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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY REPORTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1974
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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
HUGH WAYNE JEFFERS
Norman, Oklahoma

1974

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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May others have the good fortune of their counsel in the years to come.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vi
 Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION.	1
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.	8
Primary Sources	8
Secondary Sources	10
Criterion Sources	19
III. THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM	21
The Principles of Analysis.	21
Design for this Study	32
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF PURPOSES AND PRIORITIES	39
First Purpose	41
Second Purpose.	42
Third Purpose	44
Fourth Purpose.	45
Fifth Purpose	46
Priorities.	48
Summary of Chapter Four	52
V. THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF QUALITY AND EQUALITY.	55
Equality of Opportunity	56
Quality and Equality as Interacting Principles	62
Further Analysis as to the Meaning of Quality.	68
Summary of Chapter Five	72

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

VI.	THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERRELATION OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT QUALITY, EQUALITY, AND THE USE OF RESOURCES.	74
	The Implications of Equality of Educational Opportunity for Resource Use	74
	The Macroeconomic Assumption and its Implications for Quality	78
	The Assumption that the Knowledge Represented by the Standard Bachelors' Degree Is a Constant and Need Not Be Changed.	83
	Summary of Chapter Six.	92
VII.	THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF GOVERNANCE: SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AS THE GIVEN CONDITION	94
	A Preliminary Consideration of the Alternatives	96
	The Commission's Point of View as to Recommendations for the Governance of Institutions of Higher Education	98
	Social Expectations as the Given Condition.	103
	Summary of Chapter Seven.	110
VIII.	THE FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ITS EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS FUTURE.	112
	Higher Education's External Relationships	114
	Nature and Scope of Higher Education.	119
	A) Scope.	119
	B) The Degree and its Meaning	123
	C) The Certification and Evaluation of Teaching	126
	D) Summary as to the Nature and Scope of Higher Education	135
	Recommendations for the Future: A Call for Reform	136
	Summary of Chapter Eight.	149
IX.	CONCLUSION.	153
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	160

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration	Page
I. The Analytical Model.	37
II. The Analytical Model as it Applies to the Purposes and Priorities of the Commission.	39
III. The Analytical Model as it Applies to Resource Use	73
IV. The Analytical Model as it Applies to Governance	92
V. The Analytical Model as it Applies to the Functions of Learning.	109

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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze the policy reports and recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, and to report such conclusions as an appropriate analysis will yield. A brief review of the Carnegie Commission, its membership, the objectives for which it was established, and the extent of its activities, will suggest not only the importance of such a study, but also the form that it should take.

First announced in January, 1967, the Commission was established by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.¹ It was placed under the chairmanship of Clark Kerr, one whose prominence in American higher education was established during his presidency of the University of

¹"Clark Kerr Heads Study of U. S. Higher Education," Publishers' Weekly, February 6, 1967, p. 47.

California between the years 1958 and 1967. An author as well as an administrator, Kerr continues to rank among the nation's outstanding spokesmen for higher education.²

Also serving on the Commission are William Friday, David D. Henry, James A. Perkins, and Stanley J. Heywood, all of whom are, or have been, presidents of important public institutions. Theodore Hesburgh, Katherine McBride, and Nathan Pusey are, or have been, similarly associated with certain of the nation's most prestigious private institutions. Most of these people are hardly less distinguished than Kerr himself. The Commission also includes the names of people outside education fully as distinguished in their own areas. Most notable of these is William W. Scranton, former governor of Pennsylvania, former congressman, and one-time contender for the Republican nomination as candidate for President. Mr. Scranton was also chairman of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

² Who's Who in America (Chicago: Marquis, 1972), p. 1698. The information on the following members of the Commission was also taken from this same source: William Friday, p. 1078; David D. Henry, p. 1408; Stanley J. Heywood, p. 1428; Theodore Hesburgh, p. 1421; Nathan Pusey, p. 2561; William W. Scranton, p. 2832; Carl Kaysen, p. 1667; Ralph W. Besse, p. 248; Clifton W. Phalen, p. 2486; Kenneth Keniston, p. 1689; David Riesman, p. 2650; Kenneth Tollett, p. 3185; and Norton Simon, p. 2915.

Information on Joseph Cosand, Eric Ashby, and Patricia Roberts Harris was obtained from the foreword of the following publication: Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973), p. ix. The official membership of the Commission was also identified by this same reference.

The Commission also includes Eric Ashby, English educator; Joseph P. Cosand, former Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education, U. S. Office of Education, and now Professor and Director, Center for Higher Education, University of Michigan; Patricia Roberts Harris, educator, attorney, and former Ambassador to Luxembourg; Carl Kaysen, economist, and Director, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey; and Ralph W. Besse, and Clifton W. Phalen, business executives. Kenneth Keniston, psychologist, David Riesman, social scientist, and Kenneth Tollett, former professor of law and now Professor of Education, Howard University, appear to be the representatives of the professoriate in that it is they who, among this group, have had careers that are so described. The Commission is made up primarily of those whose background has been higher education administration, business, and government. Norton Simon, business executive, is the one member of the Commission whose biographical statement in Who's Who in America does not state that he completed an undergraduate degree program, or that he ever attended college. All members of the Commission have exercised leadership in higher education in either professional or non-professional capacities.

At the time of the Commission's founding, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching announced that this group was instructed by it "to analyze how Americans can afford the quantity and quality of education they are likely

to demand in the years to come." It was further announced that "this group would not aim for a supersolution . . . but would consider a number of different ways in which the nation's incredibly diverse system of higher education might develop over the next decade or two."³ By the Commission's own account it was instructed to "examine and make recommendations regarding the many vital issues facing higher education in the United States as we approach the year 2000."⁴ More recently it has reported its general purpose as being:

to make a systematic appraisal of higher education and to suggest guidelines for its continuing development. At the Commission's birth in 1967 it was given the mission of obtaining information, analyzing issues, and advising the leaders of our institutions of higher education, decision makers in and out of government, and the general public on directions for the future.⁵

From these statements it must be deduced that the Commission's mandate is quite general, and that it could proceed in almost any direction and remain within this purview.

However, it should be noted that the two-fold purpose of (1) examining and appraising, including research and analysis, and (2) suggesting or recommending guidelines,

³"Clark Kerr Heads Study of U. S. Higher Education," Publishers' Weekly, February 6, 1967, p. 47 (quoting Alan Pifer).

⁴Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), reference from foreword; unpaginated.

⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, An Important Announcement from the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, an undated, unpaginated brochure.

and specifically advising on directions for the future, clearly relates the work of the Commission to the ongoing process of goal formulation for the future of higher education. The stance of the Commission in this regard will be of particular interest to this study. For its proposals and recommendations, if they are to have any effective meaning, will either support practices which are normative for higher education in the United States, or they will be stated in such a manner that they will require modification or displacement of certain present norms in order to be put into effect. It is in this same connection that any unity or consistency in the Commission's point of view may be observed, and about which any conclusions may be drawn.

A careful study of the Commission, its point of view and recommendations, appears to be in order for a number of reasons. The first of these is the prestige of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. It has a long record of interest in education, including higher education, and has become well established as a source for funding special projects in educational research. The second has to do with the prestige of the Commission itself, the very prominence of whose members requires that their opinions be reviewed and evaluated. A third reason has to do with the extent of financial and human resources applied to this enterprise, which finally resulted in the expenditure of no less than six million dollars and the publication of more

than one hundred books and monographs.⁶ An effort such as this cannot be ignored, and it can be expected that these publications will be the object of continuing interest.

A final reason has to do with the breadth of the Commission's interest as well as the extent of its activities. It has studied and reported on many areas. Such an extensive effort, if taken seriously, can have a profound influence on higher education during the approaching years, even for decades.

The Commission's stance, or point of view will be determined, and judgments made as to its general adequacy, on the basis of the following interrogative problem statement:
To what extent has the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education accomplished its task through the exercise of sound principles, consistent use of theoretical constructs or models; or if not, then to what extent have its policy statements been influenced by unsupported assumptions as to fact, by value judgments, and incomplete or fallacious arguments?

A critical analysis will be helpful in estimating the soundness of the Commission's proposals and recommendations for the future, and in determining what the various stances

⁶Reported by Donald McDonald in "A Six Million Dollar Misunderstanding," Center Magazine, September/October 1973, p. 32. The publications of the Carnegie Commission are listed in the Chronicle of Higher Education, October 9, 1973, p. 18. There are 104 titles in all.

by the academic community, government and its agencies, and the public should be. These are the groups to which the Commission has addressed itself, and from whom it can rightly expect a candid response.

Chapter Two will review the literature pertinent to this study. The delimitations of this study will be set forth and secondary sources reviewed. Criterion sources from which the analytical method and criterion principles have been developed will be introduced.

Chapter Three will present the approach to the problem as stated above. This will include the criterion principles of analysis and an analytical model based upon means-end relationships. The separate dimensions of the model provide the steps (Illustration I on page 38) to be followed in the analysis, as follows:

Chapters Four and Five will analyze the expressed purposes and priorities of the Carnegie Commission. Chapter Six will analyze the implications for resource use that follow from the Commission's presuppositions as to meaning.

Chapter Seven will analyze the same implications for governance.

Chapter Eight will analyze the implications for the nature, scope, and functions of higher education -- the relationships of learning.

Chapter Nine will present the conclusion to this study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature pertinent to this study falls into three categories: primary sources, secondary sources, and criterion sources. The primary sources will be the subject of this study. The secondary sources are those statements by independent observers, the important ones of which will be reviewed for specific suggestions as to strengths and weaknesses of the proposals and recommendations of the Carnegie Commission. The criterion sources consist of those writings in logical analysis from which a research method has been derived, and by which the research problem will be developed.

Primary Sources

The primary sources will consist of those policy reports, or policy statements, in which the Carnegie Commission has formally stated its position, and its recommendations, for the future of higher education in the United States. The first of these statements, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education, was issued in December, 1968. A revised edition was issued in 1970.

The series was concluded with the publication of Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, November, 1973. Twenty-two such policy reports were released, not including the one revision. A complete list of these monographs appears in the Bibliography for this analysis. Published by McGraw-Hill Book Company of New York, New York, as Reports with Recommendations, this series will be referred to for convenience as policy reports, or policy statements. This is because they set forth the official point of view of the Carnegie Commission, and its many formal recommendations. They therefore represent those ideas for which the Commission must accept responsibility, and by which it must be judged. Hence this analysis is delimited to include these statements as its subject, or research material.¹

The Commission has also sponsored the preparation of sixty-four Research Reports and nineteen Technical Reports. The analysis is delimited to exclude these two series because they were prepared by commissioned authors under contract whose views are not necessarily those of the Carnegie Commission. Thus the policy statements are the only primary source documents for the study of the problem statement.

¹Complete and separate lists of the Reports with Recommendations, sponsored Research Reports, and Technical Reports appear in Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, pp. 191-197. The policy statements have also been listed in the Bibliography for this study.

Secondary Sources

Beginning in the year 1970, the policy statements and other reports prepared under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Commission began to appear with some frequency. Secondary sources as to their content also began to appear, a few of which are sufficiently penetrating in their insight to merit some discussion.

The first to be considered is an essay presented to the National Conference of the American Association for Higher Education in March, 1972, by Alan Wolfe.² According to him the Commission is a voice of the higher education establishment, it deals with symptoms not causes, and that we therefore cannot expect effective results from its work. In Wolfe's opinion the approach of the Commission to the problems of higher education is subjective. It is not scientific. Conclusions have been reached on the basis of what people think, which is to assume that truth is a matter of relatively informed or uninformed collective opinion. With some degree of opinion of his own Wolfe claims that American higher education has never really been good, but that it was not a problem until students and junior faculty created the campus disturbances of the sixties. He adds that in light

²Alan Wolfe, "The Carnegie Commission: Voice of the Establishment," The Expanded Campus: Current Issues in Higher Education, 1972, ed. by Dyckman W. Vermilye (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972), pp. 28-34.

of this the Commission wishes not to reform higher education, "but people's attitudes toward higher education,"³ presumably in its present form and as to its present substance.

Wolfe also criticizes the Commission for that which he describes as the "selective definition of terms which runs throughout these reports."⁴ He offers as an example its discussion of the politicization of the university. So long as it has been a status quo institution it has been apolitical, from which it follows that any attack upon the status quo from within institutions of higher education represents the trend toward politicization. Wolfe chooses to invert this argument on the grounds that the status quo so conceived represents instead a convenient political arrangement with the higher learning being one of those activities presently upholding it. He further argues that attacks upon this status quo arrangement are in effect acts of depoliticization. Given Wolfe's point of view, his criticism holds; but given the Commission's stance, its argument holds equally well. At best, Wolfe has ridiculed the practice of selective definition by making use of it. What he has possibly missed, and the Commission also, is that insufficient definition results in a faulty analysis.

³Ibid., p. 29.

⁴Ibid.

The most important of Wolfe's criticisms of the Commission is "its failure to be theoretical, to place things in their political context, to examine causes, to be historical -- in short, to analyze what is wrong with higher education."⁵ But the consequences of an approach which is theoretical, historical, and analytical may, or may not, prove to be those that Wolfe wishes to expect. He perceives an unjust society, higher education a subservient part of it, thus standing in a relationship the radical nature of which the Carnegie Commission policy statements leave untouched. Aside from Wolfe's judgment as to the condition of American higher education (which he does not think is good), in a society (which he does not think is just), his criticism may have merit. However the general condition of higher education and its social relationships are to be judged, this cannot properly be done until all significant relationships have been radically examined, until higher education has been subjected to a thoroughly critical analysis.

A more recent commentary is that by Norman Birnbaum.⁶ Forthright as to his own value judgments, Birnbaum identifies with those who have been disappointed with the Commission policy statements for one of two reasons. On the one hand

⁵Ibid. p. 30.

⁶"Politics of the Future," Change, November, 1973 pp. 28-37.

are those who would prefer to look forward to a more critical university than that which would emerge from the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission, and on the other there are those who would wish to look to a new multiversity of the future appropriating to itself a great deal more social and political significance -- "a new kind of Third Estate, able to dispense with a revolution as it installed itself in power and privilege."⁷

Birnbaum claims instead that the reader is caught up in the lengthening shadow of the multiversity as conceived by Clark Kerr on an earlier occasion. Hardly critical, hardly revolutionary, it is all things to all men, as it was according to The Uses of the University, written by Kerr in the year 1963. As to the Commission:

The burden of its entire analysis is that a nation's education largely depends on its economic and social trends. An industrial society requires knowledge and knowers: the educational system provides both.⁸

Birnbaum perceives this as being a condition which excludes the capability of acting independently, critically, or of allowing the activities of higher education to significantly influence the patterns of American culture. Instead the nation's colleges and universities are seen essentially as uncritical servants of other forces within the social system.

⁷Ibid. p. 28.

⁸Ibid.

Birnbaum charges that Clark Kerr has a fondness for economic imagery, and that this imagery has found its way into the policy statements of the Commission. But at the same time Birnbaum, with Kerr, has possibly missed the significance of the frequent economic references, even though hints to such are provided by some of Birnbaum's other observations. He claims for example that the Carnegie Commission fails to entertain the prospect that "political justice and the unlimited growth of American capitalism may be in conflict."⁹ In still another reference he charges that the "corporate domination of our public life"¹⁰ is not necessarily to the best interest of American democracy. Economic growth and corporate domination are perceived by Birnbaum as conditions which the policy statements blandly accept, even their influence upon higher education. This point, coupled with this same critic's prior observation that higher education's social function is subservient and complementary, has important implications for this analysis.

W. Roy Niblett, a British scholar, has reacted to two basic themes appearing throughout the policy reports -- quality and equality.¹¹ Niblett holds that quality, as this term applies to academic standards, is necessarily in tension

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹"The Commission's Work: A view from Abroad," Change, November, 1973, pp. 38-44.

with the principle of equality of access to institutions of higher education. Educational egalitarianism for the masses at the college level and learning excellence do not go together, and the former can be achieved only at some sacrifice to the latter. He charges the Commission with being vague as to the meaning of quality. Its understanding cannot be taken for granted, and consequently there is some confusion as to the meaning of this term.¹²

Another criticism of Niblett's is closely related. This has to do with the rejection of the concept of general education and offering in its place the concept of a "broad learning experience." General education is only vaguely described, its successor vaguely conceived, with the consequence that the Commission's discussion of this issue is lacking in precision and depth.¹³

Niblett also criticizes the Commission for proposing as a part of the broad learning experience the consideration of "alternative cultural models" to that which prevails in western civilization, particularly as real options to our own. He believes that the Commission hardly means what it has said in this case, for this would logically introduce both Soviet and Chinese Communism as live possibilities for the ordering of our lives and our society.¹⁴

¹²Ibid., p. 39.

¹³Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 44.

In response to these vague conceptions of key terms, and the making of proposals as for example "broad learning experience," without taking measure of the consequences for its argument, Niblett has his own suggestion for making improvements -- "The Commission needs to become aware of its own hidden assumptions, and to tease them out."¹⁵ He thus implies that the Commission is not fully aware of the reasons for the positions that it has taken, not fully aware of the meanings of many of its proposals. It follows that certain meanings may be incomplete, some contradictory, and some of rather unexpected consequence. To the extent that this may be so it represents an area for further study.

The most severe criticism of the Carnegie Commission has come from Donald McDonald.¹⁶ He regards not only the policy statements, but also the Sponsored Research Reports, as inferior when compared to other contemporary treatments of the nature of higher education in the United States. He charges that the policy statements in particular are "smooth and serene," but do not represent a dialogue among the members of the Commission. They are "light on criticism and heavy on recommendation,"¹⁷ because the Commission was more interested in having an impact than in conducting a study

¹⁵Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁶"A Six Million Dollar Misunderstanding," The Center Magazine, September/October, 1973, pp. 32-52.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 33.

into the essence of higher education. Interestingly enough, Kerr has admitted that this was indeed the strategy of the Commission, and on the occasion of his visit to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in the spring of 1973, he defended this as the proper strategy.¹⁸ This decision, according to McDonald, has resulted in making "whatever else the Commission has decided to do -- . . . a waste of time on a scale of monumental proportions and leaves the Commission's study without any center of gravity."¹⁹

McDonald takes issue with the Commission's pristine definition of the academic life -- having to do with the intellect, rationality, objectivity, logic, preservation and transmission of culture -- which, he claims, is unassailable except on the grounds that nowhere in higher education do these conditions truly exist.²⁰ In a similar fashion the Commission upholds teaching as being second to none in importance. Also, in similar fashion, McDonald levels his criticism again. He charges that because there is no "delineation of the art of teaching, why it is indispensable, or the actual treatment of teachers, its recommendations read more like the obligatory obeisances which university administrators ritually make for the record every two or

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 34.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 34.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 40.

three years, and which everyone recognizes for what they are and promptly ignores."²¹ In fairness to the Commission it should be noted that the failure to analyze the nature and function of teaching is an issue quite aside from whether an attempt is being made to mollify the professorial guild with rhetoric. The latter is hardly appropriate as a criticism because the reader cannot really claim to divine motives. But it is most appropriate to call the Commission to task if it has taken an idealistic conception of the university as fact, or has failed to thoroughly study and report on the essence of the learning enterprise, including the state of the art of teaching.

In summary, it can be said that there is general agreement among the critics on certain points. This holds for the claim that the policy statements are lacking in clarity and meaning, that meanings and facts appear to have been taken for granted especially as this applies to basic concepts and key terms. Wolfe's charges of subjectivity and selective definition illustrate the point, as does McDonald's claim that the Commission holds to an unreal and idealistic conception of higher education.

There is also general agreement as to how the Commission has perceived the relationship of higher education to the larger society. Its role is not a critical one, but

²¹Ibid., p. 41.

subservient, a point which is consistent with the claim, particularly of Birnbaum, that neither is the Commission very critical of higher education.

The taking of meanings and facts for granted would add credence to the charge of Niblett that the Commission needs to examine its own assumptions. Confusion as to meaning, as to fact, as to functions and relationships, could well proceed from unstated and unexamined assumptions. To the degree that the opinions of the critics are sound, they are in support of the purpose of this analysis, which is to discover and set forth those assumptions.

Criterion Sources

The criterion sources for this study are selected from the writings of three authors: Alfred Jules Ayer, Irving M. Copi, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Ayer will be used primarily for the contributions of his principle of verification and for his definition of a significant statement.²² Copi will be used for reference to the basic principles of logic,²³ and Peirce for his contribution to the understanding

²²Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), pp. 33-45.

²³Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).

of the nature of meaning.²⁴ Further reference will be made to these authors as each makes his contribution to the formulation of the research criteria, or principles of analysis, as they will be called in this study.

²⁴Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER III

THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

The problem statement clearly calls for the method of induction, of advancing from particulars to the whole in which they are bound together, from words and concepts to the general conclusions according to which all antecedent particulars may be expected to be in agreement. The commission's stance will initially be accepted on its own terms. It follows that words and concepts must be studied in order to determine those meanings which emerge in connection with their usage by the Commission. The same must also hold for the development of the Commission's arguments. They must be taken as they stand and for what they reflect.

The Principles of Analysis

Toward this end the problem statement will now be supplemented with a series of subordinate questions designed to inquire of the internal relationships which are presumed to exist in the policy statements of the Carnegie Commission. These presupposed relationships will subsequently be formulated into principles of analysis, which will in turn be used to

treat the problem statement set forth in the Introduction to this analysis. Those principles will likewise serve as independent criteria according to which the policy statements will be assessed. The subordinate originating questions are as follows:

First, what are the presuppositions as to meaning of the determinative words, expressions, and concepts employed by the Commission?

Second, what are the assumptions as to principle inherent in the stance of the Commission?

Third, what are the assumptions as to fact?

Fourth, what are the fallacies?

These interrogatives embrace seven basic principles which will now be further discussed. The first such principle is that of meaning, and is intended in this case to express certain categories of relationships. In its broadest sense it may denote the relationship of cause to effect, but more precisely of means to ends, and objects to their use. In this analysis the principle of meaning will be taken as applying to the relationship of an abstraction to its reference -- of words, signs, and symbols to that which they represent. The exercise of this principle is important because one cannot assume prior to the analysis any degree of stringency on the part of a writer. He may, or may not, have defined his terms, or have adhered strictly to

precise definitions of his own formulation or to those of a standard reference. Meaning is a function of usage, of that which words and statements are employed to communicate.¹ It is with this principle in mind that those words, expressions, and concepts essential to the Commission's position will be studied in context. Reasoning from usage, the Commission's presuppositions as to meaning will be inferred and set forth. The principle of meaning will thus be used to treat the first of the originating questions -- as to the meaning of the determinative words, expressions, and concepts employed by the Commission.

The second principle of analysis is that of logical significance, and inheres in the relationship of an antecedent to its consequent, or a premiss to the conclusion drawn therefrom. This principle is close in meaning to that which Peirce has described as a leading principle -- that habit of action whereby the reasoner moves from a premiss to a conclusion. Peirce further identifies a leading principle as a "proposition of which the antecedent should describe all possible premisses upon which it could operate, while the consequent should describe how the conclusion to which it would lead would be determinately related to those premisses."²

¹Peirce develops a similar, though not identical, position in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) pp. 23-41.

²Ibid. p. 133.

It is an expression of form as well as substance. This point can be illustrated by a particular instance of a leading principle, of the form,

If P, then Q,

as it applies to a specific substantive condition. Given a particular case of P, then what conclusion must necessarily follow? Logical significance is offered as a descriptor, or criterion statement, of propositions satisfying this condition. As such it will also be offered as the characteristic of those presuppositions and assumptions which must necessarily hold given the stance, the proposals and recommendations, of the Carnegie Commission.

It should be anticipated that the Commission will not be preoccupied with formal argument, and that premisses will be taken as understood. That which must be the case for a given conclusion to hold will accordingly be set forth. The identification of these antecedent conditions will satisfy the second of the originating questions: What are the assumptions as to principle inherent in the stance of the Commission? The leading principle, as a principle, will be used to treat according to its converse, which is fallacy, those propositions offered in support of a point for which they have no logical significance. They will be so identified in this negative fashion.

Just as there may be assumption as to principle, there may also be assumption as to fact. Assumptions as to principle

are those that attach controlling significance to beliefs, commitments, or theoretical statements that are taken as holding aside from the question of factuality. But assumptions as to meaning, and any other assumptions, may be fully as contingent upon fact as on principle. Therefore the third principle of analysis is that of empirical significance, and is a criterion of the relationship of an express or implied proposition and the supporting evidence. That which is empirically significant is that for which sufficient evidence has been cited or there is sufficient common knowledge. This principle embraces in part Ayer's criterion of significance by making such a matter of observation. It nonetheless differs from Ayer's principle of verification in that the principle of significance is to be understood in this analysis as embracing the principle of verification only in the a posteriori sense of that which has been sufficiently observed to be taken as fact.³

Conversely that which is taken as fact but not verified, yet at the same time verifiable, will be so labelled -- as verifiable in principle in the same sense of Ayer's use of this expression. The position is thus taken that a proposition, unless it be expressly proposed on an experimental basis, should rest upon established fact. The principle will therefore be used to treat the third of the originating questions --

³ Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946) pp. 33-45.

both to identify and make a judgment about the Carnegie Commission's assumptions as to fact.

The fourth principle of analysis is that of validity. As with logical significance, this is a function of syllogistic relationship -- a conclusion to its premisses, a consequent to its antecedent, a point of view to any necessary preconditions. The principle of validity is to be understood as meaning no more, and no less, than its application to syllogisms. It differs from empirical significance, and logical significance in particular, in that the latter are defined here as characteristics of premisses. Validity is a characteristic of the argument as a whole. Given the truth of premisses, the valid argument is the one in which the offered conclusion must necessarily follow. If the necessary conclusion does not follow, but some conclusion other than the necessary consequence of the conditions expressed in the premisses, then the argument is invalid.

It can be said that conditions satisfying the criterion of logical significance will preclude the necessity of the introduction of the principle of validity, in that such arguments as will have been reconstructed according to the principle of logical significance will be valid. This is true, and on this account the principle of validity will be restricted in use to those occasions on which observations as to validity and fallacy are to be made about arguments as a whole. Though its use will be rare, this principle

is included in this section in order to have all possibilities covered.

The same holds for the fifth principle of analysis, which is soundness. That argument is sound the premisses of which are true and the conclusion valid. As the principle of validity presupposes logical significance for premisses, the principle of soundness presupposes not only validity for the argument but also empirical significance for the premisses. It is thus a two-fold criterion, and must be applied in order to separate valid arguments the premisses of which are empirically significant from those whose premisses do not meet this prior condition. Validity is a function of logical, not empirical, significance; soundness is a function of both. As a criterion, the use of the principle of soundness will be restricted to those few occasions on which a summary observation of this nature is in order. As with validity, the principle of soundness is also included in order to cover all possibilities.

Of more importance to this analysis is the sixth principle, which is consistency. It inheres in the relationship of premisses to premisses, premisses to conclusions, and conclusions to conclusions. Two separate propositions may be taken as consistent with one another if they do not rest upon mutually exclusive premisses, and if they are in agreement as to fact, assumption, conclusion, or expected consequences.

It can be argued that this principle is redundant in the sense that propositions satisfying the principle of empirical significance will be consistent as to fact, arguments satisfying the principle of validity will be logically consistent, and that soundness must therefore of necessity be a criterion of consistency understood thus. It must be granted that factual and logical consistency would be properties of all arguments meeting these expectations.

Consistency is not proposed simply for taking measure of that for which other principles are adequate. It is offered instead to cover conditions which are beyond the limits of the principles of logical and empirical significance, validity, and soundness. Whereas these apply to particular propositions and arguments, the principle of consistency will apply to the general point of view of the Carnegie Commission taken as a whole. In this connection it should be noted that unsupported and/or unstated assumptions, and value judgments, may be discovered to have played an important role in the stance of the Commission. Separate propositions resting on assumptions false as to fact may nonetheless be in agreement. They may rest upon beliefs, commitments, value judgments, or unarticulated theories having no basis in fact, but which are nonetheless in full agreement. Consistency that is false as to fact,

and inconsistency, may be traced to words and their use, even to unstated assumptions quite determinative in their impact.

Hence the principle of consistency does not presuppose a stringent level of significance, nor even validity. It is possible that certain separate recommendations of the Commission may appear to be in agreement when in fact they are generalizations for which no valid formal argument can be inferred. To the degree that any faulty logic or faulty information is in agreement as to fact, assumption, or consequence, such consistency may be described as the bias of the policy statements of the Carnegie Commission, and as further evidence of any presuppositions that have so determined it.⁴

The seventh principle of analysis is that of dominance. It is an expression of the relationship of assumptions having logical significance to those that do not, and of those having greater significance to those having lesser. Given the option of alternative assumptions-as-premisses, dominance is a characteristic of that assumption which must be accorded significance either to the exclusion or subordination of other assumptions as to principle or as to fact.

⁴As in quantitative research bias is understood to be a characteristic of a sample not corresponding in its distribution to the population from which it is drawn, it is similarly understood in this context to mean opinion purporting fact or principle, or assumptions as to fact which cannot be so taken.

Dominance may be a characteristic of that which is uncertain or even false as to fact so long as it is a logical antecedent to the Commission's point of view. It is through such logically antecedent assumptions that the conceptual basis for the Commission's point of view will be traced and any bias identified.

Special attention should be called to the fact that of all these analytical principles, the most crucial is that of meaning. This is for two reasons. First, statements purporting fact or principle cannot be accorded significance of any sort, nor can they be labelled as verifiable in principle, unless they are clear as to fact and meaning. Clarity and specificity are the preconditions of argument, and of any judgements about significance, validity, or soundness.

Second, the same principles of significance, validity, and soundness are not to be taken as presupposing a preponderance of formal or informal argument. It can be anticipated that the Commission's point of view may frequently constitute no more than its collective opinion, and its recommendations a restatement of that opinion. Meaningful statements about argument cannot be made if there is no discernible argument. Hence it will fall primarily upon the principle of meaning to construct the Carnegie Commission's

point of view, and upon the principles of consistency and dominance to make final judgments.

It should be finally noted that either the Commission has followed a set of coherent principles specifically designed to bring factual information, its point of view, and its proposals into sound relation, or else unstated assumptions will have provided for any consistency inherent in the policy statements. It is this very possibility of assumptions and presuppositions functioning as antecedent conditions, that can serve to make the impact of the Carnegie Commission something more, something less, or something different than that which the Commission may have expected or intended. This may be taken as the hypothetical formulation which this study is intended to test.

Design for this Study

The design for this study is suggested by the basic characteristic of the principle of meaning, which is the relationship of means to ends. As words are means to expression, so is the statement of propositions. It likewise holds that more detailed conceptualizations are to some purpose, and this is no less so for the Carnegie Commission policy statements than any other documents.

However, the means-end relationship will now be taken as it applies to the functions of higher education, its supportive functions, and its implied and express purposes as supplied by the Commission, as the basic construct of an analytical model. Basic to a given function is a means-end dyad standing as an indivisible analytical unit, as for example resource use or governance functions as means to instruction (see Illustration I, p. 38). Given certain purposes, as for example those of the Commission, serving as prior cause for intended effect, a series of events are then perceived to exist in sequence toward those ends.

The research model is initially built upon three such hypothetical functions, as follows:

Function A serving as a means to function B;

Function B serving as a means to function C.

Hence,

A is related to B as means to end;


B is related to C as means to end.

In relation to function A in this sequence, function B serves as end, or in more theoretical language as goal, purpose, or objective. In relation to function C it serves as a means, which is to say that at the same time that B functions as an end to A it is a means to C. Consequently function C is the ultimate end for both A and B, while B, as the purpose of A, may be described as a penultimate end for the reason that it is also a means to C. These three functions, operating interdependently, shall be called a triadic sequence of cause and effect.

It should be noted, however, that it is not always necessary so to conceive a problem. If for example function C in our hypothetical sequence is neither desired nor expected, it may be dropped. Function B may in turn be perceived as cause for nothing except its own continuation. Hence it becomes the ultimate purpose of function A, with which it forms a dyadic series of cause and effect complete within itself. Function B is penultimate as to purpose given the triadic sequence, but ultimate given the independent dyadic sequence.

These two separate hypothetical sequences may be illustrated as follows:


1. The dyadic sequence reads,



with the arrow indicating that B is cause for A.


B is ultimate as to purpose.

2. The triadic sequence reads,



with the arrow indicating that C, as the predetermined end, is prior cause for both A and B. C is ultimate and B penultimate as to purpose.

The same two elements can be combined into a more general construct in order to represent contradistinction, complementarity, mutually exclusive alternatives, or contradiction, as follows:



A word is in order about the function of goals, objectives, or especially purposes, as the latter is the term preferred by the Commission. Given certain purposes as the motivations for preferring certain means to the desired end, an ends oriented pattern of action is thus set into operation. Such may be described as being teleological and cyclical. A given end, so long as it is the ultimate end and remains unchanged, functions as prior cause to perpetuate the set of conditions described by it. Hence function C may be perceived as prior cause for function A in the triadic sequence, function B for function A in the dyadic sequence, with the perceived end in each case closing the cycle of functions or events.

This model can be illustrated by substituting for the hypothetical functions means and ends that actually exist, as follows:

Function A as learning in the predicative sense;

Function B as learning in the substantive sense.


Learning in the predicative sense has reference to learning as a process -- research, scholarship, and creativity as processes. These are the means to the end in which learning as an accomplished fact is realized, which in turn represents learning in the substantive sense -- the possession of skill and knowledge. Accordingly the functions of learning can be understood as ends in themselves. When this is observed to

be the case, then the cause and effect sequence is of the form,

Predicative learning as a means to substantive learning, with the dyadic sequence of events operating independent of other ends. That is to say that means and ends are determined within the system of action so defined, and to the extent that this takes place the function set can be described as operating autonomously.

In the triadic sequence, learning is not essentially an end in itself, but a means to other ends, and is therefore subject to those other ends in their function as prior cause. Though functions A and B shall also be taken here as representing learning in the predicative and substantive sense, function C is now added to represent learning in the utilitarian sense -- knowledge and skills as judged according to their social usefulness. The dyadic sequence is thus incorporated into the triadic sequence as a subset, with social utility appropriating to itself control of the activity through its prior cause functions. Autonomy for institutions of higher education to generate from within their own ends and means can no longer be guaranteed unless, of course, social usefulness is understood to derive from learning as an autonomous function.


Social control and autonomy as contradistinct but coexistent possibilities for prior cause may be portrayed as follows:



This model will be expanded to apply to resource and governance functions as antecedent conditions related to one another and to the learning process itself, functions upon which the learning process is in fact contingent. They may also be perceived as owing their existence as functions to the learning process, aside from which there would be no reason for them. This duality of possibilities, analogous on the one hand to social control and on the other to autonomy, represents the basic framework within which the analysis shall proceed. The model is expanded to include these additional maintenance functions in Illustration I on page 38.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS

Social control: externally determined purposes as prior cause for the learning enterprise and its maintenance functions.



38

ILLUSTRATION I

The lines and arrows above the cells in this illustration indicate that socially determined ends are logically significant antecedents exercising prior cause for the learning enterprise and its support functions of resources and governance. The Arrows below the graph indicate autonomy for the functions of learning, or learning as an end in itself.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF PURPOSES AND PRIORITIES

With a theoretical construct of means-end relations as a frame of reference, the analysis now proceeds to the Carnegie Commission's formal statements of purposes and priorities for the future of American higher education. The immediate object will be to identify prior cause functions, separate ultimate from penultimate ends, and further pursue the problem of meaning according to the ends to which terms and concepts are used (Illustration II, p. 40).

The Commission originally set forth its statement of proposed purposes for higher education with the publication of The Purposes and Performance of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000, in June, 1973.¹ A second list offered as representing the same purposes, though at some variance with the original, appeared in Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.² The final form, as the Commission's last word, will be taken as authoritative

¹(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company), p. 1.

²(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS

Social control: externally determined purposes as prior cause for the learning enterprise and its maintenance functions.




ILLUSTRATION II

Chapters Four and Five analyze the purposes and priorities of the Carnegie Commission in order to determine the assumptions as to purpose and whether they presuppose social control for higher education, autonomy for the learning enterprise, or both.

The First Purpose

The first of the purposes offered by the Commission suggests both the dyadic form in which learning may be an end in itself, and the triadic form in which it serves ends beyond itself. It is as follows: "Advancing the intellectual and professional capacity of students within a constructive campus environment." Clarity as to means is contingent upon that which is meant by a "constructive campus environment;" clarity as to ends by the "advancement of intellectual and professional capacity of students."³ As to the development of intellectual capacity, this may mean no more than an expression in personal terms of the principle that learning is an end in itself. But as to the development of professional capacity, this cannot be so reduced because of the implied use of learning as a means to occupational objectives outside formal education. Be it law or medicine, engineering or business, the purpose of education thus perceived suggests utilitarian values. The principle of learning as an end in itself becomes penultimate, the cycle of cause and effect triadic, of the form:

Learning (function A) as a means to skill (function B)
as a means to a profession (function C).

³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.

In either the case of intellectual or professional development, it is not inconsistent with this purpose to assert that the ultimate purposes of education may consist of the goals brought to the enterprise by the student as client. Insofar as those goals of the student seeking intellectual development are consistent with the principle of learning as an end in itself, that principle may hold. Otherwise, from the point of view of the client, it does not hold. In its earlier statement of this purpose the Commission referred to the "development of students," and to "their more general developmental growth."⁴ Though it is quite general in its formulation, this highly individualistic reference is stated in a manner according to which client purposes may indeed become the ultimate end to which higher education is put.

Second Purpose

Contrary to the highly individualistic reference of the first purpose, the second states practically the same end in social, or collective, terms: "Enhancing human capability in society at large through training, research, and

⁴ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Purposes and Performance of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 1.

service."⁵ With reference to means, the Commission has moved from the general in the case of the first purpose to the specific in the case of the second. "Training, research, and service" have taken the place of a "constructive campus environment." Considered separately, and according to their common usage, these terms may be understood in their grammatical relationship to "human capability in society at large" to denote means to ends on the following order:

research as a means to the creation of knowledge,
training as a means to the transmission of knowledge,
and service as a means to the application of knowledge.

These become, in a sense, partial descriptors of the "constructive campus environment."

At the same time it is true that the first and second purposes advanced by the Commission are redundant. Taken together, they express the same general proposition that, individually and collectively, the functions of higher education are to serve both individuals and society as a whole in their general intellectual, skill, and professional development. Because the two incorporate the same general proposition they represent only one recommended purpose. This purpose retains in principle the alternative of

⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: Mc-Graw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.

interpreting learning, as an end in itself, as being either ultimate or penultimate. Research and training are consistent with both options, but the concept of service is clearly utilitarian.

Third Purpose

In the third statement of purpose, learning in the predicative sense as a means to learning in the substantive sense, along with any utilitarian functions of learning, as learning, are missing. That purpose is as follows:

"Increasing social justice through greater equality of opportunity to obtain an advanced education."⁶ Attention has moved from the means and ends of education to a concern for the abstract condition of equal opportunity to obtain an education. As such it is not a criterion of education but of social justice, rather than a function standing in cause-effect relation to the means and ends of learning.

In its earlier statement of this purpose the Commission referred to "the enlargement of educational justice for the postsecondary age group,"⁷ which is an expression implying more than an abstract condition of opportunity. However, the Commission further explained this point at the time by

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Purposes and Performance of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 1f.

defining it as primarily providing opportunity. It was nonetheless indicated that more places would have to be provided in order to include those for whom equal educational opportunity would heretofore have been denied. Higher education thus became a means to ends of the larger society. This assumption as to principle indicating utilitarian ends is of some consequence, as will be seen when subjected to an analysis of meaning in the next chapter.

Fourth Purpose

The fourth of the Commission's purposes clearly indicates both the dyadic sequence with self-contained ultimate purpose, and the triadic sequence with utilitarian purpose for education, as follows: "Advancing learning for its own sake through science, scholarship, and the creative arts, and for the sake of public interest and consumption."⁸

By setting forth science, scholarship, and the creative arts as means to learning -- as an end in itself -- the Commission has clearly appropriated this assumption as to principle into its purposes. This likewise requires the condition in which operational independence for learning,

⁸Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.

or autonomy, is logically necessary. If it is to exist for itself the ends of learning must inform the means, and restrictions of any sort serve to substitute whatever ends might inhere in those restrictions. Though this argument is not used by the Carnegie Commission, it necessarily follows from the principle of learning as its own end, and aside from which that principle has no meaning.

But learning, taken not only as an end in itself, is proposed in this same purpose "for the sake of public interest and consumption."⁹ In this case learning is penultimate as to ends, and as a function serves a public demand. This leaves the fourth purpose as a whole incorporating separate ends that are in effect disjunctive unless one is subordinated to the other. Learning as an end in itself and utilitarian learning represent separate principles, both of which are here assumed by the Commission as determinative for the future of higher education. These separate assumptions as to principle are indeed matters to be considered further in the analysis of meaning.

Fifth Purpose

The fifth and final purpose offered by the Commission for the future of higher education appears on first reading to be a clear statement of the utilitarian, triadic

⁹Ibid.

sequence, as follows: "Evaluating society, for the benefit of its self-renewal, through individual scholarship and persuasion."¹⁰ Stated in the format of the means-end sequence the statement takes the form: Individual scholarship and persuasion (function A) as means to knowledge (function B), are taken together with knowledge as means for evaluating society (function C) for the benefit of its self-renewal. If in fact evaluation and self-renewal are to serve as prior cause for scholarship and persuasion, then it follows that society must subscribe to the critical function of higher education as an unassailable value. This in turn implies independence, a condition which cannot be present unless the learning functions are permitted to operate autonomously, both as to the selection of commitments and the pursuit of knowledge.

As this must be the case, then learning as its own end becomes prior cause for society to maintain this function set. Society is to reorder itself according to the weight of scholarly persuasion. This represents an inversion of the cause-effect, independent-dependent relationships of the triadic sequence as originally set forth.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Priorities

The Commission makes what appears to be a substantial distinction between purposes and priorities. "Purposes are the overall ends of higher education. Priorities relate to those things that most need to be improved, both as to means and as to ends."¹¹ Priorities thus become, in the Commission's point of view, a characteristic of the order of importance given the means and ends of education at a point in time. The circumstances of priority can be attributed to a number of variables as for example resource availability, program inadequacies, and public interest in the improvement of some aspect of higher education.

However, this distinction made between purposes and priorities does not consistently hold in the actual usage of these terms. It has already been noted in the previous section that the stated purposes prescribe means as well as ends. Likewise the priorities set forth by the Commission are formulated in such a manner that they introduce different ends than those which have been previously offered. Those priorities are as follows (with those ends which may be taken as introducing new purposes in addition to those which have been discussed above underscored for emphasis):

¹¹Ibid., p. 21.

"Clarification of purposes

"Preservation and enhancement of quality and diversity

"Advancement of social justice

"Enhancement of constructive change

"Achievement of more effective governance

"Assurance of resources and their more effective use"¹²

In the case of social justice there is an identity of purpose and priority. This can logically be taken as a case of giving precedence to this purpose over other possible purposes not included in this list. Consequently there is no ambiguity as to the relationship of purpose to priority in this instance.

This is not so simple a matter with the other priorities in this list. Consider for example the first priority -- the clarification of purposes. It was in this connection that the Commission restated the five purposes set forth in a previous monograph, as has been noted in the analysis of those same five purposes above. It should now be noted that these purposes have been offered by the Commission as though the act of doing so were sufficient in order to initiate the process of clarification. Further criteria, in the form of proposals involving people other than members of the Carnegie Commission in a continuing process, are not really offered. The Commission has chosen

¹²Ibid., p. 23.

instead to assert that it believes its own list of purposes to be adequate for higher education taken as a collective enterprise. Then one reads, on the Commission's orders, that "higher education needs to clarify what it thinks it is about and to place this clarified set of purpose (sic) before the nation."¹³ In strict grammatical terms, the antecedent of "this clarified set of purposes" is not clear, even in the total context from which the quote is taken. It could either be the Commission's purposes or self-determined purposes. As a consequence of this ambiguity the reader can only conclude that the Commission's expressed goals, and its admonition, simply represent its opinion on the matter. Neither is the Commission's opinion clear. There is no inherent assumption as to principle other than those which have already been expressed in the statements of purpose.

It has been demonstrated that the second and fourth priorities set forth as ends quality, diversity and constructive change, though it will later be illustrated that diversity and constructive change are sub-categories of quality.¹⁴ These ends do not appear with the stated purposes, though they are extensively discussed throughout the policy statements in connection with them. This is particularly true of quality of education and equality of educational opportunity. Moreover the constructive campus environment and

¹³Ibid., p. 26

¹⁴Infra, p. 147.

its more specific descriptors of the means of learning -- training, research, service, science, scholarship, and the creative arts -- are discussed not only as means to purposes but also to priorities. This definitely leaves the Commission's separation of purposes and priorities uncertain.

The two remaining priorities set forth by the Commission, more effective governance, and the assurance and more effective use of resources, are not presented in such a way as to make their relationship to the means and ends of learning clear. Governance in particular is treated in such a manner that it takes on the character of a miscellany, with a great deal of attention given to some of the problems which the Commission takes as belonging to governance -- collective bargaining, politicalization (sic), and political activism. The discussion of the effective use of resources deals with the cost of education as a maximum feasible percentage of the gross national product, or meeting the demands of greater enrollment without appreciable increases in the cost of education, of imposing certain demands upon instructional programs in order to reduce the amount of time that is spent in school, all of which will be treated in subsequent analysis.

Summary of Chapter Four

In summary, it can be noted that there are a number of key terms and assumptions as to principle having logical significance for the Carnegie Commission's formal statements of purposes and priorities. The meanings of certain terms are antecedent to the meanings of certain principles, which in turn are antecedent to the general meanings of the purposes and priorities. Certain of these assumptions are implied, which is to say that they inhere in the purposes and priorities as they are stated. Certain of these are explicit.

The first such implicit assumption inheres in those statements of purpose presupposing a relationship of higher education to the supporting society. The possibility, indeed the necessity, of social ends acting as prior cause in the determination of program illustrates the logical significance of this relationship. For the purposes of this analysis that relationship will be referred to as the principle of social control. It need not be taken as deliberate or even conscious control, but it is nonetheless control in the sense that it is exercised by forces of the larger society acting upon the enterprise of higher education.

The second such implicit assumption as to principle inheres in the relation of learning to its own ends, a

relationship presupposing learning as an end in itself. This same principle also presupposes independence, or autonomy. It may, or may not, be related to social ends, but insofar as it is valued by the supporting society it may control certain events in that society according to higher education's research findings and its teaching.

The third assumption as to principle is that of equality of opportunity, or in certain references equality of educational opportunity. Because it has been explicitly appropriated into both the list of purposes and priorities, it represents a value judgment by the Commission. As such it is not to be taken as a bad mark. However, it only has logical significance for higher education, which is to say that it exercises in principle a prior cause function, in the sense that such education may be perceived and employed as an agent of equal opportunity, and as equal opportunity is a required practice of institutions of higher education. This principle, as a principle, is not intrinsically a part of the learning process, either as to means or ends -- not as it has been developed by the Commission. This is a matter of important consequence in the interaction of this with the next of the principles, a point which will come to light in the next chapter.

The fourth assumption as to principle is quality. By its nature it is the expression of the relationship of performance to expectations, though it is never so defined

by the Commission. It should be recalled that quality was not set forth as a purpose of the Commission, but as a priority. But if quality as a maintenance function is to be of any consequence, then it must in some sense be perceived as an operational objective. We have already seen in this connection that a superficial separation of purposes from priorities has resulted in ambiguity.

This introduces the problem of meaning as it applies to these assumptions. The problem involves not only the substantive meaning of such terms as "purposes" and "priorities," but also "equality" and "quality." Moreover, there are assumptions as to meaning related to all of the above principles. This holds for the relationship of higher education to the supporting society, the very nature of learning, and assumptions about the order of dominance -- according to which one principle will prevail over the other when the two are in conflict. The next chapter will continue the analysis of the assumptions as to principle as they apply to "equality" and "quality."

CHAPTER V

THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF QUALITY AND EQUALITY

Quality and equality, as principles antecedent in meaning to certain of the purposes and priorities presented by the Carnegie Commission in its final report, were a concern of this group from the outset. It should be recalled that Quality and Equality was the title of the very first policy statement.¹ Even at the time the formation of the Commission was announced in February, 1967, reference was made to the "quality of education"² as one of the issues that this group would consider. Throughout this period both the equality of educational opportunity and the quality of educational functions have been treated as though these have been as pressing as any two issues facing higher education today. The next step of this analysis is

¹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968).

²"Clark Kerr Heads Study of U. S. Higher Education," Publishers' Weekly, February 6, 1967, p. 47 (quoting Alan Pifer).

to establish the empirical reference or meaning of each of these terms.

Equality of Opportunity

The argument for the equality of educational opportunity is based first upon the nation's democratic tradition, and the role that education has played in that tradition. This is seen as becoming more important to society as it in turn becomes more complex, and more demanding of institutions of higher education for trained personnel.³

The argument is based secondly upon the belief that Americans aspire to extend universal education beyond high school into the college years. A Gallup Poll is cited indicating that ninety seven percent of all parents questioned desire that their children enter college.⁴ The Commission argues first, that "More and more Americans, with aspirations for a better life, assume the necessity of a college education," and second, that "Equality of opportunity through education, including higher education, is beginning to appear as a realistic goal for the less privileged of our society."⁵ At the time this was written (1968), a college

³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.

⁴Ibid., p. 7.

⁵Ibid., p. 1.

education had been perceived by the Commission as taking on the connotation of necessity. Moreover it is not just the opportunity to obtain such an education that constitutes social justice, as was implied in the final purposes and priorities set forth by the Commission, but in the earlier reference the education itself -- it is through the acquisition of it that equality of opportunity in the larger society can be achieved.⁶

Thus an important assumption is made by the Commission in its use of the principle of equality of opportunity: The objectives of higher education necessarily become those of the student clientele, which are, according to the Commission, fundamentally social and economic. As the social ends of the clientele, they become the ultimate ends of higher education.

The argument for equality of opportunity is based thirdly upon the proposition that it is not fully in effect. One can hardly question the empirical significance of this proposition, a point which the Commission makes by thoroughly reporting the circumstances according to which such equality is denied. Five categories are offered: income, geographic location, ethnic group, age, and quality of early schooling. The point is made that families in the higher income levels are many times as likely to send their children to college as those from the lowest levels.

⁶Ibid.

Minority groups are under-represented, as are people from certain geographic areas. Many Americans who are beyond that which is traditionally thought of as college age did not have the opportunity to continue their education at this level, and it is believed that some of these would benefit in doing so.⁷ The meaning of equality of educational opportunity is thus further defined by those economic and social conditions under which it cannot truly exist.

Though the Commission did not carry its discussion further in order to demonstrate the points of conjunction for the categories of disadvantage, it does treat them as though they largely occur together, and particularly according to geographic region. Special remedial programs are proposed for elementary and secondary school age children in Appalachia, the Ozarks, and the inner city, in an effort to treat some of the effects of disadvantage prior to completion of secondary school. It is also recommended that college recruitment programs concentrate upon these same areas in order to further increase per capita attendance among the disadvantaged groups.⁸

One set of recommendations does not follow the premise that disadvantage occurs according to region, but

⁷The Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 1-3.

⁸Ibid., pp. 6-9.

instead is based strictly upon the demonstration of financial need. First and most important of these were the proposals for economic opportunity grants, as follows:

The Commission recommends strengthening and expanding the present program of educational opportunity grants based on need by providing:

1. That the level of funding be increased so that all college students with demonstrated need will be assured of some financial aid to meet expenses at institutions which they select
2. That grants based on need be available for a period not to exceed four years of undergraduate study and two years of study toward a graduate degree.⁹

In addition to this the Commission has recommended federal and state matching grants, federally supported institutional scholarship funds, and that which has since become known as the work-study program. The Commission acknowledges that not all these are new programs, though the level of funding proposed in the year 1968, and again in 1970, if adopted, would have substantially increased the funding.¹⁰

Still another recommendation was designed to initiate aggressive searches for graduate student talent, and to provide research to assist high school counselling programs in the early identification of those students possessing

⁹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 19.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 22f.

sufficient talent to attend college.¹¹ The position taken is not one of passive support for potentially good students, but active exploration of the population in order to find them, wherever they are, and further assure them that whatever the social or economic circumstances of inequality might be, equal educational opportunity will not be denied them.

Also toward the achievement of the goal of equal educational opportunity the Commission recommends the continued expansion of community colleges until eventually there is one within commuting distance of ninety-five percent of the nation's population. The original recommendation was for an additional 230-280 such institutions.¹² A two-year program is regarded as an essential characteristic of institutions designed to offer both academic transfer and terminal occupational programs to all students. Conversion to institutions offering four-year baccalaureate programs is considered as inconsistent with the comprehensive purpose of these institutions. But full transfer rights to four-year colleges for those who successfully complete a two-year college preparation program are urged.¹³

¹¹Ibid., p. 24f.

¹²Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 39.

¹³Ibid., pp. 16-19.

The Commission further argues that all comprehensive two-year colleges should practice an open admissions policy, charge little or no tuition, and offer to all students extensive services in educational and occupational guidance.¹⁴ These institutions would in effect serve as the basic institutional type through which equality of opportunity would ultimately be extended to all the population. Such colleges thus would be the primary agents of the policy of "universal access" which, on account of location, low tuition, occupational program options, and counselling services, they are perceived as being ideally equipped to be.¹⁵

In summary, it should be first noted that equality of opportunity is taken as being deeply rooted, in principle if not in fact, in the American democratic tradition. Second, equality of educational opportunity is taken as demanded by all segments of the population, including those to whom this has generally been denied. Third, it is used in such a manner that it has reference to social and economic opportunity as its functional purposes. It is therefore utilitarian with this set of purposes exercising

¹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 51.

prior cause function. The means to correcting situations of disadvantage are remedial programs in the public schools, massive programs of grants and loans as well as remedial and research programs in institutions of higher education, aggressive recruitment programs, and expansion of the nation's system of universal access two-year colleges.

Quality and Equality as Interacting Principles

The Commission's fundamental assumption as to the measure of quality appears in the following statement: "Our colleges and universities must maintain and strengthen academic quality if our intellectual resources are to prove equal to the challenges of contemporary society."¹⁶ Hence quality, as a descriptor of academics, becomes a function of the expectations of the supporting society. Those expectations have been set forth by the Commission as follows:

The economy is dependent upon basic research and advancing technology, and upon the higher skills needed to make that technology effective, to assure national economic growth and well-being.

More managers, teachers, and professionals of all sorts are required to serve our complex society. More health personnel are essential to staff the fastest-growing segment of our national endeavor.¹⁷

¹⁶Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.

¹⁷Ibid.

It can be seen that certain presuppositions have been incorporated into those expectations -- continued economic growth with its attendant increased requirements for technological, administrative, and pedagogical or professorial skills. Standards of skill required by these occupations and socio-technological functions logically become the conditions of quality. Education would thus have quality to the degree that it meets the standards of skill, knowledge, and other aspects of formal preparation that are implicit in the expectations put upon it by the supporting society. Though this assertion does not appear specifically, it is the logical antecedent to quality given the arguments that the Commission has advanced. The possibility of this can be illustrated by reference to that condition which Niblett has described as the "natural tension"¹⁸ between equality of opportunity and academic excellence. The Commission first avoids this issue by making an assumption; and second, by offering a formula. As to the assumption, it is taken for granted that American higher education is of such quality that it enjoys a reputation of pre-eminence the world over.¹⁹ That quality

¹⁸See supra p. 14f and W. Roy Niblett, "The Commission's Work: A View from Abroad," Change, November, 1973, p. 39.

¹⁹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 1.

should nonetheless be maintained, extended, and, in certain cases, improved.

As to the formula, the position is taken that equality of educational opportunity, yet to be fully realized in the United States, must forthwith be assured without any reduction in the quality of instructional, research, or service functions of higher education. In support of this concern certain adjective phrases are employed which, by virtue of their repetition, evolve into cliches. One such phrase is "quality of result and equality of access."²⁰ The second is a refinement of the same theme that better marks the disjunctive nature of the two concepts, and may be paraphrased as the endorsement of the principle of universal access to higher education but the rejection of the notion of universal attendance. This is taken by the Commission as setting forth the conditions on which equality of access will be provided and quality of result maintained.

The argument is advanced that many will not want to go on to college, will not be able to benefit from it, and because of family or societal pressures may become reluctant attenders. On this account the position is taken that:

we therefore oppose universal attendance as a goal of American higher education and believe that non-college alternatives should be made more available and more attractive to young people.

²⁰ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.

We favor, on the other hand, universal access for those who want to enter institutions of higher education, are able to make reasonable progress after enrollment, and can benefit from attendance.²¹

Universal access and universal attendance are thus offered as being complementary to one another, and to quality and equality. Universal access represents a restatement of the principle of equality of opportunity according to socioeconomic conditions which must be fully compensated for if equality of education opportunity is to be realized. But it is so understood to proscribe a particular universe, including those who either have or are potentially able to demonstrate the ability to perform according to the standards of higher education, and exclude those who cannot.

It follows that these terms reflect two judgments. The first, universal access, has reference to socioeconomic conditions that must not determine the course of one's education. The second, universal attendance, so delimits the principle of equality of opportunity that conditions of inequality other than socioeconomic may determine who may, and who may not, remain in school at the college level. This is the logically antecedent condition upon which the principle of universal attendance is rejected. The practical consequence is that after the initial matriculation, and allowing for the operation of certain compensatory

²¹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 11.

programs, discrimination can be expected to take place on the basis of ability and performance.

As the principal institution through which equality of educational opportunity is to be extended, the community college logically becomes the agency through which discrimination on the basis of ability and performance is most likely to take place.²² It is its mission to maintain policies of low tuition and universal access, while other institutions of higher education are only advised to take exception to their selective admissions policies in order to accommodate the socioeconomically disadvantaged. Their basic obligation to the two-year college transfer student, so it is recommended, is to admit those who have successfully completed their program and are fully qualified.²³

The same community college likewise becomes the principal institution for the maintenance of quality, insofar as quality is a measure of student performance, for it is here that the student will find his educational program coming to an end unless he meets the standards of quality required by the upper division institution to which he seeks transfer. Hence, the practical effect of the Commission's recommended policies would be to extend public

²²See supra, p. 61.

²³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 11-19.

education as presently conceived in the United States by a maximum of two years. This logical consequence -- which is not so perceived by the Commission -- can be supported by two additional assumptions that the Commission makes.

Though they will be further discussed in other connections, it is appropriate to call attention to them in this context. The first has to do with the overlapping characteristics of the last year of high school and the lower division of college, a point of view with important historical antecedents.²⁴ The second has to do with the expressed desirability of a pattern of governance that assures local control.²⁵ These factors, together with little or no tuition and a parallel program of occupational training, create a situation of similarity to that of the public high school more than higher education in its traditional sense.

The tension between equality of opportunity and quality of result has been alleviated by taking the position that these principles are to be enforced at separate points in time. Universal access, as an expression of the

²⁴There are various references to how Henry Philip Tappan, William Rainey Harper, and others were in general agreement not only as to the nature of what we know as the lower division, but its similarity to secondary education. A thorough account of this point of view may be found in Leonard V. Koos, The Junior College, Vol. II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1921), pp. 342-345.

²⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 48.

principle of equality of educational opportunity, has been put forward as an admissions policy, but with quality criteria taking effect at some later time. However, the Commission is quite vague about the latter, as shall be demonstrated in the next section.

Further Analysis as to the Meaning of Quality

Reference to quality is frequently made throughout the entire series of policy reports. It is viewed as being affected not only by the principle of equality of educational opportunity but also the use of resources. It is in this last connection that it appears most frequently. It is a fundamental criterion as to whether resources are being effectively used, even though the term is never defined with any precision.

This confusion as to meaning can be illustrated by reference to a few passages wherein the context most closely supplies a definition. The first such reference discusses quality measures with output, leaving the reader to separate out that which is applicable to quality, as follows:

When a college or university launches a move toward more effective use of its resources, no step is more important than a careful analysis of costs, in relation not only to appropriate measures of input, such as FTE enrollment, but also in relation to appropriate measures

of output or quality, such as credit hours completed, degrees awarded, performances of graduates on the Graduate Record Examination, and ratings of its departments in the studies of graduate education that have been conducted by the American Council on Education and other agencies.²⁶

According to this reference quality becomes a function of performance on standardized tests, ratings by government agencies, and other agencies. This point has important implications for the standardization of institutions, programs, and even courses, a trend that the Commission ardently decries in other references.²⁷

The Commission also believes that student-faculty ratios are an indication of quality, that it is a responsibility of faculty to call attention to the importance of this criterion on those occasions that the management of resources may adversely affect it. At the same time the Commission reports that these ratios were pushed considerably upward during the last decade with no apparent adverse effect on quality,²⁸ and that in the interest of more

²⁶Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 44.

²⁷Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 35.

²⁸Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 64.

effective use of resources this practice ought to continue but in a cautious manner.²⁹ Curiously enough, the Commission does not report how one might know that quality was not affected by the ratio increase. That the ratio did increase is a simple matter of fact which can be taken on the strength of the reported statistics. However, the casual observation that there apparently was no concomitant loss in quality does not follow. This is particularly to be noted in light of the Commission's claim that "we know far too little about the impact of student-faculty ratios on quality of instruction."³⁰

Such an observation can only be made by one whose reference to any defensible quality criteria is either obscured, confused, or nonexistent. The following reference further illustrates the Commission's confusion as to the meaning and operation of the principle of quality:

Quality is of the essence in academic life and it is hard to measure; but among carefully selected institutions and within the same institution it may be assumed to be sufficiently equal so that comparisons can be made -- it is easier to compare quality than to measure it.³¹

To argue that it is easier to compare quality than to measure it is to confuse the fact that measurement is a form

²⁹Ibid., p. 23.

³⁰Ibid., p. 17.

³¹Ibid., p. 23.

of comparison. It is either the comparison of at least one variable to another, or the comparison of one or more variables to a standardized scale, just as a carpenter measures dimensions with a rule, a psychometrist an individual performance to national norms. The essence of measurement is comparison. This fundamental meaning escapes the Commission, as do the criteria for determining "carefully selected institutions" in order to make comparisons. Such preselected standards would in effect incorporate the social or institutional program expectations which that being measured -- or compared -- would be expected to meet.

For the principle of quality to have any meaning except in the abstract, it must have clear reference either to expectations or assumption as to expectations. It should be repeated that the one identifiable assumption happens to be that quality which is a function of social expectations. There are no clear references to self-determined program expectations. Specific performance criteria are also absent. Neither is there any discussion as to how such criteria ought to be determined. Prior cause therefore begins and ends with social expectations. It follows that social control is dominant in this respect over other possible causal alternatives, and for this reason is the logically significant antecedent event to learning functions.

Summary of Chapter Five

Social expectation is the underlying assumption of both equality of educational opportunity and quality of educational function. The two are advanced as complementary insofar as equality of opportunity is cause for either open or flexible admissions policies, depending upon the institution, and for both pre-admission and post-admission programs of compensatory education, and quality as a discriminatory maintenance function based upon ability and performance. Operating in conjunction the two principles would, assuming full adoption of the Commission recommendations, have the effect of extending universal education by a maximum of two more years, depending upon the degree to which those students eligible for benefits under these provisions should use them.

At this point the similarity of the two principles breaks down. Equality of educational opportunity is a clearly defined concept, referring to the nation's democratic, egalitarian traditions, socioeconomic situations according to which those conditions do not in fact exist. The term is consistently used in this reference. It has both empirical significance as to fact and logical significance for the Carnegie Commission's point of view in that the empirical reference as to conditions of inequality, with the principle of equality, are prior cause for

commitment of resources and institutional efforts to these ends.

The same does not hold for the principle of quality. Its one discernible property is social expectation as a criterion source. Any other criteria which might apply to the functions of learning are vague or ambiguous, as for example the presumed difference between measurement and comparison which does not hold in fact. To the contrary there is an uncritical endorsement of the use of standardized tests, as for example the Graduate Record Examination, as a measure of the quality of departmental or institutional output. Such a practice implicitly subjects a given institution to norms which represent the expectations of a larger system, albeit an association or corporation, if not actually a federal agency. This vagueness as to meaning has important implications, as a consequence of which it will receive further attention in subsequent sections of this analysis. This will especially be the case in the discussion of the effective use of resources for higher education.

CHAPTER VI

THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERRELATION OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT QUALITY, EQUALITY, AND THE USE OF RESOURCES

Though equality of educational opportunity and quality of function are principles presupposing social expectations as prior cause, it does not follow that they function either as joint or parallel events in a means-end sequence. One would expect that they would determine resource allocation given the full adoption of the Carnegie Commission recommendations. This does not hold, for the two principles are in fact quite dissimilar in their relation to the allocation and use of resources. The relationships of these assumptions to resource use are the subject of this chapter (see Illustration III, p. 75).

The Implications of Equality of Educational Opportunity for Resource Use

We have seen that the Commission has argued that equality of opportunity, as a democratic principle, has yet to be fully realized in our society, that equality of educational opportunity is a means thereto, and that the

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS




ILLUSTRATION III

Chapter Six analyzes the assumptions as to purpose as they apply to resource use, and in order to determine if assumptions presupposing social control for higher education are dominant over assumptions to the contrary.

long term trend from elitist, to mass, to universal access education beyond high school should become a matter of public policy.¹

A sense of the potential impact of this principle can be gained by considering the range of recommended activities for which federal support is proposed, and its estimated cost. The student aid programs alone include educational opportunity grants, work-study subsidization, counselling programs, a graduate talent search program, doctoral fellowships, and a student loan program. As was noted earlier, these concepts are not original with the Commission, but its level of funding proposed for these programs is noteworthy. Expressed in constant value dollars for the year 1968, nearly five billion would be allocated for the year 1980. Additional recommendations for cost-of-education supplements to institutions, construction, research and other programs necessary to the implementation of these recommendations would bring the total cost by the year 1980 to twelve billion, six-hundred-million dollars.²

¹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, New Students and New Places: Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 9.

²Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: Revised Recommendations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 30.

Hence the assumption of equality of educational opportunity as an end for educational function, and thus prior cause for those functions, would not exist exclusively in the abstract. It would operationally affect institutions of higher education. This point is further strengthened by the fact that certain of the proposals by the Commission presuppose that certain federal support funds, educational opportunity grants in particular, be matched by institutional funds.³ Such funds are necessarily enlisted in the support of purposes which may have merit, are taken by the Carnegie Commission to have merit, and may be so taken by institutions of higher education. That such ends represent socially determined education functions is a matter of logic entirely aside from this or any other value judgment about the matter. The object of this step in the analysis is to point out that massive federal resource allocation on the primary grounds of equality of opportunity in American society through education supplies the national system of higher education with this predetermined purpose. To the extent that institutions of higher education subscribe to these same ends, their institutional goals are in this respect utilitarian. This is a fact of argument according full logical significance to the principle of equality of

³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 19.

educational opportunity, and thus to social ends, as this applies to the allocation of public tax revenue resources to these ends.

The Macroeconomic Assumption and its
Implications for Quality

The macroeconomic assumption made by the Carnegie Commission is that the total expenditures for higher education in the United States from all sources should not appreciably exceed a fixed percentage of the gross national product. The Commission argues that:

the total expenditures of higher education must be, should be, and can be reduced by nearly \$10 billion per year (in 1970 dollars) by 1980 as compared with the costs which would be incurred if the trends of the 1960s were to be continued; that expenditures should be held to a level around \$41.5 billion as against \$51 billion per year. This is approximately a 20-percent reduction. This would mean that these expenditures would rise to 2.7-percent of the GNP as compared with their present percentage of 2.5 and as compared with the possibility of 3.3 percent if the trends of the 1960s were to be continued and as against about 1.0 percent in the year 1960. We seek to show why this reduction of about 20 percent needs to take place and how it can be accomplished without any general deterioration in the quality of higher education.⁴ (Emphasis added.)

The macroeconomic assumption, with its implications as to the nature and behavior of the principle of quality, is one of major import, the Commission's discussion of which will now be treated.

⁴Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 1.

Standing at one percent in the year 1960, the proportion of the gross national product allocated to higher education had experienced a phenomenal increase by the year 1972, bringing the proportion of the whole to two and one-half percent. This rise has been both possible and necessary. It has been possible on account of demand, on account of a generally rising level of personal income throughout our society, and because the public was willing to pay the price, to spend a substantial proportion of their increase in personal income for this purpose. This same increase was necessary because higher education has not experienced a productivity increase in the cost of education as compared to the industries in which rising productivity has been a continuing characteristic.⁵

According to the Commission, this trend cannot, and will not, continue unchecked. Not only must the total costs of higher education not be allowed to appreciably exceed two and one-half percent of the gross national product, neither must the annual increase in educational costs, allowing only for a negative productivity factor, exceed the annual rate of inflation.⁶ This may be true. However, the Commission's arguments do not convey a sense of economic authority on this matter. They have reference in part to values,

⁵Ibid., p. 6f.

⁶Ibid., p. 7.

attitudes, and opinions which either are known, or presumed, to have widespread following in society at large and inhere in psychological antecedents rather than the logic of macroeconomic theory.

The Commission argues for example that "middle class elements are . . . resisting the public subsidy of college attendance by children of lower income (including minority) families," and that "The 'adversary culture' may continue to find its most favorable environment on campus, and its greatest opposition in the general public."⁷ The problem with these arguments is not with their basis in fact. There is no reason to reject them on this score alone. To the contrary, it is the Commission's use of them, for this is inconsistent with the proposal to spend billions of dollars in order to extend equality of opportunity to the very groups that have been denied this. The Commission has made certain proposals, if not bold in originality as least so in the call for an extensive resource commitment, and now proposes retrenchment. True, the retrenchment is not in the area of aid to students and institutions by the Federal government for the purpose of equality of educational opportunity, but for expenditures in connection with certain other aspects of academic programs. They are proposed nonetheless because middle class elements do not want to

⁷Ibid.

subsidize the education of lower income groups. The Commission's recommendations are designed to respond to the expectations of both the needy and the affluent, but in the case of the affluent, the design is to mollify them with economies that will not eventuate in the objectives of the affluent.

The Commission also argues that other "great priorities remain before the nation."⁸ Granted that many such priorities do exist, as they surely do, the crucial issue for higher education is where it may stand in the order of these priorities. Of equal importance is the merit of instructional programs and what those programs must cost if they are to be adequately maintained. The Commission did indeed use costs as a means of determination of its recommendations for programs of equal opportunity. But now it changes principle for making other recommendations on the basis that popular support can be questioned rather than on the basis of the estimated cost of quality requirements.

Yet the reader is told that costs can be so reduced without any adverse effect on quality. One can infer, on the basis that societal expectation is the one constant reference of the concept of quality according to the Commission's usage of this term, that changing expectations will satisfy this condition. If the public should prove to be

⁸Ibid.

satisfied with that which is twenty percent cheaper, then quality will have been maintained.

This brief caricature is not offered as the inevitable consequence of the Commission's point of view, though it may be the consequence. To the contrary it is advanced in the absence of any specific quality criteria, of any principles for determining such criteria, in order to illustrate one possible consequence resulting from the use of a term having neither parsimony or specificity as to meaning. It follows that in the absence of any variables that have been identified for measurement or "comparison," or any agreed upon standards for doing so, the argument as to quality can only rest upon popular judgments. Social expectation and quality may both vary, but so long as the latter appears to be the equal of the former, the quality criterion could be satisfied. In light of this it could be claimed that the Commission's insistence that quality can be maintained on expenditures that should be reduced by the year 1980 to a figure twenty percent below the present trend would amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Assumption that the Knowledge Represented by the
Standard Bachelor's Degree Is a Constant
and Need Not Be Changed

The reader is not left without recommendations for reducing total costs for higher education while at the same time presuming to maintain quality. These recommendations are made with full appreciation of the demands that will be put upon higher education in the coming years. Likewise the Commission takes full account of the impact of its recommendations for equal educational opportunity should they be adopted, and also those for a vastly expanded program of health care education. It estimates that these and other growth factors will create a need for another three million student places by the year 1980. This represents a fifty percent increase over the year 1972, when the policy statement in question was written.⁹ In light of these expectations on the one hand, and a twenty percent projected reduction in expenditures on the other, it must be said that any measures proposed for the reduction of costs would have to be extensive in their impact. In this respect they are impressive, as will be shortly demonstrated.

But of more interest to this analysis is the fact that certain of these recommendations introduce the reader

⁹Ibid., p. 7.

to assumptions about the nature of learning, and of knowledge. They also further illustrate the consequences of that which takes place on account of the assumptions that have been made about the nature of quality. The recommendations call for a significant reduction of the amount of time that students spend in college, for the further adoption of non-traditional degree programs, and for the greater use of certified non-traditional educational experience to meet the requirements of regular academic degree programs.

One recommendation is based on the reasonable assumption that there will be increasing differences as to ability, level of acquired knowledge, and interest of students as programs designed to further the cause of equality of educational opportunity are put into effect. This recommendation is offered as a "foundation year . . . tailored to a more rapid, less rapid, or customary progress, to a degree depending on the past training and ability of the individual student."¹⁰ This recommendation is defended on the grounds that:

If a college were to structure the first-year course work for each student according to his own preparation, maturation, work schedule, and educational objectives,

¹⁰Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 22.

with the help of precollege examinations and individual faculty advisors, then no group -- as a group -- would be identified as special or disadvantaged.¹¹

Whereas the foundation year would give the disadvantaged an opportunity for compensatory training, the undecided an opportunity to explore the various professional and educational options open to them, it would permit those who have accelerated their learning to move on to advanced course work. This could hold also for students who have experienced some form of non-traditional learning beyond the secondary school.

A specific recommendation of the Commission follows upon this very possibility: "That the time to get a degree be shortened by one year to the B. A. and by one to two more years to the Ph. D. or M. D. practice."¹² This proposal is further supported by the arguments that (1) the practice of granting advanced standing is widespread and could be increased to include as many as 500,000 students annually, (2) that substantial numbers of students have covered the entire first year of college work in high school,

¹¹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company), p. 13f.

¹²Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options: Education Beyond the High School (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 15.

and for them much of the lower division course work is redundant, and (3) that students having educational deficiencies upon entrance can take advantage of summer terms in order to complete an undergraduate degree program in three years. "Thus the lower division in college could soon become a one-year program except for those needing remedial work."¹³

This point represents a substantial argument for the reduction of costs in that the amount of time spent in college by a given student could in principle be decreased by one academic year, even though the costs per year would remain the same. Increased enrollments in summer sessions would also mean better utilization of physical facilities and faculty.

There appear to be only two bases on which to take issue with the Commission's proposal for an accelerated program of this nature. They both have to do with the unstated assumptions that have been made about the nature of learning and knowledge. These assumptions bear examination, a task which can best be accomplished by using theoretical quantities to represent the standard pattern of twelve years of elementary school and four years of college. The former twelve years shall be represented by the quantity X, and the latter four by the quantity Y. The total acquired

¹³Ibid., p. 16.

education for the holder of the standard baccalaureate degree or its equivalent may be stated as follows:

The B. A. = $X + Y = 12 \text{ years} + 4 \text{ years of education.}$

If a given student successfully completes high school with the total knowledge equivalent of one who formerly had gone on to complete the first year of college, that training could be expressed as:

High School Diploma = $X + 1 = 13 \text{ years}$

compared to the knowledge equivalent of prior standards. If this same person were to matriculate at a college or university and receive full credit for this extra attainment, the work remaining in order to qualify for the degree could be expressed as:

The B. A. = $(X + 1) + (Y - 1) = 13 \text{ year equivalency} + 3 \text{ years.}$

The standard baccalaureate degree is therefore taken to be a constant value. The knowledge that it is supposed to have represented in the past is likewise sufficient for the future.

This might be viewed as a factitive proof by those who would contend that the assumption is actually created by the theoretical formulation just advanced with this end in view. Anyone who would do so should consider two points: first, the consequences of the Commission's assumptions; and second, the alternative to this interpretation which, interestingly enough, the Commission has not advanced.

Consider first the consequences. The proposals place proportionately more of the responsibility for the total education of the student upon the high school, and proportionately less upon the college. Secondary schools are in fact encouraged by the Commission to "take over the work now given in the first year of college," that colleges should look "to the time when the standard term of a B. A. degree will be three years."¹⁴ These developments would in effect reduce the two-year community college system to a one-year system for large numbers of students -- for as many as would have completed the secondary education in schools that cover the first year of college work in their last year.

Consider also these additional consequences of another recommendation -- that 230 to 280 new community colleges be constructed in the United States by the year 1980. This represents by far the largest single expansion by type of institution recommended by the Commission. This will mean proportionately more students in two-year -- if not indeed in one-year -- institutions, proportionately fewer in four-year colleges and universities. This will also mean proportionately more in institutions with strong compensatory programs. Transfers will be more commonplace, the transferability of credit more important, with the prospect of the lowest common denominator the accepted norm.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 27.

Institutions of higher education will have the attention of students for twenty-five percent less time. Students will be devoting twenty-five percent less of their lives to this period of instruction. It is difficult to believe that the total acquired knowledge possessed by the student as a theoretical quantity, could be increased under these circumstances.

Consider briefly the alternative to this interpretation -- that the level of knowledge which the baccalaureate degree represents not be held constant but permitted to increase. This certainly appears to be a live option given that which the Commission claims is frequently happening -- that many students are indeed completing high school with a knowledge equivalent of those formerly completing the first year of college. It also would appear more desirable given the Commission's own argument for the need of the higher skills needed to manage our increasingly technological society.¹⁵

The Commission has instead taken the norms of the last decade as the standard for the immediate future. Those same norms can also be accepted, though the Commission has not really stated this, as the criteria for quality. Their

¹⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.

adequacy has nonetheless clearly been assumed, and on the basis of this assumption the recommendations have been made.

Consider finally the basic assumption about learning that is implicit in the Commission's argument that the amount of time required for earning the bachelor's degree be reduced by one year. It should be recalled that this is based on the belief that there is much duplication between the last year of high school and the first year of college, that this duplication is wasteful of resources, of the student's time, and should therefore be avoided. It follows that one exposure to information, allowing for certain contrary strategies within a given course of instruction, ought ordinarily to be sufficient. However knowledge is gained it should be formally validated through testing, and when it becomes equal in kind to that required for a degree, then a degree should be awarded.

So much is assumed, and the information so scant, that no conclusions about learning theory can be drawn from these references.¹⁶ Learning functions in higher education do appear to be mechanistic, with learning a matter basically of exposure to information or its presentation. Even

¹⁶Even though the Commission discusses these matters at length in another context, no clear understanding of learning theory or learning problems is exhibited. The impressions gained here apply there also. See The Fourth Revolution: Instructional Technology in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), which will be treated at a later point in this analysis.

though these bare outlines may be consistent with certain behavioristic theories, they are more noteworthy for that which is not stated than that which is; specifically, that whatever the nature of knowledge and learning, it can meet the quality expectations presupposed by the Commission's recommendations.

To be sure, these are matters quite aside from the Carnegie Commission's basic concerns. They are of another order than those pertaining to the nature of the learning situation. The principal reasons advanced for reducing the amount of time spent in obtaining a college education are economic, as for example:

to assist students -- by saving the time of students by reducing the years they spend in education, by reducing the duplication between high school and college they now endure¹⁷

As has been pointed out, "the cost will be the same for each year but there will be fewer years to pay for and one less year of foregone earnings."¹⁸

The above statement resounds with mathematical certainty, but only because the economic imperative to save resources forced other assumptions. Quality is assumed, as has that which can be accomplished within the learning

¹⁷ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 15.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

process, but without a systematic consideration of what is involved in either case. The economic presupposition has dictated the form that the recommendations have taken, and with which other variables must fit.

Summary of Chapter Six

This analysis has demonstrated that insofar as resource use is concerned, the principle of equality of opportunity has logical significance. It truly functions as a variable within the means-end sequence of events as prior cause for the allocation of resources according to the needs of those who by virtue of deprivation have been denied equal opportunity. This principle represents a specific social expectation, the empirical significance of which has already been accorded as either verified or verifiable in principle. Clear as to meaning, consistent as to use, the order of dominance can be traced through it to social control as prior cause for the functions of higher education.

This cannot be said for the principle of quality. Though it was labelled in the previous chapter as being logically significant in principle, this was taken to be so only with reference to social expectations as a criterion set. This does not hold in connection with the Commission's treatment of resource use. It might have reference to social expectations; it does have reference to contemporary norms in higher education according to certain contexts.

Lacking in meaning, it has no empirical significance, no logical significance, nor is it consistently used with reference to the same assumptions. The term meets none of the criterion principles of this study.

More importantly, quality as a term means that which is left for it to mean after the economic imperatives have been satisfied. It is left with contradictory reference as to meaning, indicating no empirically verified or verifiable criterion statements as to fact, and therefore has no causal, or logical, significance.

Vague and uncertain assumptions as to the nature of learning and knowledge have made their first appearance in this study. As with the meaning of quality, these concepts can only mean that which they must mean in order for the economic argument to hold. This in turn means that the theoretical quantity of knowledge representing the bachelor's degree is assumed to remain for now a constant, and that the dynamics of learning can adequately function within the economic restrictions imposed upon them by the Commission recommendations.

CHAPTER VII

THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF GOVERNANCE: SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AS THE GIVEN CONDITION

The antecedent assumptions about quality, equality, social control, and autonomy apply not only to the use of resources but also to governance (Illustration IV, p. 95). Any prior conditions which may determine how resources are to be used can be expected not only to influence these but also other decisions. For this is the essence of governance: the specific patterns of role interaction according to which decisions are made, conflicting expectations resolved, and all activities directed through which institutions take, and are given, their general direction as to programs and operational purposes.¹

¹John J. Corson has offered a similar definition which lists by group the role incumbents, and which presupposes a measure of autonomy, features which this analysis will supply according to the general position of the Commission. Corson's definition is as follows: ". . . the process of deciding. . . . the process or art with which scholars, students, teachers, administrators, and trustees associated together in a college or university establish and carry out the rules and regulations that minimize conflict, facilitate their collaboration, and preserve essential individual freedom." Taken from Governance of Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), pp. 12-13.

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS




ILLUSTRATION IV

Chapter Seven analyzes the assumptions as to purpose as they apply to governance in order to further determine the dominance of socially determined ends over the functions of learning, and according to which it is discovered that the fundamental control is the market.

This definition is constructed in such a manner that it is not to be taken as making any assumption about the roles involved, or as to whether groups external to institutions of higher education have a role in governance. It is designed instead for use in the assessment of the relative power of social control and autonomy, in contexts other than quality and equality. These terms are used as defined not by the Commission but by the analytical model, as prior cause functions determining in principle the organizational behavior proceeding not from but through decisions and their execution. If one prior cause principle is clearly dominant over the other, or if behavior reflects an interaction of these principles, then it should so appear in this analysis.

A Preliminary Consideration of the Alternatives

The alternatives according to the analytical model may be described as three in number: social control, autonomy, and a pattern of action in which these separate principles are perceived as interacting.

The first and second of these options are assumed to be of a theoretical nature, each functioning to the exclusion of the other. It should be recalled from Chapter Three that autonomy was defined as existing to the degree that prior cause for a given sequence of cause and effect

resides in that sequence.² Prior cause taken thus is internal; which is to say that so long as the intentions and objectives of the learning enterprise belong to that enterprise by virtue of having been generated within it, the sequence of events may be described as autonomous. This condition exists so long as learning as an end in itself is prior cause for the means of learning -- so long as the learned and the ones learning follow the path of truth wherever it leads, so long as they are vested with the authority so to determine instruction and research, and so to act. But so long as prior cause is identified with external social forces operating determinatively, controlling the sequence of events according to social ends, autonomy is either subordinated or absent. Social control as prior cause and ultimate end, the condition according to which autonomy may not exist, then describes the state of affairs. Perceived as mutually exclusive functions, either the learning enterprise or social control are prior cause for resource and governance functions.³

The practical alternative presupposes complementarity and/or conflict through interaction. These two

² Supra, p. 36

³ These latter functions are instrumental and contingent, in that they exist for, and of, the learning enterprise, whether it be ultimate or penultimate as to purpose. Aside from their respective maintenance functions there would be no use for them.

principles may operate simultaneously or at separate points in time depending on the issues and the customs, and as has previously been pointed out, society may defer to the learning function by allowing the enterprise of higher education a critical role vis-a-vis society. This represents a voluntary inversion of the principle of dominance, a condition which has been pointed out as being necessary if social criticism is to be a fundamental purpose of higher education.

Finally, there may be assumptions and presuppositions that predetermine how an agency of governance, be it a board, office of the president, or faculty is to perceive its role. These may support or contravene the recommendations. These also are the final object of this chapter of the analysis.

The Commission's Point of View as to Recommendations
for the Governance of Institutions
of Higher Education

Chapter Four of this analysis demonstrated that the principle of autonomy -- as defined by the analytical model -- is implicit in certain of the Commission's expressed purposes.⁴ The analysis will now proceed to

⁴See supra, p. 45-47.

determine if this point of view holds in fact, and if so in what sense.

With respect to one of its early policy statements, this does not appear to be the case. In The Open-Door Colleges the Commission takes the position that the governance function is influenced by the relationship of separate levels of government, not only as these relationships apply to resource allocation but also to the determination of the types of instructional programs.⁵ State and national manpower boards ought also to be factors in this collective governmental influence, though they are not so important as the local board because:

occupational programs need to be geared to local, state, and national labor market trends, and for this reason it is particularly desirable that they be guided by an advisory board composed of persons thoroughly familiar with the local labor market.⁶

Hence the role of the board is to assess labor market conditions, and introduce and support the types of programs offering training in the skills necessary to meeting the demands of the market. Moreover, the expectations to which a local board is expected to respond are predetermined -- the expectations of a market upon the institution.

⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 47.

⁶Ibid.

The Commission does endorse autonomy, but in a very problematical reference, as follows:

Not only is it important to provide for a meaningful degree of local autonomy, but the problem of building community support for local community colleges without impairing their autonomy is a difficult one.⁷

The term "autonomy" is used twice in this one statement, but each time with a different grammatical antecedent. The first reference, to "local autonomy," is to local community control of such an institution by means of a locally selected lay board, thus meaning independent community control. The second reference to "autonomy" in this same sentence does not mean community control of the institution, but instead some indeterminate measure of self-governance for these institutions. "Local autonomy" is viewed by the Commission as a constraint upon, if not actually a threat to, institutional autonomy. The two separate loci of autonomy are thus viewed as being in tension.⁸

If one retraces the steps of the Commission's argument it shall be observed that the principle of dominance is at work. Though the principle of faculty autonomy is upheld, the nature of it is not clear. To the contrary there is some specificity as to the expected membership of the board of control and the hierarchy of influences impinging upon it. That board is not to be selected for its

⁷Ibid., p. 48.

⁸Ibid.

expertise in the management of instructional programs, or even for its understanding of the institutional life of community colleges. Instead it is to be selected on the basis of a potential incumbent's familiarity with the local and regional job market. It is to be influenced by state and national manpower needs. These needs are in turn to determine the instructional programs. It is therefore not a local board, not an instructional staff, not an administration, but output expectations originating in the larger society that ultimately control the institution. We have already noted that the Commission's descriptor for these expectations is -- the market. This market circumscribes the role of the board, the president, and the faculty, and likewise autonomy as a descriptor of instructional program determination.

In the seventeenth of its twenty-three policy statements, Governance in Higher Education: Six Priority Problems,⁹ the Commission appears to be taking a different position. Public control, as the authority vested in agencies of government, and institutional independence, denoting areas of authority reserved for boards of control and by consent of the same and by custom to presidents and faculties, are viewed as existing jointly. Public control designates an area of circumscribed power, independence one

⁹(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 25-27.

of circumscribed freedom. The Commission's recommendations as to the power of appointment to boards of control -- who may serve, their qualifications, and the pattern of representation are carefully designed to provide constraints upon governors, budget officers of the state government, or any other person with vested interests.¹⁰ Governors should not serve on the boards of control for public institutions. The appointments they make should be ratified by legislatures; and alumni, faculty, and students, should be given some influence in the power of appointment. Board membership ought to reflect age, sex, and racial groups. Faculty members from other institutions should be considered for appointment to a given board, and faculty and students should be represented on committees of the board for their own institution. These recommendations accord the principle of institutional independence both logical and empirical significance. They are based upon the factuality of the situation and the principle is in turn a causal factor for these recommendations.

The same can be said for public control. Law enforcement is reserved for the courts, power of appointment to the board of control, either to the governor and legislature on the one hand or the public domain through popular

¹⁰Ibid., p. 35.

election on the other. The state shall also appropriate funds and conduct postaudit.¹¹

As to the balance between independence and public control, it shifts in favor of the latter on two counts: determination of institutional function, and the effective use of resources. These areas of authority are perceived as functions of a state coordinating agency through program approval for the former, budget review and postaudit for the latter.¹² It hardly need be argued that program approval has clear implications as to influence over the means and ends of learning. In Chapter Six it was demonstrated that the same also holds for the effective use of resources, particularly as this concern has been perceived and interpreted by the Commission.

Social Expectation as the
Given Condition

Beyond the seeming difference in the point of view of the Commission's treatment of governance in The Open-Door Colleges, and its later and more thorough treatment of this same subject in Governance of Higher Education, there is a degree of consistency.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 26.

¹² Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Capital and the Campus: State Responsibilities for Postsecondary Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 23-37.

This consistency is partially obscured by the fact that even though the principle of autonomy had been consistently upheld throughout the preparation of the policy statements to the one on governance, it was then dropped on the grounds that:

Autonomy, in the sense of full self-governance, does not now exist for American higher education, nor has it existed for a very long time -- if ever. Autonomy is limited by law, by the necessary influences and controls that go along with financial support, and by public policy in areas of substantial public concern. Autonomy in these areas is neither possible nor generally desirable.¹³

It is argued to the contrary that institutional independence should be preserved, that "Higher education . . . should be substantially self-governing in its intellectual conduct, academic affairs, administrative arrangements."¹⁴ Autonomy as a term of reference is rejected; independence is chosen in its place, then circumscribed to mean partial independence. This preference does not alter usage, which, in the policy statements, has been substantially synonymous. The Commission has reference to functions, areas of authority, and circumscribed areas of freedom.

It is in this sense also that the terminology of the Commission is at some variance with the analytical model. Whereas "public control" applies to the powers of

¹³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Governance of Higher Education: Six Priority Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 17.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 18.

appropriation, appointment of boards, "social control" applies not just to functions but to assumptions about the nature of events in their cause-effect, means-ends relations. It applies to the given conditions to which governance activities must respond, and as those conditions are perceived to be characteristics of the larger society.

"Autonomy" similarly has reference to such given conditions as they are perceived to inhere in the relationship of the means and ends of learning as an independent function. As theoretical principles, social control and autonomy are once removed from the Commission's express concerns and its preoccupation with deciding within whose purview a given activity happens to fall.

The Commission's unexamined, fundamental, and determinative assumption in the interpretation of governance activities is the microeconomic demand of individuals for instructional services -- the market. The ability to interpret the market was the one prerequisite worthy of mention as to whom should serve on community college boards, a given condition expressed in the very same paragraph in which local and institutional autonomy were upheld. One cannot escape the paradoxical conclusion that a display of independence, of freedom, of that self-determination which is autonomy, is contingent upon response to the market.

If to the contrary one is to understand independence as a condition of self-determination circumscribed by market forces, then the paradox can be avoided. The market and the principle of independence function at separate points in the sequence of events, with independence existing so long as market forces, as antecedent events, are satisfied. It follows that autonomy, understood as a term denoting absolute and complete independence, should ultimately have been rejected by the Commission as an inaccurate descriptor. In similar fashion the principle of autonomy, as this theoretical concept is perceived by the analytical model, expresses a condition which the market, as a ruling principle, precludes. Predicative and substantive learning are subordinated functions.

Partial exception is taken to the market model on at least one occasion, but this supports rather than negates its use. This ironically takes place in a discussion of models for governance, in reference to which the Commission insists there are none. Yet from several options the market is taken as one having limited application.¹⁵ More importantly, the same policy statement takes a position fully consistent with the market model. This takes place in response to the question: "How . . . may independence be earned?" Several answers are provided, the first of

¹⁵Ibid., p. 14.

which is, "Performing . . . functions that are important to the people in the larger society."¹⁶ This is virtually the academic equivalent of economic free enterprise in that market response is the condition of freedom.

Because it has not been theoretically formulated, the principle of the market cannot be taken as a model. It is instead a presupposition, and as such it repeatedly represents the basis on which decisions are made. In its actual use it may have a variety of applications -- the market for jobs or skills requiring collegiate training, for certain courses of instruction aside from their occupational importance, and for contract research.

In The Capitol and the Campus the Commission asks whether or not the market should be a regulator. It is seen as the alternative to pervasive governmental control, while at the same time governmental support is seen as a facilitator of the market. Just as the colonies supported higher education for that which the Commission perceives as certain desired results, so did the national Congress inaugurate the Land Grant movement. Higher education has enjoyed state supported lotteries, exemption from taxes, and military service; and "In turn, the colleges fulfilled their public responsibilities by providing the type of educational

¹⁶Ibid., p. 24.

services which society seemed to need."¹⁷ Because the greatest support for higher education today comes from public financing, the state is perceived as the "one big purchaser."¹⁸

The failure of the professor to understand this fundamental reality is perceived as a problem. The assertion is made, perhaps erroneously, that professors "do not directly subject their wares to a market test,"¹⁹ and are isolated from these pressures. Because they have tenure there is little if anything that can be done about their insensitivity to the market. This, however, is not so much a problem calling for correction as one that must be accepted in the interests of faculty freedom, morale, and self-determination. It is nonetheless a problem for the president of an institution, who is faced with:

an independent artisan economy from the point of view of producing services but it is a collective enterprise in terms of securing income -- and the chief artisans have tenure [With] little or no control over the

¹⁷Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 11.

¹⁸Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 22.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 21.

component outputs or the totality to which they add up . . . the [president] must take the totality and present it for the highest price he can get.²⁰

The professor's independence is described as "a productive form of mild anarchy -- internal free enterprise."²¹ Note again the use of economic figures of speech.

No sooner is this point made than the market is viewed as a solution to the problem of effective use of resources. The commission proposes that students "conduct the search for lower cost, higher quality, and greater diversity"²² through the expenditure of their money for tuition. As has been pointed out before in connection with recommendations for the effective use of resources, this can have consequences for instructional program. The market would become the measure of which courses and programs are important and which are not. It would necessarily determine, to the degree that it is depended upon, the areas in which institutions of higher education may be able to exercise independence. In a sentence, the market becomes the dominant force in the management and operation of the enterprise of higher education.

²⁰Ibid., p. 22.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 23.

Summary of Chapter Seven

Given social expectations in the form of a demand for the academic equivalent of goods and services as the condition to which the agents of governance must respond, public control and independence are then both terms with logical and empirical significance. As conceptualized, their reference is to fact; they are cause for the Commission's recommendations. It follows that higher education decision making proceeds from the interaction of roles according to which the principles of public control and independence are causal. They would determine the locus of responsibility for the various types of decisions that have to be made.

But public control and independence are once removed from the theoretical concepts of the terminology of the model. Social control and autonomy denote assumptions as to fact which are taken as prior cause for governance functions, whereas public control and independence have reference to the functions themselves. The functions of a state coordinating agency represent public control; social expectations social control.

Social expectations manifest themselves in the form of demand for specific courses, degree programs, and other services according to their occupational and social usefulness. The presupposition as to the role of the market thus

becomes the dominant given condition from which decisions proceed. There is no cause for governance activities to show a response to self-determined ends derived from the nature of learning-as-such so to function. The market is supreme.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ITS EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS FUTURE

If the market is to determine the appropriation and allocation of resources, and in turn the decision making commonly described as governance, then it follows that the same may in principle cover the activities of learning. This can be interpreted as restricting any possible autonomy for those functions which have been described as predicative and substantive learning. In the face of this prospect it is incumbent upon the student of the policy statements to look for evidence to the contrary. The analysis therefore turns to a consideration of the possible conditions under which the principle of learning as an end in itself, which the analytical model refers to as autonomy, may be a dominant feature in higher education (Illustration V, p. 113).

This principle concerns not only the nature of learning as such, in and of itself, but also the nature of the relationship of this activity to the total society aside from support and governance functions. It should be

AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS




ILLUSTRATION V

Chapter Eight analyzes the nature, scope, and functional relationships of learning in order to determine if these can be understood independent of the social expectations which the Commission has consistently assumed to be the fundamental controlling mechanism for the functions of learning.

recalled that the operation of this principle was implicit in the fourth of the formal purposes expressed by the Commission. It should also be recalled that the critical function, expressed in the fifth purpose, requires an inversion of the principle of social control in order to assure the independence of higher education to perform a critical function.¹ The analysis now proceeds to determine if these purposes can in any sense be taken as compatible with the Commission's presuppositions and assumptions.

Higher Education's External Relationships

It has been pointed out that in its relationship to the larger society higher education is to respond to the knowledge, skill, and research needs of a technological-industrial society; that as for the individual it is primarily a means to social and professional opportunity. Though the policy statements are vague as to that which is meant by quality, standards of excellence are usually to be taken to be that which is necessary for a society as understood by its technological and economic growth characteristics.

Descriptors of that relationship according to characteristics that are not economic in their point of view are difficult to find. They are generally used in

¹Supra, p. 47.

passing, and the context is so limited that inferences according to such are not based upon sufficient data to be reliable. The Commission's references to culture illustrate this point:

The cultural contributions of higher education take on wider dimensions as rising levels of education and growing affluence and leisure make possible greater concern with the quality of life in the United States.²

This proposition is offered with little evidence as to what is meant by culture. In at least one other passage the term has reference to the fine arts, particularly the performing arts. One of the perceived benefits of a community college for example is its possible value in the fostering of the arts as a cultural contribution to its locale.³

Beginning with the tenth of the policy statements reference is made to the "cultural revolution," which represents the first appearance of this term in a context with shades of meaning congruent to its anthropological usage. In this connection the observation is made that:

More young people are now seeking vocations or lifestyles outside the Horatio Alger syndrome than ever before. How far will this go? Higher education is

²Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.

³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, New Students and New Places: Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 3.

built on the work ethic and we may now be shifting to a more sensate culture.⁴

This reference is far more revealing in its assumptions about the past and present than its concern for the future. Aside from whether it has any significance as to fact, this statement clearly leaves the Commission attached to a point of view. Though one cannot assume thereby that the "Horatio Alger syndrome" has been equated to the work ethic, it is without doubt perceived as coexistent and complementary to the latter. Moreover the prospect that the Horatio Alger model should go into eclipse throws into question the compatibility of higher education premised upon the work ethic with whatever might follow.

Upward mobility -- if this represents in contemporary language the nineteenth century success story given expression by Horatio Alger -- is consistent with the Commission's assumption that one important purpose of American higher education is for individuals to utilize it in the pursuit of a "better" life. Neither is it inconsistent with the assumption that the purpose of higher education is to train managers, professionals, and technicians, and to provide expertise and research on a utilitarian basis.⁵

⁴Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 17.

⁵Supra, p. 62.

In a similar vein the recommendations for community colleges include the strengthening of vocational training, in-service training for skilled craftsmen, occupational training for adults, and extensive programs of occupational guidance and placement. The discussion culminates with a statement that renders inference unnecessary in order to sense the economic and utilitarian presuppositions:

It is particularly important for all students to recognize that, whether they choose a transfer, general education, or occupational program, the ultimate objective is preparation for an occupation. . . . Thus a primary objective of guidance programs should be to encourage students to make wise choices between curricula that are specifically designed to prepare them for an occupation and those that are designed to lead to ultimate career choices that benefit from prolonged academic education preceding specialization.⁶

The only surprising element in this statement is in its presumption as to what the students' opinion should be. As a generality to which certain exception can be taken, this statement must surely have considerable empirical significance. There is some well-informed opinion of long standing to this effect.⁷ Unfortunately this uncritical value judgment of the Commission is taken as binding upon all matriculants. Accordingly the prevailing norms for the present are endorsed for the future, and current practices and their premisses are left unexamined.

⁶Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 21

⁷Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America (Stanford, California: Academic Reprints, 1954), pp. 85-134.

Even so the Carnegie Commission is not without its idealism and social concern. It has expressed its support for the improvement of society through its instructional, research, and service functions. In Higher Education and the Nation's Health it has made recommendations designed to vastly expand the programs of training for physicians, dentists, and medical support personnel.⁸ It has recommended that higher education attack the problems of the environment, and foster research in learning theory and educational methodology.⁹

This idealism is ruled nonetheless by a conception of culture that is fundamentally economic. In summary, the findings following the analysis of resource and governance functions still hold -- that higher education will continue to serve society essentially on society's own terms. Higher education need not necessarily accept that society as good in every important way, but even the task of social improvement would have to be as a response to expectations that pressing social needs will be met.¹⁰

⁸ (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).

⁹ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: Revised Recommendations -- New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 26f.

¹⁰ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 25.

Nature and Scope of Higher Education

The analysis now moves to the center of the nature of higher education -- its scope and internal relationships. It will be demonstrated that aside from socioeconomic expectations, the Commission's assumptions as to the nature of higher education are obscure. Meanings are not easy to infer. This in turn results in negative judgments about significance, validity, and consistency because these are criteria that apply to meanings. Selected passages will illustrate the problem of interpretation.

Scope

It is a natural practice of a reader to assume that word usage follows custom, or a standard reference definition unless it is stated otherwise. This practice does not always serve the reader well. A case in point is the type and range of institutions to which the Carnegie Commission is referring when it speaks either of higher education or postsecondary education. One can peruse several of the policy statements without meeting a serious problem on this score because the reference is usually to institutions offering programs leading to the bachelors' degree or beyond. Occasional references are made to a concern for including other institutions in the discussion and planning for education beyond high school, but without conveying a

sense of meanings for the terminology contrary to familiar usage.

Then, in the eighth of the policy statements, the Commission took issue with that which it perceived as the popular meaning of the term "higher education" and its connotations.

As it is usually defined, higher education encompasses only public and private two-year and four-year colleges and universities. Defined in this way, higher education includes some 2,500 institutions and about 8 million students. Postsecondary education more broadly defined, however, also includes private profit and non-profit trade and technical schools, public adult and area vocational trade union apprenticeship as essential in state planning.¹¹

If higher education is to have reference to all postsecondary education, and if the popular notion of higher education is taken to be insufficient because it does not, then it follows that recommendations as to equality of opportunity, as to goals for postsecondary education, as to resource allocation, apply to all institutions embraced by this more inclusive conceptualization. In The Capitol and the Campus this is indeed the case. Furthermore, the placing of two years of postsecondary education "in the bank" for every high school graduate, as recommended in Less Time, More Options, is seen in retrospect so to apply.¹²

¹¹ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 8.

¹² (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 20.

The Commission further calls for a "pluralistic system of postsecondary education," which suggests

that state governments should broaden the focus on higher education that prevails today. Even in a state like New York, where the scope of authority of the Board of Regents is broadly defined in legislation, the Board's activities in higher education have only recently begun to broaden beyond the chartering of institutions and registering of programs.¹³

This redefinition of higher education, and consequent redirection of the authority and interest of state government agencies responsible for higher education, results in the inclusion of 7,000 trade and technical schools and more than 500 apprenticeship programs including adult schools and even correspondence schools in the discussion.

By implication the goals of universal access, "economic equality of opportunity," and program diversity are in part accomplished by the extension of the redefinition of higher education to include non-collegiate institutions and programs of instruction. Though this does not appear to have been the intention of the Commission, it has the practical effect of bringing these and other recommendations closer to realization. Certain recommendations would apply to the entire range of institutions and certain would not. The reader is left determining on the basis of

¹³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 8.

the sense of a given recommendation the types of institutions for which it would hold.

This results in a built-in uncertainty, though it should be acknowledged that the weight of the discussion is related to higher education according to its generally accepted meaning.

Then, in the twenty-first of twenty-two policy statements, the problem created by this confusion is finally clarified. Postsecondary education is defined as "all education beyond high school." Higher education is restricted to mean:

academic degrees or broad occupational certificates. It takes place on college or university campuses or through campus substitute institutions, such as the "open university" with its "external degrees."

Further education denotes:

occupational skills rather than academic degrees. It takes place in many non-campus environments -- industry, trade unions, the military, proprietary vocational schools . . .¹⁴

In being definitions which are at variance with the Commission's own prior usage of "higher education" and "post-secondary education", these do nothing to clarify any ambiguity in the first twenty policy statements.

¹⁴Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Learning Society: Alternative Channels to Life, Work, and Service (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 3.

The Degree and its Meaning

Just as the Commission has expressed some interest in postsecondary education aside from that which has traditionally been called higher education, and expects that some of its recommendations would apply to these concerns, it similarly takes a flexible position toward the type of work for which credit may be given toward the earning of a degree -- as for example advanced standing, CLEP, and military service. The Commission has recommended for example that "post-secondary educational opportunities be encouraged outside the formal college in apprenticeship programs, proprietary schools, in-service training in industry, and in military programs." These same programs should receive governmental support with credit granted on the basis of appropriate mechanisms. It is also recommended that "employers . . . hire and promote on the basis of talent alone as well as on prior certification

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That professions, wherever possible, create alternate routes of entry other than full-time college attendance . . ."¹⁵

Taken at face value these recommendations do not appear to be particularly startling.

¹⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options: Education Beyond High School (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 13f.

This does not hold for the argument upon which they rest. That argument appears in a section so problematic that only a full reading of it can convey its impact. It is as follows:

[These recommendations] will require better tests of talent, more exercise of individual judgment by employers and their representatives, more training opportunities on the job, and more concern for ladders to rise and less with ceilings based on prior certification. The best test is performance on the job. The Educational Testing Service (ETS) and the American College Testing Program (ACT) have had great experience with testing and might turn more of their attention to achievement testing as the basis for certificates that will take the place of degrees. Degrees might also be given as a result of these tests by ETS and ACT independently or with a recognized college or university. But, essentially, employers should do more of their own screening for talent and rely less on the instrumentalities of the college, which are designed primarily for other purposes. Greater reliance by employers on tests developed to screen applicants for positions would be vastly less costly to society than using the B. A. degree to screen.¹⁶

This passage endorses a de-emphasis on degrees and certificates representing satisfactory completion of educational programs by proposing "more concern for ladders to rise and less with ceiling based on prior certification. The best test is performance on the job." In the next sentence the Commission proposes a type of assessment degree, which in turn is followed by a proposal for "instrumentalities" less costly than a B. A. degree program. The statement is made that college degree programs are for other purposes. This paragraph, aside from its internal inconsistencies, appears

¹⁶Ibid., p. 14.

to be strangely out of touch with the principle of equal educational opportunity, and the prevailing belief on the part of the Commission that education is essentially training for a job.

The Commission goes on to recommend a degree structure terminating every two years, with the Associate of Arts representing successful completion of the lower division, the Bachelors' Degree the upper division, and a Master of Philosophy awarded for the completion of two years' work following the undergraduate program. A Doctor of Arts is also recommended for more widespread adoption.¹⁷ Except for the latter, there is very little argument as to why this structure would be an improvement. The claim is made that it would provide a stopping off point every two years instead of four, which, it should be noted, is a matter of convenience rather than the consequence of something inherent in the educational process. The claim is also made that those who cannot and should not go on will be able to accept the Associate of Arts as a certificate of accomplishment rather than accept dropping out as a mark of failure.¹⁸ The Master of Philosophy is offered as a teaching degree, and to serve occupations requiring more training than the Master of Arts represents. As to the reasons advanced for

¹⁷Ibid., p. 16-18.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 15.

the Doctor of Arts as a more widely disseminated degree, they will be treated in the next section.

The passage quoted above reflects the Commission's interpretation of the degree as a certificate of employment rather than representing the completion of a rigorous degree program. That the Commission does question the appropriateness of degrees and certificates in this connection can be taken as grounds for a review of its own assumption on this matter. If the degree were to be taken as basically satisfactory completion of the program it signifies, it would then be defined strictly on its own terms. The meaning of the degree would be a function of the relationship of mutually inherent means and ends.

The Certification and Evaluation of Teaching

One assumption of this analysis is that insofar as the ends of education inhere in the means, and those ends are the ends of learning in and of itself, the criterion of autonomy has been satisfied. One would be mistaken to assume that the means and ends of learning represent a dichotomization of method and subject matter. Learning is instead a function of the exploring mind in which means and ends are a series of mutually stimulating events, the consequence of which is knowledge

in the pursuit of more knowledge.¹⁹ This is not to the exclusion of the practical uses of knowledge, but neither is it subordinate to them.

If this theoretical concept exists in fact, one would normally expect it to be where there is instruction. In search of this the analysis turns now to the Commission's conception of teaching, the preparation for it and its evaluation. The Commission claims that for too long it has been of only secondary importance, and that:

We believe it will take a new degree with a new name and a new program to declare that teaching is important and will be equally rewarded and that the narrower specialization of the past will not dominate so much of higher education.²⁰

The degree would not require original research, but would instead call for an extensive independent presentation in which the ability to master and present a complex body of knowledge would be demonstrated. It would be the standard liberal arts advanced degree, the Doctor of Arts, from which one could proceed to the Doctor of Philosophy through the satisfactory completion of original research. Notwithstanding, it should be treated as equal to the Doctor of

¹⁹This definition was inspired by John Dewey, in Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 180-193.

²⁰Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options: Education Beyond High School (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 17.

Philosophy in the determination of salary, promotion, and other perquisites.²¹

The Commission argues that the training of "Ph. D's. for community college teachers should be actively discouraged. The research-oriented Ph. D. is highly inappropriate for the community college teacher." Indeed the holders of the research degree are described as having a "trained incapacity"²² for serving in these positions. The Commission does not explain this point of view, nor does it argue for it. This must either be accepted on the Commission's authority or as common knowledge. Though a popular argument, verifiable in principle, this can easily represent a case of taking opinion as fact. No research evidence has been cited in support of it.

The mastery of subject matter and the demonstrated ability to present it are therefore accepted as superior prerequisites to good teaching more than the successful experience of systematic and organized discovery. This preference is carried over into the Commission's assumptions about instruction. Educational psychology and learning theory might be a desirable component of the Doctor of Arts program, but on the whole, "there is no reason to alter the subject matter orientation of a faculty member's

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 16.

preparation." A degree program so designed is assumed to offer within it that which is necessary "to learn the art of teaching."²³ It follows that teaching is basically a matter of presentation, though not necessarily according to tradition.

One full policy statement is given over to the subject of instructional technology, the full incorporation of which into the instructional process is strongly endorsed. This does not mean that the teacher must be an expert as to its use, though he should know something of its various capabilities.²⁴ He is to be assisted by an instructional technologist whose responsibility it is to know the relative effectiveness of various technologies to given situations, and advise and assist in the preparation of their use. According to the recommendation the instructional technologist, with an information specialist who knows the "software" of media technology, should serve with the teacher as an instructional team.²⁵

It is the technologist who is expected to have the knowledge of educational psychology and learning theory, and is responsible for a knowledge also of instructional

²³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, The Fourth Revolution: Instructional Technology in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 71.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 73f.

strategy. The doctorate is desirable for him though a masters' degree is acceptable. Still, the teacher is the leader of the team, for it is he "who understands best what needs to be taught."²⁶ Technology basically assists the presentation.

Electronic and mechanical instruments of instruction are the "given" condition of the Commission's approach. They are valued for convenience and flexibility -- off-campus, independent study, individualized instruction, and nonscheduled supplementary tutorial instruction. They are valued as an innovation. However, reference is made to hundreds of studies that show the use of sophisticated electronic and mechanical technology not to be, in their effect, "significantly different from that of 'good professors, and teachers using conventional modes of instruction.'"²⁷ The Commission decides to believe an authority to its own liking, who argues that these findings "fly in the face of common sense,"²⁸ and that current research simply does not measure some of the advantages of the new media. It is hardly convincing when research findings are dismissed in so perfunctory a manner. Moreover one of the

²⁶Ibid., p. 71.

²⁷Ibid., p. 13 (see note)

²⁸Ibid., quoting Anthony Oettinger in "Will Information Technologies Help Learning?", an unpublished manuscript at the time of the quotation (1972).

Commission's own sponsored research reports is quoted as finding that the use of technology requires more rather than less of an instructor's time. Other reports are cited showing the same results. Yet the technology is taken as being superior.²⁹

In principle, the Commission has taken a position which may be consistent with certain theories of learning, even though its approach appears to be mechanistic. The Commission is concerned with the most efficient way of presenting the information, more with convenience than effect. It is in error rejecting research findings without marshalling evidence equally as formidable as that which it is confronting. In the face of evidence the Commission makes contrary assumption as to fact. Such assumptions do not have empirical significance. Accordingly the Commission's point of view is not sound. Neither is there any account of the principle of learning as an autonomous function.

If not in the training for the professorial guild, or the mechanics of its practice, then perhaps in its evaluation will the free and independent end of learning be perceived as cause for its own perpetuation. Repeated references are made in The Fourth Revolution to evaluation, but with the relegation of this important function to the

²⁹Ibid., p. 66, quoting Howard Brown and Gordon Douglass in Efficiency in Liberal Education: A Study of Comparative Instructional Costs for Different Ways of Organizing Teaching-Learning in a Liberal Arts College (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 27.

learning technologist, who is himself a subordinate on the instructional team. How evaluation is to be integrated into the instructional strategy, if in fact this is to be a part of the strategy, is not clear.³⁰ Presumably the purpose of evaluation is to measure the adequacy of the instructional effort at some logical sequence. Also, presumably, it is for the purpose of making possible some improvement in the learning process. In point of fact there is no indication as to how evaluation relates to the instructor, the course, the students, or all three.

Major importance is attached to evaluation of instruction in a policy statement issued in the same month as The Fourth Revolution. According to this publication, Reform on Campus, "greater emphasis on the prestige and art of teaching" is encouraged. The Commission asserts that:

This reemphasis depends, in part, upon the evaluation placed on the importance of teaching. This evaluation includes the ways in which institutions are graded in the hierarchy of quality, and particularly whether teaching performance is one of the rating criteria. Important also is the reward given to superior teachers as compared with other teachers and as compared, also, with those who engage heavily in research.³¹

This is a very deceiving reference in that the term "evaluation" is used in a way that grammatically has nothing to do with the evaluation of teaching performance. It has

³⁰Ibid., p. 71.

³¹Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 48.

instead to do with the evaluation of the importance of teaching. If this is interpolated to mean the relative importance of teaching or its rank in the order of institutional priorities, then the above quote begins to make sense grammatically. As to the hierarchy of quality, it is not clear whether this is a criterion reference pertaining to departments within an institution or to a comparative rating of separate institutions. In either case the reference to "quality" introduces antecedent assumptions as to principle which this analysis has discovered to be of indeterminate meaning. The one clear reference is to the relative rewards to superior teachers and researchers.

Confusing though it already is, the same paragraph continues as follows:

Teaching, however, is notoriously difficult to evaluate -- it is an art more than a science. Beyond the standard methods -- examination of syllabi, observations of classes and seminars, and others -- we have six suggestions to make.³²

The term "evaluation" is now being used according to its generally accepted reference. By taking it to mean that which it is supposed to mean, one might expect to derive a notion of the Commission's conception of the state of the art, both as to teaching and its evaluation. But the "six suggestions" offered to make the evaluation not so notoriously difficult spoil this possibility. They are:

³²Ibid., p. 48.

The incorporation of students into the evaluation process

Differential assignments of teaching load in universities

Policies that allow superior teachers to rise more nearly to as high salary levels as superior research persons

Establishment of Doctor of Arts and Master of Philosophy degrees

A greater emphasis on awards to honor outstanding teachers

Creation of teaching funds to parallel research funds³³

If we examine the above suggestions in order to determine how they are to be of help in the task of evaluating teaching, we discover that only the first has anything to do with it. The rest have instead to do with rewards, incentives, and priorities.

The recommendation to incorporate students into the evaluation process is an action that is still once removed from the process. This point can be illustrated by simply asking. What will be the criteria and strategy of the students? The Commission hardly perceives the process of evaluation as having moved beyond the level of relatively informed or uninformed opinion, or a generally subjective tradition. Neither is it perceived that evaluation can be

³³Ibid., pp. 48-49.

built into the ongoing process of lesson preparation and presentation, or that performance results might be measured against predetermined objectives. Evaluation, as perceived by the Commission, is taken as necessary. It is not, however, sufficiently understood to be an effective measure of performance against results -- at any level. This term, vague and inconsistent as to meaning, has gone the way of quality; hence, no empirical significance.

Given a definition of evaluation clearly related to the measurement or assessment of performance, the "six suggestions" offered in connection with this have no logical significance. They represent instead fallacies of relevance, for the conclusions to which they lead represent something other than that which the suggestions purport.³⁴

Summary as to the Nature and Scope of Higher Education

A fundamental treatment of the inherent logic of the relationship of learning and knowledge, considered in and of itself, escapes the reader. An analysis of the discussions in which this would most likely emerge results in a miscellany of inconsistent and shifting meanings. Not even the meaning of higher education remains constant. The meaning of a degree as a certificate of what one has accomplished is

³⁴The particular fallacy committed here is known as ignoratio elenchi, or the irrelevant conclusion. See Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (3rd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 72.

lost in its treatment as an employment credential. A substantial amount of research data is rejected because it does not conform to "common sense." The Commission's understanding of evaluation becomes confused through vague and inconsistent use and contradictions in logic. The Commission has been preoccupied with superficiality, mechanics, and issues best left to experts in their respective fields.

Recommendations for the Future:

A Call for Reform

The Commission's call for reform in higher education has proved to be of singular interest to this analysis, though not because the Commission has addressed itself to the nature of knowledge as knowledge, and what might thus be implied for the means to attaining it, nor any relationship of subject to method as though the former should suggest the latter. Neither is the call for reform of interest because the Commission suggests, as to research, any known or presumed relationship between the unknown and the organized, intelligent approach to it. Much less has the Commission studied the matter and reported on the presence or absence of any such relationships. To be sure, the means and ends of learning, aside from any utilitarian applications of knowledge, are not perceived as placing any dictates upon resource and governance considerations.

The Commission's call for reform is of singular interest because it reports the Commission's own exercise of means to ends, of research which purports to discover, thus making possible the examination of the Commission's own assumptions as to the relationship of the means and ends of learning, of method to subject, according to its own approach to one such matter. On the basis of this exercise of means to the end of knowledge it can be determined if predicative learning (as method), and substantive learning (as knowledge), can be taken together as having any pre-supposed integrity aside from utilitarian considerations.

Presumably the Commission's object was to determine the general opinions of certain groups on a number of issues pertaining to higher education. Its method was that of a questionnaire returned by 70,772 undergraduates, 32,963 graduate students, and 60,028 members of faculties. The Commission reports that certain procedures were followed in order to assure random selection, both in the gathering and processing of the questionnaire results.³⁵

This survey indicated among those participating a high level of satisfaction with higher education in the United States at that time (1971), and certainly higher than had been considered to be the case during the latter part

³⁵ Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 69.

of the decade of the sixties. At the same time the survey indicated several changes in practice desired by those returning the questionnaires. Both faculty and students were in agreement as to an emphasis on teaching effectiveness rather than research as the primary criterion for faculty promotion. They were also in agreement as to a greater emphasis on the relevance of course work to contemporary life and problems, and to more attention to the emotional growth of students. There was also partial agreement on the desire for a broad liberal education as opposed to more specialized training. Another area of partial agreement not figuring so importantly in this analysis is that of required community service for a fixed period applying to all young people after the completion of high school but not necessarily before entering college. The Commission reports two areas of disagreement on the part of the respondents -- the abolition of grades and the adoption of an all-elective system.³⁶ The Commission's interpretation of that which represents partial agreement on the one hand, and disagreement on the other, will subsequently be given closer attention.

Certain recommendations for reform are offered as following these findings. Accordingly the notion of revolutionary change is rejected as not justified, given the high

³⁶Ibid., pp. 9-17.

degree of satisfaction with the current status of American higher education.³⁷ To the contrary selective reforms are proposed, as for example the making of teaching performance "the basic criterion for rewards to faculty members" except in those institutions in which research is of equal or greater importance.³⁸ Other recommendations purport to encourage more relevance in the curriculum.³⁹

The Commission's treatment, interpretation, and recommendations pertaining to these findings are matters subject to question. This holds for its judgment as to that which constitutes partial agreement and disagreement in the total number of responses to certain questions, certain assumptions as to the meaning of key terms, and certain assumptions as to fact.

First, consider the Commission's judgment concerning that which constitutes statistical agreement and disagreement. On one point -- whether or not there should be more emphasis on a broad liberal education -- fifty-six percent of the faculty and thirty seven percent of the students responding to the questionnaire agree that there should be. Presumably, because a majority of the faculty and only a minority of the students agree, the Commission

³⁷Ibid., p. 16

³⁸Ibid., p. 50.

³⁹Ibid., p. 48.

draws the conclusion that this represents partial agreement. But on the next question -- whether or not all grades should be abolished -- the percentages are roughly reversed. A majority of the students, with fifty-nine percent agreeing, and only a minority of faculty, with thirty-three percent agreeing, represent responses which the Commission describes as being in disagreement. Given only the data and the Commission's conclusions as to partial agreement and disagreement, it appears that each conclusion is a function of how faculty has responded. It is difficult to understand how student responses may have been taken into account on one question and not the other.⁴⁰

The reported findings cannot be taken as supporting the Commission's conclusion in the one case and not the other. A fallacy has been committed. Also, the Commission either selected an arbitrary differential expressed in percentage points for determining that which is partial agreement as opposed to disagreement without telling the reader, or simply acted according to its preference for certain conclusions. Through the ignoring, either partially or completely, of one category of response -- the response of students -- a hasty generalization has been made.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 15.

⁴¹Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 68. The hasty generalization is technically known as "converse accident."

That this was done on behalf of a preconceived notion is open to question.

One set of problems incorporating assumptions as to meaning as well as to fact emerges in the Commission's treatment of the first of these two questionnaire responses -- the "partial agreement [sic]" that there be greater emphasis on a "broad liberal education." The terminology of "general education" and "liberal education" is rejected. The notion of a "broad learning experience" is offered in its place, though the Commission never makes clear how this proposal is related to the findings of the survey.⁴²

But antecedent to these problems is one that derives from the Commission's use of the term "relevance," which also was a subject of one of the questionnaire items. Respondents were reported in agreement as to the need of more relevance in course work to contemporary life and its problems. After having circulated the questionnaire, the Commission offers its own definition of relevance as follows:

"Relevance" in the curriculum means different things to different people, but a good working definition might be: Courses that relate directly to actual personal interests of students and to current societal problems.⁴³

⁴²Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), pp. 41-45.

⁴³Ibid., p. 45.

In other references the Commission's opinion of that which is relevant is identified. Programs relating to ethnic groups are included, more emphasis on the performing arts for an affluent society more given to leisure, and problem oriented courses as contrasted to discipline oriented courses. Of particular importance to the Commission is the role to be played by new perspectives as for example a "comparative world view of culture."⁴⁴

Having confided that "relevance" means different things to different people, it is rather puzzling that the Commission proceeds to propose certain program areas as relevant -- as though definitions and illustrations after the fact represent accurately that which respondents to the questionnaire had in mind at the time they reacted to the item. Granted, the Commission's definition corresponded closely to the questionnaire item. That definition was nonetheless general, and cannot be taken as supporting the Commission's opinion in particular cases. This represents a fallacy of relevance, in that the conclusions offered cannot be taken as those of the sample, which in turn have no logical significance for the specific illustrations offered.

Just as perplexing is the treatment of the subject matter of the undergraduate curricular offerings of recent

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 46.

years. Opinion was first expressed on this matter in A Chance to Learn, published just two years before the report of the survey in Reform on Campus. In the earlier report reference was made to the "conventional undergraduate neo-classical education"⁴⁵ as though this were the standard pattern at the time. The Commission was assuming that the rapidly approaching realization of universal access to higher education would result in an influx of students for whom a curriculum so described would be inappropriate, and on this basis stated that some changes would have to be made.

Though it may be true that the conventional undergraduate education may be inappropriate for certain students, the further assumption that such education is neo-classical is open to challenge. A brief review of many of the disciplines incorporated into the programs of general education in most colleges and universities will illustrate this point. Sociology and psychology, as disciplines, made their appearance in the nineteenth century in American colleges and universities. Economics and political science, both of which developed out of political economy, also made their first known appearance in American higher education in the nineteenth century. Physics, chemistry, and biology

⁴⁵Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 12.

were first generally accepted into the curriculum during this same period.⁴⁶ Indeed the burden of proof that the basic English composition required of virtually all college freshmen is neoclassical rests with those who would so contend. To argue that curricula largely made up of these courses is neoclassical serves only to identify it with real or presumed antecedents. This is roughly the same as saying that higher education has a history just as western civilization has a history. In the age of mass communication, computerized information processing, science, engineering, and technology, one is hard put also to discard these disciplines as totally irrelevant.

In Reform on Campus the Carnegie Commission again approaches this same issue, and somewhat more thoroughly. Having reported as one of its findings some preference for a "broad liberal education," to use the language of the questionnaire, the Commission rejects "general education" and "liberal education" on the grounds that "it carries with it connotations of past efforts at a general coverage of all essential knowledge. . . .We prefer the concept of a 'broad learning experience.'" The Commission declares that "despite repeated efforts over the past 70 years," such coverage is impossible. "Essential knowledge no longer has

⁴⁶Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 113, 365, and 405.

the intellectual (classical) and/or theological core that once allowed a student to cover it all in one college career."⁴⁷

The Commission has so interpreted the meaning of "liberal education" that it has cut its discussion, and recommendations also, entirely away from the questionnaire reference to a "broad liberal education." It has repeated the same fallacy of relevance that was observed in connection with the term "relevance." The Commission's conclusions and recommendations cannot be taken as having a significant relation in fact or in logic to the opinions of the respondents to the questionnaire.

To be sure the Commission is more thorough in Reform on Campus than in A Chance to Learn, but still its discussion is ever so brief. The concept of essential knowledge is rejected for program planning but not in and of itself. The intellectual is equated with the classical, but for reasons that escape the reader. Moreover a so-called classical or theological core is taken as a necessary condition for essential knowledge to be covered in one college career. All this is reported in just a few sentences.

If the Commission was able to support this point of view with any facts it certainly did not do so at the time

⁴⁷Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 42.

of writing. To the contrary it expresses another point of view in this same volume hardly consistent with these assumptions, as follows:

A century ago, higher education in the United States was "modernized" to reflect the new role of science, the rapid industrial advance of the nation, the surging populism of the people.⁴⁸

Higher education is taken at the same time to be neoclassical in its undergraduate education and also populist. These apparent differences could be reconciled with reference to separate points in time if it were not for the fact that the so-called modernization were assumed to be a task completed. They could in principle be reconciled in other ways if information to do so were provided.

Nor is this important to the Commission, for the real test of academic program comes in another way, which can be demonstrated by following another line of reasoning on which the Commission bases certain recommendations. Following upon the claim that in the nineteenth century higher education was "modernized" the Commission argues that now it:

needs to be more completely "humanized" in the sense of (a) being made more accessible to more young people, and (b) of being further adapted to the individual characteristics and attributes of its students.⁴⁹

The situation for which this is offered as a corrective is

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁹Ibid.

described as the trend toward "homogenization" -- toward a standard image for all institutions, as private colleges have become public, the single-sex coeducational, the church-related college toward non-sectarianism, as the smaller colleges became comprehensive colleges, with research and specialization becoming the capstones of this trend.⁵⁰

Diversity of program and differentiation of functions for separate institutions are seen as the correctives for this situation. Institutions should no longer follow the research university model as the only model, but seek to establish their separate identities. That instead of:

merely trying to match the accomplishments of other [institutions] . . . each should seek to perfect its own separate institutional personality, that each should strive to excel according to its own standards, and that different is better.⁵¹ (Emphasis added.)

The Commission thus makes a value judgment aside from quality as a characteristic of a given instructor's performance or an institution's degree standards. Quality becomes a measure of (1) the extent of innovation, diversity, and differentiation, and (2) humanization as this term is understood by the Commission. These goals are not to be achieved by a fixed plan of courses. Recommended instead is the formulation of a policy of diversity and differentiation,

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 35.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 36.

the final test of which will be the market. Ultimately, market demand will then determine program, for "the ideal combination is a policy that promotes diversity encouraged by and tested by the free play of the market."⁵²

The Commission recommends a broad learning experience in place of general education or liberal education, on the grounds that heretofore such programs are pre-selected on faculty authority and carry "unpleasant implications of morality."⁵³ The scientific method, the creative performance, policy formulation, exploration, and discovery are suggested alternatives to the traditional pattern. These would be an improvement, so the Commission argues, because they place emphasis not on preselected content but on ways to approach knowledge.

The analysis thus returns to the point of departure for this section. The Carnegie Commission has made its own approach in search of knowledge, then supplied definitions of key terms that severed its argument from the findings. The Commission has arrived at irrelevant conclusions as to that which is meant by "relevant," has introduced preconceived notions of that which is meant by "liberal" education, and aside from the general discussion takes the

⁵²Ibid., p. 39.

⁵³Ibid., p. 37.

position that the market is the ideal determinant of program. One cannot expect to detect in the midst of such inconsistency, contradiction, and fallacy an appreciation of the means and ends of knowledge independently considered.

Summary of Chapter Eight

With much evidence to the contrary, the policy statements were searched in an effort to determine if learning is in any way perceived as an autonomous set of functions, and according to which the nature of learning would determine the means to its acquisition.⁵⁴ The observation was made in Chapter Seven that complete and unqualified autonomy, with knowledge as its own ultimate end, was taken by the Commission as a hypothetical condition that does not in fact exist nor should exist. Yet learning could in principle exist as its own end in the penultimate sense in that circumscribed autonomy, or independence as the Commission preferred, was endorsed. The purpose of Chapter Eight was to determine if this could indeed be the case given the Commission's conception of the nature and scope of higher education, its cultural relationships, and the Commission's understanding of the learning process. The latter involved an analysis of the recommendations as to degrees,

⁵⁴Supra, p. 104.

preparation for the college teacher, and especially the Commission's own approach to discovery.

The analysis has demonstrated that though the term "culture" was occasionally used with unclear meaning, the actual relationship of higher education to society is consistently perceived as economic. Aside from market expectations there is no understanding of higher education which is built upon the work ethic. The degree is a certificate of employment. Even though the Commission considers this interpretation of the degree as an unfortunate development, it offers no opinion of that which a degree should represent.

The Commission perceives that more young people are abandoning the Horatio Alger syndrome than ever before, and because this is taken to be the case higher education is left uncertain as to its future mission; which is to say that cultural models other than the economic are incongruent with higher education as it is now constituted.

The analysis has determined that the policy statements of the Carnegie Commission are also confused as to the nature and scope of higher education. Generally accepted definitions do not consistently hold; moreover, the Commission proposes that higher education be defined to embrace all postsecondary education, and again that postsecondary education be subdivided into higher education and further education. Wolfe's charge that the Commission was selective

in its definition of terms not only has been demonstrated, but also the Commission is inconsistent and sometimes inaccurate.⁵⁵ This holds particularly for such expressions as "general education," "liberal education," and the "traditional neoclassical undergraduate education." Accordingly, one cannot assume a generally accepted definition as applying to any of the technical terminology of academe.

Much less can it be assumed that a principle of collegiality prevails in the community of the learned and the learning, or that such a community is necessarily ordered by the nature of knowledge or the means of its acquisition. Every discussion proceeds from utilitarian assumptions. Even in the case of the Commission's recommendations as to the direction that undergraduate education should take -- they are beside the point, because the market is the final judge of that which courses of instruction and degree programs should be.

The means and ends of instruction have been taken for granted. The principles of research, which according to the analytical model would represent predicative learning in the purest sense, may have been carefully employed except for the interpretation of the findings. These were circumvented in part, though not necessarily by intention, by

⁵⁵Supra, p. 11.

definitions rendering the findings of no consequence to the Commission's point of view. Preconceived notions, more than the findings of the questionnaires returned, have determined the nature of that which was labelled a "broad learning experience."

The discussion of evaluation, according to which the means and ends of learning are brought into necessary relation, was carried astray by a repetition of fallacy.

Instructional technology may truly have advantages that have escaped the studies that have been conducted, but the reader cannot be expected to accept this on the Commission's authority.

Learning as an independent function, with its own logic and assumptions as to principle, can hardly be seriously considered as a real possibility for a group that has violated its logic and principles. If learning cannot be taken as dictating the means to its own end, it cannot be taken as being penultimate as to purpose -- autonomous in the determination of its methods and its findings but taken at the same time to be socially useful. Hence the nature of learning and its inherent requirements have only a contingent significance for the Commission's recommendations. They are contingent upon budgetary restrictions, the number of years a student is expected to be in college, and upon the market.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Chapter One set forth the problem statement of this study as follows: To what extent has the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education accomplished its task through the exercise of sound principles, consistent use of theoretical constructs or models; or if not, then to what extent have its policy statements been influenced by unsupported assumptions as to fact, value judgments, and incomplete or fallacious arguments? Chapter Three concluded with a proposal that unstated assumptions, in the absence of a theoretical approach, could well determine the point of view of the Commission's policy statements and recommendations.

The analysis has demonstrated that assumptions as to meaning, as to fact, and as to principle have been the controlling factors for the Carnegie Commission's point of view. These assumptions have not been stated but instead have been taken for granted. Truth as to fact and soundness as to principle have been taken for granted,

with the result that meanings and relationships are left uncertain. Uncertainty as to meaning has been observed in the Commission's use of the term "quality"; uncertainty of relationship in the discussion of quality and equality as interacting principles.

The most serious and influential of the Commission's assumptions is of a different nature. Chapter Two pointed out that Birnbaum took notice of the Commission's fondness for economic figures.¹ The true significance of this evidently escaped Birnbaum's notice, for the fundamental presupposition of the Carnegie Commission is economic. Courses and instructional programs are treated as though they are commodities, the demands of students as market forces, and costs as a maximum allowable percentage of the Gross National Product.

One cannot say that this economic point of departure is a model in the theoretical sense. It is a presupposition. It has determined the nature of the discussion, the nature of the internal and external relationships of higher education as perceived by the Commission, and the conclusions and recommendations. But the economic presupposition has not been set forth as an instrument of analysis, nor examined for its strengths or weaknesses. Neither has this presupposition been used to test any research hypotheses,

¹Supra, p. 14.

to accept or reject any proposition, even any hunch. This presupposition or set of assumptions is not even declared, much less defined, or supported with argument. It is a presupposition -- not a model -- simply because it is taken to be a priori.

Had such a model been adequately presented with the necessary definitions of terms, the appropriate delimitations, and consciously used as an analytical or research design, that model may have proved most fruitful. But as a presupposition the economic point of view must be taken instead as a value judgment. The validity of this presupposition thus becomes a function of belief, of commitment aside from the question of evidence or a matter of demonstration. The economic point of departure therefore is to be accepted on the Commission's authority, this contextual setting of the problems of higher education on the Commission's authority, and their solution on the Commission's authority. Though cogent in principle the economic model is not so in the Commission's use of it, and only because of the failure to demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses with facts that stand independent of the Commission's prestige and commitment to it.

Economic incentives are advanced as the solution to problems. This holds in the case of equality of opportunity which is to be assured through the provision of grants,

loans, and work-study programs, as was noted in Chapter Five.² The analysis has demonstrated that the rationale was as much economic as any other, and that social justice was perceived as participation in the "better life," the affluent life. Economic justification was pursued to some detail. A case in point had to do with policies for the repayment of loans made to medical students for the financing of their training. In this connection the reasonable proposal was made that students enlisted in a national health service corps would receive forgiveness of twenty-five percent of their maximum allowable indebtedness in return for two years service. But at the same time mothers of pre-school children would be excused from obligations to repay indebtedness so long as their children remained in this age bracket, and provided they "work half-time in the labor market."³ In order to keep people productive in the economic sense the Commission is overlooking other important values -- in this case the care of small children.

If the economic precondition -- a materialistic social determinism -- is to apply to all decisions, then it is possible in principle that it will apply to non-material

²Supra, p. 59.

³Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Higher Education and the Nation's Health: Policies for Medical and Dental Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 69.

social values. No less than the social and moral development of the pre-school child, the educational process throughout, even at the graduate level is fundamentally non-materialistic. In the final analysis, learning and knowing are functions of the mind.

Further analysis of the Commission's own illustration will demonstrate how this may take place. If for example the mother of the pre-school child elects to forego employment because she considers her offspring deserving of the sacrifice, she is further denied forgiveness of a proportion of her loan. Economic policy has dictated her order of priorities. This represents a value judgment, and is subject to further justification than the Commission's opinion in the matter.

In a similar fashion the Commission has imposed restrictions of an economic nature on higher education. It proposes extensive subsidization for large numbers of students on the one hand, thus converting potential into kinetic demand; and on the other hand asserts that the resources to meet this increased demand must be restricted to an amount not significantly greater than two and one-half percent of the Gross National Product. As was pointed out in Chapter Six, this results in shifting much of the burden for the lower division of college to high school, to non-traditional programs -- the military, Educational Testing Service, and the American College Testing Program. The

Commission takes for granted that those functions of the mind involving the kinds of experience and memory that we call learning can operate within these restrictions without the loss of quality. Though the term "quality" is, as has been demonstrated, of indeterminate meaning, it has been seen to have reference in part to that which has been the norm. Likewise that which has been taken as sufficient for the recent past is further taken as sufficient for the immediate future.

That the Commission's own macroeconomic and micro-economic assumptions are congruent has not been demonstrated -- that a given percentage of the Gross National Product will be equal to the costs to be imposed by the demands of individuals for college training. At the same time the economic presupposition is the logically significant prior cause for the Commission's stance, and as such represents a self-perpetuating set of conditions. Any free, independent, and critical role for higher education is accordingly circumscribed by the economic presupposition.

Neither has the Commission demonstrated that the means and ends of learning can be adequately met within the economic restrictions that the recommendations have imposed. To be sure the Commission's own misunderstanding of quality as a performance criterion, its own misuse of the method of the higher learning, and fallacies of relevance in the discussion of evaluation, are sufficient to discredit it as

an authority. Yet it is on the Commission's authority that the reader is to accept the Commission's list of opinions.

The economic presupposition is applied to the exclusion of the functions of learning independently considered. This is as much in error as it is for the manufacturer of automobiles to disregard the relative strength of materials and compression ratios in relation to one another aside from market consideration in order to determine if a satisfactory product can be built. Moreover the cost to manufacture a satisfactory product is as much a market factor as demand. The same may in principle hold for higher education.

The economic presupposition, not just because it is pervasive but because it is followed to the subordination, and in certain cases the virtual exclusion of alternatives to it, represents the bias of the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education. If in the preparation of its policy statements the Commission had accepted the limitations of an economic model, or had it considered and weighed a number of alternative approaches to the nature, scope, and problems of higher education, this bias need not have been present. On this same account the policy statements must surely represent something less than the Commission intended.

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