INFORMATION TO USERS

This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again – beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

A Xerox Education Company

Downloaded from SHAREOK. Persistent Handle URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11244/3307

72-23,102

MARKMAN, Robert Paul, 1938-
THE ARKANSAS CHEROKEES: 1817-1828.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1972
History, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1972

ROBERT PAUL MARKMAN

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE ARKANSAS CHEROKEES: 1817-1828

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

ROBERT PAUL MARKMAN

Norman, Oklahoma

1972

THE ARKANSAS CHEROKEES: 1817-1828

APPROVED BY

Lowell D. Burkett

Sidney D. Brown

Norman L. Crockett

Rufus G. Hall

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS		iv
MAP		vi
INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter		
I.	PERIOD OF TRANSITION	4
II.	THE ARKANSAS BRANCH	24
III.	NEGOTIATING A HOME	59
IV.	THE ARKANSAS SETTLEMENT	107
V.	BORDER WAR	131
VI.	DEFENDING PARADISE	146
VII.	PARADISE LOST	182
BIBLIOGRAPHY		196

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Researching the Arkansas Cherokees provided the opportunity to work in several regional collections. The following people greatly facilitated my investigation: Jack Dan Haley, Western History Collection, Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma; Mrs. Alice Timmons, Phillips Collection, Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma; Mrs. Rella Looney, Oklahoma State Historical Society, Oklahoma City; Mrs. Marie Keene, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Russell P. Baker, Assistant Director, Arkansas Historical Commission, Old State House, Little Rock, Arkansas; and Mrs. E. A. Stadler, Archives, Missouri Historical Society, Jefferson Memorial, St. Louis, Missouri.

I am especially indebted to my chairman, Dr. A. M. Gibson, who supplied time, direction and encouragement when they were most needed. Sincere gratitude is extended to the members of my committee, Dr. Sidney Brown, Dr. Russell Buhite, Dr. Norman L. Crocker, and Dr. Rufus G. Hall, Jr., for helping me finish this project.

I deeply appreciate the unstinting work of Mrs. Karen Schafer, who typed and helped proofread this paper.

My wife, Joyce, deserves special recognition for mixing understanding and hours of hard work with gentle threats of bodily violence to assure a completed work.

TERRITORY ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED
TO THE
CHEROKEE "NATION OF" INDIANS



VI

INTRODUCTION

Recently historians have been striking at the cliches concerning Indian removals from the East. The old image of the 'Trail of Tears' portrayed the cruel United States army driving the unfrotunate Cherokees from Georgia. Indeed, such events occurred in the 1830's, when the Eastern Nation was forcibly relocated in Oklahoma. New studies, however, have tempered that picture. Fragments from the East voluntarily crossed the Mississippi prior to the 1830's, in contrast to those who preferred to occupy ancestral lands rather than cultivate a wilderness tract.

Thomas Jefferson instituted land exchanges and removals in 1803. Federal authorities then used bribes, cajolery, and intratribal rivalries to encourage removal to the West. Among those accepting the offers as a realistic means to protect their traditions, certain Cherokees in Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama colonized the Arkansas valley. Others followed to strengthen their hold on the undeveloped frontier. In 1817, the James Monroe administration negotiated a treaty which formally ceded land to the Arkansas Cherokees and, as a result, more emigrants crossed the Mississippi. Unfortunately, their claim on the land was

tenuous. Within a decade the Arkansas Cherokees were the unwilling participants in another removal to Oklahoma.

The Arkansas Cherokee colony developed an erratic pattern. Although early migration was voluntary, fears that the hunting and religious traditions would be lost through assimilation sparked conservative elements to remove. An early refugee, Tolontuskee, envisioned his people living on an Indian reserve free from the pressures of Anglo-American settlement. Federal officials encouraged him believing other Cherokees would join his people.

Although Tolontuskee's dream had become a reality when the negotiations were completed, the Cherokees West found the federal government unwilling to fulfill treaty provisions. Nevertheless, in 1818, Monroe promised Tolontuskee a permanent outlet to the West as a bridge to hunting grounds on the plains. John Jolly, Tolontuskee's successor, tried vainly to implement the President's words.

The growth of the white community in Arkansas menaced Cherokee designs on the rich lands of eastern Oklahoma. Their ability to influence Congress expanded, and they challenged the Cherokee rights to land in western Arkansas as far as the Verdigris River. Finally, in 1828, the government, under fire from both Indian and white interests, determined to force another removal which would relocate the Western Cherokees outside the limits of Arkansas. A compromise settlement secured eastern Oklahoma for the

Cherokees, but cost the tribe its original grant in Arkansas.

For those who believe that earlier removals did not produce the violence of the 'Trail of Tears,' the experience of the Arkansas Cherokees provides counter-evidence of a different type of hardship. Federal authorities acted irresponsibly. They failed to fulfill treaty commitments, evaded payment of annuities and allowed warfare on the Indian frontier which prevented the Western Cherokees from achieving their goal, establishment of a new Indian Nation in the western wilderness. Eventually federal officials bowed to the will of the white settlers and forced the Western Cherokees to move from Arkansas farther west onto the prairies which became Indian Territory.

THE ARKANSAS CHEROKEES: 1817-1828

CHAPTER I

A PERIOD OF TRANSITION

For years the Cherokees living in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama had been attracted by the trans-Mississippi West. Following the American Revolution they hunted on land occupied first by Spain, then by France, and after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, by the United States. Starting with a trickle in the 1780's, more and more Cherokees migrated to present-day Arkansas. Some reacted negatively to a series of treaties dating from the Revolution, agreements which periodically deprived the tribe of its holdings through cessions to the United States. Others left because hunting in the West was better. Whatever the reason, by 1820, nearly one-third of the total Cherokee population of 13,000 had settled in the new territory.[1]

---

[1] For material on the early cessions see Thurman Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Story of the Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 11; also Charles Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, in John Wesley Powell, Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1883-84 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1887), p. 150. Hereafter cited as Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians.

The most adamant opponents to early treaties ceding land, the Chickamaugas, lived in northwestern Georgia and the adjacent regions of Alabama and Tennessee in the Lower Towns. More warlike than their brethren to the north, they led in migrating to the West. In the meantime the Spanish, anxious to block United States' expansion, encouraged Cherokee involvement with their intrigues in the Old Southwest prior to Pinckney's Treaty.[2] Since the Chickamaugas intermittently warred with the United States after the Revolution, the conspiratorial Spanish met some success.[3] Unfortunately for the alliance in the early 1790's, frontier militia stunned the Chickamauga villages in retaliation for raids on American settlements.[4] The Anglo-Americans

---

[2]Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 203; also Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 29.

[3]Log of His Majesty's Galiot, La Fleche, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1945. Volume III (Part II), Spain in the Mississippi Valley: Post War Decade, 1782-1791), edited by Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946), 118. Hereafter cited as Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, III. Ibid., Volume IV (Part III), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-1794, edited by Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O, 1946), xiii. Hereafter cited as Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV. See also Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), p. 35.

[4]John Haywood, The Civil and Political History of the State of Tennessee From Its Earliest Settlement Up to the Year 1796 . . . (Nashville, Tenn.: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1891), pp. 273-279; also American State Papers: Documents Legislative and

defeated the Indians and the help promised by the Spanish did not materialize.[5]

With that turn of events some Chickamauga leaders took a new stance to prove their loyalty to the United States.[6] Others, influenced by Spanish agent John McDonald, decided, in 1794, to move west of the Mississippi. An estimated two to three hundred Cherokees were in his group.[7] They had to decide their loyalty because in November of that year the Cherokees signed a peace with the United States that terminated the wars of the previous decade. An era of opposition had ended.

The Treaty of 1794 was not a panacea. First, increased numbers of whites settled on Chickamauga lands. Second, the treaties between the United States and the Cherokees between 1795 and 1800 provided additional

---

Executive, of the Congress of the United States, . . . Commencing March 3, 1789 & Ending March 3, 1815, IV, selected and edited by Walter Lourie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Indian Affairs, II, Class II (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832), 276, 280. Hereafter cited as American State Papers, Indian Affairs.

[5]Baron de Carondelet to Gayoso de Lemos, June 17, 1793, Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV, Part III, 175-176; also Enrique White to Carondelet, July 10, 1793; ibid., 191.

[6]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 532; also Blount to Secretary of War, November 10, 1794, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. & ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume IV: The Territory South of the River Ohio, 1790-1796 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1936), 365. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, IV.

[7]Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV, Part III, 334, 344.

cessions despite promises by American negotiators that no more land would be taken.[8] In such an atmosphere dissatisfied members of the Lower Towns looked westward for an escape from the growing pressure on their domain. For the Chickamaugas the decade of the 1790's became a period of transition.

The Cherokees asked for and received permission from Spanish Governor Estevan Miro to settle in the West as early as May, 1792.[9] Many had fled to the Spanish settlement at New Madrid north of the St. Francis River during the fighting with frontier militia.[10] In April, 1794, Cherokee leaders counciled there with the Shawnees and other northern tribes to discuss western settlement and to examine the surrounding country.[11]

One of the significant events in turning the attention of the Lower Cherokee Nation to Arkansas occurred in June, 1794. A party of westward moving Anglo-Americans,

---

[8]Emmet Starr, Early History of the Cherokees Embracing Aboriginal Customs, Religion, Laws, Folk Lore, and Civilization (n.p., 1917), p. 43. Hereafter cited as Starr, Early History of the Cherokees. Also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 324; see also Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 184.

[9]Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 116.

[10]Tomas Portell to Carondelet, Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV, Part III, 247.

[11]Louis Houck (ed.), The Spanish Regime in Missouri: A Collection of Papers and Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana . . . , II (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1909), 84-86.

led by William Scott, James Pettigrew, and John Pettigrew, poled rafts down the Tennessee River. At Muscle Shoals they encountered a Cherokee party. The Indians went aboard and traded for goods including whiskey. After some exchanges the Chickamauga leader, The Bowl, believing that his men had been cheated, complained to the pioneers but got no satisfaction. Bowl went ashore and Scott's crew decided to resume the journey. They attacked three Cherokees still on deck, killing one with a boat pole and provoking the Indians on shore to fire at the rafts. All the white men were slain but the women and children were spared. The Indians plundered the boats taking the slaves and the livestock. The Bowl knew this action would be deplored by tribal officials because of the recent treaty with the United States.

The Bowl also realized that the United States would expect an accounting for this incident. Therefore, his followers and their families fled down the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers, crossed the Mississippi, and entered the St. Francis valley in northeastern Arkansas. In the meantime the surviving whites floated to New Orleans where they reported the "Mussel Shoals massacre" to authorities. The Cherokees had left four "faithful black men" with them to travel down river.

News of the incident at Muscle Shoals came at a time when the Cherokees had just embarked on an era of peace and,

as expected, the Cherokee Council condemned the attack and refused to assume any responsibility for The Bowl's action. The Bowl's band, now renegades, found life in the new country pleasing. Game abounded and there were no American settlers.[12] Afterward, small bands of Cherokees migrated to Arkansas. Those near the mouth of the Ohio River also joined their brothers on the St. Francis River. In contrast to later tribal movements the first Cherokee migration entered Arkansas without any government encouragement.[13]

Following the Louisiana Purchase Thomas Jefferson consciously developed a policy to colonize eastern Indians

---

[12]Cephas Washburn, "Reminiscence of the Cherokees," in Emmet Starr, Cherokees "West": 1794-1839 (Claremore, Okla.: n.p., 1910), pp. 19-22. Hereafter cited as Starr, Cherokees West. Also James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokees, in J. W. Powell, Nineteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1897-98, Part I (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1900), p. 76. Hereafter cited as Mooney, Myths of the Cherokees. See also Mary Whatley Clarke, Chief Bowles and the Texas Cherokees (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), pp. 9-12. In contrast to the above account when the white claimants petitioned for government compensation their story differed from that of the Cherokees and a sympathetic Cephas Washburn. The survivors reported to Congress that the Scott party had "goods and chattel to the value of more than one thousand dollars. . . ." The settlers said the attack occurred on June 9, 1794, and charged, with some exaggeration, that the Cherokees killed "all the white people of the family" and stole the slaves and property. U.S., Annals of the Congress of the United States, 11th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1810, p. 1538; also Cherokee Chiefs to Meigs, November 21, 1811, National Archives, War Department, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties. Hereafter cited as Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties.

[13]Cherokee Chiefs to Joseph McMinn, July 23, 1818, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties.

west of the Mississippi. Anticipating the purchase in a January, 1803, message to Congress, the President secretly proposed an exchange of land with the Indians living east of the Mississippi for territory in the newly acquired West. He considered removal as a means to end friction in the old Southwest. As a suggested alternative, however, the government also tried to convert the Indians from hunters to farmers.[14] The President failed to obtain formal congressional approval for Indian colonization, but the Committee on Public Lands reported favorably on funds for an exchange.[15] In March, Congress formed the purchase into two territories, Upper and Lower Louisiana, and appropriated $15,000 to facilitate removals and exchanges.[16]

The Cherokee agent, Return Meigs, stressed the importance of a trade factory west of the Mississippi not only to serve the Cherokees who had previously migrated but also as an inducement to draw more from the East. He thought it might be possible "to effect a removal of the greatest part of the nation within a few years" and announced that he had found support within the Nation. Meigs sought

---

[14]U.S., Annals of the Congress of the United States, 7th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1803, p. 23.

[15]Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 215; also Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 12.

[16]Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 202; also United States Statutes at Large, II, Part XV (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1875-1919), 245.

approval to continue working on the project.[17]

Evidently, it was no secret to the frontiersmen what the government had in mind. They favored immediate action. Meigs, answering a query about a removal from a Colonel Ballenger in charge of relocating white intruders from Cherokee lands, told him he had not yet received instructions. The prospective removal policy appealed to squatters and land speculators who had an eye on the Cherokee reserves.[18]

The notion of an exchange found favor among Chickamauga elements, too, as expanding white settlement decreased the size of their hunting grounds in the East. They realized their holdings were less valuable for game than they had been in the past. In addition Meigs encouraged some Chickamauga leaders to join him and follow a course set by the government, which meant cessions. As a reward for support from certain tribal leaders, federal authorities granted special considerations. The recipients of gifts included James Vann, Doublehead, and Tolontuskee, among others. The first two were assassinated before 1809, but Tolontuskee later emerged as the first statesman of the emigrant

---

[17]Smith and Meigs to Secretary of War, June 23, 1804, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian Affairs, Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Deeds, 1803-1804. Hereafter cited as Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, C.M.D.

[18]Ibid., July 15, 1804.

Cherokees in Arkansas.[19]

Tolontuskee was a valuable ally for the federal government. Originally an opponent of cessions to the United States, he converted to Meigs' position in late 1804, in return for special favors.[20] In the course of his changeover Meigs recognized him as one of the important chiefs among the Cherokees.[21] By white standards he was dishonest, "void of every principle of honesty . . . ," but he had added to his own prestige and wealth by his realignment.[22]

During the negotiations in January, 1806, reservations for a few Indians had been provided in return for new cessions which split the Nation. Following the agreement more settlers entered Cherokee country with the

---

[19]Dearborn to Meigs, May 30, 1803, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs. Hereafter cited as Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs. Also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 657; see Cap'n Smith to Meigs, December 28, 1803, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records; also ibid., Byers to Meigs, August 4, 1805; see Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, pp. 191-193. The spelling of many Indian names is varied and Tolontuskee is no exception. Among the forms are Tolunteeskee, Talluntuskee, and Toluntuskee. See Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 67n.

[20]"Tollostiskee" statement, October 19, 1804, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties Ratified.

[21]Meigs to General Daniel Smith, April 25, 1805, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, C.M.D.

[22]Ibid., Cap'n Smith to Meigs, December 28, 1803.

mistaken idea that additional acreage had been opened. Thus, the men who were connected with the treaty, in particular those to whom Meigs had given special treatment, were under fire from the Upper Towns of the Cherokee Nation.[23]

Tolontuskee and Doublehead especially encountered criticism. Rumors circulated that Tolontuskee had sold his reservation to whites. In self-defense he explained: ". . . it is mine yet & I mean to keep it. . . ."[24] Nevertheless, his reputation declined and he felt pressure from the anti-cession wing of the tribe. At that time he showed no inclination to emigrate to Arkansas.

The lodestone to turn westward emerged when the Spanish charged that the "treacherous Osage . . . wage the most cruel war upon us in this region as well as upon our Indian allies."[25] This threat served as a rationalization for Cherokee warriors to cross into Arkansas. In the 1790's

---

[23]Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 159; also Charles Royce (comp.), Indian Land Cessions in the United States in John Wesley Powell, 18th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute; 1896-97, Part II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1899), p. 672.

[24]Tollontuskee to Meigs, April 16, 1806, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[25]Luis de Blanc to Baron de Carondelet, February 18, 1792, Kinraird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV, Part III, 10.

Baron Francois Hector de Carondelet recognized their menacing pressure when he suspended trade with them. He added that Spanish citizens could kill with impunity any Osages they met. He even considered raising an Indian army to pit against them. At that time, however, the Cherokees did not take part in the war on the Osages.[26] One attack by the Spanish-supported confederation of western Indians, principally Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, occurred in 1800 and "filled . . . the Osages with such terror and such fear that few have dared to leave their homes. . . ."[27] In the following years battles with them continued, but the role of the Cherokees remained limited despite their common usage of hunting grounds in the Arkansas and White River valleys.[28]

By 1800, the Osages had broken into the Great and Little Osage bands. The latter numbering around 1,200 warriors, kept the western Louisiana boundary in turmoil with their forays.[29] After the Louisiana Purchase Spanish

---

[26]"Agreement of Arkansas Traders to Fight the Osage," ibid., IV, Part III, 145-148; see Carondelet to Zenon Trudeau, ibid., IV, Part III, 155.

[27]Auguste Chouteau to Gayoso, April 17, 1799, Folder 1798 thru 1799, Pierre Chouteau Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Pierre Chouteau Papers.

[28]Mooney, Myths of the Cherokees, Part 1, p. 390; also Manuel de Salcedo to Don Carlos Delassus, August 27, 1801, Folder 1801, Pierre Chouteau Papers.

[29]Kinnaird (ed.), Spain in the Mississippi Valley, IV, Part III, xx.

rule ended and the United States assumed the responsibility for dealing with them. The change at first favored the Osages as Jefferson guaranteed that their tribal lands in Louisiana would not be taken away unless "voluntarily" sold.[30] Shortly thereafter, federal officials heard that the Arkansas Cherokees planned a war against the Osages. Meigs advised the eastern part of the Nation not to take part.[31] Had his orders been followed the grief of future Cherokee-Osage wars might have been avoided, but that was not to be. In March, 1805, a Cherokee party returned to the Cherokee Agency with three Osage scalps, avenging an earlier killing of two Cherokees by the Osages.[32]

Generally, Indians used guerilla tactics to retaliate for the murder of a member of their tribe. Although great numbers of warriors could have been brought to bear and large scale confrontations could have occurred, the Cherokees and Osages preferred small parties in which destruction of property and horse-stealing were more significant than pitched battles. Each tribe protected its prestige by never allowing an opposition act to go unchallenged. Under those circumstances intermittent but limited

---

[30] Dearborn to Osage Chiefs & Warriors, July 18, 1804, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[31] John Thompson to Meigs, January 2, 1805, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, C.M.D.

[32] Ibid., Hicks to Meigs, March 31, 1805.

war continued into the 1820's between these two antagonists and their allies. More often than not the American government did nothing to abate this battling.

Hunters from the Cherokee Nation in the East crossed the Mississippi River, joined their Western brothers, and trespassed on Osage hunting grounds which led to more conflict.[33] The Western Cherokees grew more numerous and broadened their economic activities, although hunting continued to occupy a good part of their time.[34] Traders from St. Louis and other river towns recognized the economic potential of the St. Francis area and bartered goods to the Cherokees for skins and furs.[35]

The government, encouraged by the success of the Western Cherokees, prepared to remove more eastern Indians. To accomplish this, federal officials first had to extinguish Osage title to vast tracts of western territory. The Osages had been weakened by incessant conflict with the

---

[33] Ibid., Black Fox to Meigs, October 23, 1806.

[34] John Treat to Dearborn, April 1807, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Superintendent of Indian Trade, Letter Book of the Arkansas Trading Post, 1805-1810. Hereafter cited as Letter Book of the Arkansas Trading Post. Also Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 33.

[35] Trade licenses granted by Meriwether Lewis, April 1 to September 30, 1808, Folder 1800-1814, Indian Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Indian Papers. Also James McFarlane to Meriwether Lewis, December 11, 1808, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIV: The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 268.

Cherokees and their allies during the period 1805-1808.

Encouragingly for the Cherokees, the federal government considered recent events as a means to secure an Osage cession. During November, 1808, when Osage representatives visited William Clark, federal Indian superintendent at St. Louis, they signed a treaty by which they surrendered 50,000 square miles of territory between the Arkansas River and the Mississippi River embracing parts of Arkansas and Missouri. In return the tribe received $1,100, which was split between the Great and Little Osages with $100 subtracted as a direct payment to the chiefs. Hardly an Osage victory in statesmanship or economic terms, it established the Western Cherokees in a better territorial position.[36]

During the next year Osages living on the Verdigris River, Clermont's band, also approved the agreement which secured land that would be offered to the Eastern Cherokees as an inducement to emigrate in 1808. Not surprisingly, Missouri territorial Governor Meriwether Lewis attributed John Treat's withholding of merchandise at the Arkansas Trading Post as most significant in gaining the Osage territory.[37]

---

[36]William Clark to Dearborn, September 23, 1808, Folder 1807-1810, William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Clark Papers.

[37]Harriette Johnson Westbrook, "The Chouteaus: Their contributions to the History of the West, Part II. Diplomatic and Social Relationships of the Chouteaus," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XI, No. 3 (September, 1933), 951; also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 766; also

The federal government pushed removal as never before. In 1807, renewed unrest had spread throughout the Cherokee Nation. Friction within the tribe between elements responsible for cessions of eastern lands and those opposed to them led to the assassination of Doublehead, considered by many as the principal culprit in violating a Cherokee law that provided the death penalty for anyone selling Cherokee lands.

The killing deprived Meigs of an ally but he still retained the support of Black Fox and other leaders in the Lower Towns. Meigs had gained a measure of satisfaction that the Cherokees were improving themselves when he reported that some mixed bloods in the Nation had turned to farming and husbandry. Noting that a few had collected property, which he considered to be a sign of growing civilization, he predicted assimilation because of intermarriage, which would cause the Indians to disappear and the remaining people to be integrated into Cherokee communities.[38]

Meigs' optimism was premature. Doublehead's murder characterized the growing dissatisfaction with the government party in the Nation. It also reflected the differences

---

John Hugh Reynolds, Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association, II (Fayetteville, Ark.: Arkansas Historical Association, 1906), 214.

[38]Meigs to Secretary of War, August 4, 1805, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

between the jealous Upper Towns and the Chickamaugas; the latter had received Meigs' major attention since they had been the source of problems in the Nation in the 1790's. A few members of the Lower Towns had been amassing wealth, as proven by James Vann's purchase of the goods which comprised the Cherokee annuity in June, 1807.[39] In this tense atmosphere the government tried to purchase land to initiate a removal. Following his usual pattern Meigs lined up his remaining allies, to forge another cession treaty.

The approach did not succeed as it had with earlier treaties. Part of the Nation opposed his tactics. In August, 1807, Cherokee friends warned him that his reputation had fallen among some tribal elements, but he pushed forward anyway.[40] Meeting with a part of the Nation at Old Fields near Muscle Shoals, Meigs proposed another purchase which met widespread disapproval. His hopes received a blow when Vann, unpredictable but usually amenable to bribes, joined the party opposed to more land sales, diminishing the ranks of Meigs' friends.[41] The desired result was later achieved when a part of the Cherokees accepted

---

[39]Dearborn to Meigs, June 16, 1807, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[40]Colonel James Phillips to Meigs, August 15, 1807, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records. See also R. S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 158.

[41]As quoted by Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, p. 40.

the cession.[42] The new agreement, however, produced bad feeling, which partially contributed to the failure of tribal segments to remove in 1808 and 1809.

Meigs was torn between assimilation and preservation of tribal identity. Two constant problems harried him and seemed insoluble--horse-stealing by the Indians and intrusions by the whites. Both threatened his plans to lead the Indian into the white man's culture. "It is my opinion," he concluded painfully, "that there never will be quietness on any of these frontiers untill [sic] the Indians are removed over the Mississippi." He had no ties with groups who sought to speculate or to settle on the reservation. So he was moved by idealism and government policy, which proved disappointing. For one thing the goal to develop farming had fallen below his expectation. Recognizing that some of the successful or "well educated" Cherokees would "require reservations" in the East, he predicted that eventually even they would be drawn to the West.[43]

During the early spring of 1808, the government worked for the transfer. The Secretary of War told Meigs in preparing the Nation for a removal, "to use every

---

[42] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 754.

[43] Meigs to Dearborn, February 9, 1808, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

favorable occasion" to promote it.[44] That moved Meigs to initiate another council through Black Fox to cede lands north of the Tennessee River. He felt justified in suggesting an "exchange of land" be made and set it in the frame of a natural tribal development because the majority of Cherokees wanted to hunt. A few, he pointed out, had already crossed the Mississippi where the geography and settlement favored that way of life.[45]

As 1808 progressed into late spring and summer, Meigs campaigned for the move. He stressed that the government intended to give the tribe a Western domain that would combine the potential for hunting, "farming and domestic manufacture." After his failure to convert them to farming, he revealed the basis for his attitude:

> their /Indians/ existence as a distinct people depends on their migration. They must change their ground or their idle habits. . . . Labour is painfull /sic/, & in the idea of most of them dishonorable. The love of ease is their predominant passion.

His words found fertile ground as The Glass led a party to explore the western country.[46]

In keeping with his desire to maintain unity, Meigs specifically advised Black Fox that emigration by the tribe

---

[44] Dearborn to Meigs, March 25, 1808, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[45] Meigs to Black Fox, May 6, 1808, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[46] Ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War, June 3, 1808.

as a unit was a necessity because a division would only weaken their "character." Black Fox, with several others, agreed to relocate. The chief summed up the growing local problem for much of the tribe by saying simply 'our game had disappeared.'[47] Later, when the band split violently on the issue, Meigs' allies--Black Fox and The Glass, denied any part in approving an exchange. Instead, they left the impression that they had been tricked. Using tribal sentiment as a guide, they nimbly disclaimed ever having committed themselves to removal.[48]

While Meigs hoped to remove the entire tribe, the federal government was willing for removal to be piecemeal. Since the tribe already was divided into Eastern Cherokees and Western Cherokees, federal leaders opportunistically offered to sponsor emigration of those elements favoring Arkansas colonization. The chance to promote this occurred in mid-1808, when Cherokees in the Upper Towns launched a complaint to President Jefferson that they had not received their share of annuities and goods in comparison to the Lower Towns. In addition they wanted a permanent tribal

---

[47]Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, p. 43.

[48]U.S. Commissioners to George Graham, July 8, 1817, Andrew Jackson, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, May 1, 1814 to December 31, 1819, ed. by John Spencer Bassett, Papers of the Department of Historical Research, ed. by J. Franklin Jameson (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1927), 303. Hereafter cited as Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson.

division and a boundary line to separate them from the Lower Towns. The Upper Towns showed an interest in severalty, too. They asked for individual landholding with an option to seek citizenship.[49]

In January, 1809, Jefferson assured the agrarian-minded Upper Towns of his sympathy with their new aspirations. Not wanting to discourage the hunters of the Nation, he offered them an alternative. They could "reconnoitre . . . the Arkansas and White Rivers--and the higher up the better. . . ." If they "found a tract of country suiting" them, they could "exchange" equal amounts of land in the East for new acreages.[50] Thus, the President encouraged a tribal division by approving a Chickamauga exploration of the Trans-Mississippi West.

---

[49]Dearborn to Meigs, May 5, 1808, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; also Missouri Gazette, December 21, 1808.

[50]Jefferson to Cherokee Chiefs, January 9, 1809, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 125.

CHAPTER II

THE ARKANSAS BRANCH

The second phase of migration was underway. For those Cherokees who had moved, the period from 1809 to 1817 was especially difficult. Their familiarity with western lands served as their only advantage. The federal government gave them verbal encouragement but no assistance in paying their expenses. Furthermore, the new Madison administration refused to grant permanent title to any part of Arkansas which left the Western Cherokees in an insecure position. Early optimism concerning a removal was later turned into frustration as procrastination blocked fulfillment of Jefferson's promises.[1]

In the autumn of 1809, the Cherokee Council called another conference in Willstown, located in the Lower Towns. The "refractory" chiefs meant to stop any agreement for an exchange. Meigs believed the parley would be an effective aid by providing those involved with an opportunity "to reflect" on the removal which could only lead to a Cherokee

---

[1]Cherokee Chiefs to Meigs, November 2, 1811, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties.

colony in Arkansas.[2] Meigs had miscalculated. Rival factions unified to oppose the government-sponsored migration and formed a committee of thirteen to conduct the work of the entire Nation, thus binding the leaders of the Upper and Lower Towns.[3] Meigs did not realize the significance of the new organization, but its members adamantly opposed further cessions. In November, Meigs hopefully repeated that an "exchange of land" was in their best interest, explaining that those who left for Arkansas would receive equal land for the surrendered acres and a trade factory for their benefit. Again he emphasized the abundant game in Arkansas but unsuccessfully exploited their desire to hunt. The council was unmoved.[4] With dogged determination Meigs maintained many could be manipulated into moving if the government gave them "advances to establish themselves."[5]

From his prior dealings, Tolontuskee took the responsibility for relocating an estimated 1,130 Cherokees. He requested financial aid from the government but received

---

[2]Meigs to Sevier, September 1, 1809, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[3]Thurman Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Story of the Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 49.

[4]Meigs to Cherokee Chiefs, November 2, 1809, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[5]Ibid., Meigs to Eustis, December 1, 1809.

no reply. The party went on anyway feeling that crossing the Mississippi was a change for the better. John Chisholm, a white living in the Nation, intended to emigrate because he liked the territory between the Arkansas and White Rivers west of the St. Francis country. Apparently it satisfied Tolontuskee, too, for he did not press to reconnoitre the area previous to migration as it was already familiar to some tribal members.[6]

Meigs' fear of a piecemeal migration came to pass as the Nation divided and more Cherokees drifted westward. During January, separate groups, one numbering sixty-three and another of seventy-five, left via the Tennessee River. Meigs heard that towns farther west and south were also abandoning their holdings to move. The hunting culture prevailed in Alabama and the Lower Towns and the amount of game in Arkansas remained a strong lure. Realizing that the majority of emigrants were poverty-stricken, Meigs asked the War Department to provide for the new arrivals, a request that was never fulfilled.

Just as Meigs' maneuverings might have had a meaningful result, James Madison took office and his administration withdrew the funds offered by Jefferson.[7] Meigs

---

[6] Ibid., Meigs to Chisholm, May 28, 1809; ibid., Meigs to Cherokee Chiefs, November, 1809, ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War William Eustis, December 1, 1809.

[7] Ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War, January 10, 1810; ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War, January 22, 1810.

immediately pressed the new government to give him more tangible help in his drive to effect a removal, although he had already assured the Cherokee council that he would not use "improper means . . . to induce migration."[8] Instead, Madison's War Department chose to adopt a cautious approach to the Jefferson plan deciding it needed further study. Secretary of War William Eustis asked Meigs to reexamine the exchange policy hoping he would agree to a "more gradual migration." If, after careful consideration, Meigs still desired a treaty to move the entire tribe, he would get permission to go ahead and hold more meetings.[9] Not until 1811 did Eustis resume "the project."[10]

For the moment the change destroyed Meigs' direction. Tolontuskee, who, for a price, had remained loyal to the government policy found himself adrift in Arkansas and dependent on his own limited resources. Many of the poorer members of the Nation had accompanied him and lacked the means to make themselves comfortable in the new country. While the Arkansas band suffered, the Eastern Cherokees seized the opportunity to deepen the break. They "disavowed" the Western branch rationalizing it had no claims

---

[8] Ibid., Meigs to Blount, February 16, 1810.

[9] Ibid., Eustis to Meigs, March 27, 1810.

[10] Charles Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, in John Wesley Powell, Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1883-84 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1887), p. 204.

to tribal considerations, such as annuities, unless it returned.[11] Ironically, after cutting off the emigrants, the council informed the Secretary of War they did not want a tribal split.[12]

In March and April, 1811, federal officials reintroduced the subject of an exchange of lands to Meigs. He concluded that since the government could not protect all the Cherokee holdings in Tennessee and Georgia under present conditions, a cession to reduce their reserve would enable the remaining Cherokees to retain their family grounds. He had, however, reached the point where he believed even those who stayed in the East and remained unassimilated would eventually leave because of their weaknesses: ". . . indolence & excessive love of ease . . . they are intemperate: but not so much as formerly."[13]

With this in mind Meigs wrote a brief favoring Cherokee removal but asking for several considerations. If the plan for a partial cession with severalty proved unacceptable, then he approved the alternative of exchanging eastern

---

[11]Cherokee Chiefs to Meigs, November 21, 1811, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties.

[12]American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States . . . Commencing March 3, 1789 & Ending March 3, 1815, IV, selected and edited by Walter Lourie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Indian Affairs, II, Class II (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 143. Hereafter cited as American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II.

[13]Meigs to Eustis, April 5, 1811, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

territory for land across the Mississippi. Reminding Eustis that Jefferson had developed such a contingency, he accepted it after speaking with members of the Arkansas band, who confirmed reports that the Western territory supported the cultivation of corn and contained admirable hunting. The agent felt the government would have to offer as inducements not only a trade factory, food, and arms but also agricultural aid, skilled artisans in the form of "Blacksmiths, Interpreters, and agency," an army post, and a country bounded by "natural or artificial boundaries." Meigs honestly sought justice for the tribe.[14] When the Secretary of War asked the "practicability" of his plan, Meigs maintained the factory and an army post were necessities for new settlement.[15]

With no definite commitment from the government Meigs reiterated the removal plan later in the year to the patient but unmoving National Council. In the last weeks of 1811, Madison finally began to tease the Indians by approving Mississippi crossings, if they wanted to pay their own expenses. To the economically distressed Cherokees the offer was slightly less than attractive. Later, the government added ambiguously that the Indians "shall have such assistance as may be thought necessary. . . ." Incentives which Meigs considered prerequisities and which the

---

[14] Ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War, April 6, 1811.

[15] Ibid., Meigs to Eustis, May 30, 1811.

government should provide included arms, traps, hoes, and a "garrison" on the Arkansas.[16] The chance to bring that policy to fruition stalled when the War of 1812 distracted the administration's attention from internal affairs.

While those moves were preliminaries for later dealings in the East, they proved meaningless for the already departed Cherokees. Since 1808, the Arkansas band had been treated as outcasts by the Eastern Cherokees. Annuities were withheld by the Eastern group, even after Tolontuskee sent word to Meigs that his impoverished band needed the help promised in 1808. Their desperate pleas were to no avail because no money had been allocated for that purpose. Adding to their difficulties, Choctaws from Mississippi began entering Arkansas.

Since Tolontuskee and the scattered Arkansas band had arrived, peace with all the other Indians in the area, even the Osages, had been momentarily established. Therefore, the Cherokees considered the Choctaws as militant intruders. Violence followed and three Cherokees and two Choctaws were killed. The Cherokees blamed the Choctaws for the warfare. In 1810, Tolontuskee and another chief, Kannetc, who had been in Arkansas since about 1796, asked Meigs to prevent Choctaw crossings. They received no response. Thus, Choctaw immigrants disturbed the peace

---

[16] Ibid., Meigs to Cherokee Chiefs and Headmen, December 1811.

along the Arkansas.

Other problems had also come to the fore. James McFarlane, a special subagent, inspected the St. Francis country to search for unlicensed traders who took advantage of the Indians. Very shortly after his arrival he uncovered illegal goods and "seized merchandise and whiskey" from those competing with the United States trade factory at Arkansas Post.[17] The American trading post stood as an example of what the government could do for the emigrants. Offering a fairer price for Indian furs the factory gave the Cherokees an alternative to exchanging with St. Louis-based traders. But in May, 1809, all the Indians in Arkansas were hurt when Congress decided to shut down the system, sell the buildings, and collect the debts owed by the tribes.[18]

Another nagging matter which paralleled tribal troubles in the East concerned the influx of whites into the St. Francis country. The Cherokees encountered the same problems that existed across the Mississippi. The older villages in southeastern Missouri were hostile, too,

---

[17]William Clark to Secretary of War, April 29, 1809, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIV: The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 264. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV.

[18]Superintendent of Indian Trade to James Waterman, May 29, 1809, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent by Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1801-23; 13:146-147.

as Indians generated fear within them. The Cherokees created friction with their demeanor. In St. Genevieve, Cherokees and other Indians moved freely about the town with an air of "insolence," one report charging that "they appeared to be masters of the town." The Cherokees shared in the onus of violent crimes, terrifying Anglo-American settlements in Arkansas. In 1812, the St. Francis Cherokees were accused of killing a white man named Rector. They "Cut open his body, tore out his bowels and afterwards cut and mangled his body in a most savage manner." Irate local authorities sought the alleged murderers, but the tribe refused to surrender them. As a large segment of Cherokees shifted their homes west, United States citizens near them felt surrounded. A few scattered Cherokees settled along the White River added to the unrest.[19] Overcoming their earlier aversion to the Choctaws they occupied "four or five villages" in the same vicinity. The countryside supported large amounts of game, but also served as a base for "vagabond Indians," who contributed to lawlessness.[20] The citizens anxiety was chiefly due, however, to Osage raids in which horses had been stolen.[21]

---

[19]"A Petition to the Secretary of War from the Inhabitants of Arkansas District," April 14, 1812, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 544.

[20]Louisiana Gazette, March 14, 1811.

[21]Niles Weekly Register, December 7, 1812 [1811], p. 247.

While the Arkansas Cherokees were beginning to solve some of the problems of relocation, the Osages had split into three bands. The Great Osage villages were concentrated primarily on the Osage River, but some had expanded farther southwest to the Neosho River. Also, the Little Osages established three settlements on the Neosho River and shared the hunting grounds with the Great Osages. Clermont's band, the third group, inhabited the Upper Arkansas valley on the Verdigris River.[22] Local tribal conflict resulted in a few fatalities and invited retaliation. Inevitably, the increased Red population on the St. Francis and White Rivers as well as encounters with hunters from other tribes disturbed the Osages, who once ranged freely south with little interference from other Indians. One incident, in which the Great Osages killed two Shawnees and a Delaware "in a most inhumane manner," caused William Clark in St. Louis to approve acts of revenge by the other Indians.[23] Clark was undoubtedly disappointed by the resumption of the Indian wars because treaties in 1808 and 1809 seemed to have brought them to a halt. In the

---

[22]Jedidiah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the U.S. on Indian Affairs Comprising a Narrative of a Tour Performed in the Summer of 1820, Under a Commission From the President of the United States, for the Purpose of Ascertaining, for the Use of the Government . . . (New Haven: Howe & Spaulding, 1822), pp. 203-205. Hereafter cited as Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs.

[23]William Clark to Secretary of War, July 20, 1810, Folder 1807-1810, Clark Papers.

aftermath Osage opponents formed new alliances, and it was with some difficulty that Clark, despite his own sympathies, intervened to prevent them from taking the offensive, in the fall of 1810, to attack the Great Osages.[24] The raids that followed constituted another part of the Cherokee-Osage hostilities that burst into the more destructive war of the 1820's.

The frontier wars did not impede economic improvement. The Cherokees were experiencing better times. They cultivated corn on rich land, raised cattle and hogs, and their women wore clothing woven from their own looms. In addition they hunted buffalo to the West. For a time even peace was restored between them and Osages on the Arkansas.[25] But disaster struck the St. Francis country at the end of 1811. The river usually carried "the overflow from the swamp district" to the north. A portion of the area, however, became flooded when the New Madrid earthquake lowered the land level with a series of shattering tremors, some of which were felt as far north as Canada.[26] With parts of

---

[24]Clark to Secretary of War, September 12, 1810, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 412-413.

[25]Meigs to Eustis, From a Report by Kiamee, April 6, 1811, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[26]Edwin James (comp.), Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, XVII, Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 . . . , ed. by Reuben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 38n. Hereafter cited as Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII.

their villages under water, nearly all the Cherokees abandoned the valley to join their brethren between the Arkansas and White rivers. The principal chief, The Bowl, moved south of the Arkansas River between Shoal and Petit Jean Creeks, where several villages supported themselves with farming and hunting. In 1812, the government approved the change, although the Cherokees did not receive any formal title to their new holdings.[27] In similar circumstances Anglo-Americans, also devastated by the calamity, were granted permission to relocate farther west, too, leading to future complications over territory claimed by Indians.[28]

Since the majority of the Cherokees remained in the East, the annuity remained in the hands of the old Nation despite the Treaty of 1819. Also, the Arkansas band had developed its own peculiar problems, including a trade favoring private St. Louis merchants, open hostility with the Osages, and the inevitable but legal incursions by squatters. The new location on the Arkansas had not completely satisfied

---

[27]Emmet Starr, Cherokees "West": 1794-1839 (Claremore, Okla.: n.p., 1910), pp. 22, 39, 40. Hereafter cited as Starr, Cherokees West. Also Emmet Starr, Early History of the Cherokees Embracing Aboriginal Customs, Religion, Laws, Folk Lore, and Civilization (n.p., 1917), p. 121. Hereafter cited as Starr, Early History of the Cherokees. Also James Manford Carselowey, Cherokee Notes (Fayetteville, Ark.: Washington County Historical Society, 1960), p. 10.

[28]General Land Office to Hartwell Boswell and John Trimble, July 16, 1821, National Archives, Records of the General Land Office, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, 1796-1860.

Tolontuskee. Settlement along the river was menaced by seasonal freshets of the Arkansas and some Cherokees escaped up the numerous creeks.[29] The band's economy was undercut when earthquake survivors and emigrants from the East united on the Arkansas River creating a food shortage. Kanneto clamored that few supplies were available for the indigent members of the tribe. The emigrant party was in "distress," it needed an agent to represent it. The War Department appointed William Lewis Lovely to that position in January, 1813.[30]

Tribal leaders were already acquainted with Lovely. Tolontuskee, for one, had worked earlier with him on land cessions. He showed an informal and relaxed quality in dealing with the subagent. In a personal note, for example, he told Lovely he was digging a salt well and had decided not to drink another drop "until I found salt." He also asked Lovely's help in courting a woman. Lovely appeared to have his confidence.[31]

---

[29]Tolontuskee to Meigs, March 14, 1813, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[30]Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 39; also Secretary of War to Lovely, January 4, 1813, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs. Clark in St. Louis offered Colonel Pierre Menard as subagent, but the decision had already been made. See also Clark to Secretary of War, February 24, 1813, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 632-633.

[31]Tolontuskee to Lovely, March 13, 1813, Folder 1800-1814, Indian Papers.

In all those years the status of the Western Cherokees had never been cleared. Without a reserve of their own, civil law applied to them because they were not living on Indian land. In December, 1812, Congress created the Missouri Territory and the County of Arkansas which reflected the influx of white settlers along the river. Understandably then, the Cherokees did not regard the growing population as a blessing. And the extension of civil authority to the locals in Arkansas County left them at the mercy of white competitors for the land. In addition the Americans were abusive. Kanneto accused Anglos of stealing even when he opened his home to them as guests. Unfortunately, the Cherokees lacked any means to counter the growing number of lawless whites, who tended to "corrupt /the/ Indians."

Even worse, it was claimed that settlers encouraged the Cherokees to attack the Osages. The Cherokees realized that when Madison had asked them to remain at peace, he had in a sense emasculated them. So with a military end in mind Kanneto sought government approval for Cherokee action against the Osage. He slyly represented his people as innocents persecuted on the frontier by their enemies.[32] Such a masterful portrayal was misleading because both the Cherokees and the Osages were poised for another campaign.

---

[32]Kanneto letter, n.d., Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

The problems of increased white pressure and the Osage raids introduced Lovely to the Arkansas frontier. He sided with the Western Cherokees. Lovely charged that many of the Anglo-Americans were criminals, who had escaped to the Arkansas country because no law had been established there.[33] Later, he endorsed a Cherokee recommendation for bringing peace to the frontier, by the federal government assigning two companies of troops to the area. He did so at Tolontuskee's request and because "there are some whites of the worst character in this country whose influence with the Indians is dangerous to the peace of the land."[34] Lovely's assistant and clerk, Richard Witt, repeated the refrain when he called Anglo-Americans in the area "malicious."[35]

The Cherokees discovered that other tribes wanted Lovely to function as their agent. His duties legitimately included the Quapaws, who complained that whites had invaded their lands to the south of the Arkansas, erecting "plantations" and controlling the salt springs, another source of potential wealth. The tribe wanted them returned.[36] Of more importance, the Osages asked for a

---

[33] Ibid., Lovely to Meigs, August 6, 1813.

[34] Lovely to Clark, October 11, 1814, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[35] Witt to Meigs, September 6, 1813, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[36] Ibid., Quapaw's talk to Lovely, May 10, 1813.

meeting. Seeking a factory in their vicinity, they demanded relief from the "depredating" whites. All Indians suffered the same pressures.[37]

Lovely's instructions did not include any responsibility for the Osages, but he did not rule out a better association with Clermont's band. Richard Witt euphemistically described relations with the Osage as good, although "people appear much exasperated against them."[38] His understatement hardly covered events as they unfolded. Lovely arranged an intertribal conference of Quapaws, Cherokees, Pawnees, Choctaws, and Osages hoping a confrontation would calm the frontier. Prior to the council, Lovely, searching for leverage from Washington, adopted the old line that securing the frontier depended on building a factory and a mill, drawing boundaries, and stationing troops on the Arkansas. A trade factor, in particular, would solve a source of friction because the Cherokees were positive that private traders overcharged for goods bartered in Arkansas and cheated on fur purchases. A certain foil to them would be a federally operated post similar to that existing prior to 1810.[39]

Lovely did not succeed in getting the factory

---

[37] Ibid., Lovely to Meigs, August 6, 1813.

[38] Ibid., Witt to Meigs, September 6, 1813.

[39] Ibid., Lovely to Meigs, July 6, 1813; also Lovely to Secretary of War, October 1, 1813, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 705.

erected on the Arkansas, but he found a means to establish a truce. He took it upon himself to appease the Indians by drawing boundaries between the combatants, setting "temporary" limits which left permanent solutions for the future. The Cherokees preferred to think of Lovely's work as the beginning of an assignment to them of a reserve because he gained lands south of the Arkansas River for them. It could not be considered lasting; Lovely had unintentionally ignored previous treaties.

Lovely's frontier truce soon dissolved. White settlers living adjacent to the Indians south of the Arkansas charged that Lovely had turned their holdings over to the Cherokees. In fact Cherokees entered the area to arrange distribution of land, anticipating a government survey. The tribe acted with great confidence because Lovely had constructed the truce by turning the area over to the Cherokees, irrespective of who had made improvements on it. The Americans were, to say the least, unhappy. To seek a redress of their grievances, they petitioned Congress for relief. In a hard hitting complaint the farmers struck at Lovely personally. They reported that he was often in his cups. "Scarcely sober since in this country," he kept a "whiskey bottle" within reach of his bed. One observer said, "I never seen him sober or free from gross intoxication." Clerk Richard Witt, although characterized as "less dissipated," was still a "villain."

The settlers also showed a definite preference with regard to Indian neighbors. Most of the land claimed by the Osages south of the river belonged to the more docile Quapaws, and the whites did not like the possibility of the stronger Cherokees controlling the rich area on the southern bank.[40] There was no question of its worth. In a rapturous moment Lovely called it the "garden of the World."[41]

Although reacting to an immediate need, Lovely had not been authorized to fix the boundaries and/or to council with the Indians along the Arkansas. While he acted in the best interest of the tribes, he was not empowered to make such a sweeping agreement. Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Clark at St. Louis took Lovely to task for not first asking permission to negotiate and for disregard of administrative channels. He reprimanded Lovely and demanded to see a copy of his appointment accompanied by his instructions.[42]

Clark's note put Lovely on the defensive. Assuring Clark of his cooperation, Lovely was determined to catalogue some of the problems he had already encountered to help justify his solution. To lessen pressure on himself he

---

[40]William Russell to Edward Hempstead, November 1, 1813, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 720.

[41]Lovely to Meigs, July 16, 1813, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[42]Clark to Lovely, September 29, 1813, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

repeated an oft-told story of senseless buffalo kills on Indian land by white hunters who wanted only the tallow from the animals, leaving the carcasses to rot. The Indians regarded such waste with consternation because they used every part of the buffalo. Of greater significance Lovely had initiated a truce through intertribal meetings.[43] He pointed out that the Osages had asked him to intervene in their affairs, and he had forged a momentary peace between Clermont and the Cherokees. Since relations had worsened between Clermont and the bands on the Osage River, Clermont had wanted Lovely to provide his people with a higher return for their furs.[44] Clark's tone revealed that Lovely's attempt to secure a permanent Cherokee reserve had failed. In particular whites were most concerned about settlement rights in the region near The Bowl's village and other acreages south of the river.

After his conference with tribal leaders, Lovely had looked eastward to get Meigs' help in securing troops needed in the West to preserve the peace. He had located a central site for a fort to serve all the tribes in the area. Looking ahead he told Meigs that as more Cherokees crossed the Mississippi, annuity payments would have to be adjusted

---

[43] Ibid., Lovely to Clark, October 3, 1813.

[44] Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 40. The other Osage bands dealt with the influential Chouteaus which explained their advantage over Clermont.

to guarantee the Arkansas Cherokees their share of earlier negotiated settlements.[45] Tolontuskee still pleaded for the compensation he believed Jefferson had promised, but in lieu of those funds Lovely felt a share of the annuity would be an appropriate substitute. Tolontuskee trusted Lovely as a willing ally in seeking federal support for the emigrants, but the government did not respond to the requests to split tribal monies.

Lovely found it impossible to negotiate a permanent peace with recurring rumors of an Osage war. This threat and other frontier problems took most of his time as unrest among the Arkansas tribes menaced the new emigrant farms. Unable to do more than deal with short term events, Cherokee leaders watched in near helplessness as incident piled on incident, all leading to explosive, destructive warfare. In October, 1813, stories circulated among them that a band of Osages had killed one of their chiefs, but no one could ascertain whether Clermont's or White Hair's band was guilty. Although the murder called for retaliatory measures, the Cherokees followed the government's advice and waited before seeking revenge. No doubt Lovely had played a role in cooling their militancy. Despite the Osage's talent for provoking Cherokee wrath, they feared a war with the Western Cherokees because it would probably result in an alliance

---

[45]Lovely to Meigs, August 6, 1813, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

of several tribes against them. So pressure again built on the Arkansas frontier.[46]

Lovely gave up on a lasting settlement, but he was in a good position to determine whether the peace could be maintained. Clark asked Lovely to keep him posted "relative to Indian Relations as may occur within your agency."[47] By the spring of 1814, the prestige of Clark's office had finally registered with Lovely, who begged Clark to exert his influence to lessen friction between the two tribes.[48] In talks between Osage and Cherokee chiefs the opponents momentarily agreed that they wanted an end to the fighting. The Cherokees, with unusual cooperation, asked Clermont to invite White Hair's band and the Little Osages to a meeting at the mouth of the Verdigris, possibly because they wanted to gain favor with officials in Washington by such a conciliatory act. In terms of prestige the majority of Osages would have preferred to meet at Fort Osage or St. Louis on what could be considered home territory.[49] The Cherokees and Osages both acted with one eye on reactions by the

---

[46]Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, pp. 38-40. See also Lovely to Secretary of War, October 1, 1813, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV, 705; also George Sibley to Clark, November 30, 1813, ibid., XIV, 711.

[47]Clark to Lovely, February 8, 1814, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[48]Ibid., Lovely to Clark, April 4, 1814.

[49]Cherokee Chiefs to Osage Chiefs, June 1814, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

federal government. In the maneuvering to keep from displeasing the Great White Father, Osages had slipped and the Western Cherokees took advantage of this leverage.

The Cherokee enemy also had a reservoir of goodwill. Rarely did the Osages attack whites because they had great respect for the United States.[50] Unfortunately, some American citizens had been killed by members of Clermont's band and pressure mounted for him to deliver the murderers to the authorities. He had been placed on the defensive and he stalled with Lovely. When the chief finally discussed the slain Americans, he refused to surrender the men responsible but instead made a counter offer. His entire band was willing to give up all their horses, their primary wealth, as an indemnity because they held the guilty parties in high esteem.[51] The Arkansas Cherokees enjoyed the Osage dilemma.

In the role of mediator Lovely looked to Clark for direction. Clark told Lovely that he believed that he could bring the Osages to terms by reducing trade with Clermont until the Osages surrendered the killers.[52] Clark had hit the Osages where they were vulnerable. Prepared to come to terms before Lovely delivered Clark's ultimatum, they

---

[50]Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII, 155.

[51]Osage Chiefs to Lovely, June 1814, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[52]Clark to Lovely, June 15, 1814, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

apologetically reduced frontier incidents to "unfortunate disturbances" and told Lovely they wanted "a permanent peace." Then, too, the Cherokees had already exacted their revenge with interest by killing twelve Osages in retribution for the death of the Cherokee chief.

With the stage set preliminary negotiations were opened when Lovely told Clermont that Clark had stopped trade with the Osages until the murderers were delivered.[53] Up to that point Lovely had concentrated on the Osages because, in the government's point of view, they were in the wrong. Unfortunately, charges of Cherokee thievery rediverted his attention to them.

Until then the Cherokees had been in the government's good graces because they had caused less trouble than the Osages. That factor notwithstanding, in the summer of 1814, some of the Arkansas band stole horses from a settler named Harrington, and an annoyed Clark insisted that Lovely quickly restore the "plunder." With the Osages upsetting the countryside, Clark wanted no difficulties with other tribes.[54] Lovely circulated Clark's "demand" that the horses be returned in fifteen days. To effect a settlement four Cherokee chiefs visited Clark in St. Louis, which the

---

[53] Ibid., Clermont to Lovely, July 1814 (ca); Clermont to Lovely, March 1814. See also Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (n.p.: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), p. 178.

[54] Clark to Lovely, August 21, 1814, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

experienced Lovely viewed cynically as a ploy "to gain time." Revealing his practical side Lovely again called for troops--specifically two companies.[55]

Lovely stressed the basic problem of ending the Osage-Cherokee conflict. With unfounded confidence he believed he was close to a peace between Clermont and the Cherokees, despite Clermont's delay in turning the killers over to him. At the same time Tolontuskee wanted to improve relations with the Osages and traveled to their villages. His visit to the Verdigris in August promised improved relations. But while there he observed items stolen from Alexander McFarland. He demanded their return.[56] This coincidence ruined the opportunity for an understanding. What had started for Lovely as a chance to resolve the Osage-Cherokee friction was, from 1815 through 1817, slowly deteriorating. The failure of diplomacy probably upset Tolontuskee because lack of stability in Arkansas reduced the Cherokee opportunity to retain the land.

During 1815, the amount of violence rose but it was difficult to blame any single Osage band. In the spring Cherokee hunters in the Arkansas valley tried to carry tallow they had secured from buffalo kills downriver, but

---

[55]Lovely to Clark, October 11, 1814, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[56]Ibid., Lovely to Clark, August 9, 1814. See also Grant Foreman, Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926), p. 74.

the Osages stole their harvest.[57] Despite growing tensions the Cherokees attributed the attack not to Clermont's band but to those situated along the Osage River. Lovely shared that impression since the Verdigris band looked to him to fill their request--to learn the "art of agriculture manufacturing."[58] The agent went further than the chiefs by defending Clermont, contrasting his behavior to that of the "unfriendly disposition of Mons. Chouteau & the White Hair Osages toward the United States." Even if the Osages surrendered the guilty parties, Lovely was convinced that conflict would continue.[59]

The federal government attempted once again to bring peace to the frontier with a series of unsuccessful treaties in September, 1815, involving the trans-Mississippi tribes in Missouri and Arkansas. The participants forgave earlier acts of war and promised "perpetual peace and friendship" for the future.[60] With the Western Cherokee community growing in size and still hunting the same general

---

[57]"John C. Luttig to Christian Wilt," April 16, 1815, Arkansas Historical Quarterly, I, No. 2 (June, 1942), 151-155.

[58]Lovely to Secretary of War, May 27, 1815, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[59]Lovely to Meigs, May 29, 1815, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[60]Charles J. Kappler (comp. and ed.), Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1904), 119-120. See also Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, pp. 12-13 for a synthesis of these "unsatisfactory" meetings.

areas, however, it was just a matter of time before more ruptures would occur which would increase friction between the tribes settled there.[61] In late 1815, an Osage party killed a lone Cherokee. That was followed by a raid in which Osage warriors stole Cherokee horses and attacked a group of white hunters. Soon thereafter members of Clermont's village killed two whites. Despite such a record Lovely attributed the action to Clermont's "bad young men" and absolved the chief from blame for the chaos.[62]

In the spring of 1816, additional murders were reported. When the Big Osages killed two Cherokees, the Osage subagent, George Sibley, believed that an Osage-Cherokee war was imminent.[63] In all the Cherokees maintained the pose of the injured party. They retained Clark's confidence by sustaining an uncharacteristically passive acceptance of the insults but not without good reason. They asked the government to mediate, and surprisingly, officials took the responsibility for seeking justice.[64]

---

[61] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 76. The government estimated the Arkansas Cherokees at an inflated 5,000 with 1,000 warriors.

[62] Lovely to Clark, January 20, 1816, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[63] Sibley to Clark, April 14, 1816, George Sibley Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Sibley Papers.

[64] Talk of Commissioners to Cherokees in Council, April 29, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

In St. Louis, Clark asked Pierre Chouteau to visit Clermont and persuade him to return the stolen horses. Chouteau, believing that moment would be advantageous for a meeting between leaders of the two tribes, invited Lovely to bring the Arkansas Cherokees to the Verdigris, in June, in an attempt to rejuvenate the peace.[65] Also, Chouteau unsuccessfully asked the Osages to surrender the murderers for punishment to fulfill part of an earlier agreement with the Cherokee chiefs.[66]

The call for a conference found the Arkansas band in an enviable position. With praiseworthy patience the Cherokees maintained a passive demeanor through the spring. William Crawford, the Secretary of War, reported that the President had approved their action of "referring" the Osage dispute to the federal government, while arranging a meeting of all interested parties--the Osages, Quapaws, and Cherokees--to make a cession and to run lines. Unfortunately, he also included the disputes between the Eastern and Western Cherokees, which extended the council's function too broadly to be effective. His decision had been logical because a grant from the Tennessee Cherokees would have allowed an exchange reserve to be marked for the Western band. So the federal government, while seeking to attain its own ends and

---

[65]P. Chouteau to Lovely, May 1, 1816, Folder 1815-24, Indian Papers.

[66]Clark to Lovely, May 2, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

acquire eastern land, was willing to assist Tolontuskee in securing his tribal territory.[67]

Federal officials offered practical but improbable solutions. Basically, they hoped to defuse the frontier by drawing definite bounds, an impossible solution for those nomads following game. With surveys to determine tribal limits the War Department felt it would prove to the Osages whether the Cherokees were trespassing on their lands. Once the line was established, it was believed, one source of friction would be resolved.[68] While the arrangement seemed pragmatic, it was too simple. It did not recognize the mobility of tribal hunters who had to trail wild game, animals that disregarded boundary lines.

Never completely discouraged, Lovely offered an alternative. Despite the attacks of Clermont's men on individual Cherokees, a belief persisted of his band's potential friendship. Osages to the north remained in Chouteau's sphere-of-influence, but relations between Clermont and the Arkansas Cherokees were better than those of other bands. Lovely suggested, therefore, that those Osages be attached to his office. This change would integrate the tribes under his guidance and open the opportunity for finding where their interests coincided, thus availing

---

[67]Crawford to Clark, Edwards, Chouteau, May 27, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[68]R. Wash to Sibley, June 30, 1816, Sibley Papers.

to Lovely the potential of making a lasting peace.[69]

In mid-1816, Lovely arrived as planned at Clermont's village to offer the Osages a means to evade the earlier criminal indemnities required of them for depredations in Arkansas. In the name of the United States Lovely traded that payment for a cession of territory from north of the Arkansas River westward to the falls of the Verdigris, containing an exaggerated estimate of 6,000 square miles.[70] The grant, called Lovely's Purchase, did not end the war between the Arkansas tribes.[71] There can be little doubt from the agreement that Lovely had achieved a long-sought goal of the Arkansas Cherokees, a claim to the prairies west of their settlements, for which they had passively accepted the repeated acts of violence to their hunters and herds without appropriate retaliation. In the succeeding years the leaders of the band would fight to gain formal recognition of Lovely's work.

Unfortunately, Osage-Cherokee interests suffered a a setback when after Lovely's return to the agency, he contracted a fever from which he did not recover. Weakening as the year ended, he died on February 24, 1817. The

---

[69]Meigs to Crawford, June 4, 1816, Folder 1815-24, Indian Papers.

[70]Grant Foreman, "The Three Forks," Chronicles of Oklahoma, II, No. 1 (March, 1924), 37-47.

[71]Lovely to Clark, September 22, 1816, Folder 1815-17, Clark Papers.

Arkansas Cherokees had lost a strong advocate at a time when they most needed an ally in the government.[72]

The Arkansas Cherokees had campaigned to win the approval of the federal government. They had absorbed punishment from the Osages with self-proclaimed restraint and either carefully led the government to believe that they patiently awaited its justice or stalled hoping that the Osages would overstep themselves and cause federal involvement. In either case they gained from such tactics. The number of Osage incidents grew intolerable to authorities, causing some, especially Governor Clark, to sympathize with the Cherokee position. In early 1817, Clark reminded Sibley that he had called for a meeting of the Quapaws, Cherokees, and Osages which had failed to materialize. Clark allowed his own feelings to surface:

> The Arkansaw Osage has conducted themselves very improperly and some check should be put to their career. They listen to nothing that is said to them . . . on the subject of annuities and should you err let it be on the side of severity to that tribe who have conducted themselves improperly, perhaps it may be well to reserve a part of the annuities.

An exasperated Clark, sure that war was in the offing, concluded that "it is not in my power to prevent /it/ should

---

[72]John D. Chisholm to Meigs, September 23, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records; see ibid., Lovely to Meigs, January 20, 1817, in which Lovely predicted he would not survive and asked that Mrs. Lovely be cared for after his death.

I be disposed."[73]

Clark's attitude dovetailed nicely with that of the Arkansas Cherokees which paved the way for an Indian war that would further cast the Osages in an unfavorable light with the government. During January, 1817, Tolontuskee and his war chief, Takatoka, dramatically pleaded their case to Meigs. They had sincerely tried to make peace with the Osages in years past but, alas, their people had suffered too many "Injuries and Insults." One story, repeated later with deliberate regularity, characterized Osage deceit. An innocent Cherokee boy had been lured to an Osage camp where he was murdered. Now the Cherokees were unable "to restrain" the anger of their people.[74] The touching recital of Osage perfidy fitted into the effort to prepare the government to accept their planned offensive. The other tribes on the Arkansas looked to the Cherokees for leadership as a coalition of Quapaws, Shawnees, Delawares, and Choctaws formed to support Takatoka and Tolontuskee. The growing Osage menace united them.[75]

During a widespread campaign to justify their intent

---

[73]Clark to Sibley, January 11, 1817, Sibley Papers. With Clark stationed in St. Louis, the Chouteau base, his attitude toward the Osages later shifted, but at the moment he did stand with the Cherokees.

[74]Tolontuskee and Takatoka to Meigs, January 21, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[75]Ibid., Meigs to Graham, March 12, 1817.

to retaliate against the Osages, the Western Cherokees informed American leaders, including Andrew Jackson, of the wrongs done to them. In the midst of a plea for his help in getting title to their land, the Arkansas chiefs loosed a brisk verbal attack on the Osages.[76] Yet despite the anger that was manifested in complaints to the government, no immediate action followed. Instead, the nations along the river very deliberately continued their anti-Osage campaign. During March, Clark encouraged Tolontuskee. "It grieves me," he said, "to hear that the Osage are still deaf to the words of justice and persist in those acts of violence calculated to produce enemies." Sidestepping the issue, Clark did not openly condone a war, but he did not deny its use as a final alternative.[77]

Under such circumstances the renewal of hostilities was predictable. During the late winter a potent Cherokee-led confederation developed with even the Eastern Cherokees volunteering help.[78] The situation became complicated. Locally, federal representatives observed the war preparations with an attitude that could not possibly dampen the

---

[76]Cherokees of the Arkansas River to Jackson and Meigs, April 18, 1817, Andrew Jackson, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, May 1, 1814 to December 31, 1819, ed. by John Spencer Bassett, Papers of the Department of Historical Research, ed. by J. Franklin Jameson (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1927), 289.

[77]Clark to Tolontuskee, March 22, 1817, Folder 1815-17, Clark Papers.

[78]Clark to Sibley, April 4, 1817, Sibley Papers.

spirit of the Cherokees. Taking the longer and more responsible view, Washington officials directed Clark to play a positive role and mediate the problem.[79] Meigs, too, received instructions to discourage the Eastern Cherokees from crossing the Mississippi. He did slow the surge by preventing some reinforcements under John Jolly, Tolontuskee's brother, from joining the Western Cherokees. Warriors had already departed when Meigs claimed he stopped one group, but some of those leaving may have migrated as settlers rather than as warriors.[80]

The Western Cherokee were determined to make war on the Osages. One of the leading war chiefs, Takatoka, had concluded that the enemy had to be "exterminated."[81] As war preparations developed the Cherokees remonstrated against Osage outrages. With no exaggeration the Arkansas chiefs told Governor Clark that they had come to the end of their patience. An Osage party had surprised a Cherokee settlement and stole horses which spurred local anger. "With the few horses we have left," the chiefs said, "we intend to go to the Osages and hunt for those horses taken; we are going to do mischief." Then in a tone of false humility he added: "We are but a few Cherokees, our father

---

[79]Graham to Clark, April 1, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[80]Meigs to Jolly, May 3, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee; also ibid., Meigs to Graham, May 6, 1817.

[81]Starr, Cherokees West, p. 82.

knows us well, and we therefore beg that he will not scold us."[82]

The Cherokees took advantage of Osage seasonal movements. Planting corn in the spring, they sometimes roamed 300 miles westward to hunt buffalo in the summer, returned to harvest the cornfields, then hunted deer and beaver in the fall. The Cherokees timed their attack to coincide with the late summer buffalo hunt already in progress. A battle took place during August, 1817. Armed with cannon and gunnery skills acquired in the Creek War, the allied Cherokee army of 565 warriors and eleven whites, clearly had the advantage as they fought near the site of Earhart's Salt Works on the Grand River. They killed an Osage chief after drawing him into the open. Then they pursued the Osage remnants to a place called The Bulls to continue the attack.[83] With warriors of Clermont's Osage village away on the annual hunt, the attackers' task had been made easier, as they burned and plundered the town. Nearly seventy women and children were slaughtered--most of them in a retreat from the village, while at least fifty more were taken prisoner. In contrast the Cherokees suffered several

---

[82] Niles Weekly Register, September 27, 1817, p. 74; see also Foreman, "The Three Forks," Chronicles of Oklahoma, II, No. 1 (March, 1924), 37-47.

[83] Niles Weekly Register, September 27, 1817, p. 80; Louis Houck, A History of Missouri from the Earliest Exploration and Settlement Until the Admission of the State into the Union, I (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1908), 197 suggests the battle took place in the "spring of 1817. . . ."

wounded while only one ally, a Delaware, was killed. According to Governor Clark an estimated twenty-five white scalps were recovered in the village.[84]

The Cherokees and their allies had struck hard at the Osages. Although no peace resulted, the relative strengths of the Osages and the other tribes along the Arkansas River had changed. But not until after Tolontuskee was involved in negotiating a removal the following year did he reveal all his motives. He characterized the Osage attacks as "many insults" and hoped to use the victory to gain Osage lands. Using the pattern of white war aims as well as Indian custom, he sought an Osage cession as an indemnity.[85]

---

[84] In a short analysis of the fight, the Osages were driven off an adjacent plain and clearly defeated. See Clark to Sibley, November 11, 1817, Sibley Papers; also Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, pp. 50-51; also Foreman, "The Three Forks," Chronicles of Oklahoma, II, No. 1 (March, 1924), 42; John P. Brown, Old Frontiers: The Story of the Cherokee Indians from Earliest Times to the Date of their Removal to the West, 1838 (Kingsport, Tenn.: Southern Publishers, Inc., 1938), p. 474; see Rachel Caroline Eaton, "The Legend of the Battle of Claremore Mound," Chronicles of Oklahoma, VIII, No. 4 (December, 1930), 369-377.

[85] Tolontuskee Speech, February 21, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATING A HOME

The Osage wars absorbed only a part of the Western Cherokees' attention. Their most important goal after the War of 1812 focused on obtaining formal title to the area north of the Arkansas River. The government tied final settlement of this matter to an agreement with the Eastern Cherokees for a cession of land in the East and a subsequent removal West. In addition to the primary problem for the Western Cherokees, gaining legitimate title before the white settlers completely innundated them, the chiefs petitioned for a federal trading factory to compete with local traders, and a military post near their western border.

American officials agreed that a military post was needed. In 1815, Clark told Lovely that a fort on the Arkansas River would better relations between Whites and Indians. He predicted that soldiers would be stationed there within a year.[1] In April, 1816, the Western Cherokees went to St. Louis to urge that a trading factory be

---

[1]Clark to Lovely, January 25, 1815, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

established on the Arkansas.[2] Supporting their request Meigs estimated that a factory would exchange about $20,000 in merchandise, a profitable undertaking for the government.[3] The Osages and the Cherokees, in a rare moment, concurred that a post would help since both thought that the St. Louis peddlers cheated them.

But the overriding concern of the Western Cherokees was title to their land in Arkansas. Tolontuskee was a leader in this cause. In May, 1815, in a carefully constructed statement to Clark, Tolontuskee objected to the "loss of priviledge [sic]" for the tribe when government for Arkansas Territory was organized. This placed the Western Cherokees under civil authority because they were not on an Indian reserve. Tolontuskee harkened back to Jefferson's vague offer promising his people land if the Cherokees moved west. He claimed that a nine mile strip on each side of the river had been "cleared" by his people. While professing only friendship for the Anglo-American settlers, he wanted to know how much of the area belonged to the band. Pointing to a growing problem, he said it was "impossible . . . in [the] present situation . . . to prevent depredations" by whites and Cherokees. The pressure

---

[2]Ed Bearss and Arrell M. Gibson, Fort Smith: Little Gibraltar on the Arkansas (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 11.

[3]Meigs to Crawford, February 17, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

was not great in 1815, but friction was increasing. The Cherokees recognized their jeopardy and traced the cause to the lack of a permanent holding.[4]

Momentum for an exchange had not died among members of the Arkansas band. In June, 1814, John D. Chisholm, a white living with the Cherokees, reminded Meigs that the Arkansas Cherokees were satisfied with their situation near Dardanelle Rock. Chisholm went to Washington to object personally to the Secretary of War because the new political organization of Arkansas threatened their holdings.[5] Such an arrangement would also discourage a removal by the majority still living in the East.

The Cherokees believed that they had gained a special status in the Arkansas country by the various treaties. In addition agent Lovely had drawn a temporary boundary to separate the Anglo-American settlers, the Cherokees, and other tribes along the line, thus lessening white pressure on the Cherokees.[6] As a result of the special pleading Clark took a usual course for government officials. That fall he ordered Anglo-Americans living on Indian land in Arkansas to vacate but did not provide a means to implement

---

[4]Tolontuskee to Clark, May 25, 1815, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

[5]Meigs to General Armstrong, June 24, 1814, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[6]Lovely to Clark, May 27, 1815, Folder 1811-1814, Clark Papers.

his decision. The whites ignored Clark's order and continued to trespass. The Cherokees had no real way to prevent "intrusions of white people, who . . . destroy their game, settle among them without their consent, and act in such a manner as to produce disorder, discord, and confusion." Naturally, this caused the Cherokees to press all the harder for a ceded tract of their own, separated completely from the public domain of the United States.[7]

The urging of the Arkansas Cherokees caused hardly a stir in the government. Jefferson's original intention, to effect a removal, had failed because the scattered groups that had gone to Arkansas had not made formal cessions of eastern land. At the time, 1815, the vast majority of the Eastern Cherokees had not agreed to any exchange which prevented the government from making terms agreeable to the Western Cherokees. There were other limits. While Tolontuskee represented his band as poor in wealth and asked for a part of the annuity, the Eastern Cherokees refused to split the tribal funds. Since the Arkansas band lacked any monetary support from the government, they were

---

[7]Report of Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, October 18, 1815, American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive, of the United States, . . . Commencing March 3, 1789 & Ending March 3, 1815, IV, selected and edited by Walter Lourie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Indian Affairs, II, Class II (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 9-11. Hereafter cited as American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II.

dependent on hunting and fur trading for essentials.[8]

In 1816, the Madison administration reinstituted the policy of cessions and exchanges along the lines that Jefferson had proposed earlier. As a result government officials delayed considering the Arkansas Cherokees' request, until the Eastern Cherokees proved willing to cede territory. A conference in the spring of 1816, between the Eastern Cherokee Council and the United States' commissioners, failed to resolve the question of title or to draw the boundaries for the Arkansas emigrants. Rather than close the door, the commissioners told the attending chiefs that they would ask the President for further instructions.[9]

Meanwhile, during the autumn of 1816, Meigs attempted to obtain approval for a trading factory on the Arkansas River in the vicinity of Dardanelle Rock, situated near the center of the Arkansas Cherokee settlements and within reach of the Osages. Meigs said such a facility would appeal to potential Cherokee emigrants and would serve as a guarantee

---

[8]Meigs to Crawford, February 17, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records. Less than 2,500 Cherokees lived in the West. See Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense (n.p., University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 13n.

[9]Talk of Commissioners to Cherokees in Council, April 29, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

of the government's good will.[10] He contended that:

> The Cherokees have a claim on the ground of a partial contract and if the government still wish an exchange of lands with the Cherokee Nation nothing will facilitate such exchange so effectively as to fix a small garrison and a good factory. . . .[11]

The War Department studied Meigs' request. Secretary of War William Crawford made it clear to Meigs and the Western Cherokees that requests, including a land cession in Arkansas, were predicated on whether the Eastern Cherokees made a grant of land in Tennessee and Georgia to the United States. If the Eastern Cherokees acknowledged that the emigrants were entitled to a part of the tribal annuity, then the government would distribute it to the Western band. Since the Nation in the East was adamantly opposed to splitting its payment, War Department officials claimed that they were helpless.[12] In the fall of 1816, when the federal government pressed for cessions from the Eastern Cherokees, that part of the tribe demanded, instead, that the Western band be forced to return to their ancestral lands.

Crawford had adopted the attitude that it was essential for the Eastern Cherokees to move west. "By cherishing

---

[10]Superintendent of Indian Trade to Crawford, March 27, 1816, Letters Sent by Superintendent of Indian Trade, B.I.A., C:482.

[11]Meigs to Crawford, June 4, 1816, Folder 1815-24, Indian Papers.

[12]Crawford to Clark, Edwards, A. Chouteau, September 17, 1816, Chouteau Papers.

the new settlement," he said, "and by a liberal partition of their annuities with them, the restless and indolent part of the nation will be attracted to it [west], by the decrease of game within the nation. . . ."[13] As an alternative the government could simply seize the land, but such action would lead to the Indian's "extinction," an idea which he described as "abhorrent to the feelings of an enlightened and benevolent nation. . . ."[14]

Strangely, throughout the maneuvering that preceded the Cherokee conferences, many federal officials acted as if the chiefs would reject the offers. Despite this negative approach Meigs asked the Cherokee leaders to heed Madison's "propositions," telling them that the President would "purchase, or exchange . . . land . . ." if the Cherokees found the offer "just."[15]

In March, an Eastern Cherokee delegation traveled to Washington under orders not to make a final disposition of of tribal lands, but it negotiated a partial settlement.[16]

---

[13]Crawford to Meigs, September 18, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs. Crawford adopted some of Meigs' ideas but also he reflected the emerging Indian policy of the Madison government after the war.

[14]U.S., Annals of the Congress of the United States, 14th Cong., 1st Sess., 1816, pp. 195-199.

[15]Meigs to the Cherokee Deputation, February 28, 1816, Box #6, Division of Manuscripts Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.

[16]Charles Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, in John Wesley Powell, Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of

In a convention signed on March 22, the Cherokees surrendered claims to lands in South Carolina, an estimated 94,000 acres.[17] In return the tribe received $5,000.[18] Before the meeting adjourned Cherokee representatives approved a survey to separate Creek and Cherokee lands, an adjustment that helped the latter. With some outlay of gifts the administration persuaded the delegation to come to terms.[19] In keeping with prior agreements the federal authorities again promised to remove white settlers who had squatted illegally on Indian lands.[20] Although the treaty did not directly affect the Arkansas band, it revealed that a determined administration had the means to settle claims.

The controversial agreement caused local interests

Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1883-84 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1887), p. 206. Hereafter cited as Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians.

[17]Emmet Starr, Early History of the Cherokee Embracing Aboriginal Customs, Religion, Laws, Folk Lore, and Civilization (n.p., 1917), p. 44. Hereafter cited as Starr, Early History of the Cherokees.

[18]Charles Royce (comp.), Indian Land Cessions in the United States in John Wesley Powell, 18th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute: 1896-97, Part II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1899), pp. 680-681.

[19]Charles Kappler (comp. and ed.), Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1904), pp. 124-126. Hereafter cited as Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties.

[20]Crawford to Principal Chiefs and Warriors of the Cherokee Nation, May 13, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 109-110.

to lash out against the federal government. Many covetous citizens of Tennessee argued that the Cherokees did not own the Creek lands. They felt deceived because the Creek War cession had seemingly made more Indian land available for settlement, but the recognition of Cherokee claims to a part of the Creek cessions prevented it. Andrew Jackson echoed the outcry of his brother Tennesseans, when he blamed the agreement on land hungry "whites and half breeds" in the Cherokee Nation. He excused the tribe's full bloods of similar designs.

War Department officials at least appeared to protect the interest of the Cherokees, thus courting their favor for future negotiations. With some haste Jackson and the other commissioners attempted to run a line along the Cherokee-Creek border to take advantage of the end of the Creek War, but Crawford declared that they did not have the "power" to survey.[21] The War Department's position did not, however, stop local agitation for an exchange. Government officials listened to Tennessee's request for a cession leading to a Cherokee removal from north and south of the Tennessee River. To further Tennessee's desires and the removal policy, federal authorities proposed to make $25,000 worth of annuities and gifts available. Following an earlier pattern Meigs located allies within the tribe who

---

[21] Crawford to Jackson, May 20, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

would cooperate in negotiations.[22] Crawford also instructed Jackson that Indian titles were confused and scolded him for defending the claims of local settlers.[23]

The Secretary of War represented the divided attitude within the administration, mixing idealism with sensitivity to the political pressure from the frontier. Of the two the latter caused more concern. To legalize all white claims the government had to gain more cessions before allowing surveys and auctions. Jackson reflected the impatient position of the men on the pale of settlement, but Crawford defended Madison's position:

> In this state of uncertainty, an enlightened and liberal nation should not set aside the claims of its ignorant and savage neighbours, where they have never been recognized by any act of the government. . . . When we are judges in our own cause, and where the weakness of the other party does not admit of an appeal from our decision, delicacy, as well as a proper sense of justice, should induce us to lean in favor of the claim adverse to ours.[24]

Despite such idealism Crawford ordered Meigs to resume the drive for an exchange of lands with the Cherokees. Initially intending simply to get title to the Cherokee land, he wanted Meigs to send a deputation to a Chickasaw conference scheduled for September, where it might be possible

---

[22]Crawford to Meigs, May 27, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 110.

[23]Ibid., 112.

[24]Crawford to Jackson, June 19, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

for the American commissioners to have leaders of both tribes make a cession simultaneously.[25]

The administration still experienced pressure from the citizens of Tennessee. Already a few settlers had intruded on the land in question. The responsibility for ejecting them rested with the War Department and it turned to General Jackson, Commandant for the Southwest District. Thus, squatters were relatively safe.[26]

Jackson's attitude presaged a change. For some months War Department officials stubbornly defended the right of the Cherokees and the Chickasaws to refuse to cede lands. This was altered during the first week of July, 1816, when administration officials decided to make "a more strenuous effort to obtain the lands lying between the Cherokee line and the Tennessee River, both from the Chickasaws and the Cherokees. . . ." In addition the War Department officials advised Jackson that action to remove intruding settlers was "suspended."[27] Jackson was quick to catch the new tone. Rationalizing that it was essential "for national defence and protection of our frontier," he sought

---

[25] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 112.

[26] Crawford to Jackson, July 1, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[27] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 102. For evidence that the government would allow the Indians to react negatively to more cessions see Crawford to Jackson, June 19, 1816, ibid., 100; see Crawford to Jackson, July 1, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

a cession of all the lands south of the Tennessee River "for a moderate compensation."[28] The promise of a treaty proved to be a catalyst to speculators and provided an added incentive for the commissioners to complete the work of removal.[29]

As a matter of course Meigs tested the attitudes of Cherokee leaders regarding a cession. Although he originally got a negative answer, he was later encouraged by the prospects. Cherokee leader George Lowry, with land to the north of the Tennessee River, had been approached and wanted to accept the offer made for his holdings, but the thirty or more families that lived near him felt there would be too much "hardship" in moving. Nevertheless, he thought that when the time came there would be cessions in western Tennessee because it was in the best interest of the tribe.

So far the Arkansas Cherokees had not achieved any of their ends in the maneuvering which preceded the 1816 convention. That which followed did not contribute to their security. Although the deputation sent to the Chickasaw

---

[28] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 103.

[29] Jackson to Brigidier-General John Coffee, June 21, 1817, Andrew Jackson, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, May 1, 1814, to December 31, 1819, ed. by John Spencer Bassett, Papers of the Department of Historical Research, ed. by J. Franklin Jameson (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1927), 298. Hereafter cited as Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson.

conference had instructions not to sell any land, a familiar pattern re-emerged. The commissioners distributed presents to the Indians making it easier to negotiate.[30] With twelve Cherokees in attendance another treaty was signed on September 14. In it the Cherokees surrendered claim to nearly 2.2 million acres south of the Tennessee River running to the Tombigbee River in return for an immediate payment of $5,000 and a $6,000 annuity for ten years. The tribal representatives, aware that they had ignored their orders, added a clause reserving the right of the National Council to approve the new agreement before it would go into effect.[31] Jackson's role cannot be ignored; strongly and stubbornly he drove negotiations. As the key figure representing the government, and in effect, Tennessee, he pressed the Cherokee delegates for a favorable treaty. In his own words, ". . . it was found both wise and politic to make a few presents to the chiefs and interpreters."[32]

---

[30]Thurman Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Story of the Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 94; also Crawford to Jackson, September 10, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[31]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 92, 113, 114; also Treaty with the Cherokees, September 14, 1816, Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties, II, 133-134; see Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 44; also Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, p. 94; see Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 42.

[32]Jackson, Meriwether and Franklin to Crawford, September 20, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 104-105.

With the first business out of the way the government moved to improve the Arkansas Cherokee position. Crawford sought a formal recognition of the emigrant's situation on the Arkansas River. The means to legitimatize their migration included obtaining an acknowledgment of their existence as a western branch of the tribe from the Eastern Cherokees and to endorse the migration of additional Eastern Cherokees. The Nation in the East had to recognize that it was in its own best interest "to encourage and cherish the emigrant settlement. . . ." He believed that part of the tribe wanted to progress in the Anglo-American tradition, as individual property owners.

> They must become civilized, or they will finally, as many tribes have already been, become extinct. Those among them who have property must feel the want of fixed laws, judiciously administered, for the protection of that property. This can hardly be affected whilst the great mass of their people are destitute of property and attached exclusively to the wandering life of huntsmen.

Thus, emigration was the solution for the largest part of the poor, landless Cherokees.[33]

Crawford's concern for migration was echoed more optimistically by two of his operatives in the field. Confidently Jackson believed that a total cession was imminent.[34] And another Tennessean trying to affect a cession, former Governor Joseph McMinn, worked for a huge grant

---

[33]Crawford to Meigs, September 18, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[34]Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 215.

including lands to the north of the Tennessee River. Once the tribe realized its holdings were shrinking, he thought, it would chose to cross the Mississippi River rather than stay in a crowded region. As an inducement he proposed that the federal government give each emigrant warrior a rifle and a supply of powder and shot. For those remaining in the East, he suggested each receive an allotment of from 640 to 1,000 acres, with the status of a free colored citizen who paid taxes. Later, if the individual wanted to dispose of his allotment, the transfer could only be made to American citizens. In his proposal the important factor of local opinion was not ignored. Correctly assuming that the administration had been disturbed by frontier grumbling over the failure to gain Creek territory, McMinn reminded federal officials that when the Cherokees made the cession, the friction of the previous summer would be ended.[35]

For the Arkansas Cherokees the critical time had arrived. If they were to receive title to their Western territory and gain the extra considerations of an outlet to the West and a trading post, negotiations between the Eastern Cherokees and the federal government would have to be utilized. Jackson and President James Monroe believed that the land should belong to the people who could put it to its best use, Anglo-Americans. Thus, men in a position

---

[35]McMinn to Crawford, October 25, 1816, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 115.

to effect it had strong beliefs in the urgency of cession and removal.[36] In Monroe's First Annual Message to Congress in December, 1817, he said:

> . . . In this Progress, which the rights of nature demand and nothing can prevent, marking a growth, rapid and gigantic, it is our duty to make new efforts for the preservation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants. The hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert. It yields to the more dense and compact form and greater force of civilized population; and of right it ought to yield, for the earth was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for their own support and comfort.[37]

The earlier cessions had already prompted some of the Cherokees to move westward. Still personally rationalizing that the future identity of the tribe could best be preserved in the West, Meigs encouraged such action. The three states most interested in Cherokee removal, South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee, also exerted great pressure on tribal leaders. Meigs believed that the Cherokees were not insensitive to what was happening and would accept the inevitable. He estimated that $20,000 worth of gifts

---

[36]Henry R. Schoolcraft, Journal of a Tour into the Interior of Missouri and Arkansas in 1818-1819, ed. by Hugh Park, Schoolcraft in the Ozarks, Arkansas Historical Series No. 3 (Van Buren, Ark.: Press-Argus, 1821, 1955), p. 278.

[37]James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897: Published by Authority of Congress, II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1896), 16.

would be required to secure negotiations.[38] "The Indians are very slow in all their public transaction and we must," advised Meigs, "wait with patience: The prospects at present is [sic] favorable."[39] Congress cooperated. The Senate Committee on Public Lands recommended that treaties of exchange be made with Eastern Indians to move them West. Interaction of whites and Indians, its members said, corrupted the morals of each.[40]

Prominently paving the way by promoting good will, General Jackson invoked the usual, ineffective pronouncement ordering intruders off Cherokee lands. If the settlers did not have Meigs' permission to stay, they were given thirty days to leave the Indian country.[41] He also ordered whites to remove from Indian reservations established in January, 1806.[42] During the winter Meigs sounded out tribal leaders, especially the recalcitrant Cherokee Chief Path-killer. The War Department knew that the chiefs had asked "not to be pressed" for more sales, but it was impossible to

---

[38]Meigs to Crawford, November 8, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[39]Ibid., Meigs to McMinn, November 8, 1816.

[40]Niles Weekly Register, January 18, 1817, p. 348; see American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 123-124.

[41]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 108; see Niles Weekly Register, November 30, 1816, p. 233.

[42]Graham to Jackson, December 28, 1816, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

hide the government's drive for a cession.[43] One Cherokee, Dan Ross, reminded Meigs in a plaintive note that he owned his land by an "early promise." He did not want the "inconvenience" of moving to an "unknown country," although he added that he had no intention of fighting.[44] Ross had reason to worry. The administration decided in January to restore the reservations of January, 1806, to the public domain providing the terms were "reasonable," feeling that such action was warranted because the original Indian grantees had abandoned them.[45]

A preliminary meeting between Meigs and the Cherokee chiefs failed when the major leaders of the Nation did not appear. Among those involved in the boycott were Pathkiller, Sour Mush, Charles Hicks, and The Ridge. Even in their absence the men attending split along predictable lines with some favoring a cession and others forming into "violent opposition." Major Walker, who earlier had shown favor to an exchange, now took a more "cautious" stand. On the other hand, a well-known white living with the Cherokees, John Rogers, announced his intention to move "to the Hot Springs." A large tract had been leased from the

---

[43] Ibid., Graham to Meigs, December 9, 1816.

[44] Dan Ross to Meigs, December 27, 1816, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[45] Graham to Jackson, January 13, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; see ibid., Graham to Jackson, March 22, 1807.

Quapaws for fifty years by Rogers and appeared to have been part of a plan to convince the Cherokees that good lands were available in the West. The lease, approved by William Clark, lent an air of sanctity to the transaction. In the meantime Meigs listened to various suggestions that would encourage an exchange. Rogers believed that the "poorer class" of cattle owning Cherokees would be more inclined to leave if they could sell their livestock rather than try to take it with them.[46]

Meigs' determination to complete an exchange was based on a fear that time had grown short for the Cherokees. "It is my opinion," he wrote, "that the Cherokee Nation ought to embrace the Present opportunity to secure themselves the lands on the Arkansas river, it is now in their power, but the probability is that it cannot long remain so." Without a treaty those who had already emigrated would have no security. They would be like "renegades" because they lacked title to the land.[47] A cession had to occur in the Eastern Nation to assure the Arkansas Cherokee position.[48]

Governor McMinn grew in importance because the

---

[46]Meigs to McMinn, January 17, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[47]Ibid., Secretary of War to Meigs, January 17, 1817.

[48]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 125.

government expected him to lay the groundwork for the cession. He was already at work in January, 1817, although admittedly awaiting instructions from the President to go further. As the new year started McMinn listened to whites advocating a removal.[49]

Preparing for the removal Meigs wrote to Western Indian agents for information concerning the Osage purchase, particularly "the quantity and quality of the land" and the number of Cherokees living in Arkansas.[50] The administration was confused about the next step. Jackson, for one, had been sent to negotiate for a clearance of title for reservations which dated from January, 1806. In the days that followed the War Department decided to make such an agreement secondary, advising Jackson instead to concentrate on the exchange.[51]

The treaty preparations had long been carried on in fits and starts but in late April, the commissioner worked more earnestly to draw specific plans. The Eastern tribal leaders turned to a strategy which was based on delay. They thought that by using this tactic they would prevent

---

[49] McMinn to Meigs, January 29, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[50] Ibid., Meigs to Lovely, March 6, 1817.

[51] Graham to Jackson, March 22, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; see ibid., Graham to Jackson, March 25, 1817; Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 292.

cessions. In a reversal the government suddenly moved more firmly, believing that a vast majority of the Cherokees would agree to terms. Jackson still attributed the tribe's negative attitude to "a few half breeds."[52]

Both the Senate and the President approved of the objectives of the contemplated treaty.[53] Land for relocating the Cherokees was chosen adjacent to the Osage boundary in northwestern Arkansas. Richard Graham, a frontier agent, told Jackson that the area was "most congenial to their habits" of hunting, and that the latter could employ any one of several means to make an agreement. For example he could offer cash to help pay the costs of travel to the Arkansas River or arms and blankets could be promised if other "articles" were needed. Ironically, the War Department expected Cherokees who owned land to go as soon as they realized ". . . the benefits they will derive from the enjoyment of the rights and immunities of a citizen of the United States, and in the protection of the laws. . . ." As a last-ditch "inducement," if necessary, Jackson was to offer a section of land. Even if the treaty failed to materialize, War Department officials cautiously rationalized that the meeting would publicize the government position and thus make a later cession easier to

---

[52]Jackson to Graham, April 22, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 292.

[53]Graham to Jackson, May 14, 1817, Letters Sent By the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

accomplish.[54]

Opposition grew within the Nation. Individuals counted on by Meigs for help were, in an understated manner, "under some restraint" from less sympathetic elements. Meigs willingly accepted the idea that if half the Eastern Cherokees wanted to "become civilized," they would be allowed to retain their property, while the other half of the Nation would migrate.[55] At that time Meigs guessed that as many as half the tribe might want to remain behind, certainly a disappointment to those seeking a complete exchange.

The meetings began at Cherokee Agency in Tennessee during the spring of 1817. By June 20, the conferences had yielded no results. The tribe's delaying tactics had some effect. The only chiefs in attendance were those from the Arkansas country led by Tolontuskee. Jackson still blamed the negative influence of "whites and half breeds" in the East who had determined not to appear.[56] Pathkiller, the principal Cherokee chief and strongly opposed to the exchange, was too ill to be present since he would have to travel 200 miles. The commissioners encountered more disappointment when the leaders who did appear opposed the

---

[54] Ibid., Graham to Jackson, May 16, 1817.

[55] Meigs to Jackson, May 24, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 295.

[56] Jackson to Coffee, June 21, 1817, ibid., 298.

transaction, too. Arguing that the men who went to Washington, in 1808, had no authority to make any exchange, they declared that agreements of that period were illegal. That also meant they did not approve of any grants that would give land to the Arkansas Cherokees, as shown by an attack in early July before the assemblage: "we are now distressed with the alternative proposal to remove from this country to the Arkansas, or stay and become citizens of the United States."[57]

In addition the presence of the Arkansas Cherokees raised the ire of Eastern Cherokee leaders. On July 3, they objected particularly to John Chisholm, whom they said combined the liabilities of a bad reputation with the fact that he was a white man. He did not represent the tribe. They called for solely "bona fide" Arkansas Cherokees to speak. The Nation criticized the cession by pointing out that the discussion caused widespread anxiety due to rumors of the impending treaty.[58] The arguments impeded but did not prevent the negotiations. The commissioners recognized the factions within the Eastern Nation and said ". . . those not prepared for civil life whill /sic/ go to the Arkansas, the extension of the law will make all go who are afraid of

---

[57] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 142-143.

[58] U. S. Commissioners to Graham, July 8, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 302.

good government."[59]

Jackson clarified the federal position on July 4, 1817, prior to the acceptance of an exchange by some members of the tribe, by breaking the alternatives into three parts: 1) fast migration for those who wanted to go to Arkansas; 2) American citizenship for those who wanted to remain with rights to a reservation of land; or 3) those who wanted to live within the tribal framework could do so. Jackson invoked Monroe's figure to the opposition. The President, he said, had promised land to the Cherokees in Arkansas adding that his word "must be fulfilled."

The turning point for the commissioners occurred on July 4, when they made a presentation especially pleasing to the Cherokees.[60] Although not publicized at the time, Jackson added a 'private article' to the treaty that included a bribe of $1,000 for John Chisholm.[61] Chisholm supported the exchange and accepted the gift.

The treaty was signed on July 8, 1817. Its terms had sweeping importance for the tribe on both sides of the Mississippi. According to the preamble the agreement reflected Jefferson's advice to Cherokees to settle high

---

[59]U.S. Commissioners to Graham, July 8, 1817, ibid., 303-304.

[60]U.S. Commissioners to Cherokee Council, July 4, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 299-301.

[61]Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, pp. 43-44.

on the Arkansas and White River. If they removed, the emigrants would be given lands in exchange for those in the East. Nevertheless, the entire undertaking had an air of unreality because a large number of the Cherokee leaders had not approved the action. Still, the government was determined to make an exchange putting Jefferson's previous commitment "into full effect." The Cherokees East requested that the Arkansas Cherokees be forced to return and continued to oppose payment of the annuity to the Arkansas band.

Indeed, the first article of the treaty fulfilled Jefferson's promise. It provided for a cession by the Cherokees to the United States of all territory extending from the

> high shoals of the Appalachy river, thence along the boundary line . . . , westwardly to the Chatahouchy /sic/ river; thence, up the Chatahouchy river, to the mouth of Souque creek; thence, continuing until it reaches the Indian boundary line, and, should it strike the Turrurar river, thence, with its meanders, down said river to its mouth, in part of the proportion of land in the Cherokee nation east of the Mississippi, to which those now on the Arkansas and those about to remove there are justly entitled.

The second article also contained a cession taking the land that ran to the north and west of the following points:

> Beginning at the Indian boundary line . . . from the north bank of the Tennessee river, opposite to the mouth of Hywassee river, at a point at the top of Walden's ridge, where it divides the waters of the Tennessee river from those of the Sequatchie river; thence, along the said ridge,

> southwardly, to the bank of the Tennessee river, . . . near to a place called the Negro Sugar Camp, opposite to the upper end of the first island about Running Water Town; thence westwardly, a straight line to the mouth of the Little Sequatchie river; . . . to its source; and thence, due west, to the Indian boundary line.

The two clauses transferred land belonging to Cherokees in the Upper Towns to white settlers and forced the Cherokees southward into Georgia. Thus, the states of Tennessee and South Carolina effectively removed the Cherokees from most of their territory.

The third and fourth articles were closely linked. The former called for a census of the Eastern Cherokees and the Western Cherokees during June, 1818. In the latter clause the signers agreed to split the annuity for 1818 in proportion to the relative populations east and west of the Mississippi. Eastern leaders had fought the apportionment of the annuity, but gifts distributed by the commissioners to certain tribal leaders silenced much of the opposition.

The treaty required the United States to survey a tract in Arkansas for the Cherokees.[62] The land was north of the Arkansas River and south of the White River. The western part of the grant remained open as Tolontuskee had recommended earlier. White settlers, except Persis Lovely,

---

[62]McMinn and Meigs believed the lack of a western boundary would serve to absorb late arriving emigrants. McMinn to Calhoun, February 12, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal. Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties, II, 140-144.

the wife of the late William Lovely who elected to live with the Cherokees, were to be removed. A trading factory was promised.

In article six the government offered "to all the poor warriors" who left for Arkansas "one rifle gun and ammunition, one blanket, and one brass kettle, or in lieu of the brass kettle, a beaver trap . . . considered as a full compensation for the improvements which they may leave; . . ." Federal officials provided flatboats for transporting the emigrants.

In the seventh article the commissioners promised to pay Cherokees for improvements on the ceded land, and the next article gave a reservation of 640 acres and offered citizenship to each Cherokee who remained in the East. Children were to receive the land later in fee simple. Reservations formed in January, 1806, for Doublehead and Tolontuskee were returned to the public domain. The treaty failure of 1816 had been rectified. Many signed for the Eastern Cherokees but prominent by their absence were Pathkiller, John Ross, and The Ridge, which indicated that the significant leaders of the tribe had not been brought to heel.[63]

Nevertheless, the commissioners were pleased with the results because the treaty offered "justice to all." The obstacles, according to Jackson, were the mixed bloods

---

[63]Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties, II, 140-144.

and "supposedly friendly whites." The old chiefs were the most pliable. "Had the Nation been left to the council of its old chiefs, we would have but little trouble. . . ." Still smarting from the strong opposition, the commissioners called the National Council "corrupt." Ironically, since the old chiefs had accepted "gifts" they became more reliable.[64] They ceded an estimated 5,000,000 acres in the East and received 3,020,800 acres in Arkansas.[65] For the next eighteen months the reaction to the treaty was mixed. The National Council energetically opposed it. A number of small factions considered moving. In spite of these tribal attitudes, government officials believed that the Nation was on the verge of a mass removal.

The government moved quickly to implement the removal. Shortly after the ceremony completing the negotiation, part of the Nation, which had been anxious to emigrate, signed to abandon their lands and move West. The first party consisted of 700 Cherokees and prompted Meigs to predict that a majority of the tribe would remove within "a few years."[66] Meigs acted to insure that transportation would be furnished for the first enrollees. He

---

[64]U.S. Commissioners to Cherokee Council, July 4, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 300-301.

[65]Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 44.

[66]Meigs to Governor Clark, July 24, 1817, Niles Weekly Register, September 27, 1817, p. 74.

told the Secretary of War that the boat construction would be contracted as soon as possible, and requested that 500 rifles, promised in the treaty, be forwarded to Tennessee. Although flatboats had been noted as necessary for the trip down the Tennessee to the Arkansas country, the agent pointed out that keelboats would have to be built, too, to move the Cherokees up the Arkansas River.[67]

The first sign that the federal government was unprepared to carry out the terms of the treaty as quickly as the commissioners expected occurred in exchanges between a Tennessee contractor, William Rockhold, and the War Department. After approving that he construct sixty flatboats and distribute the rifles and lead to emigrants, War Department officials discovered that food stores for the Indians were unavailable. Provisions and arms were promised for November, which meant that the Cherokees would have to move during the winter.[68] The government made $80,000 available for the purchase of kettles, blankets, shot,

---

[67]Meigs to Secretary of War, July 24, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[68]Rockhold to Graham, August 6, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal; ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, August 11, 1817; also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 144; also Graham to Rockhold, August 13, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; also Rockhold to Meigs, August 30, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

powder, rifles, and traps.[69]

The agent for Cherokee removal, Governor Joseph McMinn, operated at his own discretion with the President's approval.[70] Having a free hand enabled McMinn to use the presents judiciously as a lure to induce more Cherokees to leave Tennessee.[71] McMinn recognized the irony of the situation when he explained to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that rifles encouraged the hunters to leave their land and pursue game instead of agricultural interests, which slowed assimilation.[72]

After the treaty was signed in 1817, the government cleared white settlers from northwestern Arkansas in the event that all the Cherokees removed.[73] Only the Osage presence barred unquestioned title to the area, but Lovely's Purchase had irritated them. The Osages originally negotiated with Lovely convinced that the land surrendered was not as large as later represented and would not become

---

[69] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 144, 479; also McKenney to George Graham, August 13, 1817, Letters Sent by Superintendent of Indian Trade, B.I.A., D:393.

[70] C. Vandeventer to McMinn, June 25, 1818, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[71] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 478-479.

[72] McMinn to Calhoun, September 20, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[73] Graham to Clark, July 11, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

Cherokee property. Although the agreement was "unauthorized" and never ratified, it served as a basis for the Cherokee's dream of colonizing western Arkansas. The tribe was "disappointed to learn that the Cherokees through the treaty of 1817 could acquire that territory."[74]

The Osages lost the opportunity to stop the expansion of the Cherokees. During the wars between the Cherokees and the Osages, the former realized that a victory would promote their territorial claims to the West in the same manner as victors in a European war. Tolontuskee enunciated that as a war aim, ". . . my object," he said, "was to be remunerated by a cession of their country."[75] Hoping to gain government acceptance, Tolontuskee offered a part of the land recovered from the Osages as a refuge for Shawnees, Delawares, and "other small bands" revealing that he understood the atmosphere in Washington regarding Indian removals to the West.[76] In the winter of 1818,

---

[74]Stephen H. Long to Thomas Smith, January 29, 1818, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIX: The Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), 4-6. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX.

[75]"Toluntiskee" speech, February 21, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records; see also ibid., McMinn to Graham, November 25, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal, for a similar statement by McMinn.

[76]Tolontuskee speech, February 22, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

President Monroe innocently assured Tolontuskee that federal officials would work for a treaty of cession with the Quapaws because "it is my wish that you should have no limits to the west, so that you may have good millseats, plenty of game, and not to be surrounded by the white people."[77] That agreeable statement counted as a major achievement for the Cherokee statesmen. Monroe rewarded him for his work in Tennessee with a promise that his people would have a permanent and unthreatened reserve in Arkansas. Monroe was aiding American interests, too, by making Arkansas attractive for more removals.

In the spring of 1818, Governor Clark summoned Osage and Quapaw leaders to St. Louis. The Secretary of War told Clark to make an agreement that would be "favorable to the Cherokees, as the President is anxious to hold out every inducement to the Cherokees, and the other southern nations of Indians, to emigrate to the west of the Missouri."[78] The Quapaws signed a treaty in August, 1818, in which they yielded their claims to the land from the mouth of the Arkansas River to the Red River.[79] Similarly, in September,

---

[77]Monroe to Tolontuskee, February 3, 1818, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XX: The Territory of Arkansas, 1826-1831 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956), 333. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX.

[78]Calhoun to Clark, May 8, 1818, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[79]Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties, II, 160-161 for details.

1818, the Osages came to terms with the United States. The federal government assumed spoliation claims and other debts which the Osages had accumulated in their attacks against whites. In return the Osages surrendered rights to the land from Frog Bayou, west of the Cherokee settlements, on the Arkansas River west to the falls of the Verdigris River.[80]

Federal authorities believed that the Quapaw and Osage treaties would serve as a sign of their good faith to convince the rest of the Cherokee Nation to remove.

> Under the late treaty with the Quapaws and Osages very extensive tracts of land have been acquired, a considerable portion of which is not intended to be brought immediately into the market, and which hereafter become the means of exchanging for lands held by the Southern Indians. . . .[81]

In the meantime the Monroe administration mobilized all possible elements to convince the Cherokees to remove West. Meigs pressed his favorite plan, that the government build a trading post and station the military on the Arkansas. The treaty promised a fort would be built and in July, 1817, the Secretary of War ordered Jackson to search for a location to serve as a "check" on the warfare between the Cherokees and the Osages. The first troops slated for duty

---

[80] Ibid., 167.

[81] Secretary of War to Jackson, December 15, 1818, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 19; also Secretary of War to Jackson, November 16, 1818, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

were instructed to restore peace.[82]

Federal officials invited Isaac Rawlings, who ran the post at Chickasaw Bluffs, to establish a trading factory in Arkansas.[83] The most favored location was at Dardanelle Rock across from Illinois Bayou and the line of Cherokee villages. The mouth of the Verdigris River was also considered because it could serve the Osages, although it was west of the main body of Arkansas Cherokees.[84] In the late spring the trade factory was located at Fort Smith situated on Belle Point where the Poteau River joined the Arkansas River.[85] Fort Smith had been erected in 1817, under orders of the War Department, in fulfillment of a treaty obligation to the Cherokees.[86]

Small parties of Cherokees trickled West during late 1817 and early 1818. In an attempt to influence leaders of the Cherokee Nation, McMinn used rifles, blankets, and money gifts to induce emigration. He even took delegations of prominent Cherokees to Washington to expose them to the appeals of the President and the Secretary of War. A

---

[82]Graham to Jackson, July 30, 1817, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[83]McKenney to Rawlings, December 12, 1817, Letters Sent by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, B.I.A., D:644.

[84]Ibid., McKenney to Calhoun, March 17, 1818, E:7.

[85]Ibid., McKenney to Rawlings, May 29, 1818, E:52; see ibid., McKenney to Rawlings, July 20, 1818, E:81.

[86]Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, pp. 49-50.

visit, in 1818, included payment of $1,000 to Tolontuskee. Others attending got half that sum for "aiding the operations."[87]

The ultimate in bribes by McMinn occurred just prior to the Treaty of 1819. Meeting tribal leaders opposed to removal on November 24, 1818, he offered the chiefs $100,000 if they would exchange their lands. When they refused, he doubled it, calling it an "indemnity."[88] He made yet another offer five days later that met with the same answer.[89] For McMinn none of the earlier maneuvers seemed misdirected, only inadequate. In January, he acted in exasperation. Trying to block the work of the National Council ". . . I yielded to the necessity," he said, "of purchasing their friendship. . . ." The object of his beneficence, four Cherokee leaders received cash gifts to hinder the work of the National Council and to help McMinn sign more emigrants.[90]

Another disappointment for McMinn and the Cherokees who planned to emigrate concerned evaluation of ceded land. Originally provisions were made for federal agents to assess property and make the payments for improvements as soon as

---

[87]Calhoun to McMinn, March 16, 1818, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 478-479.

[88]Ibid., 481-482.

[89]Ibid., 488.

[90]McMinn to Calhoun, January 24, 1819, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

possible. If that had been accomplished it would have served the best interest of the Cherokees and the administration. McMinn had the power to "fix" the amounts to be paid.[91] To prevent jealousy and also to add to his leverage, McMinn decided in mid-1818, to withhold information concerning the assessments and payments for improvements from the emigrants. McMinn had decided that his powers enabled him to get "any arrangement for the execution of the treaty. . . ."[92]

His problems multiplied when he realized that the administration had not made sufficient funds available and that the property values were higher than originally expected. To those in the midst of removing, McMinn promised that their money would follow them to Arkansas. To the cautious he advised that in a short time there would be thievery and encroachments by their white neighbors. A prompt migration to the West would ensure the fair value of their improvements.[93] A leader among the Cherokee emigrants, Dick Justice, asked McMinn to explain what he intended to do with the land. McMinn produced a plan to "lease" Cherokee improvements for three years. He could

---

[91] An agent in the field, George Gillespie, made the evaluation. Ibid., Calhoun to McMinn, March 31, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[92] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, June 8, 1818.

[93] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, November 13, 1818; see Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 224; see also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 481-482.

not total the value in advance because he did not want to "bind" the government for what had not been computed. He promised that once the holdings were sold ". . . I will, be able from those sales to make presents. . . ."[94]

Starting in the late fall of 1817, the migration got underway. Among the first to leave was John Rogers, a white man who had lived with the Cherokees for almost forty years. With thirty-one Cherokees he received government provisions for the journey.[95]

The greatest victory for the removal party occurred when John Jolly, one of the most respected and economically independent members of the Tennessee Cherokees, decided to migrate. He sent part of his wealth, forty-three horses, ahead with Rogers' party.[96] He did not picture the move as regressive because his people were not abandoning the agriculture learned from Meigs or the word of the missionaries. He requested teachers for his new home, feeling that instruction would be more effective in the Arkansas country because "we shall settle more compactly on our new lands than were here."[97]

---

[94]McMinn to Dick Justice, December 4, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[95]Ibid., McMinn to Secretary of War, November 11, 1817.

[96]Ibid., McMinn to Secretary of War, January 8, 1818.

[97]Ibid., Jolly to Calhoun, January 23, 1818.

In early 1818, Jolly's party, consisting of 331 Indians, departed for the West aboard twelve flatboats and four keelboats. One flatboat remained behind to carry runaway slaves to Arkansas following their recovery.[98] Based on information gathered from Cherokees who had moved to Arkansas in 1811, the trip would take sixty-six days. Jolly received rations for seventy days. Through his influence he succeeded in luring most of the people from his locale in Tennessee into making the trip with him. The Jolly excursion highlighted this phase of the Cherokee removal.[99]

The emigrant's trip overland was marred by the actions of white settlers. Three of Jolly's horses were stolen for which Rogers later asked compensation. Rogers also used the incident to call attention to white hostility claiming that Cherokees on the road could be "plundered or murdered" while passing through Alabama.[100] By the end of February, 1818, McMinn had launched nineteen boats and 400 people. He stated that he would have to move into the interior to gain more converts, "those who live a considerable distance from the agency" because enrollment had dropped.[101] The rate of migration had slowed by the fall

---

[98] Ibid., Jolly's Passport, January 26, 1818; see also ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, February 12, 1818.

[99] Ibid., Meigs to Secretary of War, February 18, 1818.

[100] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, September 28, 1818.

[101] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, February 28, 1818.

of 1818, yet McMinn estimated that about 2,900 Cherokees lived west of the Mississippi River with an exceptionally large number, 196 families, signed to leave for Arkansas between October 20 and November 15.[102] By the end of November, he had added 93 more and believed that nearly 720 families in all had "enrolled."

For the most part the problems encountered by migrants while traveling did not discourage removal. Nevertheless, tragedy almost occurred in January, 1818, when low water delayed The Glass party and forced it to land near Muscle Shoals where the 160 Cherokees consumed all their rations. As a result they barely survived the winter.[103] As the new year started McMinn won Major Walker over to removal. He had reached him on the National Council with a bribe, and Walker and ninety-two others signed to migrate. For many months he had been a "friend" of the removal faction.[104]

Another way to obtain Cherokee land, provided for in the Treaty of 1817, was through severalty. Federal authorities set aside reservations or allotments in severalty for individual Cherokees either in the East or in Arkansas. One Cherokee favoring removal asked for a

---

[102] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 483.

[103] Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 66.

[104] McMinn to Calhoun, January 1, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

section reserved for his family promising, in turn, that he would continue to encourage settlers to go to Arkansas.[105]

The War Department suspected that many Cherokees used the reservation option to delay migration. Calhoun ruled that Cherokees taking land in severalty but deciding later to move to Arkansas would receive the benefits of emigrants, but their eastern allotment reverted to the government.[106] Thus, severalty emerged to parallel Jefferson's earlier plan, one that would not disrupt the drive to acquire Cherokee territory.

In July, 1818, Calhoun mistakenly believed that a total removal was imminent. He told McMinn that reservations were only a momentary alternative because the Cherokees were ". . . surrounded . . . by the white population. . . ."[107] By late November, the number taking reservations had shrunk to less than 150 families, about one-fifth the number who took advantage of the treaty to leave Tennessee.[108] The slowdown in emigration, by late 1818, caused federal officials to summon tribal leaders again to Washington. McMinn had forced the issue when he threatened to withdraw federal protection against settler

---

[105] Ibid., Petition of Brown to Secretary of War, January 1, 1818.

[106] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 478-479.

[107] Ibid., 480.

[108] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, November 29, 1818, 482.

intrusion.[109]

From the very beginning a majority of the National Council fought the removal party. McMinn found the opposition took several forms, some more effective than others. A census had been agreed to in the treaty as a means to proportionally divide the annuity as well as a popular test of policy. Each side tried to use it to gain an advantage. Sensing its importance in early 1818, McMinn cautioned the War Department on the negative value of a headcount before a large number of Cherokees had removed.[110] The Eastern Cherokees understood its importance, too. In the face of their strong representations McMinn did not know if he should "suspend" it.[111] In the interim the Arkansas Cherokees agreed that their goals would be better served with a delay. Tolontuskee told McMinn that his people would stall the Western census for as long as possible.[112]

The showdown, in 1818, took place at a council at Oostinallee when Eastern Cherokee leaders asked McMinn why the census had not been made. McMinn announced he was

---

[109] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, December 8, 1818, 482.

[110] McMinn to Calhoun, February 12, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal. Originally the government meant to conduct a census. Calhoun to McMinn, April 25, 1818, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 479.

[111] McMinn to Calhoun, May 10, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[112] Ibid., McMinn to Secretary of War, June 8, 1818.

awaiting orders from Washington, but on July 7, Charles Hicks "pressed" for an "enumeration" as soon as possible.[113] At the end of 1818, Pathkiller reminded McMinn that the failure to hold the census was a breach of the treaty. That was more than a gentle prod since the division of the annuity was at stake. McMinn answered a little weakly that each headcount would have to be taken at the same time intimating that there were delays in the West.[114]

From the first a strong faction of Cherokees, centering in the National Council, blocked the movement of emigrants. Cherokees living in northwest Georgia received modest encouragement from a minority in Congress. When the Treaty of 1817 went to the Senate, the opposition criticized it on the grounds that it had not been approved by a majority of the tribe and was not binding. Nevertheless, the treaty was ratified.[115]

A sensitive Jackson defended the treaty by saying that every principal Cherokee chief, except Pathkiller, had signed the document.[116] The Cherokee Council retaliated

---

[113]Extract of Letter to the Cherokee Chiefs in Council from McMinn, July 1, 1818, Documents Related to the Negotiation of Indian Treaties Ratified; see also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 528.

[114]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 484, 489.

[115]Ibid., 143.

[116]Jackson to Graham, August 19, 1817, Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, II, 322.

against one of the chiefs who had signed, Toochalar, by stripping him of his power.[117] By September, 1818, they had composed a statement attacking the 1817 treaty, charging "improper methods and influences. . . ."[118] The Eastern Cherokees understood the treaty's irony:

> . . . your encouragement to our people has not been availing in agriculture, and manufacturing clothing, and educating our children; yet we are told by our neighbors that we shall have to move over to the Arkanas country as hunters, return to that state again in which our forefathers lived; for a great many of our people are now experiencing the advantages of the domestic habits of living by industry and raising stock.[119]

Opposition also took the form of rumors. One story circulated that since the treaty was not authorized by Cherokee leaders, it would never be ratified. All talk of removal was wasted, which meant that the promised gifts would never be received. According to another tale, if presents were available, such as rifles, they would be inferior. As a counter move McMinn gathered Cherokees to witness emigrant departures and measure the quality of the merchandise that was distributed.[120]

The rumors were followed by more coercive measures. The Cherokee lighthorse, the Indian constabulary, seized

---

[117] Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy, p. 96.

[118] Royce, Cherokee Nation of Indians, p. 219.

[119] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 146.

[120] McMinn to Graham, November 25, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

migrant property which caused the subagent, Sam Houston, to intervene and arrest the responsible parties. The damage had been done. Many reconsidered before they signed the rolls for moving to the Arkansas country. In one incident an interpreter, friendly to the removal party, was threatened by members of the rival faction.[121] The Eastern Cherokees felt justified in pressuring would-be emigrants calling them "rebels," which increased fears that land would be confiscated or that the death penalty might be invoked.[122]

In July, 1818, when McMinn tried to complete an exchange for total removal, he heard that threats of murder had been made to those Cherokees considering cooperation with the government. Even McMinn feared violence, if he attended the meetings at Oostinallee. In addition the Cherokee lighthorse illegally seized arms from emigrants claiming that they were owed for debts. Opposition had reached a danger level.[123]

Of more importance nationally was a letter of

---

[121] Ibid., McMinn to Secretary of War, December 29, 1817.

[122] Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, January 19, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[123] Ibid., McMinn to Secretary of War, July 4, 1818, Letters Received by Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency East. Hereafter cited as Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.E. Meigs to Pathkiller, July 4, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records; also American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 528.

special pleading which appeared in the influential Niles Weekly Register. Tracing the progress of the Cherokees in terms of cultivating cotton and spinning it into cloth, the writer, an "Aboriginal Cherokee," told of the wide alarm in the Nation caused by the proposed removal to Arkansas, 700 miles away. He feared that the bad water in Arkansas would cause illness among the children. Eastern Cherokees had served notice that they were not helpless in the face of force.[124]

While the Eastern Cherokees used all means at hand to protect their land title, the Arkansas Cherokees also exerted pressure because their interests were at stake. They followed a single logic. The more that emigrated, the more land the government would add to their holdings and the larger the Western band's fraction of the annuity. Not only did the Arkansas Cherokees sustain their position but they were, in fact, the allies of the federal authorities in trying to implement the removal policy. McMinn used them whenever possible.

The most significant figure representing the interests of the Arkansas band was Tolontuskee. In a July, 1817, speech, he told his listeners that he had come "to give all the country east of the Mississippi with open hands." From the start of the negotiations, he was a prime publicist for

---

[124]Pathkiller to McMinn, July 12, 1818, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties; also Niles Weekly Register, Supplement to Vol. XVI, 96.

the good country of Arkansas. He called it the promised land for the Cherokee future.[125] The Eastern Cherokees lost no opportunity tc attack the trans-Mississippi elements of the tribe. When the Arkansas Cherokees visited Washington, their eastern counterparts viewed it with suspicion and insisted that their representatives also visit the President.[126] They complained that if Tolontuskee had his way they would fall under the "control of the minority of our nation. . . ."[127]

In early 1818, McMinn put his forces together to argue for a total removal and asked for the presence of the Arkansas delegation, representing it as a positive force in the fight for emigration rather than as a symbol that raised antagonisms among the Eastern Cherokees.[128] Government officials cooperated with the Arkansas band because it furthered the federal policy. Tolontuskee used Monroe's promise of a western outlet as a sign of the government's good faith. The President's promise provided extra incentive because it had been one of the specific requests

---

[125]"Toluntiskee" Speech, July 1817, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties Ratified.

[126]Meigs to George Graham, September 11, 1817, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[127]Principal Chiefs in Council to Deputation visiting the President, September 19, 1817, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 145.

[128]McMinn to Calhoun, February 12, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

made earlier.[129] Tolontuskee assured McMinn that the census in Arkansas would be delayed by his people, another sign of the informal alliance.[130] It was no surprise then that McMinn "prevailed" on Tolontuskee to stay in the East in the spring of 1818. In the face of Pathkiller's obstinacy, Tolontuskee was a useful foil.[131]

Overall, however, the move to effect a total removal of the tribe was a clear failure by 1819. The government recognized that it had arrived at an impasse and called for a meeting of Eastern tribal leaders in Washington in February, 1819. Although the census had not been taken, Calhoun wanted enough land to cover the number of emigrants who lived in Arkansas plus those who had enrolled.[132] The treaty signed in February was negotiated without an Arkansas representation. The meeting resulted in cession of slightly more land than agreed to in the July, 1817, treaty. The Monroe administration called it the "final adjustment." In addition the Eastern Nation agreed that the annuity would be split, the western branch to receive one-third of the total.[133]

---

[129]President to Arkansas Cherokees, February 1818, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 333.

[130]McMinn to Secretary of War, June 8, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Agent for Removal.

[131]Ibid., McMinn to Calhoun, April 24, 1818.

[132]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 190.

[133]Kappler (ed.), Laws and Treaties, II, 177-181.

Anticipating a future problem Calhoun noted that the absence of the Arkansas band at the proceedings might nullify some provisions, but the administration acted as if the treaty had resolved the difficulties of the last months.[134] For the next decade, the Arkansas band would build a new society in the southwestern wilderness.

---

[134]Calhoun's Statement, 1819, U.S., Congress, House, Calhoun Statement, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., January 3, 1826.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARKANSAS SETTLEMENT

The Treaty of 1817 secured a domain in northwestern Arkansas for the Western Cherokees. Once the terms of the treaty were publicized, most Anglo-American settlers residing there moved to new locations south of the Arkansas River.[1] By 1820, the Cherokee emigrants had blended with the older elements to form a new colony. A line of Cherokee villages stretched 100 miles from Point Remove on the Arkansas upriver to the Mulberry River near Fort Smith. In lesser numbers others lived to the north in the White River valley.[2] About one-third of the band continued to reside on the south bank of the Arkansas River.[3]

---

[1]Edwin James (comp.), Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, XVII, Early Western Travels: 1748-1846 . . ., ed. by Reuben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 28. Hereafter cited as Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII. See also Thomas L. Nuttall, Journal of Travels into the Arkansas Territory, During the Year 1819, XIII, Early Western Travels: 1748-1846 . . ., ed. by Reuben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 195. Hereafter cited as Thwaites (ed.), Nuttall in Arkansas, XIII.

[2]Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII, 128.

[3]In September 1823 an estimated 1,200 out of a total of 3,000 Cherokees remained south of the river. Arbuckle to Acting Adjutant General, September 3, 1823, Clarence Edwin

The Arkansas tract originally was conceived as a home for Cherokee hunters, an area more suited to them than the agrarian East. The makeup of the Arkansas Cherokees, however, did not differ substantially from the diversity of the Eastern Cherokees because some farmed while others raised livestock and hunted.[4]

Those removing encountered severe deprivation. They suffered from want and discomfort in the relocation. In the new country they had to endure all manner of sickness and disease. The most common ailment, which decimated the newcomers and left those who survived with fever-wracked, weakened bodies, was diagnosed as "intermittent fever." Observers believed that the western environment produced this disease. Stephen H. Long wrote:

> A luxuriant soil yielding its products to decay and putrify upon the ground, also stagnant waters, flat lands, and marshes in which the river valleys of this region abound, cannot fail to load the atmosphere with pestilential miasmata, and render the country unhealthy, . . .[5]

Timothy Flint, a visitor to the Arkansas valley, declared that the region was plagued with the "ague" and that "more than half the inhabitants" suffered from it. Territorial

---

Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIX: The Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), 546. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX. See Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 11 (November, 1825), 355.

[4]Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII, 22.

[5]Ibid., 129.

Governor William Miller admitted that most residents were afflicted but few died from it.[6]

The geography of the Cherokee territory in Arkansas varied widely. Land along the Arkansas River was fertile and covered with oak and pine forests. As the tribe developed settlement northward, the soil declined in quality.[7] Between the White and Arkansas rivers were prairies, wooded valleys, and rocky, thinly soiled extensions of the Ozark Mountains.

As had been their custom in Tennessee, Cherokees settled in towns, each with its local leadership. Through the years the men who had led the Cherokees across the Mississippi evolved into tribal chiefs. Two of the early leaders of the trans-Mississippi Cherokees did not play a role in the 1820's. The first principal chief, The Bowl, displaced by Takatoka in 1813, lived on the south side of the Arkansas. He objected to the treaties of 1817 and 1819

---

[6]Timothy Flint, Recollections of the Last Two Years, Passed in Occasional Residences and Journeyings in the Valley of the Mississippi . . . (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard and Co., 1826), p. 147. Hereafter cited as Flint, Recollections. Also duVal to McKenney, September 13, 1824, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency West, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs. Hereafter cited as Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[7]Jedidiah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the U.S. on Indian Affairs Comprising a Narrative of a Tour Performed in the Summer of 1820, Under a Commission From the President of the United States, for the Purpose of Ascertaining for the use of the Government . . . (New Haven: Howe & Spaulding, 1822), p. 255. Hereafter cited as Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs.

which restricted his people to the north bank of the Arkansas. He led his band of an estimated sixty families into Spanish Texas. Hence, he did not play a role in the development of the Western Cherokees after 1821.[8] Tolontuskee, the elder statesman of the tribe and prime advocate of the treaty, died in late 1818. The federal government had lost its foremost Indian supporter of total Cherokee removal.

Other chiefs who migrated prior to 1817 were aged. The most prominent was Takatoka, the war chief. After Tolontuskee's death political and military leadership gravitated to him. About sixty-five years old, vigorous, and white-haired, part of his reputation rested upon expeditions against the Osages and part upon his background as medicine man for the tribe. He built his village seven miles up the Illinois Bayou.[9] In the early 1820's he led the conservative Cherokee faction, which opposed the entry of missionary teachers favored by the late Tolontuskee.[10] As the single most adamant opponent to schools and missions,

---

[8]Secretary of War to George Gray, November 17, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 353; also Emmet Starr, Early History of the Cherokees Embracing Aboriginal Customs, Religion, Laws, Folk Lore, and Civilization (n.p., 1917), 123. Hereafter cited as Starr, Early History of the Cherokees. See also Emmet Starr, Cherokees "West": 1794-1839 (Claremore, Okla.: Emmet Starr, 1910), p. 134. Hereafter cited as Starr, Cherokees West. Also Elizabeth Whatley Clarke, Chief Bowles and the Texas Cherokees (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), pp. 13-14.

[9]Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, pp. 23-24.

[10]Starr, Cherokees West, pp. 75-76.

Takatoka prevented children from his own and neighboring villages from attending the Presbyterian mission school at Dwight.[11] So strongly did he stand against schools that after he died missionary-teacher Alfred Finney recalled that he "harbored the most inveterate prejudices against civilization. . . ."[12]

In 1818, John Jolly, a brother of Tolontuskee, settled on Spadre Bayou and eventually emerged as the civil chief of the Western Cherokees. After a short contest for power with Takatoka, he was elected principal chief.[13] With great energy he led the moderates in encouraging the missionaries to establish schools for Cherokee youth in Arkansas.[14] Another leader, Walter "Wat" Webber, was a close associate of Jolly. Webber, a Cherokee mixed blood, spoke English. He married a full blood, became a slave-owner, and affected Anglo-American dress. To many he looked much like any southern frontiersman. In addition he operated store on the bluff just east of the Illinois Bayou. Unlike Jolly he played an active military role in

---

[11]Grant Foreman (ed.), "Dwight Mission," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XII, No. 1 (March, 1934), 44.

[12]Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 8 (August, 1825) 247. In his memoirs, Cephas Washburn remembered charitably that Takatoka had shown interest in Christian ideals.

[13]Meigs to McMinn, August 10, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[14]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, pp. 210-211; also Foreman (ed.), "Dwight Mission," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XII, No. 1 (March, 1934), 146.

Cherokee affairs. In June, 1821, he led Cherokee warriors in a campaign against the Osages in which a French trader, Joseph Revoir, was murdered and his horses stolen, after which the warriors returned home.[15]

Tom Graves was another Western Cherokee leader. A mixed blood but, unable to speak English, he used one of his slaves as interpreter. His personal holdings included a comfortable log house, enclosed fields, crops, and livestock. To visitors he resembled an up-and-coming southern gentleman. Graves also fought against the Osages.[16]

One last local chief should be noted. Dick Justice or Dek-keh the Just, emigrated to Arkansas after the Treaty of 1817. A full blood, estimated to be over 100 years old, he resettled in Arkansas with "a number of wives" and "more than thirty children." He disembarked at St. Charles, Arkansas, on the White River in one of three waves of Cherokee settlers from Tennessee.[17] In agreement with Takatoka, Justice believed ". . . that for the true Indian the old ways were the best; that his people were getting to be neither white men nor Indians. . . ." He, too, venerated

---

[15] Missionary Herald, XVII, No. 7 (July, 1821), 212.

[16] Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII, 16-17. Reports of the mid-1820's call Graves a white who had lived with the Cherokees since he was a child. In the negotiations of 1817, Graves had accompanied Tolontuskee east.

[17] Timothy Flint, Recollections, p. 147.

tribal ceremonies but at his advanced age, he lacked the energy to lead, although he exercised great influence over the Western Cherokees and was held in high esteem.[18]

Scattered Indian settlements sprang up along the Arkansas and the White rivers in a pattern similar to that of Anglo-Americans elsewhere in the South, featuring plantations and farms with "decent log houses."[19] Many emigrants brought ". . . slaves, fine horses, waggons and ploughs, and implements of husbandry and domestic manufacture."[20]

Having a defined territory generally protected the Cherokees from white settlers squatting on their lands, but it did not protect them from robbery, murder, and theft by white renegades living on their borders. Botanist Thomas Nuttall made a scientific excursion through their territory in 1819. He described the outlaws as having ". . . the worst moral character imaginable. . . ." Many were wanted for crimes in the states.[21]

Early Western Cherokee governmental structure consisted of local authority held by village chiefs. The scattered settlements and decentralized authority complicated

---

[18]Starr, Cherokees West, p. 101.

[19]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 213.

[20]Flint, Recollections, p. 147; see Thwaites (ed.), Nuttall in Arkansas, XIII, 172.

[21]Thwaites (ed.), Nuttall in Arkansas, XIII, 214.

the problem of peace and order. Therefore, during the summer of 1820, Western Cherokee leaders met to establish a more centralized form of government. John Jolly and Walter Webber were prominent in this movement. The new plan provided for three companies of lighthorse police "to suppress all thefts of every kind, also, to collect, and restore to the proper owners, all stolen property . . . as well as debts . . . contracted." The lighthorse moved with severity when they believed events dictated such action. One official "destroyed the eyesight" of a relative who repeatedly refused to obey the law.[22] An example of the effectiveness of lighthorse patrols occurred in January, 1821, when about forty-five stolen horses were recovered. All but five were returned to their owners. The regulators captured the thieves and "flogged" them.[23] Cherokee leaders also asked Governor Miller to assist in checking criminal acts by Anglo-Americans.

During the summer of 1824, the Cherokees concluded the reorganization of their government. At a council at Takatoka's village on the Illinois Bayou, which served as the Western Cherokee capital from 1813 to 1824, the Cherokee domain in Arkansas was divided into four districts. Two elected representatives from each district served on the

---

[22] Arkansas Gazette, July 29, 1820, p. 3; also Thwaites (ed.), Long Expedition, XVII, 22-23, 23n.

[23] Arkansas Gazette, January 20, 1821, p. 3.

National Council.[24] Following elections on September 11, the eight delegates met to consider various laws with Walter Webber presiding over the council. David Brown, educated in Tennessee mission schools, served as secretary.[25] Three men were chosen as chiefs, each to rule for a four year term. The scattered Cherokee settlements were served by a system of local courts and law enforcement officers.[26]

The Arkansas Cherokees progressed in education. Tolontuskee invited missionaries from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to instruct his band's children. He promised a warm welcome for those missionary-teachers sent to Arkansas.[27] The government encouraged this with an appropriation of $10,000 for the general purpose of Indian education.[28] In supporting assimilation Secretary of War Calhoun announced, in early 1820, that funds were available to those church groups wishing to help the Indians. He cited the Eastern Cherokees as an example of how civilization through mission schools

---

[24]Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 123.

[25]Starr, Cherokees West, p. 103-104.

[26]Missionary Herald, XX, No. 1 (January, 1824), 8.

[27]Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 80. Tolontuskee to Jeremiah Evarts, June 10, 1818, Cherokee Agency in Tennessee, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records.

[28]Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 81n.

had been introduced to give them "a more favorable appearance than any other tribe of Indians. . . ."[29]

Independently of the federal government the American Board of Commissioners granted $1,150 for an Arkansas Mission.[30] The Boston-based board appointed several men to start "This business of civilizing and christianizing the Indian tribes . . ." in Arkansas. A possible competitor, the United Foreign Missionary Society in Utica, New York, had also committed funds to send two missionaries to the Arkansas Cherokees. Its representatives, Epaphras Chapman and Job P. Vinall, reached Arkansas ahead of those from the American Board. The Cherokee agent, Reuben Lewis, took them upriver to meet Cherokee and Osage leaders, although both suffered from fever and Vinall later died. A Cherokee leader, John Brown, approved schools to "teach our children," but Chapman decided his group should work with the Osages because the American Board had previously come to an agreement with the Cherokees.[31]

The American Board missionaries, Cephas Washburn and Alfred Finney, traveled to a Cherokee council in

---

[29] Arkansas Gazette, April 15, 1820, p. 2.

[30] Missionary Herald, XVII, No. 1 (January, 1821), 4.

[31] William Graves, The Protestant Osage Missions, 1820-1837 (Oswego, Kans.: Carpenter Press, 1949), pp. 27-28; also Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 210; see also Grant Foreman, Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926), pp. 42-43.

Tennessee, held August 12, 1819, where they described their goals.[32] Many of the Arkansas band looked forward to receiving teachers. John Jolly saw that schools would fill the educational needs of tribal youth. The more reserved Eastern Cherokee council left the final disposition for a later date to see if the "operations should be found injurious to the right of the nation."[33]

Undaunted by delays Washburn and Finney continued on to Brainerd Mission in Tennessee. They crossed the Mississippi in late February, 1820. Assailed by the same "burning sun, . . . cypress swamps, . . ." fevers, and assorted ailments that had stricken early emigrants, the party had no end of discomfort.[34] By mid-July, they had reached the territory of the Western Cherokees and met with Jolly and Mrs. Persis Lovely. Jolly welcomed Washburn assuring him of cooperation.[35]

---

[32]Dwight Mission Records, 1819-1830, Arkansas Mission Previous to September, 1824, Dwight Mission Journal, unpublished manuscript, Congregational House, Boston, Manuscript Library, on microfilm at Arkansas Historical Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas. Hereafter cited as Dwight Mission Records.

[33]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 210.

[34]Panoplist & Missionary Herald, XVI, No. 2 (February, 1820), 85; see also Starr, Cherokees West, pp. 37-38; also Dorsey D. Jones, "Cephas Washburn and His Work in Arkansas," Arkansas History Quarterly, III, No. 1 (Spring, 1944), 125.

[35]Missionary Herald, XVII, No. 5 (May, 1821), 150, 152.

With Jolly's help many obstacles were overcome. Choosing a place for the school could have been difficult. Yet the location, about five miles up the Illinois Bayou, was selected by Washburn without complaint from the Indians. Founded in the midst of the Cherokee settlements, it had potable water, a good mill seat, and was accessible by keelboats.[36] From there the responsibility for further development fell on Washburn's shoulders. Most of the Indians adopted an aloof attitude, forcing the missionaries to supply the labor for construction. By October, four cabins, each about twenty feet square, had been completed.[37]

By May, 1821, Finney, James Orr, and Jacob Hitchcock with twenty teachers had joined Washburn.[38] That raised the hopes of Cherokee leaders such as John Jolly, Walter Webber, and John Rogers, who looked forward to the education of their children. In contrast, traditionalists like Takatoka grieved that the Cherokees were turning from the ways of their fathers. The first mission service held on May 13, 1821, was disastrous. Washburn neglected to provide an interpreter for the four or five Cherokees in attendance although "Blacks and people from the white settlements south of the River made for . . . [a7] respectable

---

[36]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 214; also Missionary Herald, XVIII, No. 4 (April, 1822), 107.

[37]Missionary Herald, XVII, No. 7 (July, 1821), 212.

[38]Starr, Early History of the Cherokees, p. 89.

congregation. . . ."[39] That day was not remembered as a moment of triumph. Another disappointment followed when several Cherokee children appeared for school before construction had been completed. Their return home dampened the enthusiasm for learning among some Indian families.[40]

In the summer of 1821, John Jolly visited the mission to view the progress. He apologized for not making an earlier appearance and asked when the school would be open. He reaffirmed his faith in the mission and encouraged his followers to attend church.[41] Inviting Washburn to preach at Spadre, he promised to open his house for services.[42] In early 1824, Washburn conducted a service in Jolly's home to an "attentive" audience. After the sermon Jolly told the Cherokees in attendance that he was actively seeking Christianity.

During the same period Walter Webber showed an earnest interest in Washburn's teachings.[43] In early August, 1821, he visited the mission, a momentous opportunity

---

[39]Finney to Evarts, May 13, 1821, Dwight Mission Records; see also Missionary Herald, XVII, No. 11 (November, 1821), 367.

[40]Finney to Evarts, May 25, 1821, Dwight Mission Records.

[41]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 231.

[42]Finney to Evarts, August 12, 1824, II, Dwight Mission Records.

[43]Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 7 (August, 1825), 245.

for the missionaries because he spoke English and was one of the recognized leaders of the Arkansas band. The fact that he was "deplorably ignorant of all spiritual subjects" added to the challenge.[44]

But the mission school was the center of attention opening in January, 1822. According to Finney the teachers thought modestly that they would take "no more than 15 or 20, during the winter. . . ." but already had eighteen by January 12, and soon had "about 40" students. In the midst of an Osage attack alert, several families attempted to leave their children at the school for safety even if there was no room for them. The mission staff finally agreed to receive the new students.[45]

The zeal for education may have screened other motives. Often the pupils lacked clothes. Washburn and Finney described some of the young scholars as "almost naked." The missionaries shared some of their own clothing with the children. Washburn reported that a large amount of apparel received at the mission in March, 1822, was used to dress the students.

In spite of handicaps the mission buildings were completed in 1822, without benefit of government funds. Calhoun had promised the American Board that money would be

---

[44] Ibid., XVIII, No. 3 (March, 1822), 73.

[45] Ibid., No. 6 (June, 1822), 200; see also ibid., No. 9 (September, 1822), 288.

forthcoming as soon as the construction was finished.[46] Even then the grant was slow in arriving. During August, 1822, Calhoun directed Colonel David Brearley at the Cherokee Agency to pay officials at one mission $1,000.[47] Nearly a year later the money had not yet been delivered and, in the interim, Brearley had resigned. The operation had to continue with limited financing.[48]

The goal of Dwight Mission was to take Cherokee children "before their habits are formed, placing them in a Christian family, and teaching them not only the common branches of human learning. . . ." In this way assimilation could be achieved.[49] For many young Cherokees the school was organized confusion. Its curriculum mixed tangibles and intangibles. Instruction stressed the evils of drink, praised industry, and imparted skills that would enable the Cherokees to make their own clothes. Following a traditional approach classes studied prose and poetry, spelling, word definition, geography, and penmanship. Missionary teachers never questioned the utility of a course like

---

[46]Calhoun to Evarts, June 29, 1822, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[47]Calhoun to Brearley, August, 1822, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 454.

[48]Calhoun to Evarts, July 16, 1823, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[49]Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs, p. 215.

geography.[50] On the practical side Cherokee girls were taught to organize a household, wash dishes, and iron clothes. Cherokee boys were taught farming, stock raising, blacksmithing, and carpentry.[51]

Cherokee acceptance of the new learning varied. General opposition arose among those tied to the traditional way of life although they were not strong enough to prevent the school from opening. Takatoka felt the fiercest antagonism. He made it a habit to stay away from any contact with Dwight or its personnel. He would not venture even a glance at the buildings when by chance he passed.[52] The chief suspected that the Anglo-Americans did not want to improve the Cherokees. "If he /the President/ so wishes," why, he reasoned, "when we emigrated from the old homes did he not give us a hoe and spelling book, instead of a blanket and a rifle?" Takatoka mocked those who favored education as the "breeches and pantaloon party." Also suspicious of the school was Dick Justice, who thought the missionaries meant to cheat the band out of its land.[53]

Dwight Mission had to face other objections. When

---

[50] Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 8 (August, 1825), 244.

[51] Finney to American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, July 21, 1825, Dwight Mission Records.

[52] Starr, Cherokees West, p. 76.

[53] Matthew Lyon to Calhoun, July 20, 1822, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 451; see Starr, Cherokees West, pp. 76-77, 101.

school reopened in September, 1822, no Cherokees sent their children to the mission. Washburn and Finney met in council with Cherokee leaders on September 2, to explain the school's "principles." In turn the council adopted regulations requiring attendance of enrolled pupils. Other problems had arisen. Some Cherokees resented having their children work part of the day at the mission farm, while others were interested in the possibility of a rival school offering "a better plan." One chief, for example, decided to send his offspring to another mission believing they would learn more if they did not have to do chores. An unexpected outbreak of fever occurred in late summer and some tribesmen feared their children would become infected if they went to Dwight.

Other obstacles arose to thwart the missionaries. Several white men trading and living along the Arkansas River portrayed Washburn in negative terms. Agent David Brearley added weight to their description when he charged that the mission's "object is a sinister one. . . ." Several disgruntled Cherokees saw the school as a threat to "enslave" their children.[54] However, most of the Cherokee objections to Dwight Mission were overcome, due mainly to Jolly's support. By the end of September, more than seventy

---

[54]Finney and Washburn to Evarts, September 7, 1822, Dwight Mission Records.

Cherokee youth had enrolled.[55]

Washburn, dismayed by the charges made by outsiders, mobilized allies to answer his critics. Cherokee David Brown wrote to the Secretary of War defending Washburn and charging that Brearley had plotted against the teachers. He "enquired why he /Calhoun/ employed such vicious and impious officers as our agents. . . ."[56] Brearley's subtle intimidations received another setback when a Cherokee delegation met Calhoun in 1823. As a result of the conference Calhoun told the Indian agent that the Cherokees West were pleased with the school and that the government would provide "protection" for it.[57]

Christianity took slow root among the Arkansas Cherokees. It gradually gathered momentum from teachings at the school and from the sermons delivered at the mission church on Sunday. A sign of acceptance in degree was exemplified by the decision in August, 1823, of a mixed blood Cherokee who opened a store near the mission, and closed it on Sunday.[58]

---

[55] Missionary Herald, XIX, No. 6 (June, 1823), 171-172.

[56] David Brown to Evarts, April 19, 1823, Dwight Mission Records. Brown enjoyed a respected position among federal officials. In 1824, the government provided $100 for his education. See Calhoun to Evarts, February 9, 1824, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[57] Calhoun to Brearley, March 10, 1823, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[58] Missionary Herald, XX, No. 2 (February, 1824), 46.

Because of the scattered Cherokee settlements, it was expected that additional schools would be requested. David Brown acted as a catalyst because he reinforced the missionaries' teachings by preaching to his people in Cherokee.[59] Although he entered Cherokee politics, playing a role in the new government established at Piney Creek, his work as a Christian missionary was most significant. In August, 1824, about a month after he started preaching, Finney, who recognized his impact, asked the American Board in Boston to send another man with Brown's skills.[60]

Jolly had other reasons for promoting the missionaries. He hoped that Finney and Washburn could eliminate intemperence among his people. The problem of drunkenness did not originate with the Arkansas Cherokees, but it contributed to instability within the band. So detrimental was its effect that, in 1806, a federal act forbade the sale of alcohol to the Indians in the Louisiana Territory. Needless to say, both whites and Indians evaded the law. In April, 1809, a government agent, James McFarlane, seized whiskey in the Cherokee villages on the St. Francis River

---

[59]Calhoun to Evarts, February 9, 1824, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

[60]Finney to Evarts, September 17, 1824, Dwight Mission Records. Finney hoped Brown would eventually edit a Cherokee newspaper. See Finney to Evarts, August 12, 1824, Dwight Mission Records, II; also Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 2 (February, 1825), 43-44, 50.

supplied by unlicensed traders.[61] Spirits, however, continued to filter into the Cherokee settlements.

Spanish reports on the American frontier had ascribed changes to the Arkansas Cherokees that included a trade of "their primitive good faith for the vices, the astuteness and bad faith of the Americans." In particular " . . . they equal their teachers in the love of strong drink. . . ."[62] Even the Cherokees agreed with that assessment. After the 1817 and 1818 migrations, Dick Justice complained that the morals of the Cherokees had declined and he blamed alcohol for the "degeneracy of his people. . . ."[63] Demon rum was a vexing problem, which led to a deterioration of relations between the Cherokees and the neighboring whites. Traders seeking skins plied the Indians with liquor and resultant violence often included murder.[64] In April, 1819, Indian Superintendent Clark explained that he wanted to limit the sale of spirits but

---

[61]McFarlane to Clark, April, 1809, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIV: The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 264. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIV.

[62]Dr. and Mrs. T. L. Hodges (ed.), "Jean Lafitte and Major L. Latour in Arkansas Territory," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1948), 253-254.

[63]Starr, Cherokees West, pp. 101-103.

[64]Edgar Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (n.p.: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), p. 29.

that greedy traders made it impossible to uphold the law.[65]

Travelers in the Mississippi and Arkansas valleys observed the growing affliction. Timothy Dwight, a missionary, noticed that John Rogers, who seemed progressive in his desire for schools and missionaries, drank to the point that his wife, with classic understatement, complained of his bad temper when he was inebriated.[66] And Thomas Nuttall characterized the "attachment to whiskey" as a chief hindrance in the Cherokee advance to civilization.[67] The missionaries tried to limit drinking by starting a temperence society but they were unable to supervise the traders. Their supplications fell on many deaf ears. The United States army also attempted to play a role. In 1831, it turned persons violating the law over to the territory of Arkansas but local judges thwarted prosecution. Colonel Matthew Arbuckle, Commandant at Fort Smith, took this problem to the War Department but the Attorney General decided he could not overrule regional authority.[68] Control of the liquor traffic was impossible.

---

[65]Clark to Sibley, April 29, 1819, Sibley Papers.

[66]Flint, Recollections, p. 147.

[67]Thwaites (ed.), Nuttall in Arkansas, XIII, 173.

[68]Attorney General (John Berrien) to Secretary of War, July 21, 1831, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XXI: The Territory of Arkansas, 1831-1836 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956), 58. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XXI.

Another Cherokee practice that challenged the missionaries was the widespread belief in and practice of witchcraft. Carried to Arkansas by the conservative element among the emigrants, several women, identified as witches, had been executed. And, of course, Cherokee medicine men practiced their art on the Indians. Washburn fought sorcery and witchcraft meeting with success, in 1824, when the council adopted a law forbidding the killing of witches. Although the new law did not prevent witchcraft, Washburn reported that thereafter no Cherokees were put to death for its practice.[69]

Of the venerable Tolontuskee's two goals--mission schools for Cherokee children and another government trading factory for Cherokee hunters, the former was achieved in 1822. The latter had been realized in 1818. Under President Thomas Jefferson the first trading factory system expanded to implement Indian removals.[70] John B. Treat, appointed factor in 1805, served both the Cherokees and the Quapaws at Spadre Bluff on the Arkansas. In the early years the Cherokees took second place in volume of trade to the

---

[69]Starr, Cherokees West, pp. 54-58.

[70]American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 684-685 for an 1803 statement concerning goals; see also Robert S. Cotterill, "Federal Indian Management in the South," MVHR, XX, No. 3 (December, 1933), 343; see also George Harmon, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs: Political, Economic and Diplomatic, 1789-1850 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 94n. The factory served as a store or government trading post.

Quapaws and to the Verdigris Osages. The latter, in particular, tried to dominate the hunting area west of Fort Smith to the extent that they drove some tribes south of the Red River.[71] During 1809, the Superintendent of the Indian Trade notified Treat that a reduction in commerce at his post required that it be closed. This was done the next year.[72]

In March, 1816, the federal government showed renewed interest in the trade factories west of the Mississippi River, hoping the influx of eastern Indians would increase the trade. Meigs had recommended a new post as an added inducement for Cherokee hunters to migrate. Finally, in 1818, federal authorities reopened the Arkansas factory.[73] Within a year the volume of business proved that many Cherokees could earn part of their living by hunting. They exchanged bear, beaver, deer, and raccoon skins for tools, guns, fabrics, and trinkets.[74] Cherokee hunters brought in considerable beeswax gathered from hives on Osage hunting grounds. The 1821 report for business at the

---

[71] Treat to Henry Dearborn, November 15, 1805, Letter Book of the Arkansas Trading Post; ibid., Treat to William Davy, November 15, 1805.

[72] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 770-771; also Superintendent of Indian Trade to Treat, May 23, 1809, Letters Sent by Superintendent of Indian Trade, B.I.A., A:389-391.

[73] McKenney to Secretary of War, March, 1820, Letters Sent by Superintendent of Indian Trade, B.I.A., E:426.

[74] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 208.

Cherokee factory showed a steady trade in beaver, deer and raccoon pelts, as well as bear oil.[75]

In spite of sustained volume of exchanges at the government trading factory, more and more Cherokees were abandoning the chase and taking up farming. Raising cotton became a common enterprise. As a further service the Cherokee factor, Matthew Lyon, obtained a cotton gin for the Cherokee farmers. Cotton, corn, and other vegetables were the principal crops raised on Cherokee farms. Also, more and more Indians turned to stock raising. Partly because of mismanagement and partly because of growing economic diversity the factory was never profitable. In 1824, the federal government closed it.[76]

---

[75] Ibid., 352.

[76] Calhoun to Brearley, March 10, 1823, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs.

CHAPTER V

BORDER WAR

The Osage war continued to be an obstacle to security for the Cherokees in the western wilderness. The brunt of the sporadic fighting was carried out by Cherokee hunters roaming the territory claimed by the Osages. Most of the actual combat occurred west or north of the principal Arkansas Cherokee settlements, but occasionally Osage raids extended into their towns. Livestock and crops particularly suffered from Osage desolation.

Such a situation was deplorable to at least one element in the Nation. The increase in the number of agriculturalists and stock raisers drove those particular Cherokees to pursue a permanent peace with the Osages to protect their property. John Jolly was their principal spokesman. The opposition war faction, consisting largely of hunters, was led by Takatoka. He had a fixed hatred for the Osages, whom he considered completely untrustworthy calling them a "nation of liars." His heated emotions caused him to want "perpetual war" with them.[1]

---

[1]Emmet Starr, Cherokees "West": 1794-1839 (Claremore, Okla.: Emmet Starr, 1910), p. 42. Hereafter cited as Starr, Cherokees West.

There were several old scores to be settled between the Cherokees and the Osages. The two principal sources of conflict were captives and territory. In 1817, when the Cherokee army desolated the Osage villages during the Battle of Claremore Mound, the invaders took several Osage women and children. A number of the women were taken as wives by Cherokee warriors, and the children were adopted by Cherokee families. Osage leaders warned that they would make war until the Cherokees restored the captives.

The conflict over territory was more complex. First, the land granted to the Western Cherokees in northwestern Arkansas had been claimed by the Osages but ceded to the United States in 1818. The Osages tried to discourage the Cherokees from using that area. The Western Cherokees were regarded as intruders and the Osages resented their presence. Second, the Western Cherokees claimed the right to territory west to the Verdigris River as the fruits of conquest resulting from their campaigns against the Osages in 1817. The Western Cherokees had battled to confirm their title to this area which originated with the so-called Lovely's Purchase in 1816. And third, Cherokee hunters ranged west along the upper Arkansas, the Canadian, the Red Rivers and their tributaries, hunting buffalo and trapping fur-bearing animals on territory claimed by the Osages. Inevitably, incidents occurred which prejudiced the prospects for good relations between

the Cherokees and the Osages.

In both tribes young men operated independently of their leaders which complicated the attempts to maintain peace. Federal officials further confused the problem by taking sides because small-scale guerilla operations made it difficult to fix blame. Earlier, the Madison administration had tried to stop the Osage-Cherokee clashes. In contrast the Monroe administration refused to actively force an armistice upon the belligerents, insisting only that white settlers be protected.[2] This policy sheltered white citizens in Arkansas from attack but allowed the Indians to kill one another with impunity.

Governor William Miller of Arkansas Territory was one of the few officials who strove for peace between the tribes. When Miller reached Arkansas, in 1818, he began at once to work for a truce between the Western Cherokees and the Osages. He consulted Cherokee leaders, Osage leaders, officers at Fort Smith, and became acquainted with the irritations between the two tribes. Miller also succeeded in persuading Cherokee and Osage leaders to meet in council, face one another, and discuss their grievances. Most of these were held at Fort Smith. Miller learned that the most significant difference between the two tribes concerned

---

[2]Secretary of War to Governor William Miller, June 29, 1820, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIX: Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), 199. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX.

restoration of the captives.[3]

Finally, during October, 1820, at Fort Smith, Cherokee leaders returned most of the captives to an Osage delegation and the leaders of both tribes agreed to a truce. The next month, however, a party of seventy Osages attacked a hunting camp on the Canadian River, killed two Cherokees, and plundered a large supply of furs. The militant faction in the Western Cherokee Nation, led by Takatoka, clamored for war on the Osages to avenge this outrage.[4] The only way for the recent peace to be enforced was for the federal government to change its policy from one of detachment, which permitted the Indians to fight it out, to one of strong involvement. The fact that white squatters had settled on Lovely's Purchase augured well for a stronger show of force by the federal government.[5]

Before the federal government reacted to the explosive situation on the Arkansas frontier, the peace party in the Cherokee Nation took the initiative by visiting Washington. John Jolly, Walter Webber, Thomas Maw, and

---

[3]Governor Miller to Secretary of War, June 20, 1820, ibid., 199; see also Arkansas Gazette, March 18, 1820, p. 3.

[4]Grant Foreman, Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 85-86; see also Arkansas Gazette, December 30, 1820, p. 3.

[5]Miller to President Monroe, December 10, 1820, Folder 1815-1824, Indian Papers.

interpreter James Rogers led the delegation. Matthew Lyon successfully preached restraint to the war faction until the results of Jolly's trip were made known. In that way, he pointed out, the Cherokees would not damage their bargaining position. Takatoka assumed an air of watchful waiting.[6]

The Cherokee delegation reminded the President of the government's treaty obligation to maintain peace on the frontier. Also, they desired affirmation that the Osages were under its supervision. If the authorities acknowledged that this was the case, then it was planned to show that the administration had not attempted "to punish those murderers." In essence the Western Cherokees wanted guarantees of their rights which could be insured by more government involvement in controlling the frontier with troops from Fort Smith. The delegation also asked the President to recognize their rights to Lovely's Purchase.[7]

Even before the Cherokee delegation reached President Monroe, he had already decided to strengthen the federal position with the Indian tribes. In his annual message to Congress in 1820, he had outlined the need for additional western forts to "direct control over" the Indians. The federal government's plan to increase its

---

[6]Matthew Lyon to Secretary of War, March 22, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 333.

[7]The Arkansas Cherokees to the President, March 17, 1821, ibid., 272-275.

military strength on the southwestern frontier was slowly applied. Before this occurred, however, the Osages and Cherokees had resumed their border war.[8]

Guerilla-type strikes by small bands of Osages on Cherokee hunting parties ranging west of Fort Smith, and retaliation by Cherokees throughout 1821 raised fears of war within each nation. Even the peace faction in the Arkansas band was more attentive to Takatoka's demands for a war to the death on the Osages. Their change in attitude reflected concern over expected raids on their livestock and crops.[9] The attack materialized when small parties of Osages roamed the western bounds of the Cherokee tract, most of them on foot and carrying halters and bridles, intent on stealing Cherokee horses. Squatters living on Lovely's Purchase fled in great numbers to the protection of Fort Smith.[10]

On several occasions large Osage war parties moved menacingly down the Arkansas valley, ostensibly bound for the Cherokee towns. The small garrison at Fort Smith numbered less than 100 men but accosted the Osage intruders

---

[8] Arkansas Gazette, January 6, 1821, p. 2.

[9] Richard Graham to Secretary of War, June 1, 1821, Folder 1819-21, Richard Graham Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Graham Papers.

[10] Matthew Lyon, "Journal, An Account of the Osage-Cherokee War," April 8, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 343.

each time and turned them back.[11] The Cherokees responded to the constant threat of Osage invasion initially with a counter-strike carried out by small marauding forces.[12]

In June, 1821, the Osages broke camp to go on their annual western hunt leaving their Verdigris villages unprotected. In their absence a Cherokee war party burned and plundered through the Osage towns. Infiltrators killed Osage trader Joseph Revoir and took fourteen of his horses.[13] Later in the year the Cherokee response changed to a large-scale invasion of Osage territory.

During October, 1821, a Cherokee army of 300 marched into Osage territory, while the enemy was scattered in small groups hunting buffalo on the western plains. The invaders broke into small columns and stalked the enemy. Around November 1, Cherokee warriors numbering about eighty, closed in on an undefended Osage hunting village. In their fury they killed twenty-nine women and children netting about ninety prisoners, destroyed great quantities of meat and

---

[11] Thomas L. McKenney to Matthew Lyon, August 2, 1821, ibid., 308; see also Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 96-98.

[12] David Brearley to Secretary of War, April 26, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 285; also Secretary of War to Acting Governor Crittenden, July 7, 1821, ibid., 299; see also Matthew Lyon, "Journal, An Account of the Osage-Cherokee War," April 14-15, 1821, ibid., 345.

[13] Missionary Herald, XVIII, No. 3 (March, 1822), 72; also William Bradford to Secretary of War, August 10, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 308; see also Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 101n. This was Webber's raid.

furs, and captured several horses.[14]

The Osages had been quiet during the winter of 1821-22, but because the Cherokee invaders had destroyed their food supply, many nearly starved before the spring. Filled with vengeance the warriors were determined to repay the Cherokees for the torment and suffering their families had to endure. In the spring and summer of 1822, small Osage parties harassed Cherokee settlements along the Cherokee-Osage border, burning houses and barns, destroying crops, killing livestock, and stealing horses. But the presence of army patrols on the border prevented large-scale war between the two nations.

Seeking other means the War Department ordered General Edmund Gaines, Commander of the Southwestern Military District at Louisville, to travel to Fort Smith and attempt to settle the border turmoil. General Gaines reached Fort Smith in the spring of 1822. Working with Governor Miller and the Osage and Cherokee agents, he prepared for a series of councils with tribal leaders. Takatoka was regarded by federal officials as a source of difficulty and a barrier to peace because of his unremitting hatred for the Osages. In an attempt to temper his obsession for war, President Monroe sent him a personal message through General Gaines.

---

[14]Graham to Calhoun, December 28, 1821, Folder 1819-1821, Graham Papers; see Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, p. 105-107; also Lyon to Calhoun, October 20, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 330.

Unable to read the note Takatoka took it to Dwight Mission where one of the teachers translated it. Monroe ordered both tribes to stop their fighting because "he sees no just cause of War . . . , nor will he permit them any longer to spill the blood of each other."[15] Takatoka reacted to its contents with bad grace. He "spit upon it, threw it upon the ground, stamped it and rubbed it with his foot till it was ground to shreds."[16] Takatoka was determined never to desist from his role as a war leader of the Cherokees.

For the time being, however, he did cooperate with Gaines. During the summer of 1822, Gaines and Miller presided over several councils at Fort Smith with Cherokee and Osage leaders in attendance. By the terms of a treaty signed on August 9, the Cherokees agreed to return the prisoners taken during the recent invasion of Osage territory. Takatoka signed this pact.[17] Additional negotiations, during the summer of 1822, guaranteed Cherokee rights to hunt south of the Arkansas on land claimed by the Osages.[18] Also, the leaders of each tribe pledged to

---

[15]Gaines to Cherokee and Osage Chiefs, June 24, 1822, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 442.

[16]Starr, Cherokees West, p. 44.

[17]Ibid., pp. 40-45; see Arkansas Gazette, August 20, 1822, p. 3; see also Missionary Herald, XIX, No. 3 (March, 1823), 81.

[18]Gaines to Secretary of War, July 20, 1826, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XX: Territory of Arkansas, 1826-1831 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956), 272. Hereafter

surrender persons accused of committing theft or murder against other tribes or against settlers to officials at Fort Smith.

This last provision angered Takatoka, since it defined tribal acts of honor as common crimes. In disgust he led about 100 followers away from the Cherokee towns in Arkansas and settled along the Kiamichi River valley, situated southwest of Fort Smith. Close to Takatoka's settlement on Red River, resided a renegade Cherokee, Dutch. He and his followers preyed on Osages and other Indian tribes, American settlements in western Arkansas, and the Mexican villages in Texas. Raiders from both Takatoka's group and Dutch's band continued the Cherokee vendetta against the Osages, stealing horses, burning villages, and ambushing Osage parties hunting south of the Arkansas River. Of course, the Western Cherokees disavowed their depredations. The problem of border peace was complicated by bands of Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos wandering across Cherokee and Osage territory, raiding, killing, burning, and stealing horses. Osage leaders and government officials usually assigned responsibility for these incidents to the proper parties.[19]

---

cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX. Also William W. Graves, The Protestant Osage Missions: 1820-1837 (Oswego, Kansas: Carpenter Press, 1949), pp. 52, 60, 62.

[19] Arkansas Gazette, September 16, 1822, p. 3; see ibid., October 22, 1822, p. 3; see Arbuckle to Nourse, September 30, 1822, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 463.

These predatory attacks on dispersed Osage hunting bands continued through November, 1822. Several detachments of victorious raiders passed Fort Smith on their return to the Cherokee towns. Each had in its van plunder and captives, most of them women and children. One group had thirty Osages and seventy horses in tow. Later, Osage leaders estimated that they lost over 100 warriors in the campaign.[20]

By late 1822 and early 1823, the federal government's determination to establish peace between the Osages and Cherokees was being effected. Colonel Matthew Arbuckle commanding 250 fresh troops reached Fort Smith. His men patrolled along the Cherokee-Osage border intercepting intruder forces from either nation. Governor Miller of Arkansas territory, who also served as superintendent of Indian affairs for this southwestern region, exerted great pressure on both Cherokee and Osage leaders to join him in council to settle the issues between the tribes which were used to justify continuing the border war.[21] Federal authorities directed Assistant Osage Agent Nathan Philbrook and resident Cherokee Agent Brearley to report signs of hostility at once to military officials at Fort Smith.

---

[20] Arkansas Gazette, March 19, 1822, p. 3; also ibid., April 2, 1822, p. 3; also Missionary Herald, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1822), 381.

[21] Miller to Calhoun, May, 1822, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 437-439.

Also, they were directed to promote peace among the Indians under their respective jurisdictions.[22]

The Cherokees, in 1825, saw the solution of two earlier tragedies--the Graves' incident and the Wellborn massacre. Chief Tom Graves was involved in a complex affair. In January, 1823, a small Cherokee party hunting on the Canadian River was attacked from ambush by what the survivors claimed were Osages. One Cherokee, Graves' son, was slain. Before the grieving father could raise a force to obtain vengeance, he was charged by Arkansas territorial authorities with the murder of three Osage captives, a woman and two children, taken during the invasion in 1822. The crime allegedly took place in Graves' village. Following his arrest Graves was arraigned on March 6, 1823, in Little Rock courthouse. The jurisdictional justification was that the action occurred in Crawford County, outside Cherokee territory, and that Graves was liable under the laws of Arkansas Territory.[23]

The chagrined Cherokees issued threats of an uprising.[24] Even the moderates within the Nation could not understand why local authorities had taken Graves into

---

[22]Missionary Herald, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1822), 381; also William Bradford to Calhoun, September 28, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 322.

[23]Arkansas Gazette, March 11, 1823, p. 3; also Missionary Herald, XXI, No. 7 (August, 1825), 247.

[24]Arkansas Gazette, April 8, 1823, p. 3.

custody after a newly completed treaty with the Osages seemingly had adjusted all their difficulties. The Osages had not asked that Graves be punished but were more interested in the return of their people still held prisoners.

In late April, 1823, Graves came to trial. The basic question was jurisdiction. The court finally ruled that Graves should be released because the alleged crime occurred on land recently assigned by the federal government to the Choctaws. Based on that technicality Graves had not committed murder on Arkansas Territory. He was "discharged."[25]

Upon his release, Graves acted to avenge his son's death. He planned to raise a war party and invade Osage territory to search out the killer.[26] After urging Graves to await justice Colonel Arbuckle at Fort Smith visited Clermont's village to demand the surrender of young Graves' slayer. Clermont and his council offered to trade part of their annuity to the Cherokees in lieu of the murderer. Arbuckle refused Clermont's alternative and pressed for a fulfillment of the recent treaty obligation regarding surrender of tribesmen accused of breaking the truce. For months after Graves and other Cherokee leaders continued to press Arbuckle and he, in turn, persisted in his talks with

---

[25] Ibid., April 29, 1823, p. 3.

[26] DuVal to Calhoun, September 6, 1824, Letters Received by the O.I.A., C.A.W.

Osage leaders. Finally, after nearly two years, on August 24, 1826, the Osages turned over to Arbuckle a young warrior who was identified as the slayer of young Graves. He was confined in the Fort Smith stockade.[27] Quite understandably Cherokee leaders demanded that the prisoner be turned over to them for trial and execution, but Arbuckle refused.

The arrest did not calm the Indian frontier. Renegade Cherokees from Dutch's band on Red River slew five Osages during 1826. The Western Cherokees disavowed his action, but the Osages demanded that Arbuckle's prisoner be released since this mass slaying of Osages by Cherokees had properly avenged Graves' death. Arbuckle, William Clark, the Indian superintendent at St. Louis, and other frontier officials weighed the case. They appealed to the Secretary of War, who referred it to the President.[28] Before a decision on the Osage prisoner's fate was rendered, he escaped from Fort Smith, fled to the Osage Nation, and was never heard from again.

In the meantime the government had confirmed its determination to pacify the old Southwest. In 1824, the War Department directed the construction of two military posts west of Fort Smith. Cantonment Gibson, soon renamed

---

[27]Clark to Barbour, January 4, 1827, Box 28, Grant Foreman Papers, Thomas R. Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Okla.

[28]Henry Atkinson to Adjutant General, January 9, 1827, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 361; see Arbuckle to Edward Butler, ibid., 365.

Fort Gibson, was erected near the mouth of Grand River in the heart of Osage territory. South of Cantonment Gibson near Red River, troops built Fort Towson, which enabled federal officials to occupy a position of strength near the turbulent renegade band of Cherokees led by Dutch, as well as Shawnee, Kickapoo, and Delaware bands.

The major incident leading to the ultimate settlement of the Cherokee-Osage border strife had occurred in 1823. Major Curtis Wellborn, an officer from Fort Gibson in company with a party of trappers, was slain on Blue River, a tributary of Red River in southern Indian territory. Survivors of the Wellborn massacre straggled into Fort Smith and reported the incident, charging it to the Osages. Federal officials responded promptly.[29] Osage leaders were summoned to St. Louis. There, in 1825, they signed a treaty ceding to the United States all of their territory west of Fort Smith. They agreed to vacate their villages along the Verdigris and Grand rivers and to move north into what became southern Kansas.

Only slowly did the Osages remove. And even after their relocation, Osage raiders occasionally harassed the Cherokee settlements as of old. The territory west of Arkansas, which included the Lovely Purchase area, soon became the home of the Western Cherokees.

---

[29]Arbuckle to Gaines, December 3, 1823, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 570-571; also Arbuckle to Gaines, December 4, 1823, ibid., 572-574; see also Arkansas Gazette, June 29, 1824, p. 3.

CHAPTER VI

DEFENDING PARADISE

The Western Cherokees fought the Osages for twenty-five years to establish their right to occupy western Arkansas. Their legal claim was confirmed by a treaty negotiated with the United States government, in 1817, which ceded them a territory bounded on the south by the Arkansas River and on the north and east by the White River. The Cherokee's western boundary had not then been set. As a result they tried to expand west to the Verdigris River in present northeastern Oklahoma, spurred by William Lovely's agreements completed, in 1816, in which the Osages had deeded a tract to the United States and the Cherokees. Also, the Cherokees claimed it by right of conquest from their victories over the Osages.

The Osage threat to the Cherokees on the Arkansas border was substantially reduced, in 1825, when the Osages ceded all their land in Oklahoma and agreed to relocate on a reservation strip in present southern Kansas. After that menace to Cherokee peace and order had been removed, the Western Cherokees had to face another obstacle to their tenure of lands on the Arkansas border, as their old struggle

resumed with the land-hungry Americans. Most of the Western Cherokees had separated from the Cherokee Nation in the East and moved to the western wilderness to escape the settler juggernaut. The frontier tide, however, had crossed the Mississippi on the heels of the Cherokee migration and by 1820, whites lived adjacent to the Indian grant in northwestern Arkansas.

Citizens of Arkansas Territory and their representatives pressured Congress to remove the Western Cherokees and open their Arkansas lands to settlement. Federal officials found themselves caught between the Cherokee struggle with the whites for control of this land. The Cherokees expected the treaties of 1817 and 1819 to be enforced and with good reason. President James Monroe had guaranteed the Cherokees their borders, an outlet to the west, and freedom from American encirclement. But in the 1820's, his administration found it difficult to implement treaty promises. When John Quincy Adams took office in 1825, the Western Cherokees' position further deteriorated because his cabinet had no compunctions in favoring settler interests over those of the Indians. To plead their cause Western Cherokee leaders spent much time in Washington with the President and other officials trying to prevent engulfment by the settlers.

Besides regular appeals to federal officials to honor treaty obligations, Cherokee leaders also developed

a strategy aimed at protecting their right to the land in northwestern Arkansas, the western outlet into Lovely's Purchase, and nullify white claims of vast, unused tracts.[1] One tactic was to increase their numbers in the west by appealing to Eastern Cherokees to migrate and take up residence on their lands. Also, Cherokee leaders invited bands of Delawares, Quapaws, and other tribal remnants wandering across Arkansas and Missouri to settle. Another Cherokee arm extended to the Old Northwest where representatives spoke with scattered bands of Senecas and Shawnees. This was intended to firm up their claim to Lovely's Purchase and to lessen the chance of their reserve falling into Anglo-American hands.[2]

As early as 1818, Tolontuskee, accompanied by Sam Houston, had visited Washington to discuss the growing settlers' threat to his people's flank. Monroe stated that Tolontuskee had been a longtime friend of the United States "and it is my wish," he added, "to make you and your nation happy." Unfortunately, Monroe's good intentions did not provide an enduring contract for the Arkansas

---

[1]Matthew Arbuckle to Calhoun, December 15, 1822, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIX: Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), 473. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX.

[2]Timothy Flint, Recollections of the Last Ten Years, Passed in Occasional Residences and Journeyings in the Valley of the Mississippi . . . (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard and Co., 1826), p. 149. Hereafter cited as Flint, Recollections.

Cherokees. He pledged:

> I have not yet obtained the lands lying up that river [Arkansas], to the west of your settlement. I will give instructions to Governor Clark to hold a treaty with the Quapaws this summer . . . , I will direct them to be laid off for you. It is my wish that you should have no limits to the west, so that you may have good mill seats, plenty of game, and not be surrounded by the white people.

The chief executive was committed to secure the Arkansas grant which fulfilled Tolontuskee's goal. At that hightide of good will the President also promised to assist other Cherokees who might desire to move to the West. Tolontuskee's influence with federal officials was of some importance in protecting Western Cherokee territorial interests.[3]

The tribe's claim to the much desired Lovely's Purchase was first threatened, during 1819, in an exchange between Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Cherokee Agent Reuben Lewis. Calhoun pointed out that Monroe mistakenly believed that Lovely's Purchase was Quapaw territory when, in fact, it belonged to the Osages, who definitely did not want Cherokees near them. He did see, however, a possibility that Monroe's word could be kept "by extending their [Cherokee] possessions to the west of their present settlement on the Osage cession, so as to make the quantity of land allotted to them on the Arkansas equal to what they

---

[3]Monroe to Tolontuskee, February 1818, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XX: Territory of Arkansas, 1826-1831 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956), 333. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX.

have surrendered east of the Mississippi. . . ."[4]

His answer grieved the Cherokees because they assumed Monroe had delivered ownership, but Calhoun's words introduced the element of doubt. Governor William Miller caught part of the dilemma when he surmised that the tribe was willing

> . . . to exchange the lands they now hold for other lands further up the river, so as to include what is called Lovely's Purchase, and onto the Osage boundary--The Osages are opposed to this. They say they have never sold these lands to the United States to be given to other Indians, particularly the Cherokees.[5]

Shortly after the full realization struck that they had not yet acquired Lovely's Purchase, the Cherokees decided to alter their means in pushing westward. Earlier, Tolontuskee had insisted the western boundary remain undefined as an attraction to Eastern Cherokees and to make it easier to expand. In June, 1820, the modified strategy called for a survey of the Cherokee's western boundary, if it included the western outlet.[6]

The rivalry for Lovely's Purchase was under way. In December, 1818, agents of the General Land Office inquired if a survey of Lovely's Purchase, a preliminary to settlement, would be considered timely. While the

---

[4]Calhoun to Reuben Lewis, July 22, 1819, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 87-88.

[5]Governor Miller to Calhoun, March 24, 1820, ibid., 153.

[6]Miller to Calhoun, June, 1820, ibid., 193-194.

Commissioner of the General Land Office refused the request, it was significant because the Anglo-Americans were prepared to compete with the Cherokees for permanent title.[7] Within the month, however, federal officials closed the upper Arkansas region and Lovely's Purchase to the Americans. Thus, the threat that the Cherokees would be surrounded on the west had been momentarily blocked.[8]

The Cherokees had to move quickly in trying to secure the area west of their Arkansas domain. In 1820, Arkansas whites numbered over 4,000 and the prospect of a larger influx was no longer a speculator's dream but a reality.[9] In the following decade only the appeal of Texas lands held down the population of Arkansas Territory. Some Americans, even before 1821, drifted onto Lovely's Purchase.[10]

There were other reasons for the Cherokees to fear the future. Settlers in Arkansas reacted to the Indian presence exactly as they had in Tennessee. The Arkansas legislature of 1820 showered Congress with memorials aimed

---

[7]Calhoun to George Gray, November 17, 1821, ibid., 353.

[8]Lewis to Calhoun, January 21, 1820, ibid., 137.

[9]John Hugh Reynolds (ed.), "Western Boundary of Arkansas," Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association, II (Fayetteville, Ark.: Arkansas Historical Association, 1908), 219. Hereafter cited as Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, II.

[10]Lewis to Calhoun, January 21, 1820, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 137.

at stopping the tide of Red migration and removing Arkansas Indians already there.[11] That body petitioned Congress in March, 1820, to stop using Arkansas as an Indian reservation. In strong terms the Arkansans said: "We humbly hope that our territory will not be the only receptacle for that unfortunate race of beings. . . ."[12]

The Arkansas Gazette, for years the most influential newspaper in the territory, urged Indian removal and promoted settlement. For readers outside Arkansas the Gazette boomed the rich possibilities for Americans who migrated.[13] The extension of control by Arkansas Territory over Cherokee villages south of the Arkansas River was confirmed, in 1820, when Arkansas counties were organized.[14]

During 1821, white aggressiveness emerged to contest control of the land. In July, Cherokee leaders accused whites of trespassing on their reserve, destroying its value for farming, and killing the game. Such actions, they implied threateningly, made the "young people very uneasy."[15]

---

[11] Arkansas Gazette, October 7, 1820, p. 3; also ibid., October 14, 1820, p. 2; see also Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 221.

[12] Arkansas Gazette, March 11, 1820, p. 3. More removals from the East were considered a threat, leaving whites "at the mercy of the Indians," ibid., October 7, 1820, p. 3.

[13] Ibid., May 27, 1820, p. 3.

[14] Ibid., July 23, 1820, p. 3.

[15] Arkansas Cherokees to Calhoun, July 24, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 305.

Cherokee leaders continued the drive to confirm their right to Lovely's Purchase. In March, 1821, Cherokee chiefs complained about the quality of soil in their domain between the Arkansas and White rivers:

> The greater part of the country we possess between the Arkansas and White rivers is so encumbered with barren mountains, that scarce a deer inhabits it, therefore we have looked for a country to the west far beyond our present settlements. . . .[16]

The conclusion was clear. If a transition to farming with the goal of assimilation was government policy, then better land was a prerequisite.

In the late winter of 1821, Secretary of War Calhoun instructed Governor Miller to clear Lovely's Purchase of settlers saying: "It is not the intention of the government at present to permit any white settlements to be made upon the lands acquired by the U. States to the west of the Cherokees boundary."[17] Of even greater significance he informed Cherokee leaders: "It is to be always understood that in removing the white settlers from Lovely's Purchase for the purpose of giving the outlet promised you to the west, you acquire thereby no right to the soil but merely to an outlet. . . ." The final "disposition" of the area had changed and would await a later decision despite

---

[16] Arkansas Cherokees to President Monroe, March 17, 1821, ibid., 272-275.

[17] Secretary of War to Miller, March 16, 1821, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; see Calhoun to Miller, February 21, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 267-268.

Monroe's earlier promise.[18]

Officers at Fort Smith took no positive action. When asked by Cherokee leaders to remove settlers, they argued that they lacked authority to deal with those whites living west of Arkansas because no boundary line had been set for the Cherokee domain.[19]

In August, 1821, Cherokee chiefs moved to protect their domain by asking federal officials to survey their western boundary.[20] Besides desiring a definite line, they were anxious to know if the terms of the 1817 treaty, providing for an exact exchange, "acre for acre," of eastern land for western land had been fulfilled. Again in February, 1822, they insisted that the "acre for acre" part of the 1817 treaty be honored. They made their request to Governor Miller, who dutifully passed it along to Calhoun.[21] By the fall of 1822, the War Department had checked all the previous negotiations and confirmed that the band was entitled to the exchange it wished, but Calhoun restricted the lines to "confined" areas--excluding the sought after

---

[18]Calhoun to Arkansas Cherokee Chiefs, October 8, 1821, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 324; also Calhoun to George Gray, November 17, 1821, ibid., 353.

[19]William Bradford to Cherokee Chiefs, March 16, 1821, ibid., 340.

[20]Miller to Calhoun, August 12, 1821, ibid., 310.

[21]Miller to Calhoun, February 11, 1822, ibid., 403; also Miller to Calhoun, July 15, 1822, ibid., 450.

Lovely's Purchase.[22]

The actual survey raised a controversy. Territorial citizens, in the midst of a Congressional election, listened to candidates Henry Conway and J. Woodson Bates call the surveys detrimental to local self-interest.[23] Unfortunately, Bates had no concept of the potential size of the western outlet and estimated that the Cherokees were entitled to 2,000,000 acres. So in February, 1823, when the War Department ascertained that the land due the tribe ran to 3,380,710 acres, the citizens were dismayed.[24] Yet the final details remained ambiguous because the Secretary of War refused to issue a definite statement on the status of Lovely's Purchase, preferring to postpone it until after the lines had been drawn. No one could be happy with the final decision pending.[25].

The Indians were disappointed with the new estimate which was smaller than they expected. In June, 1823,

---

[22]U.S., Congress, House, Calhoun to Miller, September 10, 1822, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter from the Secretary of War Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 9.

[23]Arkansas Gazette, May 6, 1823, p. 4; also ibid., May 20, 1823, p. 3.

[24]Ibid., June 17, 1823, p. 3.

[25]U.S., Congress, House, Calhoun to Arkansas Cherokee Deputation, February, 1823, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 9.

territorial Secretary Robert Crittenden became Acting Governor, while Miller took a trip east. Crittenden was alarmed that the Cherokees insisted on a survey from the Osage boundary east which would have included Lovely's Purchase in their holdings. He asked officials in Washington for their evaluation. The Cherokees countered by objecting to the survey plan favored by Arkansas officials, which would cost the Arkansas band its western outlet. Their cries had little effect on Crittenden, who was patently disinterested in seeing that they receive justice. His primary concern, serving settler interest, meant ridding Arkansas of its Indian population.

The Cherokees received shattering news in July, 1823, when it was reported that the survey would encompass 3,285,710 acres, and would not include Lovely's Purchase. They were not soothed by word that the government had decided to start the line on the Cherokee eastern boundary at Point Remove, blocking any chance to alter the position of the tract to include Lovely's Purchase.[26]

The Arkansas Gazette and territorial leaders urged the settlement of a "dense population" in Lovely's Purchase to counter the Cherokee claim.[27] If the western outlet became a part of Arkansas, the territory could offer land

---

[26] Arkansas Gazette, July 1, 1823, p. 3; also ibid., July 8, 1823, p. 2.

[27] Ibid., May 28, 1822, p. 3.

to Americans making their way from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. The prairies of Lovely's Purchase offered a superior and healthier location for colonizing than along the lower Arkansas River.[28]

The Cherokees maneuvered to block this move by Arkansas Territory. In early 1823, a Cherokee delegation traveled to Washington to secure confirmation of title to Lovely's Purchase. The attempt failed. A very cautious Calhoun refused to grant any concession regarding the "western outlet." He told the Cherokee representatives that the best they could expect was a review of the matter after the survey had been completed. Despite Monroe's promise of 1818, federal officials had grown more attentive to the demands of Arkansas' leaders.[29]

Nevertheless, the presence of the delegation in Washington increased fears in the Arkansas settlements that the government might surrender the land to the Cherokees. Candidates for public office in Arkansas Territory advocated annexation of Lovely's Purchase and the expulsion of the tribes from Arkansas. Henry Conway, candidate for Congressional delegate, urged those points plus opening

---

[28]Ibid., September 17, 1822, p. 3.

[29]U.S., Congress, House, Calhoun to Deputation of Arkansas Cherokees, February 12, 1823, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 9.

Lovely's Purchase to settlement.[30]

Governor Crittenden pressed federal officials to legalize squatter settlement in Lovely's Purchase. Describing the soil there as the finest quality, he called their attention to the strategic value of placing white families between the various Indian tribes as a barrier to Indian communication.[31] Although he received no approval, border officials, including military officers at Fort Smith, half-heartedly enforced the rule against intrusions by settlers.[32]

Crittenden harassed the Cherokees. As territorial governor he was local superintendent for Indian affairs and thus controlled the distribution of the Cherokee annuity, which he deliberately withheld.[33] His action was only one in a line of provocations in which money due the Cherokees had not been delivered. Discontented Cherokee leaders claimed that they had not received "one cent" of their annuity since the treaty in 1819.[34]

With Miller's return in August, 1821, the Cherokees repeated their request for the delinquent annuity, asking

---

[30] Arkansas Gazette, May 6, 1823, p. 4.

[31] Robert Crittenden to Calhoun, September 28, 1823, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 548.

[32] Arbuckle to Calhoun, ibid., 559-560.

[33] David Brearley to Calhoun, May 1, 1820, ibid., 172-173.

[34] Miller to Calhoun, June, 1820, ibid., 193-194.

that it be paid to them in the form of looms and spinning wheels.[35] The months passed with no sign of goods or annuity. Miller, like Crittenden, was unmoved. Chief Jolly reminded him that his people had yet to receive the annuity due from 1818-1819. The Western Cherokees won redress of this grievance finally in March, 1823, when their delegation visited Washington and was issued the annuity there.

During 1823, Crittenden, serving again temporarily, tried to force 1,000 Cherokees who resided on the south bank of the Arkansas River to move north within their assigned territory by again withholding their annuity. They refused declaring that they occupied Choctaw territory and were there at the invitation of the Choctaw Nation. Their position was defended by Edward duVal, the Cherokee Agent, who demanded that Crittenden issue the annuity as required by law.[36] The Secretary of War concurred with duVal in approving the annuity's distribution because he believed that a Cherokee transfer from the south bank of the Arkansas could not be effected without it.[37] Calhoun had already asked for

---

[35]Miller to Calhoun, August 12, 1821, ibid., 310.

[36]DuVal to Secretary of War, January 31, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; also Arkansas Gazette, March 30, 1824, p. 3.; see also ibid., April 13, 1824, p. 3; also Crittenden to duVal, March 7, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 623.

[37]Calhoun to Crittenden, April 28, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 653.

an evacuation in October, 1821, through the tribal council.[38]

In the face of mounting pressure the Cherokees tried logically to justify occupying land south of the river. They reminded Calhoun that the annuity could not be tied to removal because payment was guaranteed in the treaties of 1817 and 1819. Such arguing was sophistry because, after the Treaty of 1817, whites settled on the Cherokee reserve had been forced to remove. The treaty also contained an agreement for the Western Cherokees to occupy only the area north of the river. Cherokee leaders shrewdly defended their villages south of the Arkansas as a bond to assure assignment of all land, acre by acre, to which they were entitled.[39]

Time ran out for those Cherokees on the south bank. Crittenden received new orders for removal in the spring of 1824, with the understanding they could remain until the western boundary had been affirmed and the total acreage of the Cherokee reserve had been established.[40] Despite the reprieve there were delays in paying the annuity. Crittenden failed to turn the government warrant into cash because, he said, $4,000 was too large a sum for anyone in

---

[38]Calhoun to Arkansas Cherokee Chiefs, October 8, 1821, ibid., 324.

[39]DuVal to Calhoun, March 20, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[40]Calhoun to Crittenden, April 28, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 653.

the territory to handle. Not until August, 1824, did the tribe collect its money.[41]

Obtaining the annuity had not turned attention, Cherokee and settler, from Lovely's Purchase with its rich soil and minerals. Salines existed on the Grand River and an Anglo-American, Mark Bean, had discovered valuable deposits on the Illinois River, which he developed in 1820.[42] In March, 1821, Jolly identified his people's interest in them by making the acquisition of a saline to the west a tribal priority. The delegation that went to Washington, in the fall of 1821, however, failed to get Calhoun's promise to provide either the land or the equipment for a salt works.[43]

Arkansas settlers asked the military to prevent the Cherokees from acquiring the salt springs on Lovely's Purchase. The War Department leased the salines, after 1820, to Mark Bean and his partners, but they received renewals in 1822, and afterward despite the army's policy of keeping other whites off those lands.[44]

---

[41] DuVal to Crittenden, August 7, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[42] Lewis to Calhoun, January 21, 1820, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 137.

[43] Additional Instructions to Cherokee Delegations, March 25, 1821, ibid., 341; also Calhoun to Arkansas Cherokee Chiefs, October 8, 1821, ibid., 324.

[44] Arbuckle to Charles Nourse, September 30, 1822, ibid., 463; also Arbuckle to Calhoun, October 27, 1823, ibid., 559.

At first the Cherokees had the advantage in trying to obtain full title to the western outlet reinforced by Monroe's promise and by the irregular removal of the Anglo-American settlers by the military since 1818.[45] As they lost momentum with the white onslaught of the early 1820's, the Cherokees mounted a newspaper and diplomatic operation of their own to counter the determined drive for their land. The best person to undertake the task was the highly-literate Cherokee, David Brown. He attacked those who sought the Cherokee reserve, accusing white promoters of purposely defaming the Indians to ease a takeover of Lovely's Purchase. Brown's comments were more effective in the East than in Arkansas, where local elements chose to believe negative stories about Indian character.[46]

Tribal leaders postponed a final disposition of Lovely's Purchase until the survey of their Arkansas domain had been completed, but they still asked that the surveys run from the Verdigris River east rather than from Point Remove, obviously trying to incorporate the western outlet.[47] At this time, mid-1823, Cherokee leaders sought to occupy western Arkansas as completely as possible urging Eastern Cherokees to join them. Under the

---

[45] Arkansas Gazette, November 12, 1822, p. 3.

[46] Ibid., May 22, 1823, p. 2.

[47] Chiefs of the Arkansas Cherokees to Calhoun, June 24, 1823, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 526-527.

circumstances the federal government cooperated by pushing to acquire more territory from the Osages and Kansas tribes. The Cherokees planned to expand their reserve northward and westward as part of a reasonable offer to induce their new neighbors to settle.[48]

The strategy had great potential. In February, 1824, the Cherokees heard they might receive extra land with a shift of their boundary to include Delawares and Shawnees living near their reserve on the banks of the White River and a small bayou tributary. The chiefs worked to achieve this incorporation, and told Calhoun they would be pleased to have the addition to their property.[49]

In the meantime the Indian remnants wanted formal recognition of their position along the White River. To settle the question Takatoka and his followers planned a trip to Washington in October, 1824, with tribal approval. They intended to visit their Indian brothers in Illinois and Ohio mapping out a plan for all of them to migrate to Arkansas.[50] Although Takatoka died in Illinois, the rest of the delegation went to Washington still hoping to

---

[48]William Clark to Calhoun, September 27, 1823; Calhoun to Richard Graham, September 27, 1823, Folder 1822-23, Graham Papers.

[49]DuVal to Calhoun, March 1, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[50]Ibid., Cherokee Chiefs to All Whom. . . , October 27, 1824.

implement Cherokee policy.[51]

Cherokee attempts to attract eastern tribes across the Mississippi were timely, but again government intervention blocked progress. The concept of Arkansas as an Indian reservation was beginning to crumble. In March, 1826, William Clark perceived that all tribes would have to be removed from the states and the territories of the United States. He included not only Eastern Shawnees and Eastern Delawares but also western elements like the Arkansas Cherokees. They would have to give up their holdings and move west in toto. If Clark's plan gained a following among federal officials, the Arkansas Cherokees faced another removal.[52] His new design had immediate impact. By January, 1827, the Shawnees were exploring the lands adjacent to the Osages, and the Delawares were ready to take the same action. Another means to enlarge the Cherokee reserve had been closed.[53]

In November, 1823, the request for a boundary survey of the Cherokee domain was answered, but disappointingly it began at Point Remove, blocking an extension into Lovely's

---

[51] Ibid., Cherokee Delegation to Calhoun, February 27, 1825.

[52] Clark to James Barbour, March 1, 1826, Folder 1826-1828, E. G. Voorhis Memorial Collection in William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. Hereafter cited as Voorhis Collection.

[53] Pierre Menard to Graham, January 17, 1827, Folder 1826-28, Graham Papers.

Purchase. When the council discovered what was happening, they refused to take part. Rather than send an observer to oversee the marking, Jolly protested that his people were being cheated. He informed the Secretary of War that he had not received "notice" in time to prepare properly for it.[54]

Cherokee leaders in February, 1824, called a meeting of the tribal council to criticize the completed survey. The tribe objected to the government's failure to mark the boundary from the Verdigris to the east, a chief factor in their original request for a survey.[55] In March, 1824, a delegation went to Washington to clarify the tribal position with regard to the western outlet.[56] The Cherokees were confident another line had to be run because the amount surrendered in the East had yet to be fully assessed.

The means to accumulate more land had been opened through the misrepresentation of the last survey. Through the persistence of the Cherokee delegation, the government quickly recognized that Governor Miller had misread his instructions and the line had not been run according to specifications agreed to earlier. Calhoun willingly

---

[54] Arkansas Gazette, November 4, 1823, p. 3; also John Jolly to Calhoun, November 6, 1823, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 562-563.

[55] DuVal to Calhoun, March 1, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[56] Ibid., John Rogers, Mackey, and Brown to the President, March 3, 1824.

admitted the error and conceded that the tribe was due as much "frontage" on the Arkansas as it had on the White.[57] The War Department did not immediately complete the requested survey because the eastern states still had not reported all the exchanges from 1817 and 1819.[58]

With the exact acreage unknown the Cherokee envoys cleverly broached the subject of Lovely's Purchase, by requesting that

> all the lands from the Lower Cherokee lines lying between the Arkansas and White Rivers to the Osage boundary line remain and be unsettled and untouched either by Indians or whites and let that be provisionally the Cherokees until the quantity ceded by the Cherokees shall be ascertained; during which time we shall give special orders to the Cherokees . . . to confine their settlement. . . .[59]

---

[57]Calhoun to John Rogers, Mackey, and Brown, March 8, 1824, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Related to Indian Affairs; also Calhoun to Crittenden, March 19, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 620.

[58]Thomas McKenney to Arkansas Delegation, March 22, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 626; also Rogers, Mackey, and Brown to Calhoun, March 23, 1824, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; see also U.S., Congress, House, McKenney to Cherokee Chiefs, March 24, 1824, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 14.

[59]U.S., Congress, House, Arkansas Delegation to McKenney, March 23, 1824, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 14. For totals of land surveyed see American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, . . . Commencing March 3, 1789 & Ending March 3, 1815, IV, selected and edited by Walter Lourie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Indian Affairs, II, Class II (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832), 461, 463, 499. From those figures it appears that the Arkansas band was not even entitled to 4,000,000 acres.

As the delegates prepared to leave for Arkansas, they believed that the government would stand by its promises of the treaties of 1817 and 1819, which meant that their claim to Lovely's Purchase, while not approved, would not be set aside either.[60]

The presence of the Cherokee delegation in Washington had again stirred anxiety among settlers in Arkansas. They petitioned Congress, with Senator Thomas Benton of Missouri serving as their advocate, asking that territorial boundaries be fixed to include white settlers living farther west. His bill was finally approved in late May, 1824, and the Territory of Arkansas was extended farther west to include Lovely's Purchase.[61]

However, Arkansas official concern grew when John Rogers, a member of the 1824 Cherokee delegation, returned home. In speaking to the editor of the Gazette, he described his work in Washington in very optimistic terms. He interpreted the War Department's position as favoring Cherokee possession of Lovely's Purchase. Rogers also announced that more than 100 Cherokee families had crossed the newly completed survey, another sign that the tribe

---

[60] Arkansas Cherokee Delegation to Thomas McKenney, March 31, 1824, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., 1828, p. 14.

[61] Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, II, 221-222.

intended to press for final control of the land in question.[62]

Rogers' statements were premature. Senator Benton's action in Congress blocked any effective way to deprive the Anglo-Americans of the western claims and countered Monroe's promise to keep whites from outflanking the Cherokee community. The goal of removing all Indians from the coveted land upriver, including Quapaws and Choctaws who owned large areas within the territory, was succeeding. The Gazette, with some prescience, noted in July, that all the tribes except the Cherokees were leaving Arkansas and that even they "will be induced in a short time to exchange lands."[63]

In the middle of the confusion arising from claims and counterclaims, the government tried to rerun the western boundary as a 'provisional line.' Having promised quick work to undo Miller's mistake, they attempted to have the tribe agree to a conditional survey. Only the absence of Takatoka prevented authorities from immediately undertaking the task in September, 1824.[64] Nevertheless, on January 14, 1825, the survey began from above Fort Smith running northward about 130 miles to the White River.[65] Allen

---

[62] Arkansas Gazette, May 4, 1824, p. 3.

[63] Ibid., July 27, 1824, p. 3.

[64] DuVal to Thomas McKenney, September 13, 1824, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 697.

[65] Claude Rankin Report, State Land Commission, April 24, 1954, Arkansas Historical Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Martin, the surveyor, increased the acreage of the reserve from 3.2 to 4.2 million acres as over 970,000 were added. The frontage on the Arkansas was raised to 114 miles while that on the White River was lowered to 134 miles.[66] The new line intersected a part of Lovely's Purchase so that the tribe had gained by the action.[67]

Martin's survey did not deter the government from reconsidering Cherokee removal during January, 1825. At Fort Gibson Colonel Matthew Arbuckle promoted one scheme. If the Osages approved a cession, he argued, more land could become available, opening the area west of Lovely's Purchase for possible Cherokee resettlement. Such a move would benefit the territory because it would permit whites to develop the disputed parts of Lovely's Purchase.[68] Calhoun entertained similar ideas in his correspondence with Monroe believing that the Arkansas band could be persuaded to trade their tract in the Arkansas and White valleys for holdings to the west. He based his premise on growing tribal opposition to white settlement on Lovely's Purchase because they wanted to avoid encirclement. Therefore, they would exchange acre for acre outside Arkansas'

---

[66] Arkansas Gazette, February 22, 1825, p. 3. That rectified one injustice of the previous survey in which the poorer land on the White River far exceeded the richer frontage on the Arkansas.

[67] Ibid., January 13, 1825, p. 3.

[68] Arbuckle to duVal, January 14, 1825, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XIX, 747.

boundaries to escape such a possibility. So while the newly-drawn line represented a partial victory for the Cherokees, they were being undermined at the federal level by those promoting removal from Arkansas.[69]

The government's attitude was presented when another Cherokee delegation traveled to Washington in early 1825.[70] In short order the Cherokees told Calhoun they had no reason to surrender their land and expressed shock at his even considering a removal. They reminded him that they chose Arkansas originally because it was relatively free from Anglo-American penetration. The government had promised if they made improvements, their holdings would be their own. In a tone heavy with irony and regret the delegation contemplated their future:

> Our situation is burdensome. We cannot remove from houses and farms anymore. We have made known that our desire is to concentrate the Shawnees and others on our western boundary. . . . Surely it cannot be the wish and object of the government to monopolize all the good lands for our white brethren and gave /sic/ us the worst. We are willing to believe that it is not . . . but a suspicion. . . .

Analyzing the momentum of the frontier, they foresaw that another removal to the west would only create a vacuum drawing more whites to the edge of their new reserve. ". . . we are fully convinced we can never get out of their reach--

---

[69] American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 543.

[70] Arkansas Cherokee Delegation to Calhoun, February 21, 1825, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

therefore it would be folly in us to try removing from place to place. . . ." They refused to consider another exchange.[71]

Then the delegates countered plans for removal with a proposal originally authored by Calhoun. The tribe would shift its eastern boundary to the west enabling the Cherokee reserve to encompass Lovely's Purchase.[72]

Monroe seemed willing to try the Cherokee plan but in March, 1825, John Quincy Adams took office. He took the same tack as the previous administration. James Barbour, Adams' Secretary of War, advised George Izard, Arkansas Territorial governor, to effect an exchange from Point Remove on the east which would open some Indian land but at a cost of part of Lovely's Purchase. Federal officials were groping for a compromise, and they told Izard to act with discretion because they did not want to anger the tribe. He was directed to try for a total exchange. Evidently, Barbour meant to test the Arkansas band's determination to remain on its reserve.[73] The maneuver failed completely because the Western Cherokees strongly opposed additional removal. When Izard made his offer, he infuriated the tribe to the degree that it passed a "perpetual

---

[71] Ibid., Arkansas Cherokee Delegation to Calhoun, March 12, 1825.

[72] Ibid., duVal to Calhoun, March 29, 1825.

[73] Secretary of War James Barbour to George Izard, April 16, 1825, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 62-63.

law" sentencing to death any Cherokee "who shall propose the sale or exchange of their lands. . . ."[74]

Despite that turn of event., during July, Izard still worked for removal.[75] Threateningly, he asked for names of any whites who spoke against an exchange. Within the Nation the death law restrained the factions that might have been tempted to surrender their holdings. The National Council, under Jolly's leadership, had taken a firm stand. Stubbornly, Izard scheduled a meeting, in August, to discuss a treaty which Jolly thwarted because he feared if his people counciled with Izard, they could be converted with presents or promises. He said, therefore, rather categorically:

> We have not any land to part with on any account whatever. We made a treaty in the year 1817 with the United States in which they bound themselves to give us as much land here as we relinquish to them by the same treaty, and also a promise never to extend a white settlement to the west, and this is the only reason which induced me to move myself and people to this country, and we think it is very unreasonable of the government to ask for us a new treaty and the treaties of 1817 and 1819 not as yet complied with.[76]

Chief Jolly's answer shattered Izard's demeanor.

---

[74]George Izard to Thomas L. McKenney, September 16, 1825, John Hugh Reynolds (ed.), "Correspondence of Governor Izard," Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association, I (Fayetteville, Ark.: Arkansas Historical Association, 1906), 430-431. Hereafter cited as Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, I.

[75]Izard to David Barber, July 17, 1825, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 249.

[76]Jolly to Izard, August 18, 1825, ibid., 105.

Turning vindictive he committed himself to limit the mobility of the tribe. Under the guise of eliminating violence he directed Cherokees and Americans to keep within their own boundaries.[77] Forwarding Jolly's message to the President, he personally evaluated the "insolent language which he /Jolly/ has dared to use on the Subject of our government precludes all further friendly intercourse with him on my part as a functionary of the UStates. . . ."

Jolly had made an uncompromising enemy as Izard promised action to correct "wrongs" done by Cherokees to whites.[78] The Governor ignored any information that contradicted his viewpoint or interfered with the best interests of whites in the territory. He misinterpreted, for example, the Cherokee desire to extend to the Verdigris as an admission that they would willingly trade their ownership of land on the lower Arkansas when, in fact, the tribe wanted to increase the size of its reserve. At the same time since the hunters were not tied to the reservation as was the farming element, he had some logical basis for his conclusion. With some exaggeration, however, he chose to see that "the greater number were disposed to seek better hunting grounds in the western country, but that the measure was vehemently opposed by the half-breeds and whites

---

[77] Arkansas Gazette, August 23, 1825, p. 3.

[78] Arkansas Cherokee Delegation to Calhoun, February 28, 1828, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties, Ratified and Unratified.

established among them." Admitting the latter were in large numbers and very influential in making policy, he did not want to believe that their concern took precedence. Most Cherokee leaders were landed. Following Jolly's rebuff Izard mounted his own counter-attack to control Lovely's Purchase. He told Barbour that he was not "disappointed" that the Cherokees would not move because it afforded an opportunity to seek the western outlet for the territory.[79]

The future of Lovely's Purchase remained in limbo during the fall of 1825. Recognizing the indecision of the new administration, Arkansas officials organized another campaign to make Lovely's Purchase available to American colonists, hoping that the threat of such grants would cause the Cherokees to remove westward. Nevertheless, the tribe had confidence in its position because they believed that Colonel Arbuckle would prevent permanent settlement by whites.[80] The Cherokees also felt future ownership of the western outlet depended on the surveys of the eastern areas surrendered earlier. As long as they envisioned millions of acres added to their holdings, they believed that their chances for obtaining Lovely's Purchase were good. Unfortunately, the eastern states stalled in

---

[79]Izard to Calhoun, September 3, 1825, Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, I, 428-429.

[80]McKenney to Izard, October 8, 1825, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 121; also Memorial to the President from the Arkansas Assembly, October 24 (ca), 1825, ibid., 127-129.

doing the final survey work and that left the issue unresolved.[81]

Past events made it possible for Izard to nullify the Cherokee hold on the western outlet. In 1820, the Choctaws had been granted the land to the south of the Cherokees across the Arkansas River.[82] The outcry against Choctaw settlement along the Arkansas was heard most loudly during elections, when candidates promised to ease the Indians out of the territory.[83] In light of those emotions, when Izard took office, he tried to effect a Choctaw removal, but the site that he proposed for them was Lovely's Purchase. In effect he could block the Cherokees and still open the Choctaw reserve to Anglo-American development.[84] He had to await a final decision from Washington.

The Adams administration finally realized that the pressure to remove Indians had reached the point where it had to be answered. Secretary of War Barbour's new recommendations in February, 1826, followed Jeffersonian lines in suggesting that all Indians be moved away from American settlements, an important turn for the Western Cherokees because they were, despite the Treaty of 1817, on the verge

---

[81] McKenney to duVal, October 28, 1825, ibid., 146.

[82] Arkansas Gazette, June 25, 1822, p. 3.

[83] Ibid., May 20, 1823, p. 3.

[84] Izard to Barbour, October 29, 1825, Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, I, 434.

of encirclement.[85] Idealistically, Barbour wanted to educate the Indians and make farmers of them, but local citizens objected to any plan which would give them land on a permanent basis.[86] While Barbour formulated his proposal, William Clark also developed an outline to encourage Indian removal, which not only would provide commissioners to negotiate the exchanges but economic inducements to stabilize the participating tribes.[87] That was a bad omen for the Western Cherokees in Arkansas as the Adams administration deliberately modified Monroe's promises.

A real setback for the tribe occurred when news of Henry Conway's work reached Arkansas. As the territorial representative, he had lobbied to open the western outlet and had been rewarded, in the spring of 1826, with permission from the General Land Office to survey twenty townships, a first step in initiating white settlement there.[88]

The Cherokees realized their position in the western outlet was eroding and tribal unrest occurred as a result.

---

[85] Arkansas Gazette, April 18, 1826, pp. 1-3.

[86] John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams . . . , ed. by Charles Francis Adams, VI (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 119.

[87] Clark to Barbour, March 1, 1826, Folder 1826-28, Voorhis Collection.

[88] Arkansas Gazette, July 4, 1826, p. 3; Edward Butler to Arbuckle, June 18, 1826, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 264.

Reiterating Monroe's promise that they would "have no limits to the west," they argued that the government should wait for all the eastern surveys to be totaled before sectioning Lovely's Purchase. In essence the council had restated its 1821 position, but the pendulum had swung away from federal protection of Cherokee interest.[89] In October, 1826, the War Department lifted its ban on Anglo-American settlers in Lovely's Purchase.[90] The tribe was helpless as orders for a survey were granted. This freed Arkansas Territory of its fears that settlers would lose the valuable area to the west.[91]

The tribe tried to discover surveyor René Paul's direction to ascertain their position after his work was finished.[92] Cherokees applied direct pressure and a bit of harassment. They argued with him personally and "hindered" him near Webber's on Mulberry Creek. When Paul threatened to bring in the army, they subsided.[93] While he worked, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas McKenney asked Arbuckle to restrain settlement in Lovely's

---

[89]Cherokee Nation to duVal, July 24, 1826, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[90]Ibid., R. Jones to Arbuckle, October 10, 1826.

[91]Arkansas Gazette, November 23, 1826, p. 3.

[92]Cherokee Chiefs to René Paul, December 13, 1826, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 424; see Paul to Chiefs, December 13, 1826, ibid., 424-425.

[93]Extract of René Paul, January 26, 1827, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

Purchase.[94]

The appearance of the surveyor unsettled the Cherokees and they urged the federal government to have the work set aside. Jolly voiced his disapproval by sending a delegation to Washington.[95] That afforded federal officials another opportunity to test whether tribal leaders would accept a proposal that the Cherokees vacate Arkansas. William Clark summoned Cherokee leaders to St. Louis to "ascertain" the possibility of an exchange.[96] When the party led by Graves and James Rogers arrived, Clark praised land to the west of Arkansas as more desirable than their small reserve. His proposal was to no avail because Graves and Rogers had not been authorized to negotiate.[97]

With the increased pressure the Cherokees would have been cheered had they known that not all federal officials were as committed to their removal as the people on the frontier. George Graham of the General Land Office accepted that the Arkansas Cherokees "be confined to their present boundaries." He was neither conceding them Lovely's

---

[94] Ibid., George Graham to McKenney, December 19, 1826; also McKenney to John Cocke, December 15, 1826, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 326; also McKenney to Graham, December 19, 1826, ibid., 326.

[95] John Jolly and Black Fox to duVal, December 20, 1826, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; also ibid., duVal to Jolly and Black Fox, December 25, 1826.

[96] William Noland to George Graham, February 1, 1827, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 382.

[97] Clark to McKenney, March 5, 1827, ibid., 415.

Purchase, nor did he envision them removing any farther west.[98] The War Department judged that a permanent Cherokee boundary depended on whether the reserve spilled over to the west after a final accounting was made in the East. If that was the case, it would mark another line.[99]

Through persuasive measures, diplomacy, and finally threats, the Cherokees had succeeded in stopping the work along their boundary, but the future was uncertain. The excitement caused by the extension of Arkansas land districts to the west had been real with federal authorities answering local Anglo-American pressure.[100] True to the flow of the frontier, a trickle of whites had seeped onto the area between the fork of the Canadian River and the Arkansas. Since that locale had never been under territorial jurisdiction, it could have been designated an Indian holding, but no tribe claimed it. For the Cherokees it meant that Anglo-Americans were flanking them, and that once the sod was broken their hunting would be curtailed.[101] The Arkansas Cherokees could not cope with confident

---

[98]Graham to William McRee, March 17, 1827, ibid., 421.

[99]Graham to Barbour, March 17, 1827, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; also ibid., Barbour to Graham, March 17, 1827.

[100]McKenney to Barbour, March 26, 1827, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 430-431; also Graham to McRee, April 3, 1827, ibid., 442; see also McRee to Graham, April 6, 1827, ibid., 443.

[101]Arkansas Gazette, April 10, 1827, p. 3.

Arkansas settlers.

In contrast to Washington the representatives in the Arkansas government were certain of their objectives. Henry Conway informed his constituents that the Cherokees and the Choctaws would be removed as soon as they "can be induced to sell."[102] In a letter to Governor Izard one settler concluded that a treaty with the Cherokees would be "a very difficult one. . . ." On the other hand he showed some knowledge of Indian affairs when he outlined a procedure that might work.

> . . . in the first place there must be a delegation of chiefs to Washington City which will require considerable funds judiciously employed in the selection of the delegation. To hold a treaty here would be fruitless as the whole nation would be to contend with . . . I must have some thing to grease the hinges with at least two thousand dollars . . . if it was known it would cost my life and should you succeed I shall expect to be handsomely rewarded as I should risk my life.[103]

By mid-July, the Western Cherokees had split over removal. A small element had emerged, despite the stricture on seeling land, ready to take part in an exchange. Another segment, the mixed bloods, would not accept any alternative which would cost them Lovely's Purchase. They did not want to surrender any rights to mine the minerals on that tract.[104]

---

[102] Ibid., May 22, 1827, p. 3.

[103] Copy of a letter to Governor Izard enclosed in another headed Fort Smith, June 20, 1827, from an American citizen, Foreman Papers.

[104] Izard to Barbour, July 6, 1827, Reynolds (ed.), Arkansas Historical Association, I, 447-448.

Thus, the tribe had to decide how its best interests could be served. They elected to send another delegation to Washington. Before federal officials they would try to defend the tribal domain from the numerous pressures applied by Arkansas settlers and politicians.[105]

---

[105]Cherokee Chiefs in Council, December 28, 1827, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

CHAPTER VII

PARADISE LOST

For years the Cherokees had tried to gain a clear title to Lovely's Purchase. Their frustrating treks to Washington had yielded some minor victories, such as delivery of the annuity and postponing extended white settlement. Confirmation of ownership of Lovely's Purchase, however, was prevented in the 1820's by governmental indirection. By the mid-decade growing numbers of Americans west of the Arkansas Territory aggravated Cherokee fears that Anglo-Americans would engulf Lovely's Purchase.[1]

Previous experience in the East had taught the Cherokees that once Americans penetrated an area, they would nibble on Indian land until they took the entire reserve. The Arkansas Cherokees were compelled to defend their interest in Lovely's Purchase before it was lost. Territorial elections in September, 1827, raised new concerns as the candidates promised to promote a Cherokee removal, certainly good political tactics, but irresponsible from the Indian's viewpoint. To protect tribal

---

[1] Arkansas Gazette, December 19, 1826, p. 3.

interest, the council picked another delegation to represent it in Washington.[2]

Among those chosen Black Fox, John Rogers, and David Brown comprised the leaders among the delegation. They were instructed to seek clear title to Lovely's Purchase and gain awards for the tribe arising from the Osage Wars. Chief Thomas Graves and George Guess, Sequoyah, also accompanied the party, but were poor selections because they had their own special interests. Each had a claim on the government.[3] The delegation's orders were clear. Under no circumstances were they to negotiate a cession. The Cherokees arrived in Washington during the second week of February, 1828.

The Cherokees spent most of their time in conversations with Secretary of War James Barbour and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas McKenney. Emphasizing the estimates of the acres exchanged as supplied by Andrew Jackson, in 1817, they argued "that five million acres had been surrendered" with another two million added after the 1819 agreement. With at least seven million acres exchanged in

---

[2]Ibid., November 27, 1827, p. 2; also duVal to Barbour, November 30, 1827, Letters Received by the O.I.A., C.A.W.; see also Memorial to the President by the Territorial Assembly, December 24, 1827, Clarence Edwin Carter (comp. and ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XX: Territory of Arkansas (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956), 570-573. Hereafter cited as Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX.

[3]Cherokee Chiefs in Council, January 1, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; also ibid., Cherokee Chiefs in Council, December 28, 1827.

the East, they concluded that federal attempts to restrict their western territory to 4,264,096 acres was substantially short of the promised "acre for acre" exchange.[4]

The delegation hoped to find someone in the Adams administration to champion their cause, to recommit the government to fulfill President Monroe's earlier offer. Unfortunately, by 1828, it was impolitic for federal officials to bow to Indian designs. In St. Louis, Clark had been edging toward another removal. Even McKenney, who sympathized with the tribe's position, concurred when he suggested that Barbour agree "to give them other limits." But federal officials claimed that they could not consider another Cherokee relocation until the Eastern states had surveyed the total cessions made earlier by the emigrants.

The Office of Indian Affairs had adopted an ambivalent position because McKenney also maintained that the federal government should keep its early promises.[5] He noted the injustice done the tribe:

> In regard to the promise made to the Cherokees that Lovely's Purchase should be reserved, it is all true--nor can the government in good faith to these people, decline the execution of the solemn pledges made to them in their references in the letter.[6]

---

[4]Cherokee Delegation to Barbour, February 28, 1828, Documents Related to the Negotiations of Indian Treaties, Ratified and Unratified.

[5]McKenney to William McLean, March 7, 1828, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 624.

[6]McKenney to Barbour, March 18, 1828, ibid., 626.

Immediate action would have to be taken to curb additional white settlement on Lovely's Purchase. Already some 3,000 whites occupied land claimed by the Western Cherokees.[7]

Reviving Calhoun's earlier compromise, McKenney suggested that the Indians receive the land from the Verdigris eastward in an exchange for their present holdings in Arkansas. At the same time the Creeks who had recently moved there would be relocated between the Canadian and Arkansas rivers. If his plan were accepted, it would serve as an article of "good faith" by the Cherokees.[8]

Barbour supported that solution vowing that with a removal all other treaty provisions dating from 1817 would be honored by the government. He attempted to ascertain whether the delegation would negotiate on the offer extended by McKenney. The Cherokee representatives realized that the Adams administration was determined to remove them, even if it meant pushing Arkansas' western boundary forty miles to the east.[9]

Continued negotiations would not accomplish their goals. For a time they considered leaving Washington before they succumbed to the government's blandishments. They told Barbour of "their great anxiety to bring their business to a

---

[7]Ambrose H. Sevier to Barbour, February 18, 1828, ibid., 604.

[8]McKenney to Barbour, March 18, 1828, ibid., 627.

[9]Barbour to Arkansas Cherokee Delegation, March 27, 1828, ibid., 633-634.

close, as soon as practicable, that they may return to their homes." They accepted his word, however, that he meant to honor the 1817 treaty.[10]

Barbour cornered the delegation in a series of talks that pressed for another exchange of land. By early April, Black Fox and David Brown appeared receptive but suspicious. They asked Barbour to supply information on the total acreage that the administration would make available west of Arkansas "for the purpose of losing the subject. . . ."[11] Knowing of the reluctance of federal officials to mark off a large grant, the delegation asked that 6,000,000 acres be exchanged.[12] President Adams refused this offer and directed that War Department officials include only 3,194,784 acres in the Arkansas domain which completely nullified the chance to expand. Adams ignored all previous Cherokee arguments that they were entitled to 5,000,000 acres as originally stated by Jackson in 1817.[13]

With the President pulling in one direction, Barbour was surprised to discover that McKenney continued to defend

---

[10]Chief's statement /to Barbour/, March 29, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[11]Ibid., Chiefs to Barbour, April 2, 1828.

[12]Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 639n; also John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams . . . , ed. by Charles Francis Adams, VI (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 499. Hereafter cited as Adams, Memoirs, VI.

[13]McKenney to Arkansas Cherokee Delegation, April 11, 1828, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 645-646.

the Cherokees, referring to the government's unkept promises. The tribe, he pointed out, would be terrorized should whites settle Lovely's Purchase. "I need not speak," he said, "of hate which is cherished towards them by new settlers. . . ." That would spark additional trespassing which had characterized previous frontier conditions. He wanted Barbour's assurance so the Redmen would not "despair" over the government's credibility.[14]

McKenney had influenced the final decision, yet Barbour's attitude carried more weight with Adams. The Secretary of War was "perplexed" by the amount of land that the Cherokees asked from the government. Barbour was reinforced by Arkansas representative Ambrose Sevier, who tried to protect his constituents' interests.[15] Yet McKenney's compromise took precedence as the answer for the executive branch.

By April 24, the delegation faced the worst possible alternative--a removal from Arkansas without any other considerations. The Cherokees remonstrated against such an exchange and, at the same time, directed a personal attack against Sevier. Yet signs of a compromise surrender were emerging. Seeking to gain an additional grant of money for

---

[14]McKenney to Barbour, April 12, 1828, ibid., 648-649.

[15]Adams, Memoirs, VI, 516; also Sevier Statement, April 22, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.; also ibid., duVal to McKenney, April 22, 1828.

the exchange, tribal representatives depicted western land as poorer in quality than their present holding. That was definitely a sign they were trying to bargain. They asked for an "inducement" to balance the scales and repair the "inequality" of such an agreement. Also, their reserve had been cultivated and improvements made. Therefore, a shift to Lovely's Purchase would cause hardship. In addition the area around Grand River was "equal" to but "not superior" to the lands which the Cherokees presently inhabited in Arkansas. Still denying that they would ever come to terms, the delegates had obviously weakened.

For a seasoned diplomat like Adams the Cherokees were clearly trying to make better terms. Even duVal, probably without the knowledge of the chiefs, was advising Barbour how to manage the Cherokee delegation. He foresaw the need to offer a permanent Arkansas boundary east of the Indian lands.[16]

On May 1, Black Fox and James Rogers met President Adams in what constituted another step in getting the delegation's approval for a cession. Adams gave his word that a removal would make it possible to accomplish Monroe's and Calhoun's earlier promises.[17] Aided by duVal the process of wearing down the Cherokees went on until May 5, when the

---

[16]DuVal memo, April 25, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[17]Adams, Memoirs, VI, 526.

agent pleaded with McKenney for just a little more time.[18]

Opposition to an agreement collapsed. In terms of self-interest each side gained materially with the Treaty of May 6, 1828. For the United States, and in effect, the Arkansas Territory, the Cherokees agreed to remove to a tract west of Arkansas and east of the Verdigris River. The present Arkansas boundary was established eliminating their territorial claims in eastern Oklahoma, although Arkansans were already settled there. In the cession the Western Cherokees took title to a vast amount of land, 7,000,000 acres by administration reckoning, which comprised the much desired Lovely's Purchase. The Cherokees had finally received the land to which they had felt entitled since the Treaty of 1817.

At the same time the government agreed to grant the Cherokees a "perpetual" western outlet along the hundredth meridian. That settled an unanswered request from past conferences. Federal officials filled other needs, too. When the agency land was surveyed and sold, the money collected would pay for a grist mill and a saw mill on the new reserve. The government made another cession, an outright lump sum payment of $50,000, to cover the difference in value between the improved Arkansas land and the western prairies. The Arkansas band was given fourteen months to

---

[18] DuVal to McKenney, May 5, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

remove and the Adams administration agreed to pay a three-year annuity of $6,000 for loss of "stock" and any other problems attendant to changing their homesites. More than $8,000 went into the tribal coffers to pay for Osage spoliations and several individual payments were made, including $1,200 to Graves for the losses he suffered while imprisoned in Little Rock, and $500 to Guess in recognition of his work with the Cherokee syllabary.[19]

The delegation accepted a government present of clothing.[20] Also, it attempted to obtain justice in the murder of Graves' son. It presented Barbour with a "demand" to either jail the criminal or watch the Cherokees "apply the law of retaliation." President Adams believed a proper solution could occur only after the "offender" surrendered to American officials, who would ransom him from the Cherokees and avoid another Cherokee-Osage war.[21]

The government had blundered in the details of the exchange. In its haste to effect the removal, the administration turned land over to the Arkansas Cherokees upon which immigrant Creeks already had settled.[22] In mid-May,

---

[19]Charles Kappler (comp. and ed.), Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1904), 288-291.

[20]Copy of Remarks on Tucker and Thompson Accounts . . . , "Peter Porter," October 27, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[21]Adams, Memoirs, VI, 542.

[22]For a short review of the Creek position see Grant

Senator Thomas Cobb of Georgia, who helped to facilitate the removal, asked McKenney about the status of Lovely's Purchase. The chief of the Office of Indian Affairs had assured him that the cession in no way conflicted with any other tribal grants. McKenney knew better because Creek emigrants were already establishing settlements there.[23]

During April, 1828, the Arkansas Cherokees, ignorant of the treaty's formulation, vigorously defended their rights to Lovely's Purchase.[24] They were certain that no one in the delegation would cede the tribal domain in Arkansas because the members had been "specially instructed" to make no such deal. The death penalty faced any who contemplated a cession. They were shocked to hear that a treaty had been signed. The vast majority strongly disapproved of it, although they had not seen the terms. The delegation, well aware of the mood that existed among the Western Cherokees, took up temporary residence among the Eastern Cherokees rather than face the anger of their own people.

Foreman, Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926), p. 210; also Charles Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians, Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1883-84 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1887), p. 251 for negotiations that finally settled difficulties between the two tribes.

[23]McKenney to Cobb, May 17, 1828, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 682.

[24]Arkansas Gazette, April 23, 1828, p. 3.

In mid-June, the Western Cherokees awaited the party's arrival, determined to exact justice from those who had overstepped tribal law.

> Poles have been erected in front of the houses of the Delegation on which their heads are to be exhibited as soon as they return. . . . The people were very clamorous--collecting in mobs, drinking, and conducting /themselves/ in a very disorderly manner. Their excitement was principally directed against the Delegation. . . . It is, . . . not believed that they will proceed to commit violence on any except the delegation.[25]

The Western Cherokees regarded the treaty as a sell-out to the government. Although removal meant that the Cherokees could evade the threat of white encroachment, the grief of the cession prevented a calm assessment. Few elements regarded the new tract as their "last home."[26] By September, the shock had passed and duVal noticed some order restored.[27] But his estimate of the situation was unduly optimistic. Jolly had convened the National Council in July, 1828, to vent his dissatisfaction. At that time its members read the agreement but preferred to wait before making any public statements. On September 16, 1828, the Cherokee council objected strenuously to the treaty negotiated by the delegation.[28] It took a stand too late to

---

[25] Ibid., July 2, 1828, p. 3.

[26] Washburn to Evarts, July 3, 1828, Dwight Mission Report, Presbyterian Church.

[27] DuVal to McKenney, September 16, 1828, Letters Received by O.I.A., C.A.W.

[28] Ibid., David Brearley to Peter B. Porter, September 27, 1828.

effectively change the course of the agreement. With reluctance the Western Cherokees prepared to move. Already federal officials swarmed over their lands, making surveys, and preparing it for settlement.[29] Tolontuskee's dream of a home in Arkansas was lost.

At the time very few Cherokees could view the treaty in long range terms. For those who remembered Tolontuskee's vision of a permanent holding in Arkansas, removal was a bitter disappointment. Yet, by the same measure, in 1828, the new treaty might still yield the results sought by the old chief in his previous agreement. His original plan had suffered from real weaknesses from its inception. Although he had known the Arkansas valley was fertile, the Treaty of 1817 limited tribal growth to the northern bank of the river. He failed to obtain the south bank, where a small number of Cherokee villages had been established since 1813. The best land was there, while the soil to the north varied widely in quality. Also, without title to the south bank, Anglo-American settlement could push along the river creating the very pressure he was trying to escape.

Seemingly, Tolontuskee's oversight had been rectified. In 1818, he received Monroe's word that the tribe would not be surrounded by whites, a great victory because

---

[29]McKenney to duVal, July 29, 1828, Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers, XX, 717; William McRee to Angus L. Langham, August 12, 1828, ibid., 738; Charles J. Nourse to Izard, August 23, 1828, ibid., 739.

the Arkansas Cherokees would gain a permanent western outlet. Following Tolontuskee's death, John Jolly assumed the mantle of leadership and tried to maintain the position established by Tolontuskee. The inherent shortcomings of Tolontuskee's agreement surfaced afterward. First, Anglo-American settlement increased pressure on the reserve. Since Tolontuskee had not sealed the lands to the south in the 1820's, the absolute hold that the Indians had once held was dissipated by the extension of the Arkansas Territory. Monroe's promises had gone unfulfilled. Jolly failed to capitalize on the President's commitment, and the Arkansas Territory countered tribal attempts to gain the reserve and Lovely's Purchase, too.

Second, the tribe vainly attempted to destroy the Osage barrier to the west. The continued warfare prevented concentration of all Cherokee energy on the immediate problem of expanding their reserve. The constant violence on the frontier kept the nerves of the white population raw, reducing its tolerance of the tribes. In the face of Monroe's and Adams' policy of removal, the tribe could not protect its holdings from the assault of land-hungry elements in the territory. For those members of the tribe who were in transition, changing from hunters to farmers, the need to protect the Arkansas reserve became paramount in trying to create some stability among the scattered clans on the Arkansas bayous.

So the dream of a permanent home in Arkansas was doomed despite the best efforts of the Cherokee statesmen. While escaping the torment and suffering of the 'Trail of Tears,' endured later by the Eastern Cherokees, the Western Cherokees were subjected to the mental agony of half-kept promises, late annuities, and serving as the government's catspaw. Ironically, they were not completely innocent because they tried to use the federal government for their own ends, but they never fully realized how ambivalent Washington officials were in Indian affairs. What the Western Cherokees did not know at the time was that Lovely's Purchase, which became the Cherokee Nation portion of Indian Territory, would be their final relocation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliographies and Reference Works

Dockstadter, Frederick J., comp. The American Indian in Graduate Studies: A Bibliography of Theses and Dissertations. New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation, 1957.

Gibson, A. M. A Guide to Regional Manuscript Collections in the Division of Manuscripts: University of Oklahoma. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953.

Griffin, Grace G. et al., comp. Index to the Writings on American History. American Historical Association. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1902-1948.

Hamer, Philip M., ed. A Guide to the Archives and Manuscripts in the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Hodge, Frederick Webb, ed. Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. 2 vols. New York: Pageant Books, Inc., 1959.

Stoutenburgh, John L. Dictionary of the American Indian. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960.

Wright, Muriel H. A Guide to the Indian Tribes of Oklahoma. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951.

Primary Source Material

Arkansas Historical Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas
Dwight Mission Records, 1819-1830. Arkansas Mission Previous to September, 1824, Dwight Mission Journal, Unpublished Mss., Congregational House, Houghton Library, Boston. On microfilm.
Clara Eno Collection
John Nicks Collection

George W. Paschal Collection in the Eno Collection
Works Progress Administration Papers

Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri
Pierre Chouteau Papers
William Clark Papers
Richard Graham Papers
Indian Papers
George Sibley Papers
E. G. Voorhis Memorial Collection in the William Clark Papers

National Archives, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes, Microcopy T-494, Roll 1
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letter Book of the Arkansas Trading House, 1805-10, Microcopy 142, Roll 1
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Cherokee Agency East, Microcopy 234, Rolls 71-76
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Cherokee Agency West, Microcopy 234, Roll 77
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of the Secretary of War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-23, Microcopy 271, Rolls 1-6
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1807-23, Microcopy 16, Rolls 1-6
Records of the Bureau of Land Management, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, 1796-1889, Microcopy M-25, Rolls 1-3
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency in Tennessee, 1801-35, Microcopy 208, Rolls 1-14

Oklahoma State Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Grant Foreman Collection, Vertical File, Indian Archives
Thomas J. Harrison Collection, Indian Archives

The University of Oklahoma, Western History Collection
Cherokee Miscellaneous Papers
Cherokee Nation Papers

Thomas R. Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma
Grant Foreman Papers

Published Primary Source Material

Adams, John Quincy. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams Comprising Portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. 12 vols. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875.

Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945, Volume II, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794. Edited by Lawrence Kinnaird. Part I, The Revolutionary Period: 1765-1781. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949.

Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945, Volume III, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794. Edited by Lawrence Kinnaird. Part II, Post War Decade, 1782-1791. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946.

Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945, Volume IV, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794. Edited by Lawrence Kinnaird. Part III, Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-1794. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946.

Carter, Clarence Edwin, comp. and ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume IV: The Territory South of the River Ohio, 1790-1796. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1936.

_____. The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIV: The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1806-1814 (cont). Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949.

_____. The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XIX: The Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953.

_____. The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XX: The Territory of Arkansas, 1826-1831. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1956.

_____. The Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume XXI: The Territory of Arkansas, 1832-1836. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1958.

Cherokee Nation. Laws of the Cherokee Nation Adopted by the Council at Various Periods. Tahlequah, C.N.: n.p., 1852.

Flint, Timothy. Recollections of the Last Ten Years, Passed in Occasional Residences and Journeyings in the Valley of the Mississippi, from Pittsburgh and the Missouri to the Gulf of Mexico, and from Florida to the Spanish Frontier: in a Series of Letters to the Rev. James Flint, of Salem, Mass. Boston: Cummings, Hilliard and Co., 1826.

Foreman, Grant, edited and annotated. A Traveler in Indian Territory: The Journal of Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Late Major-General in the United States Army. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1930.

Houck, Louis, ed. The Spanish Regime in Missouri: A Collection of Papers and Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana Principally within the Present Limits of Missouri During the Dominion of Spain. 2 vols. Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1909.

Irving, Washington. A Tour of the Prairies. Edited by John Francis McDermott. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.

Jackson, Andrew. Correspondence of Andrew Jackson. Edited by John Spencer Bassett. 6 vols. Papers of the Department of Historical Research. J. Franklin Jameson, ed. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-33.

James, Edwin, comp. Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, Performed in the Years 1819 and '20. Part III. Edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites. Early Western Travels, 1748-1846: A Series of Annotated Reprints of Some of the Best and Rarest Contemporary Volumes of Travel, Descriptive of the Aborigines and Social and Economic Conditions in the Middle and Far West, during the Period of Early American Settlement. Vol. XVII. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905.

Morse, Jedidiah. A Report to the Secretary of War of the U. S. on Indian Affairs Comprising a Narrative of a Tour Performed in the Summer of 1820, Under a Commission from the President of the United States, for the Purpose of Ascertaining for the use of the Government The Actual State of the Indian Tribes in our Country. New Haven: Howe & Spaulding, 1822.

Nuttall, Thomas. Journal of Travels into the Arkansas Territory, During the Year 1819. Edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites. Early Western Travels, 1748-1846: A Series of Annotated Reprints of Some of the Best and Rarest Contemporary Volumes of Travel, Descriptive of the Aborigines and Social and Economic Conditions in the Middle and Far West, during the Period of Early American Settlement. Vol. XIII. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905.

Reynolds, John Hugh, ed. Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association. 4 vols. Fayetteville, Ark.: Arkansas Historical Association, 1906-1914.

Royce, Charles C., comp. Indian Land Cessions in the United States. John Wesley Powell, 18th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute, 1896-97. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1899.

Schoolcraft, Henry R. Journal of a Tour into the Interior of Missouri and Arkansas in 1818-1819. Edited by Hugh Park. Schoolcraft in the Ozarks. Arkansas Historical Series No. 3. Van Buren, Ark.: Press-Argus, 1821, 1955.

Government Documents

American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States . . . . Edited by Walter Lourie and Walter Franklin. Indian Affairs. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1834.

Kappler, Charles J., comp. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 4 vols. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1904.

Reports on Indian Affairs, 1824-1841. /Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1842./

U.S., Congress, Annals of Congress of the United States. 1789-1819.

U.S., Congress, Lovely's Purchase--Arkansas, Letter from the Secretary of War Transmitting Correspondence Relative of Lovely's Purchase in Territory of Arkansas, Document 263, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., April 30, 1828.

U.S., Statutes at Large. 9 vols. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1875-1919.

Newspapers and Magazines

Arkansas Gazette, 1819-1830. /Microfilm, University of Arkansas/

Louisiana Gazette/Missouri Gazette, July 1808-1811. /Missouri Historical Society/

Niles Weekly Register, 1817-1830.

The Panoplist/Missionary Herald, 1807-1835.

Secondary Materials

Anonymous. History of Benton, Washington, Carroll, Madison, Crawford, Franklin and Sebastian Counties, Arkansas: From the Earliest Time to the Present . . . . Chicago: Goodspeed Publishing Co., 1889.

Bearss, Ed and Gibson, Arrell M. Fort Smith: Little Gibralter on the Arkansas. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969.

Brown, John P. Old Frontiers: The Story of the Cherokee Indians from Earliest Times to the Date of their Removal to the West, 1838. Kingsport, Tenn.: Southern Publishers Inc., 1938.

Brown, Samuel. The Western Gazateer: or Emigrant's Directory Containing a Geographical Description of the Western States and Territories . . . . Auburn, N.Y.: H. C. Southwick, 1817.

Carselowey, James Manford. Cherokee Notes. Fayetteville, Ark.: Washington County Historical Society, 1960.

Clark, Mary Whatley. Chief Bowles and the Texas Cherokees. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.

Cotterill, Robert S. The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954.

Foreman, Grant. Indians and Pioneers: The Story of the American Southwest Before 1830. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.

_____. Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926.

Graves, William W. The First Protestant Osage Missions, 1820-1837. Oswego, Kans.: Carpenter Press, 1949.

Harmon, George Dewey. Sixty Years of Indian Affairs: Political, Economic and Diplomatic, 1789-1850. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1941.

Haywood, John. The Civil and Political History of the State of Tennessee: From its Earliest Settlement Up to the Year 1796, Including the Boundaries of the State. Nashville, Tenn.: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1891.

Horsman, Reginald. Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812. /East Lansing, Mich./: Michigan State University Press, 1967.

Houck, Louis. A History of Missouri from the Earliest Exploration and Settlements Until the Admission of the State into the Union. 3 vols. Chicago: R. R. Donnelley, 1908.

James, Marquis. The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston. N.Y.: Blue Ribbon Books, 1929.

Johnson, Boyd. The Arkansas Frontier. n.p., privately printed, 1957.

Mathews, John Joseph. The Osages: Children of the Middle Waters. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.

Mooney, James. Myths of the Cherokees. John Wesley Powell. Nineteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1897-98. Part I. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1900.

Peake, Ora Brooks. A History of the United States Indian Factory System, 1795-1822. Denver: Sage Books, 1954.

Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Royce, Charles. The Cherokee Nation of Indians. John Wesley Powell. Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1883-84. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1887.

Schwarze, Edmund. History of the Moravian Missions Among the Southern Indian Tribes of the United States. Transactions of the Moravian Historical Society. Vol. I. Bethlehem, Pa.: Times Publishing Co., 1923.

Shinn, Josiah. Pioneers and Makers of Arkansas. Little Rock: Genealogical and Historical Publishing Co., 1908.

Starkey, Marion L. The Cherokee Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.

Starr, Emmet. Cherokees "West": 1794-1839. Claremore, Okla.: Emmet Starr, 1910.

_____. Early History of the Cherokees: Embracing Aboriginal Customs, Religion, Laws, Folklore, and Civilization. n.p., 1917.

Swanton, John R. The Indians of the Southeastern United States. Smithsonian Institution. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 137. New York: Greenwood Press, 1946, 1969.

Wardell, Morris L. A Political History of the Cherokee Nation. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938.

Wesley, Edgar Bruce. Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825. n.p.: University of Minnesota Press, 1935.

Whitaker, Arthur Preston. The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927.

Wilkins, Thurman. Cherokee Tragedy: The Story of the Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People. New York: Macmillan Co., 1970.

Periodicals

Abel, Annie Heloise. "Proposals for an Indian State, 1778-1878," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1907 (Washington, D.C.: 1908), I, 89-102.

Cash, Marie. "Arkansas in Territorial Days," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, No. 3 (September, 1942), 223-234.

Clark, Joseph Stanley. "The Eastern Boundary of Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XI, No. 4 (December, 1933), 1084-1110.

Cotterill, Robert S. "Federal Indian Management in the South," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XX, No. 3 (December, 1933), 333-352.

Davis, John B. "The Life and Work of Sequoyah," Chronicles of Oklahoma, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1930), 149-180.

"John C. Luttig to Christian Wilt," April 16, 1815, Arkansas Historical Quarterly, I, No. 2 (June, 1942), 151-155.

Eaton, Rachel Caroline. "The Legend of the Battle of Claremore Mound," Chronicles of Oklahoma, VIII, No. 4 (December, 1930), 369-377.

Foreman, Grant (ed.), "Dwight Mission," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XII, No. 1 (March, 1934), 42-51.

_____. "Salt Works in Early Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, X, No. 4 (December, 1932), 474-500.

_____. "Some New Light on Houston's Life Among the Cherokee Indians," Chronicles of Oklahoma, IX, No. 2 (June, 1931), 139-152.

_____. "The Three Forks," Chronicles of Oklahoma, II, No. 1 (March, 1924), 37-47.

Hodges, Dr. and Mrs. T.L. "Jean Lafitte and Major L. Latour in Arkansas Territory," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1948), 237-256.

Jones, Dorsey D. "Cephas Washburn and His Work in Arkansas," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (Spring, 1944), 125-136.

Way, Royal B. "United States Factory System for Trading with the Indians, 1796-1822," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI, No. 2 (September, 1919), 220-235.

Westbrook, Harriette Johnson. "The Chouteaus: Their Contributions to the History of the West, Part II. Diplomatic and Social Relationships of the Chouteaus," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XI, No. 3 (September, 1933), 942-966.

Worley, Ted (ed.). "A Letter of Governor Miller to his Wife," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, XIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1954), 388-390.

Dissertations and Theses

Andrus, Thekla Nowotny. "Sam Houston and the Indians," Master's Thesis, Texas College of Arts and Industries, August, 1950.

Crouch, William W. "Missionary Activities Among the Cherokee Indians, 1757-1838," Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1932.

Dickson, John L. "The Judicial History of the Cherokee Nation from 1721 to 1835," Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1964.

Frazier, Jo Wood. "The Removal of the Indians from Arkansas," Master's Thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1931.