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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING IN THE AMERICAN STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING POLICY OUTCOMES

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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
JAMES IRWIN MOORE

Norman, Oklahoma

1971

LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING IN THE AMERICAN STATES:
AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING
POLICY OUTCOMES

APPROVED BY



DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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PREFACE

In response to escalating rates of reported criminal activity and acts of civil disobedience during the 1960's, the Congress, in June, 1968, enacted the Safe Streets Act as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. With President Johnson's approval of this legislation, the Federal government began, for the first time in this nation's history, to provide significant financial assistance to state and local governments for improvement of their criminal justice systems.

An important provision of the 1968 Safe Streets Act requires that the bulk of the Federal aid be awarded to the States on the basis of each State's total population. In fiscal year 1970 this amounted to about $185 million. Within the next few years, Federal law enforcement assistance is expected to increase to approximately $1.5 billion, at which time the Federal government will have assumed twenty percent of the criminal justice costs which formerly were the sole responsibility of state and local governments.

This study analyzes the manner in which state law enforcement planning agencies have allocated the $185 million

in fiscal 1970 Federal funds made available to the states in the form of block grants. The influence of interstate variances in selected social, economic and political system characteristics on the outputs of the law enforcement planning process are investigated. Multi-variate statistical techniques, including factor analysis, stepwise regression and residual analysis are employed. Consideration is given to the issues related to Federal law enforcement assistance, the probable impact of this assistance on reported crime rates and on the American tradition of local control of law enforcement. The larger implications of this major national effort to reduce crime and civil disorder by more effective law enforcement are also dealt with.

Although this study deals primarily with statistical data provided by various governmental agencies and by earlier studies of the policy process in the American states, considerable insight regarding the law enforcement planning process was gained through personal interviews. From June through August, 1970 the law enforcement planning agencies of Kansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, Virginia and Massachusetts were visited by this researcher. Informative discussions of the law enforcement planning process were held with the staff director and several of the supervisory board members in each of the states visited. In all cases the staff personnel and board members interviewed were most cooperative and willing to contribute information asked for.

In addition to the field visits outlined above, a number of visits were made to the Office of Law Enforcement Programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Washington, D.C. Again, individuals interviewed were helpful in providing information and data on law enforcement planning, and in making available the comprehensive law enforcement plans of all states. Several visits were also made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of obtaining data on crime statistics. As in the other visits, a high degree of cooperation was received from the Chief of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section and his staff.

The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of his dissertation committee: Dr. Hugh G. MacNiven, Chairman; Dr. Richard E. Hilbert; Dr. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick; Dr. F. Ted Hebert; and Professor Samuel G. Chapman. The suggestions and encouragement of each committee member contributed materially to the preparation of this dissertation. Mrs. Frank Olney, Sr. deserves my wholehearted thanks for her efficient typing. Finally, and most importantly, to my wife, Olive J. Moore, for her cheerful and continuing assistance as critic, proofreader and provider of sustenance, goes my deepest appreciation.

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LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING IN THE AMERICAN STATES
AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING
POLICY OUTCOMES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to improve our understanding of how policy outcomes in the American states are influenced by environmental and political system differences among the states. To this end the relationships between selected policy decisions related to criminal justice administration and indicators of the socio-economic and political characteristics of each of the forty-eight states are explored.

The method of investigation is that of multivariate statistical analysis using a systems model. Techniques employed include simple correlation, multiple stepwise regression, factor analysis and residual analysis. The results of earlier investigations of the policy process in the American states and the outcome of the law enforcement planning process during fiscal year 1970 are relied upon as our major sources of data.

The findings of other researchers incorporated in this study include those reported by Dye, Fenton, Fry and Winters, and by Sharkansky and Hofferbert. In addition, extensive use is made of the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and of the reports of the Congressional committees that were instrumental in the initiation of this first national program to improve all phases of the criminal justice process.

One of the questions in the study of public policy that has generated considerable controversy in recent years is whether political or environmental variances are the more important as policy determinants. Prior to about 1957 and the advent of Easton's systems approach,[1] there existed little doubt in the thinking of most political scientists that state political systems have a distinctive imprint on patterns of public policy.[2] This generalized assumption of the importance of the political process appears to have been due to the methodology then employed--case studies, community power approaches, and investigations of the environment and government structures. The main thrust of these approaches dealt with government structure as a key variable.

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[1] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 9 (1957), 383-400.

[2] Based on Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 867-79.

Following the publication of Easton's A Systems Analysis of Political Life[1] in 1965, some scholars adopted his input-output model in their investigations of influences which determine policy outcomes. Aggregate census data began to be used to reflect environmental characteristics while official revenue and expenditure data became the chief indicators of public policy outputs. As Clarke describes the effects of this change to the systems approach,

> The most interesting and, for some, unsettling finding to emerge from these studies is that policy outcomes are most closely associated with the environmental rather than the political characteristics of the units of analysis. This finding, of course, is at odds with the substantial body of community research which preceded the output studies. Both the case study and community power literature focused on decision-making structures and thus in those studies dealing specifically with the determinants of public policies, political process variables were found to be exceedingly important.[2]

As suggested by Clarke, a number of recent studies employing the systems approach have concluded that policy outcomes are most closely associated with environmental rather than political characteristics of the units of analysis. These include:

- Dawson and Robinson's 1963 examination of the relationship between interparty competition and welfare

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[1] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

[2] James W. Clarke, "Urban Policy Output Models," a paper presented to the American Society for Public Administration Conference (Philadelphia, April 7-8, 1970), p. 6 (mimeo).

policies[1] as evidenced by a group of state tax and expenditure measures which the authors labeled "welfare orientation." Although Dawson and Robinson found that interparty competition, as an indicator of the political system, was related to welfare orientation in the states, this relationship fails to persist when controls for per capita income are introduced.

- Hofferbert's 1966 analysis[2] which refined the definition of welfare orientation used by Dawson and Robinson and added a number of political system indicators. Hofferbert's results, which tended to confirm the findings of Dawson and Robinson, showed no independent impact on welfare policies for any of the political variables considered.

- Dye's 1966 study[3] of the influence of urbanization, industrialization, income and education and the political variables of interparty competition, voter participation, and malapportionment on a variety of expenditure and tax measures. Dye's findings were that for forty-seven of fifty-four tax and expenditure measures, socio-economic variables had

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[1]Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, XXV (1963) 265-289.

[2]Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966), 73-82.

[3]Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

more influence on policy outcomes than did political variables.[1]

In contrast to the foregoing, Sharkansky's 1968 analysis[2] of state government expenditures tends to support the earlier arguments that politics or political systems are the key to policy outputs. These findings are supported by those of James Q. Wilson[3] and Duane Lockard.[4]

In the controversy over the nature of public policy determinants there exists yet another set of recent aggregate studies. These point to a middle ground where there lies no single answer to the question of whether the socio-economic or the political variables of the American states has the greater impact on policy outputs:

- Sharkansky and Hofferbert,[5] who dealt with factors and not with isolated variables in their investigation of which dimensions of policy respond to what dimensions of politics and economics, found that different social and

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[1]For a more complete discussion of this literature see Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," Journal of Politics 30 (May 1968), 510-538.

[2]Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

[3]James Q. Wilson, City Politics and Public Policy (New York: Wiley, 1968), Chapter 1.

[4]Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver Garceau (ed.), Political Research and Political Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 190-220.

[5]Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit.

economic characteristics have different relevance for policies, and their relevance varies between substantive areas of policy. The authors stress the importance of the multidimensionality in state economics, politics and public policy.

- Cnudde and McCrone,[1] who employed causal inference techniques to investigate the impact of party competition on the struggle between the "haves" and the "have nots," conclude, as Key might have predicted,[2] that different models are required for the explanation of different policies.

- Clarke,[3] who investigated the correlates of charter-reform activity in forty-three third-class cities in Pennsylvania between 1957 and 1966, reported:

> What this analysis has demonstrated is not that environmental variables are unimportant, but rather that their importance must be assessed in combination with relevant and meaningful political variables; that is, political process variables which are often recognized but rarely included in comparative urban research.[4]

Of particular usefulness to this investigation is the work of David Easton and Thomas R. Dye concerning the use

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[1] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 858-866.

[2] V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 307.

[3] James W. Clarke, "Environment, Process and Policy: a Reconsideration," American Political Science Review, LXIII (December, 1969), 1172-1182.

[4] Ibid., p. 1182.

of systems models in the analysis of the policy process. The findings of Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert are used extensively as a systems model is applied to law enforcement planning as an example of the state-level policy process.

In view of the fact that police power in the United States is reserved to the States, it can be argued that State policy on law enforcement has been in existence since the birth of the nation. The implication here is that the mere formalization of the law enforcement planning process for the purpose of obtaining Federal funding assistance does not constitute the formation of policy. However, the thrust of the legislation which authorizes Federal assistance for law enforcement at both the state and local levels is toward the improvement of all criminal justice functions--police, prosecution, judicial, correctional (penal), probation, and parole--with emphasis on state-wide planning and coordination. Thus, while the state-wide law enforcement planning process does represent formalization of policy, it can be argued that an element of policy formation must necessarily take place.

The foregoing suggests that in somewhat parallel fashion the national effort to standardize the accounting of criminal activity and to quantify the effectiveness of law enforcement by the computation of "clearance rates," represents a formalization of both crime reporting and of law enforcement efforts.

Research Design

An excellent opportunity for comparative analysis of the policy process is provided by the American States, each having a common institutional framework and function within the same federal system. The fact that all States share the same national language, symbols and history facilitates comparison, as does uniformity in the division of authority within each state between executive, legislative and judicial branches. As Dye observes, "This background of institutional and cultural uniformity in the American states makes it easier to isolate causal factors in our analysis of public policy outcomes."[1]

In this analysis of one policy process we seek to determine how state social and economic factors are associated with political system differences in the influencing of statewide law enforcement planning. The general hypothesis of this study is that law enforcement planning at the state level is influenced to an important degree by the social, economic and political characteristics of each state. Three propositions are implicit in this hypothesis.

1. That although the American States are alike in many respects, as noted above, there exists in each State a unique combination of social, economic and political characteristics.

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[1]Dye, op. cit., p. 11.

2. This combination of characteristics interacts with the state's pattern of criminal activity to produce a distinctive criminal justice system and style of law enforcement.

3. State-wide planning for law enforcement, or the administration of criminal justice, is influenced by those elements described in the first two propositions.

Under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, state-wide law enforcement planning is funded chiefly by the Federal government for the purpose of improving the administration of criminal justice state-by-state throughout the United States in order to better control criminal activity. Three types of criminal activity are specifically mentioned by the Congress as being in need of control emphasis: street crime, organized crime, and civil disorders and riots.[1]

The approach used in this investigation consists of two main phases: 1) an aggregate analysis of the interrelationships between the various social, economic and political characteristics of each state; and 2) the application of the aggregate analysis findings in which the hypotheses developed are tested for validity and usefulness. Throughout this analysis a system model comparable to that used by Dye in his study of public policy outcomes in the American States is employed.[2]

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[1]U.S., Congress, House, The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, H.R. 5037, Title I.

[2]Dye, op. cit., Chapter I.

Our conceptualization is taken from the work of David Easton.[1] The essential variables of political life, according to Easton, include a capability to allocate values for a society, and to induce most members to accept these allocations as binding, at least most of the time. Applying a systems concept, political life can be viewed as that complex set of processes through which demands and support from the environment, called "inputs," are converted into authoritative policies, decisions and implementing actions which are called "outputs."

Political life forms an open system,[2] one that has been analytically separated from other social systems and is therefore exposed to influences from the other systems in which it is imbedded. That political systems do survive is an indication that they have made adaptive responses to buffetings from their environment. In this adaptive process political systems accumulate large repertories of mechanisms through which they seek to cope with their environments.

In Easton's conceptualization, the effects of environmental influences are transmitted into the political system in the form of two major input indicators: demands and support. These are the key indicators of the way that

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[1]The description of the political system which follows is based on Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., pp. 17-29.

[2]As defined by Easton, a system is any set of variables regardless of the degree of interrelationship among them. This definition avoids the argument of whether a political system is or is not really a system.

environmental influences and conditions modify and shape the operations of the political system. Comparable to these inputs the consequences flowing from the behavior of the members of the system, as evidenced by their decisions and implementing actions, are called outputs. The significance of outputs is not only that they influence events in the broader society of which the political system is a part, but that in so doing they help to determine each succeeding round of inputs that finds its way into the political system. This is accomplished through a feedback loop, which includes the production of outputs by the authorities, a response on the part of the members of the society with respect to these outputs, the communication of information about this response to the authorities, and possible succeeding actions on the part of the authorities.

In short, Easton's interpretation of the political process is that of a continuous and interlinked flow of behavior which takes in demands and support as they are shaped in the environment and produces something out of them called "outputs" which return to haunt the system.

In his discussion of model-building for policy research, Dye refers to the responses of the political system as policy outcomes viewing them as the "value commitments of the political system, and as such they are the chief output of that system."[1] Easton emphasizes that we must "distinguish

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[1]Dye, op. cit., p. 4.

the outputs from their consequences or what we may call, their outcomes," because, "Failure to do this would lead us to consider the infinite chain of effects that might flow from an authoritative allocation as part and parcel of that allocation."[1] Easton's terminology has been adopted in this regard since the effects of the policy process with which we are concerned in this analysis are those authoritative decisions concerning the allocation of resources for criminal justice functions; this inquiry does not seek to determine the effect of the outputs.

The systems model which we have developed for this investigation is illustrated in Figure 1. It provides for the grouping of state indicators in three main divisions: environmental inputs, the political system, and policy outcomes. Within our model particular attention is focused on the crime environment of each state and on governmental efforts to control certain types of criminal activity. These efforts are measured primarily by comparison of interstate differences in expenditures of public funds for criminal justice functions. The policy outcomes of primary interest are those related to law enforcement planning under the Safe Streets Act.[2] Specifically we are interested here in the interstate variances in the allocation of Federal block grant funds for

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[1] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 351.

[2] Public Law 90-351, op. cit., Title I.




Figure 1.--Systems Model

fiscal year 1970, the latest year for which allocation data is available.

Phase One--Aggregate Analysis

In Chapters III, IV and V, which follow, each of variables to be considered is described in terms of its relationship to other variables within the same division or subdivision. In several instances groups of variables are subjected to factor analysis in order to reduce the number dealt with and to thereby achieve a degree of parsimony. As the relationships among certain variables become relatively clear, hypotheses are developed--to be tested later.

Two types of indicators are dealt with during the aggregate analysis. The first type are indicators of single state characteristics, such as "population increase" or "contributions claimed." The second type are multi-characteristic factors which either have been derived by other investigators or by the author using factor analysis techniques. In the case of the single-characteristic indicators the most recent complete data available from years 1967 through 1969 are used. The multi-characteristic factors are generally reflective of conditions existing in the late 1950's.

Although this study does not seek to explain differences in patterns or intensity of criminal activity, such differences are important to our systems approach, for they comprise an important aspect of the "environment" dealt with by state law enforcement planning agencies. For this reason,

indicators of reported criminal activity are used to measure the "crime environment" of each state. It is recognized that there occurs an unknown volume of criminal activity not accounted for by the data available. This "unknown" does not detract from the analysis, however, because this inquiry is concerned with the influence of reported crime rates on the allocation of resources to the several major components of the criminal justice system.

Limitations

It is appropriate here to set forth the limitations of the research upon which this report is based, and to indicate those factors not analyzed which are important to a full understanding of interstate variances in the administration of criminal justice. Sharkansky and Hofferbert set the scene for this discussion by observing that:

> The effort to explain why politics and policies differ from one state to the next may be helped considerably by examining the dimensions laying beneath readily measured variables. But no amount of archival search and factor analysis will account for the contributions made to the institutions of policies of individual states by dynamic personalities or the force of strong traditions. The study of elite and organizational behavior, plus exploration of the values that prevail in the cultural environments of the individual states may be essential for a thorough understanding of inter-state differences in politics and public policy.[1]

One method by which an investigation of this nature can arrive at a foregone conclusion is through a strategy of omission, either in the selection of data used, or in

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[1] Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1969, op. cit., p. 879.

interpretation of the results of the analysis. In this study no strategy of omission has been consciously employed. This is not to imply that all possible factors have been considered, but only that failure to include important indicators which might increase the explanatory power of our theoretical models, or the accuracy of the operational models, can be attributed to limitations in two areas: the resources and skill of this researcher, and the availability, reliability and currency of the data used.

Concerning the first of these limitation areas, with added resources and skills it would have been feasible to analyze in greater detail the fiscal 1970 allocation decisions of the forty-eight[1] state law enforcement planning agencies (SPA's) and to have provided a different, and perhaps more suitable, breakdown of these allocations. In short, limitations in this area have affected primarily the flexibility with which the outputs of the law enforcement planning process are analyzed.

Other data limitations which have constrained the research design adopted for this study can be attributed to factors other than the researcher's limitations. The accuracy of the criminal justice expenditure data, for example, is dependent on the response of state and local government to surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The first of

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[1]Hawaii and Alaska are not included in this study because data is not available for these two states with regard to several of the socio-economic and political variables dealt with.

these surveys to include estimates of local government expenditures for criminal justice functions was not available to the public until published in December, 1970. Since there exist no comparable reports for periods prior to fiscal 1968-1969 (contained in the 1970 report), it is unfeasible to derive any trends in criminal justice expenditures that include the most important category--local government expenditures.

Historical data concerning allocations of block grant funds prior to fiscal year 1970 is limited to that for fiscal year 1969 in which only $29 million was allocated by the SPA's of all fifty states. Since the total allocated in fiscal 1970 was about $185 million, or 6.4 times that of the previous year, no attempt was made to derive any trends over the brief period covered (1969 and 1970). With regard to the allocations of the fiscal 1970 funds, it is assumed that the actual spending of Federal law enforcement assistance funds has been in accordance with the 1970 plans. This assumption is adequate since the thrust of this investigation is to investigate factors influencing allocation decisions by SPA's, and not the outcome or effects of such decisions.

The fact that the available crime statistics pertain only to the seven serious crimes, so designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as those most likely to be reported to the police, constitutes another limitation of this study. Since these seven offenses are most often committed

by the poor, the black, and the young, the effect of concentrating on these offenses is to slant this investigation away from consideration of "middle class" or "white collar" crime which, admittedly, are classes of crime far less likely to be reported to police authorities.

Finally in this brief summary of data limitations, it is important to note that the data upon which several of the primary indicators (those derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert) are based is that of about 1960. The changes experienced by the American states during the past ten years necessarily renders these indicators less accurate than is desirable.

Phase Two--Application

The second phase of this study, presented in Chapter VII, consists of the application of the aggregate analysis findings. Retaining the framework of the systems model, a total of six operational models are constructed using the findings of the aggregate analysis and, where appropriate, incorporating some indicators of state characteristics which were not identified as being predominant during the aggregate analysis phase.

The six models are then tested through application to data representative of the forty-eight states. In this process, those sets of state characteristics most often associated with interstate variances in governmental response to

the problem of crime control and the maintenance of order are identified.

In addition to providing a vehicle for the evaluation of our aggregate analysis, the application phase serves to identify particular states wherein the governmental response or output in the administration of criminal justice cannot be explained satisfactorily by the models employed. In these instances the need for a more detailed analysis which looks at factors not dealt with in this study becomes evident.

Hopefully, the application phase will refine and sharpen our understanding of how changes in one area of society, including changes in patterns of criminal activity and in style of law enforcement, tend to influence changes in other areas of the society.

Chapter VIII, which concludes this report, summarizes the chief findings of the inquiry and discusses some of the unanswered questions related to law enforcement planning in the American States.

We turn now to the initial descriptive chapter of this report dealing with the origins, purposes and issues related to the 1968 Safe Streets Act.

CHAPTER II

THE SAFE STREETS ACT: ORIGINS, PURPOSES, ISSUES

Title I of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is known as the Safe Streets Act. It is precedent-setting in two ways: 1) it provides for the first Federally-funded national effort to improve all aspects of criminal justice administration at both the state and local governmental levels; and 2) it is the first major program of Federal assistance to be enacted with a "block grant" funding provision wherein decisions on the allocation of Federal funds are made primarily at the State level.

This chapter introduces the concept of Federal law enforcement assistance and examines the main issues raised thereby. The purpose is to provide a background upon which the reader can evaluate the analysis of social, economic and political-system interrelationships presented in the chapters which follow.

Purposes of the Safe Streets Act

Upon signing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 on June 19, President Johnson explained

that he was approving the legislation in spite of serious reservations about certain provisions,[1] because "it responds to one of the most urgent problems in America today--the problem of fighting crime in the local neighborhood and on the city street."[2] Less than a month earlier, on May 23rd, after the Senate voting on the Omnibus Crime Control Act was concluded, Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem.) of Montana, rose to say,

> Mr. President, with a loud and clear voice the Senate has said, "Let us reverse the growing crime rate; let us give our law-enforcement officers the help and assistance they need." The cry of "crime in the streets" is not by any means a false alarm; it exists and it is about time the Congress faced the issue squarely. With the passage of this measure, the Senate has responded. I think this entire body may be proud of such an achievement.[3]

The foregoing rhetoric describes the purposes of the Safe Streets Act in rather broad terms and reflects the mood of the Congress. More specifically, the purposes of the Act are set forth in Title I of public law 90-351 as follows:

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[1]The President called on the Congress to repeal Title III which provides for the use of wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques by law enforcement agencies. For analysis and criticism of this and other Titles of the Omnibus Crime Control Act see Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), and Adam C. Breckenridge, Congress Against the Court (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).

[2]From the text of President Johnson's remarks upon signing the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, published in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 28, 1968, pp. 1632-33.

[3]Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 1968, 14799.

1. To encourage States and units of general local government to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans based upon their evaluation of State and local problems of law enforcement.[1]
2. To authorize grants to State and units of local government in order to improve and strengthen law enforcement; and
3. To encourage research and development directed toward improvement of law enforcement and the development of new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals.

Roots of the Safe Streets Act

The 1963 report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice is generally credited as being the source of the 1968 Safe Streets Act. The Attorney General's Committee was headed by Francis A. Allen, Dean of the University of Michigan Law School. The Committee's report demonstrated that the effects of poverty on crime were far greater than any had suspected.[2] On March 8, 1963, President Kennedy sent to Congress a bill incorporating the Allen Committee's recommendations, which

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[1]The term "law enforcement" as used in the Safe Streets Act, was initially defined as meaning "all activities pertaining to crime prevention or reduction and enforcement of the criminal law." In 1970 this definition was modified to include specific mention of the activities of the criminal courts and related agencies, corrections, probation and parole authorities, as well as police efforts. Throughout this study we employ the term "law enforcement" as defined in the Safe Streets Act, and reserve the term "police activities" for the more limited meaning, i.e. actions in the criminal-justice process which are preliminary to prosecution for violation of criminal law.

[2]This discussion is based on Richard Harris, "Annals of Legislation: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968," in The New Yorker, Nov. 8, 1969, pp. 131-32.

led to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and the creation of the Office of Criminal Justice within the Department of Justice. This Office was responsible for preparation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965,[1] a $7 million (annual) project which was the forerunner of the 1968 Safe Streets Act.[2]

Under the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the Attorney General was authorized to make grants to, or to contract with, public or private non-profit agencies for projects intended to improve law enforcement and correctional personnel, to increase the ability of state and local agencies to protect persons and property from lawlessness, and to instill greater public respect for the law. The major objective of the 1965 legislation, as described by President Johnson, was to "provide an infusion of ideas and support for research, for experiments, for new programs," and to give the policeman "modern training, organization, and equipment if he is to succeed in saving our cities from the malignancy of crime."[3]

The 1965 Act was administered through the Justice Department's Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), a

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[1]Public Law 89-197, 89th Congress, H.R. 8027, September 22, 1965.

[2]Although the 1965 Act "broke the ice" with regard to Federal law enforcement assistance, the recommendations of the National Crime Commission, to be discussed later, led to the enactment of the 1968 Safe Streets Act.

[3]Statement by President Johnson following the signing of Public Law 89-197, 89th Congress, H.R. 8027, September 22, 1965.

forerunner of the present Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Congress appropriated a total of about $22 million during the three years from 1965 to 1968, or about 52 percent of the total requested by the Attorney General for support of projects under the 1965 Act. As administered by OLEA, about 66 percent of the funds went to projects involving police departments, 15 percent to correctional institutions, 11 percent for crime prevention studies, and 8 percent to courts and prosecution projects.[1] Several of the projects funded by OLEA were directly associated with research and investigations related to the work of the then very active President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Also, some of the earliest OLEA projects were funded to support the staff work of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia.

The results of the 1965 Act, as summarized in the Third Annual Report of the OLEA, were as follows:[2]

- 27 states established new criminal justice planning committees or broadened the activities of previously existing groups;
- 17 states began police science courses and college degree programs;
- 20 states started planning for statewide integrated in-service correctional training systems;
- 33 large cities developed or improved police-community relations programs;

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[1] U.S., Department of Justice, Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress on Activities Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1968), p. 4.

[2] Ibid., pp. 6-25.

-10 medium-sized city and county police departments set up full-time planning and research units.

An indication of the degree of interest in obtaining Federal assistance was reflected in the 1,200 requests from state and local law enforcement agencies totaling more than $85 million as of April, 1968.[1]

The National Crime Commission

One of the outgrowths of events which brought the theme of "law and order" into the national political arena, including Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign emphasis, was the creation in mid-1965 of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the "National Crime Commission"). In establishing this Commission, President Johnson appointed his then Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach as chairman and James Vorenberg, Professor at Harvard Law School, as Executive Director.[2] The President also listed four tasks to which the Commission should address itself:

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[1] Ibid., p. 5.

[2] In addition to chairman Katzenbach, the Commission's membership included: Genevieve Blatt, Charles D. Breitel, Kingman Brewster, Garrett H. Byrne, Thomas J. Cahill, Otis Chandler, Leon Jaworski, Thomas C. Lynch, Ross L. Malone, James B. Parsons, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William P. Rogers, Robert G. Storey, Julia D. Stuart, Robert F. Wagner, Herbert Wechsler, Whitney M. Young, Jr., and Luther W. Youngdahl. In addition to Vorenberg, key members of the Commission's staff included Henry S. Ruth, Jr., deputy director; Gene S. Muehleisen, Elmer K. Nelson, Jr., Lloyd E. Ohlin, and Arthur Rosett, associate directors; David B. Burnham, Bruce J. Terris, Samuel G. Chapman, Howard Ohmart, Vincent O'Leary, and Charles H. Rogovin, assistant directors; and Alfred Blumstein, director of science and technology.

- The problem of making our streets, homes and places of business safer;
- The special problems of juvenile crime;
- The administration of justice in our overcrowded lower courts; and
- The means by which organized crime can be arrested by federal and local authorities.[1]

In the President's view, "No agency of government has ever in our history undertaken to probe so fully and deeply into the problems of crime in our nation."[2]

The National Crime Commission began its work in September, 1965 by concentrating on four major areas: police, courts, corrections, and assessment of the crime problem.[3] Assisted by a number of full-time staff members and consultants and advisers, a panel of Commission members concentrated on each of these areas. Later, special task forces or working groups were formed to give greater attention to organized crime, juvenile delinquency, narcotics and drug abuse, drunkenness, and science and technology.

The full-time staff of the Commission, which in time grew to number more than forty persons, consisted mostly of lawyers, but also included police officials, correctional personnel, prosecutors, sociologists, psychologists, systems

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[1] Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965, p. 1396, reprint of President Johnson's March 8, 1965 message to the Congress on crime.

[2] Ibid.

[3] A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 311-312; hereinafter cited as National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime.

analysts, juvenile delinquency prevention planners, and professional writers and editors.[1] The Commission's overall expenditures during the eighteen-month period has been estimated at approximately $1.4 million.[2]

The Commission obtained its information on the nation's crime problem in a number of ways. Surveys were conducted on police-community relations, professional criminals, unreported crime, and correctional personnel and facilities (the latter two being the first nation-wide studies ever made in those areas). Over 2,200 police departments were asked by questionnaire what field procedures they had found especially effective against crime (however only 414 departments responded).[3] The Commission also had the benefit of data and suggestions from various governmental agencies at the federal, state and local levels, and from officials in some foreign countries. In addition, professional organizations contributed information in several areas related to crime.

A number of conferences concerning matters such as mentally disordered offenders, riots and their control,

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[1] Ibid., p. 311.

[2] Personal interview June 18, 1971 with Mr. William Caldwell, who served as Administrative Officer (Business) for the National Crime Commission.

[3] National Crime Commission, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 46.

correctional standards, plea bargaining, and the Federal role in crime control were sponsored by the Commission.

The full Commission met seven times, for two or three full days each time. In addition, Commission members participated on a continuing basis in preparing materials and developing the final report which was issued in February, 1967.[1] In its general report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, the Commission called for a revolutionary change "in the way America looks at crime," in addition to "basic changes in the operations of police, schools, prosecutors, employment agencies, defenders, social workers, prisons, housing authorities, and probation and parole officers."[2]

Seven major objectives were adopted by the National Crime Commission as a means of achieving a "significant reduction in crime in America":[3]

> First, society must seek to prevent crime before it happens by assuring all Americans a stake in the benefits and responsibilities of American life, by strengthening law enforcement, and by reducing criminal opportunities.
>
> Second, society's aim of reducing crime would be better served if the system of criminal justice developed a far broader range of techniques with which to deal with individual offenders.

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[1] The complete report consists of the Commission's general report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, plus nine task force reports, all published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1967.

[2] National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, op. cit., p. v.

[3] Ibid., p. vi.

> Third, the system of criminal justice must eliminate existing injustices if it is to achieve its ideals and win the respect and cooperation of all citizens.
>
> Fourth, the system of criminal justice must attract more people and better people--police, prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, probation and parole officers, and corrections officials with more knowledge, expertise, initiative, and integrity.
>
> Fifth, there must be much more operational and basic research into the problems of crime and criminal administration, by those both within and without the system of criminal justice.
>
> Sixth, the police, courts, and correctional agencies must be given substantially greater amounts of money if they are to improve their ability to control crime.
>
> Seventh, individual citizens, civic and business organizations, religious institutions, and all levels of government must take responsibility for planning and implementing the changes that must be made in the criminal justice system if crime is to be reduced.

Each of these major objectives is supported by a number of specific recommendations which spell out the actions required by agencies, institutions and individuals in order to achieve these objectives. The recommendation which is of primary interest in this study, and which led to the 1968 Safe Streets Act, falls under the heading, "What the Federal Government Can Do":

> The Federal Government can make a dramatic new contribution to the national effort against crime by greatly expanding its support of the agencies of justice in the States and in the cities.[1]

The Crime Commission's rationale for Federal support of the magnitude visualized includes the following two arguments: 1) crime is a national, as well as a State and local phenomenon and failure of the criminal justice institutions in one State may endanger the citizens of others.

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[1] Ibid., p. 283.

Additionally, the Federal Government already has assumed much of the responsibility in such fields as education and welfare, employment and job training, housing and mental health, which bear directly on crime and its prevention; 2) there are important needs that individual jurisdictions cannot or should not meet alone in terms of economy of effort and of feasibility such as research, availability of information on criminal matters, and pooling of resources and services among local jurisdictions.[1]

It was clearly the opinion of the National Crime Commission and its staff that Federal assistance must be provided to state and local agencies "if they are to have an opportunity to gain on crime, rather than barely stay abreast of it, as is now the case."[2]

The Commission was well aware of the precedent-setting nature of its recommendations as the following statement indicates:

> In proposing a major Federal program against crime, the Commission is mindful of the special importance of avoiding any invasion of State and local responsibility for law enforcement and criminal justice, and its recommendation is based on its judgment that Federal support and collaboration of the sort outlined below are consistent with scrupulous respect for--and indeed streghtening of--that responsibility.[3]

Supporting this concern for the preservation of local control of law enforcement, the Commission's Task Force on the Police

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[1] Ibid., pp. 284-285. [2] Ibid., p. 284.

[3] Ibid., p. 285.

recommended that state commissions on police standards and training be established and empowered to establish mandatory standards for local police departments. In this manner, the state commission could "help to establish adequate personnel selections standards, to strengthen training procedures, to coordinate recruitment, and to improve the organization and operations of local departments,"[1] without removing control of law enforcement from local agencies.

Evaluating the Crime Commission's Work

In the opinion of many the work of the National Crime Commission is impressive. James Q. Wilson of Harvard University termed the Commission's Report a "landmark event,"[2] while the editor of the Congressional Quarterly Service study Crime and Justice in America described the Commission's work as being "perhaps the most significant development involving the growing Federal role in the crime problem."[3]

In spite of accolades, criticism of the Crime Commission's efforts are by no means lacking. Herbert L. Packer, Professor of Law at Stanford University, is critical of what he terms the "utter failure" of the Commission to come to

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[1]National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 216.

[2]James Q. Wilson, "What Makes a Better Policeman," The Atlantic Magazine, March, 1969, p. 134.

[3]Joseph Foote (ed.), Crime and Justice in America (2nd ed.; Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), p. 3.

grips with the simple proposition that all uses of the criminal sanction are not equal. In Packer's judgment,

> The prospect of spending billions of dollars, as the federal government now seems prepared to do, on improving the capacity of the nation's system of criminal justice to deal with gamblers, narcotics addicts, prostitutes, homosexuals, abortionists, and other producers and consumers of illegal goods and services would be seen for the absurdity that it is if we were not so inured to similar spectacles. Our national talent runs much more to "how-to-do-it" than to "what-to-do."[1]

As noted earlier, the Crime Commission's Report calls for major and fundamental change. However in the opinion of Isidore Silver, the Commission fails to propose the "significant reshaping of our institutions" demanded by the call for fundamental change.[2] This criticism is in accord with the observations of Albert K. Cohen who contends that some of our seemingly localized and uncomplicated problems may be incapable of solution within the framework of existing institutions.[3]

Another important omission of the National Crime Commission, according to Silver, is that it did not raise such fundamental questions as the nature of "crime," the nature of

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[1]Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 366.

[2]Isidore Silver, "Crime and Punishment: Analysis of Report," Commentary, March, 1968, p. 73. See also Warren Lehman, "Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Michigan Law Review 66, No. 7 (May, 1968), 1487-1540.

[3]Albert K. Cohen, "Multiple Factor Approaches," in Marvin E. Wolfgang, Leonard Savitz, Norman Johnston, eds., The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 79.

the "criminal," or the nature of the society that fosters them. Instead, says Silver, "the report simply tends to assume that crime is an alien phenomenon, a disease of society."[1]

Issues Influencing Passage of the Safe Streets Act

The enactment of the 1968 Safe Streets Act was influenced by four central issues. One of these issues is that of "law-and-order," the 1964 revival of which stimulated pressure for greater involvement by the Federal Government in crime control.[2] This pressure prompted a second issue--the controversy over the tradition of local control of law enforcement.[3] These two issues led to a third--that of the block grant funding provision with its promise of increased state control of all criminal justice functions. A fourth issue stems from the generally unstated assumption, implicit in both the national Crime Commission's Report and in the

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[1] Silver, op. cit., p. 69.

[2] Writing in mid-1969, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, who served as chairman of the National Crime Commission, comments: "When President Johnson appointed his Crime Commission to study and make recommendations to him on the 'challenge of crime,' he did so in the consciousness of a growing fear of crime and a growing political issue. His hope was that this group of well-known citizens with the highest quality of professional help could depoliticize the problem. Despite the thoroughness of its study, the unanimity of its views, the concreteness of its recommendations, it failed in this purpose." (Introduction to Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit., p. 10.

[3] This is not to suggest that the tradition of local control of law enforcement is limited to the United States. A number of other Western democracies also observe this tradition, one notable exception being France.

Congressional hearings, that there exist certain "causes" of crime, the identification of which is important to any improvement in the control of crime.

The Law-and-Order Issue

While the roots of the Safe Streets Act can be traced to the 1963 report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, it was the 1964 revival[1] of the law-and-order issue in national politics that enriched the political climate and stimulated the outcropping of a major Federal program of financial assistance to state and local law enforcement.

The law-and-order issue appears to have played a key role in both Presidential and Congressional actions which culminated in the June, 1968 enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. Examples of the influence of the law-and-order issue on the Congress are found in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the anti-crime legislation. For example, Senator Hugh Scott (Rep.) of Pennsylvania, a member of the original U.S. Crime Commission headed by Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, maintained:

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[1]See Robert M. Cipes, The Crime War (New York: New American Library, 1968), p. 13. Cipes contends that the law-and-order issue was quiescent at the national political campaign level between 1928 and 1964. The revival in 1964, claims Cipes, was due to the Republican need for a campaign issue that would arouse the voters without also arousing their anxieties about candidate Barry Goldwater, who succeeded in projecting white anxiety about the Negro into a fear of Negro criminality.

> It should be clear to all that this country has failed in the first order of business--the maintenance of law and order. This failure threatens to rend the very fabric of American life as we know it.[1]

Senator James C. Eastland (Dem.) of Mississippi indicated that he was strongly in favor of Federal financial assistance for local law enforcement agencies, and that in his judgment, "the sharp and steady increase in violent crimes against persons and property, which results in a constantly spiraling rate of crime, constitutes our most serious domestic crisis."[2]

The impact of the law-and-order issue was felt throughout the election year of 1968. President Johnson began the year by sending the Congress a special message on crime. Although he stressed that homicide rates in the late 1960's were lower than in 1930, Vice President Humphrey "campaigned from the assumption that the crime rate is getting out of hand."[3] George Wallace almost always warned his listeners "they might get hit on the head on the way home by a thug who would probably be out of jail before they got out of the hospital."[4] A stock punch line of Mr. Nixon's

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[1]U.S., Congress, Senate, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967, S. Rept. 1097 to accompany S.917, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 209.

[2]Ibid., p. 220.

[3]Fred P. Graham, "A Contemporary History of American Crime," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (eds), Violence in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 486.

[4]Ibid.

all-purpose campaign speech was that "Crime is rising nine times faster than the population."[1]

Underlying the law-and-order issue is the susceptibility of the law to politics, especially in the broad sense in which "politics reflects the prevailing customs and prejudices of the established classes of the society."[2] This makes the law-and-order issue highly attractive to the political candidate who would seek to oust an incumbent opponent by showing that the incumbent is "soft" on crime and criminals. In essence, this amounts to the politicizing of essentially non-political acts when the "crime" involved is not that of illegal political protest.

This politicizing of criminal activity appears to have intensified America's racial crisis with the consequent spontaneous eruption of violence in skirmishes and riots in our Negro ghettoes.[3] This, claims William Stringfellow, "has questioned the function of the police in American society in a most acute form."[4] Employing Murray Edelman's useful concept, it is profitable to view the law-and-order issue as a

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[1] Ibid.

[2] William Stringfellow, "Unresolved Issues in the Allocation of Justice: An Existential View," in James R. Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn, eds., The Politics of Local Justice (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 235.

[3] U.S. Congress, Senate Report 1097, op. cit., takes the position that riots are war regardless of the underlying causes, and that they represent crime in its most aggravated form. (p. 35).

[4] Stringfellow, op. cit.

major "condensation symbol"--one that "evokes the emotions and condensed anxieties, remembrances of past humiliations, and promises of future greatness."[1]

What are the implications for law enforcement planning under the Safe Streets Act of this revival of the law-and-order issue in national politics? At best the revival makes more difficult the bringing about of a change in the way "America looks at crime," which the Crime Commission strongly recommended. At worst, this revival could lead us far down the road to totalitarianism. James Q. Wilson deals with the first of these implications as follows:

> Now that "crime in the streets" has become a major issue, it is probably too much to expect that public officials, sensitive to this popular concern, will be much inclined to encourage police administrators to do better those things the police can do (maintaining order) and look elsewhere (primarily to the correctional agencies) for help in doing those things that the police cannot do (reducing the incidence of those crimes committed by repeaters).[2]

A more serious implication of this revival of the law-and-order issue is described by James B. Kelley:

> If he is defeated this fall, a mayor who has tried to understand the people of the ghetto--who may even feel that they deserve a disproportionate amount of his time because for so long they received no part of anyone's time--will be said to have been defeated because the people want law-and-order.

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[1]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 6.

[2]James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 296.

> The law and order being thus sought is the kind the S.S. troops and the Gestapo brought to Germany.[1]

In close agreement with Kelley, Richard Harris concludes that the law-and-order debate had created in some people more fear about the fear of crime than about crime itself:

> In their view, once the people were sufficiently aroused over the threat of being engulfed by criminality and public disorders, they might be persuaded to set aside their own Constitutional safeguards as the only way to preserve society, and thereby utterly destroy it.[2]

Ramsey Clark, then U.S. Attorney General, observed that "the ironic and profound tragedy threatened by the prevailing fear of violent crime" is that "those who suffer the least would deprive those who suffer most of the very programs that would attack the underlying causes of crime."[3]

The foregoing illustrations point up the ambiguity of the term "law-and-order" and the fact that "law" and "order" are frequently found to be in opposition. As Skolnick explains, "law implies rational restraint upon the rules and procedures utilized to achieve order" while "order" implies the "threat of coercion and summary judgment."[4]

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[1]James B. Kelley, "Law and Order Equals Status Quo?", America, October 18, 1969, p. 326.

[2]Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order, and Freedom in America (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1970), p. 13.

[3]Ibid., p. 28 (Clark is quoted by Harris).

[4]Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 9.

However the law is not as free from ambiguity as Skolnick would have us believe. In his perceptive analysis of the forms and meanings of political language, Murray Edelman finds that legal language is "in fact almost completely ambiguous in meaning." According to Edelman this ambiguity serves a number of purposes. It gives lawyers, judges, and administrators a political and social function, and it facilitates the symbolic satisfaction of reference groups with conflicting interests.[1]

Federal Assistance and Local Control

A second important issue which influenced the enactment of the Safe Streets Act concerns the implications of Federal law enforcement assistance for the traditional principal of local control of law enforcement. While the law-and-order issue provided strong arguments for increased Federal involvement in crime control, some critics saw the proposed direct funding provisions as the first move toward a national police state. In their rationale for block grant funding to state governments versus categorical grants to units of local government, Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott and Thurmond argued:

> It is the purpose of these amendments to insure that federal assistance to state and local law enforcement does not bring with it federal domination and control nor provide the machinery or potential for the establishment of a federal police force. Frankly, we fear that S. 917 without such (block grant) provisions,

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[1]Edelman, op. cit., pp. 130-151.

> could well become the vehicle for the imposition of federal guidelines, restrictions and eventual domination.[1]

The President and his spokesmen stressed repeatedly the importance of the local-control principal, and assured all concerned that the Federal government was interested only in providing assistance, not in taking control.

For purposes of discussion, the principal of local control of law enforcement can be conceived of in three ways:

- As a bulwark against the trend toward a police state, or

- As a defense against the "modernization" thrust in American government, with its emphasis on technical professionalism, or

- As the preserve of personalized government and its corollary, "local justice."

The common element in these conceptions is resistance against greater centralization of power in the Federal Government.

A brief review of the structure of law enforcement agencies in the United States provides a basis for this discussion of the several concepts outlined above. As in most Western democracies, law enforcement in the United States always has been under the control of local units of government. Among the estimated 40,000 police agencies in the United States, there are only 50 law enforcement agencies on the

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[1]U.S. Congress, Senate, Report 1097, op. cit., p. 227.

Federal level, and 200 at the state level.[1] The remaining 39,750 police agencies are at the local level. According to the National Crime Commission's Task Force on the Police, "The great majority of police forces--33,000--are distributed throughout boroughs, towns, and villages."[2]

Several reasons for the extreme decentralization of American law enforcement have been suggested. The most deeply rooted reasons reflect the basic nature of the federal system and the concept of federalism prevalent in American political thought and the Constitution. With certain functions allocated to the central government, with state powers defined negatively by prohibitions and with the remainder of power left to the states as a residual, the criminal justice function in the United States has developed primarily within this residual context. Federal criminal law is not as highly developed as state law; furthermore, there is in concept no federal police force. This tendency is evident in Knudten's reflection on the "traditional reluctance of the American people to give potentially coercive power to a centralized police force."[3] As the National Crime Commission's Task

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[1]National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 7, based on A. C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R. J. Gallanti, Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1966), p. 32.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

[3]Richard D. Knudten, ed., Criminological Controversies (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1968), p. 115.

Force on the Police observed, "because local police departments have traditionally maintained law and order within their jurisdictions and because thousands of violations occur daily in all parts of States, the responsibility for preventing crime has been delegated by States to the local governments in which the violations occur."[1]

Another view of the reasons for the decentralization of American law enforcement is that of Richard Quinney who maintains that "In a sense there are as many systems of law enforcement as there are communities," for "Each police department must operate within a community." This leads to "differences in law enforcement which can be attributed to the concrete social setting in which police operate."[2]

As a bulwark against the police state

The potential of Federal law enforcement assistance to influence a trend toward a national police state, as noted above, was well recognized prior to the enactment of the 1968 Act.

Proponents of the Safe Streets Act repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving the local control of law enforcement. The President's Crime Commission, for example, recognized that the prevention and control of crime is

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[1]National Crime Commission, Task Force on the Police, Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 8.

[2]Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 113.

basically a State and local government responsibility. The Commission urged, however, that crime reduction also be considered a national problem requiring help from the Federal Government.[1]

In his February, 1967 message to the Congress, "Crime in America," President Johnson characterized the Federal Government's overall role as involving stimulation and support rather than control and coercion, promising that "The Federal Government must not and will not try to dominate the system."[2] Attorney General Ramsey Clark testified before both the Senate and House Subcommittees to the effect that "law enforcement is a local responsibility" and that "we would have it no other way."[3]

Members of Congress concurred with the Administration spokesmen on this point. Congresswoman Edna F. Kelly (Dem.) of New York stated, for example:

> I believe the prevention, regulation, and control of crime is and should be a local problem and thus remain under the control of local authorities. However, now that crime has become a nationwide problem it is up to us in Congress to meet the issue head on.[4]

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[1] National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, op. cit., p. 284.

[2] U.S. Congress, Senate, Report 1097, op. cit., p. 29.

[3] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Controling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, on S.300 and 15 other bills, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 148.

[4] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Anti-Crime Program, Hearings, before Subcommittee No. 5, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 1967, p. 282.

Senator Hiram L. Fong (Rep.) of Hawaii stressed that the Constitution "confers no general police power on the Federal Government." "The denial of such power," said the Senator, "is soundly predicated on the fear that a too-powerful central government will become despotic."[1]

As defense against modernization

As seen by Matthew Holden, Jr., the Crime Commission's emphasis on making uniform the criteria of public order "may appropriately be seen as a part of a broad 'modernization' thrust in American government."[2] This, says Holden, is part of a historical trend toward "increasing the capabilities of government to control inter-personal violence and illegal transactions in property."[3] As a result of this modernization thrust, with its emphasis on technical professionalism, the personnel of law enforcement agencies will have a heightened sense of common interest and will be drawn into national politics as a lobby by virtue of their professional interest in the subject."[4] Holden's main concern is with an expected growth in electronic surveillance into non-criminal matters in a way such that fundamental changes in the operations of the polity may be anticipated."[5]

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[1] Individual views of Senator Fong, Senate Report 1097, op. cit., p. 179.

[2] Matthew Holden, Jr., "Politics, Public Order, and Pluralism," in Klonosky and Mendelsohn, The Politics of Local Justice, op. cit., p. 252.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 253.

While not as sinister as the implications of widespread electronic surveillance, it appears that efforts to improve the coverage and accuracy of crime statistics, under the direction of the FBI (or any other agency that might be assigned to the task) holds a "spill-over" potential of important dimensions. As Alvin W. Gouldner points out, "information-gathering systems . . . always premise the existence and use of some system of social control."[1] The voluntary system of reporting criminal activity administered by the FBI now finds about 8,500 jurisdictions in the fifty American states cooperating by submitting data.[2] This system has the potential for influencing many law enforcement agencies that is perhaps unrecognized. Because the FBI makes public the percent of various crimes that are "cleared" by the nation's major police departments, the quality of the reports submitted to the FBI should be of interest and importance to most police administrators.

Thus, the collection of crime statistics has the potential of influencing the operation of our "locally controlled" police departments. Any significant improvement in the degree of accuracy of the voluntary Uniform Crime

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[1]Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 50.

[2]U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 52; hereinafter cited as FBI, Uniform Crime Reports.

Reporting System[1] seems to portend important implications for increased social control.

As the preserver of personalized government

In a third view, the principal of local control of law enforcement is seen as the preserver of personalized government, and of a style of "local justice" that opposes individualism and subverts the concepts of contractual relations and constitutionalism in the opinion of Robert C. Wood.[2] The small towns for which the multitude of American police departments provide varying degrees of police protection are frequently credited with supporting a milieu in which the American aims of equality and liberty are best secured. However, according to Wood, the proudly displayed equality of the American small town operates in an anti-individualistic way. It liberates only when the individual is part of the majority, says Wood. "When he dissents, equality is as likely to display as intolerant a disdain for private opinion as does the autocratic state."[3] The most significant political feature of the town protected by the small

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[1]Under this national voluntary system each contributing law enforcement agency is wholly responsible for compiling its own crime reports and is supplied with Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, published by the FBI which outlines in detail procedures for scoring and classifying offenses.

[2]This discussion is taken from Robert C. Wood, "Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics," in Klonoski and Mendelsohn, The Politics of Local Justice, op. cit., pp. 56-63.

[3]Ibid., p. 58.

police department is, in Wood's terms, "the frequency with which legal and procedural requirements are overlooked and ignored." The smaller the town, the more justice is a matter of personal opinion in the community itself, "rarely formalized, rarely examined, rarely permanently established, depending on the sentiment of the moment."[1]

This "personalized government" can be both effective and beneficial. The small-town way of life and the sense of fraternity it fosters has definite advantages, including the promise of security in a group of like persuasion, the fostering of a sense of belongingness, the bolstering of faltering egos, and the banishment of an awful sense of loneliness, observes Wood. But it also moves counter to the tradition of law and constitutionalism. The notion of contractual relations is replaced by the reality of personal relations, who belongs and who does not.

The future of local control

Although the stated purpose of the Federal Government's action to provide assistance to state and local law enforcement, implementation of the Safe Streets Act suggests strong emphasis on coordination among law enforcement agencies within each state under the doctrine of comprehensive planning. Emphasis is placed on treating the several phases of the criminal justice process as a "system," and on the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

need for improved "coordination" of all law enforcement functions.

While the traditional principal of local control is preserved in writing, the emphasis outlined above plus the delegation to state government of the authority to allocate Federal funds under the block-grant provision, may, in time, shift at least part of the control of law enforcement from the local to the state level. As Edelman suggests, "It is not uncommon to give the rhetoric to one side and the decision to the other."[1]

Although not wholly attributable to Federal assistance under the Safe Streets Act, the recent development of computerized law enforcement information systems at the state level is an indication of the type of increased control by state government that we foresee. The most recent Uniform Crime Reports,[2] published in August, 1970, for example, announces a second step in the development of a national system of police statistics: the FBI ceased the collection of data directly from municipalities and counties in New Jersey and California. The Uniform Crime Reports for these two states are now obtained from the New Jersey State Police and the California Department of Justice, respectively. As the statewide programs for the collection of crime statistics develop in other states, they too will be channeling crime reports

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[1]Edelman, op. cit., p. 39.

[2]FBI, Uniform Crime, Reports, 1969, op. cit., p. 50.

to the FBI, provided that their programs conform to the national Uniform Crime Reports standards.[1]

Federal Assistance in the Form of Block Grants

A third issue of importance to the passage of the Safe Streets Act concerns the method of allocating Federal funds appropriated for law enforcement assistance.

Conceptually, the provision of Federal funds to state and local governments can be viewed as one device by which the national government seeks to influence the balance of program levels in states and cities.[2] That is, through grants-in-aid the nature of those trade-offs that a sub-national government sees as available to it in program development are altered. Thus, with appropriate design, the apparent budget constraints are adjusted in a manner that leads the state or city to "develop programs of national concern while at the same time pursuing its own best interests."[3]

Once the basic decision to render federal financial assistance to state and/or local governments for any purpose has been made, then questions arise concerning the method of disbursement and the limitations of purpose for which the

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[1] Ibid. Ten conditions for state participation are outlined here.

[2] Based on Selma J. Mushkin and John F. Cotton, Functional Federalism: Grants-in-Aid and PPB Systems (Washington, D.C.: State-Local Finances Project of the George Washington University, 1968).

[3] Ibid., p. 35.

federal funds may be used. In 1949 the first Hoover Commission urged that "a system of grants be established upon broad categories--such as highways, education, public assistance, and public health--as contrasted with the present system of extensive fragmentation."[1] In the two decades which followed, this recommendation was virtually ignored as the number of categorical programs continued to increase.[2]

Indications of Congressional disenchantment with the categorical grant approach became evident with the 1966 passage of the Partnership for Health Act[3] in which a dozen specific categorical grants were combined into a single grant for comprehensive public health service.

As submitted to the Congress by President Johnson in early 1967, the Safe Streets Act continued the pattern of direct, categorical grants, with state governments treated on the same basis as their more populus political subdivisions. The Administration's rationale for bypassing the states in dealing with large cities was founded on the view that most

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[1]Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Overseas Administration, Federal-State Relations, Federal Research, Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 31-32.

[2]See U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), I:165.

[3]Public Law 89-749. In addition the Social Security Act amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-248) consolidated a number of sections of the Social Security Act dealing with child health, thereby permitting greater state control over the selection of projects to be funded.

states lacked experience in all phases of law enforcement, especially in providing police protection in urban areas, and had spent considerably less than their local jurisdictions for this purpose.

The original version of the Safe Streets Act provided that only those localities having an individual or combined population of 50,000 or more would be eligible for Federal grants. This would serve to limit the number of direct federal-local contacts, and would encourage inter-local cooperation and coordination in applications for law enforcement assistance funds. The role of the state, as described by Attorney General Ramsey Clark, would be concerned primarily with planning for improvement of corrections and courts, and should not involve local law enforcement--other than in setting state-wide standards, and in providing training opportunities for local police in small jurisdictions.[1]

In spite of the Administration's efforts to retain the categorical and direct grant methods, the House of Representatives on August 8, 1967, approved, by a vote of 256 to 147[2] a "block grant" amendment to the Safe Streets Act offered by Representative William T. Cahill (Rep.) of New Jersey. This amendment provided that seventy-five percent

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[1]U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Anti-Crime Program Hearings, p. 36.

[2]Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., August 8, 1967, 21859-60.

of the law enforcement assistance action funds be awarded to state governments, with a mandatory "pass through" of at least fifty percent to units of local government. The remaining twenty-five percent would constitute a discretionary fund for use by the Attorney General in law enforcement assistance. On May 23, 1968 the Senate, by a vote of 48 to 29[1] accepted a similar amendment offered by Senator Everett M. Dirksen (Rep.) of Illinois. The major change of the Dirksen amendment increased the block grant portion from 75 percent to 85 percent and the "pass through" percentage from 50 percent to 75 percent. Two weeks later, without resorting to a conference committee, the House adopted a resolution agreeing to the Senate's amendment.[2]

Arguments employed by advocates of the block grant funding method have been summarized by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as follows:

> They claimed that a Federal-State-local partnership in the program was the most effective strategy for fighting crime in the streets since courts and correctional institutions, as well as police departments, required upgrading. This was also the most efficient way to administer Federal aid, they asserted, because States were more aware of urgent local problems than the Federal Government and they could better apply funds to meet these needs, thereby avoiding waste, duplication, and nationwide competition for Federal dollars. Block grants were also considered to be an appropriate means of reinforcing traditional federal principles and of braking

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[1] Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 1968, 14711.

[2] Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., June 6, 1968, 16271-300.

> the escalation of "creeping federalism" to "galloping federalism."[1]

The strong majority by which the block grant amendments to the Safe Streets Act were approved in both the House and the Senate suggests that the Congress was quite willing to delegate control of federal law enforcement assistance funds to the states, and to keep the LEAA staff relatively small. For example, Congressman John J. Rooney (Dem.) of New York, chairman of the appropriations subcommittee reviewing LEAA's proposed budget took the position that the agency could function with "six persons and a checkwriter."[2] However, while the Congress may limit the federal role, it also holds federal officials accountable for expenditures at the state level.

In his review of block grant funding under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, Douglas Harman stresses the importance of the cross pressure generated by state and local public interest groups.[3]

> The representatives of the cities have a vested interest in proving that the bloc grant approach fails to achieve

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[1]U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Making the Safe Streets Act Work (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June, 1970), p. 15, based on Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 1968, 14751-71.

[2]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, The Judiciary and Related Agencies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1040.

[3]Douglas Harman, "The Bloc Grant: Readings from a First Experiment," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (March/April, 1970), 141-153.

> meaningful results and does not direct funds to the cities. The representatives of the states wish to demonstrate that the bloc grant has been a successful experiment.[1]

Accordingly, the National Governors' Conference has devoted a great deal of attention to the administration of law enforcement assistance, while the National League of Cities and other organizations representing the interests of the nation's largest cities have been critical of the way that the block grant funds have been distributed.[2]

Harman points out that the federal government's role in law enforcement assistance remains strong because of the pressures of Congress and urban organizations, even though the block grant concept was intended to reduce federal control and transfer responsibilities to state governments.[3] Harman also observes that intergovernmental competition has resulted from the block grant method, and that controversy surrounding this program has been "particularly acute because the greatest crime problems are found in central cities, and the block grant is not an administrative device capable of funneling large amounts of money directly into cities."[4] Harman's conclusion is that,

> If Congress had intended to develop a system of aiding the large cities with serious crime problems, a direct, categorical grant system would have been appropriate.

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[1] Ibid., p. 143.

[2] See Harman, op. cit., pp. 143-144 for further discussion of the state-versus-city controversy.

[3] Ibid., p. 146.

[4] Ibid., p. 152.

> In this instance, Congress has another principal objective: the transfer of grant-in-aid powers to state governments and the promotion of interjurisdictional law enforcement planning. . . .
>
> In the final analysis, the ability of state governments to apportion funds wisely and to respond to urban needs will determine the success or failure of the bloc grant.[1]

That the block grant method has been at least partially successful can be argued on the basis of President Nixon's recent message to the Congress urging the sharing of revenues for purposes of fighting crime. On March 2, 1971 the President proposed the first of his six Special Revenue Sharing programs which would require "no matching funds, no maintenance of effort, no prior project approval and, within the six broad areas, recipients would have the authority to spend these funds on programs which are of the highest priority to them."[2] The program proposed on March 2, 1971, is designed to assist states and cities in meeting their problems in the area of law enforcement. The President supported his program in this area with the following statement:

> This program is based on the assumption that those who bear responsibility at the State and local level are best qualified to identify their enforcement problems, and to set the priorities and develop the means to solve these problems. It is designed particularly to encourage and provide for experimentation and innovation in the search for more effective solutions to the crime problem. With less assistance each State has developed, in partnership with local governments, a comprehensive

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 5, 1971, p. 540.

> statewide approach to improving law enforcement and reducing crime. . . .
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> I think it is clear that LEAA has assumed a vital and effective role in this area of Federal, State and local concern. But, I believe it can must be made more effective.[1]

The Causes of Crime

The fourth issue to be considered here concerns the implicit assumption dominating the work of the Crime Commission and the action of the Congress on the Safe Streets Act: that it is possible to identify certain "causes" of crime, and that this identification is important to the control of crime.

Some observers question this assumption. Morris and Hawkins, for example, argue that there are "no more causes of crime than there are causes of human behavior."[2] In their opinion, any search for crime causation is essentially illusory, "not unlike the 18th century chemists' search for the elusive hypothetical sybstance, phlogiston . . . the principle of fire and the cause of combustibility in all inflammable bodies."[3]

This view is in line with that of the nineteenth century French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, who argued that crime is both normal and necessary to society. "Crime is

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 47.

[3] Ibid., p. 45.

normal," said Durkheim, "provided that it attains and does not exceed, for each social type, a certain level, which it is perhaps not impossible to fix in conformity with the preceding rules."[1] Durkheim continues:

> To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall also be possible. One does not occur without the other.
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> . . . Crime implies not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine the form they will take.
>
> . . . Crime, for its part, must no longer be conceived as an evil that cannot be too much suppressed. There is no occasion for self-congratulation when the crime rate drops noticeably below the average level, for we may be certain that this apparent progress is associated with some social disorder.[2]

Restating Durkheim, Isidore Silver maintains that,

> Americans will have to accept the inevitability of a certain amount of crime despite even a maximal effort to suppress it. Crime is endemic to a rapidly changing Society, and America has always been precisely that.[3]

Other concepts of crime causation are too numerous for detailed consideration,[4] however, there are three

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[1]Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), excerpt from pp. 65-73 reprinted in Marvin E. Wolfgang, Leonard Savitz, and Norman Johnston (eds), The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 10.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Isidore Silver, in "Afterword" to Crime Commission's general report, Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 787.

[4]See Martin R. Haskell and Lewis Yablonsky, Crime

perspectives on the cause of crime which merit our attention at this time: 1) the "cause of crime" is the law itself; 2) defective human nature causes most crime; and 3) crime is the result of societal defects.

The first of these perspectives was well stated by Robert MacIver about thirty years ago when he argued that "it is vain to seek the causes of crime as such."

> Crime is a legal category. The only thing that is alike in all crimes is that they are alike violations of law. In that sense, the only cause of crime as such is the law itself.[1]

Recently, Richard Quinney has extended and updated MacIver's argument by contending that crime is a political construct. Certain activities are defined as criminal, says Quinney, by those persons in positions of power as a means of protecting their interests. This view, that criminal law stems from the conflict of interests of different groups,[2] is regarded by Sutherland and Cressey as correctly describing a part of the process of law-making, but a failure in accuracy regarding other aspects of the law.[3]

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and Delinquency (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970) for an excellent bibliography of writings on crime causation.

[1]Robert MacIver, Social Causation (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1943), p. 88.

[2]See Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime, op. cit., p. 303 ff.

[3]Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, 7th ed. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, Co., 1966), p. 11.

A second perspective of interest to our brief look at concepts of crime causation is that "defective human nature" is the cause of crime. This concept groups those views which attribute high crime rates to "criminality" or the inborn traits of certain "crime-prone" or "delinquent" persons. At times this view is extended to suggest that a significant percentage of Negroes possess a criminal nature.[1] In general, this concept absolves society of any important responsibility for crime causation, hence it tends to be popular with those whose main concern is to preserve the status quo.

In large measure these concepts have been rejected by contemporary social scientists;[2] however, the notion persists among many Americans and their representatives in Congress that a chief cause of crime is the "criminality" in certain persons.

A third concept of crime causation, and one that has received the greatest public attention in recent years.

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[1]See Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime and Delinquency," in National Crime Commission, Task Force on Assessment, Report: Crime and its Impact (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 149 for summary of findings on the relationships between race and crime.

[2]Cesare Lombroso, leader of the Italian positivist school, contended that criminal tendencies were hereditary, and that the "born criminal" is an atavist--a throwback to an earlier, more primitive species of man. In 1901 Dr. Charles Goring, an English prison official, tested Lombroso's theory by comparing 3,000 criminals with 1,000 Cambridge University students, and found no significant differences in physical types. In the 1950's the Gluecks revived interest in William Sheldon's theories that certain physical types of children are more crime-prone than others. (Based on Haskell and Yablonsky, op. cit., pp. 345-348.)

including that of the National Crime Commission, gives credit to the defects of society. This concept finds expression in a number of ways: historical development, heterogeneity and mobility of population, dehumanization of mass culture, the impact of the mass media, technological change, cultural lag, and efforts to correct societal defects.

A broad historical element which undergirds the propensity for violent crime is that described by Thomas Rose, who maintains that a major feature of American history is that Americans force others to be as they want them to be. Thus, a governing minority has always imposed its will on the majority by force and violence, saying that "what is good for us is good for you."[1]

In an extensive survey of factors influencing crime and delinquency prepared for the National Crime Commission's Assessment Task Force, Judith Wilks reports on a number of earlier studies. In her judgment,

> . . . the frequent finding that offenses and offenders tend to be concentrated in areas characterized by low income, physical deterioration, mixed land usage, non-traditional family patterns . . . and racial-ethnic concentrations . . . is a gross <u>oversimplification</u> of the interrelationship of area attributes and crime and delinquency rates.[2]

After an exhaustive analysis of how processes such as urbanization, technological change and industrialization are

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[1]Thomas Rose, <u>Violence in America: A Historical and Contemporary Reader</u> (New York: Random House, 1969), p. xx.

[2]Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates," <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 149 (emphasis supplied).

related to crime rate changes over time, Wilks concludes that "change, particularly technological change, is associated with high rates of crime."[1] Wilks also concludes that in order to predict and explain an area's crime rate it is necessary to be aware of the "existing social structure, ongoing social processes, the population composition of the area, and the area's position within the larger urban and societal complex."[2]

Another societal defect that frequently is credited with causing crime is the heterogeneity of most metropolitan areas, which today is largely ascribed to the increased mobility (both geographic and social) afforded minority groups in our "affluent society." Both mobility and the heterogeneity it fosters can be viewed as "defects" of the society only if we accept, contrary to Durkheim, et al., the proposition that factors associated with criminal activity are defects which require correction. For many individuals, of course, mobility is a positive value, not something to be denied them in the interest of low crime rates. The vision a crime-free society presents to us is that of an extremely closed, brittle and non-mobile social structure.

Not all observers agree that heterogeneous communities experience higher crime rates than do homogeneous communities. Nathan Goldman, for example, contends that heterogeneity leads not to higher actual crime rates, but to the

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[1] Ibid., p. 156. [2] Wilks, op. cit., p. 149.

reporting of higher percentages of those crimes that occur. In the homogeneous community, says Goldman, a wide scope of law-violating behavior is handled informally by the police.[1]

These brief comments on mobility would be incomplete without recognition of the vast and continuing migration of millions of Negro citizens from Southern rural areas to the great metropolitan centers. One disruptive by-product of this historic migration has been the increasing clamor for recognition of constitutional "civil" rights, accompanied by both violent and non-violent demonstrations on behalf of minorities. In the opinion of some observers, an important role change which the Supreme Court adopted more than thirty years ago can be given credit for much of the turmoil in American society today. This role change is well described by Pritchett and Weston:

> Since 1937 the Court has replaced its property agenda with central constitutional preoccupation with issues of status--problems of minority rights; of liberty involving freedom of expression and association; and of justice or due process.[2]

These authors hold that this change in the Court's role has contributed to rising expectations, "with the resultant increase in frustration and violence as more and more

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[1]Quoted in Quinney, op. cit., p. 116.

[2]C. Herman Pritchett and Alan F. Weston, The Third Branch of Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 3.

Americans begin to insist on their constitutional rights, as interpreted by the Court."[1]

Three elements--self-respect, poverty, and alienation combine with the "American Gospel of Success," to form yet another concept of crime causation. In order to think well of themselves, middle-class Americans demand a high standard of living. This demand is exploited through the mass media to the degree that "it is impossible for the poor to retain any self-respect unless they become alienated from the society and reject its reward system."[2] The "Gospel of Success"[3] tells every man that he is a failure unless he is a success in terms of climbing the American ladder toward ever-increasing material gain. As Gorer points out, "everything that an American has, or is responsible for, becomes important as an index of his status and position, because of the relative uniform structure of American society, and because success in America is defined only in relative, and not absolute, terms."[4] At the root of this great emphasis on success lies the statement, "We hold these truths to be

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "Hooked on Law Enforcement," in The Nation, Oct. 16, 1967, p. 364.

[3] See Moses Rischin, The American Gospel of Success: Individualism and Beyond (Chicago: Quandrangle Books, 1965).

[4] Geoffred Gorer, The American People: A Study in National Character (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964, rev. ed.), p. 187.

self-evident, that all men are created equal,"[1] for this doctrine of equality for all men implies the obligation to be equally successful.

This brief review of several concepts of crime causation concludes with a summary statement from the National Crime Commission's general report:

> Society insists that individuals are responsible for their actions, and the criminal process operates on that assumption. However, society has not devised ways for ensuring that all its members have the ability to assume responsibility. It has let too many of them grow up untaught, unmotivated, unwanted. The criminal justice system has a great potential for dealing with individual instances of crime, but it was not designed to eliminate the conditions in which most crime breeds. It needs help. Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment, is warring on crime. A civil rights law is a law against crime. Money for schools is money against crime. Medical, psychiatric, and family-counseling services are services against crime. More broadly and most importantly every effort to improve life in America's "inner cities" is an effort against crime. A community's most enduring protection against crime is to right the wrongs and cure the illnesses that tempt men to harm their neighbors.[2]

Legislating the Safe Streets Act

The House and Senate together took sixteen months in which to process the anti-crime legislation stemming from the work of the National Crime Commission, and from Congressional reaction to recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of procedural rights in the criminal process.[3] What emerged in

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[1] The Declaration of Independence, 1776.

[2] National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, op. cit., p. 6.

[3] For informative accounts of the legislative action on anti-crime legislation in 1967 and 1968 see Breckenridge,

June, 1968 as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is considerably different from the president's proposal of February, 1967, which was based on the recommendations of the National Crime Commission.[1]

The essential features of the president's proposal[2] can be summarized as follows:

1) To provide planning and program grants to the states and local governments "for new approaches and improvements in law enforcement and criminal justice";

2) To establish, in the Department of Justice, a director of a new Office of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance;

3) To provide grants to states, cities, and regional and metropolitan bodies to assist them in developing plans to improve their police, courts, and correctional systems;

4) To authorize the attorney general to make research grants or contract with public agencies, institutions of higher education, or other organizations; and

5) To authorize grants for the construction of significant new types of physical facilities, on a regional or

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op. cit., and Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit., p. 32. Harris maintains that underlying the Southern Democratic effort to sharply reduce the power of the Supreme Court in criminal cases was an effort to give the Court "a thrashing for its decisions on civil rights cases, particularly the 1954 decision to desegregate public schools."

[1]Seven of the eight major recommendations of the National Crime Commission were dealt with in this Act.

[2]H.R. 5037, introduced on February 8, 1967.

metropolitan basis, such as crime laboratories, community correction centers, and police academy-type centers.[1]

The president also urged passage of gun control legislation previously submitted, extension of immunity to witnesses in crimes associated with racketeering (organized crime), a unified corrections system (federal), the Right of Privacy Act of 1967 (to outlaw all wiretapping except that necessary where the security of the nation is at stake), and to establish in the Department of Justice a National Institute of Criminal Justice. The cost of these programs was estimated to be $50 million in fiscal year 1968, increasing to $300 million in fiscal 1969.

The legislation that was finally approved by the Congress in June, 1968 retained most of the president's proposals, but it had grown into a much broader piece of legislation than he had asked for. The major changes and additions can be summarized as follows:

Block grants.--The method of distribution of the Federal funds for law enforcement assistance was changed from that of direct grants to units of local government to the block grant method whereby eighty-five percent of the action funds are awarded to state governments. Seventy-five percent

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[1]Based on Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of February 10, 1967, p. 199, and on Breckenridge, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

of these funds must then be "passed-through" to local governments or combinations thereof.[1]

Supreme Court decisions.--Title II of the 1968 Act seeks to overturn several important Supreme Court decisions related to confessions and other rights of accused persons. These decisions include Mallory versus the United States[2] (arraignment must be made without unnecessary delay); Miranda versus Arizona[3] (an accused must be advised of his rights before interrogation); and United States versus Wade[4] (an accused has the right to counsel in police line-ups). The chief advocates of this Title were Senator John L. McClellan (Dem.) of Arkansas and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Dem.) of North Carolina.

Wiretapping.--Title III of the 1968 Act greatly broadens the authorized use of wiretapping and is in direct contradiction to the Administration's Right of Privacy Act.[5] Instead of limiting the use of wiretaps to only those cases where the security of the nation is at stake, Title III authorizes wiretapping by officials upon the approval of judges at virtually any court level wherever state laws permit such

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[1] Changes to the 1968 Act which were approved by the Congress in late 1970 are noted in the next section.

[2] 354 U.S. 449 (1957). [3] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[4] 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

[5] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 7, 1968, p. 1433.

interception. In addition, under "emergency conditions," officials may employ wiretapping for up to forty-eight hours without a warrant.

Gun control.--Title IV prohibits the sale of pistols and revolvers by interstate mail order to any individual who is not a dealer, and the sale of handguns over the counter to anyone who is not a resident of the state where the sale takes place, or is under the age of twenty-one, or is a fugitive or a felon. Rifles and shotguns are exempted from control, thereby weakening the Administration's proposal for meaningful firearms control.[1]

Organized crime and disorder control.--Emphasis on the control of organized crime and civil disorders (riots), was added by the Congress.[2] The House added $25 million specifically for riot control; the Senate increased this amount by another $10 million.

The Safe Streets Act (H.R. 5037) was passed by the House of Representatives on August 8, 1967, six days after debate began. The major change enacted by the House was the substitution of block grant funding for the categorical grant

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[1]In the Senate Judiciary Committee the key vote on gun controls came in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s murder on April 4, 1968. Two days later, by a vote of 9 to 7, the Committee approved Senator Dodd's amendment on gun control, but only after exempting rifles and shotguns.

[2]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1967, p. 851.

approach asked for by the Administration.[1] On the final vote for passage, 17 members of the House voted against the Safe Streets Act, while 369 voted for the Act.[2]

Although the Senate subcommittee hearings under the direction of the chairman, Senator McClellan, were concluded on July 12, 1967, it was not until May 1, 1968 that the Senate leadership called up S. 917, Title I of which contained the President's proposals that had been reflected in H.R. 5037. S. 917 also included Titles II, III and IV described above, the first two of which were strongly opposed by President Johnson. Final action in the Senate came on May 23, 1968, when S. 917 passed by a vote of seventy-two to four.[3] The editors of the 1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac describe the final Senate action in this manner:

> The showdown came on the votes to restrict the jurisdiction of the (Supreme) Court itself, and it was then that the conservative coalition came unstuck. As Southern Democrats held fast, Republicans defected in large numbers to join Northern Democrats on three crucial roll calls. The votes deleted from the bill provisions denying the Court jurisdiction to review state court determinations on the admissibility of voluntary confessions and of eyewitness testimony, and state court criminal convictions where such review was by means of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the heart of the conservative attack on the Court was cut out of the bill.[4]

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[1] On a roll call vote the block grant provision won 256 to 147.

[2] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 14, 1968, p. 1500.

[3] Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 1968, p. 14798.

[4] Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1968, p. 822.

The immediate question faced by the House was whether to call for a conference, since the legislation passed by the House the previous August did not include the controversial Titles II and III, nor the gun control measure, Title IV. Representative Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House subcommittee which had held extensive hearings on H.R. 5037, urged a conference because of his disagreement with Titles II and III.[1] However, this protest was voiced on June 5, 1968, when Senator Robert F. Kennedy had been fatally wounded in California.

The mood of the House was against Representative Celler's plea. The vote was not even close--317 to 60 against a conference. The following day, June 6, 1968, the House voted 369 to 17 to accept in toto the Senate version, including Titles II, III and IV that had never been debated in the House.[2]

On June 19, 1968, President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, having delayed his approval until the last day in which he could have vetoed the bill. Richard Harris observes that when a week had passed without presidential action, speculation arose that he would either veto it or let it become law without his

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[1] Based on the Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., June 5, 1968, pp. 16065 ff. For informative discussions of the Congressional action see Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit., pp. 72-109, and Breckenridge, op. cit., pp. 73-94.

[2] Congressional Record, June 6, 1968, op. cit., p. 16300.

signature. In Harris' opinion, "in view of the President's earlier failure to take a public stand against the bill, it seemed unlikely that he would now deprive members of his party of the chance to claim credit for doing something about crime when they went home to face the electorate--a claim that would have been greatly weakened either by his veto, even if it was later overriden, or by his refusal to sign the measure. . . . Finally, on June 19th, the last day left for his approval, President Johnson, saying that the bill 'contains more good than bad,' signed it--an act that the (New York) Times described as "a surrender to public hysteria."[1]

Implementing the Safe Streets Act

The Safe Streets Act provides for the establishment of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the Department of Justice, as the agency responsible for implementing the Act. As established, LEAA has been headed by an Administrator of Law Enforcement Assistance and two Associate Administrators, all three of whom shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. As interpreted by the Attorney General, the three Administrators of LEAA have been virtually co-equal,

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[1]Harris, The Fear of Crime, op. cit., pp. 109-110. For the text of the President's remarks upon signing the 1968 Safe Streets Act, see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 28, 1968.

which has meant that all policy decisions within LEAA must have the concurrence of all three Administrators.[1]

As administered by LEAA, the Safe Streets Act provides five basic type of Federal financial aid:[2]

- Block planning agency grants to states for creation of state-wide comprehensive law enforcement improvement plans. The Federal share for planning programs is 90 percent while state and local governments provide 10 percent.

- Block action grants to states to carry out specific improvement plans. Eighty-five percent of LEAA action grant funds are given to state governments in this form, with the provision that 75 percent of the block action grants be made available to units of local government or combinations of such units (the pass-through requirement).[3] It is the administration of these "block grants" by state law enforcement planning agencies that is the subject of this investigation.

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[1]The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-644) amends the Safe Streets Act of 1968 in a number of ways, as described in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of December 25, 1970, p. 3055. With regard to the "troika" arrangement of three co-equal administrators, under the 1970 Act the Administrator of LEAA is designated executive head to exercise all substantive powers with the concurrence of one or both assistant administrators.

[2]This description is based on the 1971 LEAA bulletin, "A Program for a Safer, More Just America," pp. 3-6.

[3]The pass-through requirement was modified by Public Law 91-644 which requires that effective July 1, 1972 each state pass on that part of the block grant which corresponds to the part of total-statewide law enforcement expenditures for the preceding year funded and spent by local units.

- Action funds given at LEAA's discretion for anti-crime programs with emphasis on special aid to cities. These are called "discretionary grants" and comprise 15 percent of the action funds distributed by LEAA.

- Research and development grants and contracts to devise more effective techniques and equipment for the criminal justice system.

- Grants and loans to finance college studies by law enforcement personnel and promising students preparing for law enforcement careers.

The $268 million received by LEAA for fiscal year 1970 was distributed as follows: action grants, $215 million (85 percent in the form of block grants to state government and 15 percent in the form of discretionary grants to cities); planning grants, $21 million; research and development, $7.5 million; academic assistance, $18 million; technical assistance and training, $1.2 million; statistics and information service, $1 million; administration, $4.3 million.

Both planning and action grants are awarded under the block grant provision on the basis of population. In fiscal 1970 action grants ranged from $17,287,000 to California to a minimum of $500,000 to the states with the least population. A summary of the allocations of both planning and action funds for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 is presented in Table 2-1, taken from the 1971 LEAA bulletin cited above.

TABLE 2-1.--Allocation of Planning and Action Grants by LEAA During Fiscal Years 1969 and 1970 (amounts in thousands)

	Fiscal Year 1969			Fiscal Year 1970		
STATE	Planning	Action	Total	Planning	Action	Total
Alabama	$ 338	$ 434	$ 772	$ 369	$ 3,175	$ 3,544
Alaska	118	33	151	121	249	370
Arizona	210	201	411	228	1,503	1,731
Arkansas	232	242	474	252	1,787	2,039
California	1,388	2,352	3,740	1,566	17,287	18,853
Colorado	233	243	476	258	1,863	2,121
Connecticut	297	360	657	326	2,669	2,995
Delaware	135	64	199	141	480	621
Florida	504	737	1,241	575	5,597	6,172
Georgia	404	555	959	450	4,127	4,577
Hawaii	150	91	241	159	699	858
Idaho	147	86	233	154	639	793
Illinois	833	1,339	2,172	938	9,877	10,815
Indiana	436	614	1,050	487	4,565	5,052
Iowa	285	338	623	312	2,501	2,813
Kansas	253	279	532	275	2,065	2,340
Kentucky	315	392	707	347	2,906	3,253
Louisiana	346	449	795	384	3,344	3,728
Maine	165	120	285	175	882	1,057
Maryland	347	451	798	384	3,349	3,733
Massachusetts	465	666	1,131	516	4,902	5,418
Michigan	678	1,055	1,733	763	7,817	8,580
Minnesota	340	439	779	380	3,302	3,682
Mississippi	258	289	547	280	2,117	2,397
Missouri	409	565	974	452	4,155	4,607
Montana	147	82	229	153	627	780
Nebraska	197	176	373	211	1,310	1,521
Nevada	130	55	185	134	405	539
New Hampshire	146	84	230	154	634	788
New Jersey	571	860	1,431	641	6,372	7,013
New Mexico	168	123	291	176	896	1,072
New York	1,333	2,251	3,584	1,490	16,392	17,882
North Carolina	439	619	1,058	492	4,625	5,117
North Dakota	143	78	221	148	562	710
Ohio	803	1,284	2,087	911	9,563	10,474
Oklahoma	267	306	573	294	2,291	2,585
Oregon	234	246	480	253	1,806	2,059
Pennsylvania	882	1,427	2,309	998	10,591	11,589
Rhode Island	161	111	272	169	819	988
South Carolina	274	318	592	304	2,406	2,710
South Dakota	145	83	228	151	599	750
Tennessee	362	478	840	402	3,562	3,964
Texas	831	1,334	2,165	942	9,926	10,868
Utah	169	126	295	179	929	1,108
Vermont	128	51	179	133	387	520
Virginia	405	557	962	452	4,150	4,602
Washington	308	380	688	352	2,971	3,323
West Virginia	221	221	442	239	1,640	1,879
Wisconsin	382	515	897	422	3,795	4,217
Wyoming	121	39	160	125	290	415
D.C.	154	99	253	161	723	884
American Samoa	102	4	106	102	28	130
Guam	106	12	118	108	90	198
Puerto Rico	281	330	611	308	2,454	2,762
Virgin Islands	104	7	111	104	50	154
TOTALS	$19,000	$24,650	$43,650	$21,000	$182,750	$203,750

The requirements for matching funds from state and local government established in the Safe Streets Act vary depending on the use to be made of the block grant funds. With the priority given by the Congress to the control of organized crime and civil disorders, LEAA-administered funds pay up to 75 percent of costs for projects in these areas. The matching requirement for construction of law enforcement facilities is 50 percent. For other action projects the Federal share is 60 percent, while the state and local share is 40 percent.

The relative size of Federal law enforcement assistance under the Safe Streets Act can be appreciated by looking at estimated national expenditures for all criminal justice functions. These expenditures by Federal state and local government agencies are estimated at about $7.4 billion for fiscal year 1968-1969.[1] During fiscal year 1970 the Safe Streets Act added $268 million. For fiscal years 1971 through 1973, expenditures of $650 million, $1.15 billion and $1.75 billion respectively have been authorized.[2] It is

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[1]U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1968-69 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 1-2. (Hereinafter referred to as LEAA-Bureau of the Census, Expenditure and Employment Data, 1968-69).

[2]Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of December 25, 1970, p. 3055. Public Law 91-644 provides that no less than 20 percent of the fiscal 1972 and 1973 funds used for law enforcement grants be used for corrections.

anticipated that within a period of five years the Federal government will have begun to assume approximately 20 percent of the criminal justice costs which formerly were the sole responsibility of state and local governments, with the latter bearing the major portion of the fiscal load ($4.7 billion versus $1.9 billion in fiscal 1968-69).

Having outlined the origins and purposes of the 1968 Safe Streets Act, and having discussed a number of the issues which were related to the 1967-1968 legislative action on the Act, we return, in the chapters which follow, to a consideration of the environmental, political system, and policy outcome indicators which comprise the systems model upon which this investigation is based.

CHAPTER III

ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS

As described in Chapter I, this study employs a systems model, as depicted in Figure 3-1, which groups indicators of state characteristics in three main divisions: environment, the political system, and policy outcomes. This chapter deals with those state characteristics which comprise




Figure 3-1.--Systems Model

the environmental division of our model, including indicators of both the socio-economic and crime environments of the forty-eight states.

In subjecting twenty-one ecological variables to a factor analysis for each census year from 1890 to 1960, Hofferbert[1] derived two factors, Industrialization and Affluence which are representative of the major environmental variances which distinguish the individual American states. Hofferbert's two factors have been adopted[2] as the primary indicators of the socio-economic environment. Five other variables have been added to supplement and update Industrialization and Affluence. Four crime-environment factors, which we derive from the 1966-1969 FBI reports, complete our list of eleven environmental indicators, as shown in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2.--Environmental Indicators

Socio-Economic Environment	Crime Environment
Industrialization	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates
Affluence	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio
Population Increase, 1960-70	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases
Percent Negro, 1968	Murder and Auto Theft Increases
Negro Increase, 1950-68	
Non-white Migration, 1950-60	
Contributions Claimed, as Percent of Personal Income	

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[1]Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960," in Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (Aug. 1968), 401-418.

[2]In adopting these factors only the factor scores for 1960 have been used.

Factor scores or other appropriate data for each of the indicators described in this Chapter are located in Appendix A of this study.

Industrialization

The factor Industrialization, as described by Hofferbert, reflects patterns of economic and occupational activity which are distinguished by the proportion of the population engaged in manufacturing employment, and the value added per capita by manufacturing at the positive end of the scale.[1] At the negative end are moderately strong loadings recorded by states with large average farm size and with a high percentage of owner-occupied homes. Industrialization is not predominantly ethnicity, wealth, education or population change, nor has Industrialization occurred at a uniform rate in all states. Those states that ranked near the bottom of this scale at the turn of the century have experienced a greater increase in Industrialization than states which where then relatively Industrialized. In testing the stability of Industrialization over time, Hofferbert found it to be "fairly volatile in terms of its relation to all of the indicators of policy."[2]

Our reasons for including Industrialization as one of two principal environmental indicators lie primarily in

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[1]This description is based on Hofferbert, op. cit., pp. 411-413.

[2]Ibid., p. 416.

the relationships between the socio-economic variables which load heavily on Industrialization, as shown in Table 3-1, and the inter-state variances in criminal activity to be introduced later. Earlier researchers have examined relationships between the distribution of criminal activity and urbanization,[1] industrialization,[2] population density,[3] and economic status.[4] Each of these environmental characteristics is an important contributor to Hofferbert's Industrialization factor. Since the subject of our inquiry, law enforcement planning, deals primarily with the control of criminal activity, it appears that Industrialization is a potentially important environmental indicator.

A secondary reason for including Industrialization in this analysis is to test its value in explaining differences in policy outcomes related to the administration of criminal justice.

States ranking highest in Industrialization include New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts. The

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[1]Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime and Delinquency," op. cit., pp. 140-143.

[2]Karl Schussler, "Components of Variation in City Crime Rates," Social Problems, 9 (Spring, 1962), p. 325.

[3]Sarah L. Boggs, "Urban Crime Patterns," American Sociological Review, 30 (December 1965), pp. 899-908.

[4]Calvin F. Schmid, "Urban Crime Areas: Part I," American Sociological Review, 25 (August 1960), pp. 527-542, and Calvin F. Schmid, "Urban Crime Areas: Part II," American Sociological Review, 25 (October, 1960), pp. 655-678.

TABLE 3-1.--Loadings of Socio-economic Variables on Industrialization and Affluence, 1960 (oblique rotation)

Variables	Industrialization	Affluence
Value added by manufacturing/capita	.907	.015
Percent employed in manufacturing	.877	-.132
Value/acre of farm land and buildings	.831	.024
Population per square mile	.775	.008
Percent foreign	.703	.230
Total population	.672	.045
Percent urban	.657	.522
Telephones per 1,000 population	.650	.675
Average number of employees per manufacturing establishment	.638	-.351
Personal income per capita	.573	.730
Percent failures of business and commercial establishments	.421	.287
Value of real property per capita	.132	.792
Percent Negro, 1960	.066	-.752
Percent illiterate	.039	-.737
Percent increase in population	-.006	.551
Median school years completed	-.026	.909
Percent farms operated by tenants	-.266	-.468
Percent housing owner occupied	-.316	.240
Divorce rate	-.325	.430
Acerage per farm	-.503	.488
Motor vehicle registrations per 100,000 population	-.568	.703
Percent of total variance	32.4	25.3

Source: Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890-1960," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. XII, No. 3 (August, 1968), 406 and 409.

four states with lowest scores in this factor include New Mexico, South Dakota, Wyoming, and North Dakota.

Affluence

Hofferbert's Affluence factor is our second principal environmental indicator. In his terms, Affluence is reflective of high educational attainment, the general cultural deprivation of non-white Americans, the value of real property per capita, and per capita personal income. "Percent foreign born" is a positive element of this factor for the reason that a major portion of the immigrants into the United States in the earlier decades covered by Hofferbert's study settled in the states which already were "culturally enriched"[1] in terms of wealth, educational attainment, etc. This dimension is obviously heavily regional, along North-South lines, with a "distinct clustering of southern states at the bottom."[2] In Hofferbert's judgment, the features which are heavily loaded on this factor are the characteristics of "modern affluent cultures." The loadings of the twenty-one variables on Affluence are recorded in Table 3-1.

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[1] In his 1968 article, Hofferbert labeled Affluence as "Cultural Enrichment." In later articles he shifts to Affluence as being a more appropriate description of this factor.

[2] States occupying ranks 38 through 48 in 1960 include: Virginia, Kentucky, West Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Mississippi. The five top-ranked states are Nevada, California, Wyoming, Colorado and Oregon.

In testing the stability of Affluence over time, Hofferbert finds that it is "much less volatile than Industrialization in terms of its relation to policy outputs," which leads him to conclude that Affluence is "more pervasive and comprehensive in its impact upon the decisions of policy makers within the states than is Industrialization."[1]

Our reasons for including Affluence as an environmental indicator in this study of law enforcement planning outcomes are similar to those outlined above with regard to Industrialization. We note first that both Affluence and Industrialization correlate positively with personal income per capita and percent urban, both of which have been the subject of earlier investigations referred to with regard to "urbanization" and "economic status" by Wilks and Schmid respectively. Concerning other elements of Hofferbert's Affluence factor, earlier researchers have reported on the relationships between crime environment and affluence in terms of the availability of goods to be stolen,[2] racial composition,[3] and education.[4] Thus, based on our earlier rationale,

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[1]Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 417.

[2]Task Force on Assessment, Crime and its Impact, op. cit., p. 27.

[3]Earl R. Moses, "Differentials in Crime Rates Between Negroes and Whites," American Sociological Review, 12 (August 1947), pp. 411-420, and C. V. Willie and A. Gershenvitz, "Juvenile Delinquency in Racially Mixed Areas," American Sociological Review, 29 (October 1964), pp. 740-44.

[4]Daniel Glaser, "Correctional Institutions in a Great Society," Criminologica, III, Nos. 2-3 (August-November, 1965), 3-5.

Affluence is as potentially important to our inquiry as is Industrialization. To not include both of these factors would be indeed remiss.

Population Increase, 1960-1970

As a means of determining the influence of population shifts during the 1960's on law enforcement planning, we include Population Increase, 1960-1970, as a supplemental indicator of the environment.

In a discussion of why California leads the nation in reported crime rates, while at the same time being the recognized leader in the field of police professionalization, the Task Force on Assessment of the National Crime Commission observes that California has been "the recipient of one of the great migrations in history. And whether migration is itself as important a cause of crime as is sometimes asserted or not, in large quantities it is clearly unsettling and disruptive of the social order."[1] Concerning the increases in reported crime rates of our major cities over the past thirty years, the Task Force on Assessment states:

> The dramatic and turbulent changes which America's cities have been undergoing throughout this period are well known. They were bound to have an impact on the amount of crime in the city. One of the most significant facts has been the simple one of growth.[2]

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[1]Task Force on Assessment, Crime and its Impact, op. cit., p. 34.

[2]Ibid., p. 35.

In view of these citations it appears that our inclusion of Population Increase, 1960-1970, as an environmental indicator is justified. In effect this variable updates the "percent increase in population" variable employed by Hofferbert, which loads .551 on Affluence and -.006 on Industrialization, and reflects state population increases of the 1950's. Our data is derived from the 1960 and 1970 Census of Population reports.[1]

Percent Negro, Negro Increase, and Non-White Migration

Three indicators of shifts in racial distribution are covered in this section, all of which reflect the degree to which changes have occurred in the interracial balance of the American states during the past two decades. To an important degree the increases in reported crime rates which played a key role in the 1968 enactment of the Safe Streets Act appear to be related to white reaction to the civil rights movement.

It has been estimated that between 1940 and 1963 approximately 3.3 million Negroes left the South,[2] and have migrated northward, most of them being absorbed in the

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[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 12; and The Washington Post, December 1, 1970, p. A9.

[2] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Negroes in the United States: Their Economic and Social Situation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 2.

metropolitan areas of the North-east and North-central regions of the nation.[1] Ploski and Brown have described the migration of Negroes from the South in the twentieth century as "the most extensive movement of a single group in U.S. history."[2]

A number of earlier studies which have sought to determine the relationships between race and criminal activity have been reviewed by Wilks who states:

> From these findings we may conclude that the racial composition of an area does have an impact upon the area's crime rate, but this relationship is not a simple one. That is, we cannot unequivocally assert that certain nationality or racial groups have high rates of crime regardless of their geographical location nor can we state that the geographical location exclusively determines the crime rates of such groups. It is necessary to consider the area's ongoing social processes and the social and cultural structure of the residential area in order to understand the relationship between geographical location, racial composition, and area crime rate.[3]

Analysis of arrest rates reported in the Uniform Crime Reports indicates that Negroes become involved in violent personal crime much more frequently than do non-black Americans.[4] Explanations of this apparent racial bias include minority

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[1]Harry A. Ploski, and Roscoe C. Brown, Jr., The Negro Almanac (New York: Bellwether Publishing Co., 1967), p. 219.

[2]Ibid., p. 223.

[3]Wilks, op. cit., p. 146. For additional studies on the relationships between race and crime rates see Alphonso Pinkney, Black Americans (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), Chapter 6.

[4]In 1969, for example, Negroes made up 62 percent of the arrests for murder, and 55 percent of the victims, according to Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, p. 9.

status pressures,[1] lack of opportunity to develop stable community relations or improved occupational status,[2] and social frustration.[3] The potential effect on crime rates of current efforts to improve the educational and occupational status of those living in delinquency areas is well summarized by Wilks who sees such efforts as being directed toward the solution of the "American Dilemma":[4]

> The American dilemma is a resultant of the belief that all men are created equal (or perhaps more accurately, that all men have not only an opportunity but an obligation to be successful) in conjunction with the reality that some individuals in our society are disadvantaged, they do not have equal opportunities to succeed. Thus, most current attempts at delinquency and crime prevention are directed toward opening the opportunity structure.
>
> There is no doubt that some, even many, individuals will be "saved" by such procedures. Many individuals will probably have better "life chances" as a result of such programs, particularly if educational and vocational programs are directed toward the mutual problems of increasing skill dilution, increasing skill obsolescence, and increasing occupational specialization.
>
> But it still remains to be determined whether or not there will be a decrease in the rates of crime and delinquency as a result of such programs. It must be recognized that a new differential patterning of crime and delinquency rates over geographical areas may develop as a result of these programs.[5]

Our primary interest in variables which reflect shifts in racial balance is to determine how the American

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[1]Walter C. Reckless, The Crime Problem (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 3rd ed., 1961), p. 70.

[2]Moses, op. cit.

[3]Schuessler, op. cit., p. 325.

[4]Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harpers, 1962, revised edition).

states have responded to these shifts in terms of criminal justice administration--especially whether the impact of racial shifts is reflected in the allocation decisions of the state law enforcement planning agencies.

Percent Negro, 1968

In order to update Hofferbert's variable, "percent Negro, 1960," which loads -.752 on Affluence and -.006 on Industrialization (Table 3-1), we have computed "Percent Negro, 1968" from Bureau of the Census reports[1] of 1960 and 1970.

Negro Increase

As used in this study, Negro Increase refers to the estimated increase between 1950 and 1968 in the percent of each state's population that is Negro. Data is taken from two sources: the 1950 Negro population data is that recorded by the Bureau of the Census during the 1950 Census of Populations; the 1968 figure is the Percent Negro 1968 variable described above. The differences between the 1950 and 1968 percentages are divided by the 1950 percentage to obtain the percent of Negro population increase in each state for the eighteen-year period, 1950 to 1968.

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[1]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics, U.S. Summary, Final Report PC (1)-1B (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Table 56; and Center for Research and Marketing, Inc., The Negro Population, Table I.

Non-white Migration

The 1960 Census of Population Reports include data on non-white migration for each of the states. We have included this variable as a partial "cross check" on the validity of the Negro Increase variable described above.

Contributions Claimed

The percent of personal income claimed as contributions by the citizens of each state in their 1968 individual income tax returns is included as an indicator of the socio-economic environment of each state. Data for this variable, which we have designated "Contributions Claimed," are derived from the 1970 report of the Internal Revenue Service[1] and from Bretzfelder and Dallavalle's estimate of 1968 personal incomes.[2]

This measure of the propensity of individuals to make and to claim tax-deductible contributions is included here as an indirect measure of the influence of organized religion within each state, which we believe has some influence both on patterns of criminal activity and on efforts to control that activity.

About twenty years ago Porterfield analyzed relationships between social factors and crime rates within

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[1]U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Pub. 79 (9-70), Statistics of Income, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 171.

[2]Published in Survey of Current Business, August, 1969, p. 13.

census tracts in Fort Worth, Texas.[1] His findings suggest that church membership is an important indicator of propensity toward certain types of crime, especially homicide and suicide. Extending Porterfield's approach, we have included Contributions Claimed as an environmental indicator in order to "get at" the state-wide influence of organized religion on both crime distribution and on criminal justice practices, including outcomes of the law enforcement planning process.

We recognize that Contributions Claimed is influenced by factors other than those which stem from religious institutions, and we make no claim that this variable is an adequate indicator of the influence of organized religion within each state. Were other more direct measures of organized religion's influence on a state-by-state basis available, we would use them. Our investigation reveals, however, that the only available data on state-wide church membership that is reasonably comparable is that published by the Bureau of the Census about thirty-five years ago. The changes which have occurred since then render such data obsolete for our purposes. A recent analysis of Contributions Claimed does indicate, however, that approximately sixty percent of this amount goes to organized religion,[2] hence there appears to

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[1] Austin Porterfield, "Suicide and Crime in Folk and Secular Society," American Journal of Sociology, 57 (January, 1952), pp. 331-338.

[2] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income; Individual Income Tax Returns, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 6.

be a reasonable basis for including Contributions Claimed as an indirect indicator of the influence of the church in each of the states.

Crime Environment Indicators

An important environmental component of the systems model used in this analysis is the interstate variance in criminal activity--the crime environment. Data on criminal activity is taken from the reports of approximately 8,500 law enforcement agencies. These reports are compiled and published by the FBI,[1] which act as the national clearinghouse for crime statistics.

In discussing the basis for the crime statistics, the 1969 Uniform Crime Reports include the following description:

> The Uniform Crime Reporting Program employs seven crime classifications to establish an index to measure the trend and distribution of crime in the United States. These crimes--murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny $50 and over in value, and auto theft--are counted by law enforcement agencies as the crimes become known to them. These crimes were selected for use in the Crime Index because, as a group, they represent the most common local crime problem. They are all serious crimes, either by their very nature or due to the volume in which they occur. Offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault, are categorized as violent crimes. Offenses of burglary, larceny $50 and over in value, and auto theft are classes as crimes against property.
>
> It is believed desirable to point out that there is no way of determining the total number of crimes which

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[1]Reports are published quarterly and annually by the FBI. The annual reports are published in the Uniform Crime Reports (yr.) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, yr.).

> are committed. Many criminal acts occur which are not reported to official sources. In light of this fact, the best source for obtaining a count of crime is the next logical universe, namely, crimes which come to police attention. The crimes used in the Crime Index are those considered to be most consistently reported to police and the computations of crime trends and crime rates are prepared using this universe--offenses known to police.[1]

It is realized that there occur a large number of crimes that are not covered by the crime index, including those offenses of a consensual nature in which there is seldom a complainant. In addition, "important segments of crime are dealt with by regulatory agencies under the auspices of administrative and civil law" and not by criminal justice agencies under the auspices of criminal law.[2]

While recognizing that the indicators of the crime environment to be employed in this study do not cover all types of criminal activity, nor do they purport to accurately represent all criminal activity of the types covered, it remains true that no other source of state-by-state crime data of a comparable nature exists. Furthermore, in large measure the seven "index" crimes covered by the Uniform Crime Reports are those types of criminal activity that the Congress sought to control in approving the Safe Streets Act.

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[1] Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., p. 4.

[2] Harry M. Shulman, "The Measurement of Crime in the United States," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 57, No. 4 (December, 1966), p. 483.

In spite of noteworthy progress recorded by the FBI[1] in compiling and publishing crime statistics, the National Crime Commission concluded that police statistics which are compiled by the FBI do not begin to indicate the full amount of crime. This conclusion was based on the results of the first national surveys ever made of crime victimization, which were initiated by the National Crime Commission in 1965. In pointing out the implications of this volume of unreported crime, the Commission's general report states:

> This margin of unreported crimes raises the possibility that even small changes in the way that crime is reported by the public to the police, or classified and recorded by the police, could have significant effects on the trend of reported crime. There is strong reason to believe that a number of such changes have taken place within recent years.[2]

One reason given for the deficiencies in the reported crime statics is that given by the National Crime Commission's Task Force on Assessment: "In short the United States is today (1967), in the era of high speed computers, trying to keep track of crime and criminals with a system that was less than adequate in the days of the horse and buggy."[3]

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[1]By act of Congress approved June 11, 1930, the FBI was authorized to collect and compile nation-wide crime figures. The original program to do this was initiated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The Committee on Uniform Crime Records of that Association continues as advisor to the FBI on the conduct of the program. The number of cooperating agencies has increased from 400 in 1930 to about 8,500 in 1969.

[2]National Crime Commission, op. cit., p. 20.

[3]Task Force on Assessment, op. cit., p. 123.

Another reason for the inaccuracies in crime reporting is, according to a number of observers,[1] the manipulation of crime reports by police administrators who are interested in maintaining a "respectable" clearance rate.[2] While this may happen from time to time, it is probably the lack of knowledge and training on the part of the police record keepers that is responsible for most of the inaccuracy in crime reporting.

A recent study of the Jackson, Mississippi Police Department conducted by the Public Administration Service[3] will serve as an example of the manner in which inadequate record keeping contributes to unreliability in crime statistics. The report states in part,

> Police records are the most decentralized and uncoordinated of all the Jackson technical services. Some records are kept in the detective bureau; some in the traffic control section; others in the identification bureau; still others in the sergeant's office. Statistical summaries are prepared by each office, but the Department's annual statistical activity report is the product of a civilian records clerk who classifies complaints for key punching by the city data

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[1]See, for example, Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp.

[2]The clearance rate is the ratio of offenses of each category that are "cleared by arrest" or solved for crime reporting purposes, to the total number of offenses of that category reported. Hence, it is possible to create a false clearance rate that is higher than it should be simply by not reporting all crimes that are "known to the police."

[3]Public Administration Service, Jackson, Mississippi Police Department; A Survey Report, December 31, 1970.

> processing unit and works under the nominal supervision of the detective chief.[1]

The report then describes the process of complaint recording and makes the observation that complaint calls which are routed to the detective major may never be recorded at all.

> If they are recorded by the detective major, they may not necessarily be submitted to the criminal records section in the division for processing, since the major makes an arbitrary decision whether to "make a case" or simply to log the complaint on an informal "white sheet." A call which is "white sheeted" is set aside, but kept available should an arrest ensue or property be recovered. However, it is not statistically tallied by the records staff.[2]

The survey staff determined that 758 calls to the detective desk were "white sheeted" in 1969, "including 419 auto accessory theft reports; 330 stolen bicycles and 9 thefts or burglaries, 8 of which involved firearms."[3]

The foregoing example illustrates one type of crime reporting deficiency which the FBI seeks to overcome through its continuing effort to improve the validity of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. A standard operating procedure employed by the FBI is to examine each incoming report for both arithmetical accuracy and for reasonableness as a possible indication of errors. Unusual variations are brought to the attention of the submitting agency by correspondence. This process resulted in the writing of 21,020 letters to contributors during 1969.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 117. [2] Ibid., p. 121. [3] Ibid., p. 122.

[4] Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., p. 52.

The Seven Crimes "Known to the Police"

Our data on the crime environment of the American states is limited to that contained in official reports voluntarily submitted to the FBI by approximately 8,500 jurisdictions in the fifty states. State-by-state crime rates per 100,000 population are computed annually by the FBI and are published in the Uniform Crime Reports for the seven "index" or "serious" crimes which are described below:

Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter[1] includes all willful killings without due process, and is scored on the basis of police investigation. Suicides, accidental deaths, manslaughter by negligence and justifiable homicides are not counted here. Most murders are committed by relatives of the victim, or by persons acquainted with him. In 1969, for example, this category of "nonfelonious" killings accounted for 73.5 percent of all murders reported to the FBI. Another 7.2 percent were "suspected felony type" while 19.3 percent were "known felony type" of murders in which the victim was not acquainted with his killer.[2]

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[1] Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 5-9. The term "murder and nonnegligent manslaughter" has been shortened to "murder" throughout this discussion. For an interesting historical study of this offense see H. D. Brearley, Homicide in the United States (Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1969) (reprint of 1932 edition).

[2] For additional discussion of murder see Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide," in Federal Probation, March, 1961, pp. 48-55.

Aggravated Assault[1] is defined as an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury, usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or other means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Attempts are included since it is not necessary that an injury result when a gun, knife, or other weapon is used which could and probably would result in serious personal injury if the crime were successfully completed. As in the case of murder, most aggravated assaults occur within the family unit, or among neighbors or acquaintances. The relationships between aggravated assault and murder were investigated by Pittman and Handy in a survey of 241 cases of aggravated assault occurring in the St. Louis, Missouri area during 1961.[2] In comparing their results with those of Wolfgang,[3] Pittman and Handy concluded that the pattern for the two crimes is quite similar. "Both acts, of course, are reflections of population sub-groupings which tend to externalize their aggression when confronted with conflict situations."[4] This conclusion is supported by Porkorny who found homicide and aggravated assault are similar in all

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[1]This discussion of aggravated assault is based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[2]David J. Pittman and William Handy, "Patterns in Criminal Aggravated Assault," in Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 55 (1964), pp. 462-470.

[3]Wolfgang (1961), op. cit.

[4]Pittman and Handy, op. cit., p. 470.

aspects studies, and are basically the same category of behavior.[1]

Forcible Rape[2] is defined for the purposes of uniform crime reporting as the carnal knowledge of a female through the use of force or the threat of force. Assaults to commit forcible rape are also included; however, statutory rape (without force) is not counted. About two-thirds of these offenses reported in 1969 were actual rapes, while the remainder were attempts or assaults to rape. Although this offense is thought to be the most under-reported crime, due primarily to fear and/or embarrassment on the part of the victim, almost one-fifth (18 percent) of all forcible rapes reported to the police in 1969 were determined to be unfounded and therefore not counted.

Menachem Amir's study[3] of 646 cases of forcible rape occurring in Philadelphia between 1958 and 1960 revealed, inter alia, that rape is not a violent crime in which brutality is inflicted upon the victim. In 87 percent of the cases studied, only seduction and verbal coercion were used initially to subdue the victim. Over fifty percent of the victims failed to resist their attackers in any way.

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[1] Alex D. Porkorny, "Human Violence: A Comparison of Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Suicide, and Attempted Suicide," in Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 56 (1965), No. 4, pp.

[2] This discussion of forcible rape is based on the 1969 Uniform Crime Reports, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

[3] Menachem Amir, "Forcible Rape," Federal Probation Vol. 31 (March, 1967), 51-58.

Robbery[1] is the stealing or taking anything of value from the person by force or violence or putting him in fear by strong-arm robbery, stickups, armed robbery, assault to rob and attempt to rob. Injury to the victim frequently results. About 55 percent of the reported robberies are committed in the street, and about 60 percent of all robberies included the presence of a weapon such as a gun, knife, or club. The average value loss to the victims of robbery during 1969 was $288.

Burglary[2] is defined as the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft, even though no force was used to gain entrance. Forcible entry, unlawful entry without force, and attempted forcible entry are included in this offense category. Residential burglary accounted for 56 percent of the 1969 total, over one-half of which occurred during daytime. Of the non-residential burglaries, only 6 percent occurred during daytime.

Larceny-Theft[3] is the unlawful taking or stealing of property or articles of value without the use of force or violence or fraud. It includes crimes such as shoplifting, pocket-picking, purse-snatching, thefts from autos, thefts of auto parts and bicycle thefts. (Auto theft is excluded

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[1]Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

[2]Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 16-19.

[3]Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 19-25.

here since it is a separate Crime Index offense.) Larceny is exceeded in volume only by burglary. During 1969, larceny was highest in the summer months. Only thefts of property of $50 value or greater are recorded in this crime category. The average value of property stolen in each larceny in 1969 was $111, up from $74 in 1960.

Auto Theft[1] is defined as the unlawful stealing or driving away of a motor vehicle, including attempts. This definition excludes taking for temporary use when the vehicle is actually returned by the taker provided prior authority for its use has been granted or can be assumed. From 1960 through 1969 the percentage increase in auto theft was four times greater than the percentage increase in automobile registrations and four times greater than the percentage increase in the young-age population, 15 to 24 years. Nationally, one of every 100 registered automobiles was stolen during 1969, and 84 percent of those stolen were recovered. This high recovery rate can be attributed to the fact that approximately 75 percent of all cars stolen are used for transportation or for unknown purposes other than resale or stripping for parts. As in prior years, in 1969 persons arrested for auto theft were mostly the young, with 77 percent under 21 and 58 percent under 18 years of age.

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[1]Based on Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 25-28.

Crime Environment Interrelationships

Having looked at some of the problems in crime reporting, and having defined the seven crime categories for which State data is available, we turn now to an analysis of the statistical relationships among the various crime categories.

Data for this analysis is taken from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for 1966 through 1969. From these Reports the state mean rates and the percent increase in each of the seven Index crimes by state has been computed. The results of this computation were then subjected to correlation analysis and the simple correlations shown in Table 3-2 were obtained.

The relationships among the property crimes of burglary, larceny and auto theft are especially strong. Of interest is the higher correlation of forcible rape with aggravated assault and property crimes than with murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. We note in Table 3-2 also the parallel decreasing relationships among murder and aggravated assault and the property crimes of robbery through auto theft. The highest correlations involving the increases in crime rates are those which represent the relationships between the increase in auto theft rates and the mean rates of burglary and auto theft over the period 1966 through 1969.

TABLE 3-2.--Simple Correlations[a] of 1966-1969 State Mean Crime Rates and State Crime Rate Increases

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I	6I
1	Murder													
2	Forcible Rape	.47												
3	Aggravated Assault	.76	.70											
4	Robbery	.31	.71	.60										
5	Burglary	.22	.74	.53	.73									
6	Larceny	.13	.68	.44	.65	.91								
7	Auto Theft	.02	.47	.30	.68	.76	.66							
1I	Murder Increase	-.01	.20	.08	.27	.29	.19	.38						
2I	Forcible Rape Increase	.08	.39	.19	.28	.38	.40	.31	-.04					
3I	Assault Increase	-.29	.09	-.14	.11	.24	.21	.25	.07	.18				
4I	Robbery Increase	-.16	.07	.07	.24	.41	.30	.45	.16	.27	.51			
5I	Burglary Increase	-.07	.15	.04	.09	.16	.18	.15	.15	.40	.13	.37		
6I	Larceny Increase	-.45	-.16	-.27	-.22	-.05	-.09	.07	.13	.34	.38	.43	.27	
7I	Auto Theft Increase	-.10	.23	.11	.31	.42	.29	.45	.15	.30	.16	.38	.15	.39

[a]Pearson's r.

Suicide/Homicide Ratio

In addition to the fourteen crime-environment variables described above and listed in Table 3-2, the ratio of suicides to homicides during 1967[1] is included as an indicator of the crime environment. This ratio overlaps the 1966-1969 mean murder rate described above, however it includes the additional element of suicide. Earlier studies have indicated that both homicide and suicide rates are influenced by both sociological[2] and economic variances.[3] Hence it appears that the addition of the 1967 suicide rate may contribute to the explanation of environmental influences of both the socio-economic and the crime-environment nature. As illustrated in Table 3-3, interstate variances are emphasized when the suicide/homicide ratio is employed.

Derivation of Crime-Environment Factors

As is evident in Table 3-2, there exists considerable overlap among the crime-environment indicators described above. To lessen multicollinearity problems, and to reduce the number of variables to be dealt with, the fifteen crime-environment indicators were subjected to factor analysis

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[1]U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1967. Vol. II-Mortality, Part A, pp. 1-169 to 1-249.

[2]Jack P. Gibbs, and Walter T. Martin, Status Integration and Suicide: A Sociological Study (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon Press, 1964).

[3]Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., Suicide and Homicide (New York: The Free Press, 1954).

TABLE 3-3.--Suicide, Murder, and Homicide Rates Compared

Type of Rate or Ratio	High/ State	Low/ State	High/Low Ratio
Suicide Rate (1959-61)	26.8 NEV	6.1 R.I.	4.4
Homicide Rate (1959-1961)	10.7 GA	0.9 VT	11.9
Murder Rate (1966-1969 mean)	12.1 GA	0.8 N.D.	14.5
Suicide/Homicide Ratio (1967)	14.75 ME	0.64 MISS	23.0

employing a varimax rotation technique and Kaiser criterion.[1] By this means the following four crime-environment factors were derived:

1. Low rape and property crime rates
2. Low murder-high suicide/homicide ratio
3. Rape and property crime rate increases
4. Murder and auto theft rate increases

The factor loadings of the crime-environment variables are listed in Table 3-4. Factor scores of the forty-eight states are located in Appendix A.

This factor analysis has produced a set of crime rate groupings which differs from that adopted by the FBI. Analysis of Table 3-4 indicates that during the period 1966-1969 the frequency rates of forcible rape and robbery were

[1] See Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantative Analysis of Political Data (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, forthcoming), Chapter 4.

TABLE 3-4.--Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix: Fifteen Crime-Environment Indicators (normalized solution)

Crime-Environment Variable	Factor Loadings 1	2	3	4
Forcible Rape Rate	-.764	-.422	.138	-.040
Robbery Rate	-.811	-.262	.020	.202
Burglary Rate	-.906	-.113	.186	.212
Larceny Rate	-.906	-.179	.152	.033
Auto Theft Rate	-.723	.026	.165	.477
Murder Rate	-.152	-.907	-.057	-.068
Assault Rate	-.500	-.741	.048	- 019
Suicide/Homicide Ratio	.219	.821	.009	-.297
Assault Rate Increase	-.291	.513	.335	.145
Rape Rate Increase	-.316	-.127	.750	-.202
Robbery Rate Increase	-.265	.232	.561	.399
Burglary Rate Increase	-.092	.033	.661	-.065
Larceny Rate Increase	.244	.343	.697	.324
Auto Theft Rate Increase	-.167	-.151	.505	.507
Murder Rate Increase	-.175	-.029	-.083	.759
Percent Total Variance	27.4	18.5	15.2	10.5

Factor Labels:

1 - Low Rape and Property Crime Rates
2 - Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio
3 - Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases
4 - Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increases

more closely associated with the property crimes of larceny auto theft and burglary than with murder and aggravated assault. The FBI grouping, as published in the Uniform Crime Reports, places burglary, larceny and auto theft in a "property crime" category, while forcible rape and robbery are included with murder and aggravated assault in a "violent crime" category. The main distinction here is that the violent crime category includes those offenses against persons, while the property crimes are not directed against persons. It appears that our factor analysis grouping of the seven index crimes tends to emphasize the underlying motives, and thereby groups forcible rape[1] and robbery with property crimes rather than with violent crimes.

The fact that Auto Theft Increase loads equally on both factors three and four is noted. In this instance we have elected to include Auto Theft Increase in our label for the fourth factor, with the realization that the offense category which clearly dominates this factor is Murder Increase.

Intercorrelations Among Environmental Indicators

Having described the indicators which represent the environmental division of our systems model, we turn now to the relationships among these indicators.

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[1]This grouping of forcible rape with property crimes is supported by Amir, op. cit., p. 83, who reports that forcible rape "is not a violent crime in which brutality is inflicted upon the victim." We might speculate that this offence is akin to property crimes in that the offender seeks to "take" something the victim is reluctant to part with.

The Pearson product-moment or simple correlations among the eleven environmental indicators are set forth in Table 3-5. In our analysis of these relationships, we consider first the two factors derived by Hofferbert in 1968: Industrialization and Affluence, for which we have used the 1960 factor scores made available by Hofferbert. Table 3-5 shows that the single-characteristic environmental variables are generally isolated from Industrialization. However, with regard to Affluence the variables of Population Increase, Negro Increase, and Percent Negro 1968 register correlations of .46, .30, and -.71 respectively. It is probable that these relationships are of a spurious nature because the variable Percent Negro, 1960 is an important contributor to the Affluence factor, with a loading of -752 as shown in Table 3-1.

One exception to the foregoing relationships is the virtually equal loading of Non-white Migration on both the Industrialization and Affluence factors (.44 and .46). This is most likely a reflection of the Negro migration away from the South to the more industrialized states. Because there were so few Negroes residing in some of these states prior to 1950, the in-migration of a small number of Negroes during the 1950's resulted in a large percentage increase, thereby skewing the data on this variable.

The relationships between the four crime-environment factors and Industrialization show a positive association

TABLE 3-5.-- Environmental Indicators - Simple Correlations[a]

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Industrialization										
2	Affluence	.03									
3	Population Increase	.08	.46								
4	Non-white Migration	.44	.52	.43							
5	Negro Increase, 60-70	.04	.30	-.06	.56						
6	Percent Negro, 1968	.09	-.71	.01	-.43	-.50					
7	Contributions Claimed	.15	-.11	.13	-.24	-.30	.37				
8	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	-.25	-.53	-.63	-.25	.06	.09	-.17			
9	Low murder-high Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	-.01	.56	-.03	.50	.57	-.83	-.33	.01		
10	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases, 66-69	.18	.16	.23	.26	.20	-.04	-.09	.01	-.00	
11	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increases, 66-69	.56	.01	-.14	.14	-.22	-.06	.00	-.00	-.02	.00

[a]Pearson's r.

of Industrialization with Murder and Auto Theft Increase, and a negative association with Low Rape and Property Crime Rates. While this may appear inconsistent at first, the negative relationship with low rates implies a positive relationship with high crime rates of the categories specified. The above set of relationships suggests that states with relatively high 1966-1969 mean rates of rape and property crime recorded the greatest increases in murder rates. The implication here is that prior to 1966 the murder rates in these states were relatively low, and even slight increases in the number of murders over the four-year period resulted in the statistically high increases.

Considering the relationship between Population Increase (1960-1970) and Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, a rather strong negative relationship (-.633) is recorded. This indicates that states which experienced relatively high in-migrations also experienced relatively high rates of rape, robbery, larceny, burglary and auto theft.

Percent Negro, 1968, is strongly (and negatively) associated with only one of the four crime-environment factors --Low Murder and High Suicide/Homicide Ratio. Again a negative relationship with low crime rates implies that a relatively large concentration of Negroes is related to above-average murder rates.

Summary

Chapter III has introduced the eleven environmental indicators which comprise the input division of the systems model. Among these indicators are Hofferbert's factors--Industrialization and Affluence--derived by factor analysis from twenty-one ecological variables representative of 1960 interstate socio-economic variances. These two factors are supplemented by four single-characteristic variables which record shifts in population and racial balance occurring between 1950 and 1968. In addition, employing factor analysis techniques, four crime environment factors have been derived from the fifteen criminal activity indicators introduced. Incident to the derivation of the crime-environment factors, some of the problems encountered in the collection of comparable crime statistics have been discussed.

Our examination of the interrelationships among the eleven environmental indicators shown in Table 3-5 has indicated that relatively high rates of property crime (robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft) and forcible rape are strongly associated with high rankings in Affluence and Population Increase, and moderately related to Industrialization and Non-white Migration. In contrast, violent crimes against persons (murder and aggravated assault) tend to occur most frequently in states where the Negro population is highest. On the other hand, states which recorded the largest percentage increase in their Negro populations during the past

two decades tended to rank below-average in rates of violent personal crime between 1966 and 1969.

Lastly, of interest is the definite and positive relationship ($r = .56$) between Industrialization and the Murder and Auto Theft Increase factor. Further examination of the simple correlations (not shown in Table 3-5) reveals that the Auto Theft Increase (1966-1969) and Industrialization relationship dominates ($r = .62$), while the increase in reported murder rates is virtually isolated from Industrialization ($r = -.06$).

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL SYSTEM INDICATORS

Chapter IV introduces and describes the political system indicators listed in Figure 4-1. As in the preceding chapter, two multi-characteristic factors derived by earlier researchers are enlisted as chief indicators of state political systems. Factor analysis is employed to derive two factors which are representative of criminal justice systems and which are treated as part of the political system for the purposes of this inquiry. These four factors are augmented by single-characteristic variables. Factor scores

Figure 4-1.--Political System Indicators

State Political Systems	Criminal Justice Systems
Professionalism-Local Reliance	Police-Corrections Expenditures
Competition-Turnout	Judicial-Prosecution Expendt's
	Expenditure Level
	State/Local Expenditure Ratio
Governor's Formal Power	Prisoner/Population Ratio
	Prison Inmate Increase
Revenue as Percent of Personal Income	Percent Prisoners Paroled
	SPA Police Representation
Innovation	SPA Courts Representation
	SPA Corrections Representation
Centralization	State/Local SPA Representation Ratio

and other data concerning the indicators to be described below are located in Appendix B of this study.

Professionalism-Local Reliance

The first of two multi-characteristic factors which are representative of state political systems, Professionalism-Local Reliance, has been derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert,[1] who describe this factor as having drawn its name

> . . . from the positively-loaded measures of judicial and legislative compensation, expenditures on legislative compensation, expenditures on legislative services, and legislative activity; and from negatively-loaded measures of reliance upon state government expenditures and federal aids. States scoring high on this factor show high salaries for judges and legislators, well-financed legislative staffs, and primary reliance on locally-raised and spent revenues. . . . (This factor) suggests that states making heavy use of intergovernmental assistance have judicial and legislative institutions that are less well-developed than average.[2]

Loadings of the political variables employed by Sharkansky and Hofferbert on Professionalism-Local Reliance are listed in Table 4-1.

Competition-Turnout

The second of our two chief indicators of state political systems is Competition-Turnout, another factor

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[1] Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 867-79.

[2] Ibid., p. 870.

TABLE 4-1.--Varimax, Rotated Factor Loadings of Political Variables on the Sharkansky-Hofferbert Political System Factors

Political Variables	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Competition-Turnout
Compensation of Judges	.897	.045
Compensation of Legislators	.865	.142
Legislative Service Expenditures	.821	.025
Number of Bills Introduced	.812	-.130
State and Local Revenue from Federal Government	-.763	-.293
State and Local Revenue spent by state agencies	-.732	-.330
Lower House Seats of the Major Party	-.280	-.861
Gubernatorial Election Turnout	.033	.827
Gubernatorial Vote for Major Party	-.077	-.775
Liberal Suffrage Laws	-.006	.717
Lower House Tenure of Major Party	-.061	-.623
Percent of total variance	36.7%	28.8%

Source: Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 867-79.

derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert. Their description of this factor is as follows:

> (Competition-Turnout) has as its highest-loaded variables the measures of turnout in a gubernatorial election, an index of suffrage liberality, and (negatively) one-party dominance in the state legislature and in recent elections for governor. The Competition-Turnout dimension provides some post hoc justification for the many studies of state politics that have focused almost entirely on electoral processes and inter-party struggles.[1]

The reasons for adopting both Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout as the chief indicators of state political systems are found in the variable loadings displayed in Table 4-1. The variable which loads highest on Professionalism-Local Reliance is Compensation of Judges. Considering the importance of the judicial function to criminal justice administration and assuming that there exists some relationship between compensation of judges and the character of judicial decisions the contribution of this one variable renders Professionalism-Local Reliance potentially important to our analysis. The variables which are next in importance to this factor are the three indicators of professionalism in state legislatures. These characteristics could be instrumental in legislative decisions related to state expenditures for criminal justice functions, and to the character of state criminal statutes. Such legislative decisions affect the style of police and other criminal justice activities within the state and thereby enhance

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[1] Ibid.

the potential of Professionalism-Local Reliance as an indicator of influences on law enforcement planning.

With regard to the Competition-Turnout factor the importance of those variables which pertain to the competitiveness among state political parties is noteworthy, as is the contribution of other variables which measure the degree of voter participation in state-wide elections. High scores in both party competition and voter participation suggest the presence of general support for the existing political structure, and a lessened propensity toward the alienation and civil disorder related thereto.[1] For this reason Competition-Turnout merits inclusion as a potentially important indicator of law enforcement planning influences, especially since the control of civil disorder is one of the main objectives of Federal assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.

Governor's Formal Powers

One outcome of Joseph A. Schlesinger's study, "The Politics of the Executive,"[2] is a general index of the formal powers of each state's governor. This index is based on four specific measures of the governor's formal powers: tenure potential, appointive power, budgetary power, and veto power. In the index devised by Schlesinger the maximum

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[1] See Easton, (1965), op. cit., p. 55.

[2] In Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 207-237.

rating is a score of 19, awarded only to New York. The lowest rating assigned is a score of 7, for which four states qualify: North Dakota, Texas, Mississippi and South Carolina.[1]

In Schlesinger's judgment, the formal strength of each state's governor is positively associated with the size of the state of which he is the chief executive. This suggests that "as the complexity of a state increases, the governor's need for explicit means of control over his administration also increases."[2]

Although an index ranging from 7 to 19 may be adequate for Schlesinger's purposes, at this point it appears that the narrow range of index scores will not provide the degree of discrimination needed in dealing with forty-eight states.[3] This raises the question of whether Schlesinger's index of gubernatorial power merits inclusion here as an indicator of state political system characteristics.

The reason for the inclusion of Schlesinger's index, despite its apparent limitations, lies in the implications of the block grant funding method which give the governor a key role in influencing the direction of law enforcement planning within his state--provided, of course, that the governor has

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[1] Ibid., p. 228.

[2] Ibid., p. 231.

[3] Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 871, note that Schlesinger's index survived their initial test for high intercorrelations among substantively similar variables, but failed the test for higher loading on a single factor.

the formal powers to appoint those whom he wishes as members of the SPA supervisory board within the guidelines set forth by LEAA. Table B-4 of Appendix B, for example, illustrates the great variance in the composition of the various SPA's. Representation by sheriff and police departments ranges from a high of 55.6 percent in Vermont to a low of 12.5 percent in Delaware, for example.

Revenue as Percent of Personal Income

In his comparative study of the issue-basis of political divisions, John H. Fenton uses the percent of per capita income collected as state and local tax revenue from own sources to isolate those states in which issue-oriented politics exists independent of the two-party form. Fenton reports that his measure of governmental versus private allocation of income is not significantly related to competition, income or urbanism. He concludes that the level of government versus private expenditures is at least partially determined by factors somewhat independent of these three variables.[1] In his search for independent factors, Fenton notes that in 1959 eleven of the twelve states which ranked lowest in governmental versus private allocation of personal income had one important characteristic in common:

> In each one, with the single exception of Connecticut, the composition of both the Democratic and Republican parties is in part a function of the Civil War. People

[1] John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966), p. 48.

> from the South who settled in those states often sympathized with the South during the Civil War and voted Democratic, and settlers from New England voted Republican in support of Abraham Lincoln. The political loyalties that developed out of the Civil War persist in the 1960's through the sons and grandsons of the original settlers, which means that current political affiliations have little relevance to current issues. Thus, in these states, class and other divisions of the electorate concerning twentieth-century issues are obscured and distorted by the white supremacy issue and by the sectional division produced by the Civil War, and the consequence in all eleven states has been an almost unbroken history of standpattism and oligarchical rule.[1]

Taking our lead from Fenton, we include State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income as an indicator of state political systems. Our interest here is the relationships between state histories of "standpattism and oligarichal rule," patterns of criminal activity, and the allocation decisions of the state law enforcement planning agencies. Data for this indicator is taken from Rankings of the States[2] and consists of the general revenue of state and local governments from own sources, 1967-1968, as percent of personal income in 1968.

In comparing the 1959 data used by Fenton with the 1967-1968 data employed in this study, we note that eight of the twelve lowest-ranking states in Fenton's 1959-based list were still among the twelve lowest-ranking in 1968: Texas,

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[1] Ibid. Regarding Connecticut, Fenton comments: "It is possible that Connecticut's low rank is due to the high incomes of suburban dwellers near New York City, which distorts the per capita income figure for the state."

[2] National Education Association (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 38.

New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Illinois and Missouri. The four states which climbed out of the "lowest twelve" grouping are Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Delaware. These four have been replaced by Tennessee, Arkansas, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.[1]

It is important to note that our data, like that of Fenton, is based solely on personal income; other measures of a state's financial resources such as corporate income and wealth, are not reflected. Thus, our indicator does not reflect the full measure of a state's ability to finance public services, including law enforcement or criminal-justice services.

Innovation

To explain the relative speed of adoption and the patterns of diffusion of innovations by state legislatures, Walker has devised an "innovation score"[2] which we have adopted as an additional means of investigating political system influences on state-wide law enforcement planning.

The reason for including Innovation as a political system indicator rests in a belief that states whose legislatures are "innovative" should be those states in which law enforcement planning is also "innovative."

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[1]This instability over time of the lowest-ranking states appears to weaken Fenton's thesis of the continuing effects of the Civil War.

[2]Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation among the American States," American Political Science Review LXIII (September, 1969), 880-899.

Walker's Innovation score is based on his analysis of eighty-eight different programs which were enacted by at least twenty state legislatures prior to 1965. The larger the innovation score, the faster the state has been, on the average, in responding to new ideas or policies.[1] The programs considered by Walker comprised six to eight different pieces of legislation in each of twelve areas: welfare, health, education, conservation, planning, administrative organization, highways, civil rights, corrections and police, labor, taxes, and professional regulation. Sixteen of the eighty-eight programs diffused primarily during the latter half of the nineteenth century; the remainder were adopted during the twentieth century. States ranking highest in Innovation include New York, Massachusetts, California, New Jersey, and Michigan. Those ranking lowest include Texas (44th), South Carolina, Wyoming, Nevada, and Mississippi (48th).

Centralization

In an effort to evaluate the degree to which important decisions in state political systems come from one organizational location (centralized decision-making) or are shaped by several cohesive subgroups (decentralized decision-making), Wayne L. Francis has developed a centralization

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[1] Ibid., p. 883.

index, which ranges from 0.0 to 1.0.[1] This index is based on the opinions of state legislators as to where the most significant decisions are made in their legislature. Opinions were obtained by means of a mail questionnaire.

Responses from legislators who felt that important decisions are made "in the governor's office" or in "policy committee" were assigned a score of 1.0. "Party caucus" rated a score of .50, while "regular committee meetings" and "on the floor" received scores of 0.0. The scores were totaled for each state and then divided by the number of responses for that state. Responses ranged in number from 5 in Texas to 25 in Iowa, with an overall return rate of 54 percent from 1,600 questionnaires mailed in late August and early September, 1963.

According to Francis' centralization index, Alabama, New Jersey and Tennessee rank highest in centralization, while South Carolina, Nevada and Florida rank lowest. Scores for all forty-eight states are located in Table B-2 of Appendix B.

The rationale for inclusion of Centralization is similar to that given for including Governor's Formal Power as an indicator of state political system characteristics. Since a high Centralization score implies that important decisions are made in either the governor's office or in policy

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[1]Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), pp. 72-75.

committee, where governors are frequently important participants, it is appropriate to consider Centralization as being, in effect, a measure of governor's informal power.

Political System Interrelationships

The relationships among the political system indicators shown in Table 4-2, indicate that Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout are both positively related or associated with Innovation and Governor's Formal Power. However, the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors are inversely related to Centralization and to State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income. This suggests that although the correlations with the latter two variables are less than with the first two, the inverse relationships may portend greater explanatory power by Centralization and State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income than the simple correlations imply.

The negative relationship between Centralization and the State and Local Revenue Indicator suggests that where the key decisions on legislation are made in the Governor's Office or locations other than in the state legislature, the citizens are less willing to tax themselves than in states where decision making is less centralized.

Criminal Justice System Indicators

For the purposes of this study, state criminal-justice systems are treated as subsystems of the state

TABLE 4-2.--Simple Correlations, Political System Indicators

	1	2	3	4	5
1 Professionalism-Local Reliance					
2 Competition-Turnout	-.00				
3 Innovation	.71	.37			
4 Governors' Formal Power	.39	.32	.52		
5 Centralization	.26	-.17	.31	.37	
6 State & Local Revenue as % Pers. Income	-.20	.20	-.18	-.04	-.26

political systems.[1] Since this inquiry concerns the influences of both environmental and political system variances on law enforcement planning outputs, and in view of the fact that the several components of the criminal justice system--courts, corrections and police--are strongly represented on the SPA boards, it is apparent that the following indicators are important to our overall analysis.

Variances in state criminal justice systems for which indicators have been selected reflect three distinct areas: 1) expenditures by state and local governments for all criminal justice functions; 2) state prison systems; and 3) the composition of the SPA supervisory boards.

[1]It is recognized that state criminal justice systems could be considered indicators of policy outcomes. At one point certain criminal justice expenditure indicators are employed as dependent variables in order to determine the influence of other political system and environmental characteristics on the criminal justice system of each state.

Criminal Justice Expenditures

This comparison of differences in criminal justice expenditures by both state and local governments within the state relies on the December, 1970 report issued jointly by LEAA and the Bureau of the Census, "Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1968-69." In each of the indicators derived from this report, expenditures are computed in terms of each state's 1968 total personal income in order to provide a basis for comparison of the relative fiscal effort that the expenditures entail.

As explained in the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report, expenditure data for the report was gathered in connection with the 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Governmental Finance, and the 1969 Annual Survey of Public Employment, both conducted by the Bureau of the Census. These surveys were augmented by responses to mail canvass questionnaires sent to a sample of approximately 6,200 local governments to elicit judicial expenditure data. The data is presented with a warning that there are "various limitations on the comparability of governmental finance and employment data."[1]

While recognizing the limitations of the data used, it is important to note that prior to December, 1970 expenditures for judicial activities were not separately tabulated

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[1]U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and Bureau of the Census, "Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1968-69," issued, December, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report).

in reports on criminal justice expenditures. Hence, this is the first instance in which expenditures for all three major components of the criminal justice system by both state and local governments have been available for comparative purposes.

Listed below are the six variables derived from the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report which have been adopted as indicators of interstate variance in criminal-justice systems for fiscal year 1968-1969.

1. Ratio of state government expenditures to local government expenditures for all criminal justice functions.

2. Percent of total personal income (1968) expended by state and local government for all criminal justice activities.

3. Percent of state and local criminal justice expenditures allocated to police protection. This includes regular police service, traffic control, and traffic safety activities, vehicular inspection, and detention and custody of persons awaiting trial at the municipal level.

4. Percent of state and local criminal justice expenditures allocated to judicial activities, including all courts and activities associated with courts (e.g. law libraries, medical and social service activities, and juries).

5. Percent of state and local criminal justice expenditures allocated to prosecution, which includes the activities of the attorneys general and their staffs involving

advice to the Governor on the legality of proposed actions, representation of the State in all law suits, and prosecution of violators of criminal law. Expenditures for both civil and criminal activities are included.

6. Percent of state and local criminal justice expenditures allocated to correctional activities, which include the confinement and correction of adults and minors convicted of offenses against the law, as well as the pardon, parole, and probation activities. Expenditure data for county jails and other closely related items are included, but not for city jails, which is included under police protection.

In order to keep the number of indicators dealt with to a minimum, variables 3 through 6 above have been subjected to factor analysis, using the varimax rotation technique. The result of this analysis, as shown in Table 4-3, is to combine the four variables into two criminal justice expenditure factors.

From Table 4-3 it is apparent that the first factor reflects relatively high state and local expenditures for police protection and relatively low expenditures for correctional activities. We specify the relative nature of these expenditures for the reason that nation-wide expenditures for police protection are consistently highest (62 percent), while correctional activities receive about one-third that amount (21 percent), and judicial and prosecution activities

TABLE 4-3.--Rotated Varimax Factor Matrix of State and Local Government Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions

Expenditure Variables	Factor Loadings 1	2
Police Protection	.95635	-.28492
Correctional Activities	-.92631	-.34687
Judicial Activities	-.15206	.81613
Prosecution Activities	-.15215	.68397
Percent of Total Variance	45.5	33.4

Factor Labels: 1 - Police-Corrections Expenditures
2 - Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures

rank a poor third (7 percent).[1] Thus, when we indicate that a state expends a relatively high amount on police protection, and a relatively low amount on correctional activities, we mean that police protection commands more than 62 percent of criminal justice system expenditures, and correctional activities receive something less than the national average of 21 percent.

Of the state and local government expenditures for the Judicial-Prosecution factor, judicial activities account for 76 percent, while prosecution claims the remaining 24 percent.

[1]Computed from LEAA-Bureau of the Census, op. cit., Table 5, pp. 14-15.

State Prison Systems

The second type of criminal justice system indicators to be dealt with are those which are representative of state prison system differences. Data used is for the year 1967, which is the most recent data available.[1]

Prisoner-to-Population Ratio. The ratio of the 1967 year-end inmate population of state prisons to the number of persons residing in the state ranges from a high of 1.448 prisoners per 1,000 population in California, to a low of 0.285 per 1,000 in North Dakota, with a national mean of 0.886 inmates per 1,000 population. Care must be taken in interpreting this ratio because of the wide variances in minimum sentence which leads to incarceration in a state's prison system, and in parole policies.

Prison Inmate Increase. The second indicator of state prison system variance is the percentage increase in prison inmate population between 1964 and 1967. Nationally, the total number of state prison inmates at the end of 1967 was 8.9 percent less than at the end of 1964, indicating that there existed during this four-year period a general trend toward reducing the number of persons incarcerated in state prison systems. Whether this trend is offset by increases in jail populations is unknown. Of the forty-eight states studied, eleven recorded net increases in inmate populations,

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[1]U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin, No. 44 (1967).

with Nevada leading with an increase of 35.1 percent, from 450 to 651 prisoners, between 1964 and 1967. The state which recorded the largest percentage reduction in inmate population is West Virginia with a drop of 29.8 percent from 1,722 to 1,208 prisoners.

Percent Prisoners Paroled. The final indicator of state penal systems included in this study is the percent of all state prison inmates released during 1967 who were released on parole or other conditional release. Nationally, 67.6 percent of inmates released from state prisons during 1967 were granted conditional releases (generally on parole). The state of Washington led all others in this category by conditionally releasing 99.8 percent of inmates, while Oregon released only 40.1 percent in this manner. Wyoming ranks last in percent of conditional releases with 8.7 percent, which means that over 91 percent of Wyoming's state prison inmates who were released during 1967 served out their sentences in confinement.

The foregoing does not take into account the average length of sentence awarded by the courts in each of the states. This could have an important impact on parole philosophies. Another factor here, and one which is dealt with later, is the pressure on parole boards to maintain a constant level in the inmate population of the state prison system.

State Planning Agency Composition

The third area in which indicators of criminal justice system differences are sought is in the composition of the SPA supervisory boards which have been appointed by the forty-eight state governors in response to the Safe Streets Act. Assisted by a professional staff, the SPA board is responsible for planning and implementing law enforcement improvement on a state-wide, coordinated basis. This responsibility includes, inter alia, establishing priorities for law enforcement improvement; monitoring progress and auditing expenditures under grants to local units of government; coordination with other federally-supported programs having an impact on law enforcement; and collecting data relevant to law enforcement in the state as required by LEAA.

LEAA Criteria. Guidelines[1] published by LEAA set forth the criteria for SPA board composition. Of particular interest are the criteria for representation. The Safe Streets Act stipulates that state planning agencies must be representative "of law enforcement agencies of the State and of the units of general local government within the State."[2] In implementing this provision, LEAA guidelines require

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[1]U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Guide for Comprehensive Law Enforcement Planning and Action Grants, Fiscal Year 1970, pp. 3-4.

[2]Public Law 90-351, op. cit., Sect. 203(a).

"balanced representation" in the make-up of the SPA board, which must include representation of the following:[1]

1. State law enforcement agencies.
2. Units of general local government by elected policy-making or executive officials.
3. Law enforcement officials or administrators from local units of government.
4. Each major law enforcement function--police, corrections, courts--plus, where appropriate, representation identified with the Act's special emphasis areas, that is, organized crime and riots and civil disorders.
5. Juvenile delinquency, as well as adult crime control competencies.
6. Community or citizen interests.
7. Reasonable geographic and urban-rural balance, with regard for the incidence of crime and the distribution and concentration of law enforcement services in the State.

Lastly, the LEAA guidelines call for representation between State law enforcement agencies on the one hand and local units of government and local law enforcement agencies on the other, to approximate proportionate representation of State and local interests.

The foregoing has been set forth to illustrate the problem faced by a governor who would seek to comply with the LEAA guidelines in this respect. Two "loophole" provisions in the guidelines ease the governor's problem however. The first makes it possible for one board member "to be representative of more than one element or interest." The second provides for a case-by-case evaluation by LEAA of the "representative character of a State planning agency and its staff." This provision is in recognition of the

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[1]LEAA Guide, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

"existing diversity of State governmental structures and of law enforcement conditions within the States."[1]

Among the several responsibilities of the SPA boards, the main concern of this study is the manner in which these boards allocated the $184.5 million in fiscal 1970 block grant action funds. In effect, the allocation decisions of the forty-eight SPA boards constitute the principal "dependent" variables, that is the law enforcement planning outputs, of this inquiry.

SPA Board Composition. In spite of the detailed LEAA criteria for representation on SPA boards, for the most part these boards are composed of criminal justice system representatives--which seems reasonable considering the responsibilities involved. The degree of citizen and local elected official representation is generally quite small. As of December 31, 1969, it was estimated[2] that citizens occupied 19 percent of SPA board memberships, while local elected officials occupied 13 percent and "others" 15 percent.

As a means of analysis, the following four indicators of SPA board composition have been derived from a report to the Congress by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations dated June, 1970:[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

[2] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, op. cit., Table 6.

[3] Ibid.

1. Percent of SPA board members representing police agencies, both state and local, including sheriffs departments and highway patrol agencies.

2. Percent of SPA board members representing courts, including the judicial, prosecution and defense functions.

3. Percent of SPA board members representing correctional activities, including probation, parole and penal.

4. The ratio of the SPA board members representing state government agencies to those representing non-state government agencies and "citizens," hereinafter referred to as the state/local ratio.

Criminal Justice System Interrelationships

The interrelationships among the eleven criminal justice system indicators are set forth in Table 4-4. Inspection of this Table indicates that where the state/local criminal justice expenditure ratio is high, expenditures for correctional activities are also high, and expenditures for police activities are relatively low. The explanation here is that in most states the prison system claims the bulk of the state government's criminal-justice expenditures.[1] Thus, when the state-to-local expenditure ratio is high, expenditures for correctional activities may be above average, or may only appear to be so due to the absence of large city expenditures for police protection and related activities

[1]This statement is based on a review of the data presented in Table 4 of the LEAA-Bureau of the Census report, op. cit.

TABLE 4-4.--Simple Correlations[a] of Criminal Justice System Indicators

	Indicator	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Police-Corrections Expenditures										
2	Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	-.01									
3	Police Representation on SPA Board	-.23	.09								
4	Courts Representation on SPA Board	.19	.12	-.13							
5	Correct'ns Representation on SPA Board	.16	.14	.05	.02						
6	Inmate/Population Ratio	.07	-.13	-.13	-.29	-.10					
7	Percent Paroled	.07	-.05	.06	.16	-.08	-.25				
8	Total Criminal Justice Expenditures	.01	.10	-.09	-.08	-.15	.17	.07			
9	State/Local Ratio, Crim.Just. Expend's	-.60	-.11	.35	-.01	-.06	-.18	.06	-.50		
10	State/Local Ratio on SPA Board	-.03	.01	-.10	.42	-.02	-.14	.02	-.11	.19	
11	Prison Population Increase, 1964-67	.05	-.11	.02	-.22	-.07	.03	-.00	.38	-.05	.19

[a]Pearson's r.

including the operation of jails or other pre-trial detention facilities not counted as "correctional activities."

A second relationship of interest among the Table 4-4 indicators is the positive association between Prison Population Increase and the total expenditures for all criminal justice functions. One interpretation of this relationship might be that expenditures have risen in response to increases in "criminality" during the 1960's. The sequence in this instance would be that higher crime rates led to increases in arrests, convictions, and incarcerations, all demanding higher-than-average expenditures for criminal justice matters. An alternative hypothesis could be that where increased expenditures for criminal justice functions were not forthcoming, either fewer persons were awarded prison sentences, or larger percentages were granted parole. This second hypothesis is supported by the virtual lack of association between both expenditure factors and Prison Population Increase. It is important to note, however, the lack of relationship between both the Inmate/Population ratio and Percent Paroled and Prison Population Increase.

Lastly among the criminal justice system relationships, the negative ($r = -.25$) association between Percent Paroled and Prison Population Increase is noted. This appears to be consistent, for as the percent of prisoners released on parole increases, the prison population should tend to decrease, other factors remaining stable, of course.

Having looked very briefly at the interrelationships among the criminal justice system indicators, we turn now to a consideration of the manner in which indicators of the state political systems are associated with the criminal justice system characteristics just presented.

Political and Criminal-Justice Systems Relationships

The relationships among the six indicators of state political systems and the eleven criminal-justice system indicators are set forth in Table 4-5. As in the case of the environmental indicator relationships (Table 3-5), the associations here generally are not strong, however, there are exceptions.

From Table 4-5 we can hypothesize that states ranking high in Professionalism-Local Reliance (and in Innovation) tend to allocate more than the average percent of personal income for all criminal-justice matters. In these states the SPA boards include a higher-than-average representation of police agencies and local governments tend to bear a greater share of criminal-justice system expenditures.

The relationships between Competition-Turnout and the criminal-justice system indicators suggest that states ranking high in political party competition and voter turnout tend to have relatively high representation of the courts on SPA boards and provide for the parole of state prison inmates more so than does the average state. These same states

TABLE 4-5.--Simple Correlations[a] of Criminal Justice System and Political System Indicators

Criminal Justice System Expenditures	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Competition-Turnout	Innovation	Governor's Formal Powers	Centralization	State & Local Revenue as % Personal Income
Police-Corrections Expenditures	.24	-.14	.04	.12	.14	-.17
Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	-.28	.17	-.21	-.14	-.17	.43
Police Representation on SPA Board	.34	-.18	-.30	-.09	-.10	-.03
Courts Representation on SPA Board	.09	.37	.31	.26	.13	-.09
Corrections Representation, SPA Board	-.16	-.08	-.24	-.04	-.15	-.05
Inmate/Population Ratio	.12	-.36	-.07	.10	.12	-.05
Percent Paroled	.32	.36	.58	.25	.19	-.06
Total Criminal-Justice Expenditures	.49	-.22	.26	.37	-.02	.25
State/Local Ratio, Crim-Just. Expnd's	-.39	-.07	-.22	-.25	-.17	.05
State/Local Ratio on SPA Board	-.07	-.02	.10	-.11	.19	-.28
Prison Population Increase, 1964-67	.03	-.11	-.04	-.16	-.15	-.17

[a]Pearson's r.

appear to spend relatively less of total personal income on police protection, enjoy a lower prisoner-to-population ratio, and have fewer than average numbers of police representatives on their SPA boards.

Summary

Chapter IV has dealt with the nineteen indicators which represent the political system division of the systems model upon which this study is based. The primary indicators of state political systems--Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout--are augmented by indicators of governor's power, both formal and informal, and the innovativeness of state legislatures, and the percent of personal income collected as revenue by state and local governments.

The relationships among the political system indicators, as shown in Table 4-2, indicate that the innovativeness of state legislatures, as defined by Walker, and the formal powers of the state's governor, as defined by Schlesinger, are positively associated with both Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout. Centralization which is an indicator of the governor's informal power, is somewhat negatively associated ($r = -.17$) with Competition-Turnout and positively related ($r = .26$) with Professionalism-Local Reliance. In contrast, State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income shows an inverse relationship with the two Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors. Also, the positive associations among Innovation, Governor's formal Power and

Centralization suggest that the innovativeness of a state legislature, as defined by Walker, is determined at least in part, by the actions of the state's governor.

For the purposes of this study three aspects of state criminal justice systems are treated as part of the state political system: state and local expenditures for criminal justice functions, state prison system characteristics, and SPA supervisory board composition. Factor analysis has been used to reduce the number of expenditure indicators from six to four.

The relationships among the eleven criminal justice system indicators, as set forth in Table 4-4, reflect the fact that state correctional (prison) systems are funded primarily by state governments, while local governments expend the bulk of their criminal justice funding on police activities. Of interest is the positive association ($r = .38$) between prison population increase and total expenditures for criminal justice functions. This suggests that either increases in crime rates during the 1960's have led to the higher expenditures for criminal administration, or, alternatively, that increased appropriations have made it possible to arrest and incarcerate an increased number of offenders. Of interest also is the negative association ($r = -.25$) between Percent Prisoners Paroled and Prison Population Increase, which appears consistent--for as the percent of prisoners released on parole increases, the population of

the prison can be expected to decrease, other conditions remaining relatively stable, of course.

The relationships among both political system and criminal justice system indicators, as set forth in Table 4-5, require little additional comment here. High rankings in Competition-Turnout are associated with a relatively high court representation on the SPA supervisory board and above-average scores in Percent Prisoners Paroled. States with these characteristics tend also to spend a relatively smaller portion of total personal income on police activities, enjoy a lower prisoner-to-population ratio, and have a below-average representation of police agencies on their SPA boards. States ranking high in Professionalism-Local Reliance, and in Innovation, have relatively strong police representation on their SPA boards and tend to allocate an above-average percent of personal income for all criminal justice functions. These states are characterized by high urbanization, with large city governments providing the bulk of the overall financing for criminal administration.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC POLICY OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

Indicators of the third main division of the systems model are presented in this chapter. These indicators are of public policy outcomes of a socio-economic nature, and of law enforcement planning outputs for fiscal year 1970. Included in this group of indicators are two policy outcome factors derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert--Welfare-Education and Highways-Natural Resources--plus two additional measures of general public policy outcomes--Redistributive Ratio and Income Distributional Inequality. To these general indicators are added six measures of law enforcement planning, as shown in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1.--Policy Outcome and Output Indicators

General Policy Outcomes	Law Enforcement Planning Outputs
Welfare-Education	SPA Block Grant Allocations for:
Highways-Natural Resources	Police Activities
	Correctional Activities
	Courts
Redistributive Ratio	Organized Crime Control
	Civil Disorder Control
Income Distributional Inequality	Miscellaneous

Factor scores and other data concerning the indicators to be described below are located in Appendix C of this study.

Welfare-Education

The first indicator of general public policy outcomes in the American states is the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factor Welfare-Education. States ranking high in this dimension tend to grant relatively generous welfare payments including Aid to Families of Dependent Children, Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. These states also have a higher percentage of high school pupils remaining in school until graduation, and have a relatively high percentage of candidates passing the selective service mental examination. The loadings of the policy variables employed by Sharkansky and Hofferbert on the Welfare-Education factor are set forth in Table 5-1.

Reasons for including this factor as an indicator of public policy outcomes are centered on the necessity of determining whether policy outcomes in areas not specifically related to criminal justice administration tend to influence the allocation decisions of the state law enforcement planning agencies. The characteristics represented by the Welfare-Education factor have also been credited with influencing the crime environment of the American states; hence, although there may be no direct influence of one policy outcome on another, or on law enforcement planning outputs, it is very possible that the "feedback" from policy outcomes

related to both education and welfare have an indirect, or what might be termed "second generation," influence. Daniel Glaser, for example, stresses the importance of improving the educational level of the population:

> But the primary anti-crime factor in the immediate future, in my opinion, is the general educational upgrading of our population. It has always been true that violent reaction to rebuffs, and willingness to risk arrest and prosecution by stealing, are more accepted--even expected--among the less educated than among the more educated. The more educated have more to lose by overt crime, and are more conditioned against it. I am, of course, not referring to so-called "white collar" crime, but to the offenses most often prosecuted in our felony courts.[1]

Other observers report that relative deprivation and frustration are important contributors to the violent, personal crimes dealt with in this study. According to Schuessler,[2] an important factor underlying intercity variation in crime patterns is linked to social frustration. When individuals are led to believe that social advancement opportunities are equally distributed throughout the society, but live under semicaste conditions, high discontent and associated violence, especially in inter-personal relationships, may be expected to occur. As Wilks points out,[3] most current attempts at delinquency and crime prevention are directed toward opening the opportunity structure.

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[1]Daniel Glaser, "Correctional Institutions in a Great Society," Criminologica, III (August-November, 1965), 3-5.

[2]Karl Schuessler, "Components of Variation in City Crime Rates," Social Problems, 9 (Spring, 1962), 323.

[3]Wilks, op. cit., p. 151.

TABLE 5-1.--Loadings of Policy Variables on the Sharkansky-Hofferbert Policy Outcome Factors

Policy Variables	Welfare-Education	Highways-Natural Resources
AFDC payments	.911	.049
OAA payments	.864	.170
High school graduates	.848	.113
AB payments	.834	.042
Examination success	.779	.414
APTD payments	.719	-.274
Rural road mileage	.109	.869
Hunting licenses	-.058	.860
Highway expenditures	.118	.857
Fishing licenses	.040	.800
Natural resource expdt's	.310	.719
OAA recipients	.041	.709
Percent of Total Variance	35.4	34.9

Source: Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3 (September, 1969), p. 874.

Highways-Natural Resources

The major components of the second Sharkansky-Hofferbert policy outcome factor--Highways-Natural Resources --are measures of rural highway mileage and highway expenditures, plus indicators of fish and wildlife services and expenditures for natural resources. The incidence of Old Age Assistance recipients among the population with incomes of less than $2,000 also loads high (r = .71). The authors observe that aid to the aged is "distinct from that of other welfare and education programs," and that "the aged are the largest group of potential welfare recipients who are

eligible to vote"[1]--thus explaining why this variable is not reflected in the Welfare-Education Factor. As before, the factor loadings of the policy variables dealt with by Sharkansky and Hofferbert on this factor are shown in Table 5-1.

The reasons for including Highways-Natural resources as an indicator of policy outcomes are similar to those outlined with regard to Welfare-Education, especially with regard to the frustration-aggression argument set forth by Schuessler. That is, we are interested here in whether high scores in those indicators of interest in outdoor recreation (hunting and fishing licenses sold, for example) are not inversely related to high rates of violent, personal crime.

Redistributive Ratio

In their study of "The Politics of Redistribution,"[2] Fry and Winters derive a summary measure of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures for the three lowest income classes in each state which they term the Redistributive Ratio. In arriving at this Ratio, the expenditure benefits received are compared with the revenue paid by each income class. The lowest three income classes, for which the Redistributive Ratio is derived, include those

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[1] Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit., p. 873.

[2] Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," in American Political Science Review, LXIV (June, 1970), 509-522.

families with 1961 incomes of $3,999 or less. The higher ratios indicate more redistribution to the lowest income groups. The authors explain the criteria for their Ratio as follows:

> Since it is commonly believed that the lowest income groups are denied access to the decision-making chambers of government, the limitation of our analysis to redistribution to the three lowest income groups poses a rigorous test for hypotheses involving political variables.[1]

The source of data used by Fry and Winters is a study by the Tax Foundation[2] and is restricted to revenues and expenditures for state governments only, although intergovernmental revenues and expenditures are included. The reasons for including Redistributive Ratio as an indicator of policy outcomes are discussed in the section which follows.

Income Distributional Inequality

Dye hypothesizes that the degree of income inequality in a state affects both the character of its political system and the content of its policies.[3] The Income Distributional Inequality index recommended by Dye has been

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[1] Ibid., p. 514.

[2] Tax Foundation, Inc., Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditure by Income Classes, 1961 and 1965 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).

[3] Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality and American State Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIII (March, 1969), 157-162.

incorporated here as a potentially important indicator of public policy outcomes.

The reasons for inclusion of this variable, as well as the Fry and Winters' Redistributive Ratio, rest on the findings of earlier studies[1] which indicate that marked income differences, with attendant restrictions on opportunity for certain groups, leads to high frustration and consequent high rates of certain types of criminal activity, as discussed above.

Dye employs the Lorenz curve, which shows the cumulative proportions of aggregate income accruing to cumulative proportions of the population, and measures the extent of income inequality within each state by Gini index which ranges from 1.00 (theoretical perfect inequality) to 0.00 (theoretical perfect equality). The Gini indices used by Dye were computed by Thomas D. Hopkins from income distributional data for total families and unrelated individuals in 1959. At that time, income inequality was greatest in Mississippi (.510) and least in Utah (.394). It is Dye's contention that the Gini index "permits us to systematically explore linkages between income inequalities and other

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[1] An excellent summary of "barriers to legitimate opportunity" is contained in Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 97-107. See also Ernest W. Burgess, "The Economic Factor in Juvenile Delinquency," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 43 (May-June, 1952), pp. 29-42.

measurable political system and public policy variables,"[1] thereby providing a single, comparable measure for each state.

Law Enforcement Planning Outputs

The public policy outcomes of primary interest in this study are those outputs[2] of the law enforcement planning process which are reflective of allocation decisions made by the SPA supervisory boards during fiscal year 1970.

Data concerning these allocations was obtained from the Director, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, LEAA in the form of a preliminary program analysis prepared in July, 1970. The data from this analysis is presented in Appendix C. In this program analysis, prepared by LEAA staff members, the percentage of available Federal block grant funds allocated to each of six major program categories by each of the SPA's were computed. This was done by studying the 1970 annual law enforcement plan of each state, and breaking down the total planned expenditures into the following six program categories: police, corrections, courts, organized crime, disorders, and miscellaneous.

In order to reduce these six variables to a parsimonious number of dependent variables, we subjected them to

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[1] Dye, op. cit., p. 158.

[2] See discussion in Chapter I of difference between outputs and outcomes.

a factor analysis employing a varimax rotation technique, the results of which are shown in Table 5-2.

TABLE 5-2.--Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Six Law Enforcement Planning Output Indicators

Percent of Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Funds Allocated to:	Factor Loadings	
	1	2
Police Activities	0.97139	-0.19837
Correctional Activities	-0.63697	0.37502
Court Activities	-0.64563	-0.30355
Organized Crime Control	0.01130	0.75108
Civil Disorder Control	-0.07794	0.74351
Miscellaneous	-0.50637	-0.44319
Percent of Total Variance	33.8%	26.4%

Factor labels: 1 - Police, Courts and Corrections
2 - Organized Crime and Disorder Control

From Table 5-2 it is evident that the first factor is "double ended" with a very high loading of the police activities variable at the positive end, and moderately strong loadings of the correctional and court activities variables at the negative end. This means that a state ranking high in the first factor tended to allocate an above-average portion (more than 55 percent) of 1970 block grant funds to police activities, and a below-average portion to correctional and court activities (that is, below 25.4 percent and 5.5 percent respectively). Low rankings in this

factor are suggestive of an inverse tendency in allocations for police, courts and correctional activities.

The strong, positive loadings of the Organized Crime Control and Civil Disorder Control variables on the second factor are indications that SPA allocations for these two purposes may be influenced by the same circumstances. States ranking high in this factor are those which allocated above-average portions of block grant funds for either organized crime control (2.4 percent) or for civil disorder control (2.5 percent). Low rankings in this factor suggest lower than normal allocations for these purposes; however, inspection of Table C-4 of Appendix C indicates that all states in the lower quartile of both variables allocated less than 0.5 percent for these purposes. This suggests that low scores in the second factor will be of doubtful value.

Policy Outcome Interrelationships

The simple correlations among the policy outcome and output indicators dealt with in this study are recorded in Table 5-3. Examination of these relationships reveals a virtual isolation of Welfare-Education from the SPA allocation factors. There are, however, indications that high rankings in Welfare-Education are associated with SPA allocations for courts ($r = .23$) and to control organized crime ($r = .11$). Highways-Natural Resources is unrelated to the Police-Courts-Corrections factor but does show a modest negative association ($r = -.24$) with the Organized Crime and

TABLE 5-3.--Simple Correlations, Policy Outcome and Output Indicators

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Welfare-Education										
2	Redistributive Ratio	.27									
3	Highways-Natural Resources	-.00	-.37								
4	Income Distributional Inequality	-.72	-.05	-.25							
5	SPA Allocations for Police	-.08	-.05	.09	.13						
6	SPA Allocations for Courts	.23	-.12	.22	-.41	-.50					
7	SPA Allocations for Correctional Activities	-.07	.22	-.22	-.02	-.67	.13				
8	SPA Allocations for Organized Crime Control	.11	.00	-.23	.04	-.16	-.19	.07			
9	SPA Allocations for Civil Disorder Control	-.08	.04	-.01	.16	-.23	-.10	.08	.35		
10	Police-Courts-Corrections Allocations Factor	-.09	-.02	.04	.20	.96	-.64	-.63	.03	-.06	
11	Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control Factor	-.06	.13	-.24	.17	-.19	-.31	.37	.75	.74	.03

Note: Data for items 10 and 11 are factor scores derived in Chapter V. Items 5 through 9 are based on percentage of available block grant funds allocated for each item during fiscal year 1970.

Disorder Control factor. Further examination of Table 5-3 reveals that Highways-Natural Resources does not influence allocations for civil disorder control, but is somewhat negatively associated ($r = -.23$) with the organized crime control element. The relationship of Highways-Natural Resources with SPA allocations for Courts and for Correctional activities cancel each other, which accounts for the isolation between Highways-Natural Resources and the Police-Courts-Corrections factor.

The foregoing suggests that in states ranking high in Highways-Natural Resources--Wyoming, Nevada and Montana, for example--the SPA's did not find a need to allocate Federal law enforcement assistance funds for civil disorder control, but did see a need to bolster the control of organized crime and to improve the court system more so than in most states. At the same time, the SPA's in states ranking high in Highways-Natural Resources tended to allocate below-average percentages of block grant funds for correctional activities.

Also of interest in the Table 5-3 relationships are those among the four socio-economic outcome indicators. A consistent pattern in the positive association of Redistributive Ratio with Welfare-Education and in the negative relationship of Income Distributional Inequality therewith is evident. This pattern does not prevail, however, with regard to Highways-Natural Resources, where we find negative

relationships with both Redistributive Ratio and Income Distributional Inequality. The roots of this apparently inconsistent pattern are believed to lie in the isolation between Redistributive Ratio and Income Distributional Inequality ($r = -.05$) and between Welfare-Education and Highways-Natural Resources ($r = -.00$). That is, both pairs of indicators do not represent the extremes of a continuum, but, because of the varimax rotation technique, reflect different and unrelated policy outcomes.

Summary

With the possible exception of a mild influence of Highways-Natural Resources on allocations for Organized Crime and Disorder Control, socio-economic outcomes do not appear to influence law enforcement planning outputs. Of interest is the strong negative association between Welfare-Education and Income Distributional Inequality, a matter to be discussed more fully in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI

ENVIRONMENT, POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLICY OUTCOME RELATIONSHIPS

In the three preceding chapters we have examined the relationships among the several factors and variables which serve as indicators of the main divisions of the systems model developed in Chapter I. We turn now to the main purpose of the aggregate analysis: to evaluate the influences of environmental, political system and policy-outcome characteristics on state-wide law enforcement planning outputs. The investigation here employs both simple correlation and stepwise, multiple regression techniques.

Environment and Policy Outcomes

The simple correlations between eleven environmental indicators and six policy-outcome or output variables are set forth in Table 6-1. These seventeen indicators include, inter alia, four factors derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert, four crime-environment factors derived in Chapter III, and, as dependent variables, two law enforcement planning output factors derived in Chapter V above.

TABLE 6-1.--Simple Correlations[a], Environmental and Policy Outcome Indicators

Environmental Variables	Organized Crime & Disorder Control	Police-vs-Courts & Corrections	Highways-Natural Resources	Redistributive Ratio	Welfare-Education	Income Distributional Inequality
Industrialization	.15	-.09	-.70	.49	.38	-.32
Affluence	-.04	-.12	.44	.01	.70	-.72
Population Increase	.25	-.22	.11	-.08	.05	-.18
Non-White Migration	.09	-.02	-.25	.19	.59	-.63
Negro Increase	-.14	.04	.16	.07	.53	-.47
Percent Negro, 1968	.36	.04	-.43	-.01	-.67	.71
Contributions Claimed	.24	-.24	-.21	.18	-.17	.14
Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	-.22	.39	.04	-.11	-.35	.27
Low Murder-High Suicide Rates	-.23	.02	.36	.06	.63	-.69
Rape and Property Crime Increases	-.04	-.17	-.18	.20	.12	-.09
Murder and Auto Theft Increases	.01	.28	-.38	.38	.17	.13

[a]Pearson's r.

Inspection of Table 6-1 shows relatively weak relationships between socio-economic environment indicators and law enforcement planning outputs. It is of interest that the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, Industrialization and Affluence, are less strongly related to law enforcement planning than are the Population Increase and Contributions Claimed variables, both of which have similar relationships with the two law enforcement planning output factors.

With regard to allocations of block grant funds to police, courts and correctional activities, negative relationships with both Population Increase (1960-1970) and Contributions Claimed--our indirect measure of organized religion's influence--are noted. This suggests where the population increased at an above-average rate during the 1960's, law enforcement planning agencies in fiscal 1970 tended to grant relatively large portions of block grant funds to courts and correctional agencies, and less to police-related projects. In these same States, there was a propensity for citizens to contribute a higher-than-average percent of personal income to tax-deductible causes, with organized religion receiving a significant share of these contributions.[1] This set of relationships points to a possible connection between the strength of organized religion

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[1]U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, op. cit.

and the degree of emphasis placed on the various functions of the criminal justice system.

The one environmental indicator showing the strongest relationship (r = .36) with Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control, as a factor, is Percent Negro, 1968. This suggests that states with relatively large Negro populations are also states wherein the problems of organized crime and civil disorder were given priority by the SPA supervisory boards. This relationship between racial distribution and block grant allocations is dealt with at some length in the next chapter.

Crime Environment Influences

The simple correlations between the four crime-environment factors and the two law enforcement planning output factors have been extracted from Table 6-1 and are set forth in Table 6-1A. The strongest relationships recorded in this table are between SPA allocations and the Low Rape and Property Crime Rate factor. This suggests that where the 1966-1969 mean rates of such crimes were relatively low, a higher-than-average portion of available Federal block grant funds were allocated by the SPA to police activities, while courts and correctional activities received relatively smaller allocations than the national average for these functions. At the same time we note a negative trend (r = -.23) between low rape and property crime rates and allocations to control organized crime and disorders. The

implication here is that in states with high mean rates of rape and property crimes, there exists a tendency to stress control of organized crime and disorders in the allocation of block grant funds. Alternatively, the foregoing may mean that the higher mean crime rates stimulated increased expenditures for police, courts and corrections in the years preceding 1970, with the result that the less traditional functions of organized crime and civil disorder control were "in line" for augmentations available due to the Federal block grant fund allocations.

TABLE 6-1A.--Crime Environment and Law Enforcement Planning Output Interrelationships[a]

Crime-Environment Factor	Police vs. Courts and Corrections	Organized Crime and Disorder Control
Low Rape and Property Crime	.388	-.225
Low Murder-High Suicide	.018	-.234
Rape and Property Crime Increase	-.165	-.043
Murder and Auto Theft Increase	.276	.004

[a]Pearson's r.

Crime Environment and Socio-Economic Policy Outcomes

In extending this inquiry to the relationships between the four crime-environment factors and the indicators of general, socio-economic policy outcomes, we consider the

simple correlations presented in Table 6-1 wherein an interesting set of relationships is recorded. Low murder and high suicide/homicide ratio is positively associated with Welfare-Education (r = .63), and negatively associated with Income Distributional Inequality (r = -.69). Although of lesser intensity, this relationship is reversed with regard to the low rape and property crime-environment factor. This confirms the observations of earlier researchers[1] that property crime rates tend to rise with educational levels, while high murder rates correlate frequently with socio-economic circumstances characterized by inequalities.

In order to explore further the relationships between Welfare-Education, Income Distributional Inequality and certain environmental variables, we have extracted from Table 6-1 the correlations shown in Table 6-1B. The essential point illustrated in these relationships is that in each instance the correlation between Income Distributional Inequality and the environmental variable is opposite to the relationship of Welfare-Education and that variable. On balance, the strengths of the several relationships are about the same. Thus, at least with regard to measuring the influence of these seven environmental variables on public policy outcomes, the simple Gini index of Income Distributional Inequality advocated by Dye[2] is as valid as indicator

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[1]See Glaser, op. cit. and Wilks, op. cit.

[2]Dye, op. cit.

as the more complex Welfare-Education factor derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert.

TABLE 6-1B.--Selected Environmental and Policy Outcome Interrelationships[a]

Environmental Indicators	Welfare-Education	Income Distributional Inequality
Industrialization	.380	-.327
Affluence	-.696	.721
Non-white Migration	.593	-.634
Negro Increase	.530	-.467
Percent Negro, 1968	-.669	.713
Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 1966-1969	-.346	.273
Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	.625	-.692

[a]Pearson's r.

Combined Influences

Having examined the correlations between individual environmental and policy-outcome indicators, we now consider the combined influences of selected environmental variables on law enforcement planning outcomes. In selecting seven indicators to be used as independent variables in a series of stepwise regressions, we have excluded Population Increase, Negro Increase, Non-white Migration and Percent Negro, 1968, in the interest of parsimony and to avoid problems of multi-collinearity. As noted earlier, the three

indicators of racial shifts overlap Percent Negro, 1960, an important component in the Affluence factor.

With the Police-Courts-Corrections factor as the dependent variable, the results of the first stepwise regression analysis are as shown in Table 6-2. All seven environmental variables explain 32.8 percent of the interstate variance in allocations of block grant funds to police versus to courts and correctional activities. Of the seven variables, only two make contributions which are statistically significant at the .01 level. The four crime-environment factors together account for 26.5 percent, while the three socio-economic indicators claim only 6.3 percent of the 32.8 percent total explained variance.

The main implication of the relationships illustrated in Table 6-2 is that the SPA board in states with relatively low rape and property crime rates allocated higher portions of available block grant funds to police activities, and less to courts and correctional activities than did SPA boards in states with higher rape and property crime rates between 1966 and 1969.

When the seven environmental indicators employed above are used in a second stepwise regression to explain variances in allocations of block grant funds to control organized crime and civil disorders, the results are as recorded in Table 6-3. None of the variables entered in this regression registers a significant influence. At best,

TABLE 6-2.--Regression of Seven Environmental Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities, Fiscal 1970

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	8.17	.3884	.1509	.388
2[c]	Murder and Auto Theft Increases	4.34	.4765	.2270	.276
3	Industrialization	2.03	.5109	.2610	-.088
4	Contributions Claimed	1.39	.5331	.2842	-.240
5	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases	1.34	.5534	.3063	-.165
6	Affluence	0.36	.5585	.3123	-.116
7	Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	0.95	.5730	.3283	.018

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable at step enterend.

[b]Significant at the .01 level -- see note.

[c]Significant at the .05 level.

Note.

Although we are treating a universe of observation throughout the American states, in this Table and in all regression tables which follow a test of significance is used to provide an emperical basis for judgments about relative contributions of the independent variables.

With forty-eight cases, the F value for .01 level significance is 7.20; for .05 level significance the F value is 4.04. (Dennis J. Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science (NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts,1969)

Where appropriate in each of the following regression tables, variables which make significant contributions are so identified by footnote. Absence of such indication means that none of the independent variables made significant contributions.

TABLE 6-3.--Regression of Seven Environmental Variables on Allocations for Control of Organized Crime and Civil Disorders, Fiscal 1970

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1	Contributions Claimed	2.92	.2444	.0598	.244
2	Low Rape & Property Crime Rates, 66-69	1.70	.3065	.0939	-.224
3	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	1.49	.3517	.1200	-.234
4	Industrialization	0.315	.3606	.1300	.149
5	Murder and Auto Theft Increase, 66-69	0.153	.3650	.1332	.004
6	Rape & Property Crime Increase, 66-69	0.146	.3692	.1363	-.043
7	Affluence	0.003	.3692	.1363	-.035

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable at step entered.

these results suggest that the indirect measure of religious institutional influence, Contributions Claimed, explains about six percent of the interstate variance with which we are here concerned. The second-ranking contributor is Low Rape and Property Crime Rate, which explains an additional 3.42 percent of the variance. The relationship in this latter instance is negative, which indicates that low rape and property crime rates are associated with relatively low allocations for the control of organized crime and civil disorders.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing two regressions is that the allocations by SPA supervisory

boards of fiscal year 1970 block grant funds for the control of organized crime and civil disorders is much less sensitive to environmental indicators than are decisions regarding allocations for police, courts and correctional activities.

Political System and Policy Outcome Relationships

The simple correlations between seventeen political system indicators and the same six policy-outcome variables discussed above are recorded in Table 6-4. To be considered first are the relationships between the more general incicators of state political systems and the two law enforcement planning output factors. Although the correlations recorded in the upper left section of Table 6-4 are not high, the Sharkansky-Hofferbert indicators of state political systems are here more closely associated with law enforcement planning outputs than were their indicators of the socio-economic environment discussed earlier. However, only Professionalism-Local Reliance, with correlation coefficients of -.204 and .343 appears to discriminate clearly between the two law enforcement planning factors. Innovation shows a pattern similar, but with weaker relationships. The implication of this set of relationships is that states ranking high in Professionalism-Local Reliance and in Innovation tended to allocate Federal funds for the control of civil disorders and organized crime, and to upgrade court systems and

TABLE 6-4.--Simple Correlations[a], Political System and Policy Outcome Indicators

	Organized Crime & Disorder Control	Police vs. Courts & Corrections	Highways-Natural Resources	Redistributive Ratio	Welfare-Education	Income Distribu-tn'l Inequality
Professionalism-Local Reliance	.34	-.20	-.55	.40	.39	-.16
Competition-Turnout	-.20	-.17	.25	.03	.70	-.74
Innovation	.15	-.17	-.43	.49	.70	-.54
Governor's Power	.01	-.26	.04	.27	.39	-.43
Centralization	.18	-.04	-.40	.29	-.08	.08
State & Local Revenue as % Personal Inc.	-.07	-.07	.67	-.23	.19	-.14
Police-Corrections Expenditures	.31	-.03	-.21	-.09	.01	.18
Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	-.10	.11	.46	-.13	.11	-.15
Police Representation on SPA Board	-.12	.04	.31	.07	-.33	.23
Courts Representation on SPA Board	.05	.12	.03	.17	.35	-.38
Correct'ns Rep, SPA	-.12	.23	.13	-.04	-.02	.03
Inmate/Population	.31	-.16	-.20	-.10	-.22	.39
Percent Paroled	.22	-.26	-.14	.20	.50	-.50
Prison Pop. Increase	.14	.05	-.11	.02	-.01	.02
Total Expenditures for Criminal Justice	.19	-.25	.09	.15	.23	-.27
State/Local Ratio, Crim-inal Justice Exp.	-.31	.06	.16	-.03	-.20	.01
State/Local Ratio, SPA Board Represent'n	-.20	.38	-.23	.11	-.01	-.11

[a]Pearson's r.

correctional activities more so than did most states. The fact that Competition-Turnout is negatively associated with both output factors suggests that states ranking high in this political system indicator did not find it necessary to allocate Federal funds for either the traditional police activities or the control of disorders and organized crime, both of which are essentially police functions. Instead, these states (ranking high in Competition-Turnout) tended to stress the upgrading of courts and correctional agencies in the allocation of fiscal 1970 block grant funds. It is of interest to note that where the Governor's Formal Powers are strong, the tendency of the SPA supervisory board was to favor courts and correctional systems--which tend to be agencies of the state government more so than of local governments.

The relationship between Centralization and allocations to control civil disorders and organized crime ($r = .18$) suggests that there exists some connection between what can be regarded as the governor's informal powers and the SPA supervisory board's perception of the importance of problems related to organized crime and civil disorders.

Criminal Justice System Indicators

In Chapter IV we described how factor analysis was employed to reduce the number of criminal justice system indicators from thirteen to eleven. Four of these eleven variables reflect the composition of the SPA supervisory

boards as of December, 1969; three reflect state prison system characteristics. The four remaining indicators in this category represent different aspects of State and local government expenditures for criminal justice functions. The simple correlations between these eleven criminal-justice system variables and the two law enforcement planning output factors are recorded in the lower left section of Table 6-4.

As in the earlier cases, we find relatively weak relationships between the criminal justice indicators and the law enforcement planning factors. There are, however, a number of instances in which rather clear relationships are evident. For example, the Percent Paroled variable shows a positive relationship ($r = .23$) with Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control, and a negative association ($r = -.26$) with high allocations to police and low allocations to courts and correctional activities. This indicates that states in which the larger percentage of prison inmates are released on parole tend also to allocate relatively high portions of block grant funds to improve control of organized crime and civil disorders. A perhaps equally important indication here is that states which parole the larger percentage of their prison inmates are the same states in which a relatively larger portion of the fiscal 1970 block grant funds were allocated to courts and to correctional activities. The implication here may be that the better-established state parole systems were able to demonstrate to the SPA boards

the need for additional allocations which fall under the "correctional activities" category.

The positive relationship ($r = .31$) between SPA allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control and state and local expenditures for police versus corrections is of interest to our analysis. As detailed in the following chapter, the control of organized crime and civil disorders is essentially a police function, which means that the bulk of the block grant funds allocated under this heading will go to police agencies. The implication in this instance seems to be that of continuing the strong emphasis on police activities which earlier expenditure patterns have established.

Combined Influences

To determine the combined or cumulative influence of state political system differences on law enforcement planning outputs, the following six indicators have been selected for use as independent variables in a series of two stepwise, multiple regressions:

Professionalism-Local Reliance
Competition-Turnout
Governor's Formal Powers
State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income
Centralization
State/local Representation Ratio on SPA Board

The first five of these indicators reflect state political system characteristics which appear to have the greatest influence on law enforcement planning outputs. The sixth

indicator, which is representative of the criminal justice system differences, was selected because of its generally higher correlation with both output factors of interest--higher, that is, than the other criminal justice system indicators.

The first stepwise regression employing the six variables listed above explains 21.94 percent of interstate variance in allocations of block grant funds for police versus courts and correctional activities, as shown in Table 6-5. The variance explained in this table compares unfavorably with the 32.83 percent variance explained by the seven environmental indicators employed in the regression of Table 6-2 above. As is the case in this earlier regression, we again find that the Sharkansky-Hofferbert indicators are overshadowed by less complex variables. In Table 6-5 Governor's Formal Powers and State-Local Representation Ratio on SPA Boards claim 19.5 percent of the 21.9 percent explained variance.

The results of a second regression analysis employing six political system indicators explains 22.06 percent of the variance in SPA Board allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control are shown in Table 6-6.

For the first time in four multiple, stepwise regressions, we find the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors dominating, albeit the competition is not strong. That is, Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout account for 15.73 out of a 22.06 percent total explained variance.

TABLE 6-5.--Regression of Six Political System Variables on Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities, Fiscal 1970

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	State/Local Representation Ratio, SPA	7.79	.3805	.1448	.381
2	Governor's Formal Power	2.787	.4412	.1947	-.262
3	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.533	.4520	.2043	-.204
4	Competition-Turnout	0.677	.4655	.2167	-.168
5	Centralization	0.134	.4682	.2192	-.037
6	State & Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income	0.010	.4684	.2194	-.074

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

A comparison of the regression results of Tables 6-5 and 6-6 highlights the inverse relationships between several of the independent variables and the two law enforcement planning outputs. Where state government tends toward strong representation on the SPA supervisory board, and where Governor's Formal Power and Professionalism-Local Reliance receive low scores, then SPA allocations for police activities tend to be favored. In contrast, high rankings in Professionalism-Local Reliance and Centralization, and relatively weak state government SPA board representation leads to an emphasis on Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control by the

SPA. High rankings in Competition-Turnout are associated with low emphasis on police activities and the control of organized crime and civil disorder control, and above-average allocations of block grant funds for courts and correctional activities.

TABLE 6-6.--Regression of Six Political System Variables on Allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control, Fiscal 1970

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r[a]
1[b]	Professionalism-Local Reliance	6.12	.3427	.1174	.343
2	Competition-Turnout	2.13	.3966	.1573	-.200
3	State/Local Representation Ratio, SPA	1.77	.4357	.1899	-.202
4	Centralization	0.554	.4474	.2001	.177
5	Governor's Formal Power	1.10	.4694	.2206	.008
6	State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income	- -	.4694	.2206	-.068

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

Environment and Political System Relationships

In this section the relationships among the environmental and political system indicators are explored. As before, a stepwise regression analysis is employed with one of the following measures of criminal justice expenditures

filling the role of dependent variable in each of four regressions:

1. Total expenditures for criminal justice functions by state and local governments within the state, as percent of 1968 personal income.
2. Ratio of state-to-local government expenditures for all criminal-justice functions, fiscal 1968-69.
3. State and local government expenditures for police activities, as compared with expenditures for correctional activities.
4. Level of state and local government expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions.

In this series of four regressions the same eleven environmental and political system indicators are used as independent variables. These include the four crime-environment factors derived in Chapter III and Hofferbert's two socio-economic environment factors, Industrialization and Affluence. The Sharkansky-Hofferbert political system factors, Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout, plus Governor's Formal Powers, Innovation and Centralization complete the set of eleven independent variables.

Total Expenditures

The results of the first regression in this series are shown in Table 6-7. The cumulative influence of the eleven independent variables explains 73.1 percent of inter-state variance in total expenditures for all criminal justice functions by state and local governments as a percent of 1968 total personal income. Analysis of Table 6-7 indicates that:

- The percent of personal income expended by state and local governments for all criminal justice functions is

TABLE 6-7.--Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political System Variables on Percent of Total Personal Income for 1968 Expended by State and Local Government for Criminal Justice Functions

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	77.42	.7920	.6273	-.792
2	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	1.89	.8014	.6423	.118
3	Competition-Turnout	1.16	.8071	.6515	.022
4	Affluence	3.34	.8226	.6766	.476
5	Professionalism-Local Reliance	1.37	.8288	.6868	.489
6	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	1.44	.8352	.6975	.036
7	Innovation	2.61	.8462	.7160	.264
8	Governor's Formal Power	2.14	.8549	.7308	.374
9	Industrialization	0.48	.8568	.7341	.244
10	Centralization	0.41	.8585	.7370	-.023
11	Murder and Auto Theft Increases, 66-69	0.01	.8586	.7371	-.000

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .01 level.

strongly influenced by the 1966-1969 mean rates of rape and property crimes. The negative relationship here (r = -.79) indicates that where rape and property crime rates were low, the percent of personal income expended for criminal justice functions was also low. By implication, high expenditures

for all criminal justice functions are associated with high rates of rape and property crimes.

- Only 8.4 percent of the 73.7 percent explained variance is accounted for by variables which are not reflective of crime environment. Political system variables account for 5.5 percent, while environmental indicators other than those related to crime claim an additional 2.9 percent of the explained variance. Since the Rape and Property Crime Rate factor so strongly dominates the results of this regression, no conclusions are drawn from the meager contributions of the other independent variables.

Because of the importance of the Rape and Property Crime Rate factor in this regression, the relationships between the individual offense categories which comprise this factor and overall criminal justice expenditure levels merit further attention. The simple correlations and factor loadings of five 1966-1969 mean crime rates are shown in Table 6-8.

It is evident in Table 6-8 that the four property crimes are dominant, and that forcible rape is not as strongly related to high expenditures for criminal justice functions as the factor lable suggests. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the states in which a relatively high percentage of personal income is expended for criminal justice matters are characterized by relatively high rates of property crime, especially larceny and burglary, and that the reported rates

of forcible rape are, in these states, probably only slightly higher than the national average.

TABLE 6-8.--Factor Loadings and Simple Correlations of 1966-1969 Mean Crime Rates with Low Rape and Property Crime Rate Factor

Mean Crime Rate, 1966-1969	Simple Correlation	Factor Loading
Larceny	.756	-.906
Burglary	.725	-.906
Auto Theft	.626	-.723
Robbery	.625	-.811
Forcible Rape	.491	-.764

State/Local Expenditure Ratio

The second dependent variable employed in our exploration of state characteristics which influence the expenditure of public revenues for criminal justice functions is the ratio of state-to-local government expenditures for all criminal justice functions during fiscal year 1968-1969. The outcome of a stepwise regression analysis employing the same eleven independent variables as used in the previous regression are recorded in Table 6-9.

Analysis of the results shown in Table 6-9 suggests that:

- States in which the state-local ratio of criminal justice expenditures is relatively high are those states identified by relatively low levels of Professionalism and

TABLE 6-9.--Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political System Variables on the Ratio of State-to-Local Government Expenditures for all Criminal Justice Functions, Fiscal 1968-1969

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Professionalism Local Reliance	8.46	.3941	.1553	-.394
2[c]	Industrialization	5.92	.5034	.2534	-.078
3	Centralization	2.17	.5371	.2885	-.168
4	Competition-Turnout	1.92	.5647	.3189	-.067
5[b]	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	8.35	.6572	.4319	.277
6	Innovation	0.98	.6672	.4451	-.223
7	Low Rape and Property Crime Rate, 66-69	0.28	.6700	.4490	.262
8	Affluence	0.44	.6746	.4550	-.090
9	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	0.59	.6807	.4633	.094
10	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increase, 66-69	0.26	.6834	.4670	.060
11	Governor's Formal Power	0.17	.6852	.4695	-.250

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .01 level.

[c]Significant at the .05 level.

Local Reliance in their political systems. This can be explained by the absence of large, industrialized metropolitan areas and the Professionalism-Local Reliance associated therewith in states where the state government's share of

criminal justice expenditures is above average. There are important exceptions however in states with very small geographic area and high population density, as discussed in Chapter VII.

Police versus Corrections Expenditures

The third expenditure factor to be examined by stepwise regression is Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures. The results of this regression are recorded in Table 6-10.

Analysis of the regression results listed in Table 6-10 indicates:

- That 16.1 percent of the expenditure variance is accounted for by two of the four crime environment factors: Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio, and Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 1966-1969. The remaining nine variables account for an additional 8.6 percent of the 24.7 percent total explained variance.

- That states characterized by low murder rates and relatively high increases in rape and property crime rates between 1966 and 1969 tend to spend relatively higher amounts on correctional activities than on police activities. The implications of this are discussed further in Chapter VII.

- There also exists a tendency for states ranking high in Professionalism-Local Reliance and low in Competition-Turnout to expend relatively high amounts for police protection, and less than average amounts on correctional activities. Again, we note that Professionalism-Local Reliance is

TABLE 6-10.--Regression of Eleven Environment and Political System Variables on Expenditures for Police versus Correctional Activities by State and Local Government, 1968-1969

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	6.28	.3466	.1201	-.347
2	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	2.19	.4012	.1609	-.202
3	Professionalism-Local Reliance	2.42	.4524	.2047	.244
4	Competition-Turnout	0.59	.4641	.2154	-.205
5	Industrialization	0.41	.4722	.2223	.068
6	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increase, 66-69	0.44	.4808	.2312	.103
7	Centralization	0.41	.4889	.2389	.136
8	Innovation	0.17	.4921	.2422	.044
9	Affluence	0.06	.4933	.2433	-.152
10	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 1966-69	0.17	.4968	.2468	-.166
11	Governor's Formal Power	0.00	.4969	.2469	.117

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

generally associated with Industrialization and a dominance of large cities over state government in the criminal justice expenditure area. This accounts for the lower emphasis on correctional activities in the overall expenditures for criminal justice functions in these states.

Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures

In the fourth regression of this series we employ the relative level of combined state and local government expenditures for both judicial and prosecution functions as the dependent variable. The cumulative influence of the same eleven independent variables used earlier is recorded in Table 6-11.

Analysis of the regression results recorded in Table 6-11 indicates that:

- The Sharkansky-Hofferbert environmental factors, Industrialization and Affluence, each make significant contributions, and together explain 34.02 percent of the interstate variances in level of expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions. The negative relationship with Industrialization ($r = -.44$) means that states ranking high in Industrialization are not states in which a relatively high portion of criminal justice expenditures are devoted to the judicial and prosecution functions.

- The positive correlation of Affluence ($r = .37$) complements the foregoing and suggests that states ranking high in Affluence tend to allocate relatively high amounts for both judicial and prosecution functions from revenue raised within the state. The implications of this and the foregoing finding are examined in Chapter VII.

- The variables entered in steps 1 through 3 are all environmental indicators and together account for 38 percent

TABLE 6-11.--Regression of Eleven Environmental and Political System Variables on State and Local Expenditures for Judicial and Prosecution Functions

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Industrialization	10.94	.4383	.1921	-.438
2[b]	Affluence	10.25	.5848	.3420	.374
3	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	2.76	.6171	.3808	-.211
4	Governor's Formal Power	2.10	.6401	.4097	-.140
5	Centralization	4.82	.6859	.4705	-.167
6	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	1.38	.6984	.4877	.001
7	Competition-Turnout	1.81	.7141	.5099	.171
8	Innovation	1.06	.7231	.5228	-.206
9	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	1.06	.7319	.5357	.250
10	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increase, 66-69	0.53	.7364	.5423	-.290
11	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.08	.7371	.5433	-.277

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

explained variance. The five political system variables account for only 12.58 percent. Thus it appears that expenditures for the judicial and prosecution functions are influenced to a greater degree by environmental than by political system characteristics.

Summary

To summarize the results of the foregoing four regressions, the percent of explained variance accounted for each of three variable groupings is shown in Table 6-12.

TABLE 6-12.--Summary of Environmental and Political System Influences on State and Local Government Expenditures for Criminal Justice

State and Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Characteristic	Percent Variance Accounted for by: Socio-Economic Environment	Crime Environment	Political System
Total Expenditures	2.9%	64.2%	5.5%
State/Local Ratio	10.0%	12.0%	15.5%
Police-vs.-Corrections	3.0%	16.0%	5.5%
Judicial and Prosecution	34.0%	6.6%	12.6%

Notes:

The last two expenditure characteristics listed are factors derived in Chapter IV, and are "breakouts" from the total expenditure characteristic listed first.

Percentages listed represent the sums of each individual contribution toward the total explained variance, and are not the influence of these variables considered together with others held constant as "multiple-partial" coefficients.

This summary table makes evident the strong influence of the crime environment on the total expenditures for criminal administration by state and local governments. Political system differences are somewhat more important than other types with regard to the state/local expenditure ratio,

although the influences in this category of expenditures are almost equally balanced. Although the regression analysis of expenditures for police versus corrections is not as fruitful in percent of variance explained as the other regressions, again we find the influence of the crime environment dominant. Lastly, the regression analysis of influences on expenditure levels for judicial and prosecution functions shows that the socio-economic environmental indicators account for the bulk of the interstate variance. This is the one expenditure category wherein crime environment influences are relegated the last position. A possible explanation for this pattern of influences may lie in the traditional practice of the courts to virtually "pay their own way" through fines and court costs, and thereby be in a better position to absorb fluctuations in case loads. Also, the fact that the criminal prosecutor enjoys great discretionary power with regard to the prosecution (or not) of criminal cases, provides great flexibility for handling case loads.

Public Policy Outcome Influences

The relationships among the public policy outcome indicators which comprise the third division of our systems model were examined in Chapter V wherein it was concluded that, with possible exception of the Highways-Natural Resources factor, socio-economic outcomes do not influence law enforcement planning outputs.

To validate this conclusion, the two output factors were subjected to stepwise regression analysis using the four socio-economic outcome indicators as independent variables. The results were meager indeed. Only 5.93 percent explained variance in allocations for police versus courts and correctional activities was accounted for by the four independent variables. The results with respect to allocations by the SPA supervisory boards for the control of organized crime and civil disorders were only slightly better, with 7.61 percent explained variance achieved. These results, which do not merit tabulation here, confirm our initial finding that law enforcement planning outcomes are not associated to an important degree with socio-economic outcomes, that is with previous policy outcomes in other policy areas.

One important feature of our systems model--the lack of a feedback loop--may well lie at the roots of the foregoing conclusion. This matter will be taken up in the concluding chapter.

Environment, System, and Outcome Influences

In the two sections which follow, the combined influences on law enforcement planning of variables representing all three divisions of our systems model are investigated. As before, regression analysis is used in this search for models which best explain inter-state variances in law enforcement planning. Different combinations of independent

variables are used while retaining as dependent variables the two law enforcement planning outcome factors derived in Chapter V.

Police, Courts and Corrections Allocations

Five combinations or groupings of independent variables, ranging in number from five to seventeen, have been subjected to stepwise regression analysis as a means of finding the combination which best explains variances in the allocation of fiscal 1970 block grant funds by SPA boards for police versus courts and correctional activities. The results of these regressions are shown in Tables 6-13 through 6-17.

The fraction of explained variance obtained ranges from a low of 23.9 percent using twelve independent variables to a high of 50.3 percent using seventeen variables. Explanatory power is not gained, however, solely by increasing the number of independent variables. As will become evident, greater explanatory power is achieved primarily by adjusting the "mix" of the independent variables employed. Analysis of the five regressions recorded in Tables 6-13 through 6-17 leads to the following two conclusions.

1. Crime-environment indicators must be included in any model which purports to explain law enforcement planning outputs which are related to allocations of block grant funds for police, courts and correctional activities.

2. The inclusion of Income Distributional Inequality plus the two criminal justice expenditure factors is essential to achieving maximum explanatory power within the limits of the systems model employed and the indicators dealt with in this study.

The first conclusion is founded on the marked difference in explanatory power of Tables 6-13 and 6-14. Although the eleven variables of Table 6-13 represent all three main divisions of the systems model, and include the six primary indicators derived by Sharkansky and Hofferbert, they yield only 23.9 percent total explained variance, or less than the yield of any of the four other combinations tested. In Table 6-14, four crime-environment indicators have been substituted for three policy-outcome variables--Welfare-Education, Highways-Natural Resources, and Income Distributional Inequality--and one political system variable--State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income. These substitutions increase the total explained variance by 20 percentage points--from 24.3 percent in Table 6-13 to 44.3 percent in Table 6-14.

The fact that deleting three socio-economic outcome indicators had virtually no adverse impact accords with the earlier finding that socio-economic outcomes have little influence on the type of law enforcement planning outputs dealt with here. The deletion of one political system variable does not weaken the new combination (Table 6-14) since five other political-system indicators are retained.

TABLE 6-13.--Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1	Governor's Formal Power	3.40	.2622	.0688	-.262
2	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.60	.2846	.0810	-.204
3	Industrialization	0.75	.3105	.0964	-.088
4	Income Distributional Inequality	0.94	.3403	.1158	.200
5	Highways-Natural Resources	2.06	.3964	.1571	.039
6	Welfare-Education	2.53	.4540	.2061	-.091
7	Competition-Turnout	0.73	.4693	.2203	-.168
8	State & Local Revenue as % Pers. Income	0.40	.4778	.2283	-.074
9	Centralization	0.23	.4825	.2328	-.037
10	Affluence	0.11	.4849	.2351	-.116
11	Innovation	0.20	.4892	.2393	-.173
12	Redistributive Ratio	0.15	.4925	.2426	-.023

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

Additional support for the first conclusion is found in Tables 6-15 and 6-16. The fraction of explained variance accounted for by the first six variables entered in these two tables is essentially the same as that of Table 6-14. The main difference in the latter two tables is the inclusion of criminal justice system indicators in place of two

political system variables, Centralization and Innovation. The effect of this change in mix is to replace the principal environmental indicator, Industrialization, with Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures as the third-ranking independent variable. Crime-environment indicators still retain their high rankings and contribute 22.7 percent, or about half of the explained variance regardless of the mix.

TABLE 6-14.--Regression of Eleven Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	8.17	.3884	.1509	.388
2[c]	Murder and Auto Theft Increase, 66-69	4.43	.4765	.2270	.276
3	Industrialization	2.03	.5109	.2610	-.088
4	Competition-Turnout	1.16	.5296	.2804	-.168
5[c]	Affluence	4.19	.5880	.3457	-.116
6	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	3.80	.6334	.4011	-.165
7	Governor's Formal Power	1.46	.6498	.4222	-.262
8	Centralization	0.83	.6590	.4343	-.037
9	Innovation	0.45	.6640	.4409	-.173
10	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	0.04	.6645	.4415	.018
11	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.08	.6655	.4428	-.204

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-15.--Second Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	8.17	.3884	.1509	.388
2[c]	Murder and Auto Theft Increase, 66-69	4.34	.4765	.2270	.276
3	Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	2.23	.5141	.2643	.105
4	Competition-Turnout	2.20	.5479	.3002	-.168
5	Affluence	2.85	.5870	.3446	-.116
6	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase, 66-69	3.79	.6325	.4000	-.165
7	Highways-Natural Resources	0.36	.6367	.4054	.039
8	Industrialization	0.84	.6465	.4179	-.088
9	Welfare-Education	0.26	.6495	.4219	-.091
10	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.18	.6516	.4246	-.204
11	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	0.04	.6520	.4252	.018
12	High Police-Low Corrections Expenditures	0.01	.6521	.4253	-.034

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .01 level.

[c]Significant at the .05 level.

With regard to the second conclusion and the achieving of maximum explanatory power, we note that when criminal

justice system indicators are included in the mix, their contribution is second only to that of crime-environment indicators, as illustrated in Tables 6-15 and 6-16. When policy-outcome variables are also made available they enter at the seventh step. In Table 6-15 the Sharkansky-Hofferbert outcome factor--Highways-Natural Resources--contributes only 0.5 percent; however in Table 6-16, seventh-ranking Income Distributional Inequality contributes about 3 percentage points.

Taking into account the importance of a parsimonious mix of independent variables in the regression of Table 6-17 our investigation has been limited to a mix of only five variables, each representing a different subdivision of the systems model. We see that the first four variables entered in Table 6-17 account for 33.4 percent explained variance, or more than any other combination of four independent variables.

In selecting variables for the Table 6-17 regression we chose the one indicator from each subdivision of the systems model which is most strongly associated with the dependent variable, while at the same time is relatively independent of the other variables chosen. That our success in this endeavor was less than complete is evident from inspection of the correlations recorded in Table 6-18. The chief difficulty in keeping the relationships among the independent variables of Table 6-18 weak, while still retaining

TABLE 6-16.--Regression of Seventeen Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts, and Correctional Activities

Step No.	Variable Entered	Value	R	R^2	r^a
[b]1	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	8.17	.3884	.1509	.388
[c]2	Murder and Auto Theft Increases, 66-69	4.34	.4765	.2270	.276
3	Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	2.23	.5141	.2643	.105
4	Competition-Turnout	2.20	.5479	.3002	-.168
5	Affluence	2.84	.5870	.3446	-.116
6	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases, 66-69	3.79	.6325	.4000	-.165
7	Income Distributional Inequality	2.16	.6563	.4308	.200
8	Governor's Formal Powers	0.97	.6668	.4446	-.262
9	Innovation	1.66	.6840	.4678	-.173
10	Professionalism-Local Reliance	1.02	.6943	.4821	-.204
11	Centralization	0.85	.7029	.4941	-.037
12	Redistributive Ratio	0.20	.7050	.4970	-.079
13	Industrialization	0.13	.7063	.4989	-.088
14	Highways-Natural Resources	0.10	.7074	.5005	.039
15	Welfare-Education	0.14	.7089	.5026	-.091
16	High Police-Low Corrections Expendt's	0.01	.7090	.5027	-.034
17	Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	0.00	.7091	.5028	.018

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .01 level.

[c]Significant at the .05 level.

strongest-available correlations with the dependent variable is the -.53 correlation between Low Rape and Property Crime Rates and Professionalism-Local Reliance.

TABLE 6-17.--Regression of Five Variables on SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	8.17	.3884	.1509	.388
2[c]	State/Local Representation Ratio, SPA	5.75	.4970	.2470	.381
3	Contributions Claimed	2.80	.5404	.2921	-.240
4	Income Distributional Inequality	2.69	.5777	.3338	.200
5	Professionalism-Local Reliance	0.05	.5785	.3346	-.204

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .01 level.

[c]Significant at the .05 level.

Organized Crime and Disorder Control Allocations

The second of two law enforcement planning output factors to be employed as the dependent variable in a series of stepwise regressions is the Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control factors derived in Chapter V. As in the previous analysis of combined influences, five different groupings of independent variables are subjected to regression analysis. Four of these five groupings are identical

with those employed above. The fifth grouping of five independent variables contains a different mix.

TABLE 6-18.--Simple Correlations, Table 6-17 Variables

		1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69						
2	State/Local Representation Ratio, SPA	.20					
3	Contributions Claimed	-.17	.08				
4	Income Distributional Inequality	.27	-.11	.14			
5	Professionalism-Local Reliance	-.53	-.07	.21	-.16		
6	Competition-Turnout	-.15	-.02	-.15	-.74	-.00	
7	Police vs. Corrections Expenditures	.39	.38	-.24	.20	-.20	-.17

The fraction of explained variance obtained in this series of regressions ranges from a low of 17.2 percent using only five variables to a high of 42.7 percent using seventeen variables. As noted earlier, achieving greater explanatory power is not a matter of simply increasing the number of independent variables, but is related primarily to the mix or selection of variables employed. The following discussion of this second series of five regressions builds

on the analysis of the previous section and supports the following three conclusions:

1. The influence of crime-environment indicators is less important to the explanation of SPA allocations for the control of organized crime and civil disorders than it is with respect to allocations for police, courts and correctional activities.

2. Interstate differences in expenditures for criminal justice functions exert an influence on SPA allocations for the control of organized crime and civil disorders which approximates that exerted on SPA allocations for police, courts and correctional activities.

3. The inclusion of the Sharkansky-Hofferbert indicators (factors) is important to the explanation of interstate variances in allocations for the control of organized crime and civil disorders.

In support of the first conclusion, the mix of variables listed in Tables 6-19 and 6-20 is compared. In the latter table we have substituted four socio-economic policy outcome indicators and one political system variable for the four crime-environment factors which are included in Table 6-20. Although the result of this substitution is a gain of only 2.2 percentage points in explanatory power, the policy outcome variables which replaced the crime-environment variables of Table 6-19 account for 6.9 percent explained variance. This is a marked increase over the .13 percent

TABLE 6-19.--Regression of Eleven Variables on SPA Allocations for Organized Crime and Disorder Control

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Professionalism-Local Reliance	6.12	.3427	.1174	.343
2	Competition-Turnout	2.13	.3966	.1573	-.200
3	Industrialization	0.78	.4147	.1719	.149
4	Centralization	0.69	.4301	.1850	.177
5	Governor's Formal Power	0.65	.4442	.1973	.008
6	Affluence	0.65	.4581	.2099	-.035
7	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	0.61	.4708	.2217	-.234
8	Innovation	0.40	.4791	.2295	.154
9	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases, 66-69	0.60	.4914	.2415	-.043
10	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increases, 66-69	0.01	.4916	.2417	.004
11	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates, 66-69	0.00	.4916	.2417	-.225

[a]Indicates simple correlation between dependent variable and independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

claimed by the four crime environment factors enteres in Table 6-19.

The relative unimportance of crime-environment indicators in this series of regressions on SPA allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control is also evident

TABLE 6-20.--Regression of Twelve Variables on SPA Allocations for Organized Crime and Disorder Control

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Professionalism-Local Reliance	6.12	.3427	.1174	.343
2	Income Distributional Inequality	2.88	.4129	.1705	.174
3	Affluence	0.77	.4298	.1847	-.035
4	Welfare-Education	0.84	.4475	.2003	-.062
5	Innovation	1.14	.4706	.2214	.154
6	Governor's Formal Power	0.82	.4866	.2368	.008
7	Centralization	0.87	.5031	.2531	-.037
8	Industrialization	0.42	.5109	.2610	.149
9	State & Local Revenue-Percent Pers. Income	0.06	.5120	.2621	-.068
10	Competition-Turnout	0.03	.5126	.2628	-.200
11	Highways-Natural Resources	0.03	.5132	.2634	-.239
12	Redistributive Ratio	0.00	.5133	.2635	.134

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable named at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

in Tables 6-21 and 6-22. In both instances the four crime-environment factors are entered only after the bulk of the explanatory power has been claimed by indicators of other subdivisions. In Table 6-21 the four crime-environment variables claim only 2.6 percent of the 28.8 percent total

explained variance; in Table 6-22 they account for only 4.5 percent out of the total explained variance of 42.7 percent.

In order to understand why allocations to control organized crime and civil disorders are more sensitive to political-system than to crime-environment variances, it is profitable to review the type of control projects which were approved by the SPA's of three states which rank among the upper quartile in allocations for organized crime and civil disorder control, as listed in Table C-2 of Appendix C.

In Indiana, organized crime control funds were allocated primarily to establish an organized crime intelligence unit within the Indiana State Police.[1] Disorder control allocations emphasize police-community relations programs, and the purchase of riot-control equipment. In addition, a number of programs to study causes of racial unrest and to develop recommendations for resolving them were planned for 1970 fund allocations.

In Michigan, organized crime control allocations stress improving existing organized crime units in police departments and developing them in departments where they do not exist.[2] Of particular interest is a plan to create special inter-departmental task forces (involving 16 law enforcement agencies) to work closely with the Michigan Intelligence

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[1]U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Second Annual Report of LEAA (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 7.

[2]Ibid., p. 11.

Network Team in combating organized crime. Major efforts in education programs to alert the public to the dangers of organized crime are also included. Projects in the civil disorder control category place equal emphasis on police training in the prevention and control of riots, and in the development of a state-wide emergency preparedness program for dealing with riots, civil disorders and natural disasters, including the training of 1,200 to 1,500 police reserves to aid law enforcement agencies.

In Pennsylvania, organized crime control funds are allocated to establish an intelligence unit in the state Department of Justice. In addition, the Organized Crime Division of the State Police receives additional funds to broaden its undercover operations. It is of interest that the Pennsylvania SPA spells out the problem of organized crime in some detail, for example:

> Income from gambling alone is estimated to be $2 billion a year--as much as the entire state operating budget. One hundred and forty-two identified members of the national organized crime syndicate live or operate in Pennsylvania; 92 of these individuals have criminal records totaling 495 arrests for indictable offenses, but only one is presently in jail. The national crime syndicate operates directly or through franchises, vast and lucrative criminal enterprises in gambling, loan-sharking, untaxed liquor, narcotics racketeering, and organized prostitution.[1]

With regard to civil disorder control, the largest project planned by the Pennsylvania SPA is for the expansion of the Philadelphia Police Department's Civil Disobedience

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[1] Ibid., p. 13.

Squad. Emphasis is also given to police-community relations programs, the recruitment of more Negroes to be policemen, and the development of community action programs in cooperation with the police to reduce crime.

These three examples illustrate how projects to control organized crime and civil disorders tend to focus on police activities rather than on courts and corrections. However, the scope of each of these projects exceeds the traditional areas of police responsibility and involves coordination of efforts with state and local agencies other than police agencies. A second element of importance here is the fact that the types of crime or criminal activity normally associated with organized crime and civil disorder are not those seven "index" crimes which comprise the crime environment dealt with in this study.

The relationships between allocations for organized crime and civil disorder control and political system variances are explored further in Chapter VII, and the implications of this important relationship are discussed in Chapter VIII.

The second conclusion to be drawn from this regression series concerns the important influence of criminal justice expenditure factors on both law enforcement planning output factors. This conclusion is based on the regressions recorded in Tables 6-21 and 6-22. In both regressions, police-versus-corrections expenditures by state and local

TABLE 6-21.--Second Regression of Twelve Variables on Allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control

Step No.	Variable Entered	F Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Professionalism-Local Reliance	6.12	.3427	.1174	.343
2	Police-Corrections Expenditures	3.07	.4168	.1737	.314
3	Welfare-Education	2.04	.4586	.2104	-.062
4	Affluence	1.07	.4790	.2295	-.035
5	Highways-Natural Resources	0.42	.4869	.2371	-.239
6	Industrialization	0.73	.5004	.2504	.149
7	Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	0.28	.5055	.2555	-.234
8	Competition-Turnout	0.35	.5120	.2621	-.200
9	Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	0.20	.5156	.2659	-.095
10	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases	0.24	.5201	.2705	-.043
11	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	0.39	.5275	.2783	-.225
12	Murder and Auto Theft Rate Increases	0.46	.5362	.2876	.004

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6-22.--Regression of Seventeen Variables on Allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control

Step No.	Variable Entered	Value	R	R^2	r^a
1[b]	Professionalism-Local Reliance	6.12	.3427	.1174	.343
2	Police-Corrections Expenditures	3.07	.4168	.1737	.314
3	Welfare-Education	2.04	.4586	.2103	-.062
4	Affluence	1.07	.4790	.2295	-.035
5	Governor's Formal Power	1.00	.4974	.2474	.008
6	Innovation	1.77	.5278	.2786	.154
7	Income Distributional Inequality	1.88	.5577	.3110	.174
8	Centralization	0.86	.5709	.3259	-.037
9	Rape and Property Crime Rate Increases	0.61	.5800	.3365	-.043
10	Judicial-Prosecution Expenditures	1.15	.5971	.3566	-.095
11	Murder and Auto Theft Increases	0.90	.6101	.3722	.004
12	Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	0.98	.6240	.3894	-.225
13	Redistributive Ratio	1.16	.6399	.4095	.134
14	Competition-Turnout	0.46	.6462	.4176	-.200
15	Highways-Natural Resources	0.12	.6479	.4198	-.239
16	Industrialization	0.31	.6523	.4255	.149
17	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	0.10	.6539	.4274	-.234

[a]Indicates simple correlation of dependent variable with independent variable at step entered.

[b]Significant at the .05 level.

governments combined enters at step 2 and contributes about 5.5 percent to the total explained variance. Referring back to Tables 6-15 and 6-16, we note that the other expenditure factor--Judicial and Prosecution expenditures--enters at step 3 in those regressions and contributes about 4 percent to the total explained variance in SPA allocations for police versus courts and correctional activities.

It is noted that in Tables 6-21 and 6-22 the Police-versus-Corrections expenditure factor correlates positively ($r = .31$) with SPA allocations for the control of organized crime and civil disorders. This adds support to our earlier observation that the allocation of block grant funds for organized crime and civil disorder control is essentially an allocation to police activities, although the programs to be carried out frequently exceed traditional police responsibilities.

The third conclusion, concerning the importance of the Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, is based on the relative stability of the explained variance in Tables 6-20 and 6-21, despite the shifting of variables that takes place. The key to this stability lies in the retention of all six Sharkansky-Hofferbert factors, two of which represent each of the main divisions of the systems model employed in this study. The substitution in Table 6-21 of the two criminal justice expenditure variables for two policy-outcome variables of Table 6-20 has the effect of replacing Income Distributional Inequality with Police-Corrections Expenditures

as the second-ranking contributor. The Welfare-Education factor enters at step four vice step three, while Professionalism-Local Reliance maintains its pace as the most important contributor.

Summary

In continuing this search for the mix of independent variables with the highest possible explanatory power, we examine the results displayed in Table 6-22 in which seventeen independent variables account for 42.7 percent explained variance. Comparison of Tables 6-22 and 6-21 reveals that Table 6-22 retains the mix of twelve variables from Table 6-21, and incorporates five of the six variables deleted from Table 6-20 when the Table 6-21 combination was created. This addition of five variables has increased the total explained variance by 14 percentage points. The key to this important gain is found in the variables entered in steps five through eight of Table 6-22. Three political system indicators--Governor's Formal Powers, Innovation, and Centralization--and one policy outcome indicator--Income Distributional Inequality--account for 10.65 of the 14 percentage points gained. Keeping the importance of parsimony in balance with the desire for maximum possible explained varience, it appears that the combination of independent variables entered in steps 1 through 13 of Table 6-22 best explain the fiscal 1970 block grant allocation decisions related to the control of organized crime and civil disorders

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the weaker relationship between two of the independent variables and the dependent variable.

TABLE 6-24.--Simple Correlations, Table 6-24 Variables

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Police-Corrections Expenditures					
2	Contributions-Claimed	.14				
3	Highways-Natural Resources	-.21	-.21			
4	Competition-Turnout	-.14	-.15	.25		
5	Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	-.35	-.33	.36	.68	
6	Organized Crime & Disorder Control	.31	.24	-.24	-.20	-.23

The low explanatory power of Table 6-23 merits only brief comment. The Police-Corrections Expenditure factor enters first in Table 6-23 and second in Tables 6-22 and 6-21. This lends support to the earlier conclusion regarding the relative importance of criminal justice system indicators in explaining law enforcement planning allocations. We note also that the multicollinearity ($r = -.35$) between the first and last variables entered in Table 6-23 produces a result not unlike that of Table 6-17 where the two most closely independent variable occupy the first and last positions in the "variable entered" list.

CHAPTER VII

APPLICATION

The previous aggregate analysis of law enforcement planning in forty-eight American states provides the foundation for construction of operational models of state-wide criminal administration and of law enforcement planning. This chapter builds on the findings of the previous four chapters through the construction and testing of six models, four of which depict various aspects of state and local governmental expenditures for criminal administration. Two final models incorporate sets of state characteristics which are associated with the law enforcement planning outcomes dealt with in previous chapters.

The models to be presented and discussed in this chapter are useful in identifying those sets of state characteristics most often associated with inter-state variances in governmental response to the problem of crime control and the maintenance of order. Two purposes are served by the analysis which follows: 1) evaluation of the aggregate analysis results of the previous chapters; 2) identification of unique or over-riding circumstances in certain states which

require a more detailed investigation than that performed by aggregate analysis.

The general finding of the aggregate analysis, as reported in Chapter VI, is that the fiscal 1970 state planning agency allocations of Federal block grant funds for police, courts and correctional activities were more sensitive to environmental variances than to political system variances. In contrast, allocations for the control of organized crime and disorders were found to be sensitive to political system differences, but were not influenced by environmental variances to an important degree. These findings lead to the question of how the influences of varying environmental and political system characteristics operate to affect the allocation decisions of the SPA supervisory boards. Chapter VII responds to this question through the construction of models, followed by their testing and evaluation.

The procedure employed in model construction is to build on the multiple regressions of Chapter VI through the substitution and addition of indicators which strengthen the mix of variables entered in each regression. It is recognized that this procedure leads to instances of overlap or multicollinearity in which two or more variables reflect aspects of essentially the same state characteristics. Hence the accuracy computed for each of the models is not meant to indicate the degree of explanatory power of the model, but is included only to suggest the degree to which the tendencies of state rankings in the variables which comprise each model

are predictable. Indications of model accuracy are based on ordinal rankings only; no attempt is made to employ the interval data which was processed in the earlier aggregate analysis since the purpose here is to provide a standard for comparison. This is done in order to tie the aggregate analysis to particular states with a view toward enhancing the explanation of interstate variances in law enforcement planning.

All six models presented here are "double ended" in that each permits the identification of groups of states which rank at either extreme in the characteristic represented by the model. States which rank either high or low, as appropriate, in most of the model's variables form one group, while other states with inverse rankings in most of the same variables form another group.

Following a brief introduction, each of the six models is tested through application to the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in the characteristic represented. It is recognized that in applying each model to only twenty-four states, the effectiveness of the model is not tested with regard to the twenty-four other states which rank neither particularly high or low in the characteristic which the model represents. This is largely compensated for by the fact that forty-seven of the forty-eight states dealt with are examined with regard to at least one of the six models, while thirty-two states are examined by three of the six models, and eighteen states are examined by four models.

In a less mathematically sophisticated fashion, this application phase resembles the procedure employed by Matthews and Prothro[1] who derived a multiple regression equation to represent the typical relationships between twenty-one social and economic characteristics and Negro voter registration rates in 997 southern counties. The values of these demographic attributes for each county were entered into the regression equation to predict the 1958 Negro registration rates. Counties in which the actual voter registration rates varied significantly from the predicted rates were then examined by "residual analysis."[2] In this manner Matthews and Prothro were able to "control the effects of the socio-economic structure on Negro registration and ascertain whether political and legal factors have any independent association with Negro registration; and if so, how much." As the authors explain, "The larger the residual, the more likely it is that other factors are needed to explain the county's Negro registration rate."[3]

In this application phase the rankings of the twenty-four states in each of the variables which comprise the model are examined. Rankings inconsistent with those

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[1]Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," American Political Science Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June, 1963), 355-67.

[2]Deviations from predicted levels are called "residuals" in statistical parlance.

[3]Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., p. 356.

predicted by the model suggest that the model is inappropriate for particular states. In some cases it is possible to explain the ranking inconsistencies by analysis of the data upon which the rankings are based. In other instances there appears, within the parameters of the model, to be no explanation for the inconsistencies. This requires the exploration of state characteristics not represented by the model. In a few instances this exploration extends to variables not included in the earlier aggregate analysis. The result is a sharpening of our understanding of law enforcement planning complexities.

The first four models to be examined all deal with expenditures for criminal justice functions, in short, with how state and local governments allocate their own resources for purposes of crime control and the maintenance of order. The final two models are representative of fiscal 1970 law enforcement planning outcomes, or how state law enforcement planning agencies allocated Federal block grant funds to improve law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice within each state.

Model I
Criminal Justice Expenditure Level

Model I employs a set of eight state variables, as shown in Figure 7-1, which together appear to have influenced the 1968-1969 level of expenditure for criminal justice functions by state and local governments. For comparative

purposes the combined expenditures of state and local governments within the state are expressed as a percent of total personal income for 1968. Model I is based largely on the regression of Table 6-8 in that six of the eleven variables entered in that regression are included. In addition, Model I incorporates Population Increase, 1960-1970 and Prison Inmate Population Increase, 1964-1967.

Figure 7-1.

Model I

Environmental Variables	Political System Variables
Industrialization Affluence Population Increase Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	Professionalism-Local Reliance Governor's Formal Power Innovation Prison Population Increase

Expenditure Characteristic

State and Local Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions as Percent of Personal Income

The eight variables which comprise Model I suggest that the following conditions are associated with relatively high combined state and local government expenditures for all criminal justice functions:

- High mean rates of forcible rape and property crimes, accompanied by rapid population growth between 1960

and 1970, and by a relative increase[1] in state prison inmate population between 1964 and 1967.

- High rankings in Affluence and above-average rankings in Industrialization, accompanied by high scores in Professionalism-Local Reliance, Governor's Formal Powers, and moderately high ranking in Innovation.

Among the states in which the level of criminal justice expenditure as a percent of personal income was highest in 1968-1969, Model I is best exemplified by California and New Jersey. At the low-expenditure end, Arkansas best exemplifies Model I, with Alabama, South Dakota, Iowa, North Dakota and West Virginia only slightly less representative.

A comparison of California's ranking in Model I variables with the ranking of Arkansas, as shown in Table 7-1, illustrates the two aspects of Model I. The loadings of Table 3-1 show that the three variables which load relatively high on both Industrialization and Affluence are Percent Urban, Telephones per 1,000 Population, and Personal Income Per Capita. To a lesser degree, both factors are also characterized by above-average rates of business and commercial establishment failures. When these variables are combined with high rates of population increase and prison population increase, there exists the type of environment

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[1] As indicated in Table B-5 of Appendix B, only 10 of the 48 states recorded actual increases in prison inmate population between 1964 and 1967. Thus a "relative increase" may, in some instances, mean an actual decrease in inmate population.

frequently associated with high rates of property crime--in which California led the nation from 1966 to 1969. California's high rankings in Professionalism-Local Reliance, Governor's Formal Power, and Innovation are all consistent with relatively high expenditures for all criminal justice functions.

As noted above, Arkansas exemplifies the low-expenditure aspect of Model I. Again we find consistency in that the socio-economic environment of Arkansas is that which is generally associated with low rates of property crime in which Arkansas ranks fourth in the nation. It appears that the median rankings of Arkansas in Governor's Formal Powers (32), Innovation (32), Prison Population Increase (31), and Population Increase (33) are not entirely consistent with this state's bottom ranking (48) in level of expenditure for criminal justice functions and low ranking (41) in Professionalism-Local Reliance.

TABLE 7-1.--Rankings of California and Arkansas in the Variables of Model I

Variables	Calif.	Ark.
Industrialization	10	40
Affluence	2	44
Population Increase	4	33
Low Rape & Property Crime Rates	48	4
Professionalism-Local Reliance	2	41
Governor's Formal Powers	7	32
Innovation	3	32
Prison Population Increase	8	31

Appraisal

Tables 7-2 and 7-3 present the rankings in the eight variables which comprise Model I of the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in percent of 1968 personal income expended for criminal administration by both state and local governments within the state. Inspection of these two tables indicates that Model I is appropriate for eleven of the twelve top-ranked states and for nine of the twelve low-ranked states. This evaluation is based on the fact that Model I is 80 percent accurate in locating twenty of the twenty-four states within the appropriate half of all forty-eight states ranked according to criminal justice expenditure levels.

Dislocations

As implied above, Model I does not apply to four of the twenty-four states listed in Tables 7-2 and 7-3. The one state of Table 7-2 for which Model I is not appropriate is New Mexico, where a moderately high mean reported rate of forcible rape and property crime is the only characteristic which clearly suggests that this state belongs among the upper quartile in criminal administration expenditures. In six of the seven other Model I variables, New Mexico's ranking suggests that this state does not fit Model I. It is necessary to look beyond the limits of Model I to account for this state's apparent dislocation. Table A-4 shows that between 1966 and 1969 the increases in rape and property

TABLE 7-2.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions as Percent of Total Personal Income, 1968: Rankings in Model I Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Affluence	Population Increase	Low Rape & Property Crime Rates	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Governor's Formal Powers	Innovation	Prison Population Increase
1	NEV	42	1	1	45	28	21	47	1
2	N.Y.	3	18	31	46	1	1	1	39
3	MD	12	29	5	47	10	8	16	18
4	CAL	10	2	4	48	2	7	3	8
5	ARIZ	41	16	3	44	20	41	36	13
6	N.J.	1	19	13	28	7	3	4	11
7	DEL	8	12	7	31	16	42	40	6
8	N.M.	45	24	35	34	37	34	41	26
9	WISC	14	32	20	18	9	28	10	24
10	FLA	32	14	2	42	13	44	31	7
11	LA	24	43	19	35	19	24	19	3
12	MASS	4	20	25	32	3	30	2	23

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model I.

TABLE 7-3.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions as Percent of Total Personal Income, 1968: Rankings in Model I Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Affluence	Population Increase	Low Rape & Property Crime Rates	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Governor's Formal Powers	Innovation	Prison Population Increase
37	UTAH	36	10	11	37	44	11	22	12
38	ALA	31	45	37	14	33	14	30	30
39	S.C.	23	47	30	10	21	46	45	10
40	OKLA	38	26	28	29	40	25	42	14
41	SD	46	25	46	6	43	33	43	19
42	IA	25	15	43	13	25	26	29	35
43	N.D.	48	31	47	8	42	48	23	42
44	KANS	34	9	40	15	22	35	25	36
45	N.H.	16	30	8	3	39	37	17	5
46	IND	13	28	23	26	18	31	18	37
47	W.VA	27	40	48	2	38	43	35	48
48	ARK	40	44	33	4	41	32	32	31

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model I.

crime rates reported by law enforcement agencies in New Mexico were sixth highest in the nation. In per capita personal income for 1968, New Mexico ranked forty-second, and in total personal income fortieth.[1] These two factors suggest that New Mexico's high ranking (8) in criminal justice expenditures as a percent of personal income stems from a surge in criminal administration expenditures not matched by increased personal income.

In considering the states listed in Table 7-3 for which Model I is not appropriate the characteristics of Indiana, New Hampshire and Utah require examination. In Indiana, middle rankings in property crime rates (26), property crime rate increases (25), and in population increase (23) all combine with a four-year decrease of 19.1 percent in prison inmate population, as indicated in Table B-5, to lessen pressures for high criminal justice expenditures normally associated with the degree of industrialization achieved by Indiana.

In the case of Utah, high rankings in Affluence, Population Increase, Governor's Formal Powers, Prison Population Increase, and property crime rates all suggest that Utah's expenditures for criminal justice should command a percentage of her total personal income greater than that of most states. This reasoning ignores the low rankings of Utah

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[1] National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1970, op. cit., p. 31.

in Industrialization (36) and Professionalism-Local Reliance (44) which over-ride the other influences including the high reported rates of forcible rape and property crime. This may be accounted for by the fact that although Utah experienced relatively high mean rates of property crime between 1966 and 1969, the increases in these offense categories over that period were relatively low, as evidenced by Utah's ranking of forty-first in property crime rate increases.[1] This set of conditions suggests that in 1966 Utah's law enforcement agencies were more efficient than those of most states in crime reporting, or that Utah's citizens were highly attentive in reporting property crimes to police.[2] In either case there would have existed a relatively small "reservoir" of unreported crime to be drawn upon between 1966 and 1969. Consequently, with reported crime rates of the property type high but not rising as rapidly as in most states,

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[1]From Table C-2 we note that Utah ranks last in Income Distribution Inequality, which suggests that the absence of severe relative deprivation may have held down the increases in property crime rates. In 1968 Utah ranked thirty-seventh in both per capita income and in total personal income. For additional discussion of the relationships between relative deprivation and crime rates see Paul Eberts and Kent P. Schwirian, "Metropolitan Crime Rates and Relative Deprivation," Criminologica, Vol. V, No. 4 (February, 1968), 43-52.

[2]This suggests that there is some connection between Utah's crime reporting and the fact that this state leads the nation in contributions claimed on individual income tax returns as a percent of personal income. This temptation is increased when we note that New Hampshire ranks forty-eighth in Contributions Claimed and ranks third from the bottom in reported property crime rates.

there would be less justification for increased expenditures for criminal justice functions.

New Hampshire is the third of the twelve low-ranked states for which Model I is not appropriate. Four variable rankings indicate that New Hampshire belongs elsewhere, while an equal number suggest that this state is rightfully located among those which spend the least portion of personal income for criminal justice functions. The indicators of New Hampshire's dislocation include high rankings in Industrialization, Population Increase, Prison Population Increase, and Innovation. These are counterbalanced by low rankings in Affluence, Professionalism-Local Reliance, and Governor's Formal Powers, and by especially low reported rates of forcible rape and property crimes between 1966 and 1969. Also, as in the case of Utah, we find that New Hampshire ranks near the bottom (43) in rape and property crime rate increases. Our interpretation of these circumstances is that an absence of marked increases in property crime rates combined with low mean rates of these offenses provided little justification for high criminal justice expenditures, hence New Hampshire's appearance in Table 7-2, rather than in Table 7-1.

The foregoing rationale for the apparent dislocation of both Utah and New Hampshire is admittedly speculative, and is limited to consideration of only a few of the influences which, over time, resulted in the expenditure levels

reported by these states for fiscal year 1968-1969. The key to the low ranking of both states in criminal justice expenditures appears to lie in their comparatively stable reported rates of property crime, and by their low rankings in Professionalism-Local Reliance. Both states vary greatly in the four other characteristics of Model I which might influence criminal administration expenditure levels.

Model II
State/Local Expenditure Ratio

Model II includes the set of nine state characteristics listed in Figure 7-2 which are associated with relatively[1] high expenditures by state government for criminal justice functions, as compared with the expenditure level of local governments within the state for the same general purposes. Our reliance in the construction of this model on the regression of Table 6-10 is strong in that six variables are taken from that regression. One criminal justice expenditure variable and two indicators of general policy outcomes are added to bring the total of Model II variables to nine.

The state-wide characteristics most often associated with relatively high state government expenditures for

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[1]Nationally, state governments account for only about 29 percent of state-local expenditures for criminal justice functions. Thus, a particular state government's portion may be rated as relatively high and still be substantially less than the expenditures of the local governments within the state for criminal justice functions.

criminal justice matters which Model II represents are as follows:

- Low rankings in Industrialization and the political system indicators of Professionalism-Local Reliance, Innovation, and Governor's Formal Powers.

- Above-median rankings in Highways Natural-Resources, and relatively high expenditures for correctional activities plus low expenditures for police.

- Below-average rates of property crimes and murder, combined with a relatively high suicide/homicide ratio, and small geographic size or area.

Figure 7-2.

Model II

Environment	Political System	Policy Outcomes
Industrialization	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Welfare-Education
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	Innovation	
Low Property Crime Rates	Governor's Formal Powers	Highways-Natural Resources
Geographic Area	Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures	

Expenditure Characteristic

State/Local Ratio of Expenditures for All Criminal Justice Functions

Among the states with the highest state/local expenditure ratios, Model II is best exemplified by Vermont. The inverse side of Model II is best illustrated by New York,

with New Jersey, Michigan and Illinois also providing excellent examples. A comparison of New York's rankings in the Model II variables with those of Vermont, as shown in Table 7-4, will serve to illustrate the two aspects of Model II.

TABLE 7-4.--Rankings of New York and Vermont in the Varibles of Model II--State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio

Model II Variables	New York	Vermont
Industrialization	3	30
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide	26	1
Low Property Crime Rates, 1966-69	46	7
Professionalism-Local Reliance	1	48
Innovation	1	28
Governor's Formal Power	1	40
Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures	11	47
Welfare Education	6	35
Highways-Natural Resources	44	6
Geographic Area	30	43

New York's high rankings in Industrialization, Police-vs-Corrections expenditures, and in property crime rates[1] are all consistent with a low state/local expenditure ratio, as are Vermont's relatively low rankings in these variables with a high state/local expenditure ratio. The fact that Vermont ranks near the bottom (47) in police-corrections expenditures suggests that the state government's penal system claims an above-average portion of the state's criminal justice expenditures. In contrast, New

[1]The property crime rate factor emphasizes low rates of rape and property crimes, hence a low ranking (46) in this factor indicates high rates of these offenses.

York's ranking of eleventh in this variable indicates that municipal police expenditures tend to dominate. Checking the urbanization of these two states, we find that in 1969 about 87 percent of New York's 18.3 million population lived in standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA), while Vermont, with a population of 439,000 had no SMSA.[1] While these relationships all contribute to making New York and Vermont superior examples of Model II, an even more important contributor is Professionalism-Local Reliance. In this characteristic we find New York leading the nation, while Vermont ranks last. Inspection of Table 4-1 reveals that the "Local Reliance" element includes high negative loadings for State and Local Revenue from the Federal Government, and State and Local Revenue Spent by State Agencies which accounts for the key role Professionalism-Local Reliance in Model II.

Appraisal

Tables 7-5 and 7-6 present the rankings in the ten variables of Model II of the twelve states which rank highest and lowest in the state/local ratio of criminal justice expenditures for fiscal year 1968-1969. From these two tables we observe that Model II is adequately representative of nine of the twelve top-ranked states, and of eleven of the twelve low-ranked states. Overall, Model II is 77 percent

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[1]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 919-922.

TABLE 7-5.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in State/Local Ratio of Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions, 1968-1969: Rankings in Model II Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Low Murder-High Suicide	Low Rape and Property Crimes	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Innovation	Governor's Formal Powers	Police-vs-Corrections Expendit's	Welfare-Education	Highways-Natural Resources	Geographic Area
1	VT	30	1	7	48	28	40	47	35	6	43
2	DEL	8	23	31	16	40	42	48	32	38	47
3	ME	26	3	12	35	20	36	45	33	12	39
4	N.C.	18	46	5	24	24	39	46	41	43	28
5	CONN	2	11	22	14	6	15	21	11	42	46
6	N.M.	45	34	34	37	41	34	13	22	14	5
7	R.I.	7	5	29	32	15	38	24	19	47	48
8	KY	33	35	17	36	27	18	19	38	29	37
9	IA	25	4	13	25	29	26	36	12	19	25
10	MONT	44	8	33	46	38	13	42	27	3	4
11	VA	19	38	20	29	21	5	3	39	35	36
12	MISS	39	42	1	27	48	45	10	48	22	32

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model II.

TABLE 7-6.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in State/Local Ratio of Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions, 1968-1969: Rankings in Model II Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Low Murder-High Suicide	Low Property Crime Rates	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Innovation	Governor's Formal Powers	Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures	Welfare-Education	Highways-Natural Resources	Geographic Area
37	NEV	42	20	45	28	47	21	26	34	2	7
38	TEX	29	41	27	12	44	47	9	37	31	2
39	OHIO	9	31	11	8	11	16	37	20	36	35
40	FLA	32	40	41	13	31	44	16	38	34	22
41	MO	15	36	36	15	39	9	12	32	24	19
42	MICH	15	29	43	5	5	19	2	15	33	23
43	PA	6	23	16	4	7	4	22	25	37	33
44	CAL	10	19	48	2	3	7	35	1	25	3
45	ILL	5	35	40	6	13	2	6	5	43	24
46	MASS	4	15	32	3	2	2	30	2	48	45
47	N.J.	1	25	28	7	4	3	1	8	45	46
48	N.Y.	3	26	46	1	1	1	11	6	44	30

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model II.

accurate in locating twenty of the twenty-four states among the appropriate half of all forty-eight states when ranked according to state/local expenditure ratio.

Dislocations

The two top-ranked states for which Model II is not appropriate are Connecticut and Rhode Island, both of which rank high (2 and 7) in Industrialization, and low (42 and 47) in Highways-Natural Resources. Based on Connecticut's ranking in seven of ten and Rhode Island's ranking in six of nine Model II variables, it would appear that criminal justice expenditures in these two states should be borne by local governments to a much larger degree than they are. Nationally, local governments account for about 71 percent of all criminal justice expenditures; in Connecticut they account for only 49 percent, and in Rhode Island only 52.5 percent.

One reason why local government expenditures in these two states are exceptionally low may be that neither state has the county system,[1] hence expenditures that in many states are borne by county governments are shifted to the state government in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Another reason for the apparent dislocation of these two states may lie in their small geographic area as indicated in Table 7-5. Seven of the twelve states in which the state/local expenditure ratio

[1]Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 102. Lockard notes that only three states, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Alaska have no counties as organized units of government.

is highest rank in the lower quartile with respect to geographic area.

The single state among the twelve of Table 7-6 in which local government expenditures for criminal justice functions dominate and for which Model II is clearly inappropriate is Nevada, wherein seven of the nine variable rankings suggest dislocation. The one variable which appears to dominate in the case of Nevada is the state's ranking of forty-fifth in the Low Rape and Property Crime Rate factor, which means that Nevada experienced relatively high rates in these offense categories between 1966 and 1969. In 1969 approximately seventy-four percent of Nevada's 460,000 citizens lived in the state's two metropolitan areas of Las Vegas and Reno. In view of the concentration of Nevada's gambling industry in these two areas, we speculate that the exceptionally high local government expenditures for criminal administration are related to, and supported by, the gambling industry and its "take" from non-residents.

Model III
Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures

Model III is representative of those characteristics which influence state and local government decisions in the relative amounts to be expended for police protection and for correctional activities. In many instances these two functions are in competition for fiscal support, which means that above-average allocations for police activities results in below-average allocations for correctional activities.

Figure 7-3.

Model III

Environment	Political System	Policy Outcomes
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	Professionalism-Local-Reliance	Highways-Natural Resources
Property Crime Rate Increase	Competition-Turnout	Income Distrib. Inequality
Percent Negro, 1968	Centralization	State/Local Criminal Justice Expend. Ratio

Expenditure Characteristic

State and Local Expenditures for Police versus Corrections

In the development of Model III the regression of Table 6-11 is relied upon in that five of the nine Model III variables listed in Figure 7-3 are taken from that table. In addition, Model III includes two indicators of policy outcomes, one criminal-justice expenditure factor, and Percent Negro, 1968. This combination of nine characteristics suggests that states in which police activities are awarded the lion's share of criminal justice funds, to the detriment of correctional funding, are characterized by the following conditions:

- Above average rates of murder and aggravated assault (violent, personal crime), a below-average ratio of suicides-to-homicides, and somewhat lower than average increases in forcible rape and property crime rates between 1966 and 1969.

- Greater inequality in distribution of income than is found in most American states, combined with an above-average percentage of Negro citizens.

- Somewhat below-average rankings in Highways-Natural Resources and in Competition-Turnout.

- Relatively high scores in Professionalism-Local Reliance and in Centralization, combined with above-average expenditures for criminal justice functions by local governments and relatively low state government expenditures in this area.

Among the states in which expenditures for police activities dominate those for corrections, Model III is best exemplified by Louisiana, while Oregon sets a superior example among states where expenditures for correctional activities, as a percent of personal income, are highest. Table 7-7 facilitates a comparison of Louisiana's rankings in the Model III variables with those of Oregon to illustrate the two features of Model III.

Oregon is characterized by low murder and high suicide rates, relatively equal distribution of income, strong political party competition in the state legislature and liberal suffrage laws, decision-making in the legislature versus the governor's office, and a low percentage of Negroes among its population. These circumstances are consistent with relatively high emphasis on correctional efforts and relatively low emphasis on police activities. In contrast,

Louisiana ranks high in violent personal crime, inequality in distribution of income, centralized decision-making, and in percent of residents who are Negroes (third highest of forty-eight states). These characteristics combined with very low scores in Competition-turnout to maintain a climate which favors relatively high expenditures for police protection, and assigns a low priority to correctional efforts.

TABLE 7-7.--Rankings of Louisiana and Oregon in the Variables of Model III--Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures

Model III Variables	Lousiana	Oregon
Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	39	9
Property Crime Rate Increases, 1966-69	29	18
Highways-Natural Resources	27	8
Income Distributional Inequality	5	40
State/Local Criminal Justice Expend's	34	28
Percent Negro, 1968	3	38
Professionalism-Local Reliance	19	26
Competition-Turnout	43	9
Centralization	7	43

Appraisal

The rankings in the nine variables of Model III of the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in police-versus-corrections expenditures are recorded in Tables 7-8 and 7-9. Inspection of these two tables reveals that Model III is 70 percent accurate in locating twenty of the twenty-four states in the appropriate half of the nine variables which comprise Model III.

TABLE 7-8.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures by State and Local Government: Rankings in Model III Variables

Rank	State	Low Murder-High Suicide	Property Crime Increases	Highways-Natural Resources	Income Distributional Inequality	State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio	Percent Negro, 1968	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Competition-Turnout	Centralization
1	N.J.	25	22	46	45	47	17	7	10	2
2	MICH	30	40	33	41	42	15	5	14	22
3	VA	38	21	35	13	11	7	29	42	19
4	NEB	7	30	13	19	29	31	31	2	45
5	LA	39	29	27	5	34	3	19	43	7
6	ILL	35	42	44	30	45	13	6	7	20
7	ARK	43	2	18	2	22	8	41	44	5
8	ARIZ	17	37	16	17	36	30	20	30	11
9	TEX	41	9	31	11	38	14	12	39	37
10	MISS	42	36	22	1	12	1	27	45	35
11	N.Y.	26	39	45	26	48	19	1	41	10
12	MO	37	13	24	14	41	16	15	20	31

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model III.

TABLE 7-9.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures by State and Local Government: Rankings in Model III Variables

Rank	State	Low Murder-High Suicide	Property Crime Increases	Highways-Natural Resources	Income Distributional Inequality	State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio	Percent Negro, 1968	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Competition-Turnout	Centralization
37	OHIO	31	4	36	42	39	20	8	22	24
38	W.VA	29	46	30	16	13	27	32	21	17
39	GA	44	34	32	8	30	5	17	47	4
40	OREG	9	18	8	40	28	38	26	9	43
41	MINN	13	15	10	24	35	39	11	3	32
42	MONT	8	48	3	32	10	48	46	5	29
43	COLO	18	4	11	28	27	32	30	13	26
44	WASH	14	1	18	36	19	35	23	12	25
45	ME	3	17	12	39	3	45	35	28	18
46	N.C.	45	23	43	10	4	6	24	32	39
47	VT	1	20	6	23	1	46	48	36	42
48	DEL	22	14	38	22	2	12	16	24	14

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model III.

Dislocations

The one top-ranked state listed in Table 7-8 for which Model III is clearly not appropriate is Nebraska, whose ranking in six of the nine variables indicates dislocation. Analysis of Nebraska's rankings here fails to suggest the reason for the dislocation; however, by reference to Table B-5, we note that in 1967 Nebraska ranked thirty-first in the percent of the state population incarcerated, and that between 1964 and 1967 this state's prison population decreased by 26.8 percent. Only three other states, Georgia, Montana and West Virginia, recorded greater decreases in prison population during the same period. Table B-3 shows that Nebraska ranks thirty-sixth in percent of 1968 personal income expended for all criminal-justice functions. Of this total, police activities claimed 66.1 percent, while correctional activities received only 18.2 percent and courts 15.5 percent.[1] Thus it appears that Nebraska's high ranking in police-versus-corrections expenditures stems primarily from earlier actions to reduce the state's prison inmate population. This appears not to have been accomplished by releasing excessive numbers of prisoners on parole, for in 1967 Nebraska ranked forty-sixth in Percent of Prisoners Paroled with 31.8 percent releases listed as "conditional." This suggests that Nebraska's parole system does not have a large work load on which to justify high expenditures.

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[1] LEAA-BuCensus, Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, op. cit., Table 5, p. 14.

Model III is not appropriate for Georgia, Ohio, and North Carolina, three of the twelve states which rank lowest in the police/corrections expenditure ratio. In the case of Georgia, eight of the nine Model III variable rankings indicate that this state is "out of place" by ranking thirty-ninth in police-versus-corrections expenditures. Inspection of Table 7-9 indicates that we must look to indicators not included in Model III for an answer to Georgia's apparent dislocation. Table B-5 indicates that Georgia ranks sixth in the nation in percent of population incarcerated in the state's prison system in 1967, after having reduced the inmate population by 27.4 percent between 1964 and 1967. Also, Georgia ranks thirty-ninth in percent of prisoners paroled in 1967, with only 41.4 percent released conditionally. Table A-3 indicates that law enforcement agencies in Georgia reported a relatively low rate of property crime between 1966 and 1969, and that the state ranked thirty-fourth in reported increases in these offense categories during the same period. This is in contrast with Georgia's high ranking (4) in murder and aggravated assault rates during the same period. From Table B-3 we note that Georgia ranks twenty-fifth in percent of personal income allocated for all criminal justice functions.

The foregoing suggests that the propensity toward violent crime against persons, where arrest and conviction rates are high, versus property crime, where arrest and

conviction rates are low, has led to Georgia's relatively high expenditures for correctional activities as compared with police activities. In short, it appears that given the pattern of criminal activity which enables fewer police to "deliver" the same number of convictions, Georgia's criminal justice system calls for relatively high correctional expenditures.

The second of three low-ranking states for which Model III is not appropriate is Ohio whose ranking in five of nine variables suggests dislocation. Table A-3 shows that Ohio's pattern of criminal activity tends to be somewhat like that of Georgia's in that rates of property crime were relatively low between 1966 and 1969, and violent crimes against persons tended to occur at rates higher than in most states. The major difference between Ohio's and Georgia's crime pattern is the marked increase in forcible rape and property crime rates in Ohio between 1966 and 1969, as compared with such increases in Georgia. Ohio's penal system ranked thirteenth in percent of population incarcerated in 1967, and twenty-fifth in prisoner increase from 1964 to 1967.[1] Of interest here is Ohio's high ranking of fourth in percent of prisoners paroled in 1967 (94 percent), which suggests an above-average sized state-parole system. Thus it would

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[1]This middle ranking in prisoner-increase represents a net reduction in Ohio's state prison inmate population of about 13 percent between December 31, 1964 and December 31, 1967, with the total dropping from 11,861 to 10,323, for a net reduction of 1,538 in inmate population.

appear that the earlier patterns of criminal activity led to the incarceration of an above-average percentage of Ohio's population and an over-loading of the state's penal system. This, in turn, appears to have led to the establishment of an extensive parole organization. We speculate here that the effect of the high increases in property crimes between 1966 and 1969 will result in a shift toward greater relative expenditures for police activities. Whether this will bring about a reduction in correctional expenditures will, we suggest, be decided by the budgetary skills of Ohio's correctional "establishment."

North Carolina is the third state ranking low in police/corrections expenditures for which Model III is inappropriate. In four of the nine Model III variables North Carolina's ranking suggests that expenditures for police activities should rank much higher than they do. Inspection of Table 7-6 reveals that in contrast to Ohio and Georgia, North Carolina ranks near the top (4) in the ratio of state government to local government expenditures for all criminal justice functions. Since the bulk of correctional funding in North Carolina, as in other states, is by the state government ($31 million provided by state government versus $4.8 million by local governments in 1968-1969), North Carolina's high rankings in percent of population incarcerated (10) and prisoner increase, 1964-1967 (4),[1] both support the

[1]North Carolina was one of ten states in the nation that reported net increases in number of persons

low-ranked position recorded in Table 7-6. As in Ohio and Georgia, North Carolina's pattern of criminal activity has been distinguished by low rates of property crime and high rates of violent personal crime, which apparently have led to the budgetary dominance of the correctional establishment for the reasons outlined above. Increases in property crime rates between 1966 and 1969 reported by North Carolina's law enforcement agencies were moderate (ranked 23), as were reported increases in murder and auto theft (ranked 20).

In summary, the three states ranking relatively low in expenditures for police activities for which Model III is inappropriate illustrate the effect of distinctive crime patterns on the funding of the several criminal justice functions. Violent crimes against persons, that is murder and aggravated assault, tend to result in higher arrest and convistion rates than do property crimes.[1] This leads to higher "production" levels for police, or to the capability of fewer police to produce the number of arrests adequate to keep the state's penal system fully loaded, provided, of course, the court system "cooperates" in awarding sentences to confinement. This, in turn, leads to the requirement for additional correctional facilities, which never seem to be adequate, and the creation of an adequate force of parole officials.

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incarcerated in state institutions between the end of 1964 and 1967.

[1] Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., pp. 8-9. In 1969 the arrest rate for murder and non-negligent homicide was 86 percent, and for aggravated assault, 65 percent.

Together these circumstances appear to over-ride the influences of other state characteristics represented by the Model III variables, at least in the case of Ohio, Georgia and North Carolina. This hypothesis is supported by the case of Nebraska outlined above. Nebraska's "dislocation" at the "police" end of the police-corrections expenditure spectrum appears to be the result of a decreased emphasis on correctional activities.

This analysis suggests that each state is at a different phase of a cycle of police-courts-corrections expenditures which, in turn, are in response to shifts in patterns of criminal activity from property crime to violent crime and back again.

Model IV
Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures

Model IV has been constructed to depict those state characteristics which are most frequently associated with relatively high expenditures by state and local government for judicial and prosecution functions. Our dependence in this model on the regression of Table 6-12 is substantial in that six of nine variables listed in Figure 7-4 are taken from that table. The variables added include Percent Negro, 1968, Police Expenditures, and Revenue as a Percent of Personal Income, 1968.

The state characteristics associated with relatively high expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions, as depicted by Model IV, are as follows:

- Low scores in Industrialization and Percent Negro, 1968 (outside the South), combined with relatively stable rates of murder and auto theft between 1966 and 1969.

- Relatively low rankings in the political system indicators of Professionalism-Local Reliance, Innovation, Governor's Formal Powers, and Centralization.

- Above-average scores in the percent of personal income collected as public revenue by state and local governments.

- Below-average expenditures for both police and correctional activities (as a percent of personal income), which together means low rankings in expenditure levels for all criminal justice functions.

Figure 7-4.

Model IV

Environment	Political System
Industrialization	Professionalism-Local Reliance
Percent Negro, 1968	Innovation; Centralization Governor's Formal Powers
Murder and Auto Theft Increase, 1966-69	State and Local Revenue as Percent Personal Income Police Expenditures

Expenditure Characteristic

Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures by State and Local Government

Among the states ranking highest in judicial and prosecution expenditures, Model IV is best exemplified by South Dakota; at the other extreme New Jersey sets the

example for Model IV. From Table 7-10 it is possible to compare the rankings of South Dakota and New Jersey in the variables which comprise Model IV as a means of illustrating the conditions represented by the model.

South Dakota, which ranks fourth in the percent of criminal justice expenditures allocated to judicial and prosecution functions combined, is distinguished by very low scores in Industrialization, Percent Negro, 1968, Professionalism-Local Reliance, and Innovation. In contrast, New Jersey's rankings in the Model IV variables are virtually the inverse of South Dakota's. Of particular interest is New Jersey's ranking of forty-second[1] in State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, compared with South Dakota's ranking of eighth in this variable.

The foregoing leads us to speculate that a minimum expenditure level is required to render the judicial and prosecution functions operable, and that once this level is reached these functions have the capacity to process the outcome of a significant increase in police expenditures. The low Industrialization rankings of most of the states listed in Table 7-11 suggests low total personal incomes. The implication here is that a high ranking in state and local

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[1]This low ranking is probably related to New Jersey's proximity to New York City, and the fact that many of New Jersey's residents earn their incomes out of state--a circumstance that would make for a high total personal income of which only a relatively small portion is taxed by state and local government in New Jersey.

revenue as percent of personal income for low-Industrialization states does not necessarily mean a large revenue from which to fund the criminal justice system. In sum, in all probability states like South Dakota which rank high in judicial and prosecution expenditures as a percent of all criminal justice expenditures, are states that expend relatively little in the way of public funds for all criminal justice functions, which makes even small expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions appear to be relatively large.

TABLE 7-10.--Rankings of New Jersey and South Dakota in the Variables of Model IV--Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures

Model IV Variables	New Jersey	South Dakota
Industrialization	1	46
Percent Negro, 1968	17	47
Murder and Auto Theft Increases	4	25
Professionalism-Local Reliance	7	43
Innovation	4	43
Governor's Formal Powers	3	33
Centralization	2	36
State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income	42	8
Police Expenditures	1	36

Appraisal

Rankings in the nine Model IV variables of the twelve states which rank highest and lowest in expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions are listed in Tables 7-11 and 7-12. Inspection of these tables reveals that Model IV

TABLE 7-11.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures: Rankings in Model IV Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Percent Negro, 1968	Murder & Auto Theft Increases	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Innovation	Governor's Formal Powers	Centralization	State & Local Revenue as % Personal Income	Police Expenditures
1	N.D.	48	42	48	42	23	48	33	1	37
2	IDHO	43	44	43	45	33	23	38	4	35
3	FLA	32	9	34	13	31	44	48	28	24
4	S.D.	46	47	25	43	43	33	36	8	36
5	COLO	35	32	21	30	9	22	26	15	46
6	OKLA	38	24	33	40	42	25	27	20	23
7	WYO	47	40	14	47	46	12	34	2	28
8	ALA	31	4	31	33	30	14	1	27	25
9	MONT	44	48	29	46	38	13	29	6	45
10	NEV	42	25	46	28	47	21	47	10	29
11	TEX	29	14	16	12	44	47	37	41	14
12	ARIZ	41	30	45	20	36	41	11	13	10

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model IV.

TABLE 7-12.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Judicial and Prosecution Expenditures: Rankings in Model IV Variables

Rank	State	Industrialization	Percent Negro, 1968	Murder & Auto Theft Increases	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Innovation	Governor's Formal Powers	Centralization	State & Local Revenue as % Personal Income	Police Expenditures
37	LA	24	3	35	19	19	24	7	9	5
38	KY	33	21	9	36	27	18	12	33	16
39	VA	19	7	23	29	21	5	19	40	2
40	MASS	4	33	7	3	2	30	30	30	21
41	NEB	37	3	2	31	26	27	45	22	3
42	N.J.	1	17	4	7	4	3	2	42	1
43	WISC	14	29	44	9	10	28	9	14	27
44	MISS	39	1	41	27	48	45	35	19	8
45	WASH	19	35	17	23	14	6	25	18	42
46	S.C.	23	2	24	21	45	46	46	36	13
47	MD	12	10	39	10	16	8	23	31	9
48	N.C.	18	6	20	24	24	39	39	35	40

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model IV.

is 80 percent accurate in locating eighteen of the twenty-four states in the appropriate half of all forty-eight states.

Dislocations

Model IV is inappropriate for three of the twelve top-ranked states: Florida, Alabama and Texas. One possible key to these dislocations is the high ranking of these three states in Percent Negro, 1968; all nine other top-ranked states of Table 7-11 have a much lower proportion of Negro residents. Considering the other variables of Model IV, we note that in addition to ranking high (9) in Percent Negro, 1968, Florida's relatively high ranking (13) in Professionalism-Local Reliance is the other characteristic which suggests that this state should not rank as high as it does in judicial and prosecution expenditures. These influences appear to have been overcome by Florida's exceptionally low rankings in Governor's Formal Powers (44) and in Centralization (48). The low rankings of Texas in these two variables appears to lend support here; however this approach is not applicable to Alabama which ranks relatively high (14) in Governor's Formal Powers and ranks at the head of all states in Centralization.

There remains to be explored one variable of Model IV in which the three states of Florida, Alabama and Texas are clearly set apart from the other nine states listed in Table 7-11: State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, 1968. The relatively low ranking of these three

states in this variable suggests that at least with respect to the other nine states of Table 7-11, expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions by state and local governments are linked directly to the level of revenue collected. All considered, Table 7-11 suggests that the level of expenditures for the judicial and prosecution functions is determined primarily by the degree of tax effort of state and local government. However, for reasons not evident in Model IV, a high ranking in percent of Negroes overcomes the relative lack of public revenue in the case of Alabama, Florida and Texas.

Among the twelve states which rank lowest in expenditures for judicial and prosecution functions Table 7-12 indicates that Model IV clearly does not apply to Nebraska, Mississippi and Wisconsin. In the rankings of the first two states named, seven of the nine Model IV variables indicate dislocation, while Wisconsin's ranking in five of the nine variables also suggests that this state belongs elsewhere with respect to judicial and prosecution expenditure levels. If we limit consideration to the nine variables of Model IV, it appears that Nebraska's very high rankings in Murder and Auto Theft Increase (2) and Police Expenditures (3) over-ride all other rankings of Table 7-12, and in Mississippi the nation's highest percent of Negro residents in 1968, coupled with a high ranking (8) in police expenditures has taken charge of judicial and prosecution expenditure levels. Under

the same limitations, in Wisconsin it would appear that upper quartile rankings in Industrialization, Professionalism-Local Reliance, Innovation and Centralization dominate.

The foregoing completes a brief analysis of the four expenditure models. We turn now to Models V and VI which deal with allocations by the SPA supervisory boards of the fiscal 1970 Federal block grant funds.

Model V
SPA Allocations to Police, Courts and Corrections

Model V employs the set of ten state indicators listed in Figure 7-5 to represent those state characteristics which appear to influence SPA's to favor the support of police activities in their allocations of block grant funds. Eight of the ten Model V variables are taken from the regression of Table 6-17. The two variables added are Percent Prisoners Paroled, 1967, and Total Criminal Justice Expenditures as a Percent of Personal Income, 1968.

The characteristics associated with relatively high allocations of block grant funds to police and relatively low allocations to courts and correctional activities suggested by Model V are as follows:

- Low reported rates of forcible rape and property crimes between 1966 and 1969, coupled with relatively low increases in the reported rates of these offenses during the same period.

Figure 7-5.

Model V

Environment	Political System	Policy Outcomes
Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	Competition-Turnout	Income Distributional Inequality
Increase in Murder Rate 1966-1969	Governor's Power	
Increase in Property Crime Rates	Innovation	
	Professionalism-Local Reliance	
	Expenditures for Criminal Justice	
	Percent Prisoners Paroled, 1967	

SPA Allocation Factor

Block Grant Funds to Police versus Courts and Correctional Activities

- Above average increases in rates of murder and non-negligent homicide and auto theft.

- Below-average expenditures for all criminal-justice functions by state and local governments.

- A below-average record in percent of state prison inmates released on parole or other condition during 1967.

- Below average scores in the political system indicators: Competition-turnout, Innovation, Governor's Formal Power and Professionalism-Local Reliance.

- Greater inequality in the distribution of income than exists in most of the American states.

Among the states which allocated the largest portion of available fiscal 1970 block grant funds to police activities, and less to courts and corrections, Model V is best

exemplified by South Dakota, Mississippi, and South Carolina. At the other extreme, where SPA emphasis was on courts and corrections, Washington is the best example of Model V. A comparison of South Carolina's rankings in the Model V variables with those of Washington, as shown in Table 7-13, will serve to illustrate the two aspects of this Model.

TABLE 7-13.--Rankings of South Carolina and Washington in the Variables of Model V--SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Corrections

Model V Variables	South Carolina	Wash-ington
Low Rape and Property Crime Rates	10	38
Increase in Murder Rate, 1966-1969	24	17
Competition-Turnout	48	12
Property Crime Rate Increase, 1966-69	27	1
Governor's Formal Power	46	6
Innovation	45	14
Professionalism-Local Reliance	21	22
Income Distributional Inequality	6	36
Criminal Justice Expenditures Level	39	23
Percent of Prisoners Paroled, 1967	47	1

South Carolina is distinguished first by very low scores in Competition-Turnout, Governor's Formal Power, Innovation, Percent of Prisoners Paroled in 1967, and in equality of income distribution. The picture thus far appears consistent with SPA emphasis on police activities, however we must look further. South Carolina ranks thirty-ninth in percent of personal income expended for criminal justice functions. Given the circumstances outlined above, we speculate that the primary concern of the South Carolina

SPA in allocating fiscal 1970 funds was not that of fostering change and rehabilitation through improved court and correctional systems, but rather putting "first things first" and upgrading police effectiveness.

With regard to Washington's propensity to favor courts and correctional activities in the allocation of block grant funds, the rankings of Table 7-13 show that this state leads the nation in increases in property crime rates and in percent paroled, which suggests a rapid turn-over in prison inmate population--perhaps the result of an earlier emphasis on upgrading police capabilities. In comparison with South Carolina, it appears that Washington is a phase or two "ahead" in emphasizing courts and corrections. However, Washington's high ranking (6) in Governor's Formal Power compared with South Carolina's very low ranking (46) may have permitted Washington's governor to appoint a SPA supervisory board oriented toward state responsibilities (courts and corrections) more so than municipal responsibilities (police).

Appraisal

The rankings in the ten Model V variables of the twelve states which rank highest and lowest in allocation of block grant funds to police activities versus courts and correctional activities are shown in Tables 7-14 and 7-15. Examination of these tables shows that Model V is reasonably accurate with regard to ten of the twelve top-ranked states, and to a like number of the twelve low-ranked states,

Overall accuracy in locating these nineteen states in the appropriate half of the variable rankings is 76 percent.

Dislocations

The two top-ranked states for which Model V is not appropriate are Connecticut and New Jersey, both of which rank much higher in Industrialization than do six of the eight other states listed in Table 7-14. Although two other states, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, both rank among the top one-third in Industrialization, the characteristics of their political systems and low increases in property crime rates place these two states among the less industrialized for which Model V is appropriate. In effect, Model V allows for wide variation in Industrialization ranking, provided that the patterns of criminal activity and the state-wide political systems do not vary too greatly.

One of the three states listed in Table 7-15 for which Model V clearly is not appropriate is Texas, where seven of ten variable rankings suggest that this state belongs at the police end of the police-courts-corrections continuum. Based on Table C-4 a primary reason for Texas' dislocation appears to be that this state led all others in percent of block grant funds allocated to the "miscellaneous" category (31.5 percent versus 8 percent national average). Further examination of the 1970 allocation decisions of the Texas SPA (Tables C-3 and C-4) reveals that 28.6 percent of the block grant funds were allocated to police, 7.1 percent

TABLE 7-14.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in Allocation of Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Funds for Police versus Courts and Corrections: Rankings in Model V Variables

Rank	State	Low Property Crime Rates	Murder Increase	Competition-Turnout	Property Crime Rate Increases	Governor's Formal Power	Innovation	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Income Distribution Inequality	Level of Expenditure for Criminal Justice	Percent of Prisoners Paroled, 1967
1	S.D.	6	25	29	25	33	43	43	15	41	44
2	R.I.	28	1	26	33	38	15	32	33	21	25
3	NEB	9	2	2	30	27	26	31	21	36	46
4	ALA	14	31	46	28	14	30	33	3	38	32
5	CONN	22	10	15	3	15	6	14	46	27	13
6	MISS	1	41	45	36	45	48	27	1	35	31
7	FLA	42	34	38	26	44	31	13	12	10	38
8	N.H.	3	15	25	43	37	17	39	43	45	2
9	N.J.	28	4	10	22	3	4	7	45	6	11
10	WYO	23	14	16	47	13	46	47	47	15	48
11	N.C.	5	20	32	23	39	24	24	10	26	34
12	S.C.	10	24	48	27	46	45	21	6	39	47

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model V.

TABLE 7-15.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Allocation of Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Funds for Police versus Courts and Corrections: Rankings in Model V Variables

Rank	State	Low Property Crime Rates	Murder Increase	Competition-Turnout	Property Crime Rate Increases	Governor's Formal Power	Innovation	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Income Distribution Inequality	Level of Expenditure for Criminal Justice	Percent Prisoners Paroled, 1967
37	VT	7	13	36	20	40	28	48	23	17	17
38	WISC	18	37	8	8	28	10	9	38	9	6
39	IND	26	22	6	24	31	18	18	33	46	15
40	MICH	43	8	14	40	19	5	5	41	22	12
41	N.Y.	46	6	41	39	1	1	1	26	2	8
42	LA	35	35	43	29	24	19	19	5	11	29
43	MINN	25	40	3	15	20	12	11	24	33	16
44	WASH	38	17	12	1	6	14	22	36	23	1
45	IDHO	19	43	4	16	23	33	45	46	16	24
46	UTAH	37	37	1	41	12	22	44	48	37	5
47	MD	47	39	35	11	9	16	10	29	3	35
48	TEX	27	16	39	9	47	44	12	11	33	45

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model V.

to courts, and 25.2 percent to correctional activities. These figures compare with national averages of 51.0 percent to police, 6.9 percent to courts, and 26.7 percent to corrections. Thus it is apparent that the relatively high allocation to "miscellaneous" activities was taken largely from the police end of the police-courts-corrections continuum.

The second low-ranking state for which Model V is not appropriate is Louisiana, which in 1970 allocated 40.2 percent of available block grant funds to police activities, and 44.3 percent to correctional activities. These allocations ran counter to national averages by about 11 percent less to police and 17 percent more than average to correctional activities. Thus, where the Texas SPA "took" funds from police activities and allocated them to a miscellaneous category, the Louisiana SPA simply "shifted" such funds from police to correctional activities.

The status of the prison systems in Texas and Louisiana may hold part of the answer to the dislocation of these two states with respect to police-versus-corrections allocations. Both states rank among the top ten in the nation in ratio of prisoners to population, in increase in prison inmate population between 1964 and 1967, and in police expenditures by state and local government combined. These circumstances lead us to speculate that the SPA's in these two states were confronted with much over-loaded correctional systems, while the police agencies of both states were

receiving relatively high appropriations, thereby adding to the correctional overload through an increased capability to make arrests. The data suggests that the SPA's of Texas and Louisiana dealt with similar situations in different manners. In Texas the correctional system received a "standard" portion of the block grant funds available, while more than 30 percent was allocated to "miscellaneous" projects related to law enforcement. In Louisiana, the SPA reduced the "normal" allocation for police activities and increased the portion of block grant funds for correctional activities. In both states the SPA's effort appears to have been in the direction of correcting an imbalance within the state's criminal justice system.

The third low-ranked state for which Model V is inappropriate is Vermont whose ranking in seven of the ten variables suggests dislocation. Analysis of Vermont's Model V variable rankings fails to indicate a reason for this dislocation; however, by extending the analysis we find the answer to be not unlike that in the case of Texas and Louisiana. Tables C-3 and C-4 indicate that Vermont's SPA allocated 47.8 percent of the fiscal 1970 block grant funds to police activities, 18.2 percent to correctional activities, 2.8 percent to courts, and 26.8 percent to the miscellaneous category. In this last category Vermont is second only to Texas. Thus, as with Texas, Vermont's dislocation with respect to Model V lies in the relatively high grant for

miscellaneous law enforcement programs. In contrast to both Texas and Louisiana, most of the miscellaneous allocation by Vermont's SPA has been "taken" from courts (4.1 percent) and from correctional activities (8.5 percent).

From the foregoing we may attribute the dislocations of all three states, Texas, Louisiana and Vermont, to exceptional allocation patterns involving high allocations to either correctional activities (Louisiana) or to the miscellaneous category (Texas and Vermont). It appears evident that in each instance the SPA dealt with the several components of the state's criminal justice system as a system, and made some effort to redress the imbalance in the combined state and local expenditure patterns. Whether such redress would have occurred without the block grant method of funding and the requirement for "comprehensive" planning at the state level is, we feel, doubtful.

Model VI
Organized Crime and Disorder Control

Model VI is comprised of state indicators which appear to have influenced SPA decisions to allocate funds for the control of organized crime and disorders. Three of the eight Model VI variables listed in Figure 7-6 are taken from the regression of Table 6-23. Thus, Model VI relies on the results of the earlier aggregate analysis to a lesser degree than do any of the other five Models. Variables added in Model VI include Percent Negro, 1968 and the state/local

ratios of both criminal justice expenditures and of representatives appointed to the SPA supervisory boards. In addition, and for the first time in our model construction, Model VI includes two measures of fiscal 1970 SPA allocation decisions: percent of block grant funds to corrections, and percent to the miscellaneous category

Figure 7-6.

Model VI

Environment	Political System	Policy Outcomes
Percent Negro 1968	Professionalism-Local Reliance Police-Corrections Expenditures State/Local Expenditure Ratio State/Local SPA Representative Ratio	Highways-Natural Resources SPA Miscellaneous Allocations SPA Corrections Allocations

SPA Allocation Factor

Organized Crime and Disorder Control

The conditions associated with relatively high allocations of fiscal 1970 block grant funds for the control of organized crime and disorders which Model VI depicts are as follows:

- A relatively low state/local ratio of expenditures for all criminal justice functions, combined with a below-average ratio of state government representatives on the SPA supervisory board.

- Relatively low scores in Highways-Natural Resources, complemented by high scores in Professionalism-Local Reliance and in Percent Negro, 1968.

- High relative expenditures for police activities, balanced by below-average expenditures for correctional activities by state and local government.

- A relatively high allocation of block grant funds for correctional activities, and a low allocation of these funds for "miscellaneous" projects.

Among the states which allocated the largest portion of available block grant funds to the control of organized crime and disorders, Model VI is best exemplified by Indiana and Louisiana. Among the states which allocated lowest portions in this area, Montana is the best example of Model VI. Table 7-16 sets forth the rankings of Indiana and Montana in the variables of Model VI. A comparison of these rankings provides a means for illustrating the two features of Model VI.

TABLE 7-16.--Rankings of Indiana and Montana in the Variables of Model VI--SPA Allocations to Control Organized Crime and Disorders

Model VI Variables	Indiana	Montana
Professionalism-Local Reliance	18	46
Police-vs-Corrections Expenditures	20	42
Highways-Natural Resources	27	3
SPA Miscellaneous Allocations	28	12
SPA Corrections Allocations	16	38
State/Local Criminal Justice Expend's	25	10
State/Local SPA Representative Ratio	38	16
Percent Negro, 1968	22	48

Indiana, which ranks fifth in percent of block grant funds allocated to control organized crime and disorders, shows generally median rankings in seven of the eight Model VI variables. We do note a moderate tendency toward Professionalism-Local Reliance, and high expenditures for police which are compensated for by relatively high SPA allocations for courts and corrections. Although Indiana's state/local ratio of expenditures for criminal justice functions is average, the portion of local representatives on the SPA supervisory board is well above average. Thus, we conclude that Indiana's relatively strong emphasis on organized crime and disorder control is reflective of a SPA supervisory board that recognized and was sensitive to the urban-oriented problems of organized crime and disorders.

In the case of Montana, which ranks forty-sixth in SPA allocations for organized crime and disorder control, we note particularly low scores in Professionalism-Local Reliance, Police-Corrections Expenditures, and SPA allocations for courts and corrections. The picture here is one of relatively high state and local expenditures for corrections, balanced by low SPA emphasis on this function. In addition, the SPA supervisory board includes an above-average representation of state government officials and the state government's portion of expenditures for all criminal justice functions is well above average. All considered, it appears that the Montana SPA could well have allocated a greater

portion of block grant funds to control organized crime and disorders. The fact that such allocations were not made suggests that the control of organized crime and disorders in Montana was not recognized as being important, or at least not as important as other problems for which larger amounts were allocated.

Appraisal

The rankings in the eight Model VI variables of the twelve states which rank highest and lowest in the allocation of fiscal 1970 block grant funds for the control of organized crime and disorders are presented in Tables 7-17 and 7-18. Our examination of these tables reveals that Model VI is reasonably representative of eleven of the twelve top-ranked states and of ten of the twelve low-ranked states. As in the previous models, this criteria for representativeness is based on the accuracy of the model in locating each state in the appropriate half of the forty-eight states in the variables which comprise the model. On this basis, Model VI is 74 percent accurate with regard to twenty of the twenty-four states listed in Tables 7-17 and 7-18.

Dislocations

The four states of Tables 7-17 and 7-18 for which Model VI clearly is not representative are Colorado, Iowa, Illinois and Maryland. Iowa's ranking in seven of the eight Model VI variables suggests dislocation. Only a relatively

TABLE 7-17.--Twelve States Ranking Highest in Allocation of Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Funds for Control of Organized Crime and Disorders: Rankings in Model VI Variables

Rank	State	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures	Highways-Natural Resources	Block Grant SPA Allocations to Miscellaneous	Block Grant SPA Allocations to Corrections	State/Local Criminal-Justice Expend. Ratio	State/Local SPA Representative Ratio	Percent Negro, 1968
1	CAL	2	35	25	45	28	44	45	23
2	LA	19	5	26	41	1	34	31	3
3	MISS	27	10	22	44	35	12	36	1
4	COLO	30	43	11	39	21	27	15	32
5	IND	18	20	27	28	16	25	38	22
6	NEV	28	26	2	32	22	37	41	25
7	PA	4	22	37	15	19	43	34	18
8	NEB	31	4	12	37	46	29	40	31
9	MICH	5	2	33	9	29	42	30	15
10	MASS	3	3	48	36	5	46	28	33
11	IA	25	36	19	19	32	9	32	37
12	ALA	33	25	28	27	36	31	18	4

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model VI.

TABLE 7-18.--Twelve States Ranking Lowest in Allocation of Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Funds for Control of Organized Crime and Disorders: Rankings in Model VI Variables

Rank	State	Professionalism-Local Reliance	Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures	Highways-Natural Resources	Block Grant SPA Allocations to Miscellaneous	Block Grant SPA Allocations to Corrections	State/Local Criminal-Justice Expend. Ratio	State/Local SPA Representative Ratio	Percent Negro, 1968
37	ILL	6	6	44	8	41	45	33	13
38	MD	10	15	39	3	3	15	26	10
39	N.M.	37	13	14	5	45	6	6	32
40	N.D.	42	23	9	13	36	32	19	42
41	VT	48	47	6	2	43	1	25	46
42	WYO	47	27	1	25	30	18	29	40
43	OREG	26	40	8	6	24	28	48	38
44	DEL	16	48	38	11	43	2	8	12
45	WASH	23	44	18	26	20	19	47	35
46	MONT	46	42	3	12	38	10	16	48
47	S.D.	43	31	5	29	48	26	11	47
48	MINN	11	41	10	4	33	35	46	39

Note: Underscored rankings are those not in the appropriate half of all 48 states as predicted by Model VI.

low ratio of state/local representation on the SPA supervisory board is consistent with Iowa's ranking of eleventh in allocations for control of organized crime and disorders. Inspection of Table 7-17 reveals that none of Iowa's fiscal 1970 block grant funds were allocated for disorder control, and that 8.8 percent of such funds were allocated for control of organized crime. It is apparent that further investigation of circumstances in Iowa would be required to determine why Iowa's ranking in allocation of block grant funds for organized crime control is unique.

Colorado's ranking of fourth in SPA allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control appears to be out of line with this state's ranking in five of the eight Model VI variables. The one ranking which does support relatively high allocations (10.5 percent) to control organized crime and civil disorders is that of thirty-ninth in allocation of block grant funds for miscellaneous law enforcement projects. This ranking, combined with a ranking of forty-third in police-corrections expenditures, suggests that police departments in Colorado were "in line" for a healthy portion of the available block grant funds, and that the SPA supervisory board saw a greater need for allocations to the police-related areas of civil disorder and organized crime control than for other areas. This emphasis may be rooted in the 52.9 percent non-white migration experienced by Colorado

between 1950 and 1960.[1] Although Colorado's Negro population increased by about 97 percent between 1950 and 1968, at the end of this period the state's Negro population represented only 3.5 percent of the total population, or about one-third the national average. It seems reasonable that the bulk of the state's non-white migration included a high percentage of Mexican-Americans, which led to the "Chicano" movement in Colorado's metropolitan areas. Thus, the allocations for organized crime and disorder control could be related to the growing demands of the state's Mexican-American minority.

Among the twelve states which rank lowest in the use of Federal funds to control organized crime and disorders, Model VI is clearly not appropriate for Illinois and Maryland. The rankings of these two states in the Model VI variables, as shown in Table 7-18, indicate that Illinois and Maryland are much alike in the manner in which they differ from the ten other states of Table 7-18. Of primary interest are the parallel rankings in Percent Negro, 1968 and in Professionalism-Local Reliance. No other state ranking as high in percent Negro citizens ranks as high in Professionalism-Local Reliance as do both Illinois and Maryland.

Summary

Summarizing the foregoing discussions of six models is simplified somewhat by the fact that the characteristics

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[1]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, op. cit., p. 34.

represented by three of the four expenditure models are included as variables in our two models of the law enforcement planning process. Model V, representing influences which favor the allocation of block grant funds for police activities over those for courts and corrections includes as one of ten variables the level of criminal justice expenditures which is represented by Model I. In a like manner, Model VI includes among its eight variables the characteristics represented by Models II and III.

Combining the variables which make up Models I and V, the following state characteristics are associated with relatively high allocations of fiscal 1970 block grant funds for police activities:

- Above-average rankings in Income Distributional Inequality and in Murder and Auto Theft Increases.

- Below-average rankings in Affluence and in Industrialization and the political system characteristics which are frequently associated therewith: Professionalism-Local Reliance, Competition-Turnout, Innovation, Governor's Formal Power, and Population Increase, 1960-1970.

- Below-average rankings in Rape and Property Crime Rates and increases therein, in Percent of Prisoners Paroled, in Prison Inmate Population Increase, and in Expenditures for Criminal Justice as a Percent of Personal Income.

Models II, III and VI combined indicate that the state characteristics associated with relatively high allocation of

block grant funds for the control of organized crime and disorders include above-average rankings in the following:

- Industrialization and the political system characteristics frequently associated therewith.

- Percent Negro, 1968, Income Distributional Inequality, Geographic Size, and Welfare-Education.

- Expenditures for police activities versus correctional activities.

- Murder and Aggravated Assault Rates and Rape and Property Crime Rates.

- Allocation of Federal block grant funds for correctional activities.

These rankings are balanced by below-average rankings in the following variables:

- State/Local Criminal-Justice Expenditure Ratio, and the State/Local ratio of representatives on the SPA supervisory board.

- Highways-Natural Resources, Competition-Turnout, and the allocation of block grant funds for "miscellaneous" programs to improve law enforcement.

- Rape and property crime rate increases, and the suicide/homicide ratio.

In comparing the lists of variables which make up the two combination-models outlined above, we find that four variables are operative in both: Income Distributional Inequality, Industrialization, Property Crime Rates, and

Professionalism-Local Reliance. The manner in which these four state characteristics are related to the allocation decisions of the SPA's are set forth in Table 7-19. Examination of this table shows that relatively high allocations to courts and corrections and to the control of organized crime and disorders are associated with above-average rankings in Industrialization, Property Crime Rates, and Professionalism-Local Reliance. In contrast, relatively high allocations to police activities are associated with below-average rankings in each of these three characteristics.

TABLE 7-19.--Trends of State Rankings in Variables which Influence all Block Grant Fund Allocations

	Ranking Tendency of States Wherein SPA Allocations are Relatively high for:		
Variable	Police	Courts and Corrections	Organized Crime & Disorder Control
Industrialization	low	high	high
Property Crime	low	high	high
Professionalism-Local Reliance	low	high	high
Income Distributional Inequality	high	low	high

Note: "Low" and "high" indicate that rankings tend to be in the lower or higher half of the forty-eight states, respectively.

Income Distributional Inequality, the fourth variable of Table 7-19, is important because it is the only

variable which indicates that allocations for the improvement of courts and correctional activities are favored by circumstances different from those which favor allocations to control organized crime and disorders. If our earlier finding that SPA allocations tend to redress imbalances within state criminal justice systems is valid, the rankings of Table 7-19 suggest that inequality in the distribution of income is associated with relatively high state and local expenditures for corrections, and below-average expenditures for police protection. Such conditions would call for the SPA allocation of relatively greater amounts for police activities and for organized crime and disorder control, which falls under the "police" heading more so than under the "courts and corrections" heading. By implication, the SPA's of states which tend toward equality in the distribution of incomes saw the need for improvement of correctional activities to be greater than that for improvement of police activities, including organized crime and disorder control.

This summarization concludes with a review of the findings with regard to application of Model IV. The apparent direct linkage between the degree of tax effort by state and local governments and expenditures for the judicial and prosecution functions, except where the percent of Negro residents is especially high, suggests that courts are lowest on the priority list of the criminal-justice components. However, an alternative hypothesis seems worthy of consideration: that where the degree of tax effort by state and

local governments is relatively low, court systems tend to be self-sufficient through the collection of fines. This would, for the most part, obviate the necessity for the expenditure of public tax revenue for the judicial and prosecution functions. In states with a high percentage of Negroes (most of whom are poor) and with the accompanying patterns of violent, personal crime, the courts are less likely to be self-supporting through collection of fines, and more likely to award sentences of imprisonment. This hypothesis is consistent with our earlier proposition that high rates of violent, personal crime make it possible for fewer police to produce a volume of arrests sufficient to keep the courts and correctional systems overloaded.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This final chapter summarizes the main findings of the foregoing aggregate analysis and application phases and then discusses the conclusion to be drawn from this study. Lastly, a number of questions related to law enforcement planning and the administration of criminal justice in the United States which remain unanswered are outlined.

Summarization

The findings of Chapter VI which can be illustrated by the relationships among indicators of the crime environment, expenditures for criminal administration, and SPA block grant allocations are shown in Table 8-1. These relationships indicate that:

1. Where state and local expenditures for all criminal justice functions as a percent of personal income are above average, and where the emphasis is on expenditures for police versus corrections, the 1966-1969 mean rates of property crime and forcible rape tended to be relatively high. The SPA's of these states emphasized support of courts and

TABLE 8-1.--Comparison of Relationships Between Indicators of Crime Environment And Criminal Justice Expenditures and SPA Block Grant Allocations, 1970

Crime Environment Factors		State & Local Government Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions								Allocations of 1970 Block Grant Funds			
		Total Expenditures		State-Local Ratio		Police versus Corrections		Judicial and Prosecution		Police vs. Courts & Corrections		Organized Crime & Disorder Control	
		High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Rape and Property Crime Rates	High	x		x		x		- - -[a]		x		x	
	Low		x		x		x				x		x
Violent Personal Crime Rates	High	- - -		x		x		x		- - -		x	
	Low				x		x	x					x
Rape & Property Crime Increases	High	x		- - -		x		x		x		- - -	
	Low		x				x		x		x		
Violent Personal Crime Increases	High	- - -		- - -		x		x		x		- - -	
	Low						x	x			x		

[a]Indicates simple correlation of 0.10 or less.

correctional activities and the control of organized crime and civil disorder in their allocations of block grant funds.

2. Where state government expenditures for criminal justice functions were relatively high (and municipal or local expenditures relatively low), and where the SPA supervisory board allocated an above-average portion of 1970 block grant funds for police activities, the 1966-1969 mean rates of property crime and forcible rape were relatively low.

3. Where 1966-1969 mean rates of murder and aggravated assault were above average, state and local governments tended to allocate a relatively high percentage of their combined criminal justice expenditures to police activities, and relatively low amounts to correctional activities. The SPA's of these states emphasized allocations to control organized crime and civil disorders.

4. Where reported rates of murder increased most dramatically between 1966 and 1969, combined state and local expenditures emphasized police protection over correctional activities, while judicial and prosecution expenditures in these states were relatively low. The SPA's of these states tended to favor police-related projects in their allocation of 1970 block grant funds.

In addition to the foregoing, the aggregate analysis of Chapter VI indicates that SPA decisions on the funding of police activities, courts and correctional activities are more sensitive to variances in state crime environments than

to any of the other state characteristics considered. In contrast, SPA decisions to fund projects aimed at the control of organized crime and civil disorders are most sensitive to political system differences.[1] The results of the aggregate analysis also make it clear that in addition to environmental variables indicators of criminal justice expenditures and of income distribution must be included in any model which best explains the distribution of block grant funds to either police, courts, or correctional activities.

In the application phase of this study (Chapter VII), operational models were developed to represent those combinations of variables which appear to have the greatest influence on state and local criminal justice expenditures and on SPA allocation decisions. These six models include:

I - Total Criminal Justice Expenditures, State and Local, as Percent of Personal Income

II - State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio

III - Police-versus-Corrections Expenditures

IV - Judicial and Prosecution Expenditure Level, as Percent of Personal Income

V - SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Correctional Activities, Fiscal 1970

VI - SPA Allocations for Organized Crime and Civil Disorder Control

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[1]Further discussion of this important finding is located in the "conclusion" section of this chapter.

The results obtained by applying each of these six models to the twelve states ranking highest and lowest in the Characteristics represented by the model are summarized in Table 8-2. Examination of these results indicates that the following state characteristics tend to be associated with above-average SPA allocations for police activities:

- Greater inequality in the distribution of income than in most states.

- Above-average rankings in Murder and Auto Theft rate Increases, 1966-1969.

- Below-average rankings in Affluence and in Industrialization and the political system characteristics frequently associated therewith: Professionalism-Local Reliance, Competition-Turnout, Innovation, Governor's Formal Power, and Population Increase.

- Below-average rankings in Rape and Property Crime Rates, and in increases in those offense categories, in Percent Prisoners Paroled, in Prison Inmate Population Increase, and in Expenditures for Criminal Justice as a Percent of Personal Income.

Table 8-2 also indicates that SPA emphasis on the control of organized crime and civil disorders in the allocation of 1970 block grant funds is associated with the following state characteristics:

- Relatively high scores in Population Increase, Industrialization, Professionalism-Local Reliance and Innovation.

TABLE 8-2.--State Rankings[a] in Variables Associated with Above-Average SPA Allocations for Police, Courts and Corrections, and for Control of Organized Crime and Civil Disorders

Variable	Police	Courts & Corrections	Organized Crime & Disorders
Affluence	Low	High	- -
Industrialization	Low	High	High
Percent Negro, 1968	- -	- -	High
Population Increase, 1960-70	Low	High	High
Rape and Property Crime Rates, 1966-69	Low	High	High
Increases in Rape and Property Crime Rates	Low	High	Low
Murder and Aggravated Assault Rates, 1966-69	- -	- -	High
Increases in Murders and Auto Thefts, 1966-69	High	Low	- -
Professionalism-Local Reliance	Low	High	High
Competition-Turnout	Low	High	Low
Innovation	Low	High	High
Governor's Formal Power	Low	High	- -
State/Local Criminal Justice Expenditure Ratio	- -	- -	Low
State/Local SPA Representation Ratio	High	Low	Low
Total Criminal Justice Expenditures, State & Local	Low	High	High
Police-Versus-Corrections Expenditures	- -	- -	High
Percent Prisoners Paroled	Low	High	High

TABLE 8-2.--Continued

Variable	Police	Courts & Correc-tions	Organized Crime & Disorders
Prison Population Increase	Low	High	High
Highways-Natural Resources	- -	- -	Low
Income Distributional In-equality	High	Low	High
Welfare-Education	- -	- -	High[a]
SPA Allocations for Cor-rections	- -	- -	High

[a]A high ranking, as used in this table, indicates a ranking between 1 and 24; a low ranking is one between 25 and 48.

- Above-average rankings in Percent Negro, 1968, Income Distributional Inequality, and Welfare-Education.

- State and local government emphasis on expenditures for police protection versus correctional activities, and SPA emphasis on courts and correctional programs.

- Above-average rates in Murder, Aggravated Assault, and in Forcible Rape and Property Crimes.

- Below-average rankings in Highways-Natural Resources, Competition-Turnout, and in Forcible Rape and Property Crime rate increases.

- Relatively low total state and local expenditures for criminal administration, and a below-average percent of state government representatives serving on the SPA supervisory board.

As applied to most of the upper- and lower-quartile states examined in Chapter VII, model accuracy ranges from 70 to 80 percent. However, each model is clearly inappropriate for from one to three states in each group of twelve states examined. Inquiry into the reasons for these exceptions has led to two propositions:

First, that a crime environment characterized by high rates of violent crime against persons and low rates of property crime, is associated with relatively high expenditures for correctional activities and relatively low expenditures for police activities. The reason for this distinctive expenditure pattern in certain states appears to be related to the marked difference in clearance rates between violent personal crime (murder and aggravated assault) and property crimes. The fact that clearance rates for murder and aggravated assault are several times that of clearance rates for most property crimes means that a state where the crime environment is characterized by high rates of murder and aggravated assault, and low property crime rates, a comparatively few police officers are able to produce a number of arrests sufficient to overburden the courts and correctional agencies of the state. On the other hand, in areas where murder and aggravated assault rates are low, and where property crime rates are high, a comparatively large police force is needed to produce the number of arrests which the courts and correctional system can handle.

Secondly, that without a systems approach and coordinated budgeting for criminal justice functions at state and local levels imbalances within the criminal justice system of each state are both inevitable and predictable in an age of rapid social, economic and political change such as that experienced by most American states. These changes, briefly summarized, include:

- A growing economy accompanied by increasing mobility, urbanization, rising expectations, and relative deprivation.

- A shift in patterns of criminal activity, especially in the increased property crime rates reported--related to conditions described above.

- White reaction to the civil rights movement, leading to the 1964 nomination of Barry Goldwater and the revival of law-and-order as a national political issue. Two results of this revival were the creation of the National Crime Commission and the enactment of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

- Marked progress in the FBI's voluntary program for the reporting of crime statistics. As the number of cooperating jurisdictions has increased from 7,700 in 1960 to 8,500 in 1969, the reporting requirements have become more detailed. A result has been the centralization of crime reporting in many large cities, which has tended to increase the number of "offenses known to the police" for reporting purposes.

The effect of these changes in the environment within which all criminal justice systems operate has been to increase the public demand for better police protection (more arrests), "tougher" prosecutors and judges (fewer dismissals), and longer prison sentences (delayed parole).[1] The cumulative impact is to reduce the flexibility of the criminal justice process, which is founded on discretion in the arrest, prosecution, judicial and parole functions, and thereby to aggravate the tendency toward workload imbalance among the three major components of the criminal justice system. This is entirely at odds with one of three central themes of the National Crime Commission which strongly urged that there be a far broader range of alternatives for dealing with offenders. The Commission based its premise,

> . . . On the belief that, while there are some who must be completely segregated from society, there are many instances in which segregation does more harm than good. Furthermore, by concentrating the resources of the police, the courts, and correctional agencies on the smaller number of offenders who really need them, it should be possible to give all offenders more effective treatment.[2]

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[1]An interesting example of the impact of parole board policies on state prison inmate population trends is found in the recent history of the Kansas prison population. Following the 1960 election, a new "hard line" parole board was created to fulfill a campaign promise of the new Governor. Subsequently, the inmate population rose by thirty percent in four years. Since about 1965 a more lenient parole policy has reduced the Kansas prison population to its pre-1961 level.

[2]National Crime Commission, Challenge of Crime, op. cit., p. vii.

Conclusion

In Chapter I the controversy in the study of public policy over whether political or environmental variances are the more important as public policy determinants was reviewed. This review pointed out the importance of the methodology to the outcome of public policy studies. The use of Easton's input-output model by Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert, and Dye has challenged the earlier assumptions about the importance of political variables. Those assumptions had been reinforced through the methodology of case studies and community power approaches which dealt with government structure as a key variable.

A number of recent aggregate studies point to the middle ground where there exists no single answer to the question of whether environmental or political variables of the American states are the more important determinants of policy outputs.

The conclusion to be drawn from the present investigation is that law enforcement planning decisions or outputs related to allocations for police, courts and correctional activities are most sensitive to environmental variances, while decisions by SPA's to allocate funds for the control of organized crime and civil disorders are most sensitive to state political system differences.

This conclusion appears to be in accord with the "middle ground" findings of Cnudde and McCrone, Clarke, and

Sharkansky and Hofferbert[1] whose studies suggest that different political, social and economic characteristics have different relevance for policies which varies between substantive areas of policy. Although the control of organized crime and civil disorders falls within the law enforcement or criminal justice policy area, the allocation of block grant funds for such purposes calls for consideration of factors in addition to those normally dealt with when allocating resources for police, courts, and correctional activities. As illustrated in the case of Indiana, Michigan and Pennsylvania, organized crime and disorder control projects may involve governmental agencies other than those which comprise the state's criminal justice system. The types of criminal activity to be controlled under the "organized crime" heading--Gambling, loan sharking, narcotics, prostitution and bootlegging--exist because there is a market for the illegal goods and services dealt with. The inflated value of these goods and services has, in large measure, been created by the criminal laws which render the activities of organized crime illegal. While there exists a general consensus in the society that law related to violent personal crime and property crime should be enforced, the same cannot

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[1] Cnudde and McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," op. cit.; Clarke, "Environment, Process and Policy: a Reconsideration," op. cit.; and Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," op. cit.

be said with respect to the enforcement of laws which, in effect, make organized crime a worthwhile enterprise.

In a similar manner, the control of civil disorders frequently lacks a general consensus. In making a distinction between "inputs" and "withinputs," Easton argues that in transitional societies the counter-elites demand reform of the existing political structure so as to improve their chances of obtaining power. "To the extent that demands can be shown to arise out of and reflect dissatisfaction with the current structure of the political system, we can say that they are internally generated,"[1] states Easton.

In summary, law enforcement planning with regard to the allocation of resources to the functional areas of state criminal justice systems responds primarily to externally-generated demands which are identifiable through analysis of interstate socio-economic variances. In contrast, demands which are generated primarily within the political system influence those law enforcement planning decisions related to the more controversial areas, of which the control of organized crime and civil disorders are prime examples.

Unanswered Questions

It is perhaps to be expected that in a study of this nature more questions will be raised than are answered. Our concentration on fiscal year 1970 law enforcement planning

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[1]Easton (1965), op. cit., p. 55.

outputs has virtually excluded from consideration a number of important questions related to law enforcement planning and criminal administration. These questions stem from the dilemma faced by all governments: how can citizens and their property be protected while at the same time permitting the degree of freedom and flexibility needed to accommodate the changes which science and technology force upon the modern world? In Lincoln's terms, "Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"[1]

Remarkable advancements in science and technology have contributed to a society that is more affluent than any the world has known, but one that has seen life in America grow increasingly complex. This, in turn, has stimulated a demand for simple solutions. As James Reston has pointed out, the more irrational the world seems, the more the people long for rational answers; "the more diverse everything is, the more they want it all reduced to identity."[2]

In Chapter II several issues related to the 1968 Safe Streets Act and the decision of the Congress to provide Federal financial assistance for state and local law enforcement assistance were introduced. In large measure, the unanswered questions discussed below stem from those issues.

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[1]Gaylon L. Caldwell and Robert M. Lawrence, American Government Today (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), p. 12.

[2]Quoted by Yale Kamisar in "When the Cops Were Not Handcuffed," New York Times Magazine, November 7, 1965, p. 109.

1. The law-and-order issue gives rise to the question of whether any amount of Federal assistance in the area of law enforcement or criminal justice administration can be effective when candidates for public office insist on politicizing the crime problem? In the opinion of James Q. Wilson, it is probably too much to expect that public officials, sensitive to the popular concern about "crime in the streets," will encourage police administrators to do better those things the police can do, which is to maintain order, and to look to the correctional agencies for help in reducing the incidence of crimes committed by repeaters, which the police cannot do.[1]

2. A related question under the law-and-order issue heading centers on Thurman Arnold's perceptive observations on the symbolic importance of the criminal trial,[2] and the futility of expecting to "improve" this feature of the criminal justice process in terms of effectiveness measured by the mundane criteria of case loads processed, the speedy trial, or the percentage of convictions "won" by the prosecutor.

3. Local control of law enforcement is an issue that appears to have been given all the rhetoric, while the decision of the Congress went to "states' rights" under the

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[1]James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 296.

[2]Arnold, op. cit.

block grant label. One basic question which stems from the block grant funding method of the Safe Streets Act concerns its implication for nation-wide efforts to standardize criminal laws and punishments. With state governments making the allocation decisions with regard to the block grant funds, it would seem that inter-state differences in criminal laws and their application will tend to increase. Another question in this area concerns the impact of the block grant provision of the Safe Streets Act on the relative power of rural-dominated state governments versus the large municipal governments within the state. It would appear that the block grant funding method will off-set somewhat the impact of the historic Backer versus Carr[1] and Reynolds versus Sims[2] apportionment decisions of 1962 and 1964 respectively. In the latter case the Supreme Court's decision included the statement

> Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.[3]

In the judgment of George B. Merry, the impact of Reynolds versus Sims "has proven to be even more far-reaching than the decree handed down in Backer versus Carr."[4]

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[1] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

[2] 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

[3] Ibid.

[4] George B. Merry, "Now Your Vote May Count for More." Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1966, p. 9.

4. The systems approach which is stressed in the LEAA Guidelines for state-wide law enforcement planning raises a question that appears to have been largely ignored: whether the doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches is not threatened when the separate criminal justice functions--police, judicial, correctional--are dealt with as a system?

5. Of all the needs of law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice, the National Crime Commission found that the greatest need is the need to know. As of 1967, the Commission reported that negligible amounts were being expended for the types of research "that are the obvious prerequisites for a rational program of crime control."[1] In stressing the need for research, the Commission was aware that final answers to many of the vexing questions about crime will not be provided by research:

> Decisions as to the activities that should be made criminal, as to the limits there should be on search and seizure, or as to the proper scope of the right to counsel, cannot be made solely on the basis of research data. Those decisions involve weighting the importance of fairness and privacy and freedom--values that cannot be scientifically analyzed. But when research cannot, in itself, provide final answers, it can provide data crucial to making informed policy judgments.
>
> There is virtually no subject connected with crime or criminal justice into which further research is unnecessary.[2]

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[1] National Crime Commission, The Challenge of Crime, op. cit., p. 273.

[2] Ibid.

To meet the need for more complete information about the operation of the criminal process, the Commission recommended the creation of a National Criminal Justice Statistics Center. A major effort of the proposed Center would be to overcome many of the present limitations in law enforcement record keeping and the crime statistics based thereon.

Responding to the need for better information about crime and criminals, an important upgrading of the FBI's voluntary Uniform Crime Reporting Program recently has involved the establishment of several multi-state, computerized criminal-intelligence systems.[1] While the importance of such systems to more effective law enforcement is recognized, their creation gives rise to questions concerning invasion of privacy and the possible political use of criminal intelligence information.

6. Recognizing that ours has always been a changing or transitional society, it appears that the rate at which American society has changed since the 1954 Brown versus Board of Education decision[2] is greater than ever. This proposition raises the question of whether there does not now exist a level of criminal activity that is "normal" for today's transitional society--a level that is higher than that which was "normal" for the pre-1954 or even pre-1965 American society? If so, then it would appear that a significant

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[1]FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1969, op. cit., p. 50.

[2]347 U.S. 483 (1954).

reduction in reported crime rates must take into account Durkheim's important warning:

> There is no occasion for self-congratulation when the crime rate drops noticeably below the average level, for we may be certain that this apparent progress is associated with some social disorder.[1]

The implication here, in broad terms, is that the current "crime wave" is a "normal" level of criminal activity for today's transitional society, and that a marked drop in reported crime rates resulting from "improved" law enforcement must necessarily signal a slowing down of the pace at which the society is changing or undergoing transition.

Epilogue

One of the paradoxes of the American society, and perhaps of all societies, is the apparent correlation between change which seeks to irradicate discrimination in housing, employment, education, transportation and access to public facilities and the threat or actuality of violence, disorder and the breaking of laws. Recently Ted Gurr advanced the theoretical proposition that "a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of the population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another

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[1]Durkheim, op. cit.

form."[1] In his investigation of the means employed to deter civil strife Gurr finds that the magnitude of civil violence tends to increase as the level of resources devoted to coercive deterrence is escalated--up to a certain point--"and then only at relatively high levels of coercive force does strife tend to decline. Moreover at the outer limit the relationship again tends to change direction: countries with the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife than those with somewhat smaller forces."[2]

In spite of the apparent reasonableness of those propositions which seek to reduce crime by attacking some of its underlying causes, the prospects for strong national efforts in this direction are not bright for the reasons described by Breckenridge:

> Our society cannot and will not accept an enlarged lawlessness even if it must tolerate some of it. And even if it may be at fault in tolerating many of the basic causes of crime, it will not wait for long-range, time-consuming, money-consuming solutions to stop or reduce it. It will take the means at hand to control it, even abusive means, in its concern and belief that crime must be controlled and reduced, if not wholly eliminated.[3]

All considered, perhaps Tillich's judgment that "injustice is unavoidable in the struggle for justice,"[4] is

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[1]Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using new Indices," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1104.

[2]Ibid., pp. 1123-24. [3]Breckenridge, op. cit., p. 42.

[4]Paul Tillich, To Live As Men: An Anatomy of Peace (Santa Barbara, Calif.: The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965), p. 15.

the most accurate conception of the dilemma faced by all who seek to improve law enforcement and criminal justice in the American states through state-wide law enforcement planning.

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APPENDIX A

ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATOR DATA

TABLE A-1.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: Industrialization, Affluence, and Contributions Claimed

Rank	Industrialization		Affluence		Contributions Claimed	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Percent
1	N.J.	2.112	NEV	2.340	UTAH	3.22
2	CONN	1.940	CALIF	1.520	ALA	2.11
3	N.Y.	1.920	WYO	1.325	N.Y.	2.03
4	MASS	1.602	COLO	1.209	MISS	2.02
5	ILL	1.561	OREG	0.966	DEL	1.95
6	PA	1.235	WASH	0.964	OKLA	1.88
7	R.I.	1.218	MONT	0.932	TENN	1.84
8	DEL	1.200	NEB	0.782	FLA	1.82
9	OHIO	1.138	KANS	0.776	CONN	1.81
10	CALIF	1.014	UTAH	0.739	IDAHO	1.80
11	MICH	0.884	CONN	0.690	N.C.	1.79
12	MD	0.847	DEL	0.584	N.J.	1.78
13	IND	0.776	IDAHO	0.556	S.C.	1.78
14	WISC	0.526	FLA	0.511	PA	1.77
15	MO	0.366	IA	0.453	MINN	1.74
16	N.H.	0.263	AIRZ	0.442	MO	1.68
17	WASH	0.036	MINN	0.405	CALIF	1.67
18	N.C.	-0.057	N.Y.	0.390	ARK	1.66
19	VA	-0.079	N.J.	0.366	GA	1.65
20	TENN	-0.081	MASS	0.361	MASS	1.61
21	MINN	-0.145	ILL	0.266	ARIZ	1.58
22	GA	-0.148	OHIO	0.207	MD	1.57
23	S.C.	-0.170	MICH	0.192	MICH	1.54
24	LA	-0.199	N.M.	0.153	VA	1.54
25	IA	-0.208	S.D.	0.147	LA	1.53
26	ME	-0.217	OKLA	0.120	TEX	1.53
27	W.VA	-0.234	TEX	0.017	ILL	1.47
28	OREG	-0.298	IND	0.005	COLO	1.40
29	TEX	-0.354	MD	0.001	OHIO	1.39
30	VT	-0.365	N.H.	-0.002	NEV	1.38
31	ALA	-0.392	N.D.	-0.045	N.D.	1.36
32	FLA	-0.396	WISC	-0.047	KANS	1.35
33	KY	-0.453	PA	-0.122	R.I.	1.35
34	KANS	-0.534	MO	-0.170	WISC	1.34
35	COLO	-0.532	VT	-0.207	WYO	1.32

TABLE A-1.--Continued

Rank	Industrialization State	Industrialization Score	Affluence State	Affluence Score	Contributions Claimed State	Contributions Claimed Percent
36	UTAH	-0.591	R.I.	-0.227	IND	1.32
37	NEB	-0.720	ME	-0.319	VT	1.31
38	OKLA	-0.765	VA	-0.833	S.D.	1.30
39	MISS	-0.824	KY	-1.287	KY	1.29
40	ARK	-0.848	W.VA	-1.301	IA	1.27
41	ARIZ	-0.993	GA	-1.350	NEB	1.27
42	NEV	-1.148	TENN	-1.355	OREG	1.22
43	IDAHO	-1.167	LA	-1.379	WASH	1.19
44	MONT	-1.277	ARK	-1.424	N.M.	1.18
45	N.M.	-1.290	ALA	-1.502	MONT	1.14
46	S.D.	-1.360	N.C.	-1.627	ME	0.98
47	WYO	-1.456	S.C.	-2.050	W.VA	0.85
48	N.D.	-1.494	MISS	-2.173	N.H.	0.84

[a]Scores for Industrialization and Affluence are factor scores provided by Richard I. Hofferbert. "Percent" under Contributions Claimed is percent of 1968 personal income claimed as "contributions" on 1968 individual income tax return calculated from: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Pub. 79 (9-70), Statistics of Income, 1968, Individual Income Tax Returns (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 171.

TABLE A-2.--State Rankings and Percentages: 1968 Negro Population, Negro Increase, Non-white Migration

Rank	1968 Negro Population State	Percent	Negro Increase 1950-1968 State	Percent	Non-white Migration 1950-1960 State	Percent
1	MISS	37.0	WISC	350.0	N.H.	137.0
2	S.C.	32.0	ME	228.6	CONN	71.1
3	LA	31.0	N.D.	202.3	WISC	68.4
4	ALA	27.5	N.M.	143.9	ME	67.7
5	GA	24.5	ARK	114.3	NEV	63.0
6	N.C.	23.0	KY	109.1	COLO	52.9
7	VA	19.5	NEB	106.9	CALIF	52.7
8	ARK	18.5	MINN	104.1	N.J.	34.6
9	FLA	17.5	COLO	97.4	MASS	32.1
10	MD	17.0	MASS	92.3	N.H.	29.5
11	TENN	16.0	CONN	88.0	WASH	28.6
12	DEL	14.0	NEV	85.9	ILL	28.3
13	ILL	13.0	ILL	75.6	MICH	27.9
14	TEX	12.0	IND	58.0	OHIO	25.6
15	MICH	10.5	PA	56.3	IND	25.4
16	MO	10.5	IDAHO	55.5	OREG	22.7
17	N.J.	10.0	MINN	55.0	VT	20.1
18	PA	9.5	N.Y.	53.5	NEB	17.5
19	N.Y.	9.5	N.J.	51.7	FLA	16.6
20	OHIO	9.0	MICH	51.3	DEL	14.6
21	KY	7.0	CALIF	48.7	MINN	13.8
22	IND	7.0	MO	39.8	R.I.	13.7
23	CALIF	6.5	OHIO	39.3	IA	12.3
24	OKLA	6.0	UTAH	37.5	PA	12.0
25	NEV	5.0	IA	33.3	MD	9.3
26	CONN	5.0	MONT	33.3	MO	9.3
27	W.VA	5.0	VT	33.3	UTAH	8.0
28	KANS	4.5	OREG	31.6	IDAHO	7.1
29	WISC	3.5	KANS	17.2	KANS	6.5
30	ARIZ	3.5	R.I.	13.6	TEX	- 2.7
31	NEB	3.0	MD	3.2	N.M.	- 2.9
32	COLO	3.0	DEL	2.1	KY	- 7.6
33	MASS	3.0	KY	2.0	VA	- 9.5
34	N.M.	3.0	ARIX	0.9	ARIZ	-10.3
35	WASH	2.0	TENN	- 0.7	LA	-10.4

TABLE A-2.--Continued

Rank	1968 Negro Population State	Percent	Negro Increase 1950-1968 State	Percent	Non-white Migration 1950-1960 State	Percent
36	R.I.	2.0	TEX	- 5.4	TENN	-10.7
37	IA	1.0	LA	- 5.7	MONT	-11.4
38	OREG	1.0	OKLA	- 8.0	OKLA	-13.0
39	MINN	1.0	N.C.	-10.7	N.D.	-18.3
40	WYO	0.8	VA	-11.8	WYO	-18.4
41	UTAH	0.6	W.VA	-12.7	GA	-19.2
42	N.D.	0.4	ALA	-14.1	N.C.	-19.2
43	N.H.	0.3	WYO	-14.7	S.D.	-19.4
44	IDAHO	0.3	ARK	-17.2	ALA	-22.8
45	ME	0.3	S.C.	-17.6	S.C.	-26.5
46	VT	0.2	MISS	-18.3	MISS	-32.7
47	S.D.	0.2	FLA	-19.6	W.VA	-35.0
48	MONT	0.1	GA	-20.6	ARK	-35.0

Sources:

Percent Negro, 1968 is taken from Table I of The Negro Population published by the Center for Research and Marketing, Inc., 1968.

Negro Increase, 1950-1968 is calculated from The Negro Population, op.cit., and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Table 56.

Non-white Migration is taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 34.

TABLE A-3.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: 1960-1970 Population Increase; Low Rape and Property Crime Rate ; Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio

Rank	1960-1970 Population Increase		1966-1969 Low Rape and Property Crime Rates		1966-1969 Low Murder-High Suicide/ Homicide Ratio	
	State	Percent	State	Score	State	Score
1	NEV	71.3	MISS	1.6	VT	1.8
2	FLA	37.1	W.VA	1.4	N.D.	1.8
3	ARIZ	36.1	N.H.	1.2	ME	1.7
4	CALIF	27.0	ARK	1.1	IA	1.5
5	MD	26.5	N.C.	1.0	R.I.	1.2
6	COLO	25.8	S.D.	1.0	N.H.	1.2
7	DEL	22.8	VT	0.9	NEB	1.2
8	N.H.	21.5	N.D.	0.8	MONT	1.1
9	CONN	19.6	NEB	0.8	OREG	1.1
10	WASH	19.5	S.C.	0.7	WISC	1.1
11	UTAH	18.9	OHIO	0.7	CONN	1.0
12	N.J.	18.2	ME	0.7	IDAHO	0.9
13	OREG	18.2	IA	0.7	MINN	0.8
14	VA	17.2	ALA	0.7	WASH	0.7
15	TEX	16.9	KANS	0.7	UTAH	0.6
16	GA	16.4	PA	0.6	MASS	0.5
17	VT	14.1	KY	0.6	ARIZ	0.5
18	MICH	13.4	WISC	0.6	COLO	0.3
19	LA	11.9	IDAHO	0.5	WYO	0.2
20	WISC	11.8	VA	0.5	CALIF	0.2
21	N.C.	11.5	GA	0.4	NEV	0.1
22	MINN	11.5	CONN	0.4	KANS	0.1
23	IND	11.4	WYO	0.4	DEL	0.1
24	R.I.	10.5	TENN	0.2	PA	0.1
25	MASS	10.5	MINN	0.1	IND	0.0
26	ILL	10.2	IND	0.1	N.J.	-0.1
27	TENN	10.0	TEX	0.1	N.Y.	-0.1
28	OKLA	9.9	N.J.	0.0	OKLA	-0.1
29	OHIO	9.7	OKLA	0.0	S.D.	-0.1
30	S.C.	8.7	R.I.	0.0	W.VA	-0.2

TABLE A-3.--Continued

Rank	1960-1970 Population Increase		1966-1969 Low Rape and Property Crime Rates		1966-1969 Low Murder-High Suicide/Homicide Ratio	
	State	Percent	State	Score	State	Score
31	N.Y.	8.4	DEL	-0.1	MICH	-0.3
32	MO	8.3	MASS	-0.1	OHIO	-0.3
33	ARK	7.7	MONT	-0.1	MD	-0.4
34	IDAHO	6.9	N.M.	-0.3	N.M.	-0.7
35	N.M.	6.8	LA	-0.4	KY	-0.7
36	KY	6.0	MO	-0.4	ILL	-0.8
37	ALA	5.4	UTAH	-0.4	TENN	-0.8
38	NEB	5.1	WASH	-0.5	MO	-0.9
39	PA	4.2	COLO	-0.8	VA	-0.9
40	KANS	3.2	ILL	-0.8	LA	-1.0
41	MONT	2.9	OREG	-0.9	FLA	-1.3
42	ME	2.5	FLA	-1.3	TEX	-1.4
43	IA	2.4	MICH	-1.7	MISS	-1.4
44	MISS	1.8	ARIZ	-1.9	ARK	-1.4
45	WYO	0.7	NEV	-1.9	GA	-1.4
46	S.D.	-2.1	N.Y.	-2.1	N.C.	-1.7
47	N.D.	-2.3	MD	-2.7	ALA	-1.8
48	W.VA	-6.2	CALIF	-2.8	S.C.	-1.8

[a]Scores for 1960-1970 Population Increase are percent increase in total state population as recorded by Bureau of the Census; scores for other two variables are factor scores derived by factor analysis technique, with data computed from FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, 1966-1969, and from Public Health Service reports on cause of death in Vital Statistics, 1967.

TABLE A-4.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: Rape and Property Crime Rate Increase; Murder and Auto Theft Increase; Suicide/Homicide Ratio, 1967

Rank	1966-1969 Rape-Property Crime Rate Increases		1966-1969 Murder and Auto Theft Increases		1967 Suicide/ Homicide	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Ratio
1	WASH	2.1	R.I.	3.6	ME	14.75
2	ARK	1.9	NEB	1.9	N.D.	12.00
3	CONN	1.8	MO	1.8	IA	7.14
4	COLO	1.6	N.J.	1.4	N.H.	6.67
5	OHIO	1.6	OHIO	1.3	VT	6.20
6	N.M.	1.5	N.Y.	1.2	WISC	5.13
7	KANS	1.5	MASS	1.0	MINN	5.08
8	WISC	1.3	MICH	1.0	WYO	4.93
9	TEX	1.0	KY	0.9	OREG	4.28
10	MASS	0.9	CONN	0.9	WASH	3.91
11	MD	0.8	DEL	0.6	COLO	3.85
12	NEV	0.5	TENN	0.5	MONT	3.81
13	MO	0.5	VT	0.5	CONN	3.76
14	DEL	0.5	WYO	0.4	NEB	3.49
15	MINN	0.4	N.H.	0.2	KANS	3.00
16	IDAHO	0.4	TEX	0.2	CALIF	2.98
17	ME	0.4	WASH	0.2	IDAHO	2.98
18	OREG	0.4	W.VA	0.1	UTAH	2.82
19	IA	0.3	CALIF	0.0	R.I.	2.61
20	VT	0.3	N.C.	0.0	S.D.	2.45
21	VA	0.1	COLO	-0.1	MASS	2.36
22	N.J.	0.1	IND	-0.1	PA	2.32
23	N.C.	0.1	VA	-0.3	ARIZ	2.25
24	IND	-0.1	S.C.	-0.3	IND	2.24
25	S.D.	-0.1	ILL	-0.3	NEV	2.17
26	FLA	-0.2	S.D.	-0.4	W.VA	2.16
27	S.C.	-0.2	OREG	-0.4	OHIO	1.98
28	ALA	-0.4	N.M.	-0.4	N.M.	1.94
29	LA	-0.4	MONT	-0.4	N.J.	1.55
30	NEB	-0.4	KANS	-0.4	DEL	1.55

TABLE A-4.--Continued

Rank	1966-1969 Rape-Property Crime Rate Increases		1966-1969 Murder and Auto Theft Increases		1967 Suicide/ Homicide	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Ratio
31	PA	-0.5	ALA	-0.4	MICH	1.48
32	CALIF	-0.5	GA	-0.4	KY	1.46
33	R.I.	-0.5	OKLA	-0.4	OKLA	1.43
34	GA	-0.5	FLA	-0.5	VA	1.39
35	KY	-0.6	LA	-0.5	MO	1.38
36	MISS	-0.6	PA	-0.6	N.Y.	1.28
37	ARIZ	-0.7	UTAH	-0.6	ILL	1.20
38	TENN	-0.8	ARK	-0.7	ARK	1.11
39	N.Y.	-0.9	MD	-0.7	FLA	1.10
40	MICH	-1.0	MINN	-0.7	TENN	1.04
41	UTAH	-1.1	MISS	-0.8	MD	1.03
42	ILL	-1.1	IA	-1.0	TEX	0.89
43	N.H.	-1.1	IDAHO	-1.0	N.C.	0.84
44	OKLA	-1.2	WISC	-1.0	GA	0.76
45	N.D.	-1.3	ARIZ	-1.2	ALA	0.76
46	W.VA	-1.4	NEV	-1.5	LA	0.73
47	WYO	-1.7	ME	-1.6	S.C.	0.72
48	MONT	-1.9	N.D.	-2.1	MISS	0.64

[a]Scores for the 1966-1969 crime rate are factor scores derived by factor analysis of 1966-1969 Uniform Crime Reports data on seven index crimes, plus Buearu of Public Health Vital Statistics, 1967 data on suicides and homicides compiled from cause-of-death certificates.

APPENDIX B

POLITICAL SYSTEM INDICATOR DATA

TABLE B-1.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: Professionalism-Local Reliance; Competition-Turnout Innovation

Rank	Professionalism-Local Reliance		Competition-Turnout		Innovation	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Score
1	N.Y.	4.230	UTAH	1.629	N.Y.	.656
2	CALIF	2.140	NEB	1.494	MASS	.629
3	MASS	1.651	MINN	1.339	CALIF	.604
4	PA	1.648	IDAHO	1.266	N.J.	.585
5	MICH	1.354	MONT	1.235	MICH	.578
6	ILL	1.154	IND	1.152	CONN	.568
7	N.J.	1.010	ILL	1.034	PA	.560
8	OHIO	0.619	WISC	0.949	OREG	.544
9	WISC	0.558	OREG	0.913	COLO	.538
10	MD	0.500	N.J.	0.843	WISC	.532
11	MINN	0.417	N.D.	0.780	OHIO	.528
12	TEX	0.289	WASH	0.694	MINN	.525
13	FLA	0.260	COLO	0.679	ILL	.521
14	CONN	0.200	MICH	0.627	WASH	.510
15	MO	0.126	CONN	0.431	R.I.	.503
16	DEL	0.116	WYO	0.413	MD	.482
17	GA	0.087	CALIF	0.363	N.H.	.482
18	IND	0.036	KANS	0.359	IND	.464
19	LA	0.031	IA	0.326	LA	.459
20	ARIZ	-0.005	MO	0.305	ME	.455
21	S.C.	-0.013	W.VA	0.281	VA	.451
22	KANS	-0.159	OHIO	0.226	UTAH	.447
23	WASH	-0.160	PA	0.192	N.D.	.444
24	N.C.	-0.161	DEL	0.192	N.C.	.430
25	IA	-0.163	N.H.	0.191	KANS	.426
26	OREG	-0.207	R.I.	0.166	NEB	.425
27	MISS	-0.210	MASS	0.071	KY	.419
28	NEV	-0.221	ME	0.045	VT	.414
29	VA	-0.243	S.D.	-0.138	IA	.413
30	COLO	-0.255	ARIZ	-0.141	ALA	.406
31	NEB	-0.297	NEV	-0.170	FLA	.397
32	R.I.	-0.328	N.C.	-0.198	ARK	.394
33	ALA	-0.399	OKLA	-0.293	IDAHO	.394
34	TENN	-0.582	KY	-0.351	TENN	.389
35	ME	-0.619	MD	-0.377	W.VA	.386

TABLE B-1.--Continued

RANK	Professionalism-Local Reliance State	Score	Competition-Turnout State	Score	Innovation State	Score
36	KY	-0.661	VT	-0.483	ARIZ	.384
37	N.M.	-0.734	TENN	-0.556	GA	.381
38	W.VA	-0.739	FLA	-0.560	MONT	.378
39	N.H.	-0.752	TEX	-0.566	MO	.377
40	OKLA	-0.799	N.M.	-0.615	DEL	.376
41	ARK	-0.827	N.Y.	-0.643	N.M.	.375
42	N.D.	-0.869	VA	-0.964	OKLA	.368
43	S.D.	-0.976	LA	-1.152	S.D.	.363
44	UTAH	-1.032	ARK	-1.360	TEX	.362
45	IDAHO	-1.052	MISS	-1.770	S.C.	.347
46	MONT	-1.095	ALA	-2.504	WYO	.346
47	WYO	-1.421	GA	-2.516	NEV	.323
48	VT	-1.546	S.C.	-2.838	MISS	.298

[a]Scores for Professionalism-Local Reliance and Competition-Turnout are from Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, (September, 1969), p. 876.

Innovation scores are from Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation among the American States," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (September, 1969), p. 883.

TABLE B-2.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: Governor's Formal Powers; Centralization; State and Local Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, 1968

Rank	Governor's Formal Powers		Centralization		Revenue as Percent of 1968 Personal Income	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Percent
1	N.Y.	19	ALA	86	N.D.	17.7
2	ILL	18	N.J.	82	WYO	17.5
3	N.J.	18	TENN	79	N.M.	15.9
4	PA	17	GA	75	IDAHO	15.0
5	VA	17	ARK	74	MINN	14.9
6	WASH	17	CONN	69	MONT	14.8
7	CALIF	17	LA	65	CALIF	14.7
8	MD	16	PA	60	S.D.	14.6
9	MO	16	WISC	60	LA	14.5
10	OREG	16	N.Y.	60	NEV	14.5
11	UTAH	16	ARIZ	58	N.Y.	14.5
12	WYO	16	KY	56	UTAH	14.2
13	MONT	16	R.I.	54	ARIZ	14.1
14	ALA	15	DEL	50	WISC	13.9
15	CONN	15	IND	50	COLO	13.6
16	OHIO	15	CALIF	50	IA	13.6
17	TENN	14	W.VA	50	VT	13.6
18	KY	14	ME	50	WASH	13.4
19	MICH	14	VA	47	MISS	13.1
20	MINN	14	ILL	46	OKLA	12.9
21	NEV	14	UTAH	45	OREG	12.9
22	COLO	14	MICH	44	NEB	12.8
23	IDAHO	14	MD	44	W.VA	12.8
24	LA	13	OHIO	42	DEL	12.7
25	OKLA	13	WASH	40	MICH	12.5
26	IA	12	COLO	38	KANS	12.3
27	NEB	12	OKLA	38	ALA	12.0
28	WISC	12	KANS	37	FLA	12.0
29	GA	12	MONT	36	GA	12.0
30	MASS	12	MASS	34	MASS	11.8
31	IND	12	MO	32	MD	11.7
32	ARK	11	MINN	31	ME	11.6
33	S.D.	11	N.D.	31	KY	11.5
34	N.M.	11	WYO	28	IND	11.3
35	KANS	11	MISS	25	N.C.	11.3

TABLE B-2.--Continued

Rank	Governor's Formal Powers State	Score	Centralization State	Score	Revenue as Percent of 1968 Personal Income State	Percent
36	ME	11	S.D.	23	S.C.	11.2
37	N.H.	10	TEX	20	TENN	11.2
38	R.I.	10	IDAHO	19	ARK	11.0
39	N.C.	10	N.C.	19	R.I.	10.9
40	VT	10	N.M.	18	VA	10.9
41	ARIZ	10	IA	18	TEX	10.6
42	DEL	10	VT	13	N.J.	10.5
43	W.VA	8	OREG	11	PA	10.5
44	FLA	8	N.H.	9	MO	10.3
45	MISS	7	NEB	8	N.H.	10.2
46	S.C.	7	S.C.	6	OHIO	10.1
47	TEX	7	NEV	4	CONN	9.9
48	N.D.	7	FLA	0	ILL	9.8

[a]Scores for Governor's Formal Powers are from Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Politics in the American States; A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 229.

Centralization scores are from Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 74.

Revenue as Percent of Personal Income, 1968 is from National Education Association, Ranking of the States, 1970 (Washington,D.C.: National Education Association, 1970), p. 38.

TABLE B-3.--State Rankings and Scores[a] in Expenditures for Criminal Justice Functions: Police-versus-Corrections; Judicial and Prosecution; State/Local Ratio; Total Expenditures as Percent of 1968 Personal Income

Rank	Police-versus-Corrections		Judicial and Prosecution		State/Local Ratio		Expend's as Percent of Personal Income	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Ratio	State	%
1	N.J.	1.6	N.D.	3.0	VT	4.07	NEV	1.52
2	MICH	1.4	[illegible] O	2.5	DEL	2.19	N.Y.	1.34
3	VA	1.3	[illegible]A	1.6	ME	1.18	MD	1.30
4	NEB	1.2	S.D.	1.6	N.C.	1.14	CALIF	1.28
5	LA	1.2	COLO	1.4	CONN	0.98	ARIZ	1.13
6	ILL	1.2	OKLA	1.1	N.M.	0.93	N.J.	1.07
7	ARK	1.2	WYO	0.9	R.I.	0.92	DEL	1.03
8	ARIZ	1.1	ALA	0.8	KY	0.88	N.M.	1.01
9	TEX	0.9	MONT	0.8	IA	0.79	WISC	0.98
10	MISS	0.9	NEV	0.8	MONT	0.77	FLA	0.97
11	N.Y.	0.9	TEX	0.8	VA	0.77	LA	0.94
12	MO	0.7	ARIZ	0.5	MISS	0.76	MASS	0.94
13	N.M.	0.6	MICH	0.4	W.VA	0.73	COLO	0.93
14	OKLA	0.6	KANS	0.4	IDAHO	0.72	OREG	0.93
15	MD	0.5	OHIO	0.3	MD	0.72	WYO	0.89
16	FLA	0.5	CONN	0.3	OKLA	0.72	IDAHO	0.89
17	N.H.	0.5	BA	0.3	UTAH	0.71	VT	0.89
18	S.C.	0.4	OREG	0.2	WYO	0.69	MO	0.85
19	KY	0.3	IA	0.1	WASH	0.68	ILL	0.85
20	IND	0.3	UTAH	0.1	N.H.	0.68	PA	0.83
21	CONN	0.2	MINN	0.0	S.C.	0.66	R.I.	0.82
22	PA	0.2	N.H.	0.0	ARK	0.61	MICH	0.82
23	N.D.	0.2	PA	0.0	KANS	0.59	WASH	0.82
24	R.I.	0.2	DEL	-0.1	TENN	0.56	OHIO	0.80
25	ALA	0.1	VT	-0.2	IND	0.55	GA	0.77
26	NEV	0.1	N.M.	-0.2	S.D.	0.55	N.C.	0.78
27	WYO	0.1	R.I.	-0.2	COLO	0.55	CONN	0.77
28	IDAHO	0.0	TENN	-0.2	OREG	0.53	MONT	0.77
29	UTAH	0.0	W.VA	-0.4	NEB	0.50	ME	0.77
30	MASS	-0.1	N.Y.	-0.4	GA	0.48	KY	0.76

TABLE B-3.--Continued

Rank	Police-versus-Corrections State	Score	Judicial and Prosecution State	Score	State/Local Ratio State	Ratio	Expend's as Percent of Personal Income State	%
31	S.D.	-0.	ARK	-0.4	ALA	0.47	TEX	0.76
32	TENN	-0.	ILL	-0.4	N.D.	0.45	TENN	0.75
33	WISC	-0.	ME	-0.4	WISC	0.45	MINN	0.74
34	KANS	-0.	MO	-0.5	LA	0.44	VA	0.74
35	CALIF	-0.	CALIF	-0.5	MINN	0.43	MISS	0.73
36	IA	-0.	IND	-0.5	ARIZ	0.40	NEB	0.73
37	OHIO	-0.	LA	-0.6	NEV	0.39	UTAH	0.73
38	W.VA	-0.	KY	-0.7	TEX	0.38	ALA	0.73
39	GA	-0.	VA	-0.8	OHIO	0.37	S.C.	0.71
40	OREG	-1.0	MASS	-0.8	FLA	0.36	OKLA	0.70
41	MINN	-1.0	NEB	-0.8	MO	0.35	S.D.	0.69
42	MONT	-1.1	N.J.	-0.9	MICH	0.34	IA	0.68
43	COLO	-1.3	WISC	-0.9	PA	0.33	N.D.	0.65
44	WASH	-1.4	MISS	-1.1	CALIF	0.33	KANS	0.63
45	ME	-1.5	WASH	-1.5	ILL	0.32	N.H.	0.61
46	N.C.	-1.6	S.C.	-1.3	MASS	0.31	IND	0.59
47	VT	-2.6	MD	-1.9	N.J.	0.31	W.VA	0.57
48	DEL	-2.9	N.C.	-2.2	N.Y.	0.24	ARK	0.53

[a]Scores for Police-versus-Corrections and for Judicial and Prosecution expenditures are factor scores derived by factor analysis (varimax rotation) of data from U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1968-1969 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp.4-6.

State/Local expenditure ratios and Expenditures as Percent of Personal Income have been calculated from the data cited above.

TABLE B-4.--State Rankings and Percentages[a]: Supervisory Board[b] Representation of Police, Corrections, Courts and State/Local Ratio

Rank	Sheriff & Police State	%	Corrections State	%	Courts State	%	State/Local Ratio State	Ratio
1	VT	55.6	N.H.	20.0	CONN	50.0	CONN	3.50
2	TENN	43.8	MO	16.7	PA	42.9	R.I.	2.15
3	NEV	41.2	MONT	16.7	MASS	36.7	N.C.	1.60
4	ALA	40.0	IND	15.4	WYO	36.4	ME	1.38
5	MINN	37.5	ARK	14.3	N.J.	35.7	N.J.	1.30
6	ARK	35.7	GA	13.6	MICH	28.6	N.M.	1.25
7	FLA	34.6	ALA	13.3	KANS	28.3	ARK	1.00
8	MONT	33.3	IDAHO	13.3	N.D.	26.7	DEL	1.00
9	MO	33.3	IA	13.3	IA	26.7	FLA	1.00
10	OKLA	31.9	N.D.	13.3	COLO	26.3	KANS	1.00
11	ME	31.6	MD	12.5	KY	25.6	S.D.	1.00
12	S.D.	31.3	DEL	12.5	OKLA	25.5	IDAHO	0.88
13	N.C.	30.8	S.C.	12.5	MONT	25.0	S.C.	0.78
14	MASS	30.0	S.D.	12.5	S.D.	25.0	VA	0.78
15	MISS	29.4	NEV	11.8	VA	25.0	COLO	0.73
16	UTAH	27.8	KY	116	NEB	23.8	MONT	0.72
17	ILL	26.7	N.C.	11.5	ILL	23.3	OHIO	0.69
18	IDAHO	26.7	N.M.	11.1	IND	23.0	ALA	0.67
19	COLO	26.3	OKLA	10.6	VT	22.2	N.D.	0.67
20	KANS	25.0	CONN	10.5	MO	22.2	TEX	0.67
21	WISC	25.0	COLO	10.5	UTAH	22.2	W.VA	0.67
22	S.C.	25.0	ILL	10.0	ARK	21.4	MO	0.64
23	MD	25.0	MASS	10.0	ME	21.1	N.Y.	0.64
24	MICH	25.0	NEB	9.5	MD	20.8	UTAH	0.64
25	W.VA	24.0	OHIO	9.1	MISS	20.6	VT	0.63
26	PA	23.8	WYO	9.1	IDAHO	20.0	MD	0.60
27	N.H.	23.3	MISS	8.8	N.C.	19.2	KY	0.59
28	KY	23.3	N.Y.	8.7	TEX	19.0	MASS	0.58
29	GA	22.7	KANS	8.3	R.I.	18.2	WYO	0.57
30	OHIO	22.7	WISC	8.3	OHIO	18.2	MICH	0.56
31	R.I.	22.7	CALIF	8.0	ARIZ	17.6	LA	0.55
32	WYO	22.7	FLA	7.7.	N.Y.	17.4	IA	0.50
33	N.J.	21.4	MICH	7.1	NEV	17.6	ILL	0.50
34	WASH	20.7	N.J.	7.1	LA	17.6	PA	0.50
35	IA	20.0	PA	7.1	N.M.	16.7	WISC	0.50

TABLE B-4.--Continued

Rank	Sheriff & Police State	%	Corrections State	%	Courts State	%	State/Local Ratio State	Ratio
36	N.D.	20.0	WASH	6.9	DEL	16.7	MISS	0.48
37	CALIF	20.0	MINN	6.3	N.H.	16.7	TENN	0.45
38	TEX	19.1	TENN	6.3	WISC	16.7	IND	0.44
39	NEB	19.1	VA	6.3	CALIF	16.0	OKLA	0.42
40	VA	18.8	ARIZ	5.9	W.VA	16.0	GA	0.38
41	LA	17.6	UTAH	5.6	FLA	15.4	ARIZ	0.31
42	ARIZ	17.6	VT	5.6	WASH	13.8	NEB	0.31
43	CONN	16.7	ME	5.3	OREG	13.6	NEV	0.31
44	N.M.	16.7	TEX	4.7	MINN	12.5	N.H.	0.30
45	IND	15.4	OREG	4.5	TENN	12.5	CALIF	0.25
46	OREG	13.6	R.I.	4.5	ALA	10.0	MINN	0.23
47	N.Y.	13.0	W.VA	4.0	GA	9.1	WASH	0.21
48	DEL	12.5	LA	2.9	S.C.	6.3	OREG	0.16

[a]Calculated from U.S. Congress, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge," June, 1970 (mimeo).

TABLE B-5.--State Rankings, Percentages and Rate[a]: Percent Paroled, 1967; Prisoner Increase, 1964-67; Prisoners per 100,000 Population, 1967

Rank	Prisoners Paroled		Prisoner Increase		Prisoners/ Population	
	State	Percent	State	Percent	State	Rate
1	WASH	99.8	NEV	35.1	CALIF	144.8
2	N.H.	99.2	R.I.	25.9	MD	138.1
3	KANS	98.4	LA	15.1	NEV	137.0
4	OHIO	94.0	N.C.	12.9	COLO	127.3
5	UTAH	92.9	N.H.	12.2	FLA	121.1
6	WISC	92.1	DEL	9.6	GA	117.5
7	CALIF	91.9	FLA	8.0	TEX	113.3
8	N.Y.	87.6	CALIF	4.7	LA	112.3
9	PA	86.2	TEX	2.9	OKLA	110.5
10	NEV	84.8	S.C.	1.3	N.C.	109.7
11	N.J.	84.5	N.J.	0.0	ALA	109.6
12	MICH	83.9	UTAH	-1.5	KANS	100.6
13	CONN	79.9	ARIZ	-1.9	OHIO	98.7
14	ME	78.0	OKLA	-1.9	ARIZ	97.7
15	IND	77.0	COLO	-5.7	OREG	90.2
16	MINN	75.7	KY	-6.5	S.C.	89.9
17	VT	74.5	TENN	-6.5	KY	88.9
18	W.VA	73.9	MD	-6.8	N.M.	88.9
19	COLO	73.5	S.D.	-6.9	VA	88.9
20	N.D.	72.0	CONN	-7.5	WASH	88.7
21	ARK	71.0	MO	-7.5	ARK	83.9
22	ILL	70.6	WASH	-7.5	MICH	82.0
23	MASS	69.9	MASS	-7.9	WYO	80.6
24	IDAHO	64.0	WISC	-8.3	IND	78.1
25	IA	59.3	OHIO	-8.8	N.Y.	76.8
26	R.I.	58.6	N.M.	-9.6	TENN	76.6
27	MONT	57.4	MINN	-11.3	MONT	74.3
28	N.M.	57.3	OREG	-12.3	S.D.	72.6
29	LA	56.9	MICH	-12.4	MISS	71.0
30	OKLA	54.0	ALA	-15.4	MO	70.8
31	MISS	53.5	ARK	-17.1	NEB	67.7
32	ALA	52.7	VA	-17.2	W.VA	67.2
33	VA	49.3	ME	-17.7	IA	66.5
34	N.C.	48.7	MISS	-18.9	N.J.	65.9
35	MD	46.5	IA	-18.9	ILL	64.6

TABLE B-5.--Continued

Rank	Prisoners Paroled		Prisoner Increase		Prisoners/ Population	
	State	Percent	State	Percent	State	Rate
36	ARIZ	46.4	KANS	-18.9	UTAH	63.6
37	KY	44.1	IND	-19.1	WISC	62.2
38	FLA	42.2	ILL	-19.6	ME	60.8
39	GA	41.4	N.Y.	-20.2	DEL	58.9
40	OREG	40.1	IDAHO	-21.8	IDAHO	55.9
41	MO	38.0	VT	-24.1	CONN	54.3
42	TENN	35.7	N.D.	-24.2	VT	52.8
43	DEL	33.6	WYO	-25.0	PA	48.8
44	S.D.	33.1	PA	-26.0	MINN	46.1
45	TEX	33.1	NEB	-26.8	R.I.	38.9
46	NEB	31.8	GA	-27.4	MASS	33.7
47	S.C.	27.6	MONT	-29.8	N.H.	32.4
48	WYO	8.7	W.VA	-29.8	N.D.	28.5

[a]From U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. 44 (1967) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Table 6.

APPENDIX C

PUBLIC POLICY OUTCOME DATA

TABLE C-1.--State Rankings, Scores and Ratio[a]: Welfare-Education; Highways-Natural Resources; and Redistributive Ratio

Rank	Welfare-Education State	Welfare-Education Score	Highways-Natural Resources State	Highways-Natural Resources Score	Redistributive Ratio State	Redistributive Ratio Ratio
1	CALIF	1.849	WYO	3.728	MASS	3.320
2	MASS	1.446	NEV	2.866	MO	2.712
3	WISC	1.445	MONT	1.847	N.Y.	2.644
4	MINN	1.316	IDAHO	1.583	OKLA	2.567
5	ILL	1.258	S.D.	1.546	CONN	2.486
6	N.Y.	1.152	VT	1.313	R.I.	2.482
7	N.H.	1.035	UTAH	0.688	COLO	2.464
8	N.J.	1.035	OREG	0.656	OREG	2.446
9	N.D.	0.901	N.D.	0.614	KY	2.428
10	KANS	0.852	MINN	0.594	ILL	2.376
11	CONN	0.846	COLO	0.473	WISC	2.340
12	IA	0.845	ME	0.344	CALIF	2.322
13	WASH	0.789	NEB	0.337	MISS	2.274
14	OKLA	0.785	N.M.	0.269	ALA	2.267
15	MICH	0.761	N.H.	0.183	LA	2.252
16	OREG	0.735	ARIZ	0.175	OHIO	2.242
17	COLO	0.711	WISC	0.095	ARK	2.212
18	NEB	0.705	WASH	0.063	IDAHO	2.205
19	R.I.	0.640	ARK	0.056	VT	2.199
20	OHIO	0.284	IA	-0.059	DEL	2.190
21	WYO	0.220	KANS	-0.082	N.J.	2.135
22	N.M.	0.184	TENN	-0.169	GA	2.127
23	IND	0.155	MISS	-0.191	PA	2.107
24	UTAH	0.124	OKLA	-0.262	MINN	2.098
25	PA	0.085	MO	-0.298	WASH	2.093
26	IDAHO	-0.045	CALIF	-0.345	ME	2.060
27	MONT	-0.063	LA	-0.361	TENN	2.031
28	S.D.	-0.072	IND	-0.399	W.VA	2.011
29	MD	-0.155	ALA	-0.405	IA	2.001
30	AIRZ	-0.266	KY	-0.420	KANS	1.998
31	MO	-0.378	W.VA	-0.422	MONT	1.962
32	DEL	-0.390	TEX	-0.493	UTAH	1.954
33	ME	-0.465	GA	-0.535	MD	1.923
34	NEV	-0.535	MICH	-0.578	MICH	1.920
35	VT	-0.615	FLA	-0.589	N.C.	1.900

TABLE C-1.--Continued

Rank	Welfare-Education State	Welfare-Education Score	Highways-Natural Resources State	Highways-Natural Resources Score	Redistributive Ratio State	Redistributive Ratio Ratio
36	LA	-0.729	VA	-0.645	FLA	1.850
37	TEX	-0.808	OHIO	-0.756	N.D.	1.845
38	FLA	-0.875	PA	-0.769	N.H.	1.830
39	KY	-1.041	DEL	-0.779	NEV	1.826
40	VA	-1.062	MD	-0.787	NEB	1.813
41	N.C.	-1.079	S.C.	-0.808	TEX	1.800
42	ARK	-1.263	CONN	-0.845	IND	1.793
43	W.VA	-1.360	N.C.	-0.857	S.C.	1.775
44	GA	-1.452	ILL	-0.877	N.M.	1.720
45	S.C.	-1.580	N.Y.	-1.079	S.D.	1.715
46	TENN	-1.738	N.J.	-1.115	ARIZ	1.694
47	AIA	-1.753	R.I.	-1.144	WYO	1.660
48	MISS	-2.432	MASS	-1.363	VA	1.620

[a]Scores for Welfare-Education and Highways-Natural Resources are from Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (September, 1969), p. 876.

Redistributive Ratio is from Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV (June, 1970), p. 515.

TABLE C-2.--State Rankings and Scores[a]: Block Grants to Police versus Courts and Corrections; to Control Organized Crime and Disorders; and Income Distributional Inequality

Rank	Police vs. Courts & Corrections		Control of Org. Crime & Disorders		Income Distributional Inequality	
	State	Score	State	Score	State	Index
1	S.D.	2.3	CALIF	2.8	MISS	.510
2	R.I.	2.0	LA	2.2	ARK	.486
3	NEB	1.7	MISS	2.0	ALA	.478
4	ALA	1.1	COLO	1.3	TENN	.478
5	CONN	1.0	IND	1.2	LA	.477
6	MISS	1.0	NEV	1.1	S.C.	.474
7	FLA	0.8	PA	1.0	KY	.474
8	N.H.	0.8	NEB	0.9	GA	.469
9	N.J.	0.8	IA	0.8	OKLA	.465
10	WYO	0.8	MASS	0.8	N.C.	.465
11	N.C.	0.7	MICH	0.8	TEX	.464
12	S.C.	0.7	ALA	0.7	FIA	.462
13	MONT	0.6	FLA	0.7	VA	.461
14	ME	0.6	OHIO	0.7	MO	.459
15	COLO	0.6	UTAH	0.7	S.D.	.456
16	DEL	0.6	ARIZ	0.6	W.VA	.451
17	IA	0.5	GA	0.5	ARIZ	.445
18	ARK	0.4	N.J	0.4	N.M.	.440
19	N.M.	0.2	KY	0.2	NEB	.440
20	CALIF	0.1	KANS	0.0	KANS	.439
21	GA	0.0	N.Y.	0.0	IA	.439
22	KY	0.0	S.C.	0.0	DEL	.434
23	MO	0.0	WISC	0.0	VT	.434
24	N.D.	0.0	ARK	-0.1	MINN	.431
25	OHIO	0.0	OKLA	-0.1	N.D.	.430
26	ARIZ	-0.1	TENN	-0.2	N.Y.	.429
27	KANS	-0.1	CONN	-0.3	CALIF	.427
28	TENN	-0.1	W.VA	-0.3	COLO	.425
29	MASS	-0.2	N.H.	-0.4	MD	.424
30	VA	-0.2	TEX	-0.4	ILL	.423

TABLE C-2.--Continued

Rank	Police vs. Courts & Corrections State	Score	Control of Org. Crime & Disorders State	Score	Income Distributional Inequality State	Index
31	W.VA	-0.2	N.C.	-0.6	R.I.	.418
32	OKLA	-0.3	VA	-0.6	MONT	.415
33	ILL	-0.4	ME	-0.7	IND	.414
34	OREG	-0.4	MO	-0.7	NEV	.414
35	NEV	-0.5	R.I.	-0.7	MASS	.414
36	PA	-0.5	IDAHO	-0.8	WASH	.413
37	VT	-0.5	ILL	-0.9	PA	.412
38	WISC	-0.5	MD	-0.9	WISC	.412
39	IND	-0.7	N.M.	-0.9	ME	.412
40	MICH	-0.7	N.D.	-0.9	OREG	.411
41	N.H.	-0.8	VT	-1.0	MICH	.409
42	LA	-0.9	WYO	-1.0	OHIO	.408
43	MINN	-1.2	OREG	-1.1	N.H.	.407
44	WASH	-1.2	DEL	-1.2	CONN	.404
45	IDAHO	-1.3	WASH	-1.2	N.J.	.403
46	UTAH	-2.2	MONT	-1.3	IDAHO	.402
47	MD	-2.9	S.D.	-1.5	WYO	.399
48	TEX	-3.1	MINN	-1.8	UTAH	.394

[a]Scores for Police-versus-Courts and Corrections and for Control of Organized Crime and Civil Disorders are factor scores derived by factor analysis (varimax rotation) of data taken from U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, "Preliminary Program Analysis," July, 1970.

Income Distributional Inequality is the Gini index computed by Thomas D. Hopkins from income distributional data for total families and unrelated individuals in 1959 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960 series PC (1) 1C to 53C, "General Social and Economic Characteristics," Table 65. See Thomas D. Hopkins, "Income Distribution in Grants-in-Aid Equity Analysis," National Tax Journal 18 (June, 1965), 209-213.

TABLE C-3.--State Rankings and Percentages[a]: 1970 Block Grant Fund Allocations for Police, Courts, and Correctional Activities

Rank	Police Activities State	Percent	Courts State	Percent	Correctional Activities State	Percent
1	S.D.	86.4	WASH	20.9	LA	44.3
2	R.I.	79.9	IDAHO	20.4	UTAH	42.5
3	NEB	72.7	UTAH	16.5	MD	41.6
4	DEL	72.0	MD	13.5	ARIZ	38.5
5	CONN	68.0	MINN	12.6	MASS	37.3
6	WYO	67.5	ILL	12.0	GA	34.5
7	N.C.	67.1	ME	11.9	OKLA	32.5
8	ALA	67.0	WISC	11.4	TENN	31.4
9	ME	66.3	IND	11.1	KANS	30.6
10	MONT	65.7	NEV	11.0	OHIO	30.5
11	N.H.	65.0	VA	10.5	N.J.	30.3
12	N.J.	64.4	N.Y.	9.7	MO	29.8
13	S.C.	63.4	N.D.	9.5	KY	29.8
14	FLA	63.3	MICH	8.7	IDAHO	28.6
15	MISS	61.7	MO	7.7	IND	28.1
16	COLO	59.0	W.VA	7.5	CONN	28.0
17	ARK	58.7	TEX	7.1	W.VA	27.9
18	MO	58.6	N.C.	7.1	PA	27.6
19	N.M.	58.4	OREG	6.9	WASH	26.0
20	N.D.	58.0	PA	6.7	COLO	26.0
21	IA	57.8	TENN	6.5	NEV	25.5
22	VA	55.5	S.D.	6.2	TEX	25.2
23	GA	55.5	OKLA	6.0	OREG	25.4
24	TENN	55.2	N.M.	5.5	FLA	25.4
25	ARIZ	54.0	KANS	5.0	N.Y.	24.7
26	W.VA	54.0	CALIF	5.0	ARK	24.7
27	KY	53.7	MONT	5.0	N.C.	24.7
28	KANS	53.7	WYO	4.6	CALIF	24.5
29	ILL	53.6	IA	4.3	MICH	24.5
30	OHIO	53.6	OHIO	4.1	WYO	22.8
31	OREG	52.7	GA	4.0	VA	22.7
32	OKLA	52.6	N.H.	4.0	IA	21.8
33	MASS	51.0	MASS	3.2	MINN	21.7
34	CALIF	50.0	COLO	3.0	S.C.	21.1
35	WISC	49.7	VT	2.8	MISS	20.5

TABLE C-3.--Continued

Rank	Police Activities		Courts		Correctional Activities	
	State	Percent	State	Percent	State	Percent
36	NEV	48.2	R.I.	2.7	N.D.	20.0
37	WASH	48.0	FLA	2.6	N.H.	20.0
38	VT	47.8	LA	2.5	MONT	19.8
39	PA	46.4	ARIZ	2.5	ALA	19.5
40	IDAHO	46.3	NEB	2.3	WISC	19.5
41	N.Y.	46.0	MISS	2.0	ILL	19.0
42	MINN	45.7	ARK	2.0	ME	18.9
43	MICH	45.2	KY	1.8	VT	18.2
44	IND	45.1	S.C.	1.7	DEL	17.0
45	LA	40.2	CONN	1.5	N.M.	16.7
46	UTAH	33.8	N.J.	1.3	NEB	12.7
47	TEX	28.6	ALA	1.0	R.I.	11.2
48	MD	23.3	DEL	1.0	S.D.	2.6

[a]Calculated from data in U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, "Preliminary Program Analysis," July, 1970.

TABLE C-4.--State Rankings and Percentages[a]: Fiscal 1970 Block Grant Fund Allocations by SPA's for Organized Crime Control, Disorder Control, and Miscellaneous

Rank	Organized Crime Control State	Percent	Disorder Control State	Percent	Miscellaneous State	Percent
1	IA	8.8	CALIF	15.0	TEX	31.5
2	NEB	7.6	MISS	8.5	VT	26.8
3	MISS	6.7	NEV	8.4	MD	20.4
4	N.Y.	6.2	IND	7.4	MINN	20.0
5	PA	6.1	WISC	6.8	N.M.	15.2
6	LA	6.1	ALA	6.0	OREG	14.4
7	MICH	5.7	S.C.	5.5	N.Y.	13.4
8	CALIF	5.0	COLO	5.5	ILL	11.9
9	COLO	5.0	LA	5.4	MICH	10.8
10	FLA	4.5	ARK	5.1	WISC	10.6
11	IND	4.4	MICH	5.1	DEL	10.0
12	NEV	3.4	UTAH	5.0	MONT	9.5
13	TEX	3.3	TEX	4.3	N.D.	9.5
14	OHIO	3.2	N.M.	4.2	KY	9.5
15	N.J.	3.2	OHIO	4.1	PA	9.3
16	KANS	3.1	PA	3.9	ARK	8.5
17	UTAH	3.0	MASS	3.4	VA	8.0
18	ALA	3.0	OKLA	3.4	S.C.	7.9
19	GA	2.7	KY	3.1	IA	7.3
20	MASS	2.6	N.D.	3.0	W.VA	7.1
21	R.I.	2.6	ME	2.9	KANS	7.0
22	ARIZ	2.5	NEB	2.6	N.H.	7.0
23	ILL	2.5	TENN	2.6	UTAH	6.4
24	VA	2.4	FLA	2.5	OKLA	5.5
25	KY	2.1	VT	2.1	WYO	5.1
26	VT	2.1	GA	2.0	WASH	4.6
27	W.VA	2.0	N.H.	2.0	ALA	4.5
28	N.H.	2.0	W.VA	1.5	OHIO	4.5
29	WISC	2.0	ARIZ	1.5	IND	3.9
30	CONN	1.0	N.C.	1.1	S.D.	3.7
31	IDAHO	1.0	IDAHO	1.1	MO	3.6
32	MD	1.0	ILL	1.0	NEV	3.6
33	S.D.	1.0	VA	0.9	R.I.	3.6
34	WASH	0.9	N.J.	0.8	TENN	3.2
35	S.C.	0.4	KANS	0.6	IDAHO	2.6

TABLE C-4.--Continued

Rank	Organized Crime Control		Disorder Control		Miscellaneous	
	State	Percent	State	Percent	State	Percent
36	OREG	0.1	OREG	0.6	MASS	2.3
37	TENN	0.1	MO	0.3	NEB	2.1
38	ARK	0.1	S.D.	0.1	FLA	1.7
39	DEL	0.0	MD	0.0	COLO	1.5
40	ME	0.0	NY	0.0	CONN	1.5
41	MINN	0.0	CONN	0.0	LA	1.5
42	MO	0.0	DEL	0.0	GA	1.3
43	MONT	0.0	IA	0.0	ARIZ	1.0
44	N.M.	0.0	MINN	0.0	MISS	0.6
45	N.C.	0.0	MONT	0.0	CALIF	0.5
46	N.D.	0.0	R.I.	0.0	ME	0.0
47	OKLA	0.0	WASH	0.0	N.J.	0.0
48	WYO	0.0	WYO	0.0	N.C.	0.0

[a]Calculated from data in U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Office of Law Enforcement Programs, "Preliminary Program Analysis," July, 1970.