

Regardless of whether the two ancient schools of scepticism can be given a full doctrinal distinction, one thing is clear:

⁷ See The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy (679), for more detailed information on Renaissance editions and dates of publication for these three works.

Renaissance thinkers for the most part did not seem to distinguish the two any more clearly than they distinguished "Platonism" from "Neoplatonism." (Schmitt, Cicero 8)

While this may have been true of most "Renaissance thinkers" as Schmitt says, it was not of most Renaissance Sceptics. Montaigne, in the Apologie de Raimond Sebond, clearly distinguishes between the two groups in his summary of the philosophical theories of knowledge inherited from the Greeks:

Whoever seeks anything comes to this point: he says either that he has found it, or that it cannot be found, or that he is still in quest of it. All philosophy is divided into these three types. Its purpose is to seek out truth, knowledge, and certainty.

The Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Stoics, and others thought they had found it. These established the sciences that we have, and treated them as certain knowledge.

Clitomachus, Carneades, and the Academics despaired of their quest, and judged that truth could not be conceived by our powers. The conclusion of these men was man's weakness and ignorance. This school had the greatest following and the noblest adherents.

Pyrrho and other Sceptics or Epechists--whose doctrines, many of the ancients maintained, were derived from Homer, the Seven Sages, Archilochus, and Euripides, and were held by Zeno, Democritus, Xenophanes--say that they are still in search of the truth. These men judge that those who think they have found it are infinitely mistaken; and that there is also an

overbold vanity in that second class that assures us that human powers are not capable of attaining it. (Montaigne 371)

Quevedo knew the Essais of Montaigne and admired them;⁸ he therefore very likely knew these basic distinctions. Perhaps the key part of this passage is the theme of human weakness and insufficiency developed by the Academics according to Montaigne: "truth could not be conceived by our powers" and "man's weakness and ignorance." Many have commented on "the undertone of misanthropy in Quevedo's character" (cf. R. O. Jones, Golden 190), but it is important to acknowledge that such ideas, at least in part, stem from his philosophical and theological background which perceives man in a miserable state, a theme he develops in La cuna y la sepultura.

The scope and consistency of Quevedo's scepticism cannot be understood without reference to La cuna y la sepultura. In chapter four of that work, he repeatedly states that "nadie sabe nada" (Obras I, 1343). Although he announces in the introduction his intention to spend four chapters elaborating "la doctrina estoica" (1327), Chapter Four stands somewhat apart from the first three philosophically because of the intensity with which it attacks the possibility of human knowledge and denounces "el estudio vano" (1343). Henry Ettinghausen rightly calls the fourth chapter "Quevedo's sceptical chapter" (Ettinghasuen 82), but he focuses his brief comments on the

⁸ The first mention of Montaigne in Spanish literature occurs in Quevedo. In the Defensa de Epicuro, he praises Montaigne as a moral philosopher: "Dará fin a esta defensa la autoridad del señor de Montaña en su libro que en francés escribió, y se intitula Essais o Discursos, libro tan grande, que quien por verle dejara de leer a Séneca y a Plutarco, leerá a Plutarco y a Séneca" (Obras I, 1099). Also, see the article by Juan Marichal: "Montaigne en España."

miseria hominis theme, in this context the insufficiency of man to know anything for certain; the extent to which the contents of Cuna may aid in the analysis of Mundo falls beyond the scope of his discussion. Ettinghausen concludes that "It is probably impossible to determine exactly the sources of Quevedo's sceptical attitudes" (83), but it seems that a reasonable attempt may be made with the recognition of a possible source for Cuna Chapter Four not mentioned by Ettinghausen, The Divine Institutes of Lactantius.

Lactantius lived during the late third and early fourth centuries A.D., just a century before St. Augustine. According to some traditions, he was born in Africa, and like St. Augustine, he converted to Christianity as an adult, having spent his youth studying classical rhetoric and philosophy and achieving considerable fame as a rhetorician. As William Fletcher observes,

Lactantius has always held a high place among the Christian Fathers, not only on account of the subject matter of his writings, but also on account of the varied erudition, the sweetness of expression, and the grace of elegance and style, by which they are characterized. (Lactantius ix)

That elegance of style Lactantius developed in emulation of Cicero, and as a result, came to be known as *Cicero christianus* (Schmitt, Cicero 25). Lactantius was also fascinated by Cicero's philosophical works, including the Academica, which figures heavily in Book Three of the Divine Institutes, entitled, De falsa sapientia. Quevedo knew the Divine Institutes, and refers to the third book by name in the Defensa in order to clarify a point about Epicurus's theory of pleasure. Although De falsa sapientia is considerably longer than

Cuna Chapter Four--Lactantius develops his thesis over the course of thirty chapters--, the two works still share a number of significant parallels in both structure and content.

First, both men approach their subject as a denunciation of false wisdom in order to arrive at an understanding of what constitutes true wisdom and worthwhile study, Lactantius calling his subject *sapientia* and Quevedo calling it *sabiduría*.⁹ Their use of the term "wisdom" allows them to set up an important distinction between it and philosophy, or false wisdom. Lactantius recognizes the possibility for confusion, but does not hesitate to define the two terms in an exclusionary manner:

Philosophy is (as the name indicates, and they themselves define it) the love of wisdom. By what argument, then, can I prove that philosophy is not wisdom, rather than by that derived from the meaning of the name itself? For he who devotes himself to wisdom is manifestly not yet wise, but devotes himself to the subject that he may be wise. (Lactantius 141)

And Quevedo, more concisely and caustically: "...pues filósofo no dice otra cosa que amante de la sabiduría, que fué reprehensión de los que antes se llamaban *sophos*, sabios (Obras I, 1344). This distinction allows them to attack all theories of human knowledge, a method that must necessarily include some expression of scepticism.

⁹ Quevedo, probably because he detested neologisms and latinate words as signs of corruption in the language, utilizes the word *sabiduría* instead of the more direct Spanish equivalent *sapiencia*: "La mayor hipocresía y más dañosa y sin fundamento, es la de la sabiduría..." and, "Toda nuestra sabiduría es presunción acreditada de la ignorancia de otros" (Obras I, 1343).

They both begin their attack on false wisdom with a repudiation of natural philosophy. Lactantius develops his comments at length, mentioning all of the major schools of thought in Antiquity as well as many of the individual philosophers with examples of their teachings. Quevedo keeps his comments brief and very general, merely referring to natural philosophy as "fantástica y soñada" (1343). Interestingly, each cites a different passage from the satirist Persius in ridicule of these philosophers and their pursuits (L 176, Q 1343). Each also briefly dismisses Logic in similar terms as nothing more than a method of speech:

There remains that third part of philosophy [after natural and moral], which they call Logic, in which the whole subject of dialectics and the whole method of speech are contained. Divine learning does not stand in need of this, because the seat of wisdom is not the tongue, but the heart; and it makes no difference what kind of language you employ, for the question is not about words, but facts. (L 166)

¡Qué ocupadas están las universidades en enseñar retórica, dialéctica y lógica, todas artes para decir bien! Y ¡qué cosa tan culpable es que no haya cátedras de saber hacer bien, y donde se enseñe! (Q 1345)

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, after they repudiate false wisdom, they establish a tripartite and fideistic unity to explain the nature of true wisdom. First Quevedo: "...porque la sabiduría verdadera está en la verdad, y la verdad es una sola, y esa verdad una es Dios solo, que por eso le llaman Dios verdadero; y fuera dél,

todo es opinión y los más cuerdos sospechan" (1344). Lactantius had elaborated on the idea a little more thoroughly:

Therefore no system, or science, or law of living well has been established, except in this the only true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to philosophers. For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, and altogether opposed to itself. And as there is but one founder and ruler of the world, God, and as truth is one; so wisdom must be one and simple, because if anything is true and good, it cannot be perfect unless it is the only one of its kind. (L 171)

The fideist model provided by Lactantius would become typical of many Christian Sceptics of later centuries (see Schmitt, Cicero 26), but perhaps more important for understanding Quevedo is the fact that in the first section on natural philosophers, Lactantius repudiates them with the arguments of the Academic Sceptics, frequently referring to the Academy, its teachings, and those of its chief sceptical philosopher, Arcesilas. One passage should serve as an example: "But if, as I have shown, there can be no inner and peculiar knowledge in man on account of the frailty of the human condition, the party of Arcesilas prevails" (Lactantius 145). Lactantius does not wholly endorse Academic scepticism. In fact, he takes issue with its conclusions many times. As Schmitt has observed, however, "The Academic approach is a safeguard for Lactantius. It abolishes the pretended knowledge of the philosopher and prepares the way for the infusion of genuine truth which comes only from God" (Cicero 28). The implications for Quevedo are clear. If he did not know Cicero's Academica, he certainly knew a great deal about the

Academics and their teachings through Lactantius. Moreover, the apparent parallels in Cuna would seem to indicate that Quevedo has appropriated Lactantius's argument, including his brand of scepticism.¹⁰

The one significant difference in message between Lactantius and Quevedo lies in their respective views on moral philosophy. Lactantius attacks moral philosophy on the grounds that the men who taught such doctrine were themselves destitute of virtue (172 ff.), and arrives at a conclusion that rejects all forms of philosophy: "Therefore philosophy must altogether be laid aside, because we are not to devote ourselves to the pursuit of wisdom, for this has no limit or moderation; but we must be wise, and that indeed quickly" (175). For Lactantius, true wisdom may only be found in religion. Quevedo agrees to a point. He will not call moral philosophy true wisdom,

¹⁰ Quevedo was certainly not the first one to do so in the Renaissance, although he was probably the first one to do so in Spanish. A significant group of *nouveaux academiciens* arose in the 16th-century who developed a Christian fideism based on Academic scepticism. Popkin describes one of the texts that dealt with the movement:

Cardinal Jacopo Sadoleto, Bishop of Carpentras, a friend of Reginald Pole, wrote an answer to Academic scepticism, Phaedrus sive de Laudibus philosophae, probably as a result of his correspondence with Pole on the question of whether anything can be known by rational means. The work was composed in 1533, and first published in 1538. In the first part of the book, Phaedrus presents the views of the Academics, drawn mainly from Cicero, and advocates the fideist thesis. He points out the futility of natural philosophy. God has hidden the secrets of nature, so that we can never know them. Those who think they have discovered something about nature contradict themselves and each other in their principles and theories. We can only know God by Revelation, and not by philosophy. Moral philosophy is as hopeless as natural philosophy. Our aim is to act virtuously, not to discourse and dispute about virtue and good. Similarly, dialectic is useless, just a lot of figures and syllogisms by which one can prove anything he wants, even absurdities. So Phaedrus contends, we can only learn truth through God's Revelation, and not through philosophy (Popkin 26).

The argument sounds very familiar, although Popkin nowhere in his study of Renaissance scepticism mentions the influence of Lactantius on these writers.

which a man may only receive after death: "...y que cuando muere empieza a aprender, y que sólo entonces está el alma capaz de doctrina, pues le desnuda en el cuerpo de la rudeza y de las tinieblas e ignorancia deste mundo" (1344). However, the impossibility of true wisdom in this life does not lead Quevedo to completely reject the pursuit of it like Lactantius, rather he suggests that the only worthwhile area of study is moral philosophy: "Preguntarásme que, supuesto esto, cuál es la cosa que un hombre ha de procurar aprender. No me parece que el trabajo y el estudio del hombre logrará en nada fuera de la consideración y ejercicio de las virtudes" (1344-45). His immediate description clarifies what he means by "ejercicio de las virtudes":

¿Qué cosa más digna de estudio y de alabanza que el ejercicio del sufrimiento, armado de prudencia y modestia contra las insolencias de la fortuna? ¿Qué mayor riqueza que una humildad atesorada de tal suerte, que ni desprecias a nadie ni sientas que te desprecien todos? Estas cosas sirven a tu alma y le son de interés. (1345)

With this, Quevedo returns to his expressed purpose in writing Cuna, the elaboration of Stoic doctrine.

Throughout Cuna Chapter Four, Quevedo creates an important dynamic between his scepticism and Neostoic moral philosophy. Nothing about Nature, the macrocosm, may be known for certain, but the microcosm, man himself, is another matter. A man should know himself, a common maxim to be sure; even Lactantius had said as much. For Quevedo, knowledge of self will include knowledge of the governance of one's deeds and passions:

Acaba de persuadirte a que dentro de ti mismo tienes que hacer tanto, que aun, por larga que sea tu vida, te faltará tiempo; y que no puedes saber nada bueno para ti, si no fuere lo que aprendieres del desengaño y de la verdad; y que entonces empezarás a ser sabio, cuando no temieres las miserias, no codiciaras las honras, ni te admirares de nada, y tú mismo estudiaras en ti; que leyéndote está tu naturaleza introducciones de la verdad. (1346)

Here, Quevedo mentions the importance of learning “del desengaño y de la verdad,” the central theme necessary to understanding El mundo por de dentro, but equally important is the context: “dentro de ti mismo” and “tu naturaleza.” Knowledge of oneself must include knowledge of human nature in general. The Sueños as a whole concern themselves with human nature, especially man’s vices and hypocrisy, hence the satirical presentation. Mundo in particular deals with recognizing man’s deceptions and learning to see the truth. For this reason Quevedo gave the name “Desengaño” to the allegorical teacher-guide of the fourth dream, a figure who encompasses both the sceptical and the Neostoic elements of Quevedo’s philosophy.

After the sceptical prologue, Mundo begins with a paragraph in which the narrator describes himself as a young man lost in his own desires for pleasure and variety. He chases after appearances: “...ya corria donde tras la hermosura me lleuauan los ojos” (Sueños I, 196), and he actively gives himself over to the deceptions of the world: “...procuraua que se me alargase el engaño” (196-7). At this juncture, he hears a voice call to him and turns to see an old man, his clothing

torn due to the mistreatment of others--somewhat reminiscent of Boethius's description of Lady Philosophy in this regard--, but still a venerable figure. At first, the narrator accuses the old man of envying his youth and the pleasures he enjoys. The old man explains that rather than envy, he feels pity for the narrator whose notion of youth does not reflect a true understanding of the passage of time, that the days are like links in a chain, each one leading toward death, and that death should not be feared. Impressed by this teaching, taken from the Stoics, the narrator asks the old man his name, who responds, "Yo soy el Desengaño" (197). Desengaño then makes an important offer:

Si t   quieres, hijo, ver el mundo, ven conmigo, que yo te lleuar   a su calle mayor, que es adonde salen esas otras, y alli ver  s juntos los que por aqui van diuididos, sin cansarte, y yo te ense  nar   el mundo como es, que t   no alcan  as a ver sino lo que parece. (198)

This passage provides a much clearer indication of Quevedo's sceptical influences, because it creates a distinction between what seems and what is, between appearance and reality, deception and truth.¹¹

With regard to appearances and the reliability of sense information, the Pyrrhonists and Academics held quite differing

¹¹ Warnke devotes an entire chapter to the appearance vs. reality theme in Baroque literature (21-51), and mentions the scepticism of Montaigne in passing (40), but otherwise has little to say about the philosophical backgrounds of this important literary theme. About Spanish literature he comments, "Illusion and disillusionment, *enga  o* and *desenga  o*, are the great themes of these masters, as they are of the whole Spanish Baroque" (44). Ihrie, in her book on scepticism in Cervantes, devotes the bulk of her discussion to the appearance vs. reality theme.

views. The Pyrrhonists developed the more complicated doctrine based on their central tenet, the suspension of judgement regarding knowledge rather than the denial of the possibility of knowledge argued by the Academics. As a result, some confusion has existed concerning the Pyrrhonist doctrine on appearances, a problem noted by Sextus Empiricus in the second century: "Those who say that the [Pyrrhonist] Sceptics reject what is apparent have not, I think, listened to what we say" (8). The confusion seems to lie in the fact that the Pyrrhonists will not go so far as to equate appearance with reality--since they suspend judgement on such a question--, but they nevertheless consider appearances the only basis for knowledge, as Sextus explains:

That we attend to what is apparent is clear from what we say about the standard of the Sceptical persuasion. [...] We say, then, that the standard of Sceptical persuasion is what is apparent, implicitly meaning by this the appearances.... [...] Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions—for we are not able to be utterly inactive. (9)

Diogenes Laertius provides the same information in The Life of Pyrrho: "...but with regard to the things about which our opponents argue so positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgement because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to our impressions" (Lives IX. 103). In contrast, Cicero notes the denial of sense information on the part of the Academics: "Arcesilas used to attack Zeno because, whereas he himself said that

all sense-presentations are false, Zeno said that some were false, but not all" (De natura deorum I. 70).¹²

That Quevedo's sceptical thought more closely follows that of the Academics should be apparent. The title of the dream itself, El mundo por de dentro, refers to the discrepancy between the world of exterior appearances and the reality beneath, or inside, clearly adding to the overall distrust of sense information expressed by Desengaño to the narrator of Mundo. Desengaño's statement, "yo te enseñarè el mundo como es, que tû no alcanças a ver sino lo que parece," cannot be interpreted as an expression of the doctrine of the Pyrrhonists which confines knowledge to impressions. When Desengaño creates a distinction between appearance and reality, he rejects and denies the former; he does not embrace it as the only basis of knowledge. However, he also implies that reality may be known when he tells the narrator that he will show him the world as it really is. In this he seems to be at odds with a true sceptical position that denies the possibility of knowing reality, until the context of his statement becomes clear; he refers to knowledge of human conduct, not the natural world, and gives examples of human deception as he guides the narrator along the principle street of the world called Hypocrisy.

They observe and discuss many sights along the street, including a funeral procession in which a widower appears to mourn the loss of his wife. The narrator comments on how fortunate the

¹² Although any direct knowledge Quevedo may have had of Cicero's Academica remains uncertain, he did know the De natura. That text only refers to the Academics and their doctrines in passing, but it still adds significantly to the information available to Quevedo from other sources, such as Montaigne and Lactantius.

woman had been to have such a devoted husband. Desengaño, in response, shakes his head and smiles, saying, "...esso todo es por de fuera, y parece assi; pero aora lo veràs por de dentro, y veràs con quànta verdad el ser desmiente a las apariençias" (Sueños I, 200). The old man attributes the widower's sadness to the cost of the funeral, and explains that the man already plans to marry another woman who has been his "amiga" for some time. Surprised upon learning the truth, the narrator exclaims, "Què diferentes son las cosas del mundo de como las vemos!" (201).

The examples in Mundo are almost all of this type, depicting human deception and hypocrisy. In doing this, Quevedo combines the sceptical and the moral in a somewhat non-traditional manner, speaking of deceptive appearances in the context of moral discernment. Traditionally, Sceptics have discussed the nature of appearances in a more physical, or medical sense. For example, Francisco Sanches, in Quod nihil scitur, provides a lengthy discussion of the ways in which human perception changes as a result of such things as distance or the amount of light available, and, as a result, may provide faulty knowledge (241ff.). Quevedo knew the traditional argument, ultimately stemming from the Academic Sceptics, and incorporates it into one passage of Mundo in which Desengaño exclaims to his new pupil in exasperation,

Hasta aora te juzgaua por çiego, y aora veo que tambien eres loco; y hecho de ver que hasta aora no saues para lo que Dios te dio los ojos, ni quàl es su offiçio. Ellos han de ver y la razon ha de juzgar y elegir: al rebes lo hazes, o nada hazes que es peor. Si te andas a creerlos, padeceràs mil confusiones: tendràs las

sierras por açules y lo grande por pequeño, que la longitud y la proximidad engañan la vista (207).¹³

However, this type of physical argument represents a divergence for Quevedo. Elsewhere he maintains the peculiar dynamic between epistemological scepticism and moral philosophy where nothing may be known truly except for human nature and even that only with great difficulty because of man's willful deceptions.

Quevedo does not qualify his statements at the beginning of Mundo and in Cuna when he says that nothing is known. The context does, however. He wishes to make categorically sceptical statements primarily about natural philosophy and Logic; his scepticism does not extend to matters involving divine revelation or human conduct. Scepticism, then, forms a central part of Quevedo's ideological makeup, denying value to all forms of study outside the realms of theology and moral philosophy. It may seem odd, considering the

¹³ Quevedo included a similar, but more extensive, sceptical passage in his Providencia de Dios (1641), written twenty-nine years after Mundo, showing the consistency of his thought on the matter:

Ves desde muy lejos una torre o edificio, que perfectamente es cuadrado, redondo; y no puedes decir ni afirmar otra cosa, creyendo a los ojos, a quien se le torneó la distancia, donde llegó su fuerza limitada. Las montañas y cerros de peñascos tienen el color pardo o blanco de la tierra, y el verde de su yerba y árboles; y siendo así, desde lejos tus ojos te lo muestran de azul ultramarino, porque juntándose la oscuridad de tu vista (que tiene esfera de actividad limitada y desfallece fuera della), con la claridad y luz del medio y del objeto, resulta aquel color que consta de oscuro y claro. Miras muchos hombres de un mismo tamaño en diferentes distancias: juraras por lo que ves, que unos son mucho menores que otros y desigualísimos, siendo iguales; y la perspectiva con la razón y con la demostración te enseña que la desigualdad es de las distancias, y no de los cuerpos. Pudiera convencer a los ojos de otras muchas burlas que hacen; mas éstas bastan por todas. Pues si la razón te enseña la verdad de la mentira de tus ojos, y te desengaña del engaño que ves, no puedes negar que se ve mejor lo que se cree a persuasión de la razón, que lo que se mira con los ojos. Pues si la razón del hombre asegura más lo que por ella se cree que lo que se mira, ¿con cuánto mayores ventajas y prendas se asegura lo que se cree de Dios por la fe con él, que toso lo que se ve sin ella? (Obras 1547-48).

importance of scepticism in Quevedo's thought, that he makes only a few openly sceptical remarks in his works and avoids referring to the Academic Sceptics with whom he seems to have the most affinity. Perhaps Quevedo's personal situation accounts for that to some degree. In contrast with Montaigne and Francisco Sanches, who lived in France and could freely and extensively express their sceptical views, Quevedo lived in Spain and had to contend with the Inquisition. He could make a few general remarks about man's ignorance because such ideas are easily found in the Bible and Church Fathers (see I Cor. 3:19). He could not afford to be identified as an Academic or a Pyrrhonist.¹⁴ Nevertheless, he does make his scepticism evident, and he does so by incorporating it into texts that deal with moral satire and moral philosophy, making it an integral part of those works.

¹⁴ Scepticism, when applied in its entirety, leads to moral and theological uncertainty, and is therefore incompatible with the teachings of the Church regarding divine revelation. Saint Augustine addresses these issues, particularly the moral one, in the Contra Academicos, his early philosophical work in which he denounces Academic scepticism.

Chapter Four:

The Doctrine of Death in the Sueños

In each of the last four Sueños, Quevedo presents didactic passages that deal with the nature of death and the manner in which individuals should confront its inevitability. The doctrine of death presented in the Sueños closely follows that which Quevedo outlines in La cuna y la sepultura, but it ultimately derives from the teachings of the Stoics, particularly those found in the Epistulae morales of Seneca. Among the many philosophical and moral issues discussed in Quevedo's satires, the subject of death should perhaps be considered the most important simply because of the frequency with which he introduces it into his texts. And he does not do so purely out of morbid fascination or single-minded fixation, although his fascination with the subject is well known. Rather, the passages on death play a crucial role in the satire; the whole message of the Sueños cannot be properly understood without a clear understanding of their doctrine of death.

The extent to which Quevedo assimilates Stoic philosophy, as well as the true nature of his own Christian beliefs, are questions that continue to confound critics. According to Felicidad Buendía, "Quevedo es uno de los senequistas más convencidos y el más ferviente de todos ellos en el siglo XVII" (Obras I, 1065). The statement certainly represents what has been the majority opinion.

However, Américo Castro has stated the opposite view: "Suele alegarse a Quevedo como ejemplo de senequismo español, aunque basta leerlo para convencerse de no ser eso cierto" (Castro, Realidad 148). He bases his position on the fact that Quevedo is unwilling to accept Stoic teaching on noble suicide and emotional imperturbability: "Pero sin apatía y sin suicidio, ¿qué queda de la moral de Séneca?" (148). Castro implies that nothing remains when quite the opposite is true, especially in light of the fact that Quevedo does not wholly reject the Stoic notion of "apatía." Quevedo's position on the subject merits a brief review.

In Nombre, origen, intento, recomendación y descendencia de la doctrina estoica, Quevedo summarizes the Stoic doctrine of "apatía," which he prefers to term "la insensibilidad":

El intento de los estoicos fué despreciar todas las cosas que están en ajeno poder, y esto sin despreciar sus personas con el desaliño y vileza; seguir la virtud, y gozarla por virtud y por premio; poner el espíritu más allá de las perturbaciones; poner al hombre encima de las adversidades, ya que no puede estar fuera, por ser hombre, establecer por la insensibilidad la paz del alma, independiente de socorros forasteros y de sediciones interiores; vivir con el cuerpo, mas no para el cuerpo; contar por vida la buena, no la larga; no por muchos años sino por inculpables. (Obras I, 1088)

After a discussion of suicide, which he calls "el escándalo de esta secta" (1088), he attempts to reconcile Stoic imperturbability with Christian doctrine, first having to admit that this part of the Stoa was condemned by the Church Fathers, especially Aquinas:

Santo Tomás, doctor angélico, y con él todos, condenan esta insensibilidad católicamente, sin que pueda ser lícita alguna respuesta. Yo, para mostrar que no se me ha cansado la afición con los estoicos, confesando ser hoy herejía afirmarlo, y error en la antigüedad, como lo prueban todos, me esforzaré a interpretarlos.

Ellos dicen que no se han de sentir algunos afectos, y esto enseñan y esto mandan. Persuádome que algunos, por la palabra sentir, entendieron dejar vencer de los afectos, puesto que de sentirlos nacen las virtudes, como la clemencia, piedad y conmiseración, y de vencerse dellos procede de la pusilanimidad para poder producir las virtudes. No es cortesía descaminada entender bien lo que dijeron algunos de aquellos que encaminaron todas sus acciones al bien; muchas cosas los debemos; débanos una. (1092)

So, rather than reach a point where one has no emotions, which Quevedo admits is heresy, he prefers to think that some Stoics intended by this that one should not allow himself to be ruled by emotions while he remains aware of them for the sake of virtue: "de sentirlos nacen las virtudes." The distinction may seem slight, but it allows Quevedo to reconcile apathy with Christian fortitude, which he calls "la paciencia," almost always in connection with the name of Job. Thus, while Quevedo does indeed reject Stoic teaching on suicide, he easily transforms apathy, making acceptable those teachings that deal with confronting death, poverty, sickness, persecution, loss, and the other hardships of human life.

Stoicism, therefore, plays a far greater role in Quevedo's thought than Américo Castro admits when he says that Quevedo excludes part of the philosophy when, in reality, he merely reinterprets it, leaving it essentially intact. Castro's position implies that Quevedo must blindly assimilate all of the philosophy in order to be accurately considered a "senequista."¹ Even Seneca did not receive unquestioningly the teachings of his Stoic predecessors, sometimes taking issue with Zeno and ridiculing him over the nature of his syllogisms.² If one Stoic can selectively interpret another Stoic, why should it be a cause for surprise that a seventeenth century Christian author should do so? Quevedo clearly states that he does not consider himself a Stoic, but rather an admirer of the Stoics: "Yo no tengo suficiencia de estoico, mas tengo afición a los estoicos" (1093). Castro interprets the self-characterization on the part of Quevedo as further indication that he is not a "senequista" (148). The statement actually serves to show that Quevedo considered Stoicism an important adjunct to his ideological makeup, not the basis of it, the basis being Christian doctrine. As Julián Juderías

¹ Castro's position, in and of itself, may not seem deserving of the attention given it here, but his problematic evaluation has influenced others, perhaps most notably Charles Marcilly who repeats the same misconception: "En resumen, como Américo Castro ha señalado, ¿qué queda de la filosofía estoica si de ella se suprime la insensibilidad al mundo exterior y el derecho a elegir la propia muerte?" (76). Marcilly, like Castro, also questions Quevedo's orthodoxy, attributing to him an "angustia" similar to "la agonía unamuniana" (84).

² Epist. ad Luc. LXXXII. 9: "For I take pleasure, excellent Lucilius, in poking fun at the absurdities of the Greeks, of which, to my continual surprise, I have not yet succeeded in ridding myself. Our master Zeno uses a syllogism like this: 'No evil is glorious; but death is glorious; therefore death is no evil.' A cure Zeno! I have been freed from fear; henceforth I shall not hesitate to bare my neck on the scaffold. Will you not utter sterner words instead of rousing a dying man to laughter?" Seneca clearly states that he prefers plain reason to the sophistry found in these types of syllogisms.

observed in 1917, "El estoicismo de Quevedo está mitigado, influído, por el espíritu cristiano" (Juderías 178). Quevedo's love for Stoicism lies in the fact that he considered its doctrine so similar to that of Christianity.³ Both sets of beliefs must be considered when trying to understand and interpret the difficult passages on death in the Sueños.

Without a doubt, the influence of Seneca and the Stoics on Quevedo finds its greatest expression in his concept of death. In El alguacil endemoniado, Quevedo begins to describe death in Stoic terms during a conversation that takes place between Quevedo the dreamer and a demon that has possessed a constable. The demon, who speaks authoritatively from his perspective as a spiritual being, declares that mortals do not properly understand the passage of time and the nature of death: "Quàl de bosotros saue estimar el tiempo, y poner preçio al dia, sauiedo que todo lo que passò lo tiene la muerte en su poder, y gouierna lo presente a agoarda lo por benir,..." (Sueños I, 154). The statement redefines death as a process that develops continually with the passage of time, rather than an event that occurs at the end of one's life.

³ Although Quevedo does not go so far as to assert that Seneca had secretly been a Christian, an idea commonly held in the Middle Ages, he repeatedly suggests that the Stoics had knowledge of the Bible, and that those from Seneca's period in the first century A.D. may have had the opportunity to observe and learn from the Apostles or earliest Christian martyrs, hence the similarity in doctrine:

...porque Séneca y Epicteto, que vivieron en tiempo de los apóstoles, y veían las hazañas de la fe de los cristianos y la perfección de la vida, y que le daban al fuego y al cuchillo, no sólo con valentía, sino con gozo enamorado, confeccionaron con lo que veían lo que escribieron; de tal manera, que su doctrina, con resabios de aquella atención, es en muchas cosas bien parecida a nuestra verdad: tuvieron por maestros en la primitiva Iglesia a los mártires, y oyeron la doctrina de sus triunfos. (Obras I, 1394)

The demon mentions the doctrine only in passing here, but another demon develops the idea much further in a passage in El sueño del Infierno, in which the dreamer, on his excursion through Hell, comes upon a group of the damned who cry out lamenting their bad fortune. When the dreamer inquires about the group, one of their number explains that they are those who died suddenly, implying quite clearly that had they lived longer, or had some warning of impending death, they would have had time to turn away from their sins and vices in order to live a virtuous life and avoid damnation. In response to the rationalization, a demon explains that the damned soul lies, and corrects him with Stoic doctrine:

Mentís, dixo vn diablo, que ningun hombre muere de repente; descuydado y diuertido, sì. Còmo puede morir de repente quien desde que naze ve que va corriendo por la vida, que lleua consigo la muerte? Què otra cossa veis en el mundo sino entierros, muertes y sepolturas? Què otra cossa oís en los pulpitos y leéis en los Libros? A què volueis los ojos que no os acuerda de la muerte? Vuestro vestido que se gasta, la cassa que se cae, el muro que se enuejeze, y hasta el sueño cada dia os acuerda de la muerte, retratandola en sì. Pues còmo puede hauer hombre que se muera de repente en el mundo, si siempre le andan haisando tantas cossas? (174)

The ideas in this passage ultimately derive from Seneca who, in Ep. ad Luc. XXIV. 19-20, sets forth the important theme of *Cotidie morimur*, no one dies suddenly because we, in fact, die daily.⁴

⁴ "I remember one day you were handling the well-known commonplace,—that we do not suddenly fall on death, but advance towards it by slight degrees; we die everyday. For every day a little of our life is taken from

However, Quevedo does not directly adapt Seneca here. As Ilse Nolting-Hauff has shown, the demon's discourse comes almost directly from Erasmus's De praeparatione ad mortem.⁵ Although Erasmus may have exerted a somewhat lesser influence on Quevedo than Justus Lipsius, he nonetheless provided another important model for Quevedo in the Christianization of Seneca and Stoic doctrine.⁶ In this particular passage, Quevedo has adapted Stoic doctrine on death to a Christian message on repentance.

When the demon in hell reproaches the damned soul by telling him that he did not die suddenly, but rather "descuydado y diuertido," he implies several things that lead to a moral conclusion. First, with the word "diuertido," he implies that when death occurred, the man was living a life of diversion, i.e., completely involved in his vices. Second, with "descuydado," he implies that the man was careless with regard to the bigger questions in life, especially the state of his soul. More importantly, when he says that no one dies suddenly, he indicates that those who understand death, those who possess an awareness of the continual proximity of death, and live their lives accordingly, will not die "descuydado y diuertido," and they will not see themselves damned. Thinking on death, and properly understanding it, can result in producing virtue. As

us; even when we are growing, our life is on the wane. We lose our childhood, then our boyhood, and then our youth. Counting even yesterday, all past time is lost time; the very day which we are now spending is shared between ourselves and death."

⁵ See Nolting-Hauff (175-76).

⁶ Marcel Bataillon discusses how Erasmus and his followers prepared the way for Lipsius and the Neostoics (II, 395 ff.), but he observes that the influence of Erasmus had significantly diminished by the early seventeenth century. Of Quevedo, Bataillon says, "...no parece que Erasmo lo haya seducido" (II, 397).

Quevedo says in Virtud militante: "Bueno es temer la muerte por la mala vida, si aquel miedo atiende a enmendar la vida, por quien se teme la muerte" (Obras 1425). Death, then, becomes a philosophical tool for eradicating the vice that Quevedo satirizes in the Sueños, and therefore plays an intrinsic part in the moral message of the works.

However, a philosophical problem arises when one reads "Bueno es temer la muerte...." This passage, and others like it, represent what K. A. Bluhner calls a "Desintegración del estoicismo de Quevedo" in the works belonging to the latter years of Quevedo's life, from 1635 onward (472). Referring to the Virtud militante (1635-36) and Providencia de Dios (1641-42), Bluhner sees Quevedo distancing himself from Stoic teaching on the foolishness of fearing death and the need to face it calmly and gladly as an inevitable part of life.⁷ In his earlier works, such as Cuna, Quevedo clearly reflects the Stoic position: "De dónde viene este miedo de la muerte, que ha crecido tanto arrimado a la ignorancia..." (Obras I, 1338). When he describes the fear of death as "bueno" in the later works, his position seems inconsistent, causing Bluhner to refer to "las internas contradicciones de la concepción quevediana de la muerte" (476). Fortunately, Bluhner recognizes that Quevedo makes his positive statements about fear of death in a context distinct from that of the traditional "desprecio de la muerte." Bluhner offers the following explanation for the seeming contradiction: "Esta formulación

⁷ As in Ep. ad Luc. XXX 10-11: "He [Bassus] says that it is foolish to fear death as it is to fear old age; for death follows old age precisely as old age follows youth. He who does not wish to die cannot have wished to live. For life is granted to us with the reservation that we shall die; to this end our path leads. Therefore, how foolish it is to fear it, since men simply await what is sure, but fear only that which is uncertain! Death has its fixed rule,—equitable and unavoidable."

paradójica no quiere decir sino que Quevedo distingue ahora, algo que antes no había hecho al tratar de la muerte, entre un miedo natural y otro escatológico" (474). He attributes the distinction between the foolish fear of natural death and the good fear of eschatological death to a change in Quevedo's thinking late in life, a change in which he began to subordinate Stoic doctrine to that of Christianity (472).

It is important to note that Bluher says Quevedo had not made this distinction regarding fear of death in his earlier works: "algo que antes no había hecho." Ettinghausen takes issue with Bluher's thesis, saying that "Quevedo subordinated Stoicism to Christianity before as well as after 1635" (123), but he does not directly address the seeming contradiction pointed out by Bluher. It is fitting then, that the matter be resolved by examining a passage from the Sueños.

In El mundo por de dentro (1612), written more than twenty years before the change in Quevedo's thought postulated by Bluher, the allegorical character Desengaño makes a number of significant statements about death. In a long passage at the beginning of the work, Desengaño addresses the narrator in terms similar to those of the demon in Alguacil regarding the link between time and death: "Tù por ventura saues lo que vale vn dia? entiendes de quànto preçio es vna hora" (Suenos I, 197). He goes on to explain that death and the passing of days are linked together like a chain: "...estàn eslabonados y en una cadena, y quanto màs caminan los Dias que van delante de ti, tiran hàzia ti y te açercan la muerte" (197). Then he addresses the subject of fearing death:

Por nezio tengo al que toda la vida se muere de miedo de que se ha de morir, y por malo al que viue tan sin miedo de ella como si ni la hubiese; que èste la viene a temer quando la padeze, y emaraçado con el temor, ni halla remedio a la vida ni consuelo a su fin. Cuerdo es el que viue cada dia como quien cada dia y cada ora puede morir. (Sueños I, 197)

His words, if not read carefully, may seem contradictory. On the one hand, he says that only a fool spends his life fearing death, on the other, only an evil man lives without fearing it. Clearly, "fear of death" connotes different things in each instance, creating a distinction between two different types of fear, as Blucher pointed out.

The connotation in the first instance poses no difficulty in interpretation because it directly corresponds to the wretched man described in Stoic doctrine who makes his life miserable fearing what he cannot change: "Most men ebb and flow in wretchedness between fear of death and the hardships of life; they are unwilling to live and yet they do not know how to die" (Ep. ad Luc. IV. 5). Such a man is a fool because he robs his own mind of peace and tranquility, filling it with fear when he should learn to despise death. This part of the Stoa serves to teach one how to attain happiness in this life by dispelling fear and the misery that accompanies it.

The second instance described by Desengaño takes on a moral component not present in the first because the old man designates as evil, "malo," one who lives without fear of death, as if there were no such thing: "...como si ni la hubiese...." The evil man here behaves much as the damned soul in Infierno who complains of sudden death

as a miscarriage of fortune. To live as if death will never come is to live carelessly, "descuydado," and to live absorbed in one's vices, "diuertido," is to be evil. The passage contains a suggested exhortation to fear death, and necessarily implies a recognition of divine justice, a recognition that death will bring about an accountability for the manner in which one has lived. In this context, fear of death is good because it produces virtue, whereas fear of mere physical death is not because it only serves to produce wretchedness. In a sense, Quevedo's position here parallels his resolution of the problem of Stoic imperturbability. Just as one should not be ruled by emotions but be aware of them for the sake of virtue, one should not live in terror of death but be aware of the fact that it could come at any moment and live accordingly, as Desengaño says: "Cuerdo es el que viue cada dia como quien cada dia y cada ora puede morir."

The teaching provided by Desengaño on death demonstrates how Quevedo blends and reconciles Stoic and Christian doctrine, remaining faithful to both. It also demonstrates the consistency of Quevedo's position on the matter. Long before Virtud militante and Providencia de Dios, he clearly had formulated the distinction between Stoic and Christian views on fearing death, the one seeing it as negative because of its implications for this life, the other positive because of its implication for the next. With the recognition of this distinction, the seeming contradictions in Quevedo's position disappear. The distinction between good and bad fear may appear labored. The union forged by Quevedo between Stoic and Christian doctrine may not appear seamless, but it makes sense, with one

proviso: it hinges on Quevedo's belief in an afterlife. When he writes, "Bueno es temer la muerte por la mala vida, si aquel miedo atiende a enmendar la vida, por quien se teme la muerte," the statement presupposes an afterlife that will entail either a reward or a punishment commensurate with the state of the soul at the moment of physical death. Fear of punishment meted out by God may induce one to live virtuously; fear of oblivion has no such power. Without a Christian belief in the immortality of the soul, Quevedo's views on death make no sense. And yet, his works contain a number of passages that, if not read carefully, seem to indicate that he did not believe in an afterlife, that he was in fact a nihilist. One such passage occurs in the Sueños, again, in the words spoken by Desengaño.

Shortly after Desengaño delivers his instruction on death, he and the narrator begin their walk along the street called Hypocrisy. They soon come upon a funeral procession and during their conversation about the event, Desengaño indicates the corpse of the woman in the casket and makes the following comment: "Pues saue que lo que alli va no es nada, porque aun en la vida lo era, y en muerte dexò ya de ser..." (Sueños I, 200). James Crosby views the passage as an expression of Epicurean philosophy:

Finalmente, redobla la afirmación diciendo que al morir, lo que no era nada ha dejado de existir. Esto va mucho más allá de algunos de sus predecesores: el satírico griego Luciano (siglo II d.C.) se había limitado a impugnar la idea de la vida después de la muerte, diciendo que la muerte reduce todo a la nada, y sus imitadores del siglo XVI criticaron solamente el aparato

exterior de los entierros, propagando así un culto más depurado e interior. Aquí Quevedo recuerda la filosofía epicúrea de la muerte. (Crosby, Intro 69)

Epicurus unambiguously taught that nonexistence followed death. He addresses the subject in the Letter to Menoeceus, preserved by Diogenes Laertius: "Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer" (Lives X. 125). In the Letter to Herodotus, he describes the nature of the soul as corporeal, made of atoms, the body serving as the frame, or housing, for those atoms. With the death of the body comes the dissolution of the soul; the atoms dissipate. All sentient function provided by the soul ceases, and the person ceases to exist. Regarding the notion that an incorporeal soul will continue, he says, "But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space" (Lives X. 67). Lucretius discusses the same issues in the De rerum natura. He devotes Book III especially to the exposition of Epicurean doctrine on death. Quevedo cites Lucretius at the beginning of El sueño de la muerte on the very subject of death (Sueños I, 217), a fact that might tend to support Crosby's attribution of Epicurean philosophy to Desengaño's words on nonexistence.

However, if Crosby is correct, the true nature of Quevedo's Christianity comes into question. If Quevedo did not believe in an afterlife, if he did not believe in the immortality of the soul, then he was not a Christian in any orthodox sense, not the devout Catholic he

pretended to be. If nonexistence was his credo, then he was a nihilist. Indeed, several critics, including Américo Castro, Manuel Durán, and Raquel Sajón de Cuello, have referred to Quevedo as a nihilist.⁸ Castro and Durán use the term in passing without enough supporting analysis to indicate clearly what they mean by their use of a word that came into existence in the late eighteenth century and has been used in a variety of contexts since then, most famously by Nietzsche. In the case of these critics, they appear to employ the term very generally, almost equating it with the words "pesimista" or "negativista," to refer to the attitude towards life displayed in Quevedo's works. Sajón de Cuello, in contrast, indicates very clearly what she means when she terms Quevedo a nihilist.

Sajón de Cuello begins presenting the word "nihilist" within a string of adjectives meant to indicate Quevedo's multifaceted personality: "Humanista, conceptista, nihilista, estoico, escéptico... (223). She soon becomes more specific, however. After examining some of the many passages that deal with death in Quevedo's works, including some of his poems that reduce human life to nothing but death and dust, she reaches a conclusion in which she contrasts

⁸ Durán apparently regards Quevedo's interest in suffering and death as sufficient justification to characterize him as a nihilist:

"En el fondo estos tratados estoicos y ascéticos, con su constante insistencia en el sufrimiento y en la muerte, expuesta en forma mucho más detallada y reiterada que los párrafos dedicados a la salvación y la vida eterna, señalan una vez más las características de pesimismo, nihilismo y visión negativa de la vida humana que hallamos en el Quevedo satírico...." (159)

One can't help but notice how casually Durán dismisses as less than convincing all of Quevedo's ascetic passages and works that discuss eternal life and salvation. Castro refers to Quevedo's "desengaño nihilista" ("Escepticismo" 42) in the context of Quevedo's scepticism and fascination with the subject of death. Dámaso Alonso has also described Quevedo's "cinismo pesimista" as "Una especie de nihilismo que lleva a la reducción, a la atracción a plano inferior de todas las bellas alturas de la vida (531).

Quevedo with the Spanish mystics, paraphrasing Américo Castro ("Escépticismo" 43):

La diferencia de concepción de la muerte entre el místico y nuestro poeta reside en que para el primero la muerte significa apertura a la vida eterna; en tanto, para el segundo la muerte sólo sirve para paternizar que la realidad más segura del ser humano es **su no ser**. (243)

Sajón de Cuello places the last three words in boldface to emphasize her conclusion that for Quevedo, the most certain reality of human existence is nonexistence. She recognizes that such a characterization places Quevedo at odds with the Church doctrinally and has to ask, "¿Compartió la ortodoxía de la Iglesia o es un renegado y descreído?" (243). In order to be consistent with her thesis in declaring Quevedo a nihilist, she must opt for the latter choice in her question and declare Quevedo's Christianity to be disingenuous: "...su esperanza en la Salvación del alma y de la vida eterna más se asemeja a una retórica que una convicción" (248). Then she advances nihilism as the most salient theme in his works: "...porque nada adivínase más allá de su desgarrado nihilismo que todo lo envuelve y arrastra hacia el confín de la nada" (248).

In perhaps the most telling part of her commentary, Sajón de Cuello cites a passage from La cuna y la sepultura that directly addresses the subject of eternal life. Quevedo wrote the passage in the form of a debate between "el Demonio y el Hombre:"

Y el demonio, falto de razones, dice:

D. -¿Qué sabes tú de lo que será tu alma ni a donde irás?

H. -Yo no sé dónde iré. Por mis pecados merezco ir contigo; por mi dolor y por la sangre de Cristo y intercesión de la Virgen... espero que no iré donde tú fuiste porque desesperaste.

.....

D. -Mira que con la vida se acaba todo; que no hay otra vida.

H. -Mientes en eso como en todo, pero con mayor desvergüenza. Yo creo la inmortalidad del alma y la vida perdurable, que nunca se acaba para la pena o para la gloria.

(Obras I, 1357)

According to Sajón de Cuello, "Esto le venía de perlas para quedar bien con la Iglesia" (270). Of course, it would be extremely naïve to suggest that Quevedo did not write with some awareness and concern for the Church censors. In fact, he often made slight changes in successive editions of his works in order to "quedar bien con la Iglesia." But Sajón de Cuello's position goes far beyond this recognition to portray Quevedo's Christianity as a fraud, to dismiss large and integral parts of his ideology in order to resolve the contradiction inherent in asserting that a man who claimed to be a Christian did not actually believe in the immortality of the soul.

Once again, these critics have made an issue of an apparent contradiction in Quevedo's thought where none actually exists, a contradiction that can easily be resolved with a simple distinction that does not involve accusations of heresy: when Quevedo makes statements regarding nonexistence and describes an ending of nothing but death and dust, he refers only to corporeal existence, the fragile and fleeting nature of mortal life. The seemingly nihilistic passages never refer to the immortal soul made in the image of God.

This distinction can easily be seen in Desengaño's comment about the corpse in the funeral procession, if his words are read carefully and in context.

First, it is important to recognize his subject in the passage. When he says "lo que va alli no es nada," he refers to the corpse, not the person. When he says "en muerte dexò ya de ser," he repeats again, in the following lines of the same passage, that he refers to the corpse: "Alli no va sino tierra de menos fruto y màs espantosa que la que pissas..."(200). Quevedo substitutes "tierra" here for the "polvo" that he often uses in his poems, but the message is clear; the body, upon death, ceases to exist and will return to the earth from whence it came. The content of the passage is perfectly compatible with the Biblical tradition as expressed in Genesis 3:19: "...til thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."⁹ Also, Ecclesiastes 12:7 describes the cessation of physical life and the continuation of the spirit, succinctly providing the model to look for in Quevedo's works: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

The central theme of the Book of Ecclesiastes is the vanity of man. Quevedo addresses that vanity in another seemingly nihilistic passage in Cuna that resembles the words of Desengaño in Mundo: "Mira que eres el que ha poco que no fuiste, y el que siendo eres poco, y el que de aquí a poco no serás: verás cómo tu vandidad se

⁹ Crosby also notes the biblical source of the references to "tierra," but he does so as if it were merely poetic imagery for Quevedo, unconnected to a larger ideology regarding the immortality of the soul.

castiga y se da por vencida" (Obras I, 1329)¹⁰ . Once again, these words, if not read in context, could be taken as further proof of Quevedo's supposed nihilism. However, the topic of the immediately following paragraph in the text should dispel any such notion: "¡Grandes cosas caben en el entendimiento del hombre! ¡Gran dignidad es la suya, pues tiene alma semejante a Dios, inspirada dél, y eterna!" (1329). And he continues:

Alma eterna semejante a Dios tiene: mas no la tiene ni la trata como a semejanza de Dios ni como a eterna, mientras la hace seguir al cuerpo y la olvida por cualquier apetito. Todo lo haces al revés, hombre: al cuerpo sombra de muerte, tratas como a imagen de vida; y al alma eterna dejas como sombra de muerte. (1329)

All of these affirmations on the immortality of the soul can hardly be dismissed as disingenuous. In addition, it should be apparent that the passages that purportedly demonstrate Quevedo's nihilism actually concern themselves with inspiring humility. Quevedo refers to human life as "nothing" in order to indicate the brevity and frailty of it. In the Virtud militante, he makes this last point perhaps more clearly than in any other place in his works: "Todos los días, dice el gran Séneca, muestran cuán nada somos, y con algún nuevo argumento amonestan a los olvidados de la fragilidad, cuando atendiendo a las cosas eternas, nos fuerzan a mirar la

¹⁰ According to Blüher (444), Quevedo adapts this passage from Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. LXXVII. 11: "Would you not think him an utter fool who wept because he was not alive a thousand years ago? And is he not just as much of a fool who weeps because he will not be alive a thousand years from now? It is all the same; you will not be, and you were not. Neither of these periods of time belongs to you."

muerte" (Obras I, 1426). The passage comes directly from Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. CI. 1: "Every day and every hour reveal to us what a nothing we are, and remind us with some fresh evidence that we have forgotten our weakness; then as we plan for eternity, they compel us to look over our shoulders at Death." Both Quevedo and Seneca speak of human life as "nothing," but in a relative, or comparative manner. Compared to the lives of the gods, or compared with the scope of Eternity, human life seems as if it were nothing. Neither Quevedo nor Seneca use the word "nothing" in a truly nihilistic sense here. With these issues in mind, a definitive answer may be attempted with regard to the supposed influence of Epicurus on Quevedo's theology.

Quevedo does indeed cite Lucretius at the beginning of Muerte, but, in the passage from Book III. 931-39, of the De rerum, Lucretius merely imagines what a personified Nature might say in reproach of a foolish mortal who laments and mourns the prospect of death.¹¹ Far from invoking that part of Epicurean doctrine that deals with nonexistence, this passage only serves to indicate how closely Epicurean moral philosophy parallels that of the Stoics. Quevedo's admiration for Epicurus stems precisely from that similarity. In the Defensa de Epicuro, he goes so far as to call Stoic the Epicurean

¹¹ Quevedo cites the text in Latin:

Denique si vocem rerum natura repente
Mittat, et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa:
Quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis quod nimis egris
Luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles?
Nam si grata fuit tibi vita anteacta priorique
Et non homnia (sic) pertusum congesta quasi in uas
Comoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiire:
Cur non vt plenus vitae conuiuia recedis
Aequo animoque capis / securam, stulte, quietem?

doctrine on pleasure: "Epicuro puso la felicidad en el deleite, y el deleite en la virtud; doctrina tan estoica, que el carecer deste nombre no la desconoce" (Obras I, 1094). Quevedo also admired Epicurus for his condemnation of dialectics, and he explains how other philosophers, out of envy, intentionally misrepresented the doctrine on pleasure in order to slander Epicurus. Many passages from Seneca provide Quevedo with support regarding the virtuous nature of Epicurus's life and teachings. However, just as Quevedo took issue with his favorite philosopher, Seneca, on the subject of suicide, his admiration for Epicurus also has definite limits, particularly as regards the nature of the soul.

Quevedo mentions and discusses the immortality of the soul in many of his works, but he does so most extensively in the Providencia de Dios. The entire first section of the work is devoted to an apologetic proof of the immortality of the soul that includes a repudiation of Epicurean doctrine on the matter. Quevedo begins by stating that he considers it somewhat ridiculous that it should even be necessary for him to write in defense of the propositions that there is a God, that He concerns himself with the affairs of humanity, and that the soul is immortal (Obras I, 1543). Throughout his argument, he links divine providence and the immortality of the soul as necessarily related subjects; the one implies the other, consistent with the biblical teaching that God made man in His image. The eternal soul that makes man like God is the only thing that differentiates man from the beasts:

¿Cómo puede ser que un hombre, que sólo en el alma racional
inmortal se diferencia de las bestias, quiera, negándose esta

razón y inmortalidad, no sólo ser igual a los brutos, sino inferior en el conocimiento a las moscas y arañas, como en su lugar probaré? (1543)

Early on in his discussion, he mentions Epicurus and Lucretius, making clear distinctions that indicate how thoroughly he knew and understood their doctrine:

Los que no creen la inmortalidad del alma dicen que ni hay Dios, ni Providencia; y son muy pocos los que la niegan, que confiesen hay Dios. Mas éstos negaron su providencia, como fueron Epicuro y Lucrecio, Demócrito y Heráclito, que afirmaron había Dios; mas no que cuidase de algo, atribuyéndolo todo a la fuerza de naturaleza. (1543)

As Quevedo states, the Epicureans believed that the gods existed, but only they were immortal, and they never took interest in humanity's affairs, neither to reward nor punish in any afterlife. Hence the gods were not to be feared. Virtue was to be sought for its own reward, as the path to happiness, not to avoid divine wrath. The Epicurean denial of divine providence stands in direct opposition to Quevedo's Christian formulation of fear that produces virtue.

On the Epicurean doctrine of the soul, he refers to the exposition of the matter given by Lucretius in the De rerum, and succinctly dismisses it with something of a contemptuous tone: "No gastaré tinta en responder a los argumentos con que Lucrecio porfiadamente osó probar que era mortal el alma del hombre; porque ni el responderlos será ingenio, ni el confundirlos difícil" (1544). After the general repudiation, he makes one more comment on Lucretius in which he declares the notion of the corporality of the

soul to be erroneous: "Escribió Tertuliano un libro de Anima, donde su elocuencia centelló más vivas luces; empero mancilladas con algunos errores, y principalmente con afirmar que el alma tiene un género de cuerpo, mal persuadido de un verso de Lucrecio" (1544).

Quevedo had obviously read all of the texts carefully; he knew their doctrines, and he knew what he himself believed. He writes a long and impassioned attack against the "atheistas" (sic) who would deny the immortality of the soul. And yet those who would classify him as a nihilist, those who would group him with the atheists he attacks, justify their reading by saying that his religious works seem lacking in conviction. A reading that finds itself forced to eliminate such a vast percentage of Quevedo's works must be questioned. Once again, the passages that some would read as nihilistic merely deal with the brevity and frailty of human life, a fact that Quevedo emphasizes more clearly in El sueño de la muerte.

After he cites Lucretius at the beginning of Muerte on the foolishness of fearing death, he presents a passage from the book of Job that he has translated and interpreted in verse: "Al fin hombre naçido / de muger flaca, de miserias lleno, / a brebe vida como flor traido, / de todo bien y de descanso ajeno, / que como sombra vana / huie a la tarde y naçe a la mañana" (217-18). Man's life is short and full of misery. For Quevedo this was a certainty derived directly from sacred scripture, and the manner in which Job confronted it gives further reason to affirm the immortality of the soul, as Quevedo explains in Providencia:

¿Por qué piensas que Job en trabajos nunca vistos y en persecución tan cruelmente dilatada tuvo paciencia siempre

victoriosa y triunfante, y alma, no sólo capaz de muerte, sino de calamidades que se la hacían desear? Porque creyó y supo creer la inmortalidad de l'alma, cap. XIX, verso 25: *Scio enim quod Redemptor meus vivit, et sin novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum: Et rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea videbo Deum.* Afirmando misterios tan grandes, como que hay Dios, resurrección de la carne, alma eterna, que aguardaba Redentor, y su resurrección con la suya: no dice creo, sino sé, para enseñar que sólo con infalible certeza se sabe lo que de Dios y por Dios se cree. (Obras I, 1554)

According to Quevedo, it was Job's belief in the next life that gave him the strength and fortitude to face the misery of this one.

Inherent in this affirmation is the belief that Job would be rewarded for his patience and fortitude in the next life. For Quevedo, it was inconceivable that there would be no reward for the good nor punishment for the wicked: "En esta vida hay buenos y malos, vicios y virtudes, delitos y méritos. Si no hay otra vida, ni las virtudes tienen premio, ni los vicios castigo, ni los malos pena, ni los buenos gloria. Este absurdo no se puede conceder..." (1559). The Sueños themselves, set as they are among those souls at the Last Judgement or among the damned in Hell, rely on the notion of divine justice to give their satire meaning. Admittedly, Quevedo's comic presentation of the afterlife might call into question how seriously he takes the theological assumptions in the structure of the works, but, as already seen, the satires contain many serious theological and philosophical passages consistent with Quevedo's ascetic works. For example, in Muerte, Quevedo once again satirizes those who live carelessly, as if

they were never going to die, this time explicitly mentioning the role of divine justice and mercy. The dreamer stands in the court of Death, and observes those who die of laughter: "La Muerte de Risa era postrera, y tenia vn gran çerco de confiados y tarde arrepentidos, gente que viue como si no hubiera justiçia y mueren como si no hubiera misericordia" (226). He goes on to explain that these "tarde arrepentidos" are those who, each time they were urged to go to confession, merely laughed saying that they never felt better, as if death were far away. It is primarily on account of these lost souls that Quevedo repeatedly gives the Stoic message on the proximity of death, death as process, as in the words of the allegorical Muerte to the dreamer: "... lo que llamais morir es acabar de morir, y lo que llamais naçer es empeçar a morir, y lo que llamais viuir es morir viuiendo" (223).

Quevedo does indeed display a tremendous fascination and concern with the subject of death, but that concern belongs to a long philosophical tradition, not a nihilistic tendency. For example, one of the Essais of Montaigne bears the title That to Philosophize is to Learn to Die. Montaigne begins by citing Cicero as one of many classical authorities who support the proposition, and in a moment of personal revelation in the essay, he reveals that he thinks about death continually in order to prepare for it (60). Seneca also taught that "it is a wonderful thing to learn how to die," and he cites Epicurus for support: "Think on death" (Ep. ad Luc. XXVI. 8). Quevedo's interest in preparing for physical death differs little when compared to that seen in the works of his predecessors. However, the Biblical tradition plays an equally important role. To deny it is to

misread the works and their message. The moral exhortation contained in the Sueños consists of both Stoic doctrine on the proximity of death and Christian doctrine on the immortality of the soul. Awareness of both doctrines leads Quevedo repeatedly to include passages on the need for timely repentance and virtuous living. Of course, he does so in a negative manner, caustically condemning those who repented too late, but such is the nature of satire.

Chapter Five:
Dystopian and Otherworldly Constructs in the Sueños

When first published in 1627, Quevedo's five satirical visions bore the title Sueños y discursos de verdades descubridores de abusos, vicios y engaños en todos los oficios y estados. The contents of the works, then, purportedly consist of "verdades." In most cases, such an assertion could be dismissed as mere pretense and typical literary convention, but in the Sueños, Quevedo has actually gone to considerable lengths to create an elaborate structure that makes the revelation of truth possible in the scheme of his fiction. The principal device he utilizes in this structure is the notion of the otherworld, a place where the truth may be known, a necessary recourse, since, in the world-view established in the satires, this world contains only lies and false appearances.¹ However, once the revelation of truth becomes possible, it must have a subject to address. Referring once again to the title, the subject is concisely stated as "abusos, vicios, y engaños," the vices and deceptions of mankind. And while Quevedo may at times refer to mankind in general, his primary concern is naturally with his own society, his own age. In revealing the truth about his society, he portrays it as

¹ See the discussion in Chapter Three with respect to Quevedo's moral and sceptical philosophies.

an evil place, a dystopia. Throughout all five of the Sueños, Quevedo interweaves sometimes complex constructions of otherworldly and dystopian presentations. These presentations may seem to be completely cynical and pessimistic denunciations, but an occasional suggestion does appear to indicate that Quevedo denounces with some hope of reform, thus turning the dystopian into the utopian.

Quevedo had a variety of otherworldly models available to him in the literary tradition, and, at one time or other in his career, he made use of most of them, including the afterlife of Christian tradition, the allegorical realms so popular in the Middle Ages, as well as mythological realms, whether located in the halls and courts of Mount Olympus, or the depths of Tartarus. To this list should be added imaginary lands ostensibly set in this world but set apart from it by the author as another place that may be used to reveal truth about a society, either by comparison or contrast. Of course, the imaginary lands set in this world do not usually evoke the spiritual and divine aspects frequently associated with the realms to which one travels in literary dreams and visions. Quevedo, therefore, does not draw directly on this last tradition for the Sueños, since spiritual authority plays such an important role in the works, but he was influenced by the tradition, and admired the work that established the pattern for the genre, Thomas More's Utopia (1516).

It remains unclear just exactly when Quevedo became acquainted with the Utopia. It is known that he possessed a copy of the 1548 Louvain edition which he annotated somewhat, primarily criticizing the Erasmian passages. That copy still exists in the

Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid.² In spite of the reservations he may have had about Erasmus, Quevedo urged his friend, Jerónimo de Medinilla y Porres, to prepare a Spanish translation of More's work which, when published in 1637, contained a letter of recommendation by Quevedo. In the recommendation, Quevedo describes More as a learned and saintly man. He sees the Utopia primarily as an attack by More on a repressive English government:

Vivió en tiempo y reino que le fue forzoso para reprender el gobierno que padecía, fingir el conveniente.

Yo me persuado que fabricó aquella política contra la tiranía de Inglaterra, y por eso hizo isla su idea, y juntamente reprehendió los desórdenes de los más príncipes de su edad. (Obras I, 537)

Quevedo recognizes the subject and context of the work as early Renaissance England, but he also notes its broader application and universal appeal. In his own works, he seems to have adopted the model of the Utopia at least to some degree in the episode entitled "la isla de los Monopantos" included in his last satire, La hora de todos. A brief passage will indicate the nature of his adaptation:

...los Monopantos, gente en república habitadora de unas islas que entre el mar Negro y la Moscovia, confines de la Tartaria, se defienden sagaces de tan feroces vecindades, más con el ingenio que con las armas y fortificaciones. Son hombres de cuadruplicada malicia, de perfecta hipocresía, de extremada disimulación, de tan equivocada apariencia que todas las leyes y naciones los tienen por suyos. La negociación les multiplica

² See R. O. Jones, "Some Notes on More's Utopia in Spain."

caras y los manda los semblantes, y el interés los remuda las almas. (Obras I, 298)

The imaginary island republic of the Monopantos is clearly a dystopia, and indeed, it seems that even the thought of depicting an ideal society populated by men of virtue and frugal customs would have run completely counter to the spirit of Quevedo, a man famous for his cynicism.

One of the traditional criticisms leveled against the literary depictions of ideal societies is that they reflect overly optimistic assumptions about human nature.³ In his analysis of "Dystopian Demurrers," Peyton E. Richter notes how Aristotle, in his criticism of Plato's Republic, "attributes the cause of many social ills to the *wickedness of human nature* which, he thinks, is often overlooked by utopian planners in their enthusiasm for social panaceas" (5). It should be no cause for surprise that Quevedo, a man consumed with the study of moral philosophy, who spent much of his literary career either discussing or depicting exactly that "wickedness of human nature," would succumb even less readily than Aristotle to the idealism of the utopians, that the dystopian side of the equation would appeal to him more.

However, the gulf between utopian and dystopian is not as great as it might appear. As Alistair Fox has observed:

Utopia may also be viewed as the prototype of the obverse genre, the dystopia. The paradigm More created lends itself

³ "It was impossible for the Utopians to obtain a correct view of human nature. Hence frequently they went astray. In the first place they assumed that men were originally perfect, born angels, as Rousseau said, then corrupted by the social environment..." (Hertzler 302).

ideally to satire, because the distance between his imaginary society and the society in which he lived enabled him to contrast the two. Nevertheless, this paradigm allows satire to work in either direction, depending on whether the contrast between the imaginary and actual societies is favorable or unfavorable. Many writers after More have seized the possibility of creating an imaginary society in which disturbing tendencies in actual society are brought to a frightening culmination. When satire works against an imaginary society, the utopia turns into its opposite, the dystopia. (12)

Fox places some emphasis on the fact that utopian and dystopian satire normally finds its expression in an imaginary world, but this need not always be the case. Joyce Herztlr has described as utopian the message of the prophets of the Old Testament who decry the wickedness of the nation of Israel because of their implicit desire to see social improvement (12 ff.). Elias Rivers has likened Quevedo to the same prophets, and has described the type of world Quevedo hoped to achieve through denunciation. The description sounds decidedly utopian:

... like a Hebrew prophet, he considered it his religious duty to denounce the idolatry of his people, now whoring after strange gods; he yearned for a primitive virtue which had been lost, a simple society of brave warriors and good women, without lawyers and bankers, without spices and fancy foods, without perfumes and frilly laces, without aristocratic vanity and indolence, without frivolous entertainments of all sorts. (18)

So, although Quevedo satirizes the members of his society directly in the Sueños, without employing the device of a surrogate and fictional kingdom or island as he would later in La hora de todos, his satire still may be referred to as dystopian, especially in light of the unilateral and seemingly categorical portrayal of his society as an evil place.

Quevedo's choices of otherworlds play a crucial role in the categorical nature of his denunciation. In the first three Sueños, he utilizes some part of the afterlife of Christian tradition to place large segments of his society in Hell, a place that, by definition, contains only the wicked. In El sueño del Juicio final, the dreamer observes the judgement of the resurrected inhabitants of the earth, and at the end of the dream, the mouth of Hell opens to receive the condemned souls whom Quevedo has described and satirized as they passed before the Throne of Judgement. In El alguacil endemoniado, the dreamer converses with a demon who describes the nature of Hell and its inhabitants. In El sueño del infierno, the dreamer travels to Hell to observe for himself those souls who populate the infernal regions. As a devout Catholic living during the Counter-Reformation, Quevedo naturally has an occasional comment about the enemies of the faith such as Luther, Calvin and Mohammed, and he places them among the damned. He also has much to say about those souls who belong to any age of man such as lovers, poets and adulterers. But his chief concern seems to be with those readily identifiable as members of his own society; he addresses the avarice among craftsmen of the middle class such as tailors and piemakers, the ineptitude and corruption among doctors, constables and lawyers,

and the pretentiousness of everyone from the nobleman to the stableboy. All of these people can be revealed for what they are beyond a shadow of a doubt, because Quevedo transports them to another world where all lies and pretenses are stripped away and of no use. As Quevedo observes at the end of Infierno, "...pues dezir de los que están en el infierno no puede tocar a los buenos" (Sueños I, 189).

Quevedo had apparently been thinking of his society in terms of the infernal for some years before he began to write the Sueños. Antonio Papell suggests that the satires may have had their gestation during Quevedo's early years as a student at Alcalá (438). While this may be the case, the five years he spent at Valladolid seem to have played a much greater role. In 1601, Philip III relocated his court, moving it from Madrid to Valladolid. Quevedo followed, apparently with great reluctance, but his years there would have great significance. It was at Valladolid that he began to enjoy renown as a poet, attracting the admiration of men such as Lope de Vega, as well as the enmity of Góngora. He took courses in theology at Valladolid that would lead to his taking minor orders in the Church. He also began his correspondence with Justus Lipsius whose Neostoic works so profoundly influenced his own life and works. He also wrote the first of the Sueños. In January 1606, it was announced that the court of Philip III would return to Madrid. Quevedo remained a few months after the royal exodus to finish his theological studies, and then left for Madrid in June, 1606. As a farewell, he wrote a poem about Valladolid that contains the following lines: "En cuanto a mudar tus armas, / juzgo que acertado fuera, / porque solos los

demonios / traen llamas en sus tarjetas. / La primer (sic) vez que las vi / te tuve en las apariencias / por arrabal del Infierno, / y en todo muy su parienta." (Obra poética II, 481-482). At first sight, Quevedo says, he thought of the city as a suburb of Hell. Astrana, in his biography, indicates that Quevedo never liked the city, which was so frequently either muddy or dusty. He certainly disliked leaving Madrid and Alcalá to study instead at Valladolid (see Astrana 65-123). Even more significant than these biographical factors are the events occurring in the larger society. Doris L. Baum suggests that Quevedo, who had grown up in the pious court of Philip II (d. 1598), was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the decadence and corruption of the court of Philip III (20).⁴ What seems certain is that something during this period of Quevedo's life caused him to begin to characterize his society in terms of the infernal.

Of course, Quevedo, in some sense, had been trained to think in these terms from a very young age by the religious literature and iconography of the period. He says at the beginning of Juicio that his reading of the book of Blessed Hypolitus on the second coming of Christ caused him to have his dream, but he certainly had known something about apocalyptic literature even before beginning his theological studies, and he had seen the many images both in churches and on canvas depicting the end of the world. Philippe Ariès has noted that beginning in the twelfth and continuing to the sixteenth centuries, church walls and portals commonly included

⁴ The historian, J. H. Eliot, indicates that it was the disparity between the disappointing reality of Spain under Philip III and the dream of Spain during the grandeur of the sixteenth-century that "prompted the bitter satires of Quevedo" (316).

representations of Christ's return (99 ff.). As the Middle Ages progressed, these works increasingly focused on aspects of judgement and the punishment of the damned. Even during the Renaissance, these images continued to appear in the paintings of Van Eyck and Hieronymous Bosch. Bosch especially was popular in Spain. Philip II liked him because of "his obvious moralizing," and owned a number of his works (Kamen Philip 192).⁵ Quevedo refers to Bosch comically in Alguacil, or rather the demon does, complaining that he does not appreciate the manner in which artists tend to render his kind (Sueños I, 150-51), indicating that Quevedo had at least some familiarity with the artist's works.

However, the iconographic tradition appears to have had only a very general influence on Quevedo, and it should not weigh heavily in the consideration and analysis of the Sueños. By the early seventeenth century, ecclesiastical use of images showing judgement and damnation had diminished substantially in favor of more positive images of resurrection (see Ariès 106), and after the death of Philip II, the works of Bosch became increasingly unpopular to the point that he was considered by many in Spain to be a heretic (see Iffland 43, n. 27). Most commentators on the Sueños have argued against the notion of any direct influence by Bosch on Quevedo, and rightly so. James Iffland has provided an overview of the criticism on this matter as well as a summary of the few similarities and many differences between the creations of the two men. Perhaps the most significant of Iffland's comments addresses the different manner in

⁵ "By 1574 he [Philip] possessed thirty-three paintings by Hieronymus Bosch" (G. Parker 46).

which Bosch and Quevedo portray mankind in their respective Hells. In the paintings of the former, "Represented seems to be a generic Man, an abstraction, rather than differentiated individuals" (45). In Quevedo, "It is not so much Man that is depicted as *men*, and *men* who are shoemakers, doctors, lawyers, poets, and all the rest who belong to his *galería humana*" (46).⁶ In other words, it is the social aspect that differentiates Quevedo from Bosch as well as from the medieval iconography. Rather than describe naked masses of indistinguishable humans descending into the underworld, Quevedo focuses on characters, professions, types from his society. His Hell, then, serves as a metaphor for the undesirable elements in his own society. To some degree, the Hell of the Sueños takes the place of the imaginary kingdom normally expected in utopian/dystopian satire. Just as More's ideal Utopia does not contain any lawyers, Quevedo's naturally dystopian Hell does. In this manner, the otherworldly and the dystopian become part of the same satirical scheme.

One passage in the Sueños, perhaps better than any other, serves to indicate just how Quevedo utilizes the notion of Hell

⁶ "The interesting thing to note is that despite these fantastic deformations found in Bosch's world, there is relatively little distortion or deformation of the human figure itself. His Hell, for example, is mainly populated by virtually indistinguishable naked figures who vary little even in size. Represented seems to be a generic Man, an abstraction, rather than differentiated individuals. In Quevedo, to the contrary, there is much more distortion of the human figure, much more distinction between physical types. Part of his tendency is rooted in the emphasis placed on the different classes and professions who are shown suffering the tortures of Hell. It is not so much Man that is depicted as *men*, and *men* who are shoemakers, doctors, lawyers, poets, and all the rest who belong to his *galería humana*. They are clothed in the garments which characterize their group rather than being universally and anonymously naked as they are in Bosch. One of the obvious sources of this crucial difference is Quevedo's openly satiric intent, one which seems to be all but absent in the dream-worlds of Bosch. Quevedo needs to deal in specific types rather than in abstract humanity, and hence the great collection of distinctively drawn figures in the Sueños" (Iffland 45-46).

metaphorically for the purposes of social criticism and satire. It occurs in El sueño de la muerte as the dreamer stands with a personified Death, observing a parade of characters pass in front of them. At one point Death asks the dreamer what he sees, and the dreamer responds that he sees Hell:

Miro (respondì) al Infierno con atencìon, y me parece que le he visto muchas vezes. Dònde? (preguntò). Dònde? (dixe): en la cudiçia de los Juezes, en el odio de los poderosos, en las lenguas de los maldiçientes, en las malas intenciones, en las venganças, en el apetito de los lujuriosos, en la vanidad de los Prìncipes; y donde caue el infierno todo entero, sin que se pierda gota, es en la Hipocresia de los Moatrerros de virtudes, que haçen logro del aiuno y del oir Misas. (Sueños I, 224)

Quevedo defines Hell, here, as existing in the deeds of the wicked rather than as a place that exists to receive the wicked upon death.

The passage makes clear Quevedo's metaphorical use of Hell, but it may at first seem like something of a departure from the first three Sueños that do portray Hell as a place with all of the concomitant expectations of demons, pits, and the tortures of the damned. However, one must always keep in mind that Quevedo portrays a comic Hell whose rules and characteristics follow the dictates of the author's satirical purpose first and foremost, before incorporating any of the received tradition about the "true" nature of the underworld.⁷ As discussed in Chapter Four, Quevedo believed in

⁷ Quevedo apparently knew many works that did pretend to discuss the true nature of demons and the underworld. He mentions in the prologue to Alguacil the work by the Byzantine writer Michael Psellus, De operatione demonium, but he dismisses it as superstition (Sueños I, 145). Later in Alguacil, the demon ridicules those who arrive in Hell expecting to find

divine judgement and an afterlife that would entail reward for the just and punishment for the wicked. And he does indeed use his comic Hell to relate both moral and theological truths. None of this should be taken to infer, however, that he ever believed he was giving a true representation of Hell as a place. The truth to which Quevedo makes claim is a moral one; he does not claim to be an otherworldly cosmologist or cartographer. The elaborate structure of Dante's Inferno serves no purpose in Quevedo's Hell, which even when described as a place, really only functions as a social metaphor, an otherworld Quevedo has constructed and given a familiar name and features.

In addition to indicating something of the metaphorical nature of Hell in the Sueños, the dreamer's statement that he sees Hell also serves to encapsulate most of the moral concerns expressed by Quevedo in the satires. The dreamer mentions religious hypocrisy as the worst of the infernal behaviors. Hypocrisy in general bothered Quevedo greatly and had been the principal subject of the previous dream, El mundo por de dentro, whose content addresses the difficulty of discerning moral reality in a world of deceptive appearances (see Chapter Three). The dreamer also mentions aspects of personal morality that could be classified under the seven deadly sins. For example, "las venganças" would fall under Wrath, and "el apetito de los lujuriosos" would fall under Lust. Quevedo never forgets the broader questions of personal morality in the sermonizing of the Sueños, but he always focuses on some matter that he clearly

Rhadamanthus or some other figure from Greco-Roman mythology (149). Clearly, Quevedo wishes to distance himself from the received traditions on Hell in favor of the otherworld he has constructed for his satire.

regards as related to the structure and function of his own society. When the dreamer says that he sees Hell in "la cudiçia de los Juezes" and in "la vanidad de los Prinçipes," he indicates two problems from which Spanish society suffered throughout the reign of Philip III: inept and indifferent leadership coupled with the corruption of government officials. Quevedo could only refer to the king obliquely, but he openly attacks bad officials.

The second Sueño in particular deals with the corruption of constables and other officers of the law. The demon of the dream mentions many different characters as inhabitants of Hell in his general satire, but he focuses on the "alguacil" whom he has possessed as well as others who have been charged with the administration of justice. Quevedo had announced in the prologue "Al pio lector" that such a focus had been his intention: "Sòlo e querido aduertirte en la primera oja que este papel es sòlo vna rreprehension de malos ministros de justiçia..." (146). The prologue to Infierno, addressed to the "endemoniado y infernal Lector," contains a similar statement: "...sòlo reprehendo los viçios, murmuro los descuydos y demasias de malos offiçiales" (160). Both dreams contain numerous comments on judges, constables, and other officials, but one passage from Alguacil sums up their general tone. The demon refers to "los jueçes que viueron mal en la tierra" (152), and the dreamer responds, apparently surprised, "Luego Jueçces ay algunos allà?" The demon explains the role played by corrupt officials in swelling the ranks of the damned:

Juezes son nuestros faysanes, nuestros platos regalados, y la simiente que màs prouecho y fruto nos da a los diablos; porque

de cada Juez que sembramos cogemos seys Procuradores, dos Relatores, quatro Escriuanos, çinco Letrados y çinco mill negoçiantes, y esto cada dia. De cada Escriuano cogemos veynte offiçiales; de cada offiçial, treynta Alguaçiles; de cada Alguaçil, diez Corchetes; y si el año es fertil de trampas, no ay troxe en el ynffierno donde recoger el ffruto de vn mal ministro. (152)

From one bad minister, the judge, corruption multiplies exponentially downward on the scale of officials, filling Hell in the satire, but destroying any hope for justice in society when read through the metaphor. Quevedo's use of the word "reprehensión" seems noteworthy with regard to his expressed intent to focus on official corruption. As already seen, he would years later use the verbal form of the same word when describing the nature of More's Utopia, which he did not see as the description of an ideal society but rather as something More wrote in order to reprove, "reprender," the government of England. Quevedo clearly preferred to think of More and himself as having engaged in the same type of enterprise, the difference being that More chose to write utopian satire, "fingir el conveniente," while Quevedo had chosen the more direct dystopian brand he adapted for the Sueños.

The exchange between the dreamer and the demon with regard to bad officials hints at one of the peculiarities in Quevedo's satire that has caused considerable consternation among critics. In both Alguacil and Infierno, demons act as authoritative messengers of truth, delivering sermons based on Christian and Stoic moral doctrines and generally serving as the mouthpiece of Quevedo the

author.⁸ The demon in Alguacil in particular, acts as Quevedo's satirical agent, giving voice to the author's expressed intention in the prologue to chastise evil ministers of justice:

Quièn podrà negar que Demonios y Alguaçiles no tenemos vn mismo officio? pues bien mirado nosotros procuramos condenar, los Alguaçiles tanuien; nosotros, que aya uicios en el mundo y pecados, y los alguaçiles los dessean con màs aynco porque ellos lo an menester para su sustento, y nosotros para nuestra compaña. (147)

The demon compares the activities of constables to those of his own kind and declares them to be the same. Once again, Quevedo characterizes members of his society in terms of the infernal, to reveal the truth of their corruption, but he does so through the agency of a demon, an evil and deceptive creature by definition.

When Quevedo the dreamer hears these comments, he declares his amazement at the keen observances of the demon, "Admiraronme las sutilezas del diablo" (148), and he wants to hear more. During most of the conversation the demon describes those who populate Hell, a satirical description of Quevedo's own society for the most part. At the end of the discourse, the demon adds a statement taken from Stoic doctrine regarding the passage of time and the proximity of death (see Chapter Four), which finally provokes the question within the dream as to how the father of lies can provide sermons of such benefit. The demon explains that he has an evil purpose in speaking as he does, so that no one can say they have not been

⁸ "Uno de los extraños ingredientes de la sátira de Quevedo, desde sus obras de juventud, es la prédica por boca de personajes infames, y entre ellos el diablo mismo y sus servidores" (Lida 184).

forewarned: "...que no podays decir que faltò quien os lo aduirtiesse..." (154). Finally the demon adds a comment about repentance, an important subject for Quevedo and the Sueños as discussed in Chapter Four: "...que en vuestros ojos conozco muchas lagrimas de tristeza y pocas de arrepentimiento" (154).

The explanation given at the end of the dream is clearly inadequate to rectify the discrepancy between the demon's evil nature and the beneficial nature of his words. In the comparison with the constable, the demon states his purpose as seeking the damnation of mankind: "procuramos condenar." And yet, his actions work contrary to his goal. Rather than deceive his hearers into sin, he enlightens them about sin and its punishment. The inconsistency lies not so much in the fact that the demon speaks the truth--after all, the Bible depicts Satan quoting sacred scripture during the temptation of Christ in Matthew, Chapter 4--; it lies in the fact that Quevedo's demon does not twist the truth to evil purposes, but rather uses it to inspire virtue. There appears to exist a contradiction in the formulation of the character, one of which Quevedo is aware and tries to dismiss with a rather half-hearted explanation. However, the contradiction arises because Quevedo combines elements of the received tradition regarding the evil nature of demons with the otherworldly scheme of his satires. In the second dream, the dreamer does not go to the other world to observe the truth for himself; the demon, an agent of the otherworld, comes to this one so that the dreamer may listen to revealed truth. In providing a beneficial sermon, the demon's actions may contradict his nature, but they remain consistent with Quevedo's satirical

purpose and belong to a consistent pattern in the structure of the works.

Quevedo refers to part of the pattern at the beginning of Infierno: "Io que en el Sueño del Juyçcio vi tantas cossas, y en el Alguazil Endemoniado oy parte de los que no hauia visto..." (160). Quevedo draws a distinction as to the different methods of learning in the first two dreams. In Juicio, the dreamer had seen the truth; in Alguacil, he had heard the truth as it was explained to him by a demon. Both dreams involve the notion of another world for the revelation of truth, but the first one takes the dreamer to that world while the second brings an agent of the otherworld to this one. All five dreams follow the same basic pattern. In Infierno, the dreamer returns to the otherworld in his travels through Hell. In Mundo, he remains in this world and must have the truth explained to him by Desengaño. In Muerte, he again leaves this world and travels to the courts of Death. The dreams alternate, then, between firsthand experience in the otherworld and explanations given in this world by otherworldly agents, although it should be noted that in the third and fifth dreams, the dreamer learns from both observation and conversation. Quevedo's allusion to the initial formation of the pattern at the beginning of Infierno indicates his awareness of the structure he was creating. It also likely indicates that the final alternating pattern for all five dreams was a conscious act on his part.

However, one matter that deserves some clarification and comment is the suggestion that the character Desengaño acts as an agent of the otherworld. Certainly, he acts as an agent of truth; his

name alone indicates that. He also declares that such is indeed the case when he presents himself to the young narrator who has lived a life caught up in the deceptions of this world: "Mi hauito y traje diçe que soy hombre de bien y amigo de dezir verdades, en lo roto y poco medrado, y lo peor que tu vida tiene es no hauerme visto la cara hasta aora" (197). Desengaño mentions his dedication to telling "verdades," but his comment also indicates something of his dual nature, acting as both a literal and allegorical character. In the literal, he appears to be merely an old man whose wisdom and insight come as a result of his age and experience. However, when he says to the protagonist "lo peor que tu vida tiene es no hauerme visto la cara hasta aora," he implies that he would have been able to impart the same wisdom at any point earlier in the young narrator's life, thus giving a timeless quality to his wisdom and indicating the eternal and allegorical part of his nature. Desengaño's participation in the eternal suggests an otherworldly origin, something to which he alludes in the next passage:

Yo soy el Desengaño; estos rasgones de la ropa son de los tirones que dan de mì los que diçen en el mundo que me quieren; estos cardenales del rostro, estos golpes y coçes me dan en llegando, porque vine y porque me baya; que en el mundo todos dezìs que quereys Desengaño, y tiniendole, vnos os desesperays, otros maldezìs a quien os le dio, y los màs corteses no le creeys. (197-98)

Twice he uses the phrase "en el mundo," and describes the abuse and ill treatment he receives from those "en el mundo." He also uses the words "llegando" and "vine," suggesting that he came to this world

from some other place. He does not say what other place exactly, but Quevedo provides the answer with a parallel passage that appears in Alguacil.

As part of the general commentary on bad ministers of justice, the demon of Alguacil relates an allegorical tale of the treatment given Truth and Justice by mankind when the two came to earth:

La Verdad y la Justiçia vinieron a la tierra; la vna no hallò comodidad por desnuda, y la otra por rigurossa: anduuieron mucho tiempo assi, asta que la Verdad de puro neçesitada assentò con vn mudo. La Justiçia, desacomodada, anduuo por la tierra rogando a todos, y uiendo que no haçian casso de ella y que la hussurpauan su nonbre para honrar tiranias, determinò de boluerse huyendo al çielo. (152)

Immediately apparent is the common experience shared by Desengaño with Truth and Justice of rejection and ill treatment by the inhabitants of the world. This passage, however, states more directly that Truth and Justice came to earth from some other place, that place being identified at the end of the passage as "el çielo." That Quevedo would give Heaven as the place of origin for these beneficial allegorical characters makes perfect sense, first because of the eternal and immutable aspect of their natures, but also because he had described many allegorical characters within the celestial panorama witnessed in the first dream, Juicio (see Chapter Two). Desengaño, therefore, appears to act as an otherworldly agent of celestial origin, especially in light of the fact that he can do what mortal man cannot: see "el mundo por de dentro," read men's hearts and know their hypocrisy rather than be deceived by outward

appearances.⁹ Desengaño, in Mundo, plays essentially the same role as the demon in Alguacil, both being otherworldly agents who explain the truth to the protagonist since he may not observe it for himself in the two dreams set in this world.

Quevedo's construction of an otherworld that makes possible the revelation of truth relies on the notion of inversion, the idea that a place exists where things are not as they are in the mundane world which seems to contain nothing but lies and false appearances. In the Heaven and Hell of the Sueños, no deception is possible; everything stands revealed plainly for what it is. In order to have access to the truth and insight inherent in those eternal places, one must either go there or receive instruction from one who hails from there. Quevedo develops both possibilities ingeniously in the Sueños. However, the notion of inversion should also be recognized as one of the primary characteristics of utopian/dystopian satire.

Marina Leslie, with reference to the work of Darko Suvin, notes how utopia makes use of the "ancient topos of *mundus inversus*" (3). She then observes that the inversion occurs in both utopian and dystopian texts, since both take a critical stance with respect to the original world they satirize: "Even texts that divide much more clearly between earnest utopian reform and cynical dystopian satire not only share a critical posture with respect to the old world, but

⁹ Desengaño's ability to penetrate any form of hypocrisy and deception and explain it to his pupil, the narrator, parallels a passage in Infierno that deals with religious hypocrisy. Quevedo notes that mortal eyes that cannot see the hypocrites as they truly are, but before the eternal eyes of God, they have no masks: "Al fin alli conozi que van èstos arreuzados para nosotros, mas para los ojos aeternos que huiertos sobre todo juzgan el secreto màs esquino de los retiramientos del alma, no tienen mascara" (162). The similarity serves to further suggest that Desengaño participates in the eternal and the divine in his abilities.

also employ the same formal patterns, framing devices and themes as well" (4). Once again, although there exist significant differences between Quevedo's otherworld and the utopian kingdom or island, there also exist significant parallels such as this inversion that achieves the same satirical goal.

The theme of *mundus inversus* actually became one of the great themes of the Spanish Baroque, although in this context, the theme is usually referred to as "the world upside down," or in Spanish, "el mundo al revés." Curtius lists "the world upside down" as one of the important *topoi* of the Middle Ages (94-98). José Antonio Maravall has observed that "The Spanish Baroque retrieved the topos....," and he discusses it as one of the elements of the Baroque world view.¹⁰ Naturally, when one speaks of the world as being upside down, the suggestion is that things are not what they should be. For Quevedo, the problem frequently manifests itself in mankind's unwillingness or inability to call things by their proper

¹⁰ "It is possible to assume that the image of the world upside down was the product of a marginal culture of the dispossessed, that is as a popular counter-culture. This is how M. Bakhtin has suggested it should be conceived for the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. I see it, rather, above all when the topos acquires such a force in the baroque, as a product of the culture of a changing society in which the disturbances that certain groups underwent in their position and function created a feeling of instability, which translated into a view of a staggering disorder. Considered in this way, it would be the result of a conservative or—perhaps better said—traditional valorization. There is no doubt that the theme revealed—and this Rousset has made evident with respect to the French baroque—a feeling of instability and mutability. But if with regard to the assertion that everything changes, one judges that everything in the world is found to be distorted, it is because an underlying rational structure exists whose alteration allows for considering the existence of disorder: if one can speak of the world upside down it is because it can be right-side up. Quevedo's satirical *Discursos* and *Sueños* played on the basis of that structure" (Maravall *Culture* 152).

names, i.e., tell the truth.¹¹ In Mundo, Desengaño gives a speech over the hypocritical and inappropriate use of names and titles (198-99), but a passage in Infierno, spoken by a demon, states the problem more clearly:

Assi los honbres que todo lo entendeis al reues: vouo llamais al que no es sediciosso, aluorotador, maldiziente; sauio, al mal acondicionado, perturbador y escandalosso; valiente al que perturba el sosiego; y couarde al que con bien compuestas costunbres, escondido a las ocasiones, no da lugar a que le pierdan el respecto estos tales en quien ningun viçio tiene lizençia. O pesia tal, dixе yo: Màs estimo hauer oydo este diablo que quanto tengo! (171)

Again, the dreamer validates the teaching of a demon, one who states that man's understanding is the reverse of what it should be. In this case, speech itself is the culprit, too often used to fabricate a world of false appearances, an inverted world where the "perturbador y escandalosso" receives the appellation of "sauio."

The comments of the demon demonstrate Quevedo's principal didactic method in the Sueños, which is to expose falsehood and hypocrisy, reprove vice, generally "reprender el mal." Rather than portray the ideal society, rather than present how things should be, he merely suggests this by showing how things should not be. When he discusses the actions of corrupt judges and constables, he does not bother to create a contrasting depiction of good and honest officials;

¹¹ See the essay by R. M. Price, "Quevedo's Satire on the Use of Words in the *Sueños*," which deals with "...the moral nature of Quevedo's satirical attacks on the use of words which conceal the truth, on lies or misleading statements in words, phrases, and larger groups, and on those who use such words" (170).

he simply denounces the bad ones. The most significant instance in which he does create a contrast to reveal a utopian ideal occurs when he discusses the issue of material wealth.

At the beginning of Infierno, the dreamer describes two roads stretching before him, one narrow and difficult on which few people travel, the other broad and easy, crowded with many people. He first describes the narrow road leading to Heaven:

Era de la mano derecha tan angosta que no admite encareçimiento, y estaua (de la poca gente que por ella yua) llena de abrojos, asperezas y malos passos: con todo, vi algunos que trauajauan en passarla, pero con ir descalzos y desnudos, se yuan dejando en el camino vnos el pellejo, otros los brazos o las cauezas, otros los pies, y todos yuan amarillos y flacos. (160).

Those on the road to Heaven travel naked, on bare feet, extremely thin and pale. A few lines ahead, the dreamer notes the lack of horses and coaches on the road: "...es cossa de admirar que no hauia señal de rueda de coche...." In contrast, the road to Hell has many horses and coaches, people wearing fine clothing and jewels:

Volvime a la mano izquierda, vi vn acompañamiento tan reuerendo, tanto coche, tanta carroza cargados de competencias del Sol en humanas hermoßuras, y gran cantidad de galas y libreas, lindos cauallos, mucha gente de capa negra, muchos Caualleros. [...] ...aqui todo era vayles, fiestas, juegos y saraos, y no el otro camino, que por falta de Sastres yuan en èl desnudos y rotos, y aqui nos sobrauan Mercaders, Joyeros y todos offizios. (161)

Although Quevedo mentions parties and games, and the generally frivolous nature of those on the road to Hell as opposed to the seriousness of those on the road to Heaven, the most striking difference lies in the difference of material possessions. Those on the road to Heaven have none, not even clothing. Quevedo satirically explains that all of the tailors travel on the road to Hell, making it impossible for anyone not on that road to have clothing. The passage nevertheless communicates the traditional message of *contemptus mundi*.

Indeed, the demon in Alguacil goes so far as to declare that the poor do not enter Hell, and claims to not even know what "poor" is when asked about it by the dreamer:

En todo esso estoy bien (le dixe); sòlo querria sauer si ay en el ynffierno muchos pobres. Què es pobres? (replicò). Es honbres que no tienen nada de quanto tiene el mundo. Hablara yo para mañana! (dixo el diablo): si lo que condena a los honbres es lo que tienen del mundo, y èssos no tienen nada, còmo se an de condenar? (153)

Naturally, Quevedo would not suggest that the poor cannot sin and therefore cannot be damned. What he does here is to focus satirically on the corrupting power of worldly goods and suggest that the poor cannot be damned by what they do not have.

Quevedo characterizes money as one of the principle evils of the world, and he addresses the subject repeatedly in his satirical poems and in the Sueños. His attitude was by no means unique with regard to the subject. Maravall in his analysis of the Quixote and the "continuous utopian construction that runs through the entire novel"

(Utopia and Counterutopia 186), notes disdain for money as one of the important utopian themes of Cervantes's masterpiece, tracing the subject as one of the characteristics of Renaissance Humanism from More's Utopia, through Vives's treatise De subventionem pauperum, up to the Baroque (37ff.). Quevedo seems to have had particularly strong feelings on the matter, possibly as a result of the extravagance, outright waste, and corruption he observed in the frequent parties and frivolous lifestyles of the ministers and *privados* of Philip III. And yet, Quevedo's anger over the corruption caused by money in his society does not extend to a notion of social injustice perpetrated against the poor in these passages. He portrays poverty as the ideal state, a utopian goal, at least from the standpoint of personal morality; for the rich do not so much hurt the poor with their greed and extravagance as they hurt and damn themselves.

The discussion of those who do not enter and are not bound for Hell represents a digression for Quevedo. The purpose of satire is to reprove bad conduct, and Quevedo does so almost exclusively. This notwithstanding, the occasional hint at a utopian ideal, however unrealistic it may be in the real world, indicates that Quevedo believed in the possibility of change. The cynicism he expresses for his society is not, for example, the complete and utter despair later seen in some of the Romantic authors. Underlying Quevedo's dystopian denunciation, there exists a utopian optimism, however faint. Otherwise, why include all the passages on the need for repentance?

Quevedo may or may not have yet known More's Utopia when he began to write the Sueños in his mid twenties. His social criticism

nevertheless participates in the Renaissance tradition begun by More. According to Karl Mannheim, "An state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs" (173). Quevedo's incongruity with his own state of reality leads him to create another one, another world from which he can make sense of this one. Of course, visionary access to another world properly belongs to the dream-vision genre, but, as seen in previous chapters, Quevedo incorporates many traditions and philosophies into the construction of these works to achieve different purposes. The otherworld of the dream-vision allows him to show his society as it is. The elements of utopian/dystopian satire allow him to suggest how it should be. Both traditions come together to serve Quevedo's moral purpose.

Chapter Six:
The Satirical Tradition, Politics, and the Sueños

Many of the themes and literary devices developed by Quevedo in the Sueños have ample precedent in classical satire. For example, the inclusion of sceptical and Stoic doctrines in the Sueños may be modeled after Persius, whose satires are distinguished by their Cynic-Stoic content and whom Quevedo cites numerous times in his works. Two satirists in particular merit some extended comment as possible models for Quevedo, Lucian and Juvenal. Lucian seems the most obvious influence of the two. His Menippean satires were widely read during the Renaissance, including his Dialogues of the Dead which, set as they are in the underworld of Greek myth, provide a clear precedent for the comic afterlife of the Sueños. At first glance, there would appear to exist significant parallels between the works of Lucian and Quevedo, but the differences are more significant. In contrast, the satires of Juvenal seem to have little in common with those of Quevedo, set as they are in Rome rather than some otherworld, composed as poetry rather than prose. And yet, Quevedo learned a great deal from the "poeta severo," particularly with regard to the political dimension of satire.

The works of Lucian were reintroduced to Western Europe in 1397 when the Byzantine scholar, Manuel Chrysolorus arrived in Florence at the invitation of that city's government to teach a

seminar on ancient Greek (see Marsh 13). As an introductory grammar, Chrysolorus used a text he had prepared himself, but as a reader, he used the works of Lucian. The practice of using Lucian as a primer continued throughout the Renaissance, and Quevedo would have become familiar with him as a student at Alcalá. In addition to the simple eloquence of his Greek, Lucian was also admired for the moral content of his texts as well as their form. Thomas More translated several of Lucian's works, and a number of humanists produced satirical dialogues in imitation of Lucian, including Erasmus, who published his Charon in 1523. In Spain, Alfonso de Valdés published his Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón (1528), in which he explicitly acknowledges the influence of Lucian and Erasmus: "Si la inuención y doctrina es buena, déense las gratias a Luçiano, Pontano y Erasmo cuyas obras en esto hauemos ymitado..." (71). Considering the wide diffusion of Lucian's texts, his popularity, and the fame of some of his imitators, his possible influence on Quevedo seems a legitimate line of inquiry.

The apparent similarities between Lucian and Quevedo have attracted the attention of numerous critics. The most extensive comments appear in an essay by Margarita Morreale entitled "Luciano y Quevedo: La humanidad condenada." Rather than adduce any direct influence, her analysis consists chiefly of a general comparison and contrast of themes. She acknowledges as much in her introduction:

[Quevedo es] demasiado original en el sello creador de su espíritu, para que nos acerquemos a él en busca de "fuentes." Nuestra intención no es tampoco la de examinar su arriago en

la tradición clásica, y ni siquiera la de definir su relación con el corpus lucianesco. Preferimos la tarea mucho más humilde de escoger algunas temas de entre los preferidos de Luciano y buscar el eco que hayan podido tener en los Sueños. (214)

Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the possibility that Quevedo may have been influenced by Lucian runs throughout the essay as an implied suggestion. For example, Morreale sees Quevedo's hostile attitude toward philosophers as similar to that of Lucian: "[Quevedo] comparte con el samosatense cierto desprecio por la dialéctica y una actitud utilitaria y moralística..." (214). However, as seen in Chapter Three, Quevedo's dislike for dialectic and natural philosophy derives from the influence of the Academic Sceptics as filtered through the fideistic views of Lactantius. The similarity with Lucian seems more coincidental than anything else. Morreale even mentions that Quevedo does not participate in Lucian's attacks on Stoicism, indicating that their satires on philosophers are not as similar as they would at first seem. This does not mean that there could not have been any influence; Quevedo knew Lucian's works and Morreale points out some intriguing parallels, but it is unlikely that Quevedo modeled the Sueños on the Dialogues of the Dead for one reason: Quevedo detested Lucian as an impious man and an enemy to Christianity.

Quevedo's attitude toward Lucian probably derives from Lactantius, who characterizes Lucian's satire as irreverent in that they "spared neither the men nor the gods."¹ The judgement of

¹ "In his Divine Institutions 1.9.8, Lactantius, the Christian Cicero, condemned Lucian in a phrase that was to resonate with nearly Scriptural

Lactantius was widely known in the Renaissance, and by the 1440's had "placed the name of Lucian in a context of suspicious heterodoxy" (Marsh 7). Admirers of Lucian, such as Erasmus, were denounced as atheists simply by association.² The attacks on Erasmus initially came from Protestant Reformers, but Erasmus increasingly fell into disfavor with Roman Catholics, as did Lucian, especially in Spain. During the Counter-Reformation, it seems somewhat ironic that Quevedo utilizes the name of Lucian to denounce the Reformers, referring in the Providencia de Dios to John Calvin: "Calvino, cuyo nombre es anagrama de Luciano, siendo abominable hereje" (Obras I, 1546). Earlier in the same work, Quevedo had referred to Lucian as an atheist, giving a paraphrased translation of Lactantius: "Crece este número [de ateístas] Luciano, cuya eminencia fué reirse y escarnecer de un Dios y de alguno y de todos, enemigo jurado de cristianos" (1543). In addition to repeating Lactantius's evaluation of irreverence toward God and everyone else, Quevedo does two things: first, he places Lucian's name among a list of atheists, and second, he adds his own denunciation of Lucian as an enemy of Christians. It is precisely the distinction between pagan and Christian that separates the Sueños from Lucian's satires.

When compared to the works of Lucian, or those of his imitators like Erasmus and Alfonso de Valdés, Quevedo's Sueños are conspicuous for their avoidance of setting and characters taken from

authority during the Renaissance, *Lucianus, qui neque diis pepercit neque hominibus...*" (Marsh 6).

² "The fervent Reformers likewise adopted Lucian's name as a catchword for heterodoxy and disbelief. Thus, in a 1526 letter addressed to the elector John of Saxony, Erasmus complains that Luther has branded him an 'atheistic Lucian'" (Marsh 7).

Greek myth. Rather than continue the incongruous sixteenth-century practice of presenting Hermes and Charon involved in discussions of contemporary politics and religion, and even having pagan gods cite the words of Christ from the Gospels, as in the Diálogo de Mercurio and Carón, Quevedo rejected Classical mythology for his early satires in favor of models taken from the Christian afterlife and medieval allegory. Considering the religious fervor of the Counter-Reformation, and Quevedo's own zealousness as a defender of Roman Catholicism, it is not surprising that he would choose to separate his works from those of Lucian and his tradition, in spite of the fact that the tradition provided him with the otherworldly model he wished to employ in his satires.

Although Quevedo's dislike for Lucian remained strong, he appears to have later regretted having placed his satires in the Christian afterlife rather than that of myth. The evolution of his thought on the matter can be seen even in the different settings utilized in the Sueños. Quevedo wrote the first three satires as a group from 1605-1608. Only these three involve settings directly related to Heaven and Hell, divine judgement and demons. The last two Sueños, written in 1612 and 1621, utilize allegorical characters and settings. As seen in the discussion of the previous chapters, the satirical and philosophical tone and content of the five works is relatively consistent, but the difference in setting is significant. Between the time of the composition of the third and fourth Sueños, in 1610, Quevedo attempted to publish at least El sueño del Juicio final, perhaps all of the first three. While he did eventually obtain a license,--which he did not use at that time--the first censor to whom

the work was submitted criticized the work harshly, calling it "chabacano e imprudente."³ Quevedo's decision to turn the Last Judgement into a satirical scene of comedy exposed him to the accusation of irreverence for divine matters. The similarity with the traditional accusation against Lucian could not have escaped him. Criticism from the Church may, then, account for the transition to the allegorical. Even more significant than this transition, is the fact that Quevedo later embraced the Classical mythology he had earlier gone out of his way to avoid. When he published the second edition of the Sueños in 1631, he made numerous changes in order to paganize the first three texts, changing, for example, the title of El sueño del Juicio final to El sueño de las calaveras. El alguacil endemoniado became El alguacil alguaciliado, and most significantly, El sueño del Infierno became Las zahurdas de Plutón. The changes came about apparently as the result of the criticism provoked by the first edition. In spite of this, Quevedo's desire, at least early in his career, to separate himself from Lucian and the model of Menippean satire seems clear.

In contrast with Quevedo's dislike of Lucian, he held Juvenal in high esteem. In the Providencia de Dios, he refers to Juvenal's teaching on poverty as worthy of a Christian: "¡Oh palabras alentadas con esfuerzo generoso! ¡Lástima es que mereciendo oídos católicos, no fuesedes pronunciadas por lengua cristiana!" (Obras I, 1610). He

³ "[Quevedo] quiso dar a la imprenta El Sueño del Juicio Final, y solicitó la licencia correspondiente del Consejo de Castilla. Encomendada la censura al padre maestro fray Antonio Montojo, de la Orden de Predicadores, éste contestó el primero de Julio de 1610, que, examinando con atención el libro, debía negarse al autor la licencia para imprimirle. La censura del padre Montojo, por la cual vemos que don Francisco era 'servidor del rey,' hallaba el estilo de la obra 'chabacano e imprudente,' sin otras graves apreciaciones" (Astrana 181-82).

had earlier cited Juvenal as an authoritative "maestro" on the question of the existence and divine nature of the soul (1558). In La constancia y paciencia de Santo Job, he even describes Juvenal as knowledgeable about ancient Hebrew scripture and custom: "Este poeta tuvo más noticia de los ritos de los judios que otro alguno de los latinos..." (1483). Quevedo's attitude toward Juvenal resembles that which he had toward Seneca. He admits that both men were pagan, but he sees so many parallels between their teachings and those found in the Bible that he confidently asserts that they either had knowledge of the Scriptures or contact with Jews and Christians, or both.⁴ Quevedo learned a great many things from Juvenal, as he did from Seneca, but the most important subject seems to have been the political nature of poverty.

In the Defensa de Epicuro, Quevedo declares his admiration and affinity for Juvenal with the possessive "mi," just as he does so many times with Seneca: "Mi Juvenal, que a mi juicio escribió la política en versos con nombre de sátiras..." (Obras I, 1095). A passage from La virtud militante indicates more clearly what Quevedo means when he refers to Juvenal's satires as political. He translates a passage from Satire VI, adding his own comments:

Para nuestra confusión traeré unos versos de Juvenal en recomendación de la pobreza, que son éstos (sat. 6): "La fortuna humilde en otros tiempos producía castas matronas

⁴ Although Quevedo may engage somewhat in hyperbole with regard to Juvenal's knowledge of Judaism, his assessment is not entirely without merit. Juvenal refers to Jews directly in a couple of the Satires, describing them as one would from first-hand observation. However, his description of the Jewess in Sat. VI, for example, presents a picture more akin to gypsy fortune-telling than anything biblical.

latinas. Malos y humildes y pequeños techos consentían el trabajo que llegasen los vicios el breve sueño, y con la lana tosca las manos duras y fatigadas, y cerca de la ciudad Anibal, y de guarnición los maridos en la torre Colina. Agora padecemos largamente los daños de la paz; más cruel que las armas nos acometió la lujuria, y vengó el mundo vencido. Ningún delito ni maldad de la desorden falta desde que pereció la pobreza romana." ¡Oh grandes y prudentes palabras, acreditadas, no sólo con la ruina de Roma, sino también de otras monarquías! ¡Sumo misterio político! En pereciendo la pobreza romana, pereció su virtud; y esto porque con ella acabó la humildad, y con las riquezas empezó sus tragedias la soberbia. (Obras I, 1406)⁵

Quevedo considers this teaching on poverty something of a paradoxical mystery, because of the proposition that a civilization's success and prosperity could result in its downfall, but he also considers it a political truth, associating poverty with virtue and

⁵ Quevedo would later use this same passage again in the Providencia de Dios, providing a new translation and this time focusing his commentary on Juvenal's other point regarding the insidious and debilitating nature of peace on a civilization:

La fortuna humilde hacía castas a las romanas antiguamente, y el trabajo cerraba en las cabañas el paso a los vicios; el sueño breve, y las manos ásperas y duras con los vellones de Toscana, y arrimado a la ciudad Anibal, y asistiendo a su defensa los maridos en la torre Colina. Ahora padecemos largamente los malos de la paz: más crueles que las armas, se apoderaron de Roma las delicias; y dan venganza della al mundo, que ella venció. Ningún crimen ni maldad de la concupiscencia falta desde que pereció la pobreza humana." Hacen auténtico este grito los sucesos todos de las edades que ha vivido el mundo; y no hay que temer que en lo porvenir pierda la fuerza de sentencia definitiva, ejecutoriada en juicio contradictorio con tantas repúblicas, reinos y monarquías. La paz hace soldados contra sí mismos a los que se fian della: olvídalos de que son hombres y acuerda a los enemigos de que ya no lo son. (1610)

humility, wealth with vice and pride. He applies this truth not just to Rome but also to other monarchies and civilizations, including his own. Therefore, the description of the poor on the road to Heaven at the beginning of El sueño de Infierno not only evokes the Christian concept of *contemptus mundi* and personal morality, but it has broader political implications as well that help to further suggest the utopian ideal underlying the cynical denunciations of the Sueños.

Gilbert Highet, in The Anatomy of Satire, refers to the "underlying idealism of satire" (151), without which it would merely be invective and lampoon (151-52). The passage above, translated by Quevedo, indicates something of the ideal underlying Juvenal's satires. He mentions the humble homes and hands hardened from working with Tuscan wool, suggesting a rural, pastoral life. He mentions the approach of Hannibal that kept men vigilant, suggesting an idealized past during the period of the Roman Republic. The setting and target of Juvenal's satire is the city,⁶ the imperial city of Rome contemporaneous to the author; the contrasting ideal exists in the rural past.⁷ The surroundings, then, the environment in which one lives and works have at least as much to do with instilling virtue as does inner strength of character or adherence to moral philosophy such as that taught by the Stoics. Relating virtue to social

⁶ "It is in the city that the satirist finds the material which he wishes to attack, and there can be no doubt about the historical reality of Juvenal's picture of the actual *Urbs*, with its fires, traffic, towering apartment-blocks, and of many features of Roman life, the humiliations of clients, the arrogance of the nouveaux riches, the nobles and women fighting in the amphitheatre..." (Courtney 19).

⁷ "It is natural that if vice is associated with the imperial city, virtue should be linked with the republican country..." (Courtney 19).

environment necessarily relates virtue to politics, a concept Quevedo understood well.

The moral and political ideal presented by Juvenal in some ways recalls the myth of the Golden Age when men lived virtuously, in harmony with nature and the gods. The myth is probably best known from Ovid's description in the Metamorphosis, but Juvenal also describes it at the beginning of Satire VI:

In the days of Saturn, I believe, Chastity still lingered on the earth, and was to be seen for a time--days when men were poorly housed in chilly caves, which under one common shelter enclosed hearth and household gods, herds and their owners; when the hill-bred wife spread her silvan bed with leaves and straw and the skins of her neighbours the wild beasts--a wife not like thee, O Cynthia, nor to thee Lesbia, whose bright eyes were clouded by a sparrow's death, but one whose breasts gave suck to lusty babes, often more unkempt herself than her acorn-belching husband. For in those days, when the world was young, and the skies were new, men born of riven oak, or formed of dust, lived differently from now, and had no parents of their own. Under Jupiter, perchance, some few traces of ancient modesty may have survived; but that was before he had grown his beard, before the Greeks had learned to swear by someone else's head, when men feared not thieves for their cabbages or fruits, and lived with unwall'd gardens. After that Astraea withdrew by degrees to heaven, with Chastity as her comrade, the two sisters taking flight together. (VI. 1-20)

The flight of Chastity from the earth as described by Juvenal in some way resembles the tale told by the demon in El alguacil endemoniado about Truth and Justice. Such virtues appear to be gone from the world of men forever, belonging to a bygone age. However, Juvenal does indicate, in the passage translated by Quevedo, that the situation under which virtue had once thrived could be recreated in his own time by returning to the simpler, humbler lives, not of the mythical golden age, but of their very real, albeit idealized, ancestors during the Republic.

Although idealized presentations of rural life appear in many eclogues and pastoral works in Antiquity and the Renaissance, Juvenal presents that life not simply as the poetic notion of *beatus ille*, but as the underlying ideal of his satire, as a serious political and moral statement. Such ideas have not been uncommon throughout the centuries. In the Spanish Renaissance, Antonio de Guevara published his book Menosprecio de corte y alabanza de aldea (1539) in which he confidently and very seriously states that men who live in villages are more virtuous than those who live at court: "Es privilegio de aldea que allí sean los hombres más virtuosos y menos viciosos, lo qual no es assí por cierto en la corte y en las grandes repúblicas, á do ay mil que os estorben el bien y cien mil que os inciten al mal" (135). However, this popular dichotomy between the virtuous village and the vice-ridden city cannot easily be seen in Quevedo's satires. While his denunciations do focus on life in the city, and he does not attack rural characters such as shepherds and farmers, neither does he, like Juvenal, include passages in which he openly extols the virtues of rural life. Not surprisingly, there exists

some question as to whether Quevedo's satires contain an underlying ideal at all.

In contrast with the argument presented in the last chapter, that Quevedo's dystopian denunciations contain the utopian suggestion of reform, Morreale, in her comparison of Lucian and Quevedo, denies the possibility of seeing any such message of reform:

Ni uno ni otro autor cobijaron ideas de reforma, Luciano por demasiado cínico e indiferente, Quevedo por demasiado pesimista. Por esto se diferencia--en los Sueños--de los erasmistas que, aun levantando el látigo de la sátira lucianesca, sabían soñar con un cristianismo utópico. Los Sueños, en cambio, no nos dejan ningún resquicio de esperanza y parecen excluir la posibilidad de un reino de Dios sobre la tierra. (224)

Morreale places emphasis on Quevedo's pessimism, and understandably so, since she focuses her study on the Sueños to the exclusion of his other works. Quevedo's idealism, like Juvenal's, can best be identified in political statements, but Quevedo put few of those into his satires, preferring to write separate political works.⁸ One of those works in particular provides information helpful to the explication of the Sueños, España defendida.

Quevedo wrote España defendida in 1609, not long after he had finished the third Sueño. The work provides important insight into his Counter-Reformation views, because in it, he positions Spain against the rest of the world morally and culturally, having been

⁸ B. Sánchez Alonso, in his essay, "Los satíricos latinos y la sátira de Quevedo," has also noted the discrepancy between the political content in the satire of Juvenal and that of Quevedo, as for example when he observes, "No siguió Quevedo el ejemplo de Juvenal, que en pleno reinado de Trajano, dirigía sus dardos contra Domiciano y sus ministros" (143).

aroused to this defense of his homeland by the slander of foreigners. He mentions some specific attacks that have aroused his patriotic ire, including that of Joseph Scaliger who referred to Quintilian, Lucan, and Seneca as "Pingues isti cordubenses" (Obras I, 550), and that of Jerónimo Bezón, who wrote a work about the New World in which he perpetuated the Black Legend of Spain, but he sees these attacks as part of a pervasive European hatred of everything Spanish and accordingly gives a general response, portraying Spain as a land of great leaders and men of good customs.

In order to argue the moral superiority of Spaniards, Quevedo develops the thesis that the customs of Spain's inhabitants derive in large part from the country's temperate climate:

Como sea verdad asegurada por los filósofos que de la buena o mala templanza de los humores resultan las complexiones en los cuerpos, y de ellas las costumbres; las cuales aunque suele corregir la razón, por la mayor parte muestran, o en las obras o en la intención, imperiosamente su malicia, es sin duda que España, teniendo tierra templada y cielo sereno, causará semejantes efetos en humores y condiciones; como se ve, pues ni la frialdad nos hace flemáticos y perezosos como a los alemanes, ni el mucho calor inútiles para el trabajo como a los negros y a los indios; pues, templada la una calidad con la otra, produce bien castigadas costumbres. (Obras I, 585)

Quevedo's comments, on one level, are full of sad irony. He compares Spaniards to other races and nationalities, terming Germans lazy and Indians and blacks useless when it comes to work, when he knew

very well that Spain suffered from a blight of arrogant nobles and hidalgos who considered work beneath them. However, his purpose is to put Spain in a positive light here, and one can expect hyperbole in this context, just as in many of the grotesque exaggerations of his satires. At the end of his general comments on the subject, Quevedo reaffirms his thesis: "Así que concluimos que las costumbres propias y primeras de España fueron en todo hijas de la templanza de su cielo y de la naturaleza del lugar, y por eso modestas, moderadas y según justa ley y disciplina" (586). So, Quevedo does accept the notion that "naturaleza del lugar" to a considerable degree determines the moral character and customs of a people. What he does not do is present that place as simply a village or rural setting, rather the ideal moral environment is all of Spain.

The ideal depiction in España defendida would appear to be completely at odds with the contents of the Sueños. After all, the people satirized and condemned to Hell in the Sueños belong to Quevedo's own society, his own country. How can the ideal moral environment be full of vice, corruption, and sin? For Quevedo, the answer is simple: Spain has been corrupted by contact with other nations.⁹

"¿Quién nos llama bárbaros? ¿Quién nos dice que somos locos ignorantes y soberbios, no teniendo nosotros vicio que no le debamos a su comunicación de ellos? Supieran en España qué

⁹ "Quevedo conocía, sin duda, las razones por las que los españoles no eran bien vistos más allá de los Pirineos, pero su nacionalismo no le permitía reflejar únicamente la actitud extranjera, sino que tenía que contraatacar, descubriendo los flancos débiles del enemigo, haciendo ver así cómo nuestros vicios eran debidos a la influencia exterior. Para reforzar más su posición enumera algunos, incluyendo las herejías, que habían contaminado la pristina pureza española: la homosexualidad, el alcoholismo, etc." (Roncero López 83).

ley había para el que, lascivo, ofendía las leyes de la Naturaleza, si Italia no se lo hubiera enseñado?" (550).

Quevedo's attribution of homosexuality in Spain to contact with Italians may help to explain an enigmatic passage in the Sueños in which the demon of Alguacil comments that demons wish nothing to do with Italians and will not accept them: "Days al diablo vn Ytaliano, y no le toma el diablo, porque ay ytaliano que tomarà al diablo. Y aduertid que las màs veçes days al diablo lo que èl se tiene, digo, nos tenemos" (151). The passage does not specify what makes Italians so repugnant even to demons, serving rather as a general denunciation of that nation's people. However, Quevedo wrote the comment in España defendida just two years after that of Alguacil, and he very likely had in mind the same offense for both passages, a sin that he characterizes as one not even the demons of Hell will condone, homosexuality.

The subject of homosexuality appears explicitly in the Sueños, in a passage in El sueño del Infierno. There, Italians are not mentioned, but there is a similarity in that the demons in Hell declare that they want nothing to do with "putos:" "...no solamente no sauemos de ellos, pero no querriamos que ellos supiesen de nosotros, que en ellos peligrarian nuestros traseros; y los diablos por esso tenemos colas, porque como estàn acà los putos, hauemos menester moqueador de rauos" (Sueños I, 174). The explanation, that demons have tails for the sole purpose of protecting them from homosexuals, is amusing, but Quevedo took very seriously what he would describe as offenses to Nature, and mentions the subject again

toward the end of España defendida to indicate what a problem it had become in Spain:

Y lo que más es de sentir es de la manera que los hombres las imitan [a las mujeres] en las galas y lo afeminado, pues es de suerte, que no es un hombre ahora más apetecible a una mujer que una mujer a otro. Y esto de suerte, que las galas en algunos parecen arrepentimiento de haber nacido hombres, y otros pretenden enseñar a la Naturaleza cómo sepa hacer de un hombre mujer.

Al fin hace dudoso el sexo, lo cual ha dado ocasión a nuevas premáticas, por haber introducido vicios desconocidos de naturaleza. (588)

All of this he would attribute to the taint of foreign contact.

Quevedo's apparent xenophobia is characteristic of the isolationism that became official policy during the latter sixteenth century. Almost fifty years before the composition of the first Sueño, Spain, which had been "wide open to European humanistic influences," began to transform itself into "the semi-closed Spain of the Counter-Reformation" (Elliot 221). A number of steps were taken to protect the nation from the "foreign contagion," beginning in 1558 with a pragmatic forbidding the import of foreign books and requiring that books printed in Spain should be licensed by the Council of Castile. The following year another pragmatic forbade Spanish students from going abroad to study (see Elliot 222). After the decrees that came out of the Council of Trent in 1564, the Inquisition increasingly played a role in the enforcement of such legislation. Henry Kamen has observed, that "a good part of the

Inquisition's zeal for religion was little more than active xenophobia" (Inquisition 276). However, he has also observed that the reach and effectiveness of the Inquisition has often been exaggerated. Many Spaniards simply ignored the restrictions on publishing and travel, taking advantage of the many loopholes in the laws (see Inquisition 103 ff.). The possibility that Spain might truly manage to isolate itself never really existed, but it did exist as a political ideal, one which Quevedo endorsed.

The political and religious climate in Spain in the decades just before Quevedo's birth does not provide the only precedent for the isolationism expressed in España defendida; Juvenal expresses similar sentiments in Satire VI with regard to the decadence of Rome: "Filthy lucre first brought in amongst us foreign ways; wealth enervated and corrupted the ages with foul indulgences" (107). Once again, Juvenal draws attention to the corrupting power of money, the contrasting ideal having been explicitly stated as the humble life and the blessings of poverty. It is important to note, however, that wealth is but one of the culprits responsible for the moral decline of Rome, the other being peace. In the passage translated by Quevedo, Juvenal had said, "...padecemos largamente los daños de la paz," and had mentioned the conflict with Hannibal, or more generally the state of war, as the contrasting ideal. Quevedo makes the same observation in España defendida without reference to Juvenal:

Mientras tuvo Roma a quien temer y enemigos, ¡qué diferentes costumbres tuvo! ¡Cómo se ejercitó en las armas! ¡Qué pechos tan valerosos ostentó al mundo! Mas luego que

honraron sus deseos perezosos al ocio bestial con nombre de paz santa, ¡qué vicio no se apoderó de ella! (585)

Quevedo saw clear parallels between the rise and fall of Rome and that of his own country. He considers times of war to be times of moral greatness, and times of peace to be times of decadence.

Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth-century had made peace with many of its enemies, but at great cost. J. H. Elliot refers to the "heroic imperialism" of Charles V in the previous century, and the "humiliating pacifism of Philip III" (244). Quevedo felt that humiliation keenly, and lamented the peace of his day, hoping it would merely be a pause in Spain's sacred duty to continue its struggle against the Turks and all other heretics:

...y así, en esta época de paz que alcanzamos en parte maliciosa, el largo hábito a las santas costumbres de la guerra las sustenta en ellas, aunque a mi opinión España nunca goza de paz: sólo descansa, como ahora, del peso de las armas, para tornar a ellas con mayor fuerza y nuevo aliento. Y son a todos, como a ella importantes las armas suyas; pues, a no haberlas, corriera sin limites la soberbia de los turcos y la insolencia de los herejes.... (585-86)

Quevedo rhetorically states that Spain will return to its arms with renewed vigor, not in the surety, but in the hope that it will, suggesting that it do so as a necessary part of its national identity as defender of the true faith.

The Sueños only contain a brief, but significant, hint at Quevedo's idealization of war as necessary for the moral structure of the society. It appears in Infierno, in the description of the two

roads of life: "No faltaron en el camino Ecclesiasticos, muchos Theologos vi, y algunos Soldados, pero pocos, que por la otra senda a fuerza de absoluciones y gracias yuan en yleras ordenadas honrossamente, triunphando de su sangre" (163). The first road mentioned is the road to Hell, which in contrast with the many theologians on it, contains very few soldiers. The vast majority of the soldiers march along the road to Heaven in orderly ranks, triumphant in having shed their own blood, presumably in just causes. Quevedo mentions the "absoluciones y gracias" that make it possible for the soldiers to be on the road to Heaven, indicating perhaps his acknowledgement of what he would consider the necessary evils of war and the need for divine forgiveness. It also reflects something of the warmongering decried by Erasmus in so many of his works, including the colloquy Charon, in which he satirizes the members of the clergy who urge war assuring divinely guided victory, and also promise that if any should fall on the battlefield, they will fly directly to Heaven.¹⁰

Wealth and peace, then, bring about moral and social decline according to both Juvenal and Quevedo, wealth being the more serious of the two. Quevedo consistently addresses the corrupting power of money, and even in España defendida, where he attempts

¹⁰ "Certain creatures in black and white cloaks and ash-gray tunics, adorned with plumage of various kinds. They never leave the courts of princes. They instill into their ears a love of war; they incite rulers and populace alike; they proclaim in their evangelical sermons that war is just, holy, and right. And--to make you marvel more at the audacity of the fellows--they proclaim the very same thing on both sides. To the French they preach that God is on the French side: he who has God to protect him cannot be conquered! To the English and Spanish they declare this war is not the Emperor's but God's: only let them show themselves valiant men and victory is certain! But if anyone does get killed, he doesn't perish utterly but flies straight up to heaven, armed just as he was." (Colloquies 391-92)

to paint a positive portrait of Spain, he has to admit that money has opened the door for vice to replace many of the good customs of his people: "A qué vicio no ha abierto la puerta con llave de oro la avaricia?" (587). Rather than despair of this situation and descend into the purely negative, pessimistic, and nihilistic attitude of which he has so often been accused, he consistently offers suggestions for reform. He believed that a remedy did exist for the moral decline of his country. However, he does not suggest that a mere return to the simple rural life would be sufficient. To be effective, the remedy would have to include all of society, both those who lived at court and those who lived in villages, and even those who lived in other countries who might look to Spain for moral example. The type of sweeping change Quevedo envisioned could only be realized one way, through strong political leadership.

Quevedo viewed order in society as necessarily beginning at the top, with the king, whose diligence and example should ensure that justice and virtue would travel downward, through his ministers, reaching into every level of society. Likewise, just as good leadership could cause justice to pervade society, corrupt leadership bred corruption that flowed downward. The description in Alguacil of the judges who lived badly illustrates this last point perfectly (see Chapter Five). Throughout the reign of Philip III, Quevedo held out hope that the pious, but weak and ineffectual king would provide the remedy to Spain's moral ills: "Llegaron estas cosas a desesperar de remedio a España, si la modestía y virtud y cristiandad de don Felipe III, nuestro señor, no diera freno a estas cosas con su ejemplo" (587). Only a strong Christian king can put a halt to Spain's decline.

Quevedo reiterates the same idea in a later passage of España defendida, expanding it to include the need for ministers who will act in accordance with the king's good will:

Al fin se ve en estado España, por nuestros pecados, que a no intervenir rey santo y tan justo y honesto, y ministros tan conformes a su virtud y tan celosos de su opinión del servicio de Dios y del aumento del reino desesperará a las vueltas del tiempo de poderla traer peor estado.

Esto dice de España un hijo suyo, ingrato, con verdad, de mi propia tierra, con tener el referido nombre de madre la patria.... (588)

At the same time that he admits to some of Spain's faults, Quevedo also expresses hope for reform in the intervention of a "rey santo," a virtuous Christian king.

These ideas on reform may be difficult to see in the Sueños, but they are not entirely absent. In El sueño de la muerte, written just after the death of Philip III, Quevedo echoes some of the comments of España defendida, in a conversation between the narrator and the shade of Enrique de Villena:

Quièn reina aora (preguntò) en España? que es la postera curiosidad que he de saber, que me quiero bolber jigote, que me allo mejor. Muriò Philipo tercero, dixe yo. Fue santo Rey de virtud inmemorable (dixo el Marques) segun le vi yo en las Estrellas pronosticado. Reina Philipo quarto dos dias a, dixe yo. Ello pasa? asi que ya ha dado el terçero quarto para la ora que yo esperaua? y diciendo y haçiendo se subió por la redoma y la trastornò y salió fuera, y yba diçiendo: Màs justiçia se ha

de haçer aora por vn quarto que en otros tiempos por doce millones. (235)

Quevedo's hope for justice under Philip IV would go unfulfilled as it had under Philip III, but the desire for reform, through strong, righteous, leadership is unmistakable. Clearly, Morreale is mistaken in her assessment of the Sueños when she says that they contain neither ideas for, nor hope of reform.

Quevedo places considerable emphasis on the need for a righteous king, not merely a strong one. He vehemently disliked the depiction of the ideal ruler given in Machiavelli's The Prince, and included Machiavelli among the many atheists whom he detested. The Sueños contain few references to kings, but one passage in Alguacil does provide a description of the cruel, arrogant and covetous kings who condemn themselves to Hell:

Ay Reyes en el ynffierno? (preguntè), y satisfiço a mi duda diçiendo: Todo el ynffierno es figuras, y ay muchos porque el sumo poder, liuertad y mando les haze sacar a las Virtudes de su medio y llegar los uiçios a su extremo; y biendose con la suma reuerençia de sus vasallos, y con la grandeça opuestos a diosses, quieren valer punto menos y parecerles. Tienen muchos caminos para condenarse, y muchos que le ayuden, porque vno se condena por la crueldad, y matando y desterrando los suyos, es vna ponçona coronada y vna peste real de sus Reynos. Otros se pierden por la codiçia, haciendo Amaçonas sus villas y çiudades a fuerça de grandes pechos, que en bez de criar dessustançian. Ottros se van al ynffierno por terzeras perssonas, y se condenan por poderes,

fiandose de inffames ministros; y es gusto berlos penar porque, como boçales en trauajos, se les dobla el dolor en qualquier cossa. Sòlo tienen bueno los Reyes que como es gente honrrada, nunca bienen solos, sino con pinta de dos o tres Priuados, y a ueçes va el encaxe y se traen todo el reyno tras sì, pues todos se gouiernan por ellos. Y en resoluçion los Reyes malos se van al ynffierno por el camino real, y los Mercaderes por el de la plata. (151)

Once again, Quevedo states the principle regarding the contagious and destructive nature of corruption in that a king never condemns himself alone; rather, he pulls at least some of his ministers down with him, and sometimes his entire kingdom. This negative portrayal of kings does have an underlying ideal, one already indicated rather clearly in España defendida, but the contrasting ideal of the righteous, Christian king, who cares for his subjects as the good shepherd does his flock, is discussed to its fullest extent in the two volumes of Quevedo's Política de Dios.

Quevedo published the first volume of Política de Dios in 1626, having written it several years earlier. He dedicated the work to Philip IV, and in it he describes the monarchy as a divinely inspired institution that requires great work and sacrifice on the part of the king in the care of his subjects: "A Vuestro cuidado, no a vuestro aluedrio, encomendò las gentes Dios nuestro Señor, y en los Estados, Reynos, y Monarquias, os dio trabajo y afan honroso, no vanidad, ni descanso" (Política 38). He contrasts work with vanity, echoing a passage from the Sueños on the vanity of princes (see Chapter Five). This passage alone indicates something of the type of idealized

monarch envisioned by Quevedo, but the rest of the work leaves no doubt but that he did possess a positive vision of what the monarchy should be, since the entire thesis revolves around the notion that a king should imitate Christ in all things: "Imitad a Christo, y leyendome a mi oidle a el, pues hablo en este libro con las plumas que le siruen de lenguas" (38). Drawing on passages from the Gospels, Quevedo provides parallels that serve to instruct a king on the proper conduct in a variety of situations, including for example, how to deal with ministers and *privados*, the biblical parallel being found in Christ's relationships with his disciples. The positive idealizations of the Política de Dios must be kept in mind when considering the underlying ideal of Quevedo's satires.

The influence of Lucian on Quevedo has frequently been exaggerated, while that of Juvenal has been underestimated. The association with Lucian leads to an unfortunate emphasis on Quevedo's cynicism and pessimism, while the recognition of Juvenal's influence leads to an understanding that Quevedo does indeed do more than denounce in the Sueños. His satires contain a number of passages that suggest the type of political reform he envisioned. He expresses this underlying ideal much more directly in his political works, where he defends Counter-Reformation views and portrays Spain as a great nation standing against the rest of the world as a bastion of Roman Catholicism with a strong, righteous king as its ruler. Although utopian and unattainable in many respects, Quevedo had seen a close approximation of his ideal as a boy during the reign of Philip II. His desire to see a return to those days never

materialized, but that hope remained a strong presence in his works, even in the Sueños.

Chapter Seven:
Dante and the Sueños

Dante and Quevedo deal with many of the same themes and issues in the Commedia and the Sueños, respectively. Yet they approach them in such different fashions that any direct parallels or patterns of influence become difficult to identify. The serious tone and highly structured poetry of Dante¹ contrasts sharply with the seemingly frivolous, rambling prose of Quevedo. Whereas Dante faints in terror at the horrific sights to which he is witness during his journey through Hell, Quevedo frequently laughs during his.² The Commedia, however, is not without its moments of humor, particularly the grotesque humor in which Quevedo delights. And, as seen in the analysis of the previous chapters, the Sueños reflect Quevedo's vast erudition in serious moral, philosophical, theological, and even political matters. Although Quevedo avoids direct quotations of and obvious borrowings from Dante, there are,

¹ See John Freccero on "The Significance of *Terza Rima*" (258ff.) Dante's use of *terza rima* and the tripartite structure of the poem allow him to communicate ideas that go beyond the literal level of the poem by means of numerical symbolism.

² "...cuando a Dante este hórrido espectáculo causa pavor y espanto. Quevedo ríe, ríe sin tasa, en largas y sonoras carcajadas, que en aquel lugar maldito disuenan y extrañan más todavía que los mismos roncós lamentos y aullidos de dolor de los condenados. ¡Cuán profundo contraste, y qué temperamento espiritual tan diferente revela en uno y otro poeta!" (González de Amezúa 70). In his essay on "Fases y caracteres de la influencia del Dante en España," González de Amezúa only devotes a few pages of general comments to Quevedo.

nonetheless. a number of aspects in the Sueños that can best be understood in light of the tremendous precedent established by the Florentine poet.

Quevedo explicitly acknowledges the influence of Dante at the beginning of the first dream in which he states that he fell asleep while reading the Commedia: "...habiendo cerrado los ojos con el libro de Dante." However, this admission appears only in the revised edition of 1631, the Juguetes version; in the original text, the dreamer falls asleep while reading about the second coming of Christ in the book of "beato Hypolito." The reference to Dante is but one of the many changes Quevedo made in the text in order to remove the possibility of theological controversy and to avoid the criticism that had arisen in reaction to the first edition. The fact that these changes were intended to paganize, or secularize the satires indicates something of the attitude with which Quevedo viewed Dante's work. In spite of the Commedia's abundant religious themes, Quevedo apparently did not think of it as a religious text.³ In fact, his one significant comment on the poem demonstrates that he read it with an eye towards its political content.

The passage occurs in the Marco Bruto, in which Quevedo presents the various ancient witnesses who testify to the character of Brutus, portraying him as a man of honor and virtue. At one point, he notes that Dante did not share the same opinion:

³ Quevedo's decision to refer to Dante as a means of removing religious controversy from the Sueños perhaps indicates just how much attitudes regarding the Commedia had changed by the seventeenth century. Peter S. Hawkins notes how during the Middle Ages the work was viewed by many as divinely inspired and having almost scriptural authority (133), a view fostered by Dante himself, especially in Paradiso 25.1 where he refers to his poem as "sacred."

El Dante sigue contraria opinión, y pone a Casio y a Bruto con Judas, no sólo conduciéndolos por traidores, sino por pésimos traidores. Deste fué causa el ser Dante de la facción gibelina y de los emperadores.--Canto 34 y postrero del Infierno. (Obras I, 919)

Although not strictly a Ghibelline as Quevedo states, Dante did take what was essentially the Ghibelline position during his exile, making many statements in the Commedia and the Monarchia in favor of the Empire and against both the papacy and the ruling factions of Florence that had exiled him.⁴ In spite of the inexactitude, Quevedo's political reading anticipates some of the more sophisticated criticism of recent years, such as that of Joan M. Ferrante who, in The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy (1984), considers political issues the principal concern of the Commedia.

The inclusion of Dante's contrary opinion amidst the praise for Brutus, praise in which Quevedo shared, might indicate that Quevedo disagreed with Dante and therefore bore some animus toward him. Quevedo's admiration for Brutus, however, was not without qualification. While he does generally describe Brutus as a man of great virtue, and goes to considerable lengths to justify some of his actions, he cannot justify the betrayal and murder of Caesar, because of his strongly held view that the monarchy was of divine origin:

Grave delito es dar muerte a cualquier hombre; mas darla al rey es maldad execrable, y traición nefanda no sólo poner en

⁴ W. P. Friederich characterizes the Monarchia as a "staunchly pro-Ghibelline book" (46). Charles Till Davis makes the following comment: "Dante's 'Ghibellinism,' his advocacy of the imperial cause, was an important but passing phase in the evolution of his thought. His treatise on the empire, Monarchia, which d'Entrèves dates as c. 1312, was an aberration..." (67).

él manos sino hablar de su persona con poca reverencia, o pensar de sus acciones con poco respeto. El rey bueno se ha de amar; el malo se ha de sufrir. Consiente Dios al tirano, siendo quien le puede castigar y deponer, ¿y no le consentirá el vasallo, que debe obedecerle? No necesita el brazo de Dios de nuestros puñales para sus castigos, no de nuestras manos para sus venganzas. (961)

Because of that one act, Quevedo views Brutus as a great man who ended badly; he therefore agrees with Dante's condemnation of the betrayal.

Quevedo also mentions Dante in España defendida, in which he describes the poet as "doctísimo" with reference to "el Convivio Amoroso" (Obras I, 572). The reference, in addition to indicating Quevedo's respect for Dante, also suggests that Quevedo had seriously studied Dante's works at precisely the time in his life that he was working on the first three Sueños, since he wrote España defendida in the year following the composition of El sueño del Infierno (1608). His expression of admiration for Dante early in his career, coupled with the acknowledgement of influence in the second edition, stands in contrast with the disdain he expressed for Lucian (see Chapter Six). And yet, there has been a tendency among critics to look to Lucian as Quevedo's model for otherworldly satire,⁵ when Dante offers a clearer precedent at least with regard to many of the otherworldly elements.

⁵ For example, Felicidad Buendía asserts that "[Quevedo] tuvo que elegir un género satírico. Inspiróse en el escritor helenístico Luciano de Samosata..." (Obras I, 136).

The first and most obvious precedent may be seen in Quevedo's choices of otherworlds for his satires. While Lucian offers a model of a pagan, mythological afterlife, Dante offers a predominantly Christian one.⁶ Quevedo deliberately chose to break with both Classical and Renaissance tradition in his avoidance of mythological settings for his early satires (see Chapter Six), and his decision no doubt resulted in large part from the influence of Dante. In addition, Dante's model serves just as well as that of Lucian with regard to social criticism. As Erich Auerbach has observed, "The earthly world is encompassed in the other world of the Comedy.." (90). Just as Quevedo uses the Hell of the Sueños as a metaphor for his own society, Dante before him had employed Hell as a means of denouncing the corruption he saw in his own period of history, particularly the corruption of the papacy and the city of Florence. In fact, Ferrante has convincingly argued that Dante used the city of Florence as the model for his Hell (65ff.). Quevedo's political reading of the Commedia, his awareness of Ghibelline politics even in the condemnation of Brutus and Cassius, indicates clearly that he saw in Dante a literary model in which the Christian afterlife could be used to comment on the affairs of this life.

Dante's vision of the Christian afterlife also provided Quevedo with one very specific element for the Sueños not to be found at all in Lucian, that element being demons, especially comic ones. Olaf

⁶ The setting created by Dante for the Commedia deserves the qualification of "predominately" Christian because of such unorthodox ideas as the pagan Limbo, one of the many points of contention for Dante's detractors through the centuries. Quevedo, a well trained theologian himself, would have been aware of such issues, which may have added to his apparent inclination to read the work as something other than a religious document.

Lagercrantz has referred to the demons in Cantos XXI and XXII of the Inferno as a "gang of waggish devils" (40) who create an atmosphere of farce with their coarse jokes and absurd behavior. James Iffland views these cantos of the *Malebolge* as belonging to a "popular and mirthful" tradition of Hell and somewhat separate from the rest of Dante's "serious" and "pathos filled" journey (23). So, where humor is the exception in Dante, a "respite" according to Iffland (23), it becomes the rule in Quevedo, who has taken one element from Dante and expanded on it to accommodate his satirical purposes. However, Dante's demons do more than engage in grotesque behavior such as making trumpets of their anuses (Inf. XXI.139); they have a definite moral task to perform. The mirth of the *Malebolge* in no way replaces or dispels the seriousness of the rest of the poem. Indeed, these cantos may be considered the most significant of the poem with regard to Dante's political and social message, since the *Malebolge* deals with various types of fraud, "the most important of [Dante's] sins" (Ferrante 166).

The main task of the demons in Dante's Hell is not to provide comic relief, but rather to act as the jailers and castigators of the damned. They play their roles gleefully, taking delight in the torment of lost souls, but they nevertheless do so only with divine sufferance, according to a divine plan. Dante reminds us of this fact when, in Inferno XXI, he describes the pit of boiling pitch into which the Barrators are plunged, and affirms that it exists "by the art of God" (XXI. 16). The torments of Hell exist because God has put them into place. If the demons were not somehow fulfilling His purpose, He would not allow them to exist. Quevedo likewise describes

demons as instruments of divine justice. For example, in El sueño del Juicio final, large groups of demons appear with whips and sticks, herding resurrected souls toward their judgement: "Era de ver vna legion de espíritus malos con açotes, palos y otros instrumentos, còmo trayan a la audiencia una muchedumbre de animas del gordillo... (Sueños I, 133). These evil spirits display a definite ludic quality, but their actions must be understood within the larger context of their serious theological purpose.

Moreover, these demons, as much as they torment with whips, meat hooks, fire, pitch, and other forms of "physical" torture, also delight in making moral pronouncements. In both Dante and Quevedo, demons at times serve as the voice of the author to denounce with authority and explain which sins have been committed by a soul or group. Dante in Inferno XXI, provides the comment of a black, winged demon who carries the souls of Barrators down to the pit of pitch:

Then from our bridge, he called: "O Malebranche,
I've got an elder of Saint Zita for you!
Shove this one under--I'll go back for more--
His city is well furnished with such stores;
there, everyone's a grafter but Bonturo;
and there--for cash--they'll change a *no* to a *yes*." (37-42)

In Quevedo, it becomes even more clear that such pronouncements are meant to add to the torment of the damned, since they force the condemned souls to think beyond their suffering to the reason why they suffer. At one point in El sueño del Infierno, a demon gives a lengthy discourse on the nature of nobility,

explaining that it exists in virtuous action, not bloodlines: "Y el que en el mundo es virtuoso, èsse es hidalgo..." (Sueños I, 170). The recipients of this sermon, a pretentious "Hidalgo" and "Cavallero," are caused very visible anguish by what they hear: "Carcomiase el Hidalgo de oyr estas cossas, y el Cauallero que estaba a su lado se afligia pegando los abanillos de cuello, y voluiendo las cuchilladas de las calzas" (170). When he observes this activity, Quevedo the narrator describes it as characteristic of Hell that the truth would be used as an instrument of torment: "O dixe yo entre mì, y còmo se hecha de ver que èste es el infierno, donde para atormentar a los hombres con amarguras, les dizen las verdades!" (171).

The use of truth by these demons in this context is perfectly understandable, since they do so in a mean-spirited fashion, instructing the damned about their folly when it is far too late for them to do anything about it. Life has ended, and the opportunity for repentance has passed. The truth only causes anguish. The actions of these demons differ significantly from the peculiar behavior of the demon in El alguacil endemoniado who speaks the truth in order to forewarn his listeners who still inhabit the world of the living. One expects demons to find some way to cause harm, whether by truth or lie, just as in Inferno XXI when Malacoda maliciously misleads Dante and Virgil as to which path they should take. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, the demon of Alguacil is an aberration that arises because Quevedo uses him as an agent of truth in this world. The demons that populate Juicio and Infierno, the first and third dreams, very much follow the tradition of Dante.

In addition to his use of demons, Dante also sets an important precedent in his treatment of human characters. "It has generally been assumed that one of the major achievements of the Comedy was the introduction into the poem of contemporary figures and obscure persons of the poet's acquaintance..." (Morgan 51). Quevedo follows Dante's example, to the extent that he can; he had to work within the limits placed on him both by his own historical circumstances and his artistic purpose. Regarding the latter, the characters of the Sueños serve primarily as targets for satirical denunciation. Quevedo, therefore, has very little opportunity, within the limits of his satire, to create positive portraits of individuals from his life, such as Dante does with Beatrice. More relevant for Quevedo, then, is Dante's treatment of the damned in the Inferno. However, with regard to contemporary characters, Dante had a certain freedom that Quevedo did not. Having first been condemned to exile, then given an additional sentence of death should he ever return to Florence, Dante may have been emboldened by these circumstances to name his enemies and place acquaintances in Hell. Quevedo, on the other hand, had to be much more cautious.

It would have been unwise for Quevedo to attack openly contemporaries from his own society. He did so with Góngora and other writers, but primarily on artistic grounds. In the Sueños, he avoids naming contemporary individuals even when he seems to have a specific person in mind. For example, the "Maestro de Esgrima" mentioned in Juicio (135) has sometimes been thought to be the fencing master Luis Pacheco de Narváez, with whom Quevedo shared a mutual animosity (see Ortenbach 42). However, even this

tentative type of identification is virtually impossible in most cases, such as when the narrator of Infierno comes across the soul of a bookseller he had known in life:

Pasè adelante por vn pasadizo muy oscuro, quando por mi nonbre me llamaron. Boluì a la voz los ojos cassi tan medrosso como ella, y hàllome vn honbre que por las tinieblas no podia diuissar màs de lo que la llama que le tormentaua me permitia. Yo soy, dixo, Ay (lo yua a dezir yo, y prosiguiò tras su nonbre), el Librero. (165)

It turns out that the bookseller finds himself in Hell because of bad works, but not his own. Here Quevedo creates a play on the word "obras," which means both "deeds" and "literary works." Merely the sale of bad works by others is enough to earn damnation. Quevedo may very well have had a specific "Librero" in mind when he wrote this passage, but he avoids placing the name in the written text--even though it apparently passed between the two characters in the scene--, and thereby ends with a general comment on booksellers as a type, rather than an individual, which suits his satirical purpose all the better.

However, Quevedo does refer to many infamous historical figures by name. For example, as already discussed in Chapter Two, he consigns Julius Caesar Scaliger to Hell for advocating the superiority of Virgil to Homer. He also provides a list of several astrologers, alchemists, and magicians, the most significant of them being Michael Scot, whom Dante mentions and places in the *Malebolge* for the sin of fraud: "That other there, his flanks extremely spare, / was Michael Scot, a man who certainly / knew

how the game of magic fraud was played" (Inf. XX.115-17). Quevedo, clearly following Dante's example, describes Scot's sin not as the use of magic, but as deception: "A Escoto el Ytaliano no vi allà por echizero y magico, sino por mentiroso y enbustero" (186). The emphasis on fraud undoubtedly reflects Quevedo's larger concern with the deceptive world of appearances and the reality that lies beneath. Anyone who adds to that deception, creating false appearances for personal gain, is worthy of damnation. Giuseppe Mazzotta makes a similar point with regard to the character in Dante:

The alchemists, who believe that there is a secret, valuable core beneath the world of deceptive appearances, are like the Neoplatonists, who seek to transcend the illusions of nature. But these alchemists, just as the magician Michael Scot, never penetrate the veil of appearances and abide in coverings and disguises. Griffolino and Michael Scot are both masters of illusion: their "gioco" is, quite literally, the illusory doubling and counterfeiting of being. (238)

While Dante and Quevedo share a similar attitude toward Michael Scot and his sin, they differ concerning his punishment.

For Quevedo, it seems enough that he places an individual among the damned in Hell. He rarely indicates any particular type of punishment, referring only very generally to eternal fires and demonic torment. Dante, on the other hand, applies the principle of the *contrapasso*,⁷ the notion that each sin deserves a specific and

⁷ "The 'contrapasso,' which translates what St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics and in the Summa theologiae calls 'contrapassum,' is the ethical principle of justice that establishes the symmetrical correspondence between a sin and the suffering for that sin" (Mazzotta 80).

corresponding punishment. For example, he places Michael Scot among the Diviners and Astrologers whose punishment is to have their heads turned around on their bodies and who must therefore walk backwards in the valley that forms the fourth pouch of the *Malebolge*. The type of reciprocity that exists between sin and punishment in Dante requires an elaborate and well-planned categorization of offenses, something Quevedo seems reluctant to provide. Although he does refer to homosexuals as repugnant even to demons, and describes alchemists as "la cossa màs vil" (185), these are merely examples of hyperbole for effect, and do not indicate an attempt to place sin in any descending order of seriousness. Quevedo's attitude, in this respect, may reflect the influence of Stoic doctrine, as Ettinghausen observes:

His satire on stupidity in word and deed in his early Memoriales, Premáticas, and Genealogías reveals a scorn for the *vulgus* that harks back to the Stoics and the Latin satirists; and his unwillingness to categorize or arrange in order of demerit the varied butts of his attacks recalls the Stoics' doctrine that all vices are equal. With the possible exception of the first, all the Sueños contain Stoical ideas. (126).

Although Ettinghausen's comments specifically address satirical vices rather than theologically categorized sins, his analysis still provides an explanation as to why Quevedo did not choose to adopt the *contrapasso* for his Hell, preferring, in this instance, Stoic principles to those of the Thomism that influenced Dante.

In addition to Michael Scot, another historical figure plays an important role in the underworlds of both authors, Judas Iscariot. A

comparison of how Dante and Quevedo present the figure of Judas reveals some significant similarities within their vastly different approaches, for they both expand the implications of the character beyond that of his own historical and theological relevance and use his name and sins as representative of corruption in their own societies. In accordance with teaching already well established in the Church Fathers, Dante and Quevedo view Judas as an archetypal figure whose sins may be seen reflected in the actions of persons contemporary to the authors. Dante presents these persons individually, in separate cantos, so that all of Judas's sins are represented in the Inferno. Quevedo, in contrast, uses a more direct approach in which the narrator of El sueño del Infierno comes across Judas during his wanderings and rails against him, comparing him to members of his own Spanish society. In the comparison, those Spaniards become types of Judas.

In order to analyze the differing approaches of the two authors, the first question that should perhaps be addressed regarding Judas is that of his sin and punishment. For what sin or sins is he condemned? What is his place in Hell? In the Gospel of Matthew 27:4, Judas is quoted as saying that he sinned in that he betrayed innocent blood. This is the sin for which Dante consigns him to the deepest part of Hell in Inferno 34 with the other famous betrayers, Brutus and Cassius, all being chewed in the mouth of Satan who rebelled against his Maker. However, Judas was guilty of other sins. He hanged himself, a sin worse than murder according to Thomas Aquinas,⁸ and he not only betrayed his Master, but he did so for

⁸ As noted by Scott (70) in his analysis of the suicide of Cato.

money. In the Gospel of John he is called a thief because he was not a faithful and honest steward when entrusted with the Lord's purse. The question of placement within Hell figures significantly in Dante's scheme. Is a figure guilty of many sins punished on the basis of his worst one? The principle of the *contrapasso* must be kept in mind in making this determination, but there are other factors to consider as well.

According to John A. Scott, the individual's social and historical circumstance must be taken into account when considering whether or not that person is guilty of a certain sin:

...we should state that, for the world-judge of the Comedy, human conduct had to be judged by moral laws known to the individual; suicide was not a sin for a pagan whose conscience dictated otherwise. We thus find Dido and Cleopatra among the lustful (Inf. V. 62-63), not among the suicides, and Lucretia in Limbo (Inf. IV. 128) despite her condemnation by St. Augustine (70).

This cultural relativism regarding the applicability of sin and punishment to the characters of the Inferno may be one of the methods utilized by Dante to create "exceptions" to the accepted theological rules concerning salvation and damnation in order make possible some surprising placements in the Commedia. For example, Cato is given a prominent place in Purgatory even though he was both a pagan and committed suicide. However, Dante's creative placements do not mean that he exonerates his characters of all sin except the one for which he shows them being punished. Certainly Dante considers Vanni Fucci in Inf. XXIV an individual guilty of many

sins, and this is no less the case with Judas. The question of his placement, then, although it may seem to derive from his worst sin, is really one of progression, or "the biblical and patristic notion of sins engendering more sins" (Cassell 46).

The progression is neither chronological nor linear. Judas's last sin was to commit suicide, and yet he is not physically placed among the suicides of the Inferno. Still, placement should not be viewed as restriction to one area of the poem. One need only look at the example of Ulysses, whose name and story are either repeated or alluded to at several junctures throughout the work, to realize that it might also be wise to look for less-than-obvious allusions to Judas, whose importance is partially to be found in the description of Virgil in Inf. XXXIV. 61 as "That soul up there who has to suffer the most." Anthony K. Cassell has examined the imagery of the suicide cantos at length, and believes that the image of the trees in Inf. VIII is meant to evoke the common medieval portrayal of Judas hanging himself from a tree. His argument rests primarily on the reference in line 107 of Canto VIII to bodies being hung on stumps as well as the commentary written by Dante's son, Pietro Alighieri, who "mentions Judas in reference to Pier della Vigna and his sin of despair" (Cassell 47). Cassell's argument is convincing and helpful to the understanding of the poem. But where Dante does not explicitly condemn Judas for suicide, Quevedo does, describing his sins as those not of a man, but rather of a eunuch:

...porque èl me pareziò Capon. Y no es posible menos, ni que tan mala inclinazion y animo tan doblado se hallase si no es en quien (por serlo) no fuesse honbre ni muger. Y quièn sino vn

Capon pudiera condenarse por lleuar las bolsas? Y quièn sino vn Capon tubiera tan poca verguenza que vesara a Cristo para vendelle? Y quièn sino vn Capon tubiera tan poco animo que se aorcara, sin acordarse de la mucha misericordia suya? (178)

Quevedo, here, does mention in order Judas's three sins, referring first to the purse, then his betrayal with a kiss, then his suicide. With regard to the last sin, the reference to "tan poco animo" means that Quevedo also recognizes that Judas killed himself as an act of despair.

If we accept the proposition that Judas's suicide is represented in the Commedia in the person of Pier della Vigna, then there would seem to be little difference in the views of Dante and Quevedo on the matter other than to note that Quevedo condemns it more explicitly. However, the question of courage vs. despair is one that should be examined more closely when comparing the attitudes of these two writers regarding this sin. It seems to be on the basis of courage that Dante views Cato's suicide as a righteous act, a patriotic stand for liberty and the continuation of the Republic in Rome. Correspondingly, Cato is given a prominent place as a saved soul in the Purgatorio, the exemplary figure of free will in Dante's scheme. Scott has argued that the justification of suicide in Dante was based on the influence of Stoic philosophy and the writings of Seneca (71). Stoic ideas and ideals were of even greater importance for Quevedo, who incorporated so much of the doctrine into the Sueños. However, Quevedo, unlike Dante, could not reconcile his Christian beliefs with the Stoic praise of suicide under certain circumstances:

While Quevedo's account of the basic doctrines of Stoic moral philosophy was taken principally from Epictetus, his outline of the aims of Stoicism is primarily Senecan: to seek virtue for its own sake, to raise one's soul above ill fortune, to live with the body but not for it, to live with a view to dying, and neither to despise nor fear death. His approving account of the Stoa's aims is, however cut short by what he calls the scandal of Stoicism: the Paradox which permitted, and under certain circumstances recommended the sage to take his own life (Ettinghausen 30).

Although Quevedo does not address the example of Cato in the Sueños, he does provide a comment in the Marco Bruto that indicates something of his position on the issue: "Necio ahorro es el del miedo. Dase Catón la muerte porque César no se la dé: si fué por esto, él fué en sí propio vencido..." (Obras I, 954). Clearly, Quevedo also considered Cato's suicide an act of despair, not heroism, and he would not have countenanced going against Christian doctrine concerning suicide in order to see the Roman patriot as an "exception" as did Dante. Quevedo held firm views on suicide that do not offer the ambiguities that must be resolved in Dante's treatment of the sin.

If suicide was Judas's last sin, the one that began his journey into the deepest part of Hell was theft. The designation of "thief" was applied to Judas not only in the Gospel of John, but it was also commonly used by such writers as St. Augustine:

Behold he is a thief, this Judas! And that you make not light of that, a thief and sacrilegious, not any common kind of thief! A thief who stole from the purse, yea, but that of the Lord! From

the purse, yea, but from the sacred purse! If in the courts of law a difference is made between the crime of common theft and peculation, for it is called peculation when it is the stealing of public property and the stealing of private property is judged not so heinous as that of the stealing of public property, how much more sternly shall the sacrilegious thief be judged who has dared to rob, not in any common way, but to rob the Church! He who steals aught from the Church is one with Judas the lost.⁹

Cassell cites this passage from St. Augustine in order to establish that Judas is a figure whose covetousness leads to his betrayal of Christ. The connection that Cassell does not make, as he had between Judas and Pier della Vigna in Inf. VIII, is the one this passage creates between Judas and an important figure from Canto XXIV. If "he who steals aught from the Church is one with Judas the lost," then surely Vanni Fucci is one with Judas.

In Inf. XXIV, Dante and Virgil have entered the seventh pouch of the *Malebolge* and find themselves among the thieves. One of the sinners catches their attention and they ask his name. He identifies himself as Vanni Fucci, and when Dante asks to know what sin has thrust him into Hell, he turns to Dante and says, "I am set down so far because I robbed / the sacristy of its fair ornaments, / and someone else was falsely blamed for that" (XXIV. 137-39). Not only does Vanni Fucci's theft from the Church associate him with Judas, but there is an added connection in that an innocent was blamed and

⁹ Cassell takes this passage from St. Augustine. In Joannis Evangelium, Tractatus L. 9-10.

suffered persecution because of Vanni Fucci's actions, recalling Judas's lament before he went to hang himself that he had sinned by betraying innocent blood. This connection between Judas and Vanni Fucci seems as sure as that which exists between Judas and Pier della Vigna. Thus Dante establishes a progression in the Inferno in which Judas is represented, or prefigured, at least obliquely, in the cantos that deal with all three of the sins for which he was famous, starting with suicide, moving to theft, then ending with Judas in the deepest part of Hell suffering more than any other for his betrayal of Christ.

For Dante, Judas's worst sin was his betrayal of his Master. It is interesting that this may not have been the case with Quevedo. Whereas Dante the pilgrim does not converse with Judas in his Inferno, Quevedo the dreamer's longest dialogue is with Judas. During this conversation, Quevedo asks him why he sold his Master for so small a sum. In response, Judas offers a theological defense of his actions:

Pues vossotros por què os quejais de esso? que a vosotros bien os estubo, pues fue el remedio y arcaduz para vuestra salud. Yo soy el que me he de quejar, que soy a quien le estubo mal; y ya ha hauido Herejes que me han tenido veneraçion, porque di prinzipio a la entrega a la medizina de vuestro mal. (178)

Quevedo the dreamer seems to take a harsh stance towards Judas during their conversation, but Quevedo the author allowed Judas to say these words in his defense, and not just on this occasion; he had portrayed Judas saying similar words standing before the Throne of Judgement in El sueño del Juicio final. For this reason, Quevedo was criticized during his own time, accused of trying to exonerate the

betrayers of Christ (see Vilar 106). There is apparently an element to Quevedo's thought which views Judas's actions as an evil which resulted in a greater good, as part of a Divine plan.¹⁰ As Jean Vilar has observed, "En el sistema de pensamiento de Quevedo, la necesidad aparece como el instrumento por el cual se muestra a los hombres la divina providencia a los fines de su justificación" (118). Man's own foolishness then, which leads to his own destruction, is an important instrument of God in bringing man to his salvation. Vilar attributes this idea to Quevedo's misanthropy, which causes him to view man trapped in his own sin. This is consistent with the overall satirical and caustic nature of much of Quevedo's literary production.

If any doubt exists as to whether Judas's self-justification reflects Quevedo's own theological views, that doubt disappears with the second half of Judas's comments, an obvious attack by Quevedo on corrupt clergy:

Y no penseis que soy yo sólo el Judas, que despues que Cristo murió ay otros peores y más ingratos, pues no sólo le venden, pero le venden y compran, açotan y crucifican, y lo que es más que todo, ingratos a la vida, pasión, muerte y resurrección, le maltratan y persiguen en nombre de hijos suyos. (178)¹¹

¹⁰ Riamundo Lida has made some similar comments about Quevedo's Judas:

Que su crimen más grave no haya sido la traición puede acaso sorprender a muchos lectores de hoy (como hubiera sorprendido tal vez a Dante), pero no tanto a los lectores de Cervantes y Quevedo. Hace unos años Juan Bautista Avallé-Arce ha aducido con razón, a propósito de la idea misma de muerte desesperada (la de Grisóstomo, en el *Quijote*), aquel pasaje de Cervantes en que el padre de la Gran Sultana sienta como indudable "que más pecó en ahorcarse / Judas, que en vender a Cristo" (Lida 187).

¹¹ As one might expect, this ant-clerical passage was removed from the *Juguete*s version.

With this comment, Quevedo turns the discussion of Judas's sins into a continuation of his more general critique of the sins and vices of his own society. As seen in the previous two chapters, Quevedo was especially concerned with the corrupting power of money, and here, he turns his attention to the corruption it has wrought in the Church by those who "sell" Christ. Quevedo considers Judas the progenitor of this particular sin, and those of his own society who have turned religion into a money-making enterprise, types of Judas.

Quevedo's condemnation of corrupt clergy recalls Dante's invective against simoniacal popes in *Inf.* XIX. There, in the Third Pouch of the *Malebolge*, Dante and Virgil come across the Simonists whose punishment consists of being placed head-first into pits with flames burning their protruding feet. At one point, Dante notices a "shade suffers and quivers more than all his other comrades..." (*XIX.* 31-32), Pope Nicholas III, to whom Dante addresses the following remark: "And Peter and the others never asked / for gold or silver when they chose Matthias / to take the place of the transgressing soul" (*Inf.* XIX. 94-96). Of course, the "transgressing soul," mentioned merely in passing, is Judas. It might be carrying the previous analysis too far, however, to suggest that one of the sins of Judas is represented in the figure of Nicholas III. Where Quevedo makes no distinction between him who sold Christ and those who sell the offices and sacraments of the church, Dante apparently does. He mentions Simon Magus, who gave the sin its name, in the first line of Canto XIX, and calls all others guilty of the sin disciples of Simon Magus. Any connection with Judas in Dante seems tenuous. Nonetheless, the possibility that Judas might be prefigured yet again

is intriguing if only because of Quevedo's perspective and the connection he establishes between Judas and the simonists in the Sueños.

As horrible as avarice and corruption were to Quevedo, he apparently considered duplicity Judas's worst sin. The Sueños contain a reference to Judas's "doble animo," (sic) but Quevedo deals with this issue most clearly in another work, entitled Consideraciones sobre el testamento nuevo y vida de Cristo:

Cristo Nuestro Señor dió a Judas mojado el pan en la cena, y dijo Crisóstomo: *Per panis tictionem illius significat fictionem*. Un bocado teñido es un Judas fingido, y el mismo Lucifer no tuvo ánimo de entrar en el corazón de Judas hasta que comió este pan mojado: *Et post bucellam introbit in eum Sathanas*.

Porque sólo el que trama una traición puede comulgar a un Lucifer, o porque Luzbel se apodera luego de un fingido corazón. ¡Cuántos corazones hay de éstos! [...]

Monstruoso Proteo es un hombre falso, traidor afectando suavidades con un corazón diamantino, por fuera un cordero, por dentro un león; una paloma cándida en lo que se ve, un gavián rapante de las honras en lo que se oculta: monstruo compuesto de risa y rencor, de malicia en el alma y de lisonja en la lengua. (Obras I, 1306)

Once again, Judas serves as the archetypal figure, in this case for disingenuous behavior, all false men being types of Judas. Quevedo's reference to this type of man as a monstrous Proteus, who appears to be one thing when he is actually another, again demonstrates the concern with false appearances, especially in the context of moral

hypocrisy. Dante presents a reminiscent monstrous figure in Inf. XVII, in Geryon, "that filthy effigy / of fraud" (XVII. 7-8) who wears the face of a just man but has the body of a monster.

As stated at the outset, Quevedo and Dante deal with many of the same themes and issues, but they do so in vastly different fashions. The comparison of their use of the figure of Judas serves more to highlight their differences than indicate any direct influence. Other than the reference to Michael Scot, Quevedo seems to have borrowed few details from Dante. However, Dante's influence with regard to the broader brush-strokes on Quevedo's canvas seems undeniable. Merely the fact that Quevedo depicts a conversation with Judas in Hell, probably indicates some inspiration from the many conversations with the damned depicted in Dante's Inferno.¹² Quevedo's use of the Christian afterlife and the comic, sermonizing demons, both owe something to the general influence of the Commedia. In addition, Quevedo's political reading of the work must not be forgotten. Such a reading, coupled with his political reading of Juvenal's satire discussed in Chapter Six, provides some insight as to how Quevedo arrived at the creation of a comic Hell. Rather than continue with the traditional suggestion that Lucian served as Quevedo's model, it seems much more plausible to look at the combined influences of Juvenal and Dante, the former providing

¹² Isle Nolting-Hauff generally attributes these conversations to the influence of Lucian: "Aunque la parte fundamental del Infierno se compone principalmente de estilo directo, los episodios singulares son muy cortos. Sólo hay diálogos más intensos en los episodios de Judas y de Mahoma, que son 'diálogos de muertos', según modelo de Luciano" (84). However, it seems that Dante's model serves just as well.

social criticism in a satirical context, the latter providing social criticism in an otherworldly context.

Chapter Eight:

Conclusion

The most salient feature of the Sueños may indeed be the delight the author takes in judging and condemning various groups and types from his society. At almost regular intervals, in El sueño del Juicio final and El sueño del Infierno, the first person narrator, in reaction to the scenes of judgement and damnation, repeats the phrase "diome risa ver" or variations such as "diuertiome" (sic). In El alguacil endemoniado, the narrator listens in delight as the demon names those groups that inhabit Hell, urging him to give more details. The dreamer's fascination with the damnation and suffering of others, on the face of it, seems malicious at times. One would think that he would be disposed to expressing more compassion and sympathy for the foibles of humanity and its propensity for making bad moral choices in light of the ease with which the dreamer himself mistook the proper road of life at the beginning of Infierno, and before he knew any better, found himself in Hell. However, two things should be noted here. First, taking delight in exposing the vices of others is a typical feature of satire. Second, Quevedo does provide enough qualifying statements to show his awareness of the seriousness of damnation, and, indeed, he even to shows some compassion for those he damns.

At the end of Juicio, after the Last Judgment has taken place, and those judged assigned their final reward, the dreamer hears noise and cries coming from a part of the valley, and approaches to investigate:

Lleguè por ver lo que hauia, y vi en vna cueua honda la garganta del infierno, y en ella penar muchos. Alli vi vn Letrado no reuoluer tantas leyes como caldos, y un Escriuano comiendose letras que no hauia querido leer. Vi todos los ajuares del Infierno, y las ropas y tocados de las condenadas estauan alli presos con Alguaciles; y vn Auariento contando màs duelos que dineros, vn Medico penando en un orinal, y vn Boticario en vna melicina. Diome tanta risa ver esto que me despertaron las carcajadas, y fue mucho quedar de tan triste sueño màs alegre que espantado. (Sueños I, 139)

In spite of the sadness of the dream, explicitly mentioned here, the dreamer cannot help but laugh at the scene before him, and when he awakes, he describes the overall effect of the dream as having left him more happy than frightened, "màs alegre que espantado." It is important to note that he does not say happy rather than frightened; both emotions come into play. Although secondary to the humor, the serious underlying tone remains intact. In describing the emotional reaction experienced by the dreamer, Quevedo may well be indicating the reaction he intends to provoke in the reader. First and foremost, the reader should laugh, be entertained and enjoy the work, but to a lesser degree, the reader should be both sad and frightened in order to learn from it. In the sadness, there is

compassion for the lost souls, and the fright provides the motivation to avoid joining them, motivation to live a just life.

But what exactly should the reader find amusing and entertaining about damned souls? When the dreamer laughs, he does not do so simply because he sees others suffering--to do so would be evil in and of itself--, rather he laughs at who those persons are and how they suffer. When Quevedo mentions the "Medico penando en vn orinal, y vn Boticario en vna melicina," he presents types from his society already widely ridiculed because of their fraud and incompetence. He also creates one of the few examples of a satirical *contrapasso* in the Sueños, probably inspired by Dante, in which the doctor suffers in a chamber pot, and the apothecary in a medicine jar, items associated with their fraudulent administration of care. The humor results from both the general disrepute of these characters and the appropriateness of their punishment. However, the punishment is only appropriate in a satirical context. Dante might well have them eternally suffering from leprosy or some other disease they failed to cure, or put them into a level of the Malebolge with the fraudulent. Quevedo chose the chamber pot and medicine jar not simply because of the poetic justice they provide, but because of the humor that exists in proposing punishments of such a ludicrous nature.

The majority of the humor in the Sueños relies on some element of the ludicrous in order to point out human folly, as when, in Juicio, an astrologer shouts that it cannot be Judgment Day, since Saturn has not risen to its proper place in the heavens (139). He remains firm in his conviction in spite of the fact that God, who made

all the heavens, had indeed declared it to be Judgement Day. And elsewhere, an adulteress remarks that had she known she was going to be condemned, she would not have bothered to go to mass on holy days (138). The comment is ridiculous in that she should have known already that going to mass with an unrepentant heart and leaving with unchanged ways would serve no purpose. Quevedo tends to follow this pattern, taking the sin seriously, but finding humor in those who commit them because of their inanities. In this fashion, he can both correct folly and punish evil, essential goals of satire as Gilbert Highet explains: "The purpose of satire is, through laughter and invective, to cure folly and punish evil; but if it does not achieve this purpose it is content to jeer at folly and expose evil to bitter contempt" (156). Of course, by joining the ridiculous and inane with the condemnation of sin, Quevedo runs the risk of appearing to make light of sin. The notion of divine judgement, so important to Quevedo's scheme, may seem diminished when it incorporates bed pans into its punishments. These passages, if read in isolation, might lead one to the conclusion that Quevedo, like Lucian, had no respect for God or anyone else. However, the larger context does offer significant clarification.

Ilse Nolting-Hauff has noted that "Las posibilidades poéticas del conceptismo determinan el desarrollo artístico de Quevedo" (295). The "concepto" in Baroque poetry typically involves the joining of two or more normally unrelated ideas, symbols, or motifs, in order to form an ingenious new metaphor, and Quevedo was perhaps the greatest master of the style. Nolting-Hauff postulates that Quevedo's "conceptismo" controlled the development of the Sueños, as he took

elements of the medieval dream-vision within which he developed a continual series of satirical jokes, forming a totally renewed genre (295). Recognition of Quevedo's poetic genius and style may explain how he not only brings together the serious and the comic without seeing any inherent contradiction, but also how he reconciles a number of philosophical traditions and doctrines.

The multifaceted nature of Quevedo's philosophical beliefs presents significant problems for any reader, especially in his satires where the philosophy is subordinate to the humor. However, the Sueños must be approached as philosophical texts in order to grasp fully the message of reform, the positive alternative, underlying the condemnation. For example, the condemnation of dialecticians in Juicio and the repeated advice to distrust outer appearances can only be understood fully in light of Quevedo's reception of Academic scepticism as transmitted through Lactantius. However, Quevedo complicates matters by adapting scepticism to Stoicism, applying the mistrust of outward appearances to disingenuous human conduct, hypocrisy. In this way, Stoic moral philosophy becomes ancillary to Academic scepticism in Quevedo's thought. Of course, Quevedo's use of these classical disciplines is always governed by Christian doctrine. The Sueños not only teach the Stoic doctrine of virtue for its own sake, but they also add the Christian tenet of virtue for Heaven's sake, for the sake of one's soul. The union of the two doctrines in Quevedo's work, especially when the author deals with the issue of death, has provoked accusations of contradiction and nihilism, but for Quevedo there is no contradiction. In his mind, each view complements the other and is easily reconciled, providing the

ideological basis from which he formulates sermons on the true nature of outer appearances, death, nobility, and the destructive nature of money. Although the ideological basis may be difficult to identify and interpret, the sermons are not, and leave no doubt as to the ideals of moral conduct which Quevedo espouses.

More difficult to argue, but no less important, are Quevedo's larger social concerns. To some extent, he addresses them in the Sueños with his numerous references to judges, constables, ministers, and even, on a couple of occasions, kings. Corruption amongst these officials spreads corruption through society and destroys any hope for justice and order. These passages alone sufficiently suggest that Quevedo denounces these groups in the hope of reform. A glance at his works outside the Sueños confirms it. In the Política de Dios and España defendida, he describes positive role models with which he would like to replace the negative ones of his satires. In addition he describes the positive characters on the road to Heaven, a passage made more accessible when studied through the influence of Juvenal. These descriptions together begin to provide an idea of the perfect society envisioned by Quevedo, a society of righteous warriors and poor, humble, incorruptible people, led by a strong, devout king.

It is worth reiterating that Quevedo read the works of Thomas More, Juvenal and Dante primarily as political documents. Rather than focus on the depiction of the ideal society, the satirical description of Roman society, or the journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, Quevedo recognized the political and social statements these authors proposed in works that ostensibly deal with something else. It should not be surprising, then, that Quevedo would borrow

from these works and traditions in order to form his own creation from which he could suggest reforms indicative of his Counter-Reformation views, at the same time that he exercised his wit artistically and comically.

Although there are definite aspects of pessimism and misanthropy in Quevedo, he always held out some hope that man as an individual could live up to his potential, make the right moral choices, and that the larger society would follow. That hope can be seen in the underlying ideal of the Sueños.

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