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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE VERTICAL DIMENSION OF LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBAN SCHOOL

DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY


MICHAEL RHODES FITZGERALD

Norman, Oklahoma

1975

THE VERTICAL DIMENSION OF LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBAN SCHOOL  
DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

APPROVED BY

  
The block contains five handwritten signatures, each written over a horizontal line. From top to bottom, the signatures are: Samuel A. Hays, Hugh L. Martin, D. Ted Herbert, and Oliver Benson. The fifth signature is partially obscured by the bottom line.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE



TO

RICHARD FORREST FITZGERALD  
M. THOMAS HICKMAN  
DAVID REID MORGAN

A life devoted to earning the respect of such men would  
be well spent indeed.

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CHAPTER I

URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION  
IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The principal impediment to systematic empirical research on the politics of education has been the lack of a broad integrating theoretical framework. This problem has proven especially difficult because educational governance in the United States reflects the complex structural characteristics of the federal system. A theoretical framework of sufficient breadth and depth is needed to simultaneously organize educational and sociopolitical phenomena at several governmental levels into a coherent whole. This dissertation proposes such a theoretical framework, a penetrated system's theory of educational policy making and implementation, which attends to the critical multilevel interactions which ultimately account for local school policy implementation. To test the utility of this theoretical framework a research model with associated hypotheses has been devised and will be subjected to an empirical application and evaluation.

The educational policy selected for this empirical analysis and exercise in theory building is urban public school desegregation in the United States. This topic is

particularly appropriate for theory testing for several reasons. It is unquestionably a momentous public policy with dimensions permeating the entire federal structure. The theoretical framework will not be applied to a trivial sociopolitical issue, but one of the more important domestic policy questions of the last quarter century. Also, while this particular public policy has an explicitly educational character, it has far broader social and political implications as well. Few issues within the politics of education so clearly highlight the education-policy nexus as the development of a national desegregation policy and its relative implementation at the local level. Fewer still make the multifaceted nature of public policy, education, and the federal system so distinctly apparent. Most distinctive of all, this particular educational policy manifests a deep social change dimension that renders its understanding and explanation particularly critical for social scientists.

This dissertation, to test the proposed theoretical framework and research model, seeks to answer the following basic research questions:

- (1) What have been the prevailing patterns of urban public school desegregation in the United States? To what extent do U.S. cities vary in levels of desegregation?
- (2) To what extent have these public school desegregation patterns changed in recent years? To what extent do U.S. cities vary in levels of change?
- (3) What social, economic, demographic and political forces within the American federal system are

associated with urban school desegregation patterns and changes in those patterns? To what extent may explicitly causal inferences be drawn concerning these relationships?

Hypotheses derived from the above questions will be tested in a systematic comparative analysis of 205 American cities. Multivariate statistical techniques will be used as a mode of analysis, and eventually the relative explanatory power of the various model components will be determined. This analysis will allow for a critical assessment of the research model and the theoretical framework from which it was developed.

#### The Politics of Education

The politics of education has only recently emerged as a field of specialization in political science. As late as 1959 Thomas Eliot wondered whether or not political scientists would be permitted to "speak of the 'politics' of education" at all. Eliot's seminal essay on understanding public school politics signalled a general reconceptualization among political scientists as to the pervasively political nature of American education. He directly challenged students of government to attend a variety of research questions regarding education and politics at all levels of the federal system. Having delineated briefly the nature of the research issues appropriate to each level of American government, Eliot concluded:

In all such studies, the realization that public policy in education is the product of discernible professional-lay interaction (sometimes conflict) at

different governmental levels, may serve as a unifying conception. The conception itself needs to be tested by acute political analysis. If it is valid, it can lead to the identification of the real sources of power and the main roadblocks to progress, however defined--and so to new concepts of organization and more productive leadership, professional or lay or both.<sup>1</sup>

In the years following Eliot's request for broad analysis of the critical relationship between the politics of education and the nature of the federal system was ignored by all but a small group of scholars. Still, these political students endeavored to penetrate the anti-political ethos which had for so long held sway in American education and inhibited the systematic study of its politics.

Bailey et al. affirmed in the strongest possible terms, as had Eliot earlier, the fully "political" nature of the educational process in the United States in a landmark study of state aid to education. They wrote:

There is irony in the fact that school systems and school problems have rarely been studied as political phenomena. More public money is spent for education than for any other single function of state and local government. No public school in America exists without state legislative sanction. All over the United States school boards are elected or appointed through a highly political process--often most supremely called 'non-political.' Educational planks are increasingly found in partisan platforms at all levels of American politics. The size, location, cost, looks, and facilities of school buildings are frequently matters of high political controversy. The size, scope and influence of state departments of education are inevitably conditioned by political forces.

That is, Bailey et al. continued to argue, "education is one of the more thoroughly political enterprises in American life--or for that matter in the life of any society." The major

thrust of this study was the heavy price paid by professional educators, "schoolmen," insofar as these officials manifested a common failure to understand political realities and come to grips with the politics of the education process.<sup>2</sup>

Masters, Salisbury and Eliot five years after the Eliot essay published an important study of the extent to which the government of each state actually controls public education.<sup>3</sup> They sought to promote the idea that important political phenomena rested within those activities called "education," and argued that inattention to this critical area of public policy was hazardous for professional, lawmaker and scholar alike. As the politics of education focus continued to develop, the primary thrust of the field was not aimed at understanding the critical nexus between the institutions of government at several levels and school policy as it was actually implemented within the political process. Instead, the concern of political scientists in this area was upon education as a support for the political system. For example the public schools were studied as a socializing agent engaged in the transmission of the political culture for the society.<sup>4</sup> Despite the relative monopoly of attention paid to political socialization, the politics of education field continued to broaden throughout the sixties. The early work of Baily et al., and Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot, was supplemented by inquiries into public school finance<sup>5</sup> and a proliferation of studies into the growing role of federal aid to education.<sup>6</sup> These studies,

indicating the beginning of a broader approach to this field of specialization, prompted Harman to comment:

Since 1965 the volume of publications has increased vastly and there is now a rich and exciting literature on many aspects of the politics of American education, as well as studies by American scholars of politics and education on other countries. As in any new field the quality of the literature varies greatly, but some of it is particularly good by any standards.<sup>7</sup>


Regardless of the reasons for the delay among political scientists in turning to education as an important independent and dependent variable in their analyses, the politics of education became an area of specialization of considerable magnitude, and this growth,

can be attributed to fundamental changes that have taken and continue to take place within political science and the study of education. Despite the continued trend towards specialization, in the last decade or so there has also been a growing awareness within the social sciences and education of the inter-relatedness of social institutions and processes. This has led scholars to concern themselves with a much wider range of school phenomena and data. It has also led to an increasingly important tendency to borrow insights and theories from other disciplines and other fields.<sup>8</sup>

Today an incredible variety of aspects of the educational process and the linkages between education and government are being examined. For example, the issue of control of public schools,<sup>9</sup> school decentralization,<sup>10</sup> the school policy process,<sup>11</sup> educational finance,<sup>12</sup> schools and school boards as decision making organizations,<sup>13</sup> the behavior of professional educators,<sup>14</sup> as well as the general topic of the politics of education,<sup>15</sup> have been subjected to analyses.

The largest problem with this growing body of literature is that it typically has been case study, impressionistic in analysis, and atheoretical. Therefore, a review of the politics of education literature yields what has been described as a "grab bag of both theory and method."<sup>16</sup> To meet this problem, Wirt has suggested that serious consideration be given to conducting empirical research concerning the politics of education within the theoretical framework contained in Easton's systems theory. This approach would prove useful, Wirt contends, because of the distinctly federal character of American education. Thus, to order all of the salient factors involved in the development of local educational policy, Wirt offered the theoretical framework shown in Figure 1-1. The value of this structure is primarily in its capability of incorporating, simultaneously, several levels of governmental phenomena into the same design. However, it has the misleading characteristic of suggesting that local educational outputs are primarily the result of national policy, filtered through the state level. This is, of course, not necessarily accurate, and the theoretical model developed subsequently for this study will take that into account. By assuming a broad framework sensitive to the intergovernmental relations inherent in American educational policy, one is then able to study, for example, federal aid policy in which:

differential results will be observed as outcomes across the sweep of 19,000 school districts for even one phase



TAKEN FROM: Frederick M. Wirt, "American Schools as a Political System: A Bibliographic Essay," State, School, and Politics, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), p. 262.

FIGURE 1-1  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK



of that policy, while differential patterns will likely develop across several policy phases. The outcome is more than speculative, given the power of diffusion in the prism of a federal system. If so, what theoretical explanations less sweeping than the federal structure are there for such variety of outcomes? Is it possible to predict the conditions under which local compliance with national or state outputs is high and when low? Is the key variable the structure of the community in which the policy operates or is it attributable to the skills and other qualities of actors on the local scene?<sup>17</sup>

It is with a framework of sufficient scope--such as systems theory--that these issues can be directly confronted and toward which the politics of education field must turn. Another essential aspect of this framework would be that it must deal with the origins, operations, and consequences of social change. That is, the field of the politics of education needs to guide its empirical analyses with a concern for theory which . . .

explains, and predicts, the origin and acceptance of innovation. The role of social change is emphasized here because it offers a chance of explaining differences in the many aspects of systems theory seen earlier. What is required is a theoretical explanation of the origin, acceptance, or rejection of change.<sup>18</sup>

An empirical analysis of exactly the type of issue Kirst considered pertinent to theoretical development will be undertaken later, and will involve all levels of the federal system as these manifest a particular social change: urban public school desegregation. The broad purpose of this research is to develop a type of systems structure that allows one to test the polity-education linkage as it relates to social change and which permits a theoretical explanation of the extent to which local communities resist or accept this social change.

Thus, in the mainstream of the politics of education field the focus will be upon the explicitly political nature of education policy, yet attending to the whole range of phenomena, non-political as well as political, which may be expected to impinge upon this important policy.

### The Development of a National School

#### Desegregation Policy, 1896-1972

In 1896 the United States Supreme Court made the racial separation of American citizens a national public policy. Invoking the doctrine of "separate but equal," Mr. Justice Brown, in speaking for the Court, declared:

A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between white and colored races--a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color--has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.

Explaining how the provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not apply regarding separation of the races, Mr. Justice Brown continued,

The object of the amendment [Fourteenth] was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.

The Plessy decision was directed at segregation in public accommodation and conveyance and did not refer specifically to public school policy. Yet, Mr. Justice Brown referred to segregation in public education specifically in justifying the policy, noting that it was a common manifestation of legitimate state power:

The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.<sup>19</sup>

In a short period of time following this decision, Plessy was to become the "legal foundation for segregated schools in America."<sup>20</sup> Although it may be argued that the Plessy decision did not constitute a national segregation policy per se, since it did not require racial separation in public facilities, its impact was nevertheless to allow the States to pursue such a policy in any fashion considered expedient and wise. It was a national policy of inaction regarding racial relations, which reaffirmed and legitimized more local policies of segregation by race.

With the Plessy decision and its "separate but equal" standard as a guide, American states and communities, primarily though not exclusively within southern and border regions, separated races in a variety of social contexts by providing segregated facilities for blacks and excluding them from the use of white facilities--especially the public schools.

Across America public education became and remained for almost sixty years racially segregated.

Plessy remained undisturbed as national law until nearly mid-century when, in a series of test cases, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sought the dismantling of the "separate but equal" standard in American race relations. In 1938 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state could not fulfill its legal obligation to provide "equal" educational facilities by giving black students tuition payments to out-of-state law schools.<sup>21</sup> Ten years later, the Court held that qualified blacks must be admitted to a state law school or receive an equivalent education within that state.<sup>22</sup> Then, in 1950, the Court went further in defining what equal facilities meant, holding that admission to a state graduate school was insufficient if the scholastic activities of a minority student were maintained separately.<sup>23</sup> Finally, the issue of admission to any state supported institution of higher education was dealt with, and the Court held that denial of admission to law school based solely on race was in violation of the Constitution.<sup>24</sup> Still, in none of these historical cases was the Court willing to rule on the continued constitutionality of the Plessy decision, instead using some other criteria for rendering its verdicts. Nonetheless, each of these higher education cases set the stage for what was to occur in 1954, when the doctrine of separation by race in the public schools

was placed squarely before the Court for endorsement or rejection.

In 1954 the Supreme Court, in the Brown v. Board of Education decision, initiated a long series of federal court efforts to end legally sanctioned racial segregation in the public schools.<sup>25</sup> Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court, ruled: "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate facilities are inherently unequal." No longer would racial separation be, explicitly or implicitly, the national policy governing public school enrollment. The Court was well aware of the awesome national implications of its decision and took care to indicate that racial segregation in public education was not necessarily the product of any single region. In a footnote to the decision the Court pointed out that:

The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.<sup>26</sup>

The Brown decision did not contain any order regarding enforcement of its desegregation provisions or guidelines for compliance; that was postponed until Brown II (1955). In that decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren decreed for the Court:

Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts.<sup>27</sup>

This aspect of the Brown II decision was based upon a reasonably accurate perception of the explicitly local nature of educational policy, and the implementation of such policy. The Court was aware that ultimately local community officials would have to effect the desegregation policy it had just rendered. Yet, the Brown II decision was vague in its requirements regarding local compliance, directing the "district courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminating basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases." This vague compliance order immediately introduced ambiguity into desegregation policy and left wide compliance latitude to local courts and public officials. It was sufficiently imprecise to invoke years of delay in compliance, such that the ten-year period following Brown II has even been called "nine parts deliberation and one part speed."<sup>28</sup> Latitude in compliance requirements led into a judicial era in which:

Obstinacy usually triumphed over loosely drawn Federal laws and court orders. The paramount example of the

futility of the vague early edicts must be the 'with all deliberate speed' standard for implementing court-ordered school desegregation. Instead of acceding to Federal orders, voting registrars, school boards, and private citizens throughout the Black Belt dug in their heels, unfurled the Confederate battle flag, and screamed 'Never!' Policy makers from governors on down devoted their energies to concocting strategies with which to avoid compliance instead of seeking to calm and reassure a troubled citizenry. Techniques of discrimination were refined as criteria less blatant than race were introduced to foil Federal efforts. The ingenuity of the Deep South in carrying out its opposition so muted early civil rights decisions that integration was confined to scattered instances of tokenism.<sup>29</sup>

Ten years after Brown I, in recognition of the substantive lack of compliance with federal courts' decisions regarding school desegregation, and reflecting a broad national commitment to ending de jure segregation in public schools, the Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act (PL 88-352). This law provided the national executive with a mandate, and the administrative means, for enforcing an effective policy to end de jure segregation in public education. In addition to providing the wherewithal for handling segregation by law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also contained measures designed to foster the development of local policies to end de facto segregation as well. The sections under this law which enabled the national executive to foster voluntary desegregation activities were not limited to school systems under court order to desegregate or attempting to overcome de jure segregation. Any local school system seeking to desegregate public schools was eligible for federal assistance. Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act required that the Office of Education gather

precise information on racial and ethnic enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools and report to the Congress as to the results within two years. The Office of Education was also authorized under this title to provide technical assistance to local education agencies, in the form of information, personnel, and various types of federal grants, to facilitate the process of school desegregation. Enforcement provisions were an integral part of Title IV, as the U.S. Attorney General was authorized to file suit for the desegregation of public schools upon receipt of a meritorious, signed complaint, and which otherwise could not be continued in the courts. Despite the extension of technical assistance to all types of desegregation, this title of the law expressly withheld authorization from U.S. officials, or federal courts, to order busing for racial balance. Title IV contained a federal 'carrot and stick' with which local school systems could be "persuaded" to conform to a broad national desegregation standard.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act contained additional enforcement power with which desegregation policies could be pursued. Title VI authorized the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to coordinate the withdrawal of any federal program within a local district that did not comply with the law to desegregate schools; i.e., federal funds could be cut off for noncompliance with Title VI of the law. Although not immediately perceived as a powerful weapon in the hands of active federal officials, this provision eventually proved the most effective



means of securing local compliance in ending segregated schooling. One further title in this law facilitated the administrative role of the national executive in bringing about desegregation of public education. Title X created the "Community Relations Service" of the Department of Justice. This new office was designed to provide technical assistance to local communities in mediating desegregation disputes. The immediate impact of this administrative package, as written into the Civil Rights Act, was that,

Armed with this legislation, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare began to develop guidelines for desegregation so that school districts would know what they had to do in order to get federal aid. This whole process was characterized by testing, adjustment, pressure, revision, and a language which facilitated bargaining; for example, the guidelines were full of such phrases as 'reasonable assurance,' 'substantial good faith,' 'prompt and effective action.'

For its part, the Department of Justice was aggressive in bringing suits . . . or participating in suits . . . for the purpose of getting federal court orders to desegregate schools. This proved to be a slow process, however, particularly since real enforcement meant coordination with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in order to employ the sanction of cutting-off funds.<sup>30</sup>

No longer would federal judges be alone in attempting to enforce national desegregation policy, at least for awhile.

In 1968 desegregation policy moved North as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare began to focus attention on nonsouthern, as well as southern and border school districts. In March of that year HEW released new guidelines for desegregation, and these applied to schools throughout the nation.<sup>31</sup>

Within a month the Department of Justice filed its first desegregation suit outside the South, charging that a school system near Chicago was in violation of the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the racial assignment of school children. Four similar suits were initiated in the North within a year, and during this period a nonsouthern school district was cited by HEW, for the first time, for Title VI noncompliance. At the time the Nixon Administration assumed office, federal funding had been terminated for 123 school districts for Title VI noncompliance. All of these were in the South, although a number of northern districts had been threatened with such action. The new administration, however, rejected this form of coercion, such that after July 1969, no further fund cut-offs were announced by HEW. An entirely different approach to desegregation policy was assumed by the Nixon Administration. Eschewing administrative enforcement, its policy was to return to the federal courts as a coercive device. At that point the Department of Justice and the federal courts, not the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, would bear the brunt of desegregation enforcement activity regarding public schools. The administrative role of HEW was not eliminated by any means, it was simply placed into an entirely noncoercive framework--although responsibility for establishing Title VI compliance remained with this agency.

The Nixon Administration approach to school desegregation had two thrusts. The first represented dependence upon the

courts for enforcement of desegregation in school districts unwilling to comply with the law. The second thrust was based upon the elimination of any administrative distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Although the executive branch continued to recognize that the law required only the elimination of segregation by law, it held that regardless of legal status desegregation was a policy worth pursuing. Now, instead of using federal pressure against the South exclusively, attention would be paid to all regions, in an attempt to obtain voluntary desegregation of public schools. Therefore, a cooperative administrative program to facilitate voluntary desegregation throughout the country was developed. In May, 1970, the President proposed a \$1.6 billion program for federal grants to assist local school districts involved in desegregation. It took the Congress two years to enact this program, and in the interim a short term assistance program was established.

The Emergency School Assistance Program of 1970 (ESAP I), was a temporary measure designed to provide federal funds for local districts engaged in court-ordered desegregation activities. As the Office of Education has described the program:

The first Emergency School Assistance Program (ESAP I) was established in August, 1970 as an interim measure in anticipation of Congressional action on the President's Emergency School Aid Act which he had sent to the Congress in May, 1970. The purpose of ESAP I was to provide emergency assistance to school districts implementing desegregation plans. Funds were allocated to meet the additional costs of new or expanded activities necessary to achieve desegregation.<sup>32</sup>

Between August 1970, and July 1971, the period of the ESAP I program, the Supreme Court issued a decision placing a heavier desegregation burden upon states in which it could be demonstrated that segregation by law had existed. This decision endorsed busing to overcome racial imbalance as a legal means for effectuating the Brown principles. In reaffirming that the Constitution required the elimination of all vestiges of state-imposed segregation in public schools, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, ruled that absent of a finding of this Constitutional violation, no federal court had the authority to impose racial enrollment formulas upon local school systems. In those cases involving segregated schooling in districts with a previous history of dual educational facilities created by force of law, the Court reaffirmed the obligation of the local authorities to desegregate, and ruled firmly that, "in default by the local school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system."<sup>33</sup> With this decision the Court, at last, told southern and border districts that no further delay would be tolerated in ending segregation in public schools. If local officials would not adopt remedial actions, federal courts were empowered to do so--even if that involved busing. Yet, it is significant that the Swann (1971), decision continued to recognize the distinction between de jure

and de facto segregation and extended the judicial responsibility only as far as the former.

The Swann decision forced large numbers of southern school districts to finally face the reality of desegregation. To cushion this shock the Nixon Administration proposed an extension of the ESAP program, in that Congress still had to finish work on the original Emergency School Assistance Act. The ESAP II (July 1971-June 1972) program thus was invoked and remained in force until the new law became available. Finally, in June 1972, President Nixon signed the long awaited ESAA (PL 92-318). Consistent with the ESAP programs, its express purposes were:

To meet the special needs incident to the elimination of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools.

To encourage the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation in elementary and secondary schools with substantial proportions of minority group students.


To aid school children in overcoming the educational disadvantages of minority group isolation.<sup>34</sup>

In this fashion the Congress and Executive branches formalized what had been administrative policy since around 1968, the desegregation of public schools without regard to the legal status of previous segregation patterns. At the same time, this law made it "perfectly clear" that coercion would not be used.

According to almost any criteria the implementation of the national desegregation policy proved a very slow process.

As late as November, 1962, only 7.8 percent of the black students in southern and border states attended biracial public schools, and three states (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina) had no biracial schools at all.<sup>35</sup> Among the seventeen states directly under the onus of the 1954 Supreme Court order to end segregated public schooling, and cited specifically in the terms of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, resistance to desegregation was itself a public policy.<sup>36</sup>

Appreciable changes in public school segregation levels in the United States since 1954 became apparent only after the Office of Education began to use the initially overlooked enforcement sections of the Civil Rights Act and threatened non-complying school districts with the loss of all federal funds. This administrative sanction has been considered extremely effective. According to Thomas R. Dye, "The threat of monetary loss did more to bring about desegregation than all of the previous actions of the federal courts."<sup>37</sup> This point is dramatically shown in Figure 1-2, where the percentage of black students in "desegregated" schools is plotted over time. The large relative increase in desegregation during the administrative-enforcement period is impressive--although at no point as of 1969 had the percentage of blacks in desegregated schools ever exceeded sixteen. Thus, the Congressional action of 1964 proved to be no simple endorsement of previous judicial policy. This law made possible the imposition of that



Percentage of Negro students attending desegregated schools in seven Southern states. The states involved are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia. Save for North Carolina and for Virginia, in none of these states did the percentage of Negro students attending desegregated schools, whether under court orders or administrative enforcement, ever exceed 16%. Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Federal Enforcement of School Desegregation*, Washington: GPO, 1969, p. 36.

TAKEN FROM: Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock, III, Law and Social Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 96.

FIGURE 1-2

DESEGREGATION LEVELS AMONG SEVEN  
SOUTHERN STATES, 1954-1969

policy upon recalcitrant national subsystems, the state and local public school systems:

Until 1964 thousands of southern communities openly defied the Constitution and there was little Federal officials could do about it. A little-noticed provision in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, fundamentally altered the equation of power, opening the way for a far-reaching reconstruction of race relations in southern schools. By forbidding the use of federal aid in segregated school systems and by authorizing the Attorney General to bring lawsuits on behalf of Negro children, the new law put the weight of the bureaucracy on the side of change.<sup>38</sup>

### Emerging Patterns in Public School

#### Desegregation, 1954-1972

Despite the national policy inherent in federal court decisions, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Emergency School Assistance Act of 1972, to eliminate racial segregation in public schools, such segregation remains a cruel fact of American life. This fact was documented within three years of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in its famous report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (1967).<sup>39</sup> Table 1-1 shows that, as late as 1963, before the impact of federal administrative pressure became apparent in segregation levels in southern and border states, 61 percent of black students in the U.S. attended public elementary and secondary schools with 95 to 100 percent minority enrollment. Four years later, in 1972, more than a third of the black students were still enrolled in such schools.<sup>40</sup> This measure of segregation is at best conservative but gives a rough idea of



TABLE 1-1

SEGREGATION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES, 1968-1972  
(Percent Black in 95-100% Minority Schools)<sup>a</sup>

| State          | Segregation 1968 | Segregation 1972 | Difference |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------|
| Total          | 61.0             | 34.8             | -25.2      |
| Alabama        | 90.9             | 33.5             | -57.4      |
| Alaska         | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Arizona        | 27.6             | 19.8             | -07.8      |
| Arkansas       | 74.1             | 2.3              | -71.8      |
| California     | 47.8             | 43.9             | -03.9      |
| Colorado       | 45.0             | 25.1             | -19.9      |
| Connecticut    | 18.3             | 21.7             | +03.4      |
| Delaware       | 21.6             | 18.3             | -03.3      |
| Florida        | 72.1             | 8.6              | -63.5      |
| Georgia        | 83.4             | 22.5             | -60.9      |
| Idaho          | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Illinois       | 72.4             | 71.0             | -01.4      |
| Indiana        | 43.5             | 40.7             | -02.8      |
| Iowa           | 3.6              | 0.0              | -03.6      |
| Kansas         | 31.8             | 21.1             | -10.7      |
| Kentucky       | 26.6             | 26.5             | -00.1      |
| Louisiana      | 88.1             | 34.5             | -53.6      |
| Maine          | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Maryland       | 52.6             | 45.8             | -06.8      |
| Massachusetts  | 18.3             | 26.8             | +08.5      |
| Michigan       | 46.4             | 49.9             | +03.5      |
| Minnesota      | 4.0              | 3.1              | -00.9      |
| Mississippi    | 92.7             | 26.4             | -66.3      |
| Missouri       | 66.0             | 62.9             | -03.1      |
| Montana        | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Nebraska       | 35.0             | 24.1             | -10.9      |
| Nevada         | 39.5             | 0.0              | -39.5      |
| New Hampshire  | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| New Jersey     | 32.8             | 37.6             | +04.8      |
| New Mexico     | 15.9             | 9.1              | -06.8      |
| New York       | 35.8             | 40.1             | +04.3      |
| North Carolina | 65.1             | 2.8              | -62.3      |
| North Dakota   | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Ohio           | 42.8             | 44.3             | +01.5      |
| Oklahoma       | 48.3             | 5.8              | -42.5      |
| Oregon         | 0.0              | 4.3              | +04.3      |
| Pennsylvania   | 44.1             | 48.3             | +04.2      |
| Rhode Island   | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| South Carolina | 84.1             | 13.8             | -70.3      |
| South Dakota   | 3.1              | 0.0              | -03.1      |
| Tennessee      | 71.6             | 38.9             | -32.7      |
| Texas          | 63.1             | 38.8             | -24.3      |
| Utah           | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Vermont        | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |
| Virginia       | 68.2             | 2.9              | -65.3      |
| Washington     | 0.0              | 1.5              | +01.5      |
| West Virginia  | 5.7              | 0.9              | -04.8      |
| Wisconsin      | 39.6             | 54.2             | +14.6      |
| Wyoming        | 0.0              | 0.0              | *          |

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970 and 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1970 and 1974).

<sup>a</sup>Hawaii not included.

the extent of the problem. Yet, even under a very conservative definition of racial segregation, such as 95 percent black enrollment, it is clear that after years of federal effort, a substantial amount of segregation remains.<sup>41</sup>

As Table 1-1 shows there is considerable variation among the states as to levels of public school desegregation. At the extremes, in 1972 Illinois had about 71 percent of its black students attending schools with 95-100% minority enrollment; while West Virginia had only about nine-tenths of one percent of its black students in such a situation. Nineteen states at the same time were completely desegregated according to the 95-100 percent minority enrollment criterion. Table 1-1 also shows the development of change in segregation levels aggregated at the state level. In recent years, because of the national public policy against segregation by law and the pressures brought upon states to conform to this policy, substantial changes in the patterns of segregation, as well as an absolute national decline, have occurred. The reduction of segregation from 61 percent in 1968 to roughly 35 percent in 1972 represented a decline largely limited to the Southern states. Nationally there was an absolute decrease of 25.2 percent black students enrolled in racially segregated schools between 1968 and 1972. It is clear that the preponderance of this decrease was due to changes in enrollment figures in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. The large, urban

states of the North, however, changed very little, and many increased rather than decreased in absolute levels of segregation. Consequently, the relative rank of the states by level of segregation was altered as well. For example, in 1968 the four states leading in segregation were Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Louisiana. In four years school segregation patterns had shifted to the point where the segregation leaders among the states were Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin and Michigan. In the pre-1972 era the highest levels of segregation could be found in the southern states, where it was once the product of law and for which desegregation involved a formal redirection of previous public policy. Later, under the pressure of the federal judiciary and bureaucracy, the burden of the highest levels of segregation among the states had shifted northward, where segregation was allegedly de facto--the product of housing patterns and not explicit public policy.<sup>42</sup>

While the distinction between de jure and de facto types of segregation have long been maintained in courts of law, this distinction had weakened as closer attention has been paid to northern segregation. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has long argued that northern as well as southern segregation in public schools was not the result of random events, but occurred because of deliberate public policy at all levels of government. The Senate Select Committee has endorsed this

view<sup>43</sup> as has Gary Orfield.<sup>44</sup> In 1971 U.S. District Judge Stephen J. Roth argued in Bradley v. Millikin that:

While the racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may have played some part in the development of this pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict the housing opportunities of black people. On the record there can be no other finding.

Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, Federal, State and Local, have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area.<sup>45</sup>

In short, "Although governmental action by no means bears the full responsibility for metropolitan segregation, the power of federal, state and local governments was powerfully invoked on behalf of segregation throughout the basic period of development of the ghetto system and the construction of the early post-World War II suburbs."<sup>46</sup> Yet, whether public school desegregation was required by law or whether it has been the direct result of non-statutory policy at various governmental levels, the fact remains that since at least 1968 it has become a metropolitan phenomena of unprecedented scale and not confined solely to southern communities.

Public school segregation assumed a far less southern flavor by 1970, as may be seen in Table 1-1. As this desegregation process was implemented in the southern areas of the nation, the metropolitan dimension of residual segregation became ever more salient. In addition to the fact that nonsouthern

blacks are basically an urban population, national demographic trends testify to the increasingly metropolitan aspect of racial segregation. Table 1-2 indicates that the black segment of the population not only has been more heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas than its white counterpart, it has also been far more concentrated in the inner city section of these areas. Trends in this regard are not promising as concerns the prospect of reversing this black concentration in the core of American cities. Although about 8 percent fewer white metropolitan Americans continued to live within inner cities between 1960

TABLE 1-2  
RACIAL DISTRIBUTIONS WITHIN METROPOLITAN  
AREA AND INNER CITY, 1960-1970

| Characteristics                                 | 1960 | 1970 | Change |
|-------------------------------------------------|------|------|--------|
| Percent White in Metropolitan Areas             | 62.7 | 64.0 | +1.3   |
| Percent of White Metro Population<br>Inner City | 47.9 | 39.7 | -8.2   |
| Percent Black in Metropolitan Areas             | 64.8 | 70.7 | +5.9   |
| Percent of Black Metro Population<br>Inner City | 79.6 | 78.1 | -1.5   |

and 1970, the proportion of black citizens within metropolitan areas living in the inner city declined less than 2 percent during this period. Since heavy concentrations of blacks facilitate racial isolation in the public schools within a community, the fact that seven out of ten black Americans live in metropolitan areas, and of these eight out of ten within the inner city, indicates the intrinsically metropolitan nature of contemporary desegregation problems.

The metropolitan dimension of segregation as it has emerged in the past decade draws attention to the extent to which American cities vary in their manifestation of this phenomena. As Table 1-3 indicates, considerable variation among U.S. cities exists as to absolute levels of segregation in public schools and in changes in those levels since 1968. It is immediately apparent that even as late as 1968, fourteen years after Brown I, segregation levels among large southern and border cities remained very high, and these communities had higher levels than most of their northern counterparts. This suggests that, among these communities at least, the impact of federal desegregation policy since 1954 had limited effect. Within two years, however, this impact seems more clear as nearly every southern and border city within Table 1-3 manifested segregation decreases. Many of these were dramatic, such as those declines observed in Miami (-38.8), Jacksonville, Florida (-32.5), Ft. Lauderdale (-40.5), Tampa (-23.9), San Antonio (-25.2), Mobile (-40.4), Charleston, South Carolina

TABLE 1-3

PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION LEVELS AMONG SELECTED U.S. CITIES, 1968-1970  
(Percent Black in 90-100% Minority Schools)

| City District    | % Black 1968 | Segregation 1968 | Segregation 1970 | Diff. |
|------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|-------|
| New York         | 31.5         | 52.2             | 57.9             | +05.7 |
| Los Angeles      | 22.6         | 83.0             | 83.3             | +00.3 |
| Chicago          | 52.9         | 86.6             | 89.7             | +03.1 |
| Detroit          | 59.2         | 69.0             | 73.9             | +04.9 |
| Philadelphia     | 58.8         | 67.1             | 70.0             | +02.9 |
| Houston          | 33.3         | 88.0             | 73.7             | -14.3 |
| Miami            | 24.3         | 80.7             | 41.9             | -38.8 |
| Baltimore        | 65.1         | 78.6             | 79.2             | +00.6 |
| Dallas           | 30.8         | 87.6             | 91.4             | +03.8 |
| Cleveland        | 55.9         | 86.0             | 89.2             | +03.2 |
| Memphis          | 53.6         | 92.7             | 89.5             | -03.2 |
| Rochester, NY    | 28.9         | 27.7             | 24.2             | -03.5 |
| Milwaukee        | 23.9         | 63.2             | 60.4             | -02.8 |
| San Diego        | 11.6         | 54.7             | 46.4             | -08.3 |
| Jacksonville, FL | 28.2         | 87.4             | 54.9             | -32.5 |
| Ft. Lauderdale   | 23.8         | 79.7             | 39.2             | -40.5 |
| St. Louis        | 63.5         | 87.6             | 82.7             | -04.9 |
| New Orleans      | 67.1         | 81.2             | 78.6             | -02.6 |
| Columbus         | 26.0         | 40.7             | 45.2             | +04.5 |
| Indianapolis     | 33.7         | 57.6             | 55.6             | -02.0 |
| Atlanta          | 61.7         | 90.0             | 77.9             | -12.1 |
| Tampa            | 19.0         | 73.3             | 49.4             | -23.9 |
| Denver           | 14.1         | 56.1             | 36.9             | -19.2 |
| Boston           | 27.1         | 43.1             | 52.8             | +09.7 |
| Nashville        | 24.1         | 61.3             | 62.4             | +01.1 |
| San Francisco    | 27.5         | 34.3             | 31.7             | -02.6 |
| Fort Worth       | 24.7         | 85.4             | 75.3             | -10.1 |
| Cincinnati       | 42.9         | 43.9             | 39.5             | -04.4 |
| Seattle          | 11.0         | 8.1              | 3.1              | -05.0 |
| Albuquerque      | 2.4          | 31.4             | 27.1             | -04.3 |
| Newark           | 72.5         | 85.6             | 86.4             | +00.8 |
| Tulsa            | 12.2         | 77.0             | 68.7             | -08.3 |

TABLE 1-3--Continued

| City District      | % Black 1968 | Segregation 1968 | Segregation 1970 | Diff. |
|--------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|-------|
| San Antonio        | 14.7         | 85.3             | 60.1             | -25.2 |
| Portland, OR       | 8.1          | 20.5             | 17.4             | -03.1 |
| Las Vegas          | 12.2         | 51.9             | 30.0             | -21.9 |
| Pittsburgh         | 39.2         | 52.5             | 56.5             | +04.0 |
| Kansas City, MO    | 46.8         | 69.8             | 74.8             | +05.0 |
| Buffalo            | 36.6         | 62.6             | 56.1             | -06.5 |
| Oklahoma City      | 21.8         | 83.3             | 75.1             | -08.2 |
| Long Beach         | 7.6          | 0.0              | 0.0              | *     |
| Mobile             | 41.7         | 87.5             | 47.1             | -40.4 |
| Oakland            | 55.2         | 63.4             | 58.6             | -04.8 |
| Minneapolis        | 7.5          | 0.0              | 0.0              | *     |
| Baton Rouge        | 37.3         | 91.0             | 68.7             | -22.3 |
| Wichita            | 13.0         | 47.4             | 31.5             | -15.9 |
| El Paso            | 2.9          | 25.9             | 18.5             | -07.4 |
| Birmingham         | 51.4         | 91.6             | 69.7             | -21.9 |
| Toledo             | 26.7         | 52.4             | 48.5             | -03.9 |
| Charleston, SC     | 35.5         | 84.2             | 53.7             | -30.5 |
| Tucson             | 5.2          | 23.7             | 18.5             | -05.2 |
| Greenville, SC     | 22.1         | 83.3             | 0.0              | -83.3 |
| Norfolk            | 41.9         | 79.6             | 46.3             | -33.3 |
| Austin             | 15.0         | 84.6             | 78.5             | -06.1 |
| Shreveport         | 43.7         | 97.4             | 65.1             | -32.3 |
| Louisville         | 46.1         | 52.7             | 68.4             | +15.7 |
| Sacramento         | 13.9         | 3.5              | 3.3              | -00.2 |
| St. Paul, MN       | 5.8          | 12.4             | 10.7             | -01.7 |
| Richmond           | 68.3         | 84.6             | 44.7             | -39.9 |
| Gary               | 61.6         | 85.0             | 85.7             | +00.7 |
| Corpus Christi     | 5.4          | 77.6             | 54.0             | -23.6 |
| Flint              | 37.0         | 37.3             | 30.4             | -06.9 |
| Des Moines         | 7.8          | 0.0              | 0.0              | *     |
| Columbus           | 29.5         | 87.5             | 80.9             | -06.6 |
| Savannah           | 41.1         | 86.5             | 64.5             | -22.0 |
| Virginia Beach, VA | 10.6         | 37.8             | 12.6             | -25.2 |
| Fort Wayne, IN     | 13.8         | 32.2             | 40.6             | +08.4 |

Source: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of the Secretary; news release, June 18, 1971.



(-30.5), Shreveport (-32.3), and Richmond (-39.9).

Greenville, South Carolina, completely eliminated segregated public schools (from a 1968 level of 83.3). It would be misleading to attribute complete change in the southern and border region, as Dallas actually increased in its segregation levels slightly (+3.8), as did Nashville (+1.1).

Several such cities decreased their segregation only by slight amounts, such as Memphis (-3.2), St. Louis (-4.), New Orleans (-2.6), Austin (-6.1), and Columbus, Georgia (-6.6). Louisville was a deviant case within the cities of this region, increasing its absolute level of segregation over 15 percent. Table 1-3 indicates in clear terms that substantial southern and border region change was not necessarily a rule for all cities, and that the rate of change among those cities realizing appreciable declines was varied. Further, even in many cases of great decline in segregation levels, residual levels remained considerable, such as in Jacksonville, Florida, where over half of the black students remained in segregated schooling, or Birmingham, Alabama, where almost seven out of ten black pupils remained segregated. Although change in southern and border segregation is readily apparent, desegregation was by no means realized except in Greenville, South Carolina.

Northern communities were consistently more stable in segregation levels between 1968 and 1970, and the latest levels among the largest cities appear comparable to southern levels. Several communities even decreased in absolute levels of

segregation: especially San Diego (-8.3), Seattle (-5.0), Las Vegas (-21.9), Buffalo (-6.5), Wichita (-15.9), Tucson (-5.2), and Flint, Michigan (-6.9), and several others declined by nominal amounts. Thus, it was not exclusively among southern and border cities that desegregation progress was made. At the same time, a number of northern cities actually became more segregated by appreciable amounts, such as New York (+5.7), Columbus, Ohio (+5.0), and especially Boston (+8.4). This sort of fluctuation, however, was not common among large northern school districts as these communities were generally stable in segregation levels--far more so than southern and border cities.

The absolute levels of segregation during the 1968-1970 period which varied widely from city to city were not necessarily the product of the proportion of blacks in the school district. For example, Los Angeles had less than a quarter of its school enrollment that is black, yet in 1970 over 80 percent of these pupils were concentrated in segregated schools. St. Louis had almost an identical proportion of black students in segregated schools as Los Angeles, yet had over three times the proportion of blacks enrolled. Another example of the discrepancy between black proportions and segregation levels would be Denver and Tulsa. These cities held similar proportions of black students, around 14 percent, yet Tulsa evidenced almost twice the level of segregation. Long Beach and Portland both had around 8 percent black enrollment proportions, yet

Long Beach maintained no segregation, and Portland had 17.4 percent of its black students in segregated schooling. Corpus Christi and Tucson were nearly identical in black enrollment proportions, yet Corpus Christi had over two and one-half times the segregation. Obviously, there is more to understanding the desegregation process than simply looking at the relative size of black enrollments. This raises several critical questions which deserve attention: given the development of federal desegregation policy since 1896, and especially since 1954, what accounts for variation among cities in desegregation patterns and patterns of change? To what extent may this federal policy be directly credited with affecting these patterns, and to what extent has the nature of the federal structure, especially in education policy, constrained this impact? It is now appropriate to survey the answers extant in the desegregation literature regarding this question, so that our study may be more fruitfully designed to deal with these issues.

#### Explaining Desegregation in America: The Literature

The research literature pertaining to urban school desegregation in the United States has consisted of two basic types: case studies and comparative analyses. In surveying this extensive literature a case study was defined as a descriptive research design applied to less than four communities. Because each category of study is distinct concerning the

utility of its information, i.e., they are not identical in the generalizability of their research findings, they have been reviewed separately in this survey. The case study literature is severely limited in the breadth of application of its research findings because, by the very nature of this type of research design, analysis is concentrated on a single community--or limited number of communities--without a consistent conceptual scheme capable of orienting the analyst to a wide variety of cities. This literature has not been reviewed in detail, although the broad thrust of the findings within it will be useful in guiding preliminary thinking about the study of school desegregation. Comparative analyses, on the other hand, are reviewed in detail and will be critically evaluated, for this type of analysis bears directly upon the nature of the research effort contained in this study.

### Case Studies

The major findings of the case study literature surveyed have been summarized in Table 1-4. This table indicates the nature of these research findings and enumerates the specific factors that have been explanatory across several of the studies. While generalizations as to the exact nature of these relationships are not possible beyond each of the specific communities studied, it remains useful to consider the existence of certain key factors as these seem to reappear in desegregation case studies.<sup>47</sup>

TABLE 1-4

## SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS RELATING TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

| Case Study                | School Board | Community Climate | Black Population | Community Socioecon | Residence Patterns | Political Process | Black Action | Local Leadership | Extra-Local |
|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------|-------------|
| Tipton (1953)             | +            | +                 |                  |                     |                    |                   |              | (+ -)            |             |
| Allen Report (1964)       | o            |                   | -                | -                   |                    |                   |              |                  |             |
| Hauser (1965)             |              |                   | -                | -                   | -                  |                   |              |                  |             |
| Lang-Lang (1965)          |              | -                 | -                | (+ -)               |                    |                   |              |                  |             |
| Luchterhand-Weller (1965) |              |                   | -                | -                   |                    |                   |              |                  |             |
| Pettigrew (1965)          |              |                   | -                | -                   | -                  |                   | +            |                  |             |
| Dentler (1966)            | +            | -                 | -                | -                   |                    |                   | +            | (+ -)            | +           |
| Swanson (1966)            | (+ -)        | (+ -)             |                  |                     |                    |                   |              |                  |             |
| Becker (1967)             | -            |                   |                  |                     |                    | -                 | +            |                  |             |
| La Frankie (1967)         | -            |                   | -                | -                   | -                  |                   |              |                  |             |
| Bouma-Hoffman (1968)      | +            |                   |                  |                     | -                  |                   |              |                  | +           |
| Heifetz (1968)            |              |                   |                  |                     |                    |                   |              | -                | -           |
| Hendrick (1968)           | +            | o                 |                  |                     |                    | -                 |              |                  |             |
| Rogers-Swanson (1968)     |              |                   |                  | -                   |                    | -                 |              | -                |             |
| Stoute-Sroufe (1968)      | -            |                   |                  |                     |                    | -                 |              |                  |             |
| Warshauer (1968)          | +            | +                 |                  |                     |                    |                   |              |                  | +           |
| Dammerell (1968)          | +            |                   |                  |                     |                    |                   |              | +                |             |
| Sullivan (1969)           | +            | o                 | o                |                     |                    | +                 | +            | +                | +           |
| Inger (1969)              | o            |                   |                  |                     |                    | -                 |              | -                | (+ -)       |
| Noland (1969)             | -            | -                 |                  |                     |                    |                   |              |                  | +           |
| Wogaman (1969)            | +            | +                 | o                |                     |                    |                   |              | +                |             |
| Rogers (1970)             | -            | -                 |                  |                     |                    |                   | o            | -                |             |
| Bagwell (1972)            | +            | o                 |                  |                     |                    |                   | +            |                  | +           |
| Bonachich (1972)          | -            |                   | -                |                     | -                  | -                 |              |                  |             |
| Rubin (1972)              | -            | -                 |                  |                     |                    | -                 |              |                  |             |
| Caughey (1973)            | -            | -                 |                  |                     | -                  |                   |              |                  | -           |
| Holden (1974)             | -            | (+ -)             |                  |                     | -                  | -                 | +            |                  | (+ -)       |

NOTE: The meanings of the symbols used in this table are as follows: + denotes the factor facilitated desegregation in the community studied; - denotes the factor inhibited desegregation; o denotes the factor was not found to be important; + - denotes that the factor's impact involved facilitative and inhibitory aspects.

The single factor most commonly found important in explaining school desegregation in the case study literature has been the local school board and its members. The precise nature of the relationship between local school boards and desegregation activities is not completely clear. For, as is apparent in Table 1-4, many studies have found local boards helpful in bringing desegregation in schools, while others have found these organizations, and their membership, to have exactly the opposite effect. The operant condition as to whether or not the local school board facilitates or inhibits desegregation seems to be the extent to which its members are willing to be assertive in making the decision. Assertive school boards are more likely to facilitate desegregation than boards that are reluctant to assume decision making responsibility in this area. The findings regarding the social-political climate of the community have been similar in terms of inconsistency. The impact of this variable appears to depend largely on the research site involved and upon the fashion in which the issue has been raised. In communities where desegregation was approved, or had taken place, the climate was found to be either slightly positive in impact, or unimportant. In communities where desegregation had been defeated, or had failed to take place, the negative-hostile climate of the community in general was given credit. It is not at all clear whether or not communities with similar social-political climates behave similarly regarding school desegregation.

The consistency with which black population characteristics (such as size, proportion, and growth), lower community social status, higher levels of direct citizen participation in desegregation decisions, and community residential patterns, have tended to mitigate against the desegregation process is striking. These relationships have tended to occur regardless of the case study involved. Similarly, civil rights activity and black political action have been consistently found important as a positive desegregation factor. The behavior of local community leadership, especially elites, and extra local forces, such as state and national governments, have been found to be inconsistent in the direction of their impact on school desegregation. Again, the nature of these relationships appear to be idiosyncratic to the specific research site involved, although the overall importance of these factors is clear in all of the studies including them in the design.

Despite the obvious limitations which must be placed upon interpreting the results summarized in Table 1-4, given the lack of comparability of the studies involved, it is nonetheless unmistakable that the factors contained therein merit further systematic attention in empirical research. That is, each of the nine factors needs to be taken out of the case study context which has made a preliminary determination of its utility and subjected to the more rigorous test of systematic comparative inquiry.

### Comparative Analyses

The comparative literature pertaining to public school desegregation contains a wide variety of material, ranging from designs that are basically case studies applied to a number of separate communities, to those involving large numbers of cities subjected to a comparative, multivariate design. Moreover, there is considerable discrepancy as to the nature of the relationships found among important factors and the desegregation process, although--as was found in the case study literature--certain factors reappear as important in explaining variation in desegregation of public schools.

Three distinct approaches have emerged within the comparative literature pertaining to the study of U.S. school desegregation: (1) That which engages in comparative analysis of the desegregation "issue." This approach is concerned primarily with the linkage between selected factors and the extent to which local community officials make, or fail to make, a policy decision regarding public school desegregation. (2) A second approach engages in a systematic comparative analysis of the relationship between demographic, socioeconomic, and less often, political variables, and varying levels of analyses of actual racial enrollment ratios. (3) The final approach has been taken by studies concerned with the systematic analysis of the relationship between selected demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables, as these relate to actual enrollment ratios among city school districts. These are the



community-level analyses. Each approach makes a particular contribution to knowledge concerning school desegregation in the U.S., and each has strengths and weaknesses. The local level of analysis, especially as it is directed toward delineating the configuration of actual racial desegregation levels and assorted causal factors, seems the most directly useful approach. For, it is at the local level that this particular public policy must ultimately be implemented, and hence, where the impact of that policy must ultimately be measured. Nevertheless, the other modes of analysis yield valuable insights and useful hypotheses regarding desegregation and related phenomena to which we must be attentive.

In a comparative case study involving over twenty communities on the edge of the South, Williams and Ryan sought to determine the extent of desegregation and the major factors associated with it. They found that desegregation among cities was uneven and not subject to quick change. Forces external and internal to the local community were found to be related to school desegregation including: the number and proportion of blacks in any given community; the presence of other racial or cultural groups--diversity facilitated desegregation; the level and nature of community action activity by various groups; and the policy and practices of state-level agencies. In each of the communities surveyed, however, very little actual desegregation had occurred, and the overwhelming

majority of black students were totally segregated in the school system.<sup>48</sup>

Patterns of desegregation in the counties of five border states were analyzed by Pettigrew and Cramer. The basic desegregation measure was whether or not a given county had at least a single biracial school. The most important variables related to desegregation were urbanism, the black ratio in the county, and "traditionalism." Those counties most likely to contain some biracial schools were more likely to be urban, have fewer blacks, and tended to employ more white women in the labor force--the measure of "tradition." This study was an important early contribution to the comparative desegregation literature because it actually measured school desegregation and attempted to account for county variation with a number of demographic and socioeconomic factors.<sup>49</sup>

Somewhat later Pettigrew again studied southern desegregation levels, this time at the city level. Based upon an impressionistic reading of demographic and racial enrollment data, Pettigrew concluded that southern cities were consciously replacing school desegregation by law with patterns more closely related to housing and other community cleavages; i.e., southern segregation patterns increasingly approximated the de facto character of northern school segregation. Although the laws requiring segregated schools had disappeared, Pettigrew pointed out that enrollment statistics clearly showed that desegregation was not taking place in southern cities at a meaningful rate.

Instead of desegregating their schools, these communities, following the northern example, were increasingly using federal urban renewal funds, local real estate practices, and school zoning policy to perpetuate the segregation once protected by law. Although Pettigrew's analysis of these trends was impressionistic, it still represented a singular improvement over the journalistic accounts of urban desegregation that were otherwise available.<sup>50</sup> Pettigrew, in several monographs, has argued that the real effect of federal court rulings against de jure segregation was only to modify southern practices into a de facto mode of discrimination more acceptable to the national norm.<sup>50</sup>

The first truly comprehensive comparative study of desegregation levels was undertaken by Matthews and Prothro in 1964. They studied desegregation patterns among over 900 southern counties and sought to account for variation in segregation levels with a variety of demographic and political variables. This study was innovative in explicitly seeking to establish "whether a battery of political variables--taken as reflecting the varying stateways of the region--add significantly to the explanatory power of demographic variables." As a basic goal Matthews and Prothro sought to determine the linkages between demographic and political forces as these were directly related to desegregation variation in southern counties. Through the use of correlation and regression techniques they were able to determine that several demographic factors--percent of the

county urban, median black income, black and white median education, percent black population in 1900 and 1950--were associated with county desegregation (measured as whether or not the county maintained any biracial schooling). Specifically, it was determined that desegregated counties were more likely to be urban, with more affluent and better educated black populations, and more affluent whites. The size of the black population in any county, in either 1900 or 1950, was inversely related to desegregation. Thus, Matthews and Prothro concluded that: "The findings might appear, then, to support the theory of social determinism--and inferentially, the idea that folkways outweigh stateways." This strong conclusion notwithstanding, the demographic variables involved explained only about a quarter of the total variance in county desegregation. This is not actually an impressive amount, although Matthews and Prothro considered the multiple correlation to be of "rather impressive magnitude." They continue in this vein, "we may conservatively conclude that demographic characteristics are critically important--although not wholly determinate--in southern responses to Brown v. Board of Education."52

An important goal of the Matthews and Prothro study was the establishment of the unique explanatory power of political variables as these related to southern desegregation. They found that certain political factors were statistically associated with county desegregation, especially the percent States Rights Presidential vote in 1948 and the percent Republican

Presidential vote in 1928, 1948, and 1956. Specifically, the amount of popular support in any given county given to the States Rights Party in 1948, was inversely related to county desegregated, and popular support for Republican Presidential candidates in 1928, 1948, and 1956, was higher in desegregated counties. These results led Matthews and Prothro to conclude:

When political variables were brought into the analysis we found that a 'Dixiecratic' political climate decreases the chances of obtaining desegregation and that Republicanism increases the probability of desegregation.

In further analyzing their data, however, Matthews and Prothro determined that the independent influence of these political variables was negligible, and that:

Contrary to our hypothesis, demographic factors are of far greater importance than political factors in accounting for variations in southern responses to Brown v. Board of Education. While the addition of 10 political variables adds less than anticipated to the explanation of the pattern of school desegregation in the South, it does increase the explanatory power of demographic variables by about one-fifth.<sup>53</sup>

In a case study design applied to eight cities, Crain and Street attempted to study the desegregation "issue," and local school board "acquiescence" to demands arising from that issue. The actual implementation of desegregation decisions was not studied, rather desegregation decision making itself was the dependent variable in the analysis. In their comparisons Crain and Street were able to establish that the local school superintendent played a very limited role regarding the desegregation decision. The school board was found to be nearly autonomous in racial issue policy making. Whether

this organization was distinctly "political or non-political" was strongly related to its desegregation decision: high status boards were more likely to acquiesce to desegregation demands. Moreover, the local elite was considered important as an indirect factor influencing board decisions.<sup>54</sup>

Hill and Feeley studied desegregation of public schools as a policy issue in an eight city comparative case study. They found that the local school board was the focal point of the issue, and that the school superintendent was often an important actor regarding this type of policy. The federal courts and litigation were found to be important factors regarding desegregation in each city in the study, although the impact of these factors was ambiguous, and Hill and Feeley were unable to assess it. Their analysis was descriptive and impressionistic. It did not yield any precise information as to the exact nature of the relationships between the salient social and political variables within each community and the implementation of the desegregation decisions themselves. There was, nevertheless, one important finding in their study that stood out relative to the findings of previous research: they discovered that the activity of civil rights groups, especially blacks, was not decisive in controlling the desegregation issue.<sup>55</sup>

In a comparative case study of ten northern cities Wirt examined local efforts to overcome de facto desegregation. In comparing the results of the case study for each community,

Wirt concluded that local control of the school system stymied innovation; i.e., changes in the segregation policy were strongly inhibited by local forces. Black population trends since the Second World War had also tended to limit the possibility of school desegregation--particularly as these were reflected in rapid increases in black public school enrollment. According to Wirt, it was the action of civil rights groups and blacks themselves which brought what little desegregation activity could be found. The social change inherent in school desegregation was perceived to be facilitated and inhibited by state and national activity, depending upon the community involved, i.e., that extralocal impact was not entirely consistent in its impact regarding school desegregation. These findings led Wirt to conclude that:

to understand the existence and diversity of desegregation policies, one should comprehend that even where there may be an agreement on needs and preferences, the resources available may vary and so affect the policy outcome.<sup>56</sup>

Unfortunately, Wirt makes no attempt to study this important question.

In the most exhaustive comparative case study in the desegregation literature, Crain et al. studied how fifteen U.S. city school systems made decisions regarding school desegregation. This research was concerned with the process by which local school boards did, or did not, take desegregation action, as these decisions were demanded by local groups. Actual levels of public school desegregation were not measured, and no attempt was made to establish the extent to which school board

response to local demands were actually reflected in changes in racial balance in the schools. That is, Crain et al. were concerned exclusively with the extent to which the local school boards acquiesced to the demands of groups that some desegregation policy be developed. The major findings of the study were:

(1) Placing as many black students as possible in desegregated schools was not the single overriding goal of civil rights leaders. In both northern and southern cities, the primary goal appeared to be to force the local school board to make an official commitment to racial equality--a symbolic gesture. This demand, Crain et al. found, could be met without desegregating every school. (2) Most school board members were found to respond to the school desegregation issue by "acting according to their predispositions about civil rights; liberal boards tended to integrate; conservative boards did not." The board's behavior proved to be remarkably consistent in this regard, and civil rights demonstrations were not effective in modifying the initial board response.<sup>57</sup> This specific finding is consistent with several other case studies which suggest that, although it takes civil rights activity to initially raise the desegregation issue, actual desegregation decisions, or implementation of these decisions, are not the product of such black activity.<sup>58</sup> (3) The local board was found to set the tone for local desegregation decisions, and the school superintendent's role was severely limited. (4) Whether or not the school board was political or nonpolitical had an important



influence upon its predilection on desegregation policy. Crain et al. indicated that politically appointed board members were more conservative on racial matters and were unwilling to engage in the necessary controversy over desegregation policy. They also found, on the other hand, that more professional boards, with members tied to the white power structure and business class (civic elites) were more amenable to desegregation demands. The important factors controlling the composition of the local school boards, concluded Crain et al., depended upon the "political style of the city." Their operationalization of this concept was tied to the presence or absence of indirect elite influence within city affairs:

In general, school boards are reformed in cities that have an active elite; and these are the cities where high income families have not moved to the suburbs and where strong political parties provided a structural channel for elite influence.<sup>59</sup>

The primary difficulty inherent in this study was that its limited sample of cities made it impossible for them to find significant differences between the communities on important variables. Thus it was not possible to control for the effect of each independent variable in the analysis. As a result, the relative importance of each of these factors could not be assessed as they related to desegregation policy making. A further limitation of the study was the amorphous nature of the dependent variable, "school board acquiescence," as this incorporated a wide variety of not necessarily comparable desegregation decisions. The study did not concern itself

with connecting demographic and other community characteristics with the implementation of whatever board decision was reached, hence the extent to which these decisions proved trivial remains open.

This was an excellent study of the school desegregation issue as it had been raised in several cities. Their findings led the researchers to delineate four primary factors which accounted for local school board behavior: attitudes of the local electorate, civic elite ideology, internal organization, and the civic elite's relation to government. These factors created what Crain et al. considered the "political style" of any given community. Unfortunately, because of the case study nature of the research design, the social and economic forces which are likely to bound the actual implementation of the desegregation decision (what Wirt called the resources) were not assessed in this study. Thus, the actual impact of their political climate factor as an independent force upon public policy went undetermined. Therefore, without a more exact measurement of the socioeconomic, demographic, and political constraints which surround any policy at the local level, the broad generalizations made by Crain et al. concerning the heavy impact of the political style of a city seems premature.

To summarize, the basic thrust of the Crain et al. study of school desegregation decisionmaking was to delineate a series of factors which conditioned school board response to

racial demands. Their conclusion after an exhaustive study of the desegregation policy process was that:

The decision about school integration is one of the most important to be made in any city, and we find that the powerful men of the city either do not choose to influence this decision, or attempt to and are unable. Yet at the same time, we find that cities that have influential civic elites have school boards that act as if they were being influenced by the elite. The reason for this consistency is that the influentials exert their influence indirectly by acting to set a style of politics for the city. It is this political style which overrides the actual formal governmental structure to produce a school board which then takes actions appropriate to their style.<sup>60</sup>

If these analysts are correct in this (and their data support the above conclusion only in a very tentative sense) it may be expected that significant differences can be observed between communities with distinct political styles and school board structures as to desegregation patterns and patterns of change. That is, if the forces contained in the Crain et al. conclusion above can be measured empirically, comparative analysis should be able to test the extent to which these significantly affect actual levels of public school desegregation, and the extent to which demographic and socioeconomic forces constrain policy impact. It is this critical empirical issue, testing the empirical linkage between political style, school board, and policy implementation, that Crain et al. fail to undertake.

Crain and Vanecko further analyzed the school desegregation issue, and school board response to it, in a report concerning eight of the fifteen cities contained in the original Crain et al. study. The specific focus of this monograph was

upon the relative weight of political leaders as compared to civic elites in determining the desegregation acquiescence of the community school boards. As had been reported earlier by Crain et al., the composition of the local school board was considered the best explanation of the extent to which demands for desegregation were actually met:

we need only to find out whether the school system has a 'reform' or a 'political' school board, since this would tell us whether the demands of the civil rights movement would be met or not.

The determining factor as to whether or not any given board was reformed or political, was the degree to which it was open to the influence of the local civic elite; i.e., "nonpolitical" boards were more open to this influence and more likely to acquiesce to civil rights demands. Thus, the overall conclusion for this study was that:

the two main dimensions that account for school board composition are, first, the overall influence of the civic elite which seems to have its roots in . . . the extent to which the elites have stayed in the city, and second, the strength of political parties. The civic elite cannot win 'control' of the school board as easily if political parties are weak.<sup>61</sup>

As was true for the larger Crain et al. study, Crain and Vanecko did not explore the linkages between the school board decisions, or nondecisions, and actual levels of school desegregation as these existed in public education among the cities.

In 1967 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted a staff survey of racial isolation in seventy-five urban school systems across the nation. Although the report based on this

survey was not a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between the salient demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables and varying levels of urban racial segregation, this report was a landmark due to the comprehensive data presented. The two major findings of the Civil Rights Commission survey of racial enrollment figures was, first, that racial isolation in U.S. city schools was intense throughout the nation--regardless of region, and second, that these high levels of isolation existed in large cities and small, regardless of the relative size of the black student population. The Civil Rights Commission attributed this widespread isolation phenomenon to a number of interrelated factors, although their analysis was basically descriptive and impressionistic: growing economic and social isolation between cities and suburbs contributed to continued racial segregation in schools, as did continuing population trends which denied public schools within the inner city the pool of white students so critical in reducing levels of racial separation. The Commission was especially harsh in denouncing a variety of educational policies and practices which reinforced residential segregation patterns and created racial isolation in public schools. The distinction between de jure and de facto forms of racial isolation became less viable, the Commission pointed out, when the formal and informal policies of various governmental institutions, at all levels, were closely examined. For these policies had for years complimented, reinforced, and caused growing racial

segregation within the metropolitan areas of the nation, and an effective policy for obviating these policies had yet to be applied. Because of the broad analytical approach assumed by this study, it was unable, however, to precisely delineate the relationship between the factors assumed and asserted to be causal regarding racial isolation in public schools. Thus, as important as this early descriptive effort clearly was, it served only to suggest the dimensions of the segregation problem, and to provide some tentative hypotheses concerning the causes of racial isolation in urban school systems.<sup>62</sup>

Similar limitations obtain for the second major Commission on Civil Rights report released during this period. In a survey of desegregation patterns among the seventeen southern and border states specifically under the Brown order to desegregate, the Commission found that, indeed, during the 1966-1967 school year desegregation in this region had increased. Still, although the proportion of black students attending desegregated schools had more than doubled during this period, it was found that more than four-fifths of the black children in the eleven southern states--and more than nine-tenths of the black children in the "deep" South--remained in completely segregated schools. Among the border states it was found that a large majority of black school children attended schools which were less than 80 percent black and very few attended totally segregated schools. The major finding of the report, then, was that as of 1967, the

South itself had yet to comply with the Brown decision beyond token implementation. Several explanations of this low level of racial desegregation were offered, although none were actually operationalized and applied to the racial enrollment data: insincere state and local efforts through "freedom of choice" plans, black fears of retaliation for attending bi-racial schools, improper official pressure to inhibit black enrollment in all-white schools, and continuing socioeconomic discrimination against blacks which perpetuated poverty. Further, the federal administration of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was held to have proven ineffective in bringing change to the South. Finally, the Commission blamed the existence of private, all-white, elementary and secondary schools--many receiving federal tax shelters--for the maintenance of dual school systems, although such racial separation had been held unconstitutional twelve years earlier.<sup>63</sup>

An important limitation of the comparative literature reviewed above has been the paucity of systematic empirical inquiry into the correlates of actual patterns of desegregation in public schools. The earliest analysis to meet this shortcoming at the urban level was made by Thomas R. Dye in 1968. In a systematic comparative study of levels of urban public school segregation, Dye initially determined that U.S. cities varied substantially in racial enrollment patterns. His primary task was, then, to account for this variance with a variety of demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables.

Dye used an explicitly public policy approach to school desegregation; i.e., public school segregation was conceptualized as a "policy output of political systems--states and school districts." This perspective explicitly assumed that "racial segregation in both northern and southern cities does not result from fortuitious circumstances unrelated to the activities of political systems." Dye argued that, at the very least, racial segregation throughout the country resulted from conscious governmental inaction:

Yet the existence of racial imbalance in public schools testifies to the absence of any effective policy to eliminate segregation. Our measures of segregation reflect 'non-decision,' and public policy can reasonably be defined to include non-decisions as well as decisions.<sup>64</sup>

An extremely important part of Dye's argument that cities all had the opportunity to make desegregation a public policy was his insistence that, with the exception of Washington, D.C., "no city has yet so few white pupils that it is physically unable to bring an end to segregation." At the same time, he recognized that "the greater the Negro proportion of the school population, the more extensive the policy changes required to accomplish desegregation--but it is not impossible."<sup>65</sup>

Dye surveyed segregation patterns in the public elementary schools of fifty-five northern and southern cities. Simple and multiple correlation and regression techniques were used to determine the relationship between a set of socioeconomic



factors, political variables, and urban segregation levels.<sup>66</sup> These factors, socioeconomic and political, were separately analyzed as they correlated with segregation. The last stage of Dye's analysis was a comparison of these results to ascertain the relative impact of socioeconomic as compared to political factors. In exploring the relationship between socioeconomic factors and segregation levels Dye found that "the single most influential variable affecting school segregation is still sectionalism." The years of northward black migration had made the proportion of blacks within cities roughly comparable--regardless of region. Thus, Dye concluded that whatever differences existed between northern and southern segregation could no longer be attributed to variations in black population percentages. Still, it was determined that:

not only does the extent of school segregation differ markedly between Northern and Southern cities, but the determinants of segregation patterns also differ in North and South. Political and environmental variables which may be influential in determining the extent of segregation in Northern cities are not necessarily influential in shaping segregation in southern cities.

Because of this finding Dye followed the procedure set by Crain et al., in which southern and northern cities were separated for statistical analysis.<sup>67</sup>

Among northern cities, Dye found that the proportion of black pupils in the public schools was the most important correlate of segregation levels. He noted that, while segregation was not a necessary result of large black enrollments, the presence of large black enrollments "certainly generate strong

demands and place important constraints on school systems in racial matters." It was, he thought, simply "far more difficult to adopt an effective policy of desegregation in cities with large Negro enrollments." Of considerable importance in northern school segregation levels were the social status characteristics of the populations involved: increases in adult education and white collar employment levels were associated with decreases in segregation, and these relationships held under statistical controls. In southern cities, unlike northern communities, the social status characteristics of the population were not associated with variation in segregation. The status characteristics of the black population in communities were not found to be related to public school segregation levels in either region. Aggregate comparisons indicated that the ethnicity of a city was related to its racial separation of school students: large ethnic populations were found to exist within less segregated cities, and this negative relationship held under statistical control in both regions. Larger and older cities tended to be less segregated than younger and smaller communities in the North, but no such relationship was apparent in the South. In all regions the proportion of students enrolled in private schools was not associated with levels of segregation--leading Dye to conclude that, "the segregation of public school children is not a product of the existence of private schools."<sup>68</sup>

In examining the relationship between political factors and levels of public school segregation Dye found, generally, that political system variables were less important than socioeconomic variables in explaining racial imbalance. Those few political variables that did correlate significantly with segregation proved weak in explanatory power, or disappeared under statistical control, among northern communities. In the South, however, political characteristics were more closely associated with urban segregation variation, even under statistical controls. Specifically Dye found that mayoral governments were more likely to be desegregated than nonmayoral systems. Regarding this association Dye warned, "of course mayor governments do not 'cause' desegregation but we believe that the 'political' climate associated with mayor government is more likely to produce desegregation than the 'nonpolitical' environment associated with manager government." This finding is discrepant with that of Crain et al., and Crain and Vanecko, in which reformed structures were found to facilitate desegregation, and more political forms to hinder this process. In southern cities it was found that lower levels of segregation existed among communities with partisan elections--another manifestation of unreformed cities; in the North no such association was found. These relationships led Dye to conclude:

In Southern cities at least, more 'political' forms of government--mayor governments and partisan election--may result in increased Negro political power and more progress in school desegregation. 'Nonpolitical' forms

of government--managers and non-partisan elections--may suppress effective political action on behalf of desegregation.

Dye further determined that nonpolitical school boards (appointed membership) were associated with greater levels of northern segregation--although the relationship was fairly weak. This association was also found among southern cities and was quite strong. Similarly, Dye found that at-large school boards tended to exist in cities with greater segregation than ward constituency boards--again further evidence that "political" forms of government facilitated desegregation. These findings brought the following conclusion from Dye: "Cumulatively these findings increase our suspicion that 'non-political' structures are associated with 'non-decisions' which in turn support existing patterns of school segregation." Thus, overall, the relative importance of socioeconomic and political variables depended upon the region of the country in which a city could be found. In the North socioeconomic variables were more important than political factors in explaining variation in school segregation. Among southern cities, however, socioeconomic factors were less strongly associated with segregation than among the cities of the North, and political factors were of considerable strength.

This study was a major contribution to the desegregation research literature in several respects. It was innovative in its comparative statistical analysis as applied to the local patterns of public school desegregation. Dye tested the extent

to which desegregation policy making had actually been implemented and attempted to draw some basic conclusions regarding the forces which affected this implementation. More important, Dye actually tested these relationships over a large collection of cities and was therefore able to make more valid generalizations than has often been possible from other studies.

In an eight city comparative case study design, Inger and Stout analyzed how local school boards handled the public school desegregation issue. They found that white opposition to desegregation was not a primary cause of delay, or defeat, of desegregation plans. The white community would accept a desegregation program, without subsequently abandoning the school system, if the desegregation issue were handled properly. The most important factor regarding the likelihood of desegregation action was the school board and its willingness to accept decision making responsibility. The boards that asserted this responsibility and issued a desegregation plan encountered less, and ineffective, opposition within the white community. Similarly, school superintendents who avoided the desegregation decision, refusing to accept its legitimacy as an educational question, invited controversy, cost, and delay in the desegregation process. Those superintendents who viewed desegregation as an important educational policy actually facilitated its acceptance within the community as a whole and reduced the amount of opposition to such a program. Thus, according to

Inger and Stout, the extent to which the desegregation issue became a controversial, more difficult issue, was largely determined by the willingness of responsible officials to bear the burden of decisionmaking. When this responsibility was avoided, and the public was directly involved in settling the desegregation issue, the likelihood of action diminished as community controversy developed. That is, as far as desegregation policy was concerned, "apparently, the community tends to accept the idea if it comes from a legitimate governmental body such as the school board. The significant task for government, then, would be to prevent race relations from becoming simply a conflict between 'those Negroes' and 'us whites.'"<sup>69</sup> The extent to which this relationship is true when controlled for other salient factors was undetermined by Inger and Stout, as they did not inquire into the extent to which environmental constraints prevent implementation of such decisions once they have been formulated.

Mack et al. studied school desegregation in nine U.S. communities and attempted to draw certain basic conclusions based on separate case studies. In reviewing each case study Mack concluded that the trend in smaller cities was "clearly" toward desegregation, although in larger cities the public school pattern was toward "resegregation." The critical explanatory factor, according to Mack, was "citizen's organizing and protesting." That is, unless the civil rights movement actively attempted to bring desegregation, no change would be

made. Mack's willingness to generalize as to the effectiveness of civil rights activity in actually bringing desegregation is at odds with the earlier findings of Crain and Street, Crain et al., and Inger and Stout, as these studies determined that direct citizen involvement in the desegregation issue did not actually bring changes in levels of racial segregation.<sup>70</sup>

Based upon the racial school enrollment data reported in the famous Coleman Report in 1966, Thomas Pettigrew conducted a brief study of segregation patterns among U.S. cities and concluded that the primary cause of continued urban segregation was structural.<sup>71</sup> Apparently the fashion in which local school systems were organized and the decisions made by local school officials had actually reinforced racial segregation in the public schools. Specifically, Pettigrew blamed school system decentralization, the existence of private--especially parochial--schools, and school attendance zoning policies, as inhibiting school desegregation activities in cities. Unfortunately, in describing the causes of racial segregation among cities Pettigrew was completely inattentive to the constraints imposed by socioeconomic and demographic factors in the environment. Thus, he was not able to systematically establish the independent impact of the policies he blamed for desegregation inactivity. His findings, left uncontrolled for other salient variables, thus are too general to precisely delineate the nature of urban school desegregation.<sup>72</sup>

Vanfossen conducted an empirical inquiry into the demographic correlates of desegregation patterns among the southern and border states. She found that the percent of the black student population in any given state attending bi-racial schools was related to the proportion of blacks in the schools, and the social class composition of the state-wide nonwhite population; i.e., those states with higher levels of desegregation were those with proportionately smaller, more affluent black populations. Wealthier states were found more likely to have desegregated, although the social class structure of the white population exerted little direct influence on desegregation levels. Variation in southern and border state desegregation was not found to be related to levels of urbanization or industrialization. Thus, based on these empirical findings, Vanfossen concluded:

A segregated state is much more likely to display wide discrepancies between the socioeconomic standing of whites and Negroes; that is, the lower social class of the average Negro, in comparison with the social class position of the white in the same state, the less likely is that state to readily accept integration. It is also possible that the class position of Negroes is the relevant variable behind the very strong correlation between the percentage of Negroes in the state and that state's inclination to remain segregated.<sup>73</sup>

Although one cannot apply the findings of a state-level analysis to the communities within it without danger of ecological fallacy, this research nevertheless suggests the existence of a segregation determinant not empirically operationalized before: the relative characteristics of the subpopulations of the community being studied. Dye, for example, did not employ this



type of measure in his analysis. Vanfossen's study suggests that attention needs to be devoted to the relative distribution of salient population characteristics as well as absolute levels as these relate to desegregation patterns.

An extremely broad, descriptive, analysis of desegregation patterns among American cities was conducted by the U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity in 1972. This report studied the extent of racial isolation in U.S. cities in a way very similar to the Racial Isolation report of the Civil Rights Commission of 1967, although the survey data were more comprehensive. This study found that progress in reducing black isolation had been substantial among southern school districts, although such segregation remained at high levels throughout the cities of the nation. Based on a review of demographic statistics, but without the use of rigorous statistical analysis, the Committee attributed metropolitan segregation in public schools to two general factors: the existence and persistence of segregated residential housing patterns within communities--especially those that had been sanctioned and perpetuated by the policies and practices of government agencies at all levels, as well as private organizations; and second, the actions of school authorities which had often assured that the public schools became, and remained, racially and socially homogeneous institutions. The Committee was especially emphatic that isolation in inner city school systems held socioeconomic as well as racial overtones.

Increasingly the black, poor, and economically depressed central cities were becoming isolated from white, affluent, and economically active suburban rings. This central city-suburban schism reinforced the racial isolation so prevalent in American metropolitan areas. The serious difficulty with studies such as the Select Committee's is that the reliance upon examination of broad demographic trends, and impressionistic readings of political behavior and decisions, does not allow for a precise or comprehensive understanding of the relative importance of these factors as they relate to desegregation levels. This broad analysis of recent demographic trends and metropolitan policies led the Committee to conclude: "much of the remaining school isolation in the South and nearly all of it in other areas of the country is the result of factors which converge to produce both residential and school segregation."<sup>74</sup>

In an examination of varying rates of public school desegregation among southern counties as these related to selected sociopolitical phenomena, Prothro updated the seminal Matthews and Prothro monograph. As had been true of the earlier study, Prothro's basic purpose was to establish the extent to which a number of social and political characteristics could statistically explain variation in school desegregation patterns among southern counties. As a broader objective, Prothro wanted to test the "relative importance" of "stateways" (political factors) and "folkways" (social factors) as these

conditioned the implementation of public policy. In a multiple correlation analysis of data taken from 894 southern counties, Prothro analyzed socioeconomic and political variables separately and found that the impact of political variables did not appear to be independent of socioeconomic factors in determining levels of desegregation.<sup>75</sup>

School desegregation levels were most strongly related to the proportion of blacks in the county, the larger the proportion of blacks the less desegregation was found. Further, lower levels of desegregation were related to increases in black-white educational dissimilarity, higher rates of farm tenancy, and higher rates of church membership. These results led Prothro to conclude that:

Black-fearing, God-fearing counties with acute differences in black and white schooling and with lots of tenant farmers are not conducive to integration. On the positive side, counties with higher levels of black education, with better incomes for both blacks and whites, and with the greatest decreases in the proportion of blacks in the population since 1900 are found to have higher rates of integration.

The early tokenism of the judicial era had led to the relationship between urbanism and desegregation, contended Prothro, but in 1970, when more meaningful levels of desegregation had been reached, cities were more rigid in segregation patterns.<sup>76</sup>

As had been predicted in the original monograph, political factors were found by Prothro to have become "more strongly related to school integration as the amount of integration has increased." Prothro, however, did not find that the contribution of these political variables was independent of social

factors as had been expected. A variety of political variables were found to have a limited amount of explanatory value as to levels of southern desegregation: States Right Party support in 1948, Republican Party support in 1928, 1948, and 1956 were associated with desegregation levels. The States Right support level inhibited desegregation, and Republicanism facilitated it. The size of the county's black electorate was positively related to desegregation, while these levels were negatively affected by the presence of any white race organization. Overall, however, Prothro concluded that the independent contribution of political factors to explaining desegregation among southern counties was "minor." When it came to public school desegregation patterns in the South, "folkways dominate stateways."<sup>77</sup>

A critical limitation of the original Matthews and Prothro monograph, repeated by Prothro in the second piece, was the total failure to deal with the large residual generated in their statistical explanation of desegregation levels. This oversight is also apparent in the Dye monograph. Originally they were able to account for less than a third of the variance in desegregation levels with their set of socioeconomic and political independent variables, choosing to simply ignore the residual of unexplained variance--about seventy percent. The existence of such a large residual term merited some attention, if only speculation as to its cause. For example, Matthews and Prothro might have noted that their

study did not take extralocal forces into account, such as state and national influences regarding desegregation policy, which may be reasonably assumed to have caused a large part of the unexplained residual variance. Prothro, in the later study, at least alluded to the potentially disturbing presence of such extra-local forces as these would affect his regression results--which left approximately forty percent of the variance in desegregation levels unexplained. He suggested, briefly, that the intrusion of the national government might represent "an 'arbitrary' or 'outside' force that has thrown out of kilter what might be some 'natural' relations." This observation was offered in the context of speculation as to why political variables had proven statistically unimportant in the analysis. Incredibly, considering the fact of large-scale federal intervention into local southern desegregation policy, Prothro proceeded to discount this possibility. He continued: "But, all such reservations probably represent too great a sensitivity to the possibility that our results are merely artifactual."<sup>78</sup> A close examination of the contours of both these studies indicates a striking lack of theoretical justification for the interrelationships they hypothesized among their variables. Thus one wonders whether this lack of theoretical focus does not tend to render the results largely artifactual. The inattention to the disturbance factor apparent in the statistical results, coupled with a paucity of theoretical justification for variable inclusion in the

predictive equations, highlight what would appear to be a serious flaw in the Matthews and Prothro study: inability to incorporate federal and state factors into the analysis. A theoretical framework was required that could have organized a systematic consideration of national, state, and local factors salient to patterns of public school desegregation implementation.

A major systematic study, involving a random sample of ninety-one northern cities over 50,000 with at least 3,000 blacks in the population, was undertaken by Kirby et al. in 1973. They attempted to deal with de facto segregation in northern schools and the nature of the desegregation issue as it had emerged within these cities during the 1960's. Only northern desegregation was considered because, following the assumption of Crain et al. earlier, this was considered to be a different issue, depending upon the region of the country in which it was raised. According to Kirby et al., in the North desegregation was distinguished by local option, whereas in southern communities it was a matter of federal imposition. The primary purpose of the study was to determine the patterns and consistencies existing in the desegregation controversies experienced among northern communities. They were not specifically interested in measuring actual levels of public school desegregation but were "more concerned with the political processes surrounding the appearance and resolution of school desegregation." Thus, while somewhat more concerned with

establishing the exact nature of whatever desegregation action was taken by a city in response to the demands of civil rights groups than had been Crain et al., this study was still basically concerned with symbolic desegregation activity, i.e., whether or not some policy was made at all, and less with what racial balance existed in a city.<sup>79</sup>

Using simple correlation and multiple regression techniques Kirby et al. established the dimensions of northern desegregation issues in the sixties. An analysis of population characteristics and other "background" factors indicated that:

the greatest pressures on the schools to improve the quality of black education occurs in the large central cities with their large ghettos and extensive political organization of the poor. On the other hand, we find that these are factors which produce enormous amounts of controversy over education, and produce a high level of general response, but relatively little specific desegregation. The cities which did act to desegregate are only slightly larger on the average than the cities which did not.

It was discovered that the cities most active in desegregation were those that had the largest ethnic populations and tended to be located in certain states--especially on the northeast and west coasts. The concentration of cities more acquiescent to black desegregation demands within certain states led the authors to suggest that "one of the most important factors is the pressure exerted by the state government, particularly the state department of education." This conclusion is essentially speculative since no state government variables were included in the study.<sup>80</sup>

Among the more expressly political characteristics included in the study, Kirby et al. discovered that the black community exerted considerable initial influence on the school desegregation decision. Specifically, they found that the growth of black political power, in electing blacks to office, was an important factor encouraging a favorable general response to desegregation demands. But, black power "does not increase desegregation itself." In refining the nature of the black power-desegregation relationship, Kirby et al. pointed out that a:

strong, unified and more conservative civil rights movement which has the support of prominent blacks in the community can influence the school system to desegregate. However, the total amount of civil rights activity does not seem to be an important factor.

That is, this study indicated that the civil rights movement could raise the desegregation issue, but it was incapable of carrying it to a conclusion.<sup>81</sup>

The local school board proved to be an important force in settling the desegregation issue, although the findings in this regard were discrepant with those of Crain et al. Earlier it had been suggested that the racial ideology of the local school board membership was a critical factor guiding their ultimate policy decision. These authors, however, found that while "school boards do make a difference by their actions . . . this cannot be predicted on the basis of attitudes." They had discovered that the more liberal school boards were no more likely to take acquiescent desegregation action



than more conservative bodies. Further, the school superintendent was now considered an important actor in this public policy. Cities with assertive superintendents regarding desegregation were more likely to have taken acquiescent action. Another political factor analyzed extensively by Kirby et al. was the activity of the city mayor. The mayor usually appeared to avoid the school desegregation issue, "but where he does become involved, he tends to take a mildly integrationist stance." The actions of the civic elite were found to be very important in determining the desegregation activity of any given city. In particular, the authors generalized that the presence of a strong and cohesive group of businessmen, even though such a group may be conservative, "has the effect of facilitating school desegregation. Our interpretation is that a city where elites are strong will be less concerned about the dangers of white backlash." In regard to the effectiveness of white opposition to desegregation, it was specifically found that:

white citizen opposition has had very little impact on school desegregation decisions. In fact, white opposition is more the result of school desegregation than the cause of it. The contention that school boards and administrators oppose school desegregation for fear of arousing angry mobs of white parents is just not the case. This is not to say that some professional educators have not opposed desegregation; but a realistic fear of white opposition has little, if any, bearing on their decisions.

The problem with this generalization is that Kirby et al. studied these decisions at one point in time only, and thus

were unable to establish the impact of white opposition as it affected the implementation of whatever desegregation action might be taken by the local school board. Actual changes in the racial enrollment statistics were not measured over time, such that the critical factor most likely to test the effectiveness of white opposition--whether or not any real desegregation ever occurred at all--remained unexamined. Thus, the extent to which such opposition may have actually assured that the decision would never be meaningfully implemented remains an open empirical question.

Kirby et al. found that white support for desegregation had little impact on what happened in any city. Their conclusion, based on these findings, was that: "Once again we see that community leaders and elites seem to have more impact on the school desegregation decision than do the masses." Further, it is emphasized that:

the traditional villains of local government--the business interests and the 'power structure'--are helpful to the issue of school desegregation. They take a less parochial view of urban problems than does democratically elected local government.<sup>82</sup>

The fundamental discrepancy between the findings of this research and that of Dye is clear in the above conclusion. Dye had found that more "political" communities, where the direct citizen pressure on government was more possible, were more likely to have lower rates of segregation. On the other hand, Kirby et al. argued that nonpolitical structures, especially as these insulated decisionmakers from community political pressures, were

more likely to facilitate desegregation. Some of this difference may be accounted for simply in the way in which desegregation was operationalized in these two studies. For Dye desegregation involved the measurement of actual racial enrollment ratios within city elementary schools--and thus his finding of what accounts for "desegregation," i.e., lower racial imbalance in public school enrollment statistics. Kirby et al. drew their conclusion in terms of the handling of black demands, most of which were symbolic and did not call for actual racial balance implementation. Therefore, the dissimilarity between Dye and Kirby et al. could have been induced by the simple difference in exactly what dimension of racial segregation-desegregation was being measured: policy formulation or policy implementation, symbol or substance.

The discrepancy between Dye and Kirby et al. might well have been resolved, perhaps, had the latter fully operationalized all of the variables they found useful in explaining the desegregation issue in a study of racial enrollment patterns among their cities. However, this was not done. What was attempted was an extremely brief, limited investigation of the relationship between 1968 racial desegregation statistics and several demographic variables. In this abbreviated analysis it was found that "school desegregation action increased dramatically in 1968 because court orders increased dramatically in that year."<sup>83</sup> Based on fall 1968 enrollment statistics, the relationship between actual desegregation levels and

selected variables (percent black students "moved" in school system 1964-1971, school district population, the residential Taeuber index of segregation, and the percent black in the school district) was subjected to a multiple regression analysis. Although this analysis would have allowed an empirical test of many of the other propositions concerning school board activity and the political style of the cities at hand, such factors were not operationalized in this stage of the study. Statistically the independent variables explained slightly more than two-thirds of the variance in city desegregation levels, with percent of black students moved within the district having twice the relative explanatory power of the others. What Kirby et al. failed to determine was the socioeconomic and political characteristics of those cities most likely to move black students and thus to realize lower segregation levels. Their analysis only makes a good start at establishing the possible relationships that could have been explored. Based upon the regression results the authors concluded:

the normal pattern of American cities is a segregated school system, and the major reason for any change in this pattern is administrative action. Unfortunately, despite a lot of time and energy invested in this problem, the number of cities attempting to desegregate their school system has been small, and is declining. The middle and late sixties seem to have been the high point for progressive, 'liberal' policy. Further research may reveal to what extent this decline in the number of cities desegregating is part of a secular trend in the United States away from redistributive political actions. If it is, the courts would seem to be the only factor which might change this.<sup>84</sup>

Unfortunately this large generalization was based upon enrollment statistics for a single year. The measurement of "change" therefore seems limited. What was apparent was great variation in the amount, absolute and relative, of segregated schooling existing among U.S. northern cities in 1968. These authors do not account for this variation insofar as the wide variety of sociopolitical factors salient to desegregation could have been operationalized. In particular, the impact of extralocal variables, state and national, went unmeasured.

Kirby et al. developed an outstanding but limited study of school desegregation. Basically they were able to demonstrate that in the 1960's in response to the pressures from proponents of school desegregation, some northern school boards initiated desegregation "action." When any such decisions were made they usually were symbolic in nature and did not, in fact, lead to school desegregation as such. As important as this finding may be, and as important for the community decisionmaking literature as the findings regarding the correlates of these decisions may be, it does not inform us as to what accounts for why some cities had more desegregation than others. Nor is it entirely clear as to whether segregation levels have changed over time. Kirby et al. do not deal with a very vital issue regarding public school desegregation: the extent to which any, even the best intentioned, desegregation policy can be implemented in the face of demographic and sociopolitical constraints within a given local community.

Further, no explicit operationalization was made of the role of the state and national levels of government in shaping local desegregation policy and patterns. Still, it is not entirely fair to excoriate research for what was not studied, and as far as it goes, this is a truly excellent research effort. What is disconcerting, however, is the willingness with which the researchers suggest that they have dealt with northern desegregation, when in fact what had been studied was the desegregation issue.

Kirby and Crain in 1974 subsequently reanalyzed the data upon which the original Kirby et al. study was based. In this version, however, they were more interested in establishing the extent to which community conflict over school desegregation was "functional or dysfunctional." In particular they wished to study the extent to which controversy ultimately affected the school board desegregation decision, and whether "grass roots" demonstrations concerning this issue were effective or not. The most notable difference, and an improvement over the original study, was the inclusion of a research model for school desegregation decisions that was operationalized by the use of correlation and regression analysis. Kirby and Crain found that conflict-increasing tactics were "necessary to make school desegregation an issue," and that conflict within the local school board actually facilitated the likelihood that the board would acquiesce to desegregation demands. However, civil rights demonstrations were not generally found

to increase the likelihood of a favorable school board response to desegregation demands, nor was white grass roots activity any more effective in inhibiting desegregation decisions.<sup>85</sup>

The question of exactly what it is that Crain and Kirby, and Kirby et al., are actually studying is important to bear in mind. Although in both reports general statements regarding "desegregation" and the extent to which community background, or political characteristics facilitated or inhibited this policy are available, these conclusions are not always justified. For what has been studied was the desegregation "issue" at one point in time, for the most part, how it was raised and how the city responded. The independent variables in these studies were not comprehensively applied to the more direct question of how such cities varied regarding school desegregation, and why. Thus, the findings of these otherwise excellent studies must not automatically be generalized to urban desegregation patterns in toto.

In a study based on comprehensive racial enrollment data for public elementary schools for 1967-1968, Farley and Taeuber examined variation in segregation levels among sixty large U.S. cities. Using a reasonably complex measure of the extent to which any city would have to move elementary students to achieve racial balance within the school district, Farley and Taeuber found that "levels of racial segregation were universally high in large U.S. cities in fall 1967," and that southern cities were more segregated than their northern counterparts. Thus,

they concluded that "there is no justification for the assertion that school segregation in the North was as extensive as that in the South," although since that time, 1967, these patterns could have been changed. These analysts noted, however, that this result did not actually explain the segregation phenomena, because the causes of the residential segregation remained unclear. Although this monograph does not systematically explore the wide variety of socioeconomic, demographic, and political factors that might be expected to explain segregation levels among cities, it nonetheless is valuable in its attention to the necessity for sensitive, accurate empirical indicators of segregation and offers one viable alternative. But, because segregation levels were examined only at one point in time, the important change dimension of desegregation went unassessed. Further, the limited range of explanatory variables reduced the general information available from the analysis.<sup>86</sup>

Bullock and Rodgers studied the elimination of dual school systems among thirty-one Georgia districts between 1968 and 1970.<sup>87</sup> The purpose of the research was to establish an explanation for variation in the degree of coercion required to implement national desegregation policy. Six separate conditions were defined as antecedent to the elimination of dual schools in Georgia, involving the Department of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, the Department of Justice, and private litigants. The coercive techniques used by these



groups constituted the dependent variable of the study. These techniques included, in the order of severity as defined by the authors: a) voluntary compliance with Office for Civil Rights guidelines; b) Department of Justice litigation under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; c) private litigation; d) termination of federal funds under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; e) threatened loss of state funds in accord with the ruling in U.S. v. Georgia (1969);<sup>88</sup> and f) termination of federal funds in conjunction with threatened loss of state funds. The factors with which Bullock and Rodgers sought to explain the level of coercion used against school districts were divided into the environmental context (income and educational levels of total and black populations) and attributes of local school decision makers (attitudes, perceptions, and socioeconomic status). Coercion proved most intense in communities in which school officials disagreed with desegregation policy, had large black populations, and lower education and income levels. According to the authors, "These factors, singularly and in combination, created conditions that led school officials to evaluate defiance as worthwhile."

Levels of segregation in 1968 and 1970 for a large number of southern school districts were studied by Michael W. Giles.<sup>89</sup> In this study the mean level of segregation in districts subject to Department of Health, Education and Welfare enforcement proceedings was compared with that of districts under federal court order. The purpose of the analysis

was to evaluate the extent to which one federal agency was more effective than the other in enforcing compliance with federal desegregation policy. According to Giles, the mean index of segregation was "significantly" higher for court-ordered than for HEW-enforced southern districts. He also found that mean segregation levels were lower in both types of districts between 1968 and 1970; the decline in segregation, however, was greater among court-ordered districts. Based upon these results the author concluded that the "superiority" of HEW over court-ordered enforcement was confirmed.

A second step in the Giles study was the inclusion of percent black and school district size with the enforcement agency variable in a multiple regression analysis. This attempt to explain variation in segregation established the limited explanatory power of the enforcement agency. In 1968, the size of the school district and percent black explained 38 percent of the variance in segregation. The enforcement agency contributed only four percent explained variance when added to the prediction equation. In 1970, percent black was no longer "significantly" related to school segregation, although the importance of district size had increased (explaining approximately 21 percent of the variance). Once again, the explanatory contribution of enforcement agency was limited--adding only four percent to explained variance. Despite Giles' inattention to the fact, it is interesting to note that the 1968 regression equation explained only 41 percent

of the variance in segregation. Moreover, in 1970 the independent variables statistically explained only 25 percent of the variance in school segregation. At no time does Giles address himself to the large error term (unexplained variance) in the equations. Further, he completely ignores the change dimension inherent in the study, i.e., the difference (absolute or relative) between 1968 and 1970 segregation levels. This oversight is serious. It is specious to suggest that agency enforcement of any kind "caused" segregation levels in 1968. Any causal link existing between segregation and enforcement of public policy must be considered in view of the amount of change in this phenomena associated with such efforts. This point is of particular significance when juxtaposed with Giles' conclusions. For, based upon his observation that in 1968 and 1970 HEW districts had a lower mean segregation level than that of court-ordered districts, the author concluded that HEW-enforcement was superior. This conclusion does not take into account the vital question of whether such districts were distinctive in their segregation levels prior to agency enforcement! In fact, we would expect that court-ordered districts became such targets precisely because of original high segregation levels and further suspect that districts with which success could be anticipated (lower segregation levels) attracted HEW attention originally as a matter of strategy.<sup>90</sup> As a consequence, the most sound basis for comparison between such districts would be the variation in the amount of change

between time-one and time-two. Interestingly enough when Giles briefly looked at the absolute difference between 1968 and 1970 segregation levels he discovered more change among court-ordered districts! Contrary to the author's conclusion, we suggest that the data would indicate the greater efficacy of the courts as enforcement agencies because of the larger reduction in segregation in their districts.

Robey sought to determine the relationship between selected socioeconomic and political variables, and school segregation levels in 872 southern counties.<sup>91</sup> Basically this research was designed to refine the earlier research of Matthews and Prothro in order to establish whether political or socioeconomic forces were more closely associated with levels of segregation. As a result of simple and partial correlation analyses Robey concluded that the single strongest explanatory variable regarding 1967 levels of school segregation was the percent of a county's population black in 1960. The only association with segregation among political variables to withstand statistical control was the county percent vote for Wallace in 1968. Overall, counties with larger black populations and stronger Wallace support tended to be more segregated. The author concluded that each of these variables effectively stood for the rest of the factors in each class and that the "environmental variable" explained 23 percent and the "political variable" 16 percent of the variance in county segregation levels in 1967.

The major findings of the comparative studies reviewed above have been summarized in Table 1-5. This table indicates the nature of the research findings and enumerates the particular factors that have been considered explanatory across these empirical studies. The nature of these relationships, as is apparent in Table 1-5, has not always been consistent among the studies. Yet, the important factors associated with school desegregation within this literature are apparent and have been discussed in detail above.

#### Critical Evaluation of the Research Literature

While certain critical comments have been included within the discussions of particular pieces of desegregation research, a more integrated summative statement of what might be considered the major limitations of this literature is necessary. This study will explicitly attempt to avoid, or overcome, these several research problems in delineating the nature of urban public school desegregation patterns and patterns of change. Generally, the limitations outlined below will be avoided through the use of an explicit theoretical framework operationalized in an appropriate research model. The model will be applied across a comprehensive, and up-to-date, data base, composed of independent variables selected according to prior theoretical considerations of their explanatory relevance. To test the research model multivariate statistical techniques will be utilized, and through a systematic evaluation of the

TABLE 1-5  
SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE STUDY FINDINGS RELATING TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

| Comparative Study                                | Desegregation Measured Explicitly | Federal Impact | State Impact | Local Demo-graphic | Black Demo-graphic | Local Socio-Economic & Elites | Black Socio-Economic | Local Political Factors | Citizen Activism | School Board/ Superintendent | School District Organization | Region | City Size |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| Williams-Ryan (1954)                             | No                                | +              | -            |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         | +                | +                            | +                            |        |           |
| Pettigrew-Cramer (1959)                          | Yes                               |                |              |                    | -                  | -                             |                      |                         |                  |                              |                              |        |           |
| Pettigrew (1963)                                 | Yes                               | -              |              |                    |                    |                               |                      | -                       |                  |                              |                              |        | -         |
| Matthews-Prothro (1964)                          | Yes                               |                |              |                    | -                  | +                             | +                    | o                       |                  |                              |                              |        |           |
| Crain-Street (1966)                              | No                                |                |              |                    |                    | +                             |                      |                         | o                | (+)                          | -                            |        |           |
| Hill-Fealey (1967)                               | No                                | (+)            | (+)          |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         | o                | (+)                          |                              |        |           |
| Wirt (1967)                                      | No                                | (+)            | (+)          |                    | -                  |                               |                      |                         | +                |                              |                              |        |           |
| Crain-Vanecko (1968)                             | No                                |                |              |                    |                    | +                             |                      | o                       |                  | (+)                          |                              |        |           |
| Civil Rights Commission (1967), Racial Isolation | Yes                               | -              | -            | -                  | o                  | -                             |                      |                         |                  |                              | -                            | o      | o         |
| Civil Rights Commission (1967, Southern)         | Yes                               | (+)            | -            |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         |                  |                              | -                            |        |           |
| Dye (1968)                                       | Yes                               |                |              | +                  | -                  | (+)                           | o                    | (+)                     | o                |                              |                              | (+)    | -         |
| Inger-Stout (1968)                               | No                                |                |              |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         | -                | (+)                          |                              |        |           |
| Mock (1968)                                      | No                                |                |              |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         | +                |                              |                              |        | -         |
| Crain, et al. (1968)                             | No                                |                |              |                    |                    | (+)                           |                      | (+)                     | o                | (+)                          |                              | (+)    |           |
| Vnn Fossen (1968)                                | Yes                               |                |              | o                  | -                  | o                             | +                    |                         |                  |                              |                              |        |           |
| Pettigrew (1969)                                 | Yes                               |                |              |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         |                  |                              | -                            |        |           |
| Senate Select Committee (1972)                   | No                                | -              | -            | -                  |                    | -                             |                      |                         |                  |                              |                              |        | -         |
| Prothro (1972)                                   | Yes                               |                |              | -                  |                    | -                             |                      | o                       |                  |                              |                              |        |           |
| Kirby, et al.                                    | Yes                               | +              | +            | +                  | -                  | +                             |                      | -                       | o                | (+)                          |                              |        | -         |
| Farley-Tacuber (1974)                            | Yes                               |                |              |                    | -                  |                               |                      |                         |                  |                              |                              | (+)    | -         |
| Kirby-Crain (1974)                               | No                                |                |              | +                  |                    |                               |                      | +                       | (-o)             | (+)                          |                              | o      |           |
| Bullock-Rodgers (1974)                           | Yes                               | +              | +            |                    |                    |                               |                      |                         |                  | (+)                          |                              |        |           |
| Giles (1975)                                     | Yes                               |                |              |                    | -                  |                               |                      |                         |                  |                              | -                            |        |           |
| Robey (1975)                                     | Yes                               |                |              | o                  | -                  | o                             | o                    | -                       |                  |                              |                              |        |           |

NOTE: The meanings of the symbols used in this table are as follows: + denotes the factor facilitated desegregation in the community studied; - denotes the factor inhibited desegregation; o denotes the factor was not found to be important; + - denotes that the factor's impact involved facilitative and inhibitory aspects.

extent to which the research model is, or is not, successful in explaining desegregation patterns, and patterns of change, the theoretical framework's empirical utility will be determined.

The very nature of the case study design has limited the case study literature. It tends to be idiosyncratic as to its findings, limited essentially to the research site(s) for which the information was gathered. Generally the desegregation case studies described how community "A" or city "B" handled its desegregation crisis at one point in time. These series of unrelated studies, done at different time periods in different places simply lack comparability. Other than having a common research focus on problems of race and education they are simply impossible to relate to one another, and their findings cannot be generally applied to the full spectrum of American cities. An especially difficult problem with this literature has been the lack of any underlying conceptual framework which might otherwise have led them together. Cumulatively they fail to provide reliable, systematic, generalizable information concerning public school desegregation across the United States. At the same time, this literature remains an invaluable raw resource of research experience upon which the sensitive empirical student may wisely draw. For within these case studies lies a goldmine of potentially useful hypotheses and preliminary exploration. The point is that these constitute

a starting point, not the finished product, for systematic inquiry into school desegregation.

The comparative research literature concerning public school desegregation has been found to be more directly useful within the requirements of this study; yet as was true of the case studies, several major limitations are apparent. Basically these would appear to stem from disagreements over exactly what research approach would best facilitate a comprehensive understanding of school desegregation.

Several of the comparative studies reviewed were hardly more than a compilation of separate case studies from which a few broad conclusions about desegregation were drawn. The discontinuity in research methods and incomparability of findings for these studies are readily apparent. This problem is especially conspicuous in the work of Williams and Ryan, Hill and Feeley, Wirt, and Mack. The best of the comparative case study literature compensates for this problem by vigorously seeking consistency in the application of research design across the cities involved; but these too suffer from lack of power in generalizing beyond the specific research sites contained in the study. Therefore, the first important limitation of the comparative literature has been its inability to generate broadly applicable knowledge concerning desegregation patterns.

Particularly disconcerting is the large number of desegregation studies that do not deal with desegregation at all.



This is the "issue" literature, and it has focused almost exclusively on the way desegregation decisions at the local level have been made. Little if any attention has been paid to the extent to which this process, these decisions, were actually related to the implementation of school policy. Further, almost without exception such issue-oriented research has neglected the state and federal input to local decision-making in this regard. The hard reality of the years after 1954 has been that the elimination of segregation in schools has generally originated as a policy from without local political systems and has proceeded as a policy--as apart from implementation--in spite of local systems in many cases. Thus, the issue literature has failed to deal with the truly critical linkage inherent in this area of social policy--the extent to which the local communities have facilitated, or inhibited, the relative implementation of this penetrated policy. This criticism applies to some of the very best work in the area, Crain et al., Kirby et al., Inger and Stout, and Crain and Street. In particular, these studies fail to inquire into the implementation dimension insofar as their explanatory factors are not set against environmental constraints upon desegregation and evaluated systematically. This appears to be a very serious oversight, for the critical dimension of policy study is left untouched: the extent to which the decisions of political actors and institutions actually make a difference in the social affairs of the communities over

which they have governing responsibility. In addition to determining how and why public policy is formulated, it is also critical to understand to what effect. This is only possible--in the case of desegregation policy--by systematically considering the intricate and complex relationships between demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors at all levels of the federal structure, as these impinge upon the local school system and its racial balance. Within the comparative literature there were, of course, certain studies that explored this dimension of desegregation policy: Pettigrew and Cramer, Pettigrew, Matthews and Prothro, Vanfossen, Prothro, Dye, Bullock and Rodgers, Giles and Robey. Yet each of these tended to be unidimensional in its approach to desegregation--using a single, often politically insensitive measure. Further, only Bullock and Rodger, and Giles sought to incorporate national variables in an explanatory framework. Several completely neglected to include any political factors in the design.

It was not uncommon to find that some of the very best data concerning racial enrollment in the public schools were wasted in simplistic, impressionistic, and descriptive treatments. Such studies, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission or the Senate Select Committee, for example, did not systematically determine the interrelationships between salient socioeconomic, demographic and political characteristics of communities as these related to the implementation of desegregation policy.

Instead, they were content to draw broad conclusions, often attributing causality, based on the roughest approximations of demographic and racial enrollment data. The result was imprecision and assumption. The weight of causal factors could not be determined because these factors were never actually operationalized. The problem here is that remedies were suggested, especially in terms of federal action. It would seem dangerous to continue to base our knowledge concerning desegregation, and how best to increase it, on such broad studies. Now, more specific intelligence regarding the demographic constraints, as well as the socioeconomic and political, upon desegregation is needed. What is needed operationally is a broad, systematic study of desegregation patterns, incorporating the widest variety of theoretically useful variables into a design capable of making causal inferences.

The need for comparative research capable of yielding causal information leads to the discussion of the last, and greatest, shortcoming of the comparative research literature. Although amazingly replete with speculation, assumptions, guess work, and hypothesizing, the comparative literature--across the board--has been conducted with a singular inattention to theoretical considerations. Several pieces of work have implicitly contained the bare rudiments of a theoretical framework, Dye, Kirby et al., and Kirby and Crain; yet these have tended to relate only to local decisionmaking and were

unable to incorporate the state and national dimensions of desegregation policy making. The lack of a theoretical framework to guide these inquiries allowed inattention to important extralocal variables which must be included in delineating the parameters of school desegregation policy. As a result there is often a lack of selectivity in setting the factors into the analyses, and an almost total unconcern for the extent to which disturbing forces offset these results. Since no theoretical framework bounds these inquiries, there is no standard against which the findings may be assessed and other possible explanations developed. Symptomatic of this inattention to theory has been the widespread practice of raising a plethora of questions to be answered, often questions the research design has no capability for dealing with; and then in the course of the analysis never raising these questions again--or inadequately exploring the extent to which the research findings answered the questions. Most of all, this lack of an integrating theoretical framework has generated a literature with findings that are disorganized, impressionistic, speculative, idiosyncratic, and incapable of causal interpretation. Without a theoretical framework to guide its inquiry, the systematic study of public school desegregation has drifted.

Cumulatively these limitations in the research literature have placed us in a very limited position as far as understanding patterns of racial desegregation is concerned. For, without exception these studies have tended to focus exclusively

upon the static aspects of desegregation policy and have been inattentive to the social dynamics inherent in the nature of this public policy. The gap between research and theory has served to heighten this problem in that the framework for dealing with change has not been applied. In order to delineate with any precision at all the configurations of urban school desegregation, systematic attention must be paid to its inherently dynamic character. To do so requires a theoretical framework capable of unifying factors at all levels within the federal structure and which is expressly capable of accounting for social change as this is reflected in the explicit intent of public policy. It is toward the development of such a theoretical framework that the following chapter is devoted.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics," American Political Science Review 53 (December 1959): 1032-51.

<sup>2</sup>Stephen K. Bailey, et al., Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962, pp. vii-viii).

<sup>3</sup>Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, State Politics and Public Schools (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

<sup>4</sup>This literature is vast indeed, and a detailed citation would be laborious. The basic works are: Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: Praeger, 1969); Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); Harmon Zeigler, The Political Life of American Teachers (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown, 1969); and Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>5</sup>Jesse Burkhead, Public School Finance (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).

<sup>6</sup>Among the very excellent work in this area there has been: Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York: Norton, 1969); Paul E. Marsh and Ross A. Gortner, Federal Aid to Science Education (Syracuse University Press, 1963); Philip Meranto, The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1967); and Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., National Politics and Federal Aid to Education (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962).

<sup>7</sup>Grant Harman, "Continuities and Research Gaps in the Politics of Education," Social Science Quarterly 55 (September 1974): p. 265.

<sup>8</sup>Harman, "Continuities and Research Gaps," p. 267.

<sup>9</sup>Robert Agger and Marshall Goldstein, Who Will Rule the Schools? (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1971); Robert Bender, The Politics of Schools (New York: New American Library, 1969); Laurence Iannaccone, Politics, Power and Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970); Alan Rosenthal, ed., Governing Education (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1969).

<sup>10</sup>Alan A. Altshuler, Community Control of Schools (New York: Pegasus, 1970); Roald F. Campbell, "The Folklore of Local School Control," The School Review 68 (Spring 1959): 1-6; Leonard Fein, The Ecology of the Public Schools (New York: Pegasus, 1971); Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, and Richard Magat, Community Control and the Urban School (New York: Praeger, 1971); Marilyn Gittell, et al., Demonstration for Social Change (New York: Institute for Community Studies, 1971); George R. LaNoue and Bruce L. R. Smith, The Politics of School Decentralization (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973); Charles H. Moore and Ray E. Johnson, "School Decentralization, Community Control, and the Politics of Education," Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (June 1971): 421-445; Joe L. Rempson, "For an Elected Local School Board," The Urban Review 1 (November 1966): 2-11; and Michael D. Usdan, "Citizen Participation: Learning from New York City's Mistakes," The Urban Review 4 (September 1969): 9-13.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas R. Dye, et al., "Differentiation and Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area," Midwest Journal of Political Science 7 (May 1963): 145-55; Thomas R. Dye, "Government Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (February 1967): 353-380; Marilyn Gittell, Participants and Participation (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1969); and Marilyn Gittell and Edward T. Hollander, Six Urban School Districts (New York: Praeger, 1969).

<sup>12</sup>Alan Campbell and Philip Meranto, "The Metropolitan Education Dilemma," Urban Affairs Quarterly 2 (September 1966): 42-63; Richard F. Carter, Voters and Their Schools (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); Neal Gross, "Who Controls the Schools?" Education and Public Policy, ed. by Seymour E. Harris (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing, 1965); David W. Minar, "The Community Basis of Conflict in School System Politics," American Sociological Review 31 (December 1966): 822-834; and William R. Odell, et al., Voters and Their Schools and Communities and Their Schools (Stanford: Stanford Institute for Communications Research, 1960).

<sup>13</sup>Charles E. Bidwell, "The School as a Formal Organization," Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); L. L. Cunningham, "Decision-Making Behavior of School Boards," American School Board Journal (February 1962): 25-30; Neal Gross, Who Runs Our Schools? (New York: John Wiley, 1958); Van Miller, The Public Administration of American School Systems (New York: MacMillan, 1965); Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis (Chicago: Educational Methods, 1964); Alan Rosenthal, "Administrator-Teacher Relations: Harmony or Conflict?"

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<sup>14</sup>Ivar Berg, "Unionized Educators: Some Comparisons With the Private Sector," The Urban Review 3 (June 1969): 24; 34-37; Marilyn Gittell and Maurice Berube, Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville (New York: Praeger, 1969); M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "The Politics of Teacher-Administrator Relations," Education and Social Science 1 (1969): 73-82; Naomi Levine and Richard Cohen, Ocean Hill-Brownsville--A Case History of Schools in Crisis (New York: Popular Library, 1969); Martin Mayer, The Teachers Strike, New York, 1968 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Alan Rosenthal, Pedagogues and Power (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969); Arthur E. Salz, "Policymaking Under Decentralization: The Role of Collective Bargaining at the Local Level," The Urban Review 3 (June 1969): 24; 31-34.

<sup>15</sup>Robert S. Cahill and Stephen P. Hencley, eds., The Politics of Education (Danville, Ill.: Interstate, 1964); Marilyn Gittell and Alan G. Hevesi, eds., The Politics of Urban Education (New York: Praeger, 1969); Ralph Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision Making (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); Michael W. Kirst, ed., State, School, and Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972); Michael W. Kirst and Edith K. Mosher, "The Politics of Education," Review of Educational Research 39 (December 1969): 620-624; Philip Meranto, School Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970); Phi Delta Kappa, "The Politics of Education," Phi Delta Kappan 49 (February 1968); Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); and Harmon Zeigler and Karl F. Johnson, The Politics of Education in the States (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).

<sup>16</sup>Frederick M. Wirt, "American Schools as a Political System: A Bibliographic Essay," State, School, and Politics, ed. Michael W. Kirst (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972), p. 249.

<sup>17</sup>Wirt, "American Schools as a Political System," pp. 249-263.

<sup>18</sup>Wirt, "American Schools as a Political System," p. 265.

<sup>19</sup>Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 573: 1896.



<sup>20</sup>Joel B. Grossman and Richard S. Wells, Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 319.

<sup>21</sup>Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337: 1968.

<sup>22</sup>Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631: 1948.

<sup>23</sup>McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637: 1950.

<sup>24</sup>Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629: 1950.

<sup>25</sup>347 U.S. 483: 1954.

<sup>26</sup>Brown v. Board, 1954.

<sup>27</sup>Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294: 1955.

<sup>28</sup>Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock, III., Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 69.

<sup>29</sup>Rodgers and Bullock, Law and Social Change, pp. 7-8.

<sup>30</sup>Charles O. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 102-3.

<sup>31</sup>The discussion of the 1968-1971 federal desegregation efforts relies heavily upon the account provided in the Congressional Quarterly, Civil Rights Progress Report 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1970), pp. 49-52.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Office of Education, Federal Assistance to Desegregating School Districts: A Report on Activities From August 1970 to September 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 26.

<sup>33</sup>Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1: 1971.

<sup>34</sup>U.S. Office of Education, Federal Assistance to Desegregating School Districts: A Report on Activities From August 1973 to September 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 1.

<sup>35</sup>Southern Education Reporting Service, Statistical Summary of School Segregation-Desegregation in the Southern and Border States (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Service, 1962), p. 2.

<sup>36</sup>There is a rich literature covering this period in American history. See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), Chapter 2; Harold Baker, The Federal Retreat in School Desegregation (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1969); Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970); Daniel M. Berman, It Is So Ordered (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966); Congressional Quarterly, Revolution in Civil Rights, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1967); Congressional Quarterly, Civil Rights Progress Report 1970; Thomas R. Dye, The Politics of Equality (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Benjamin Muse, Ten Years of Prelude (New York: Viking, 1964); Jack W. Peltason, 58 Lonely Men (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961); Rodgers and Bullock, Law and Social Change; The Southern Regional Council, Desegregation 1966: The Slow Undoing (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1966); Kenneth N. Vines, "Courts and Political Change in the South," Journal of Social Issues 22 (January 1966): 59-72; and C. E. Williams, "Implementation of the Supreme Court's Decision on Racial Desegregation in Public Education," AAUP Bulletin 43 (June 1957): 295-305. For a classic account of the South in the years following the Plessy decision see, C. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

<sup>37</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 43. For an extremely comprehensive treatment of the impact of Title VI in the South see Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education (New York: John Wiley, 1969).

<sup>38</sup>Orfield, Reconstruction, pp. 2-3.

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

<sup>40</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 125.

<sup>41</sup>In 1972, 11.2% of black pupils in the U.S. were still attending totally segregated schools. Statistical Abstract 1974, p. 125.

<sup>42</sup>See Dye's excellent discussion of these trends and their implications in Understanding Public Policy, chapter III.

<sup>43</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, Toward Equal Educational Opportunity, S. Rept. 92-000, 92D, Cong., 2d sess., 1970.

<sup>44</sup>"Federal Policy, Local Power and Metropolitan Segregation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 29 August-2 September, 1974.

<sup>45</sup>Bradley v. Milliken, Civ. Action 35257 (E.D. Mich. 1971). In July 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that busing across district lines would not be allowed, reversing Judge Roth. Milliken v. Bradley, 1974.

<sup>46</sup>Orfield, "Federal Policy, Local Power," p. 6.

<sup>47</sup>The following are the major case studies reviewed in this section and included in Table 1-4: James H. Tipton, Community in Crisis: The Elimination of Segregation from a Public School System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); Advisory Committee on Human Relations, "The Allen Report on New York City Schools," Integrated Education 2 (August-September 1964): 14-32; Philip M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," Daedalus 94, 4 (Fall, 1965): 847-877; Kurt Lang and Gladys E. Lang, "Resistance to School Desegregation: A Study of Backlash Among Jews," Sociological Inquiry 35 (Winter 1965): 94-106; Elmer Luchterwand and Leonard Weller, "Social Class and the Desegregation Movement: A Study of Parents' Attitudes in a Negro Ghetto," Social Problems 13 (Summer 1965): 83-88; Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Continuing Barriers to Desegregated Education in the South," Sociology of Education 38 (Winter 1965): 623-630; Robert A. Dentler, "Barriers to Northern School Desegregation," Daedalus 95 (Winter 1966): 45-63; Bert Swanson, The Struggle for Equality: School Integration Controversy in New York (New York: Hobbs-Dorman, 1966); Jerome Beker, A Study of Integration in Racially Imbalanced Urban Public Schools: Final Report (New York: Syracuse University Youth Development Center, 1967); Robert LaFrankie, "Englewood: A Northern City in Crisis," The Urban R's: Race Relations as a Problem in Urban Education, ed. by Robert A. Dentler, Bernard Meekler, and Mary Ellen Warshaver (New York: Praeger, 1967); Donald H. Bouma, The Dynamics of School Integration: Problems and Approaches in a Northern City (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Erdmans, 1968); Robert Heifetz, "The Public Sector, Residential Desegregation, and the Public Schools: A Case Study from Buffalo, New York," The Urban Review 2 (February 1968): 30-33; Irving G. Hendrick, The Development of a School Integration Plan in Riverside, California: A History and Perspective (Riverside, Cal.: University of California Press, 1968); David Rogers and Bert Swanson, "White Citizen Response to the Same Integration Plan: Comparisons of Local School Districts in a Northern City," Sociological Inquiry 35 (Winter 1966): 107-22; Robert T. Stout and Gerald Sroufe, "Politics Without Power: The Dilemma of a Local School

System," Phi Belta Kappan 49, 6 (1968): 342-45; Mary Ellen Warshaver, "Glen Cove, New York: The Evolution of a School Desegregation Plan," The Urban Review 2 (February 1968): 25-28; Reginald G. Damerell, Triumph in a White Suburb (New York: Morrow, 1968); Neil V. Sullivan and Evelyn S. Stewart, Now Is The Time: Integration in the Berkeley Schools (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969); Morton Inger, Politics and Reality in an American City: The New Orleans School Crisis of 1960 (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1968); James R. Noland, Jerry Robinson, Jr., and Edwin Martin, "How It Was in Houston, Texas," Integrated Education 7 (May-June 1969): 38-43; T. D. Wogaman, "Desegregation in Berkeley: Some Applicable Lessons," The Urban Review 3 (February 1969): 13-16; David Rogers, "Obstacles to School Desegregation in New York City: A Benchmark Case," The Politics of Urban Education, ed. by Marilyn Gittell and Alan G. Hevesi (New York: Praeger, 1969); William Bagwell, School Desegregation in the Carolinas: Two Case Studies (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1972); Edna Bonacich and Robert F. Goodman, Deadlock in School Desegregation: A Case Study of Inglewood, California (New York: Praeger, 1972); Lillian B. Rubin, Busing and Backlash: White Against White in a California School (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972); John Caughey, To Kill a Child's Spirit: The Tragedy of Segregation in Los Angeles (Ithaca, Ill.: Peacock, 1973); and Anna Holden, The Bus Stops Here: A Study of Desegregation in Three Cities (New York: Agathon, 1974).

<sup>48</sup>Robin M. Williams, Jr. and Margaret Ryan, eds., Schools in Transition: Community Experiences in Desegregation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 14-16.

<sup>49</sup>Thomas F. Pettigrew and M. R. Cramer, "The Demography of Desegregation," Journal of Social Issues 15 (Fall 1959): 61-71.

<sup>50</sup>Thomas F. Pettigrew, "De Facto Segregation, Southern Style," Integrated Education 1 (October-November 1963): 15-18.

<sup>51</sup>"Demographic Correlates of Border-State Desegregation," American Sociological Review 22 (December 1957): 683-689; "Continuing Barriers to Desegregated Education in the South," Sociology of Education 38 (Winter 1965): 623-630; and "School Integration in Current Perspective," The Urban Review 3 (January 1969): 4-8.

<sup>52</sup>Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways," Essays on the American Constitution, ed. by Gottfried Dietze (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964): 141-150.

<sup>53</sup>Matthews and Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways," pp. 150-154.

<sup>54</sup>Robert L. Crain and David Street, "School Desegregation and School Decision-Making," Urban Affairs Quarterly 2 (September 1966): 64-82.

<sup>55</sup>Roscoe Hill and Malcom Felley, eds., Affirmative School Integration (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1967).

<sup>56</sup>Frederick M. Wirt, "The Politics of Education," School Desegregation in the North, ed. by T. Bentley Edwards and Frederick M. Wirt (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), p. 325.

<sup>57</sup>Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 357-358.

<sup>58</sup>Robert A. Dentler, "Barriers to Northern School Desegregation," Daedalus 95 (Winter 1966): 45-63; Bert Swanson, The Struggle for Equality (New York: Hobbs, Dorman, 1966); and Anna Holden, The Bus Stops Here (New York: Agathon Press, 1974).

<sup>59</sup>Crain, et al., Politics of School Desegregation, pp. 359-361.

<sup>60</sup>Crain, et al., Politics of School Desegregation, pp. 364-5.

<sup>61</sup>Robert L. Crain and James J. Vanecko, "Elite Influence in School Desegregation," City Politics and Public Policy, ed. by James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 135-144.

<sup>62</sup>Racial Isolation in the Public Schools.

<sup>63</sup>U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Southern School Desegregation: 1966-'67 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1967).

<sup>64</sup>Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation," Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (December 1968): 142-43. For extended discussions of the nondecision aspect of policy making see: Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 947-52; and "Decisions and Non-decisions," American Political Science Review 57 (September 1963): 632-42. Also, Raymond Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," American Political Science Review 65 (December 1971): 1063-80, and Frederick W. Frey, "Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power," American Political Science Review 65 (December 1971): 1081-1101.

<sup>65</sup>Dye, "Urban School Segregation," pp. 144-145.

<sup>66</sup>Segregation was defined as the percent of total black elementary pupils enrolled in 90-100% minority schools. Teacher segregation was also used as a dependent variable, however, since the results corresponded to those for student segregation, and since the thrust of the Dye monograph was in discussing pupil segregation, the teacher-findings are not explicitly reviewed here.

<sup>67</sup>Dye, "Urban School Segregation," p. 151.

<sup>68</sup>Dye, "Urban School Segregation," pp. 152-155.

<sup>69</sup>Morton Inger and Robert T. Stout, "School Desegregation: The Need to Govern," The Urban Review 3 (November 1968): 35-8.

<sup>70</sup>Raymond W. Mack, ed., Our Children's Burden (New York: Random House, 1968).

<sup>71</sup>James S. Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).

<sup>72</sup>Thomas F. Pettigrew, "School Integration in Current Perspective," pp. 4-8.

<sup>73</sup>Beth E. Vanfossen, "Variables Related to Desegregation in the South," Social Forces 47 (September 1968): 39-44.

<sup>74</sup>Senate Select Committee, Toward Equal Educational Opportunity, 1972, p. 127.

<sup>75</sup>James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited: An Error in Prediction," Journal of Politics 34 (May 1972): 352-64.

<sup>76</sup>Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited," pp. 358-60.

<sup>77</sup>Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited," p. 362.

<sup>78</sup>Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited," p. 363.

<sup>79</sup>David J. Kirby, et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973).

<sup>80</sup>Kirby, et al., Political Strategies, pp. 14-15.

<sup>81</sup>Kirby, et al., Political Strategies, p. 15.

<sup>82</sup>Kirby, et al., Political Strategies, pp. 15-18.

This argument in behalf of the upper and middle class ethic being "public regarding" has also been put forward by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson as "ethos Theory." See, for example: City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review 58 (December 1964): 876-87; and "Political Ethos Revisited," American Political Science Review 65 (December 1971): 1048-62.

<sup>83</sup>Detailed racial enrollment data were for fall 1968, taken from HEW's Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts. To count the number of students reassigned to "increase integration," Kirby et al. used the 1968 HEW data and looked for biracial schools. They then asked local informants whether this school had become biracial because of student transfers, or because it was in a balanced neighborhood.

<sup>84</sup>Kirby, et al., Political Strategies, p. 200.

<sup>85</sup>David J. Kirby and Robert L. Crain, "The Functions of Conflict: School Desegregation in 91 Cities," Social Science Quarterly 55 (September 1974): 478-92.

<sup>86</sup>Reynolds Farley and Alma F. Taeuber, "Racial Segregation in the Public Schools," American Journal of Sociology 79 (January 1974): 888-905.

<sup>87</sup>Charles S. Bullock, III and Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., "Compliance to Coercion: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., 1974.

<sup>88</sup>Civil No. 12972, N.D. Ga., December, 16, 1969.

<sup>89</sup>"H.E.W. Versus the Federal Courts: A Comparison of School Desegregation Enforcement," American Politics Quarterly 3 (January 1975): 81-90.

<sup>90</sup>John S. Robey, "Public School Desegregation Policy in the South: Economic Versus Political Models of Explanation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, Texas, 1975.

## CHAPTER II

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### A Public Policy Approach to Urban

#### School Desegregation

Public policy analysis in political science is concerned with what governments do, why and to what effect. Although it is apparent that several conceptions of public policy have been used over time by political scientists which raises potential definitional and conceptual issues, Sharkansky's solution to this problem seems reasonable:

It would be futile and misleading to work toward a clear definition of policy, policy process, or policy-making. Political scientists who study these topics take different approaches and use specific definitions that are appropriate for their purposes. These definitions, however, do share certain meanings. We can express these terms simply, while admitting that some ambiguities exist.<sup>1</sup>

While specific conceptualizations and definitions of public policy and related constructs vary depending upon the perspective and research intent of the analyst, a broad consensus does appear as to the essence of the concept. Public policy is, as Dye has defined it: "whatever governments choose to do or not to do."<sup>2</sup> According to this simple definition there are action and inaction dimensions to public policies:



Realistically, our notion of public policy must include all actions of government--and not just stated intentions of governments or government officials. Finally we must also consider government inaction--what a government chooses not to do--as a public policy. Obviously government inaction can have as great an impact on society as government action.<sup>3</sup>

The actions and inactions of governments encompass a variety of formal and informal behaviors relative to numerous functional areas that are considered "policy." Among these would be the regulative, symbolic, organizational, and extractive allocation of values within the society as a whole.

Public policy, as broadly conceived, is not a new concern of political science. Traditionally students of politics have been attentive to the nature of government activity: "Political scientists have long been concerned with public policy, how it gets enacted, which groups favor or oppose a particular policy, and who derives the benefits or suffers the consequences of certain policy enactments."<sup>4</sup> In the period between the great World Wars, political science primarily concerned itself with the philosophical-legal-institutional dimensions of government activity, predominantly in a descriptive and prescriptive fashion.<sup>5</sup> The post-World War II era, however, brought a shift in the discipline's approach to the study of public policy. Behavioral political science attended to the process and behavior dimensions of government activity involving,

. . . the study of the sociological and psychological bases of the individual and group political behavior; the determinants of voting and other political activities; the functioning of interest groups and political

parties; and the description of various processes and behaviors in the legislative, executive and judicial arenas.<sup>6</sup>

This behavioral "revolution" in the study of public policy eschewed the philosophic-normative-institutional preoccupations of the earlier period, substituting concentration upon institutional structure inasmuch as these could be shown to relate to the process by which government activities were affected and behavior modified.<sup>7</sup> In short, the behavioral shift to process, and the redirected attention to policy analysis, "grew out of the scientific movement in political science which developed following World War II. This produced a primary focus on the process by which policies were formulated and the maneuverings and power plays which resulted in the choice of a particular policy over another."<sup>8</sup>

By the early sixties the behavioral focus upon process drew increasing criticism. The primary criticism raised was that, "while this approach described the processes by which public policy was determined, it did not deal directly with the linkages between various processes and behaviors and the content of public policy."<sup>9</sup> Also, in the middle and late sixties the relevance of the process approach to important social issues was questioned.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, in the sixties the contemporary public policy perspective emerged, heavily influenced by the behavioral approach and its empirical, quantitative, theory-oriented, and explanatory thrusts. The emerging public policy perspective shifted primary analytical focus from the

process to the product; the impact as well as the content of government activity became salient as a research issue. This third major approach to the traditional policy concerns of political science involved the "description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity."<sup>11</sup> It has been distinguished from traditional approaches in its primary concern with explanation rather than prescription; its reliance upon comparative studies of policy across nations, government agencies, states or local communities; an interdisciplinary search for important concepts and explanatory factors beyond purely traditional political and governmental elements; and its heavy emphasis upon cumulative empirical research directed toward theory building. The policy perspective is distinctive from the behavioral approach because of its primary focus on policy content and impact, as opposed to process and behavior. The explicit concern of the public policy approach in its contemporary form is to "investigate the relation between political processes and the policies adopted by political systems." From this particular perspective public policy becomes the major dependent variable of political analysis, and socio-political structures, processes, and behaviors with which analysts seek to explain public policy are the independent variables:

Public policy, its formulation, implementation and effects, is one of the major interests of students of politics. Political science is concerned with how various formal and informal institutions, economic, social, philosophical, and geographic conditions influence the adoption and implementation of policy.<sup>12</sup>

In summary, the contemporary public policy approach is explicitly concerned with describing policy content, measuring and evaluating the effect of important environmental institutional and behavioral factors upon policy content, and measuring the impact of public policy upon the society to which it has been applied.

Public school desegregation policy in the United States is a particularly appropriate subject for policy analysis for several reasons. This is no trivial policy; it reflects extremely significant allocations of values within American society. Within the confines of the desegregation issue manifestations of the basic social cleavages that have shaped American history since mid-century are apparent. A tremendous volume of public energy and resources have been allocated to this educational phenomenon. As an issue, desegregation highlights the education-polity nexus, and the extent to which this policy has had social impact is of a matter of interest to students and practitioners of government alike. This policy affords a unique opportunity to study the configuration, and impact, of abiding social change, and this is a critical element of public policy. That is, a primary concern of policy analysis is the extent to which public decisions ultimately shape, or fail to shape, the society for which policy has been developed. Desegregation of public schools is the kind of public policy that allows us to deal with "substantive" policy.

A common criticism of the policy approach has been that it has relied exclusively upon the investigation of fiscal policy and hence has not yielded information pertaining to more socially-relevant social questions.<sup>13</sup> Because levels of racial segregation in schools can be measured in quantitative terms, this subject offers an excellent opportunity to apply advanced statistical analysis to such a "socially relevant" question.

Earlier the limitations of the desegregation research literature were delineated at length. As a rule these fail to yield precise, comprehensive information as to the causes for variation in desegregation patterns. The public policy approach, as part of a larger conceptual framework, is capable of guiding a multivariate analysis of these patterns in a way as to meet this shortcoming. Given the public policy focus upon the spectrum of environmental, institutional, and behavioral forces that are relevant to desegregation policy, it should be possible to design research in such a way as to maximize information concerning this social phenomenon. Moreover, utilizing the public policy perspective affords the benefit of conducting research within an already rich set of concepts and operational hypotheses, i.e., the information available from systematic empirical analysis of other types of public policy may be utilized in examining this particular policy. What is needed then, to supplement the policy perspective, as it would guide desegregation research, is a specific theoretical

framework capable of organizing the entire set of forces, environmental, socioeconomic, and political, which may be expected to cause variations in desegregation patterns of American cities.

Although by no means limited to these areas, the policy approach has been most widely and fruitfully applied to the study of comparative American state and local government.<sup>14</sup> In organizing comparative state and local research from a policy perspective analysts have generally relied heavily upon the seminal theoretical work of David Easton. The systems framework developed by Easton has provided, if only implicitly, the model within which the preponderance of empirical research in comparative state and local politics has been conducted.<sup>15</sup>

#### The Eastonian Model of the Political System

Systems analysis, as conceived by Easton, is built upon four general premises: (1) that it is "useful to view political life as a system of behavior;" (2) that a system is "distinguishable from the environment in which it exists and open to influences from it;" (3) that "variations in the structures and processes within a system may usefully be interpreted as constructive or positive alternative efforts by members of a system to regulate or cope with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal sources;" and (4) that the "capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences

that return to its actors and decision-makers." According to Easton, "it is helpful to interpret political phenomena as constituting an open system, one that must cope with the problems generated by its exposure to influences from these environmental systems. If a system of this kind is to persist through time, it must obtain adequate feedback about its past performances, and it must be able to take measures that regulate its future behavior."

Easton considered a political system as "a set of interactions isolated from other kinds of interactions in which the human being is engaged." He argued that the political system, like all social systems, is analytic in character. The political system has no biologic existence; it does not exist in reality but is an analytic construct with which the analyst organizes the "sets of interactions spatially dispersed, diffused, or imbedded in other kinds of behaviors" which taken as a whole constitute those activities the analyst defines as "political." However, Easton has further emphasized that, despite its analytic character, the political system has empirical status; the interactions which characterize this analytic construct are real, and these may be observed: "The analytic characteristic of the political system does not affect its empirical status. It refers only to the fact that for purposes of theoretical treatment political activities will be differentiated and temporarily abstracted from all other kinds of

activities. But we are still dealing with observable behavior." The important contribution of using the systems construct Easton argues is that "This approach will not lead us to ignore the other kinds of behavior out of which the abstraction is made; they will have important consequences for the political aspects of the total behavior. Indeed . . . they make up the social environment of a political system. We will need to take into account the interaction among the different analytic systems by which political behavior may be shaped." The most important element of the basic Eastonian framework, apart from the specific components that comprise it, is that the theoretical status of a political system is "analytic but nonetheless empirical in character;" that is, it can be used to guide empirical research into the actual behavior of political actors and institutions.<sup>16</sup>

Within Easton's theoretical framework, public policy (what government does) is considered to be the product (output) of the political system (structures and processes engaged in the authoritative allocation of values to the rest of the society). Public policy is developed by the political system through what is called the "conversion" process, in which demands (input) that are received from the environment surrounding the political system are translated into authoritative decisions (output). Thus, public policy is considered the product of the political system, and insofar as demands are



satisfied the important subsidiary function of system maintenance is also realized. A key premise of the framework is that unless demands are effectively met, i.e., unless inputs are converted to satisfactory outputs, the system cannot adapt to its environment and can be expected to have difficulty in maintaining itself. Figure 2-1 presents a simplified diagram of the Eastonian system model under discussion.




FIGURE 2-1

SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF SYSTEM MODEL

The system model analytically suggests that, within any political system, public policy is a response to environmental forces that are filtered through political structures and processes. Implicit in the model is the principle that the nature of the environment will tend to significantly affect the nature of the system and the character of the public policy which emerges from the system. That is, what goes into the system must bear some relation to what ultimately will emerge. The extent to which this actually holds true depends upon the nature of the structure and activity within the political system, where conversion occurs, as well as upon the nature of the demands themselves. The empirical-analytic character

of this framework suggests that its utility may be evaluated through the extent to which structures and activities within the system actually modify environmental forces in real world situations. The nature of the linkage between input and output, and its obvious importance for this framework, accounts for the heavy public policy concentration upon the degree to which variation in output may be accounted for simply through variation in political variables. Yet, public policy analysis within the Eastonian systems framework deserves to be more broadly construed than as a means of testing the importance of political phenomena. As one observer has noted, the purpose of such analysis should involve the establishment of an "understanding of linkages between environmental forces, political processes, and public policy."<sup>17</sup>

The systems framework, as conceptualized by Easton, does not require the inclusion of any specific activity within its boundaries--so long as these are related directly to the authoritative allocation of values,

Accordingly, what we choose to put inside our system, to consider within its boundaries, will depend upon what we wish to examine in detail; for scientific purposes we also expect that these variables will show considerable interrelationship and coherence. What we leave outside, as part of its environment, will be those factors that we can accept as givens.

The flexibility inherent in this aspect of the framework makes its popularity, and utility, for research in policy analysis obvious. It is also useful because it analytically distinguishes between the "political" and the "environment" without extending

preeminence to either. The environmental factors represent the independent variables in the framework, and according to Easton, "in identifying them we thereby relieve ourselves of the need to go into detail about how they arise and what induces them to take the values that they do." This characteristic of Easton's framework is particularly attractive to policy analysts, as they are unconcerned with the causes of certain environmental factors, except as these relate to, and have impact upon, the political system and its products. The framework imposes no assumption of the intrinsic "importance" of the factors involved, be they within or without the political system:

The external as compared to the internal or dependent variables may well have major consequences for the operation of the system. The fact that we consider them to be parameters of the system is not to be interpreted as indicating their irrelevance or lesser significance for understanding the functioning of the system. Their exclusion from the system for purposes of analysis says nothing at all about their contribution to the persistence or transformation of the system. All that it indicates is that the interrelationship of those elements or variables included in the system is what we wish to understand. They are the strictly political variables.<sup>18</sup>

Although the analyst accepts environmental elements as "givens", it is nevertheless pertinent to be concerned with tracing their impact on the dependent, internal, or political variables.

The Dye Modification of the Systems Model

Empirical research conducted within the basic systems framework has frequently emerged as an argument over the relative importance of environmental and political factors in explaining variation in state and local public policy. Perhaps as a result of the sequential nature of the linkages in the basic Eastonian scheme, such research appears to have assumed that the relative impact of environmental and political elements is of preeminent theoretical and substantive concern. The argument has been especially vociferous as to the importance, or relative unimportance, of political factors.<sup>19</sup> Occasionally it even appears as if there are a number of political analysts holding a normative attitude that, somehow, political variables "ought: to be more important than "mere" environmental factors in explaining public policy.<sup>20</sup> A substantial proportion of such research is based on an assumption, often implicit, that political factors should be expected to be substantially independent in their impact on public policy. No genuine justification for such an assumption is readily apparent in the basic systems framework. In fact, it suggests just the opposite: that the political system functions as an elaborate filter for inputs, serving to process and convert environmental forces into public policy, and not necessarily to generate policy independent of environmental factors--although such "withinputs" are possible. A probable cause of this common

assumption, and the consequent controversy, is that many of the studies involved are not sufficiently grounded in, or concerned about, theory. They simply adopt, often implicitly, the Eastonian framework without considering its nature and structure in detail. Without an explicit consideration of the framework as a part of the research design, it is not difficult to understand how the pseudo-issue of the "importance" of political as compared to social and economic factors would emerge. This dispute, however, has diverted attention from the basic fact that this is an analytic framework, and that the distinctions between its components are arbitrary, even if empirically observable. Conceivably, this controversy reflects, in large degree, a disciplinary defensiveness about the significance of its subject matter. But as Prothro has noted:

If, in tracing explanatory factors, our paths of explanation lead us outside the political and into the broader social system, we have simply demonstrated anew that politics does not exist in isolation. The significance of political science lies, however, in what we are trying to explain, not in the parochial claim that would restrict the range of independent variables.<sup>21</sup>

In short, one of the major theoretical arguments concerning Easton's framework, as it has been operationalized in the research literature, has actually led policy analysis astray: all too often political analysts have been carried away with the analytic distinction between the political system and the environment surrounding it, when the original purpose of the

framework was to achieve the "most effective and efficient explanation of policy outcomes." That is,

economic or other environmental variables explain public policy more clearly than political variables, so much the better. The object is to explain public policy, and not to assert the primacy of politics or economics in determining policy outcomes.<sup>22</sup>

As public policy research proceeded under the systems framework, it often found that socioeconomic variables explained more variance in public policies than political factors, under statistical control.<sup>23</sup> The reverse has also been found.<sup>24</sup> Soon it was apparent that a modification in the framework was needed. Since in many cases environmental variables were found to have an independent affect upon public policy, it is the conversion function of the political system that could not always be considered determinative, or even significant, in explaining or understanding public policy. Therefore, Dye and others have created an additional linkage to account for the potentially independent impact of the environment on public policy, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.<sup>25</sup>




FIGURE 2-2

#### DIAGRAM OF MODIFIED SYSTEM FRAMEWORK

Although argument continues concerning the extent to which, in any given policy-area, political or environmental variables

are preeminent in determining public policy, this modified framework has gained wide currency.

#### Theoretical Requirements of Desegregation Change

The systems framework emphasis on the interaction between the elements of the environment and political factors renders it an excellent framework of analysis for this study. Desegregation policy will be considered, as in the modified framework of Figure 2-2 above, as the potential product of both environmental and political forces with the understanding that a direct linkage between environmental forces and desegregation patterns is possible--in fact given the literature available, we are especially interested in precisely determining the environmental forces which independently affect this particular public policy. Although this research is capable of testing the existence of such a direct linkage, that is not its primary consideration.

Earlier the development of desegregation policy in the United States was traced, and the fact that this involved a reversal of previous national, state, and local public policy was emphasized. The basic systems framework suggests that the environment could bring a change in the policy of the political system which could account for desegregation changes, and the Dye modification indicates that, at the same time, other non-political forces in the environment could operate directly to constrain the formulation, or at the very least, the

implementation of this particular policy. Without question the empirical inquiry framed in this study has a particular need for the dynamic elements of the systems scheme. The very nature, however, of desegregation as a public policy requires more. Although school desegregation policy is implemented at the local level, it is dangerous to assume that desegregation patterns can be entirely "explained" at this level.

Racial matters in the United States concern attitudes, customs, institutions, and many other social forces which created racial segregation in public schools in the first place, and these spanned local community borders. The factors which caused the reversal of racial apartheid practices in public schools tended to transcend community boundaries as did certain forces opposing this change. The impact of the federal structure as well as the environment of the local political system must be explicitly added to the basic theoretical structure. Although this addition to the framework may prove of limited usefulness in dealing with patterns of urban school desegregation at one point in time, it becomes critical in the empirical measurement and systematic analysis of changes in these patterns.

The exclusion of extralocal forces from the framework would seriously compromise the substantive import of the study when it came to comparing cities which have changed their desegregation patterns and those which have not. Attention must be given to exactly why this is so, and then a specific modification that will retrieve the framework will be given.



The national policy explicit in the Brown decision, subsequent federal court decisions, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1970-72 ESAP I and II programs, involved a reversal of formal public policy for seventeen states. In many of the remaining states this was a reversal of informal policy that existed through a variety of subtle practices in housing and education--or at least because of "nondecisions" regarding the issue of segregation. Desegregation, regardless of whether it was mounted against formal or informal governmental decisions, constituted a change in social policy that was not usually the result of local community politics but was imposed by nonlocal levels of government; state and federal. Segregation in the United States was more than a typical public policy; it was a tradition, a way of life, a part of the culture of nearly every American community with appreciable numbers of blacks, and deeply embedded in the social fabric.<sup>26</sup> The change in school segregation was no mere adjustment of a public policy, no extension of a few benefits or simple increase in governmental expenditures. If implemented it required deep change, initially only among southern communities but eventually across the nation. This was a change in the way people lived, and, though Orfield speaks specifically of the South, his description captures the essence of desegregation as it manifested itself throughout our nation:

The 1954 decision set in motion a fundamental change in constitutional law, challenged the basic premises of southern life, and called into being a powerful social

movement strongly influencing both the psychological orientations and the political beliefs of millions of Negroes and whites.<sup>28</sup>

This drastic alteration, in fact reversal, of public policy was largely imposed by the Federal government upon the various local, and even state systems. Accordingly, it hardly seems profitable to try to "explain" changes in desegregation patterns with a series of independent variables gathered solely at the local community or even the state level.<sup>29</sup> It is apparent that forces external to the local community systems "caused" to some degree, if not completely in most communities, the change in public school enrollment policy. In fact, the federal laws involved were designed to penetrate local community systems with the purpose of making a change in policy. But it was up to the local systems to implement the change. This dichotomy of responsibility--federal responsibility for causing change and local responsibility for its implementation--imposes a distinctive theoretical requirement for this particular public policy. It requires simultaneously an account for federal, and to a lesser extent some state, penetration and must incorporate local community variables which would relate to the facilitation or inhibition of the kind of change being implemented. If the extra-local factors can be incorporated into a theoretical framework, we may then suggest a test to see the extent to which local forces did, or did not, block the imposition of change from without.

### A Penetration Component for the Systems Model

It has been suggested that the nature of public desegregation as a social change necessitates an important modification in the systems framework, especially as this framework is applied to understanding the "causes" of variations in desegregation patterns and changes in those patterns during the years following the Brown decision. Especially among the southern states, whatever school desegregation policy changes occurred were usually initiated because of federal pressures or incentives to do so. Although this basic fact is often alluded to in the research literature it has yet to be actually built into a theoretical framework and operationalized in a systematic comparative design. The theoretical basis upon which we propose to introduce extralocal factors into a model of desegregation policy implementation is through use of the "penetration" concept as it has emerged in comparative political analysis.

Joseph La Palombara in 1971 defined "penetration" as follows:

penetration means conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority. The degree of penetration in any polity may be viewed as the probability that governmental policies regarding the polity as a whole, or any of its subdivisions, will be carried out--at least with regard to the spirit of such policies and the regulations that ensue from them.

That is, La Palombara continues,

for any political elite, penetration refers to whether they can get what they want from people over whom they

seek to exercise power. Such power clearly refers to areas of governmental policy that go considerably beyond taxation, conscription, and control of deviant behavior.<sup>29</sup>

In this way penetration is limited not to certain governmental activities but may pertain to the entire range of public policies within the purview of any central government. Moreover, La Palombara points out that this phenomenon does not refer only to "geographic subdivisions of a polity" but also to the "social, ethnic, linguistic, racial, and other subdivisions."

There are two closely interrelated dimensions to the "penetration phenomenon," according to La Palombara: The first may be thought of as the capability of the central government to achieve penetration regardless of what may be the views, desires, attitudes, or predispositions of those who are the objects of governmental policy. This dimension corresponds to the extent to which the federal government has been able to induce implementation of its desegregation policies among the local communities across the nation, independent of local environmental or political factors. The second dimension,

has to do with the existing or modified ability and predisposition of the objects of policy to receive information regarding policy accurately and to wish to conform to such policies voluntarily. Varying degrees of such ability and predisposition are obviously inextricably tied to what we mean by legitimacy. Consequently a particular choice of means for resolving a penetration problem may in certain political cultural contexts result in successful penetration crisis management, but it may also recreate or aggravate legitimacy problems.<sup>30</sup>

More specifically, the second dimension refers to the fact that local environmental and political characteristics, be they resources, institutions or attitudes, are also significant factors regarding the extent to which penetrated policy, or policy change due to penetration, can or will be implemented. These two dimensions of the penetration phenomenon capture exactly the type of factors needed to complete our theoretical framework: the ability of the federal government, independently, to induce desegregation as a policy, and the extent to which local political and social factors intervene to facilitate or inhibit implementation of that policy. La Palombara explicitly recognized the juncture of these dimensions as they applied to questions of "equality," which of course underlies the development of school desegregation policy in the United States. He pointed out that equality was one of the general conditions often faced within the context of the phenomenon of penetration:

For if we are correct in assuming that the thrust or motivation for equality is a generalized condition, everywhere to some degree discernible in space and time where social organization is present, it is clear that we must conclude that certain means of resolving penetration crises are undesirable. Whether they are untenable or inefficacious over time depends, we believe, on the intensity of the need or desire for equality in its several dimensions.<sup>31</sup>

This, of course, characterizes the "American dilemma" of racial segregation and the empirical question this dissertation will deal with: to what extent have the two dimensions of the penetration phenomenon interacted and what has been the result of

this interaction among American cities? Have the "means" selected to induce change been efficacious?<sup>30</sup>

#### A Penetrated Systems Framework for Public Policy

The thrust of the discussion in this chapter has been that the study of public school desegregation is best undertaken within a public policy perspective, and that a theoretical framework has already been adapted for use in this mode of analysis. The Eastonian framework, with Dye's modification, was discussed, and its limitations regarding the application to desegregation patterns among cities was established. In order to incorporate extralocal factors into the systems framework it was considered advisable to utilize the "penetration phenomenon," and the nature of this potential component of our framework was analyzed. Given the requirements of desegregation as a public policy, and taking into account the limitations of the modified Eastonian framework, we offer the penetrated systems framework illustrated in Figure 2-3. This




FIGURE 2-3

#### A PENETRATED SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

framework incorporates state and national components explicitly in the model and not simply as "givens" of the larger environment in which the local community functions. The broken lines in the framework indicate that these linkages do not always operate but are subject to the nature and development of particular public policies. Otherwise, extralocal political systems are simply another part of the larger system in which the local political system operates. It must be emphasized that this framework alludes to the fact that the interaction between extralocal and local systems are systematic, and the interrelationships must be accounted for if certain kinds of public policy are to be understood.

The theoretical framework illustrated in Figure 2-3 suggests four general propositions concerning the relationships between its units and its overall thrust. These general propositions frame this study and guide the development of research hypotheses that will enable us to empirically test the framework with a systematic comparative analysis. Table 2-1 presents the theoretical propositions associated with the penetrated systems framework developed in this section.

TABLE 2-1

GENERAL THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS FOR  
PENETRATED SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR  
ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

---

1. Public Policy and its implementation are the product of government activity and that activity may be directly or indirectly affected by environmental forces which facilitate or inhibit it.

2. Public policy and its implementation are not exclusively the result of forces within any given system but may be directly or indirectly affected by extrasystem forces.

3. Within federal systems certain classes of subnational public policies, their initiation or relative implementation, are the result of penetration by national (federal, central) systems.

4. The extent to which subnational system penetration is necessary, and is efficacious, is conditioned by (a) the nature of the penetration intent; (b) the nature of the penetration itself; and (c) the nature of the subnational system's environmental and political structure.

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### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Ira Sharkansky, ed., Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 1. For examples of various definitions and conceptualizations of this construct see: Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 71; David Easton, The Political System, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 130-1; Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 70; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968); 126; Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 3-8; James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making (Homewood: Dorsey, 1962), p. 3; Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 6-9; Vernon Van Dyke, "Process and Policy as Focal Concepts in Political Research," Political Science and Public Policy, ed. by Austin Ranney, 1968, pp. 27-29; Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy," Political Science and Public Policy, ed. by Austin Ranney, 1968, pp. 152-154; Larry L. Wade, The Elements of Public Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), pp. 10-18; Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 1; Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 6; Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 25 (May 1963), p. 267.

<sup>3</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>David R. Morgan, Handbook of State Policy Indicators (Norman: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1971), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>There were notable exceptions as the significant work of the Chicago School led by Charles Merriam and his student Harold Lasswell. See Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis of Political Data (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), chapter I for an excellent discussion of the behavioral-scientific work being done during this period, as well as Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), chapter 10.

<sup>6</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>For a detailed account of the impact of this shift in political science as a discipline see Somit and Tanenhaus, Development of American Political Science, chapters 11-12, Howard Ball and Thomas Lauth, Jr., eds., Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), chapters 5-7; and James C. Charlesworth, ed. Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1967), chapters 1-3.

<sup>8</sup>Morgan, Handbook, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup>For a cogent discussion of the fundamental attacks on the behavioral approach see Easton, Political Science, 2nd ed., Epilogue.

<sup>11</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup>Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables," p. 265.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power," Journal of Politics 30 (May 1968: 510-538; and Philip B. Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy," Polity 3 (Fall 1970): 22-43.

<sup>14</sup>At the national level see, for example, Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making, 1962, or James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1968). At the cross-national level see Stefanie H. Cameron and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Dynamics of Intergovernmental Responsibility in Federal Systems," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.

<sup>15</sup>It was Easton's work to which Wirt (1972) directed the politics of education field for a theoretical framework.

<sup>16</sup>David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 24-44. Easton's work has developed in several writings: "An approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics 9 (April 1957): 383-400; The Political System, 2nd ed., 1971; and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965).

<sup>17</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup>Easton, Framework, pp. 66.

<sup>19</sup>See especially Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public; Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables"; Dye, Understanding Public Policy, chapter 11; Jacob and Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power"; Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review 64 (June 1970): 508-22; and the most recent example, Robert H. Blank, "Socio-economic Determinism of Voting Turnout," Journal of Politics 36 (August 1974): 731-52.

<sup>20</sup>In such instances "important" is defined as statistically explaining more variance in the dependent variable.

<sup>21</sup>"Stateways versus Folkways Revisited," p. 3.

<sup>22</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 247-48.

<sup>23</sup>Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition;" Dye, Politics, Economics; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review 60 (March 1966): 73-82; Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Rand McNally, 1968); Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 880-89; Richard E. Dawson and Virginia Gray, "State Welfare Policies," Politics in the American States, 2d ed., edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); John L. Sullivan, "Political Correlates of Social, Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American States," Journal of Politics 35 (February 1973): 70-84; and Michael A. Baer and Dean Jaros, "Participation as Instrument and Expression," American Journal of Political Science 18 (May 1974): 365-83.

<sup>24</sup>For example, see: John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview: Scott Foresman, 1966); Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," Political Research and Political Theory, ed. by Oliver Garceau (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Fry and Winters, "Politics of Voting Turnout"; Brian R. Fry, "An Examination of the Relationship Between Selected Electoral Characteristics and State Redistributive Efforts," American Journal of Political Science 18 (May 1974): 421-31.

<sup>25</sup>Dye, Understanding Public Policy, chapter 11.

<sup>26</sup>There is considerable evidence this remains true today. See Karl E. and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Chicago: Aldine, 1965).

<sup>27</sup>Orfield, Reconstruction of Southern Education, p. 45.

<sup>28</sup>Not as long as we refuse to make any attributions as to causality, and speak only of the "correlates" of desegregation.

<sup>29</sup>Joseph La Palombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Government Capacity," Crises and Sequences in Political Development, ed. by Leonard Binder, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 208-209.

<sup>30</sup>La Palombara, "Penetration," p. 209.

<sup>31</sup>La Palombara, "Penetration," pp. 209-210.

### CHAPTER III

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

The penetrated systems framework developed in chapter II allows for the consideration of multiple levels of social activity as these interact to affect public policy at the community level within a federal system. More specifically, given the nature of a particular policy with which this study is concerned, a framework was needed that was capable of making explicit what previous researchers were willing to accept as given: that to understand and explain public school desegregation patterns and changes in those patterns after 1954, a systematic consideration of the nature of the federal structure was required. This was especially needed because a local community level of analysis was being assumed, and federal penetration into that level needed to be accommodated. The next task is to develop appropriate conceptualizations of the salient elements which constitute the components of the theoretical framework. Once these components have been operationally defined, the relationships between the elements of the framework may be systematically examined. Therefore, what is now needed is a research model capable of testing the theoretical propositions associated with the

theoretical framework. This research model must delineate specific elements, including operational variables, for each of the following components of the penetrated systems structure:

- I The Federal Component
- II The State Component
- III The Local Environment Component
- IV The Local Political Component
- V The Local School System Component
- VI The Policy Implementation Component

When each of the elements for the above components of the theoretical framework have been defined and integrated into a testable research model, it will be possible to statistically determine the relationships between these elements --especially as these affect levels of urban school desegregation and patterns of change in this phenomenon. The research strategy appropriate to this analytic task must deal with several fundamental questions:

1. How may public school desegregation and change be measured so that a broad spectrum of U.S. cities may be meaningfully compared?
2. To what extent do U.S. cities vary as to desegregation and patterns of change?
3. What demographic and sociopolitical forces are associated with variation among U.S. cities in urban school desegregation? Are the same forces related to desegregation change?
4. To what extent do local forces facilitate or inhibit the implementation of desegregation policy in the face of national and state penetration? What are

the relative weights of a variety of forces involved in explaining desegregation levels, and changes in those levels?

These are the fundamental issues with which a research model of urban school desegregation must deal. Only a systematic comparison of these phenomena across a number of U.S. cities is capable of dealing directly with such questions.

#### Data Base

This study will compare the 205 cities in the U.S. with a population of at least 25,000 in 1950, and 50,000 in both 1960 and 1970, and which had a black population of at least 1.5 percent of the total population in 1970. A list of these cities is provided in Appendix 1. This group of cities encompasses all U.S. communities of sufficient size to be considered large and with enough blacks to be considered at all "biracial."<sup>1</sup> While the actual number of blacks necessary to include a community in the study may be very small, only 750 in a city of 50,000, the heart of the issue is the extent to which this subpopulation is, or is not, isolated within the public school system. The smallness of the black population relative to the white does not necessarily assure that their children have been integrated into the public schools. Thus, as many cities as could reasonably be assumed to have a potential isolation problem were selected for inclusion, even those with as few as 1.5 percent black populations.

The basic unit of analysis for this study is the local public school district servicing the cities in our population. Unfortunately for comparative analysis, school district boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with those of the city. Hence, our racial enrollment data do not necessarily correspond to exactly the same geographic area as the units for which sociopolitical variables have been collected. To deal with this potential problem all cities in the study will be tested for conterminous boundaries, i.e., the extent to which the city public school enrollment given in the 1972 County and City Data Book corresponds to the student enrollment of the school district servicing the city. Any city with a considerably deviant ratio of city-to-district populations will be treated with care in the analysis, and if the magnitude of this difference is overly large, that city will be eliminated from analysis.<sup>2</sup> The issue of consolidated county school districts is somewhat different although just as important. Here, a single district serves an entire county, including the city in which this study is interested. Rather than eliminating such cities from the analysis and losing many communities--especially in the South--or using county-level demographic, and sociopolitical data- these communities will be included and sociopolitical-demographic data collected at the city level used.<sup>3</sup>

The data on racial enrollment in the public schools are taken from the 1970 and 1974 Department of Health, Education,



and Welfare, Directory of Racial and Ethnic Enrollment in Public Schools in Selected Districts, and are based upon surveys taken in the Fall of 1968 and 1972.<sup>4</sup> These surveys are the first and latest completely comprehensive statistics on racial enrollment in the United States. Since 1968 is the first year for which such comprehensive data are available that will be the base year of the study, and changes in levels of desegregation in each city will be measured from it.<sup>5</sup>

### The Research Model

The elements which define each component of the theoretical framework have been integrated into a research model and are presented in Figure 3-1. Later, specific operational definitions of these elements will be presented and hypotheses concerning their interaction will be offered. The arrows are meant to indicate causal linkages between components, especially as they contribute to the development of policy implementation in the local community--in the penetration situation. The following is a discussion of each of the six components of the research model including their associated hypotheses.

### The Federal Component

Component I of the model includes the categories of federal penetration that define the range of national system activities regarding desegregation policy since 1954. Judicial penetration was basically unidimensional, coercive, in




FIGURE 3-1 RESEARCH MODEL

its thrust. It was coercive in that the federal judiciary in the 1954-1972 period ordered local communities to take action, or to desist from action, under penalty of law. Executive penetration during this period had three dimensions in its impact on desegregation policy. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ESAP programs there were both coercive and cooperative dimensions. The executive branch of the national government had the capability of pressuring local communities toward implementing desegregation under threat of fund suspension or legal action. At the same time, it was also possible for local communities to receive federal technical assistance, and grant funds, to further desegregation policy. The third dimension to federal penetration was that of desegregation constraint. While the courts and the executive were ostensibly penetrating local systems to institute school desegregation, during this entire period other federal programs--in the executive branch--were actually working at cross-purposes. For example, federal housing programs, urban renewal and highway building programs, often had the effect of reinforcing racial segregation in cities and of constraining the possibility of realizing desegregation. Table 3-1 provides the preliminary hypotheses for this component of the research model.

The hypotheses offered in Table 3-1 are designed to test the general theoretical proposition that subnational penetration is conditioned by the nature of the penetration

TABLE 3-1  
HYPOTHESES FOR THE FEDERAL COMPONENT

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|                 |                                                                                                        |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hypothesis I-1: | Judicial penetration is negatively associated with initial levels of desegregation.                    |
| Hypothesis I-2: | Judicial penetration is positively associated with increases in levels of desegregation.               |
| Hypothesis I-3: | Coercive executive penetration is negatively associated with initial levels of desegregation.          |
| Hypothesis I-4: | Coercive executive penetration is positively associated with increases in levels of desegregation.     |
| Hypothesis I-5: | Cooperative executive penetration is negatively associated with initial levels of desegregation.       |
| Hypothesis I-6: | Cooperative executive penetration is positively associated with increases in levels of desegregation.  |
| Hypothesis I-7: | Constraining executive penetration is negatively associated with initial levels of desegregation.      |
| Hypothesis I-8: | Constraining executive penetration is negatively associated with increases in levels of desegregation. |

---

intent and the nature of the penetration itself. Each hypothesis takes into consideration that federal activity after World War II included policies which penetrated the local system and influenced school desegregation levels--but were not necessarily identical in intent or impact. These policies were basically either desegregation-oriented in primary intent, such as court decisions, the Civil Rights Act, or ESAP; or these programs conceivably had other, non-desegregation policies, as a primary intent--such as housing loans, construction, urban renewal, and highway construction projects.<sup>7</sup> The nature of each penetration leads to categorizing these phenomena into general coercive, cooperative, and constraining areas. It was hypothesized in Table 3-1 that, since initially very little school desegregation had occurred in the U.S. before 1968, the relationship between coercive-cooperative penetrations and the level of desegregation in communities would be negative in time one. Allocation of limited penetration resources to the initial manifestations of the desegregation problem is expected to have been undertaken according to whether initial segregation was sufficiently severe to attract early federal attention. It has, thus, been hypothesized that cities with relatively lower desegregation levels in time one were less likely to have been penetrated by national forces than more desegregated cities. Moreover, a time lag is assumed. The visible impact of such penetration is not expected to have become apparent until after time one.

Federal constraining penetration has been hypothesized as negative in its relationship with desegregation levels because certain housing, urban renewal, and highway construction programs tended to reinforce local patterns of residential segregation and have made subsequent desegregation less likely. The impact of this type of penetration is expected to have been more immediate--it involved no change for any of the cities, only reenforcing what was already going on--and thus this negative impact has been hypothesized for both time periods.

#### The State Component

The second component of the research model comprises the state level elements that may be expected to affect local community structure and activity. This component further tests the theoretical proposition that subsystem policy is conditioned by the policy intent and the nature of the penetration. It also tests, to some extent, the proposition that subnational environment and political structures will affect penetration efficacy. The nature of this extralocal component is somewhat distinctive from that of the national level. The state level serves directly as a penetration agent regarding local communities, as these units are a legal creation of the state government, and state laws circumscribe a variety of local community structures and activities. Simultaneously, the state is also an environmental force influencing the substate units within its borders. This is

the nature of the federal structure of intergovernmental relations, and although the environmental dimension of the national component was not considered salient for the model, this aspect of the state component most certainly is so considered.

The elements of Component II have a broader implication than those of Component I, although this is not to suggest that these forces will prove to be of greater influence on desegregation policy. The state level component of the research model comprises the penetration element, the political structure (with government structure, innovation, and political culture subelements), socioeconomic structure (with industrialization, affluence, and social traditionalism subelements), and educational structure (with organization and revenue-expenditure subelements). These elements constitute both the penetration and environmental dimensions which are held to affect the local community's resources, structures, and policy. As a broad assumption the climate of the state within which a given community exists is held to relate to local activity; i.e., one would expect communities within states of similar penetration and environment to behave similarly regarding desegregation policy implementation--if these in fact are salient factors in setting that phenomena. Table 3-2 presents the hypotheses associated with the state level component of the research model.

TABLE 3-2

## HYPOTHESES FOR THE STATE COMPONENT

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---

|            |        |                                                                                                                            |
|------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hypothesis | II-1:  | State cooperative penetration is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                |
| Hypothesis | II-2:  | State constraining penetration is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.               |
| Hypothesis | II-3:  | State government structure is associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                              |
| Hypothesis | II-4:  | State government innovation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                  |
| Hypothesis | II-5:  | A moralistic-liberal state political culture is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation. |
| Hypothesis | II-6:  | Industrialization is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                            |
| Hypothesis | II-7:  | Affluence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                                    |
| Hypothesis | II-8:  | Social traditionalism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                        |
| Hypothesis | II-9:  | School district consolidation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                |
| Hypothesis | II-10: | Educational revenue dependence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.               |
| Hypothesis | II-11: | Educational expenditure equity is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.               |

---



State penetration into the local system has both cooperative and constraining dimensions. The development and implementation of antidiscrimination legislation is taken to indicate a sociopolitical climate within a state more favorable to the type of social change involved in school desegregation. Further, the presence of this type of state-level commitment to racial equality under the law is potentially a legal remedy for continued segregation. It has accordingly been hypothesized that desegregation levels will be higher among communities within states with more extensive antidiscrimination legislation.

The constraining penetration of the state level is held to be of a single intent, to inhibit desegregation--at least insofar as this component will be operationalized; and, as had been hypothesized for constraining federal penetration, the relationship is expected to prove negative. It has been hypothesized that communities within states with greater constraining penetration will have lower desegregation levels.

When a contemporary state government has a more responsible, responsive structure it is expected that it can adjust to, and facilitate, social change, even one as controversial as the desegregation of public schools. It has been hypothesized that the level of state government structure is related to desegregation levels. The nature of this association depends upon the relative distribution of specific structural features to be discussed later. The extent to which a state

has been innovative in policy-making, or in adjusting policy structures, has also been hypothesized as facilitating statewide adjustment to social change, including the process of desegregation regardless of time period. Thus, certain elements of the state political structure are held to create a more favorable climate to meaningful social change, and therefore facilitate desegregation efforts among the communities within such states. Most especially, the political style of a state facilitates or inhibits acceptance of social change. The extent to which a state has moved from more passive, constraining, traditional political patterns toward more activist behaviors, and attitudes, conditions the statewide climate regarding social change--including desegregation change. That racial relations have been tied, directly or indirectly, to traditional American political culture is clear. The extent to which any state has broken with this past creates a more conducive environment within which local communities may also initiate this social change. The desegregation levels of communities in states with relatively more modern and responsive government structure, more innovation, and more moralistic-activist state political structures have been hypothesized to have higher desegregation levels.

The level of state economic development is a pervasive environmental factor regarding local community structure and activity.<sup>8</sup> In Table 3-2 above hypotheses are offered to the effect that the level of socioeconomic development within any

given state, as manifested in industrialization, affluence, and levels of social traditionalism, creates a state-wide climate that either facilitates or inhibits the acceptance of social change. Among the communities in more socio-economically developed and less socially traditional states, the levels of desegregation are expected to be similar, and lower, than among less developed, more socially traditional states. The extent to which a state manifests social traditionalism has been hypothesized to condition among its communities exactly the opposite effect; communities among more socially traditional states will, it is expected, have lower levels of desegregation.

The educational structure of a state provides an important environmental element with which the local community must contend. The extent to which local school systems have been consolidated indicates one way in which state-wide school desegregation is technically feasible. It is more difficult to desegregate numerous, relatively small, independent school districts. Hence, it has been hypothesized that among communities within states with increasing consolidation, desegregation levels will tend to be higher. The extent to which a state's school systems are dependent upon federal revenue suggests, in some degree, the extent to which they are also likely to be susceptible to federal desegregation penetration. It has been hypothesized, therefore, that the relationship between local dependence on federal aid and levels of

desegregation will be positive. Further, it is expected that the extent to which a state has equalized its state education expenditures is also positively related to desegregation levels. The concern with social equality inherent in state efforts to assure equity in educational finance would seem to indicate a climate more likely to facilitate other types of equality in education, including biracial schooling. It has been hypothesized, then, that communities within states with a more consolidated, federally dependent, and equitable expenditures will manifest similar and lower levels of desegregation.

#### The Local Environmental Component

The environment of the local community is the third component of the research model, and is composed of demographic, socioeconomic, and city classification elements. The demographic element of the component comprises population patterns of the entire community and the black subpopulation. Community socioeconomic structure contains general and subpopulation characteristics. In addition, general classifications of local communities are within Component III; these defined as city age, metropolitan status, and region for each community.

Component III will test the theoretical proposition regarding the extent to which the local system's environmental structure conditions the efficacy of national penetration. The hypotheses associated with Component III are provided

TABLE 3-3

## HYPOTHESES FOR THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT

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|            |         |                                                                                                                                   |
|------------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hypothesis | III-1:  | Community demographic stability and homogeneity are positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.    |
| Hypothesis | III-2:  | Black demographic stability is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                         |
| Hypothesis | III-3:  | Black/general population demographic dissimilarity is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.  |
| Hypothesis | III-4:  | Higher community social class is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                       |
| Hypothesis | III-5:  | Higher black social class is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                           |
| Hypothesis | III-6:  | Black/general population social class dissimilarity is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation. |
| Hypothesis | III-7:  | Community age is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                                       |
| Hypothesis | III-8:  | Presence of an identifiable central city is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.            |
| Hypothesis | III-9:  | Southern cities manifest less initial desegregation than northern cities.                                                         |
| Hypothesis | III-10: | Southern cities manifest larger increases in desegregation than northern cities between periods.                                  |

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in Table 3-3. In their formulation these hypotheses were explicitly guided by two separate, but complementary, bodies of research literature: the desegregation analyses reviewed in chapter I and the urban politics and policy literature. A review of this research literature suggests that the overall stability and homogeneity of the local environment conditions the nature of the demands and supports it affords the political system. The relative demographic and socioeconomic stability and homogeneity has, therefore, guided our hypothesizing regarding desegregation patterns within the urban environment.<sup>9</sup>

The demographic structure of the local community has three salient dimensions that impinge upon urban school desegregation levels: community structure, black structure, and black-total differences. The demographic structure of the entire community is the initial dimension; its stability and homogeneity have been hypothesized to positively affect desegregation levels. The extent to which the demographic structure of any community has avoided severe transformation deeply influences its ability to adjust to social change. The rapid growth, or decline, of any community introduces dynamics which only serve to compound the complexity of the social change inherent in school desegregation. This is particularly true in that rapid population growth facilitates the disintegration of social patterns and community attachments which may facilitate adjustment to social change. Yet,

if the relationship between demographic factors and desegregation is to be clearly established, and understood, then the community population must be decomposed into its white and black subpopulations. The demographic stability of the white community, with its migration patterns tending to greatly affect the technical feasibility of desegregation, is a critical factor in understanding desegregation patterns. It has been hypothesized that white demographic stability has a positive impact upon desegregation levels. The extent to which white populations have been stable within a community facilitates the avoidance of white flight in the face of changing racial ratios.

The demographic stability of the black community is also, we would expect, a crucial dimension related to desegregation levels. Insofar as a community has maintained, and adjusted to, a stable proportion of blacks, and the extent to which this population has been stable in demographic patterns, seems directly related to the probability of desegregation. The rapid influx of blacks into communities, or the rapid relative growth of black subpopulations, may well counter what may have been racial stability within a community and makes desegregation technically, as well as politically, more difficult.

The basic demographic-desegregation hypotheses revolve around the crucial factors of population stability and homogeneity. It has been hypothesized that desegregation levels

will be consistently higher among communities that have not been subject to the social decomposition effect of significant population shifts or subject to the social cleavages inherent in heterogeneous subpopulations.<sup>10</sup>

As a concomitant to the demographic forces already discussed, the relative demographic stability of black and white subpopulations is important. More important, we suspect, than the community-wide demographic patterns, or white-black patterns taken separately, are the relative differences between racial demographics. The extent to which the demographic patterns of blacks and whites are discrepant serves to increase the likelihood of racial tension and highlight racial differences.

The overall social class of the community is one of the most salient ways by which American cities may be classified. The attitudes, behaviors and institutions associated with class distinctions lead us to hypothesize that as the social class of a community increases so will its level of desegregation activity. The diversity of lower-class communities and their relative economic and social deprivation tend to exacerbate racial differences and fuel racial tensions. Therefore it is expected that community cleavages make desegregation more difficult and less likely. Accordingly, it has been hypothesized that higher community social class is positively associated with community desegregation levels.<sup>11</sup> The relative social class standing of black and total populations are also



critical factors in desegregation activity. It has been hypothesized that higher black social class is positively associated with levels of desegregation. The increased education involved in higher social class levels leads one to expect a decline of racial prejudice and tension among higher class populations. Blacks of higher social stature are less likely to generate fear and intolerance than might be expected from relatively lower class black population, and hence would generate less white fear and hostility for biracial schooling. A potentially crucial social class distinction is the relative class standing of blacks in any community. Unless there is some sort of parity we would expect social distance, as well as race, to exacerbate community social relations.

It has been hypothesized that community age and metropolitan classification are negatively associated with desegregation. Older communities are more likely to have disintegrating cores with the associated problems of old housing and low-income renters. The difficulty of rejuvenating old neighborhoods so that community social balance may be restored is exacerbated by black concentration in older neighborhoods and housing projects. Whether a community contains a central city is expected to affect desegregation levels; the class, racial and economic cleavages in the central city exacerbate the problem of desegregation.

### The Local Political Component

The local political system is contained in Component IV of the research model. This system is composed of the political structure (involving structural, mayoral power, and innovation sublements) and political culture (with participation, Republicanism, and conservatism sublements). Table 3-4 presents the major hypotheses associated with the elements contained in the component. This component tests the theoretical proposition that the local political structure ultimately must implement policy for the local community, and that the efficacy of policy penetration is conditioned by the nature of this component which will ultimately facilitate or inhibit its implementation.

The municipal reform movement sought to eliminate corruption and foster efficiency in local government. This end was to be accomplished by removing politics from the conduct of local government and placing the conduct of city business on a purely professional and business-like level. To realize these goals several institutions which have been labelled "reform" were introduced, such as city-manager government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large constituencies. These structures were supposed to remove "politics" from local government. Unreformed structures are generally considered to be mayor government with partisan elections and ward constituencies. The goal of the reform was to remove decision-

TABLE 3-4  
HYPOTHESES FOR THE LOCAL POLITICAL COMPONENT

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|                  |                                                                                                             |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hypothesis IV-1: | Reform government structures are positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation. |
| Hypothesis IV-2: | Mayoral power is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                 |
| Hypothesis IV-3: | Government innovation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.         |
| Hypothesis IV-4: | Citizen participation is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.         |
| Hypothesis IV-5: | Northern Republicanism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.        |
| Hypothesis IV-6: | Southern Republicanism is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.        |
| Hypothesis IV-7: | Political conservatism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.        |

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makers from special interests and political pressure so that the welfare of the entire community would guide their behavior.<sup>12</sup> It has been hypothesized that the relationship between governmental reformism and desegregation levels will be positive because the insulation of city decisionmakers enhances the likelihood that they can withstand the strong political pressure brought to bear against desegregation by white majorities. A key aspect of the desegregation literature has been the reluctance of cities to take any action concerning school desegregation perhaps partly due to a fear of political consequences.<sup>13</sup> Therefore it has been hypothesized that cities with reform governments would be more likely to be able to institute and carry out the type of deep, potentially unpopular, change involved in the desegregation of public schools.<sup>14</sup>

Among mayoral cities it has been hypothesized that the power of the mayor is positively associated with desegregation levels. It is expected that when the mayor chooses to become involved in the desegregation question it is often in support of that policy.<sup>15</sup> Because certain structural features of mayoral power may invite the exercise of mayoral initiative and activity as a community leader, these characteristics increase the likelihood that the mayor will become involved in desegregation activity. It has therefore been hypothesized that among those cities with greater formal mayoral power desegregation levels will be higher.

An important facet of the climate in which community decisions are made is the extent to which the government has a record of policy innovation. Those communities that have shown a predilection for innovation in a variety of technical and policy areas are expected to be more likely than those less innovative to institute, or accept, change in racial policies as well. It has been hypothesized that city innovation has a positive impact on levels of school desegregation.

The major thrust of the literature would lead us to believe that desegregation is more likely when decision-makers are isolated from the vicissitudes of the political struggle. It was found in several studies that the extent to which the local community became actively participatory constrained desegregation activity.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it is hypothesized that the impact of citizen participation on desegregation levels would be negative. Similarly, in the northern section of the country, the Republican party has been less forceful in the civil-rights field than the Democratic party, thus it is expected that among the non-southern communities with higher levels of Republicanism there would be lower levels of desegregation.

In the South, the Democratic party and its one-party rule has been a tradition long associated with segregation. Thus, it has been hypothesized that Republicanism in this region represents a break with traditional anti-black politics and a weakening of the segregationist tradition; therefore, the impact upon desegregation would be positive.

The extent to which any community has been conservative in its political perspective, and has supported candidates with anti-civil rights backgrounds suggest increased difficulty in instituting desegregation in that community. Politically conservative communities are more likely to hold to established patterns of social interaction and resist change in them--the kind of change personified by desegregation.

#### The Local School System Component

The school system itself is a potentially important set of factors affecting desegregation levels. In Table 3-5 the major hypotheses associated with component V are offered. To the extent that system is independent of the city government, and conceivably less subject to political pressures, desegregation levels are expected to increase. The literature

TABLE 3-5

#### HYPOTHESES FOR THE LOCAL SCHOOL COMPONENT

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|                 |                                                                                                                            |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hypothesis V-1: | School district independence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                 |
| Hypothesis V-2: | School board insulation and professionalism are positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation. |
| Hypothesis V-3: | Nonwhite enrollment is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.                          |

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suggests that the extent to which the board is insulated from politics and is recruited by the community elite is important in determining whether or not it is capable of implementing desegregation.<sup>17</sup> The insulation of school boards limits more political, non-professional behavior. This conditions the nature of the impact that body may have on desegregation levels. It has been hypothesized that the more insulated school board will have a positive impact on desegregation. It has further been hypothesized that the relative presence of black and non-white minority students is related to desegregation; the increased incidence of non-white enrollments is expected to depress desegregation and change.

#### The Policy Implementation Component

The sixth component of the research model defines the policy implementation dimension of desegregation policy. This component consists of three distinct elements: desegregation patterns in the initial time period of the study (1968), desegregation patterns at the terminal period of the study (1972), and changes in those patterns between time one and time two. These elements define a most salient feature of desegregation as a public policy, the extent to which it has, or has not, been implemented among communities. Component V is thus the dependent element of the research model, and variations in its elements are what the model is designed to explain. The hypothesized relationships between the rest of the research model and the elements of the policy implementation

component have been specified and illustrated above. They are presented in summary form in Table 3-6.

It is immediately apparent from the information contained in Table 3-6 that the factors involved in the determination of desegregation levels, and changes in those levels, are not all expected to move in the same direction. The complexity of the public policy issue is thus emphasized. School desegregation reflects an interplay of forces which are often mutually inconsistent and contradictory. The research model being offered suggests that ultimately the amount of desegregation that does, or does not, take place in any given community will depend upon the relative weight these factors assume. Determining the relative impact for these factors is the basic research task ahead. First, an operational structure must be created which will permit an empirical verification of the relationships which have been hypothesized above.

#### Operationalizing and Testing the Research Model

The theoretical framework and the propositions associated with it have been converted into a research model with preliminary hypotheses. The next task is to specify the fashion in which the research model and its associated hypotheses may be empirically measured so that hypothesis testing and theory building may be undertaken. The set of independent and dependent variables defining each component of the research model is presented in Table 3-7. The specific operational definitions



TABLE 3-6

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TO TEST THE RESEARCH MODEL  
OF URBAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

| Components I-V                              | Component VI<br>T <sub>1</sub> Change |     |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----|
| FEDERAL                                     |                                       |     |
| Judicial Penetration                        | -                                     | +   |
| Coercive Executive Penetration              | -                                     | +   |
| Cooperative Executive Penetration           | -                                     | +   |
| Constraining Executive Penetration          | -                                     | -   |
| STATE                                       |                                       |     |
| Cooperative Penetration                     | +                                     | +   |
| Constraining Penetration                    | -                                     | -   |
| Government Structure                        | + -                                   | + - |
| Government Innovation                       | +                                     | +   |
| Moralistic-Liberal Political Culture        | +                                     | +   |
| Industrialization                           | +                                     | +   |
| Affluence                                   | +                                     | +   |
| Social Traditionalism                       | -                                     | -   |
| District Consolidation                      | +                                     | +   |
| Revenue Dependence                          | +                                     | +   |
| Expenditure Equity                          | +                                     | +   |
| LOCAL ENVIRONMENT                           |                                       |     |
| Demographic Stability-Homogeneity           | +                                     | +   |
| Black Demographic Stability                 | +                                     | +   |
| Demographic Dissimilarity                   | -                                     | -   |
| Community Social Class                      | +                                     | +   |
| Black Social Class                          | +                                     | +   |
| Social Class Dissimilarity                  | -                                     | -   |
| Community Age                               | -                                     | -   |
| Central City                                | -                                     | -   |
| Southern City                               | -                                     | +   |
| LOCAL POLITICAL                             |                                       |     |
| Reform Government Structure                 | +                                     | +   |
| Mayoral Power                               | +                                     | +   |
| Government Innovation                       | +                                     | +   |
| Citizen Participation                       | -                                     | -   |
| Northern Republicanism                      | -                                     | -   |
| Southern Republicanism                      | +                                     | +   |
| Political Conservatism                      | -                                     | -   |
| LOCAL SCHOOL                                |                                       |     |
| District Independence                       | +                                     | +   |
| School Board Insulation and Professionalism | +                                     | +   |
| Nonwhite Enrollment                         | -                                     | -   |

TABLE 3-7

## THE RESEARCH MODEL VARIABLE SET

## FEDERAL COMPONENT

Coercive Penetration

## Judicial:

Federal Court Order 1954-1972  
 Number of Federal Court Orders 1954-1972  
 Court Order Before 1964 Civil Rights Act

## Health Education and Welfare:

HEW Title VI Noncompliance Citation  
 HEW Title VI Noncompliance Before Nixon Administration  
 HEW Title VI Termination of Federal Funds  
 HEW Title VI Termination of Federal Funds Before  
 Nixon Administration

## Department of Justice:

Department of Justice Title IV Lawsuit  
 Department of Justice Title IV Lawsuit Before Nixon  
 Administration

Cooperative Penetration

## Health Education and Welfare:

HEW Title IV Assistance  
 HEW Title IV Assistance Before Nixon Administration  
 Amount of HEW Title IV Grants

## Community Relations Service (Department of Justice):

Community Relations Service Program in State 1970-1971  
 Community Relations Service Program in District 1970-1971

## Office of Education:

ESAP Assistance 1970-1972  
 Total Amount of ESAP Assistance Per/Pupil 1970-1972

## HEW and Office of Education:

Total Amount of Federal Desegregation Funds Per/Pupil  
 1964-1972

Constraining Penetration

Federal Housing Program Involvement  
 Level of Housing Activity  
 Federal Urban Renewal Program Involvement

STATE COMPONENT

Political Structure

Cooperative Penetration:

Antidiscrimination Legislation Index

Constraining Penetration:

Racial Segregation in Education Statute  
 Racial Segregation in Education Statute After 1900

Government Structure:

Government Responsiveness (Sutton Index)  
 Legislative Professionalism (Grumm Index)  
 Executive Power (Schlesinger Index)  
 Electoral Structure (Blank Index)

Government Innovation:

Policy Innovation (Walker Index)  
 Agency Innovation (Presence/Absence of Separate EPA)

Political Culture:

Political Culture (Walker Index)  
 Interparty Competition (Ranney Index)  
 Black Elected Officials Per/100,000  
 Income Redistribution (Booms-Halldorson Index)

Socioeconomic Structure

Industrialization:

Industrialization 1960  
 Industrialization 1960-1970

Affluence:

Affluence 1960  
 Affluence Change

Social Traditionalism:

Population Mobility  
 Black Migration

Black Population 1960  
 Church Related School Enrollment  
 Social Diversity

Educational Structure

Organization-Consolidation:

Number of School Districts 1968  
 District Consolidation Since 1968

Revenue-Expenditure:

Local Educational Revenue Dependence on Federal Govern-  
 ment  
 Change in Local Educational Revenue Dependence 1958-1968  
 Intrastate Expenditure Disparity  
 Interstate Expenditure Disparity

LOCAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT

Demographic Structure

Community:

Population Density  
 Density Change  
 Population  
 Ethnicity  
 Mobility  
 Mobility Change  
 Median Age

Black Community:

Black Population  
 %Population Black  
 Black Mobility  
 Black Mobility Change  
 Black Median Age

Demographic Dissimilarity:

Black/General Population Mobility Difference  
 Black/White Age Difference

Socioeconomic Structure

Community:

Median Education  
 Below Grade School  
 Median Education Change

Median Family Income  
 Family Poverty  
 Families Above \$25,000 (Elite Presence)  
 Unemployment  
 Employee-Population Ratio (Suburban Exploitation)  
 Employee-Population Change  
 White Collar  
 White Collar Change  
 Ratio of Manager/Proprietors/and Officials (MPO, Power  
 Centralization)  
 MPO Change  
 Owner Occupied Dwellings (Middle Class Presence)  
 Owner Occupied Change

Black Community:

Black Median Education  
 Black Family Poverty  
 Black Families Above \$25,000 (Black Elites)  
 Black Unemployment  
 Black White Collar

Socioeconomic Dissimilarity:

Black/General Population Education Difference  
 Black/General Population Poverty Difference  
 Black/General Population Unemployment Difference  
 Black/General Population White Collar Difference

Community Classification:

Southern-Border City  
 Central City  
 City Age

LOCAL POLITICAL COMPONENT

Political Structure

Government:

Reformism Score  
 Manager Government  
 Appointed Mayor  
 Mayoral Turnover (1960-1970)  
 Nonpartisan Council Elections  
 City Council at/Large  
 Overlapping City Council Terms

## Mayoral Power:

Length of Term  
Veto Power

## Innovation:

Year Started Automatic Data Processing (Innovation)  
Number of Departments with ADP Capability (ADP  
Application)  
Public Housing Innovation (Years since first project)  
Urban Renewal Innovation (Years since first project)  
Fluoridation Program  
Fluoridation Rejection

## Political Culture:

Voting Turnout in Municipal Election  
Average GOP Presidential Vote (Republicanism, County)  
American Independent Party Vote 1968 (Conservatism)

## LOCAL SCHOOL COMPONENT

## Organization:

City-Run School System  
County-wide District  
Composite Board Score (Insulation-Professionalism)  
Appointed Board  
Nonpartisan Board Elections  
Length of Board Elections  
Length of Board Terms  
Size of Board

## Enrollment Statistics:

Private Elementary Enrollment 1960  
Private Enrollment Change 1960-1970  
1968 Black Enrollment (NLOG)  
1968 Percentage Black  
1968 Percentage Nonblack Minority  
Black Enrollment Change  
Nonblack Enrollment Change

and sources for each variable in the set are provided in Appendix 2.

The research model developed in this chapter is designed to explicitly focus upon a public policy encompassing social change. Specifically, it is being used to explore the relative implementation in the change from segregated to desegregated racial enrollments among U.S. cities. In this particular case the penetrated systems structure is not being used to explain the development of a public policy per se. Rather, with this framework and the research model designed to test it, we are seeking to understand and explain the relative implementation of a change in public policy that was largely, if not exclusively, the result of systems penetration. The linkages in the research model indicate that sociopolitical factors at several levels in the federal system, beyond generating demands for a change in public policy, also serve to condition the acceptance of such social change as this change was imposed upon each local community system from a penetration agent beyond its immediate environment. The interaction between these factors, multi-level and multi-faceted, generated within each community a climate that proved either facilitative or inhibitory to that penetrated social change: desegregation of public schools. Moreover, the extent to which purely demographic constraints within the local community either facilitated or inhibited social change becomes an object of attention because of these critical linkages. In short, the relative distribution of key sociopolitical and

demographic characteristics is hypothesized within the research model to create varying social climates which could be expected to account for variance in levels of desegregation among local communities, and variance in levels of change, especially insofar as this social process constituted a formal, externally imposed reversal of previous public policy. The task is to discover the relative importance of these factors as they confronted penetration.

The state and community variables were selected according to whether or not they seemed to indicate forces likely to be important in the creation of a social climate relative to the acceptance of social change. It is expected that these variables, in the additive linear model, can account for an important amount of variation in the implementation of desegregation policy across communities in the United States. To determine the extent to which the variable set in Table 3-7, used to operationalize the research model in Figure 3-1, may, or may not, explain levels of desegregation and changes in these levels is the explicit analytic purpose of this research. It is model testing that is the goal, and from model testing it becomes possible to develop empirical evidence with which to make intelligent adjustments in that model, and in the theoretical framework upon which it was based.



In summary, this study has as its primary goal the expansion of its theoretical system, such that:

When the limit of a theory is encountered, in the form of the occurrence of a theoretically precluded phenomenon, the search is begun for some component of the error term which is correlated in the relevant sense, and in conjunction with its discovery, the substance of the theory is revised.<sup>18</sup>

We shall adhere to Goldberg's research strategy and evaluate with care the causal attributions inherent in our model and its empirical result and, insofar as it becomes appropriate, will make specific suggestions as to improvements of the theoretical system from which it has been developed.

### Organization of the Study

#### Chapter 4

In the fourth chapter a concise discussion of school desegregation measurement, and an explanation of the two indices used in the study, precede an examination of the 1968-1972 desegregation patterns. To establish the extent to which separate desegregation indices are warranted, Pearsonian product-moment correlations between the measures are reported. Summary tables of means and standard deviations for 1968, 1972 and change levels among cities are presented. Later, northern and southern-border cities are compared. To establish whether desegregation patterns are different between regions in the United States, an analysis of variance procedure is reported and its implications for subsequent analysis are drawn. Chapter 4 thus draws a complete picture of urban school

desegregation in the U.S. during the late sixties and early seventies, and provides the basic information upon which later analysis is based.

## Chapter 5

In this chapter the analytic tasks of the study are initiated. Each component of the research model developed in chapter 3 is separately evaluated to determine if the individual variables within are closely intercorrelated. A data reduction strategy was invoked based upon the result of multiple and partial correlation analyses. If multicollinearity was discovered among variables within a component certain variables were eliminated and those remaining were assumed to effectively stand for those removed.

Once the number of variables defining each model component had been reduced to the maximum number of independent measures further multiple and partial correlation analyses were completed. The results of these analyses determined the extent to which the variables remaining in each component were independently associated with desegregation and change.

## Chapter 6

Building upon the preliminary work completed in chapter 5, a comprehensive examination of the empirical validity of the entire research model is undertaken in the sixth chapter. The elements of each component found to be most closely associated with desegregation are integrated into a statistical

model and subjected to multiple correlation and regression analyses. In this fashion the relative explanatory contribution of each model component is evaluated under appropriate statistical control.

### Chapter 7

The final chapter of the study presents a summary of the research findings as these were developed in chapters 4 through 6. Included in this section is a restatement of the major hypotheses offered in chapter 3 and an evaluation of the extent to which these hypotheses were confirmed by subsequent analysis. The research model is considered in light of the empirical evidence. Appropriate modifications in the structure are offered, the utility of the theoretical framework is considered, and new directions for research are suggested.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>This study is concerned exclusively with the dominant racial isolation situation as it exists throughout the U.S., black-white separation. It does not address itself to the undeniably important issue of "minority" isolation since non-black minorities--American Indians, Chicanos--are insufficiently dispersed among the entire spectrum of large American communities to facilitate the type of cross-national study involved in this research.

<sup>2</sup>This seems the only practical way of determining coterminous boundaries without actually studying city maps for over 200 U.S. cities and comparing them with school district boundaries.

<sup>3</sup>This requires the assumption that in a consolidated system the determinative sociopolitical and demographic characteristics are primarily those of the large city within it. This assumption is preferred to one which would require county-level data to be used, especially in view of the comparability problems which would emerge in city comparisons with the rest of our communities.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts: Fall 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts: Fall 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974).

<sup>5</sup>The case can be made that, both in terms of the aggregate figures available before the 1968 survey and those available in Kirby, et al., that no meaningful urban school desegregation occurred in any U.S. community prior to 1968. As Farley and Taeuber, "Racial Segregation in Public Schools," have argued: "As of fall 1967 few large school systems had been compelled by specific court order or federal administrative sanction to desegregate. These data, then, represent the best available baseline prior to the major desegregation efforts and controversies of recent years." Thus, using 1968 as a baseline does not adversely affect the change factor.

<sup>6</sup>The HEW survey is taken every two years for all school districts in the U.S. with at least 3,000 students, and for a scientific sample of the smaller school districts.

<sup>7</sup>That is not to say that federal programs of the second type were not, as a secondary or subsidiary intent, devoid of segregation overtones. See, for example, the summary of then

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney, in Toward Equal Educational Opportunity, pp. 122-3.

<sup>8</sup>See, for example, Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables;" or Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public.

<sup>9</sup>The desegregation literature has been reviewed in chapter 1. The basic urban literature is too broad to review in a single footnote. Specific research pieces will be cited later as these are relevant to particular hypotheses. For excellent reviews of this literature in general see: Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics 29 (February 1967): 94-108; and Charles O. Jones, "State and Local Public Policy Analysis: A Review of Progress," Political Science and State and Local Government (Washington, D.C.: American Political Association, 1973), pp. 27-54.

<sup>10</sup>The hypotheses related to the existence of community cleavages of the type discussed in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, chapter 3. An excellent operational discussion of this social cleavage-demographic link is available in Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities," Municipal Yearbook 1965, Vol. 32 (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1965): 82-97; and in Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies. Demographic characteristics of cities have been linked, although not entirely consistently, in a number of empirical analyses, e.g.: John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," American Political Science Review 56 (September 1962): 615-20; Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review 61 (September 1967): 701-17; and Leo F. Schnore and Robert R. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (June 1963): 1-17. These variables, however, have not always been found to be important, e.g., Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities;" and Robert Lineberry, "Community Structure and Planning Commitment," Social Science Quarterly (December 1969): 723-30.

<sup>11</sup>Again, the basis for the hypotheses emerges from Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, 1963, chapters 3 and 4. A wide variety of empirical inquiries have linked social class structure to political structures and outputs, e.g.: Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review 33 (August 1968): 576-93;

Schnore and Alford, "Forms of Government"; Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review 21 (Summer 1961): 131-35; Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley, 1964); Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New York: Free Press, 1967); although, class and community wealth have not always been found to be important determinants of structure and policy, e.g.: Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies; Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review 60 (June 1966): 306-26; Lineberry, "Community Structure and Planning Commitment"; Bryan T. Downes, "Municipal Social Rank and the Characteristics of Local Political Leaders," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (November 1968): 514-38; and Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 124-44.

<sup>12</sup>An extremely vast literature has developed regarding the causes and effects of city reformism. The prevailing theory has been that of "ethos" as a cause for adoption of reform; i.e., that communities with larger middle-class populations and closer elite involvement will opt for the more professional, reformed, nonpolitical structures as a part of the value systems of this population. The basic literature in this area is: Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics; Norton Long, "Recent Theories and Problems of Local Government," Public Policy, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour Harris (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, 1958); Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos"; Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies"; Alford and Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities"; Schnore and Alford, "Forms of Government."

<sup>13</sup>See Inger and Stout, "School Desegregation"; Crain, et al., Politics of School Desegregation; Crain and Vanecko, "Elite Influence in School Desegregation"; and Kirby et al., Political Strategies. Dye, "Urban School Segregation," however, found the opposite. We shall use Dye's study as a means of testing the reform school--realizing that his "political" approach may in fact be the determinative factor if our reform approach fails.

<sup>14</sup>This hypothesis is guided by the urban literature and Banfield and Wilson's "ethos" hypothesis, that is, that reform cities developed from community consensus over goals of government and a middle-class, public regarding, ethic of cooperation, honesty, and efficiency. This political climate, we

expect, allows elites to keep things under control and limits social cleavages--which inhibit social change such as desegregation. We are opting for the consensus and not the cleavage explanation of why things change within communities.

<sup>15</sup>Kirby, et al., Political Strategies.

<sup>16</sup>Inger and Stout, "School Desegregation," and Crain and Street, "School Desegregation and School Decision-Making," for example. The function of conflict was explored by Kirby and Crain, "Functions of Conflict," and direct citizen activity was found to be ineffective in ultimate community outcomes.

<sup>17</sup>Although Dye found exactly the opposite, "Urban School Segregation"; we shall hypothesize according to the findings of Crain, et al., 1968; Crain and Vanecko, 1968; Kirby, et al., 1973.

<sup>18</sup>Arthur S. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review 60 (December 1966), p. 915.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

This chapter is devoted to describing the fundamental patterns of public school desegregation among American cities during the period from 1968 to 1972.<sup>1</sup> An appropriate method of measuring school desegregation is discussed and two indicators are operationalized. The need for separate indices is tested with correlation analysis. Then the actual levels of urban school desegregation in 1968 and 1972 are compared and change between these years is measured. Finally, regional differences between desegregation patterns and change are considered.

#### Measuring Urban School Desegregation

Before cities can be systematically compared as to school desegregation levels it is imperative that the problem of developing a valid, reliable measure be confronted. Any such definition must involve an indicator capable of being applied to a number of cities with considerable variation in racial composition ratios. A serious limitation apparent in much of the research literature reviewed in chapter one is the inexact definitions of desegregation, and



the common lack of an explicit empirical measure of this phenomenon to facilitate comparisons among cities.<sup>2</sup>

Desegregation in this research is defined as the process by which a school district actually maintains a biracial system of public education. Specifically, the focus is upon this process as it exists within the public elementary and secondary schools of urban school districts. For many, if not most communities, this process has been a dynamic one, usually involving a change from a previously segregated status to a less segregated one. Whether it has been de jure or de facto, no distinction is made concerning the source of the original policy which resulted in the enrollment patterns to be measured. At this stage the analysis is concerned only with establishing the actual desegregation level without regard to cause. The indicators are aimed simply toward ascertaining how "desegregated" city school systems were in 1968 and 1972.

Desegregation is measured in two ways: 1) with an index based upon a fixed black-white enrollment ratio; and 2) with a flexible ratio based upon a broader interval, set within certain assumptions regarding the political feasibility of moving students to achieve desegregation. While complementary, these indices are designed to capture somewhat distinctive aspects of the desegregation process and, in tandem, are expected to provide a more accurate picture of urban school desegregation than would be possible with only a single measure.

The Fixed Desegregation Index

Any empirical measure of desegregation must accurately reflect the reality of black isolation in public schools and its relative incidence in American cities. The most common measure of black isolation within a school district has been the percentage of black pupils enrolled in schools that are 90 to 100 percent minority.<sup>3</sup> This particular measure is a sound indication of extreme black isolation within any school district. This study, however, is concerned with desegregation and as such adjusts the fixed ratio to reflect the percentage of blacks in schools less than 90 percent minority. As an absolute standard for comparing a variety of cities even this modified measure can prove misleading as to actual desegregation, especially when extreme racial imbalance exists within the general school population. For example, in 1968, Washington, D.C. and Jackson, Mississippi, had similar levels of desegregation according to the fixed index (6.1 and 5.4 respectively). Yet, to assume these systems were equally desegregated, as the index shows, overlooks the important substantive fact that in 1968, over 95 percent of Washington's public school enrollment was black compared with only 46.2 percent in Jackson. Clearly, while the extreme racial isolation of black students may be nearly the same, the comparison is unfair. No matter how hard the Washington school authorities may try, it is just not feasible to reduce desegregation by any great amount in the face of district-wide

racial proportions--there are just not enough white students to go around. Jackson, on the other hand, given the availability of a large residual of white students, could effectively reduce the racial isolation of its black students. As this single comparison clearly shows, an across-the-board comparison of cities based upon the fixed ratio may effectively measure racial isolation but is incapable of distinguishing between desegregation reality and desegregation potential, or effort. Isolation is, therefore, only a part of the desegregation process, and a more flexible indicator is clearly needed to allow for more general racial imbalance as it is compared to efforts to overcome such ratios.

Another limitation on the complete validity of comparisons based on the fixed ratio is more political in nature. A fundamental fact of life in American cities is white flight, or out-movement, as a result of an "intolerable" increase in the proportion of blacks in a community.<sup>4</sup> This social phenomenon, often called the "tipping point," would seem to set very real social and political limitations upon any school board regarding the process of desegregation. The danger of violating the "tipping point" was, for example, a major element of the Allen report on Chicago desegregation, and others have recently reaffirmed the need to adjust desegregation to meet ratios acceptable to the white community.<sup>5</sup> While the "tipping point" remains an imprecise concept it must nonetheless be considered as a factor in measuring desegregation.

For, in addition to adjusting our measure to more accurately reflect the racial balance of the district as a whole, some consideration must be given to estimating the proportion of students yet in segregated schools that could, within the social and political limits of the "tipping point," still be desegregated. Obviously, the fixed 90-10 ratio cannot capture this critical aspect of the desegregation process.

#### The Flexible Desegregation Index

To fairly compare desegregation among a variety of cities it is imperative that the relative effort of each city in the face of generalized racial imbalance also be assessed. Given the tendency of white populations to abandon schools that are perceived as disproportionately minority, this effort must be assessed within the imprecise bounds of social and political feasibility. Therefore, to capture this important second dimension of school desegregation, this study has adopted an additional index of desegregation.

The flexible desegregation index developed by Christine H. Rossell has been adopted to measure the extent to which, within the boundaries of demographic, social and political reality, a school district has exhausted its supply of students eligible for desegregation.<sup>6</sup> Thus, in addition to comparing cities as to the absolute level of racial isolation with a fixed ratio, it will also be possible to assess the relative isolation given limitations upon desegregation potential with a flexible ratio.

The flexible index of desegregation is the ratio of students already enrolled in desegregated schools to students who could be enrolled in such schools. The specific assumptions and computational formulae for the index are presented in Appendix III. The theoretical values for the index range from 0.0 indicating that none of the students eligible for desegregation have been so enrolled (total segregation) to 100.0, indicating that all eligible students have been desegregated (total desegregation).

The extent to which these two measures potentially capture distinct aspects of the desegregation process is apparent when one examines the cities discussed earlier, Washington, D.C., and Jackson, Mississippi. While the fixed index showed these cities to be extremely similar in 1968, each with a desegregation score around 6.0, the flexible index gives a different perspective: the flexible desegregation score for these cities in 1968 was 75.6 and 5.3 respectively! These differences mean that although a similar level of black isolation existed in 1968, Washington had already desegregated 75 percent of those capable of being placed in such schools, but Jackson had desegregated only 5 percent of this total. That is, the nature of racial isolation in the two cities was considerably different, despite similarities in the absolute levels, and would need to be evaluated in this light.<sup>7</sup>

### The Relationship Between Desegregation Measures

Despite what would appear to be compelling substantive reasons for using the two desegregation measures described above, the extent to which these do in fact represent distinct dimensions of this phenomenon remains to be tested. To accomplish this, fixed and flexible school desegregation scores were calculated based on 1968 and 1972 enrollment data for all cities. To determine whether the separate scores were in fact closely related, Pearsonian product-moment correlations were calculated. In Table 4-1 the matrix of simple correlation coefficients between all of the desegregation measures are arrayed. Of direct interest are the

TABLE 4-1

PEARSON'S PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION (r) COEFFICIENTS  
BETWEEN FIXED AND FLEXIBLE DESEGREGATION  
INDICES: 1968, 1972, AND CHANGE (N=205)

|                        | 1.   | 2.   | 3.   | 4.   | 5.   | 6.   |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Fixed Index 1968    | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Fixed Index 1972    | .58  | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Fixed Change        | -.54 | .00  | 1.00 |      |      |      |
| 4. Flexible Index 1968 | .75  | .36  | -.54 | 1.00 |      |      |
| 5. Flexible Index 1972 | .35  | .55  | .03  | .50  | 1.00 |      |
| 6. Flexible Change     | -.18 | -.12 | .69  | -.27 | .07  | 1.00 |

coefficients between the fixed and flexible indices for 1968 and 1972, as well as the correlation between the change scores.<sup>8</sup>

A close perusal of Table 4-1 indicates that, while these measures are very closely related insofar as 1968 desegregation ( $r=.75$ ) and desegregation change ( $r=.69$ ) are concerned, they are not identical. What is more important, by 1972, these measures are far less related ( $r=.55$ ). Obviously the nature of urban desegregation was different in 1968 than in 1972, and it would appear that the character of that phenomenon in the cities that changed will tell the story. The utility of maintaining this dual measure of desegregation is clear, especially in view of the surprisingly limited correlation between 1972 measures.

The changing configuration of urban desegregation as reflected in the growing discrepancy between fixed and flexible indices is strongly accentuated when cities are partitioned according to regional location. Among those cities within states not covered by the Brown decision (northern) the correlation between measures was more limited than for cities in general, as is apparent in Table 4-2. The relationship between 1968 and 1972 correlations remained stable; i.e., the fixed and flexible measures shared approximately 30 percent of the variance--certainly not identical manifestations of school desegregation in this region. In regard to change measures, there was virtually no relationship between them.

TABLE 4-2

PEARSON'S PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION (r) COEFFICIENTS  
 BETWEEN FIXED AND FLEXIBLE DESEGREGATION INDICES  
 [1968, 1972 AND CHANGE] AMONG NORTHERN CITIES:  
 1968, 1972 AND CHANGE (N=123)

|                        | 1.   | 2.   | 3.   | 4.   | 5.   | 6.   |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Fixed Index 1968    | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Fixed Index 1972    | .84  | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Fixed Change        | -.30 | .14  | 1.00 |      |      |      |
| 4. Flexible Index 1968 | .58  | .54  | -.01 | 1.00 |      |      |
| 5. Flexible Index 1972 | .54  | .55  | -.10 | .81  | 1.00 |      |
| 6. Flexible Change     | -.26 | -.18 | -.07 | -.57 | -.04 | 1.00 |

Within cities located in states covered by the 1954 Brown decision (southern and border) desegregation measures were more closely associated than for northern cities in 1968, and for desegregation change. Among these cities it made less difference how 1968 desegregation and change were measured as may be seen in Table 4-3. By 1972, this was much less true and the extent of covariation between desegregation isolation and effort had diminished in southern and border cities.

The correlation results presented in Tables 4-1 to 4-3 indicate that while the two desegregation indices utilized for this research are undeniably "variations on the same theme," the distinctions are empirically measurable and potentially significant. Especially in 1972, and to some



TABLE 4-3

PEARSON'S PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION (r) COEFFICIENTS  
 BETWEEN FIXED AND FLEXIBLE DESEGREGATION INDICES  
 AMONG SOUTHERN AND BORDER CITIES:  
 1968, 1972 AND CHANGE (N=82)

|                        | 1.   | 2.   | 3.   | 4.   | 5.   | 6.   |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Fixed Index 1968    | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |
| 2. Fixed Index 1972    | .34  | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |
| 3. Fixed Change        | -.51 | .06  | 1.00 |      |      |      |
| 4. Flexible Index 1968 | .73  | .14  | -.56 | 1.00 |      |      |
| 5. Flexible Index 1972 | .32  | .56  | .09  | .35  | 1.00 |      |
| 6. Flexible Change     | -.18 | -.16 | .74  | -.30 | .11  | 1.00 |

extent in 1968, the distinction holds substantive import because one can now compare cities along reasonably unique dimensions of desegregation: the fact of isolation, and the relative effort to alleviate it. The empirical validity of the distinctive indices has been confirmed, especially with regard to change and regional differences. Accordingly, the desegregation patterns of U.S. cities will be examined with both types of measure and, when appropriate, comparisons in the results will be drawn.

#### Urban Desegregation in General

On the average, public schools in American cities were less segregated in 1972 than four years earlier, and the change

TABLE 4-4

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS  
FOR U.S. CITIES: 1968, 1972 AND CHANGE

|                 | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|-----------------|------|--------------------|
| Fixed 1968      | 57.0 | 35.0               |
| Fixed 1972      | 74.1 | 30.0               |
| Fixed Change    | 1.3  | 3.0                |
| Flexible 1968   | 65.0 | 26.2               |
| Flexible 1972   | 80.0 | 17.7               |
| Flexible Change | 1.3  | 10.0               |

appears considerable. As Table 4-4 shows, on the average in 1968 less than six of ten black children were attending schools less than 90 percent minority. By 1972, however, almost three-quarters of black students were now in such schools. This increase was equally apparent for cities in terms of desegregation effort as well. By 1972, 80 percent of the children eligible for desegregation were in fact in such schools, although only 65 percent were desegregated as of 1968. According to the change ratios, the relative increase in fixed and flexible desegregation levels was even, 1.3 for both. Even in view of the undeniably appreciable segregation residual in 1972 (one out of four blacks remained racially isolated in 90 percent minority schools, and one of

five students capable of being desegregated was not) it is nonetheless evident that between 1968 and 1972 progress of an impressive magnitude had been made in implementing desegregation policy. Moreover, American cities had become more similar regarding desegregation levels during the period. The dispersion around the group mean decreased for fixed index desegregation by 5 points, and for flexible index desegregation by about 8 points; i.e., cities were, in addition to being less segregated, less varied in these levels. The amount of variation in change was far less in terms of desegregation effort (flexible index) than for simple isolation (fixed index). A comparison of standard deviations indicates that the level of reduction in racial isolation was more consistent across cities than was the increase in desegregation effort.

#### A Comparison Between Regions

Given the tumultuous history of race relations in the United States, a crucial question to consider is the extent to which cities within the North and South are actually distinctive in school desegregation patterns. Regional divisions were defined according to the original applicability of the 1954 Brown decision. Any city within a state specifically maintaining de jure school desegregation at the time of the decision is categorized "southern or border." Cities within any of the remaining states not explicitly covered by Brown are considered "northern."<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 4-5

COMPARATIVE DESEGREGATION STATISTICS FOR  
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN-BORDER CITIES

|            | North (N=123) |                       | South and<br>Border (N=82) |                       |                                  |
|------------|---------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
|            | Mean          | Standard<br>Deviation | Mean                       | Standard<br>Deviation | Explained<br>Variances ( $E^2$ ) |
| Fixed 1968 | 74.3          | 28.5                  | 31.0                       | 26.8                  | *37.0%                           |
| Fixed 1972 | 77.2          | 28.1                  | 69.5                       | 31.2                  | 1.6%                             |
| Change     | .1            | .9                    | 3.0                        | 4.0                   | *22.1%                           |
| Flex. 1968 | 76.2          | 20.0                  | 48.0                       | 25.3                  | *28.1%                           |
| Flex. 1972 | 79.8          | 17.5                  | 80.2                       | 18.1                  | 0.1%                             |
| Change     | .1            | .2                    | 3.2                        | 15.7                  | * 2.3%                           |

\*The difference between means is of sufficient magnitude to consider the cities statistically independent populations ( $p=.05$ ).

The comparative school desegregation statistics for cities in the north and south are available in Table 4-5, and the differences are striking. Among northern cities the average level of desegregation approximated 75 percent whether a fixed or a flexible scale was used. While a relative increase in the amount of desegregation occurred during the period, it was indeed limited (+.1). Of interest are the subtle changes occurring among northern cities that are suggested by differences in

fixed and flexible standard deviations. As noted above, the relative increase in both measures was equal. But the dispersion around this average change is quite different; the variation in the decline of extreme black isolation was four times as great as that for relative desegregation effort, indicating that the increase in the level of desegregation effort was more consistent across northern cities than was the relative reduction of black isolation in minority schools.<sup>10</sup> The variation among northern cities in fixed desegregation levels was greater in both years than was that of desegregation effort. Moreover, this dispersion remained virtually unchanged for fixed desegregation during the period. The variation in these cities as to desegregation effort was, however, reduced--from 20.0 to 17.5; i.e., although northern cities on the average were no more alike in 1972 than in 1968, in the reduction of black isolation levels, they were somewhat more similar than in their level of desegregation effort.

The patterns of school desegregation among southern and border cities was considerably different than those of northern cities during this period--although the desegregation levels had become strikingly similar by 1972. In 1968, the cities of the South were far more segregated than those of the North according to both fixed and flexible indices. On the average, less than a third of the blacks in southern and border cities were in schools less than 90 percent minority as compared to

approximately three-fourths of the black pupils in northern cities. Although the difference is considerably more limited, a smaller proportion of students eligible for desegregation (48 percent) were actually desegregated in southern and border than in northern (76.2 percent) cities in 1968. Unlike those in the North, however, these cities changed dramatically between 1968 and 1972, increasing school desegregation at an almost incredible rate. By 1972, southern and border cities had increased mean fixed desegregation to 69.5 percent, a relative increase of 3.0 as compared to 0.1 in the north. Thus, while the north remained somewhat more desegregated (77.2 compared to 69.5) according to the fixed index, the gap had been almost closed within four years. The difference between desegregation effort in 1968 among northern and southern cities was not as sharp as was that of isolation. Almost half of the children capable of being desegregated in southern and border cities had in fact been desegregated in 1968. In the North approximately 75 percent of such pupils had been desegregated, a desegregation advantage far more limited than that enjoyed according to the fixed index. Within four years, however, the southern and border desegregation effort had attained a mean level of 80.2, slightly more than the 79.8 realized among northern cities! In short, although in the initial period southern and border cities were on the average, far less desegregated than their northern counterparts, by 1972, these differences had been largely erased. In fact,

within four years the proportion of southern children eligible for desegregation that had in fact been desegregated slightly exceeded that ratio among northern cities. Nevertheless, a note of caution must be interjected. The dramatic increases in overall southern and border urban school desegregation effort are to be considered in light of extremely large variation among these cities with regard to change (standard deviation of 15.7). The rate of change in desegregation effort was anything but constant across these cities, and a close scrutiny of the nature of this large variance and its causes will attract considerable attention in subsequent chapters.

The comparative statistics presented in Table 4-5 indicate quite unambiguously that by 1972, the mean level of urban school desegregation had lost most, if not all, of its regional character. American cities, it would appear, were far more alike regarding this phenomenon than had been true four years earlier. To further verify the apparent disintegration of regional differences with regard to school desegregation, a series of one-way analyses of variance were performed.<sup>11</sup> To estimate the impact of regional grouping upon the desegregation means of fixed, flexible, and change indices, a measure of shared variance ( $E^2$ ) was calculated, and the results are presented in the last column of Table 4-5. In 1968, regional differences explained over a third of the variances in the fixed desegregation index. Region accounted

for approximately 22 percent of the variance in fixed-change between 1968 and 1972.<sup>13</sup> But, by 1972 regional differences no longer made an appreciable impact regarding the reduction of extreme black isolation, explaining only 1.6 percent of the variance.

Consistent with the earlier finding that regional differences between cities as to desegregation effort were more limited than differences in extreme racial isolation, less of the variance in the 1968 flexible index was explained by regional grouping (28.1%). As had been true of 1972 fixed desegregation, virtually no variance in 1972 desegregation effort could be attributed to regional grouping. Although the difference is sufficient to statistically justify considering the cities within regions separate populations, the amount of variance in desegregation effort change that may be attributed to regional differences is only 2.3 percent.

### Conclusion

In this chapter it has been established that a comparative analysis of urban school desegregation requires more than a single, unidimensional measure. The desegregation process demands attention not only to the oppressive fact of extreme black pupil isolation in minority schools, but consideration of the demographic, social, and political parameters within which any reduction in isolation must occur. To meaningfully compare any appreciable number of American



communities both the fact of racial isolation and the effort to reduce it in the face of strong limitations must be measured. Consistent with that principle, two separate desegregation indicators have been selected and applied to U.S. cities. The fixed index of desegregation determines the proportion of black children that are in less than 90 percent minority schools. This provides an estimate of the degree to which black isolation in minority schools has been reduced. The flexible desegregation index determines the proportion of students who have been placed in desegregated schools to the number of students who could, within certain limits, be placed in desegregated schooling. This measure, adjusted to reflect district-wide racial balance and student movement possible within the "tipping point" principle, is taken to indicate the desegregation effort of any district.

The results of correlation analysis confirmed the empirical utility of the distinctions drawn between reducing isolation and increasing effort within demographic-political constraints. It was determined that, while these measures were rather closely related in terms of school desegregation levels in 1968, they were by no means identical. In measuring desegregation change between 1968 and 1972, the association between measures was also strong, but again not identical. Desegregation measures in 1972 were quite independent of each other, sharing only about a quarter of the variance.

It was decided to continue the use of both measures in subsequent analysis.

Whether considered as the reduction of extreme black isolation, or as an adjusted desegregation effort, urban school desegregation increased--on the average--between 1968-1972. Not only was the mean level of desegregation higher in 1972 than 1968, but the variance of U.S. cities around this mean had been reduced; i.e., cities were increasingly alike in desegregation levels.

Regional comparisons showed that although northern were far more desegregated than southern and border cities, by 1972 these differences had virtually been eliminated. Although the mean level of school desegregation had increased in cities in both regions between 1968 and 1972, the change among southern and border cities was considerably greater.

While the desegregation levels and change have been established, and regional differences measured, the causes for variation among cities remains an open issue. The determination of the causes of urban school desegregation variation was the purpose for which the research model in chapter two was developed. In the following chapter the first stage of its application is undertaken.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>The criteria by which cities were selected is worth mentioning again at this point. These 205 communities represent the entire population of American cities that had a population of at least 25,000 in 1950, populations of at least 50,000 in 1960 and 1970, and which also had a black subpopulation of at least 1.5 percent of the total population in 1970.

For descriptive purposes the population of cities contained in this study will hereafter be treated as "cities" in general in the text. As a matter of convenience the qualifier, "cities in this study" will no longer be used. Unless otherwise noted any further reference to cities, or urban, pertains only to the population used in this research.

<sup>2</sup>For a particularly lucid discussion of the problems associated with the plethora of qualitative and quantitative definitions of desegregation see Mary Ellen Warshauer and Robert A. Dentler, "A New Definition of School Segregation," The Urban R's (New York: Praeger, 1967). An early treatment of desegregation measurement was Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indices," American Sociological Review 20 (April 1955): 210-17. A discussion of desegregation measurement closely attuned to the relationship between indices and achieving the fact of desegregation is contained in Kirby et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), Chapter 12.

<sup>3</sup>The commissions and organizations using this measure of segregation include the following: Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools ("Hauser Report"), Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964); Massachusetts State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Report on Racial Imbalance in the Boston Public Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1965); Urban League of Greater New York, A Study of the Problem of Integration in New York City Public Schools Since 1955 (New York: Urban League, 1963); State Education Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions ("Allen Report"), Desegregating the Public Schools of New York City (New York: State Department of Education, 1964); and the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation.

Among scholars who have used this definition in their research have been: Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation," Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (December 1968): 141-65; John S.

Robey, "Public School Desegregation Policy in the South," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, Texas, 1975; and Thomas Pettigrew, "School Integration in Current Perspective," The Urban Review 3 (January 1969): 4-8.

<sup>4</sup>For example see Peter H. Rossi, Why Families Move (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

<sup>5</sup>James S. Coleman, "Second Thoughts," Newsweek, June 23, 1975, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup>See Kirby et al., Political Strategies, Appendix F.

<sup>7</sup>In practical terms it means that the prospects for actually desegregating Jackson schools were far superior than those of greatly decreasing segregation in Washington. Further, while Washington might have been open to criticism for not being as desegregated as could be expected, it clearly had done a good deal. Jackson, conversely, had in 1968, done almost nothing and was thereby open to severe criticism and HEW sanctions. In fact Jackson, Mississippi, was the only one of the cities included in this study to ever actually have federal funds terminated by HEW for Title VI noncompliance. In fairness it must be added that by 1972, this segregationist holdout had desegregated over 80 percent of its eligible students! During the very same period the amount of desegregation in Washington, D.C., decreased--to 74 percent. See Appendix I for a complete list of the desegregation scores for all cities on these measures.

<sup>8</sup>Change for both measures is defined as the ratio of the difference between period-one and period-two desegregation scores to the base period's score:

$$\text{Change} = \frac{1972 - 1968}{1968}$$

1968

In this way the actual amount of change relative to the original was calculated.

<sup>9</sup>The 82 cities considered as southern and border were located in the following 17 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia.

<sup>10</sup>Because of the nature of the measurements themselves this finding is interesting but limited in its substantive import. The uneven dispersion of blacks between northern cities inevitably induces limitations as to the desegregation potential of some cities as compared to others. It would be surprising, then, if there was not a considerably larger dispersion around this mean than around that of the flexible measure--which has compensated for demographic limitations. It remains nonetheless an important fact that cities in the North became more similar in their desegregation effort levels during the period, but remained as dispersed in extreme black isolation in 1972 as in 1968.

<sup>11</sup>Analysis of variance is simply an extension, or generalization, of the difference-of-means test and is especially appropriate for this purpose. In this case northern and southern-border cities are being tested to determine whether the difference in their mean desegregation levels are sufficient to consider these cities part of "statistically" distinct populations. For a detailed explanation of this procedure see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill), chapter 16.

<sup>12</sup>The eta statistic ( $E^2$ ) is a correlation based upon the ratio of explained to the total sum of squared differences:

$$E^2 = \frac{\text{Explained SS}}{\text{Total SS}}$$

The coefficient is interpreted as indicating the amount of variation in a given characteristic that can be statistically attributed to the grouping being studied. Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 354-55.

<sup>13</sup>No actual attributions of causality are being made at this stage of the analysis. The purpose of these regional comparisons is to ascertain, in the most precise statistical terms possible, whether cities in separate regions realized different desegregation levels, and change, for this period. It is not being suggested, or assumed, that region itself caused such differences. The reasons for the existence of regional differences are sought in subsequent chapters.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CORRELATES OF URBAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

This chapter has the dual purpose of developing an operational model defined by fewer independent variables and of determining the independent correlates of urban school desegregation. Toward that end the problem of multicollinearity within the independent variable set is confronted and settled. Partial correlation analysis is performed to measure the independent association between the independent and dependent variables. The explanatory power of the set of variables within federal, state, and various local model components is measured, although causal interpretations are reserved until more extensive analysis can be performed. These separate model components will be integrated and tested as a single unit in the chapter which follows.

#### Developing a More Manageable Variable Set

As a theory building-testing effort this study has developed an explicit model with which to explain variation in levels of urban school desegregation and change. Operationally each component of the model was originally defined by a large number of measures, each selected to enhance the prospects of accurately reflecting the nature of that part of the

model. Such a large number of variables is unwieldy for analysis, and it is unrealistic to expect that all are truly independent dimensions of the components they are intended to represent. Moreover, it can hardly be expected that all are equally important in explaining desegregation patterns. The constraints of time and space require that only the most important, and independent, variables within each category draw sustained attention. Substantial effort has accordingly been devoted to reducing the total number of variables necessary to represent each model component.

#### The Problem of Multicollinearity

Reducing the number of independent variables is more than simply a statistical or theoretical convenience; it is an operational imperative given the basic purpose of this research. It is an empirical fact that within a large set of measures, such as have been collected for this study, there is a high probability that many are strongly intercorrelated. Lack of independence among "independent" variables is a serious problem as it tends to confound the relationships that are supposed to "explain" the dependent variable. When independent variables are closely associated with one another it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of these factors is causing variation in the dependent variable and which are related to it spuriously. That is, the presence of high intercorrelations among independent variables makes it nearly impossible to draw

a clear statistical picture of the important relationships under study. The greater this multicollinearity the greater the need to control for such interaction in order to accurately establish cause and effect. But, as multicollinearity increases so does the mathematical difficulty in imposing the required control. For, as the degree of multicollinearity between independent variables increases, the reliability of statistical controls such as partial correlations decreases. Therefore, in order to make reasonably accurate and precise inferences as to cause and effect between independent and dependent variables it is imperative that the degree of multicollinearity be reduced as much as possible; i.e., our independent variables must be "independent in a statistical sense."<sup>1</sup>

Beyond the need for controlling multicollinearity to facilitate causal attributions there is a second, more practical reason for doing so. When there is a high level of multicollinearity among a set of measures it may become impossible to calculate partial correlation and regression coefficients. In such cases the imposition of statistical control is not possible because matrices of highly intercorrelated variables cannot be inverted. When statistical control is impossible it is hazardous to make the kind of causal inferences necessary for model testing.

A third reason for reducing multicollinearity is the principle of parsimony. It is sensible to use the least number of explanatory variables necessary. Variables that are closely



related are redundant in explaining variation in a dependent variable, and may in fact overestimate actual explanatory power. When a single measure carries almost as much explanatory power as several it is better to use the one variable.

To solve the problem of multicollinearity in this research a data reduction strategy was imposed which reduced the number of variables within each component and assured a minimum amount of interdependence among these measures.

#### Data Reduction Procedure

To determine the extent of multicollinearity among the variables within each model component, product-moment correlations were calculated. Any simple correlation between measures of .7 or above was taken to indicate collinearity and one of the variables was eliminated from the set, according to the following criteria. First, whenever possible the same variables were reserved across regions to maximize regional comparability. Second, the variable with the lowest intercorrelations with other within component measures was selected for further analysis--further controlling multicollinearity. Ideally the same set of independent variables would have been used in both northern and southern-border regions, and this was actually possible for the federal, local political, and local school components. This was not feasible, however, for the state and local environment components because of very distinctive regional patterns of intercorrelations. The basic purpose of

this study is to determine the predictive and explanatory power of the six-component penetration framework. Only by including the most independent and explanatory variables within each component can a valid test take place, even if some regional comparability is sacrificed.

The reduced set of independent variables was again correlated and an attempt to partial this matrix was made. If the correlation matrix could not be inverted one of the pair of variables with the highest correlations was eliminated (according to the two criteria discussed above) and the operation was repeated until inversion was successful. Once partial correlations were available for each component a further step was taken to control for remaining multicollinearity. Any partial correlation coefficient between independent variables of .7 or above was taken to indicate continuing intolerable collinearity and one of the variables involved was removed. Finally the reduced variable sets were correlated with the appropriate dependent variables, and partial correlations were calculated to ascertain the independent correlates of school desegregation.<sup>2</sup>

#### Independent Correlates of School Desegregation: By Component

In chapter four the configuration of urban school desegregation and change was presented by region. In this section the covariation between these patterns and the variables defining each of the research model components is measured. The

independent correlates of public school desegregation and change are measured through partial correlation analysis and reported by region.<sup>3</sup>

#### Federal Component

The level of federal penetration into northern cities between 1954 and 1972 was limited.<sup>4</sup> Only 7.3 percent of these communities were the subject of a specific federal court order to desegregate, and but 6.5 percent were ever cited by HEW for Title IV noncompliance. Even fewer cities, 4.9 percent, were the target of Department of Justice desegregation suits. As a penetration instrument the use of HEW technical assistance was more generalized than the coercive devices mentioned above. Fully 29.3 percent of northern urban school districts were the recipients of such aid after 1964. The other major form of cooperative penetration, assistance within the Emergency School Assistance Program (ESAP), was much less prevalent among the city school districts within this region; only 7.3 percent received ESAP I or ESAP II aid. Altogether 31.7 percent of northern urban school districts received some form of federal desegregation funding between 1964 and 1972 under Title IV or ESAP I/II. Among the 39 districts involved this averaged to \$6.13 per/pupil enrolled in 1968. When separate types of cooperative-coercive penetrations are summed and treated as a single continuous measure, the limited extent of explicit federal desegregation involvement in northern cities

is apparent. On the average the composite penetration score of these cities was less than one (.6).

A third and clearly more pervasive classification of federal penetration has been defined as constraining the desegregation process; i.e., federal forces which reenforced segregation. In this region 80.5 percent of the cities were involved in a federal housing program and 83.7 percent in an urban renewal program.

In Table 5-1 the simple and partial correlations between desegregation and the federal component are presented. The reduction of extreme black isolation in the public schools as measured by the fixed index was initially most closely associated with the extent of housing activity, coercive-cooperative penetration, and the relative amount of desegregation aid received (among those cities receiving such aid). In 1968 fixed desegregation was essentially unrelated to the existence of a housing program per se and urban renewal involvement. Thus, at the beginning of the period, northern cities with relatively more fixed desegregation were also those that were more limited in public housing activity, less likely to have been penetrated, but more heavily funded per/pupil if receiving aid. The same relationships held for 1972 fixed desegregation levels as well. Although very weakly associated with 1968 and 1972 levels, urban renewal involvement was somewhat more directly related to fixed change. Cities with an urban renewal program had smaller increases in desegregation between these years.

TABLE 5-1

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
FEDERAL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND NORTHERN URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| Federal Variables                                          | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N   |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |     |
| Desegregation Aid Per/Pupil                                | .18 ( .21)          | .39 ( .43)  | .31 ( .34)  | .06 ( .02)             | .27 ( .24)  | .14 ( .13)  | 39  |
| Federal Penetration Score                                  | -.14 (-.24)         | -.01 (-.20) | .03 (-.09)  | -.14 (-.14)            | .09 (-.02)  | .33 ( .26)  | 123 |
| Federal Housing Program                                    | -.18 ( .06)         | -.25 ( .18) | -.16 ( .13) | -.25 (-.14)            | -.18 ( .05) | .14 ( .22)  | 123 |
| Federal Housing Activity                                   | -.29 (-.28)         | -.41 (-.42) | -.16 (-.13) | -.14 ( .00)            | -.23 (-.19) | -.09 (-.22) | 123 |
| Urban Renewal Program                                      | -.06 ( .03)         | -.12 (-.06) | -.17 (-.18) | -.20 (-.07)            | -.08 (-.04) | .15 ( .06)  | 123 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .394                | .574        | .389        | .295                   | .337        | .424        |     |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .155                | .329        | .151        | .087                   | .114        | .180        |     |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

Further, reflecting the nature of the associations in 1968 and 1972, cities that increased fixed desegregation tended to have received more aid per/pupil, were more likely to be involved in a housing program, but were less active in that program.

With the important exception of change, penetration variables were less closely associated with flexible measures of school desegregation. School desegregation effort in 1968 was just barely associated with federal variables--only penetration score and housing involvement were particularly related. Cities initially manifesting greater desegregation effort were slightly less likely than others to attract coercive-cooperative penetrations or to have been involved in a housing program. By 1972, however, these more desegregated communities were more likely to be among those receiving relatively more federal aid, and those involved in more limited housing activity. Increases in desegregation effort during the period were less closely tied to aid levels, but more strongly associated with coercive-cooperative penetrations, housing involvement and activity. Those northern cities which had relatively increased their desegregation effort were also those receiving somewhat more aid per/pupil, more penetration, and were more likely to be involved in a housing program but less active in construction of units.

Federal desegregation penetration was a more prevalent fact among city school districts in the South and border region

than had been true in the North. Almost three out of four urban districts within this region had been the subject of a specific federal court order to desegregate (73.2 percent compared to 7.2 percent of northern cities). These cities also tended to be the subject of more orders; of districts receiving such orders in the southern-border region an average of 3.5 orders were actually issued, compared to 1.8 in the North. HEW citations in this region were about three times as prevalent, 17.1 percent compared to 6.5 in the North. Department of Justice suits were filed against 22.0 percent of these community school districts, approximately four times as many as in the North. HEW Title IV assistance was provided to over half (53.7 percent) of the cities of the South-border region, about 25 percent more than in the North. Even more striking was the extreme breadth of cooperative penetration through ESAP I/II. Just over three-quarters of the South-border communities (75.6 percent) received this type of assistance for the eradication of segregation, as compared to less than one-in-ten northern cities. In the North roughly a third of the urban districts had received some federal funding under Title IV and ESAP. Of the 82 southern and border city districts almost 88 percent had obtained such funding. The relative level of desegregation funding was extremely divergent between regions. The \$22.95 per/pupil received by southern and border districts dwarfs the \$6.13 northern rate. In view of these extensive differences it is not surprising to find that the mean composite penetration

score was almost five times as large for southern and border cities (2.9 compared to .6).

Constraining federal penetrations were extremely pervasive among southern and border cities. Approximately nine of ten communities (90.2 percent) were involved in a federal housing program--compared to 80.5 percent in the North, and about seven in ten had urban renewal programs--70.7 percent as compared with 83.7 percent in the North.

While dramatic, the large-scale regional differences in penetration are not surprising. Between 1954 and 1964 the federal desegregation effort was entirely a judicial burden and limited almost completely to the southern and border region covered by Brown. Even after 1964 and the Civil Rights Act the obvious thrust of federal intervention was not in the North. Most especially the ESAP program, ostensibly without a regional target, was most frequently utilized in the South--where the large majority of court-ordered districts eligible for the funds were located.

As shown in Table 5-2, regional dissimilarity in the incidence of federal penetration extends as well to the nature of the relationships between this phenomenon and desegregation patterns. In 1968 extreme black student isolation in southern and border city schools was most closely associated with the incidence of coercive-cooperative penetrations and involvement in a public housing program. Those cities with relatively greater fixed school desegregation were more likely to attract



TABLE 5-2  
SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
FEDERAL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND SOUTHERN-BORDER URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| Federal Variables                                          | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |    |
| Desegregation Aid Per/Pupil                                | -.18 (-.08)         | .17 ( .20)  | .23 ( .14)  | -.11 ( .01)            | .05 ( .03)  | .01 ( .03)  | 72 |
| Federal Penetration Score                                  | -.66 (-.62)         | -.02 (-.01) | .49 ( .45)  | -.59 (-.56)            | .03 ( .06)  | .24 ( .21)  | 82 |
| Federal Housing Program                                    | -.30 (-.22)         | -.09 (-.12) | .06 ( .03)  | -.24 (-.16)            | -.17 (-.11) | .02 ( .05)  | 82 |
| Federal Housing Activity                                   | -.17 ( .03)         | -.01 (-.01) | .00 (-.05)  | -.14 ( .03)            | -.17 (-.08) | -.05 (-.03) | 82 |
| Urban Renewal Program                                      | .01 (-.01)          | .08 ( .14)  | -.16 (-.08) | .03 ( .01)             | -.15 (-.05) | -.19 (-.15) | 82 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .683                | .245        | .516        | .610                   | .222        | .298        |    |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .466                | .060        | .266        | .372                   | .049        | .088        |    |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

penetration and were somewhat less likely to have been involved in a federal housing program. The total amount of correlation between fixed desegregation in 1968 and the federal component was very strong (.683), and substantially larger than that realized among northern cities. By 1972, however, this situation was very different as the magnitude of multiple correlation had diminished in this region (.245), and was actually less strong than that of the North (.574). Now, as was true for northern cities, the reduction of fixed school segregation was associated with relatively larger amounts of federal aid--but the strength of this relationship was indeed limited. Southern and border cities with relatively more fixed desegregation in 1972 were those having received more desegregation aid per/pupil, were less likely to have been involved in federal housing, but more likely to have been part of an urban renewal program. Unlike the northern trend, southern and border fixed desegregation was unrelated to the amount of housing activity. The change in these relationships apparent in southern and border communities is readily understood in terms of the correlates of fixed desegregation increases during the period. The relative decrease in extreme black isolation was most strongly associated with the incidence of coercive and cooperative penetrations and mildly related to higher per/pupil aid levels. Given the strong penetration attention drawn among the originally least desegregated cities, and the positive correlation between gains in

desegregation and penetration, it is not surprising to observe the diminution of these associations by 1972.

The relative desegregation effort of southern and border cities was consistently less strongly related to the federal variables than fixed desegregation. The nature of these relationships was virtually the same nonetheless. In 1968 the cities in this region with relatively more flexible school desegregation were those that attracted less penetration and were less likely to have been involved in a public housing program. The level of multiple correlation was reasonably high (.610) but by 1972 had dissipated appreciably. At the end of the period, as had been true for extreme isolation, the relative desegregation effort of southern and border cities was but weakly associated with the elements of the federal component--even less related than had been true in the North (.222 compared to .337). The relative increase of flexible desegregation between 1968 and 1972 was, like fixed change, most strongly related to the incidence of coercive-cooperative penetrations. This relationship was, however, about half as strong with regard to desegregation effort. Urban renewal involvement was somewhat more strongly related to flexible change than was the case for fixed change. More interesting, despite the pervasive incidence of federal penetrations among southern and border cities the level of association between this phenomenon and change in desegregation effort was actually stronger in the North (.298 compared to .424).

State Component

As Table 5-3 shows, the reduction of extreme isolation of black students in urban school districts was not closely associated with differences among northern states. The correlations between individual state measures and fixed desegregation are very modest indeed. In 1968 cities with relatively more fixed desegregation were slightly more likely to be found in states with less liberal electoral structure, less policy innovation, and a more traditionalistic political culture. These cities were also somewhat more likely to exist in states with more extensive antidiscrimination legislation. Essentially the same relationships held with regard to 1972 fixed desegregation as well, and it is therefore not surprising to find fixed change was virtually unrelated to individual state variables--although cumulatively about 7 percent of variance was shared. State variables were considerably more closely related to the relative desegregation effort of northern cities. In 1968 flexible desegregation was most strongly tied to state government responsiveness, electoral structure, and affluence. Cities with relatively more flexible desegregation were located in states of more limited responsiveness, less liberal electoral structure, and greater affluence. These were also cities in states more likely to have a separate EPA, and more black elected officials, but less policy innovation. Essentially the same relationships characterized flexible desegregation in the North in 1972. Flexible change, however, followed a somewhat

TABLE 5-3

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
STATE COMPONENT VARIABLES AND NORTHERN URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| State Variables                                         | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|                                                         | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |     |
| Antidiscrimination Legislation                          | .21 ( .12)          | .09 ( .09)  | -.18 (-.06) | .20 ( .08)             | .20 ( .19)  | -.09 ( .08) | 123 |
| Government Responsiveness                               | .16 ( .08)          | .07 ( .05)  | -.12 (-.04) | .28 ( .28)             | .32 ( .24)  | -.04 (-.14) | 123 |
| Electoral Structure                                     | -.10 (-.18)         | -.14 (-.16) | -.09 (-.01) | -.15 (-.25)            | .01 (-.11)  | .25 ( .25)  | 123 |
| Policy Innovation                                       | .10 (-.15)          | .06 (-.11)  | .03 ( .07)  | .32 (-.11)             | .23 (-.15)  | -.21 ( .01) | 123 |
| Separate EPA                                            | .14 ( .06)          | -.03 (-.07) | -.20 (-.11) | .19 ( .20)             | .07 ( .04)  | -.21 (-.24) | 123 |
| Political Culture                                       | -.14 (-.14)         | -.15 (-.16) | .01 ( .01)  | -.23 ( .00)            | -.26 (-.01) | .03 (-.01)  | 123 |
| Black Elected Officials                                 | -.06 (-.01)         | .00 (-.01)  | .11 ( .02)  | .07 ( .13)             | .12 ( .09)  | .04 (-.10)  | 123 |
| Industrialization Change                                | .09 (-.07)          | .09 ( .01)  | -.09 ( .05) | -.03 (-.05)            | -.04 (-.02) | -.02 ( .06) | 123 |
| Affluence                                               | -.01 ( .06)         | .08 ( .07)  | .18 ( .04)  | .30 ( .24)             | .30 ( .29)  | -.10 (-.01) | 123 |
| School Expenditure Disparity                            | -.08 (-.06)         | -.05 (-.06) | .06 ( .00)  | .01 ( .04)             | -.03 ( .02) | -.07 (-.06) | 123 |
| Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R)                    | .318                | .300        | .260        | .556                   | .526        | .400        |     |
| Coefficient of Multiple Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .101                | .090        | .068        | .309                   | .277        | .160        |     |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

distinctive course, and was more closely related to state variables than had been fixed change. Northern cities that had increased desegregation efforts between 1968 and 1972 were more likely to be found in states of greater government responsiveness, more liberal electoral structure, with fewer black officials, and those less likely to have a separate EPA.

State component variables were usually more closely associated with urban desegregation in the southern and border region, as Table 5-4 demonstrates. Given the long and tumultuous history of the state governments with regard to education and race in this region, the stronger correlations are not surprising. The closest correlate of initial fixed desegregation was the size of the state's black population.<sup>5</sup> In this region extreme black isolation was relatively greater among cities located in states with more blacks, more policy innovation, a more traditionalistic culture, and relatively less industrialization change. These cities were also in states of somewhat increasing affluence, but more limited school consolidation. By 1972 these associations had become less strong but were of fundamentally the same nature. One noteworthy exception was the relationship between political culture and fixed desegregation. Previously negative in direction, state political culture was now positively associated with the reduction of extreme black isolation in schools; i.e., cities with greater fixed desegregation at the end of the period were likely to be found

TABLE 5-4

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
STATE COMPONENT VARIABLES AND SOUTHERN-BORDER URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| State Variables                                            | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |            | N  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|------------|----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change     |    |
| Electoral Structure                                        | .11 ( .08)          | .25 ( .21)  | .01 (-.25)  | .04 ( .25)             | -.12 (-.03) | .01 (-.20) | 81 |
| Policy Innovation                                          | -.13 ( .10)         | .07 ( .06)  | .21 ( .00)  | -.20 (-.02)            | -.13 (-.01) | .19 ( .12) | 81 |
| Political Culture                                          | -.35 (-.29)         | .15 ( .19)  | .34 ( .37)  | -.50 (-.51)            | .02 ( .11)  | .07 ( .13) | 81 |
| Industrialization Change                                   | .05 (-.25)          | -.16 (-.32) | .25 ( .37)  | -.13 (-.23)            | -.26 (-.25) | .27 ( .25) | 81 |
| Affluence Change                                           | .09 ( .15)          | -.32 (-.16) | -.08 (-.27) | .04 ( .19)             | -.01 ( .02) | .09 (-.06) | 81 |
| Black Population                                           | -.56 (-.59)         | -.18 (-.31) | .25 ( .37)  | -.29 (-.34)            | .07 (-.06)  | .08 ( .18) | 81 |
| School Consolidation                                       | -.05 (-.22)         | .00 ( .15)  | .05 ( .09)  | -.09 (-.11)            | -.08 (-.07) | .05 ( .01) | 81 |
| Federal Aid Change                                         | .24 (-.01)          | -.09 (-.02) | .02 ( .26)  | .11 (-.22)             | -.08 ( .07) | .21 ( .25) | 82 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .682                | .527        | .605        | .642                   | .300        | .448       |    |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .465                | .278        | .366        | .412                   | .090        | .200       |    |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

in states with a more moralistic political culture. The strong negative correlation between fixed desegregation and black population had weakened considerably within four years, while that of electoral structure had increased. Fixed change, nearly unrelated to state component variables in the North, was quite strongly associated with these measures in the southern and border region (.605 compared to .260). The only two measures not related to urban fixed desegregation change among these states were policy innovation and school consolidation. Otherwise, cities with relatively greater increases in fixed school desegregation during the period were to be found among states with less liberal electoral structure, a more moralistic political culture, and increasing industrialization. These were also cities in states of more limited affluence change with more blacks and increased dependence upon federal aid for local educational revenue. Essentially, the greatest change tended to occur among the originally least desegregated cities--reversing the sign of certain correlates and diminishing others in 1972.

Unlike the northern style, flexible school desegregation among southern and border cities was less closely tied to the elements of the state component than was fixed. In part this is attributable to the more limited level of association between relative desegregation effort and the state black population. While generally less strong the state component relationships are nonetheless usually in the same direction.



The most notable difference is the much stronger negative correlation between flexible desegregation in 1968 and political culture--cities with greater school desegregation effort were to be found among states with a more moralistic political culture. The originally strong associations between state variables and flexible school desegregation diminished substantially in the face of large-scale change between 1968 and 1972, such that by the end of the period, in a reversal of original positions, the relative effort to increase school desegregation was more closely tied to state variables in the northern rather than the southern and border region (.526 compared to .300).

#### Local Environment Component

The local environmental correlates of urban school desegregation and change in the North are reported in Table 5-5. The negative correlation between 1968 fixed desegregation and the black population was quite strong. Although several other variables in this component were tied to the initial level of extreme black isolation, none approach the strength of that involving the number of blacks in the community. Northern cities with relatively greater fixed desegregation in 1968 tend to be those with fewer blacks, greater suburban exploitation, increased population mobility, and a larger white collar differential between black and general populations. These were also communities of increasing population density,

TABLE 5-5

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT VARIABLES AND NORTHERN URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| Environment Variables           | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N   |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|                                 | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |     |
| Density                         | -.21 ( .02)         | -.35 (-.02) | -.09 ( .00) | .02 ( .20)             | -.16 ( .07) | -.21 (-.16) | 123 |
| Density Change                  | .24 ( .18)          | .18 ( .17)  | -.03 ( .02) | .35 ( .24)             | .22 ( .10)  | -.27 (-.20) | 123 |
| Population Change               | .10 ( .04)          | .12 (-.01)  | .00 (-.08)  | .16 ( .14)             | .20 ( .14)  | .02 (-.01)  | 123 |
| Ethnicity                       | .10 (-.08)          | -.07 (-.20) | -.14 (-.01) | .24 ( .00)             | .13 ( .00)  | -.24 (-.07) | 123 |
| Mobility Change                 | .14 ( .20)          | .12 ( .21)  | .17 (-.08)  | -.11 ( .12)            | .02 ( .23)  | .16 ( .06)  | 123 |
| Age                             | .14 ( .02)          | .04 (-.02)  | -.21 (-.19) | .18 ( .07)             | .06 (-.02)  | -.23 (-.16) | 123 |
| Black Population (NLOG)         | -.59 (-.49)         | -.59 (-.52) | .03 (-.04)  | -.58 (-.36)            | -.55 (-.34) | .19 ( .07)  | 123 |
| Mobility Difference             | .13 ( .08)          | .10 (-.01)  | -.04 (-.12) | .22 ( .21)             | .19 ( .18)  | -.10 (-.07) | 123 |
| Education                       | .20 ( .15)          | .30 ( .18)  | .05 (-.02)  | .17 ( .13)             | .21 ( .12)  | .00 (-.07)  | 123 |
| Elite Presence                  |                     |             |             |                        |             |             |     |
| (Above \$25,000)                | .18 ( .04)          | .20 ( .15)  | -.06 ( .06) | .18 ( .13)             | .18 ( .18)  | -.05 ( .03) | 123 |
| Unemployment                    | -.26 (-.01)         | -.10 ( .09) | .31 ( .06)  | -.03 (-.09)            | .02 ( .07)  | .06 ( .22)  | 123 |
| Suburban Exploitation           | .14 ( .21)          | .04 ( .24)  | -.16 ( .02) | .08 (-.06)             | .01 ( .08)  | -.08 ( .21) | 123 |
| Suburban Exploitation Change    | .34 ( .17)          | .24 ( .11)  | -.28 (-.14) | .08 (-.08)             | .14 ( .01)  | .04 ( .13)  | 123 |
| MPO (Power Centralization)      |                     |             |             |                        |             |             |     |
| Change                          | .22 ( .06)          | .22 ( .01)  | -.17 (-.14) | -.06 (-.07)            | .09 (-.01)  | .18 ( .09)  | 123 |
| Owner Occupied Dwelling Change  | -.06 ( .11)         | -.04 ( .18) | -.05 ( .09) | -.33 (-.02)            | -.18 ( .01) | .23 ( .03)  | 123 |
| Black Elites (Above \$25,000)   | .01 ( .10)          | -.03 (-.02) | -.01 (-.14) | -.08 (-.03)            | -.01 (-.04) | -.08 ( .03) | 123 |
| Education Difference            | .09 (-.11)          | .14 (-.18)  | -.03 (-.02) | .18 (-.27)             | -.03 (-.31) | .18 ( .02)  | 123 |
| Poverty Difference              | .09 ( .04)          | .11 ( .01)  | -.13 (-.18) | .17 ( .11)             | -.13 ( .23) | .17 ( .05)  | 123 |
| Unemployment Difference         | .01 ( .01)          | .16 ( .16)  | .22 ( .32)  | .00 ( .12)             | .22 (-.01)  | .00 (-.15)  | 123 |
| White Collar Difference         | .08 ( .20)          | .16 ( .22)  | .09 (-.01)  | .19 ( .07)             | .09 ( .12)  | .19 ( .05)  | 123 |
| City Age                        | -.23 ( .04)         | -.38 ( .02) | -.22 (-.04) | .05 (-.10)             | -.22 (-.10) | .05 ( .06)  | 123 |
| Presence of Central City        | -.04 ( .06)         | -.09 (-.02) | -.13 (-.08) | .16 ( .03)             | -.13 (-.01) | .16 ( .00)  | 123 |
| Multiple Correlation            |                     |             |             |                        |             |             |     |
| Coefficient (R)                 | .748                | .762        | .550        | .725                   | .683        | .528        |     |
| Coefficient of Multiple         |                     |             |             |                        |             |             |     |
| Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .560                | .581        | .303        | .526                   | .466        | .279        |     |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

increasing suburban exploitation, and higher education levels. Basically the same relationships held true with regard to the reduction of extreme black isolation in 1972. The relationship between the size of the black population and desegregation continued to dominate these associations--which had cumulatively grown even stronger within four years. Most noteworthy was the increased level of association between fixed desegregation and ethnicity; the earlier tendency for cities with less desegregation to have relatively larger ethnic populations had grown in four years. Further, elite presence (as measured by the presence of families with incomes in excess of \$25,000), had become more closely tied to increased desegregation levels by 1972. There is some indication from these correlations that more middle and upper class communities were slightly more likely to have less extreme black isolation in the city schools during this period. That is, basic indicators of more affluent communities (fewer ethnics, fewer blacks, more elites, higher education, more owner-occupied dwellings, and more limited educational differences) tended to be positively associated with fixed desegregation in 1968 and 1972. These relationships were not particularly strong individually and should be viewed in that context with caution. The relative reduction of extreme black school isolation had few environmental correlates of particular strength among northern cities. Increased fixed desegregation between 1968 and 1972 was proximate to unemployment difference, age, and poverty difference. Cities that had

increased in fixed desegregation during the period tended to manifest larger differences between black and general population unemployment rates, had older populations, and had more limited differences between black and general population poverty.

While cumulatively these environmental variables were quite strongly correlated with northern flexible desegregation, individually the relationships--like those involving fixed desegregation--tended to be rather limited. In 1968 those cities with relatively more flexible desegregation were also those with greater and increasing density, fewer blacks, more mobility difference, more limited educational difference, and increasing populations. There are no remarkable differences between the environmental correlates of fixed and flexible desegregation levels in 1968 and 1972, and the cumulative correlation between these variables and change (fixed and flexible) are close indeed (.550 compared to .528). The individual correlates of effort were somewhat distinctive, however. Flexible change was most closely tied to unemployment, suburban exploitation, and density change--items virtually unrelated to fixed change. In addition, the relatively strong positive correlation between fixed change and unemployment change was actually reversed with regard to flexible change. This reversal of relationships was also apparent for other, albeit mild, associations as well--involving exploitation change and MPO change. Without placing much weight upon differences in correlations of such limited

magnitude, it would appear that different types of northern cities reduced extreme racial isolation than increased desegregation effort between 1968 and 1972.

As is readily apparent in Table 5-6, fewer independent variables were needed to define the environmental component for southern and border cities. Initial desegregation of both types was more strongly related to southern and border than northern variables. Two variables dominated the relationship between the environmental component and fixed desegregation in 1968, the black population and education. Among southern and border communities fixed desegregation was relatively greater when there were fewer blacks, fewer people with less than grade school educations, greater and increasing population density, and a younger--more ethnic--population. These were also the communities with relatively more black mobility and less mobility difference between black and general populations. Obviously the importance of the size of the black population spans region, for in North and South alike it was negatively associated with the reduction of extreme black isolation in public schools. By 1972 environmental variables were far less related to extreme black isolation. The strong association between low education and fixed desegregation was dramatically reduced, and the relationship between black population was far less strong--though still considerable. Other changes are visible as well. Mobility difference, previously associated with lower desegregation level, by 1972 was negatively related; more fixed

TABLE 5-6

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT VARIABLES AND SOUTHERN-BORDER  
URBAN DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| Environment Variables                                      | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |    |
| Density                                                    | -.01 ( .29)         | -.15 ( .06) | -.07 ( .01) | .08 ( .22)             | -.36 (-.11) | -.08 ( .04) | 82 |
| Density Change                                             | .00 ( .25)          | -.02 ( .05) | -.01 (-.06) | -.02 ( .16)            | .12 (-.02)  | .05 ( .01)  | 82 |
| Population Change                                          | .07 ( .31)          | .13 ( .21)  | .05 (-.18)  | -.14 ( .14)            | .02 ( .06)  | -.02 (-.12) | 82 |
| Ethnicity                                                  | .20 ( .19)          | -.04 (-.10) | -.24 (-.33) | .41 ( .48)             | .04 ( .08)  | -.11 (-.22) | 82 |
| Mobility Change                                            | -.05 ( .06)         | -.03 ( .06) | -.01 ( .06) | .06 ( .22)             | -.14 (-.05) | -.04 ( .03) | 82 |
| Age                                                        | .13 (-.16)          | .15 ( .15)  | -.19 ( .12) | .06 (-.26)             | -.04 (-.02) | -.11 ( .10) | 82 |
| Black Population (NLOG)                                    | -.59 (-.65)         | -.43 (-.39) | .17 ( .23)  | -.46 (-.56)            | -.60 (-.50) | .02 ( .04)  | 82 |
| Black Mobility Change                                      | -.06 ( .25)         | -.01 ( .04) | -.05 (-.37) | -.04 ( .23)            | -.05 ( .01) | -.12 (-.29) | 81 |
| Mobility Difference                                        | -.12 (-.26)         | .23 ( .18)  | .19 ( .30)  | -.24 (-.34)            | .27 ( .21)  | .03 ( .10)  | 82 |
| Below Grade School                                         | -.38 (-.49)         | -.23 (-.16) | .35 ( .44)  | -.18 (-.33)            | -.06 ( .05) | .26 ( .35)  | 82 |
| Elite Presence (Above<br>Above \$25,000)                   | -.13 (-.20)         | -.05 (-.14) | -.06 ( .09) | -.14 (-.13)            | .00 (-.01)  | -.03 ( .14) | 82 |
| Suburban Exploitation                                      | -.07 (-.06)         | -.08 ( .01) | -.16 (-.07) | -.10 (-.04)            | -.11 ( .12) | -.09 (-.08) | 82 |
| Suburban Exploitation Change                               | .05 (-.05)          | .06 (-.02)  | -.03 (-.11) | .11 ( .10)             | .09 ( .02)  | -.05 (-.09) | 82 |
| MPO (Power Centralization)<br>Change                       | .30 (-.03)          | .13 ( .02)  | -.09 ( .24) | .23 (-.13)             | .12 ( .03)  | -.03 ( .17) | 82 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .779                | .578        | .597        | .757                   | .664        | .436        |    |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .607                | .334        | .356        | .573                   | .441        | .190        |    |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

desegregation was found in cities of greater difference between black and general population mobility. Density and density change, black mobility and ethnicity, all were previously associated with fixed desegregation but, by 1972, were virtually unrelated to that phenomenon. Between 1968 and 1972 it is quite clear that the cities of this region manifesting the most initial school segregation were generally those communities that increased their desegregation the most. That is, the southern and border cities that had increased fixed desegregation were those of more limited population change, less ethnicity, older populations, with more blacks, less black mobility, greater mobility difference, more low educated citizens and increasing power centralization. It is interesting to note that among these cities elite presence, suburban exploitation, and exploitation change were essentially unrelated to fixed desegregation or change, although each of these variables was related to northern fixed patterns.

The initial desegregation effort in southern and border cities was related to the same environmental variables as was fixed desegregation. Essentially the type of community with higher fixed desegregation also had relatively more flexible desegregation. By 1972 a few limited differences were apparent, such as the lack of any correlation between flexible levels and education variables, but the distinctions seem trivial because the correlation coefficients are usually so small. The difference between the level of multiple correlation for

fixed and flexible change seems to be primarily the result of a single relationship--the size of the black population was not associated with flexible change but had been related to fixed increases in school desegregation.

#### Local Political Component

In Table 5-7 the political correlates of school desegregation in northern cities are reported. The initial level of extreme black isolation was clearly lowest among cities with relatively greater voter participation, shorter mayoral terms, and overlapping terms for council members. Fixed desegregation in 1968 was mildly associated with a number of other political variables. Based upon these modest correlations it would also appear that the more desegregated cities were somewhat more reformed and Republican, had more limited mayoral power, and tended to be more innovative. These relationships had changed very little by 1972, and fixed desegregation change was not very closely tied to the elements of the local political component in this region. Reductions in the level of extreme black isolation were somewhat more likely to have occurred in cities with more limited application of automatic data processing, more mayoral turnover, lower voter turnout, and less AIP support--but these relationships are not strong at all.

Voter turnout and the length of mayoral terms, while remaining relatively important correlates, were less closely related to flexible than to fixed desegregation levels among



TABLE 5-7

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL POLITICAL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND NORTHERN URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| Political Variables                                        | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N   |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |     |
| Reformism                                                  | -.03 ( .10)         | .09 ( .14)  | .14 ( .08)  | .04 (-.01)             | .05 (-.09)  | .08 (-.04)  | 123 |
| Appointed Mayor                                            | .06 (-.10)          | -.16 (-.11) | .03 (-.09)  | .00 (-.12)             | .04 (-.10)  | .05 ( .03)  | 123 |
| Mayoral Term                                               | -.17 (-.38)         | -.23 (-.33) | -.01 ( .09) | -.08 (-.27)            | -.14 (-.21) | -.02 ( .18) | 119 |
| Mayoral Veto                                               | -.06 (-.02)         | -.18 ( .00) | -.13 ( .01) | -.16 (-.18)            | -.19 (-.20) | -.03 ( .04) | 112 |
| Mayoral Turnover                                           | -.02 (-.13)         | .17 ( .04)  | .17 ( .16)  | -.08 (-.18)            | .04 (-.07)  | .20 ( .21)  | 123 |
| Overlapping Council Terms                                  | .11 ( .21)          | .21 ( .18)  | .13 (-.06)  | .25 ( .25)             | .21 ( .17)  | -.07 (-.14) | 123 |
| ADP Innovation                                             | -.22 (-.05)         | -.32 (-.07) | -.09 (-.02) | -.07 ( .10)            | -.09 ( .09) | -.04 (-.07) | 85  |
| ADP Application                                            | -.12 (-.10)         | -.26 (-.24) | -.22 (-.21) | -.16 (-.09)            | -.10 (-.02) | .12 ( .13)  | 87  |
| Housing Innovation                                         | .31 ( .16)          | .38 ( .11)  | .11 (-.03)  | .25 ( .15)             | .26 ( .16)  | -.02 ( .01) | 123 |
| Urban Renewal Innovation                                   | .22 ( .16)          | .28 ( .15)  | .12 ( .06)  | .17 ( .18)             | .17 ( .10)  | -.03 (-.14) | 123 |
| Fluoridation Program                                       | .09 ( .10)          | .07 ( .10)  | -.03 (-.06) | -.02 (-.14)            | -.02 (-.10) | .00 ( .05)  | 99  |
| Fluoridation Rejection                                     | .02 ( .12)          | .05 ( .11)  | -.03 (-.10) | -.20 (-.25)            | -.17 (-.22) | .06 ( .04)  | 99  |
| Voter Turnout                                              | .27 ( .53)          | .07 ( .45)  | -.23 (-.14) | .08 ( .24)             | -.04 ( .10) | -.21 (-.24) | 84  |
| AIP Support                                                | -.08 (-.04)         | -.09 (-.10) | -.04 (-.11) | -.18 (-.17)            | -.12 (-.12) | .12 ( .08)  | 123 |
| Republicanism                                              | .17 ( .16)          | .29 ( .24)  | .08 (-.02)  | .10 (-.04)             | .18 ( .01)  | .09 ( .06)  | 123 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .642                | .650        | .382        | .572                   | .478        | .402        |     |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .412                | .423        | .146        | .327                   | .228        | .162        |     |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

northern cities. The cumulative level of association among all of the elements of this component were also less closely tied to flexible levels in both 1968 and 1972. Reformism, mildly associated with greater fixed desegregation, was basically unrelated to initial flexible desegregation--and was in fact weakly associated in 1972 with lower desegregation effort. Indicators of mayoral power were more strongly tied (negatively) to flexible than to fixed desegregation during the period. The direction of the association between fluoridation variables was opposite for the different desegregation measures; flexible desegregation, unlike fixed, was less likely to have occurred among cities that had at any time rejected this program, or which had eventually developed such a program. The relationship between AIP support and desegregation measures was essentially similar, and never very strong in either case. The level of support for Republican presidential candidates, while positively related to fixed desegregation in 1968 and 1972, was unrelated to flexible measures. Because the magnitude of many of these correlations was so limited, it is hazardous to place much substantive weight upon most of these differences. It remains apparent, nevertheless, that desegregation effort among northern cities was less closely tied to local political characteristics than was the reduction of extreme black isolation in the public schools.

With the exception of fixed levels in 1972, the local political component was more closely related to urban school

desegregation in the South and border region than in the North --as shown in Table 5-8. The diminution of these relationships with regard to flexible desegregation levels, so characteristic of northern cities, did not occur among cities in this region. Initial fixed desegregation among these cities was very strongly related to AIP support and public housing innovation. Cities within counties that had given relatively less support to Wallace in 1968, were more innovative in establishing a housing program, and more limited in the application of ADP, tended to have relatively greater fixed desegregation in 1968. These were more reformed cities, more likely to have appointed mayors with strong power, overlapping council terms and less likely to have been innovative in establishing ADP capability. Fixed desegregation in 1968 also tended to be greater among cities that had a fluoridation program, had never rejected fluoridation, and were within somewhat less Republican counties. Voter turnout, a strong positive correlate of fixed desegregation in the North, was only very weakly associated among southern and border cities.

The large-scale reduction in urban segregation between 1968 and 1972 also brought some drastic alterations in the relationship between local political variables and fixed desegregation. No longer were AIP support and housing innovation the strongest correlates of this measure by 1972; they were in fact only modestly related. This reduced level of association tended to characterize the period, although ADP innovation was an

TABLE 5-8

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL POLITICAL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND SOUTHERN-  
BORDER URBAN DESEGREGATION: 1968-1972\*

| Political Variables                                        | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |    |
| Reformism                                                  | .01 ( .22)          | .32 ( .12)  | .03 (-.11)  | .08 ( .12)             | .43 ( .35)  | -.03 (-.01) | 82 |
| Appointed Mayor                                            | -.12 (-.19)         | .28 ( .13)  | .05 ( .24)  | .06 (-.15)             | .17 ( .01)  | -.09 ( .08) | 80 |
| Mayoral Term                                               | .05 ( .20)          | -.23 ( .14) | .08 ( .05)  | -.23 (-.17)            | -.33 (-.07) | .15 ( .08)  | 73 |
| Mayoral Veto                                               | .13 ( .07)          | -.14 (-.03) | -.13 (-.08) | .16 ( .14)             | -.09 ( .28) | -.08 (-.02) | 72 |
| Mayoral Turnover                                           | .10 ( .10)          | .23 ( .09)  | -.18 (-.13) | .23 ( .10)             | .28 (-.06)  | -.20 (-.16) | 81 |
| Overlapping Council Terms                                  | -.05 ( .20)         | .10 (-.05)  | -.02 (-.02) | .06 ( .06)             | .10 (-.03)  | -.09 (-.09) | 81 |
| ADP Innovation                                             | -.11 (-.22)         | -.39 (-.40) | -.18 (-.14) | -.01 (-.15)            | -.32 (-.15) | -.11 ( .02) | 65 |
| ADP Application                                            | -.20 (-.30)         | .01 ( .17)  | -.06 ( .20) | .09 (-.03)             | -.03 (-.04) | -.19 (-.12) | 66 |
| Housing Innovation                                         | .28 ( .43)          | .14 ( .10)  | .04 (-.11)  | .22 ( .35)             | .25 ( .21)  | .09 ( .04)  | 82 |
| Urban Renewal Innovation                                   | .18 ( .04)          | .08 ( .10)  | .06 ( .14)  | .06 ( .05)             | .36 ( .24)  | .15 ( .10)  | 82 |
| Fluoridation Program                                       | .09 ( .22)          | .14 ( .23)  | -.15 (-.17) | .11 ( .07)             | .03 ( .20)  | -.12 (-.08) | 66 |
| Fluoridation Rejection                                     | -.18 (-.13)         | .08 (-.02)  | .01 (-.17)  | -.18 (-.22)            | .14 ( .06)  | -.04 (-.10) | 66 |
| Voter Turnout                                              | .18 ( .08)          | -.07 ( .15) | -.15 ( .08) | .19 ( .23)             | -.19 (-.01) | -.14 (-.21) | 58 |
| AIP Support                                                | -.41 (-.58)         | -.13 (-.14) | .46 ( .42)  | -.59 (-.61)            | -.12 (-.11) | .25 ( .10)  | 82 |
| Republicanism                                              | -.01 (-.17)         | .21 ( .16)  | .24 ( .28)  | -.24 (-.29)            | .26 ( .16)  | .19 ( .12)  | 82 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .735                | .594        | .606        | .776                   | .663        | .459        |    |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .540                | .353        | .367        | .602                   | .440        | .211        |    |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

exception--it had become the strongest correlate (negative) of fixed school desegregation. Other more subtle changes are also apparent. Cities with appointed mayors, previously less desegregated, were now among those with relatively more fixed desegregation. Fluoridation rejection and overlapping council terms had become essentially unrelated to the reduction of extreme black isolation. Republicanism by 1972 was associated with greater fixed desegregation--four years earlier it was negatively related. These shifts are easily understood by even a cursory examination of the fixed change relationships. Put simply, those cities initially most desegregated in this region were also those that increased desegregation more, i.e., the cities that had relatively increased their fixed desegregation the most were those with greater AIP application, more Republicanism, and tended to have elected mayors and less reform. In ADP, housing and urban renewal these were less innovative communities, and they were cities less likely to have established--or rejected--a fluoridation program. In comparison to the modest association between local political variables and northern fixed change (.282), the relationship found in this region was quite strong indeed (.606).

Unlike the northern pattern, the local political component was even more closely related to flexible urban desegregation in the southern and border region. The relative change in desegregation effort, however, covaried less with these variables than had change in extreme black isolation. In 1968

the two most important political correlates were the same as had been found for fixed desegregation--AIP support and housing innovation. Housing innovation, regardless of region, was always positively associated with school desegregation levels. Longer mayoral terms had been found in cities with relatively more fixed desegregation, but exactly the opposite was true for flexible levels, and mayoral veto--basically unrelated to fixed levels--was more strongly associated (positively) with flexible desegregation. Overlapping council terms, ADP application, and fluoridation programs, all related to initial fixed desegregation, were unrelated to flexible levels in 1968. Moreover, voter turnout and Republicanism were more closely tied to flexible than fixed desegregation in 1968. Fewer differences between fixed and flexible measures were found with regard to desegregation measure, once it is recognized that the level of association was more limited for flexible change. The most notable difference involved voter turnout. Negatively related to changes in flexible desegregation, turnout was positively related to fixed change.

Among the cities in the North there had been few noteworthy shifts in the relationships among these variables (political and desegregation) between 1968 and 1972. Essentially the same patterns of association existed throughout the period. An obvious explanation of this consistency is that desegregation change was extremely limited in this region. Further, political variables were less closely tied to flexible

than to fixed desegregation in this region. Exactly the opposite situation was observed among the cities in the southern and border cities, but the level of association between flexible desegregation and the political component was stronger than that for fixed levels in each year.

#### Local School Component

As Table 5-9 shows, the local school component was very strongly associated with desegregation levels among northern cities during this period, and only modestly related to change. Higher desegregation rates were prevalent among those urban districts with absolutely and proportionately fewer blacks, and a more limited non-black enrollment. These were also more likely to be city-run districts in communities of expanding private school enrollment. School board characteristics (in those cities for which data were available) as measured by the composite board score<sup>6</sup> were not related to initial fixed levels. By 1972 the distinction between city-run and independent school systems no longer was related to fixed desegregation. Private enrollment, just barely related to initial levels, was now more strongly associated with less fixed desegregation. The relatively strong associations between non-white enrollments and fixed levels were almost identical to those earlier. Increases in the proportion of non-white enrollments were only slightly related to higher 1972 desegregation rates. Relative increases in fixed desegregation were more likely to occur in districts with relatively more black students and less non-black minority

TABLE 5-9

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL SCHOOL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND NORTHERN URBAN  
DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| School Variables                                           | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N   |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |     |
| City Run System                                            | .02 ( .23)          | -.14 ( .07) | -.14 (-.17) | .05 ( .18)             | -.04 ( .22) | -.16 (-.09) | 123 |
| County-wide System                                         | .01 (-.08)          | .06 (-.01)  | .01 ( .03)  | .10 ( .12)             | .15 ( .15)  | .02 (-.01)  | 123 |
| Composite Board Score                                      | -.16 (-.01)         | -.20 ( .10) | -.14 (-.22) | .08 ( .20)             | .16 ( .31)  | -.04 (-.08) | 61  |
| Average Size School                                        | -.37 ( .02)         | -.41 (-.01) | .01 ( .01)  | -.13 ( .21)            | -.21 ( .09) | -.03 (-.12) | 123 |
| Private Enrollment (1960)                                  | -.02 (-.06)         | -.14 (-.17) | -.15 (-.08) | -.18 (-.11)            | -.24 (-.20) | -.05 (-.06) | 123 |
| Private Enrollment Change<br>(1960-1970)                   | .24 ( .20)          | .20 ( .18)  | -.01 ( .05) | .25 ( .11)             | .20 ( .04)  | -.15 (-.06) | 123 |
| Black Enrollment (NLOG)                                    | -.72 (-.39)         | -.73 (-.39) | .04 (-.08)  | -.60 (-.60)            | -.58 (-.50) | .18 ( .29)  | 123 |
| Percent Black Enrollment                                   | -.69 (-.49)         | -.70 (-.46) | .17 ( .25)  | -.35 ( .14)            | -.47 (-.12) | -.05 (-.22) | 123 |
| Non Black Minority Enrollment                              | -.19 (-.27)         | -.20 (-.29) | .07 ( .07)  | .24 ( .26)             | .23 ( .20)  | -.11 (-.12) | 123 |
| Black Enrollment Change<br>(1968-1972)                     | -----               | .15 (-.11)  | -.01 ( .02) | -----                  | -.01 (-.26) | -.15 (-.06) | 123 |
| Non Black Minority<br>Change (1968-1972)                   | -----               | .05 (-.06)  | -.10 (-.18) | -----                  | -.01 ( .10) | -.04 (-.03) | 123 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .816                | .815        | .384        | .728                   | .740        | .394        |     |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .666                | .664        | .147        | .530                   | .548        | .155        |     |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.



change. These increasingly desegregated districts were less likely to be city-run and had relatively less insulated-professional boards.

Considerably different patterns of correlation were found between school variables and flexible desegregation among northern cities. Desegregation effort in 1968 and 1972 was far more closely tied to school board insulation and professionalism (composite board score) and more strongly related to the average size school in the district. The negative correlation between flexible desegregation and the absolute size of black enrollments was much stronger than had been true for fixed levels, but the proportion of blacks was actually positively associated with desegregation effort. Moreover, directly opposite of the fixed situation, non-black minority enrollment was positively related to flexible desegregation. Thus, quite distinctive from fixed desegregation, cities with relatively more desegregation effort in 1968 were those with fewer black students (though with a larger proportion of blacks), relatively more non-black minority students, larger schools, and more limited (but increasing) private school enrollments. These were more likely to be city-run, county-wide districts with more insulated-professional boards. Only the relationship between per cent black and desegregation had changed appreciably by 1972; by then larger proportions of black students were found in less desegregated districts--contrary to the initial pattern. The only appreciable

difference between fixed and flexible desegregation change and school system relationships involved, as before, the proportion of black students. The northern cities with relatively larger increases in fixed desegregation between 1968 and 1972 were those with proportionately fewer black students (although enrolling larger numbers of blacks), opposite the pattern for flexible desegregation change.

The independent school system correlates of desegregation among southern and border cities are reported in Table 5-10. As had been true in the North, fixed desegregation in 1968 was closely associated with black enrollment statistics in southern and border city districts. Unlike in the North, however, initial fixed desegregation was also strongly related to private school enrollment in this region. Lower levels of extreme black school isolation were more extensive within districts with larger private enrollments (but which had been more limited in private change since 1960), fewer and a smaller proportion of black students, and more limited non-black minorities. These also were districts that were more likely to be city-run and county-consolidated systems with larger schools and more insulated and professional boards. By 1972 there had been several major shifts in these relationships. The independent correlation between city-controlled schools and fixed desegregation had substantially strengthened. School board insulation and professionalism was now negatively related to the reduction of extreme black isolation, as were average school

TABLE 5-10

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED  
LOCAL SCHOOL COMPONENT VARIABLES AND SOUTHERN-BORDER  
URBAN DESEGREGATION PATTERNS: 1968-1972\*

| School Variables                                           | Fixed Desegregation |             |             | Flexible Desegregation |             |             | N  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|----|
|                                                            | 1968                | 1972        | Change      | 1968                   | 1972        | Change      |    |
| City Run System                                            | -.09 ( .19)         | .08 ( .34)  | -.08 (-.27) | .04 ( .31)             | -.11 ( .12) | -.10 (-.35) | 82 |
| County Wide System                                         | -.04 ( .12)         | .14 ( .14)  | .07 ( .04)  | -.15 ( .19)            | .08 ( .29)  | -.08 (-.15) | 82 |
| Composite Board Score                                      | .22 ( .24)          | -.09 (-.18) | .13 ( .19)  | .03 (-.06)             | -.14 (-.14) | .34 ( .45)  | 50 |
| Average Size School                                        | -.33 ( .11)         | -.36 (-.22) | -.04 ( .09) | -.10 ( .06)            | -.27 ( .12) | -.06 ( .21) | 82 |
| Private Enrollment                                         | .29 ( .45)          | -.18 (-.09) | -.27 (-.31) | .28 ( .28)             | -.26 (-.31) | -.10 (-.22) | 82 |
| Private Enrollment Change                                  | -.23 (-.12)         | -.02 (-.16) | .25 ( .11)  | -.29 (-.19)            | -.01 (-.17) | .16 ( .21)  | 82 |
| Black Enrollment (NLOG)                                    | -.69 (-.44)         | -.37 ( .00) | .17 (-.10)  | -.51 (-.42)            | -.56 (-.48) | -.03 (-.19) | 82 |
| Per Cent Black Enrollment                                  | -.56 (-.30)         | -.40 (-.31) | .23 ( .27)  | -.34 ( .10)            | -.45 ( .16) | .12 ( .24)  | 82 |
| Non Black Minority Enrollment                              | .14 (-.12)          | -.15 (-.20) | -.21 (-.10) | .45 ( .42)             | .16 ( .08)  | -.08 ( .10) | 82 |
| Black Enrollment Change                                    | -----               | -.17 (-.06) | .25 ( .06)  | -----                  | -.17 (-.01) | .13 (-.15)  | 82 |
| Non Black Minority Change                                  | -----               | .09 ( .04)  | .01 ( .04)  | -----                  | .03 ( .08)  | -.01 ( .06) | 82 |
| Multiple Correlation<br>Coefficient (R)                    | .821                | .640        | .533        | .741                   | .679        | .553        |    |
| Coefficient of Multiple<br>Determination (R <sup>2</sup> ) | .674                | .410        | .284        | .550                   | .461        | .306        |    |

\*Partial correlations in parentheses.

size and private enrollment. Most important while the negative association involving the proportion of black students was unchanged, there was no independent relationship anymore between the number of blacks per se and fixed desegregation. The southern and border districts that had relatively increased fixed desegregation the most were independent systems with a larger proportion of black students, located in cities with more limited private enrollment. These were also districts with more insulated and professional school boards, increasing private enrollment since 1960, and more limited non-black minorities.

Changes in non-white enrollment proportions were not related to change or 1972 fixed levels. Fixed change was more closely associated with school system variables in this region than had been true among northern districts, and there were some important similarities as well. In both regions increased reduction of extreme black isolation was greater among independent districts and those with a larger proportion of black students. School board characteristics were related to fixed change in both regions as well, but in different directions. The most striking regional distinction was that fixed change, relative to other correlations, was quite strongly tied to private school enrollment among southern and border districts--but unrelated in the North. The strongest correlates of initial fixed school desegregation in both regions also tended to be strongly tied to change, but the direction of these

associations tended to be opposite; i.e., the type of district that had originally been the least desegregated tended to increase desegregation more between 1968 and 1972.

In general the elements of the local school component were similarly associated with initial levels of fixed and flexible desegregation. The most arresting difference involved the relative importance within southern and border districts of non-black minority students. Districts in 1968 with more fixed desegregation were somewhat more likely to have a smaller proportion of non-black minorities; the opposite was true for flexible levels. As had been the case for fixed levels, flexible desegregation in 1972 was less closely associated with the school component than was true at the beginning of the period. The most remarkable difference between the correlates of fixed and flexible desegregation was the continuing tendency for desegregation effort to be strongly associated with the number of black students in a district. By 1972, however, the number of blacks was completely unrelated to fixed school desegregation in southern and border cities. Further, the proportion of blacks was a negative correlate of fixed desegregation but was positively related to flexible desegregation. Fixed and flexible desegregation change was related to essentially the same school variables and at comparable degrees of association. The most noteworthy distinction was the much stronger correlation between school board characteristics and flexible change in this region; increases in

desegregation were more extensive in districts with more insulated and professional boards.

### Conclusion

The first purpose of this chapter was to operationalize a data reduction strategy for the production of a more manageable analysis data set, and that has been accomplished. As a result of multiple and partial correlation analyses, a reduced set of independent variables defining each model component was generated. These variables were then used to determine the statistically independent correlates of urban school desegregation in the North and South, fulfilling the second purpose of the chapter.

It has been established that within each separate model component the most important independent correlates of school desegregation varied depending upon the region of the country within which a city is located. With few but important exceptions--such as the impact of black populations and federal coercive-cooperative penetrations--the independent variables were not related to school desegregation in the same way in northern and southern-border cities. Further, the correlates of urban school desegregation often varied over time as well, especially among southern and border cities where large increases in desegregation had occurred during the period. Depending upon the way in which desegregation was operationalized, as a fixed or flexible index, or as a change ratio,

the correlates of this process varied as well. While similarities were often strong there were, nonetheless, important differences between the correlates of fixed and flexible desegregation in both regions. Moreover, substantial differences were found as to the degree of association between the separate components and desegregation; i.e., the relative explanatory power of each component was not constant across regions, desegregation measures, or time.

Now that the basic relationship between independent variables within components and school desegregation have been explored, it remains before us to determine the between component associations. That is, the relative importance of variables within the entire set must be established. Once that is accomplished it becomes possible to enter the elements of each component simultaneously into predicative equations so as to empirically test the utility and validity of the entire penetrated systems model. These are the important assignments that have been reserved for the next chapter.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed discussion of multicollinearity and associated problems in data analysis see Richard B. Darlington, "Multiple Regression in Psychological Research and Practice," Psychological Bulletin 69 (March 1968): 161-82; Robert A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," American Journal of Sociology 73 (March 1968): 592-616; J. Johnston, Econometric Methods, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); and Donald E. Farrah and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis," Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 1967): 97-107.

<sup>2</sup>There are, of course, other data reduction strategies that are helpful in settling multicollinearity problems. A variety of index constructions are possible--and several summary indices have been utilized already. Factor analytic techniques have been commonly utilized for this purpose. The procedure selected seemed best for its relative simplicity and directness. Factor analysis often yields ambiguous results and this will inhibit rather than facilitate precision in interpretation.

<sup>3</sup>Partial correlation yields a single measure indicating the degree of association (covariation) between two variables, controlling for additional variables. The partial correlation coefficient is defined as the correlation between the residuals of the regressions of  $Y$  on  $X_2$  and  $X_1$  on  $X_2$ --for the relationship of  $Y$  and  $X_1$  controlling<sup>2</sup> for  $X_2$ . This measure allows for an estimate of the relative importance and direct impact of assorted independent variables upon the dependent variable. As such it is an invaluable aid in sorting the causal from the spurious when bolstered by appropriate theory. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), chapter 19.

Because this section is exclusively oriented toward establishing the independent correlates of desegregation only the partial correlations are discussed, although both simple and partial correlation coefficients are reported in the tables. Whenever any reference is made later to "association," "covariation," or "relationship," it is implicit that these are observations based upon the statistical control of partial correlation.

The underlying relationships under study are assumed to be linear and additive within the framework of the standard regression model. Additivity implies that the effect of the dependent variable ( $Y$ ) of any other variable ( $X_1$ ) is independent of any other variable(s) ( $X_2, X_n$ ). The additive assumption is the primary reason why multicollinearity needed to be



reduced. Linearity assumes that the response of  $Y$  to  $X_1$  is the same for all values of  $X_1$ ; i.e., that there is a straight line relationship between  $Y$  and  $X$ . In the remainder of this study relationships are defined entirely within the parameters of the linear model. Although the qualifier "linear" is not used in the text, it is implicit in any discussion of the relationships between variables. Any reference, therefore, to the fact that variables are unrelated is to be considered in this context. The possible existence of nonlinear or nonadditive relationships is acknowledged. When the predictive power of the research model is assessed, the extent to which these assumptions have been met is considered. An excellent discussion of the assumptions behind the linear model may be found in Ronald D. Frank, "Use of Transformations," Multivariate Analysis in Marketing: Theory and Applications, ed. by David A. Aaker (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971).

<sup>4</sup>Region remains defined in terms of the Brown decision. Cities within the 17 states and the District of Columbia covered by that case are considered southern and border. All others are treated as northern.

<sup>5</sup>This variable, while basically independent of other explanatory state measures in the southern and border states, was strongly correlated with several variables in the North and had to be dropped from that set.

<sup>6</sup>This is a summative score developed to array school boards along an insulation-professionalism continuum. A detailed explanation of the scoring procedure is presented in Appendix II. The scores range from 0 (least insulated and professional) to 5.5 (most insulated and professional).

CHAPTER VI  
PENETRATED SYSTEMS MODELS OF URBAN  
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

The penetrated systems framework developed in chapter II was formulated to explicitly consider the multiple levels of social activity as these interact to affect public policy at the community level within a federal system. Presented in chapter III was a complex six-component research model defined by a large number of operational measures. By applying the research model to actual desegregation data an empirical examination of the validity and utility of the theoretical framework can be accomplished. In chapter V the initial stage of an empirical application of this model was reported. There, in order to produce a mathematically manageable, statistically independent set of explanatory variables for each model component, the total number of variables was reduced. The reduced sets of variables, taken to define each distinct model component, then were separately correlated with measures of school desegregation. As a result it was possible to determine for each desegregation measure, within both regions, the most important independent variables within each constituent part of the operational model. This information is merely prerequisite to the more important research task of establishing the

relative and cumulative impact of all five independent components (federal, state, local political, local environment, and local school) upon the sixth component (desegregation levels and change) under statistical control. In the present stage of the analysis the explanatory power of the entire research model, and by inference the framework it represents, can be measured and evaluated.

The most satisfactory method of measuring the independent and cumulative impact of a series of explanatory variables is through multiple regression and multiple-partial analysis.<sup>1</sup> The results of such an analysis are reported in this chapter. The final stage of the study (chapter VII) involved the critical assessment of the theoretical framework in view of the empirical evidence presented in chapters IV-VI.

#### Developing the Final Predictive Models

In the immediately preceeding chapter correlation and partial correlation procedures were used to establish which of a large number of independent variables (within each model component) were independent and directly related to urban school desegregation. The most important variables within each component were thus delineated relative to fixed and flexible desegregation for the 1968-1972 period within northern as well as southern and border cities. Based on this analysis it became apparent that the correlates of urban desegregation varied appreciably in several ways: over time, between measures of that social phenomenon, and between regions. Clearly no

single statistical model can incorporate all of the variables found to be related to one or more of the six desegregation measures involved. First, this involves too many variables relative to the number of cities in each region.<sup>2</sup> Second, although within-component collinearity has been controlled the problem of between-component collinearity remains an unestimated potential problem. To develop predictive equations incorporating salient elements of each of the model's explanatory components it is therefore necessary to further tailor the data set. Moreover, not only must the absolute number of independent variables be reduced so that all components can be tested simultaneously, but between-components multicollinearity needs to be controlled. This requires that some variables be eliminated from further consideration. The difficulty inherent in this requirement is in deciding which are to be eliminated without being totally arbitrary. The data reduction strategy employed was drawn within two firm limitations: (1) Whenever mathematically possible the very strongest correlates of each dependent variable had to be preserved for each component. (2) Strict comparability within region for each mode of desegregation measure (fixed or flexible) had to be maintained over time; i.e., the same set of independent variables would define the model components used to explain fixed or flexible desegregation within a region.

For inclusion in the final regression equations an independent variable had to be one of the stronger correlates within

its component of one of the school desegregation measures for a given region. Only those independent variables with a partial correlation coefficient of at least .2 were initially considered sufficiently related to desegregation to merit continued attention. Since the regression equations being developed were intended to test the impact of a six-component model, at least one variable per component was carried forward in the selection process. If for a given desegregation measure no variable within a component held a partial correlation of at least .2, then the measure with the largest partial coefficient was selected to represent that component in the predictive model. In this way every component was represented with its best correlate(s) of desegregation in the final predictive model. The result of this operation was four sets of potential predictors, two sets per region. Set one in the North included 21 independent variables and set two had 30 variables. Set one in the southern and border region consisted of 36 variables while set two had 32. Note these were preliminary sets that were later reduced further based on multicollinearity.

While multicollinearity within components had been reduced to acceptable levels by the procedure described in chapter V, potentially high intercorrelations between-component elements remained uncontrolled. Since no attempt was made to examine correlations between the dependent variables and the elements of more than one component at a time, this was not of serious concern in chapter V. Because elements of every component will

now be utilized simultaneously in the same predictive equations, the control of such between-component collinearity becomes absolutely imperative. Otherwise the results of multiple regression (assuming multicollinearity was not so high as to prevent the calculation of the predicted values in the first place) would be confounded by variable redundancy, overestimated explanatory power, and the lack of accurate statistical control. To establish the extent of multicollinearity, product-moment correlations were calculated for each of the four sets of independent variables described above. Consistent with the procedure developed in the previous chapter, any correlation coefficient between measures of .7 or above was taken to indicate intolerable collinearity and one of the offending variables was removed from the set. The following criteria guided the decision as to which variable would be eliminated because of collinearity:

1. To facilitate a fair comparison of the explanatory power of separate model components the number of variables used to define each component were kept as equal as possible. Whenever it was feasible variables were dropped from components with a larger number of elements.
2. To facilitate within-region comparison, whenever a variable needed to be eliminated for collinearity, those not present in the other predictive set were eliminated. In this way, insofar as it was feasible, the same variables were included in all the predictive models for a region.

As a further check against subtle intercorrelations that could compromise the independence of supposedly "independent" predictors, partial correlation coefficients were calculated

for the four predictive sets. If any pair of independent variables realized a partial correlation as high as .7 this was taken to indicate a lack of independence, and one measure (according to the criteria described above) was removed from the predictor set.<sup>3</sup> While somewhat complex this data reduction procedure yielded four sets of independent variables that were relatively independent within-and-between model components. Further, for each model (northern-fixed, northern-flexible, southern and border fixed, and southern and border flexible) it was possible to represent each of the separate components (federal, state, local environment, local political, and local school) and thereby test the predictive power of the integrated model under statistical control.

#### Predicting School Desegregation, 1968-1972

Because of the rigorous data reduction procedure reported above it was possible to integrate the elements of separate model components into single regression equations for the prediction of the several measures of urban school desegregation. These equations measured the actual relationship between school desegregation and the elements of the penetrated systems framework, under statistical control by region. Our initial interest is in determining for each predictive equation the unique effect of each separate model component on desegregation while controlling for the impact of the remaining components. This can be done through the examination of the multiple-partial values.

To establish which individual independent variables had the greatest impact upon desegregation within each equation the Beta coefficients are examined, and the bulk of the discussion which follows is based upon interpretations of these values.

### Northern Cities

Table 6-1 presents the regression model for northern fixed desegregation during the period. The multiple-partial coefficient (percent of variance explained by a given component while the other four are held constant), the b value (partial regression coefficient), the Beta weight (standardized partial regression coefficient), t-ratio (ratio of b to its standard error), and the standard error of the estimate (standard deviation of the residual) are presented along with the coefficient of multiple determination ( $R^2$  or percent of explained variance). The predictive power of the model is especially strong in 1968 and 1972, explaining respectively over 80 and 90 percent of the variance in fixed desegregation in northern cities. It is roughly half as successful in explaining variation in change during the period accounting for about 40 percent.

Of the five model components the local school system proved the most important, explaining more desegregation variance under statistical control in all three equations. The federal component proved the second most uniquely explanatory throughout the period while the independent impact of the



TABLE 6-1

REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FIXED NORTHERN SCHOOL  
DESEGREGATION, 1968-1972 (N=126)

|                            | 1968     |       |      |         | 1972     |       |      |         | Change   |       |      |         |
|----------------------------|----------|-------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|
|                            | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
| Deseg. Aid P/P             |          | 1.67  | .50  | 9.05    |          | 2.04  | .62  | 16.38   |          | 0.05  | .45  | 4.23    |
| Penetration Score          |          | -4.81 | -.16 | 2.96    |          | -0.72 | -.02 | .66     |          | -0.12 | -.12 | 1.20    |
| Housing Activity           |          | -0.01 | -.14 | 2.39    |          | -0.01 | -.20 | 4.82    |          | 0.00  | -.27 | 2.35    |
|                            | .459     |       |      |         | .753     |       |      |         | .181     |       |      |         |
| Electoral Stru.            |          | -0.35 | -.13 | 2.43    |          | -0.50 | -.19 | 5.06    |          | -0.02 | .20  | 1.86    |
| Indep. EPA                 |          | 13.52 | .24  | 3.63    |          | 11.74 | .21  | 4.66    |          | 0.10  | .06  | .44     |
|                            | .149     |       |      |         | .297     |       |      |         | .031     |       |      |         |
| Ethnicity                  |          | -0.24 | -.10 | 1.29    |          | -0.39 | -.18 | 3.06    |          | 0.01  | .07  | .44     |
| Mobility Change            |          | 0.05  | .00  | .01     |          | 6.84  | .05  | 1.30    |          | 0.24  | .05  | .51     |
| Suburban Exploit.          |          | 0.01  | .01  | .13     |          | -0.03 | -.03 | .85     |          | 0.00  | -.08 | .69     |
| Unemploy Diff.             |          | -3.95 | -.27 | 5.62    |          | -1.86 | -.13 | 3.91    |          | 0.11  | .25  | 2.73    |
| White Collar Diff.         |          | 0.13  | .05  | .83     |          | 0.21  | .08  | 2.04    |          | 0.01  | .09  | .46     |
|                            | .257     |       |      |         | .264     |       |      |         | .099     |       |      |         |
| Mayor Term                 |          | -1.56 | -.06 | 1.06    |          | -1.36 | -.05 | 1.37    |          | 0.16  | .19  | 1.84    |
| Council Term               |          | 1.71  | .03  | .52     |          | 1.72  | .03  | .77     |          | -0.15 | -.08 | .76     |
| ADP Application            |          | 0.08  | .01  | .12     |          | -1.21 | -.11 | .49     |          | 0.01  | .03  | .24     |
| Turnout                    |          | 0.47  | .23  | 2.81    |          | 0.16  | .08  | 1.44    |          | -0.02 | -.32 | 2.05    |
| AIP Vote                   |          | 0.05  | .01  | .19     |          | -0.02 | .00  | .10     |          | .00   | .00  | .01     |
| Republicanism              |          | -1.06 | -.29 | 4.25    |          | -0.93 | -.25 | 5.49    |          | -0.02 | -.19 | 1.46    |
|                            | .260     |       |      |         | .321     |       |      |         | .064     |       |      |         |
| City-Run System            |          | 1.72  | .03  | .40     |          | 6.50  | .10  | 2.22    |          | 0.02  | .01  | .09     |
| Bd. Insul.-Prof.           |          | -8.08 | -.28 | 4.47    |          | -9.29 | -.33 | 7.60    |          | -0.40 | -.43 | 3.64    |
| Pvt. Enrol. Change         |          | 25.63 | .17  | 3.37    |          | 28.61 | .19  | 5.55    |          | 0.68  | .14  | 1.46    |
| % Black                    |          | -1.24 | -.78 | 14.25   |          | -1.14 | -.73 | 19.31   |          | 0.01  | .29  | 2.79    |
| % Nonblack Minor.          |          | 0.08  | .02  | .40     |          | 0.02  | .01  | .14     |          | 0.02  | .14  | 1.38    |
|                            | .690     |       |      |         | .812     |       |      |         | .206     |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of Estimate |          |       |      | 12.72   |          |       |      | 8.61    |          |       |      | .77     |
| % Explained Variance       |          |       |      | 83.50   |          |       |      | 92.24   |          |       |      | 40.00   |

state, local political, and local environment components were relatively minor over time. The explanatory power of the model actually increased between 1968 and 1972, bolstered primarily by the growing impact of federal and school system variables. Table 6-1 indicates that the relationships visible in 1968 were simply reinforced during the four years under study. Real change was very limited and dramatic shifts in these relationships are not apparent.

The very strong impact of the local school component upon the reduction of extreme black isolation was largely the product of two measures, the proportion of black students and (to a far lesser extent) the insulation of the local school board. Quite simply, the extent to which a northern city was more desegregated in either 1968 or 1972 was inversely proportional to the relative presence of black students in the district. This fact, of course, merely reaffirms the northern dilemma: how to adjust racial balance in schools when there are few whites to go around. Obviously as late as 1972 this dilemma remained basically unresolved. But, relatively larger black enrollments actually produced greater reductions in extreme black isolation between 1968 and 1972. It seems that while a relatively large black student population is more easily concentrated within minority schools, this concentration in turn creates additional pressure to alleviate segregation. More insulated and professional school boards

produced relatively less fixed desegregation in each year and strongly limited increases between years. Whatever effective reductions in extreme black isolation had taken place among northern cities appears to have been the product of more accessible school boards. The magnitude of the negative effect of school board insulation on change was considerable. In conjunction with the evidence that proportionately larger black enrollments facilitated fixed desegregation change (most likely due to greater black demands to reduce desegregation), it appears that those boards most susceptible to direct community pressure took effective steps to reduce extreme black isolation. The only other school system variable that held any appreciable effect for fixed desegregation was private enrollment change. Despite widespread consideration of private schools as negative influences on the desegregation process because they deny the public schools badly needed white students to be used for reducing black isolation, this variable had a mildly positive effect on the reduction of extreme black isolation between 1968 and 1972. Care must be taken in interpreting this result, however. Rather than growing private enrollments actually "causing" a reduction in extreme black isolation it seems more likely that such cities were more desegregated and desegregating to begin with, and that the growing private enrollments were a reaction to this rather than a cause.

Second only to the local school system in impact the federal component showed even greater effect over time. This was

primarily a function of the remarkably strong relationship between federal desegregation aid per/pupil and fixed desegregation. Among the northern cities actually receiving such assistance (39), the amount of federal money received had a very salutary effect on the reduction of extreme black isolation. Yet, caution must be taken in interpreting this strong relationship. It is not possible to know whether the incidence of federal aid caused greater desegregation in 1968 since the pre-1968 levels of black isolation are unmeasured. It could be that the cities receiving such aid were relatively more desegregated in the first place. But, the ultimate causal effect of this factor is apparent in its relatively strong positive impact on change between the two points in time. Increased federal aid per/pupil actually produced relatively larger increases in fixed desegregation, irrespective of the base relationship in 1968. Insofar as the intention of these funds were to stimulate school districts in the implementation of desegregation policy, this was obviously money well spent. The remaining variables defining the federal component were relatively ineffective by comparison. Coercive-cooperative penetrations and public housing activity appear to have constrained the reduction of extreme black isolation in northern cities. As the construction of public housing units increased in these communities residential segregation patterns were apparently reinforced or aggravated, helping to further isolate blacks and make desegregation in

schools more difficult. The negative relationship between penetration and fixed desegregation is somewhat more difficult to understand. While rather slight this effect was nonetheless opposite of its ostensible intent. It reflects, we would suggest, the intransigence of extreme black isolation in this region. The negative coefficients of 1968 indicate only that this penetration was initially directed at the more segregated northern communities, and as late as 1972 it had yet to bring any significant improvement in black isolation levels.

The impact of the state component variables was contradictory. The activist climate which would demand, and the innovative climate which would produce, an independent state environmental protection agency (EPA) appears to have been mildly conducive to lower levels of extreme black isolation in 1968 and 1972--but was virtually unrelated to change. The influence of a more liberal state electoral structure, presumably indicative of a more open state-wide political process, had a negative influence on urban school desegregation and change. Apparently the frustrations engendered in such a less open electoral climate were transferred into an environment suitable for protest and facilitated the desegregation progress.

Of the local environment variables only two, unemployment difference between black and general populations and ethnicity, had any appreciable impact on fixed desegregation in northern

cities. Cities with relatively fewer ethnics produced relatively higher fixed desegregation levels in 1968 and 1972. Given the tendency for ethnic groups to become residentially isolated, further reinforcing the spatial separation of races and exacerbating community cleavages, this effect is understandable. This variable, however, had little effect on change during the period. Similarly, unemployment differences appear to have reinforced racial distinctions and inhibited the development of initial fixed desegregation, this effect holding in 1972 as well. Yet these differences resulted in greater increases in the reduction of extreme black isolation between these years. Conceivably this unemployment differential was the source of growing black frustration and discontent and was transferred into effective pressure for the alleviation of black school isolation.

Within the local political component two variables in particular had significance for the reduction of extreme black isolation, municipal voting turnout and Republicanism. Higher levels of turnout had a mildly positive effect on fixed desegregation levels in 1968 and 1972. This effect was reversed with respect to change, however, and the Beta was relatively high. Perhaps in those cities with lower citizen participation decision makers were afforded a wider latitude in implementing a potentially unpopular policy. Republicanism, on the other hand, consistently had a negative effect on the reduction

of extreme black isolation. Cities within counties with a proclivity for voting Republican produced less fixed desegregation in 1968 and 1972, and changed less between years. The political conservatism inherent in Republican support would seem to have created a relatively infertile environment in which school desegregation could occur. Longer mayoral terms, indicative of potentially greater executive independence, served to produce increased fixed desegregation during the period. Possibly the type of strong leadership necessary to move a community on this volatile policy was more forthcoming from mayors with this kind of independence and helped produce greater efforts to reduce extreme black isolation.

The predictive equations for the relative desegregation effort (flexible desegregation) of northern cities are offered in Table 6-2. While somewhat less effectual in predicting 1968 and 1972 levels than was true of the fixed model reported above, this model still explained a considerable amount of the variance in these dependent variables, 60 and 77 percent respectively. It was almost exactly as strong in predicting flexible change as it had been for fixed, explaining about 38 compared to 40 percent. The most substantial unique contribution to explaining initial desegregation effort levels was made by the local school component, followed by the local environment and federal components. The explanatory power of each model component increased during the period in a pattern that tended to simply

TABLE 6-2

REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FLEXIBLE NORTHERN SCHOOL  
DESEGREGATION, 1968-1972 (N=126)

|                            | 1968     |       |      |         | 1972     |        |      |         | Change   |       |      |         |
|----------------------------|----------|-------|------|---------|----------|--------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|
|                            | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b      | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
| Deseg. Aid P/P             |          | 0.98  | .42  | 3.60    |          | 1.98   | .97  | 10.85   |          | 0.00  | .12  | .79     |
| Penetration Score          |          | -.485 | -.26 | 2.63    |          | -4.98  | -.26 | 4.03    |          | 0.04  | .19  | 1.78    |
| Housing Involv.            |          | -0.12 | .00  | .02     |          | 19.08  | .43  | 4.96    |          | 0.15  | .28  | 1.94    |
| Housing Activity           |          | .00   | -.01 | .09     |          | -0.01  | -.29 | 3.27    |          | .00   | -.14 | .98     |
|                            | .185     |       |      |         | .551     |        |      |         | .095     |       |      |         |
| Responsiveness             |          | 4.99  | .24  | 2.90    |          | 2.29   | .13  | 1.99    |          | -0.03 | -.13 | 1.21    |
| Electoral Stru.            |          | -0.25 | -.13 | 1.40    |          | 0.20   | .12  | 1.68    |          | 0.01  | .28  | 2.26    |
| Indep. EPA                 |          | 6.86  | .17  | 1.84    |          | 8.80   | .25  | 3.53    |          | -0.02 | -.04 | .33     |
| Affluence                  |          | 7.96  | .21  | 1.89    |          | 12.96  | .39  | 4.58    |          | 0.00  | .06  | .68     |
|                            | .149     |       |      |         | .340     |        |      |         | .049     |       |      |         |
| Density                    |          | 0.00  | .16  | 1.42    |          | 0.00   | .07  | .80     |          | 0.00  | -.17 | 1.16    |
| Density Change             |          | 0.00  | .16  | 2.00    |          | 0.00   | .01  | .13     |          | 0.00  | -.22 | 2.16    |
| Mobility Change            |          | -2.68 | -.03 | .32     |          | 4.99   | .06  | .89     |          | 0.08  | .07  | .68     |
| Suburban Exploit.          |          | -0.07 | -.11 | 1.22    |          | -0.05  | -.10 | 1.39    |          | 0.00  | .07  | .59     |
| Education Diff.            |          | -7.88 | -.33 | 2.94    |          | -14.01 | -.67 | 7.79    |          | -0.01 | -.04 | .32     |
| Poverty Diff.              |          | -0.45 | -.11 | 1.19    |          | 0.23   | .06  | .89     |          | 0.00  | .09  | .77     |
|                            | .193     |       |      |         | .427     |        |      |         | .066     |       |      |         |
| Mayor Turnover             |          | -3.06 | -.17 | 2.08    |          | -4.97  | -.31 | 5.04    |          | 0.00  | .01  | .18     |
| Council Terms              |          | 2.98  | .08  | .85     |          | 3.52   | .10  | 1.50    |          | 0.01  | .03  | .29     |
| Fluoridaton                |          | -2.32 | -.05 | .61     |          | -3.01  | -.07 | 1.17    |          | -0.03 | .05  | .59     |
| Turnout                    |          | 0.10  | .07  | .68     |          | -0.01  | -.01 | .13     |          | 0.00  | -.18 | 1.40    |
|                            | .053     |       |      |         | .217     |        |      |         | .032     |       |      |         |
| Bd. Insul.-Prof.           |          | -6.31 | -.31 | 3.18    |          | -4.43  | -.25 | 3.33    |          | 0.04  | .16  | 1.31    |
| % Black                    |          | -0.60 | -.54 | 5.07    |          | -0.65  | -.66 | 8.14    |          | 0.00  | .01  | .09     |
| % Nonblack Minor.          |          | 0.42  | .17  | 1.75    |          | 0.11   | .05  | .71     |          | 0.00  | -.17 | 1.34    |
| Blk. Enrol. Change         |          | -4.18 | -.18 | 2.14    |          | -8.34  | -.42 | 6.37    |          | -0.02 | -.07 | .68     |
|                            | .261     |       |      |         | .466     |        |      |         | .040     |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of Estimate |          |       |      | 13.77   |          |        |      | 9.24    |          |       |      | .19     |
| % Explained Variance       |          |       |      | 60.70   |          |        |      | 77.25   |          |       |      | 38.10   |



reinforce initial relationships rather than signal real change. By 1972 the influence of the federal component had increased to the extent that it now was the strongest unique explanatory component in the model.

Within the federal component the preeminent explanatory variable in 1968 and 1972 was the relative amount of desegregation aid received (the 1972 Beta of .97 is remarkably high). Obviously, more federal money per/pupil served as an effective stimulant to desegregation effort among those cities receiving such assistance. Yet, the cause and effect of this relationship is subject to some question (as noted earlier). Whether or not this increased money actually caused greater effort initially, or simply was obtained by more desegregated districts in the first place, is undetermined. But, the amount of change between 1968 and 1972 that can be attributed directly to these funds was quite slight. As was the case for fixed desegregation, coercive-cooperative federal penetration appears to have originally been directed against those districts making the least desegregation effort. While mild, however, this penetration eventually produced relatively larger increases in this effort between 1968 and 1972. Participation in a federal housing program per se, while unrelated to initial levels of desegregation effort, had a relatively strong positive effect on change and later levels. But as this public housing activity increased, and relatively more public housing units were constructed, the

impact proved to be the opposite; housing activity served to suppress improvements in desegregation effort after 1968. This apparent contradiction may be understood in the context of the difference between the motivation behind initial involvement in the public housing program and the consequences, over time, of having been active in construction. Communities disinclined to become at all involved in public housing most likely held a very limited commitment in general to the public sector--or at least had little need for public housing--and would therefore probably be less likely to develop a commitment to desegregation (or had less of a desegregation problem to begin with). But, despite the public sector commitment inherent in initial involvement in public housing, the actual construction of these units had the consequence of reinforcing previous racial isolation patterns, serving to further concentrate blacks within the inner core of cities and having the ultimate effect of making desegregation in schools more difficult.

Of the elements of the state component, the most effective with respect to urban school desegregation effort was the electoral structure. Very slightly related to levels of effort in 1968 and 1972 (in opposite directions), the participatory and open climate of a more liberal electoral structure actually appears to have facilitated the increase in desegregation effort among cities within such states. The accessibility of the ballot to minorities, especially blacks, conceivably

magnified their effectiveness and visibility in turn making their impact on local decision makers greater, thereby stimulating greater desegregation effort. This is the opposite effect of that held by the electoral structure on fixed desegregation change, and we are frankly uncertain why this should be so. Government responsiveness (the extent to which state legislation was congruent over time to public opinion) was the only other state variable appreciably related to changes in desegregation effort and its impact was negative. Desegregation effort levels in 1968 and 1972 were greater within states of relatively greater affluence and an independent environmental protection agency. The state-wide climate created by relatively higher educational and income levels, perhaps breeding greater racial tolerance and acceptance to social change, facilitated the development of relatively higher levels of urban desegregation. The commitment to environmental protection inherent in a separate state agency for that purpose must emerge from political activism and a commitment by state officials to regulate the private sector; this atmosphere appears to have facilitated greater urban desegregation effort as well.

Ordinarily, local environment variables had little impact on northern desegregation efforts during this period. A notable exception was the strong negative influence of educational differences between black and general populations on 1968 and 1972 flexible desegregation levels. Exacerbating racial

cleavages and reinforcing social opportunity differences, the discrepancy between educational attainment apparently served only to make desegregation effort more difficult. But these differences were unrelated to changes in this effort during the period. The only environmental forces that seemed salient with respect to change were density and density change which mitigated against increasing desegregation effort. Despite the fact that growing population concentration might make technical solutions to segregation more feasible--involving less spatial distance between school populations--it seems that this concentration only further exacerbated original residential segregation and suppressed enthusiasm for efforts to overcome this in the schools.

Compared with other model components the unique contribution of the northern political component was rather insignificant. The most noteworthy influence on desegregation effort levels in either 1968 or 1972 was the negative effect of mayoral turnover. It would appear that executive stability had a salutary effect on desegregation effort. Perhaps the kind of leadership necessary to making desegregation progress was more likely to come from mayors of the experience and political ability inherent in longer tenure. Further, this relative executive stability may represent a kind of general political stability in such cities, and this may have been the kind of environment most effectively enabling decisionmakers to undertake greater

effort. But this executive stability did not make any difference as to desegregation change between 1968 and 1972. The only political factor appreciably effective in that regard was voter turnout which was negative in influence. It appears as if less politically active populations might have allowed local decision makers the room to implement a potentially controversial policy such as desegregation--or at least created an atmosphere in which decision makers felt increased efforts to ease school segregation would not create unacceptable political repercussions. Further, in communities of lower political activism the activity of particular groups pressuring for desegregation may have been magnified and more likely to gain the attention of local decision makers.

Despite the fact that flexible measures of desegregation take into account the limits of heavy black populations within a city, the proportion of black students in a school district proved a very strong suppressant of that effort in both 1968 and 1972. The implicit "threat" of large black enrollments to white control of schools does appear to constitute a serious barrier to effective desegregation efforts among northern cities. Further, as the proportion of blacks increased within a district the prospects of desegregation decreased. As the coefficients indicate, the more accessible school boards (perhaps responding to black and civil rights groups pressures) actually produced relatively more desegregation effort in 1968

and 1972 than their more insulated counterparts. Although the effect was quite weak it was the less accessible school boards that produced greater increases in this effort between 1968 and 1972. This is opposite the pattern established with respect to fixed desegregation change, and the initial pattern for flexible levels as well. The reason for this contradiction is not clear, but it may be that the "easy" desegregation efforts may have already have been mounted by 1968, and the effect of the more accessible board was important only in respect to the initial flexible levels. As late as 1968, however, it seems somewhat likely that in such desegregating districts white opposition had an opportunity to coalesce, increasing the political costs to the local school board for making more desegregation effort. This would likely make the more accessible boards hesitant to undertake increased effort, but the less accessible boards may have felt that improvements could be undertaken without undue political cost.

#### Southern Cities

Table 6-3 presents the regression equations for fixed southern and border school desegregation between 1968 and 1972. The predictive power of this model is particularly strong with respect to 1968 levels and change, explaining over 86 and 68 percent of the variance respectively. It was less satisfactory in explaining fixed levels at the end of the period, accounting

TABLE 6-3

REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FIXED SOUTHERN AND BORDER  
DESEGREGATION, 1968-1972 (N=82)

|                            | 1968     |        |      |         | 1972     |       |      |         | Change   |       |      |         |
|----------------------------|----------|--------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|
|                            | M. Part. | b      | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
| Deseg. Aid P/P             |          | 0.03   | .03  | .46     |          | 0.31  | .30  | 2.50    |          | 0.02  | .14  | 1.46    |
| Fed. Penetration           |          | -6.45  | -.32 | 4.31    |          | 1.61  | .07  | .50     |          | 1.15  | .39  | 3.42    |
| Housing Involv.            |          | -5.46  | -.06 | 1.02    |          | -9.05 | -.09 | .79     |          | -0.28 | -.02 | .23     |
|                            | .267     |        |      |         | .109     |       |      |         | .176     |       |      |         |
| Electoral Stru.            |          | -0.02  | -.01 | .18     |          | 0.26  | .14  | .95     |          | -0.04 | -.20 | 1.56    |
| Indust. Change             |          | -7.68  | -.06 | .65     |          | 6.79  | .04  | .29     |          | 7.74  | .38  | 2.90    |
|                            | .010     |        |      |         | .027     |       |      |         | .124     |       |      |         |
| Density                    |          | 0.00   | .12  | 1.67    |          | 0.00  | .02  | .16     |          | 0.00  | .27  | 2.59    |
| Blk. Mobility Change       |          | -6.69  | -.09 | 1.10    |          | 7.18  | .09  | .55     |          | -6.96 | -.65 | 5.08    |
| Mobility Diff.             |          | 0.48   | .09  | 1.40    |          | 1.30  | .20  | 1.79    |          | 0.19  | .23  | 2.51    |
| Low Educ.                  |          | 0.68   | .10  | 1.17    |          | -0.10 | -.01 | .08     |          | 0.60  | .59  | 4.56    |
| Elites                     |          | 1.56   | .09  | 1.41    |          | -4.87 | -.23 | 2.05    |          | -0.01 | .00  | .03     |
| MPO Change                 |          | 2.36   | .09  | 1.26    |          | -0.13 | .00  | .58     |          | 1.37  | .37  | 3.25    |
|                            | .110     |        |      |         | .128     |       |      |         | .387     |       |      |         |
| Reformism                  |          | 6.63   | .22  | 2.44    |          | -1.53 | -.04 | .26     |          | 1.71  | .38  | 2.79    |
| Appointed Mayor            |          | -14.33 | -.24 | 3.06    |          | 8.21  | .12  | .82     |          | -0.87 | -.10 | .82     |
| Mayor Term                 |          | -0.22  | -.01 | .11     |          | -2.23 | -.08 | .51     |          | 0.43  | .12  | .94     |
| ADP Activity               |          | -2.75  | -.27 | 4.28    |          | 1.15  | .10  | .84     |          | -0.12 | -.08 | .80     |
| Fluoridation               |          | -5.45  | -.10 | 1.61    |          | 7.60  | .12  | 1.05    |          | -1.82 | -.24 | 2.37    |
| AIP Support                |          | -0.83  | -.46 | 4.09    |          | -0.51 | -.24 | 1.16    |          | -0.14 | -.53 | 3.09    |
|                            | .357     |        |      |         | .131     |       |      |         | .264     |       |      |         |
| City-Run Schools           |          | 4.56   | .08  | .96     |          | 7.27  | .11  | .71     |          | -1.68 | -.19 | 1.55    |
| Board Insul.-Prof.         |          | 14.96  | .47  | 6.26    |          | -4.93 | -.13 | .96     |          | 1.56  | .33  | 2.88    |
| Private Enrol.             |          | 0.52   | .15  | 2.10    |          | -0.12 | -.03 | .23     |          | -0.25 | -.49 | 4.48    |
| % Black                    |          | -0.77  | -.53 | 6.26    |          | -0.96 | -.56 | 3.60    |          | 0.05  | .24  | 1.89    |
| % Nonblack Minor.          |          | -0.56  | -.23 | 2.69    |          | -1.08 | -.38 | 2.42    |          | -0.14 | -.39 | 3.01    |
|                            | .623     |        |      |         | .237     |       |      |         | .359     |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of Estimate |          |        |      | 11.64   |          |       |      | 24.94   |          |       |      | 2.63    |
| % Explained Variance       |          |        |      | 86.29   |          |       |      | 53.60   |          |       |      | 68.21   |

for around 58 percent of the variance. Unlike the northern cities, these communities realized substantial reductions in the extreme isolation of blacks in schools, and this is reflected in the declining ability of the predictive model to explain desegregation levels.

In 1968 and 1972 the most prominent effect upon extreme black isolation was generated by the local school component. Second in independent impact in 1968, the local political component was quite effective with respect to fixed change, though it had limited power in 1972. The importance of political variables in this region is in striking contrast to the rather pale influence of such factors in northern cities. While somewhat strong in effect initially, federal variables were restrained in their cumulative explanatory power for change and 1972 fixed desegregation. State variables were consistently the least explanatory as a model component, despite quite respectable coefficients for fixed change. Most noteworthy, the local environment component, hardly striking in unique impact in either 1968 and 1972, was the strongest explanatory element of the model in accounting for changes in extreme black isolation in this region. This indicates, we suspect, that while local environmental conditions may not have strongly influenced the early development of desegregation in these cities, these local forces were of critical import in filtering external pressures for change.



The importance of the local school component is unmistakable, especially in 1968. As was true of their northern counterparts the cities in this region realized fixed desegregation levels roughly inversely proportionate to their black enrollments in both 1968 and 1972. Clearly the presence of relatively larger black enrollments constituted a serious obstacle to the elimination of extreme black isolation in public schools without respect to region. Yet, relatively larger black enrollments did not prevent increases in fixed desegregation between 1968 and 1972, as the Beta coefficients show. Although quite moderate in strength, the effect of relatively larger black enrollments was to produce increased fixed desegregation. Obviously the impetus for change was sufficiently strong to overcome heavy black enrollments in these cities--conceivably the pressure for change because of larger black enrollments was great and was finally effective after 1968. Initially the southern and border cities with relatively more insulated and professional school boards produced more fixed desegregation. The influence of more insulated boards also facilitated increases in this desegregation between 1968 and 1972. Apparently the more insulated boards, less accessible to the electorate and community pressures, found it easier to implement this generally unpopular policy. By the end of the period, however, the shifts in desegregation had been of sufficient magnitude to reverse the sign of the school board-desegregation relationship. The presence of nonblack

minorities was consistently a factor inhibiting the reduction of extreme black isolation, showing appreciable negative Betas throughout the period. The community heterogeneity inherent in greater minority presence only seems to have made it more difficult to reduce racial segregation in the schools. In addition to producing even greater white hostility and fear, the presence of relatively larger nonblack minority enrollments may have created inter-minority tensions that served to exacerbate the community cleavages so debilitating to desegregation. Private school enrollment, virtually unrelated to extreme black isolation in either 1968 or 1972, was a very strong negative influence on fixed change. Larger private enrollments would indicate a heavy potential drain of the pool of white students so vital to reducing extreme black isolation. As such, these schools are a serious technical obstacle to fixed desegregation and did in fact mitigate heavily against improvements between 1968 and 1972.

The second most substantial unique contribution to predicting initial fixed desegregation levels was made by the local political component. Within that component the strongest predictor variable was the county vote for George Wallace in 1968 (AIP support). The conservative social and political climate inherent in heavy AIP voting, particularly with regard to race, appears to have the effect of stifling the desegregation process in southern and border cities. This inhibiting effect

was especially manifest with respect to change during the period; only black mobility proved a more serious barrier to the reduction of extreme black isolation in the schools. The heavy negative effect of AIP support reinforces the importance of local attitudes and politics with respect to desegregation and underlines the critical role played by local decision makers--especially the school board--in this region. In order to take effective action to implement the reduction of extreme black isolation, school decision makers appear to have required freedom of operation, a distance between themselves and the volatile community climate. The presence of an appointed rather than an elected mayor served to inhibit initial desegregation levels but was not a significant factor for change or 1972 levels. A similar pattern held for the effect of automatic data processing activity in the city government. Apparently while mayoral independence and ADP activity were more likely among the less segregated cities initially, neither was of sustained significance for the desegregation process. City government reformism was the only political variable among these communities which seemed to actually produce lower levels of extreme black isolation in 1968, and it also facilitated further reductions between the years. The more insulated and less politicized environment associated with reformed structures appears to have afforded local decision makers with the latitude to move toward the implementation of reduced black isolation.

Federal penetration had not produced relatively more fixed desegregation in this region as late as 1968. In fact, its ostensible effect was actually the opposite; the most penetrated cities (as measured by the composite penetration score) were those that continued to maintain higher levels of extreme black isolation. It would be specious to suggest that (the negative coefficients notwithstanding) federal penetration into these communities caused extreme black isolation levels to actually increase. It seems more likely that, given what we already know of the history of school desegregation in the South, that the most segregated communities originally were the targets of federal penetration efforts, and that the impact of such penetration had yet to be apparent by 1968. This explanation seems somewhat bolstered by the relatively strong positive effect of federal penetration on fixed change between 1968 and 1972. The effect of federal pressure was to further reduce extreme black isolation, although the direct influence was certainly not overwhelming. It appears to have needed a more receptive local situation in order to convert pressure to effort, and such efforts were more forthcoming within communities with reform structures and less accessible school boards. And the effect of such penetrations appears to have been blunted in the face of larger private enrollments, larger non-black minority presence, and a conservative political environment. We are suggesting that federal penetration could

stimulate, but not usually produce directly, reductions in black isolation.

Among southern and border cities the state component made a very limited unique contribution to the prediction of fixed desegregation in either 1968 or 1972 but was quite important with respect to change. The state-wide climate of social change and shifting priorities created by increasing industrialization had the effect of bringing relatively greater reductions in urban black isolation between 1968 and 1972. The influence of a more liberal state electoral structure was the opposite, tending to produce an environment which suppressed this urban change. Perhaps the frustrations created by less open political processes could effectively be turned into desegregation pressures within local communities.

The local environment component did not have a strong independent effect on fixed desegregation at either the beginning or the end of the period but proved the most important component in explaining change. Increasing reductions of extreme black isolation between 1968 and 1972 were strongly influenced by black mobility change. As black populations grew increasingly mobile the prospects of reducing black isolation declined. The heavy influx of blacks into southern and border cities seems to have only exacerbated racial divisions, conceivably increasing the perceived "threat" of strange blacks to white control and life styles. Moreover, the relative

growth of black populations without deep roots in the community may have weakened the political effectiveness and cohesion of this minority and lessened pressure for improvements in the local situation. The remaining environmental variables proved to be relatively facilitative of fixed change. Of particular interest is the heavy impact of low educational levels; cities with a larger proportion of people with very low education (less than grade school) produced relatively greater increases in fixed desegregation between 1968 and 1972. It may be that the low political efficacy and activity traditionally associated with lower educational attainment actually served to give local decision makers--especially those within reformed structures and insulated school boards--a better opportunity to implement this potentially unpopular change. Population density and mobility differences between black and general populations had a positive, if mild, influence on the reduction of black isolation. More concentrated populations making movement of students less of a technical problem, seems to have made fixed desegregation easier in this region; perhaps the relative influx of less rooted black populations as compared to less rooted whites weakened segregationist traditions somewhat. An important environmental factor with respect to increasing fixed desegregation during the period was the growth of centralized community power (increasing proportion of managers, proprietors, and officials in the labor force), which produced greater reductions in extreme black

isolation. This more centralized power would be helpful in bringing about a change that was generally without favor in the white community. The evidence suggests that cities with growing centralization of power enabled local decision makers to overcome hostile community climates and actually produced reductions in segregation. The growing centralization of community power in conjunction with lower educational attainment to dampen the prospects of effective opposition, a more stable black population to allay white suspicions, greater municipal reform to depoliticize the environment, and the inaccessability of the local school board would appear to have given southern and border decision makers the latitude needed to implement fixed desegregation under the stimulus of federal penetration.

Table 6-4 presents the regression equations for southern and border desegregation effort between 1968 and 1972. The explanatory power of the model was the most substantial in 1968, when it accounted for approximately 74 percent of the variance in desegregation effort. It was less satisfactory in predicting variation in flexible desegregation change or 1972 levels. Reflecting the elusive nature of change and the severe dynamics of the four year period in this region, it was possible to account for but half of the variance in flexible change and about 40 percent of 1972 levels.

In examining the multiple-partials for the model one unusual fact is immediately apparent. Unlike the pattern

TABLE 6-4  
REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FLEXIBLE SOUTHERN AND BORDER  
DESEGREGATION, 1968-1972 (N=82)

|                            | 1968     |        |      |         | 1972     |       |      |         | Change   |        |      |         |
|----------------------------|----------|--------|------|---------|----------|-------|------|---------|----------|--------|------|---------|
|                            | M. Part. | b      | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b     | Beta | t-ratio | M. Part. | b      | Beta | t-ratio |
| Fed. Penetration           |          | -5.94  | -.31 | 3.46    |          | .58   | .04  | .32     |          | 1.12   | .10  | .80     |
| Housing Involv.            |          | -9.14  | -.11 | 1.29    |          | -1.93 | -.03 | .26     |          | -0.20  | -.00 | .03     |
|                            | .185     |        |      |         | .003     |       |      |         | .010     |        |      |         |
| Electoral Stru.            |          | -0.09  | -.07 | .64     |          | -0.26 | -.25 | 1.71    |          | -0.14  | -.15 | 1.12    |
| Indust. Change             |          | -10.96 | -.08 | .82     |          | 13.71 | .15  | .99     |          | 33.51  | .41  | 3.06    |
|                            | .026     |        |      |         | .048     |       |      |         | .134     |        |      |         |
| Ethnicity                  |          | .39    | .11  | .69     |          | 0.64  | .25  | 1.10    |          | 0.81   | .37  | 1.75    |
| Age                        |          | -1.19  | -.19 | 1.56    |          | -1.03 | -.23 | 1.31    |          | -0.09  | -.02 | .14     |
| Mobility Change            |          | 3.18   | .05  | .51     |          | -7.40 | -.15 | 1.15    |          | -12.69 | -.30 | 2.49    |
| Mobility Diff.             |          | -0.66  | -.12 | 1.35    |          | 0.30  | .08  | .58     |          | 0.54   | .17  | 1.35    |
| Low Educ.                  |          | .77    | .12  | .99     |          | 1.12  | .24  | 1.40    |          | 2.19   | .54  | 3.44    |
|                            | .099     |        |      |         | .084     |       |      |         | .237     |        |      |         |
| Reformism                  |          | 8.28   | .29  | 2.47    |          | 11.21 | .55  | 3.24    |          | 1.49   | .08  | .54     |
| Mayor Veto                 |          | -0.64  | -.01 | .10     |          | 8.67  | .21  | 1.27    |          | -4.24  | -.12 | .79     |
| Turnout                    |          | 0.95   | .43  | 3.39    |          | 0.42  | .26  | 1.43    |          | -0.20  | -.15 | .88     |
| AIP Support                |          | -0.91  | -.54 | 4.03    |          | -0.57 | -.47 | 2.45    |          | -0.28  | -.26 | 1.50    |
| Republicanism              |          | -0.77  | -.22 | 2.42    |          | 0.06  | .02  | .18     |          | 0.70   | .33  | 2.68    |
|                            | .298     |        |      |         | .211     |       |      |         | .240     |        |      |         |
| County District            |          | 7.36   | .14  | 1.59    |          | 2.20  | .06  | .46     |          | -10.20 | -.32 | 2.70    |
| Board Insul.-Prof.         |          | 7.87   | .26  | 2.99    |          | 2.11  | .10  | .77     |          | 7.55   | .41  | 3.50    |
| Private Enrol.             |          | -0.61  | -.19 | 1.47    |          | -0.80 | -.34 | 1.84    |          | -0.08  | -.04 | .24     |
| Private Change             |          | -3.73  | -.07 | .83     |          | 1.34  | .04  | .29     |          | 7.76   | .24  | 2.11    |
| % Black                    |          | -0.35  | -.25 | 2.25    |          | -0.41 | -.41 | 2.56    |          | 0.02   | .02  | .12     |
| % Nonblack Minor.          |          | -0.20  | -.09 | .47     |          | -0.86 | -.52 | 1.96    |          | -0.54  | -.38 | 1.56    |
|                            | .239     |        |      |         | .148     |       |      |         | .310     |        |      |         |
| Standard Error of Estimate |          |        |      | 14.99   |          |       |      | 15.47   |          |        |      | 12.27   |
| % Explained Variance       |          |        |      | 73.64   |          |       |      | 44.69   |          |        |      | 54.00   |



established by the three previous models, the local school category for the present model was not the strongest explanatory component in either 1968 or 1972, although it made the greatest unique contribution to predicting change. Having taken the pre-eminent place during the initial and late period was the local political component, accurately reflecting the long-standing political nature of this policy in the southern and border region. The most arresting feature of the relationship between the local school component and desegregation effort in 1968 was the surprisingly limited Beta for percent black. The amount of desegregation effort initially apparent among these cities does not appear to have been strongly inhibited by the relative presence of black students. This observation is confirmed by the absence of any relationship between this variable and flexible change. A comparison of the b coefficients between the fixed model (Table 6-3) and flexible model (Table 6-4) indicates that percent black produced about half the effect in the latter as in the former in 1968 and 1972. This means that desegregation effort, as compared to the fact of black isolation, in this region was not as clearly a product of the heavier presence of black students in some districts; rather it appears to have been a matter of choice (nondecisions at best) to allow separation to continue. In 1968, no school variables seemed to have a very strong direct impact on desegregation efforts. Insulated school boards and county-wide school districts

produced somewhat greater desegregation effort initially while the incidence of relatively larger private enrollments, non-black minority, and black enrollments inhibited such efforts. The relative importance of the local school board in bringing increases in desegregation effort between 1968 and 1972 was considerable. As had been true for fixed change, school boards that were relatively less accessible to the electorate produced greater desegregation effort between these years. Increasing private enrollments appeared to produce greater desegregation efforts, but as noted above, we feel quite strongly that this relationship was a product of, rather than producing, desegregation. Two school system variables proved to mitigate with some strength increases in desegregation effort during the period--county-wide districts and the relative presence of non-black minority students. County-wide districts render desegregation more technically feasible since they deny urban whites the option of simply fleeing the city limits into nearby suburbs in the face of growing desegregation. To escape desegregation in a county-wide district a white family must move outside the county or transfer out of the public system entirely. But, such districts proved to be of no assistance in increasing desegregation effort between 1968 and 1972; its effect was strongly negative. This is probably because the impetus to change was of sufficient strength to overcome the immediate potential threat of white flight, which would take some time to develop anyway

in reaction to growing racial balance in schools. Moreover, though slight the influence of county-wide districts had already been felt to some extent; these tended to be more desegregated districts as of 1968. The greatest pressure for improvements may have then been in the city-districts which in fact changed more between 1968 and 1972. Most likely the negative impact of relatively larger nonblack minority enrollments was due to increased cleavages induced within the community by larger ethnic presence and potential inter-minority tensions that further exacerbated racial separation.

Political variables carried substantial weight with respect to school desegregation effort among southern and border communities. As noted above this component actually made a somewhat larger unique contribution to explaining desegregation effort in 1968 and 1972 than the school component. Throughout the period under study the more conservative climate indicated by greater county support for the American Independent Party was a consistently strong negative influence on desegregation efforts. Mounting an effective effort against school segregation in this region was especially difficult, and clearly less successful, in those areas of heavy Wallace sentiment. When desegregation effort was effectively made in 1968, it was in those cities with a less conservative political climate, more reformed government structures, and relatively higher voter turnout levels. The salutary effects of these characteristics of the local political

milieu continued into 1972. But these variables were only weakly, and negatively, linked to increased in desegregation effort between these years, suggesting that initial desegregation effort was largely a function of more politically progressive communities, but continued improvement required stronger impetus--an impetus directed at the worst and most intransigent segregation centers. That is, by 1968 the impetus for desegregation effort had to come from elsewhere: community progressivism had gone as far as it was likely to proceed, and flexible desegregation no longer appears to have responded to such political distinctions. Only heavier Republican voting appears to have had an appreciable positive effect upon desegregation change, although its initial effect was negative. Perhaps more Republican communities, having broken with the Democratic tradition in this region so long tied to racial politics, were in a somewhat better position to respond affirmatively to the impetus to change.

The unique explanatory contribution of the remaining three components proved to be quite limited, with the exception of the local environment as it affected desegregation effort change. Coercive-cooperative federal penetration was initially rather strongly related to desegregation effort, negatively. We feel this indicates that such penetration was directed most extensively at the most segregated cities and, as late as 1968, had little if any effect. Some slight increases in desegregation

effort appear to be directly attributable to federal penetration, but for the most part the federal component played virtually no direct part in change for 1972 effort levels. We can think of two reasons for this very surprising fact. First, federal penetrations may have provided a very strong stimulus for desegregation but it was ultimately the local decision makers that had to convert pressure to action. And, as the discussion below clearly indicates, certain local conditions had to be overcome before such action was likely. Second, we have only measures of overt, easily identifiable penetrations (court orders, HEW citations, grants received, law suits, etc.) and it seems possible that less overt penetrations were responsible for much desegregation progress in this region. For example, the critical differences between districts may have been in the effectiveness of the bargaining between officials in Washington, D.C. and local decision makers. This was an ongoing process and subtle. It could also be that, as some districts fell under direct pressure from Washington their neighbors, seeing the handwriting on the wall and anticipating they were next, took action in anticipation of direct federal pressure.

Of the state variables only industrialization change had a strong influence on desegregation effort during the period in the southern and border region. Increasing industrialization, inevitably breaking down old social values and traditions which were closely associated with racial segregation, seems to have

created a state-wide climate more favorable for increasing urban efforts. The impact of local environment variables was quite mild. Most noteworthy were the effects of ethnicity and low education levels, which consistently facilitated desegregation efforts among these cities. Most especially, the effect of a larger proportion of citizens with very low educational levels was to produce relatively greater increases in desegregation between 1968 and 1972. It seems most likely that the low political activism and effectiveness of such populations provided local decision makers the latitude necessary to undertake improvements in desegregation effort. Why more ethnic populations would have facilitated desegregation effort remains puzzling. The community stability inherent in a more limited population mobility change appears to have made increases in desegregation effort easier. Perhaps more deep-rooted populations are more willing and capable of absorbing social change of this type.

### Conclusion

The configuration of relationships described in this chapter is always complex and sometimes bewildering. Usually, direct causal linkages are not readily visible although certain subtle causal tendencies do emerge. It is, for the most part, more useful to consider what constellation of forces tend to inhibit or facilitate the urban desegregation process rather

than thinking in terms of direct cause and effect. In such a context it becomes possible to proceed with certain critical, if qualified, conclusions based on the multiple regression results offered above.

The pattern of the regression coefficients indicates that greater fixed desegregation was initially produced among northern cities that had relatively fewer blacks, more accessible school boards, and growing private enrollments. These were cities within states with a more closed electoral process and an activist political climate (indicated by the existence of an independent EPA). This higher level of fixed desegregation was also the result of more limited ethnicity, larger unemployment difference between black/general populations, higher voter turnout, and lower political conservatism (less Republican support). The amount of change between 1968 and 1972 in the North was so limited that these relationships usually strengthened somewhat but were otherwise unchanged by 1972. Insofar as the model could account for fixed change, and it left about 60 percent of that variance unexplained, greater reductions in extreme black isolation in this region were the result of greater federal aid per/pupil, less public housing construction, and a less open state electoral structure. These changes in fixed desegregation also were the product of greater black/general unemployment differences, executive independence (longer mayoral terms), lower voter turnout, and a less

conservative political climate (lower Republican support). Moreover, more accessible school boards, relatively larger black enrollments, increasing private enrollments, and relatively larger nonblack enrollments brought increased reductions in extreme black isolation during the period. It appears as if the reduction of extreme black isolation in northern schools depended largely on the willingness of a community to tackle the problem, as indicated by the heavy positive influence of federal funds which had to be voluntarily sought. This willingness was, we suspect, closely tied to the accessibility of the local school board which enabled pro-desegregation forces to pressure decision makers more directly. Although we cannot be certain of the source of this pressure on the more accessible boards, it is clear that it was not federal; coercive-cooperative penetrations were negative in effect when they had effect at all. The fact that districts with relatively larger black enrollments increased in fixed desegregation during the period is suggestive. It seems most likely that blacks in such districts were able to mount effective pressure for desegregation action.

The relative desegregation effort (flexible desegregation) of northern communities initially seemed to respond most strongly to essentially similar forces as had the reduction of extreme black isolation, especially being influenced by federal aid and the relative black presence. In 1968, higher desegregation



effort levels were produced by cities with relatively fewer black students, more accessible school boards, and greater federal funds per/pupil. These cities tended to be in states of greater affluence, government responsiveness, and activism (independent EPA) but with a less open electoral structure. Further, higher initial desegregation effort levels were produced by cities with more limited black/general population differences in education and more executive stability (less mayoral turnover). As was true for fixed desegregation levels, the amount of real change in desegregation effort was sufficiently limited as to engender no serious alterations in these relationships, although most tended to become stronger. Increases in desegregation effort among northern cities were a product of relatively more federal aid, more coercive-cooperative penetration and the willingness to join the federal housing program, but restraint in actual construction. Cities producing greater desegregation effort were found in states with more limited government responsiveness and more open electoral systems. Further, these increased efforts were facilitated by more limited population density, lower voter turnout, more insulated school boards, and relatively fewer nonblack minority enrollments. While as late as 1972 desegregation effort, like the reduction of extreme black isolation, seemed most strongly inhibited by relative black presence--and this barrier was only reinforced by educational differences

and widespread construction of public housing units--certain forces seemed to counter this tendency. Mitigating such negative factors were executive stability, more accessible school boards, and federal desegregation aid. These patterns lead us to suspect, as we did for fixed desegregation, that it was pressure from within the community, brought to bear upon accessible decision makers, which led to the establishment of relatively higher levels of desegregation effort in 1968 and 1972.

The regression equations established that in southern and border cities higher levels of fixed desegregation were initially the result of relatively lower black and nonblack minority enrollments, less accessible school boards, more reformed city government structures, and a less conservative political climate. As late as 1968 the effect of federal penetration had yet to be felt; less desegregation was produced by the most penetrated cities. Between 1968 and 1972 the most substantial reductions in extreme black isolation were primarily produced by federal penetrations, less accessible school boards, more limited private enrollments, more limited nonblack minority but greater black enrollments. Also, the cities producing the greatest increase in fixed desegregation were found within states with a more closed electoral system and growing industrialization. Greater fixed change was further induced by higher population density, more stable black populations, greater presence of citizens with low education, growing

centralization of community power, and a less conservative political climate. The pattern of initial and change relationships suggests that the reduction of extreme black isolation in southern and border schools depended heavily upon the ability of local decision makers to act in the face of adverse community climates with respect to desegregation. By 1972 most relationships apparent in 1968 had visibly weakened, although the negative effect of larger nonwhite enrollments was undiminished; the large scale decreases in extreme black isolation between 1968 and 1972 had altered the basic configuration of southern and border sociopolitical ties to that phenomenon. The most notable shift was the developing importance of the relative amount of federal aid. Though basically unrelated to 1968 levels this variable produced relatively greater fixed desegregation in 1972, suggesting the continuing affirmative role of the federal government in this region.

Desegregation effort among southern and border cities in 1968 was primarily the result of a less conservative political climate, more reformed city government structures, higher voter turnout, and less accessible school boards. Relatively larger black and private enrollments had a negative effect on initial desegregation effort levels. Relatively less desegregation effort was put forth by the most penetrated cities indicating that, as of 1968, this federal pressure had yet to be effective. Increases in desegregation efforts between 1968 and 1972 were

the product of less accessible school boards, more limited nonblack minority enrollments, greater ethnicity, less population mobility, and a greater proportion of low educated citizens. These increases were greater among cities within states of growing industrialization. Further, desegregation effort increases were facilitated by lower AIP support but higher Republicanism. Federal penetration had a slight positive effect on increased effort and the relative black enrollment was unrelated to change. As was true for fixed levels, initial and changing desegregation efforts appear to have depended largely upon the extent to which the local school board and other decision makers were insulated from the electorate and adverse political climates with respect to desegregation. By 1972 the negative effect of nonwhite presence on desegregation efforts in southern and border communities had strengthened appreciably, while the influence of school board insulation had virtually disappeared.

Behind all of the relationships discussed above lies a single important question: From where did the impetus for school desegregation come? The evidence contained in the relationships described earlier is primarily suggestive but would seem to justify the following answers. In the North, where federal coercive-cooperative penetration was relatively unknown and inefficacious, the impetus to change must have emerged from within the local community itself. We contend that is why in

northern cities it was the more accessible school boards, open to the pressures of desegregation activists, that actually produced greater desegregation during the period. This community pressure on accessible boards probably led to the commitment that made the use of federal funds such an effective stimulus to desegregation levels. And the local source of that pressure appears to lie in the fact that key variables that originally resulted in less desegregation (ethnicity, unemployment differences, educational differences, and larger black enrollment) had an opposite effect on change. It seems that from the factors which created the problem grew frustrations which led to pressure to undertake affirmative desegregation activity and procure federal help to alleviate racial isolation in the public schools. Unfortunately we are unable to do more than speculate at this point since it was not possible to obtain a measure of pro-desegregation activism within each city. But, given the overall pattern of the relationships in the North this seems the likeliest explanation of the source for the stimulus for desegregation change.

The impetus to desegregate was considerably different among the cities of the southern and border region. Despite usually weak direct linkages between the federal variable and desegregation measures, the most likely source remains the federal government. The evidence does show that after 1968, coercive-cooperative penetrations resulted in increases in desegregation,

but the magnitude of the impact was by no means overwhelming. It would appear that certain local conditions were particularly important in facilitating or inhibiting the effect of federal pressure--most especially the ability of local decision makers to take action in the face of adverse local conditions. A stable black population with roots in the city, a pool of citizens unlikely to be effective in politics, increasing centralization of community power, all helped translate federal pressure into desegregation change, especially insofar as reformed structures and insulated school boards afforded decision makers freedom of action.

To summarize the fundamental conclusion of this chapter: While in the North federal penetration did not provide a strong stimulus to desegregation (although its funds proved helpful once a city was willing to make a commitment), pressures within these communities were able to move accessible local decision makers. In the southern and border region local pressures, apparently generated strong negative opposition mitigating against desegregation that could only be withstood and countered by more insulated decisionmaking structures--acting in reaction to external stimuli.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>In multiple regression an attempt is made to predict a single dependent variable from any number of independent variables. The regression equations are formally defined as the path of the mean of the dependent variable  $Y$  for all combinations of the independent (or predictor) variables ( $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$ ). From such an analysis it becomes possible, through the use of the least-squares criterion, to determine how much change in the value of the dependent variable is produced by the linear combination of independent variables. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), chapter 19; and N. R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

The multiple-partial coefficient measures the multiple correlation between a dependent variable and several independent variables, controlling for one or more independent variables. It allows us to measure the independent contribution of within-equation blocs of variables, such as the separate components in the penetrated systems framework, and thereby assess their relative explanatory importance to the entire model. See Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 458-459.

<sup>2</sup>Quite simply, if the number of variables used in the regression equation begins to approach the number of cases it becomes possible to obtain very large multiple correlations due to chance fluctuations; i.e., it becomes possible within the constrained data space to pass the least squares line through all of the data points and the multiple correlation automatically becomes unity. An unfavorable variable-to-cases ratio in conjunction with high independent variable collinearity makes it possible to predict any particular variable from any combination of others, substantive sense aside. Typically, one allows theory to control the type and number of explanatory measures to enter the regression equation. Because of the complexity of the six-component model, however, theoretical considerations are not sufficiently demanding to completely solve this data problem and other criteria--discussed in detail in the text--had to be utilized.

<sup>3</sup>Because of matrix inversion problems created by the large number of remaining variables and continuing multicollinearity, it was often necessary to eliminate some variables in order to calculate partials. Consistent with the criteria developed in the text the decision as to which variables to eliminate was also based on some additional information. Regression equations for each separate dependent variable over time within each region (12 equations in all) were calculated. Each equation included

only those independent variables that had within-component partials of .2 or above with the specific dependent variable being predicted. These equations are provided in appendix IV, and it should be noted that no two equations were identical. By examining these 12 equations it was possible to make a judgment as to which independent variables could be spared from the overall models written for this chapter. Thus, by eliminating variables shown to be relatively unimportant in these experimental equations it was possible to produce a set of independent variables capable of being partialled in the four sets described in the text.



## CHAPTER VII

### URBAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the study in such a way as to allow a critical judgment of how well it has accomplished the tasks for which it was intended. Toward that end we will summarize the previous six chapters, evaluate the research hypotheses, evaluate the theoretical framework, and review the major conclusions in the context of previous research.

#### Summary of the Study

In the first chapter it was argued that the principal impediment to systematic empirical research on the politics of education was the lack of any broad integrating theoretical framework. We proposed to offer such a theoretical framework and to test it by studying a contemporary education policy of abiding social significance--public school desegregation. The development of school desegregation as a national policy was traced and its social change dimension was emphasized. The significance of this particular education policy as a vehicle for theory building was drawn, especially insofar as it clearly demonstrated the education-policy nexus as well as the federal dimension of local policy making. In that context the crucial

issue was raised: what accounted for variation in the implementation of this education policy among cities in the United States? The research literature was examined for available answers and it was discovered that this body of inquiry was often impressionistic, atheoretical, and incomplete. Even the very best research efforts were found to drift without the guidance of an integrated theoretical framework capable of organizing the local and extralocal forces behind the development and implementation of desegregation in the United States.

The second chapter was devoted to the development of a public policy approach to public school desegregation. School desegregation was therein conceptualized as the product of implicit as well as explicit decisions made by public officials at various levels of the federal system. To study the variety of forces behind these decisions and nondecisions we developed a theoretical framework based on Easton's systems model, as modified by Thomas R. Dye. To incorporate the nonlocal factors critical to the formulation of desegregation in the United States, the concept of system penetration as developed by La Palombara was incorporated into the Easton-Dye structure. This framework and associated theoretical propositions were designed to organize an empirical study of urban school desegregation in the U.S. The basic assumption of this structure was that, in a federal system, local policy is often the product of penetration by the national system. Further, it was

postulated that the extent to which local system penetration is necessary and efficacious is determined by the penetration intent, the nature of the penetration, as well as the nature of the local system's environmental and political structure.

Chapter III presented a detailed research design appropriate to the comparative quantitative study of public school desegregation in over 200 American communities. This design operationalized the theoretical framework developed in chapter II. A six-component research model with operational measures and associated hypotheses was presented (see Figure 3-1). The research strategy operationalizing the model was aimed at securing the answers to four basic research questions:

1. How may public school desegregation and change be measured so that a broad spectrum of U.S. cities may be meaningfully compared?
2. To what extent do U.S. cities vary as to desegregation and patterns of change?
3. What demographic and sociopolitical forces are associated with variation among U.S. cities in urban school desegregation and change?
4. To what extent do local forces facilitate or inhibit the implementation of school desegregation? What are the relative weights of the forces involved in explaining desegregation levels and change?

The remaining chapters of the study were designed to provide explicit responses to these questions based on empirical quantitative analyses.

The fourth chapter was designed to answer the first two questions contained in the research design. School desegregation was measured with two interval scales: (1) With an index

based on a fixed black-white ratio, and (2) with a flexible ratio based on a broader interval set within certain assumptions about the political feasibility of moving students. To ascertain whether dual measures of desegregation were empirically justified a correlation analysis was performed. It was found that the two indices were sufficiently distinct to merit the continued use of both in further analyses. The second question considered in chapter IV related to the extent to which U.S. cities varied as to school desegregation and change. An analysis of means and standard deviations for all cities showed that there was substantial, though diminishing, variation in both fixed and flexible desegregation. Moreover, separate analyses for northern and southern cities were made. It was determined that the differences between regions were sufficient to require their continued separation in further analyses. The most important regional differences between cities was the very large amount of change in southern and border desegregation as compared to the North. Southern and border cities had substantially increased desegregation levels between 1968 and 1972, while at the same time northern communities had remained very stable. It was further established that by 1972 the mean desegregation levels of cities in both regions had become quite similar, suggesting that the South had approached national desegregation standards.

Chapter V was devoted to framing a response to the third major research question, regarding the demographic and

sociopolitical correlates of urban school desegregation. In order to establish these independent correlates, however, it was first necessary to invoke a data reduction strategy to produce a more mathematically manageable data set. The reduced data set was subjected to partial correlation analysis where the statistically independent correlates of urban school desegregation for both regions were determined (Tables 5-1 to 5-10). Within each separate model component the independent correlates of school desegregation varied depending on the region within which a city was found, over time, and between desegregation measures. Moreover, substantial differences were found as to the degree of association between separate desegregation measures and the variables within each component. In short, the relative explanatory power of each model component was not constant across regions, desegregation measures, or time.

The crucial question toward which the research design was directed was the extent to which local forces facilitated or inhibited the implementation of school desegregation policy. The sixth chapter was directed toward presenting an answer to that question insofar as this was within the capacity of the research model. After further data reduction procedures it was possible to produce four sets of independent variables that were relatively independent within-and-between model components. These four sets (two per region) were then used in separate regression equations to test the predictive power of the integrated research model as well as the individual

explanatory weight of each independent variable. While the multiple regression analysis yielded a very complex picture of the urban desegregation universe (Tables 6-1 to 6-4), three major findings emerged:

1. The local school system was consistently the most important explanatory component. Three variables were particularly influential regardless of region, time, or type of desegregation index: relative black enrollments, school board insulation, and relative nonblack minority enrollment. Larger non-white enrollments consistently inhibited desegregation, although larger black enrollments per se did not preclude increases during the period. In the North school board insulation appeared to inhibit desegregation, but in the South the opposite was true.
2. The nature of the effect of the federal component was not uniform in both regions. Penetration was very limited among northern cities, and its direct impact was negligible. But, for cities willing to make a desegregation commitment by seeking federal funds, the amount of such aid was very salutary in effect for desegregation. In the South, where federal penetration was widespread, the direct effect of federal pressure on desegregation levels was limited, being filtered through a variety of important local forces. In both regions federal penetration was negatively related to initial desegregation levels, but tended to promote increased desegregation between 1968 and 1972.
3. The political component, usually an insignificant part of the northern model, was important in the South. Most particularly significant was the inhibiting effect of political conservatism and the facilitative impact of city government reformism on school desegregation in that region.

From these findings the fundamental conclusion was drawn that northern and southern-border desegregation were responses to distinctive stimuli. In the cities of the North federal penetration could not serve as a strong direct impetus to

desegregation, that had to emerge from within the community itself-- apparently from pressure applied to accessible school boards. In southern and border communities local pressures appeared to have basically inhibited desegregation, and only those public officials within more insulated structures appear to have been able to effectively move toward desegregation, stimulated by external pressure.

### Evaluation of the Research Hypotheses

In the third chapter research hypotheses associated with each of the five explanatory components of the model were offered. It is now appropriate to evaluate these hypotheses based on the findings of the partial correlation analysis reported in chapter V.

#### Federal Component

The hypotheses for the federal component were originally divided into judicial and executive penetrations. It was found to be empirically more useful to use a summary measure of coercive-cooperative penetrations without regard for judicial/executive distinctions. Therefore for purposes of evaluating the federal hypotheses judicial and executive propositions are considered simultaneously. The partial correlation analysis with which the federal hypotheses were tested is reported in Tables 5-1 and 5-2.

Hypotheses I-1, I-3, I-5: Coercive-cooperative penetrations are negatively associated with initial levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was confirmed for cities in both regions. The federal penetration score was negatively associated with 1968

levels of desegregation indicating that, as hypothesized, the most segregated communities were more likely to attract federal pressure. But, one specific type of penetration, federal aid per/pupil, did not confirm the hypothesis--it was consistently positively associated with initial desegregation levels. The source of this apparent contradiction is probably that any city receiving such funds had already made a sufficiently strong desegregation commitment as to show improvement as early as 1968.

Hypotheses I-2, I-4, I-6: Coercive-cooperative penetration is positively associated with increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was confirmed in both regions. Federal penetration was positively associated with increasing desegregation between 1968 and 1972.

Hypotheses I-7 and I-8: Constraining penetration is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

The evidence was too contradictory for acceptance of this hypothesis. Involvement in a federal housing and/or urban renewal program was not consistently associated with desegregation and change in the hypothesized direction. Housing activity, however, was consistently negatively associated with initial and increasing desegregation--as had been hypothesized. It appears that involvement in public housing or urban renewal programs does not automatically constrain the desegregation process, but as the level of housing construction increases the likelihood of desegregation diminishes.



State Component

The strong patterns of intercorrelation found among the variables within the state component made it very difficult to test the hypotheses associated with it. This problem was further compounded by large differences between regions as to the pattern of such intercorrelations. Therefore, the following conclusions are very tentative. The partial correlation analysis with which the state hypotheses were tested is reported in Tables 5-3 and 5-4.

Hypothesis II-1: State cooperative penetration is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Due to lack of variation in the antidiscriminatory legislation measure, it was not possible to test this hypothesis in the South. The hypothesis was confirmed for the North but the degree of association was very limited.

Hypothesis II-2: State constraining penetration is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Because of the unavailability of comparable data for enough states it was not possible to test this hypothesis.

Hypothesis II-3: State government structure is associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

We were unable to confirm this hypothesis since only a single government structure variable, state electoral structure, was consistently related to urban desegregation in either region over time. In the North a more liberal electoral structure was negatively associated with initial fixed and flexible

desegregation, but was unrelated to fixed change and positively related with flexible change. In the South a more liberal electoral structure was positively related to initial fixed and flexible desegregation, though negatively associated with increases in both.<sup>1</sup>

Hypothesis II-4: State government innovation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis must be rejected. Policy innovation was virtually unrelated to urban desegregation in both regions. In the North the existence of an independent state environment protection agency (an organizational innovation) was inconsistent in its relationship with fixed and flexible desegregation, contrary to the hypothesis. It was not possible because of multicollinearity between this and other state variables to test the effect the state EPA in the South.

Hypothesis II-5: A moralistic-liberal state political culture is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was confirmed only with respect to increasing desegregation in the South. Otherwise political culture was either unrelated, or related in the opposite direction than was hypothesized, to urban desegregation and change.

Hypothesis II-6: Industrialization is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was not confirmed in the North where industrialization was unrelated to initial and changing desegregation. In the South it was partially confirmed as increases in

desegregation were associated with increasing industrialization. But the relationship between growing industrialization and initial desegregation levels were contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis II-7: Affluence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was not confirmed in the North where affluence was consistently unrelated to desegregation and change.<sup>2</sup> In the South it was also disconfirmed as increasing affluence was negatively related to desegregation change and but weakly linked to initial levels.

Hypothesis II-8: Social traditionalism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was untested in the North due to high intercorrelations between this and other state variables. In the South it was only partially confirmed. The black population, the single traditionalism variable to survive data reduction, was negatively associated with initial desegregation, but positively associated with change.

Hypothesis II-9: School district consolidation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was untested in the North due to high intercorrelations between this and other state variables. In the South it must be rejected since initial desegregation levels were negatively associated with consolidation, contrary to the hypothesis, while increases in desegregation were unrelated to this variable.

Hypothesis II-10: Education revenue dependence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was untested in the North due to high intercorrelations between this and other state variables. In the South it was only partially confirmed. In that region increasing dependence on federal school revenue was negatively associated with initial desegregation, contrary to the hypothesis. As was hypothesized, however, revenue dependence was positively related to change.

Hypothesis II-11: Education expenditure equity is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was rejected in the North as there was no relationship between educational expenditure equity and desegregation. In the South the hypothesis was untested due to the high intercorrelations between this and other state variables.

#### Local Environmental Component

The partial correlation analysis with which the local environment hypotheses were tested is reported in Tables 5-5 and 5-6.

Hypothesis III-1: Community demographic stability and homogeneity are positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

With respect to community demographic stability this hypothesis must be rejected for both regions. There is no evidence that demographic stability consistently facilitated either initial or increasing desegregation. Among northern cities that portion

of the hypothesis relating to community homogeneity was partially confirmed. More initial desegregation was realized among cities with fewer blacks, although that indication of homogeneity was unrelated to desegregation change. Further, in the North, cities with more limited ethnic populations were no more desegregated initially or likely to increase desegregation, contrary to the hypothesis. Among southern and border cities the homogeneity portion of the hypothesis was also only confirmed in part. The black population was negatively related to initial desegregation, indicating that more homogeneous communities facilitated such implementation--but this variable was virtually unrelated to change, contrary to the hypothesis. As had been hypothesized, less ethnic populations increased desegregation more between years in this region. But, contrary to the hypothesis, ethnicity was positively related to initial desegregation levels. These contradictory findings made it impossible to draw any simple conclusion regarding community homogeneity.

Hypothesis III-2: Black demographic stability is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was untested in the North due to high intercorrelations between black mobility and other environment variables. In the South it was partially confirmed as increasing black mobility (instability) was negatively related with desegregation change, but initial desegregation levels were positively associated with desegregation--contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis III-3: Black/general population demographic dissimilarity is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Among northern cities this hypothesis was not confirmed as mobility differences between black/general populations were positively associated with initial desegregation and unrelated to change. Among southern and border cities this hypothesis was partially confirmed. Mobility differences were negatively associated with initial desegregation, but (contrary to the hypothesis) were also positively related to desegregation change. We are forced to conclude that, for the most part, black/general population differences were of secondary importance with respect to school desegregation.

Hypothesis III-4: Higher community social class is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

In the North this hypothesis must be rejected as the measures of social class (education, elite presence, and owner occupied dwelling change) were usually unrelated to school desegregation. This hypothesis was partially confirmed in southern and border cities as low education attainment (lower social class) was strongly negatively related to initial desegregation, but positively associated with increases in desegregation--contrary to the hypothesis. Elite presence was basically unrelated to desegregation among southern and border cities. We found very little evidence that community social class greatly affects desegregation in either region, although individual socioeconomic indicators might have impact.

Hypothesis III-5: Higher black social class is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Because of multicollinearity between the indicators of black social class and the black population it was not possible to test this hypothesis in either region.

Hypothesis III-6: Black/general social class dissimilarity is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Among northern cities there was not sufficiently consistent evidence to support this hypothesis. In the South the high level of multicollinearity between black/general variables and the size of the black population was too great to test this hypothesis.

Hypothesis III-7: Community age is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was not confirmed in the North as city age was unrelated to desegregation levels. In the South the hypothesis was untested due to high multicollinearity between city age and other environmental variables.

Hypothesis III-8: Presence of an identifiable central city is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was not confirmed in the North as the presence of the central city was unrelated to desegregation levels and change. In the South this hypothesis was untested due to high multicollinearity between this and other environmental variables.

Hypothesis III-9: Southern cities manifest less initial desegregation than northern cities.

This hypothesis was confirmed. The mean level of both fixed and flexible desegregation was lower among southern and border cities.

Hypothesis III-10: Southern cities manifest larger increases in desegregation than northern cities between periods.

This hypothesis was confirmed. The mean increase in desegregation between 1968 and 1972 was greater among southern and border communities.

#### Local Political Component

Hypothesis IV-1: Reform government structures are positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was partially confirmed in the North as fixed desegregation and change were positively associated with greater municipal reform--but the relationship was weak. Reform structures and flexible desegregation were unrelated among northern cities, contrary to the hypothesis. Among southern and border cities this hypothesis was partially confirmed as initial desegregation levels were positively associated with city reform. But reformed structures were not positively associated with desegregation change, contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis IV-2: Mayoral power is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was not confirmed as the mayoral power variables (veto, turnover, and term) were inconsistent in impact and direction of effect over time--within and between regions.



Hypothesis IV-3: Government innovation is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was partially confirmed among northern cities as innovations in data processing, public housing, and urban renewal tended to consistently facilitate initial desegregation. Desegregation change, however, was not consistently related, or related in the hypothesized direction, with innovation variables in this region. The patterns of correlation between desegregation and innovation variables among southern and border communities was not sufficiently consistent to allow an affirmative judgment on this hypothesis in this region.

Hypothesis IV-4: Citizen participation is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was partially confirmed. In both regions higher voter turnout was usually negatively associated with increasing desegregation.<sup>3</sup> Contrary to the hypothesis, however, higher voter turnout was always found positively associated with initial desegregation levels.

Hypothesis IV-5: Northern Republicanism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

Since Republicanism was virtually unrelated to initial and increasing levels of desegregation among northern cities this hypothesis was rejected.<sup>4</sup>

Hypothesis IV-6: Southern Republicanism is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Initial desegregation, contrary to the hypothesis, was negatively associated with Republicanism, but was positively related to desegregation change.

Hypothesis IV-7: Political conservatism is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

In the North the sign of the correlations was usually in the hypothesized direction but the values were so limited that we are hesitant to consider the hypothesis actually confirmed. In part this hypothesis was confirmed among southern and border communities as support for the American Independent Party was negatively associated with initial desegregation. But, contrary to the hypothesis, AIP support was positively associated with increasing desegregation.

#### Local School System Component

The partial correlation analysis with which the local school hypotheses were tested is reported in Tables 5-9 and 5-10.

Hypothesis V-1: School district independence is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis was only partially confirmed as, in both regions, city-run districts were actually more likely to have higher initial desegregation than independent districts. But, independent districts, as hypothesized, were found to produce greater increases in desegregation between years.

Hypothesis V-2: School board insulation and professionalism is positively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

This hypothesis must be rejected for northern cities as school board insulation and professionalism was usually negatively related to initial and increasing desegregation.<sup>5</sup> The hypothesis was confirmed among southern and border cities where board insulation and professionalism consistently produced higher initial and increasing desegregation.

Hypothesis V-3: Nonwhite enrollment is negatively associated with initial and increasing levels of desegregation.

In North and South alike this hypothesis was partially confirmed. The relative presence of nonwhite students (blacks and nonblack minorities) usually was negatively associated with initial desegregation levels. The impact of nonwhite enrollment on desegregation change was, however, inconsistent. Usually non-black minorities were a negative force in the desegregation process, while the relative black presence tended to be positively associated with increasing desegregation.

#### Evaluation of Hypothesis--Conclusion

To what can we attribute the incredibly abysmal exhibition of social science prognostication reported above? Three reasons would account for this long string of unconfirmed and partially confirmed hypotheses. First, we usually made the assumption, invalid it turned out, that the effect of the explanatory variables would be consistent over time. It is

quite clear that the impetus to change, or a fertile environment for desegregation change, may be developed from the very forces originally associated with desegregation. This we did not anticipate and its discovery may provide an important general lesson for those who would study social change. Second, the differential associations of fixed and flexible desegregation measures were unanticipated and this was often a source of error in hypothesizing. Finally, we did not anticipate the considerably different relationships between regions which served to create numerous qualifications and outright errors in our hypothesizing about desegregation and change. Cumulatively these misjudgments in hypothesizing about desegregation indicate that the "real" world defined by the 205 cities of our population was far more complex than we had originally anticipated.

#### Evaluation of Theoretical Framework

There are two broad criteria by which a theoretical framework may be judged, whether it makes substantive sense and the extent to which it allows us to better deal with real world phenomena. The substantive justifications for the penetrated systems framework (and its internal logic) are presented in detail in the second chapter and do not need reiteration at this point. We have discovered nothing in our research which alters our view of the substantive sense and internal logic of this structure as outlined in chapter II. The second criterion by which a theoretical framework may be evaluated is how well

it helps us understand and predict real world phenomena. In the case of urban school desegregation we have found that the penetrated systems framework performs quite satisfactorily. The five-component distinctions developed for the structure proved statistically useful. Cumulatively they were able to explain at least 38 percent, and as much as 94 percent, of the variance in desegregation measures over time. That is not a bad record for aggregate social science research, and we consider it satisfactory--though capable of improvement. The use of multiple-partial correlation analyses revealed that each model component made a substantial unique contribution to explaining one or more of the dependent variables, at one time or another, within one of the two regions under study. We would be remiss, however, if we ignored the rather appreciable error term in several of the predictive equations. The operational model of the penetrated systems framework was not entirely satisfactory in four separate areas, and the correction of these flaws could substantially reduce the amount of unexplained variance.

First, the federal component which was expected to be so critical in accounting directly for southern desegregation change proved to have very limited direct effect. The predictive model, we suspect, badly underestimated the federal impact because it relied solely on direct penetrations. What was not measured were more subtle pressures such as visits by federal officials, phone calls from agencies, and other less overt

penetrations which constitute an ongoing bargaining process by which the federal government put pressure upon local decision makers. Further, attention to diffused penetration merits attention; i.e., the process by which cities of similar desegregation situations react to overt federal pressure on other cities of their class and take desegregation action in anticipation that they too will soon become targets. The settlement of a court case involving one city may convince other communities that further resistance is futile. Our model did not incorporate such implicit, but conceivably important dimensions of penetration, and had it done so might have found federal penetrations even more directly pervasive and effective.

Second, the state component was poorly operationalized and its estimated effects are, as a consequence, potentially misleading. Because of the unavailability of city-level data and because our operationalization of this component was insufficiently conceived, we relied on state-level measures. In effect these failed to differentiate within-state penetrations and any measured between-state differences. This was unsatisfactory because it did not measure direct state penetrations of specific communities, losing a potentially important factor. Also, this mode of operationalization, while it differentiated between state-wide climates as these might serve to affect local policy, could yield statistically biased estimates. Each city within a state received the same score on each state

characteristic, and as a result the number of truly distinct cases was only 20 in the North and 18 in the South. Within such limited variation in distinct values the potential bias of a few extreme cases is considerable. In addition, because some states had more cities of the size needed for inclusion in our population, this would introduce potential bias in estimated state impact. Thus, although it did not originally seem a problem, reflection has led us to consider the state component of the model both conceptually and statistically flawed.

Third, neither the local political or the local school components allowed for the effect of the decision-making situation or individual decision makers per se. The effect of the specific decision-making situation within any given city was not determined, and role of a potentially effective leader--mayor, councilman, school board member, superintendent, etc.--remains unknown. These are potentially critical factors which could account for some of the unexplained variance in our model. Within the limits of time and resources it was simply impossible to collect such difficult-to-obtain data for 205 cities. It remains nonetheless undeniable that these unmeasured factors may have important contributions to make in explaining desegregation, and future research is needed which incorporates such elements in a penetrated systems model.

Finally, the model does not take cognizance of specific variation between communities as to elite and mass attitudes

which could play a critical role in explaining desegregation levels. It is becoming increasingly apparent that broad assumptions about the public/private regarding values associated with rough measures of community social class, occupational and income structure are of limited utility in measuring local attitudes accurately. Our measures of local attitudes were very indirect and almost hopelessly general, such that substantial inaccuracy is to be anticipated. Obviously survey research for 205 cities was beyond the resources of this project. Nonetheless, we are convinced that an important part of the error terms of this model could be reduced with specific information about community attitudes.

The four critical observations of the performance of the operational model of the penetrated systems framework are meant to suggest specific reasons why that explanatory structure realized a 6 to 60 percent error term in explaining desegregation. This should not be taken to denigrate the model; given the raw measures employed to operationalize refined concepts it was amazingly accurate in prediction. The point is that there is room for improvement. What is required is a large-scale research project employing survey, as well as aggregate data, applied to the population of cities used in this study. Aggregate research such as this study must remain exploratory until better data are available. The results of this study suggest that the model employed can be improved (as outlined above), without drastic reconceptualization of the theoretical framework.



Based on this study we consider the penetrated systems framework most promising for urban policy research.

### Urban School Desegregation in Perspective

The major conclusions drawn in chapter VI merit reiteration within the context of the other desegregation studies. Most especially we are interested in emphasizing the extent to which this research is or is not consistent in its findings with previous attempts to explain urban school desegregation.

It was found that patterns of desegregation and change were distinctive between regions. Desegregation levels among northern communities as late as 1968 were considerably higher, on the average, than those of southern and border cities. While school desegregation in the North proved to be quite stable between 1968 and 1972,<sup>6</sup> in the South large increases were observed.<sup>7</sup> By 1972 northern and southern desegregation levels were quite comparable. Moreover, the differences between regions carried over into the explanations of variation in urban school desegregation as well. The factors associated with and explaining variation in urban desegregation tended to be distinctive in the North and South. Such that, in accord with the findings of Dye, Crain et al., and Kirby et al., we conclude that the desegregation process must be considered and analyzed separately for the North and the South.<sup>7</sup>

Multiple regression analysis determined that in North and South alike, the relative black enrollment proved a serious,

usually the most serious, obstacle to school desegregation. This finding is consistent with a vast amount of previous research, including that of Matthews and Prothro, Dye, Kirby et al., Giles, Bullock and Rodgers, and Robey.<sup>9</sup> In fact, this relationship is the most frequently found and most generalized in the field of desegregation research. We also found, however, that a relatively larger black presence did not inhibit increases in desegregation between 1968 and 1972 in either region. Greater desegregation gains actually were usually found in cities with larger black enrollments. Since previous research has not actually dealt with change, it is not possible to compare this finding with other studies. But, Kirby et al. found that civil rights activity and desegregation pressure was more intense within cities of substantial black populations; i.e., where a desegregation constituency and a segregation problem exists.<sup>10</sup> This could partially explain why larger black enrollments appear to have produced more desegregation increases. Further, the evidence suggests that greater federal pressure was directed against those districts initially least desegregated, and despite the barrier of relatively larger black enrollments, this pressure eventually did show positive effect. Our basic conclusion in the regard is that relative black presence, itself the source of original segregation, seems to either generate internal pressure for, or attracts external pressure for, desegregation change. As we explained in concluding chapter VI, the patterns of

relationships lead us to view the pressures as internal in the North and external in the South.

Consistent with the findings of Dye, Kirby et al., Bullock and Rodgers, and Giles,<sup>11</sup> this study found that the most important determinants of school desegregation and change tended to be those within the local school component. This finding confirms the research strategy of Crain et al. and Kirby et al., of focusing on the school board and superintendent in studying the desegregation process. Most particularly it was determined that the structure of the local school board was a potentially critical factor with respect to understanding school desegregation and change. In northern cities regression analysis established that more accessible school boards produced relatively greater desegregation, while in southern and border cities it was less accessible boards that facilitated desegregation. This finding is consistent with Dye's finding that more political boards were less segregated in northern cities, but contradicts his finding that more political boards also led to less segregation in the South.<sup>12</sup> Crain et al. found that school boards more likely to take desegregation action were those that were highly cohesive, higher status, less constituency oriented, and appointed; i.e., less accessible to the electorate.<sup>13</sup> We found this true, as mentioned earlier, only for our southern cities.

It was discovered that the conservative political climate of many southern and border communities was usually a critical barrier to school desegregation. This is in accord with the

conclusions of Matthews and Prothro, Prothro, and Robey.<sup>14</sup> Desegregation progress in southern and border cities appears to have depended heavily upon the extent to which local decision makers had structural arrangements insulating them from the rest of the community. This confirms the observations of Inger and Stout and Crain, et al., but contradicts Dye's conclusion in 1968 that desegregation in the South was the product of political activity.<sup>15</sup> While we found political activity important in the South, it tended to be more of a hinderance than a help to desegregation. To overcome the inertia of segregationist tradition and social conservatism, more insulated decision makers appeared to have an advantage over more accessible counterparts in this region. In the North we found otherwise, as did Dye. There desegregation change appeared to be more the result of accessible decision makers reacting to community pressure to desegregate. The differential regional effect of decision maker accessibility was caused, we contend, by the different impetus to change in these regions. In the North, relatively unpenetrated as late as 1972, the stimulus to change was basically internal. But in the South, heavily penetrated since 1954, the impetus for desegregation was external--though filtered through the local political climate and decision-making structures.

Prospects for Urban Desegregation

It is very difficult to evaluate the prospects for urban school desegregation in the United States because of the shifting public policy priorities of the seventies. In addition to the basic reorientation in civil rights enforcement occasioned by the Nixon administration, there have been important readjustments in national priorities since the late sixties.<sup>16</sup> Economic recovery and energy, rather than social welfare and equality, are now the overriding concerns of policy-making institutions at all levels. Quite simply, civil rights in general, and school desegregation in particular, no longer command the attention or resources which were once mobilized in their behalf. At the same time the capacity of city school districts to produce effective reductions in black isolation has become even more limited. Financially hard pressed, and usually burdened with severely decaying physical plants, the large urban districts also face the problem of growing racial imbalance within the general population. Increasingly black urban cores ringed with white suburbs present a nearly insurmountable school segregation situation, unless some comprehensive metropolitan cooperation across district boundaries is accomplished.<sup>17</sup> There is little reason to believe that such metropolitan desegregation is likely to be accomplished voluntarily; it is difficult enough to secure cooperation between separate metro-government units under the best conditions for the most popular of causes. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rather

severely restricted the power of the federal courts to order such metropolitan desegregation.<sup>18</sup>

Further compounding an already difficult situation, the black power and community control movements in recent years have seriously eroded the traditional constituency for desegregation so that the black community and political liberals no longer are necessarily a single source for continuing desegregation pressure.<sup>19</sup> It has become increasingly apparent that whatever school desegregation is to be accomplished must now be undertaken at considerable political costs and for limited political gain. The anti-busing movement, legitimized by a variety of national political figures, has organized white opposition to desegregation in most U.S. communities to such an extent that, once again as in the early days, federal judges alone bear the brunt of bringing black and white students together. Overall, these trends do not appear conducive to much further urban school desegregation.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>A problem with testing this hypothesis was the high level of multicollinearity between structural measures. Overall we are convinced that state government structure per se is not a useful explanatory force with respect to urban school desegregation and change.

<sup>2</sup>With one exception, initial flexible levels were positively associated with state affluence, but this does not appear to be a sufficiently strong relationship to justify altering our conclusion that the hypothesis cannot be accepted.

<sup>3</sup>The single exception was for fixed change in the South where turnout was positively associated, slightly, with fixed change.

<sup>4</sup>Republicanism had a .16 partial with initial fixed desegregation in the North--opposite of the hypothesized direction. By 1972 it had increased in strength to .24.

<sup>5</sup>The only exception was for initial flexible desegregation.

<sup>6</sup>The stability of northern school desegregation levels was also found by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Racial Isolation in Public Schools, 2 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967); as well as by Kirby et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

<sup>7</sup>The fact of increasing southern desegregation since 1968 has also been documented by Charles S. Bullock and Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., "Compliance to Coercion: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., 1974.

<sup>8</sup>Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation (Chicago: Aldine, 1968; Kirby et al., Political Strategies; and Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly 4 (December 1968): 141-65; all found that differences in the desegregation process between the North and South required separate analyses for each.

<sup>9</sup>Dye, "Urban School Segregation;" Kirby et al., Political Strategies; Bullock and Rodgers, "Compliance to Coercion;" Michael W. Giles, "H.E.W. Versus the Federal Courts: A Comparison of School Desegregation Enforcement." American Politics Quarterly 3 (January 1975): 81-90. Usually this importance was found to be due to black enrollments. Our findings indicate that nonblack minority enrollments, private enrollments, and the school board are often important as well.

<sup>10</sup>Political Strategies.

<sup>11</sup>Dye, "Urban School Segregation," Kirby et al., Political Strategies; Bullock and Rodgers, "Compliance to Coercion," and Giles, "HEW Versus the Courts."

<sup>12</sup>Dye, "Urban School Desegregation."

<sup>13</sup>Crain, et al., Politics of School Desegregation.

<sup>14</sup>Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways: Critical Factors in Southern Reactions to Brown v. Board of Education," Essays on the American Constitution, ed. by Gottfried Dietz (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964; James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited: An Error in Prediction," Journal of Politics 34 (May 1972): 352-64; and John S. Robey, "Public School Desegregation Policy in the South: Economic Versus Political Models of Explanation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, Texas, 1975.

<sup>15</sup>Morton Inger and Robert T. Stout, "School Desegregation: The Need to Govern," The Urban Review 3 (November 1968): 35-38; Crain et al., Politics of School Desegregation; and Dye, "Urban School Desegregation." Dye has also contended the opposite of his 1968 southern findings. For example:

Success in desegregating Southern cities appears then to be directly related to the progressivism and cosmopolitanism of the individual cities and to the willingness of their business and civic elites to shoulder unpopular responsibilities. These elites, relatively insulated from public opinion, have the freedom, security, prestige, and power to achieve a political objective--desegregation--that is at variance with the preferences of the masses.

The Politics of Equality (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 52.

<sup>16</sup>See Leon E. Panetta and Peter Gall, Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights Retreat (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971).

<sup>17</sup>For a comprehensive survey of the obstacles confronting contemporary urban school desegregation see Gary Orfield, "Federal Policy, Local Power and Metropolitan Segregation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.



<sup>18</sup>Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

<sup>19</sup>Kirby et al., Political Strategies.

# APPENDIX I

## THE COMPLETE LIST OF CITIES USED IN THIS DISSERTATION

| City                  | 1968<br>Fixed | 1968<br>Flex. | 1972<br>Fixed | 1972<br>Flex. | Fixed<br>Change | Flex.<br>Change |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Birmingham, Al.       | 3.3           | 5.2           | 26.8          | 54.5          | 7.027           | 9.481           |
| Gladsden              | 16.3          | 17.5          | 78.7          | 72.8          | 3.844           | 3.160           |
| Mobile                | 14.4          | 29.4          | 60.4          | 74.4          | 3.211           | 1.531           |
| Montgomery            | 10.0          | 26.7          | 47.8          | 82.2          | 3.761           | 2.079           |
| Tuscaloosa            | 5.0           | 5.5           | 43.7          | 75.7          | 7.761           | 12.764          |
| Phoenix, Az.          | 14.6          | 78.6          | 17.1          | 81.5          | .172            | .037            |
| Ft. Smith, Ar.        | 60.1          | 77.8          | 23.6          | 94.9          | -.607           | .220            |
| Little Rock           | 29.7          | 28.0          | 96.9          | 86.7          | 2.261           | 2.097           |
| North Little Rock     | 44.0          | 39.4          | 100.0         | 99.1          | 1.272           | 1.515           |
| Alameda, Ca.          | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | .000            | .000            |
| Bakersfield           | 33.0          | 62.0          | 33.8          | 83.8          | .024            | .352            |
| Berkeley              | 100.0         | 99.6          | 98.5          | 94.2          | -.015           | -.054           |
| Compton               | 9.9           | 93.6          | 97.0          | 70.0          | 8.750           | -.252           |
| Fresno                | 23.4          | 91.4          | 56.0          | 94.0          | 1.393           | .028            |
| Inglewood             | 100.0         | 86.3          | 100.0         | 81.1          | .000            | -.060           |
| Long Beach            | 100.0         | 83.6          | 100.0         | 85.1          | .000            | .018            |
| Los Angeles           | 18.3          | 64.6          | 18.6          | 62.7          | .016            | -.029           |
| Oakland               | 34.7          | 78.6          | 35.7          | 83.4          | .027            | .061            |
| Pasadena              | 44.4          | 73.7          | 100.0         | 95.5          | 1.252           | .296            |
| Pomona                | 100.0         | 87.9          | 86.8          | 89.7          | -.132           | .020            |
| Richmond              | 65.2          | 64.8          | 74.4          | 81.1          | .140            | .252            |
| Riverside             | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | .000            | .000            |
| Sacramento            | 100.0         | 97.9          | 97.1          | 98.8          | .029            | .009            |
| San Bernadino         | 61.6          | 94.8          | 73.8          | 95.1          | .198            | .003            |
| San Diego             | 45.3          | 74.0          | 56.3          | 82.4          | .243            | .114            |
| San Francisco         | 69.4          | 80.2          | 91.6          | 95.5          | .319            | .191            |
| Santa Ana             | 92.0          | 100.0         | 98.1          | 91.3          | .067            | -.087           |
| Santa Monica          | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | 97.5          | .000            | -.025           |
| Stockton              | 89.7          | 96.8          | 82.4          | 82.6          | -.081           | -.147           |
| Vallejo               | 100.0         | 95.3          | 100.0         | 86.9          | .000            | -.088           |
| Colorado Springs, Co. | 75.0          | 92.0          | 85.2          | 96.3          | .136            | .047            |
| Denver                | 52.7          | 75.0          | 64.0          | 89.1          | .214            | .188            |
| Pueblo                | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | 98.6          | .000            | -.014           |
| Bridgeport, Ct.       | 91.9          | 73.4          | 66.9          | 83.0          | .272            | .131            |
| Hartford              | 46.9          | 74.2          | 29.7          | 73.5          | .365            | -.009           |
| New Britain           | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | 100.0         | .000            | .000            |
| New Haven             | 75.0          | 75.8          | 56.5          | 81.8          | .246            | .079            |
| Norwalk               | 95.9          | 99.3          | 97.6          | 98.5          | .018            | -.008           |
| Stamford              | 85.1          | 69.8          | 100.0         | 97.2          | .175            | .393            |
| Waterbury             | 84.4          | 66.1          | 100.0         | 88.7          | .185            | .342            |
| Wilmington, Dl.       | 53.4          | 75.4          | 42.3          | 72.7          | -.210           | -.036           |
| Washington, D.C.      | 06.1          | 75.6          | 04.9          | 74.0          | -.200           | -.021           |

|                     |       |       |       |       |        |         |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| Ft. Lauderdale, Fa. | 20.3  | 32.9  | 93.8  | 88.5  | 3.624  | 1.690   |
| Jacksonville        | 12.6  | 23.2  | 91.6  | 88.4  | 6.274  | 2.810   |
| Miami               | 20.8  | 58.7  | 58.4  | 80.2  | 1.804  | .366    |
| Orlando             | 22.9  | 32.9  | 77.7  | 56.6  | 2.390  | .720    |
| Pensacola           | 30.0  | 35.6  | 92.9  | 66.0  | 2.096  | .854    |
| St. Petersburg      | 27.9  | 39.4  | 100.0 | 99.4  | 2.586  | 1.523   |
| Tampa               | 26.7  | 48.9  | 100.0 | 99.2  | 2.749  | 1.029   |
| West Palm Beach     | 23.8  | 35.8  | 97.3  | 89.8  | 3.092  | 1.508   |
| Albany, Ga.         | 8.1   | 20.7  | 52.1  | 70.7  | 5.431  | 2.415   |
| Atlanta             | 12.0  | 37.9  | 19.0  | 70.0  | .588   | .847    |
| Augusta             | 10.3  | 32.7  | 81.7  | 75.5  | 6.920  | 1.309   |
| Columbus            | 7.1   | 60.4  | 98.2  | 92.6  | 12.805 | .538    |
| Macon               | 19.9  | 24.0  | 59.9  | 67.5  | 2.003  | 1.813   |
| Savannah            | 13.5  | 31.1  | 92.4  | 87.7  | 5.873  | 1.820   |
| Aurora, Il.         | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000    |
| Chicago             | 13.4  | 48.3  | 11.2  | 50.1  | -.165  | .037    |
| Decatur             | 100.0 | 72.8  | 100.0 | 86.4  | .000   | .187    |
| East St. Louis      | 23.9  | 71.0  | 18.3  | 59.6  | -.235  | -.161   |
| Evanston            | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 72.9  | .000   | -.271   |
| Joliet              | 54.6  | 65.5  | 65.9  | 71.3  | .208   | .089    |
| Peoria              | 88.2  | 59.7  | 86.2  | 85.3  | -.022  | .429    |
| Rockford            | 100.0 | 72.7  | 93.4  | 65.4  | -.066  | -.100   |
| Rock Island         | 100.0 | 67.6  | 100.0 | 65.7  | .000   | -.028   |
| Springfield         | 81.4  | 59.0  | 87.4  | 58.8  | .073   | -.003   |
| Waukegan            | 59.5  | 62.1  | 64.7  | 89.3  | .088   | .438    |
| Evansville, In.     | 76.4  | 89.2  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .308   | .121    |
| Ft. Wayne           | 67.8  | 42.7  | 73.4  | 68.5  | .084   | .604    |
| Gary                | 16.5  | 63.3  | 8.4   | 73.2  | -.493  | .156    |
| Hammond             | 100.0 | 80.1  | 73.6  | 87.6  | -.264  | .094    |
| Indianapolis        | 42.4  | 34.0  | 53.8  | 49.8  | .268   | .465    |
| Muncie              | 83.8  | 82.9  | 100.0 | 88.3  | .193   | .065    |
| South Bend          | 91.9  | 50.9  | 91.9  | 58.7  | .000   | .153    |
| Terre Haute         | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000    |
| Davenport, Ia.      | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 87.2  | .000   | -.128   |
| Des Moines          | 100.0 | 75.4  | 100.0 | 73.3  | .000   | -.028   |
| Waterloo            | 85.4  | 67.0  | 96.1  | 73.4  | .124   | .096    |
| Kansas City, Ks.    | 45.8  | 52.7  | 34.7  | 67.3  | -.243  | .277    |
| Topeka              | 100.0 | 89.1  | 100.0 | 86.9  | .000   | -.025   |
| Wichita             | 52.7  | 59.9  | 100.0 | 98.8  | .899   | .649    |
| Covington, Ky.      | 100.0 | 85.4  | 100.0 | 86.9  | .000   | .018    |
| Lexington           | 76.3  | 50.2  | 100.0 | 95.8  | .310   | .908    |
| Louisville          | 47.3  | 47.3  | 26.2  | 50.3  | -.446  | .063    |
| Baton Rouge, La.    | 9.0   | 16.4  | 32.9  | 49.4  | 2.663  | 2.012   |
| Lake Charles        | 9.5   | 12.8  | 46.9  | 56.5  | 3.914  | 3.414   |
| Monroe              | 1.0   | .7    | 28.3  | 100.0 | 26.809 | 141.857 |
| New Orleans         | 18.9  | 62.1  | 24.2  | 65.6  | .280   | .056    |
| Shreveport          | 2.6   | 6.8   | 36.8  | 69.1  | 13.007 | 9.162   |
| Baltimore, Md.      | 23.3  | 49.3  | 19.1  | 25.9  | -.179  | -.475   |
| Boston, Ma.         | 60.9  | 44.8  | 50.1  | 51.7  | .178   | .154    |
| Cambridge           | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 92.3  | .000   | -.077   |
| New Bedford         | 100.0 | 88.8  | 100.0 | 95.3  | .000   | .073    |
| Springfield         | 91.7  | 79.3  | 88.4  | 86.3  | .036   | .088    |
| Ann Arbor, Mi.      | 100.0 | 99.4  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .006    |

|                  |       |       |       |       |        |        |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Detroit          | 33.4  | 56.7  | 25.3  | 62.8  | -.241  | .108   |
| Flint            | 58.4  | 48.9  | 71.6  | 55.6  | .226   | .137   |
| Grand Rapids     | 43.8  | 46.1  | 51.9  | 59.7  | .185   | .295   |
| Kalamazoo        | 100.0 | 62.4  | 100.0 | 98.8  | .000   | .583   |
| Lansing          | 92.0  | 88.2  | 100.0 | 98.0  | .087   | .111   |
| Pontiac          | 49.4  | 52.7  | 100.0 | 90.7  | 1.024  | .721   |
| Saginaw          | 32.0  | 32.0  | 43.8  | 44.5  | .367   | .391   |
| Minneapolis, Mn. | 100.0 | 82.6  | 100.0 | 86.9  | .000   | .052   |
| St. Paul         | 87.6  | 96.4  | 89.3  | 86.1  | .019   | -.107  |
| Jackson, Ms.     | 5.4   | 5.3   | 75.8  | 80.5  | 13.077 | 14.189 |
| Kansas City, Mo. | 29.9  | 37.5  | 17.1  | 34.5  | -.429  | -.080  |
| St. Joseph       | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| St. Louis        | 12.1  | 28.1  | 89.4  | 38.0  | 6.402  | .352   |
| Omaha, Ne.       | 60.9  | 39.3  | 63.9  | 52.7  | .049   | .341   |
| Bayonne, N.J.    | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| Camden           | 42.7  | 70.7  | 27.0  | 88.6  | -.368  | .253   |
| East Orange      | 30.0  | 78.8  | 14.2  | 70.0  | -.525  | -.112  |
| Elizabeth        | 74.0  | 78.7  | 79.3  | 81.3  | .071   | .033   |
| Irvington        | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 72.3  | .000   | -.277  |
| Jersey City      | 50.0  | 78.3  | 53.4  | 82.1  | .068   | .049   |
| Newark           | 16.9  | 85.3  | 13.0  | 84.0  | -.229  | -.015  |
| Passaic          | 100.0 | 83.2  | 73.8  | 83.6  | -.262  | .005   |
| Patterson        | 75.2  | 83.3  | 49.5  | 76.3  | -.342  | -.084  |
| Trenton          | 49.8  | 74.5  | 42.0  | 66.9  | -.157  | -.102  |
| Albany, N.Y.     | 100.0 | 64.1  | 81.6  | 66.2  | .184   | .033   |
| Buffalo          | 37.4  | 66.4  | 48.6  | 73.4  | .298   | .105   |
| Mt. Vernon       | 72.5  | 85.3  | 53.3  | 75.7  | .265   | -.113  |
| New Rochelle     | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 95.8  | .000   | -.042  |
| New York         | 51.8  | 79.6  | 39.1  | 81.6  | .246   | .025   |
| Niagara Falls    | 100.0 | 93.1  | 100.0 | 99.9  | .000   | .073   |
| Rochester        | 72.3  | 81.3  | 73.7  | 83.6  | .020   | .028   |
| Rome             | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| Schenectady      | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| Syracuse         | 100.0 | 83.8  | 100.0 | 71.2  | .000   | -.150  |
| Troy             | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| Utica            | 100.0 | 92.5  | 100.0 | 94.6  | .000   | .023   |
| White Plains     | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000   | .000   |
| Yonkers          | 100.0 | 87.4  | 91.6  | 73.5  | -.084  | -.159  |
| Asheville, N.C.  | 29.2  | 51.0  | 100.0 | 93.6  | 2.420  | .835   |
| Charlotte        | 40.3  | 49.4  | 98.5  | 99.3  | 1.446  | 1.010  |
| Durham           | 16.5  | 60.0  | 74.0  | 78.0  | 3.487  | .300   |
| Greensboro       | 18.8  | 33.6  | 100.0 | 98.6  | 4.328  | 1.935  |
| High Point       | 30.6  | 51.1  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 2.269  | .957   |
| Raleigh          | 24.7  | 55.1  | 100.0 | 98.4  | 3.053  | .786   |
| Winston-Salem    | 15.6  | 26.5  | 97.7  | 98.3  | 5.254  | 2.709  |
| Akron, Oh.       | 76.6  | 44.5  | 78.0  | 43.5  | .018   | -.022  |
| Canton           | 91.1  | 49.7  | 91.8  | 54.7  | .008   | .101   |
| Cincinnati       | 57.2  | 46.3  | 62.4  | 39.4  | .091   | -.149  |
| Cleveland        | 16.3  | 31.8  | 9.3   | 43.5  | -.428  | .367   |
| Columbus         | 59.4  | 36.6  | 63.0  | 37.4  | .062   | .022   |

|                  |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Dayton           | 17.3  | 24.3  | 29.2  | 56.2  | .681  | 1.313 |
| Hamilton         | 100.0 | 61.4  | 100.0 | 70.0  | .000  | .140  |
| Lima             | 69.4  | 65.8  | 75.2  | 76.2  | .084  | .158  |
| Lorain           | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .000  |
| Springfield      | 100.0 | 67.5  | 100.0 | 73.3  | .000  | .086  |
| Toledo           | 47.6  | 46.3  | 59.5  | 48.0  | .250  | .037  |
| Warren           | 84.6  | 62.2  | 93.1  | 66.6  | .100  | .071  |
| Youngstown       | 15.4  | 45.1  | 79.2  | 33.2  | 4.152 | -.264 |
| Lawton, Ok.      | 100.0 | 95.5  | 100.0 | 97.7  | .000  | .023  |
| Oklahoma City    | 16.7  | 16.3  | 100.0 | 93.6  | 4.992 | 4.742 |
| Tulsa            | 34.7  | 56.6  | 75.2  | 65.0  | 1.166 | .148  |
| Portland, Or.    | 91.0  | 85.1  | 91.3  | 86.2  | .004  | .013  |
| Chester, Pa.     | 53.9  | 82.2  | 70.0  | 64.3  | .298  | -.218 |
| Erie             | 100.0 | 89.7  | 100.0 | 95.8  | .000  | .068  |
| Harrisburg       | 65.4  | 82.9  | 100.0 | 70.0  | .530  | -.156 |
| Lancaster        | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .000  |
| Philadelphia     | 37.5  | 54.9  | 23.5  | 45.5  | -.374 | .171  |
| Pittsburg        | 49.3  | 53.1  | 49.3  | 64.8  | .001  | .220  |
| Reading          | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .000  |
| York             | 100.0 | 86.2  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .160  |
| Providence, R.I. | 100.0 | 90.9  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .100  |
| Charleston, S.C. | 14.6  | 29.6  | 44.4  | 74.3  | 2.041 | 1.510 |
| Columbia         | 19.1  | 47.5  | 86.1  | 97.6  | 3.514 | 1.055 |
| Greenville       | 15.8  | 23.5  | 100.0 | 99.0  | 5.347 | 3.213 |
| Chattanooga, Tn. | 18.8  | 41.9  | 34.7  | 70.7  | .850  | .687  |
| Knoxville        | 33.4  | 30.6  | 68.7  | 39.5  | 1.053 | .291  |
| Memphis          | 5.5   | 11.8  | 18.4  | 33.6  | 2.353 | 1.847 |
| Nashville        | 49.0  | 60.5  | 100.0 | 76.6  | 1.040 | .266  |
| Abilene, Tx.     | 73.3  | 89.3  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .364  | .120  |
| Amarillo         | 55.0  | 73.3  | 100.0 | 100.0 | .819  | .364  |
| Austin           | 11.3  | 54.7  | 44.7  | 82.5  | 2.962 | .508  |
| Beaumont         | 22.0  | 56.2  | 38.3  | 77.9  | .737  | .386  |
| Corpus Christi   | 23.2  | 88.0  | 41.4  | 97.4  | .780  | .107  |
| Dallas           | 12.4  | 32.3  | 21.2  | 67.4  | .712  | 1.087 |
| El Paso          | 75.7  | 100.0 | 86.0  | 100.0 | .136  | .000  |
| Ft. Worth        | 13.3  | 36.9  | 41.1  | 61.8  | 2.085 | .675  |
| Galveston        | 43.9  | 80.7  | 62.3  | 90.5  | .418  | .121  |
| Houston          | 9.4   | 41.2  | 23.4  | 67.6  | 1.476 | .641  |
| Lubbock          | 45.4  | 71.4  | 48.2  | 89.2  | .062  | .249  |
| Odessa           | 51.3  | 84.7  | 06.6  | 89.2  | -.872 | .053  |
| Port Arthur      | 23.7  | 69.9  | 16.9  | 76.5  | -.285 | .094  |
| San Angelo       | 98.2  | 89.9  | 76.2  | 93.5  | -.224 | .040  |
| San Antonio      | 16.6  | 77.7  | 44.0  | 72.7  | 1.644 | -.064 |
| Tyler            | 21.3  | 31.7  | 91.1  | 89.1  | 3.266 | 1.810 |
| Waco             | 25.0  | 40.5  | 51.7  | 76.7  | 1.066 | .894  |
| Wichita Falls    | 28.6  | 58.2  | 97.7  | 100.0 | 2.414 | .718  |
| Alexandria, Va.  | 81.1  | 52.1  | 83.2  | 78.9  | .026  | .514  |
| Lynchburg        | 29.4  | 40.6  | 100.0 | 95.3  | 2.396 | 1.347 |
| Newport News     | 12.4  | 29.1  | 100.0 | 88.2  | 7.033 | 2.031 |
| Norfolk          | 18.3  | 42.4  | 100.0 | 84.1  | 4.461 | .983  |

|                  |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Portsmouth       | 14.2  | 53.4  | 98.0  | 77.9  | 5.876 | .459  |
| Richmond         | 12.8  | 77.9  | 95.2  | 76.0  | 6.459 | -.024 |
| Roanoke          | 25.1  | 61.2  | 100.0 | 93.5  | 2.979 | .528  |
| Seattle, Wa.     | 91.9  | 81.5  | 93.1  | 81.9  | .013  | .005  |
| Tacoma           | 100.0 | 94.0  | 100.0 | 99.6  | .000  | .060  |
| Charleston, W.V. | 100.0 | 89.7  | 100.0 | 62.7  | .000  | -.301 |
| Huntington       | 82.9  | 73.2  | 100.0 | 98.7  | .206  | .348  |
| Wheeling         | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | .000  | .000  |
| Milwaukee, Wi.   | 38.0  | 30.5  | 22.7  | 41.9  | -.402 | .374  |
| Racine           | 100.0 | 83.5  | 100.0 | 82.8  | .000  | -.008 |

## APPENDIX II

### THE RESEARCH MODEL VARIABLE SET WITH SOURCES

#### THE RESEARCH MODEL VARIABLE SET

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##### SOURCE CODE

##### FEDERAL COMPONENT

##### Coercive Penetration

###### Judicial:

- 1. Federal Court Order 1954-1972
- 1. Number of Federal Court Orders 1954-1972
- 1. Court Order Before 1964 Civil Rights Act

###### Health Education and Welfare:

- 2. HEW Title VI Noncompliance Citation
- 2. HEW Title VI Noncompliance Before Nixon Administration
- 2. HEW Title VI Termination of Federal Funds
- 2. HEW Title VI Termination of Federal Funds Before  
Nixon Administration

###### Department of Justice:

- 3. Department of Justice Title VI Lawsuit
- 3. Department of Justice Title VI Lawsuit Before Nixon  
Administration

##### Cooperative Penetration

###### Health Education and Welfare:

- 4,5. HEW Title IV Assistance
- 4,5. HEW Title IV Assistance Before Nixon Administration
- 4,5. Amount of HEW Title IV Grants

###### Community Relations Service (Department of Justice):

- 6. Community Relations Service Program in State 1970-1971
- 6. Community Relations Service Program in District 1970-1971

###### Office of Education:

- 5. ESAP Assistance 1970-1972
- 5. Total Amount of EASP Assistance Per/Pupil 1970-1972

###### HEW and Office of Education:

- 4,5. Total Amount of Federal Desegregation Funds Per/Pupil  
1964-1972

Constraining Penetration

- 7. Federal Housing Program Involvement
- 7. Level of Housing Activity
- 7. Federal Urban Renewal Program Involvement

## STATE COMPONENT

Political Structure

## Cooperative Penetration:

- 8. Antidiscrimination Legislation Index

## Constraining Penetration:

- 9. Racial Segregation in Education Statute
- 9. Racial Segregation in Education Statute After 1900

## Government Structure:

- 10. Government Responsiveness (Sutton Index)
- 11. Legislative Professionalism (Grumm Index)
- 12. Executive Power (Schlesinger Index)
- 13. Electoral Structure (Blank Index)

## Government Innovation:

- 14. Policy Innovation (Sharkansky Index)
- 15. Agency Innovation (Presence/Absence of Separate EPA)

## Political Culture:

- 16. Political Culture (Walker Index)
- 17. Interparty Competition (Ranney Index)
- 18. Black Elected Officials Per/100,000
- 19. Income Redistribution (Booms-Halldorson Index)

Socioeconomic Structure

## Industrialization:

- 20. Industrialization 1960
- 20. Industrialization 1960-1970

## Affluence:

- 20. Affluence 1960
- 20. Affluence Change

## Social Traditionalism:

- 18. Population Mobility
- 18. Black Migration



- 18. Black Population 1960
- 21. Church Related School Enrollment
- 22. Social Diversity

### Educational Structure

#### Organization-Consolidation:

- 23. Number of School Districts 1968
- 23. District Consolidation Since 1968

#### Revenue-Expenditure:

- 23. Local Educational Revenue Dependence on Federal Government
- 23,24. Change in Local Educational Revenue Dependence 1958-1968
- 9. Intrastate Expenditure Disparity
- 9. Interstate Expenditure Disparity

### LOCAL ENVIRONMENT COMPONENT

### Demographic Structure

#### Community:

- 25. Population Density
- 25,26. Density Change
- 25. Population
- 25. Ethnicity
- 25. Mobility
- 25,26. Mobility Change
- 26. Median Age

#### Black Community:

- 26. Black Population
- 26. %Population Black
- 27. Black Mobility
- 27,28. Black Mobility Change
- 29. Black Median Age

#### Demographic Dissimilarity:

- 28. Black/General Population Mobility Difference
- 29. Black/White Age Difference

### Socioeconomic Structure

#### Community:

- 25. Median Education
- 25. Below Grade School
- 25,26. Median Education Change

- 25. Median Family Income
- 25. Family Poverty
- 26. Families Above \$25,000 (Elite Presence)
- 25. Unemployment
- 25. Employee-Population Ratio (Suburban Exploitation)
- 25,26. Employee-Population Change
- 25. White Collar
- 25,26. White Collar Change
- 7. Ratio of Manager/Proprietors/and Officials (MPO, Power Centralization)
- 7,28. MPO Change
- 25. Owner Occupied Dwellings (Middle Class Presence)
- 25,26. Owner Occupied Change

#### Black Community:

- 28. Black Median Education
- 28. Black Family Poverty
- 28. Black Families Above \$25,000 (Black Elites)
- 28. Black Unemployment
- 28. Black White Collar

#### Socioeconomic Dissimilarity:

- 28. Black/General Population Education Difference
- 28. Black/General Population Poverty Difference
- 28. Black/General Population Unemployment Difference
- 28. Black/General Population White Collar Difference

#### Community Classification:

- Southern-Border City
- 7. Central City
- 7. City Age

### LOCAL POLITICAL COMPONENT

#### Political Structure

#### Government:

- 7. Reformism Score
- 7. Manager Government
- 30. Appointed Mayor
- 31. Mayoral Turnover (1960-1970)
- 7. Nonpartisan Council Elections
- 7. City Council at/Large
- 30. Overlapping City Council Terms

## Mayoral Power:

- 30. Length of Term
- 30. Veto Power

## Innovation:

- 32. Year Started Automatic Data Processing (Innovation)
- 32. Number of Departments with ADP Capability (ADP Application)
- 7. Public Housing Innovation (Years since first project)
- 7. Urban Renewal Innovation (Years since first project)
- 7. Fluoridation Program
- 7. Fluoridation Rejection

## Political Culture:

- 7. Voting Turnout in Municipal Election
- 25,26,33. Average GOP Presidential Vote (Republicanism, County)
- 26. American Independent Party Vote 1968 (Conservatism)

## LOCAL SCHOOL COMPONENT

## Organization:

- 33. City-Run School System
- 34. County-wide District
- 35. Composite Board Score (Insulation-Professionalism)
- 35. Appointed Board
- 35. Nonpartisan Board Elections
- 35. Length of Board Elections
- 35. Length of Board Terms
- 35. Size of Board

## Enrollment Statistics:

- 27. Private Elementary Enrollment 1960
- 27,28. Private Enrollment Change 1960-1970
- 34. 1968 Black Enrollment (NLOG)
- 34. 1968 Percentage Black
- 34. 1968 Percentage Nonblack Minority
- 34,36. Black Enrollment Change
- 34,36. Nonblack Enrollment Change

## CONSTRUCTION OF SUMMARY INDICES

Composite Federal Penetration Score

This score is a summary of the distinctive coercive-cooperative federal penetrations experienced by a local school district between 1954 and 1972. The following types of penetration were summed, each mode of penetration counting as a single point:

- Federal Court Order
- HEW Noncompliance Citation
- Department of Justice Suit
- Department of Justice Title X Assistance
- HEW Title IV Assistance
- ESAP Assistance

Black/General Population Dissimilarity

These variables measure the absolute difference between black and general populations on selected demographic as well as socioeconomic characteristics. In every instance the value for the general population was subtracted from that of the black subpopulation within a given community. The absolute difference was taken as the index of dissimilarity.

City Government Reformism

This is a continuous measure of the extent to which a city government had a more reformed government structure, and sums of the following reform characteristics were taken:

- City Manager Government
- Nonpartisan Council Terms
- Percent of City Council Elected at Large

Composite School Board Score

This is a continuous measure of the extent to which a local school board had a more insulated and professional structure, and sums the following board characteristics:

- Appointed School Board
- Nonpartisan Board Election
- Board Term of More Than Four Years
- Board Meetings More Than Twice a Month
- Board Composed of Less Than Seven Members
- Board Members Receive Compensation

The School Board Score was based on the following assumptions which guided the scoring procedure:

1. Board Members that are appointed are less accessible than elected members by virtue of not having to go before the electorate for continued tenure.
2. Board Members elected in nonpartisan elections are less accessible to the electorate and/or community political pressure than those selected in partisan elections.
3. Board Members with longer terms are less accessible to the electorate and/or community political pressures.
4. Boards which meet more frequently are more likely to develop more professional attitudes and develop expertise, having to devote more official time to their position.
5. Boards with fewer members are less accessible to the electorate and/or community political pressure than larger boards. Fewer members limits the number of possible access points to the board through which interests in the community can find a sympathetic voice.
6. Board Members receiving official compensation are more likely to view their position as a genuine position of responsibility, and modify their behavior to be more professional, than Members receiving no compensation.

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APPENDIX III  
COMPUTATIONAL FORMULAE FOR THE FLEXIBLE  
DESEGREGATION INDEX

Assumptions for the Index

The purpose of the flexible desegregation index is to give a maximum score to any city which has done as much as can be expected to reduce racial segregation in the public schools, within the limits imposed by the demography of the community. In developing the index Kirby et al. (Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), appendix F) made the following four assumptions concerning what is practical desegregation policy within American cities:

1. That blacks benefit from attending schools which are over 50% white, but where is no additional benefit as the % white increases beyond 70%.
2. That white students benefit from interracial contact, and a school must be at least 5% black to provide these benefits.
3. Social and political constraints make it inadvisable to bring black students into all-white schools in excess of 30% of the enrollment. This is a conservative assumption. A number of school systems have found that schools which are half black are viable as desegregated schools, and there is no educational research which demonstrates that a 70% white school is superior to a 50% white school. However, it seems likely that were we to propose a figure below 70% white, many school administrators and white leaders would object, and their objections might prove to be sound. On the other hand, it seems to us very unlikely that a seventy-thirty

white-black ratio would be objectionable to educators. Since one of the purposes of this exercise is to set realistic goals for school systems, it is better to err on the conservative side.

4. There is no reason to reassign students who are already in desegregated settings, and no reason to thinly disperse black students through a larger number of white schools merely to increase the number of whites benefitting from desegregation.

Within these assumptions pupil reassignment (desegregation effort) involves moving black students out of predominantly black schools and into white schools until there are no longer any blacks in predominantly black schools or no longer any whites in schools less than 30 percent black.

#### Desegregation Equations

Flexible desegregation is formally defined as the ratio of students already in desegregated schools to those who could (within the assumptions outlined above) be enrolled in desegregated schools. This formula may be expressed as:

$$D = \frac{W_I + B_I}{W_I + B_I + W_{dI} + B_{dI}}$$

Where:

$W_I$  = Number of white students now in schools less than 95% white

$B_I$  = Number of black students now in schools 50% or more white

$W_{dI}$  = Number of additional white students who could be in schools less than 95% white

$B_{dI}$  = Number of additional blacks who could be in schools over 50% white

The computational formulae for determining additional student totals ( $W_{dI}$  and  $B_{dI}$ ) may be expressed as:

$$W_{dI} = (7/3 B_S) \text{ or } W_S \text{ (whichever is smaller)}$$

$$B_{dI} = (3/7 W_T - B_I) \text{ or } B_I \text{ (whichever is smaller)}$$

Where:

$W_S$  = Number of whites in schools 95% or more white

$B_S$  = Number of blacks in schools 50% or more black

$W_T$  = Total number of white students

$B_I$  = Number of black students now in schools 50% or more white

As a result of this scoring procedure the theoretical range of values would be:

00.0 = No desegregation effort - None of the eligible students have been moved.

100.0 = Total desegregation effort - All eligible students have been moved.

APPENDIX IV  
EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIVE EQUATIONS FOR PENETRATION  
MODELS IN CHAPTER VI

Regression Equation For 1968 Fixed  
Northern Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                    | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                      |                     | .08     | 1.57  | .05  | .81     |
| Housing Activity                      |                     | -.03    | -0.01 | -.02 | .33     |
|                                       | .01                 |         |       |      |         |
| El. Structure                         |                     | -.09    | -0.14 | -.05 | .88     |
|                                       | .01                 |         |       |      |         |
| City Blk. (Nlog)                      |                     | -.10    | -2.02 | -.10 | 1.01    |
| Suburb. Exploit.                      |                     | .12     | .07   | .08  | 1.30    |
|                                       | .02                 |         |       |      |         |
| Mayor Term                            |                     | -.14    | -2.54 | -.10 | 1.49    |
| Council Overl.                        |                     | .10     | 3.95  | .07  | 1.07    |
| Turnout                               |                     | .23     | .39   | .20  | 2.46    |
|                                       | .06                 |         |       |      |         |
| City-Run Schl.                        |                     | .08     | 3.78  | .06  | .82     |
| Pvt. Change                           |                     | .09     | 8.47  | .05  | .94     |
| Blk Enrol (Nlog)                      |                     | -.26    | -7.01 | -.33 | 2.80    |
| %Blk Enrol                            |                     | -.43    | -0.64 | -.40 | 5.01    |
| %Nonblk Min.                          |                     | -.22    | -0.47 | -.14 | 2.40    |
|                                       | .40                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error Of The Estimate        |                     |         |       |      | 16.31   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance ( $R^2$ ) |                     |         |       |      | 70.70   |

Regression Equation For 1972 Fixed  
Northern Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                    | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b      | Beta | t-ratio |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| Fed. Aid. P/P                         |                     | .26     | 0.58   | .18  | 2.81    |
| Fed. Penetration                      |                     | .25     | 5.30   | .17  | 2.71    |
| Housing Activity                      |                     | -.33    | -0.01  | -.22 | 3.68    |
|                                       | .28                 |         |        |      |         |
| El. Structure                         |                     | -0.45   | -.17   | 3.12 |         |
|                                       | .08                 |         |        |      |         |
| Pop. Mobil. Change                    |                     | .20     | 18.16  | .13  | 2.12    |
| City Blk. (Nlog)                      |                     | .01     | 0.23   | .01  | .12     |
| Suburb. Exploit.                      |                     | .01     | 0.01   | .01  | .13     |
| W-Collar Diff.                        |                     | .04     | 0.08   | .03  | .45     |
|                                       | .04                 |         |        |      |         |
| Mayor Term                            |                     | -.22    | -3.56  | -.14 | 2.38    |
| ADP Application                       |                     | -.12    | -0.79  | -.07 | 1.22    |
| Turnout                               |                     | .14     | .21    | .11  | 1.43    |
|                                       | .06                 |         |        |      |         |
| Blk Enrol (Nlog)                      |                     | -.49    | -12.95 | -.62 | 5.90    |
| %Nonblk Min.                          |                     | -.17    | -0.36  | -.11 | 1.79    |
| Standard Error of The Estimate        |                     |         |        |      | 15.65   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance ( $R^2$ ) |                     |         |        |      | 72.30   |

Regression Equation For Fixed  
Northern Desegregation Change

| Model<br>Variables                    | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b    | Beta | t-ratio |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|------|------|---------|
| Fed. Aid P/P                          |                     | .30     | .03  | .29  | 3.32    |
|                                       | .09                 |         |      |      |         |
| Indep. EPA                            |                     | -.18    | -.30 | -.16 | 1.95    |
|                                       | .03                 |         |      |      |         |
| Unemployment Diff.                    |                     | .27     | .12  | .25  | 2.99    |
|                                       | .07                 |         |      |      |         |
| ADP Activity                          |                     | -.13    | -.04 | -.12 | 1.42    |
|                                       | .02                 |         |      |      |         |
| Board Insulation                      |                     | -.20    | -.17 | -.18 | 2.16    |
| %Blk Enrol                            |                     | .26     | .01  | .24  | 2.93    |
|                                       | .10                 |         |      |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate        |                     |         |      |      | .80     |
| Per Cent Explained Variance ( $R^2$ ) |                     |         |      |      | 26.90   |

Regression Equation For 1968 Flexible  
Northern Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Housing Involvement                           | .02                 | -.14    | -5.06 | -.10 | 1.42    |
| State Respons.                                |                     | .33     | 5.02  | .24  | 3.61    |
| El. Structure                                 |                     | -.20    | -0.28 | -.16 | 2.10    |
| Indep. EPA                                    |                     | .17     | 5.16  | .13  | 1.75    |
| Affluence                                     |                     | .12     | 4.10  | .11  | 1.20    |
| Density Change                                | .14                 | .16     | 0.01  | .10  | 1.63    |
| City Blk(Nlog)                                |                     | .06     | 1.03  | .07  | .66     |
| Mobility Diff.                                |                     | .00     | 0.01  | .00  | .03     |
| Education Diff.                               |                     | -.26    | -4.33 | -.18 | 2.72    |
| Mayor Term                                    | .09                 | -.01    | -0.17 | -.01 | .13     |
| Council Overl.                                |                     | .08     | 2.36  | .06  | .79     |
| Fluoridation                                  |                     | -.10    | -3.02 | -.06 | .98     |
| Turnout                                       |                     | .07     | 0.08  | .06  | .71     |
| Ave. Size Schl.                               | .02                 | .07     | 0.01  | .05  | .74     |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                               |                     | -.47    | -9.52 | -.64 | 5.49    |
| %Nonblk Min.                                  |                     | .24     | 0.52  | .22  | 2.55    |
|                                               | .25                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |       |      | 12.36   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |       |      | 66.50   |

Regression Equation For 1972 Flexible  
Northern Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Fed. Aid P/P                                  |                     | 0.56    | .27   | .27  | 3.51    |
|                                               | .10                 |         |       |      |         |
| State Respons.                                |                     | .36     | 4.48  | .24  | 3.94    |
| Affluence                                     |                     | .42     | 10.80 | .32  | 4.86    |
|                                               | .12                 |         |       |      |         |
| Mobility Change                               |                     | .16     | 8.77  | .10  | 1.64    |
| City Blk(Nlog)                                |                     | .12     | 1.73  | .14  | 1.21    |
| Education Diff.                               |                     | -.33    | -6.64 | -.32 | 3.67    |
| Poverty Diff.                                 |                     | .22     | 0.59  | .16  | 2.37    |
|                                               | .13                 |         |       |      |         |
| Mayor Term                                    |                     | .07     | 0.71  | .04  | .69     |
| Fluoridation                                  |                     | -.11    | -3.09 | -.07 | 1.10    |
|                                               | .02                 |         |       |      |         |
| City-Run Schl.                                |                     | .04     | 1.21  | .03  | .46     |
| Board Insulation                              |                     | .12     | 1.62  | .09  | 1.26    |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                               |                     | -.53    | -9.67 | -.74 | 6.45    |
| Blk Enrol Change                              |                     | -.34    | -5.00 | -.25 | 3.72    |
|                                               | .32                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |       |      | 10.86   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |       |      | 65.70   |

Regression Equation For Flexible  
Northern Desegregation Change

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b    | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                              |                     | .25     | .06  | .26  | 2.74    |
| Housing Involvement                           |                     | .20     | .13  | .23  | 2.12    |
| Housing Activity                              |                     | -.07    | .00  | -.10 | .77     |
|                                               | .11                 |         |      |      |         |
| El. Structure                                 |                     | .20     | .00  | .18  | 2.17    |
| Indep. EPA                                    |                     | -.06    | -.03 | -.06 | .59     |
|                                               | .04                 |         |      |      |         |
| Unemployment                                  |                     | -.11    | -.01 | -.11 | 1.12    |
| Suburb. Exploit.                              |                     | -.11    | .00  | -.12 | 1.13    |
|                                               | .02                 |         |      |      |         |
| Mayor Turnover                                |                     | .07     | .01  | .06  | .70     |
| Turnout                                       |                     | -.13    | -.00 | -.15 | 1.42    |
|                                               | .03                 |         |      |      |         |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                               |                     | .13     | .03  | .16  | 1.33    |
| %Blk Enrol                                    |                     | -.09    | -.01 | -.12 | .91     |
|                                               | .02                 |         |      |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |      |      | .19     |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |      |      | 26.90   |

Regression Equation For 1968 Fixed Southern  
And Border Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                    | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b      | Beta | t-ratio |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                      |                     | -.41    | -4.93  | -.25 | 3.47    |
| Housing Involvement                   |                     | -.01    | -0.51  | -.01 | .09     |
|                                       | .17                 |         |        |      |         |
| Political Culture                     |                     | .24     | 6.61   | .17  | 1.91    |
| Indust. Change                        |                     | -.15    | -10.94 | -.08 | 1.14    |
| State Blk(Nlog)                       |                     | .06     | 2.07   | .06  | .48     |
|                                       | .09                 |         |        |      |         |
| Density                               |                     | .17     | 0.00   | .12  | 1.35    |
| Density Change                        |                     | -.01    | 0.00   | -.01 | .08     |
| Population Change                     |                     | .33     | 0.15   | .17  | 2.65    |
| Blk Mobility Change                   |                     | -.03    | -1.45  | -.02 | .23     |
| Mobility Diff.                        |                     | .07     | 0.16   | .03  | .51     |
| Low Education                         |                     | -.22    | -0.88  | -.13 | 1.76    |
| Elite Presence                        |                     | .13     | 1.11   | .06  | 1.01    |
|                                       | .25                 |         |        |      |         |
| Reformism                             |                     | .07     | 1.59   | .05  | .55     |
| Mayor Term                            |                     | .12     | 1.74   | .07  | .92     |
| ADP Innovation                        |                     | .04     | .09    | .02  | .27     |
| ADP Activity                          |                     | -.34    | -2.11  | -.21 | 2.78    |
| Fluoridation                          |                     | -.16    | -3.77  | -.07 | 1.27    |
| AIP Support                           |                     | -.42    | -0.75  | -.42 | 3.53    |
|                                       | .22                 |         |        |      |         |
| Board Insulation                      |                     | .53     | 13.66  | .43  | 4.83    |
| Private Enrol                         |                     | .33     | 0.69   | .20  | 2.64    |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                       |                     | -.32    | -0.33  | -.22 | 2.58    |
|                                       | .59                 |         |        |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate        |                     |         |        |      | 10.61   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance ( $R^2$ ) |                     |         |        |      | 88.60   |



Regression Equation For 1972 Fixed Southern  
And Border Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b      | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| Fed. Aid P/P                                  |                     | .18     | 0.17   | .16  | 1.52    |
|                                               | .03                 |         |        |      |         |
| El. Structure                                 |                     | .20     | 0.39   | .22  | 1.67    |
| Indust. Change                                |                     | -.24    | -45.02 | -.28 | 2.05    |
| State Blk(Nlog)                               |                     | -.19    | -8.26  | -.19 | 1.60    |
|                                               | .10                 |         |        |      |         |
| Population Change                             |                     | .09     | 0.08   | .08  | .76     |
| City Blk(Nlog)                                |                     | .03     | 1.33   | .05  | .28     |
|                                               | .01                 |         |        |      |         |
| ADP Innovation                                |                     | -.21    | -0.99  | -.25 | 1.82    |
| Fluoridation                                  |                     | .12     | 6.68   | .11  | 1.02    |
|                                               | .05                 |         |        |      |         |
| City-Run Schl.                                |                     | .01     | 1.05   | .02  | .11     |
| Ave. Size Schl.                               |                     | -.19    | -0.04  | -.21 | 1.64    |
| % Blk Enrol                                   |                     | -.20    | -0.48  | -.28 | 1.68    |
|                                               | .08                 |         |        |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |        |      | 24.87   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |        |      | 45.30   |

Regression Equation For Fixed Southern And  
Border Desegregation Change

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                              |                     | .24     | 0.72  | .25  | 1.97    |
|                                               | .06                 |         |       |      |         |
| El. Structure                                 |                     | -.08    | -0.02 | -.09 | .64     |
| Political Culture                             |                     | -.01    | -0.04 | -.01 | .04     |
| Indust. Change                                |                     | .29     | 6.66  | .32  | 2.43    |
| Affluence Change                              |                     | -.01    | -2.19 | -.08 | .77     |
| State Blk(Nlog)                               |                     | .04     | 0.25  | .05  | .34     |
|                                               | .10                 |         |       |      |         |
| Ethnicity                                     |                     | -.06    | -0.04 | -.07 | .48     |
| City Blk(Nlog)                                |                     | .05     | 0.17  | .05  | .38     |
| Blk Mobility Change                           |                     | -.31    | -4.02 | -.38 | 2.60    |
| Mobility Diff.                                |                     | .18     | 0.13  | .16  | 1.44    |
| Low Education                                 |                     | .35     | 0.33  | .32  | 2.94    |
| MPO Change                                    |                     | .25     | 0.92  | .25  | 2.01    |
|                                               | .17                 |         |       |      |         |
| Appointed Mayor                               |                     | .06     | 0.38  | .04  | .44     |
| AIP Support                                   |                     | -.02    | -0.01 | -.01 | .18     |
| Republicanism                                 |                     | .27     | 0.13  | .23  | 2.19    |
|                                               | .08                 |         |       |      |         |
| City-Run Schl.                                |                     | -.12    | -1.05 | -.12 | .93     |
| Private Enrol                                 |                     | -.23    | -0.12 | -.24 | 1.85    |
| %Blk Enrol                                    |                     | .24     | 0.07  | .30  | 1.98    |
|                                               | .10                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |       |      | 2.98    |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |       |      | 56.70   |

Regression Equation For 1968 Flexible Southern  
And Border Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                    | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b      | Beta | t-ratio |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|--------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                      | .03                 | -.19    | -2.81  | -.15 | 1.46    |
| El. Structure                         |                     | .05     | 0.06   | .04  | .36     |
| Political Culture                     |                     | -.03    | -1.26  | -.03 | .24     |
| Indust. Change                        | .04                 | -.15    | -16.50 | -.13 | 1.19    |
| State Blk(Nlog)                       |                     | .04     | 1.36   | .04  | .30     |
| Fed. Aid Change                       |                     | -.04    | -0.71  | -.03 | .27     |
| Density                               |                     | -.02    | .00    | -.01 | .12     |
| Ethnicity                             |                     | .12     | .56    | .16  | .93     |
| Mobility Change                       | .05                 | .02     | 1.49   | .01  | .13     |
| Age                                   |                     | -.13    | -0.79  | -.12 | .99     |
| Blk Mobility Change                   |                     | .16     | 8.71   | .13  | 1.25    |
| Mobility Diff.                        |                     | -.16    | -0.59  | -.11 | 1.22    |
| Low Education                         |                     | -.13    | -0.73  | -.11 | 1.03    |
| Housing Innovation                    | .13                 | .07     | 0.15   | .05  | .53     |
| Fluoridation                          |                     | -.13    | -5.41  | -.08 | .97     |
| Turnout                               |                     | .23     | 0.47   | .21  | 1.79    |
| AIP Support                           |                     | -.26    | -0.51  | -.30 | 2.05    |
| Republicanism                         |                     | -.19    | -0.47  | -.14 | 1.48    |
| City-Run Schl.                        | .23                 | .07     | 2.82   | .05  | .51     |
| Private Enrol.                        |                     | -.01    | -0.02  | -.01 | .06     |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                       |                     | -.46    | -8.68  | -.43 | 3.98    |
| %Blk Enrol                            |                     | .07     | 0.22   | .09  | .55     |
| Standard Error of The Estimate        |                     |         |        |      | 15.11   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance ( $R^2$ ) |                     |         |        |      | 74.10   |

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Regression Equation For 1972 Flexible Southern  
And Border Desegregation

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Housing Involvement                           |                     | .18     | 13.64 | .23  | 1.54    |
|                                               | .03                 |         |       |      |         |
| Indust. Change                                |                     | -.06    | -5.24 | -.06 | .49     |
|                                               | .00                 |         |       |      |         |
| City Blk(Nlog)                                |                     | -.14    | -3.71 | -.26 | 1.14    |
| Mobility Diff.                                |                     | .09     | 0.27  | .07  | .73     |
|                                               | .03                 |         |       |      |         |
| Reformism                                     |                     | .31     | 8.15  | .40  | 2.75    |
| Mayor Veto                                    |                     | .27     | 10.94 | .26  | 2.31    |
| Housing Innovation                            |                     | .20     | 0.55  | .29  | 2.31    |
| Urban Renewal Involv.                         |                     | .16     | 0.44  | .13  | 1.30    |
| Fluoridation                                  |                     | .16     | 4.40  | .12  | 1.38    |
|                                               | .13                 |         |       |      |         |
| County District                               |                     | .17     | 5.51  | .15  | 1.39    |
| Private Enrol                                 |                     | -.09    | -0.17 | -.07 | .77     |
| Blk Enrol(Nlog)                               |                     | -.08    | -2.11 | -.15 | .64     |
|                                               | .04                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |       |      | 13.32   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |       |      | 53.60   |

Regression Equation For Flexible Southern  
And Border Desegregation Change

| Model<br>Variables                            | Multiple<br>Partial | Partial | b     | Beta | t-ratio |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------|------|---------|
| Fed. Penetration                              |                     | .14     | 1.59  | .14  | 1.18    |
|                                               | .03                 |         |       |      |         |
| El. Structure                                 |                     | -.07    | 0.08  | -.09 | .57     |
| Indust. Change                                |                     | .18     | 18.77 | .23  | 1.46    |
| Fed. Aid Change                               |                     | .20     | 3.40  | .24  | 1.63    |
|                                               | .13                 |         |       |      |         |
| Ethnicity                                     |                     | .09     | 0.24  | .11  | .76     |
| Blk Mobility Change                           |                     | -.23    | -8.89 | -.21 | 1.90    |
| Low Education                                 |                     | .21     | 0.78  | .19  | 1.74    |
|                                               | .10                 |         |       |      |         |
| Turnout                                       |                     | -.25    | -0.45 | -.33 | 2.15    |
|                                               | .08                 |         |       |      |         |
| City-Run Schl.                                |                     | -.06    | -2.65 | -.08 | .48     |
| Board Insulation                              |                     | .15     | 3.20  | .17  | 1.27    |
| Ave Size Schl.                                |                     | -.10    | -0.01 | -.11 | .78     |
| Private Enrol                                 |                     | -.04    | -0.11 | -.05 | .33     |
| Private Change                                |                     | .12     | 3.57  | .11  | 1.00    |
| %Blk Enrol                                    |                     | .19     | 0.20  | .23  | 1.58    |
|                                               | .09                 |         |       |      |         |
| Standard Error of The Estimate                |                     |         |       |      | 13.60   |
| Per Cent Explained Variance (R <sup>2</sup> ) |                     |         |       |      | 38.00   |

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