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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON AS A DELEGITIMATION OF CONTEMPORARY WESTERN POLITICAL TRADITIONS

A DISSERTATION

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degree of

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Neil E. Lindley

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1975

NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON AS A DELEGITIMATION

OF CONTEMPORARY WESTERN POLITICAL TRADITIONS

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

PREFACE

The writer owes many human debts for the completion of this work. One of his greatest obligations is to the graduate faculty in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma for its long-suffering patience in waiting to receive the final product. This work would not have been possible without the valuable assistance of several such faculty members whose counsel and guidance deserve special mention.

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Although the writer's academic debt to his aforementioned mentors is huge, he must take full responsibility for the shortcomings of this disquisition. The exposition itself was in many ways overly ambitious but was sustained by the commentator's keen interest in trying to see things whole--a particularly precarious undertaking where the quagmires of social phenomena are concerned. Yet the venture of writing and thus inviting criticism seems justified if it enables one to see a line of thought concerning a method which may prove capable of further development. To make the venture may be the more necessary just when there is a dearth of appropriate methods to deal

theoretically with the overwhelming complexities within the social contextual whole on the one hand and demanding pressures to relate practically to the subject of our social actions and legitimation of our institutions on the other hand.

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In another vein and another tradition, the investigator's colleagues in The Church of the New Covenant in Norman, Oklahoma, have left their mark upon this work. They were the first to see and hear its concepts unravelled and correlated in a formal educational setting. Their involved and committed spirit of creative collaboration led to several refinements of the conceptualizations, particularly where the consideration of the meanings of transcendental reference points and "community" were concerned.

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Neil E. Lindley

March, 1975

San Antonio, Texas

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Ideas and Integrities, A Spontaneous Autobiographical Disclosure. Edited by Robert W. Marks. New York: Collier Books, The Macmillan Company, 1972.

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Arcology: The City in the Image of Man. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969.

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Forms of Individuality: An Enquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations. Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927. See especially the quotations of his work appearing on pages 68, 69, 92 and 432 here.

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CHAPTER I

NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL DELEGITIMATION IN A TRANSIENT SOCIETY

PART I. THE OVERVIEW, THE PLAN OF STUDY, AND THE METHODOLOGY

The Overview

Introductory Statement

This is a study about the nature of man in special relation to that particular aspect of his practical public life referred to as "politics."

More specifically, it is broadly an examination of what human beings in western civilization think about what it means to be human, and of the implications that these views hold for the nature of politics and the state.

More precisely, this project constitutes an investigation into the normative content of new concepts of the human person within western culture relative to the delegitimating effect which they appear to have upon the core concepts and some practical implications of the dominant culture, i.e., upon the status quo.[1]

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[1]Seymour Martin Lipset points out that "crises of legitimacy are primarily a recent historical phenomenon, following the rise of sharp cleavages among groups which are able, because of mass communication, to organize around different values than those previously considered to be the only acceptable ones." See his chapter on "Social

Still more particularly it seems to the writer that the importance of the study of delegitimation of political values and structures in terms of the problem of concepts of personality lies in the following facts:

1. The homogeneity and viability of a culture and its governing political system depend on the existence within that culture of a core of common values alluring enough to captivate and hold the willing assent and positive self-identification of the members of the culture with those values;[1] and,

2. Western culture, indeed, the fortunes of every nation on earth whose destinies are caught up in the march of technological advance--such cultures now appear to bear the mark of constant radical change as an ostensibly permanent fact of life;[2] and,

3. Greater knowledge about the process of delegitimation and its interrelationships with legitimation or "relegitimation" could possibly enable man to adjust the ongoing balance between them in such a way as to make change possible within levels that can be tolerated both by the culture and by the individuals within it without rupturing

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Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy," Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), especially p. 64.

[1]On the subject of core values and the viability of cultures see Amitai Etzioni's A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961).

[2]This is one of the themes of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970).

the contexts in which growth (meant as an essential aspect of life) can take place.[1]

For these reasons, then, it is reemphasized that this project explores the relationship between changing concepts of the human person as these are reflected in contemporary western culture, on the one hand, and on the other hand the delegitimation in that culture of its social institutions in their political aspects.[2]

The preceding paragraph serves as a succinct working description of this endeavor's objectives. Inherent in that statement are, however, three types of comprehensive substantive objects of investigation. Together they form the subject matter of this study which it is the writer's objective to relate and elucidate for the purpose of increasing relevant understanding about the loss of authority (legitimacy) among our political traditions.

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[1]David Apter touches on this point in his The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965). (Hereinafter referred to as Modernization.) He observes that "the modernization process produces a powerful urge to individuality, leadership, and ruthlessness at a time when complex industrial societies are wrestling with the problem of the loss of individuality, with alienation and feelings of individual superfluousness," pp. xii-xiii. See also his chapter on "Some Characteristics of Modernization."

[2]The political system here is regarded as one of many social systems within the society. As Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. affirm, social systems are made up not of individuals, but of roles. The political system includes all structures in their political aspects. See their Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 18-19. (Hereinafter referred to as Comparative Politics.) See also Chapter III on "Political Structures and Culture," pp. 42-72.

The three kinds of substantive objects of investigation intrinsic within the working descriptive statement about this project include (1) a relationship, (2) a set of concepts, and (3) a process. These are as follows:

1. The relationship is the connection between the second and third substantive objects of this inquiry.

2. The set of concepts is that body of changing opinions and viewpoints about the nature of human personality which has become widespread within contemporary western culture.

3. The process is the occurrence of the delegitimation in that culture of its social institutions in their political aspects.

It is possible to diagram these three substantive objects as frames-of-reference within a larger universe of discourse. This has been done in Figure 1. However, before turning our attention to Figure 1 it is useful to comment briefly on some major assumptions which lead to that particular universe of discourse described.

First, it is assumed that a culture, as the sum total of the ways of life of a people, when examined carefully, will exhibit some normative unifying principle (or principles), and that it is the common association with this unifying core that identifies a culture's members as "a people."[1] It is further assumed that this common core

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[1] See John Lotz's "Language and Culture" in Language & Culture: A Reader, ed. by Patrick Gleeson and Nancy Wakefield (Columbus, O.: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 101-6. See also Amitai Etzioni's "The Search for Political Meaning," The Center Magazine, V, No. 2 (March/April, 1972), 208. (Hereinafter referred to as "Political Meaning.")

LEGEND

A. NOT-HUMAN-CULTURE:

B. ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL:

C. WESTERN CULTURE (FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE PRESENT):

D. CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE:

E. THE CULTURAL CHANGE COMPLEX:

E^1 - THE CENTRAL CORE CONCEPTS OF WESTERN SOCIETY SINCE 1945.

E^2 - CONCEPTS COMPETING FOR THE CORE POSITION (SPECIFIC FOCUS: NEW CONCEPTS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY)

E^3 - CORE CONCEPTS COMMON TO NEW CONCEPTS

E^4 - ULTIMATE CONCERNS OF THE CULTURE:

F. ALL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE:

F^1 - POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ALL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS:

G. TRANSACTIONAL RELATIONS (BETWEEN AGENTS OF CHANGE AND ALL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS)

G^1 - INFLUENCE BY THE CULTURAL CHANGE COMPLEX ON SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

G^3 - INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CULTURAL CHANGE COMPLEX.




Fig. 1.--The broad and narrow universes of discourse and their constituent frames-of-reference

rests upon certain human ultimate concerns which provide the impetus for the ethos of the culture, such as in the Protestant ethic, or the spirit of capitalism or the ethos of democracy.[1]

Further, it is assumed that a culture functions effectively (and efficiently) on behalf of its ethos whenever its ultimate concerns are taken for granted. These ultimate concerns then serve as supports for the members of the culture which relieves individuals of the burden of making numerous decisions about ultimate questions on a cultural basis.[2]

Yet, it is also assumed that a culture that fails somewhere, somehow, to make provisions for evaluating its own ultimate concerns periodically may do so at the risk of inviting "interlopers" to assault or undermine the culture by raising their own ultimate questions.[3] Interlopers, as such, have not as great a stake, or at least a lesser stake in the status quo than committed members, in the culture. Therefore they may raise the ultimate questions faced by man in forms that weaken rather than strengthen existing long-established cultural

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[1]Paul Tillich has done extensive work on this point. See the following of his works: The Protestant Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948); The Religious Situation, trans. by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1956); and Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). The same point is given essential importance from a strictly biological and behavioral point of view by David Callahan in his "Living with the New Biology: The Search for an Ethic," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August, 1972), 4-12. (Hereinafter referred to as "Living with the New Biology.")

[2]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," pp. 4-5.

[3]Ibid.

concepts and practices. It necessarily behooves those who do have a stake to be aware of the possible delegitimating questions and claims.

The fact that a culture functions effectively on behalf of its ethos whenever its ultimate concerns are taken for granted, and, alternatively, that a culture must make provision for evaluating its ultimate concerns periodically, means that a culture's life will oscillate in a rhythm between generating or reaffirming ideals and alternately taking them for granted in order to progress conservatively and safely.

Thus, the affirmation is made in this study that it is the nature of culture to be normative, that human culture is the source of norms, and that it is only through culture that man, as a normative creature, exhibits markedly human characteristics, viz., those that distinguish him most sharply from other animals.[1]

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[1]The observation that culture is itself normative is widely recognized in behavioral studies of political legitimacy. See for example, Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 391-409; and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Princeton University Press, 1963); (hereinafter referred to as The Civic Culture); Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); (hereinafter referred to as Political Socialization); and Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Boston: Princeton University Press, 1965); (hereinafter referred to as Political Culture).

But the affirmation that culture is the source of norms in the sense that the basis for norms can be found "in the facts" is a different point. This point is given strong support by Elijah Jordan in his Forms of Individuality: An Enquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927). (Hereinafter referred to as Forms.) See especially the first four chapters.

Also, the observation is made, which has been made by others in other contexts, that normative cultural changes involve two dynamics --erosion of existing values and structures, and development of new ones.[1] The first of these dynamics is what is meant by "delegitimation," and the second is what is meant by "legitimation" or "relegitimation," but the dynamics of these processes as considered here are approached differently from studies conducted heretofore (as far as the writer knows) and are here studied more systematically than in previous contexts (again, as far as is known to the writer).

Delegitimation of Political Values and Structures in Contemporary Western Culture

It should be pointed out still more particularly that this study is not concerned with delegitimation of culture in general or as such, but specifically with the delegitimation of political values and structures in contemporary western culture.

"Contemporary" here means the period since the end of World War II in 1945. Also "western culture" is defined thematically rather than geographically and is characterized by the following themes: the "spirit" (if not the practice) of capitalism, popular sovereignty, a historical consciousness, a Faustian spirit, an epistemological dichotomy between subjective and objective approaches to knowledge (the "subject-object split"), secularism, practical individualism and philosophic subjectivism, and scientific and technical achievements which

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[1]Etzioni, "Political Meaning," p. 6.

reflect deep-rooted if shortsighted attitudes of rationalism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism.[1] These themes (or characteristics) are only mentioned here and will be defined and discussed in detail later in this chapter and study.

It should also be noted that these are the themes in western culture which likewise characterize the institutionalized corporate relations which regulate the human experience and meaning of cooperation and conflict, competition and the pursuit of "the good life." The precise meanings of these terms as employed in this study also will be elucidated in the course of the discussion. It is the exploration of the delegitimation of much of what is represented in the eight themes of western society (and their vehicular structures) just mentioned to which this project is committed.

The Universe-of-Discourse and Its Presuppositions

It was stated earlier as a succinct description of the objectives in this effort that this project explores the relationship

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[1]This particular list of cultural themes is the writer's own, but the themes were suggested in their various dimensions by numerous works, some of which are as follows: Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); (hereinafter referred to as The Protestant Ethic); Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The Politics of Hysteria: The Sources of Twentieth-Century Conflict (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964); (hereinafter referred to as Hysteria); H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, with Supplementary Essays (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960); (hereinafter referred to as Radical Monotheism); Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); (hereinafter referred to as War and Peace); R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: The New American Library, 1954); Tillich, The Religious Situation.

between changing concepts of the human person as these are reflected in contemporary western culture, on the one hand, and the delegitimation in that culture of its social institutions in their political aspects, on the other hand. A definitive universe-of-discourse and certain frames-of-reference are implied in this statement. In Figure 1 a diagram appears illustrating the three substantive objects of investigation and their relationships within a symbolic representation of the implicit universe of discourse and its constituent frames-of-reference. The term "universe-of-discourse" refers to all the objects or ideas utilized in the arguments or discussions in this study. Collectively therefore these objects and ideas form the comprehensive system of thought which is both explicit and implicit in it. A self-consciously and intentionally conceived "universe-of-discourse" helps to render hidden assumptions explicit and visible so that clarity results in place of confusion.

In the statement of purpose certain "frames-of-reference" also are implied. These refer to certain limited contexts within the universe-of-discourse. Both types of mental mechanisms help to limit the study to the subject at hand and to render it manageable within prescribed boundaries.

Figure 1 provides a symbolic picturization of the universe-of-discourse and its constituent frames-of-reference as it is acknowledged and adhered to in this paper. The attempt has been made to identify all the major objects of thought and their essential interrelationships one with the other. The major concepts in this study which are

embodied in Figure 1 are identified by code-letter symbols. The title of each concept and a short analysis of each is given in the section that follows.

Figure 1 Code and Analysis

Figure 1 is entitled "The Broad and Narrow Universes of Discourse and Their Constituent Frames-of-Reference." It is intended that the meaning of the terms in the title and the justification for the title itself will be made clear in the analysis of each of the parts in the code which follows below:

A. Not-Human-Culture.--The space labelled by the letter "A" indicates the infinity of conceptual space resting outside the large inclusive rectangle (B) and refers to all the ideas not included in the discussion. As such, "A" is merely the identification and representation of the negative of the broad universe-of-discourse. Through this distinction the following fact is represented: Everything not specifically related to ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL (B) is excluded from discussion. Thus, e.g., the mating habits of any nonhuman animal will not be discussed unless they specifically relate to the essential points to be made in the main discussion about human culture.

B. All Human Culture in General.--This class of ideas is represented by the largest rectangle designated as "B," and this class of ideas includes all other classes of ideas within it which are discussed in this paper. This largest of all classes of ideas discussed

is called the broad universe-of-discourse because it represents the outer limits of what is to be considered. The broad universe-of-discourse stands for the implicit conceptual background against which all topical discussion takes place. In a sense, all ideas within this class are implied in all the other ideas in this class. Except for purposes of clarification in the first chapter, direct mention of this broad universe-of-discourse as such is seldom made. Yet its conceptual presuppositions are implicit throughout the discussion and ostensibly give it depth. For this reason, greater depth of understanding requires that its place in the total system of thought be shown. (See Figure 2 for a portrayal of the major characteristics of this class of ideas as understood in the present study. See also Figures 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 for the dynamics of legitimation, delegitimation and relegitimation which are understood to occur as a result of these nine characteristics.)

C. Western Culture (From the Beginning to the Present).--Rectangle "C" in the diagram is referred to as the narrow universe of discourse since it symbolically embodies the total system of ideas which are actively and explicitly employed throughout the main discussion. That is, the study really directs itself, not to all human culture in general, but to that subject matter specifically contained within the universe of discourse of western culture. This class of ideas is represented by the second largest rectangle in the figure and which is labelled "C." It falls wholly within rectangle "B" in order to

A NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE A

B ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL B

NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE

ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL

General characteristics of culture as applied to any individual culture:

1. A culture includes the sum total of ways of life of "a people."
2. Has a set of normative unifying principles that identifies members of the subject culture as "a people."
3. These common principles (core) rest upon ultimate concerns of human beings.
4. These ultimate concerns provide the impetus for the ethos of the culture.
5. Cultures which operate "economically" and "efficiently" succeed in taking their ultimate concerns for granted when not threatened.
6. When threatened, surviving cultures reexamine their ultimate concerns as the basis of their existence.
7. A culture's life oscillates between generating (and reaffirming) ideals and taking them for granted.
8. It is the nature of culture to be normative.
9. Cultural change involves two dynamics: erosion of the existing "core" and the development of a new one.

ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL

NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE

B ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL B

A NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE A

Fig. 2.--The broad universe of discourse: Human culture in general.

illustrate that it is one of several possible classes of ideas within the broad universe of discourse, "B." (See Figure 3 for an emphasis of this relationship and see Figure 4 for the eight major "themes" of western culture as understood in this study.)

D. Contemporary Western Culture.--A still smaller class of ideas contained within the class called "Western Culture" is that category dealing only with western culture from 1945 to the present. While frequent reference will be made to ideas of western culture that are not contemporary, by far the greater concern is with contemporary western culture. (See Figure 6 for the six major characteristics of this class of ideas as understood in this study.) By contrast with the first two rectangles which designate the broad and narrow universes-of-discourse, rectangle "D" is called the dominant frame-of-reference here since the predominant number of references will be made within this class. (See Figure 5 for emphasis of this relationship.) This can easily be grasped by the fact that all three of the substantive objects of study in this project fall within this category. (See also Figures 11 and 12 for different effects of this idea.)

E. The Cultural Change Complex.--This is one of the three substantive objects of study in this paper. Earlier it was listed as the second substantive object, or the set of concepts which describe the changing opinions and viewpoints about the nature of human personality which has become widespread within contemporary western culture. There are a total of eight subdominant frames-of-reference distributed




Fig. 3.--Western culture: The narrow universe of discourse as centered within the broader universe of discourse.

B ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL B

C WESTERN CULTURE C

Characteristics of western culture:

1. The spirit of capitalism.
2. Popular sovereignty.
3. A historical consciousness.
4. A Faustian spirit.
5. The "subject-object" split (epistemological).
6. Secularism.
7. Individualism.
8. Scientific and technical achievements (reflecting rationalistic, utilitarian, and pragmatic attitudes).

C WESTERN CULTURE C

B ALL HUMAN CULTURE IN GENERAL B

Fig. 4.--Western culture and its characteristics: The narrow universe of discourse.




Fig. 5.--Contemporary western culture as the dominant frame-of-reference within the narrow universe of discourse of western culture.

C WESTERN CULTURE (FROM BEGINNING TO PRESENT) C

D CONTEMPORARY W. CULTURE (SINCE 1945) D

Characteristics of contemporary western culture:

1. All of the eight characteristics of western culture given in Figure 4 are raised to their highest intensity.
2. Greater social and geographical mobility.
3. A shift from mechanical to electronic technologies.
4. Transplantation of technologies from developed to developing nations.
5. Self-determination came into being for more than 200 new nations; colonialism ends as a dominant policy.
6. Atomic power, rocket power, hydrogen power, space travel, television, and super-computers introduced totally new environments (any of which could have signalled a major shift in cultural means, ends, and perceptions).

See Figure 8 for characteristics of contemporary western culture shown as legitimation, delegitimation, and relegitimation.

D CONTEMPORARY W. CULTURE (SINCE 1945) D

C WESTERN CULTURE (FROM BEGINNING TO PRESENT) C

Fig. 6.--Contemporary western culture and its characteristics as the dominant frame-of-reference.

throughout the three substantive object classes of ideas. Four of them appear within the "E" rectangle, and are identified and explained as follows (see also Figures 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12, for various facets of the complexities in this class of ideas):

E^1 = THE CENTRAL CORE CONCEPTS OF WESTERN SOCIETY SINCE 1945:

This is the first of eight subdominant frames-of-reference, so-called because attention is focused on one or more of these eight categories at all times throughout the study, thus constituting the collective emphasis that results in the dominant frame-of-reference of the next larger class of ideas (D). There are six specific characteristics identified as the primary subject matter of the central core concepts of contemporary western culture. These were outlined in Figure 6. See also Figure 9 for juxtaposition of these six characteristics as opposed to the major divisions of new concepts of the human person. This category and the next one are represented by circles which overlap. This is meant to illustrate that the dominant "legitimate" concepts of the culture and those interlopers which challenge them have many ideas in common, even when they are at odds both politically and philosophically. (See also Figures 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12.)

E^2 = CONCEPTS COMPETING FOR THE CORE POSITION (SPECIFIC FOCUS: NEW CONCEPTS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY):

This is the second of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference. Symbolically, everything contained within the circle designated as "E^2"




Fig. 7.--The first six characteristics of culture shown as an oscillation between taking its ideas for granted and reexamining them. (See Figure 2.)

A NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE A

B HUMAN CULTURE (GENERAL OR PARTICULAR) B


TOTAL LIFE-WAYS OF "A PEOPLE"

FIRST DYNAMIC:

Total life-ways produce attacks on old core and it erodes (delegitimation)

SECOND DYNAMIC:

Simultaneously, total life-ways develop a new core and begin process of taking it for granted (relegitimation)




Old core moves from center as prime expression of culture's ultimate concerns. May take its place as a subculture; probably in modified form, but certainly with eroded basis of influence.

New core moves to center to express the ultimate concerns of the will-to-power and community love in new forms, combinations, and artifacts. Retains enough of old to make transition and preserve continuity.

B HUMAN CULTURE (GENERAL OR PARTICULAR) B

A NOT - HUMAN - CULTURE A

Fig. 8.--Oscillation between attack and support in a culture's life-ways shown as legitimation (core values), delegitimation (erosion of core values), and relegitimation (development of a new core). (See Fig. 7.)



[illegible] character structure of contemporary western culture shown as an attack on core concepts and support of new concepts




Fig. 10.--Showing three roots of social institutions and the positive and negative political aspects of social institutions.





Fig. 11.--Showing the three transactional relationships (G^1, G^2, and G^3) between the change complex (E) and social institutions (F^1 and F^2)

represents those concepts bearing new views of personality that challenge the old established views. The study focuses on this aspect of cultural change, since it seems to the writer that institutions are expressions of man's concepts of man.[1] When the latter changes, it is held, institutions also will change, and vice-versa. See Figure 9 for an enumeration of the major categories of new concepts of human personality examined in this study.[2] Figures 8 and 9 also show the challenging relationship between these new concepts and the status quo core concepts as they are in the process of delegitimation, as concluded by the writer in this study. Figures 11 and 12 carry this same idea further and relate it to social institutions in their political aspects.

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[1]The opposite point equally can be held as true, as Jordan held in his Forms. That is, individuality can be viewed as an expression of man's institutions. These two propositions may be merely aspects of a circle of truth in which it matters little at which point one begins, since there is a continuous process of social energy in which individuals and institutions make each other. However, since we are studying concepts of the human person, it seems pertinent to draw the connection between such concepts and the effects they exert upon institutions. Ernst Cassirer, for example, points out how names "fix" reality, an argument related to Benjamin Whorf's suggestion that the language we learn limits the concepts we can form. See Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans. by Susanne Langer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1946). See also Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956).

[2]See page 156 of this paper for a description of the sources from which an analysis of new concepts of human personality were made for this study.



Note:

As shown in the diagram, sociological foundations of social institutions in contemporary western culture outweigh conscious philosophical or theological foundations; and negative political viewpoints and functions outweigh positive ones.

Fig. 12.--Showing the relation of "E," "F," and "G," and highlighting the unbalanced distribution of the components in the "F" complex (i.e., social institutions and their political aspects) in contemporary western culture.

E^3 = CORE CONCEPTS COMMON TO NEW CONCEPTS:

This is the third of eight subdominant frames-of-reference. Symbolically, all concepts that fall within the elliptical area of overlapping circles marked "G" are common both to the established status quo and to the new concepts which challenge the status quo. This feature represents the cultural continuity present in all eras of transition.[1] (See also Figures 8, 9, 11, and 12.)

E^4 = ULTIMATE CONCERNS OF THE CULTURE:

This is the fourth of eight subdominant frames-of-reference, and the final one within the substantive object variously called changing opinions and viewpoints about human personality and the cultural change complex ("E"). In a very important sense, which will be seen as the study progresses, the direction and conclusions in this paper turn on the role and function of this class of ideas. This is the most difficult class of ideas to explicate and also the one most essential to the line of argument adhered to for purposes of this study. Although a fuller rendition of the meaning of the ultimate

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[1]As Apter comments, for example, about modernizing societies,

> "All modernizing societies are in the process of transition. . . . Such transition is from a condition that is not modern to a condition that though modern is not necessarily industrial, . . . but real systems rarely change by rejecting the one in favor of the other. This lack of a clean break supplies some of the most confusing data that we are obliged to consider."

Modernization, p. xi.

concerns of the culture will be reserved until later, it is useful to dwell briefly on the characteristics of this concept.

If the culture can be thought of as a single cell, "E" meaningfully could be thought of as the nucleus. It can be conceived as the life center of energies which lead to ideas and actions and which has the primary responsibility for generating and sustaining (if not initiating) all other processes within the organism. However, the analogy has only limited application. It is not advocated that culture be equivocated with an organism in the holistic or biological sense. Rather, culture is conceived as an incorporation of natural, organic processes, and that all such organic processes are bound together by the primary natural motive thrusts of (1) the will-to-power, and (2) integrative- or community love (cooperation).[1] The referents of these terms are what are meant by ultimate concerns.[2] They are viewed as being related in a dynamic polar tension that describes the patterns apparent in living processes at various levels,

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[1]This paper combines the independent but sometimes mutually supportive insights of Paul Tillich and Elijah Jordan concerning the givenness of natural organic process as the prerequisite for thought, action, and culture. Though differing in important respects on many matters, Tillich and Jordan both attest to "nature" as the ground of unity for thought and action. Tillich goes further to attribute an ontological polar structure to this ground, whereas Jordan divests the concept of any structural elements. See Tillich's The Religious Situation, p. 64, and Jordan's Forms, pp. 162-63.

[2]For Tillich an ultimate concern is that condition in which one is grasped by an all-determining concern, something which is absolutely serious even though expressed in seemingly casual terms. It is that condition that gives meaning, seriousness, and depth to all culture. See his chapter on "Religion and Secular Culture" in The Protestant Era, pp. 55-65.

including especially those distinctly human processes reflected in human culture.

Accordingly, it is conceived that the business of culture is to express these ultimate concerns and the polar tension which exists between them, to provide means and mechanisms by which the needs of these ultimate concerns can be met, and most important of all, in one sense, to give symbolic or mythical expression to the mystical ground of unity which it is assumed for the purposes of this study underlies and makes possible the paradoxical and sometimes seemingly contradictory ultimate motives of the will-to-power and integrative- or community-love.[1] (See Figures 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12.)

F. All Social Institutions in Contemporary Western Culture.--This is part of the second of the three substantive objects of study in this paper. However, we are not studying the social institutions of contemporary western culture alone, not even in their political aspects as such ("F^1"). Rather, we are investigating, as the second of three substantive objects of enquiry, the delegitimation of these social institutions (in their political aspects). This is difficult to diagram effectively. However, if "E" represents the complex of

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[1]Tillich observes: the point at which the reference of existence to ultimate concerns becomes apparent in sociological thought is the same point at which this reference appears in psychology and biology--"at the absolute givenness, the underivability, the inconstruability of the living structure, the non-rational ground on which this structure rests and which comes to expression in the demonic-divine polarity of conflict and social integration, or the will-to-power and love." The Religious Situation, pp. 63-64.

changing concepts (including the delegitimation of old, established ones), then we can affirm that we are using the diagram to look at the delegitimating impact on the area of "F," or the loss of authority of social institutions in contemporary western culture.

F^1 = THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ALL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS:[1]

Since, according to the second substantive object of inquiry in this study, we are investigating the occurrence of delegitimation in contemporary western culture of its social institutions in their political aspects, the small rectangle "F^1" is needed as a subclass of social institutions to complete the subject matter of this study object. Specifically, we are making inductions and deductions about the loss of authority of "F^1". Conceptually, however, a distinction needs to be made between social institutions as such ("F") and their political aspects ("F^1"). Obviously, "political aspects" would not make much sense without reference to the "social institutions" of which they are a part. "F^1" is also the fifth of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference.

G. Transactional Relations (Between the Cultural Change Complex (The First Substantive Object), and All Social Institutions (The Second Substantive Object).--This is the third substantive object of this inquiry. Previously it was listed in the first of the three

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[1]For definitions and analysis of what is meant by "social institutions" and "political aspects" see pp. 74-88.

positions as a relationship which is the connection between the second and third substantive objects of study.

This is due to the fact that the writer will first discuss his perspective on the nature of social relationships in the text before exploring social concepts and social institutions in depth. However, in attempting to diagram the characteristics of the other two substantive objects and their relationships, it appeared more meaningful for pictorial purposes to pay attention first to (1) changing concepts, and (2) the delegitimation of social institutions in their political aspects before it was possible to point to their interrelationships.

If this seems a contradiction, the resolution can be found in the fact that the writer had to make some basic decisions concerning his views on the nature of social relationships--i.e., for purposes of this paper, could they best be described behaviorally, philosophically, or theologically?--before it was possible to diagram their essential characteristics pertaining to the other two substantive objects. Succinctly stated, the writer decided to view social relations corporately, that is, not in abstraction from the social context which gives them meaning. What this means is that it is permissible, indeed essential, to describe social relations behaviorally--if at the same time one refers the abstracted variables back to the natural social whole which gives them meaning. In this view, then, it is not permissible merely to describe social relations behaviorally and let it go at that.

How, then, does one take his behavioral analysis and refer it back to the "natural social whole," which in itself can only be conjectured and never known in its entirety?

For one thing, a researcher may do this, indeed cannot avoid doing this, simply by referring his data and patterns to his own understanding of what it means to be human. Assuredly, this is what is meant by a heuristic model of decision-making. To wit, when no single, objectively correct solution can be obtained, additional variables must be introduced which reflect the value assumptions of the decision-maker.[1]

In its refined form such a process is both philosophical and theological. Philosophically one is led to raise questions about the proper common human ends of one's endeavor.[2] Further, when one gives an answer to such questions he is engaged in a theological process, call it what he may. For in the final analysis the answer which is given is given in faith and generally stems from that which concerns one ultimately. We all, therefore, engage in the theological process, regardless of whether our style is secularistic, deistic, theistic,

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[1]See William J. Gore, Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), especially pp. 8-14.

[2]This view is supported from many quarters philosophically. As Will Durant said, "We shall define philosophy as total perspective, as mind overspreading life and forging chaos into unity." The Mansions of Philosophy: A Survey of Human Life and Destiny (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1929), p. ix. (Hereinafter referred to as Mansions.) See also Jordan's Forms, pp. 6-63 and 89-103.

pantheistic, atheistic, agnostic, or nihilistic, for theology is the process of engagement with that which concerns us ultimately, however that may be construed.[1]

Yet, the writer is not eager to take refuge in romantic notions or metaphysical fictions that are merely "thinly disguised defeats."[2] Thus, while it is recognized in this view that it is unavoidable for the behaviorist to philosophize and theologize, it is not permissible in the present view to philosophize or theologize without relating these inductions to all of the known relevant empirical data available, or at least as valid a sampling of such data as one can muster.

It is for this reason that the writer finally was driven to the task of visually diagramming the universes of discourse and constituent frames-of-reference insofar as he could determine them. This method represents a system of checks to insure that, on the one hand, all empirical data is referred to the social contextual whole from which it comes, and, on the other hand, that all philosophical speculations and theological leaps of faith are rooted insofar as possible in a comprehensive network of behaviorally observable patterns, or exposed to the scrutiny of rigorous empirical-research-oriented questions.

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[1]On this point see Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, especially the first two chapters, pp. 11-37. See also "The Center of Value," a supplementary essay in the same volume, pp. 100-113.

[2]See Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 64.

But to return to the immediate point at hand, the third (or first) substantive object of inquiry is represented by the connecting arrows labelled "G" and which appear as links between "E" and "F," the other two substantive objects. These remaining three of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference appear as subclasses of "G" and are labelled "G^1," "G^2," and "G^3." They represent three major possible relationships delineated in answer to the question, "from what source do the dominant influences appear to be emanating, given the two dominant frames-of-reference?"

G^1 = INFLUENCE BY THE CULTURAL CHANGE COMPLEX ("E") ON SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ("F"):

This is the sixth of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference. It represents that class of possibilities in which the cultural change complex ("E"), especially the development of new concepts of the human person ("E^2"), is bringing about changes, particularly the delegitimation (or loss of authority), among the social institutions ("F"), especially within the political aspects of the latter ("F^1").

G^3 = INFLUENCE BY THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ("F") ON THE CULTURAL CHANGE COMPLEX ("E"):

This is the seventh of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference. It represents that class of possibilities in which the life-ways in the social institutions ("F"), emphatically in their political aspects ("F^1"), are stimulating or retarding changes in the cultural change

complex ("E"), especially in the concepts competing for the core position ("E^2").

G^2 = INTEGRATIVE INTERACTIONS (MUTUALLY RECEPTIVE ONES):

This is the eighth of the eight subdominant frames-of-reference. It represents that class of possibilities particularly in which the respective influences of new concepts of the human person and the political aspects of social institutions are mutually in league with one another. An example of this condition would be the occasion when a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical multi-versity (or mega-university) appoints a Vice-President in Charge of Heresy to acknowledge the participatory and even anarchist viewpoints of students routinely excluded from decision-making processes that determine their welfare.[1] Ostensibly both parties--the university and the students--perceive payoffs in the arrangement and are willing to give it support.

This completes the analysis of the universe-of-discourse and its constituent frames-of-reference as given in Figure 1 and the supporting Figures 2 through 12. When this analysis is combined with the statement of purpose in association with its three substantive objects of study and also accompanied by a declaration of the major

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[1]On this point and several other interesting proposals see Christian Bay, "Academic Government and Academic Citizenship in a Time of Revolt," in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969). (Hereinafter referred to as "Academic Government."

presuppositions outlined in this subsection, the description of the overview of the work is regarded as fulfilled. At this point in the discussion it is pertinent to turn to the second topic in this section and delineate the plan of the study.

The Plan of the Study

The plan of this study calls for the first of the three substantive objects (as listed and stated on page 4), namely, the relationships ("G") that exist between changing concepts of human personality and the social institutions in their political aspects,--for these relationships to receive their topical development here in Chapter I under the sections or subsections entitled "definitions," "delegitimation," and "accelerative thrust."

The first of these relationships is considered from the viewpoint of the status quo ("E^1"), which often typically sees the relationship as an illegitimate threat from rebellious forces and sources. It is also considered from the viewpoint of the "challengers" themselves ("E^2"), who see the relationship in terms of a legitimate right exerted to enthrone valid truths against an outmoded and illegitimate system. Further, the relationship is considered from the viewpoint of the political theorist, who sees the process as one more step in the ongoing, natural, and indeed, inevitable process of delegitimation which springs from the natural-social-political contextual whole that is the continuous living network from which all social phenomena and all social analysis draws its meanings.

It is within this latter viewpoint that attention is given to the broader context, namely, the one indicated by the frame-of-reference, "G," in Figure 1. That is, how does the struggle which ensues between the first two viewpoints in the preceding paragraph ("E^1" and "E^2") affect western culture's social institutions in their political aspects ("F," especially "F^1")? This question represents the "G^1" relationship. Further, how do changes in our social institutions, especially in their political aspects, affect our changing conceptions of human personality? This question represents the "G^3" relationship. Finally, how do those persons and institutions who find themselves irrevocably caught in the cycle of changes represented in the G^1 and G^3 relationships positively embrace and use this cycle of changes cooperatively to sustain culture, if at all? In other words, how do established elites and those who challenge them use changes in social institutions to advance their own concepts of human personality, and contrariwise, how do those who are responsible for our social institutions use changing concepts of human personality to sustain our social institutions, particularly in their political aspects? These somewhat complex questions represent the relationship "G^2" between the change complex ("E") and all social institutions in contemporary western culture ("F").

Following the completion of these considerations in Chapter I, as contrasted with the relationships between "E" and "F," the plan then calls for the remaining two substantive objects of the study ("E" and "F") to be examined themselves in the other four chapters of the

work, while at the same time advancing the exploration, application, and implications of the first object of study, namely, that of delegitimation (and, by implication, relegitimation), as represented by the relationships, "G."

These objectives are to be reached in the following manner.

The dominant core values and structures, as parts of the second and third objects of investigation ("E^1" and "F"), will be explored in Chapter II. The third substantive object, i.e., the political aspects of these values and structures ("F^1") particularly will be at issue in the discussion, hence the topic of the second chapter, "Cultural Values of the Status Quo: Political Aspects."

Chapter III furthers the analysis of the second substantive object of our intellectual examination by exploring the new concepts of the human person ("E^2") as revealed in the new imageries and rearrangement of both old and new imageries in new combinations. These new views and their forms of expression are treated as a factor integrally associated with the agent of accelerative thrust, with special attention given to the delegitimating influence which both factors taken together appear to exert upon established core values ("E^1") and structures ("F"). Thus, Chapter III is entitled, "The Imageries and Implications of Accelerative Thrust: The Scrambling of Political Boundaries."

This title also reflects the particular methodology employed in this study project, specifically, the identification, collection, comparison and analysis of linguistic signals such as key metaphors

and analogies, which are taken to be indicative of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions underlying the various viewpoints scrutinized. An explanation of this methodology follows the present discussion and will complete Part I of this chapter.

The task undertaken in Chapter IV is reflected in the title, "Delegitimation Through New Concepts of the Human Person: The Extent, the Effects, and the Prospects." Earlier this study was defended in the statement that delegitimation, as an area of inquiry, could possibly enable us to adjust the ongoing balance between the processes of delegitimation and religitimation in such a way as to make social and political change possible within levels that can be tolerated both by the culture and by the individuals within it without rupturing the contexts in which growth can take place. Therefore, it seems to the writer to be an inherent responsibility of this endeavor to assess within its limited scope what may be the extent, the effects (or influences), and the prospects of delegitimation in our culture, not from accelerative thrust <u>in general</u> as such, since that task was largely encompassed in the well-known work of Alvin Toffler, <u>Future Shock</u>; but rather from the more limited and specialized form of accelerative thrust which we have referred to throughout this treatise as "new concepts of human personality." It is this task that is undertaken in Chapter IV as reflected in the title, "Delegitimation Through New Concepts of the Human Person: The Extent, the Effects and the Prospects." (In Toffler's terms, the phenomenon of these new concepts of the human person would undoubtedly be regarded as one of many species of the

accelerative thrust indicator described as "the turnover or rapid throughput of information and ideas.")[1]

Finally, in Chapter V, consistent with the responsibility just cited, it seems important to explore the new concepts of human personality as a resource for relegitimation. If these new artistic, conceptual, and intellectual forces are to hold any ultimate significance or promise for the continuation of human culture and civilization as an environment for the support of human life, growth, and meaning, then they must be called upon for the recharging of western society, indeed of the civilizations of man with new ideals and new consciousnesses.[2] Otherwise their role degenerates into a sheer nihilistic venture devoid of any commitment other than that of abrasing an established system that is merely resented, but never engaged responsibly.

It is for this reason that this study is concluded with the topic in Chapter V: "New Concepts of Human Personality as a Relegitimizing Force: The Promise, the Limits, and the Prospects."

The Methodology

The preceding discussion about the plan of the study prepares the way to consider the method by which this work may proceed. What is needed is a means and datum by which to trace and analyze the dynamics of change ("E") which occur in the ever-shifting balance of

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[1]See Toffler, Future Shock, especially chap. ii, pp. 19-35.

[2]See David Riesmann, "Some Observations on Community Plans and Utopias," in Individualism Reconsidered (New York: The Free Press, 1954), p. 76.

support and withdrawal of support (see Figures 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 for illustrations of this effect) that exists between a culture and its key concepts ("E^1") and ultimate concerns ("E^4"), and as these are expressed in the culture's fostering institutions ("F"). Stated another way, the objective is to detect and compare (if not measure) differences between alternative concepts of human personality on the one hand ("E^2") and long-established concepts of human personality in the dominant culture on the other hand ("E^1").

In this project the required datum is to be found in the key metaphors and analogies which embody and express a culture's major themes (see Figure 4) and ultimate concerns (see especially Figures 7 and 8).[1] The required method is found in a comparison of familiar linguistic images thought to represent the "core values" of the culture and the appearance of new images which (1) are at variance with those of the core values and (2) are thought to compete with them for cultural acceptance, support, and legitimacy.

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[1]The general relevance of this approach is recognized in the field of content analysis which is a branch, of sorts, in behavioral studies. Content analysis is now conducted in the fields of psychology, communications research, and political science. One of the chief pioneers of the subject was Harold D. Laswell. The following works by Laswell on this subject are of particular interest: "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," Psychiatry, I (1938), 197-204, and (with Nathan Leites) Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics (New York: Stewart Press, 1949).

The approach used in this essay is not quantitative semantics, but indicative semantics, i.e., using clues found in language changes to infer relationship changes in the culture itself. The approach is philosophical rather than behavioral. For a philosophical approach to this method, see Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966). (Hereinafter referred to as Metaphysical Thinking.)

More will be said concerning this method. It will be elaborated in greater detail at pertinent points at which it is to be applied. However, a fuller understanding of the method and its special relation to the concept of "culture" and other associated terms depends upon an understanding of the definitions of the major terms indigenous to this study and the concepts to which they refer.

PART II. DEFINITIONS AND ANTECEDENTS OF MAJOR CONCEPTS IN THE STUDY

To recapitulate, this project explores the relationship between changing concepts of human personality as these are reflected in contemporary western culture on the one hand, and the delegitimation in that culture of its social institutions in their political aspects, on the other hand.

It is useful to give attention to each of the major terms in the preceding statement and to examine them not merely in terms of their formal definitions, but also in terms of their antecedents and continuity with the history of theoretical work in the social sciences. The major context for this study is the concept of culture as understood in several dimensions. Therefore, it is appropriate to turn our attention to an analysis of this term and its chief variants.

Four Uses of the Term "Culture"

A special component of the study of new concepts of human personality is that of the very culture itself in which those new concepts have been spawned and are flourishing. What is meant by

"culture" and what are its typifying characteristics as understood within this study?

The Use of the Term "Culture" Itself

As Harvey Wheeler says, when the literary person speaks of culture he often means the fine arts. He may use descriptive words such as classicism, romanticism, baroque, and so forth.[1]

But in the social sciences culture has a different meaning. In the broadest sense it refers to all distinctively human activities. All achievements in every field are included, which man passes on from generation to generation. Thus, there is a continuity to culture, and this is reflected in broad general activities such as using a language, getting married, bringing up children, earning a living, running a government, fighting a war, and taking part in religious ceremonies. Indeed, culture may refer to the sum total of the ways of life of a people.[2]

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[1]"Technology: Foundation of Cultural Change," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August, 1972), 48. (Hereinafter referred to as "Technology.")

[2]The first definition of culture as a sociological term was that of E. B. Tylor, a British anthropologist, who wrote in 1871: "Culture . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any and all other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." In this definition, Tylor considered culture as the sum total of human achievement. Quoted by Carlton S. Coon, in his "Theories About Culture," World Book (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corp., 1962), Vol. III, p. 947.

The Use of the Concept "Cultural Change"

We are particularly concerned with cultural change. For the social scientist, cultural change means major shifts in social institutions and belief systems, and, in contrast to the strictly literary examples used above, he may use descriptive words such as capitalism, the technological imperative, the post-industrial era, and the counter-culture. In keeping with Harvey Wheeler's understanding of the meaning of culture, it is this latter meaning of cultural change that is used in what follows.[1]

The Use of the Term "Political Culture"

Some other clarifications are also in order concerning what is meant by culture. For example, modern-day political scientists use even more particular meanings. They may, and often do, speak of political culture. This is a specialized term usually appearing within the context of discussions about political systems, or wherein the discussants are committed to the systems approach to the study of political phenomena. As Almond and Powell point out, political culture refers to the underlying propensities, or the psychological dimension, of the political system.[2] That is, it consists of "attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills" which are current in an entire population. It also includes those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population. Thus, regional groups or

[1]Wheeler, "Technology," p. 48.

[2]Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 23.

ethnic groups or social classes which make up the population of a political system may have special propensities or tendencies. Such special propensities are referred to as subcultures.[1]

Lucian Pye offers a more succinct, and in some ways more applicable, definition of political culture when he says:

> . . . political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.[2]

Pye comments further that the study of political culture encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.[3]

Since this study is concerned with a process of cultural and political change, it is inevitable that the discussion shall be confronted with and make use of concepts of political culture. For that reason it is important to mention two especial problems connected with the concept of political culture as generated by the systems approach to the study of politics.

The first of these problems stems from the nature of the presuppositions employed in the sample definitions taken first, from Almond and Powell and, second, from Lucian Pye. As we have seen, these expressions highlight such words as attitudes, beliefs, sentiments,

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[1]Ibid.

[2]See his article on "Political Culture," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, XII, pp. 218-24. For a fuller exposition of this concept, see also his article and essays by other authors in Political Culture, ed. by Pye and Verba.

[3]Pye, "Political Culture," p. 218.

and values. The problem is that the referents of these terms are in themselves entirely invisible. They cannot be seen or known directly by means of the five senses. Rather, they can only be inferred from their effects, e.g., in the cultural objects or artifacts which result from their operation.

This point was made tellingly by the juristic philosopher, Elijah Jordan.[1] Essentially what Jordan emphasized was that subjective states of mind cannot be and never were the basis of any kind of order. Stated philosophically, subjective states of mind exhaust themselves in their own self-reference.[2] The claim that they cannot serve as the basis of order is in direct contradiction to Pye's assertion that attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments give order to a political process. Accordingly, a corrective to the behavioral definition of Pye and others is needed which Jordan supplies in his concepts of cultural objects and the corporate nature of cultural institutions.[3]

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[1]The idea of cultural objects plays a major role in Jordan's philosophy of corporate personality and corporate will. The idea is explicated in several of his works. For example, in addition to his Forms previously cited, see the following: The Good Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); "Idea and Action," in Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton, ed. by George H. Sabine (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917); The Life of Mind (Indianapolis: Charles W. Laut and Co., 1925).

[2]Jordan, Forms, p. 25. See also pp. 20-23.

[3]For example, whereas Tillich emphasizes the psychobiologic individual as a unique and objective expression of reality, Jordan emphasizes institutional aspects as an expression of culture in nature. He says,

The second difficulty relates to a problem which has plagued practically all behaviorists, including advocates of the systems approach to political studies. This is the problem of the normative question. As Pye says, the concept of political culture signals an effort to apply an essentially behavioral form of analysis to the study of such traditional problems as political ideology, legitimacy, sovereignty, nationhood, and the rule of law.[1] These are all normatively-based subjects.

These problems are only mentioned here in passing and will be dealt with in depth in subsequent chapters in connection with other subject matter. However, it is useful to refer to the context in which these problems will be discussed. The context is rooted in the interpretation of culture adhered to as a basis for this study. An understanding of this point of view will provide clues regarding how the writer proposes that the two difficulties mentioned can be overcome.

Specifically, it is held that there are several essential characteristics exhibited by any culture which is capable of satisfying

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"The concrete totality of this complex of social-environmental and organic-individual elements is first and last the institution, and the only social psychology worth a fig is the critical detailed analysis of institutionalized human purposes, and not a classification of instincts. . . . [Never] will a social psychology be dug out of the depth of human nature as found in the psychological individual; this is the constructionalist fallacy, the assumption that a whole is explained by a descriptive summary of its parts. . . ."

See Jordan, Forms, p. 73.

[1]Pye, "Political Culture," p. 218.

the various definitions of culture, political or otherwise, which have appeared in this discussion (see Figure 2). Further, all of the characteristics which will be enumerated point to the normative nature of culture as the primary datum which must be dealt with as the starting point of all other inquiry initiated by the social sciences. The stark implication of this statement is that there appears to be no way the social sciences can be merely descriptive. To be explicit, the corollary of our proposition is that the social sciences, at the very point at which they make a beginning within and on behalf of the culture, either purvey norms or else generate them. Otherwise they would be outside the culture. Yet this is impossible since they can only communicate by using the culture's language.[1]

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[1]In a seminal essay Edward Sapir wrote as follows:

> "Language is a guide to 'social reality.' Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the Group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached."

Quoted by Gleeson and Wakefield, eds., in their Language and Culture, p. 38.

On this same point Ernst Cassirer contended that names "fix" reality. Because of the closeness of relation between language and

This line of thought will be pursued further. However, at present our objective is to clarify our understanding of the nature of culture more precisely by taking account of the typifying characteristics of any culture worthy of the name. It is well to bear in mind that, although the distinctions which are about to be made apply to the general nature of culture as such, we are particularly interested in their implications for the meaning of political culture.

First, a culture must have some normative unifying principle or set of principles.[1] Otherwise it could not be distinguished from any other culture. Nor is such a distinction possible only in terms of geographical boundaries, since no two cultures are exactly alike. E.g., if racial characteristics are selected as the basis for a unifying principle then differences in terms of distinctions between subcultures within the races still must be made. Further, if any other principle is selected as the unifying principle, one immediately finds

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myth, says Cassirer, people tend to identify the "name" of a thing with the "thing" itself. See his Language and Myth.

This point also became a life-long interest of Sapir's Yale student, Benjamin Whorf, who suggested that the language we learn limits the concepts we can form. This concept came to be known by linguists and anthropologists as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. See Whorf's Language, Thought, and Reality.

[1]See the following: Callahan, "Living with the New Biology"; Tillich, Theology of Culture, especially chaps. i and iv; Harvey Cox, The Secular City (rev. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), especially the Introduction; Etzioni, "Political Meaning," p. 208; Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism; Weber, The Protestant Ethic; and Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.

himself in the throes of normative considerations. Every language, for example, conveys certain perceptual ways of thinking and seeing which are regarded as important, or normative. No language ever merely describes. It also proclaims values in the images it creates.

The same observation holds true also if one selects the type of government as the unifying principle of the culture. Every government by nature establishes certain norms. Indeed, it appears that the observation concerning the requirement for a unifying normative principle or principles may be carried out in terms of any and every distinguishing feature that characterizes a "culture."

These considerations lead us to the second characteristic of culture. To wit, at bottom every culture rests upon certain ultimate concerns.[1] These are tantamouns to the ethos of the culture, as for example, the Protestant Ethic, or the spirit of capitalism, or the ethos of democracy. It is the business of culture to provide the means of expression of the ultimate concerns which form its unifying principle or principles and make it possible for the various parts of

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[1]See Callahan, "Living with the New Biology"; the following works of Tillich: The Protestant Era, The Religious Situation, The Theology of Culture, and Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Orion White, Jr., "Organization and Administration for New Technological and Social Imperatives," Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, ed. by Dwight Waldo (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971); (hereinafter referred to as "Organization and Administration); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966); Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959).

the culture, or civilization, or society, to carry out those functions necessary to its survival and further development.

Further, if for no other reason than for the sake of the economy of its energies, a culture must embody its ultimate concerns in such a manner that they become taken for granted by the populace. That is, a culture's reasons and explanations for why things are the way they are must succeed in sinking into the unwitting part of its fabric. This point was aptly argued by Philip Rieff who called attention to the fact that ". . . a culture survives principally . . . by the power of its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with reasons which sink so deeply into the self that they become commonly and implicitly understood."[1]

In this vein Rieff quotes Harry Stack Sullivan's observation that the dynamics of a culture are in "the unwitting part of it."[2] This observation constitutes the third characteristic of culture.

The fourth characteristic of culture is a corollary of the third, namely, that a culture must provide supports--as extensions of the capabilities of human persons--which can come to the aid of individuals for the purpose of relieving them of the burden of making decisions about ultimate questions all the time.[3] As David Callahan

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[1]Quoted by Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," p. 5.

[2]Ibid.

[3]For example, Stephen Ullmann points out that

> "every community will single out and label those qualities which it considers important, whereas other features will remain unnamed

observes, one function of a culture is to make up for our deficiencies in private wisdom, to take some of the burden of truth-seeking off our individual shoulders, "to save us from going to the mat on each and every question," to allow us "to know things with our feelings which we do not by philosophical standards know in our heads."[1] That is, every individual assuredly will have to seek the truth at some time, but he should not have to do it alone and he should not always have to do it. A culture should assist him. To Callahan's observation we may add that if a culture does not assist the individual it is probably fair to assume that that culture will not survive since most of its energies will be preempted for self-analysis, leaving none for the practical business of survival, whether in war, food production, or internal government.

But, fifth, a culture must, from time to time, for the sake of survival regardless of whether the threats that come to it come from internal or from external pressures,--a culture must periodically take stock of itself by asking ultimate questions.[2] It may be accurate to

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> and therefore undifferentiated. . . . Once again, we see the reciprocity of relations between language and thought. The vocabulary reflects a certain hierarchy of values, but it also hardens it and hands it down to successive generations. Its action is essentially conservative; it is one of the most powerful factors building up traditions and ensuring continuity. . . ."

See Ullmann's "The Prism of Language," The Listener, LII (July 22, 1954), 1325.

[1]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," p. 5.

[2]This point is made in one way or another by each of the following observers: Keith Melville, Communes in the Counterculture (New

say that a culture that neglects to ask the most basic questions--what is man?, what is the good life?, what is really harmful and what is really beneficial?--is either undeveloped or diseased. A culture is a nurturing context, feeding and shaping us. As such, it must generate ideals in order to be viable. This involves ultimate questions. Perhaps a healthy culture may be defined as one in which ultimate concerns need not become an obsession since they are provided for routinely.

York; William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1972), especially chap. iv entitled "The Middle-Class Revolt"; McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, especially pp. 88-93; Dusky Lee Smith, "Scientific Liberalism: Ward, Galbraith and the Welfare State," Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); (hereinafter referred to as "Scientific Liberalism"); Robert Theobold, An Alternative Future for America II (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1968); The Protestant Era, especially chap. iv, "Religion and Secular Culture"; Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), especially the Preface; Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), especially pp. 115-16; John W. Gardner, Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too? (First Perennial Library ed.; New York, Evanston, Ill., San Francisco, and London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971); Herbert A. Simon, "The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administrations," in The Dimensions of Public Administration: Introductory Reading, ed. by Joseph A. Uveges, Jr. (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 42-62; and Phillip Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). The latter, Slater, for example, said about contemporary western society that

> "the problem is that technology, industrialism, capitalism have always been evaluated in their own terms. . . . [We] need to find ways of appraising these systems in terms of criteria that are truly independent of the systems themselves. We need to develop a human-value index--a criterion that assesses the ultimate worth of an invention for a system or a product in terms of its total impact on human life, in terms of ends rather than means. . . ."

See Slater, p. 129.

These are the five characteristics of a viable culture as understood in this study. One might quarrel with this list, but if one accepts the five characteristics as valid, it becomes obvious that one also accepts the proposition that it is the nature of culture to be normative. All five characteristics as listed are descriptions of culture as the source of norms. If it is also true that man reflects markedly human characteristics, viz., those which distinguish him from all other animals, only in and through culture, then it follows that man is by nature a normative creature. Probably this is only saying what is obvious. Assuredly, the issue is not whether man is a normative creature, but how he should or in fact does go about it. This is the old issue of how a move is made from the is to the ought. Nonetheless, says Callahan,

> . . . by one means or another, the move is made. . . . Man has always sought to become something other than he finds himself to be. He is forced to project images of future states, images of correction and self-improvement--the postponement of death, a reduction in genetic defects, the defeat of virulent diseases.[1]

Normative behavior then, as such, proclaims the difference between the is and the ought. It therefore aims at change. Apparently there are two dynamics in the bringing about of social or cultural change. One dynamic is to be found in the breaking down of old habits, customs, and patterns, i.e., in the eroding of the belief system as it is revealed through its cultural objects, the relationships

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[1]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," p. 8.

existing between them, and the processes which sustain them.[1] This breaking down of the belief system is the process referred to in the title as "delegitimation."

The second dynamic is opposite from the first. It is the process of "legitimizing" new values which have been introduced into the culture (and, in our context, into the political system).[2] Although these two dynamics can be separated conceptually for purposes of intellectual contemplation, it is doubtful whether either of them ever actually occurs in isolation from the other. Indeed, if the shaping of a culture is conceived to emanate from within the contextual social whole of nature itself, then the presence of the one dynamic presupposes the existence and operation of the other.

It is hoped that these considerations about culture, especially in the political sense, will put our study of delegitimation in a more precise frame-of-reference. The foregoing discussion may serve as an introduction to several distinctions which are important to the further development of our topic. It is useful to consider these distinctions briefly before terminating this discussion concerning political culture.

The first distinction is related to the means by which cultural supports are extended to human persons to relieve them of the

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[1]Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning," p. 6.

[2]Ibid., pp. 6-7. See also Apter, The Politics of Mobilization, especially the Preface. See also Lipset, Political Man, especially Chapter III, "Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy."

imponderable burden of making decisions about ultimate questions all the time. If the verbs "legitimize" and "legitimate" (both usages are found in political science literature) refer to the process through which a value gains acceptance within a society, then the adjective "legitimate" describes those cultural supports or mechanisms which are compatible with the principle that provides the culture with its unity.

Further, the relation of support which exists between the culture (including the consent of the populace comprising it) and the major institutions which foster the unifying cultural themes--this relation is what is meant by the noun "legitimacy." Also, "legitimacy" may refer to the characteristic of authoritativeness which accompanies the supported cultural themes and the institutions primarily responsible for fostering them. Thus, the term refers both to a relationship and to a characteristic.

The Use of the Term "Contemporary Western Culture"

It must be emphasized that we are not concerned merely with delegitimation in general, although much of what is concluded might well apply in a wider context. Nevertheless, we are specifically concerned with delegitimation in contemporary western culture. It is well to delineate what this means.

Given the rapid pace of change that has occurred since the Second World War, the period since 1945 has been significant in terms of characteristics that tend to set it apart from any other period.[1]

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace.

Social and geographical mobility are greater than in any comparable period. Due largely to the war itself, a radical shift was set in motion in technologies of the developed nations and subsequently were often transferred en masse to the undeveloped nations.[1] Self-determination came into being for more than 200 new nations as the era and administration of colonialism screeched to an abrupt halt for England, France, Germany, Spain, Holland, Italy, and even the United States.[2] Atomic power, rocket power, hydrogen power, space travel, television, and super-computers introduced totally new environments, any one of which could have signalled a major shift in cultural means, ends, and perceptions.[3]

Thus, the universe of discourse that is intended to apply when the term "contemporary" is used will be that span of time experienced by humanity since the end of the Second World War. Since this paper accepts the hypothesis that indicators of the pace of change reveal a rapidly compounding rate of acceleration of change, various contexts in the narrative may place greater emphasis on the last ten, or even five, years.

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[1]For characterizations and noted effects of this development see the following: Apter, Modernization; Harvey G. Kebschull, ed., Politics in Transitional Societies: The Challenge of Change in Asia, Africa and Latin America (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966); Gustav Ranis, ed., The United States and the Developing Economies (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1964).

[2]See S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

[3]See McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace. See also Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II.

The definition of what is meant by "western culture" is more problematical. On the surface it would appear that the simplest way would be to define western culture, or almost interchangeably, western society, in terms of geography, although this approach has its own problems. For example, would one include the twenty-one Latin American nations? Would one also include the Central European or Eastern European states? The subject could easily become unmanageable when discussing the inherent philosophical differences.

An approach which seems to the writer more rewarding and more pertinent to the present topic is to leave the geographical boundaries somewhat undefined while concentrating on certain cultural themes. This decision is based on the observation that culture today is portable and that that culture which has been most closely associated with the rapid advance of scientific and industrial technologies is the culture that developed and flourished in Western Europe, the British Isles, and America.[1] It is the culture which is most closely tied to the Judaeo-Christian heritage, was host to the Enlightenment and the Renaissance, and which spawned the Protestant Reformation.[2] It is the culture which generated the Industrial and Scientific Revolutions, was the cradle of both democracy and fascism, and became the

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[1]See Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

[2]See Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, and Harry Emerson Fosdick, Great Voices of the Reformation: An Anthology, edited and with an introduction and commentaries by H. E. Fosdick (New York: Random House, 1952).

catalyst for two world wars.[1] It is the culture which is fueled by an ethos which has been exported, imitated and absorbed by nations on every continent, an ethos that seems to be nowhere near abatement.[2] This latter statement is illustrated by the appearance of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola signs in Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific; by the almost euphoric response to American jazz by people behind the Iron Curtain;[3] and by the acceptance of Communism by China.

The study of Western society is itself an inexhaustible source of intellectual inquiry which is by no means included within the scope of this modest project. The objective here is rather simply to characterize what is meant when the terms "western culture" or "western society" are used. For this purpose several of the most prominent themes, accomplishments, and failures (depending on one's point of view), will be identified and brought into focus to serve as the representative historical-social-political matrix which is the referent for these terms.

The historical-social-political matrix can only be represented. It cannot be described exhaustively due to its interminable complexities. However, the effort will be made to select themes which indicate the full dimensions of "western culture" and at the same time

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[1]Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria, especially the first two chapters.

[2]See Cox, The Secular City; and McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace.

[3]See Marshall Stearns, The Story of Jazz (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1958), especially pp. 205-9.

suggest some boundaries through comparison with that which is not western culture. For example, although our definition will not be primarily geographical, we may say that in terms of place we mean by the term "western society" to designate that civilization and its culture which developed in the Occident. In this designation we are speaking broadly of Europe and America in contrast, say, to the Orient.

To be even more precise, the themes we shall describe developed in, and are more characteristic of, Western Europe and the United States than anywhere else. Nevertheless, our definition is not primarily geographical; rather, it is thematic. Thus, we also mean to indicate that wherever Western values have been inculcated we are to some extent still speaking of western culture, for those same values are precisely the ones which appear today to be the most influential in permeating the entire globe with modern technologies and the accompanying acceleration of social, political, and cultural change.

In the present context the most characteristic themes of western culture which appear to the writer to possess the greatest pertinence for this study are as follows.

First, western society, as the civilization which was the chief heir to the triple influences of Greek philosophy, Roman law and the Christian religion, is characterized by the spirit of capitalism.[1] To paint with a broad brush, we may see this ethos as a combined result of the triple influences just mentioned in which natural reason

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[1]Weber, The Protestant Ethic.

(Greek philosophy) becomes a law (Roman influence) that is divinely ordained (the Christian religion) and which orders and regulates human affairs through a providential preestablished harmony of individual economic interests which, when taken together, are said to represent the best interests of the whole society.[1]

Second, western society, in certain prominent political expressions of those same triple influences, is that society which gave rise to the concept of popular sovereignty, particularly through ideas of natural law, human rights, and the various social contract theories.[2] Although the attempts to embody these ideas in practical political forms have ranged all the way from limited monarchies to utopian societies, perhaps the most representative worldly incarnations of popular sovereignty have come in the shape of constitutional democracies usually of the federal type. The irresistible power of this Occidental

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[1]See Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. For an exposition of the Greek mind see also Edith Hamilton's The Greek Way to Western Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1942). For background on the Roman conflict between her genius for war and her insatiable urge for law, see also Edith Hamilton's The Roman Way to Western Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton, 1932), especially Chapter X, wherein the author says:

> "The Romans were pre-eminently men of war. . . . The only choice they had for centuries was to conquer or be conquered. Possibly war was their most natural expression. . . . [But] however fierce the urge of their nature was, the feeling for law and order was deeper, the deepest thing in them."

See pp. 109-10.

[2]See M. Judd Harmon, Political Thought From Plato to the Present (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964). (Hereinafter referred to as Political Thought.)

rationale is illustrated in the fact that, practically everywhere throughout the earth, the idea of popular sovereignty cannot be withstood among developed and developing political systems. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries colonial empires and traditional monarchies alike repeatedly made way for movements resulting in recognition of the national right of self-determination. Further, most governments today, no matter how oppressive they might be, find it necessary to project themselves as representatives of the people. In this sense democracy has verged on becoming the universal norm of contemporary politics.[1]

Third, there is a characteristic which is perhaps both less obvious and less familiar than the first two mentioned; yet it is possibly the most critically distinguishing of all features of western culture. This is its historical consciousness.[2] The development of western society has been undergirded by a distinctly historically oriented culture. By this we do not mean simply that its members are aware of and remember past events. Rather we mean that it is a culture in which history is interpreted through itself rather than a culture in which history is interpreted through nature. To put it another way, a historical consciousness acknowledges history as an original reality which cannot be derived either from nature or from supernature.

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[1]See Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), especially chaps. xvii and xviii.

[2]See Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria. Also, see Cox, The Secular City, and Tillich, "Historical and Nonhistorical Interpretations of History," in The Protestant Ethic, pp. 16-18ff.

On the contrary, a historical consciousness tries to draw nature as well as supernature into its own development.

In the comments just given there is a schema in which there are two broad types of historical interpretation.[1] The one may be called natural and the other may be called historical. The differences can be contrasted as follows.

In the natural approach, nature (or supernature) is the highest category of interpreting reality, whereas in the historical approach history is an independent and, finally, the outstanding category of interpreting reality.

In the natural interpretation space is predominant against time and time is considered to be circular or repeating itself, whereas in the historical interpretation time is predominant against space. Further, in the latter the movement of time is directed by some power or principle; it has a definitive beginning and end, and is moving toward an ultimate fulfillment.

In the natural epistemology the temporal world has a lesser reality and no ultimate value, whereas in the historical epistemology the temporal world is in one way or another a battlefield between good and evil powers (whether expressed in mythological or in rational

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[1]The following works were helpful in the formulation of the ensuing comments on the historical consciousness: "Historical and Nonhistorical Interpretations of History" and "Kairos" by Tillich, both in The Protestant Ethic, pp. 16-31 and 32-54; Ray C. Petry, Christian Eschatology and Social Thought (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956); (hereinafter referred to as Christian Eschatology); Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism; Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria.

terms). In the latter, metaphysically, the world is ultimately good. (This is exhibited in the conception that the world is "God's creation.")

The religious counterpart of the natural view is that salvation is the salvation of individuals from time and history. On the other hand, the religious ethos of the historical view is found in the view that salvation is the salvation of a community from the evil powers in history through history. History is essentially a "history of salvation." Secular western examples of this are the concepts of pre-established harmony and the unseen hand mechanism in the free market, the cosmopolitan universalism of capitalism, the future classless utopia of socialistic communism, the liberal concepts of automatic progress, and even the organic vitalism of nationalism.

In the natural framework the true being and the ultimate good are eternal, immovable, and are above becoming, genesis and decay; whereas, in the historical framework the true being, or the ultimate good, is in a dynamic process of self-realization within and above temporal existence.

In the natural cosmology history is interpreted as a process of deterioration, leading to the inescapable self-destruction of a world era, whereas in the historical cosmology history has a turning-point or a center in which the meaning of history appears, overcoming the self-destructive trend of the historical process and creating something new which cannot be frustrated by the circular motion of nature.

It is well to remember that we are using broad general themes here for the purpose of indicating the full dimensions of western culture. It will be recalled that we also mean to suggest some boundaries of western culture through comparison with that which is not western culture. In such a way major patterns can be observed that might escape attention at a lower level of abstraction. At this level of abstraction an observation is in order that is consistent with the natural versus historical comparison which has just been made. That is, for wide areas of Asiatic culture mystical unawareness of history is the basic perceptual stance towards the flow of events. In contrast to this, consciousness of history is relatively rare. This is true even in the West. Other major trends, including the technological mentality, are present in western culture which regularly overwhelm the historical consciousness.[1]

This latter statement can be supported if one pauses to associate historical consciousness with the sense of contemporaneity, the sense of "here and now" in which one understands himself not to be in bondage either to an unchangeable past nor to an inevitable future. Rather, the historical consciousness is chiefly characterized by the consciousness that one can change the course of events.[2]

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[1]See Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 34-35.

[2]Cox observes: "The world has become man's task and man's responsibility. Contemporary man has become the cosmopolitan. The world has become his city and his city has reached out to include the world. . . ." The Secular City, p. 1. To Cox this represents the "defatalization of history," which is tantamount to the discovery that man "has been left with the world on his hands, that he can no longer blame fortune or the furies for what he does with it." See p. 2.

This consciousness is not the only mark of the West, nor has it always been the predominant feature. But it is a strong denominator and it is prominently unique to the West. This leads us to the fourth characteristic of western culture.

The fourth characteristic of western society is its Faustian spirit--an impatience with limits--which is characteristic, for example, of twentieth-century German philosophers of history.[1]

This theme has constituted the tragedy as well as the greatness of western society, for in addition to western culture's incredible accomplishments, the Faustian spirit has repeatedly led to a peculiar intemperateness in war and politics. As Stillman and Pfaff point out, there has never been in history another such culture as the Western civilization,

> . . . a culture which has practiced the belief that the physical and social environment of man is subject to rational manipulation and that history is subject to the will and action of man; whereas central to the traditional cultures of the rivals of Western civilization, those of Africa and Asia, is the belief that it is environment that dominates man.[2]

Yet the passion to change history in the world has resulted in grotesque crimes and the West has been capable of violence on an appalling scale, while justifying the claim that violence is indispensable to a heroic reform of society or of mankind.[3]

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[1]See Otto Butz, Modern German Political Theory (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955). See also Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans. by Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).

[2]Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria, p. 12.

[3]Ibid.

There is a lust for perfection which has driven the West forward from conquest to conquest. This has produced not only the material powers of the modern state but "universalist philosophies of historical action and totalitarian politics."[1] Naziism, wholly western, and Communism, western in origin, cannot be dismissed from the heritage and responsibility of the West. Nor can the "Garrison State" of the United States which supports a military industrial economy that appears to require the ever present threat of enemies around the globe in order to legitimate the functions and contractual arrangements necessary to the maintaining of a high level of production.[2] The infamous involvement of the United States in Vietnam has been but one of the results widely criticized by opponents of the American status quo and its tenets.[3]

Associated with its historical and Faustian dispositions is a fifth highly distinctive intrinsicality. This is a deep-seated and divisive split in the approaches which it makes to knowledge. Western culture reflects a thoroughgoing dichotomy between the subjective and objective apprehensions of reality.[4] At the extreme there appear to

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[1] Ibid., p. 13.

[2] See Terence McCarthy, "The Garrison Economy," The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 39-49.

[3] See, for example, Richard S. Kaufman, The War Profiteers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books ed., 1972).

[4] On this point see James Finn, "Autonomous Selves," The Center Magazine, IV, No. 6 (November/December, 1971), 21-22. Also see Edward B. Fiske, "New Worldview," The Center Magazine, IV, No. 6 (November/December, 1971), 19-20.

be two opposing approaches to knowledge of reality. These are the subjective method and the objective method. Although prominent thinkers and occasionally whole periods have succeeded in overcoming the opposition between the two modes, such a healing of the breach is less frequent in western civilization than the dilemma of a sometimes seemingly irreconcilable opposition between the two. This opposition has had the most radical consequences for the human spirit and the institutions through which it is expressed. It has resulted, as William Pennell Rock observes, in both a cultural schizophrenia and an individual split personality for man and his social relations.[1] This condition enables Jordan to talk about the fallacy of subjectivism in his discussion of western culture,[2] while Tillich focuses on the dominance of the object by the subject which destroys man's ability to participate fully in the whole of reality. This, Tillich points out, is the condition of secularism.[3]

Secularism is a sixth characteristic of western civilization as it applies in the contemporary setting.[4] For the present we shall define secularism in terms of man's self-perceptions and his perceptions of his world. Secularism is the presumed autonomy in which man perceives that he, as the bearer of universal reason, is the source

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[1]William Pennell Rock, "Alienation: Yes; Patriotism: Yes," The Center Magazine, IV, No. 6 (November/December, 1971), 8.

[2]Jordan, Forms, pp. 1-5.

[3]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 5.

[4]Cox, The Secular City.

and measure of all culture, including science, law, politics, and religion--in short, that he is his own law.[1] The corollary of this position is that positive law replaces natural law as the norm for order.[2] I.e., there are no transcendent reference points by which man-made law itself can be judged.[3] This is what was meant by Tillich when he spoke of the domination of the object by the subject.[4] The

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[1]See Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 56.

[2]See Jordan's Forms, pp. 19-21. The effect of this situation, says Jordan, is that men eventually perceive that insofar as the state undertakes to guarantee interests, it will be the stronger interest that determines the form and function of the state; e.g.,

> "the only possible approach to harmony of interests lies in the complete subordination of lesser interests to the greater. . . . Thus a spoils system, a system of trading and matching of power or cunning is inherent in representative democracy, and in so far as a spoils system has anywhere been overcome it has been accomplished by the substitution of other motives for interest and usually by methods of deception. The transition that is going on in legal theory from an emphasis on agency and contract to a clarification of concepts like that of trust and foundation shows a tendency to abandon the interest point of view. That the transition is being effected mainly through fictions as instruments, and not recognizing the real substantial element of legal growth inherent in fiction, is an instance of what I mean by deception. . . ."

Positive law and the resort to "interests" as a basis of order are inseparable for Jordan.

[3]See Melville, Communes in the Counterculture, p. 211. See also Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 57.

[4]See Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 64-65, in which Tillich says everything which is merely object can be approached directly with scientific reasoning and technical tools, but the idea of truth itself is reduced to the realm of observable and, if possible, calculable relations, while the truth about existence itself and its meaning for us is left to emotions and opinions, a situation most useful for the rise and victory of uncontrolled authorities.

natural world has nothing to say to man in terms of any basis for law or norms being discovered "in the facts."[1]

Yet this is just one side of the picture, for secularism reflects the dilemma of the subject-object split. Secularism itself developed as a result of naturalistic thinking and was shaped by the rational, mathematical method of thought. Secularism is based on the technical-mathematical explanation of the world by means of natural science, and on the rational conception of reality as a machine with eternally constant laws of movement manifest in an infinitely recurring natural process.[2]

Thus secularism presents this dilemma. Man is the bearer of universal reason which is both rationalistic and mathematical in character. By virtue of his reason he becomes the measure of all things. But the measure he employs is rooted in the mechanical model of the universe in which man is a mere atom caught in the eternal laws of movement and necessity.[3] Thus his autonomous freedom and his naturalistic bondage are in the sharpest conflict, causing him to oscillate violently between Faustian action on the one hand and apathy and depression on the other. In this connection Tillich comments that mental illness is the greatest among Protestant countries which

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[1]See Jordan, Forms, pp. 1-3.

[2]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 34.

[3]See Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 43.

overburden the individual with too many ultimate decisions.[1] This observation is corroborated by Callahan's analysis.[2] The latter points out that a person should not be expected to raise and answer ultimate questions all the time, but that a culture should come to his aid. At present he doubts that western culture is doing this since it is itself reexamining all of its own ultimate reasons for doing things. Thus, the culture is a milieu of doubt rather than of reassurance, where the individual is concerned.[3]

A seventh characteristic of western culture is its emphasis on the individual. As McHarg points out, no culture has placed such great emphasis on individual human rights and individual justice.[4] Jordan joins this observation by stressing the point that the psycho-biological individual has been conceptually wrenched out of the wholeness of his social existence and fallaciously regarded as an ultimate

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[1]Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 177-78.

[2]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," p. 5.

[3]This point is strongly emphasized in each of the following works: Jon Alexander, "The Soft Cell," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 90-113; L. Vaughn Blankenship, "Public Administration and the Challenge to Reason," in Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, ed. by Dwight Waldo (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971); Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. by W. S. Dell and Gary F. Baynes (Harvest Book ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959); Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness; White, "Organization and Administration."

[4]Ian McHarg, Design with Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1969), pp. 24-26.

unit of social reality. This leaves him alone and helpless against the subjectively-based forces of economics and politics.[1]

Finally, an eighth characteristic of western culture will be mentioned. This is its rationalistic-utilitarian-pragmatic attitude which has resulted in its incomparable scientific and technical achievements.[2] This is an attitude which is closely related to the feature of secularism itself. It is the attitude of "realism" in which the world is seen as self-sufficient in its own forms.[3] These are forms which can be understood by analyzing material reality into its smallest parts and discerning the interactions between the parts. This attitude was prominently advanced by Descartes, Bacon, and Kant and represented extensively today by behaviorism and quantitative analysis.[4] Some dramatic paradoxes have emerged, however, which contradict both the self-sufficiency of material forms and the adequacy of ratiocination as an epistemological method. These will be considered in a later chapter.[5]

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[1]Elijah Jordan, Business Be Damned (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952), pp. 10 ff.

[2]Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II, pp. 3-10; 21-25.

[3]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 48.

[4]See the sections relating to Descartes, Bacon, and Kant in T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene, From Descartes to Kant (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940). On behaviorism, see White, "Organization and Administration."

[5]See Chapter III in this paper.

A Summary of the Themes of Western Culture

Taken together, then, these eight characteristics are descriptive of the social and cultural realities held in mind when the terms "western society" or "western culture" are used. To summarize, the eight characteristics are the spirit of capitalism, popular sovereignty, a historical consciousness, the Faustian spirit (impatience with limits and pursuit of perfection), the dilemma of the subject-object epistemological split, secularism (or the self-sufficiency of material forms and subduing of transcendent reference points), emphasis on human individualism, and finally, incomparable scientific and technical achievements.[1] This meaning of culture, plus the time frame describing what is meant by "contemporary," and the distinctions given concerning the term "delegitimation" serve to convey the dimensions of that portion of our subject which is referred to in the phrase "delegitimation in contemporary western culture." Succinctly stated, we are examining the loss of support for core values and instrumental values maintained since 1945 by the culture, wherever it exists, which is characterized by the eight features just elucidated. In order to fill out the remaining major conceptions inherent in our overall topic, it yet remains for us to relate what is meant by the culture's "social institutions in their political aspects."

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[1]See Figure 4 for a modular representation of these characteristics within the universe-of-discourse defined for this paper. See Figure 1 to determine the relation of the characteristics of Western culture to the total universe-of-discourse.

Antecedents and Definitions of "Social Institutions" and "Political Aspects"

"Social Institutions": Three Antecedents and One Definition in Two Versions

The three antecedents.--Both the conceptual values in which the ultimate concerns of a culture are translated into expressible concepts as well as the instrumental values, or means, by which those central concepts are converted from mental thought into objective cultural objects and social products,--both kinds of values are embodied in a culture's social institutions.

Three major kinds of institutional theory are taken into account in the controlling viewpoint on social institutions which is found in this paper. One is sociological, another is philosophical, and a third is theological. Yet all are political. The advantage of each is as follows.

The advantage of the sociological source is that it roots the concept of institutions in actual human conduct that can be described empirically. It serves as a guard against basing social analysis on inter-psychic forms such as in Simmel's works,[1] an approach laid

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[1]Sociologically speaking, Simmel was a Neo-Kantian. For Simmel the special task of sociology was to study the forms of social interaction apart from their content. In this view nothing could have been more useless than to study demographic details and to occupy one's self-examining the physical characteristics of zones, neighborhoods, environs, and similar data. See, for example, Georg Simmel, "Metropolis and Mental Life," in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. by Kurt Wolff (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 409-24.

reasonably to rest by Jordan,[1] or on the invention of artificial entities such as "over-souls" as in Spengler's reified social psychology.[2]

Yet, the disadvantage of adhering to a sociological concept alone is that its precepts too often stop short with mere description and then must rely on unsociological presumptions to account for any desired social order.[3] As David Riesman says, social theorists long ago abandoned the function of generating ideals by which a culture may find meaning or by which a community may order itself.[4]

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[1]See, for example, pp. 5-27 in his Forms.

[2]Spengler adopted Simmel's concept of the city and recast it in a setting of agrarian mysticism. Spengler reifies collective psychology, visualizes it as a mass-soul, and gives it an independent reality. He also characterizes this mass-soul as an organic phenomenon with a birth, growth, or death. This follows his rural imagery, with a springtime, summer, fall, and winter. See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. by Charles Francis Atkinson (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928).

[3]In this connection Max Fisch commented that

> "the literature of the social sciences on the whole has been intellectually thin and anemic. . . . There is frequent and premature recourse to principles of philosphic generality and to universal human sentiment beyond which, it would seem, there is no appeal except to force. . . ."

See his Foreword in George Barnett and Jack Otis, Corporate Society and Education: The Philosophy of Elijah Jordan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. v.

[4]Riesman observed that in sociology the founders of the discipline in the nineteenth century such as Comte and Saint-Simon, who were avowed reformers, generated images of what society might be, as well as how it operated. Since then, he holds, sociology has become a discipline almost exclusively concerned with measuring and analyzing what is, and general cynicism about any assertion of what ought to be has its academic counterpart in the "value-free" attitude of the social sciences, the tradition of ethical relativism. See Riesman's "Some Observations on Community Plans and Utopias," in Individualism Reconsidered, p. 76.

The advantage of the philosophical source is that it provides for this singular lack among the social sciences. Whereas sociology and its sister sciences are generally barren in the art of generating ideals for order, it is the specific function of philosophy to start from the presupposition of the need for and the existence of common human ends.[1] It need not capitulate to metaphysical fictions or to constricting ideological fetishes. But it should preside over the business of serious intellectual inquiry into the nature and function of possible bases for human order and common ends. This treatise accepts the assumption that it is within the scope of political theory to make room for both the right and the obligation to conduct such inquiry. To the extent that it does so, it is engaged in political philosophy and its viewpoints on social institutions will reflect this fact.

Yet, there is a disadvantage to approaching the subject in terms of philosophy alone. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries philosophy gradually but assuredly withdrew from speculation

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[1]As Will Durant said,

> "Coordinated energy is the last word in ethics and politics, and perhaps in logic and metaphysics too. . . . Philosophy accepts the hard and hazardous task of dealing with problems not yet open to the methods of science--problems like good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and freedom, life and death; so soon as a field of inquiry yields knowledge susceptible of exact formulation it is called science. Every science begins as philosophy and ends as art; it arises in hypothesis and flows into achievement. . . ."

See his The Story of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1927), p. 2.

concerning the nature of the good, the true, the beautiful, i.e., from the examination of the bases for common human ends, to the exploration of logical and methodological questions for the sake of providing bases for science.[1]

The vanguard for atoning for this lack has largely been the task of theology. The task of theology has been to deal with man's ultimate concerns. The problem with theology is that it has too often couched its interpretations of man's ultimate concerns in dogmatic, intellectually constricting stereotypes. Theology itself as a discipline has today largely fallen upon hard days; it is not generally highly regarded as a useful discipline in academic circles outside of seminaries and courses on religion.[2]

Yet, under other names its function is inevitably carried on, even among sociologists, philosophers claiming to examine only methodological questions, and indeed, even among scientists and technicians and public administrationists.[3] This is due to the fact that any culture is based upon its orientation towards the ultimate reasons which

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[1]See Tillich's essay on "Science" in The Religious Situation, pp. 57-78 and his essay on "Realism and Faith" in The Protestant Era, pp. 66-82.

[2]This was pointed out by Dr. Liston Pope, Dean of Yale Divinity School, in a seminar on social ethics as early as 1957.

[3]See Tillich's analysis of this point in his essay on "Metaphysics" in The Religious Situation, pp. 79-84. One also gets a feel of the truth of this point in reading the searching essays in Waldo's Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, as well as some of the articles in Louis C. Gawthrop, ed., The Administrative Process and Democratic Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970).

it gives for doing what it does and being what it is.[1] When these reasons are questioned they can be answered or replaced only by dealing with ultimate questions and concerns.[2] Our society is apparently in such a transition at the present time.[3] This gives an almost blatant theological countenance at times to such secular pursuits as public administration, sociology, and physical science.

This is to say that now and again there appears an obvious overlap between the three types of endeavor, namely, sociology, philosophy, and theology. The representatives of each of these disciplines which are chosen here as the source for the writer's viewpoint concerning social institutions all serve as models to illustrate this fact. That is, the sociological model does not merely describe, but looks for patterns of meaning. The philosophical model does not merely speculate concerning common human ends, but roots this speculation in an understanding of social facts as derived through behavioral descriptions and analyses. The theological model does not merely make affirmations from a presumed participation in spiritual life, but correlates any such affirmations with broad and diverse social indicators concerning the influence of the cultural setting upon the spiritual situation; it also subjects any affirmations concerning a presumed

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[1]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology."

[2]Callahan's and Tillich's claims in this regard are corroborated by Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking. See especially Chapter I.

[3]See Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning," and Toffler's Future Shock.

spiritual life to a critical philosophical scrutiny akin to similar intellectual inquiries about culture and science. The requirements of such scrutiny follow:

1. It should relate the subject matter to as comprehensive a scope as possible and ask what the given viewpoint (concerning the nature of social institutions) explains and what it leaves unexplained.

2. It should engage in a search for realism as opposed to mere formalism.

3. It should strive for as great precision as possible, even when speaking in terms of abstractions.

4. It should pass the test of coherency in the search for intellectual order.[1]

The specific sociological, philosophical, and theological roots of the viewpoint in this paper concerning social institutions are as follows.

First, the writer finds the sociological distinctions of Max Weber to be useful. Weber's theoretical point of view may be described as a form of social behaviorism. He felt the task of sociology was to explain human conduct in its meaningful dimensions and not merely externally. That is, the task of sociology is to explain inter-human

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[1]These criteria were suggested by Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, in the "Introduction."

actions in terms of the meanings they have to the parties involved as well as in terms of specific physical changes they entail.[1]

The idea of a "social relation" for Weber was a kind of conceptual shorthand by which one can speak of the maintenance of a pattern in inter-human actions. He was careful to insist that a relation exists only so far as inter-human actions actually occur.[2]

If one grants this meaning of "social relations" it is then possible to conceive of a complex "system of relations." Following this, the institution actually exists only so far as people act in certain ways. Just as the concept of "social relation" is a helpful shortcut to express the comparative identity in a number of specific social actions, so "institution" is an economy for speaking about the occurrence of complex sets of social interactions.[3]

Weber's approach possesses the strength of dealing with the observable world and broadening the way for empirical research. Further, it goes beyond mere description to the extent that it takes into account the importance of meanings to the parties involved. It stops short, however, of solving the question of the status of such meanings or of the importance of such meanings for theory, especially epistemology and normative theory. Thus, for Weber there is no position apart from what is described, or apart from the observer, by which one can

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[1]See especially Max Weber, The City, trans. and ed. by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (New York: The Free Press, 1958).

[2]Ibid., pp. 50-52ff.

[3]Ibid., p. 51.

determine whether persons or institutions should act in such-and-such a manner. To wit, there is no basis for law, other than positive law, as such, which leaves the business of politics to whoever is mightiest.

Yet, as we shall see, this is precisely the condition so vigorously opposed by those who would change the status quo. They would supplant existing theories which lend weight to the dictum that "might makes right" with views ordering society which transcend the self-sufficiency of positive law. Therefore, we must confront the question whether the new views contribute anything additional to knowledge of man, culture, or law, which is not already comprehended through the behavioral sciences, or whether these new views also are merely disguised bids for power which, if successful, would inevitably follow the rule that power alone determines norms.[1]

Thus, the question arises, is a view of social institutions possible which regards the existence of a culture's ultimate presuppositions as anything more than subjective meanings for society's members. I.e., is there any objective basis for order?

This leads us to the second source underlying the understanding of social institutions inherent in this paper. It is the view offered by the juristic philosopher, Elijah Jordan, who sought

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[1]Morgenthau, for example, concludes that power among nations to coerce other nations is the only ordering factor in the international "system." Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (3d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

specifically to answer the question just posed, to wit, is there any objective basis for order?[1]

Jordan found his answer in the corporate nature of social facts and of human individuality. He started from the proposition that no conclusion is acceptable which does not result in common human ends, since, he says, it is the nature of human reason to follow the universal canons of logic, which logic is based, not in subjective sentiments or abstractions, but rather in the concrete cultural objects which have made human action and thought possible.[2]

While taking seriously Weber's emphasis on attention to empirical observation, Jordan goes beyond him in determining a basis for order. He finds his basis in the tendency of social fact to order itself through the continuity of human thought and action which result in corporate structures. These structures are rooted, not in positive law or in any human creation per se, but in the nature of culture itself as an expression of nature. That is, corporate human forms are natural, and their ordering tendencies stem from the ground of the wholeness of collective social fact. It is this social wholeness

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[1]Jordan confronts this question in several other works in addition to his Forms. See also The Life of Mind (Indianapolis: Charles W. Laut and Co., 1925); Theory of Legislation: An Essay on the Dynamics of Public Mind (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

[2]For a concise description of Jordan's position, see John Paul Duncan, "Natural Law as Corporate Purpose," The Oklahoma Law Review, XIII (August, 1960), 274-87.

which is prior to all human thought and which indeed makes thought possible at all.[1]

Thus, the task of social theory and of philosophy, or even of science, is not to try to arrive at some means by which individual facts can be held together. Rather, for Jordan each of these disciplines should avail themselves of the givenness of the prior ground of wholeness, which is in nature itself, and of which human culture is but one expression.

The third source for an understanding of social institutions in this paper is taken from Paul Tillich's concept of theonomous culture. Whereas Weber begins with individual social acts and finally arrives at a complex of social institutions, and Jordan begins at the other end by assuming a corporate whole out of which complexities develop, Tillich introduces certain correlates observable within the wholeness of the social context which, he says, point to certain structural elements both within human experience and within the "whole of reality" itself.[2]

Contrary to Weber, both Jordan and Tillich agree that there is a "ground" prior to human reason which provides an objective basis for order. Where the philosopher and the philosophical theologian part company is at the assertion by Tillich that that ground possesses structural elements which can be known by man. This would undoubtedly

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[1]Jordan, Forms, pp. 153-78.

[2]Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 59-65.

appear to Jordan to be a Kantian way of thinking which reintroduces formalism into social thinking of the sort Simmel attempted with his reified "over-soul."

But Tillich would resist such charges as a gross misunderstanding of his thought. Whereas Jordan posits the ground of reason and of cultural institutions in the corporate character of those institutions as a part of nature, he also denies any place to the mystery of the irrational. The irrational is merely an undeveloped prelude to reason and is to be overcome.[1]

Tillich, however, treats this aspect of human and physical nature more seriously. He says all human and physical action will not, after all, bend to the convenient logic of human reason just because we would have it so. The indeterminacy of the irrational aspect of the universe still stands as an imponderable mystery that will not fit into the categories of mere thought. Something more like intuition is required to participate in an understanding of this uncreated power.[2]

This is different, however, than positing metaphysical fictions such as "oversouls," Tillich would assert. Yet, he continues, there is no such thing as a merely matter-of-fact culture; every culture, at bottom, is ultimately serious. That is, every culture either implicitly or explicitly expresses its awareness of the unconditional,

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[1]See Jordan's Forms, pp. 140-48.

[2]Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 64-65.

underivability of the ground from which it comes. In some cultures this awareness is indirectly expressed, whereas in others it is transparent. The task of theological analysis is to translate cultural expressions of the unconditional and make them visible and apprehensible so that a society can clearly see the reasons on the basis of which it already operates, i.e., the faith it already possesses.[1]

As such, the unconditional element is not a reification; it is not a <u>being</u> the existence of which can be discussed. Rather, it is a quality.

> . . . It characterizes that which is our ultimate, and, consequently, unconditional concern, whether we call it "God" or "Being as such" or the "Good as such" or the "True as such" or whether we give it any other name. It would be a complete mistake to understand the unconditional as a being the existence of which can be discussed. He who speaks of the "existence of the unconditional" has thoroughly misunderstood the meaning of the term. . . .[2]

For Tillich, although the unconditional element in all human experience confronts man with the underivable mystery of his own ultimate concerns, which he holds are the basis of all culture and all social institutions, nevertheless it is possible to discern certain "structural elements" of man's relationship to this ground of his being. These elements are not transcendent to, or beyond, his experience; rather they are implicit within it. They are knowable.[3] The point at which the reference of man's experience to the structural

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[1] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 58.

[2] Tillich, <u>The Protestant Era</u>, p. 32, Footnote 1.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 65.

elements of "being" become apparent in sociological thought is the same point at which this reference appears in psychology and biology:

> --at the absolute givenness, the underivability, the inconstruability of the living structure, the non-rational ground on which this structure rests and which comes to expression in the demonic-divine polarity of conflict and social integration, of the will-to-power and love.[1]

To be sure, continues Tillich, these things are rarely seen in their essential character, in their reference to the unconditional quality in human experience. Thus, a justifiable realism in sociology as in biology will offer determined resistance to those romantic reactions which "are always merely disguised defeats."[2]

This analysis brings us to a summary of what is understood in this paper to be meant by the term "social institutions." The writer understands there to be three dimensions to social institutions. The context will determine which of these dimensions is paramount in any given discussion in which the term is used. But the writer understands that all three dimensions must be present whenever the term is used.

First, if one begins at the point of empirical descriptions, social institutions are those complex patterns of human actions and interactions which can be observed and described, plus whatever meanings, discernible or not, that these actions may have for the participants.

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 63.

[2]Ibid., p. 64.

Second, if one systematizes these empirical observations into patterns of corporate meaning for the society as a whole, it can be discerned that these patterns produce cultural objects which have a corporate character, and which make further thought and action possible, and thus they lend a continuity to the pattern, which is necessary to qualify such pattern as an institution. This is a critical part of what is meant whenever we speak of "institutionalizing" an idea, an issue, or an action (or solution to an issue).

Third, an ambivalent pattern does appear discernible,--a pattern of oscillation between conflict (both internal and external) and social integration, and between the self-perpetuation and expansion of institutional power on the one hand and cooperation with participants and affirmation of their needs on the other. This affirmation rests not merely upon objective observation but upon a correlation between such observation and personal experiential involvement in such oscillations as a participating individual. There also seems to the writer to be a correlation between the meaning of such oscillations, whether institutional or personal, i.e., that they all relate to the serious business of whatever concerns us--the participants--ultimately. That is, the meanings of social interactions do not seem to be merely subjective. Rather, they are objectified both in cultural objects and in the intuited meanings expressed in and through those objects and which meanings are conceivably structured according to the polarities just mentioned.

It is useful, then, to attempt a definition of the term "social institutions"--a definition which embraces all three of these dimensions.

> Social institutions are the corporate objectification of a culture's understanding of its own ultimate concerns as developed through observable social actions and interactions, the meanings of which oscillate between the polarities of the will-to-power and conflict on the one hand, and community love and social integration on the other.[1]

A shorthand version of the definition above could be:

> Social institutions are the corporate objective relations through which human beings experience the meanings of love and conflict.

This is more than a behavioral definition, although it comprehends behavioral descriptions. It is a philosophical definition as well. Yet it is not a definition in which anything is reified. However, it does give a status of reality to the human pyschobiological (but corporate) drive towards love and power. On the other hand the visible fact of social institutions rests not in these subjective drives but in their objectification in cultural objects.

The Meaning of "Political Aspects": A Congruence of Positive and Negative Views of Politics

It now remains to establish what is meant by "the political aspects" of these social institutions. Consistent with modern systems theory in the study of politics, and consistent with the increasing

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[1]For a discussion on the meaning of the terms "will-to-power," "conflict," "community love," and "social integration," see pp. 125-31 of this chapter.

interrelatedness of all social institutions in contemporary western culture, we regard that the political system consists of all social institutions "in their political aspects." That is, political institutions are not entirely separate institutions from other social institutions.[1] Rather, all institutions at times have a political character, or at least quasi-political character, in terms of what is understood here by the term "politics."

For purposes of simplification we may consider two broad contrasting conceptions of politics. One is a negative view, the other is positive.

In the negative view, the role of politics is preoccupied with the exercise of force and the contest for legitimacy as to who gets to use such force on behalf of society and its competing interests.

This view is typical of most contemporary definitions in western political science. These definitions associate the political system with the use of legitimate physical coercion in societies. Thus Easton speaks of authoritative allocation of values; Laswell and Kaplan concern themselves with severe deprivations; Dahl writes about power, rule, and authority.[2]

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[1]As Almond and Powell observed, social systems are made up not of individuals, but of roles. The same individuals who perform roles in the political system perform roles in other social systems such as the economy, the religious community, the family, and voluntary associations. As individuals expose themselves to political communication, form interest groups, vote, or pay taxes, they shift from nonpolitical to political roles. See Comparative Politics, pp. 19-20.

[2]David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 130 ff, and his A Framework for Political

Prior to these descriptions Max Weber had observed that legitimate force is the thread that runs through the action of the political system, giving it its special quality and importance and its coherence as a system.[1] As Almond and Powell point out, the political authorities, and only they, have some generally accepted right to utilize coercion and command obedience based upon it. Accordingly, force is "legitimate" where this belief in the justifiable nature of its use exists.[2]

In this view, any social institution becomes a political institution to the extent that it becomes the vehicle for the exercise of the legitimate coercion, direct or indirect, of the prevailing political authorities.

However, this definition leaves much to be desired, especially in a transitional period when the established legitimacies are precisely what are in question. For example, what about the exercise of "illegal" or, from the standpoint of the presiding authorities, "illegitimate" force? What about strikes, lockouts, demonstrations, passive resistance, civil disobedience, riots, and wars? Are these not

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Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 50 ff; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 5 ff.

[1]Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in his From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-78.

[2]Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, pp. 17-18.

politically oriented even though perhaps not "legitimate" from the standpoint of the established authorities?[1]

More broadly speaking, then, the definition of politics given by Lasswell in another context to the effect that politics is the question of who gets "what, when and how?" is more acceptable, for it includes all forms of conflict related to the distribution of goods, services, and values which make for the good life.[2]

Now, however, we can see that we have gone beyond a mere negative definition of politics, for we are no longer talking about mere coercion, but positive fulfillment of what it means to be human. This latter rationale comes closer to being in accord with the classical Greek concept of politics and society, and this brings us to the second, the positive, definition of politics.

In the original meaning of politics as given to us through classical Greek theory, this was considered as a positive form of knowledge or science. For Plato and Aristotle, politics was the system of rational principles necessary to the weaving together of human motives and purposes into such organized objective form as would give to human life objective wholeness and harmony.[3] As Jordan says,

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[1]This question was raised by Henry David Thoreau. See Walden and On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Due to wide popularity among students and young people this edition had gone into its sixth printing by 1970.

[2]Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936).

[3]Jordan, Forms, p. 41. See also Harmon, Political Thought, pp. 11-74.

> Practical politics meant such a control of the objective conditions of life as would permit to this organized body of purposes full and adequate expression in action. It is characteristic of the Greek view of politics that for it the sharp distinction between the individual and the social or public in human purposes, which seems so natural and necessary to the mind of the modern, did not exist.[1]

In short, the positive view of politics and society held that they both existed in order to make the fulfillment of the good life possible.

From the short analysis of the negative view of politics given previously, we might tentatively surmise that no such view is possible in isolation from the positive view. In other words, the use of coercion, legitimate or otherwise, appears to be related to the quest for what is perceived to be the good life. It appears that we may possibly come face to face here with an example of the polar structure of social institutions and human personalities, to the effect that they oscillate between integration and community love on the one hand and the will-to-power and disintegration on the other.[2]

Thus, when we speak of social institutions "in their political aspects" we shall mean not only the exercise by those institutions of overt and covert force (whether on behalf of or in conflict with political authorities), but also the positive quest in and through those institutions for the good life, however that quest be construed.

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[1]Jordan, Forms, p. 41.

[2]For a fuller exposition of this concept, see pp. 125-31 of this chapter.

When this study refers to "delegitimation in western culture of its social institutions in their political aspects," it presumes to speak of the corporate relations through which human beings experience the meanings of love and conflict, of the exercise of overt and covert force through those corporate relations, of the positive quest in and through those relations for the good life, and of the shifting balance of social and cultural support away from the pursuit of an existing mix of values of love and conflict to a new mix of those values.

Summary and Conclusions for Part II

This project explores the relationship between changing concepts of human personality as these are reflected in contemporary western culture on the one hand, and the delegitimation in that culture of its social institutions in their political aspects, on the other hand. A special component of such delegitimation is the very culture itself in which new concepts (of human personality) flourish to replace old ones. Culture in this context refers to the sum total of the ways of life of a people, and the changes that accrue in those ways as a result of shifts in the culture's social institutions and belief systems.

It is contended that the sum total of the ways of life of a people, when examined carefully, will exhibit some normative unifying principle (or principles) and that it is the common association with this unifying core that identifies a culture's members as "a people." It is further contended that this common core rests upon certain human

ultimate concerns which provide the impetus for the ethos of the culture, such as in the Protestant ethic, or the spirit of capitalism, or the ethos of democracy.

A culture functions effectively (and one might say efficiently) on behalf of its ethos whenever its ultimate concerns are taken for granted and thus serve as supports which relieve individuals of the burden of making decisions about ultimate questions all the time. Yet only an undeveloped or diseased culture will neglect to evaluate its own ultimate concerns periodically. Thus, a culture's life will alternate in a rhythm between questioning and evaluating its ultimate concerns, and, having reaffirmed them or acquired new ones, taking them for granted for the sake of survival, further activity, and growth.

Thus it is the nature of culture to be normative. Human culture is the source of norms, and it is only through culture that man, as a normative creative, exhibits his markedly human characteristics, viz., those that distinguish him most sharply from other animals.

Normative cultural changes involve two dynamics--erosion of existing values and structures and development of new ones. The first of these dynamics is what is meant by "delegitimation."

This study, however, is not concerned with the delegitimation of culture in general as such, but with the delegitimation of political values and structures in contemporary western culture. "Contemporary" means the period since the end of World War II in 1945. "Western culture" is defined thematically rather than geographically and is

characterized by the following themes: the spirit of capitalism, popular sovereignty, a historical consciousness, a Faustian spirit, an epistemological dichotomy between subjective and objective approaches to knowledge (the "subject-object split"), secularism, individualism, and incomparable scientific and technical achievements which reflect deep-rooted attitudes of rationalism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism.

These are the themes in western culture which characterize the corporate relations which regulate the human experience and meaning of love and conflict, competition and the pursuit of "the good life."

It is the study of the delegitimation of much of what is represented in these themes (and their vehicular structures) to which this project is committed. It is appropriate then, in preparation for subsequent chapters, to turn our attention to the scope and dynamics of delegitimation consistent with the working definitions given here in Part II.

PART III. DELEGITIMATION: SOME PROTOTYPES AND SOME APPLICATIONS

Some Prototypes

Delegitimation was described earlier as the shifting balance of social and cultural support away from the pursuit of an existing mix of values of community love and conflict to a new mix of those values. It was also pointed out that there are two dynamics in the process of cultural change, namely, the eroding of old values and the inculcation of new ones. The interactions of these two dynamics is illustrated in Figure 8.

That is, whereas Figure 7 illustrates the relationships between a culture's total life-ways and its central core concepts, Figure 8 shows the delegitimating process which occurs when those life-ways shift, in whatever degree, away from core commitments to new concepts antithetical to the old ones. This condition sets up a struggle between old and new concepts for the central dominant position. According to the visual display in Figure 8 a kind of "cell division" of thought-forms appears to be taking place around the nucleus of the ultimate concerns. It should be emphasized that the ultimate concerns themselves are conceived as formless, but they represent an undifferentiated source of primal energy. Jordan called it the undifferentiated primary mental-affective datum,[1] whereas Jung called it the archetypes,[2] while Tillich refers to it as the ground of our being.[3]

Centered around the nucleus of the culture's ultimate concerns, the "cell division" effect can result in several striking contrasts. These contrasts are all related to the extent of the "division" that is taking place. The model, of course, is representational and not literal, for the actual social contextual whole is much more complex and dynamic than our portrayal of it. Nevertheless, these picturizations may be useful in rendering certain conceptual comparisons

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[1]Jordan, Forms, p. 69.

[2]Carl Jung, Psyche and Symbol, ed. by Violet S. de Laszlo (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958).

[3]This concept appears in many of his works. But see especially, Part II of his Systematic Theology, Vol. I.

explicit for the sake of discussion and argument. Naturally, it is not possible to hold all contingencies in mind at once. Therefore, it is useful to focus on three major theoretical renderings while bearing in mind that all portrayals and contrasts are strictly relative.

These three possibilities will be portrayed here in their so-called "pure" form as prototypes, although as such probably two of them seldom if ever occur in actuality with any frequency. Their usefulness lies in comparing the prototype models and their distinguishing characteristics with actual social, historical, and political situations in order to discern the respective dynamics at work. The prototypes will be abstracted from the dynamics in the model in Figure 8 and represented in three new figures. A descriptive statement of each of the prototype situations follows next accompanied by the number of the figure which represents it.

The new ideas in a culture challenge the existing concepts and are repulsed. This prototype effect is illustrated in Figure 13.

The dominant concepts are challenged by ostensibly new concepts and are changed in the process. This prototype effect is illustrated in Figure 14.

The dominant core values are replaced by entirely new concepts, either gradually or radically (slowly or quickly). This prototype effect is illustrated in Figure 15.

It has proved interesting to search history and society for examples that approximate the prototypes. The writer was successful in finding examples that fit the actual prototype only in the case of

Note:

The dominant core concepts hold the center and are supported by the culture's life-ways, while the challenging concepts are repulsed. Either the life-ways give no support or, perhaps stimulated by stringent political proscriptions, actively attack and repulse the challenging concepts. In this situation the human ultimate concerns appear best served by the established core concepts, while the repulsed challengers retain only a slim hold on a common area with the core concepts. This common area is the irreducible minimum, since all humans and their self-expressions reflect human ultimate concerns (the will-to-power and community love). Thus, even "totally repulsed" concepts have some basis for minimal communication with the culture which rejected them.




Fig. 13.--Showing core concepts effectively and near-totally repulsing challenging new concepts

Note:

The dominant core concepts are attacked by challenging new concepts. The latter are buffeted, but receive enough support from the culture's life-ways to be partly assimilated. While the new concepts may not receive the right to be the main spokesmen for the ultimate concerns of the culture, they manage to share this function with the original core concepts and this fact moves the center of the core concepts slightly so that a new center is established.




Fig. 14.--Showing core concepts changed in the process as they are challenged by new concepts

Note:

The dominant core concepts are attacked by challenging new concepts and are expelled. Either gradually or cataclysmically the lifeways abandoned their previous central core, turned against it and purged themselves of it. This means a radical new interpretation of the culture's ultimate concerns was embraced, as well as the understanding of how they are best served. Yet, the repulsed core still retains a slim hold on a common area with the new core concepts. This common area is the irreducible minimum, since all humans and their self-expressions reflect human ultimate concerns (the will-to-power and community love). Thus, even a "totally repulsed" central core retains some basis for minimal communication with the culture which rejected it.




Fig. 15.--Showing core concepts effectively and near-totally repulsed by challenging new concepts

the second "pure type." For prototypes "1" and "3" the writer could find only approximate examples, and even these were transitory at best. In order to root this theoretical approach in the test of history and empiricism, some of the situations which proved most interesting to the writer are offered here to illustrate each prototype condition.

Prototype 1: The Search for Examples in Which the New Ideas in a Culture Challenge the Existing Concepts and Are Repulsed

Although there are numerous examples in which challenging new concepts are repulsed by the dominant core values of a culture, the writer was hard-pressed to find any examples in which challenged concepts were repulsed so irrevocably that they never raised their figurative heads again. Generally, in fact, they succeeded in surviving in at least some minimal fashion either as a subculture or, at the very least, as a remnant or fragment of antiquity which possesses the possibility of reappearing in some new connection, perhaps as an incorporated feature of some later and larger idea.

Given this qualification, examples of repulsed concepts abound. Just a few of the more prominent ones are mentioned in order to make clear what is intended in this first of the three general delegitimating possibilities.

The first example is taken from early Christian history. The setting was in the Roman culture of the Mediterranean world during the reconstruction of the empire and the final victory of the Christian Church under the emperor Constantine. This example refers not to the

core concepts of the Roman culture as such but to an inner struggle within the Christian subculture which was resolved in such a manner as to elevate the victor in that struggle to a dominant position within the Roman world itself. The inner struggle within the Christian subculture was waged between the Gnostic interpreters of the faith and those who remained within the more Hebraic tradition. The Gnostics were Greek Christians in the Platonic heritage who conceptually separated mind from body, the spirit from the physical universe. As a result of their preconceptions they taught a version of Christianity which held that Jesus was a phantom and not a real flesh-and-blood man, since to them the flesh, as a part of the material world, was evil, and the Son of God, who was divine, could never taint himself with evil.[1]

The Gnostic bid for control of the dominant interpretation of the Christian faith was widespread, perhaps as widespread as the more Judaistic Christian tradition itself. However, the Gnostics were defeated in a struggle with the theistic interpretation which held that Jesus of Nazareth was a real flesh-and-blood man, that he actually was born of a real woman, lived and breathed as a real man, bled real blood and suffered real pain when he was crucified, died a

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[1]For an extended treatment of the issues joined between Gnosticism and Christianity see Hans Lietzmann, The Beginnings of the Christian Church, Being Volume I of A History of the Early Church, trans. by Bertram Lee Woolf (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), chap. xv on "Gnosticism." (Hereinafter referred to as A History of the Early Church, Vol. I.) In Volume II see also chap. xiii.

real death, was actually buried, and rose from the grave in a physical body.[1]

This struggle was brought to a head in the Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. The issue was decided in favor of the theistic version, and the victory was legitimized in the adoption of the Nicene Creed, the forerunner of the Apostles' Creed which was formally adopted two centuries later.[2]

This struggle evolved over a period of five hundred years. Had the Gnostics, who possessed thinkers of unusual brilliance,[3] won the struggle, western civilization undoubtedly would have been strikingly different than it is now. From this perspective, the victory was indeed complete. Nevertheless, gnosticism, though never dominant in western society, has left its stamp. This is the source of the tradition that Mary, the mother of Jesus, was a virgin,[4] as well as the style in the Gospel of John which identifies the Spirit of Christ

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[1]It will be noticed that these are chief elements of the Apostles' Creed which was framed as it was largely to counteract Gnostic teachings. See Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 135-37ff.

[2]Arius of Alexandria and Eusebius of Nicomedia, who advocated the use of the term Logos to explain the relation of Christ to God, were banished from their offices by the emperor Constantine. In the Nicene Creed the term "Son" was used to apply to Christ in place of the word "Logos" which had been used by the Arians. See Latourette, A History of Christianity, pp. 151-57.

[3]These included Origen of Alexandria, Basilides and his son Isidorus of Alexandria, and Valentine of Rome. See Lietzmann, A History of the Early Church, Vol. I, pp. 279-83.

[4]See Latourette, A History of Christianity, p. 124.

with the "logos," which is the Greek term for the "Word," or the spiritual essence of the "world soul," or God.[1] Further, the Platonic and Greek distinction between mind and matter was revived in the neoclassicism of the Enlightenment and served as the basis of German idealism during the nineteenth century.[2]

The defeat of German idealism in the nineteenth century can be named as another example in which the dominant core concepts repulsed challenging newcomers. Just as early Christianity opted in favor of a view which affirmed the material world virtually equally with spiritual realities, so the utilitarian, industrially-oriented Europe of the nineteenth century chose the heritage of Descartes, Hume the critical side of Kant, and the English utilitarians Bentham and Mill, as against Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, and Fries.[3]

Yet, here again, the idealists left their mark, for Marx reinterpreted Hegel so that idealism yet survives in the dialectical part of dialectical materialism and forms the basis for socialistic utopianism.[4] Other products of idealism also survived. Leibniz in his day, and his disciple Wolff, had translated the medieval faith in eternal truths into an elaborate system of "metaphysical truths" that could be demonstrated independently of experience,--an approach subsequently

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[1]The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. VIII (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), pp. 142 and 151-52.

[2]Lietzmann, A History of the Early Church, Vol. I, pp. 294-95.

[3]Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 45-46.

[4]Ibid., p. 81.

picked up by the German idealists.[1] Taking this as a clue, we may fairly say that the mysticism of the Middle Ages is still alive in our own times, although in subordinate and often unnoticeable roles.

For example, the modern technological concept of reality is repeatedly challenged by the mystical concept, which reappears in many transformations. Theories of intuitive knowledge, classicist and romantic revivals of ancient or medieval forms of thought, phenomenology, the philosophy of life (aesthetic or vitalistic), the "theory of Gestalt," some types of the psychology of the "unconscious"--all these seek for the inner power of things beyond, or below, the level at which they are calculable and dominable.[2] One could wager that the fight between the two types of viewpoints is continuously going on, although the technological viewpoint is victorious on the whole since the situation of the contemporary man and his relation to things is determined by the effects of technology.[3]

These cursory but related examples should be sufficient to illustrate, first, that there are ample occasions when challenging viewpoints make their bid and are effectively repulsed by the dominant culture, and second, that even though repulsed, defeated viewpoints may yet leave their marks or become revived to fight again another day, or even eke out a limited survival in which they wage an ongoing war against the traditional core concepts.

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[1]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 71.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

Throughout these and other examples, however, the writer was never able to find a sample in which the repulsed viewpoints were completely obliterated, as demonstrated in the "pure" prototype of this class in Figure 13. Ideas seem to have a way, once having made their way into the history of human thought, of persisting, no matter how tenuously. It would be easy to conclude that ideas, once aborning, have a life of their own.

Prototype 2: The Dominant Concepts Are Challenged by Ostensibly New Concepts and Are Changed in the Process

The dynamics of this class of examples could be subdivided into several patterns. However, for the sake of simplicity and to expedite the main thrust of this study, the illustrations will be limited to what appears to the writer to be the most representative type of case, namely, that in which the dominant core values incorporate the new values into themselves. This has the effect of thus reducing the threat represented by the challenging concepts; it also produces the result of a change in the central core values themselves.

One of the most striking examples of this type of case which could be found by the writer was the manner in which capitalism made a captive of the strongest movement directed against it, namely, socialism. Almost all the weapons which can be used in the war against capitalist society were forged in the socialist critique which developed

throughout the whole nineteenth century and which achieved its climax in Marx's and Engels' Communist Manifesto.[1]

In the capitalist viewpoint economic activity is sufficient unto itself and human purposes are determined and fulfilled within the seeking of self-interest in the capitalist system. This position eliminates all transcendent reference points by which the process itself can be judged. The law of reason within man is relied upon as the final arbiter of all interests, problems, and purposes. Man, indeed, becomes the measure of all things, and the strongest men become the strongest measures.[2] Even religion, notably the Protestant evangelical version of Christianity, ultimately becomes a handmaiden to capitalism's interests.[3] This fact is substantiated by the alliance between American Protestant Christianity and the affluent middle-class suburbanites, which fact has resulted in a well-known and widely recognized type of American designated as a WASP.[4]

In the ultimate bases of socialism, on the other hand, there was an element of religious eschatology. Socialism looked foreward to a point in time that would be the final fulfillment of all time, a

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[1]Harmon, Political Thought, p. 391.

[2]Jordan, Forms, pp. 19-21.

[3]Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Abiding Challenge of Religion," The Center Magazine, VI, No. 2 (March/April, 1973), 43-52. See also Gibson Winter, The Suburban Captivity of the Churches (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961).

[4]White Anglo-Saxon Protestant.

fulfillment that would overcome all the contradictions of history and of capitalism.[1]

Yet the ultimately transcendent goal of socialism was made finite and temporal in its actual definition of ends. Socialism had not only to fight for the conquest of capitalist society but also for the vital interests of a proletariat which exists in the midst of that society. However, the two purposes are tragically opposed to each other. In response to this dilemma socialism accepted the theoretical and practical thought-patterns of the capitalist period and so occupied fundamentally the same position as did its opponent.[2]

Nevertheless, capitalism itself changed in the process by incorporating elements of socialism into itself, i.e., through the socialist, labor, or Christian Democratic Socialist parties in France, Germany, Great Britain, Scandinavia, and through Keynesianism in both major parties in the United States, particularly the Democratic party.[3]

Indeed, both the critics and the supporters of capitalism agree that its resilient strength lies in its tremendous flexibility and adaptability, particularly in its ability to absorb opposing viewpoints and to accommodate them to itself.[4] While capitalism has

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 112.

[2]Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[3]Ibid.

[4]See Alexander, "The Soft Cell"; John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1967); Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance"; and Dusky Lee Smith, "Scientific Liberalism."

adapted features of socialism to itself in the interest of maintaining the main core of capitalism, socialism, on the other hand, became disillusioned, began to make compromises, to adopt the doctrine of progress and to become bourgeois in its temper. Even the extreme movements, which, like communism, resist this tendency contain a sufficiently strong element of the capitalist spirit to fall victim to it again and again.

This is the only one of the three classes of examples in which the historical example selected also corresponds exactly to the prototype. Thus, the "pure type" as represented in Figure 14 fairly represents the example just given in this subsection.

Prototype 3: Replacement of the Dominent Core Values by Entirely New Concepts, Either Gradually, or Radically

Once again the writer was hard-pressed to find a cultural transition in which the examples corresponded with the prototype exactly. In the present case the task was to find a transition in which a society completely traded in its core values for entirely new ones, regardless of whether that transition was to come slowly or rapidly. The tenacity of core concepts can be illustrated by reflecting on the fact that the historical consciousness which pervades the West has origins that are evident in the earliest of Hebrew traditions and written documents. The patriarchal myths of Moses can be correlated with Semitic migrations to and from Egypt as long ago as

1600 B.C.[1] These myths embody strong historical inclinations which see history proceeding in a straight line towards a climactic goal, a goal which gave meaning to Hebrew activity and initiative and which in turn suggested inklings of human freedom in which it was possible to participate in the historical process and change it towards desired ends.[2] The earliest known written documents, those ascribed to the prophet Amos and upon which modern Old Testament versions are based, show the prophet speaking of "the Day of the Lord," an anticipated future event in which righteous activity was to be vindicated and all wrongs set right. These texts are dated by scholars as originating during the ninth century B.C.[3]

Thus, the historical consciousness of the West started working its way into the West's core values at least 2,700 years ago, and perhaps as much as 3,500 years ago. This is further testimony to the tenacity of an idea once it has entered human consciousness. To the writer this is a strong illustration of the fact that cultural legitimation/delegitimation and relegitimation are always a relative matter of degree and never an occurrence of absolutes.

Nevertheless, in terms of degree, then, what cases can be adduced for the illustration of relatively complete transformations of

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[1]Elmer W. K. Mould, Essentials of Bible History (rev. ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1951), pp. 67, 96-106.

[2]The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. I (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), pp. 8-11.

[3]The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. VI (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1956), pp. 63-76.

cultural values within a society? We are not concerned here primarily with the transplantation of cultures, such as is evidenced in the forcing of Greek culture upon Persia and Africa as a result of the conquests of Alexander the Great, although in contemporary societies of extensive mobility and rapid transcience, such transplantation, although of a much more complex character, cannot be ruled out. It is instructive, however, to look for examples in which the competition is between values as culturally transmitted rather than between armies as over against the larger culture.

As long as it is understood that we are speaking in relative terms, several transitional periods in western history may commend themselves. One of the most useful for illustrative purposes relevant to this study is the case of the transition from the medieval period to the Renaissance. To set this transition in perspective, we may ask, as do Smith and Grene, whether the change in eras was that of a sudden blossoming of interest in man, nature, and antiquity, which was totally different from anything preceding it, or whether the development was so very gradual that the "blossoming," or at least its budding, must be pushed "farther and farther back into the Middle Ages until the term 'Renaissance' means nothing at all?"[1]

The answer to the first question, according to Smith and Grene, is certainly negative. "In any age, no matter how revolutionary

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[1]Smith and Grene, From Descartes to Kant, p. 3.

its point of view, there is a high degree of continuity with the language and the thought of preceding centuries."[1]

But the answer to the second question is also negative. Certainly the roots of the Renaissance reach far back into the Middle Ages. Even so, there did occur in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a significant change in the attitudes revealed in many sectors--a change in the intellectual purposes to which they put their knowledge.[2]

E.G., one cannot say there was no interest in "nature" in the Middle Ages. Indeed, there were poets of nature like the author of Pearl, and there were empirical scientists like the emperor Frederick II. But on the whole empirical investigation was subordinated to the construction of a rational system.[3]

Nor can one say there was no interest in antiquity in the Middle Ages. Rather, there was a continuous inheritance of ancient fragments to which medival speculation constantly referred itself, and after the Aristotelian revival of the twelfth century large bodies of ancient literature formed an intrinsic part of medieval learning. But, again, the ancient authors were studied not so much for their own sakes as for their aid in the construction of one vast system of true philosophy.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 4.

One cannot say there was no interest in the experience of the individual in the Middle Ages. For the mystic and the saint, their inward vision of God was the beginning and the end of philosophy, true. But man, too, had to be given his place in that one great system.[1]

Yet, as with any system that dominates an age, men eventually became dissatisfied, and if the formulation of a new scheme of thought is preceded by a period of relatively unformed and fermenting reaction, then the "Renaissance" was such a period. Men were dissatisfied with the official scholastic philosophy of the later Middle Ages, and "a formidable series of eruptions against it occurred in various quarters."[2] In addition to the resulting change in scientific method, Smith and Grene note four other aspects of the revolt.

The first of these was the desire during the Renaissance to turn from metaphysical speculation to common-sense observations of the world. An example of this development is the Italian rhetorician Laurentius Valla (1408-57) who established the spurious character of the Donation of Constantine by the use of historical and linguistic evidence.[3]

Secondly, there developed a love of elegant language in reaction against the dry technicalities of official scholasticism. This

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

had an important effect. Citations from ancient documents had been used in the Middle Ages as material for the construction of a system of "true philosophy." With the breakdown of that system the focal point of interest in the ancients was shifted more and more to the documents themselves in what was conceived to be their original meaning.[1]

Thirdly, the new love of eloquence raised the status of Plato and his writings above that of Aristotle, whose philosophy had formed the rational basis of medieval scholasticism. This Platonic influence is apparent, for example, in the works of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), notably in the doctrine of a world-soul and a world-intellect which are at once present in and directive of all things. Consistent with the Platonic influence, men of the Renaissance began--in poetry, in speculation, in art, and in life--to throw off the shackles of scholasticism's repressive aridity in preference for the greater glory of man.[2]

But fourthly, and more importantly for a man like Martin Luther, scholasticism interfered with the "true practice of Christianity"; so its fetters, he declared, must be discarded for the greater glory of God. The subtleties of the dialecticians, Luther felt, were so many snares of pompous self-conceit obstructing the utter humility before God which alone could serve as the prelude to grace. The

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

opposition to scholastic theology from this theological side is presaged by the doctrine of "learned ignorance" of Nicholas Cusanus, and it comes to full expression in the philosophy of the Protestant reformers.[1]

The Renaissance, of course, cleared the way for the Protestant Reformation, for the Enlightenment, and for the Industrial Revolution, which together created a world as different from the Middle Ages as modern London is from ancient Camelot. Nevertheless, what we have described are changes in emphasis, not complete and entirely abrupt transformations.

Summary

These three prototypes and the historical examples selected to illustrate them have been employed to emphasize the contrasts that exist among the dynamics of the legitimacy/delegitimacy/relegitimacy process. As a conceptual tool they also may be useful in identifying and recognizing certain general patterns which may present themselves again and again in the course of social history and cultural development.

An effort will be made in the next part of this section to apply the three substantive objects and their subdominant frames-of-reference to an analysis of the historical example in the first of the three prototypes just discussed, namely the repulsion of Gnosticism by Christianity during the first five centuries A.D. The purpose of such

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[1] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

analysis will be to illustrate more fully how the universe-of-discourse employed in this study may be used to identify and relate pertinent dynamics of the legitimation/delegitimation/relegitimation process, while at the same time preserving a conceptual awareness of the contextual social whole.

Some Applications

Figures 13, 14, and 15 illustrate three theoretical prototypes of interaction between central core concepts and concepts of subcultures which challenge the core concepts. The first and third of these prototypes appear to exist in the pure sense only theoretically, although dynamics of these prototypes are discernible in historical events which serve as approximations of them. By contrast, the second prototype seems to represent a phenomenon which transpires readily in history and society.

Using the historical illustration given for the first prototype which was described in the previous subsection, it is pertinent to ask: what applications can be made to illustrate the nature of the relationship (the "G" cluster of relationships) between changing concepts on the one hand ("E") and social institutions (in their political aspects) on the other hand ("F")? To answer this question, certain other questions will be asked which are based on the three subdivisions of the "G" relationship, and which together constitute one of the substantive objects of this study. These questions already have been mentioned on pages 37 and 38 and are restated here for

the sake of convenience. They are divided according to the "G^1," "G^3," and "G^2," relationships.

The "G^1" relationship: How does the struggle between core concepts and new concepts appear to affect western culture's social institutions in their political aspects?

The "G^3" relationship: How do changes in the social institutions, especially in their political aspects, affect the changing conceptions of human personality?

The "G^2" relationship: How do those persons and institutions who find themselves irrevocably caught in the cycle of changes represented in the "G^1" and "G^3" relationships appear positively to embrace and use this cycle of changes cooperatively to sustain culture, if at all?

> I.E., how do established elites and those who challenge them appear to use changes in social institutions to advance their own concepts of human personality? and,
>
> How do those who are responsible for the culture's social institutions appear to use changing concepts of human personality to sustain our social institutions, particularly in their political aspects?

Consistent with the universe-of-discourse and frames-of-reference which have been established, it will be useful to answer these questions in terms of the frames-of-reference contained within the third substantive object, "F," namely, all social institutions (in their political aspects).

There are two kinds of subdominant frames-of-reference which have been discussed in relation to "social institutions in their

political aspects." The first inheres in our intellectual understanding of the three roots of the term "social institutions." These three roots, it will be recalled, are the sociological root, the philosophical root, and the theological root. The second subdominant frame-of-reference inheres in our intellectual understanding of the meaning of the term "political aspects." It will be remembered that there are two sides to this understanding, the negative and the positive.

The "G^1" Relationship

> How does the struggle between core concepts and new concepts appear to affect western culture's social institutions in their political aspects?

Essentially this question asks how changing concepts affect institutions. To answer this question and be consistent with our frames-of-reference, the answer must combine sociological, philosophical, and theological elements, and must speak to the positive as well as negative aspects of politics. It should prove interesting to apply this approach to the historical example discussed in relation to the first prototype. The example used to illustrate the first prototype was the repulsion of the Gnostic interpretation of the Christian faith.

Using the sociological categories of Weber, we may try to formulate an answer in terms of conceptual behavioral terms such as "social relations," "systems of relations," and "institutions." It should be remembered that the meaning of these terms emphasizes the importance of the meanings of the relations to the parties involved.

Thus, using Weber's analysis, whatever answer is given must be rooted in what is described, or rooted in the observers themselves, or both.[1]

Accordingly, it may be observed that one well-established fact within the academic circles of the historical, literary, and archaeological examination of early Christian culture is that, subsequent to the Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. and the concurrent reign of the Emperor Constantine, the Christian interpretation of man, God, and the universe was based on the sacerdotal principle. That is, the belief became firmly established and widely distributed (or enforced) to the effect that the divine presence inheres in particular offices, certain official acts, and selected established institutions. Thus, the divine presence was believed to inhere in the offices of priests and kings, in the sacramental acts of the Church, and in the institutions of church and state.[2]

If such institutions can be described, as Weber says, as "complex systems of social relations,"[3] it can fairly be concluded that these systems, in their political aspects, were undergirded by the importance of the meaning which these relations held for the parties involved: namely, the belief that the supernatural draws near to man in and through the material organizations of man's culture. This is a

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[1]Weber, The City, p. 51.

[2]D. Ray Lindley, "Types of Religious Leaders and the Church's Ministry" in The Renewal of Church: The Panel of Scholars Reports, ed. by William Barnett Blakemore, 3 vols., Vol. III: The Revival of the Churches (St. Louis, Mo.: The Bethany Press, 1963), pp. 127-49.

[3]Weber, The City, p. 51.

belief that abolishes an absolute contrast between "matter" and "spirit," the seen and the unseen, "nature" and "grace."

That is, the effect upon both the positive and negative aspects of the social institutions in western culture from the time of Constantine onwards ostensibly was to "sanctify" or "legitimize" modes of reformist, corrective, or coercive actions consistent with the belief that the purpose of history was to bend men's wills to "God's will." At that point in history this was assuredly the major source for the West's historical consciousness discussed earlier. This cultural stance resulted in positive law to the effect that man would obey "God's will" as interpreted by the ruling ecclesiastical and political authorities. Such positive law eventuated in the prohibitive aspects of the Catholic hierarchy, e.g., the divine right of kings, the Crusades, and the Counterreformation, as well as in a positive political concept as shown in the affirmations of "the good life" as expressed through medieval art, literature, vocations, and culture.[1]

Yet, on the basis of such a behavioral answer alone, it is not possible to determine from the facts whether in fact men should have believed and acted in such fashion. Thus, unless we decide to capitulate the business of politics to the matter of whoever is mightiest, a philosophical approach is needed to answer the question of how changing conceptions affect western culture's social institutions in their political aspects.

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[1]H. G. Wells, The Outline of History, revised by Raymond Postgate (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Books, 1949), pp. 635-97.

The philosophical approach is committed to asking whether there is any objective basis for order. Thus, it must ask whether, in the example cited in the description of the first prototype, any provision was made by the victors for objective common human ends, that is, a basis not rooted strictly in the subjectivity of the victorious elites. Philosophically, this becomes a matter of referring the behavioral analysis back to the "natural social whole," which, to be sure, can never be known in its entirety, but which can and must be conjectured philosophically in order for man to be able to ask about an objective basis for common human ends.[1]

In the kind of conjecture just referred to in the previous paragraph, it is assumed philosophically by the writer that corporate human forms are natural, and that their ordering tendencies stem from the ground of the wholeness of collective social fact. It is also assumed that this social wholeness is prior to all human thought and is what makes human thought possible at all. Therefore, philosophically, the task is to decipher how such wholeness was taken up into and expressed by the cultural modes of Christian sacerdotalism, as far as our present example is concerned.

Though the answer could utilize numerous cultural concepts to show how Christian sacerdotalism embodied and expressed the wholeness of the ground of natural collective social fact, the idea of a universal human community will be called upon here to illustrate the point.

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[1]Jordan, Forms, pp. 162-66.

Assuming that the quest of philosophy points to the human need for individual and social wholeness,[1] one can say that this need was symbolized and embodied culturally in the concept of a universal community which transcended all factions and divisions as experienced existentially by humankind. One of the major contributions of Christianity to western culture was its universality; it broke with narrow nationalisms of the sort which Judaism had not been able to escape by the time of Christ. From the beginning it had been an interracial message and regarded the whole world as its field. As a culturally formative power this concept reached an epitome of expression in The City of God by St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in the fifth century A.D.[2] Conceptually this literary work formed the theoretical basis for the formation of the Holy Roman Empire, a tenuous but delicately durable federation of principalities surrounding the Mediterranean world for several centuries.[3]

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[1]Durant, The Story of Philosophy, especially the Preface.

[2]Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The City of God, an abridged version of the translation by Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrium B. Zema, Grace Monahan, and Daniel J. Honan, ed. by Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1958).

[2]Although The City of God was written early during the fifth century A.D., the Holy Roman Empire did not come into being until 800 A.D. when the Pope clapped a crown upon Charles's head and hailed him Caesar and Augustus as the latter was rising from prayer in the Church of St. Peter in Rome.

Charlemagne had had St. Augustine's The City of God read to him. He conceived of a Christian Empire as being ruled and maintained

The City of God held that whereas every person was inescapably a citizen of the temporal city of man with its factions, divisions, and strife, individuals could also become members of the eternal City of God and enjoy the peace and harmony of God's presence forever. Moreover, the faithful could, by anticipation of eternity, participate in such a universal community in the very midst of the city of man even on the temporal plane. Ultimately this led to a visible organized "church universal" which assumed the prerogatives of serving as screening committee for eternal citizenship and as custodian of its earthly cultus.

Philosophically, in analysis of the situation just described, we can say that changing cultural conceptions should result in providing members of the culture with common human ends and that in the case of Christianity's accession to the position of the official Roman religion it did indeed do that. However, whether the particular shape and form which such universalism assumed in order to affect the culture's social institutions in its political aspects (namely, the power of sanctions associated with compulsory Christian conversion) should

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in its orthodoxy by some such great Caesar as himself. He was to rule even the Pope.

But at Rome the view taken of the revived empire differed. There it was felt that the Christian Caesar must be anointed and guided by the Pope--who would even have the power to excommunicate and depose him. This divergence of view was apparent during the time of Charlemagne, but in the following centuries it became acute, as a struggle ensued for control of society between the spiritual and various temporal powers. See Wells, Outline of History, pp. 650-52ff.

have been formulated the way they were becomes largely a matter of one's own faith about what it means to be human.

That is, the conclusion that human and social prerequisites affirm the need for common human ends is not the same as arriving at some particular objectively correct solution as to the attainment of those ends. Thus, ultimately, additional variables must be introduced which reflect the value assumptions of the decision-maker. One may well conclude that the need for wholeness is virtually absolute for the advance of human life and culture. But this conclusion still leaves the matter of the culture's adaptation to that fact as a relative matter. In other words, this is a question philosophy cannot answer per se. If it does, it answers in terms of a faith and thus becomes a theology, at least tentatively.

This, in fact, does appear to be what happens, as pointed out earlier. Thus, whole cultures, to the extent that they congeal a society into enough harmony to enable its members to take certain ultimate answers for granted,--whole cultures possess a theology. As Richard Niebuhr says, we are concerned with faith as dependence on a value-center, and "to deny the reality of a supernatural being called God is one thing; to live without confidence in some center of value and without loyalty to a cause is another."[1]

Thus, the third root of understanding of "social institutions" is the theological root. If one is constrained to raise questions

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[1]Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, p. 25.

philosophically about proper common human ends, when one gives an answer to such questions he is engaged in a theological process, call it what he may. That is, in the final analysis the answer which is given is one given in faith and generally stems from that which concerns one ultimately, and theology has been defined as the process of engagement with that which concerns us ultimately, however that may be construed. Following Tillich, we may consider that it is the underivable mystery of these human ultimate concerns which forms the basis for all culture and all social institutions. The ultimate concerns themselves, says Tillich, come to expression in the polarity of conflict and social integration, "of the will-to-power and love."[1]

If this be accepted, then the theological question about how changing conceptions affected the culture's social institutions in their political aspects becomes:

> How were the ultimate concerns of the will-to-power (conflict) and community love (social integration) expressed in the net result of the changing conceptions, and how did this affect the political aspects of the culture's social institutions?

We shall not undertake, at this point, a detailed description of what is encompassed by the terms "the will-to-power" and "community-love." Some of their many dimensions hopefully will be indicated throughout this project. However, it is important for the sake of clear discourse at least to offer some working definitions.

Presently "the will-to-power" will be used broadly to mean those forces, internal or external to the human psychobiologic

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 63-64.

individual, which coalesce to result in the rise of personality to conscious self-determination, and which personality occurs when the individual transcends his social ties and subordinations.[1] For the moment two notable forms of this transcendence will be acknowledged, both of which result in highlighting the momentary or sustained separation of the human individual from strictly social rationales. There may be other forms worthy of note, but the following two are particularly prominent in western literature and culture.

The first form of the will-to-power consistent with the working definition above is closely associated with the concept made famous by the German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche. We may refer to it here as a pre-social form of the will-to-power. In the human sense it is not mere brute vitality, since, in our definition here, it involves self-consciousness and transcendence of the social spectrum, rather than merely blind will which possesses no awareness of the social milieu. This form is characterized by Nietzsche's comment that the man motivated by the will-to-power is "beyond good and evil." He is the man "who is strong through wars and victories, who needs conquest, adventure, danger, even pain."[2]

The second form of the will-to-power's transcendence of social ties and subordinations may be called the post-social form. Whereas

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[1]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 102.

[2]For an exposition of the thought of Nietzsche and his concept of the will-to-power, see Durant, The Story of Philosophy, pp. 435-86. See also Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 147.

the pre-social form is aware of social ties for the ordinary man, it ignores them along with ignoring any validity to the claims of such social obligations. By contrast, the post-social form acknowledges tacit claims of society, but posits their fulfillment in the radicalization of the individual who then seeks to fulfill the power of his own unique selfhood above all. This is illustrated in the Protestant appeal to the individual in matters of conscience; in the democratic attempt to form a society on the basis of individual reason; in the rational criticism of old social structures; and in the unconditional demand of a religion of law that holds every individual responsible, or in the Calvinistic belief in individual predestination.[1] In these ways personality becomes the bearer and goal of social life. That is, it subjects the social realities to its own purposes. As Tillich observes, if and when the will-to-power is manifest in relatively unchecked form, established social groups appear to lose their power to crush and to mutilate the vitalistic source of personality, but they ostensibly also lose their power to create and protect it.[2]

This last comment leads us to consider the second term, "community-love," and its tentative working definition. Presently, "community-love" will be used broadly to mean those forces, internal

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[1]See Tillich, The Protestant Era, especially chap. viii on "The Idea and the Ideal of Personality," and chap. ix on "The Transmoral Conscience."

[2]Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 125-26. On this point see also Carl Jung, Collected Works, Vol. XVII: The Development of Personality, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), and Jung's Modern Man in Search of a Soul.

or external to the human psychobiologic individual, which coalesce to result in his self-sacrificing devotion to common human ends through the social and public spheres.[1] Again, two notable forms can be acknowledged. For the moment we shall call these the aesthetic and the public. In the aesthetic form of community-love the manifestation of this "ultimate concern" is observable in connection with concepts of "community" which are direct and unmediated. That is, they require no specific institutions, organizations, patterns, procedures, or rituals. The "openness" is conceived to be in relation to the whole of reality, or at least to the whole of humanity, without the need for mediation through any prescribed channels. At the extreme, this is the way of many artists, mystics, and prophetic types. They differ from the Superman of Nietzsche in that their dedication is to "nature," "mankind," "the cosmos" or some larger corporate or organic whole, rather than to self.[2]

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[1]Although the term is Tillich's, as in The Religious Situation, pp. 64, 132, 139, 144, and 149, the concept is consistent with the analysis in Carl Jung's Modern Man in Search of a Soul and The Undiscovered Self, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1958), and with the following works by Victor Frankl: "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression," Journal of Existential Psychiatry, I (1960), 5-20; "Angel as Much as Beast: Man Transcends Himself," Unitarian Universalist Register-Leader, CXLIV, No. 2 (February, 1963), 8-9; and Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1963).

[2]See, for example, Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals; Melville, Communes in the Counterculture; and Alan W. Watts, "The Individual as Man/World," The Psychedelic Review, I (June, 1963), 55-65.

The public form of community-love, on the other hand, is more preoccupied with the cultural side of community. This model is typified by the picture of the selfless public servant who spares nothing in his pursuit of the public or corporate good, but he pursues it through available established channels of social patterns, interactions, and institutions. That is, he seeks to mediate his service and dedication to the larger whole by means of the society's cultural creations. In so doing, he regards them as efficacious and lends them legitimacy.[1]

It seems appropriate to make one other sort of observation concerning the polarity of the will-to-power and community-love in corporate human experience. This polarity may be regarded in our present line of thought as a primary datum in which the two sides of the polarity are inseparable. It is presumed that one pole never appears to the absolute exclusion of the other. If we accept Tillich's clues in this matter, the polarity itself forms the structure of human personality as the ground of both subjectivity and objectivity.[2] That is, man as a personality is directed by the natural,

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[1]See, for example, Gardner, Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?

[2]Consider, for example, the following statement:

> "The power of nature must be found in a sphere prior to the cleavage of our worldinto subjectivity and objectivity. Life originates on a level which is 'deeper' than the Cartesian duality of cogitatio and extensio ('thought' and 'extension'). The difficult problem for all attempts to reach the uncleft level of reality is the necessity to penetrate into something 'nonsubjective' with categories of a subjective mind and into something 'nonobjective'

corporate and social forces of the will-to-power towards his own individuality as the primary vehicle for reality, and as such he is "closed" towards any inherent value significance of the world itself; and simultaneously man as a personality is directed by the natural, corporate and social forces of community-love towards the world as the source of value, and, as having a world, he is "open" to everything. It is the relative balance between these two poles which determined the direction of the expression of the ultimate concerns of an individual or a culture.[1]

Following this construction of the matter, it may be speculated that this tension between being "closed" and being "open" characterizes the development of every personality. It may be reasoned that the more the openness prevails, the more the personality is in danger of remaining bound to the "mother-womb" of the cosmic whole. The more the closedness prevails, the more the personality is in danger of losing its creative ground and the fullness of life. These extremes can be conceived as the outer limits of the risk involved in

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with categories of objective reality. This necessarily falsifies the pictures, which can be corrected only by a strict understanding of the indirect, symbolic character of terms used for the description of the power and meaning of nature."

Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 102.

[1]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 117. See also Jung, Psyche and Symbol.

both personal and corporate human existence, a risk which appears inescapable in the experience of human life itself.[1]

To be sure, numerous problems undoubtedly can be raised with any or all of these working concepts concerning the will-to-power and community-love. The venture in writing about them here, and thus risking criticism, is justified not as a means of giving any final answers about life's presumed "realities," but rather as a means of pursuing a line of thought which might admit of further development and usefulness in spite of its numerous shortcomings. To resort to a familiar metaphor, this line of thought is merely a "map" and should not be confused with the "territory" which it is meant to represent. Yet, imperfect as it is, the map may still be useful in assessing the terrain which it presumably stands for.

This having been said, it should be recalled that we are seeking to answer the question how these "ultimate concerns" of the will-to-power and community-love, as expressed in the net result of the changing conceptions in our first example, namely, the Christian victory over Gnosticism, affected the political aspects of the Roman Empire's social institutions. It is not the purpose here to answer this question exhaustively, but to indicate the kind of answer which may be forthcoming from the particular method and framework which we have employed here. Against the background of our discussion about

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[1]Carl Jung, Collected Works, Vol. IX: Axion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

the first prototype, about the "G^1" relationship between the Christian-Gnostic struggle and its effect on the "F" complex including both the sociological and philosophical roots of social institutions, it may be observed now that the third root, the theological root, is characterized in this treatise by the following effect of the Christian form of the ultimate concerns upon the Roman social institutions from the fourth century forward throughout the Middle Ages:

A bargain ostensibly was struck between the two sides of the primal ultimate concerns in which the will-to-power and community-love were held together in a dynamic unity under certain religio-cultural symbols. For example, self-sacrificing community-love was expressed in messianic symbols which were combined with symbols of the will-to-power, and both were ultimately fused in the evolution of the concept of the divine right of kings. Medieval historians know that the official welcome offered to princes, kings, and emperors by city authorities often was given in messianic terminology. Not this or that king was greeted but the king of peace, the messianic king. It can be recalled by those versed in exegesis of the biblical texts that the term "king" applied for example to Yahweh or to his Messiah. As such, it was a symbol that transcended every human king. The king was held to be called by God. The grace that was upon him was seen as divine grace.[1] The symbol worked in both directions. It gave the king--and that means the political realm--dimensions of dignity, and therefore

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[1]Petry, Christian Eschatology, chaps. iii through vi.

legitimacy, from both the religious and civil realms. This made for a powerful source of cultural homogeneity which could be called upon during times of cultural change and stress. The result was centuries of durability of a certain continuity of purpose within the culture, in spite of the changes in both ecclesiastical and political fortunes.

The political aspects of this arrangement can be seen in both their positive and negative dimensions. As the symbolic representative of the omnipotent grace of God, the king represented the ideal of "the good life," i.e., membership in the eternal city, even in the midst of the strife-ful human existence on earth. This was the positive political function. Negatively, when the king became a functionary of an autonomous state, he became either a tyrant (and was sometimes removed) or a puppet without the power of religious symbolism.[1]

We have engaged in some detail in the exposition of how our conceptual framework and methodological approach both apply to the probing of the legitimation-delegitimation dynamics as expressed in the presumed "G^{1}" relationship which maintains between the cultural change complex ("E"--i.e., the Christian-Gnostic struggle) and the complex of the social institutions ("F"--i.e., the social and political system of the Roman Empire from the fourth century A.D. forward). This discussion hopefully has served to illustrate: (1) the complexities involved in the legitimation-delegitimation process as reflected in a causal relation of changing conceptions acting upon social

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[1]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 62.

institutions, and as reflected in the selected historical example of the first representative prototype; and (2) the fact that these complexities can be meaningfully related and correlated on the basis of a universe-of-discourse founded on the social contextual whole rather than upon the more theoretically impoverished logical positivist or behavioral model.

Having taken up a lengthy space under the "G^1" relationship of the first prototype to illustrate the scope of this method, it will suffice for our purposes simply to summarize the conclusions of the method for the questions implied in the "G^3" and "G^2" relationships.

The "G^3" Relationship

As before, it will be useful to give attention to the "G^3" relationship, which is the opposite causal relationship from that of "G^1," before turning to the "G^2" relationship, which is something of a synthesis between the two.

The question involved in the "G^3" relationship, it will be recalled, is as follows:

> How do changes in the social institutions, especially in their political aspects, affect the changing conceptions of human personality?

Assuming the application of our conceptual framework and its inherent methodology as employed in the exposition of the "G^1" relationship, the following illustrative conclusions may be drawn about the application of the "G^3" question as stated above.

When the "G^3" question is applied to the Christian-Gnostic struggle, it can be discerned that the political aspects of the social institutions of the Roman Empire of the fourth century A.D., as changed by the victory of the Christians over the Gnostics, in turn affected the changing conceptions of human personality in the following manner.

First, since the victory of the Christian concepts was relatively complete in affirming an important place for the physical world, the concept of human personality as being disassociated from material matters was rather effectively defeated.[1]

Second, in the new Roman society, oriented as it was around the Christian cultus, a new corporate basis for personality was developed in which an individual's personhood gained its status from a rich complexity of physical and visible symbols, rituals, and artifacts designed to define a person's place in the scheme of things according to definitions generated by both church and state.[2]

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[1]This is illustrated in the fact that the medieval conception of the future, was definitely cast in terms of a society, not as a bodiless spiritual state. The medieval preacher was always exhorting his parishioner to realize that the only possibility of living in the fullest fellowship of the future is to make ready for such companionship insofar as one is able in the present. See Petry, Christian Eschatology, pp. 106-7. This rootedness in the present physical world was later expressed in Protestant Calvinism. As Tillich points out, those who have emphasized most the "unconditional dependence" on the "divine," as Calvin and the Puritans did, have created the most activistic type of men in all history. See The Protestant Era, p. 173. Weber also showed the relation between this motive thrust and the spirit of capitalism. See The Protestant Ethic.

[2]See Tillich, chap. viii, "Nature and Sacrament," in The Protestant Era.

Third, the result was that the political realm became the temporal expression of the corporate unity of the physical with the spiritual. That is, a status of importance, if not ultimate importance, was given to the physical world of human society and culture, whereas, had Gnosticism won, there could have been no material or corporate basis for the grounding of human personality.[1]

The legitimation of the "corporate unity" between the physical and spiritual gave permission to the physical world of human society and culture and its various functions to develop and progress within certain limits that articulated a certain concept of human personality. This may be characterized as follows. The predominance of "openness" towards corporate society became expressed through the "mother-type" of religion, i.e., the mother-church as the counterpart of the fatherhood of God as expressed in the patriarchal messianic king. In effect, medieval society was a large corporate family from which individuals, when they were regarded as such, got their status of existence and purpose. The danger in such a society is that psychobiologic individuals are subject to losing, or never reaching, fully developed personal lives. The enforced community-love pole prevails out of balance with the will-to-power pole. The political values expressed are more positive than negative from the standpoint that public life,

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[1]Thus, the struggle between the Emperor and the Pope for ascendancy over the Holy Roman Empire played a large part in the history of the early Middle Ages. See Wells, Outline of History, chap. xiii.

including ecclesiastical as well as social and political life, is the realm of the fulfillment of the good life.[1]

A concomitant of such communitarianism is the emphasis of the values of psychological and spiritual security as well as social stability. The type of man characterized by Nietzsche as one "who is strong through wars and victories, who needs conquest, adventure, danger, even pain," is a relatively unique and highly select elite-type person. Where he is found in medieval society he is not a rugged individual, but a member of a highly privileged class who can afford dangerous sorties under the banner of chivalry, a concept which in itself reflects the corporateness of the society rather than transcendence of it.[2] The net effect is that social criticism, as such, is virtually nonexistent.[3]

In short, the medieval personality is closely bound to the "mother-womb" of the cosmic whole, and therefore is close to the creative ground of social relatedness and of common human ends, but he never gains strong self-consciousness of his own particular human personality.[4]

Thus, the net effect of the changed social institutions in their political aspects in the Roman Empire from the fourth century

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[1]Petry, Christian Eschatology, chap. v.

[2]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 27-29.

[3]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 116.

[4]Ibid., pp. 117-18.

forward seems to have affected the changing conceptions of human personality in such a way as to have thrown the balance in favor of community-love, "openness," individual and corporate security and stability, positive politics on behalf of "the good life," and the retarding of fully developed individual personal life.

The "G^2" Relationship

The question involved in the "G^2" relationship is:

> How do those persons and institutions who find themselves irrevocably caught in the cycle of changes represented in the "G^1" and "G^3" relationships appear to positively embrace and use this cycle of changes cooperatively to sustain culture, if at all?

This question differs from those in the "G^1" and "G^3" relationships in the following regard. The "G^1" relationship concerned itself with a unilateral causal effect of changed concepts on social institutions. The "G^3" relationship addressed itself to the opposite, the unilateral causal effect of institutional changes on concepts of human personality. The third question, i.e., the "G^2" relationship, addresses itself to the mutual interaction of these influences towards the furthering of culture itself. The emphasis is positive, not merely neutrally causal. The point of this question and the relationship which it represents is that this "culture-building" activity is one which must be undertaken by any culture which would survive, and the philosophical and conceptual resources of the cultural change complex ("E") as well as the resources of the institutional complex of social interactions ("F") must be enlisted if this activity is to succeed. In effect, this relationship represents the positive activity

of the legitimation or relegitimation process. There may be, as a result of its activity, an inverse spinoff of delegitimating products, since choosing for one thing also means choosing against something else. But for now we are concerned about the main dynamics of the activity in the "G^2" relationship which creates or sustains culture.

In this connection, this question, upon close examination, can be seen to be composed of two subsidiary questions, and the larger question can perhaps best be understood if treated in terms of its two parts. These, it may be recalled, are as follows:

> 1. I.e., how do established elites and those who challenge them appear to use changes in social institutions to advance culturally viable concepts of human personality?
>
> 2. How do those who are responsible for the culture's social institutions appear to use changing concepts of human personality to sustain the culture's social institutions, particularly in their political aspects?

In the first question there is an adversary relationship between established elites and those who challenge them. There is also the assumption of a marketplace of ideas (not necessarily a free or open market), no matter how minimal. That marketplace might not have the sophisticated institutional supports and alternative mechanisms that exist in, say, modern Britain, Canada, or the United States, with their universities, multi-media, and traditions of free speech.

Indeed, that marketplace might be nothing more than a slowly evolving dim awareness among the culture's members of their own self-consciousness. In the Middle Ages, for example, we have seen that the supports for any kind of social criticism were virtually nonexistent.

Nonetheless, to the extent that human experience is compounded of those forces even minimally, which we have designated by the term the will-to-power, then the rudiments of social criticism will be present and a competition of ideas will take place. This involves the assumption that no transfers of power can take place in human culture without some resort to a struggle of competing ideas also.

One other final assumption is implicit in this first subsidiary question of the "G^2" relationship. It is this: The competition of ideas between elites and their challengers is regarded in itself as having a culture-building effect. The implication is that whatever harmony or homogeneity is provided by the culture through the end products of its own artifacts, this harmony was produced from a process of conflict and competition.

To be sure, such competition might also destroy culture. This is related to the observation that choosing for something also means choosing against something else. We find ourselves here confronting the relativity of creativity and destructivity, particularly as it applies to culture. To study one factor is equivalent to studying the other factor inversely as well. It should be pointed out that our major question under the "G^2" relationship is stated positively simply because we have chosen to pay attention to those aspects of cultural conflict and competition which make a central core of dominant concepts possible at all.

One final observation: We have chosen in this first of the two subsidiary "G^2" questions to focus our attention on the cultural

competition within that category of ideas including various concepts of human personality per se, not on the conflict between all competing ideas of whatever category. This decision is consistent with the overall thrust of this study and calls attention to its limits.

Against this background, how does this question apply to the example in the first prototype, i.e., the Christian-Gnostic struggle and the thorough rejection of the legitimacy of Gnosticism? Some brief observations will suffice to illustrate the application of this method.

Since the Christian-Gnostic struggle was, in the first instance, a competition between two subcultures within the Graeco-Roman world, the elites not only were in contention with each other, but with the Roman authorities as well. Thus, we may regard the Roman authorities as the established elites and the Christians as the successful challengers. Thus, the question becomes, what was the effect of the thorough rejection of Gnosticism, and how did both the Roman authorities and the Christian leaders ultimately collaborate to use changes in social institutions to advance viable concepts of human personality for the new Roman culture?

Historians will remind us that so far as Christianity challenged the divinity of Caesar and the characteristic institutions of the empire, Christianity was regarded by most of the emperors before Constantine the Great as a rebellious and disintegrating movement.[1]

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[1]Wells, The Outline of History, p. 546.

Both Decius and Diocletian organized persecutions to suppress Christianity, Gnostic or otherwise. The persecution of Diocletian represented the crowning struggle of the old idea of the god-emperor against the subculture that denied his divinity.[1]

Ultimately, however, Christian leaders and Roman elites collaborated to use changes in social institutions to bring about new concepts of man's place in society. The change that had occurred in social institutions was a transition from republicanism to autocracy. Diocletian himself had reorganized the monarchy upon lines of extreme absolutism, and had abolished the last vestiges of republican institutions.[2]

After Galerius aided the Christians by issuing an edict of toleration, and Constantine came to power, both the emperor (Constantine) and the Christians collaborated to use this new autocratic change in the social institutions to fix Christianity firmly as the religion of the empire.[3] This established a detente for hundreds of years to come and had two effects on the advancement of culturally viable concepts of human personality for the new Holy Roman Empire society. First, in much of subsequent Christianity the autocratic spirit of Constantine was perhaps more evident than the spirit of Jesus, thus paving the way for man's feudal role in a society of

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[1] Ibid., p. 547.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Wells, The Outline of History, p. 548-49.

patriarchal politics.[1] Second, Christianity completed its shift from the prophetic teaching of Jesus, which had no rites and ceremonies, to a priestly religion, which further relegated the individual to a subservient condition.[2] In exchange, the individual received the security of being appointed a given place in society through the feudal system for which ostensible divine significance was manifest. Thus, emperors and bishops collaborated to utilize the autocratic shift in Roman institutions to advance the culturally functional and temporally durable feudal concept of man.

The second question focuses more on the established elites than on the challengers, unless one includes institutions of the dissenting subcultures. It asks how those responsible for the culture's social institutions use changing concepts of human personality to sustain the culture's social institutions. In the case of the example we have been following, a ready answer presents itself. If Constantine grasped the fact that Christianity was a rebellious and destructive force towards a pagan Rome, he also realized that it was a unifying force within its own communion. He apparently reasoned that this adhesiveness could also, then, be transported throughout the empire to give it coherency and homogeneity. According to Wells, Constantine saw that Christianity

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[1] Ibid., p. 553.

[2] Tillich, The Protestant Era, chap. ii.

> . . . provided the only hope of moral solidarity he could discern in the great welter of narrow views and self-seeking over which he had to rule. It, and it alone, had the facilities for organizing will, for the need of which the empire was falling to pieces like a piece of rotten cloth. . . .[1]

By embracing Christianity Constantine renounced all those pretensions to divinity "that the vanity of Alexander the Great had first brought into the western world," and with support of the Christian he "established himself as a monarch more absolute even than Diocletian."[2] The spurious divinity of human rulers was rejected, divinity itself was removed to a transcendent realm, and the promise of the divine providence was extended to all men in exchange for their support of and participation in a new caste system that carried the aura of membership in a universal brotherhood of man.

Conclusions on Prototypes and Applications of Delegitimation

The three prototypes illustrated in Figures 13 through 15 may serve as useful models to assess the character and dynamics of different historical transitions. However, as pure types probably only the second of the three prototypes ever actually occurs with any frequency. Still, approximations of the remaining two types probably occur regularly.

As illustrated in the analysis of the first prototype example, namely the Christian-Gnostic struggle, these prototypes can be useful

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[1]Wells, The Outline of History, p. 549.

[2]Ibid., p. 551.

in identifying and relating the following: the complex delegitimation dynamics of changing core conceptions; shifting social institutions as analyzed through their sociological, philosophical, and theological cultural foundations; the positive and negative political aspects of such institutions; and finally the unilateral and bilateral interactions between concepts and institutions.

Finally we have reached the point in this disquisition where the full range of the analytical framework and method can be applied directly to the situation of our present western culture. If the various components of this framework, such as changing core conceptions, shifting social institutions, and unilateral and bilateral interactions among and between concepts and institutions,--if these factors were at all useful in correlating the legitimacy/delegitimacy dynamics which operated, e.g., in the Christian-Gnostic struggle, then they should be particularly interesting when applied to the situation in contemporary western society. The reason for this judgment is that the very nature of current western culture is perhaps best described by the word "change." Whereas change in medieval society was quite slow, by comparison the rate of change among current ideas and institutions is not only rapid but bewildering. This prodigious characteristic of modern life has been described by Toffler as the "accelerative thrust of transience."

In preparation for the full application of our analysis to contemporary western culture it is pertinent to conclude this chapter

with some observations on the nature of accelerative thrust and its function in contemporary western society.

PART IV. DELEGITIMATION AND THE ACCELERATIVE THRUST OF TRANSIENCE: A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION

Delegitimation has been characterized in this discourse as a shifting balance of social and cultural support away from the pursuit of an existing mix of values of social integration and conflict to a new mix of those values. Stated in terms of a culture's social institutions, a loss of authority of existing institutions is implied for their political aspects. Positively, corporate politics may no longer command attention for those particular forms of the good life which they traditionally proffered. Negatively, they may no longer possess the power to influence, control, or coerce human persons or other institutions.

Sociologically speaking, new social relations, new systems of relations, and new institutions likely become observable. Philosophically, new rationales can be discerned to work their way into the evolving belief systems. These may become evident in the introduction of fresh signs, symbols, metaphors, analogies, and logos with which the changing institutions identify themselves.[1] Theologically, the ultimate concerns, e.g., the will-to-power and community love may devolve into fresh modes of expression in the process and

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[1]"The form of language influences . . . the form of culture; the form of culture influences the form of language. . . ."--Gleeson and Wakefield, Language and Culture, p. vi.

simultaneously may create virgin mythological symbols that are appropriate to the new cultural situation.

Judged by these standards a widespread delegitimation process has taken place in contemporary western institutions in their political aspects. Some brief allusions can serve to establish such a perspective. The following observations, which are provided by reknown devotees of the subject of contemporary social and cultural change, are indicative.

To wit, according to Daniel Bell, "revolutionary conditions" now characterize our society.[1] As Margaret Mead said, today's youth differ in fundamental ways from all earlier generations. Behind their new environment is the central fact of massive and increasingly rapid social change.[2]

If one reads the report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence one discerns a new style of politics emerging in which demonstrations and protests are systematically developed as political resources.[3] According to Kenneth Boulding and Robert Theobold, the politics of protest now extend to nonradical constituencies, while the New Left and the Old Right join to make similar

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[1]Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 74-76ff.

[2]Margaret Mead, "Why Is Education Obsolescent?" Harvard Business Review, XXXVI (November-December, 1958), 23-36, 164-70.

[3]National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, June, 1969, prepared under the direction and authorship of Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: The New American Library, 1969).

criticisms of government.[1] Etzioni makes the sociological observation that society's rewards do not generate satisfaction, that criminality is losing its stigma, and that socially approved roles no longer mobilize people to perform appropriate action.[2]

Taken together these observations, although contributed from numerous observers from various perspectives, form a collective piece of evidence to the effect that western culture is experiencing a new mix in the values and accepted "ground rules" by which social integration and conflict and competition are permitted to take place. This evidence points, in short, to the delegitimation of western culture's institutions in their political aspects.

Even a cursory reading of the sources just cited will also indicate that a factor which appears to be associated with the delegitimation occurring in all of the examples given is what Toffler referred to as the "accelerative thrust" of the rate of transience in social relations. Toffler defines accelerative thrust as the human experience of rapid "throughput" of people, places, things, organizations and ideas in one's life situations. As such, transience is the psychological counterpart of the acceleration of the rate of social change in its physical or corporate dimensions. Without the concept

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[1]Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century; Theobold, An Alternative Future for America II.

[2]Etzioni, "Political Meaning."

of transience, says Toffler, psychology "cannot take account of precisely those phenomena that are peculiarly contemporary."[1] Further,

> . . . it will help us understand the concept of transience if we think in terms of the idea of "turnover." . . . The "throughput" is faster. The alert businessman knows the turnover rate for each of the items he sells, and the general rate for the entire store. . . .
>
> We can, by analogy, think of transience as the rate of turnover of the different kinds of relationships in an individual's life. Moreover, each of us can be characterized in terms of this rate.[2]

According to this concept, if we divide up man's experience of the world "outside" himself, we can identify certain classes of relationships. Accordingly, Toffler holds that it is the individual's relationship to people, places, things, organizations, and ideas (or information)--plus time--that structures the human experience of any situation.[3]

Toffler advocates using this schemata to measure the turnover rate of situational flow in people's lives. However, in the present context, his framework can be used as a device to organize and analyze the verbal and literary behavior of critics of the status quo in order to detect differences between "established" core concepts and those which challenge them.

That is, the accelerative thrust of the experience of transience appears to result in a significant change in the key metaphors

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[1]Toffler, Future Shock, chap. ii and also Part II.

[2]Ibid., p. 46.

[3]Ibid., p. II.

employed in the descriptive language which accompanies situational change.[1] We are concerned here particularly with those verbal symbols which are used to describe what it means to be human in the new situation of unprecedented accelerative thrust.[2]

Attention therefore will be focused on contrasting the key metaphors (and analogies) of what is presumed to be the status quo

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[1]As Dorothy Emmet says,

> "The ideas which make sense in one age, in illuminating and coordinating its intellectual experience, do not necessarily make sense in the same way in another. Therefore, there is likely to be a shift in the philosophical analogies which will commend themselves as self-evident in different periods of thought. A philosophical system is not disproved; but it is abandoned when it ceases to be relevant."

See Metaphysical Thinking, p. 216.

That present systems are being abandoned and that there is a shift in the philosophical analogies which commend themselves is one of the points of Toffler's Future Shock, wherein it is said: "We are creating a new society. Not a changed society. Not an extended, larger-than-life version of our present society. But a new society." See p. 185.

[2]McLuhan, et al., speaks of the proliferation of such verbal and other symbols in contemporary western culture and recognizes their importance to new views of humankind. He comments that

> "the pain that the ordinary person feels in perceiving the confusion is charged with thrills for the artist in the discovery of new boundaries and territories for the human spirit. He glories in the invention of new identities, corporate and private, that for the political and educational establishments, as for domestic life, bring anarchy and despair."

See his War and Peace, p. 12. This observation is consistent with the point that "the study of a given language at its limits is extremely valuable, and leads to an understanding of the potentialities and limitations of the culture and cultural elements otherwise difficult to attain." See Gleeson and Wakefield, Language and Culture, p. vi.

with the key metaphors (and analogies) associated with those positions which are strongly influenced by the factor of accelerative thrust. In order to understand where this effort fits into the universe-of-discourse already described in this chapter, it is useful to point out that we are concerned here with the "E" complex of conceptual relationships as it appears in Figure 1. The key metaphors of the status quo will be presumed to fall symbolically within the circle labelled "E^1," whereas the key metaphors associated with those positions which are strongly influenced by the factor of accelerative thrust will be presumed to fall symbolically within the circle labelled "E^2."

As indicated in the "E" complex of Figure 1, many key metaphors may be common both to "E^1" and "E^2" and thus complicate the picture. This probability is represented by the area called "E^3" which is the area in which "E^1" and "E^2" overlap one another. The relative distribution or metaphors or symbols which appear to fall within "E^1," "E^2," or "E^3" among critics of the status quo could prove to be important for analytical purposes. Ostensibly, critics who use a predominance of "E^1" symbols would be confirmed devotees of the status quo who believe the status quo should simply do more of whatever it is doing, but do it better and more effectively. On the other hand, critics who use a predominance of "E^2" symbols would seem to advocate overthrowing or replacing the belief system of the status quo as completely as possible with something else. By the same token, critics who use a predominance of "E^3" symbols would seem to be saying that some conceptual changes and reordering of values are called for, but that continuity

with the traditional core values is equally important, i.e., the existing core values should themselves evolve into new concepts rather than to be displaced by totally discontinuous ideas which may have originated from a different base of cultural and social experience.

The "E^4" symbols are those which most directly and transparently express the ultimate concerns of both the culture and of individuals. As such, this category of symbols constitutes the irreducible minimum of forms of expression which must be common both to the dominant core concepts and those which challenge them. The form common to both categories may be little more than a raw kind of involuntary expression which communicates the concern with one's own will-to-power and/or community love. The specific modes into which these basic energies are routinized into repetitive patterns for the culture's endearment and consumption set the styles and tone by which a given culture or subculture comes to be identified. It is at the point of these derived patterns of expression, derived, that is, from the raw energies which seek expression of the ultimate concerns, that one culture or subculture can be differentiated from another. It is not the fact of the ultimate concerns that differs from group to group, but the manner of their adaptability and applicability to nature and society. As a working proposition in this study, it is held that the nearer a symbol comes to a pure expression of the ultimate concerns the more mythological and less precise is its nature. Such a symbol will generally carry the power, it is asserted, to elicit greater energy or emotion from those who adhere to it.

These distinctions give us a tool with which to assess the role and function of any key metaphor. However, the question has yet to be answered as to how one decides what a key metaphor is and how it is to be located and identified.

For the purposes of this study a key metaphor is any metaphor which plays a major role in expressing what is of importance to the total life-ways of a culture or subculture. It is at this point that the schemata of Toffler becomes useful, as adapted and applied to our own objectives. If the proposition is accepted that every human situation is structured in terms of the individual's relation to other people, places, things, organizations, ideas, and time, then we can identify a key metaphor as one which expresses the crucial features of how a culture or subculture perceives these vital relationships and orders them according to certain priorities of importance. In so doing we shall begin to get a profile of the kind of "world" in which a culture or subculture finds itself.

Thus, the identification and comparison of metaphors among and between the world of the status quo and the worlds of its critics will be made in terms of Toffler's five analytical categories, plus time, making six categories in all. Departing from Toffler's order somewhat, we shall rearrange these categories in the following order: ideas, people, places, things, organizations, and time. The metaphors or analogies in each category will be selected and analyzed in terms of their significance and meaning for political values and structures as these have been defined and discussed in this chapter.

Beginning with ideas, the key metaphors (both of the status quo and of accelerative thrust) will be examined with regard to their latent or explicit presuppositions concerning ideas on metaphysics and epistemology. Such presuppositions are regarded as having a distinct bearing on political postures and will be scrutinized in terms of their sociological, philosophical, and theological roots as well as for their positive and negative political emphases. More symbols which give relatively transparent (direct) and mythological expression to the human and cultural ultimate concerns can be expected in this category than perhaps any of the others, except that of time. The reason for this condition is that by definition the symbols of one's ultimate concerns betray the implicit beliefs that are held concerning the ultimate nature of reality and knowledge.

Second, the key metaphors of the status quo and of accelerative thrust concerning perceptions of people will be identified and analyzed with attention given to implications which they may hold concerning views about the nature of human personality. In many cases the link will be discernible between these concepts and those of metaphysics and epistemology, consciously or unconsciously held.

Third, contrasting metaphors and analogies reflecting attitudes and presuppositions about a sense of place will be analyzed in terms of their political significance concerning the nature of loyalty and self-identification by citizens with nation, state, region, or local community. Again, attention will be given to the relative emphasis placed by such symbols on the positive and negative political

values, and whether these are expressed primarily through sociological, philosophical, or theological concepts, or some interrelated combination.

Fourth, metaphors about things (including both goods and services) will be analyzed for their politico-economic significance in terms of (1) what is regarded as the proper (and therefore legitimate) relation of man to "property"; and (2) what is regarded as the legitimate rationale for the equitable distribution of goods and services.

Fifth, metaphors revealing conceptions about organizations will be analyzed for their significance concerning the nature and proper (or legitimate) organization of the state. The sociological, philosophical, theological, politically positive, and politically negative aspects of this discussion promise to be interesting.

Sixth, and finally, metaphors revealing concepts of time will be analyzed for their political impact on existing and changing values and structures. For example, conceptions of time as associated with the spirit of capitalism are starkly contrasted with conceptions of time as associated with life-styles of artists, ecologists, or the adherants of the increasingly popular mid-Eastern or Oriental philosophies. It will be interesting to note that one of the most intensive assaults that is made on the status quo is made in terms of a differing interpretation of time. It can be noticed that as a result a high frequency of time-symbols appears in the "E^2" category. This may be a strong indication either that those who wish to radically overthrow the existing conceptual order have lit upon the crucial concept of

time as the fulcrum, or that those who appropriate a new concept of time differing from that of the status quo increasingly find themselves in the camp of those who would radically replace the status quo system with something else.

The question arises as to how one pinpoints the core values of the status quo and proscribes them so that they can be distinguished at some point from other concepts. In this regard this study is able to benefit from the extensive studies of Weber who has meticulously analyzed the core values of capitalism and liberal democracy. These values will be regarded as indicators of key metaphors and analogies of the status quo in western society. The main core values, as discerned by Weber, are found in positive affirmations by the culture of the concepts of discipline, achievement, austerity, objectivity, and rationality.

A similar question to the one just noted concerns the source from which the key metaphors and analogies associated with accelerative thrust will be gathered. These sources are as follows:

1. Treatises, documents, statements, or symbolic expressions by or about mass or popular subcultures. Mass or popular subcultures are regarded as consisting of observing or participaring citizens as opposed to governing or directing elites.

2. Treatises, documents, statements, or symbolic expressions by or about the more diffuse and informally organized elites, who deal with spiritual and moral problems, e.g., cultural and religious leaders. This category overlaps significantly with, but is not

synonymous with, mass or popular subcultures such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph.

3. Treatises, documents or statements or symbolic expressions by or about the organizing and directing elites. Special attention will be given to statements which deal with concrete goals and programs.

The assumptions which lie back of this particular selection of sources are as follows. The most obvious and unbridled attacks on the status quo are likely to come from subcultures which have little or no conscious vested interest in the system of the status quo and its core values. In a culture characterized by unprecedented accelerative thrust, as is contemporary western culture, such subcultures may take on the character of widespread popular folk cultures. This in fact is what seems to have happened. However, the delegitimating impact of such criticism may not become crucial as far as the dominant core concepts are concerned until the presuppositions of critical subcultures begin to appear in the verbal and symbolic behavior of the influential elites.

This analysis completes the presentation of the scope of this study and also completes the subject matter of this chapter. Based on the plan just outlined, we will next turn our attention to the cultural values of the status quo, i.e., capitalism and liberal democracy, particularly in its political aspects.

CHAPTER II

CULTURAL VALUES OF THE STATUS QUO: POLITICAL ASPECTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In this age of an unprecedented accelerative thrust of transience in people, places, things, organizations, and ideas it appears that abnormality is routine. The bizarre and unfamiliar conspire to replace what is often assumed to have been both dependable and familiar in the past.

If events in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s are taken as an example, we can surmise that few persons could have predicted that the next three presidential elections would be critically influenced, if not decided, by assassinations or attempted assassinations.[1] Who might dream that student crusades could amass enough public power to be credited with forestalling a President from running for reelection (namely, Lyndon Johnson in 1968) and ultimately swinging popular opinion to its side against an abortive war (against the Viet

[1]The assassination of President John F. Kennedy made possible the election of his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, in 1964. The assassination of Robert Kennedy resulted in Hubert H. Humphrey receiving the Democratic nomination in 1968, prior to his defeat by Richard M. Nixon. It seems fairly probable that, had Robert Kennedy not been assassinated, he would have got the nomination and defeated Nixon. The attempted assassination and consequent crippling of George Wallace in 1972 likely resulted in many of his votes going to President Nixon.

Cong) never declared by Congress?[1] Who was bold enough in 1960 to foreswear that a political has-been named Nixon would win both the nomination and subsequently the election for the U.S. presidency, get reelected by the largest landslide in the history of the nation, and then face disgrace and forcible resignation, while for the first time in its history Cabinet-level officers of the federal government would be sent to jail?[2] Who would have believed that in the process a Daniel Ellsberg would become exonerated following his theft of top-secret documents and his causing of them to be published while employees of the White House meanwhile burgled his psychiatrist's private files?

Again, few suspense fiction novels ever offered a plot more bizarre than the epic of Patricia Hearst in which the kidnappee herself became a machine-gun wielding kidnapper, and the new form of ransom was presented as a demand for the massive feeding of the poor.[3]

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[1]These events are analyzed by Dave Dellinger in his Revolutionary Nonviolence: Essays by Dave Dellinger (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1971). See Part V: "The Chicago Convention and After." See also pp. 269-83 for his observations on the assassination of the Kennedys.

[2]The reasons for the Watergate epic are examined by one of the episode's central actors who was subsequently jailed. See Jeb Stuart Magruder, "Watergate Hindsight: Magruder Observation," San Antonio Express, May 23, 1974, p. 57.

[3]News coverage of the Patty Hearst saga was prolific and dramatic. The following articles are indicative: "Patty Chose SLA Because of Father," by the Los Angeles Times Service, San Antonio Express, May 22, 1974, p. 1; "Patty: Robot Rebel?" New York Times News Service, San Antonio Express, May 29, 1974, p. 8; "Patty: Sleeping Beauty Awakened?" Associated Press, San Antonio Express, June 9, 1974, p. 4-L.

Meanwhile, the time-honored vanguards of U.S. security, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Justice Department, the Army and the Navy have experienced ceaseless, extensive, and scathing criticism.[1] This has been accompanied by unprecedented Congressional scrutiny and loss of public support.[2] No longer, it seems, is unquestioning patriotic loyalty to be easily given to erstwhile public agencies entrusted with discharging duties on behalf of the public good.[3] If such a condition was normal at one time, then "normality" seems no longer to prevail, and perhaps will never do so again.

Lurking behind these and other indications of the shift away from ready support for public institutions, a pattern seems to be working in which there is a reaction not only against the institutions themselves but against the presuppositions upon which such

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[1]Some samples are as follows. "U.S. Vietnam Spending Hit," Associated Press, San Antonio Express, June 3, 1974, p. 1; Carl Rowan, "Double Standard Justice Cripples Police," San Antonio Express, July 14, 1974, p. 5-H; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, "The CIA Cult: The Book the Government Tried to Destroy!" San Antonio Express-News, June 23, 1974, p. 1-H.

[2]Edmund S. Muskie, "Crisis of Confidence," San Antonio Express, Apr. 12, 1974, p. 19.

[3]See the following: James J. Kilpatrick, "Why Public Confidence Is Lacking," San Antonio Express, Apr. 1, 1974, p. 16; Anthony Lewis, "Confidence Crisis Noted by Pollster," San Antonio Express, Apr. 17, 1974, p. 19; "New Group of Radicals Rear Head," Washington Star News Service, San Antonio Express, May 23, 1974, p. 20. The latter article says, in part: "The non-college minority of young people has become as radical in its anti-establishment attitudes and moral values as college youth were in the late 1960's, according to a major new study." The study was conducted by the Daniel Yankelovoch polling organization in 1971.

establishments rest.[1] Yet, consistent with our observations in Chapter I, a culture never simply trades in one set of concepts for another.[2] The established core concepts which find themselves under such attack in contemporary western culture are by no means capitulating without a fight. Indeed, close observation and sober judgment lead to the conclusion that these core concepts of so-called "normality" are both tenacious and resilient. Even yet it is no light matter to the Congress or the public to consider impeaching a President, nor was it feasible for either the police or the public to dismiss as acceptable political behavior the armed protestations of even a beautiful heiress such as Patricia Hearst.

Thus, it is pertinent to examine what presuppositions may be held in common by the major public institutions in contemporary western civilization. In so doing it may be possible to distill the essence of what the opposing subcultures object to, and, at the same time, to observe to what extent the culture-at-large has made (or is making) a shift from one core position to another. The direction(s) of that shift also will be of interest.

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[1]Amitai Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning," The Center Magazine, V, No. 2 (March/April, 1974), p. 6. (Hereinafter referred to as "Political Meaning.")

[2]Ibid., pp. 6-8.

Summary of Conclusions

The Question to Be Answered in This Chapter

It may be useful to begin with a summary of the conclusions reached as a result of the investigations conducted into the question of this chapter's subject matter--namely, "what are the cultural values of the status quo, particularly in their political aspects?"

The Five Major Conclusions

Five basic conclusions were drawn regarding the political values in the culture as upheld by the status quo. Each one will be reiterated in a descriptive statement or proposition. There will follow a report as to how the writer arrived at these particular conclusions. The report will summarize the method employed and the data adduced. Finally, each proposition will be expanded upon briefly concerning its implications for the political systems in contemporary western culture as conceived within the universe-of-discourse and its respective components which were described in Chapter I.

The major conclusions concerning the political values of the status quo in contemporary western culture are reported here in terms of five categories of philosophical speculation on the subject of political life and the nature of politics. In short, these topics are (1) Metaphysics and the summum bonum or highest good for man; (2) Epistemology, i.e., the nature of knowledge, or how man knows what he knows (or thinks he knows); (3) the Nature of Society; (4) the Nature of Man;

and (5) the Nature of the State. Based on these themes the five paramount conclusions in this chapter are these:

1. Concerning Metaphysics and the summum bonum:

In keeping with certain deeply-rooted mechanical and evolutionary models of reality in western culture, man's highest goal is regarded in the status quo core values to be the experiencing by persons of a continuous increase in the quantity and technical variety of economic goods and services--in short, to have a continuous increase in the gross national product.

2. Concerning Epistemology:

In keeping with a "scientific epistemology" which is broadly-based in contemporary western culture, and which puts power on the side of "objectivity," "rationality," "austerity," "discipline," and "achievement," the continuous growth and increased strength of various "technical" organizations, including public and private bureaucracies, that contribute to the production and distribution of the goods and services is regarded in the status quo core values as both necessary and desirable.

3. Concerning The Nature of Society:

In keeping with the status quo's key images of man as "a bundle of instincts," as a "producer," as a "consumer," and as one of many "atoms" of society, society is regarded as composed of subjectively-defined, exclusive, self-seeking individuals whose relations with other individuals are external and competitive. The solution to such competition and the way to hold together a society of such individuals, so the view runs, is to satisfy their needs and wants with the increased productivity, or when necessary, to suppress the competition.

4. Concerning The Nature of Man:

In keeping with the status quo's highly individualistic and competitive view of human personality, it is held that corporate institutions are merely tools for subjective personalities and interests and are easily manageable by them.

5. Concerning The Nature of the State:

In keeping with the status quo's evolutionary and primitivistic models of human personality which result in the dictum that "might makes right"; and in keeping with the dominant core's key images about organizations to the effect that "proper" organizations

are based on hierarchies, chains-of-commands, permanency, stability, economies of scale, and efficiency; it is held that the state is and should be a power center, external to man, which not only mediates between the individuals (and groups) and balances their interests, but manipulates their wants and needs in accordance with the needs of the (police and military) industrial complex to produce the goods and services necessary to their own growth and survival. When the industrial complex is well off, people are well off, even if force is a function of the system. (Here the industrial complex tends to represent a bastardization of Rousseau's "general will.")

PART II. NOTES ON THE RESEARCH METHOD

Linguistic Analysis

The means by which these propositions were derived was a linguistic analysis of familiar verbal images and symbolic concepts which have been prominent in recent and contemporary western culture. One may have a hunch, an intuition, an insight, that certain facts are true, but the serious investigator must ask himself what, if any, corroboration there may be of his own feelings. The writer's belief that there was a close connection between changing ways of viewing human nature and the loss of authority of some of our culture's most important institutions seemed worthy of serious study. But such a study implied the need for a systematic knowledge in depth of the traditional modes of perception of what a human being is and what is his proper relation to authoritative institutions.

The Sources of Data and the Research Design

The Abundance of Data

The problem of analysis was rendered both simple and complex by the abundance of data. When one is immersed in his own culture

through involvement in countless institutions from birth to adulthood he becomes literally overwhelmed with images as data when he asks, "What does my culture think of humans and their relationships to their institutions?" At one level such a member of the culture simply "knows" the answer to this question as a result of the endless conditioning of his behavior, and probably does not usually even think to ask the question in a conscious way.

But at another level he "knows" very little about the answer simply because the stream of familiar images is so familiar that from an objective standpoint the images are virtually invisible. It is difficult at first to know what is of crucial importance and what is not.

Where, for example, does one begin to unravel the tangled, interdependent web in this vast extended family of ideas and to say, "There!--There are the crucial concepts. There are the important shifts in those concepts. And there are the vital connections between those concepts and the momentous changes taking place in our institutions--"?

The Academic Literature

One can do worse than to begin with pertinent studious literature on the subject in question, especially since one's original hunch may have been stimulated in part by that literature in the first place.

Weber's List

The familiar list of values germaine to the dominant cultural core concepts has been enumerated and commented on by Weber and others.[1] It has proved most helpful in this regard. It served as a valuable clue and starting point. This list of values has been cited in this paper previously in terms of the status quo's commitment to the themes of discipline, achievement, austerity, objectivity, and rationality.[2]

The list itself, however, was not the end of the search, but the beginning. This enumeration of core values was more a description of what was relatively fixed in the culture. But it was the point of this study to explore what impact the currents of change exerted upon these conceptual bulwarks of western institutions.

Toffler's Conceptualization

In the meantime Toffler had suggested a methodology by which the rate and extent of social change might be apprehended, relatively-speaking, but more precisely than heretofore.[3] It was his proposal that students of the subject seek to ascertain the rate of turnover in "life situations." Prior to Toffler, to this student's knowledge, no one had proffered a manageable definition of what constituted a "life

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[1]See Etzioni's summation of this point in his "Political Meaning," p. 3.

[2]See chap. i,

[3]Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (Toronto, New York, and London: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 32-35.

situation." It may turn out that Toffler's most abiding contribution may not occur in the extensive statistics and examples he cites as much as in the suggestion that all life situations are composed of some combination of the following: PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and IDEAS, plus TIME, and that this is a useful device to employ in assessing the volume, the velocity, and the direction of social change.[1]

It seemed pertinent, then, not only to know that the established institutions of western culture cherished the concepts of discipline, achievement, austerity, objectivity, and rationality, but how these values applied specifically to the perception and management of the components of the life situation experience itself--namely, to PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, IDEAS, and TIME. Not that other social scientists had not incidentally taken account of these components, but there appeared to be value in systematically analyzing the core values in terms of Toffler's categories in order more easily to assess the impact of change upon them.

Verbal Symbols and Linguistic Analysis

Thus, the method for this project began to take shape. In addition to a list of core values and a list of categories by which to ascertain the turnover of life situations, a third aspect was added. This was the factor of linguistic analysis. The reason for such an

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[1] Ibid., see especially pp. 44-47.

addition was critical, for without it the method would have been incomplete and less workable. In speaking of discipline, achievement, and so on, we are perhaps referring less to tangibles, such as PEOPLE, PLACES, and THINGS, than we are referring to intangibles, such as ideas or values.

Language and culture.--In human culture the paramount vehicle by which ideas are conveyed is language.[1] The relation between language and culture is a necessary consideration in any fruitful discussion of culture (political culture included). The form of language influences (and some would have it determines) the form of culture; the form of culture also influences the form of language and the various changes in language.[2]

The nature of language.--Further, the study of a given language at its limits is extremely valuable, and leads to an understanding of the potentialities and limitations of the culture and of cultural elements otherwise difficult to attain.[3] The nature of language, as such, as interpreted here, is primarily analogical, or more precisely, metaphorical, at the point at which it makes any kind of assertion

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[1]Charles F. Hockett and Robert Ascher, "The Human Revolution," Current Anthropology, V, No. 3 (1964), 135-68.

[2]Patrick Gleeson and Nancy Wakefield, eds., Language and Culture: A Reader (Columbus, O.: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), pp. v-vi. (Hereinafter referred to as Language and Culture.)

[3]Ibid., p. vi.

about something other than immediate experience.[1] That is, man can speak about other times and other places (other "life situations") only in terms of analogies (or metaphors) taken from his own personal and immediate experience or memory.

Metaphysical presuppositions in language.--In addition, the important configurations of speech as are expressed in any culture (or subculture) are strong indications of the metaphysical presuppositions, consciously or unwittingly held, which underlie the assertions about man, knowledge, world, society, and government.[2] There are ample precedents for this assumption in both philosophy and political theory.[3]

Changes in language and political institutions.--Thus, since language influences culture, and vice versa; and since the study of a given language at its limits is important in understanding a culture; and since the nature of language is metaphorical; and since the

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[1]I am indebted to Dorothy Emmet on this point. See her The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (London: The Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. v-vii. (Hereinafter referred to as Metaphysical Thinking.)

[2]See Daniel Callahan's short but helpful essay concerning the unwitting commitments of a culture, in his "Living with the New Biology: The Search for an Ethic," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August, 1972), 4-12. (Hereinafter referred to as "The New Biology.")

[3]Consider, for example, the concept of Analogia Entis as expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas. (See Dorothy Emmet's treatment of his concept in her Metaphysical Thinking, chap. viii, pp. 169-71ff.) For the modern political implications, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966).

metaphorical figures of speech indicate what are the metaphysical presuppositions within a culture; therefore, it is held that focusing on changes in key metaphors occurring within a society's culture and politics will indicate changes in the values of that society's political institutions.

Changes in philosophical systems.--Consistent with these points, it is assumed that the philosophical systems which lie at the foundation of a given political system are never actually "disproved" as such.[1] Rather, they simply cease to receive adherence whenever they are widely experienced as no longer relevant to the perceptions (as expressed through key analogical and metaphorical figures of speech) and therefore the needs of those who govern, and, in a democratic society, of those who are governed.

The sort of cultural shift indicated in the previous paragraph is precisely the sort of delegitimation which is indicated by changes in a culture's key metaphors. That phenomenon is specifically the object of study in this paper.

Detecting changes.--This approach, to be sure, implies knowing first of all what the core concepts have to say about PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, IDEAS, and TIME. A corollary to this implication is that if a shift away from the language supporting the concepts of discipline, achievement, austerity, objectivity, and rationality

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[1]Emmet, Metaphysical Thinking, pp. 215-16. Also Etzioni, "Political Meaning," p. 3.

could be detected as these apply to the perceptions and management of PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, IDEAS, and TIME, then two facts could be discovered: (1) whether the culture is in fact significantly withdrawing support from its core concepts and (2) if so, to what extent (as measured by the "turnover" or "replacement" of the language of the core values in reference to the subjects of the six components of humankind's "life situations").

PART III. THE COLLECTION, ARRANGEMENT, AND DISPLAY OF THE DATA

Explanation of the Code List

Table 1 and the Code List of Familiar Verbal Concepts

Since it is important to this study to determine what the core concepts express in the several categories upon which we are focusing, the writer ultimately devised a code list of familiar verbal concepts which are associated with these categories in contemporary western culture. The code list was structured according to three kinds of variables for the purpose of determining what concepts should enter the list and also to indicate what function it is believed these concepts perform in the belief system of the culture as viewed in terms of the three variables. Table 1 demonstrates how the code list was structured according to the three variables of (1) the six components which constitute human situations; (2) the five philosophical categories of inquiry in this study; and (3) the list of five categories of values dominant in western culture as suggested by Weber.

TABLE 1.--Showing How the Code List of Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture Is Structured According to Situational Components, Philosophical Categories, and Dominant Core Value Categories

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics	1.1.1	1.1.2	1.1.3	1.1.4	1.1.5
	2. Epistemology	1.2.1	1.2.2	1.2.3	1.2.4	1.2.5
	3. Society	1.3.1	1.3.2	1.3.3	1.3.4	1.3.5
	4. Man	1.4.1	1.4.2	1.4.3	1.4.4	1.4.5
	5. The State	1.5.1	1.5.2	1.5.3	1.5.4	1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics	2.1.1	2.1.2	2.1.3	2.1.4	2.1.5
	2. Epistemology	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.5
	3. Society	2.3.1	2.3.2	2.3.3	2.3.4	2.3.5
	4. Man	2.4.1	2.4.2	2.4.3	2.4.4	2.4.5
	5. The State	2.5.1	2.5.2	2.5.3	2.5.4	2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics	3.1.1	3.1.2	3.1.3	3.1.4	3.1.5
	2. Epistemology	3.2.1	3.2.2	3.2.3	3.2.4	3.2.5
	3. Society	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
	4. Man	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
	5. The State	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5

TABLE 1--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics	4.1.1	4.1.2	4.1.3	4.1.4	4.1.5
	2. Epistemology	4.2.1	4.2.2	4.2.3	4.2.4	4.2.5
	3. Society	4.3.1	4.3.2	4.3.3	4.3.4	4.3.5
	4. Man	4.4.1	4.4.2	4.4.3	4.4.4	4.4.5
	5. The State	4.5.1	4.5.2	4.5.3	4.5.4	4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics	5.1.1	5.1.2	5.1.3	5.1.4	5.1.5
	2. Epistemology	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4	5.2.5
	3. Society	5.3.1	5.3.2	5.3.3	5.3.4	5.3.5
	4. Man	5.4.1	5.4.2	5.4.3	5.4.4	5.4.5
	5. The State	5.5.1	5.5.2	5.5.3	5.5.4	5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics	6.1.1	6.1.2	6.1.3	6.1.4	6.1.5
	2. Epistemology	6.2.1	6.2.2	6.2.3	6.2.4	6.2.5
	3. Society	6.3.1	6.3.2	6.3.3	6.3.4	6.3.5
	4. Man	6.4.1	6.4.2	6.4.3	6.4.4	6.4.5
	5. The State	6.5.1	6.5.2	6.5.3	6.5.4	6.5.5

The Six Sections in Table 1

Reading from top to bottom, Table 1, which consists of a total of 150 cells, is divided into six major sections. These six sections correspond to the six components of human situations: IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME.

Five Subsections Within Each Section in Table 1

Again, reading from top to bottom, each of the six sections is subdivided into five subsections. These subsections correspond to the five philosophical categories of inquiry: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Society, Man, and the State. Thus, using Table 1, the writer was able to construct the code list which appears in Appendix A by listing verbal symbols of the status quo according to, e.g., the core culture's understanding of the nature of PLACES or ORGANIZATIONS as expressed in terms of its Metaphysical, Epistemological, or Social presuppositions. That is, IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME, are regarded as ways of perceiving, and each of those perceptual modes is regarded as possessing five philosophical presuppositions (if not explicit premises), even though these generally may be latent or unacknowledged by persons or organizations within the culture.

The Thirty Strands and 150 Cells in Table 1

This way of organizing Table 1 resulted in thirty strands, or levels (six perceptual modes x five categories of philosophical presuppositions for each). The 150 cells in Table 1 were produced by adding

five columns to the table from left to right, one each to represent the list of five major categories of values which Weber says are dominant in western culture. These values have been identified repeatedly in this study under the headings of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. Thus, this additional feature enabled the researcher to categorize verbal symbols, not only in terms of how they first reflect status quo perceptual modes, and then philosophical presuppositions, but also in terms of how they express the values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

Differences from Behavioral Methods

This methodological device proved useful in guiding the researcher's inquiries into the verbal behavior of those human and institutional sources which preserve and express the core culture's perceptual, social, philosophical, and political ways of life. As a research apparatus, although Table 1 and its use in constructing the code list in Appendix A appear to borrow heavily from certain behavioral methods, particularly those associated with the practice of content analysis, Table 1 strictly speaking, does not fulfill the criteria of a behavioral gambit.[1] It both falls short of and also goes behond the ostensible rigid requirements for a behavioral design.

[1]L. Vaughn Blankenship associates behaviorism with the "positivist" model of empirical inquiry. Its main characteristic is found in experimental procedures involving sense data which can ultimately be measured "objectively." See Blankenship's "Public Administration and the Challenge to Reason," in Public Administration in a Time of

Not parametric.--First, in this latter regard, is the fact that behavioral methods seek to deal with parametric phenomena,[1] whereas Table 1 and the code list as used in this study attempt to serve as a searchlight upon the entire contemporary western culture, the outer parameters of which, at best, are unclear and elusive.

Not micro-analysis.--A second fact, which is related to the first, is that behavioral studies generally address themselves to micro-analysis[2] whereas this project, being of a more speculative nature, addresses itself to macro-analysis.

Inquires about common human ends.--A third fact, integral to the first two, is that, as an exercise in speculative political theory, this study asks not only about the actual social and political behavior within the culture, but inquires after the sources for the basis of common human ends, i.e., the corporate human meanings of such behavior. Such philosophical topics are difficult if not impossible to render measurable according to the quantitative analysis of parametric data, for philosophical questions about meanings appear

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Turbulence, ed. by Dwight Waldo (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 188-214 at 192-94ff. (Blankenship's article hereinafter referred to as "Public Administration." Waldo's volume hereinafter referred to as Turbulence.)

[1]See, for example, K. A. Yeomans, "Statistical Sampling Practice," chap. iii, in Applied Statistics: Statistics for the Social Scientist, Vol. II (New York: Penguin paperback, 1968).

[2]Examples of subjects included in micro-analysis inquiries are electoral topics and opinion surveys. See Oliver Benson's Political Science Laboratory (New York: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1969).

inevitably to partake of the mythological and nonrational realms of man's experience--realms seldom acknowledged or sufficiently come to terms with by strict behaviorists.[1]

Similarities to Behavioral Methods

Nonetheless, in spite of these several disclaimers of behavioral status, the structure and use of Table 1 do possess several characteristics in common with the intellectual mood and development of behaviorism.

Comprehensive scope.--First, some behavioral studies have endeavored to deal with a more comprehensive scope than those generally associated with the level of micro-analysis.[2] Thus, there have developed the various approaches of systems analysis in social and political studies. In the same vein, this project also aims at embracing a comprehensive scope and seeks to render it systematically more manageable.

The search for "realism."--Second, this study, in common with much of behaviorism, engages in a search for "realism." That is, the study is not meant to be constrained by the intellectual foreclosure

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[1]As Blankenship observes, behaviorism "appears to deny the validity and relevance of knowledge based on feeling, intuition, and personal subjective experience . . . ;" see his "Challenge to Reason," p. 190.

[2]See G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971), chap. iv, "Systems Analysis as an Approach," pp. 49-65.

of particular ideologies or the formalism of law and governmental institutions.[1] Even the periodical referral to "ultimate concerns" as represented by the positing of a polarity between the will-to-power and community-love in the organic and social life forces of the culture is to be regarded as an intellectual and methodological construct. It is an experiential and experimental way of organizing the writer's perceptions of "reality" and is itself subject to constant scrutiny, reevaluation, and possible revision.

Greater precision.--Third, in common with behaviorism, this study aims at greater precision in the description, analysis, and communication of data and ideas.[2] Although philosophical questions about common human ends inevitably touch upon the mythological and nonrational aspects of human experience, nonetheless, it is useful to intellectual endeavor to try to state as precisely as possible what we mean and why we mean it as we do.

The search for intellectual order.--Fourth, as with behaviorism, this project and its methodology seek to follow the canons of coherency by persisting in a search for intellectual order.[3] By addressing itself to the chaotic milieu of the total social and

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[1]See the observations by Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 3 and 7. (Hereinafter referred to as Comparative Politics.)

[2]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[3]Ibid., p. 8.

political lifeways of the culture, this study confronts the dynamic flux of the social contextual whole and its collective social facts. These social facts as such are certainly too immense and too complex for human minds to grasp sans some ordering principle and some methodological tool to serve that principle. The virtue of the structure and use of Table 1 is that it does provide a basis for orderly processing of the limitless information flowing from involvement in and confrontation with the culture.

Procedurally, for example, Table 1 and the code system follow the use of a three-digit decimal system for the purpose of simple identification of the kind of verbal symbols contained in each cell. The decimal system also facilitates easy location of cells when referred to by their three-digit number.

To illustrate, it can be determined by referring to the code list in Appendix A, that each cell contains anywhere from one to six verbal symbol concepts. The cells in which these concepts are found are meant to indicate the functions performed by the concepts in the general culture in terms of the manner in which the three variables relate to one another as indicated by the point at which the three variables meet in each cell itself.

Example: Cell 2.4.5

The Specific Verbal Symbols

Thus, for example, the concepts of "peace," "security," "affluence," "self-fulfillment," and "honor" appear in cell 2.4.5 in the code list of Appendix A.

The First Digit

The first digit is 2 and it refers to the second situational component, PEOPLE. Consequently, it may be assumed that all the concepts in this cell tell something about how the status quo perceives PEOPLE in its culture.

The Second Digit

The second digit is 4 and it refers to Man, which is the fourth of the philosophical categories of inquiry. In this manner we are given the clue that the concepts in this cell also tell something about the status quo's philosophical presuppositions concerning the nature of man.[1]

The Third Digit

The third digit is 5 and it refers to the fifth dominant core value category, namely, achievement. Logically, then, the concepts in cell 2.4.5, in addition to saying something about how people are perceived and what is held to be true about the nature of man, also tells something about what kinds of achievements (or rewards) are expected in the culture as being proper, considering the relevant perceptions and presuppositions about human persons. Henceforth, the verbal symbols in cell 2.4.5 may be referred to by their three digits for

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[1]There is a subtle but important difference, it is held, between perceptions and philosophical presuppositions. More of an intellectual act of will is involved in the latter, whereas the former may take place more or less unthinkingly. This is held to be true even though it is conceded that each type of human activity may and undoubtedly does significantly influence and shape the other.

purposes of reference and summarization in the text in place of listing each concept by name each time this particular combination of functions is referred to. The same holds true for the other 149 cells in the code list. The reader may then be relied upon to consult the code list itself for an actual display of the concepts in that cell number. Through repeated use, particular combinations of concepts may tend to become familiar to the reader, as they did for the writer, as characteristic expressions which reappear periodically in certain connections within the culture, or at least within our analysis of that culture.

By way of summary, then, in this system the first digit refers to the particular section (from one through six) of the code list (or see Table 1) in which the cell appears. The second digit refers to the horizontal strand or level (from one through five) of the section in which the cell appears. The third digit refers to the vertical column (from one through five) in which the cell appears. Consequently, when the researcher decided that a particular verbal symbol or concept told something about how the status quo perceives the nature of physical objects or <u>things</u> (and which requires a first digit of 4), and also revealed something about the status quo's philosophical presuppositions or the <u>Nature of Society</u> (which requires a second digit of 3), and finally which somehow expressed the status quo values of <u>discipline</u> (which requires a third digit of 4), then the writer placed the word for that concept in cell 4.3.4, and so forth.

Explanation of the Procedure for Data Collection

Producing the Code List: Goals and Procedures

Again, as to procedure, the researcher then pursued the goal of attempting to find and write at least one, and hopefully as many as four, five, or six (maximum) characteristic concepts in each cell. In this manner the writer was able to produce a "grid" or "data-profile" of the dominant core concepts as determined, first, by the status quo's perceptions, second, by its philosophical presuppositions, and third by its characteristic practical values. The result was, hopefully, to introduce some intellectual order into the understanding of a complex milieu, and yet at the same time to avoid the pitfall of oversimplification. A major objective was to preserve some semblance of the dynamic complexities of the social facts while also providing enough mental guideposts to enable us to process a greater volume of information with order, simplicity, and dispatch.

The Methodology Is Speculative, Not Behavioral

Yet, although partaking of some of the characteristics of the behavioral disciplines, the methodology, again, cannot and does not seek to qualify as a behavioral approach. Its dimensions are speculative. If regarded strictly as a behavioral exercise, then Table 1 and the code list represent only the behavior of the writer's own speculations concerning what concepts fit where, and it may be that there is no further validity to them, judged behaviorally. That is, the results

found in the code list have not been subjected to, nor have they met, tests of validity generally required in a bona fide project in content analysis, which is a behavioral discipline.[1]

Why Tests of Validity Were Not Employed

Such tests would have been unduly expensive and unmanageably time-consuming for the present purpose and therefore unfeasible. Many social researchers representing numerous subdisciplines would have been required to complete the contents of the code list, each specialist working according to his particular knowledge of the social spectrum. Then the lists would have had to be compared for similarities and differences and collated to produce perhaps a small quantity of "hard data" upon which all researchers in the project might agree.[2]

The Ultimate Subjectivity of Tests of Validity

However, in the final analysis, even with strict controls, such a test of validity itself rests upon the subjectivity and preconditioning of the various researchers involved. Therefore, it too partakes to some extent of a speculative character. After all, who can know the full dimensions of the social contextual whole? Concerning it, any human mental approach must assuredly derive its models and

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[1]See Harold D. Laswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols, An Introduction, Hoover Institute Studies, Series C: Symbols, No. 1 January 1952 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), pp. 55-57 and 60-61.

[2]Ibid., pp. 60-62.

images from partial knowledge and specified or unspecified speculations.

Justifying the Venture

This being the case, if there is indeed any validity to such tests of validity as have been mentioned, it seemed to the writer justifiably worthwhile for someone to begin the venture, even though working speculatively and alone, for the sake of discovering experimentally any interesting results that might produce patterns, clues or insights which would merit further investigation.

Selecting the Concepts

The question may arise concerning how the writer went about the task of selecting concepts to form the grid. This took place in approximately the following way. The writer began with the assumption that the traditional values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement still hold strong sway in the dominant culture in spite of strong tendencies in contemporary western culture towards hedonism due to increased affluence.[1] Thus, the search began with the investigator looking for concepts which somehow

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[1]Etzioni describes the overlap between traditional capitalistic democracy and the new affluent culture:

> "By stressing the rewards produced by industrial machinery, the secularization of capitalism yielded a wholly new core set of meanings justifying hard work, compliance with impersonal rules, etc. Instead of being a means to salvation, work became a means to affluence. And affluence no longer meant a large accumulation of assets (like that of the early Rockefellers) but an ability to

embodied these values and were expressed in the institutions, in prominent documents of those institutions, or in pronouncements of the elites speaking on behalf of the established institutions.[1] It was proved to the writer's satisfaction that the familiar list of core value categories was not only alive and strong within the official culture, but it also became apparent early in the investigation that these values enjoyed considerable health among a broad sweep of folkways and folk cultures as well, as revealed in various art-form products of these cultures such as in literature, advertising, song, and drama.[2]

Qualifying Each Concept

Next, the writer examined each concept which was selected as representative of one of the five dominant values, and he sought to qualify it in terms of (1) frequent mention in a variety of kinds of

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lead a highly consumptive way of life. Thus, a hedonistic element was introduced. . . ."

Quoted from his "Political Meaning," pp. 3-4.

[1]It would be difficult if not impossible within the confines of this document to cite every television program viewed, every news article read, every speech heard, or every conversation engaged in from which the clues came. Once the search began, the writer found himself immersed in a total flow of experiential information, virtually all of which was relevant to the study at hand. Consequently, in the remaining pages of this chapter the writer elected to provide either indicative citations that are not intended to be exhaustive, or else to document the point by using one or more academic sources which corroborate the point.

[2]For a random sampling of western advertising as an art form which embodies literature, song, and drama, see Marshall McLuhan, Culture Is Our Business (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970).

sources considered to be representative of the status quo; (2) what the concept appeared to express about perceptual modes, i.e., about people, places, things, organizations, the nature of ideas in western culture, and the nature of time; (3) what philosophical presuppositions it tended to embody; and (4) which of the five practical categories it seemed to represent best.

Needless to say, many concepts easily could have fitted into more than one cell of Table 1, i.e., the code list, and, indeed, the writer saw fit to repeat a concept one or more times if in his opinion it served as one of the most characteristic expressions of a given cell's content rationale.

Some Notes on the Use of the Code List

An Explanatory Tool

Once the code list was completed, and assuming both its relevance and relative validity, the writer discovered that he possessed an exploratory tool which opened the door to a vast array of new analytical possibilities. The investigator found, for example, that it was possible to use this data-profile to ask and answer questions about status quo perceptions, presuppositions, and working values and that the question-answer procedure could be conducted from either a sociological, philosophical, or theological perspective. It became possible, for example, to cross-reference any combination of the 150 cells and then analyze the relationship between them in terms of sociological questions (e.g., "How do the values in cell 3.1.2 appear

to influence the concepts in cell 4.4.4, if at all? Does one cluster of concepts appear to exert dominance over the other?"), in terms of philosophical questions (e.g., "Which cells tend to support common human ends more than others?"), or in terms of theological questions (e.g., "In which clusters of concepts--or cells--do the ultimate concerns of the culture appear to be most transparently manifest? At which points in the grid--or code list--does the will-to-power appear to be revealed the strongest? At which points does community-love appear to hold greatest sway--as determined by the concepts and what they reveal about the culture's ultimate concerns?")

Further, in using such a data-profile, the questions may be applied broadly, i.e., in terms of the three variables as a whole. Or the questions may be applied narrowly in terms of single components of any of the major categories. That is to say, the code list lends itself to analyzing the key concepts of the status quo at practically any level of abstractness or concreteness.

Examples of Broad Questions Are These

> What are the significant concepts which express the values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement (columns 1-5) as shown in the status quo's perceptions of the nature of ideas? (See Section I.)[1]
>
> What are the status quo's dominant concepts about PEOPLE as expressed in terms of the five philosophical categories?[2]

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[1]To answer this question one must look at all the cells in Section I of the code list, i.e., cells 1.1.1 through 1.5.5.

[2]To answer this question the investigator would have to examine all the cells in Section II, i.e., cells 2.1.1 through 2.5.5.

> In connection with the question immediately preceding, which of these concepts appear more to express the will-to-power and which seem more to embody the idea of community-love? Further, which concepts appear to combine both concerns in some kind of blend or harmony?[1]

Examples of Narrower Questions

Examples of narrower questions, as construed in terms of components of the major categories of the data profile (code list) are:

> What are the specific cultural concepts which express the values of austerity or rationality as revealed in the status quo's Epistemological concepts about THINGS?[2]

> What are some key Metaphysical presuppositions of the status quo concerning acceptable achievements at which the society's ORGANIZATIONS should aim?[3]

> What Epistemological presuppositions about status quo ORGANIZATIONS are assumed to convey the virtues of objectivity?[4]

Combining Broad and Narrow Data Analysis

A researcher may also combine both broad and narrow aspects of data analysis in the same question. For example, he might ask:

> What concepts are clues to the status quo's philosophical presuppositions about the nature of Man as they express the value of discipline?[5]

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[1]Again, the researcher must survey all of Section II in order to answer these questions.

[2]See cells 4.2.3 and 4.2.2.

[3]See cell 5.2.5.

[4]See cell 5.2.1.

[5]See cells 1.4.4, 2.4.4, 3.4.4, 4.4.4, 5.4.4, and 6.4.4.

How are the clue concepts which are referred to in the previous question expressed through the status quo's perceptions of PLACES?[1]

Endless Possibilities: Deferring All but a Few

It can readily be seen from this discussion that an almost endless list of possibilities for exploration of the relation between cultural concepts is afforded by the code list design and its contents. Due to the extensiveness of these possibilities it was not feasible for the writer to pursue every question that came to mind, for one question tends to multiply into several. Consequently, many interesting lines of inquiry have had to be deferred until later endeavors. It became necessary in the interests of completing the existing study to select a few pertinent paths of investigation and to pursue them to a conclusion. As we have seen, there are countless ways in which the data can be analyzed and summarized. For purposes of the present project, the data will be presented in terms of the status quo's perceptions of the situational components, namely, IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME.

Several data summaries and the conclusions based on them are therefore offered next. The data summaries are given in terms of citations of cell numbers grouped together in tables abstracted from the code list. The reader is encouraged to locate these references in

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[1]See cell 3.4.4.

[2]See cell 4.4.4.

Appendix A for the specific verbal symbols involved. In the narrative section that follows, these citations are supplemented by a verbal summary of the writer's understanding of what the data summaries themselves mean.

PART IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: HOW THE STATUS QUO PERCEIVES THE SIX COMPONENTS OF HUMAN SITUATIONS

It will already have been noticed that the code list is divided into six sections, each corresponding to one of the six components which constitute human situations. The data appearing in each of these sections will be reviewed one at a time at this point. A table displaying the cell numbers included in each summary will accompany the appropriate narratives.

SECTION I of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of the Nature of IDEAS as a Component of Life Situations

The term "ideas" as used here can be translated roughly as "abstractions" and as such it is contrasted with the concept of "concreteness." Thus, we are asking, what appear to be the main interpretive mental concepts, or "universals," which persons committed to the status quo use to process the information relegated to them about their world by means of the five senses?

Table 2 displays the code for the cultural grid or system of essential IDEAS utilized by the status quo, as discerned by the writer. The values, or ideas, associated with each cell, or code number, can

TABLE 2.--Cell Numbers for Section I of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About IDEAS

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
IDEAS	1. Metaphysics	1.1.1	1.1.2	1.1.3	1.1.4	1.1.5
	2. Epistemology	1.2.1	1.2.2	1.2.3	1.2.4	1.2.5
	3. Society	1.3.1	1.3.2	1.3.3	1.3.4	1.3.5
	4. Man	1.4.1	1.4.2	1.4.3	1.4.4	1.4.5
	5. The State	1.5.1	1.5.2	1.5.3	1.5.4	1.5.5

be seen in Section I of Appendix A. This grid reflects the conceptual "belief system" of the status quo as it is expressed, first, by means of the five philosophical categories, Metaphysics, Epistemology, The Nature of Society, The Nature of Man, and The Nature of the State, secondarily under each of those categories, in the five functional classes of practical values, objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

This grid taken from Section I of the code list can be expressed narratively as follows.

Strand 1.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions within the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Nature of IDEAS in the Core Culture as a Component of Life Situations

Metaphysically the status quo regards the world as a cross between a machine and an evolving organism (cell 1.1.1).[1] This

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[1]The mechanical metaphor is characteristic of Newtonian physics; it results in the attempt to see the relations of things in terms of causes and effects. This view is still prominent and widespread in western culture today, but is by no means nearly as unquestioned as it once was. In Newtonian science some events have causes, in Kantian all events have causes, and in modern physics no events have causes.

The model of a machine is an illustrative analogy, drawn from relations which we have found intelligible. Hence, Lord Kelvin's well-known saying that he could only understand a thing if he could make a mechanical model of it.

This is the way of thinking in which particular things have their own peculiar properties and their "proper" place in space, and force other particular things to happen. Ernst Cassirer, however,

assumption is the basis for the rationale of objectivity. Hence, a person is regarded as being objective if he observes how one physical part reacts upon another, and further, if he seeks to understand how this interaction of physical objects contributes to and furthers the

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challenges this view as being nothing more than a myth-consciousness. He holds that the notions of substance and cause are rationalized forms of myth concepts.

Cassirer is an idealist of the Kantian variety. An example, however, of a nonidealist who challenges the idea of causality is Bertrand Russell. He charges all philosophers with the error of imagining that causation is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science; yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word "cause" never occurs.

Nevertheless, the idea is rampant in the practice of administration. This is amply demonstrated by Frederick W. Taylor's theory of scientific management which is based on the segmentation of tasks, the differential piecework rate, and such maxims as "a place for everything and everything in its place."

See the following: Emmet, Metaphysical Thinking, pp. 23-24, 85-89, 181-82; Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," in Mysticism and Logic (Anchor Book ed.; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957), chap. ix; and Judith A. Merkle, "The Taylor Strategy: Organizational Innovation and Class Structure," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XIII (1968), 59-81. (Hereinafter referred to as "The Taylor Strategy.")

The evolutionary metaphor is reminiscent of the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer, who prided himself on being a precursor of Darwin on his application of evolution to many areas besides that of biology. Based on these metaphysical presuppositions, Spencer described human conduct as good to the extent it represented a successful adaptation to the environment. At times, Spencer's dictum has been interpreted quite literally as a doctrine of "might makes right." This view is strongly entrenched in the theory of "interests" and "interest groups" in the democracies of western society. It is strongly challenged by the empirical humanism of John Dewey and the corporate philosophy of Elijah Jordan. See Will Durant on "Herbert Spencer," in his The Story of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1927), chap. viii; see also chap. xi on "John Dewey." See also Elijah Jordan, Forms of Individuality (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Company, 1927). (Hereinafter referred to as Forms.)

continued evolution of organic beings or of the world as an evolving reality.[1]

These assumptions about objectivity are associated with the expression of the value of rationality (1.1.2) through the official and popular commitments to the concept of "cause and effect"--i.e., the effect which one physical object (as cause) has on another.[2] Among living beings, especially humans, the rationality is accepted in which each individual of the species pursues his own organic interests, for this result is regarded as the effect of biological necessity, or of chemistry, which is the cause of evolution.[3]

The expression of the practical value of austerity (1.1.3) gives a quasi-Metaphysical status to the deeply-rooted commitment to "economy and efficiency" and "industry and thrift," for these virtues are regarded as worthy of reward in both heaven and earth, especially since the best machine is one that accomplishes an abundance of work

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[1]Thus, for example, elements of the metaphysics of "evolutionism" appear in such works as A. N. Whitehead's Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933). The English scientist, Julian Huxley, also used the concept of evolution, particularly in relation to the biological and social development of the individual, to explain the origin of the moral consciousness, which he traced to a "proto-ethical mechanism." (See A. I. Melden, Ethical Theories (2d ed.; New York:

[2]Cf. Russell, "On the Notion of Cause."

[3]This is reflected in many post-Freudian works today, such as in B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

("industry") but is "thrifty." Further, the organism which operates most "efficiently" and "economically" is the most likely to survive.[1]

Such valuable austerity in the status quo's family of abstract universal ideals appears to require the practical discipline of "segmenting tasks" for the purpose of "successful adaptation," especially for social adaptation among humans (1.1.4). "Successful adaptation" here frequently means "survival" and results in varied assent to the dictum that "might makes right" (1.1.4). E.g., in the military field it is the more diversified army which segments its essential tasks for the sake of greater efficiency, economy, and effectiveness that is the stronger; in the political arena the more flexible a politician is through his ability to identify, define, and segment his necessary tasks, and to thereby assign them a place in his list of priorities within given situations, the better his chances of political survival will be; in the social arena one is regarded as more likely to be successful in his upward mobility if he has more options to achieve status; similarly, economically-speaking, it is regarded as financial suicide to "put all one's eggs in one basket." So the thinking seems to run. Thus, segmentation of tasks, specialization, and consequent

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[1]Administratively the concept of economy and efficiency were introduced into American governmental life by the first director of the Bureau of the Budget, Charles G. Dawes, beginning in 1921. Later, the concept was given a theoretical basis by Luther Gulick. See Dawes's The First Year of the Budget of the United States (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1923); (hereinafter referred to as Budget); and Gulick Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937).

diversification seemed to the status quo to be commanded in the name of the Metaphysical assumption that "might makes right" (1.1.4).[1]

Further, in human society, the sign and seal of the fact that a person or group has succeeded in the disciplines necessary to strength and survival is to have some obvious evidence of the achievement of material "accumulation" and wealth (1.1.5). The achievement of such "affluence" proves that one has been fit enough to survive. Moreover, the promise of rewards held out by "reality" to those who are objective, rational, austere, and well-disciplined in the manner prescribed are the same as the achievement goals of "accumulation," "affluence," and "survival" (1.1.5).[2]

Strand 1.2: Epistemological Presuppositions within the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Nature of IDEAS in the Core Culture as a Component of Life Situations

Epistemologically, for the status quo, there are certain objective and rational ways of knowing these Metaphysical truths. Objectively speaking, "seeing is believing," true knowledge "is "objective," or having to do with objects, and "truth itself is known through experience (1.2.1). No matter that these three dictums are not necessarily

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[1]This assumption is somewhat disguised, but nevertheless implicit, for example, in Marshall and Gladys Dimock's rendition of "The Politics of Administration." See chap. viii of their Public Administration (3d ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

[2]See Benjamin A. Javits, Ownerism: A Better World for All Through Democratic Ownership (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1969). (Hereinafter referred to as Ownerism.)

consistent (since "experience" may be least as subjective as it is objective). The unhealed subject-object split is temporarily submerged here as the status quo emphasizes the rationality of "observation" (1.2.2) as a prime method of truth-seeking. This throws the weight of knowledge to the side of the material world and "material things." The multiplicity of things in all their individual uniqueness is managed by ordering them into "reliable and repeatable thought categories" (1.2.2).[1]

Such rationality requires the austerity of "consistency," which eliminates the unruliness of individual characteristics (1.2.3). Rational knowledge of man also requires the austerity of "thoroughness" in information-gathering and observation of actual behavior, or the practice of "behaviorism" as a research discipline (1.2.3).[2]

Often, in both the formal and popular versions of the way to truth, it is assumed that there is no inconsistency between requiring "consistency" on the one hand and paying attention to "actual behavior" which is frequently diverse and unpredictable on the other. Yet, the two elements of knowledge frequently find themselves having gone awry with one another.

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[1]Thus, in Max Weber's "ideal type" of administrative organization, each task is performed according to a "consistent set of abstract rules." Uncertainty in performance of tasks due to individual differences is theoretically eliminated. See Max Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 330.

[2]See Blankenship, "Challenge to Reason," in Waldo, Turbulence, pp. 188-213.

It is perhaps for this reason that the status quo places such value on the Epistemological discipline of "accuracy," "logical positivism," and "labelling" as ways of managing and comprehending knowledge (1.2.4).[1] This seems to be an attempt at harmonization of the disparate elements of knowledge just cited. To wit, if one is accurate in his observations and descriptions, and if one claims nothing that is not positively based on these accurate descriptions, and further if one holds to the mechanical logic of "cause and effect" and of the world as an "evolving organism," and finally if one finds the similar characteristics among different facts and then labels them, then all indeterminate elements are stripped of their mystery and rendered manageable, while all subjectivity is supposedly given an objective basis in reality and thus made knowable, and the subject-object split appears overcome. In formal bureaucratic and official political circles the question is not generally given much weight as to whether one can ever be "accurate" about any kind of subjectivity.[2] It is generally assumed that one can, and thus, for example, courts of law in the West routinely find persons "guilty" by establishing "motives," or alternately, find them "not guilty" by declaring them "insane."

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[1]Cf. Samuel M. Greenhouse, "PPBS: Rationale, Language, and Idea Relationships," Public Administration Review, XXVI (December, 1966), 271-77. (Hereinafter referred to as "PPBS.")

[2]The subjective basis for bureaucratic organizations is discussed by Earl Latham in his "Hierarchy and Hieratics--a Note on Bureaus," Employment Forum, April, 1947, pp. 1-6. (Hereinafter referred to as "Hierarchy and Hieratics.") Latham shows the unwitting but presumed metaphysical basis for the hierarchical, yet subjective, organization of bureaus.

In this manner, and by similar devices in other quarters of the West's institutional life, the status quo manages to attain and fulfill the achievements mandated Metaphysically by "reality" (1.1.5). Epistemologically, the achievements required to gain adequate worthwhile knowledge are those of "control" ("the world must be controlled in order to be understood"), of "subduing the earth" (controlling the earth implies subduing it), and methods of "predictability" ("Of what use is knowledge if it is not repeatable and predictable?").[1]

Strand 1.3: The Nature of Society in Status Quo Presuppositions and What They Reveal About the Nature of IDEAS in the Core Culture as a Component of Life Situations

The proffered Social ideals in the West are so deeply-rooted as to be presumed to possess an objectivity all their own (1.3.1). These social ideals include "freedom," "tolerance," "equality," and "opportunity." These are largely individual rights to which most western governments and their societies give assent. As such they reflect the fact that the stuff of Society is predominantly regarded as the individuals which compose it. In short, Society, if it is a body at all, is constituted of a collection of "atoms" (individuals), each with a center of its own, and each external to all the others.[2]

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[1]Greenhouse, "PPBS," and Ian L. McHarg, Design with Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1969), especially p. 24.

[2]A typical expression of this philosophy is found in Walter Lippman's The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955). Concerning the public interest Lippman says,

The "rationality" of this "objective" basis for Society is reflected in the emphasis on the reasonability of the concepts of "natural rights," individual "differences," "countervailing powers," and individual "happiness" (1.3.2).[1]

The responsibility for these rights, as far as Society (irrespective of government) is concerned, is located once again, for the most part, within the individual. This responsibility is expressed through the austerity virtues of "personal responsibility," "moderation," "balance," and "conformity" (1.3.3). Here, individual excesses seem to be tempered by traditionally Christian and Aristotelian ethics which tend to conspire to make possible a social contract of sorts.[2]

These expressions of the values of Social austerity within the status quo undoubtedly draw from, but are also held in tension with, the emphasis on the Social disciplines (1.3.4) of "vigilance," "practicality," "pursuit of personal and private interests," and

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> "The ends of the plurality do not comprise a single system, either one which pertains to the plurality as an entity or one which is common to individuals. The relevant ends are those of individuals, whether shared or unshared. The ends of the plurality 'as a whole' are simply the aggregate of ends entertained by individuals, and that decision is in the public interest which is consistent with as large a part of the 'whole' as possible."

[1]See Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), especially pp. 230-41. See also James Madison, "The Federalist No. 51," The Federalist (Washington, D.C.: Universal Classics Library, 1901), pp. 353-58.

[2]See Christian Bay, "Academic Government and Academic Citizenship in a Time of Revolt" in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 70-87.

"initiative." The ideals of Social achievement on the scale of the Society itself do not differ greatly from the ideals for individuals (1.3.5). Generally, the Society is to be a "society of free men," embodying the qualities of "liberty," "equality," and sometimes "fraternity" (1.3.5). Individual needs and the society's needs are to be harmonized by providing for "the greatest good for the greatest number." The result is supposed to be "progress" and "stability" for all.[1]

Strand 1.4: The Nature of Man in Status Quo Presuppositions and What They Reveal About the Nature of IDEAS in the Core Culture as a Component of Life Situations

Concerning its abstractions about the Nature of Man, the status quo presses into frequent service the "freedom" metaphor (1.4.1). As a creature set apart from all other creatures by virtue of his gift of reason, man is entitled to and must be assured of "freedom of thought," "freedom of speech," "freedom of assembly," as well as the freedom to enjoy "life, liberty, property" and the "pursuit of happiness." It is also understood, man's reasonable nature notwithstanding, that man is a competitive being as he engages in the exercise of his various "natural" freedoms.[2]

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[1]See Lippman, The Public Philosophy.

[2]Consider, for example, the liberalism of Alain and the provincial committee Radicalism of Thibaudet in France, and the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States, as means through which the values in cell 1.4.1 are expressed.

The objectivity of these concepts is rooted in the rational presumption that they are "self-evident" and consistent both with "natural law" and with the "rule of reason" (said natural law and rule of reason being activated by the human propinquity to seek one's own "interest" and to gain "affluence" if possible).[1]

In another society at another time and in another place it may be that the contradiction between "law" or "reason" on the one hand and "self-interest" on the other would loom so obvious as to elicit laughter should someone propose that they be equated.[2] Nevertheless, the two sides of such an equation have been brought together so frequently and insistently in western culture that they still endure as a commonplace presumption which is largely unquestioned in our most abiding institutions of law, economics, and government. The peace achieved between the two halves of the equation in western culture is frequently a nervous one, which time and again has erupted into philosophical and political hostilities. Nevertheless, the vested interests of an industrial society seem sufficiently strong at present to preclude any final abandonment of the forced peace between self-interest

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[1]See Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, "The Abiding Challenge of Religion," The Center Magazine, VI, No. 2 (March/April, 1973), 43-52. (Hereinafter referred to as "Abiding Challenge.")

[2]Examples might be the Greek-City States, or the Medieval Society. See the following works by Edith Hamilton on these two societies: The Greek Way to Western Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1942), and The Roman Way to Western Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1932).

and the appeal to natural law and the rule of reason.[1] Thus, western societies of the industrialized or post-industrialized varieties are left with the task of finding viable philosophical and political accommodations between the two opposite values.

In the writer's investigations, this accommodation appeared to be sought by the status quo and found, with at least some degree of manageable temporal success, in the concepts of "lawfulness" (based in growing measure upon positive law), "self-restraint," "modesty," and "reasonableness." These are the austere human virtues which appear in cell 1.4.3, and, once again, they serve to apply some social glue in the form of a tacit social contract between the disparate "atoms" of society.[2] These austere values are buttressed by the emphasis on the human disciplines of "industry," "thrift," "patience," and "consistency" (a form of "reasonableness") (1.4.4). The achievements and rewards proffered by the culture for diligence in practicing its prescribed virtues are those of "progress," "peace," "prosperity," "happiness," and "self-reliance"[3] (self-reliance is frequently presented

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[1]See John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (2d ed.; New York: The New American Library, 1971), especially chap. x, "The Approved Contradiction."

[2]In this sense the State is viewed as ethical, rather than as merely an amoral "balancer of interests." See John P. Duncan, "Res Publica Quam Bonum, Res Publica Quam Liberum," The Okalahoma Law Review, XVII (August, 1964), 294.

[3]Such concepts are rooted in the economic theories of the English utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill and were transmitted by him through Alfred Marshall to John Maynard Keynes. Through these men classical economics were reworked to introduce the elements of

as a resulting reward or achievement as well as a discipline in itself) (1.4.5).

Strand 1.5: The Nature of the State in Status Quo Presuppositions and What They Reveal About the Nature of IDEAS in the Core Culture as a Component of Life Situations

It is obvious from the historic record that the "self-interest/natural law" equation has been the source of much turmoil and disorder within the social, economic, religious, and political fabric of western civilization, as well as the source of many of its creative endeavors.[1] It also seems fair to say that, like two magnets which can sometimes be mutually positioned to attract, and just as often mutually positioned to repel, these two touchstones of western social theory undoubtedly could not have found as much workable compatibility as they have, whether voluntary or forced, on the basis of religion and philosophy alone. On the contrary, a third power was generally prominent in both fact and theory from the Renaissance onwards in the management of the equation. This third party to the uneasy marriage was the concept of the State and the recognition of the State as a present fact. This presence coincided with the growth of the concept of the individual and of man's natural and civil rights. During the same

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government intervention, but the approved goals of "progress," "peace," "prosperity," and "happiness" were always present, if not always the value of "self-reliance." Cf. George Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists (New York: The New American Library, 1952), a Mentor Book, chaps. iii, vi, and vii.

[1]See Jordan, Forms, pp. 19-23.

period theories of the State as an objective Metaphysical entity eroded considerably, but resort to whatever State powers existed increased in order to resolve a question which hitherto had received little attention--the nature and role of the individual.[1]

Consequently, during the current episode of western civilization it has been made plain via such developments as the positive enactment and enforcement of regulatory legislation in economics and civil rights, not only in the United States, but in European and Scandinavian nations as well, that the State is regarded as both an "existing fact" and a "practical necessity" (1.5.1).[2] This is a defacto affirmation within western culture in spite of the general demise of theories of the state qua state. The state is regarded as possessing the "only legitimate means of coercion," and as such it is hypothesized as a power center external to man which provides the law that harmonizes self-interest and reason by "balancing interests" and "regulating competition" (1.5.1).[3]

In this modern milieu the rationality for these objective "facts" is shifted from being grounded in "natural law" and "universal reason" as such to "positive law" (1.5.2).

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[1]Cf. Frederick M. Watkins, "State: The Concept," The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, XV, 150-56 at 152-53.

[2]Cf. Morton H. Fried, "State: The Institution," The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, XV, 143-50.

[3]Cf. Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism," The American Political Science Review, LXI (March, 1967), 1. (Hereinafter referred to as "Public Philosophy.")

Positive law, though frequently arbitrary, is regarded as rational because it establishes order where presumed natural law had failed to do so. It is also reasoned that in a social body composed of a collection of individual "atoms" (persons), the "sovereignty of a free man" requires the "sovereignty of a free state," (1.5.2) which evinces the need for a social contract between the various "atoms" to produce the "impartial" external power center called "the state" (1.5.1).[1]

There is a decided tension reflected within western culture as one peers at the austerity concepts of the State revealed in cell 1.5.3 as contrasted to the rationality values associated with the State as displayed in cell 1.5.2. Whereas the status quo's rationality concepts justifying the State give it independent status, and therefore encourage both growth and centralization, the austerity values in cell 1.5.3 mitigate growth and centralization by emphasing such rubrics as "governmental restraint," and "the best government is the least government."[2]

However, in current western culture the balance appears to be tipped in favor of growth and centralization due to the fact that the austerity column itself harbors values that opt in favor of unified

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[1]See Dusky Lee Smith's "Scientific Liberalism: Ward, Galbraith and the Welfare State," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by Donald M. Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 67-73. (Hereinafter referred to as "Scientific Liberalism.")

[2]Cf. Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 1-18.

control. Consider, for example, the call for "economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in government" (1.5.3). These are results which occur by and large as a result of economies of scale and of unified control systems rather than as a result of numerous and dispersed autonomous jurisdictions.[1]

The victory of the administrative demands for economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (which is also a victory for the arguments for the growth and centralization of the power of the State) is never quite complete, however. One reason for this fact can be found in cell 1.5.4 which represents the status quo's beliefs concerning the discipline values that should receive expression through the State. Namely, the state should discipline itself always to remain a government which is representative of the people; and in serving as the repository of the power of the people which it represents, its various powers should be delineated according to purpose and function and then kept separate so as to prevent centralization within any single locus of authority. Nevertheless, these safeguards against autocracy are mitigated by the emphasis laid upon the importance of the obligation of the State to "be prepared" (1.5.4). I.e., the argument against freedom is always the argument for security, which is also the argument in favor of the growth of a central authority.[2]

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[1]See Dawes, Budget.

[2]See C. Northcote Parkinson, The Law of Delay (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), especially chap. vii, "A Game Called Monopoly."

Thus, when one finally scrutinizes cell 1.5.5 concerning the prescribed achievements of the State within the status quo, one feels constrained to read the list of ideal accomplishments--"democracy," "federalism," "strength," "productivity," "affluence," and "freedom"--not as a well-harmonized mosaic of prizes which necessarily blend in well with one another, but rather as a list of competing possibilities, any single one or combination of which may hold the limelight for a temporary period of time.[1]

SECTION II of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of PEOPLE as a Component of Life Situations

When one moves from the status quo's perceptual/conceptual constructions about IDEAS to the second component of life situations, that of PEOPLE, the analogies and metaphors tend to become more concrete. However, the continuity may easily be traced, e.g., from the mechanical and evolutionary Metaphysical images of reality to the notions of the individual as the smallest part, or atom, of Society.

The rationale of "cause and effect" also asserts itself as a characteristic theme throughout the perceptual/conceptual renditions of PEOPLE in their several modes as revealed in Section II of the cultural grid. Nevertheless, complete harmony among all the components of the code list in this section is not to be obtained. Rather, numerous interesting contradictions between various cells, as well as between

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[1]Cf. C. West Churchman, Challenge to Reason (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 122-29.

images within a given cell, tend to suggest that processes of "give and take" and "trading off" and "accommodation" exist amidst continual competition for supremacy between established concepts within the total cultural milieu.

Table 3 displays the organization of cells found in Section II of the code list in Appendix A. As was the case in Section I, this grid demonstrates the conceptual "belief system" of the status quo as it is expressed, first, by means of the five philosophical categories, Metaphysics, Epistemology, The Nature of Society, The Nature of Man, and The Nature of the State, and secondarily, under each of those categories, in the five functional classes of practical values, namely, objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. This grid, as abstracted from Section II of the code list, can be expressed narratively as follows.

Strand 2.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PEOPLE as a Component of Life Situations

Metaphysically, the starting point in the status quo's viewpoint about PEOPLE is consistent with its general presuppositions about reality (compare 2.1.1 with 1.1.1). The universe is primarily "physical," "mechanical," and "evolutionary." Accordingly, PEOPLE are physical components of this physical-chemical system. With physical needs as the prime mover, "man is motivated by his instincts." In the social arena, "men are the atoms of society." Men are conceived

TABLE 3.--Cell Numbers for Section II of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About PEOPLE

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics	2.1.1	2.1.2	2.1.3	2.1.4	2.1.5
	2. Epistemology	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.5
	3. Society	2.3.1	2.3.2	2.3.3	2.3.4	2.3.5
	4. Man	2.4.1	2.4.2	2.4.3	2.4.4	2.4.5
	5. The State	2.5.1	2.5.2	2.5.3	2.5.4	2.5.5

as possessing individual souls, but by virtue of this absolute psychic division the interpretation reflects a physical (as opposed to spiritual, mental, or any nonphysical category) interpretation, as the image is rooted in the vision of the separation of various "parts."[1]

These "facts" are accepted as objective (2.1.1). They are also presumed to be rational facts (2.1.2), since "self-interest is reasonable," "individualism is self-evident," and "God is the Judge and Savior of individual souls."[2]

These values lend a Metaphysical austerity to the status quo's interpretation of how people should fulfill their humanity (see 2.1.3), as the facts of reality seem to exert "the austere demands of competition and work" as well as those of "self-sufficiency." Assuredly, if persons are like separate atoms, each must somehow be responsible for himself while competing with others for time, space, and power. Metaphysically, chaos is prevented and each soul justified in its efforts by means of "providence and grace" (or alternately, the "Unseen Hand"). "Modesty and simplicity" appear to be expected as the austere requirements which are the badges of credit for the progress of individual souls.[3]

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[1]See Heschel, "Abiding Challenge," pp. 44-46.

[2]Ibid.

[3]See Edward B. Fiske, "Is Our National Spiritual Heritage Still Alive?" The Christian Herald, January, 1973, pp. 14-19. (Hereinafter referred to as "National Spiritual Heritage.")

These perceptions are buttressed in the Metaphysical realm by the ostensible disciplines thought to be appropriate for human endeavors. Prominently, these are "diligence," "productiveness," "preparedness," "obedience," and "humility" (2.1.4). Characteristically, the expected achievements and consequent rewards to be anticipated are those of "preparedness," "salvation," "success," "accumulation," and "consumption" (2.1.4).[1]

It is apparently simpler for a culture to obtain relative harmony of concepts in the abstract Metaphysical realm than in the practical realms. E.g., it has been said that a primary function of Society's "symbolic universe," as it were, is to harmonize and make acceptable those contradictions which exist within the social fabric or body politic of any culture.[2] Without such an ameliorating influence perhaps no Society could long function or endure, but would fragment itself upon the contradictions inherent within it as each social, economic, political or philosophical element seeks to affirm its own prerogatives in infinite progression and veritable unlimited expansion.

Nevertheless, even within the Metaphysical realm of cultural conceptualization, the status quo finds itself subjected to some inherent contradictions. Perhaps chief among these is the conflict between demands for the austere disciplines of "diligence and industry"

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[1]See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958). Also Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chap. xiii, "Motivation and Technostructure."

[2]Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966).

(2.1.4), buttressed by the desirable attitudinal styles of "modesty and simplicity" (2.1.3), versus the resulting "success, accumulation, and increased personal consumption" thereby made possible (21.15). It appears that "modesty, simplicity, and humility" tend to beget their opposites in terms of "pride, ostentation, and indulgence."[1] The status quo today does indeed seem to be in the grip of such a dilemma. However, there seems to be little indication that the basic rationale will be totally or easily abandoned.

Strand 2.2: Epistemological Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PEOPLE as a component of Life Situations

For example, the Metaphysical rationale about PEOPLE does not stand alone, or vulnerable, or apart but is supported by an Epistemological network of ideas which helps to lend an aura of comprehensive rationality to the Metaphysical themes.

First, it is held that objective knowledge of man and his instinctual nature can be obtained by means of his pursuit of his own "self-interest" (2.2.1). If anyone wonders how it is possible to obtain a working Society out of individual human "atoms, each seeking his own self-interests," the answer is to be found, e.g., in one's "social heritage" and in a "spirit of patriotism." Through these socially binding essences man comes to know his "social roles."

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[1]Gibson Winter, The Suburban Captivity of the Churches (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961).

Furthermore, his individual instincts are turned to community benefit as he comes to know his own individual soul better by means of "prayer, industry service, and obedience" (and in this sense the "civic religion" is a socially binding force; see 2.2.2).[1]

Whereas there is an ostensible objectivity to the forms and processes of knowledge just cited, there is also a rationality to them (2.2.2). E.g., the "rule of reason" apparently is not expected to encounter any problem in accepting "instincts and self-interest" as the basic operating principles of human personality (2.1.2). Further, it is through the "historical approach" to knowledge and nurture within the "civic religion" (2.2.2) that one comes to understand the "reasonableness of self-interest" as well as through the "self-evidence of individualism" (2.1.2). The historical approach also corresponds with man's learning of his "social roles" by means of immersion in his "heritage" (2.2.1), while nurture in the "civic religion" (2.2.2) serves as the cradle of "patriotism" (2.2.1) and assures that the objectivity of the latter possesses the status of rationality as a learning vehicle.[2]

Moreover, the rational objectivity of "patriotism" and coming to know the contents of "man's soul" (2.2.1) as vehicles of knowledge both become commonplace amidst the abundant and "evidential" presence of "churches and Scriptures" which dot the social landscape

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[1]Fiske, "National Spiritual Heritage," p. 15.

[2]Ibid. See also Heschel, "Abiding Challenge."

(2.2.2).[1] Finally, concerning Epistemological rationality (2.2.2), "reason and revelation" are accepted as mutually corroborating sources of the truth, for both science and religion are assumed to be ultimately compatible, despite seeming contradictions between them.[2]

A certain ultimate seriousness is lent to this socially binding Epistemological gruel by means of the underlying austerity values (2.2.3) rooted in both Christian ethics and in the capitalist ethos. These appear to reside latently within the culture and to oppose every effort of an affluent world to cut the umbilical cord to the work ethic disciplines of "diligence," "productiveness," "preparedness," "obedience," and "humility" (2.1.4).[3] These Epistemological austerity values surface again and again in the form of "sublimation and self-denial of instincts," "honor, pride, and courage above self-indulgence," the intermittent revival of "Puritan faith and virtues," and in various states "of grace" and finally in "self-reliance" (2.2.4). However, paradoxically, as schoolmasters for the disciplining of human instincts and self-interests, these austere modes of knowledge only add further powerful confirmation (in terms of the culture's belief system) of the fact that man is basically an

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[1]Martin E. Marty, The New Shape of American Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959).

[2]Karl Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 24-26ff. and 219-21ff.

[3]David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), especially chap. ii. (Hereinafter referred to as The Lonely Crowd.)

instinctual physical creature who seeks his own self-interest first, last, and always, and that only some relentless (and perhaps forceful) curbing of his appetites or some miraculous change in his nature is sufficient to deliver him from his instinctual compulsions.[1]

This extremity is evidenced in cell 2.2.4, which advocates that the knowledge about human discipline which he should gain should focus upon "enlightened self-interest" rather than merely on "self-interest" alone. But however it may be construed, this represents a capitulation to the indomitable tenacity of the concept of "self-interest" itself, since the conclusion is that if self-interest cannot be eradicated, then it must become educated for the sake of social intercourse and the furtherance of mutual social transactions. Thus, the advocation of the Epistemological discipline of "dedication" appears as a counterweight to the Epistemological discipline of "independence," just as "moderation," the "work ethic," "persistence," and "fortitude" appear as personal disciplines rooted in and contributing to "independence" and "individualism" (2.2.4), but which are also regarded as socially useful at the same time.[2] As Epistemological vehicles the development of these disciplines is considered to be a contribution to one's knowledge of what PEOPLE are meant to do and what reality requires of them. To this end, schools ideally strive to

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[1]Heschel, "Abiding Challenge," p. 45.

[2]Cf. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Mentor Book ed.; New York: New American Library, 1963), especially pp. 164-75.

inculcate these habits in students, while both the public and private sectors of Society advertise their interest in attracting persons who demonstrate the internalization of these characteristics.[1] The rewards which are supposed to result are that such persons will achieve good "adjustment," both to themselves and to Society, a sense of "belonging" not otherwise known, personal "fulfillment" as individuals and the experiencing of "strength and security" in their life situations (2.2.5).[2] These proffered achievements are themselves regarded as distinctive means of knowing what is really real about the purpose of PEOPLE in both life and culture, and therefore they are properly categorized here as Epistemological achievements. As both objects of knowledge about PEOPLE as well as vehicles of other additional knowledge, these rewards are supremely worth attaining and knowing, according to the culture's core values.

Strand 2.3: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Society and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PEOPLE as a Component of Life Situations

If a major purpose of the Metaphysical values is to harmonize contradictions inherent in the culture, and one of the functions of the Epistemological values is to buttress the acceptance of the Metaphysical viewpoint by providing avenues of knowledge concerning it,

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[1]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chap. xxv, "The Educational and Scientific Estate."

[2]William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972); see chaps. iv and v.

then a second purpose of the Epistemological concepts is to prepare the culture's members for acceptance and participation in the life of the Society. Accordingly, one of the chief end products of the Epistemological, or learning, process is that body of "truths" which concerns the Nature of Society. We are particularly interested here in what the status quo's images of the Nature of Society indicate about its perceptions concerning PEOPLE.

Just as men are the "atoms of society" (2.1.1), Society is "a body of human atoms" (2.3.1). The competing interests of these individual atoms are "balanced by the rule of human reason" (2.3.1), and thereby mind becomes the fabric of social cohesion. However, such mind is not to be interpreted in the German sense of philosophical idealism. Rather, it is more properly intellect as embodied and expressed in "group associations" which are largely held responsible for regulating "interests" in Western European, British, and American democracies (2.3.1).[1]

However, the objective nature of such groupembodied intellect (the collective wisdom) reaches a fuller status of rationality only as it results in "legal authority" (2.3.2). As frequently noted earlier in this narrative, the logic and rationality of "individualism" and

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[1]As Robert E. Lane pointed out, the mind versus matter problem appears in many guises; e.g., as the contrast between "words and things," as rationalism versus empiricism, as idealism versus nominalism, etc. See his "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," The American Sociological Review, XXXI (October, 1966). (Hereinafter referred to as "Decline of Politics.")

"competitiveness" as the basis of human interactions are considered quite valid. The point to be emphasized here is that it now becomes the basis for the function of a whole Society, indeed, of western culture itself. The social dimension is reached theoretically by hypothesizing "group associations" as the "logical representatives of the interests of individuals" (2.3.2).[1]

The Protestant and capitalistic characteristic of austerity affirms itself in images reflecting the theoretical Nature of Society, and these frequently are expressed in the rather austere adherence to the persistent enforcement of "equal protection of the laws," and in the dictum to practice "moderation in all things," and in the recurrent return to insistence on "Christian morality" and patriotic "allegiance" (2.5.3).[2]

The vitality of the virtues of austerity are presently buffeted incessantly in contemporary western culture during a time when considerable affluence has spawned strong consumerist styles and philosophies.[3] Perhaps the one Social austerity value to which there is the most frequent and consistent recourse is the firm and determined insistence upon "equal protection of the laws" (2.3.3). It seems that, whereas the disciplines associated with high productivity do not receive quite as serious attention in an age when the problems of mass

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[1]Lowi, "Public Philosophy."

[2]Fiske, "National Spiritual Heritage," p. 15.

[3]Etzioni, "Political Meaning," pp. 2-12.

productivity have largely been solved, still the matter of consuming this productivity equitably appears to be serious business, especially in an era of rising expectations.[1]

Otherwise it appears more important to become disciplined in the skills of how to be "adaptable" and "accommodating" to one's changing social circumstances than to be sheerly productive (2.3.4), for the former skills appear to be more suited to upward mobility in a complex social milieu than does the latter (productiveness).[2]

Nevertheless, "lawfulness"--an ostensibly old-fashioned and somewhat austere virtue has made its way firmly into the circle of most important Social disciplines (2.3.4). This fact corresponds with the presence of "equal protection of the laws" as the most highly exercised of all the austere Social values (2.3.3). As noted previously, it also corresponds to the widespread insistence upon equitability and fairness in consumerism.[3] "Self-reliance" is another quasi-austere Social discipline which has managed to prevail in the contemporary status quo (2.3.4). It is a constant theme in the various subcultures dedicated to "civic-mindedness" and the "civic religion (2.3.4).[4]

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[1]Cf. Harold D. Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

[2]Amitai Etzioni, "Change and Adaptation," Science (December, 1966), p. 1533.

[3]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chap. xx.

[4]Notice, for example, the editorial content of, say, The Nation's Business or of Business Week magazine.

The Social achievements which are virtually synonomous with the sought after rewards within the social system are those of "social status," the realization of the "American Dream," or its counterparts (whatever these may mean to different people), and "success and leadership."[1]

Strand 2.4: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Man and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PEOPLE as a Component of Life Situations

Two of the most serious internal contradictions which have nipped relentlessly at the heels of western culture are strikingly represented in the verbal images which appear in cell 2.4.1 concerning the objective values on the Nature of Man as these reveal the status quo's perceptions of PEOPLE in the turnover of life situations. The images are these:

1. "All men are created equal."
2. "All personalities are unique."
3. "Ownership is the means of personal freedom."
4. "Men are the atoms of society."

These four verbal images ostensibly capture some significant perspectives which are indices to the status quo's presuppositions and conclusions about the Nature of Man. That its predisposition towards man is ambivalent and contradictory is apparent in the conflict between

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[1]See Whyte, The Organization Man, pp. 4-5.

the first two maxims and again in the conflict between the second two maxims.

The conflict inherent in the first two maxims may be stated as follows. If all men are created equal, then wherein lies the uniqueness and special value of each personality? Stated conversely, if all personalities are unique, then wherein is to be found their equality one with the other?

The conflict apparent in the second two maxims is but a special form of the conflict just expressed. The idea that "property" can be "private" and that "rights of ownership" can be accorded to "individuals" is an especially highly developed article of faith in capitalistic societies. A corollary of this article of faith ties the ownership of such property to the development of human personality and to the exercise of its freedom. Hence, "ownership (of private property) is the means of personal (human) freedom."[1]

Yet, this favorite rubric of capitalism finds itself time and again clashing headlong with an equally firm assertion of the democratic strain within the culture, to wit: that, "men are the atoms of society," and each one counts equally with all the others.[2]

The difficulty of combining the capitalist version of human personality with the democratic edition has proved to be a most troublesome task for those Western European and American nations which

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[1]Javits, Ownerism, especially pp. 184-85.

[2]Lippman, The Public Philosophy.

have undertaken the task.[1] Metaphysical and Epistemological theoretical considerations aside, in actual social and historical events the conflict has proved to be quite real, for if "ownership is the means of personal freedom," then he who owns more than others possesses more freedom and pragmatically can be said to be "more of a person." On the other hand, if "men are the atoms of society" and thereby share

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[1]Capitalist and democratic combinations repeatedly result in some form of federal governmental system. Elazar observes that

> "while many attempts to establish federal systems have ended in failure, such systems, once established, have proved to be most durable. No authentic federal system that has lasted for even 15 years has ever been abandoned except through revolutionary disruption (as in the case of Germany), and in every such case federalism--showing remarkable resilience--has ultimately been restored."

Cf. Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, V, 365.

Elazar further points out that of the sixteen formally federal nations that exist in the world today, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States were created under British colonial tutelage. These seven included all the nations established since World War II that have been able to maintain federal systems, and they provide most of the successful examples of federalism in operation. Of the nine remaining federal nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fall directly within the Hispanic political tradition, and Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, though they follow the Germanic political tradition, were also influenced by Hispanic ideas at some point in their development. Both political traditions have been influential in stimulating federal inclinations in many of the nonfederal nations, but they have been notably less successful in fostering lasting federal institutions; the Hispanic tradition has failed to combine federalism and stability, while the Germanic has tended towards authoritarian centralization. The three remaining nations, Libya, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, are federal in name "and formal structure but hardly in any meaningful sense of the term." See p. 365.

equality, what does this fact do to the incidents of ownership of private property? Are some persons "more equal" than others?[1]

This issue takes on special significance during a technological age when the widespread distribution of goods, services, and opportunities depends upon the administrative decisions made routinely by both public and private regulatory agencies on the public's behalf. Effectively speaking, one of the most powerful incidents of ownership of property is concerned not with title but with control of the function and use of such property. To the extent that this is true, both elected and appointed officials who direct regulatory agencies frequently can and do act as if they "owned" the agencies and their resources which they direct. The repeated effect is to blunt the sharp edge of public accountability as well as to make of such an administrator "more of a person" who exercises "more personal freedom" than his agency's clients ever could attain in the same regard.[2]

Nevertheless, both the capitalist economic stance towards human personality as well as the democratic political version appear to be so deeply-rooted within the status quo's core concepts as to

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[1]On this point Michael Harrington contributes the following observation: "As I wrote in The Other America, in 1959 Fortune magazine and I used the same income figures and they were happy about how many Americans were rich and I was outraged about the number who were poor." Toward a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a New Majority (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 116. (Hereinafter referred to as Democratic Left.)

[2]Latham, "Hierarchy and Hieratics." See the entire article.

enjoy an accepted status of objectivity, where initial presuppositions are concerned.[1]

As a result, the presumed objectivity, and also the inherent contradiction, carry over into the status quo concepts of rationality regarding its presuppositions about the Nature of Man (2.4.2). E.g., "equality" becomes the "basis for justice," whereas "differences" (of virtually every kind, especially differences in wealth) are taken as a "sign of unique personalities." The status quo's concept of rationality becomes institutionalized when it is articulated legally in the maxim that "liberty requires the right to property."[2] The status quo also makes an attempt to resolve the dilemma through the canons of rationality by reasserting, in varied form, that the "unseen hand regulates" matters through certain social and economic "laws" and "principles."[3]

The austerity values (2.4.3) tend to give some support to the latter rational value, which fact could serve to make the "unseen hand" claim to rationality more palatable and believable within the

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[1]On this point see Richard S. Page, "The Ideological-Philosophical Setting of American Public Administration," in Waldo, Turbulence, pp. 59-73. (Hereinafter referred to as "Ideological Setting.")

[2]Jordan, Forms, chap. i, especially p. 21.

[3]For example, the view that man is motivated solely and predictably by economic considerations and is an isolated factor of productivity independent of social and group pressures guided the development of scientific management theories and practices from Saint Simon to Max Weber and Luther Gulick. See J. L. Gibson, "Organization Theory and the Nature of Man," Academy of Management Journal, IX, No. 3 (September, 1966), 233-44.

culture (2.4.3). The relation appears to be as follows. The austerity values frequently seem to represent a running undercurrent of Christian piety, especially calvinism, within the culture, which can often be drawn upon readily to give credence to certain secular formulations which bear a familiar resemblance to certain Christian tenets. As a specific case in point, such an association seems to exist between the austerity value expressed by the verbal image of "a simple faith in providence" (2.4.3) and the rationality image to the effect that "the unseen hand regulates" (2.4.2).[1]

In another vein, we have already described the austere and fairly determined insistence by the status quo culture upon the application of "equal protection of the laws" (2.3.3). In a similar manner, there seems to be equally austere insistence upon the application of "due process of law" (2.4.3). The austere use of law as a processing and potentially harmonizing agent for the settlement of conflicts and grievances arising from the active contradiction between "equality" and "uniqueness," or between "equality" and "private property" at times appears to be a most promising one. However, to the extent that the state laws by which cases are processed do themselves embody the contradictions to be harmonized, the conflict may often only be glossed

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[1]James Luther Adams observes that "in humanism the Judeao-Christian trust in providence was transformed into a reliance upon a 'pre-established harmony' in the cosmos, in the human psyche, and in society." See his essay, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," in Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), especially p. 279.

over or skirted except in the given cases at hand, and even in these the denouement may leave all given parties dissatisfied about the outcome.[1]

Other austerity virtues finding frequent expression in status quo symbolic and verbal outputs are "self-denial," "self-sufficiency," and "the pioneering spirit" (2.4.3).[2] Though frequently buffeted, the austerity values seem to serve as an available cultural bedrock or reservoir of psychic and cultural resources from which the elites of the status quo can extract support on short notice for the purpose of facing emergencies or other causes requiring national mobilization (2.4.3).[3]

What these austerity values tell about the status quo's views of the Nature of Man is that, more sophisticated or secular versions notwithstanding, man is still viewed latently through the same pietistic, semi-authoritarian, Christian looking glass bequeathed to Western Europe, Great Britain, and the United States by Evangelical Protestantism, particularly of the Reformist varieties.[4] This subliminal or unwitting evaluation of man in quasi-evangelical terms is reinforced

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[1]Page, "Ideological Setting," p. 69.

[2]Riesman, Glazer, and Denney, Lonely Crowd.

[3]This corresponds with the "extraction capabilities" of a political system as described by Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics.

[4]The austerity values correspond closely to what Tillich calls "heteronomy." See "Religion and Secular Culture," in his The Protestant Era, pp. 55-65.

by some of the more prominent disciplines which are applauded as fulfilling man's nature (2.4.4). These include "fairness," "usefulness," "purposefulness," "independence," "lawfulness," "obedience," "loyalty," and "patriotism."[1] The final rewards or achievements offered to man for his perseverance in fulfilling his nature and role in Society as defined by the status quo are especially supportive of the latent Christian version (2.4.5). Man is enticed with the promises that he will be "justified," "fulfilled," "recognized," "endowed," "assured," and "accepted."[2]

Strand 2.5: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of the State and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PEOPLE as a Component of Life Situations

In the objective starting point for the State, the status quo professes its liberal orientation towards PEOPLE in the abstract, while its actual practices are dominated by what may actually border on ultra-conservativism. This dichotomy is revealed in cell 2.5.1 which shows some characteristic objective values of the State in its affirmations about PEOPLE. As any high school civics textbook will attest, in the status quo it is considered to be an established, objective, incontestable fact that the government is "constituted of, by and for the people." The objective reason for the existence of the

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[1]Fiske, "National Spiritual Heritage."

[2]See Jon Alexander's "The Soft Cell," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg. (Hereinafter referred to as Politics and the Post-Welfare State.)

State is still regarded in one way or another as the need for a "social contract." Historically, several liberal democracies can point to the actual signing of such a social contract as the genesis of their own governments.[1] A prominent rationale in the establishment of all such "states" is that all parties to the contract engage in a transaction to "exchange some (of their personal) freedom for security." The State thus becomes an agency through which the co-signators and their constituents do things together which are essential to their well-being and which they could not do separately. Yet, typically, such State functions theoretically have strict limits placed upon them.[2]

Up to this point the objective images of the State concerning PEOPLE are liberal ones in the old sense of preserving as much unfettered liberty to the human individual as possible.[3] Indeed, they form a classically negative conception of politics which closely corresponds to the austere ideas of the State found in cell 1.5.3 to the effect that "the least government is the best government," and that "governmental restraint" is desirable.

Yet, the one remaining verbal image in cell 2.5.1 may well tip the actual balance of State practices in favor of a more conservative, or autocratic, regimen, where PEOPLE are concerned. This is the

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[1]Elazar, "Federalism," pp. 363-65.

[2]Ibid.

[3]See Dusky Lee Smith, "Scientific Liberalism," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg.

approval given by the status quo to the "regulation (of daily governmental business) by administrative agencies."

It is a fact that technologically developed liberal democracies must process the inputs and outputs of governmental decisions more by bureaucracies than by elections, parliaments, plebescites or judiciaries.[1] As a result, administrative law, which leaves tremendous discretion to the administrators, is the greater body of law in, e.g., the United States, Sweden, and Great Britain.[2]

Thus, the lines of the dichotomy are firmly set within the status quo. The rhetoric of the State's attitudes towards PEOPLE is undoubtedly often sincerely "liberal" in its affirmations of commitments to personal liberties as "objective facts," whereas its administering dispensations on behalf of such liberties transpire according to the specific needs of the bureaucratic agencies doing the administration.[3]

Some favored images portraying the rationality of the "objective facts" are displayed in cell 2.5.2. These serve to reinforce the liberal rhetoric but do little to stem the tide of the conservative practice where personal liberties are concerned.

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[1]See Peter Woll, "Administrative Justice: Formal Prescription and Informal Adjudication," Western Political Quarterly, XIII, No. 3 (September, 1961), 647-62.

[2]John M. Capozzola, "An American Ombudsman: Problems and Prospects," Western Political Science Quarterly, XXI, No. 2 (June, 1968), 289-301.

[3]"The Immobile Bureaucrat: The Law: Stick Not Thy Neck Out," Sarasota Herald Tribune (Florida), Oct. 25, 1972, p. 7A.

The austerity values of the State in their orientation towards PEOPLE serve further to enhance the bureaucratic grip of the State upon the regulation of persons (2.5.3). I.e., by the time one moves from the objective and rational justifications for the modern democratic State to the austere practices of the State, one finds that he has moved from a primary emphasis upon "liberty" to a primary emphasis upon "equality." (Compare 2.5.1 with 2.5.3.)

Liberty and equality are not the same thing, especially if the capitalist dictum described earlier is accepted to the effect that "liberty requires the right to property" and consequently he who has more property has more liberty. On the contrary, in its political commitment to "equality" ("one man equals one vote," and "equal protection of the laws": 2.5.3), the bureaucratic State has moved to the politics in which a numerical system of justice is mandated.[1] "Freedom" is distributed "equally" throughout the populace as the administrative State becomes the "great leveller" of all sectors of Society.[2]

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[1]For example, "The weight of each vote for members of both houses of a bicameral legislature must be approximately equal to the weight of every other vote." Cf. William B. Saxbe, "Criteria Established by Court Decisions," in Reapportioning Legislatures: A Consideration of Criteria and Computers, ed. by Howard D. Hamilton Columbus, O.: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 24-27 at p. 25. Saxbe provides a complete list of court cases.

[2]Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," A Critique of Pure Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 115-16. (Hereinafter referred to as Critique.)

The levelling function of the State is continued and expanded as it serves as a "balancer of interests" and goes so far as to "restrain unequal competition" (2.5.4). These functions give the State a positive role which is far greater than the liberal definition parlayed in its rhetoric.[1]

In the disciplines which the status quo expects the State to practice are "vigilance" on behalf of the population, "initiative" in solving domestic problems, "accountability" to the PEOPLE, "honesty" in its dealings with the PEOPLE, and finally "lawfulness" (2.5.4).

The first of these functions, "vigilance," is present even in the more negative and limited view of the State; but in a complex world full of sophisticated technological armaments and huge military budgets, the nature of "vigilance" assumes a positive and commanding place in the affairs of modern democracies (2.5.4).[2]

The second of the images among the discipline values, that of "initiative" in solving domestic problems, fits appropriately with the more contemporary positive view of the State. During earlier and simpler days of liberal democracies the solving of domestic problems was assumed to be the business of individuals, local communities, and provinces. But today modern technological and administrative States

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[1]Jordan, Forms, pp. 21-23.

[2]Terence McCarthy, "The Garrison Economy," The Columbia University Forum, IV (Fall, 1966), 4.

in western culture positively acknowledge and assume the responsibility for "social legislation."[1]

Granted the expanded and more positive role of the State in the affairs of PEOPLE, the status of PEOPLE is not totally overshadowed, for in the view of the status quo they still have a right to expect the State to follow "accountability," "honesty," and "lawfulness" on their behalf (2.5.4).[2]

Finally, in exchange for support in a more positive and expanded role of the State, PEOPLE are assured that, as a part of that State, they will participate in a polis that is "free," "secure," "strong," "fair," "affluent," and "effective" (2.5.5).[3]

SECTION III of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

When one turns to a philosophical, social, and linguistic analysis of the status quo's image of PLACES, whether consciously or unwittingly held, one makes an interesting discovery: It is difficult to separate the traditional westerner's ideas of PLACES from concepts

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[1]See Dusky Lee Smith, "Scientific Liberalism," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg.

[2]On this point see Michael Mont Harmon, "Administrative Policy Formation and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review, September-October, 1969, pp. 483-91.

[3]See Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1937). Compare also E. H. Carr's "Utopia and Reality: A Conservative View," in his The Twenty Years' Crisis (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939) with Leonard Woolf's "Utopia and Reality: A Liberal Appraisal," in The Political Quarterly, XI (April-June, 1940). (Hereinafter referred to as "Appraisal.")

of activity or motion. As compared to the Japanese culture for example, it may be that the typical westerner does not have a highly developed "sense of place" as much as he has a highly developed sense of "activism," of "function" and of "change." In western culture man's relation to his environment often occurs primarily as one of conquest, dominance, and human creation.[1]

Table 4 displays the organization of cells found in Section III of the code list in Appendix A. As was the case in Sections I and II, this grid demonstrates the conceptual "belief system" of the status quo as it is expressed, first, by means of the five philosophical categories, Metaphysics, Epistemology, The Nature of Society, The Nature of Man, and The Nature of the State, and secondarily, as subdivisions of those categories, in the five functional classes of practical values, namely, objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. Some of the meanings, implications, and interrelationships of this grid, as abstracted from Section III of the code list, are expressed in the following narrative.

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[1]Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," Science, CLV (1967), 1203-7. (Hereinafter referred to as "Historical Roots.")

TABLE 4.--Cell Numbers for Section III of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About Places

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
PLACES	1. Metaphysics	3.1.1	3.1.2	3.1.3	3.1.4	3.1.5
	2. Epistemology	3.2.1	3.2.2	3.2.3	3.2.4	3.2.5
	3. Society	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
	4. Man	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
	5. The State	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5

Strand 3.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

The traditional westerner's Metaphysics about PLACES is grounded in a strong attitude of anthropocentrism. Cells 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 offer some images that tell what the status quo considers to be the most objectively and rationally important facts about the subject of geography. These appear to be two: (1) that the earth is at the center of the universe, and (2) man, as a virtual co-creator of the earth, is its ruler. These observations are expressed aptly, if somewhat differently, about western man by McHarg, who said:

> . . . For all of modern science it is still pre-Copernican man whom we confront. He retains the same implicit view of exclusive divinity, man apart from nature, dominant, exhorted to subdue the earth--be he Jew, Christian, or agnostic.[1]

The Metaphysical images of objectivity revealed in cell 3.1.1 are consistent with this view. The "earth is at the center of the universe," not scientifically perhaps, but certainly in order of importance. Further, the political and philosophical history of western culture is replete with "visions of new worlds" (3.1.1), all to be wrought by man by reshaping, indeed, recreating, this one earth to suit his own dogmas in any particular era. This ethos veritably

[1]McHarg, Design with Nature, p. 26.

forges ahead unabated in new and different forms today, even if the most recent dogmas are more economic than religious.[1]

The objective facts from which the status quo takes its Metaphysics include the given understanding that the "earth is man's domain" (3.1.1). Further, whether political, religious, social or economic, western man's dogmas sooner or later rise to assert the objective necessity for a "world brotherhood or community" (3.1.1). This is generally presented as an ideal to be achieved, but is usually, ordained by the workings of providence, economic determinism, democratic progressivism, dialectical materialism, the World Soul, or by sheer pragmatic necessity, so as to enjoy the status of the truth or law.[2]

The rationality of these positions is sustained by deep-seated cultural dogmas which affirm that "man is the crown of creation," "man's task is to subdue the earth," it is "man's right" to have "dominion" over the earth, and that "man's community" is "the whole world" (3.1.2).[3]

The austerity of western man's predisposition towards PLACES as places is revealed in his attitudes that "man is above nature,"

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[1]G. M. Woodwell, W. M. Malcolm, and R. H. Whittaker, "A-Bombs, Bugbombs, and Us," Brookhaven National Laboratory, Publication No. 9842, 1966.

[2]See Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The Politics of Hysteria: The Sources of Twentieth-Century Conflict (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), especially chap. iii, "The Triumph of the West." (Hereinafter referred to as Hysteria.)

[3]McHarg, Design with Nature, pp. 24-25.

that "nature is to be tamed," and that "the world is to be reshaped" (3.1.3). I.e., nature as such is unacceptable and is not to be met or understood on its own terms. Rather all its unruly characteristics are to be eliminated or subdued and its "raw material" is to be processed and reorganized for man's "utility" (3.1.3).[1]

To assure that these values are fulfilled, the status quo prescribes certain disciplinary attitudes which define man's relations to PLACE. As can be seen in our literature on public administration, and as can be discerned in the habits which our public schools seek to inculcate, and as the voluminous psychiatric records of thousands of "organization men" (and women) indicate, these mental and physical habits can be abrogated by those who have been effectively socialized into the culture only at the expense of anxieties and guilt complexes which reach to the core both of persons and of organizations in western culture.[2] I.e., these prescribed disciplines effectively carry the weight of command of Metaphysical truth itself. E.g., in the minds of many, to disobey the commands to follow these disciplines is tantamount to blaspheming ultimate reality itself, or God himself.

The disciplinary attitudes which are the objective of our discussion appear in cell 3.1.4. They are as follows:

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[1]This emphasis was strong in the thought of Frederick W. Taylor, who imprinted America's institutional culture with it via the vehicle of scientific management. See Judith A. Merkle, "The Taylor Strategy," pp. 59-81.

[2]Some of the cases in the following volume illustrate this point: Stanley W. Standal and Raymond J. Corsini, eds., Critical Incidents in Psychotherapy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959). See especially chaps. i, ii, xiii, and xxiii.

There is a "place for everything."
"Everything" should be "in its place."
"Places should serve useful functions."
We should always "keep a clean place."[1]

The achievements to be attained for obeying the status quo's Metaphysical commands about PLACES are that the "conquest of Nature" (the enemy) will be ultimately complete; "a new heaven and a new earth" will be attained; and "progress" and "perfection" will result.[2]

Strand 3.2: Epistemological Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

The various ways of knowing and confirming these "truths" in western culture, i.e., the approved Epistemological methods for a proper understanding about PLACES closely parallels (and presumes) the objective facts and rational propositions for the Metaphysical truths about PLACES (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Epistemologically, man is expected by the status quo to accept as objective and factual the proposition that "man's unique reason" sets him "above other creatures" (3.2.1). Western man is also directed towards the fact of "man's creativity" as an objective item of knowledge, and one which gives him the status of a "co-creator" with whatever powers can be credited with originating

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[1]Again, our institutional life was imprinted with the values in cell 3.1.4 by means of the practice of scientific management. See F. W. Taylor, Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911).

[2]Cf. Woolf, "Appraisal."

this earth (3.2.1).[1] Further, whether from a historical or an evolutionary viewpoint, man can be seen to have "made a PLACE for himself" in the earth (3.2.1). This was done in spite of humble beginnings and to an extent never to have been achieved by any other creature known throughout the entire universe--a sure sign either of man's uniqueness or of his divinity, or both.[2]

The knowledge to be gained from such objective "facts" is further informed by the rational principle which guides them, namely, it is "manifest destiny" (a sort of mutant form of "providence" or "the unseen hand" (see 3.2.2).[3] The status quo of western culture comes in for special laurels at this point, for two prominent western PLACES ("places," that is, in a grand sense) served as the locales for important epochs in the development of man's "manifest destiny." These are "The Occident: The Cradle of Western Civilization," and "The New World: The Cradle of Democracy" (3.2.2).

Concerning the more austere lessons to be learned about PLACES, the Metaphysical mandate about the proper disciplinary attitudes shown in cell 3.1.4, also serves as a preferred Epistemological method for the status quo. I.e., the best way to "learn" is by

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[1]As Stillman and Pfaff observe, the two sources of modern western civilization--the Greek and Judaeo-Christian traditions--"met in a conviction that human action was the means to immortality." Hysteria, p. 11.

[2]McHarg, Design with Nature, p. 27.

[3]Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. by H. Richard Neibuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 117-18.

"doing."[1] Thus, the maxims for Metaphysical disciplines (3.1.4) also appear as austere practices useful as Epistemological methods for learning about the proper role and function of PLACES (see 3.2.3) in human life and experience. These methods include finding "a place for everything," putting "everything in its place" (including PEOPLE), and "making places neat and functional" (read also "useful"; see 3.2.3).[2]

It follows readily, then, that the most prominent Epistemological discipline fostered by the status quo is to bring about the "organization of PLACES for the segmentation of (utilitarian) tasks" (3.2.4).

The individual and social rewards (or achievements) for effective inculcation of these attitudes and of performance based upon them are meant by the status quo to be "economy," "efficiency," "effectiveness," "security," and "peace" (3.2.5).

Strand 3.3: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Society and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

Turning to those concepts of PLACE which reveal something about the Nature of Society (or vice versa), one may see, first, that

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[1]This is an empirical method advanced by John Dewey. See his Human Nature and Conduct (New York:

[2]See Wallace Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," Public Administration Review, XVIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1958); and Dwight Waldo, "Public Administration," The Journal of Politics, XXX (1968), 443-79; also Waldo's The Administrative State; a Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration (New York: The Roland Press, 1948).

the objective facts about PLACES in Society are defined functionally. Conceptually, there are "PLACES to live" "PLACES to work," "PLACES to play," "PLACES to learn," and PLACES to worship" (3.3.1).[1] This pattern follows the western propinquity to segment "life functions" as well as "work tasks." It may be contrasted with social, historical, or anthropological examples in which elements of work, play, learning, and worshipping are blended and not sharply distinguished, and in which common PLACES may entertain several overlapping functions.[2] The western rationale, however, is "a time and PLACE for everything" (3.3.2).

The utilitarian and predominantly economic interpretation of PLACES in Society are carried forward by the expression of austerity values through the concepts of "simplicity" and "functionality" which characterize most of modern architecture (3.3.3).[3] That is, strictly

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[1]Thus, Harvey Cox speaks of "The Separation of Places of Work and Residence," and "The Bureaucratic Organization of Work," and "The Emancipation of Work from Religion." See his The Secular City (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966). See especially chap. viii.

[2]In traditional Japanese society, for example, the divisions of place are not sharp, but follow natural processes. The garden is the metaphysical symbol of society in Tao, Shinto and Zen--man in Nature. See McHarg, Design with Nature, p. 27.

[3]In this vein McHarg observes cryptically that

> "it is the claim of convenience for commerce--or its illusion--that drives the expressway through neighborhoods, homes and priceless parks, a taximeter of indifferent greed. Only the merchant's creed can justify the slum as a sound investment or offer tomato stakes as the highest utility for the priceless and irreplaceable redwoods."

Design with Nature, p. 25.

decorative or ornate features are sacrificed to the functions of economic utility.

The development and shaping of PLACES in Society for utilitarian ends requires several disciplines which are determined and defined by the value placed upon "technology," "practicality," "production and productivity," "goal-orientation," and "specialization of skill" (3.3.4).[1]

Among such social values, the rewards and achievements to be expected as a result of the proper human use of PLACES are those of having and holding "the land of the free," and "the home of the brave." Faithful members of the Society of the status quo can also expect to participate in "prosperity," "progress," "growth," "property," and "status" (3.3.5).[2]

Strand 3.4: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Man and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

If the concepts of PLACES are organized in terms of their philosophical presuppositions about the Nature of Man, an interesting arrangement results. The "sense of PLACE" seems to emerge more strongly in this category than anywhere else within the cultural grid. That is, specifically in relation to man's definition of himself as

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[1]See chap. ii, "The Imperatives of Technology," Galbraith, The New Industrial State.

[2]Read for example Ed Kilman and Theon Wright, Hugh Roy Cullen: A Story of American Opportunity (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954).

man, a sense of PLACE does, after all, seem to play an important part. This is to say that the images appearing particularly in cells 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 appear to be the bearers of self-identity symbols more so than they are symbols of utility or function. As such, they bespeak more of the mystical myths of man's origins and primeval rootedness, or organic natural unity with the world than of separation, of motion and activity, and of searching and conquering.[1] The conceptions reflecting these propinquities are those associated with the objective and rational values about man (3.4.1 and 3.4.2). The objective values are listed as these:

> "A man's home is his castle."
> "A man's nation gives him his nationality and his fellow countrymen."
> "A man's locale gives him his style and flavor" [see 3.4.1].

The self-identity images are carried one step further when some reasonable interpretive rationales are given for these objective facts; to wit:

> "Home, family, and person are virtually one."
> "A man without a country has no protected rights."
> "Everyone is shaped by his background."

However, the presence of the self-identity symbols seems to be but an intermittent interlude in the midst of other more dominant themes, namely, the familiar ones of utility and function. Accordingly, when one moves through the presuppositions of PLACE as they relate to the Nature of Man, the more utilitarian-type images reassert themselves through the values of austerity and discipline (3.4.3 and

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[1] See Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 118, 120, and 129.

3.4.4). "Cleanliness" and "property value" serve to illustrate the expression of the value of austerity as it relates to perceptions of PLACES and the status quo's presuppositions on the Nature of Man (3.4.3). Similarly, "usefulness" and "productivity" commend themselves as proper disciplines for Man to implement in his use of PLACES (3.4.4).[1]

The final achievements or rewards turn up as a mixture of self-identity symbols and utilitarian symbols (3.4.5). This result is important since it illustrates the fact that the victory of utilitarianism in the status quo is not complete or total. The hold of mystical symbols of origin and organic natural unity upon human personalities has proved to be too strong to be easily or casually broken.[2]

Strand 3.5: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of the State and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of PLACES as a Component of Life Situations

Perhaps an even more significant dimension of the evidence of the persistence of self-identity symbols of origin and organic unity in the core culture are those appearing in connection with images of

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[1]These values all seem to come together, for example, in the private enterprise concept of home ownership. "Freedom and civilization," said one official of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, "depend upon the widespread ownership of property." See Charles T. Stewart, "Public Housing--Wrong Way Program," USA--the Magazine of American Affairs, I, No. 4 (June, 1952), 91-98.

[2]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 129.

PLACE connected with presuppositions about the Nature of the State. This dimension may be the more important due to the magnitude of influence which the images may enjoy and the intensity with which they may be entertained. It is one thing for symbols of origin and "natural unity" to appear in those circles which actively or unwittingly speculate on the Nature of Man, but it is quite another thing for such symbols to be associated with The State and to run along all those influential channels which authoritatively penetrate every corner of every sector of Society. This latter process participates in the advantage of receiving the powerful aura and sanction of the State's legitimacy within the Society and culture. For this reason, the appearance of images intensely suggestive of the real or mythological origins of a people or race, or symbols which convey the sense of that people's organic unity with nature--such symbol appearances in connection with official interpretations of the Nature of the State are highly significant. They reveal a resilient thread in the cultural fabric which is potentially capable of weaving itself into a dominant pattern for the fabric as a whole.

The self-identification symbols suggestive of organic origins are generally mild but quite real as they appear in the status quo's presuppositions about the Nature of the State (3.5.1 and 3.5.2). The objective images are:

"States' Rights"--(This implies that the state or province is an original, underived unit of social existence.)[1]

"Nationalism"--(Symbols of nationalism are generally rooted in myths of unique, heroic, or divine origin. They ostensibly account for the birth of a new race, a new nation, or a new people.)[2]

"The Industrial State--(This is a utilitarian image, not an organic one. It implies that the utility of function makes the people what they are.)[3]

"World Leadership"--(This conveys mild overtones of uniqueness and originality as a special people. The pulse of nationalism also is felt here.)

(See 3.5.1 for the images just cited.)

The rational images of PLACES expressing the Nature of the State are these:

"Autonomy"--(This is a rationale in support of "States' Rights" or, alternately, national sovereignty, and could be supportive of the symbolic origins of a "unique people.")

"Protection of Borders"--(This concept could be strictly pragmatic, but could also arouse feelings about "hallowed ground" and "sacred soil.")

"National Strength"--(This is a fairly neutral image which can easily be filled with the rational and emotional content of whichever cultural motif is most dominant at any given point in time and place.)

"Leadership"--(This is a fairly strong self-identification symbol used by most charismatic political elites who wish to mobilize national, racial, or religious feelings within the body politic.)

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[1]In this sense, membership in the State is regarded as an end in itself rather than as a utilitarian means to an end. It is a Gemeinschaft relationship, not Gesellschaft. See William M. Dobriner, Social Structures and Systems: A Sociological Overview (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 144-45. Examples of such feeling are noticeable in the pride of Prussians, the independence of French-Canadians in Quebec, or the singing of "Dixie" in the United States deep South.

[2]Consider, for example, the Volksgemeinschaft of the former National Socialist ideology in Germany. See Otto Butz, Modern German Political Theory (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 63-65.

[3]See Galbraith, The New Industrial State.

(See 3.5.2 on images just cited.)

Once again, as one moves from the values of objectivity and rationality to the values of austerity and discipline, the self-identification images yield significantly to the utilitarian concepts. In 3.5.3 the austerity values assert that the State's nature requires PLACES to be "productive (especially in taxes)";[1] "enshrined" (this is the only self-identification symbol which "made it" into the austerity column); "renewed" (this concept is utilitarian and economic);[2] "accessible" (again, utilitarian);[3] and finally, "protected" (neutral).

(See 3.5.3 on images just cited.)

The disciplines which the State encourages among its populace towards the PLACES under local jurisdictions (as well as those PLACES under the State's own immediate jurisdiction) reads like a short

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[1]Cf. William H. Whyte, The Last Landscape (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 17-19ff. Also some of the land reform policies of Latin America are indicative. See Thomas F. Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America," in Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. Tomasek (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 128-68.

[2]A prime example of this value can be seen in the intense interest of the University of Chicago in a $30 million urban renewal project in its immediate neighborhood, in which the University had a large and direct material interest. Almost unlimited expertise in planning, law, architecture, community organization and related fields was provided by the University. See Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

[3]As a dramatic indication of this value, consider Toffler's report that 75,000 miles of new paved roads have been added to America's landscape every year for the last twenty years--enough pavement each year to girdle the globe three times. This development is paralleled, to greater or lesser degree, throughout the technological nations. Future Shock, p. 76.

manual in economic utility (3.5.4). Here, the balance has indeed been tipped away from organic and mystical considerations to more strictly secular ones. The categories of disciplines encouraged by the State concerning PLACES are:

> "Pride of ownership."
> "Public Pride."
> "Free Access."
> "Self-sustainment."[1]

(See 3.5.4 on images above.)

The first of these discipline images advances the concept of utility for generating the economic value of physical PLACES. "Pride of ownership" contributes directly to the sound functioning of the economy, and therefore to the paying of taxes.

By contrast the second image potentially could become a vehicle for organic self-identity, since it carries the power to remind people where they came from and why they came to be. Examples are the Acropolis in Greece and the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. However, in its existing context, "public pride" is surrounded in a milieu of influences which tend to taint it with predominantly functional considerations. Thus, images of "public pride" are more likely to be expressed (and encouraged) about such landmarks as the Appian Way in Rome and Pennsylvania Square in Pittsburgh because of the "business" they generate in the local economies than for their mobilization value as "shrines."

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[1]Javits, Ownerism.

Both the images of "free" and "equal" access to PLACES within the State's overall jurisdiction express the secularization consistent with liberal democracy and the spirit of capitalism.[1] Politically, these images are populist in tone, and economically they are highly functional for an active economy, especially in affluent and highly mobile societies.

Finally, concerning discipline images, "self-sustainment" of PLACES carries obvious economic and utilitarian connotations.

(See 3.5.4 for the images just cited.)

The ultimate achievements sought by the State for itself and its populace in its belief system about PLACES reveal an assortment of recommended accomplishments highly utilitarian in nature, but which are infused with the influence of one or two strong organic and primeval symbols. The first is that of "identity" (or "self-identity"; this refers either to the self-identity of the whole people or of any individual member or groups; see 3.5.5).

The second somewhat organic image is that of "freedom." The existence of human freedom may be construed to result from secular assurances of utility such as are found in the capitalistic affirmation that freedom and personhood are tied to the ownership and use of "property," or alternately, freedom can be thought to derive from

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[1]As so often, the values of liberal democracy and of capitalism find themselves in conflict. The confrontation can be seen in the intensity of controversy surrounding the open housing issue. See chap. xiv, "The Federal Open Housing Controversy," in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 240-54. Reprinted from Congressional Digest.

natural rights rooted in man's organic, original, and underived status as a part of "nature." The symbol of freedom, therefore, is susceptible to use as a vehicle for the ethos of either organicism or of secular utilitarianism (see 3.5.5).

The third image, "security," could also serve as a carrier for organic connotations. However, in the present context it probably conveys the ideas of economic or physical security more so than of the psychic security of self-identity.

The remaining State images of approved achievements concerning the proper administration and stewardship of PLACES are all functional. They are:

"Equality."
"Perpetuity."
"Productivity."

SECTION IV of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

Table 5 contains the organization of cells as it appears in Section IV of the code list in Appendix A. The cultural "belief system" and its perceptions of THINGS is thus represented, as in previous sections, in terms of the five philosophical categories as these are grouped together according to the five classes of practical values. The following narrative seeks to depict some of the inner dynamics of that "belief system."

The status quo of western culture, above all, seems to be preoccupied with the nature and implications of material THINGS. One of

TABLE 5.--Cell Numbers for Section IV of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About THINGS

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
THINGS	1. Metaphysics	4.1.1	4.1.2	4.1.3	4.1.4	4.1.5
	2. Epistemology	4.2.1	4.2.2	4.2.3	4.2.4	4.2.5
	3. Society	4.3.1	4.3.2	4.3.3	4.3.4	4.3.5
	4. Man	4.4.1	4.4.2	4.4.3	4.4.4	4.4.5
	5. The State	4.5.1	4.5.2	4.5.3	4.5.4	4.5.5

the paradoxes of western culture lies in its intense insistence upon the material nature of reality alongside its critical dependence upon subjective definitions of human personality and reasons for political interactions.[1] This contrast serves to accentuate the depth of the subject-object split in western culture.

Strand 4.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

In its perceptions of THINGS as a component of life situations, the status quo seems to bestow an aura of self-sufficiency upon individual objects. That is to say, no reference to any external viewpoint beyond the object itself is needed to decipher the nature and significance of material THINGS.[2] This seems to be reflected in the presumed objective facts and their Metaphysical implications (4.1.1), for "reality is material";[3] therefore, the implication seems to run, any material object contains the sufficient reason for its entire nature to be grasped. Support for this stance is given in the oft-made observation that "atoms are the ultimate particles."[4] It is

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[1]As Jordan observes, "the fact that our thought habits still follow the lead of the objectivity of the classical period, while our practice or active tendencies lead us in an opposite direction, makes of the whole a hopeless confusion." Forms, p. 5.

[2]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 106.

[3]See Lane, "The Decline of Politics".

[4]Incorrect scientifically, the statement nevertheless indicates the popular pseudo-scientific attitude which Whyte calls

therefore a simple step to reach the conclusion that each object is "independent and autonomous." The only relation between them is that of physical "cause and effect" (4.1.1).[1] Thus, we find that the individualism expressed in the dictum that "individuals are the atoms of society" has its counterpart in the maxim that could be expressed "atoms (and other objects) are the individuals of the physical universe."

It makes little difference that atoms are neither particles nor "individuals" in the scientific sense, but rather more akin to interacting networks of energy which are constantly in the process of transacting exchanges of protons and neutrons.[2] In the unwitting part of the traditional mind it seems to be firmly established that atoms are individual particles.

Indeed, "science and technology," particularly "chemistry" and "physics" are routinely given as references to verify the rationality of this ultra-materialistic position (4.1.2).[3] The result is a

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"scientism,"--an outlook which makes one vulnerable to any claim made "in the name of science." See Whyte, The Organization Man, pp. 23-32.

[1]The conception of "cause and effect" is an important thought mode in the popular mind. It is rooted historically either in Newtonian physics or Kantian logic and as McLuhan points out, it dies hard in a world not now easily fitted to its constructs. See M. McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 85. (Hereinafter referred to as War and Peace.)

[2]See George Gamow, The Creation of the Universe (New York: The American Library, 1957), especially chap. iii, "The Making of Atoms."

[3]Lane, "Decline of Politics."

rigorous, thoroughgoing, unadorned, i.e., austere, if oversimplified, version of THINGS, to the effect that they are complete--i.e., "self-sufficient" and "autonomous" (4.1.3).[1]

This Metaphysical picture of the nature of THINGS throws its weight and influence heavily towards favoring the disciplines of "physical science," and both "basic" and "applied" research as methods of keeping in step with reality (4.1.4).[2] Among nonscientific endeavors "pursuit of material gain" enjoys the legitimacy of approval.

Strand 4.2: Epistemological Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

If the Metaphysical presuppositions about THINGS are simple and uncomplicated, so also is the Epistemological method for knowing these "truths." Objectively speaking, one has only to consider "nature" and the function it performs in providing "raw materials," which are transformed by man into "wares" for his own "utility."[3] Consistent with such straightforward observations, one may also consider the equally objective "fact" that man possesses an innate "need to master physical nature" (4.2.1).[4] At the unwitting level it seems to trouble few, if

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 106.

[2]W. Henry Lambright, "Public Administration and Science: A Changing and Problematic Relationship," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 113-33.

[3]McHarg, Design with Nature, p. 27.

[4]White, "Historical Roots."

any, that such concepts as "innate needs" are difficult to derive from the material concepts described. Yet, "innate needs" are assuredly reflective of thoroughgoing subjective presuppositions which, if associated with physical causes, require rather complex Metaphysical and Epistemological gyrations in order to establish any sort of cause and effect relation. As the history of theoretical speculation on the subject from Descartes to Bertrand Russell illustrates, this feat has seldom, if ever, been accomplished satisfactorily in the modern period without recourse to some third term which transcends both subjects and objects per se.[1]

Consequently, it seems fair to say that the subject-object dichotomy in contemporary western culture is hardly confronted squarely in its Epistemology about THINGS, but rather it is skirted. It is relegated as much as possible to the "unwitting part" of the culture. This may work rather well as long as the culture's materialistic presuppositions are taken for granted. Nevertheless, such sleight-of-hand appears difficult to sustain for long, since, as revealed in cell 4.2.2, when the status quo's Epistemology moves from objective facts (4.2.1) to rational principles (4.2.2), the hidden subjective presuppositions indeed crop out.

For example, even though the status quo relies upon "science and technology," "usefulness," "function," and "control" as rational

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[1]See T. V. Smith and M. Grene, From Descartes to Kant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); and Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (Garden City Publishing Co., 1927); e.g., see the chapters on Aristotle, Bacon, Kant, and Bergson.

principles which appear, at least on the surface, to be based on objective materiality, nevertheless, its recourse to "instincts" and "desires" throw the status quo's intellectual efforts back into the quagmire of subjective considerations.[1] The difficulty seems to be that most utilitarian and/or pragmatic definitions of "wares" and "utility" (4.2.1) have resorted to "instincts" and "desires" (4.2.2) as the determining moving forces required to transform an "object" into a "ware" and thus to give it human "utility."[2]

As indicated in cell 4.2.3, "physical utility" gains cultural support due to its austere character as a definition of reality. This may indicate that the tenacity of the concept of "utility" lies not in its theoretical soundness as an Epistemological resource to reveal the nature of ultimate reality, but in the culture's deep-rooted, if latent, emotional commitment to its Puritan heritage. For example, the records of many clerical psychologists and psychiatrists in the West reveal that one of the most frequent causes of guilt feelings among patients is the feeling of not being "useful."[3] Another closely

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[1]This contradiction is analyzed by Blankenship in specific reference to the behaviorist model for seeking knowledge. See his "Challenge to Reason," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo.

[2]Jordan, Forms, p. 153.

[3]See some of the case histories in Standal and Corsini, Critical Incidents in Psychotherapy.

associated feeling identified with guilt feelings is that of being "wasteful," of "wasting one's life," or of "not having a purpose."[1]

As applied to THINGS, these austere Puritan attitudes require the typical westerner to be "thrifty." As shall be revealed shortly, this attitude conflicts sharply with those attitudes created by the demand for "obsolescence" within the culture (see 4.3.3 and 4.4.4).[2]

Nevertheless, the Epistemology of the status quo (concerning how best to understand the nature and function of THINGS) does encourage the sustaining and expansion of numerous disciplines calculated to emphasize the physical materiality of THINGS (4.2.4). These include the "study of the physical sciences" and all associated "research," the development and improvement of "technique" and technical skills, decision-making based on "practicality," the use and improvement of "precision" in technical control, "maintenance" against depreciation and obsolescence (however, see 4.3.3., 4.4.3, and 4.4.4) and finally "acquisitiveness" as a way of knowing "the good life" (see 4.2.4 on images just cited).

The successful use and application of knowledge gained through these Epistemological methods is believed by the status quo to lead to the rewarding achievements of better "knowledge," "use," and "control" of THINGS, and more "power" (however defined) as a result (4.2.5).[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Toffler, Future Shock, chap. iv.

[3] Marcuse, Critique, pp. 115-16.

Strand 4.3: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Society and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

Against the background of the Metaphysics and Epistemology thus described, it should not seem surprising that the objective use of THINGS on a Societal scale should be organized around "commerce," the "market mechanism," "merchandise," and "consumption" (4.3.1).[1] The rational principles espoused for the organizing of the objective "facts" according to those particular definitions are the logic of "supply and demand," the existence of the "unseen hand" (interpreted in modernized language and theory), the common sense of "utility," and the common interests of everybody in "employment" (4.3.2).[2]

However, when one moves from the values of rationality to the values of austerity, one makes the transition from intellectual reasons to life styles, and, as has already been suggested, the style of austerity seems to be rooted more in unwitting emotional commitments to a philosophical or scientific heritage.[3]

In this connection, however, the Puritan traits of "purposefulness" and "usefulness" are compatible with the culture's economic

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[1]Jordan, Forms, p. 153.

[2]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 30-38.

[3]Dobriner, Social Structures, p. 77.

needs to regard all THINGS as "wares" to be marketed and consumed.[1] Consequently, the emotional commitment bolsters the theoretical and mental interpretations, and this arrangement eventuates in a core of ideas which possesses great tenacity within the culture.[2]

This arrangement, as we saw in the austerity values of the status quo's Epistemology about THINGS, is expressed in the concept of "physical utility." That is, the affirmation that life should be purposeful and useful carries over into one's attitude towards THINGS as a component of life situations. Hence, everything should have a useful purpose and nothing should ever be "wasted."[3] Consequently, we found in cell 4.2.3 that the image of "thrift" also showed up as an Epistemological austerity value.

These points have been reviewed briefly in order to establish another point of crucial importance to the understanding of the status quo's view of THINGS. In the relation between the rational values and the austerity values a simmering crisis broods within the core concepts. This crisis is another instance of the repressed contradiction that exists between the status quo's handling of the subjective and objective approaches to knowledge and its management of THINGS.

First, it should be observed that the image of "physical utility" was carried over from cell 4.2.3 to cell 4.3.3. That is, this

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 107-9.

[2]Dobriner, Social Structures, pp. 77-78.

[3]Taylor, Scientific Management, p. 39.

concept is useful in the culture not only as an Epistemological method, but as a social attitudinal style which it is favorable to inculcate in order to function well in Society. Up to this point there is no contradiction.

However, whereas in cell 4.2.3 (Epistemological austerity) one finds "thrift" as a virtue, in cell 4.3.3 (Social austerity) one finds "disposability," which is just the opposite. For persons or groups caught in their own minds and life styles in the contradiction between the two values, the effect is likely to be confusing and personally costly, both psychologically as well as economically.[1]

The concept of "disposability" is one which is generated by (and is compatible with) the commitments to "commerce" (4.3.1), "the market mechanism," and "consumption," as well as "supply and demand" and "employment" (4.3.2).[2] Whereas "thrift" (4.2.3) was compatible with an earlier stage of the culture, which was attempting to develop its capital formation, it is now a troublesome carry-over.[3] The value of "disposability" is much more suitable in the status quo's affluent economy, which has a need to promote "obsolescence" and "dispensable

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[1]See L. Srob, T. S. Langer, S. T. Michael, M. K. Opler, and T. A. C. Rennie, Mental Health in the Metropolis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962); and R. E. L. Harris and H. W. Dunham, Mental Disorders in Urban Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[2]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 169-71ff.

[3]Etzioni, "Political Meaning."

wares" (4.4.3) in the interests of full production, full employment, and full consumption.[1]

These economic needs of the Society and its agencies of productivity lead to a strong emphasis by the status quo on the disciplines of "production," "management," "marketing," and "balanced distribution" (4.3.4).[2] The benefits promised to all are the assurances of "affluence," "free trade," "profits," and an "expanding Gross National Product" (4.3.5).[3]

Strand 4.4: Status Quo Presuppositions About the Nature of Man and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

Expectedly, the status quo's percepts and concepts on the relation of Man to THINGS shows up as a strong counterpart of the relation of Society to THINGS. The continuity and consistency between the two types of presuppositions lends a powerful cogency to the larger network of core concepts so that everywhere one turns within the culture he finds the basic view of materiality undergirded and mutually supported from practically every established perspective.[4] However, this cogency is potentially and often actually challenged

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[1]Toffler, Future Shock, chap. iv; Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chap. ii.

[2]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chaps. ii and viii.

[3]Marcuse, Critique.

[4]See the chapter on "The Triumph of the West," in Stillman and Pfaff's Hysteria. See also McLuhan, et al., War and Peace, pp. 115-16, 118-19.

due to the fact that the same contradictions inherent in the Epistemological and Social presuppositions carry over undiminished into the basic assumptions about Man.

Beginning with the objective values it is ostensibly apparent to everyone that the facts about man point to his well-articulated roles as a "producer-consumer" and as a "property-owner" (4.4.1).[1] The "entrepreneur" is present everywhere for fulfilling the purpose of adding "additional value" to the THINGS that are produced and consumed.[2] Such ingenuity appears to have resulted in such productivity that it is well nigh universally subscribed to throughout the culture that "THINGS are easily replaceable" (4.4.1).[3] The introduction of "replaceability" and "interchangeability" of THINGS as dominant perceptual categories may be one of the inadvertent but major victories of the latent attitude of austerity in the midst of an age of material variety and flamboyance. The attitude is austere from the standpoint that it reduces the actual individuality of any given object to nothing; i.e., this viewpoint is rigorously prohibitive of any value

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[1]See George I. Mavrodes, "Property," The Personalist: An International Review of Philosophy, Summer, 1972, pp. 245-62; (hereinafter referred to as The Personalist); and in the same issue see Roger L. Miller, "An Economist's View of the Individual," pp. 329-42.

[2]See Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (New York: Signet Books, 1961); and Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (New York: Signet Books, 1967).

[3]Toffler, Future Shock, pp. 56-57.

inherent in the individuality of a particular object.[1] This object could just as easily be replaced by another of its kind. The fact that the overtone of austerity, which is a kind of style, manages to show up in the column devoted to the definition and description of objective facts means that it has won a small but tough battle of legitimacy which could be quite significant for the transmutation and consequent survival of the ethos of austerity in an affluent culture.[2] The resulting cost, however, to members of the culture may well be a loss of a sense of permanency or relatedness to enduring artifacts of worth through which persons may meaningfully mirror and express their self-identities. They may well find themselves related to a class of objects, to an abstraction as it were, which fact is confirmed and represented to them by an unceasing flow of dispensable objects sharing similar characteristics. To the extent that important relations of self-identity exist between people and their world of THINGS, the persons involved may be programmed to see themselves abstractly, with

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[1]Tillich observes that the modern attitude about the transience of "things" is a technological attitude which has Greek origins and in which one does not look at concrete existence, its "here and now," in order to discover the power of things. Thus, attitudes of austerity which repress the concreteness of individual traits in nature, may be traced to the Greeks rather than to the Jews. See Tillich's "Realism and Faith," in The Protestant Era, especially p. 71.

[2]Yet the austerity of "technological" realism (traced to the Greek influence) is in an ongoing contest with the attitude of "historical" realism, which is a creation of the Occident, and augmented especially through Protestant influence. In the latter, the "really real" is asked for in "time and space," in our own historical existence, i.e., in that sphere "from which all Greeks had taken flight." See Tillich, "Realism and Faith," in The Protestant Era.

no enduring, permanent, or immediate direct relations to the concrete world of THINGS. Euphoric, depressed, or schizophrenic self-concepts could well be the result.[1]

In another familiar vein the classic contradiction of subject and object is expressed once again in the continued emphasis on the rationality of "instincts and interests" (4.4.2) as the motivating forces to develop "acquisitiveness" and human "ingenuity" (4.4.2).[2] The evolutionary-mechanical model of man and reality is also revealed in the acceptance of the operating principle of "the survival of the fittest" as a rationale for man's relation to THINGS (4.4.2). Ostensibly, if "newness" of THINGS "means progress" (4.4.2), then those who are "most fit" are those who can display the greatest amount of acquisition of the latest gadgets.[3]

The conflict in austerity values between "thrift" and "disposability" has already been noted in the contrast between the presuppositions on Epistemology and The Nature of Society (compare cells 4.2.3 and 4.3.3). The same conflict is expressed in the austerity-style presuppositions about the Nature of Man (cell 4.4.3). This time the conflict shows up in the contrast between "cleanliness"--a patently

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[1]Toffler, Future Shock; see "Victims of Future Shock," pp. 358-64.

[2]As Rabbi Heschel observes, "To stem the expansion of man's 'needs,' which in turn is brought about by technical and social advancement, would mean to halt the stream on which civilization is riding. Yet the stream unchecked may sweep away civilization itself." See his "Abiding Challenge," p. 44.

[3]Cf. Mavrodes, The Personalist, p. 329.

vigorous Puritan virtue--and the concurrence of THINGS as "dispensable wares" and mere "conveniences."[1]

As his essential disciplines in his relation to THINGS Man is no longer urged to practice the productive habits alone (although the affirmation of the "work ethic" is still prominent; see 4.4.4).[2] Now it is equally important to "develop consumer tastes," i.e., to be a wise consumer and not merely a prodigious producer (4.4.4).[3] As in other connections, it is urged that Man seek to achieve "security," "comfort," "status," and the fulfillment of "opportunity."[4]

Strand 4.5: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of The State and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of THINGS as a Component of Life Situations

At the level of the State the status quo seeks a rationale that will overcome the disparities and conflicts of interests inherent in the competition for THINGS. The State is seen objectively as a "harmony of conflicting interests." "Law" is considered to be the "instrument of harmony."[5] The intent of the law, in turn, is carried

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[1]This is a conflict among austerity values themselves; that of "cleanliness" which roots in the Hebraic tradition, and the technologically-oriented values stemming from the Greek tradition.

[2]Etzioni, "Political Meaning."

[3]Riesman, et al., Lonely Crowd, pp. 142-43.

[4]Whyte, The Organization Man; see especially chaps. iv, v, and xv.

[5]Jordan, Forms, pp. 19-20.

out by "administrative agencies, the agents of the law."[1] It is then the function of the agencies to "regulate" the competing interests.[2] The "goals of regulation" are twofold: (1) to "expand the gross national product," and (2) to "control" excessive or unfair "competition" (4.5.1).[3]

The "fact" that the State is a "harmony of conflicting interests" is informed by the principle that the political spectrum is composed of "countervailing powers" (4.5.2).[4] Law, as an instrument of harmony among conflicting interests, is guided by the rationale of the Society's commitment to "equal justice under the law."[5] Such equality cannot simply be mandated. Rather "politics makes policy; but administration carries it out" (4.5.2).[6] The regulatory agency is seen consequently as a "balancer of interests" (4.5.2).[7] It is assumed that all parties understand and agree on the "need for expanding

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[1]Woll, "Administrative Justice," pp. 647-62.

[2]Lowi, "Public Philosophy."

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Page, "Ideological Setting," in Waldo, Turbulence.

[6]Dawes, Budget; also, Waldo, "Public Administration," pp. 443-79, at p. 448.

[7]Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969).

markets" (4.5.2), which is ample justification for the purposes of "regulation" (4.5.1).[1]

This picture of the objective facts and rational principles of the State as the "harmony of conflicting interests" over THINGS is palatable and cogent among persons in a culture committed to the principle that Society is composed of subjectively motivated autonomous individuals, for the presuppositions are pervasive throughout the culture in its unwitting as well as its conscious parts.[2]

However, to anyone taking the perspective that human persons are either more than or other than subjectively isolable human "atoms," the legitimacy of the entire network begins to fray. Its Achilles heel lies foremost in the attempt to introduce subjective, nonmaterial causes and reasons into a universe construed as thoroughly material;[3] or, conversely, to seek to objectify or generalize that which is highly arbitrary, indeterminate, and capricious--the subjective life. As Jordan commented, "interest is incompetent as principle," and "interests, subjective states, are not the substance of order."[4] It is in this vein that the new concepts of the human person discussed in the next chapter are of interest as a delegitimizing influence on western political traditions.

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[1]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 169-71ff.

[2]Jordan, Forms, pp. 1-2.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., pp. 20 and 23.

In the meantime, it is of interest to note that a rigorous commitment to "protectionism" concerning national production of THINGS presents itself as an expression of austerity (4.5.3). This fits the conservative model of economics and of life based on scarcity, and the stern guardedness of austerity values is appropriate to it. This expression often finds itself in conflict with the more liberal attitude of insistence upon the need for constant growth of markets and of the GNP. As an illustration, the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs supported by the International Monetary Fund is frequently opposed by nations not receiving "most favored nation" treatment, but which are courted by the leading industrial states to buy finished products. They insist that what is needed is not the austerity of protectionism, but the common multiplier of liberal collaboration in the articulation of markets and production.

The conflicts arising from this and other contradictions in social policy, both domestically and internationally, have prompted the State to find the solutions for harmony by developing the disciplines known as "planning," "programming," "budgeting," and "systems analysis" (PPBS).[1] (See 4.5.4.)

Through it all, liberal democracies of the West which are closely allied with capitalism and industrial productivity, continue to push the achievements of "profit incentives," "free enterprise

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[1]Thomas P. Murphy, "Congress, PPBS, and Reality," Polity, I, No. 4 (Summer, 1969), 450-78.

systems," high "employment," and "rising standard of living," and "equal opportunity" for all (4.5.5).[1]

SECTION V of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

As so often is the case, a seemingly consistent Metaphysics within a philosophy or within a culture may give rise to diverse interpretations and developments. Accordingly, Rousseau's concept of the "real will" gave theoretical support to political radicals and reactionaries alike, as well as to advocates of liberal republics and stringent autocracies.[2] Similarly, Hegel's use of the German word Recht could be interpreted variously as applying to individual human rights, to final metaphysical truth, in an organic sense, or to the natural command of moral duty.[3] Once again, both revolutionaries and ultra-conservatives were able to find refuge and solace within the same conceptual storehouse. Other examples could be cited relating to the works of such notables as Plato, Kant, and Darwin, as well as the Protestant reformers Luther and Calvin.

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[1]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 98-100ff.

[2]M. Judd Harmon, Political Thought from Plato to the Present (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), pp. 313-15.

[3]Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. with notes by T. M. Knox (Fairlawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, 1942).

Strand 5.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

Along the same lines, the basic Metaphysical presuppositions of the nature and function of ORGANIZATIONS appear to be quite simple. But in their attempts to fulfill the Metaphysical function of harmonization, these presuppositions might well have actually institutionalized the inherent conflicts and thus insured and augmented their appearance in the social system.

The status quo's simple materialistic interpretation of the universe was examined in an earlier connection. Reality is conceived as a collection of physical particles related to one another by means of cause and effect. This relative completeness of physical objects corresponds to the status quo's view of the self-sufficiency and autonomy of human individuals, who, incidentally, form the "atoms" of Society. So far the presuppositions appear to be straightforward, and relatively consistent, if oversimplified.

However, the difficulty arises in the attempt to characterize the nature of "cause and effect" as the relational force between autonomous particles. The presence of the mechanical analogy, or "machine," and the biological analogy of a living organism are used alternately to explain the nature and functioning of cause and effect[1]

[1]Rabbi Heschel observes, "man treats himself as if he were created in the likeness of a machine. . . . The body is his god. . . ." See "Abiding Challenge," p. 47.

(see cell 5.1.1). Whereas conclusions can be, and often are, drawn about the equality between separate physical parts and the equality among autonomous human selves, the mechanical and biological models of cause and effect result in visions of a "hierarchy" of parts or selves. A machine has a central principle which is augmented by supplementary principles, and a living organism possesses a head, a heart, or some governing nucleus.

Following these analogies, then, when parts or selves are considered individually they may well appear to possess an equality between them, for there are no other qualifying characteristics since each is considerd autonomous.

However, when the principle of "cause and effect" comes into play it functions, in terms of the mechanical and biological models, according to an "hierarchy of parts" or a "chain-of-command" (5.1.1) or a "chain-reaction" of effects.[1] Consequently, in the cause and effect process the equality of parts is overridden by the inequality of functions. Necessarily, then, some parts are prior to others, either in order of time, of cause and effect sequence, or of administrative importance.

Yet, the values of equality on the one side, and of administrative effectiveness (mechanical efficiency) on the other side, seem to appear almost with even distribution throughout the status quo's "belief system" concerning ORGANIZATIONS. First one and then the

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[1]Emmet, Metaphysical Thinking, pp. 23-24.

other is put forward, depending upon the context and the need. One interesting effect is that it permits the elites in the status quo to distinguish whichever type of value it chooses in accordance with the need to balance demands. The risk, however, is that the contradiction may be effectively called to attention by critics of the status quo, and its rationales for public policy thereby may be delegitimized. That this actually happens is a fact which is evidenced in the material presented in Chapter III.

For the moment, however, it is incumbent to present the material in Section IV of the code list as represented in Table 6. The verbal images indicated therein epitomize the status quo's perceptual grasp of the nature and function of ORGANIZATIONS as a component of life situations. The data are presented in the pattern now made familiar in this study, and it is organized, first, according to the five philosophical categories, Metaphysics, Epistemology, The Nature of Society, The Nature of Man, and The Nature of the State, and secondarily, by means of the five classes of practical values, objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. Both the data in the code list and the related narrative which follows are illustrative of the conceptual conflict just described.

The so-called objective facts about reality and their rational implications for the organization of life, Society, and the State have been touched upon and are represented in cells 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 concerning Metaphysical presuppositions. The austerity values in 5.1.3 appear to tip the Metaphysical balance further in favor of effective

TABLE 6.--Cell Numbers for Section V of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About ORGANIZATIONS

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
ORGANI-ZATIONS	1. Metaphysics	5.1.1	5.1.2	5.1.3	5.1.4	5.1.5
	2. Epistemology	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4	5.2.5
	3. Society	5.3.1	5.3.2	5.3.3	5.3,4	5.3.4
	4. Man	5.4.1	5.4.2	5.4.3	5.4.4	5.4.5
	5. The State	5.5.1	5.5.2	5.5.3	5.5.4	5.5.5

administration rather than towards individual equality. This is probably due to the fact that austerity values are generally more "task-oriented" than "people-oriented."[1] The images of "productivity," "economy," "efficiency," and "self-maintenance" are consistent with this influence (5.1.3).[2]

The disciplines favored by this view of organizational realities are those consistent with "reproduction" of organizational systems and the development of "redundancy," or back-up systems, for the functioning of the ORGANIZATIONS.[3] This is not surprising in a technological age which comprehends the existence of all separate parts within the context of some ORGANIZATIONAL framework, and therefore the preservation of ORGANIZATIONS seems paramount for the preservation and functioning of individual units or selves.[4] Consequently, the "growth" and "stability" of ORGANIZATIONS are sanctioned as the achievements necessary to the growth and stability of human life itself (5.1.5).[5]

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[1]Gibson, "Organizational Theory."

[2]Ibid.

[3]See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), especially the last chapter.

[4]Harvey Wheeler, "Technology: Foundation of Cultural Change," Center Magazine, IV, No. 2 (July/August, 1972), 48-57.

[5]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 169-71ff.

Strand 5.2: Epistemological Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

At the outset, then, the traditional view of reality favors administrative values over individual ones. This trend seems to continue in the Epistemological approaches fostered for the education of the culture's members into a proper understanding of organizational life. At first blush it would appear that the objective facts of the status quo's socialization processes leave large room for individual autonomy, for "primary groups" "voluntary associations," and "interest groups" appear high on the list of human initiation into group life (5.2.1).[1] However, these occur as part of a hierarchy of groups which exert social pressure on the shape of the life of the individual, each of which inversely determines the options available for the kinds of primary groups and voluntary associations which one may choose between.[2] "Official ORGANIZATIONS," such as local zoning boards and health commissions; "economic institutions" such as banks, savings and loans, and stock markets; "political institutions" such as parties and boards of elected officials who determine the allocation of taxes, services opportunities and restrictions; and finally, State agencies which regulate production, commerce, transportation, health, education, and

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[1]Lowi, "Public Philosophy."

[2]Gideon Sjoberg, R. A. Brymer, and Buford Farris, "Bureaucracy and the Lower Class," Society and Social Research, L, No. 3 (April, 1966), 325-37.

welfare,--all such ORGANIZATIONS determine the range, the frequency, the manner, the character, and the style of choices available to individuals, primary groups, and voluntary associations (5.2.1).[1]

This hierarchy of overlapping and interacting ORGANIZATIONS represents the spectrum of accommodations between the two conflicting values residing in individuals and hierarchical organizational life. The fact that the organizational types cited here may represent degrees of mixtures of the opposing values is indicative of a pragmatic attempt to harmonize them. The continued vitality of both kinds of values--individual and organizational--is an index to the extent of the success of such pragmatic accommodation. The effect of the device is to blunt the sharp edges of individuality as well as organizational hierarchy by intersticing various organizational degrees of each between the two extremes. The diversity and resulting complexity as well as the virtual infinite variety of combinations of choices for the expression of the opposing values, seem to serve as a buffer for the conflicts inherent in the social system's network of organizational life.[2]

This fact is mirrored in the mix of rationales advanced as logical principles said to be operating in and through each type of group (5.2.3). Thus, "primary groups" give expression to

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[1]Marcuse, Critique.

[2]Henry S. Rowen, "Bargaining and Analysis in Government" (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New York City, Sept., 1966).

"individuality." "Voluntary associations" are vehicles for "liberty and self-expression." "Interest groups" are rooted in the "subjective needs" of individuals for such things as food, sex, and power. "Official organizations" exist to "protect and balance" individual rights, while "economic institutions" make it possible to provide "opportunities." "Political institutions" are designed to amass "consensus," to conduct "regulation" based upon it, and to provide for "accountability" of the administrations to the people. Finally, the comprehensive structure of the State and its various agencies exist to oversee the ultimate "balancing of interests" on behalf of the whole Society.[1] (See 5.2.2. for the rationales just cited.)

Yet, in such a complex social network, if good management and meaningful accountability are to occur, the less that is left to chance the better (presumably). Accordingly all other things being equal, the austerity values, which are more task-oriented than people-oriented, will tend to throw the balance in favor of administrative control rather than individual freedom. In the present context the austerity values tend to draw on the Aristotelian and Cartesian analytical method of "ratiocination," which in turn contributes to a positive emphasis on "specificity" and "division of duties" (5.2.3).[2] The common denominator of these three values is their tendency to seek

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[1]See Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, chap. x, at the section on "Democratic Political Systems."

[2]As Lane points out, "the knowledgeable society increasingly employs mathematical modes of expression and thought"; in "Decline of Politics."

control over reality (specifically, the work environments) by breaking it up into smaller units for both analysis and regulation. The attitude represented here towards reality is one of rigorous work for purposes of control, with as few frills as possible. As a cluster of conceptions, it thus merits the designation of austerity values.

The style favored here is one of thorough attention to detail. As applied to the concept of accomplishing work through ORGANIZATIONS, it is expressed in the emphasis placed on the disciplines of "data-gathering," and "research and analysis" (5.2.4).[1] By themselves such disciplines may tend to become elitist, since only the technical ORGANIZATIONS and their specialists are privvy to the sophisticated information which is generated.[2] However, data-bases may also serve, first, to improve the identification of various alternatives available for "decision-making" processes, and second, to provide new modes for "accountability" of administrators to their clients or the people-at-large (5.2.4).[3] As such, these are potential tools to increase knowledge on the basis of which general populations may participate in the dynamics of the various ORGANIZATIONS which make the decisions that affect their lives.[4] There is indeed a strong current of thought in

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy. See the final chapter.

[3] Blankenship, "Public Administration," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 204-8.

[4] Marvin Meade, "Participative Administration: Emerging Reality or Wishful Thinking?" in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 169-87.

the public administration literature of western democracies which calls both public and private ORGANIZATIONS acting on behalf of the public interest to account, to make its decision-making processes responsive to the inputs of the publics affected, and to acknowledge accountability of those same people.[1]

The use and application of these Epistemologically oriented values about the culture's established ORGANIZATIONS ostensibly will result in the collective achievements of "knowledge," "expertise," "power," and, as if to include the best of all possible worlds, "representative democracy" (5.2.5).[2]

Strand 5.3: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of Society and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

The Epistemological values engendered to inculcate adequate knowledge in the culture's members about ORGANIZATIONS are rooted in the objective facts about ORGANIZATIONS in the Society itself (5.3.1). It is at this level of the culture's values that strong inclinations exist in favor of the autonomy and liberty of the individual. The varieties of expression sympathetic to such individualism are legion. For the sake of manageability within our research design we shall name

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[1]All the essays in Waldo, ed., Turbulence, for example, address themselves to these issues.

[2]Gulick, "Science, Values and Public Administration," from Papers on the Science of Administration, pp. 191-95.

the classes into which such images fall as "political liberalism," "economic conservativism," "limited government," "pluralism," and "bargaining and competition" (5.3.1).[1]

Democratic liberalism and economic conservativism are the classic combination found particularly in the United States, but also in Canada and to some extent Great Britain. That is, the traditions are primarily politically liberal rather than radical or conservative. This combination has also been emulated in Germany and Japan during their democratic reconstruction after the Second World War.[2] Both of these values champion the autonomy and liberty of the individual, as do also the supporting values of "limited government," "pluralism," and "bargaining and competition" (5.3.1).[3]

The value clusters identified by the images just cited all have strong intellectual roots in the Enlightenment, wherein man was assumed to be rational and nondestructive. He was also assumed to be self-sufficient, able to find his own employment, shelter, and education. He was further assumed to be self-governing, while the best government was assumed to be local and limited self-government.[4] Broadly speaking, then, limited government and capitalism have a

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[1]Page, "Ideological Setting," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo.

[2]Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria, pp. 10-37 and 78-79.

[3]Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo.

[4]Page, "Ideological Setting," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 61.

common ground which is reflected in the rationales of the Society for its ORGANIZATIONS (see cell 5.3.2).

These include an emphasis on "self-government," "private property and profits," "popular sovereignty," and the belief that "groups are good."[1] The focus on the "public interest" is the result of philosophical developments which came later than the Enlightenment. It is a utilitarian tenet based on the concept of "the greatest good for the greatest number" (5.3.2).[2]

The tension between these liberal democratic and capitalist beliefs and the opposing societarian-type viewpoints revealed in the Metaphysics and Epistemology reveals the depth of the conflict at work in the status quo. The friction is also seen in the difference between the austerity values under Society ("limited government"; see 5.3.3) and those under Metaphysics and Epistemology, which latter, again, throw the weight of legitimacy to the side of task-oriented administrative values (5.1.3 and 5.2.3).

This conflict may actually take the form of an encounter between conglomerate bureaucracies versus grass roots populism. It is interesting, for example, that both the New Left and the New Right in western culture share many elements of the classic liberal tradition, such as individuality and equality, while giant corporations of both

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[1] Ibid.

[2] See Rubin Gotesky, "John Dewey," in Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by V. Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 134-47.

the public and private varieties share many of the same characteristics of administration and bureaucracy.[1]

In the end, the disciplines and proffered achievements sought by the Society, seem to follow those of the culture's technologically-oriented Metaphysics and Epistemology rather than the Society's liberal democratic objective facts and rational principles. Thus, we find the Society supporting the disciplines of "planning," "organizing," "budgeting," "staffing," "directing," "controlling," and "communicating" (5.3.4).[2] These widely-accepted procedures for administration and management of ORGANIZATIONS are meant to result in the achievements of "efficient production," "steady expansion of output," "steady expansion of consumption," a preference for "goods over leisure," continual technical change," the victory of "autonomy for technical ORGANIZATIONS," and the back-up supply system of human resources through "trained and educated manpower" (5.3.5).[3]

Strand 5.4: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of Man and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

This is not necessarily the final victory, however. The intensity of the conflict between societarian values (as shown in 5.3.4 and

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[1]"The Immobile Bureaucrat," Sarasota Herald-Tribune, p. 7A.

[2]Dwight Waldo, "Public Administration," in Political Science: Advance of the Discipline, ed. by Marian D. Irish (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

[3]Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 153 and 323.

grass roots values is assured and augmented when the culture's belief system shifts from contemplation of Society as such to a consideration of Man himself in relation to ORGANIZATIONS as a component of his life situations. Once again, the objective facts, as construed by the status quo out of its own perceptual conditioning, reflects the values of the Enlightenment and a liberal democratic tradition.[1] Thus we find Man's immediate relation to ORGANIZATIONS in his life situations to center around "voluntary associations," a sense of "local autonomy," awareness of his own "individuality" and "equality," a consciousness of his "right to organize" and an innate spirit of "pragmatism."[2] (See 5.4.1 for values just cited.)

The reasonable justifications (rationality) given for the support and legitimacy of these objective facts are also familiar Enlightenment virtues: "individual freedom and dignity," "self-sufficiency and responsibility," "brotherhood," the "right to press one's own interests," and the later pragmatic development of "common sense" (5.4.2).[3]

It should be noted, however, that the societarian or strongly administrative core of values did win a victory by penetrating cell 5.4.1 with some acceptance and legitimacy for the "Organization Man."[4]

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[1]Page, "Ideological Setting," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 61.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Whyte, The Organization Man.

This perhaps begrudging allowance was made on the basis of "common sense" (5.4.2) that in a highly complex organizational age one must look out for his own "economic survival" (5.4.2). Thus, even the strongest bastion of grass roots populism finds itself encroached upon by strongly anti-individualistic values, to the extent that technological conglomerates make available the employment by which they live.[1]

This is offset somewhat by the austerity column's vacillation, which has now swung back in its style of sternness from nonindividualistic images in the first two strands to "limited government" in the third strand (Society), and now the "self-sufficiency" of Man in the fourth level. The images of discipline and achievement record almost solid series of scores for liberal democracy, with "individual responsibility," "tolerance and accommodation," individual "initiative" (5.4.4) showing up as preferred disciplines, and "self-reliance," "liberty," "equality," "brotherhood," "happiness," and the fulfillment of "opportunity" as the ideal achievements (5.4.5).[2]

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[1]See the Epilogue in George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1970), especially p. 369. (Hereinafter referred to as Anarchism.)

[2]For a commentary on the tension between the philosophies represented by these images, see Louis C. Gawthorp, ed., The Administrative Process and Democratic Theory (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 438-39.

Strand 5.5: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of The State and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS as a Component of Life Situations

Finally, however, the balance seems to be tipped in favor of societarian ORGANIZATIONAL virtues as the belief system on ORGANIZATIONS is completed by the perceptions of the State. Objectively the State (which theoretically is the "people" and more practically is the governmental "elites") regards "bureaucracy" (5.5.1) as a "social instrument" (5.5.2).[1] This is an important and necessary resource, since the State must possess capabilities for the "mobilization of power and resources" (5.5.1)[2] to serve the purpose of "social welfare and development" (5.5.2).[3] Also essential to such capabilities, in order to assure the Society's "economic and social well-being" (5.5.2), is the fact of "centralization" of the government, at least relatively speaking (5.5.1).[4] State bureaucracy follows a pattern of "prudence" and "realism" (5.5.1) in its attempts to serve as an "objective" (5.5.2) balancer of interests. I.e., it avoids confrontations of the values of "good" and "evil" through its behavioral model of value-free

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[1]Page, "Ideological Setting," pp. 61-62.

[2]Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, pp. 195-96.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Woodcock, Anarchism, p. 475.

"efficiency, economy" and "good management" (5.5.2).[1] However, it is frequently open to the charge that its public administrators increasingly decide in favor of client groups with greater power when arbitrating between unequal conflicting interests.

In this milieu it is not surprising that the expression of the style of austerity as it is demonstrated by the State takes the form of the administrative virtues of "efficiency," and "economy" (5.5.3). To fulfill these mandates State bureaucracies have instituted the use of "electronic data processing," "information systems," "quantitative management techniques," "systems analysis," "systems planning," and "systems control" (5.5.4).[2] These various "systems" techniques tend to form entirely new organic environments of their own and to extend these environments throughout the entire cultural landscape.[3] Thus, a new dimension has emerged in the conflict between the values of strong administration and strong individualism in which the emphasis is now placed upon environments as the proper unit to consider rather than the individual.

The crux of the matter may not be whether the culture must choose between focusing on the individual or on the new organic

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[1]Peter Savage, "Contemporary Public Administration: The Changing Environment and Agenda," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 46.

[2]Edward I. Friendland, "Turbulence and Technology: Public Administration and the Role of Information-Processing Technology," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 134-50.

[3]McLuhan, et al., War and Peace. This is a recurrent theme throughout the book.

electronic or systems-oriented environments, since it seems increasingly likely that the culture will be obliged to do both. Rather, the crucial point may lie in the ends for which these new disciplines are but the means. Will the abstract ends of an impersonal Society be paramount? Or will the integrity of the human person be preserved, albeit reinterpreted and reconstrued? At present it seems that some major achievement goals of the modern technical State are to "maintain productive capacity," to achieve "social progress" (according to various definitions), and to accomplish the "management of social change" (5.5.5).

SECTION VI of the Code List: The Status Quo and Its Perceptions of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

Perhaps nothing is quite so characteristic of western culture as are its attitudes towards TIME. In Chapter I attention was given to a "historical consciousness" as one of western culture's major characteristics. In this consciousness, TIME is valued more than SPACE. MacIver has suggested that if SPACE is the dimension in which things exist, then TIME is the dimension in which things change.[1] Characteristically, in keeping with its Faustian spirit, western culture is more intrigued with changing existence than with speculating about it.[2] (See Table 7.)

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[1]Robert M. MacIver, The Challenge of the Passing Years--My Encounter with Time (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962). (Hereinafter referred to as Encounter with Time.)

[2]Stillman and Pfaff, Hysteria, pp. 17-18.

TABLE 7.--Cell Numbers for Section VI of the Code List Showing Familiar Verbal Concepts in Contemporary Western Culture About TIME

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Auster-ity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment
TIME	1. Metaphysics	6.1.1	6.1.2	6.1.3	6.1.4	6.1.5
	2. Epistemology	6.2.1	6.2.2	6.2.3	6.2.4	6.2.5
	3. Society	6.3.1	6.3.2	6.3.3	6.3.4	6.3.5
	4. Man	6.4.1	6.4.2	6.4.3	6.4.4	6.4.5
	5. The State	6.5.1	6.5.2	6.5.3	6.5.4	6.5.5

Strand 6.1: Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perception of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

These observations are borne out in the status quo's Metaphysical presuppositions about TIME. From the standpoint of the core concepts any objectivity about TIME starts with the proposition that "time has a beginning and an end" (6.1.1).[1] Yet, however interpreted, TIME is also regarded as moving towards an ultimate fulfillment, and therefore the right time "has a fullness" and also "time has a meaning" (6.1.1).[2]

These presuppositions concerning the objective facts reveal the paradox implicit within western culture's view of TIME. Since TIME is not circular or fatalistic as in oriental thought, the westerner can conceive of the self-actualization of himself, his society, and his universe occurring through the freedom to pursue virtually unlimited possibilities; hence, the Faustian spirit in western culture, i.e., an impatience with limits.[3]

Yet, because TIME has a beginning and an end, the limits under which westerners and all "Faustians" chafe are inescapable. This fact is reflected in such colloquialisms as "the ravages of time," "the

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[1]See Tillich's "Historical and Nonhistorical Interpretations of History: A Comparison," in The Protestant Era, pp. 16-31.

[2]See "Kairos," in Tillich's The Protestant Era, pp. 32-51.

[3]See Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Scribner's, 1949).

tyranny of time," "where has time gone?" "time flies," and time is "the hands that cannot be stayed."[1]

Whereas western man experiences the limits of TIME physically, mentally, and spiritually by means of waning energy, intellectual frustration, and emotional guilt, he also experiences the unlimited possibilities for change and accomplishment through TIME by means of his "myths of origin," his "rebirth beliefs," and his understanding that TIME is not endless or meaningless repetition, but that "history is creative" (6.1.2).[2] Whether expressed in mythological or rational terms, these modes of ordering human experience provide the "reasons" for the objective understanding of TIME.

The values of austerity, discipline, and achievement particularly receive keen expression through the culture's perceptions and management of TIME. It is through the westerner's awe-ful and virtually mystical regard for TIME that he upholds the austerity values of "self-renunciation," "making time count," placing "work before pleasure," and engaging in "self-sacrifice" (6.1.3).[3] These values generate, augment, and support the activist disciplines of "dedication," "promptness," "commitment," and "decision and action" as ways of

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[1]Ted W. Engstrom and R. Alec Mackenzie, Managing Your Time (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Books, 1967), p. 22.

[2]Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 67-68. Also Niebuhr, Faith and History.

[3]Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962).

keeping in tune with the Metaphysical demands of reality (6.1.4).[1] The "payoffs" for faithfulness to this Metaphysical view of TIME are the fulfillment of one's "destiny," the living of a "useful life," the achieving of "progress," and the attaining of "salvation or utopia" (6.1.5).[2]

Strand 6.2: Epistemological Presuppositions of the Status Quo and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

St. Augustine had queried about the nature of TIME as follows:

> For what is Time? Who is able easily and briefly to explain it? Who is able so much as in thought to comprehend it so as to express himself concerning it? And yet what in our usual discourse do we more familiarly and knowingly make more mention of than Time? And surely we understand it also when in speaking with another we hear it named. What then is Time? If nobody asks me I know; but if I were desirous to explain it to someone that should ask me, plainly I know not.[3]

Almost 1,600 years later Augustine's question is still philosophically relevant. Yet, the status quo within western culture possesses a definite Epistemology concerning its knowledge of TIME. TIME is to be known and understood through "history," for, however it may be expressed, the temporal world is in one way or another a battlefield

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[1]J. D. Batten, Tough-Minded Management (New York: American Management Association, 1963).

[2]See Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1961).

[3]Quoted in Engstrom and Mackenzie, Managing Your Time, p. 21.

between the powers of good and evil (6.1.1).[1] Specifically in the contemporary status quo, the successful and efficient use of TIME in this battle is to be known by watching "the clock," by measuring TIME in terms of material "accumulation," and by seeking various "accomplishments" within the TIME allotted (6.2.1).[2]

The rationale for interpreting "history" is a sense of "purpose," while the reliable inexorability of the clock is assured by both "solar time" and the "calendar."[3] Meanwhile, persons win or lose the battle for timely "accomplishments" and are judged in terms of the "results" (6.2.2).[4]

These Epistemological processes are undergirded by the austerity values emitted in the practices of "self-examination," a condition of preparedness or "readiness," and simply "being useful," all of which are cultural modes of self-assurance about what TIME is and how to deal with it (6.2.3).[5]

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[1]See Tillich's "Philosophy and Fate," in The Protestant Era, pp. 3-15.

[2]MacIver, Encounter with Time.

[3]See chap. i, "Evolution Versus Permanence," in Gamow's The Creation of the Universe.

[4]Ray Josephs, "Control Your Personal Time Better to Get More Done," American Business, February, 1960.

[5]See Paul Tournier, The Adventure of Living (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). A Swiss physician and psychiatrist, Tournier lauds "self-examination" by saying those persons are more human "who today are no longer content to live without thinking, to do everything unintelligently like everyone else without knowing why " Further, preparation for living is found largely in the living of it now. "There are people," says Tournier, "who go on indefinitely preparing for life

Further knowledge regarding TIME is to be gained through the disciplines of "dedication," the use of "time-savers," and the making and following of "schedules" (6.2.4).[1] Final knowledge of TIME and its mysteries then comes to those faithful ones who experience the achievements of fulfilling their "destiny" and who both "save time" and "use time" (6.2.5).[2]

Strand 6.3: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of Society and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

Following this pervasive Epistemology, the Societies of western culture generally objectify TIME "quantitatively," to wit:

"Time is history."
"Time is money."
"Time is life."
"Time is duration."[3]

(See 6.3.1.)

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instead of living it." On usefulness Tournier comments, "to help a worker discover a fresh attraction in his daily work is to help him live a fuller and very often a healthier life." See also de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure.

[1]See Lee Patrick Chapman, "Surveying and Controlling Executive Time," The Small Business Administration, No. 76, and Joseph M. Trickett, "A More Effective Use of Time," California Management Review, Summer, 1962.

[2]See Bruce Larson, Dare to Live Now (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1965). See also "Leadership Patterns and Organizational Effectiveness," Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954.

[3]See Engstrom and Mackenzie's analysis of these concepts in chap. ii, "What Is Time?" in their little volume, Managing Your Time.

Buttressed by its scientific Epistemology from other quarters, the status quo finds its warrant for its quantitative objectification of TIME in the fact that it is ultimately to be "measured by the stars" (6.3.2).[1]

Yet, history is not measured primarily by years, but by "purpose" (6.3.2)--a curious departure from the quantitative and utilitarian venue.[2] This is better understood, however, as a part of the numerical and materialistic objectification of TIME by the status quo when one contemplates the fact that "purpose" in the contemporary core concepts is interpreted primarily economically. Thus, TIME is "measured by wealth," by "deeds" which one can cite, count, and recite, and by "the clock" (6.3.2)--i.e., the "hands which cannot be stayed." As Chaplin Tyler once said, TIME is "the most inexorable and inelastic element in our existence."[3]

The smooth and stable functioning of western societies also depends upon the austerity values of "diligence," "thrift," "service," and "punctuality" in order to support an economy which is increasingly

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[1]See chap. i, "Evolution Versus Permanence," in Gamow's The Creation of the Universe.

[2]Tillich, chap. iii, "Kairos," in The Protestant Era.

[3]Quoted in Engstrom and Mackenzie, Managing Your Time; see the "Preface."

dependent (and interdependent) on technological timing, diminishing resources, and is evermore service-oriented (6.3.3).[1]

Understandably, considering the quantitative nature of TIME in the status quo, there is a focus on the disciplines of "mathematics," "economics," and the time-management emphases implicit in "industry and thrift" and "efficiency and economy."[2]

As the Society seeks to expand and improve its TIME-oriented systems it actually seeks to bend TIME to its collective will. This fact is expressed in the vernacular in such phrases as "gaining time," "buying time," "fulfilling time," and, finally, "using time."[3] (TIME often seems almost to be regarded as a god which one can prevail upon, cajole, influence, and bargain with. Yet, periodically, it seems, there is an awareness within the culture that one cannot bargain with TIME, but can only "use" it, or function in it as a medium for decision and action.)[4]

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[1]See, for example, Alfred Diamant, The Temporal Dimension in Models of Administration and Organization (Bloomington, Ill.: Comparative Administrative Group/ASPA Occasional Paper, 1965).

[2]See Hahn-Been Lee's characterization of values in developed nations as contrasted with developing nations, in his "From Ecology to Time: A Time Orientation Approach to the Study of Public Administration," International Review of Administrative Sciences, XXXIII, No. 2 (1967), 103-13. (Hereinafter referred to as "From Ecology to Time.")

[3]See chap. ii, "What Is Time?" in Engstrom and Mackenzie, Managing Your Time.

[4]Hahn-Been Lee notes this fact and reaffirms St. Augustine's observation that the temporal "entities" of past, present, and future do not actually exist in reality, but they are mere images and representations; hence the dicta: "It is not future time that is long, but a long future is a long expectation of the future. Nor is past time

Strand 6.4: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of Man and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

As a dimension of human life situations, the objective facts about TIME as related to Man are closely related to his biological life cycle. That is, all of Man's life situations are experienced between his "birth and death" and every life situation is also experienced specifically in terms of his own self-conception of where he finds himself between those two extremes of his own life. That is, his life experiences are recounted by whether they are the events of his "youth," his "old age," his "prime," and so forth. The critical, red-letter experiences of his life are often pinpointed by the phrase "the time has come" (to go, to attack, to propose marriage, to solve a vexatious problem, to die, etc. We also speak of an idea "whose time has come").[1] (See 6.4.1.)

The rationales which add "reasons" to these facts within the culture are the obvious empirical ones of human genesis and "mortality" (particularly the latter), and the conceptual ones of "rebirth beliefs" and human "history" (6.4.2).[2]

Man further makes his accommodations to the concept of TIME provided him by the status quo cultural core concepts by engaging in

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long, but a long past is a long memory of the past." Quoted in Lee, "From Ecology to Time," p. 111.

[1]Tillich, "Kairos," pp. 33-35ff.

[2]Tillich, The Religious Situation, pp. 117-18.

the austerity values of "good works," "delayed gratifications," a sometimes severely TIME-oriented personal "resolve" and habits of "punctuality" (6.4.3).[1] Everyone, in one way or another, is expected to inculcate and exhibit the disciplines of "punctuality," "preparedness," "decisiveness" (and therefore freedom), and "timeliness" (6.4.4).[2] As his rewards Man can enjoy the achievements of a "life well spent," crowned by "graceful retirement," and preceded by "power and youthfulness," "glory," and "increased life" along the way.[3]

Strand 6.5: Status Quo Presuppositions About The Nature of The State and What They Reveal About the Core Culture's Perceptions of TIME as a Component of Life Situations

Given the westerner's historical consciousness, the typical State in western culture normally finds its TIME orientation in relation to some genetic point from which it took its "origins" (6.5.1). As Carter and Hertz point out, "in the life of any country certain issues arise that . . . cut to the foundations of the political system."[4] Thus, whereas France finds the point of origin for republicanism in the Revolution of 1789, and the United States dates its beginnings with the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776,

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[1]Etzioni, "Political Meaning," p. 8.

[2]Engstrom and Mackenzie, Managing Your Time, chap. vi, "How Are You Doing?--Are You on Course?"

[3]Ibid., chap. v, "Where Are You Heading?"

[4]Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz, Major Foreign Powers (5th ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 48.

Great Britain locates its political roots in events stretching from the Magna Carta in the thirteenth century to the Great Reform Act of 1832.[1]

Such time orientation is typically highlighted and punctuated by awareness of some "golden age" (6.5.1) which distinguishes the State's identity, achievements, and reputed power. Thus, France reminisces about the glories of Napoleon and De Gaulle, while in the United States both cinema and video endlessly declare frontiersmanship as idyllic for the American character.

"Revolution" also spices the sense of the origin of TIME for western States. Thus, the sense of historical formation in the United States pivots around both the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, while Great Britain remembers the Glorious Revolution and the French remember the Revolution of 1789 and the "June days" of 1848 (among others).[2]

Closely related to its "origins," its "golden ages" and its "revolutions" is western culture's concept of TIME as rooted in a sense of "destiny" (6.5.1). Thus, in the original socialist movements of the West, a passionate "eschatological tension" served as the driving force for their dynamic hopefulness, while the democratic nations on the other hand found their historic mission in the promotion of the spirit of capitalist society. I.e., national sovereignty was for them the realization of divine, or democratic, sovereignty. As Tillich

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[1] Ibid., pp. 40-60 and 227-47.

[2] Ibid.

observes, this consciousness in a strongly secularized form still supports the great western democracies.[1]

The "origins" and "revolutions" of western nations are generally rationalized in terms of "natural law" or "special events," or both. Thus, the founding fathers of the United States produced a special event of particular courage when they risked their lives and fortunes to sign the Declaration of Independence. Yet, their actions were in response to "natural law," the truths of which were held to be self-evident (6.5.2).[2] Legends of "conquests and victories" fix the moments of the "golden age" in the minds of a nation's schoolchildren and adults alike while the State's "history of accomplishments" (6.5.2) is recounted to keep alive a national sense of "destiny."[3]

The State invokes the values of austerity by encouraging the "emulation" of the virtues of its national heroes (6.5.3). This is meant to inspire "reverence," "faithfulness," and "dedication" by the populace, not only for its national heroes, but for the ethos or national spirit which they represented.[4]

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[1]Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 117.

[2]Madison and Jefferson were influenced by Locke and Rousseau in their political outlook, and this influence is reflected in the language of the Declaration of Independence.

[3]This is reflected in any American grade school or high school textbook in civics or American history. See, for example, Henry F. Graff and John A. Krout, The Adventure of the American People: A History of the American People from 1876 (3d ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1973).

[4]Almond and Powell relate the respect for national heroes to the "symbolic capability" of a political system. This is the "rate of

The inculcation of these values about TIME requires the State to foster the discipline of "remembering," e.g., through May Day celebrations or Fourth of July observances (6.5.4).[1] The State also provides for the socialization of its citizens via "education" and expects at least a minimal degree of "obedience" to its laws and "service" to the common welfare (6.5.4).[2] The achievements sought and promised by the State in its management of TIME are those of the fulfillment of its "destiny," the achievement of "progress," the assurance of "liberty" to its constituents, and the winning of "victory" in confrontation with its adversaries (6.5.5).[3]

PART V. APPLICATIONS OF THE DATA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

Introduction: The Relation of the Code List Data to the Five Major Conclusions

The five conclusions iterated on pages 163-64 early in this chapter gained acceptance in this study as a result of the data just described in Part IV. It yet remains to state how and in what manner

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effective symbol flow from the political system into the society and the international environment." They (symbols) have little immediate cost for the elites yet are "highly dependent on tapping popular beliefs, attitudes, and aspirations for their effectiveness." Comparative Politics, p. 199.

[1] Ibid. This also falls into the category of "symbolic outputs." See also pp. 200-201.

[2] Ibid., pp. 196-97.

[3] Galbraith, The New Industrial State, chap. xv, "The Goals of the Industrial System."

the data, as described, resulted in the formulation and affirmation of precisely these conclusions. In the process of explaining these connections it will be convenient as well as didactically economical also to report certain implications for political systems generally in western civilization as determined by the writer.

First, it may be recalled that the five conclusions were directly associated with the five speculative philosophical topics of Metaphysics (and the summum bonum), Epistemology, The Nature of Society, The Nature of Man, and The Nature of the State. As a venture in political theory, the effort seemed warranted to classify and cross-reference the subject matter in terms of these classical categories of speculative political philosophy.[1]

This organizational decision resulted in imparting a certain shape to the research design and at the same time it provided two distinct advantages: first, the topical areas were broad and comprehensive enough so as not to constrict or eliminate relevant areas of human experience within the social contextual whole of western culture as these may be related to the objectives of this study; and, secondly, the topical areas also were specific enough that they provided the researcher with relevant philosophical and analytical questions which he could ask about the data which were accumulating before him.

As the initial list of verbal symbols began to evolve (the list was revised many times), certain patterns began to appear to the

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[1]The five major conclusions are given in their entirety on pages 162-63.

writer which called for the tentative formulation of some broad propositions about the belief system of the status quo. Simultaneously, when the list of verbal symbols was revised, and the data were massaged to produce better organization of the data, the propositions themselves also were revised. By the time the code list arrived at its present form of organization, the *five conclusions*[1] about the status quo belief system also had developed approximately into their present form, give or take several stylistic changes. After they were rephrased according to the mode in which they now appear on pages 163-64, they were then regarded as propositions for further testing in order to determine whether the core culture did in fact support the conclusions as stated.

The Speculative Nature of the Task

Due to the nature of the subject matter, the task just mentioned could be undertaken only on a speculative basis, which fact rendered the task appropriate for the present study in speculative political theory. As has been previously attested on pages 175-77, this project does not meet the requirements of a strictly behavioral type of study, nor one in quantitative analysis. E.g., there was only one researcher working in isolation, choosing verbal symbols which seemed to him representative of the belief system of the core culture.

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[1]All of the italicized (underlined) terms in Part V have a technical meaning as a result of their specialized relation to the research design. Such terms are italicized in order to identify them. All italicized terms and their definitions also appear in a glossary in Appendix C.

He then attempted to judge whether the inherent presuppositions of the population which uses those symbols lent support or registered opposition to certain broad propositions about the core culture. At best this is the description of a highly speculative undertaking, but as such it possesses an efficacy all its own and as such it can serve useful and valuable purposes.

The usefulness of quantitative assessments in a speculative venture.--Indeed, even though the validity of quantitative assessments in this study is not demonstrable in the usual sense, once the research design was available which had evolved to serve these speculations, it did seem to lend itself readily to further selective probing by means of making use of the 150 cells of the code list (see Table 1) as discreet units which could be counted and tabulated in response to certain questions about the status quo belief system and the five propositions concerning it.

Counting discreet units for support or opposition results in more careful and precise speculative analysis.--It was a simple matter, for example, to inquire whether each group of verbal symbols within each of the 150 cells tended to support or oppose first one and then the other of the five major conclusions, as far as the writer's own particular knowledge of western culture and linguistic analysis was concerned. This manner of speculating seemed to the writer to be more careful and more precise than a less structured, if more familiar, form of generalized speculation--a matter of particular importance in

view of the writer's commitment to a search for an improved method of viewing and representing the vast complexities of the social contextual whole.[1]

Since as many as seven or eight verbal symbols might appear within each cell, it was possible to establish a percentage to serve as a threshold above which support from a particular cell would be affirmed. The researcher decided that if 75 percent or more of the verbal concepts in a cell could, in his judgment, be deemed to be in support of the specific proposition under consideration, then that cell would be counted in the support column of tabulations for that particular proposition. Conversely, if 75 percent or more of the verbal symbols in a cell appeared to be in opposition to a given

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[1]The attempt here was to minimize the characteristic uncertainties with which "impressionistic" analysis leaves its audience. This study aims at results which are sufficiently general to validate inferences beyond the specific situation analyzed. The research design works towards generality through hypothesis and sampling. In symbol analysis, which is used in this method, generality is obtained by using suitably designed samples of determinate universes, whose limits have been determined either empirically or theoretically. In the present research design, as has been discussed at some length in chap. i, the universe has been determined theoretically. It is for this reason that this is more of a theoretical project than a behavioral one. It is a speculative project moving towards empirical data rather than a behavioral study divested of conscious theory, or reaching towards it inadvertently or merely as a postscript.

For an in-depth discussion of the considerations just reviewed, see Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols: An Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), chap. iii, especially pp. 31-32.

proposition, then it would be counted in the opposition tabulations for that particular proposition.[1]

Obviously, this left a third group of cells to be reckoned with, since not all cells would demonstrate either 75 percent support or 75 percent opposition. Consequently, cells in which the verbal symbols showed more than 25 percent, but no more than 74 percent, of either support or opposition were counted as mixed or ambivalent scores.[2]

In this manner the writer was able to obtain a forced distribution of the 150 cells into the three categories of support, opposition, or ambivalence towards each of the five major conclusions about the status quo. It then became possible to "score" the level of legitimacy enjoyed (or delegitimation suffered) by the core culture relative to the subject matter of each of the five propositions.[3] On the basis of the results obtained from this analysis, the researcher was then willing to conclude that the five major propositions which

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[1]See Appendix B for method of determining support or opposition.

[2]A corollary to this rule is that 26 percent to 74 percent of the symbols will be contradicted by the remainder of the symbols; thus, neither support nor opposition can reach the required threshold of 75 percent. Hence, ambivalence is the result.

[3]The forced distribution will result in reasonable approximations suitable to this study. For the purpose of follow-up studies, it would be possible to make use of numerous additional categories, such as, for example, the degree of support or opposition or ambivalence. As it stands, however, this study already allows for fifteen different categories--three attitudinal responses for five separate propositions.

were formulated to describe what he believed were the central rationales of the dominant core culture--that these five propositions were indeed heavily enough supported within the status quo to be regarded as reasonably accurate descriptions.

The Display of Tables 8-11

The results of the analysis leading to this conclusion are displayed in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. The data for these tables were abstracted from five variations of Table 1, in which each of the 150 cells was designated as a point scored either for support, for opposition, or for ambivalence regarding each of the five major conclusions about the status quo. These five tables of tabulations and the tabulations of raw scores derived from them appear as Appendix B of this report.[1]

The Scoring System, Some Results, and Special Problems and Limitations

The method just described served to extend the research design in such a manner as to open up further possibilities for exploration. For example, based upon the disposition of support, ambivalence, or opposition by each of the 150 cells in the code list towards each of the five major propositions, a universe of 750 legitimation-

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[1]The following sources were helpful to the writer in providing guidelines for scoring procedures: Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols, pp. 68-78; and Matilda W. Riley and Corine S. Stoll, "Content Analysis," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).

TABLE 8.--*Legitimacy-Deligitimacy Scores from* LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS by Support, Ambivalence, and Opposition for the Five Major Conclusions

Major Conclusion Number	Strand Number	Scores by Disposition of Verbal Symbols																		Totals			
		IDEAS			PEOPLE			PLACES			THINGS			ORGANIZATIONS			TIME			Subtotals			Totals
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
		0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	
1	1	11	12	2	9	10	6	17	6	2	21	4	0	12	10	3	4	10	11	74	52	24	150
2	2	12	9	4	2	17	6	12	13	0	19	6	0	14	4	7	2	14	9	61	63	26	150
3	3	22	3	0	7	13	5	11	13	1	24	1	0	19	6	0	6	8	11	89	44	17	150
4	4	23	2	0	17	8	0	11	12	2	21	4	0	17	6	2	3	8	14	92	40	18	150
5	5	13	10	2	15	9	1	15	8	2	18	7	0	17	5	3	10	13	2	88	52	10	150
Sub-totals	6	81	36	8	50	57	18	66	52	7	103	22	0	79	31	15	25	53	47	404	251	95	750
Totals	7	125			125			125			125			125			125			750			

Code: 0 = Support; Ø = Ambivalence; X = Opposition.

TABLE 9.--Legitimacy-Delegitimacy Scores from Philosophical Presuppositions by Support, Ambivalence, and Opposition for the Five Major Conclusions

Major Conclusion Number	Strand Number	Scores by Disposition of Verbal Symbols															Totals			
		Metaphysics			Epistemology			Society			Man			State			Subtotals			Totals
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
		O	Ø	X	O	Ø	X	O	Ø	X	O	Ø	X	O	Ø	X	O	Ø	X	
1	1	21	5	4	18	9	3	15	12	3	6	13	11	14	13	3	74	52	24	150
2	2	20	7	3	15	12	3	10	13	7	4	14	12	12	17	1	61	63	26	150
3	3	13	12	5	20	7	3	19	11	0	17	7	6	20	7	3	89	44	17	150
4	4	20	5	5	19	10	1	19	11	0	18	7	5	16	7	7	92	40	18	150
5	5	25	4	1	18	12	0	23	6	1	6	16	8	16	14	0	88	52	10	150
Sub-totals	6	99	33	18	90	50	10	86	53	11	51	57	42	78	58	14	404	251	95	750
Totals	7	150			150			150			150			150			750			

Code: O = Support; Ø = Ambivalence; X = Opposition.

TABLE 10.--Legitimacy-Delegitimacy Scores from the Practical Values by Support, Ambivalence, and Opposition for the Five Major Conclusions

Major Conclusion Number	Strand Number	Scores by Disposition of Verbal Symbols															Totals			
		Objectivity			Rationality			Austerity			Discipline			Achievement			Subtotals			Totals
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
		0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	0	Ø	X	
1	1	15	12	3	16	11	3	7	13	10	16	7	7	20	9	1	74	52	24	150
2	2	13	9	8	11	16	3	8	11	11	15	12	3	14	15	1	61	63	26	150
3	3	17	10	3	15	11	4	14	11	5	22	5	3	21	7	2	89	44	17	150
4	4	20	6	4	18	7	5	18	9	3	17	9	4	19	9	2	92	40	18	150
5	5	19	7	4	17	11	2	14	12	4	15	15	0	23	7	0	88	52	10	150
Subtotals	6	84	44	22	77	56	17	61	56	33	85	48	17	97	47	6	404	251	95	750
Totals	7	150			150			150			150			150			750			

Code: 0 = Support; Ø = Ambivalence; X = Opposition.

TABLE 11.--Summary of the Legitimacy-Delegitimacy Score Totals from the Three Variables by Response Categories of Support, Ambivalence, and Opposition

Response Categories	Strand Number	The Three Variables and Their Score Totals			Totals
		Situation Components	Philosophical Presuppositions	Practical Values	
Support	1	404	401	404	1,212
Ambivalence	2	251	251	251	753
Opposition	3	95	95	95	285
Totals	4	750	750	750	2,250

delegitimation points had been created which could then be distributed throughout the three legitimacy-delegitimacy categories of support, ambivalence, and opposition. This fact provided a speculative measuring device which made it possible to detect certain occurrences and trends within the scoring universe of 750 points, and to pursue them further, both quantitatively and conceptually. As a result, the writer was able to speak about legitimation-delegitimation processes in a way hitherto unavailable to him.

Some results.--For example, the writer discovered, and was able to specify the reasons for, the fact that, although the five major conclusions were supported as a group, nevertheless, conclusions three, four, and five were strongly supported, whereas conclusions one and two were so weakly supported as to be left in doubt. This discovery sets the last three conclusions in bold relief as the solid ground in which the legitimacy of the status quo is entrenched. As an aid to further speculation (not demonstrable proof) and conceptualization, and as a clue to the workings of legitimation and delegitimation, the writer also was able to determine specific margins and ratios of support, ambivalence, or opposition.

Moreover, the writer was able to detect what he labelled as a delegitimation perceptual convergence, on the one hand, constituted of the LIFE SITUATION categories of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES, and a legitimation perceptual convergence, on the other hand, combining the LIFE SITUATION categories of THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and IDEAS. These patterns will be described in due course.

Further, it became possible for the writer to determine that there is reason to believe that support among the philosophical and intellectual beliefs of the status quo increases as the level of generality of the belief increases, and that ambivalence or opposition tend to be more present as the philosophical belief becomes more specific.

Again, the writer found and described what he believes may be major delegitimation associational components among the three variables. These are the perceptual categories of TIME and PEOPLE, the Philosophical Presuppositions about Man, and the practical value of austerity. The presence of any of these components, especially in combination, lends itself to the greater likelihood of delegitimation processes taking place.

Thus, the research design provides a way of talking with greater specificity and interrelated detail than was possible heretofore about legitimation-delegitimation processes and effects within the status quo belief system (the writer believes). This is perhaps one major contribution which can be made by the research design at this point. It may be discovered, for example, that the researcher's choice of verbal symbols for the code list, or his particular formulation of the five major conclusions as a symbolic representation of the status quo belief system, or his scoring of the code list in reference to those five propositions,--that any or all of these matters might vary greatly from the way other analysts would construe the same

subject matter. This is understandable, since the writer has been engaged in a speculative venture.

Nonetheless, if the research design can simply provide a way of discussing legitimacy-delegitimacy which would be appropriated by a community of social science thinkers, and if this study can merely illustrate potential methods of discussion, and thereby open up new ramifications and avenues for exploration, then it will have served its purpose irregardless of the final status of the writer's own particular conclusions.

Special problems and limitations.--It is pertinent at this point to take note of some particular limitations of the research design and its scoring method. One of the chief limitations of the research design rests in the fact that the code list and its 150 cells are so constructed that each cell with its particular verbal symbol is used to express all three variables. Each cell, to be sure, represents its own individual combination of components from among the three variables--i.e., a combination not repeated by any other cell. Nevertheless, it became necessary, when selecting verbal symbols to fill each cell, to seek familiar concepts which came nearest to representing the unique combination of variable components for each cell.

This selection process was a meticulous and demanding task due to the necessity of representing all three variables in each verbal symbol. Yet, the results could cause important questions to be raised about the validity of both the code list and the findings based upon

the scoring of it. Even so, the alternative would have been to devise a separate code list for each variable,--a gigantic undertaking which at best would have fulfilled only secondary or tertiary objectives of this study. Nevertheless, the development of three separate code lists, one for each variable, probably would have resulted in the means for more rigorous assurances of the validity of the results.

However, this unquestionably desirable goal was overruled as being secondary to a more central thrust of this project--that of conceptualizing and illustrating in some detail the characteristics of comprehensiveness and interrelated complexity at work within the social contextual whole. This latter purpose was one of the prime objectives of the writer.[1]

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[1]Here the writer has followed the conceptual lead of R. Buckminster Fuller who talks about comprehensive anticipatory design science, and the comprehensive minimum-maximum family of universally variable factors. Fuller says in part that

> ". . . comprehensive anticipatory design science might be applied . . . to the larger question of how we can make life on earth a general success for all men instead of assuming negatively that success and even prolonged survival were for the rare and fortunate few. I felt strongly that there might be a day when society would need to state its objective in just that way. I found myself working toward comprehensive strategies and capabilities which brought me to the only truly generalized and, therefore, most powerful tool of all, and that was mathematics itself. . . ." (The italics are Fuller's.)

Fuller's Education Automation: Freeing the Scholar to Return to His Studies, Foreword by Charles D. Tenney (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 64. (Hereinafter referred to as Education Automation.) See also his Ideas and Integrities, A Spontaneous Autobiographical Disclosure, ed. by Robert W. Marks (New York: Collier Books, The Macmillan Company, 1972), and his Utopia or Oblivion: The Prospects for Humanity (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1972).

Consequently, the price was paid of using only one code list, and thereby employing fewer controls for the validity of the final results. This price was borne in order to obtain, within the limits of the resources, time and intellectual energy available to the writer, greater visibility within the research design of more comprehensive interrelated complexity of the linguistic lifeways within the core culture. At the same time, this complexity was rendered both comprehensible and manageable, the writer believes, in terms of the patterns created through the interaction of the three variables among themselves and through their subsequent impact upon the five major conclusions.

The previous paragraph describes a trade-off in which the writer intentionally engaged. He took into consideration the fact that it would be possible in additional follow-up research efforts to pursue selected specialized aspects further. I.e., one could elect to analyze either the first, second, or third variable in greater depth and to devote his research design to inculcating greater controls for and assurances of demonstrable validity.

The Application of the Scoring System to Analysis: Tables 8-11

With these factors taken into account, the application of the scoring system and the results obtained from it may now be considered with greater sagacious equanimity. It has been established that the 150 cells of the code list, when scored for their dispositions towards the five major conclusions, create a universe of 750 legitimacy-

delegitimacy points which can be distributed throughout the three legitimacy-delegitimacy categories of support, ambivalence, and opposition. The distribution of these points may be organized and analyzed primarily either in terms of the components of each of the three variables, in terms of the five major conclusions, or in terms of the totals for the legitimacy-delegitimacy categories of support, ambivalence, and opposition. However, all three of these analytical options are a matter of focus and emphasis, since the organizational intricacies of any one of them imply and involve the presence of the other two. This is a consequence of the complex wholeness of the research design itself.[1]

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[1]"Complex wholeness in research design" is a characteristic of "General Systems Theory" as developed by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, a biologist. He discovered that there were comprehensive system behaviors in nature unpredicted by the behaviors of the systems' components, a phenomenon known to scientists as "synergy." Von Bertalanffy, along with other mathematicians who had discovered synergy in the theories of games began to discover that there were complex patterns which could never be apprehended, understood, operated on, or dealt with if we approached them only in terms of their separate elements.

This development is paralleled, it seems to me, by Jordan's insight that the various corporate lives of men are actually various forms of individuality. Thus, Jordan is able to say in terms that Von Bertalanffy likely would have understood, that "social reality is continuous with and a continuation of the reality as individual, and that the individual-social conflict arises because of a mistaken conception of the type of ends that are appropriate to the means that are given in nature." This interpretation leads Jordan to conclude that "mind is a matter of ordered fact. This is a metaphysical result in that mind is itself the only principle of ultimate order."

On Von Bertalanffy see Fuller, Education Automation, p. 66. See also Jordan, Forms, pp. 162-63.

The first of these three analytical approaches just named, that of organizing the data in terms of the components of each of the three variables, and the second approach, namely, showing the data in terms of the five major conclusions, is illustrated in Tables 8-10. Analysis according to the third option, in terms of the gross scores of the legitimation-delegitimation categories, is illustrated in Table 11.

In Table 8 the distribution of the legitimation-delegitimation scores is given by each of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (the first variable) for each of the five major conclusions. Table 9 offers the same kind of tabulations of scores by the Philosophical Presuppositions (the second variable) for each of the five major conclusions, whereas the calculations for support, ambivalence, and opposition by means of the practical values (the third variable) for the five major conclusions may be found in Table 10.

In each of the tables just mentioned the analysis for the respective variable was conducted on the basis of the entire scoring universe composed of 750 points. E.g., in Table 8 there are six components (IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME), each having a total of 25 points (for 25 cells in the code list) to be allocated to support, ambivalence, or opposition for each conclusion. Six components multiplied by 25 points each equals 150 total points allocated by the six components for each conclusion. When this total

for each conclusion is multiplied by the five major conclusions, the total equals 750.

Similar calculations pertain also to the respective characteristics of Tables 9 and 10, with the result that the totals for each of these tables also is 750.

In order to calculate the proportions of legitimation-delegitimation for the total symbolic status quo belief system in terms of support, ambivalence, and opposition, irrespective of the distribution of scores towards each of the five major conclusions, the total scores for these categories from Tables 8-10 may be added respectively and displayed for each of the three variables. This results in a grand total of 2,250 points (3 x 750). The gross variable totals for either support, ambivalence, or opposition may then be compared to the grand total of 2,250 points in order to discern the relative proportions of support, ambivalence, and opposition. The results of such calculations appear in Table 11.

Before the reader turns to the data in Tables 8-10, a look at the summary data in Table 11 may prove instructive. Table 11 displays the total scores of the three variables as tabulated for support, ambivalence, and opposition. It serves as a quick indice to the level of support perceived by the writer to be given by the status quo core culture to its own perceptual, philosophical, and practical operating rationales. As against a total possible level of support of 2,250 points--a perfect score--the status quo is judged to have amassed

within its own ranks a support level of 1,212 points, or 54 percent of the total. On the other hand opposition of all kinds from within the core culture's ranks accounted for only 285 points, or 13 percent of the total. This is a relation of support to opposition in a ratio of approximately four to one. However, internal ambivalence within the core culture belief system accounted for 753 points--33 percent, or one-third, of the total. Interestingly, ambivalence and opposition jointly accounted for 46 percent of the total points.

Clues Versus Validity (and Additional Research)

The validity of these and subsequent figures cannot be demonstrated at this point. However, the numerical results of this effort may serve as clues (as contrasted with demonstrable validity) to significant indicators of the types and levels of legitimacy and delegitimacy experienced within the dominant core culture. Additional research is needed along specific lines to verify or reject the speculative conclusions reached in this essay. Further, the clues uncovered in this first effort call attention to certain areas in which further possibly fruitful investigations could be made. These will be noted following the discussion of the data yielded by Tables 8, 9, and 10.

In the meantime it is perhaps pertinent to observe that, concerning the distribution of collective scores in Table 11, a shift of only 5 percent of the scores from the support column's 54 percentage points (1,212 raw score) to ambivalence or opposition would then result in the internal support for the core culture finding itself no longer in the majority.

It is also pertinent at this juncture to contemplate that the actual shifting of such a narrow margin could indeed easily be accounted for by any one of several factors. Assuming for the moment that there could be some objective validity to the researcher's numerical evaluations, even so, it is granted that the isolated and somewhat subjective nature of the researcher's efforts make it highly possible that the investigator could have erred by five percentage points or more in either direction. Five percent is by no means a large margin for error, even if the speculative nature of the project is overlooked.[1]

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[1]To be sure, the reader can and should question what the relative distribution of scores really means. It could mean, for example, that the writer simply drafted propositions which collectively are supported by only 54 percent of the life-ways as revealed in the familiar language patterns of western culture (and as reflected by the writer's own selected representative list in Appendix A, and subsequently coded for legitimacy-delegitimacy value in Appendix B), whereas, if the writer had drawn the five differently, or, indeed, had formulated some other five propositions with totally different subject matter, then perhaps a supporting score of 65 percent or 75 percent or more could have been achieved. This is to say, then, that the first indication of the scores may not be that they measure levels of support within the mores of the culture, but that they measure the writer's accuracy of perception and reporting, as well as his selectivity of subject matter.

However, these objections may be answered in the following ways. First, the formulation of propositions based on other subject matter would have been irrelevant to the interests of this study. It was precisely the subject matter of these five propositions which were largely the reasons for the study. Further, the objective of the study was not to find whatever proposition could enjoy the highest degree of support within the status quo's language and other lifeways. For example, had some combination of statements been selected which could have been tested to produce, say, 85 percent to 95 percent support, this would likely only infer that those statements were somewhat innocuous and inconsequential as indices for the legitimacy-delegitimacy

On the other hand, if the collective scores and their respective perdentage relationships are taken at face value, then such a possible critical shift of five percentage points or more could be accounted for suddenly by means of rapidly changing events in or surrounding the dominant core culture--e.g., a swift acceleration of inflation, a flurry of new political scandals in high places among one or more major powers at approximately the same time, or massive crop failures and consequent famine in economically marginal parts of the

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of the presumed "central core" of beliefs regarded as essential to the maintenance of existing political traditions.

Indeed, virtually all the literary sources utilized in this project, whether academic or otherwise, surely indicate that western value systems generally are sustaining severe stresses and internal conflicts. Assuredly, numerous portions of the narrative in Part IV of this chapter pinpointed and described the nature of many of these conflicts. What may appear surprising to many observers is not that the 46 percent of the familiar verbal symbols reflect either doubt or opposition to the five major conclusions, but that 54 percent are judged to show solid support. This figure undoubtedly will seem too high to many confirmed students of social change, and, as such, it reflects the somewhat cautious and conservative nature of the writer's findings.

For these reasons, the writer is willing to speculate, for all the reasons given in the preceding pages, that the figures generated by the use and application of the research design which has been described in this chapter--that these figures and the ratios between them serve, at the very least, as significant clues to the workings of legitimation-delegitimation processes within the established core culture itself.

Therefore, in all that follows, the writer will speculate on what results might reasonably be predicted, if the scores displayed in Tables 8-11 could be accepted as valid. This approach will permit the narrative to be completed and the full scope of the experimental research method to be demonstrated without the need for additional disclaimers on this point. Henceforth, the stated qualifications of both the method and the data will simply be assumed and the report completed without further apology.

world which in turn make a drain on the food stores of the "have" nations. Indeed, since the period of time represented by the verbal symbols in this study extends from 1945 to 1974 (with an emphasis particularly on the last seven years), it is indeed possible if not highly probable that the internal support for the core cultures of western civilization already has suffered the loss of five or more percentage points to the ambivalence and opposition columns.[1]

A reminder is in order, however, to the effect that even democratically-ruled regimes have been able to sustain themselves with minority support, as long as the opposition was neither well-organized nor intolerably hostile.[2] It would seem particularly important, however, to watch the ratios between support and opposition, and at the same time not to discount the potential or actual delegitimating effect of the ambivalent influences upon the core culture.

The Mechanics of Tables 8-11

In this vein, it seems pertinent to note, concerning Tables 8-10, that when the raw scores are analyzed into their respective components, some soft spots in the status quo's support of its own rationales may be detected. (On the other hand, some veritably

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[1]Loss of support for established authorities is a recurrent journalistic topic. See, for example, Edmund S. Muskie, "Crisis of Confidence," San Antonio Express, Apr. 12, 1974, p. 19. See also James J. Kilpatrick, "Why Public Confidence Is Lacking," San Antonio Express, Apr. 1, 1974, p. 16.

[2]See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

impenetrable supporting belief "clusters" within the system also may be detected.) Before attention is given to these data, it is useful to gain some understanding of the "mechanics" of the tables and how they function.

Each table displays the legitimacy-delegitimacy scores of support, ambivalence, and opposition from one of the three variables (either the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS as in Table 8, the Philosophical Presuppositions as in Table 9, or the practical values as in Table 10) which affect the language of the status quo, and each table also reveals the individual legitimacy-delegitimacy scores of each component in the variable as tabulated for each of the five major conclusions about the status quo.

The scores, as given in terms of the variable components, are arranged horizontally (in strands reading from left to right), whereas they are displayed vertically (in columns reading from top to bottom) as they apply to the five major conclusions. As a result of the horizontal and vertical grid, the reader may locate the individual score of any component for any of the five conclusions, as well as for any of the components of the three variables.

As a result of this arrangement the subtotals for each of the legitimacy-delegitimacy categories (support, ambivalence, and opposition) from each of the VARIABLE COMPONENTS (e.g., IDEAS as in Table 8, or Metaphysics as in Table 9, or objectivity as in Table 10) are located at the bottom of each column. On the other hand, the subtotals as classified by the five conclusions may be found on the right-

hand side of the tables. As shown in the bottom strand ("TOTALS"), the subtotals for each variable component in Table 8, for example, equal 125, and as indicated by the last column, the subtotal scores for each conclusion equal 150. The total of all scores in the Table is 750.

The total scores for Tables 9 and 10 also each amount to 750 (see the extreme right-hand column of each table, bottom strand). However, the totals for any component in these latter two tables equal 150 each (instead of 125 as in Table 8), while the totals in the extreme right-hand columns also still come to 150 (as in Table 8).

By scanning, first, the subtotals, and second, the local scores displayed inside the body of each of the tables 8-10, one can easily identify areas in which strong support exists within the status quo belief system for its own perceptual, conceptual, or practical rationales; and conversely, one may detect areas wherein these same rationales are challenged by trends within the culture's own language.

The Usefulness of the Tables

Once these characteristics of the tables are understood, the reader may discover that he now possesses a most useful tool, not only to assess the proportions of legitimacy and delegitimacy within the conceptual system of the traditionally established political culture, but to pinpoint exact locations on the conceptual map where the traditional ground is being held effectively and where serious challenges to traditional ground are being mounted elsewhere.

Score Clusters for the Variable Components

The reader may accomplish the purposes just stated by means of a few simple steps in his use of Tables 8-10. First, by scanning the subtotals (both horizontally and vertically), and second, by scanning the individual scores (in the main body of the tables) which are displayed in Tables 8-10, one can easily identify areas in which strong support exists within the status quo belief system for its perceptual, or practical rationales; and conversely, one may detect areas wherein these same rationales are challenged by trends within the status quo's own language network.

In this manner it can be ascertained that strong support exists at specific points along the conceptual map. Thus, if the reader will scan the subtotals along the bottom of the horizontal columns of Table 8 he will find that the largest of all scores is 103 (col. 10), which is the combined support score of the status quo's perception of THINGS for all five major conclusions.

The reader also may have noticed that the smallest subtotal score is 0 (col. 12). This is the combined opposition score of the status quo's perception of THINGS for all five major conclusions. This score of 0 combines with the ambivalence score about THINGS--a score of 22--found in the subtotal of column 11 in order to form the counterpart of the support score just cited. Thus, the three scores in the subtotals for columns 10-12 form a cluster which tells a complete story about the legitimacy-delegitimacy dynamics of the status

quo perceptions of THINGS in relation to the five major conclusions. Concisely stated, there are at least four items of information conveyed by this "score cluster" for THINGS:

1. THINGS perceptions account for the strongest support of any life situation component--more than four-fifths of all possible points in its category (103/125, or 82 percent).

2. Opposition to the five major conclusions by status quo perceptions of THINGS appears to be nonexistent. (0)

3. Ambivalence or doubt about the five major conclusions is only tacitly encouraged by perceptions of THINGS within the status quo world, as it appeared in fewer than one out of five of all possible cases (22 of 125, or 21.3 percent).

4. The ratio of support to nonsupport among THINGS perceptions is 4.68 to 1 (based on the relation of the figures just quoted--125 to 22), an overwhelming margin which greatly tends to legitimize the status quo rationales stated in the five major conclusions.

Significant information can be acquired from other score clusters in the same manner. E.g., the score cluster for PEOPLE (Table 8) posts a slight victory for ambivalence, as doubt overshadows support by 57 to 50, while opposition emphasizes the delegitimizing tendencies by supplementing ambivalence to augment nonsupport with an additional 18 points (col. 6).

An illustration of a powerful delegitimizing cluster in Table 8 can be seen in the subtotal scores for TIME (cols. 16-18). Here opposition overwhelms support by almost two to one (47 to 25), and the

delegitimating result is augmented by an even greater proportion of ambivalence (53).

Score Clusters for the Five Major Conclusions

The subtotals for the five major conclusions appearing in columns 19-21 along the right-hand side of Table 8 also yield some insights about legitimation-delegitimation relationships. In the first strand the scores for the first of the five major conclusions shows opposition outscoring ambivalence by 74 to 52 while opposition posted only 24 points. Nevertheless, the combination of ambivalence and opposition produce a total of 76 nonsupport points, which places the legitimacy of the first conclusion by the status quo in doubt.

In the second strand ambivalence outscores support by 63 to 61. This fact alone is sufficient to characterize the second conclusion in terms of ambivalence rather than support and solid legitimacy. Moreover, the addition of 26 more points from opposition augments the nonsupport margin to a convincing 89 to 61.

For conclusions three, four and five, however, support registers safe margins over both ambivalence and opposition to place these three propositions securely within positions of legitimacy by the status quo.

Tables 8 and 12-19--Massaging the Data on the First Variable: The LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS and the Five Major Conclusions

Hopefully, these brief examples provide useful illustrations indicating how Tables 8-10 may be used to detect significant clues to

the processes of legitimation and delegitimation. In order to lend thorough assistance to the reader in his analysis of the data, the writer prepared several additional tables which systematically abstract pertinent data from Tables 8-10. The first group of tables, Tables 12-19, offer arrangements of data abstracted from Table 8.

Tables 12-19: Massaging the Data

Table 12 indicates the specific subtotal score clusters in Table 8 in which strong support appears. These score clusters are displayed in Table 12 in order of their rank by strength of support, and the respective ratios of support to nonsupport (ambivalence and opposition) are indicated. Finally, for purposes of verification by means of the data in Table 8, the last column in Table 12 indicates the columns in Table 8 wherein the specific scores cited may be located.

Table 12 and others to follow in this chapter, and the data displayed by them, serve as aids to speculations about the cultural activities within the status quo belief system in several ways. First, based on Table 8 and its supporting Tables 12-19, partial characterizations can be made concerning the extent, degree and kinds of legitimation and delegitimation which have taken place and presumably continue to take place within the conceptual fabric of the status quo of contemporary western civilization. These partial characterizations subsequently will be supplemented and, for purposes of this study, completed by means of a similar brief analysis of the data appearing

TABLE 12.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 8 by Variable Components (LIFE SITUATION)

Variable Components	Relationships				
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 8 Subtotals in These Columns
THINGS	1	103	22	4.68:1	10-12
IDEAS	2	81	44	1.84:1	1-3
ORGANIZATIONS	3	79	46	1.41:1	13-15
PLACES	4	66	59	1.12:1	4-6

TABLE 13.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 8 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships					
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 8 See: These Cols. & Strands	
4	1	92	58	1.59:1	19-21	4
3	2	89	61	1.46:1	19-21	3
5	3	88	62	1.42:1	19-21	5

TABLE 14.--Showing the Strong Opposition Relationships in Table 8 by Variable Components (LIFE SITUATION)

Variable Component	Relationships				
	Rank of Opposition Strength	Opposition Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 8 Subtotals in These Columns
TIME	1 (& only)	47	25	1.88:1	16 & 18

TABLE 15.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 8 by Variable Components (LIFE SITUATION)

Variable Component	Relationships				
	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Non-support Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 8 Subtotals in These Columns
PEOPLE	1 (& only)	75	50	1.50:1	3-5

TABLE 16.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 8 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships					
	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Non-support Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 8 See: These Cols. & Strands	
2	1	89	61	1.46:1	19-21	2
1	2	76	74	1.03:1	19-21	1

TABLE 17.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 8 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships					
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 8 See These Cols. & Strands	
3	THINGS	1	24	1	24.00:1	10-12	3
4	IDEAS	2	23	2	11.05:1	1-3	4
3	IDEAS	3	22	3	7.33:1	1-3	3
1	THINGS	4 (Tie)	21	4	5.25:1	10-12	1
4	THINGS	4 (Tie)	21	4	5.25:1	10-12	4
2	THINGS	6 (Tie)	19	6	3.17:1	10-12	2
3	ORGAN'S.	6 (Tie)	19	6	3.17:1	13-15	3
5	THINGS	8	18	7	2.57:1	10-12	5
4	PEOPLE	9 (Tie)	17	8	2.13:1	4-6	4
1	PLACES	9 (Tie)	17	8	2.13:1	7-9	1
4	ORGAN'S.	9 (Tie)	17	8	2.13:1	13-15	4
5	ORGAN'S.	9 (Tie)	17	8	2.13:1	13-15	5
5	PEOPLE	13 (Tie)	15	10	1.50:1	4-6	5
5	PLACES	13 (Tie)	15	10	1.50:1	7-9	5
2	ORGAN'S.	15	14	11	1.27:1	13-15	2
5	IDEAS	16	13	12.	1.08:1	1-3	5

TABLE 18.--Showing the Strong Opposition Relationships in Table 8 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships					
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Opposition Strength	Opposition Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 8 See These Cols. & Strands	
4	TIME	1	14	3	4.70:1	16 & 18	4
2	TIME	2	9	2	4.50:1	16 & 18	2
2	PEOPLE	3	6	2	3.00:1	4 & 6	2
1	TIME	4	11	4	2.75:1	16 & 18	3
3	TIME	5	11	6	1.83:1	16 & 18	3

TABLE 19.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 8 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships					
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Ambivalence Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 8 See These Cols. & Strands	
3	PEOPLE	1	18	7	2.57:1	4-6	3
1	PEOPLE	2	16	9	1.78:1	4-6	1
5	TIME	3	15	10	1.50:1	16-18	5
1	IDEAS	4 (Tie)	14	11	1.27:1	7-9	3
3	PLACES	4 (Tie)	14	11	1.27:1	7-9	3
4	PLACES	4 (Tie)	14	11	1.27:1	7-9	4
2	IDEAS	7 (Tie)	13	12	1.08:1	1-3	2
2	PLACES	7 (Tie)	13	12	1.08:1	7-9	2
1	ORGAN'S.	7 (Tie)	13	12	1.08:1	13-15	1

for the remaining two major variables, the Philosophical Presuppositions and the practical values. This is the data showing in Tables 9 and 10, which already have been displayed.

The significance of Table 12 is that it shows strong support contributed by four of the six components of the LIFE SITUATION perceptual modes.

Similarly, Table 13 illustrates the support information from Table 8 in relation to the five major conclusions.

By the same token, strong opposition exists whenever its subtotals at the bottom of a column or within the right-hand margin of a table exceed the scores for support in relation to the same variable component or major conclusion. In Table 8 there is only one example of this situation showing in the subtotals. It occurs in the case of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENT of TIME, and the relationship is illustrated in Table 14.

By way of contrast with Table 14, there was no occurrence of strong opposition by means of major conclusions; thus, no table is necessary since there are no data.

In addition to strong support which is a condition illustrating cultural legitimation, and strong opposition, which is a condition pointing to cultural delegitimation, there is a third effect yet to be described. This is the condition of strong ambivalence. It exists whenever strong support and strong opposition both fail to occur, with the result that either ambivalence alone or the combination of ambivalence and opposition together succeed in outscoring support (and when

opposition was unable to do so alone). The frequency of occurrences of this effect and the analysis of their respective relationships are given in Tables 15 and 16.

On a less generalized and more localized level, other legitimation-delegitimation pivotal points are apparent within the main body of Table 8. These more specific localized effects are in evidence as smaller scores which are elements of the various subtotals already described, and which show the combined relations of specific situational component scores intersecting (or influencing) each of the major conclusion scores. Occurrences of these localized effects and their relationships are illustrated in Tables 17, 18, and 19.

Analyzing the Subtotal Score Clusters: Tables 12-16

The writer's following observations concerning Tables 12-19 will touch on some of the more prominent features apparent within the cultural fabric as they have been revealed by the linguistic model in the research design.

First, it is evident from Table 12 that the cultural perception of the nature, function, and purpose of THINGS serves as a virtually impenetrable bastion of supporting strength for the legitimacy of the status quo, as measured by the five major conclusions about the status quo reported in this chapter. As a source of perceptual support, westerners' sensual relation to THINGS might well be regarded as the pivotal point of legitimacy for the core culture of western civilization, for this sensual support, which can be said to occur at

a subliminal level generally out of sight from the conscious mind, is more than twice as strong proportionate to the opposition (almost five to one) as any of the other three supporting perceptions (IDEAS, ORGANIZATIONS, and PLACES--all less than two to one).

Yet, the legitimizing effect of perceptions of THINGS does not stand alone. The significance of Table 12 lies in the fact that it illustrates four of the six perceptual modes to be in support of the status quo.

This network of involuntary, culturally conditioned, subliminal support also may be analytically dissected in terms of the allocation of support of the rationales enjoyed by the five major conclusions. I.e., perceptual support may be cross-referenced with the modus operandi of the status quo to determine which of these rationales benefit the most and which ones benefit the least from the support generated by the westerner's habits of perception. It does not follow, for example, that all five major conclusions will receive the support contributed by status quo perceptual modes, or receive it in equal measure. Indeed, as Table 13 has shown, only three of the five propositions enjoyed clear margins of support. These were the last three of the five propositions, leaving conclusions number one and two in doubt, as indicated by Table 16.

Although the relative support attributed to the final three conclusions was fairly evenly distributed--approximately one and a half times the amount of opposition to the same conclusions--nevertheless the fourth major conclusion gained the greatest degree of

support (1.59:1), and conclusion number five received the smallest amount of support among the three conclusions affirmed (1.42:1 for conclusion number five; compare with a ratio of 1.46:1 for conclusion number three).

Translated into operational statements, if the validity and accuracy of the data could be assumed, these figures would mean that status quo perceptional modes predispose westerners most strongly towards the highly individualistic and competitive view of human personality. It also means they tend to believe that corporate institutions are merely tools for subjective personalities and institutions, and that such institutions are easily manageable by them. As a cluster of IDEAS these two rationales--individualistic man and easily manageable institutions--are more strongly supported by the life situation components than is any other stated rationale in the five major conclusions.

However, the margin of difference in support as compared to that enjoyed by conclusions three and five is so slight that it is probably not significant. In any case, based on clues provided by our data, we may speculate that elites and their constituencies in western culture, due to their perceptual propinquities, all tend to accept, and therefore to legitimize, the following rationales which are expressed in the third and fifth propositions:

Regarding Conclusion Number Three (ranking second in terms of Support Strength):

--Man is primarily a "bundle of instincts," a "producer," a "consumer" and individual men are merely numerous individual "atoms of society."

--Society is composed of subjectively-defined, exclusive, self-seeking individuals, whose relations with other individuals are external and competitive.

--The solution to such competition and the way to hold Society together is to satisfy needs and wants of individuals with increased productivity, and

--When necessary, to suppress the competition.

Regarding Conclusion Number Five (ranking third in terms of Support Strength):

--Evolutionary and primitivistic models of human personality are affirmed.

--"Might makes right," in the final analysis.

--"Proper" ORGANIZATIONS are based on hierarchies, chains-of-command, permanency, stability, economies-of-scale, and efficiency.

--The State is and should be a power center, external to man.

--The State balances interests.

--The State manipulates "wants" and "needs" of PEOPLE in accordance with the needs of the military-industrial complex.

--When the industrial complex is well off, PEOPLE are well off (even if force is a function of the system).

Thus, we may now speculate with some reason, conclusions three, four, and five represent the "solid ground" upon which the legitimacy of the status quo has been held during the last quarter-century. The margin by which this ground is being held is neither impenetrable nor formidable, but based on the data at hand it is adequate and viable.

Nevertheless, as indicated by the data, the status quo's hold upon its own legitimacy is not entirely thoroughgoing. It is therefore pertinent to give attention to some significant areas of opposition and ambivalence from within the core culture's own ranks.

As indicated by Table 14, TIME was the only one of the six LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS, or perceptual modes, which registered predominant opposition to the rationales of the status quo. With an opposition versus support score of 47 to 25, TIME perceptions within the central core of values resist the five major conclusions as a whole by almost two to one (the ratio is actually 1.88:1). The possible reasons for this condition will be speculated on more fully in subsequent chapters. Suffice it here to note that this situation constitutes perhaps the most serious assault upon the status quo from within the central core values themselves, as far as perceptual modes are concerned. As such, then, the need to deal with the westerner's sense of the meaning, nature, and purpose of TIME should constitute the greatest source of concern for those desiring to "hold the line" on traditional values. Conversely, the mystery of TIME offers to

prime movers and catalysts of change perhaps their greatest strategic resource for delegitimating the traditional values as a prelude to gaining prospective legitimacy for alternative values, whether such alternative values happen to be introduced by said change agents themselves or not.

It is significant, however, to note that, in spite of this internal assault upon the status quo by means of perceptual modes associated with experiences of TIME, nevertheless, none of the five major conclusions was actually rejected by the status quo verbal symbols studied here. Conclusions one and two were indeed characterized by ambivalence rather than support, and these will receive comment shortly.

But for purposes of speculation in this study, an important distinction is recognized between ambivalence and opposition. Opposition constitutes an actual condition of delegitimation, whereas ambivalence does not. Ambivalence, on the other hand, is important as a category which reveals a fluid area of conceptual and perceptual activity in which processes of consolidation of existing legitimacy, or erosion of that legitimacy, or introduction of opposing values, whether tacitly or more aggressively introduced, all may be taking place either alternately or simultaneously.

Consequently, it is of interest to focus on the two modes by which ambivalence is revealed through the research method. The first mode, ambivalence by means of the LIFE SITUATION VARIABLE COMPONENT of PEOPLE, was brought into focus through Table 15. This table reveals

that PEOPLE is the only perceptual mode reflecting doubt in general about the five major conclusions. The ratio of the doubt generated is 1.50:1 or one and a half to one. This qualifies the subliminal cultural ways of perceiving PEOPLE as a significant holdout against the modus operandi of the status quo. While not actively in opposition, western ways of viewing PEOPLE can be the occasion for considerable foot-dragging in the implementation of the core culture's central rationales. This may be and probably is reflected in the conflict which frequently emerges in the form of public needs versus private rights.[1]

The second mode by which ambivalence surfaces between the perceptual categories and the major conclusions is from the position of the major conclusions themselves. Although none of these central propositions was actually rejected by the perceptual modes taken as a whole, as indicated in Table 16 both the first and second conclusions sustained greater ambivalence than support. Of these two, the second conclusion attracted more uncertainty than the first (a ratio of 1.46:1 for conclusion number two and a ratio of 1.03:1 for conclusion number one). Whereas doubt was about one and a half times as great as support in conclusion number two, in conclusion number one ambivalence was only slightly more than equal to the support.

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[1]This issue has arisen, during the time of this writing, in the form of domestic spying by the CIA in the United States. See "Guilty CIA Plea Reported," Associated Press, San Antonio Express-News, Jan. 1, 1975, p. 1.

The writer understands these clues to mean that, subject to validation by additional research, the status quo itself, with the aid of opposition by TIME perceptions and uncertainty created by PEOPLE perceptions,--the status quo itself harbors doubts about the following cluster of characteristics within the status quo modus operandi:

Regarding Conclusion Number Two (ranking first in terms of Ambivalence Strength:

--A "scientific epistemology" which emphasizes objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

--The necessity and desirability of the increased growth and power of public and private bureaucracies.

Regarding Conclusion Number One (ranking second in terms of Ambivalence Strength):

--Mechanical and evolutionary models of reality.

--A continuous increase in the gross national product is regarded as man's highest good.

When one considers the source of opposition and ambivalence among the LIFE SITUATION PERCEPTIONS, and then contemplates the particular major conclusions which are most affected by this disaffection, an interesting syndrome of polarized tensions begins to come into focus. On one side of the pole may be found the perceptions about TIME and PEOPLE, which are responsible for the greatest amount of perceptual recalcitrance. Juxtaposed against these are the characteristics of the first and second major conclusions, namely, mechanical and

evolutionary models of reality, the increase of gross national products in western culture, science and the scientific method, and the spread of bureaucracy.

Analyzing the Local Element Score Clusters: Tables 17-19

These are powerful clues to the possibility that a brooding enmity may be seething, indeed, may already have broken into civil warfare, within the status quo, between the more explicitly human values (PEOPLE), particularly as these relate to the mystery of TIME (and perhaps more latently of eternity) on the one hand, and the values of science, bureaucracy, and materialism, on the other hand.

These observations may be supplemented, and some additional clues obtained, by means of a cursory survey of the results of the individual scores (local elements) summarized in Tables 17-19. Even a few observations on the more obvious characteristics may prove to be instructive.

For example, Table 17, which exhibits the strong support relationships among LIFE EXPERIENCE COMPONENTS, reveals an interesting phenomenon. Among the sixteen local elements in the table which are ranked according to their degree of support, the six strongest in terms of support strength form an imposing cluster composed of only two perceptual modes--THINGS and IDEAS. Among the major conclusions named as having been directly affected by these individual scores, conclusion number three appears in two of the three top positions--ranks one and three; and conclusion number four also appears twice--

in ranks two and five. Conclusions number one and two, the only two conclusions not receiving outright support from the six components of life situations, receive honorable mention by appearing in ranks four and six.

ORGANIZATIONS, PEOPLE, AND PLACES are distributed throughout the remaining ranks (and THINGS and IDEAS are each mentioned once more), whereas TIME, the perennial source of opposition to the status quo, as expected, is not mentioned at all.

This quick survey serves to accentuate a clue to delegitimation in contemporary western culture, which clue has existed implicitly among preceding observations of the data; however, it is useful now to identify this aspect explicitly: namely, it appears that one of the strongest combinations of support (and legitimacy) within the status quo occurs by means of the culture's endorsement of the third and fourth major conclusions through its perceptions of IDEAS and THINGS.

By reviewing the description of the data in Part IV of this chapter, one may be reminded that in the status quo the nature and function of IDEAS is highly utilitarian and pragmatic, i.e., materialistic, while the nature of material THINGS is that they are autonomous, requiring no additional or external point-of-reference to be understood, and that their purpose is to serve as "wares" for man.

Table 17 indicates that these perspectives are the major perceptual sources of legitimacy for the characteristics in conclusions number three and four--e.g., that the way to hold Society together

is to embark on providing endless satisfaction of individual needs and wants; to restrain unruly competition by force when these measures fail; and that corporate institutions are merely tools for subjective personalities and are easily manageable by them.

After pondering this particular congeries of somewhat random propositions which were brought together into an important relation that is visible and articulable as a result of our research design and method, a reader might, if he were disposed to indulge himself in oversimplifications, reduce these ostensible key operating rationales of the status quo into a slogan. There is often a certain value in conundrums and slogans. As politicians know, they may serve as easily memorable code phrases to represent somewhat complex political ideologies. Political slogans may also function as rallying cries for the reaffirmation of particular, well-established, and often deep-rooted points of view within the culture (or subculture).[1] Following the perusal of the propositions associated with the clue just cited, one might be tempted to devise a slogan to describe the most highly legitimized aspects of the status quo as indicated by the ideas contained in conclusions three and four cited in the previous paragraph--a slogan which could run as follows: "The ABC's of pragmatism and materialism are: avarice, bribery and coercion."

Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter III, many critics seem to be arguing that such a slogan is an apt if lamentable, description of

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[1]See Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols, pp. 14-15.

the core culture. Similar slogans, compatible in tone, are often employed by opposing subcultures as battle cries to stir the detractors to action and protestation against the status quo. More will be said about this phenomenon in the next chapter.

As contrasted with the description and analysis of supporting local elements just given, Table 18 shows the opposing local elements abstracted from Table 8. Again, these are arranged in order of "rank of opposition strength."

The notable fact about Table 18 is its revelation that there were only five strong opposition score clusters out of a possible total of thirty. These five opposition clusters contrast sharply with the sixteen support clusters listed in Table 17. This is a clue to the wide extent of the status quo's support as it is distributed throughout the numerous complexities of the social contextual whole.

One major implication here is that if the few clusters of strong opposition can be kept evenly and thinly distributed throughout the cultural fabric,--i.e., to keep them divided and conquered--then no serious threat can be mounted.

Unfortunately for the core network, as Table 18 illustrates, the main clusters of opposition are grouped together under the variable of TIME. This perceptual category is responsible for four out of five occurrences of the strong opposition clusters among local elements. Furthermore, TIME managed to make contact with PEOPLE, which is the most consistent source of ambivalence within the status quo. This conjunction occurs in relation to major conclusion number two and

is responsible for that proposition's failure to gain clear support status (see ranks two and three in Table 18). TIME also was responsible for clinching the defeat of an undisputed support status for conclusion number one as TIME's opposition ratio of 2.75:1 was the margin needed to push this proposition into an ambivalent condition.

Yet, the dispersal effect did seem to work to some extent, since TIME's top-ranking opposition score--14 opposition points to three support points (and an impressive ratio of 4.70:1 as a result)--appears to be wasted on major conclusion number four which is one of the propositions most heavily supported by the status quo. TIME's other remaining opposition score cluster--the fifth-ranking opposition score cluster of 11 points to six (for a respectable ratio of 1.83:1)--also seems to have been misspent on conclusion number three, which proposition also enjoyed a firmly legitimized support status within the status quo (89 support points to 61 nonsupport points; see Table 8, columns 19-21, strand 3).

The nine remaining local elements in Table 8 surfaced as strong ambivalence score clusters. Table 19 displays them in order of their rank of ambivalence strength. A quick glance at the "ratio" column suffices to show that the margin of ambivalence strength is not as impressive as was the case with support strength in Table 17 or opposition strength in Table 18. Nevertheless, the scope of the occurrence of ambivalence--nine clusters out of a possible total of 30--and the distribution (originating among five of the six life

situation components and affecting all five major conclusions) is of some significance.

First, as to the scope of occurrence, if the nine ambivalence clusters are combined with the five opposition clusters, it means that 14 of the 30 life situation local elements (which collectively account for all possible ways that westerners perceive life) are logged in the nonsupport columns. Whereas it is to the advantage of the status quo to keep nonsupport or positive opposition as dispersed as possible, nevertheless, if such soft spots in the legitimation fabric become too pervasive, then presumably the whole system could face disintegration.

Second, concerning the distribution of ambivalence occurrences, TIME, which was already solidly logged as an opposition component within the LIFE SITUATION VARIABLE was named only once as a source of ambivalence. PLACES, on the other hand, was mentioned three times--the most frequently mentioned of all the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS. In this sense, PLACES might be considered to have stood in for TIME as the detractor. This fact may provide a clue to the dynamics of delegitimation in contemporary western culture: to wit, it appears that the closely associated cultural perceptions of TIME and PLACE tend to stand against the extension of the status quo's motifs, even within its own ranks.

On the other hand, THINGS was not mentioned at all as a source of ambivalence. Nor had THINGS occurred as a source of opposition (see Table 18). Thus, status quo proponents appear to be too strongly confirmed in their perceptual habits about THINGS for this perceptual

mode to serve as a source of delegitimation, or perhaps even of change, at present.

However, PEOPLE and IDEAS each are mentioned twice, with PEOPLE occupying the top two positions in order of the rank of ambivalence strength. This might suggest that the culture's perceptual modes of PEOPLE frequently may be added to the conjunction of TIME and PLACE to augment the occurrence and intensity of internal resistance to the status quo. This suggestion is buttressed by the fact that PEOPLE was the only LIFE SITUATION COMPONENT besides TIME to post an opposition score cluster among the local elements (see Table 18).

Based upon these observations, perhaps it is not too early to suggest, further, that what has emerged may amount to a delegitimation perceptual convergence, composed of a combination of perceptions which emphasize the prominence of PEOPLE in TIME and PLACE. That is, when events occur which highlight the insignificance of PEOPLE in relation to questions about the meaning of TIME and PLACE, then support for the belief system of the status quo (as represented by the five major conclusions) tends to be resisted, or at least neutralized. Perceptually speaking, then, the PEOPLE, TIME, and PLACE confluence tends to be a delegitimation perceptual convergence.

Conversely, we may infer (and the data seems to support the inference) that a legitimation perceptual convergence exists also, and it may be juxtaposed in contradistinction to the delegitimation perceptual convergence just described.

This can be identified as the complex of the three remaining life situation components--THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS and IDEAS. In support of this contention, it may be reemphasized that all local elements of THINGS attributed overwhelming support for the five major conclusions (see Table 17). Furthermore, ORGANIZATIONS contributed five (of a possible six) support score clusters to the benefit of the status quo (see Table 17) and just barely received mention in the ambivalence category. (It managed a tie for last place by rank of ambivalence strength, showing a shaky ratio of 1.08:1. I.e., its support strength virtually was as powerful as its ambivalence. See Table 19.) Finally, IDEAS devoted four of its six local elements to the support of the status quo (see Table 17), while receiving mention in the ambivalence category twice (see Table 19) and showing up in the opposition camp not at all (see Table 18). Both of its ambivalence commitments occurred by slim margins (ratios of 1.27:1 and 1.08:1; the latter ratio tied for last place with ORGANIZATIONS and PLACES by rank of ambivalence strength).

This completes the analysis of the data on the six LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS as applied to the five major conclusions in contemporary western culture. The next section of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the data on the five Philosophical Presuppositions as applied to the five major conclusions.

Tables 9 and 20-26--Massaging the Data on the Second Variable: The Philosophical Presuppositions and the Five Major Conclusions

Table 9 exhibits the legitimation-delegitimation scores of support, ambivalence and opposition contributed by each of the five Philosophical Presuppositions to the five major conclusions. The Philosophical Presuppositions constitute the second of the three variables affecting the language of the dominant core culture in contemporary western culture, and its five components have already been identified throughout this chapter as Metaphysics, Epistemology, Society, Man, and The State.

Since there are only five components in this variable instead of six, as was the case with the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS, the body of Table 9 (excluding subtotals and totals, that is) contains only 25 score clusters instead of 30. This means then that there are 25 local elements, as these are identical with the score clusters in the body of the table.

Otherwise Table 9 is constructed on the same format as Table 8. Consequently, one may proceed in the same manner as was the case with Table 8 in order to assess the proportions of legitimacy and delegitimacy within the belief system of the status quo, and to pinpoint exact locations on the conceptual map where these dynamics occur. This was done, it may be recalled, by scanning, first, the subtotals (see strand 6 and also columns 16-18 in Table 9), and second, the individual scores, throughout the body of the table.

As was the case with Table 8, the results of such scanning may be arranged into additional tables in order to massage the data further. Table 20, for example, shows the strong support relationships accounted for by the five variable components (Philosophical Presuppositions).

Similarly, Table 21 illustrates the same support relationship from Table 9 in relation to the five major conclusions.

By contrast with the support data in Table 9 (and Table 20), one may quickly determine by means of the subtotals in the sixth strand of Table 9 that opposition scores failed to equal or exceed support figures for any of the Philosophical Presuppositions or major conclusions. Further, in only one instance did nonsupport outscore support in the Philosophical Presuppositions. This occurred in the score cluster for the Philosophical Presuppositions about Man.

Thus, Table 22 shows Man as the only variable component in Table 9 which demonstrates an ambivalence relationship to the five major conclusions.

However, when ambivalence is analyzed in terms of its distribution among the five major conclusions, the distribution was such as to place the first two of these in the ambivalence relationship. This is illustrated by Table 23. (These are the same two conclusions, it will be recalled, which demonstrated a strong ambivalence relationship among the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS. See Tables 8 and 16.)

Tables 20-23 are indices to trends within the body of Table 9. To determine the specific legitimacy-delegitimacy pivotal points one

TABLE 20.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 9 by Variable Components (Philosophical Presuppositions)

Philosophical Presuppositions	Relationships				
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 Subtotals in These Columns
Metaphysics	1	99	51	1.94:1	1-3
Epistemology	2	90	60	1.50:1	4-6
Society	3	86	64	1.34:1	7-9
State	4	78	72	1.08:1	13-15

TABLE 21.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 9 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships					
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 for These Cols. & Strands	
4	1	92	58	1.59:1	16-19	4
3	2	89	61	1.46:1	16-19	3
5	3	88	62	1.42:1	16-19	5

Table 22.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 9 by Variable Components (Philosophical Presuppositions)

Variable Component	Relationships				
	Rank of Ambivalence	Support Score	Nonsupport Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 Subtotals in These Columns
Man	1 (& only)	51	99	1.94:1	10-12

TABLE 23.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 9 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships				
	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Nonsupport Score (Ambivalence)	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 for These Cols. & Strands
2	1	89	61	1.46:1	16-19 2
1	2	76	74	1.03:1	16-19 1

must look at the local elements. Table 24 identifies those local score clusters which exhibit the support relationship, and arranges them in order of rank of support strength.

The strong opposition relationships among the local elements of Table 9 are illustrated in Table 25.

Table 26 completes the survey of local elements in Table 9 by showing the ambivalence relationship.

Analyzing the Subtotal Score Clusters: Tables 20-23

Table 20 shows that four of the five components among Philosophical Presuppositions registered supporting ratios for the five major conclusions concerning the status quo. The only philosophical category failing to post a supporting score was The Nature of Man (as indicated by Table 22, this component registered a predisposition of ambivalence).

One might conclude from this configuration that support for the status quo tends to hold greater sway proportionately as the philosophical category itself is more generalized. To wit, the most generalized "object" of thought is "reality-itself"--which is the object of Metaphysical contemplation. Accordingly, as Table 20 bears out, Metaphysics registered the highest support ratio (1.94:1).

Similarly, the next most generalized level of philosophical cogitation has to do with "knowledge-itself"--i.e., a person hardly can relate personally to all of reality, except as he relates to it by means of his knowledge of it. Moreover, his knowledge is a personal

TABLE 24.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 9 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships				
Conclusion No.	Philosophical Presuppositions	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 for These Columns & Strands
5	Metaphysics	1	25	5	5.00:1	1-3 5
5	Society	2	23	7	3.29:1	7-9 5
1	Metaphysics	3	21	9	2.33:1	1-3 1
2	Metaphysics	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	1-3 2
4	Metaphysics	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	1-3 4
3	Epistemology	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	4-6 3
3	State	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	13-15 3
4	Epistemology	8 (Tie)	19	11	1.73:1	4-6 4
3	Society	8 (Tie)	19	11	1.73:1	7-9 3
5	Epistemology	10 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	4-6 5
4	Society	10 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	7-9 4
4	Man	10 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	10-12 4
1	Epistemology	10 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	4-6 1
3	Man	14	17	13	1.31:1	10-12 3
4	State	14 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	13-15 4
5	State	14 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	13-15 5

TABLE 25.--Showing the Strong Opposition Relationships in Table 9 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships					
Conclusion No.	Philosophical Presuppositions	Rank of Opposition Strength	Opposition Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 for These Columns & Strands	
2	Man	1	12	4	3.00:1	10-12	2
1	Man	2	11	6	1.83:1	10-12	1
5	Man	3	8	6	1.33:1	10-12	5

TABLE 26.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 9 by Local Elements (Individual Score Clusters)

Local Elements		Relationships					
Conclusion No.	Philosophical Presuppositions	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Nonsupport Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 9 for These Cols. & Strands	
2	Society	1	20	10	2.00:1	7-9	2
2	State	2	18	12	1.50:1	13-15	2
3	Metaphysics	3	18	13	1.38:1	1-3	3
1	State	4	16	14	1.14:1	13-15	1
2	Epistemology	5	15[a]	15[a]	1.00:1	4-6	2
1	Society	6	15[a]	15[a]	1.00:1	7-9	1

[a]Nonsupport and Support scores are tied at 15 each. However, the Nonsupport score includes three Opposition points, which throws the balance in favor of Nonsupport, or Ambivalence.

experience, even though rooted in a common human heritage. That is, a person has more acquaintance, and therefore more conscious direct concrete relationship, to his knowledge than to all of reality as such. The point of these observations is that, while Epistemology is still a highly abstract category of intellectual endeavor, it is less generalized and more concrete than Metaphysics.

If this interpretation is valid, it is of keen interest to note that Epistemology shows the second highest ratio of status quo support in Table 20 (1.50:1).

According to the same rationale, the third most generalized Philosophical Presupposition also shows the third highest support ratio (1.34:1). This is the category of Society, which is assuredly more concrete to the mind of an individual than is "knowledge-itself," for knowledge still is considerably abstract, but the artifacts and institutions in a person's life which imply the concept of the Society all are relatively tangible. This fact tends to make the idea of Society more tangible.

Yet, although represented by numerous sensual concretions, the concept of Society nevertheless still is somewhat abstract. It is, to be sure, a concept rather than a reified entity. As such, it is perhaps not as tangible to the human individual as is The State, for specific governmental agencies are more precisely identifiable, recognizable, and locatable.

Therefore, assuming this bit of speculation is correct, it is intriguing to note that the ratio of support has decreased as the

level of generality of the category of thought has decreased. Hence, The State shows a support ratio in Table 20 of only 1.08:1.

This line of reasoning can be carried one important, and perhaps crucial, step further. The most concrete of the five objects of philosophical speculation--that of Man himself--demurred from a support status altogether and reflected an impressive ambivalence ratio of almost two to one (1.94:1. See Table 22).

This contention, that support increases with generality and decreases with specificity, is corroborated by the observations of Berger and Luckman who discern four levels of "social reality."[1] The most basic of these is "categories" or the fundamental divisions of the world into discreet parts around which perception is structured. This level would correspond closely with the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS of IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME, although each of these components would be subdivided into numerous specific modes, each of which is peculiar to the particular culture at hand, and each possessing its own predispositions and characteristics.

The next level for Berger and Luckman in terms of generality is what could be called "folk theory," or beliefs about cause-effect relationships that have grown up and are passed on, on an indigenous, informal basis.

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[1]Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality. See also Orion White, Jr.'s interpretation of Berger and Luckman in White's "Organization and Administration for New Technological and Social Imperatives," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 151-68 passim, especially pp. 153-54. (Hereinafter referred to as "New Imperatives.")

At a still "higher" level of abstraction is "institutional theory," which is more elaborately articulated, interrelated, and formalized than folk theory. Moreover, it is promulgated primarily through authoritative means.

At the highest level of generality is the "symbolic universe." This is the conceptual system that interrelates and "systematizes" the various groups of categories, folk, and institutional theory into a coherent and legitimate totality.

Orion White uses this schemata to explain what he believes to be a paradox of technological progress.[1] He says that in a technologically advanced nation such as the United States the two most concrete levels of social reality, i.e., the "categories" and "folk theory," cause the human individual to search for personal human "community," whereas the more abstract levels, i.e., "institutional theory" and the "symbolic universe" both urge the human individual to continue to engage in competition and hostility.

If this observation is correct, then it is feasible that the more specific categories of Philosophical Presuppositions, such as Man, which may tend to be linked more closely to Berger and Luckman's "categories" and "folk theory," tend to emphasize the search for "human community," while the more abstract categories in our own scheme tend to be equated with the "institutional theory" and the "symbolic universe" as described, both of which tend to emphasize hostility and

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[1]White, "New Imperatives," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 153.

competition in keeping with the needs of the military-industrial complex.

In their scheme, Berger and Luckman (and White) may have provided what could be an explanation for the clues which have been discovered here quite independently--that support for the status quo tends to increase with the level of generality of belief, and that the more specific the intellectual frame-of-reference is, the more likely that frame-of-reference will be to show less support and more ambivalence.

It is important to point out, however, that while this contention appears to hold true where man's conscious thought is concerned, the evidence, while suggestive, is less convincing as concerns the first variable in the present study, namely the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS. It may be recalled from the data evidenced in Tables 8 and 12-19, that a legitimacy perceptual convergence was recognized which was composed of THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and IDEAS, whereas there was also a delegitimation perceptual convergence constituted by TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES. The argument that generality = support and specificity = ambivalence or possibly outright opposition seems to be supported by the generalized nature of ORGANIZATIONS and IDEAS and the concrete nature of PEOPLE and PLACES. However, one cannot deny that THINGS are quite specific, and TIME, while intensely intimate, possesses a nature which is keenly elusive. One can argue, of course, that, due to secularism, THINGS have lost their individual and personal qualities and are therefore abstract, while TIME, the medium for all

personal experience, is the most specific and concrete category of all perceptual modes. The writer believes these lines of pursuit are potentially persuasive and may wish to return to them later in other contexts. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to have noted the parallels between generality and support on the one hand, and specificity and nonsupport on the other.

Turning from Table 20 to Table 21, and concerning the analysis of support in terms of the legitimacy enjoyed by the five major conclusions, Table 21 shows that the Philosophical Presuppositions corroborate the data of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS: conclusions three through five are supported, with conclusion four receiving strongest support.

Mention has been made of the ambivalent status of presuppositions about Man (Table 22). Analyzed by means of the five major conclusions, once again we are reminded that conclusions one and two were occasions for doubt in the culture's lifeways, with conclusion two showing the highest ratio of ambivalence between the two (see Table 23).

Analyzing the Local Element Score Clusters: Tables 24-26

Although Tables 20-23 reveal the broader trends inherent within the data of Table 9, it is of interest to inquire about some of the specific occurrences among local score clusters which resulted in those trends, since the trends themselves are merely averages of the local score clusters. It may be found, for example, that some of the

individual scores are atypical in terms of the subtotals for one reason or another, and the reasons might possibly prove to be significant.

Turning to the local elements, then, one finds some interesting mixtures among the score clusters. As might be expected from the foregoing discussion, Table 24, which exhibits the supporting combinations, reveals that Metaphysics holds the strong positions in terms of rank of support strength (see ranks one, three, and four (four is a tie). Society completes the top five ranks by occupying the second rank). Unexpectedly, however, two of the three major conclusions which enjoy the four highest ratios are conclusions one and two. They appear in ranks three and four, while the fifth conclusion received the support of both ranks one and two.

On the other hand, as might be expected, Man and The State, the two most concrete of the five Philosophical Presuppositions, occupy four of the five weakest ranks of support strength, while Epistemology, having been mentioned in three higher ranks, also occupied the fourth rank from the bottom.

It is of interest to observe that both Metaphysics and Epistemology appear four times each (out of a maximum possible of five score clusters for each). Society and The State are each mentioned three times, whereas Man appears only twice in support of the status quo rationales. Altogether, then, 16 of the 25 total local score clusters registered support for the five major conclusions in Table 24. This is a sizable proportion.

Among the five major conclusions themselves, number four was mentioned in Table 24 five times, which is the total number of local score clusters which it possesses, leaving no score clusters open to the possibility of either ambivalence or opposition. Conclusions five and three succeeded almost as well, being mentioned four times each, whereas conclusion one was mentioned only twice, leaving three of its local clusters open to ambivalence or opposition, and conclusion two was mentioned only once.

Thus, whereas the Philosophical Presuppositions of the status quo as revealed in its linguistic lifeways, serve as a strong source of broadly based and diversified support, its greatest tendencies towards lack of support come from its more concrete presuppositions--Man and The State, whereas, in terms of their cumulative ranks of support strength and the number of times they are mentioned for support, Metaphysics and Epistemology are the two variable components which account for the greatest amount of support among the five Philosophical Presuppositions.

Yet, a curious paradox is present in the fact that conclusions one and two were not affirmed with clear support, and these two conclusions are preeminently concerned with the Metaphysical and Epistemological rationales of the status quo. This could perhaps foreshadow the imminent development of an ideological crisis within those very philosophical categories most responsible for supporting the status quo. However, conclusions one and two also are concerned with the rationales of the desirability of the continuous growth of the gross national

product and the bureaucracies responsible for such expansion. The failure to support conclusions one and two could therefore stem largely from a reaction against these latter motifs, or at least from significant doubts about them, rather than from opposition or ambivalence concerning the Metaphysical and Epistemological rationales in those conclusions.

In either case, a conflict internal to the philosophical aspects of the status quo belief system is indicated--one which could require continual social harmonization lest serious erosion of legitimacy occur.

As further evidence, however, of the relative strength of the status quo's grasp upon legitimacy from an ideological or philosophical viewpoint within the culture's linguistic lifeways, Table 25 shows that only three of the 25 local score clusters for the second variable were congealed into explicit opposition. All three of these clusters were generated by the single variable component of Man, as a philosophical category.

Three major conclusions are mentioned in Table 25 as the recipients of this opposition. Conclusions two and one are listed, and they occupy the two highest ranks of opposition strength (in that order). The fifth conclusion occupies the third and last position.

Since 16 of the 25 local score clusters in Table 9 were co-opted by support, and three local score clusters were captured by opposition, the six remaining clusters were apportioned to ambivalence.

Table 26 offers an analysis of the relationships among these ambivalence local elements.

If any significance attaches to the ostensible clue which has been claimed throughout this section, to the effect that generality = support and specificity = ambivalence or opposition, one would expect to find support for this motif in the ambivalence local elements. The question is, is such an expectation borne out in Table 26?

Taken in isolation from the data on both support and opposition, no strongly marked trends seem to be in evidence. One might expect, for example, that Man and The State would hold the first two or three of the six ranks of ambivalence strength. In fact, however, Society holds the top position with a ratio of two to one. The State did indeed capture the second position with a ratio of one and a half to one. However, the third rank went to Metaphysics, and Man did not place at all.

The remaining ranks four through six were occupied by The State, Epistemology, and Society, in that order. In the total configuration, meaning ranks one through six, some minor evidence occurs which could be construed as supporting the proclaimed parallel between the level of a category's specificity and the occurrence of ambivalence. To wit, the most generalized Philosophical Presuppositions, namely Metaphysics and Epistemology, appear in Table 26 only once, whereas the more speculative categories of Society and The State appear twice each. Further, although Man, which is the only component which resulted in amassing ambivalence subtotals (see Table 9

columns 13-15, strand 6), did not appear among the ambivalence local elements at all in Table 26, this is explained by the fact that three of its five clusters were scored in opposition to the status quo (see Table 25).

All in all, Table 26 provides minor evidence in support of our contention, and presents nothing to counteract it. In conclusion, Tables 9 and 20-26 appear to indicate two clues to the legitimacy-delegitimacy dynamics within the status quo belief system. First, the Philosophical Presuppositions tend to show stronger support and lesser nonsupport than do the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS. Second, among the Philosophical Presuppositions, support tends to increase with the level of generality of the intellectual category, and to decrease with its specificity.

Tables 10 and 27-33--Massaging the Data on the Third Variable: The Practical Values and the Five Major Conclusions

The third variable conceived in this study to affect the linguistic lifeways of the status quo is the practical values, constituted of the values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. The legitimation-delegitimation scores for each of these five components are displayed in Table 10, showing the proportions of support, ambivalence, and opposition contributed towards each of the five major conclusions.

Table 10 follows the same format as Tables 8 and 9, and it contains a total of 25 local score clusters. As with these previous

tables, the score clusters may be arranged into additional tables to show the relative distributions of support, opposition, and ambivalence between the variable components and the major conclusions. Thus, Table 27 displays the strong support relationships afforded by the five practical values.

The distribution of support received by the major conclusions can be viewed in Table 28. It is the same as in Tables 13 and 21.

As with the second variable (Table 9), the subtotals reveal in Table 10 that opposition scores failed to equal or exceed support scores for any of the variable components (in this case, the five practical values). As Table 29 shows, however, nonsupport did outscore support in one instance. This was in the case of austerity.

Once again, however, where the five major conclusions are concerned, the first two are found to be characterized by greater ambivalence than support. Table 30 illustrates these relationships.

Trends within the body of Table 10 are indicated by an analysis of the local elements as these are shown in Tables 31-33. Table 31 shows the strong support relationships, whereas Tables 32 and 33 give the ambivalent and support distributions.

Analyzing the Subtotal Score Clusters: Tables 27-30

As with the second variable, the third variable also showed four out of five components which recorded supporting ratios for the five major conclusions. This fact is illustrated in Table 27. The only practical value not registered in clear support of the status quo

TABLE 27.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 10 by Variable Components (Practical Values)

Practical Values	Relationships				
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Nonsupport Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 10 Subtotals in Columns
Achievement	1	97	53	1.83:1	13-15
Discipline	2	85	65	1.31:1	10-12
Objectivity	3	84	66	1.27:1	1-3
Rationality	4	78	72	1.08:1	4-6

TABLE 28.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 10 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships					
	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 10 Subtotals in These Columns & Strands	
4	1	92	58	1.57:1	16-18	4
3	2	89	61	1.46:1	16-18	3
5	3	88	62	1.42:1	16-18	5

TABLE 29.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 10 by Variable Components (Practical Values)

Practical Values	Relationships				
	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Nonsupport Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 10 Subtotals in These Columns
Austerity	1	89	61	1.46:1	7-9

TABLE 30.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 10 by Major Conclusions

Major Conclusions	Relationships					
	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Nonsupport Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: See Table 10 for These Cols. & Strands	
2	1	89	61	1.46:1	16-18	2
1	2	76	74	1.03:1	16-18	1

TABLE 31.--Showing the Strong Support Relationships in Table 10 by Local Elements

Local Elements		Relationships				
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Support Strength	Support Score	Non-support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 10 See These Cols. & Strands
5	Achievement	1	23	7	3.29:1	13-15 5
3	Discipline	2	22	8	2.75:1	13-15 3
3	Achievement	3	21	9	2.33:1	13-15 3
4	Objectivity	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	1-3 4
1	Achievement	4 (Tie)	20	10	2.00:1	13-15 1
5	Objectivity	6 (Tie)	19	11	1.73:1	1-3 5
4	Achievement	6 (Tie)	19	11	1.73:1	13-15 4
4	Rationality	8 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	4-6 4
4	Austerity	9 (Tie)	18	12	1.50:1	7-9 4
5	Rationality	10 (Tie)	17	13	1.31:1	4-6 5
3	Objectivity	10 (Tie)	17	13	1.31:1	1-3 3
4	Discipline	10 (Tie)	17	13	1.31:1	10-12 4
1	Rationality	13 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	4-6 1
1	Discipline	13 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	10-12 1
5	Discipline	15	15	15	1.00:1	10-12 5

TABLE 32.--Showing the Strong Opposition Relationships in Table 10 by Local Elements

Local Elements		Relationships				
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Opposition Score	Opposition Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 10 See These Cols. & Strands
1	Austerity	1	10[a]	7[a]	1.43:1	7-9 1
2	Austerity	2	11[b]	8[b]	1.38:1	7-9 2

[a]There were 13 ambivalence points, more than either opposition or support. However, whenever opposition exceeds support, a condition of delegitimation exists regardless of the number of ambivalence points. Therefore the latter are not shown.

[b]There were 11 ambivalence points, equal to that of opposition. However, see note a above.

TABLE 33.--Showing the Strong Ambivalence Relationships in Table 10 by Local Elements

Local Elements		Relationships				
Conclusion No.	Situation Component	Rank of Ambivalence Strength	Nonsupport Score	Support Score	Ratio	Verification: In Table 10 See These Cols. & Strands
2	Rationality	1	19	11	1.73:1	4-6 2
2	Objectivity	2	17	13	1.31:1	1-3 2
3	Austerity	3	16	14	1.14:1	7-9 5
5	Austerity	3 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	7-9 5
2	Achievement	3 (Tie)	16	14	1.14:1	13-15 2
3	Rationality	6	15[a]	15[a]	1.00:1	4-6 3
2	Discipline	6 (Tie)	15[a]	15[a]	1.00:1	10-12 2
1	Objectivity	6	15[b]	15[b]	1.00:1	1-3 1
5	Discipline	6 (Tie)	15[c]	15[c]	1.00:1	10-12 5

[a]Nonsupport score includes four opposition points, which throws the balance of the tie in favor of nonsupport.

[b]Nonsupport score includes three opposition points. Tie goes to nonsupport.

[c]This is an exact tie. There were no opposition points.

is the concept of austerity. On the other hand, achievement reported the highest ratio of support (1.83:1), indicating that the core culture in western civilization places value on "accomplishments" more than either on the work ethic (discipline and austerity) or on truth-for-its-own-sake (objectivity and rationality).

This judgment seems to be corroborated by the fact that it is the fourth of the five conclusions which received the greatest margin of support. As Table 28 indicates, conclusion number four managed a support ratio of 1.57:1, with the third and fifth conclusions close behind with 1.46:1 and 1.42:1 respectively. The fourth conclusion, it will be recalled, affirms the competitive nature of man and puts corporate institutions at his disposal to carry out his ends as if the institutions themselves belonged to him. Such institutions are powerful instruments which are relied upon to augment the achievements of the elites.

Returning to the practical values themselves, austerity also posted a 1.46:1 ratio, but this time for ambivalence instead of support (see Table 29). The lingering propinquity within the culture for the values of austerity, it seems, eschews the major thrust towards "accomplishments before all else" (it was an American football hero, Vince Lombardi, who said, "Winning isn't the main thing; it's the only thing!"). Instead, the more puritan virtues are valued, whether for their own sake or for utilitarian reasons.

As usual, ambivalence was also the predisposition shown towards the first and second conclusions (see Table 30). This result, of

course, is predetermined by the fact that the scores for the third variable are taken from the same cells in the code list as are the scores for the first and second variable. Thus, Table 30 is not significant as a corroboration of Tables 13 and 21, which give the same effect. Rather, it is included merely as a reminder of that effect in relation to the other effects for the third variable.

Analyzing the Local Elements Score Clusters: Tables 31-33

The core culture's strong bent towards achievements above all else is revealed in Table 31 which shows this value in two out of the three top ranks of support strength. Not only does achievement place in the first and third places, but also enters into a tie with objectivity for both fourth and sixth place. Since a total of 15 local score clusters supported the status quo, it is highly significant that achievements penetrated four out of seven of the strongest positions.

Since discipline scored as the second strongest value in terms of support (see Table 27), it is not surprising that this component appeared in the second rank among the local elements in Table 31. The third strongest supporting component, objectivity, captured a tie for both the fourth and sixth ranks, a relatively strong showing, whereas rationality, the fourth strongest supporting component, did not make its entry into the ranks of supporting local elements until the eighth position where it managed a tie with the ambivalent component of austerity.

Both achievement and discipline were mentioned in Table 31 four times each. Objectivity and rationality each are mentioned three times, and austerity is mentioned only once.

Table 32 reveals the only source of opposition among the practical values, which is austerity. Significantly, however, this single component made its presence felt, since its opposition was registered against conclusions one and two, and thereby contributed to their ambivalent status.

Table 33 helps to make a point clear that could easily be overlooked. As the only truly detracting value austerity nevertheless does get some help in the ambivalence category from both rationality and objectivity. These two values captured the first and second ranks of ambivalence strength, and rationality was also mentioned once more, in rank six. Austerity itself appeared in the third and fourth positions and then even managed to get some help from achievement, the strongest support component of all the practical values (see Table 27). It appeared in a tie with austerity for rank four.

Objectivity, the third strongest supporting component (see Table 27), appeared twice, once prominently in rank two, and again rather nominally in a weak tie for rank six.

Discipline, the second strongest supporting component, barely made it into the ranks of ambivalent local elements as it appeared in the last two ranks to complete the description of eight clusters which registered doubt towards the core culture.

The most ambivalent conclusion, number two, also was the most frequently mentioned in Table 33, with two of its four appearances occurring in the top two ranks. Conclusions three and five both were mentioned twice. Interestingly, the fourth conclusion, the most strongly supported of all, did not appear at all, as might be expected. However, surprisingly, conclusion number one, which is an ambivalent conclusion, was mentioned by ambivalent local clusters only once, and this was in a very weak tie for sixth place. Moreover, this conclusion was mentioned only once by opposing local elements (Table 32). Yet this single opposing element when combined with nominal mention by ambivalence (Table 33) and rather weak margins of support in Table 31 (a margin of 1.14:1 as mentioned by both rationality and discipline in a tie for rank 13), was enough to cause an ambivalent status, even in spite of one strong margin of support contributed to conclusion number one by achievement (2.00:1. See Table 31, rank four).

This analysis of conclusion number one may remind us that there is a lesson to be learned here. The first conclusion's 150 points were divided almost equally, but were loaded slightly in favor of ambivalence--76 nonsupport to 74 support. This means that any single component among the practical values could have been responsible for swinging the balance in favor of ambivalence by means of only the slightest ambivalent margin. Conversely, the core culture could have managed to maintain the undoubted legitimacy of conclusion number one if its belief in the practical values had been only a percentage point or two stronger.

What does this mean when translated into the real life complexities of the social fabric? It means that if such slight margins of change in the legitimation-delegitimation of the rationales for the established institutions could be charted over a period of time, then one could predict critical changes in the institutions themselves. This fact, in turn, could make possible more orderly transitions of ideas, role descriptions, and power in response to the rapidly increasing pace of accelerative thrust in the turnover of life situations which brings about future shock.

PART VI: SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II

In an age of unprecedented accelerative thrust of transcience, abnormality has become routine. Many reactions are occurring, not only against contemporary institutions, but against the presuppositions upon which they rest. Thus, in this chapter the presuppositions held in common by major public and private institutions in contemporary western culture have been examined in an attempt to discover to what extent the culture-at-large has made a shift away from one core position to another.

The question to which an answer has been sought in this chapter has been "What are the cultural values of the status quo in contemporary western culture, particuarly in its political aspects?"

To answer this question five major conclusions were drawn tentatively from a study of literature from and about contemporary western culture. These conclusions were then tested by means of a linguistic

analysis using three variables which are held to influence the language of the status quo.

In essence, the five major conclusions held that the status quo (1) believes the highest good of man is to participate in a continuous increase in the gross national product; (2) believes that virtually unlimited growth of bureaucracies is good; (3) believes that society is composed of exclusive, self-seeking, competitive individuals whose competition can be controlled best by satisfying their needs and wants; (4) believes that corporate institutions are merely tools for subjective personalities and interests and are easily manageable by them; and (5) believes, finally, that the state is and should be a power center external to human individuals which balances their interests and manipulates their wants and needs in accordance with the needs of the military-industrial complex.

The three variables used to test the validity of these conclusions and the degree of support given to them as indicated by the thought patterns and verbal symbols familiar to the status quo are (1) the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS and perceptual modes of the culture composed of IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME; (2) the Philosophical Presuppositions inherent in the culture's fabric, including presuppositions about Metaphysics, Epistemology, Society, Man, and The State; and (3) the practical values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

A code list of 150 units of verbal symbols was devised to represent a composite of these three variables, and then scored for

the disposition of each unit of symbols for its support, ambivalence or opposition towards each of the five conclusions. As a result of this linguistic analysis of the status quo's belief system, the five propositions were held to be affirmed by the status quo's own verbal behavior by a proportion of 54 percent support, 13 percent opposition, and 33 percent ambivalence.

Moreover, certain legitimation-delegitimation dynamic patterns were held to be discovered. Two kinds of perceptual convergences of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS were detected. One was the legitimation perceptual convergence of THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and IDEAS, which represent the "solid ground" of status quo legitimacy where perceptual propinquities are concerned. The other was the delegitimation perceptual convergence of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES, the combination of which increases the probability of delegitimation taking place.

The data also provided reason to believe that support for the status quo tends to increase with the generality of philosophical and intellectual beliefs of the core culture, and that ambivalence or opposition to the status quo tends to increase with greater specificity in the philosophical beliefs.

Delegitimation associational components in general were discovered among the three variables, the presence of any of which increase the likelihood of delegitimation processes taking place. These components are, in particular, the perceptual categories of TIME and PEOPLE, the Philosophical Presuppositions about Man, and the practical value of austerity.

It is apparent from this analysis that, even within the internal ranks of the status quo, significant pressures for delegitimation are taking place. It is pertinent now to turn attention to the more radical sources of delegitimation pressures, namely, the subcultures, whose commitments and presuppositions self-consciously and intentionally lie outside the core culture itself. The subcultures themselves, which are almost infinitely fluid, transient, and complex in their variety and numbers, will not be studied as such, but focus will be placed upon the continuity of certain patterns of thought, which are more durable and easily identifiable. These patterns of thought are interesting from the standpoint that, in terms of certain philosophical categories and methods of approach, they tend to survive the rise and demise of the visible groups themselves and to be passed on in multifarious ways, both formal and informal. The numerous means by which these thought patterns are passed on and are proliferated, many of which ultimately succeed in entering into the mainstream culture itself, constitutes one of the most interesting of all phenomenon in the study of cultural communication and transmission. This subject, however, lies outside the scope of this study except as a tangential topic. It will be discussed only as it is directly pertinent to the central motif of the study of new concepts of the human person as a delegitimation of contemporary western political traditions. As indicated, this motif will be considered in terms of patterns of intellectual continuity rather than by specific groups or methods of

communication per se. It is this objective to which we may now turn our attention in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III.

THE IMAGERIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCELERATIVE THRUST OF TRANSIENCE: THE SCRAMBLING OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

PART I. THE IDEA OF BOUNDARIES IN WESTERN POLITICS VERSUS NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Introduction

A concept which appears to be important to the western style of political thought is the idea of "boundary."[1] This is manifest in the nationalistic concept of the nation-state,[2] in constitutional mandates for the separation of powers,[3] in the limited notion of the

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[1]The following article by Orion White, Jr., was most helpful in the conceptualization of thoughts for this section. See his "Organization and Administration for New Technological and Social Imperatives," in Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, ed. by Dwight Waldo (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971). (The article will hereinafter be referred to as "Organization and Administration"; the book will hereinafter be referred to as Turbulence.)

Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., also acknowledge the importance of the "boundary" concept as it applies conceptually between the political system and other social systems. See their Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 19-21. (Hereinafter referred to as Comparative Politics.)

[2]See Paul Tillich's analysis of the development of this concept in his The Religious Situation, trans. by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, 1965), pp. 117-22.

[3]Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, V, 365.

State as the performer of primarily negative functions in Society,[1] in the doctrine of the separation of church and state,[2] and in the cardinal principles of "scientific management" upon which both industrial management and public administration in the traditional sense came to be based.[3]

On the other hand, as indicated by the voluminous flow of new images which apparently are stimulated by the accelerating thrust of transience within society, the notion of "boundary" is assailed by new concepts of the human person as unnatural and problematical.[4]

The dominant culture's regard for the concept of boundaries as a way to define what functions are political and which ones are non-political helped to make the development of both democratic federalism and economic capitalism possible.[5] Nevertheless, the appearance of

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[1]Elijah Jordan diagnoses this point in his Forms of Individuality: An Enquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 18-22. (Hereinafter referred to as Forms.)

[2]See M. Judd Harmon, Political Thought from Plato to the Present (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 312-13 and 355-58. (Hereinafter referred to as Political Thought.)

[3]See Judith A. Merkle, "The Taylor Strategy: Organizational Innovation and Class Structure," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XIII (1968), 59-81. (Hereinafter referred to as "The Taylor Strategy.")

[4]The points of view which are producing such new images, as well as many examples of the language and imageries, may be found in Richard Neville's Play Power: Exploring the International Underground (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1971). (Hereinafter referred to as Play Power.)

[5]This point is supported by Robert E. Lane's "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 50-69.

countless new cultural images and paradigms which contradict or obscure not only the specific boundaries established for familiar cultural roles, but the concept of the boundary itself, are prolific among sectors sympathetic to the stimulation of new concepts of human personality.[1] This development appears to have had an effect, conceptually at least, of "scrambling" the political "boundaries" which have so long served as the guidelines for political roles and the ground rules for how those roles were to be played.[2]

Human Persons and the Idea of the Boundary

The Definition of Human Individuals and the Refutation of "Boundary"

Perhaps the most important of all the political boundaries in western culture which has become the subject of refutation is the definition of the human individual. As Gouldner and Peterson point out, in western technological societies people learn to divide the world into two orders: that of the "mine" and that of the "others."[3] As the world comes to be perceived in terms of this boundary, individuation or ego development becomes the result of personal maturation, and conflict with others becomes the mode of self-validation.

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[1]For a sample of such literature, see The Age of Paranoia: How the Sixties Ended, by the editors of Rolling Stone (New York: Pocket Books, a Division of Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1972).

[2]Neville, Play Power, chaps. i, ii, and vii.

[3]Alvin W. Gouldner and Richard A. Peterson, Notes on Technology and the Moral Order (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962).

In this way the entire system of "free competition" and the satisfying of subjective "needs" is sustained and the State and all its institutions are accorded predominantly negative functions of balancing and restraining competition.[1]

Nevertheless, wave upon wave of new images of man have cropped up within the culture which refute the notion of the skin-encapsulated ego.[2] Perhaps one of the most significant sources of the development and advancement of a new view of human persons is the organization theorists, for they are highly articulate in their analysis of the problem. An outstanding example may be found in the writing of Herbert Shepard, who views traditional organization structures of coercion-compromise as ineffective because, although organizations are collective enterprises, they are based on a concept of self which sees individuals as separated by the boundary of their skin and hence unable to act in any terms except those that recognize this highly individual boundary.[3] Shepard sees this fact as the basic problem of organization process, and offers an alternative concept of self--one oriented toward the collectivity and "collaboration-consensus" as a way out.

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[1]Jordan, Forms, pp. 6-23.

[2]See, for example, Alan W. Watts, "The Individual as Man/World," The Psychedelic Review, I, No. 1 (June, 1963), 55-65.

[3]Herbert Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal Relations in Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1115-43.

Orion White says there are strong normative overtones to Shepard's analysis, as well as in the similar literature of which Shepard's argument is a part.[1] These overtones may well serve to undermine institutions and their concepts based upon a belief in the "natural law" of conflict and competition.

The Scrambling of Political Boundaries and the Accelerative Thrust of Transience

The proliferation of new concepts of human personality and the scrambling of political boundaries, it is held, have occurred concurrently as an effect of the rapidly increasing accelerative thrust of transience in western society.[2] The subject of the unprecedented social change occurring in technological nations has been thoroughly discussed by students of the subject and the exercise need not be repeated here.[3] Suffice it to say within the context of our own topic that certain analogies and metaphors are regarded in themselves as significant products of such accelerative thrust. These images, in turn, reflect a shift of philosophical emphasis taking place within the culture.

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[1]White, "Organization and Administration," p. 156.

[2]See Alvin Toffler on the "turnover of ideas" in his Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 152-82.

[3]An excellent reader on this subject is M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg, eds., Politics and the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). (Hereinafter referred to as Politics and the Post-Welfare State.)

To wit, if a change in the distribution of key metaphors is considered as an indication of a shift in cultural values; and if political authority and legitimacy are considered to rest upon compatibility with the culture's philosophical system (consciously or unwittingly held), then the widespread distribution of new metaphors relating to the interpretation of man's nature and role in society may be considered to be a useful indice to the delegitimation of political presuppositions posited by earlier imagery.

No lack of sources exists for the detecting of the appearance of such new images. These images are incidentally produced on a prodigious scale as a part of the artifacts created by the subcultures of hundreds of new life styles.[1] Perhaps the best indice to the spate of new images as well as new life styles is to be found in the changing strategies of the professional advertisers.[2] Those who write the advertising copy are fully aware of the trend of new images and of their power to communicate with persons living new life styles. According to one advertising consultant, the "real story of our time" is the "somewhat fantastic proliferation of life styles," particularly

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[1]An analysis of the emergence of these new life styles and social conditions leading to them is given by Orion White, Jr., and Gideon Sjoberg, "The Emerging 'New Politics' in America," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 11-35. (Hereinafter referred to as "New Politics.")

[2]For a graphic cross-section of the state of American advertising, see Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, Culture Is Our Business (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970).

the "youthquake among the young," and among the well to do.[1] This fact, he says, is creating a whole series of mini-markets. Sociologists, he adds

> call our times the "age of alternatives--a time of doing your own thing." And we now have multiple overlapping markets of highly varied, differentiated affluent, educated adults, who are demanding, demonstrative, articulate, multi-faceted, with a considerable cynicism concerning traditional advertising and marketing.[2]

This sentiment is echoed by another advertising critic who predicts that advertising will be "profoundly re-shaped over the next few years. The mass market will become obsolete."[3] This fact is underscored by the demise of the general interest magazines such as Life, Look, and Saturday Evening Post, while at the same time special interest magazines have flourished, such as Psychology Today, New York Magazine, Smithsonian, New York Review of Books, Weight Watchers, Playboy, and Mad.[4]

The Imageries of the Accelerative Thrust of Transience and the Research Design

Due to the extensiveness and fluidity of the sources of the new images of humanity and the world which are the subject matter for this chapter, it did not seem possible to produce a research design

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[1]Ed Burnett, "Psycho-graphics/Demographics--A Guide to List Selection," a special report in Januz Direct Marketing Letter, I, No. 4 (February, 1975), n.p.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

that could quantify and analyze the material by means of a stratified sample. Yet, given the provisions of the existing research design employed in Chapter II for the analysis of the key linguistic imageries of the status quo, it was possible to impart some conceptual order and consistency to the emerging patterns and at the same time to maintain the integrity of the perceived patterns themselves, even within a "nonparametric" survey such as this one.

The technique employed to determine some profile of the non-status quo concepts in the culture was to inquire whether the verbal outputs of various ostensible alternative life style subcultures either positively expressed or gave support to the practical values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement, since these latter values represent the ultimate end products of the status quo belief system.

This method commended itself for two reasons.

First, by comparing non-status quo symbols and concepts with those of the status quo, the writer could ascertain some relative degree of compatibility or hostility between the two conceptual camps (in a manner which will be described shortly).

Second, it has already been established in other sections of this report that all five of the practical values of the status quo are compatible with the aristotelian, cartesian, and baconian concept of "ratiocination," the scientific management orientation of the "segmentation of tasks," and the behaviorist propinquity towards the isolating of conceptual parts, all of which are supportive of the western

concept of "boundaries." Thus, to the extent that non-status quo concepts vary from the five practical values, they will be conceptually distant from the root sources which make the "boundary" concept culturally and philosophically viable.

The Cultural Change Complex and Its Eight Broad Classes of Image-Responses to the Practical Values

In the process of comparing non-status quo responses about the traditional practical values with the status quo position described in Chapter II, the writer was able to identify eight broad classes of responses which are readily adaptable to the frames-of-reference identified in the cultural change complex, i.e., the "E-complex" described in Chapter I and appearing in Figures 1, 8, and 9. These frames-of-reference have been designated as E^1, E^2, and E^3.

It will be recalled that E^1 represents the central core concepts of western society since 1945, E^2 stands for concepts competing for the core position (with a specific focus on new concepts of human personality), and E^3 is the symbol for the core concepts which are also common to the new concepts. There is a fourth frame-of-reference, E^4, which is considered elsewhere but does not enter directly into the present discussion. E^4 represents the ultimate concerns of the culture.

The eight classes of response-types will be described and analyzed in terms of their relationships to the E-complex frames-of-reference.

The Eight Classes as an Analytical Construct

The eight classes of responses serve as an analytical construct which is intended theoretically to organize the total subject matter of the E^1, E^2, and E^3 frames-of-reference into a related pattern. That is, all of the verbal symbols in the status quo's scored code list (Appendix B) as well as all of the imageries of accelerative thrust studied in this chapter theoretically may be classified into one or another of the eight classes of response-types, depending upon their predisposition towards the status quo values of rationality, objectivity, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

A Spectrum of Eight Degrees of Intensity of Support or Nonsupport of the Practical Values

In this way the entire subject matter of both the status quo and non-status quo verbal symbols (and their attending currents of thought, or belief systems) are sorted into a spectrum of stages of intensity of compatibility with, or hostility towards, the five practical values. As is shown in Figure 16, these eight classes of response-types are arranged so as to correspond with the E^1, E^2, and E^3 frames-of-reference in the following manner.

The first four of the eight classes of responses are located physically within the circle representing the status quo values. Symbolically, this means that these classes of material operate from presuppositions rooted within the status quo.




Fig. 16.--The eight classes of statements arranged on a spectrum of compatibility, accommodation and hostility towards the practical values of the status quo (E^1).

The last four classes fall within the circle symbolizing the non-status quo values. This means these groups of material are characterized by non-status quo presuppositions.

Further, as is indicated by Figure 16, two of the four status quo-prone classes are located within that portion of the circle represented by the symbol E^1, but the other two classes occur in the elliptical area represented by E^3. This picturization represents the fact that two of the four classes rooted in status quo values resist non-status quo concepts adamantly or uncompromisingly, while the other two accommodate themselves to such new concepts or are at least susceptible to influence by them.

Similarly, two of the four non-status quo classes occur exclusively in the E^2 area, while the other two are positioned within the E^3 space. This is meant to indicate that the two E^2 classes stoutly resist the established lifeways, and the two E^3 groups are adaptable to them in greater or lesser degree.

Thus, from the standpoint of the E-complex, the E^1 frame-of-reference is host to two classes of responses, the E^2 network host to another two, and four of the eight classes fall into the subject matter of the E^3 frame-of-reference.

Against this background it is possible, as indicated earlier, to read the eight classes of response-types from left to right as a spectrum which represents degrees of compatibility and hostility to the status quo values. The two left-hand groups (classes I and II) which occur in the E^1 section, are those most supportive of the

practical values (and actually serve as the prototype material; i.e., these groups are constituted of the belief system represented by the 54 percent of the scored code list in Appendix B which was found to be in support of the status quo).

In the E^3 area classes III and IV, which are rooted in status quo presuppositions but accommodate themselves to new material, are the next most compatible groups of material with the status quo belief system.

Classes V and VI, which are also E^3 types, owe their styles to non-status quo presumptions, but are still accommodative to the practical values, although less so than classes I-IV.

Finally, classes VII and VIII, both falling within the E^2 frame-of-reference, are hostile to the status quo beliefs.

The Thought Content of the Eight Classes

With these considerations in mind, it is pertinent to consider the actual content of the eight response-types. As a spectrum of opposites of sorts, the entire body of material may be characterized in terms of antinomies. That is, if the status quo value structure can be characterized in terms of the five categories of practical values which we have been referring to as rationality, objectivity, austerity, discipline, and achievement, then in general, and for the sake of conceptual convenience, it is useful to think of the non-status quo concepts in terms of subjectivity (as opposed to objectivity); nonrationality (as contrasted with rationality); playfulness,

festiveness, extravagance, and liberality (in contradistinction to austerity); spontaneity, whimsy, and freedom-from-constraint (as compared with discipline); and finally the efficacy of random behavior, noncompetitiveness and collaborative processes (in the place of the goal-oriented competitive behavior implied in the supreme value placed by the core culture upon achievement).

At the level of abstraction of the spectrum itself, this characterization is valid and useful. At the more concrete level of each of the eight classes themselves, however, the specific content characteristics will differ somewhat from the prototype concepts just enumerated due to a mixture of influences within the real life social context. Even the content descriptions of each of the eight classes will be far more generalized than the complexities occurring in the actual cultural milieu. Therefore, they must be taken as symbolic representations rather than as attempts at exact descriptions. With these qualifications in mind, the following descriptions may be useful.

Class I advocates the practical values and attacks the non-status quo values.--In the first type, which will be referred to as class I responses, the communication explicitly presumes support for, or actively advocates for, the five practical values of the status quo. In addition, it also indicates hostility towards, or in some manner levies an attack on, non-status quo values. Based upon the frames-of-reference in the cultural change complex (the E-complex), this type of

response is characteristic of E^1 values, and it is the most extreme of all the positions defending the status quo.

An example of the material appropriate to class I may be found in excerpts from President Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970, speech in which he announced the invasion of Cambodia by United States troops.[1] Of the five practical values of the status quo, the speech seemed to be richest in images of discipline and achievement, although there was also an overall mood of utter sobriety and austerity. The value of objectivity was championed by means of numerous references to "institutions." These references to the concrete organizational products of society are presumed in the speech to be accepted by all as sufficient evidence for the objective rationality of the speech's plea. Values counter to those of the status quo were castigated, as indicated by the following excerpt, and implications of support for the status quo concept of rationality are present in the negative references to "anarchy" and the positive references to "the great universities." In part Nixon said,

> My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed.
>
> Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without. If when the chips are down the world's most powerful nation--the United States of America--acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and

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[1]Quoted in James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972).

> anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.
>
> It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. . . .[1]

Another graphic example of a class I response occurred the next morning after Nixon's speech, and it pointedly illustrates the hostility towards E^2 subcultures characteristic of class I material as well as the staunch nature of the defense of status quo values. In this illustration Nixon had gone to the Pentagon. After a briefing on the new war's progress, he blurted to two civilian officials:

> You see these bums, you know, blowing up the campuses. Listen, the boys that are on the college campuses today are the luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities, and here they are burning up the books, storming around about this issue. You name it. Get rid of the war there will be another one. Then out there (in Vietnam) we have kids who are just doing their duty. They stand tall and they are proud. . . . They are going to do fine and we have to stand back of them.[2]

Class II advocates the practical values but shows indifference to the non-status quo values.--The second group of responses--class II responses--also advocates the practical values, but differs from class I expressions in that the verbal behavior displays indifference to non-status quo concepts while concentrating on advancing the status quo values. In terms of the E-complex, this class of communications also is an E^1 phenomenon. The communicators of this response-pattern also are staunch defenders of the status quo, but

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[1] Ibid., p. 435.

[2] Ibid., p. 437.

their position is not as entrenched or vehement as are those representing class I.

An example typical of class II subject matter appears in a book entitled The American Business Creed, in which the authors summarize the "values of a good society" as these are reflected in the public statements of business leaders, industrial advertisements, and the literature of large business associations:

> Practical realism complements individualism. It stresses the importance of those problems which no adult can avoid, and it demands that each individual meet them with competence. . . . Close attention to the practical side of life demands a kind of relentless activity. . . . The emphasis on sheer activity and effort in the creed has its natural complement in high valuations of rationality, adventure, and progress.[1]

In addition to illustrating class II material, according to Melville this paragraph also serves as a "capsule statement" of what the young are rebelling against: "practical realism," "those problems which no adult can avoid," "relentless activity," "rationality," and "progress."[2]

Class III both denies and accepts the practical values.--In the third group--class III--the communication may outspokenly decry any assent to the practical values, but in so doing it may betray unconscious commitments to them as the very presuppositions for the

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[1]Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 257-59. Quoted in Keith Melville, Communes in the Counterculture (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 98.

[2]Melville, ibid.

arguments of denial. Thus, an ambivalent predisposition of denial-acceptance of the status quo ethos is the result.

Since the communication is actively denouncing some form or application of the status quo practical values, this renders it susceptible to influence by non-status quo ideas. Class III therefore may be located in the universe of discourse for this study within the E^3 frame-of-reference which is the area of accommodation between status quo and non-status quo concepts. The accommodation in this instance is likely more awkward and less successful than the accommodation which occurs in classes IV and V. Nevertheless, it may serve as a prelude to the function of those latter classes and at least serves as a link, however tenuous, between status quo and non-status quo conceptions.

Class III material typically may include the statements of rebels who share liberal values with the status quo in spite of their disclaimers. Such, for example, would be the writings of the Frenchman Cohn-Bendit whose reflections on the Days of May on the Sorbonne may be regarded as a latter-day manifestation of the anarchist tradition. As it was indicated in Chapter I, the anarchist tradition contributed considerably to the intellectual and political outlook of the classical liberal position.

Perhaps a more pertinent example is found in the thought of Stokely Carmichael who takes the American liberal tradition to task, but does so on behalf of liberal values he himself holds dear. Consider his following comments:

> The status quo persists because there are no ways up from the bottom. When improvements within the system have been made, they resulted from pressure--pressure from below. Nothing has been given away; governments don't hand out justice because it's a nice thing to do. People must struggle and die first.
> . . . . . .
> I place my own hope for the United States in the growth of belief among the unqualified that they are in fact qualified; they can articulate and be responsible and hold power.[1]

Class IV advocates the practical values but also accommodates non-status quo values.--Class IV also represents an E^3 type of response. In this group the respective verbal behavior consciously advocates the practical values as important and viable values for the society. But it also supports accommodation of these commitments to the challenging new concepts. Thus, as a hybrid, or adjustment, of the competing E^1 and E^2 values, class IV qualifies as subject matter for the E^3 frame-of-reference. Its value to the process of social cohesion is that it appears to represent a higher level of consciousness of the processes essential to social cohesion and cultural homogeneity. Consider, for example, the following comment by Page, a public administrationist.

> . . . If the ideas and institutions of liberalism and representative government do not function fairly and honestly, then even those most ardently believing in liberal values will increasingly reject democratic processes. They will then resort to other ideologies and other political methods, including violence.

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[1]Stokely Carmichael, "Who Is Qualified?" in Thoughts of the Young Radical (a New Republic Book, Harrison-Baline of New Jersey, 1966), pp. 29 and 33-34.

> . . . The best way to deal with indictments of American society, of whatever origin or color, is to make the liberal, pragmatic methods achieve meaningful change.[1]

To some observers it may appear that there is little if any difference between the example just given for class IV and the previous example given for class III. This may be a matter of subtle degree and choice. Yet, lest the point of class IV be lost in the similarities between the two, another example may be considered in which the intentional accommodation of western status quo values to other values is perhaps less mistakeable. Rock says,

> What is utterly unique about America is that dissent--the challenge to moral values, the modification of alternatives, the criticism of cultural standards--is taking place within the context of the American situation as a whole. It is a fact that only America has the basic elasticity to change its cultural structure at this incredible pace, because the margin of revolutionary action, cultural, social and constitutional--that is, freedom--is greater in America than in any other country.[2]

Class V advocates new values and accommodates them to the practical values.--Class V may be identified as the advocation of new values with the intentional accommodation of them to the practical values of the status quo. This class is similar in nature and appearance to class IV. However, there is a gentle but important difference.

The two classes of responses begin from different presuppositions. Whereas class IV starts from presuppositions rooted, perhaps

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[1]Richard S. Page, "The Ideological-Philosophical Setting of American Public Administration," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 69. (Hereinafter referred to as "The Idealogical Setting.")

[2]William Pennell Rock, "Alienation: Yes; Patriotism: Yes," Center Magazine, IV, No. 6 (November/December, 1971), 6.

deeply, in the thought-forms and institutional interrelationships of the status quo, class V commences from commitments to other values, and, for the sake of their survival (however tacitly) adapts them to the preexisting patterns which hold the greater strength in terms of legitimacy, backup systems, and traditions within the culture. Because of the ostensible flexibility and resiliency of its position, class V represents one of the major resources for introducing new ideas and enabling the society to make a transition to new positions of perceptual and intellectual orientation in a way that is orderly and manageable. Class V responses therefore are characteristic of the subject matter within the E^3 frame-of-reference as material which is readily accessible and utilizable by both E^1 and E^2 advocates.

Kozol, the father of the "Free School" movement, while being outraged at public school systems, zoning boards, and health departments, knew that in order for his "Free Schools" and their constituents to survive, one must get leverage out of the "establishment." Kozol's following statement is illustrative of class V.

> . . . The good white radical kid who does not want to soil his hands in "exploitative business practice" just does not stop to ask where all the Free School money comes from in the first place. Every dollar, every dime and every penny in an unjust nation is, in some fashion, "impure" or "contaminated" or "immoral." The question is whether the Free School keeps on begging for the proceeds of injustice or whether it learns the way to earn those proceeds on its own and in its own terms.[1]

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[1]Jonathan Kozol, Free Schools (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1972), pp. 137-38.

Class VI both denies and accepts new values.--Class VI is a type of response which calls attention to an interesting and somewhat unusual phenomenon. It may be characterized as the denial-acceptance of non-status quo presuppositions previously adhered to. This type possesses characteristics similar to those of class III, but the ambivalent predisposition is aimed at non-status quo subject matter instead of at the practical values of the status quo. It seems most likely to occur when a communicator reacts against what he regards to be the excesses of the subculture which his own position represents. This occurred, for example, when Paul Goodman, a contemporary utopian anarchist who, even in his elder years, has served as the champion of several generations of dissenting young people, said of the contemporary young:

> Their intolerance is breathtaking. Do Your Thing means do their thing. I have seen cases where they exploit their elders' resources and sponsorship, but then betray our explicit purposes because they are convinced that we are fools or finks. They do not regard this as conning.
>
> What then? Suppose we shrug and turn away. Then they have no access to the resources that we ought to share, to which they have a right claim, and to any wisdom we have to give, such as it is. And if those of us who care for them, and whom they somewhat respect, do not take them seriously, if only to hector them, who will take them seriously? Besides, they are the ball game. And sometimes they even do know better.[1]

In this example Goodman begins by implying the denial of his own presupposition concerning the greater importance of the ideas of young people as against the practical values of the status quo, but he

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[1]Paul Goodman, New Reformation: Notes of a Neolithic Conservative (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1972), pp. xii-xiii. (Hereinafter referred to as New Reformation.)

does this in the very interest of, and finally with a reaffirmation of, the supremacy of his original premise.

The importance of class VI is that it softens the hardest positions of attack on the established values by new concepts of the human person. That is, it serves as a regulator of overreaction within the ranks of dissenters. Even though the encounter between the opposing values is still abrasive, nevertheless, as in the point just made by Goodman, the practical values of prudence and rationality are regarded as still having some relevance and usefulness. Thus, as an E^3 resource class VI takes its place as a contributor to the greater possibilities of social cohesion and cultural homogeneity.

Class VII advocates new values and shows indifference to the practical values.--Class VII is one of two classes representing subject matter characteristic of the E^2 frame-of-reference, or of the uncompromising detractors from the status quo. Class VII is the milder of the two E^2 types of responses and may be described as the advocation of new values and indifference to the practical values of the status quo. Essentially, the type of subculture represented by this class of verbal (and more often, nonverbal) behavior is one which has literally sought to withdraw from the host society. Often the adherents may do this by taking a perceptual and intellectual stance within some "transcendental" perspective which regards both the society and the material world as essentially irrelevant. Such groups have proliferated within western culture during recent years.

To wit, according to Melville,

> What started several years ago with the growing popularity of Zen is now an outrageous assortment consisting of the most venerable religious traditions side by side with dozens of cults and crazes. The list now includes Scientology, Abilitism, light radiation, Sufism, psychocybernetics, astral projection, the 3H (Happy, Healthy, Holy) Organization founded by Yogi Bhajan, transcendental meditation, Kundalini yoga, and the use of alpha-wave headsets. And that's only the beginning of the list.[1]

The devotion of many such adherents is embodied by their withdrawal from established society, both physically and intellectually, sometimes in communes and sometimes simply in forms of transient anonymity which make the society's regulation of such practitioners virtually impossible.

These developments also are fueled by, and for our purposes could be indexed by, a spate of popular written works which flood every book counter. One outstanding example of this type of best-seller is the several works of Carlos Castaneda.[2] The following excerpt, part of a book which elucidates the way to achieve a state of being within a "separate reality" which is both nonobjective and non-rational as far as the established wisdom of the status quo is concerned, is illustrative of the kind of material common to class VII responses. In this passage Castaneda's mentor, Don Juan, prods the novitiate's understanding about his erstwhile new relationship to his old world.

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[1]Melville, Communes in the Counter Culture, p. 211.

[2]See, for example, Carlos Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan: The Lessons of Don Juan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).

> "A hunter knows he will lure game into his traps over and over again, so he doesn't worry. To worry is to become accessible, unwittingly accessible. And once you worry, you cling to anything out of desperation; and once you cling you are bound to get exhausted or to exhaust whoever or whatever you are clinging to."
>
> . . . . . .
>
> ". . . The first thing you will want to do is to start on your way back to Los Angeles. What you left there is lost forever. . . . What's important to all of us is the fact that everything we love or hate or wish for has been left behind. . . ."[1]

The significance of this class and the subcultures which it represents lies in the difficulty which the status quo encounters in seeking to cope with both the thought forms and the adherents themselves, for they are virtually immune to the normal rewards and punishments upon which regulation depends. They are often difficult to locate, isolate, and sometimes to identify, for the phenomenon possesses the characteristics of transience and elusiveness. This type of subculture does not project the external visible continuity that is afforded by the attacking verbal behavior typical of the class VIII responses. Those who attack can be located, identified and regulated. Not so in the case of those who are totally indifferent.[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 95, 312-13.

[2] The counter cultures which produce class VII images are often fully cognizant of the status quo's practical values, but are intentionally antipolitical and antirationalistic. Neville describes the situation thus:

> ". . . The most intelligent of the young are dropping out. . . . Meanwhile, into the world, children are being born like they never have before. 'We want our son to be free, unprogrammed and completely unidentified with the state,' says one child's young father, who delivered the baby himself, and told no one except the Underground press. That means no birth certificate, no schooling unless the child wants it, no taxation, no official record of his existence. These children will be . . . educated by the

Class VIII advocates new values and attacks the practical values.--The last of the eight response categories, class VIII, is that of the advocation of new values and the attack on the practical values. In class VII just described, the relegitimation function was the primary rationale, and the delegitimation effect was merely secondary or incidental. But in class VIII there is a deliberate effort to delegitimate the established order and to relegitimate a new order all at the same time. The significance of this class is that the number and variety of responses within it appears to be quite large. The extent of responses in this class is an important indication of the extent of the fragmentation and delegitimation at work within the culture.

Further, the class VIII criticisms of the status quo are culturally diffused, especially to reach the young, in art modes of the modern culture with such paroxysm that their inculcation is virtually assured. This has been evidenced by the magnetic allure of the words and music of such musical heralds of the counterculture as the Beatles, Simon and Garfunkle, and Bob Dylan. The latter, Dylan, sees the world around him as a world run by a vast machine and by men who are heartless mechanized men who are part of that machine. This, believes

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community. And if one of them is ever discovered by the bureaucracy? 'He will tell them he's from another planet,' advises one father. And in a sense, he will be."

From Neville, Play Power, p. 67.

Gleason, an inveterate Dylan-watcher, is his core of attraction for the young.[1]

Dylan sings of alienation, of the emptiness of the adult society, says Gleason. He "is the clown, the Napoleon in rags, a Don Quixote riding across a neon-lighted jungle, across the moon country, past lines of empty drive-in movies showing vista-vision pictures of what's happening." The vision is "surrealistic, the images glowing, and he is articulating the realignment of priorities first heralded by the wordless revolt of the jazzmen's horns."[2]

Dylan's lyrics abound with metaphorical examples of class VIII material. Again, according to Gleason,

> There's something in Dylan for everybody. "You who philosophize disgrace," he screams at the lawmakers in "The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll" (a song about the fatal beating given a Negro servant by a Maryland farmer). He sneers at the groves of academe ("the old folks home in the college"), at religion ("the phantom of the opera in the perfect image of a priest"), at Madison Avenue ("grey flannel dwarfs"), at the war machine in "With God on Our Side," at hard work ("I ain't gonna work on Maggie's farm no more . . . they say sing while you slave, and I just get bored").[3]

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[1]Ralph Gleason, "Bob Dylan and the Children's Crusade," in Conversations with the New Reality: Readings in the Cultural Revolution, ed. by the editors of Ramparts, Foreword and Introduction by Marshall Singer (San Francisco: Canfield Press, department of Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 71-82. (The article is hereinafter referred to as "Bob Dylan"; the book is hereinafter referred to as Conversations with the New Reality.)

[2]Ibid., p. 74.

[3]Ibid.

Summary of the Eight Classes

These eight classes of responses to the status quo practical values by all the literature surveyed in this study constitute the framework to determine the frame-of-reference, and therefore the legitimation-delegitimation-relegitimation role and function, of a given communication. It is useful at this point to summarize the eight classes by giving them descriptive titles. Such titles should aid in making identification more clear in the case of future references. For the convenience of further referral the following descriptive titles will be employed.

Class I is the attacking-advocation of the status quo.

Class II is the indifferent-advocation of the status quo.

Class III is the denial-acceptance of the status quo.

Class IV is the accommodating-advocation of the status quo.

Class V is the accommodating advocation of new concepts.

Class VI is the denial-acceptance of new concepts.

Class VII is the indifferent-advocation of new concepts.

Class VIII is the attacking-advocation of new concepts.

For the sake of graphic conceptualization, the relationship of these eight classes to one another and to their respective frames-of-reference within the cultural change complex is summarized in Table 34.

Before the subject matter on new concepts of the human person is analyzed further in terms of these eight classes, two additional observations need to be made. The first concerns the relation of the eight classes and the E-complex frames-of-reference to the scored code

TABLE 34.--Showing the Eight Broad Classes of Image-Responses by Frames-of-Reference within the Change Complex ("E") and the Relationships Expressed Therein

Class Number of Image-Response Type*	E^1	E^1 / E^3	E^2 / E^3	E^2
I.	**ATTACKING ADVOCATION OF THE STATUS QUO**	(Resists E^3-type accommodation)		(Attacks E^2)
II.	**INDIFFERENT ADVOCATION OF STATUS QUO**	(Indifferent to E^3-type accommodation)		(Indifferent to E^2)
III.	(Ambivalent towards E^1)	**DENIAL-ACCEPTANCE OF STATUS QUO**	(Incidental accommodation of E^3)	(Ambivalent towards E^2)
IV.	(Advocates E^1)	**ACCOMMODATING ADVOCATION OF STATUS QUO**	(Accommodates E^3 vigorously)	(Accommodates E^2 mildly)
V.	(Accommodates E^1 mildly)	(Accommodates E^3 vigorously)	**ACCOMMODATING ADVOCATION OF E^2**	(Advocates E^2)
VI.	(Ambivalent towards E^1)	(Incidental accommodation of E^3)	**DENIAL-ACCEPTANCE OF E^2**	(Ambivalent towards E^2)
VII.	(Indifferent to E^1)	(Indifferent to E^3-type accommodation)		**INDIFFERENT ADVOCATION OF E^2**
VIII.	(Attacks E^1)	(Resists E^3-type accommodation)		**ATTACKING ADVOCATION OF E^2**

*See underlined bold-type for descriptive title and proper frame-of-reference for each class of image-response. See small-type in parentheses for the relations expressed.

list of the status quo analyzed in Chapter II. The second observation relates to the special significance of the E^3 frame-of-reference for the two essential functions required by any viable society, namely, provisions for social cohesion and provisions for social change.

The Relation of the Eight Classes to the Scored Code List of the Status Quo

First, the E^1, E^2, and E^3 frames-of-reference may be characterized in terms of the surveys conducted for the substantive material in Chapter II. E.g., the 54 percent of verbal symbols in the scored code list (Appendix B) which registered support for the status quo generally are class I or class II responses, and as such they may be classified as E^1 symbols.

Likewise, those verbal symbols which challenge, deny, or attack the E^1 symbols without having recourse to reliance upon the practical values in the process of denying status quo symbols, i.e., those which advocate entirely different values than those affirmed in the 54 percent support scores, sort themselves into the final one of the eight classes, class VIII. Consequently, these images fall into the E^2 section of verbal symbols and beliefs in this study's universe-of-discourse.

It is important, however, to distinguish this group as such from the 13 percent of verbal symbols in the scored code list which oppose the core beliefs of the status quo within its own ranks. The reason for this distinction is that in one way or another such internal

opposition by the status quo may well actually accept the presuppositions of the practical values, even when some particular form of application of those values is opposed. This was the case in the quotation by Carmichael illustrating class III material and the quotation by Page illustrating the class IV subject matter. Thus, some of the 13 percent opposition scores in the scored code list might well deny-accept the practical values, or conceivably even advocate practical values while accommodating them to new concepts.

Even so, it is true that some of the images contained in the 13 percent opposition scores in Chapter II could represent the E^2 frame-of-reference, if some of the challenging new concepts had somehow managed to penetrate into the ranks of status quo concepts and become accepted. This might happen, for example, through the insights of someone like Shepard or another one of the organization theorists who manage to prove that collaborative concepts of human personality could mean greater productive output and internal stability for the status quo's corporate bureaucracies.[1]

To the extent that E^2 symbols show up in the opposition scores in the status quo's own code list, this is highly significant, for it means that non-status quo values have succeeded in penetrating the very central core and obtaining legitimacy by the status quo itself even though it could perhaps be destined interminably to remain in

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[1]In this case, of course, the penetrating image would then become a part of the data-base for the status quo legitimation-delegitimation profile. The question is, at what point does an image or a concept move from E^3 or E^2 to E^1?

tension or conflict with other longer-standing status quo values. Nonetheless, the penetrating concept as such, in performing its function of challenging the status quo, would be able to do so from a newly-privileged position of strength and legitimacy.

The question may arise as to how such penetrating verbal symbols might be recognized and verified both as to their character and as to the fact of their penetration into the inner circles of the status quo. The first step is to become more familiar with the nature of the non-status quo symbols in general, especially as they emphasize new concepts of the human person. A fairly reliable "rule-of-thumb" was suggested earlier to the effect that one may begin by searching for images and values which suggest the opposite of the status quo practical values. As indicated, these might include the concepts of subjectivity, nonrationality, playfulness, festiveness, extravagance, liberality, spontaneity, whimsy, freedom-from-constraint, random behavior, and collaboration and noncompetitiveness.

The second step is to survey the opposition cells in the scored code list (recalling that these might vary for each of the five major conclusions) for verbal symbols which appear to advance the efficacy of any of the non-status quo values just described. The third step then is to ascertain in what way and to what extent the penetrating concept has been articulated within status quo institutions or by status quo elites. This is a task with which Chapters IV and V will specifically be concerned.

The Significance of the E^3 Frame-of-Reference

Meanwhile, some observations are in order about the E^3 frame-of-reference. The E^3 frame-of-reference represents the ambivalent area of overlap and intermixture between the E^1 core culture and the challenging new concepts. This E^3 category includes, e.g., first, status quo-oriented values which nevertheless join non-status quo concepts in opposing some existing forms and applications of any of the status quo practical values; second, the 33 percent of the verbal symbols in the scored code list which show ambivalence towards the status quo (thus, virtually all nonsupporting verbal symbols in the scored code list are included in the E^3 frame-of-reference); third, all non-status quo concepts which nevertheless seek to work within the framework of established institutions or communication channels and concepts or to combine radically differing ideas with the practical values.

The E^3 Frame-of-Reference Is an Intellectual Construct Conceptualizing the Linguistic Agents of Orderly Cultural and Social Change

In an important sense the E^3 frame-of-reference is the balancing wheel, the buffer in the culture for the stresses of opposition and transition. It is the agent for more orderly change. It is the vehicle for bringing together the disparate and hostile conceptions within the society and reducing the incidence, as well as blunting the abrasiveness, of the more cataclysmic dysfunctions and locations.

Some Metaphorical Descriptions of E^3 and Its Significance

During periods of lesser accelerative thrust of transience and greater social and cultural homogeneity, the belief system within the central core as represented by the E^1 frame-of-reference ostensibly would serve as the primary agent of social cohesion. But during the times of unprecedented rates of change, it is the E^3 arena which must fill the role of holding the society together. It serves as a conceptual melting pot where disparate images may comingle and accommodate themselves to one another and ultimately interbreed. This process then produces new code words and symbol-meanings which may serve as the "readouts" that give "feedback" to the changing culture. Such feedback is necessary in order for the culture to gain some perspective as to where it is, what it is now, and what it is still in the process of becoming. Otherwise no means is available by which the culture could accommodate its "body" to the constant changes in order to maintain its homeostasis. Its integrity (integral unity) thereby would be lost, the culture would disintegrate, and "the patient would die."

To change the metaphor, during periods of the rapid and increasing accelerative thrust of transience, the culture is a moving target which changes position so quickly that no "scope-sight" or other optical scanner sees quickly or broadly enough to monitor its movements. Therefore, no one knows for sure "where it is at," to use an idiom currently in vogue.

To return to the organic metaphor and blend it with the image of the "optical scanner," what becomes of the utmost necessity to the culture's well-being is for the cultural "body" to evolve new and better up-to-date optical self-scanning equipment and methods in order to keep up with its own metamorphosis and to hold itself together in any orderly manner.

These several metaphors and analogies are an attempt to suggest imageries that may provide models or symbols which the mind can employ as a shorthand code for the grasping and relating of much complex data. In this manner a means might be afforded for holding in mind the outlines (and some details) of a vast process as a whole. Its implicit characteristics thereby may be rendered readily accessible and recallable to mental consciousness. If this is possible, then the entire process may be made manageable, for, hypothetically at least, if a problem can be understood, it is no longer necessarily inevitable.

The explicit purpose of this discussion on symbols, conceptual models, mental shorthand, the capabilities of the human mind, the expansion of human consciousness, and the adaptation, survival and growth of human culture, apart from interest in the subject matter for its own theoretical merits, is to emphasize the observation that the E^3 category reputedly holds the greatest promise of any frame-of-reference described within this study of producing the requisite conceptual "optical scanners" capable of "showing and telling" the culture-at-large what its position is, and what are its trajectories and directions of change. It may do this by producing an endless flow

of hybridic images which epigramatically depict the variety and scope of the conceptual elements flooding into the cultural melting pot, while at the same time its symbol-producing activity generates a new type of cultural homogeneity based upon the very fact of change. The rudiments for this newly evolved type of social cohesion are to be found in the creative symbol-producing business in which raw elements otherwise repellent to one another become forged into new alloys appropriate to the conceptual consumption within the lifeways of the culture. In such fashion what could be toxic inputs are transformed into positive sources of nourishment for the maintenance of the health and vitality of a culture, the main characteristic of which is rapid change. Thereby the culture may be enabled to come to terms with itself as a phenomenon which is more dynamic than static, more fluid than congealed, more in flux than in fixity, more understandable in terms of process than of product.

Should such a conceptual transition truly suceed in taking place, as may well be happening, the event would likely best be understood in terms of an evolutionary mutation or "leap" of human society no less significant for the destiny of the human race than were the first occurrences of speech and writing which were determinative facts that liberated the progress and status of homo sapiens from the evolutionary limitations of the other species of great apes and lower mammals.

PART II. THE IMAGERIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCELERATIVE THRUST OF TRANSIENCE

The Imageries of the Accelerative Thrust of Transience as a Response to the Contradictions in the Status Quo, Particularly the Subject-Object Dichotomy

In the preceding discussion which emphasizes the importance of the image-processing and symbol-producing activity of the E^3 frame-of-reference within the cultural change complex, certain metaphorical allusions were made to "raw elements otherwise repellent to one another" becoming "forged into new alloys" appropriate to the conceptual consumption within the lifeways of the culture.

This reference is more than an effort at picturesque prose. In preparation for the discussion about specific new concepts of the human person which currently serve to delegitimate existing core concepts, it is pertinent to summarize some of the observations already touched upon about some of the "raw elements" which frequently have found themselves in conflict with one another in the past within western culture.

Contradictions Within the Status Quo

Throughout this treatise certain contradictory "raw elements" in western culture have been identified and analyzed. Several of these can be identified among the eight prominent "themes" of western culture enumerated in Chapter I.[1] These are the same themes that are recapitulated in Figure 9.

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[1]See pp. 56-73.

The "spirit of capitalism" versus "popular sovereignty."--Consider, for example, the first two of the eight themes of western culture. These are the "spirit of capitalism" and "popular sovereignty." One of the chief conceptual pillars of the capitalistic stance is grounded deeply in the somewhat anarchist belief in the natural freedom of human individuals, and in the belief that this freedom should ideally remain as unrestrained as possible.[1]

On the other hand, popular sovereignty as a current of thought has served as the foremost bearer of the idea of equality. Recently this current of thought has been strongly articulated in the United States as the doctrine that one man should equal one vote. This doctrine won its way in the issue over reapportionment of both the federal House of Representatives and the various state legislatures.[2]

Yet, as prominently as these themes have been in association with democracy and free enterprise, the concepts of liberty and equality are not the same thing. This fact is especially true if the capitalist dictum which has been scrutinized earlier is accepted to the

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[1]In defense of this tradition Kingsley Widmer says: "We should fear all orderings that falsify common human pleasures, just as we individually distrust persons who lack fullness and authenticity of response, such as the frozen-faced functionary, the rigid thinker, and the manipulative success." He also adds, "Candor may be the first effort in freeing ourselves for a truly oppositional order which recognizes the varied human surplus of aggression, and which makes it more fair and less destructive for homo negans to do what he will." See Widmer's "Toward a Politics for Homo Negans: Libertarian Reflections on Human Aggression," The Personalist, Summer, 1972, pp. 303 and 315.

[2]Stephen V. Monsma, American Politics: A Systems Approach (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 120-21.

effect that "liberty requires the right to property." The practical outcome of the victory of this dictum has been the result that whoever has more property has more liberty.[1]

The antipathy between these two "raw elements" sometimes yields to the "forging" process in which they become something of a workable "alloy" due to the periodic incompatibility of both of them with the more societarian-type corporate viewpoints manifested within the Metaphysics and Epistemology of the status quo. This issue was analyzed in reference to the scored code list of the status quo and appears in Chapter II.[2]

In this secondary conflict involving both the spirit of capitalism and popular sovereignty against the prerogatives of ORGANIZATIONS in its concepts of Society, notions of popular sovereignty sometimes look to public bureaucracies for the implementation or enforcement of the ideal of "equality." When this happens then the alloy between popular sovereignty and the spirit of capitalism may fray.

Yet, at other times the ideology of popular sovereignty finds itself pitted against public and private bureaucracies in the belief that those bureaucracies have somehow become the source of inequality,

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[1]See Chapter II, p. 231.

[2]See Chapter II, p. 282.

or at least that they have served to perpetuate such inequities.[1] In this case the forces supporting popular sovereignty concepts and those advocating the spirit of capitalism may indeed form an alloy "appropriate to the conceptual consumption within the lifeways of the culture."

This conflict may, and apparently it frequently does, take the form of an encounter between conglomerate bureaucracies versus grass roots populism. In effect, members of both the New Left and the New Right basically are populists, although perhaps for different reasons.[2]

The "historical consciousness" and the "Faustian spirit" of western culture.--The third and fourth themes also have provided their share of conflicts within the western consciousness. While the

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[1]For a helpful analysis of this phenomenon see James M. Elden, "Radical Politics and the Future of Public Administration in the Post-industrial Era," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 19-42. (Hereinafter referred to as "Radical Politics.")

[2]See Chapter II, p. 282. See also Elden's entire article, "Radical Politics," for an adroit explication of this relationship, in which he comments that

> "the attack of the Right is an attempt to recreate an earlier state of affairs by rejecting Welfare State goals and the scale of public bureaucracies necessary to attain them. . . . In contrast, the New Left's attack, essentially at the bureaucratic machinery required for the Welfare State, rests on a different set of new values and purposes. In criticizing public organization, the New Left is not simply opposing bulging bureaucracies; rather, it is attacking "corporate liberalism," formal government, and special-interest bureaucracy as part of a larger rejection of middle-class values and life styles and the bureaucratic nature of modern organizations generally [pp. 26-27]."

historical consciousness has been responsible for the western man's disposition to feel that he can bring both nature and history under his control, and the Faustian spirit as a special aspect of that historical consciousness has caused him to seek perfection amidst his intransigent impatience with human and worldly limits, both themes have not only led to his incredible accomplishments in science, education, and technology, but have also led to his peculiar intemperateness in war and politics as he has sought to change the face of the earth to suit himself and his ideas of perfection.[1]

The subject-object epistemological split as either the source or the intensifier of the other internal conflicts of the contemporary western status quo.--The fifth theme is useful as a key to better understanding the conflicts associated with all the other themes. Either it serves to accentuate the other conflicts so as to heighten their effects, or else they can be understood as direct outgrowths or transmuted forms of the conflict stated in the fifth theme. This is the dichotomy between the subjective and the objective perspectives in the western man's search for knowledge, commonly called the subject-object split. It affects the entire culture's various ways of knowing what it knows, and therefore of being what it is and doing what it does.[2]

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[1]See Chapter I, pp. 62-67.

[2]See Chapter I, pp. 67-68.

Succinctly stated, the subject-object dichotomy can be explained in this way. The objective approach to knowledge equates truth with what can be verified by means of the five senses, i.e., with the "objects" of the five senses. By contrast the subjective path to knowledge places primary emphasis on the subjective perceiver, i.e., man himself, rather than upon the objects perceived. That is, subjective approaches to truth focus on man's feelings and thought processes. It also often finds itself preoccupied with the "universal laws" by which men reason, irrespective of the five senses and the objects which are perceived by them.

As a result, subjective approaches to knowledge have resulted in the philosophical styles of rationalism, idealism and romanticism, whereas the objective approaches to knowledge have produced subjectivism's numbers in the form of empericism, pragmatism, and behaviorism.

These latter philosophical orientations, in turn, either produced, or developed as a germane part of, the sixth theme of western culture, namely, secularism.

The dilemma of secularism.--Secularism reflects the dilemma of the subject-object split,[1] for it not only serves as cultural host to currents of thought supporting the objective approaches of empiricism, pragmatism, and behaviorism, but it also relies on the technical-mathematical explanation of the world by means of natural science, and

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[1]See Chapter I, pp. 68-71.

on the rational conception of reality as a machine with eternally constant laws of movement manifest in an infinitely recurring natural process. The objective approaches to knowledge are consistent with the historical consciousness of the West, whereas the rational and technical modes actually take refuge in the presumed validity of universal reason, which is both rationalistic and mathematical in character. It is abstract and therefore subjective, per se. That is, strictly speaking, both rational thought and mathematical calculation can function by their own inherent "laws" without reference to an external "world" at all.

Thus, as has been previously indicated in earlier pages, secularism is burdened with this dilemma. Man appears in the world as the bearer of universal reason, and by virtue of his reason he becomes the measure of all things. But the measure he employs is rooted in the mechanical model of the universe in which man is a mere atom caught in the eternal laws of movement and necessity. Thus his autonomous freedom and his naturalistic bondage are in the sharpest conflict, causing him to oscillate between the extremes of Faustian action on the one hand and apathy and depression on the other hand.

The problem of individualism: "interests" versus "laws."--This issue of opposition between the products of subjective and objective preoccupations with knowledge is made more poignant in man's attempts to understand what it means to be human. It emerges sharply,

therefore, in the seventh theme, individualism.[1] In western economic, political and social theory the individual is interpreted primarily in terms of his presumed subjective "interests." Yet western theorists have attempted to "objectify" subjective "interests" by codifying them, or the fancied "instincts" which produce them, into social, economic, and political "laws" that are held to be universally operable.[2]

The observation has been made that in another society at another time and in another place it may be that the contradiction between "law" or "reason" on the one hand and "self-interest" on the other would loom so obvious as to elicit laughter should someone propose that they be equated. In spite of this fact, the two halves of the equation have so often been brought together in western culture with such determined insistence that the validity of the equation is commonly presumed.[3]

Still, the concepts of self-interest and law could not have endured as compatible elements without the growing power of the State

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[1]See Chapter I, pp. 71-72.

[2]Jordan points up the contradiction between "interests" and "law," indeed, of all common social heritage. He says,

> "The complete break between right as mental states and the objective or institutional structure of civilization is overlooked, and as a consequence contradiction runs from this point all the way through our social theory and our practical philosophy. The 'social problem' then becomes one which demands <u>how</u> we are to <u>make</u> an objective and real order <u>out of</u> the states of mind of individuals, and this is to propose an irrational situation."

See Jordan's <u>Forms</u>, p. 18. Italics his.

[3]See Chapter II, pp. 202-3.

to enforce the subjective concept of the individual as the basis of law.[1] This arrangement has worked for the purposes of the core culture due to the fact that the western concept of the individual and of the THINGS that are the objects of his "interests" have sunk deeply into the unwitting part of his psyche and his culture.[2]

Yet, to anyone taking the perspective that human persons are either more than, or other than, subjectively isolable human "atoms," the legitimacy of the entire network of the State and of the sort of "individual" it fosters begins to tumble. Here is the Achilles heel of western culture--the attempt to introduce subjective, nonmaterial causes and reasons into a universe construed as thoroughly material. It is the fallacy of trying to objectify or generalize what is either arbitrary, indeterminate, and capricious--the subjective life,--or what is merely abstract, even though perhaps internally orderly and consistent, i.e., the rational life (as in philosophical rationalism).[3]

In sum, the paradox of western culture lies in its intense insistence upon the material nature of reality alongside its critical dependence upon subjective definitions of human personality as reasons for its political interactions. This contrast serves to accentuate the depth of the subject-object split in western culture.[4]

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[1]See Chapter II, pp. 204-5.

[2]See Chapter II, p. 256.

[3]See Chapter II, p. 268.

[4]See Chapter II, pp. 252-53.

Internal Contradictions and the Vulnerability of the Status Quo Belief System

It is also at this point that the belief system of the status quo perhaps is most vulnerable, i.e., at the point of the philosophical and social contradictions resulting from the subject-object dichotomy.

This contention seems to be borne out by the major findings in the exercises conducted by means of the research design in Chapter II. It will be recalled that the results of the scored code list of key verbal symbols in the status quo revealed the legitimation perceptual convergence of THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and IDEAS. The culture's perceptual predispositions inherent within this triad of perceptional categories represents the "solid ground," the bedrock, of status quo legitimacy, as far as the way persons are taught within the culture to see things is concerned.

The Delegitimation perceptual convergence of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES.--The legitimation perceptual convergence is opposed, however, by a Delegitimation perceptual convergence consisting of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES, the combination of which increases the probability of delegitimation taking place.

This particular alignment of opposing forces is related to the vulnerability of the status quo at the point of its subject-object split in the following way. In the strongest of the three legitimation perceptual components, THINGS, the status quo bestows an aura of

self-sufficiency upon individual objects in which no reference to any external viewpoint beyond the object itself is needed to decipher the nature and significance of material THINGS.[1] The acceptance of this viewpoint within the lifeways of the culture was shown in the scored code list of key verbal symbols within the status quo to be virtually and overwhelmingly complete. No inroads by delegitimating forces seems to be possible here. To a lesser extent this is also true of IDEAS and ORGANIZATIONS.

But this illusion of the individualistic "atomistic" autonomy of material THINGS is destroyed when the same perceiving individual or culture begins to ask questions about TIME, the strongest of the delegitimation perceptual components. Whereas the culture tries in every way to quantify TIME and thereby break it up into "minutes," "hours," "days," or "dollars,"--i.e., separate autonomous, unrepeatable measurable units corresponding to the same interpretation of THINGS, and thus to make of TIME another category of THINGS, nevertheless, the lifeways of the culture-at-large, or even within the status quo itself do not "buy" the interpretation. In fact, they substantially reject it. TIME, which is the most intimate of all the perceptual-experiential modes (that is, it is the most inescapable), may have a way of exerting its own wholeness of continuity in a person's experience so as to convincingly bely the segmenting interpretation. This perception could lead understandably both to personal

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[1]See Chapter II, p. 253.

experiential conflicts within persons in their outlook as to the kind of world they live in, as well as to similar conflicts within the organizational life of institutions grappling with the same incongruity.

This is but one of several suggested instances in which the subject-object split has surfaced to expose the vulnerability of the status quo to other cultural forces, alternative ideas, and ultimately to delegitimation processes. Other instances can be seen in the holistic nature of a western person's experiences of PEOPLE and PLACES as opposed to the atomistic interpretations urged upon him and accepted by him in the case of his perceptions of the nature of IDEAS and ORGANIZATIONS.

The core culture also seems to resist its own dominant interpretations and show its vulnerability in the case of its more conscious Philosophical Presuppositions about the nature of Man, whereas in all the other categories of conscious thought-formulation the lifeways within the central core accept the dominant interpretation. It is significant that when the culture finally thinks about what it means to be human, in contrast to all the other dimensions of speculative thought, that it finally rejects the atomistic interpretation of the dominant culture and reverts to its Enlightenment heritage of being quite humanistic, which in turn, provides the basis for a more holistic perspective by recognizing the human person within the context of his relationship to his natural environment.

The practical value of austerity as a mild rebuff to the status quo.--A similar reflex takes place within the culture's practical values. As remnants of more Puritan days, the austerity values mildly reassert themselves against the dominant culture and resist the secular motif which is accepted rather strongly among the other four components.

A restudy of the data and the attendant analyses offered in Chapter II for each of these occurrences should convince the reader that subjective-objective contradictions and dilemmas had much to do with cultural perceptions that led to delegitimation processes showing up at just these points within the code list which have been indicated here. Since the information has been covered rather meticulously, it is not considered essential to recapitulate it any further here beyond the illustrations and suggested references that have just been given.

The Responses of the Various New Concepts of the Human Person to the Contradictions and Vulnerabilities of the Status Quo

This summation of what has been said concerning the various internal contradictions of the status quo, all of which are held to be significantly related in one way or another to the central problem of the subject-object cognitive dichotomy, has been offered in order to make the following point. All of the various new concepts of the human person surveyed in this study, although highly diverse in both their presuppositions and their conclusions, nevertheless possess at least three themes in common.

The reassertion of some kind of "wholeness."--The various new concepts of the human person studied in this project all attempt to reassert some kind of "wholeness" about man's life and his relation to his universe. Since the culture which begot them was fraught with contradictions rooted in a deeply divided approach to knowledge, it seems natural that their responses to such culture and their attempts to improve upon that knowledge should reflect a preoccupation above all with the division in its epistemology. This quest for some over-riding unity in man's experience and in life's meaning seems to the writer to be present regardless of whether the particular detracting philosophy begins with basically subjective starting points or objective ones.

The affirmation of two other themes: transcendent reference points and greater self-determination.--Two other themes also seem to the writer to be held in common by the various approaches to new concepts of the human person, both of which have an integral relation to the quest for meaningful unity. One is the search for, or affirmation of, some transcendent reference point above and beyond the thing-in-itself or the life-in-itself or the culture-in-itself by which each may be understood and interpreted. The other is a quest for some means of greater self-determination by persons and by groups.

Many times "wholeness" and "transcendent reference points," (both of which are generally conceived as occurring together) are viewed by the various viewpoints as providing the very means for

greater self-determination. Conversely, sometimes the view is held that if one can establish self-determination, then wholeness and transcendent insights will result. More often, however, the conception runs the other way.

As a parallel to the observations just made, these new concepts of the human person which are about to be presented may begin from a subjective point of departure and work towards the objective world in order to find wholeness. Or they may begin at the objective end of things and then work towards the perceiving subject. Or, finally, they may begin from the presupposition of a transcendent perspective and simply presume a wholeness which cannot be abrogated by the problems presented by the subject-object split.

These matters have been discussed here so the reader may understand better why the various categories of new concepts of the human person have been presented in the discussion that follows as a reaction against the subject-object dichotomy in western thought.

An Overview of the Philosophies Implicit Within the "New Imageries" of the Accelerative Thrust of Transience: Subjective, Objective, and Corporatist Approaches

The several categories of "new imageries" attending accelerative thrust can be said to represent three general types of philosophical positions recognizable in the history of western culture. These are:

1. The subjective approaches, which are not necessarily "intuitionistic," but which in this case happen to be.

2. The objective approaches, which in this case can also be classified as "naturalistic."

3. The corporatist approaches, which tend to be, and in this case are, explicitly "metaphysical."[1]

Intuitionistic, naturalistic, or metaphysical?--Considered in terms of its normative content, a viewpoint is "intuitionistic" to the extent that it explains ethical knowledge as resting on or consisting in an "intuition" of the moral value of actions or situations.[2] An

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[1]As useful background for the classification of philosophical viewpoints in this section, the writer found the following sources helpful: Lucius Garvin, "Major Ethical Viewpoints," The Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 309-22; William K. Frankena, "Moral Philosophy in America," Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by Ferm, pp. 348-60; Otto Butz, Modern German Political Theory (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955); and Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1927).

[2]Intuitionists regularly have insisted upon the unique and unanalyzable nature of intuited moral and value predicates. Therefore, they also have insisted upon the primitive and underivable status of propositions containing these predicates. An outstanding example of a moral intuitionist is found in the thought of Henry Bergson, the French philosopher. He attacked the rampant intellectualism of his day which had begun with Bacon and Descartes and had ended in the skepticism of Diderot and Hume, then was renewed in Darwin and Spencer. Specifically, Bergson was against the mechanistic materialism of his day, i.e., against Darwinism, and he followed the lead of Schopenhauer by seeking in the objective as well as in the subjective world an energizing principle, an active entelechy, which "might make more intelligible the miracles and subtleties of life." He found this principle in the elan vital, the life force. See, for example, Bergson's Mind-Energy, trans. by H. Wildon Carr (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), especially pages 29-35 in which Bergson talks about "joy as the "sign and reward of creation." See also Durant, The Story of Philosophy, pp. 487-507.

ethical viewpoint is "naturalistic" so far as it defines moral terms by reference to "natural" (for example, psychological, biological, social, and so forth) processes.[1] An ethical viewpoint is "metaphysical," in the broad sense, when it derives the ideas of rightness and wrongness from, or identifies them with, some metaphysical conception such as a transcendental absolute or the will of God (or a god).[2]

Absolutistic or relativistic?--Ethical viewpoints also may be distinguished as absolutistic, on the one hand, and as relativistic, on the other. For the most part, intuitionistic and metaphysical views tend to be absolutistic in that they regard moral truth as holding universally and apart from their relation to the experiences of any particular individuals or groups. That is, truth is regarded as absolute, regardless of time and place. Many naturalistic views, on

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[1]In contrast to intuitionism, "naturalism" asserts that normative propositions may be analyzed into or derived from those of the empirical sciences. Definitions of normative principles are expected to conform to the same requirements as those demanded for any scientific concept. That is, they must be testable in terms of empirically specifiable criteria. This includes such viewpoints as those of evolutionism, viz., Herbert Spencer; hedonism, such as in Epicurus, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick; and pragmatism, as in the thought of William James or John Dewey. See Garvin, "Major Ethical Viewpoints," pp. 312-16.

[2]Metaphysical positions seek another foundation for normative principles other than individual desire or the practice-social interests of groups. A concept of the self is often sought in terms which go beyond the ordinary thought-forms of the psychological or social sciences, such as in "self-realization" theories. This frequently results in the position of "idealism," such as in the thought of F. W. G. Hegel, T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley, although it need not do so per se, as witness the juristic and social philosophy of Elijah Jordan. See Garvin, "Major Ethical Viewpoints," pp. 316-17.

the other hand, are relativistic in that they tend to regard moral truths as depending upon the desires, interests, and valuings of individuals in societies and hence as capable of varying from one place or time to another.[1]

As it has been indicated elsewhere, it is not always easy to classify ethical viewpoints unambiguously. A theory such as hedonism for instance, may be asserted as a special form of intuitionism or as a form of naturalistic ethics--or it may even in different respects share in both forms at the same time. Therefore, there are bound to be various overlappings and cross-classifications. Thus the system of classifications as we have described it here cannot be entirely consistent. This reflects the fact, however, that ethical viewpoints themselves are seldom entirely neat and orderly.

Nevertheless, to draw some parallels, the subjective theories in our classification do tend to be intuitionistic; the objective theories tend to be naturalistic; and the corporate theories tend to be more explicitly metaphysical. Yet all of these theories aim, some more self-consciously than others, in overcoming the subject-object dichotomy in the tenets of the status quo. It is in this sense that the subjectivist theories move from the subject to the object to attempt a unity, the objectivist theories move from the object to the subject to affect a unity, and the corporate theories presume a unity to begin with, which is then explicated in its two dimensions.

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[1] Ibid., p. 312.

Cognitive and noncognitive viewpoints.--Another characteristic held in common by the three broad categories of new concepts of the human person just described is that all three categories can be classified as "cognitivist" theories. That is, they seek to derive principles for normative behavior from the "facts" of "existence." This contrasts sharply with most approaches to "truth" within the status quo, for generally the latter may be described as "noncognitivist" theories. Prominently this refers to the philosophical stance of logical positivism and the related research methods of behaviorism.

Granted these differences between the status quo and non-status quo material, it should be noted also that what is regarded as "objective" in a cognitivist sense is quite different than what is regarded as "objective" in a noncognitivist sense. The former is substantiated, or at least posited, via internal intuitionistic, or other "leaps" beyond either reason or "sense experience" in the normal sense, or by finding normative principles in the objective natural or social conditions, and the principles are taken as having something of a fixed quality.

On the other hand, "objectivity" is posited by means of empirical observations and data, i.e., through sense experience.[1]

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[1]Perhaps the foremost and also the most formative noncognitivist thinker in this century has been Bertrand Russell, who put forth "the doctrine . . . that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true." For Russell there is only one demonstrable reason for choosing any course of action, and that is because "we want to." Yet Russell advocated tolerance, sympathy, understanding, equality, and the good life, including freedom, love, creative art, and intellectual thought, for all

The seven categories of new imageries.--If the new imageries spawned in the wake of the accelerative thrust of transience may be broadly classified into the categories of the subjectivist, objectivist, and corporate approaches generally recognizable within the philosophical history of western thought, the contemporary perspectives on these old motifs when mounted as an assault on the status quo nevertheless provide a few new twists, although still drawing heavily, albeit often inadvertently, from more classical positions. As it was earlier indicated in Figure 9, the three main categories have been further divided into a total of seven philosophical groups recognized by the writer among the new imageries of accelerative thrust. To recapitulate, these are as follows:

1. Subjective approaches:
    a. The new anarchism.
    b. The new hedonism.
    c. The new transcendentalism.
2. Objective approaches:
    a. Technological man.
    b. Ecological man
3. Corporate approaches:
    a. Theonomous culture.
    b. Corporate individuality.

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men. See D. H. Monroe, "Russell's Moral Theories," in Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by D. F. Pears (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 325-55.

Although each of these positions offers much interesting material, complete expositions of them are not possible within the confines of this essay. However, for the purposes of this study, a brief characterization of each trend will be useful, whereas a fuller treatment must await other occasions.

The new anarchism.--It has been said that the anarchist movement in history failed but that anarchism as an idea was successful. Thus, traces of the idea are to be found not only in organized anarchism, "but also in movements like Russian and American populism, Spanish federalism, and Mexican agrarianism."[1] Further, anarchism provided the Indian Nationalists with the technique of passive resistance that won the great conflict against the British overlords. Moreover, anarchism helped to inspire some of the movements that in our own day have risen in resistance to trends of totalitarianism, such as the Israeli Kibbutzim. The village community movement in India, and the credit unions of North America, also are products of anarchist precepts.[2]

Whereas anarchism historically has shared with liberals their high evaluation of individualism, but wanted to abolish the state instead of merely limit it, and whereas in economic matters anarchism denies the sanctity of private property and the free marketplace, and

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[1]George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 475.

[2]Ibid.

whereas anarchism differs sharply from both Marxism and liberalism by viewing the relationship between man and nature as one of harmony rather than of opposition, and whereas "spontaneity" is one of the key words of anarchism in which it celebrates the free play of human impulses and the release of the natural forces of the personality, it is, however, the thrust of this last concept by which the new anarchism has been animated and fueled by the counter culture. Having become apolitical and rejected the norms of political liberalism and its society, the sons and daughters of liberals in the counter culture have had one of the greatest impacts of all--through "the politics of play." More will be said about this later.[1]

Until recently, according to Hacker, any definition of anarchism would have had to come more from its literature than from its record of political action.[2] Today, however, the dictum that there is a shortage of anarchists may have reversed itself. Contrary to earlier eras, it is possible that with the onset of the counter culture today there are finally more anarchists sustaining a movement with a life of its own than there are theorists who propound anarchism, in spite of the prolific output of the printing press, particularly the underground press.

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[1]See Marshall S. Shatz, ed., The Essential Works of Anarchism (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., a National General Company, 1971), pp. xi-xxix. (Hereinafter referred to as Essential Works.) See also Richard Neville, Play Power.

[2]Andrew Hacker, "Anarchism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, I, 283.

If this observation is true, it may be due to the fact that for the first time in human history a society embodying the principles of utopianism is genuinely conceivable.[1] As Shatz indicates, what is new about the new anarchism may be the fact that anarchism is a luxury which the post-industrial world is only now beginning to be able to afford.[2] Thus, in the contemporary situation, the traditional doctrines of anarchism have taken on new meaning. Modern society has begun to shift its emphasis from the task of generating material wealth to the task of utilizing it to enrich social and personal life.[3]

This fact is reflected in the changing social base from which anarchism is able to draw. Proudhon, Godwin, Stirner, Bakunin, and other classical anarchists addressed themselves to the working classes. Today, however, the basis of anarchism rests not with manual workers but with students, "hippies," youthful dissidents, intellectuals, and professional workers.[4]

Finally, a major difference in the old anarchism and the new anarchism is that an abundance of history and social development have

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[1]Anarchism is not the same as utopianism, although it may be best understood as a variety of utopianism--one which does not defer the gratification of utopian benefits until some vague future but seeks to experience them now. See "Harper's Wraparound: The Utopian Urge: You Make the Future Today," Harper's Magazine, March, 1973, pp. 5-9.

[2]Shatz, Essential Works, p. xv.

[3]Orion White, Jr. and Gideon Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 11-35, especially pp. 11-17.

[4]Shatz, Essential Works, p. xxvi.

taken place in the west to which significant ideas of anarchism have contributed. The new anarchism today benefits from this development, whereas the old anarchism had to carve its own way in a world that was not ready for it. This is not to say that the new anarchism will succeed where the old anarchism failed. It is only to underscore the fact that the idea itself appears to be enjoying ever-wider currency amidst the accelerative thrust of transience.

By abandoning any vested interest in the organizational life of the status quo, particularly the State, the new anarchism, like the old, escapes the theoretical burden of harmonizing the subjective individual with the objective world, which is the particular dilemma of the core culture. Rather, the new anarchist attempts to provide a wholeness to life by drawing the objective world into the subjective perspectives of the individual. It is therefore understandable that the new anarchism proliferates statements that are antagonistic towards the five practical values of the status quo. Consequently, Class VIII statements are highly typical of this group of images and perspectives.

The new hedonism.--In one sense the new hedonism is a broad extension of the new anarchism, for it places an emphasis upon the immediacy of man's sensual experience. In this light it differs from the calculated hedonism of Bentham and Mill's utilitarianism in the sense that under the new hedonism gratification is meant to be immediate.

The new hedonism is characterized by the celebration of the body and its various sensing organs. Indeed, the body itself is regarded as one large sensing organ which puts it in touch with its natural environment.[1]

This point is reflected in the writings of several of Freud's current followers who feel that he overemphasized the need to repress the pleasure principle in order to create civilization. Thus, Wilhelm Reich and Alexander Lowen both accept many of Freud's insights but reject his emphasis upon thanatos in favor of his emphasis on eros.[2]

Although it is true that the new hedonism performs certain anarchist functions, nevertheless the new hedonism should be distinguished from the new anarchism in several respects. Both the new anarchism and the new hedonism are critical of the status quo. As Etzioni has observed, hedonism develops whenever norms which define meanings disintegrate without being replaced by new norms.[3] Thus,

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[1]This is characteristic of the "sensitivity" movement, sensitivity training, and many encounter groups. See some of the many books produced by the movement, such as Bernard Gunther's What to Do Till the Messiah Comes, photographed by Paul Fusco (New York: Collier Books, 1971).

[2]Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis (3d ed.; New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1949), and Alexander Lowen, The Betrayal of the Body (London: Collier Books and Collier Macmillan Limited, 1967).

[3]Amitai Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning," The Center Magazine, V, No. 2 (March/April, 1972), p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as "Political Meaning.") See also "Toward a Theory of Guided Societal Change," Social Science Quarterly, L, No. 3 (December, 1969), 749-54, and The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York: The Free Press, 1968), both by the same author.

hedonism thrives amidst the spread of normlessness. Perhaps one difference between the effects of the new anarchism and the new hedonism is that anarchism helps to disintegrate norms whereas hedonism helps to fill the void following their disintegration.

Still, hedonism also has its own critical function. Etzioni points out that hedonism is the easiest critical formula against an established regime or culture and the one which has been used throughout history more than any other formula. It carries with it a view of man as inherently "good," and as self-sufficient.[1]

Yet it is just at this point that many advocates would claim that there is a fundamental difference between the new anarchism per se and the new hedonism. Although the new hedonism may receive its birth and impetus attended by anarchist phenomena, the former contrary to the latter frequently moves on its own to be taken into the general culture as such. Some observers claim that hedonism is formative of enduring culture as well as reactive against existing culture.[2] Yet, if this is true, it appears to be formative not of new institutions as much as of a new consciousness which infuses existing institutions.

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[1]Ibid. The problem, says Etzioni, is that hedonism is inherently unstable. It releases more than does any other pattern and asks for less, It is virtually impossible to institutionalize to the extent that institutions are based upon patterns of order requiring regulation. Etzioni thus questions the transcendental value of hedonism or the extent to which it is not merely a powerful rebellion but also a truly revolutionary basis for a new society. See "Political Meaning," pp. 4-5.

[2]See, for example, Robert Theobold's Alternative Future for America II (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1971).

That the great liberal establishment has found the powers of the new hedonism tolerable and indeed even useful, is demonstrated by the fact that, as Alvin Toffler points out, our society is moving towards an ad-hocracy, or what executives call "project" or "task-force" management.[1] In an increasing number of situations it appears that traditional, functional organizational structures created to meet predictable, non-novel conditions, prove incapable of responding effectively to radical changes in the environment. As a result, teams are assembled in many industries, particularly the aerospace industry, to solve specific short-term problems. Then, like mobile playgrounds, they are disassembled and their human components reassigned.[2]

Task-force ad-hocracy apparently works only if there is a high degree of self-satisfaction in one's work attended by a sense of independence and autonomy as a person. As indicated by Marcuse, self-gratification in one's work is a strongly hedonistic quality, which leads to feelings of confidence and independence of thought and action.[3]

These developments rest upon a hedonistic interpretation of the nature of man which is becoming more and more articulated in increasingly sophisticated ways by advocates of the position. A

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[1]Toffler, Future Shock, pp. 125-26, 135-36, 148, 151, 402, 408-9.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Reason. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965.

prominent example is found in the popular theories of Maslow and his thesis that human beings begin to drive towards self-actualization as soon as their basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter are satisfied.[1] Maslow's disciple, Theobold, affirms that a new view of the nature of man is developing according to data emerging in current psychological research and that it is possible for individuals to deviate as far from the cultural norm in positive healthy ways as the neurotic or psychotic individual deviates in unhealthy ways.[2]

It is perhaps clear, even from this brief description, that the new hedonist, for purposes of classification, falls within the subjective approach to reality and knowledge. His approach also is intuitive. Within the subjective-objective polarity the new hedonist starts at the subjective pole and drives towards the objective relationship by viewing himself as an individual whose being is continuous with the self-actualizing powers of life which are at the core of nature as a whole. Thus, the way to be at home in the world, in society, and with other people, according to the new hedonist, is to realize one's own potentialities.[3]

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[1]Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954); and by the same author see Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962); The Psychology of Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); and New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

[2]Robert Theobold, An Alternative Future for America II (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1968).

[3]Ibid., p. 24.

The delegitimating and reformulating powers of the new hedonism may be quite significant. Theobold claims that the change required if we are to survive as individuals and as a race in the technological era is to alter our cultural, semantic, and psychological patterns rather than to confirm to the behaviorist psychology which ostensibly eschews man's freedom as an unaffordable luxury, as in the thought of Skinner.[1]

The verbal output of the various advocates of the new hedonism contains statements ranging from Class V to Class VIII.

The new transcendentalism.--Not unrelated to the new anarchism and the new hedonism, and indeed, intertwined with both at many points, the new transcendentalism nevertheless is increasingly discernible within the hallowed halls of the status quo's own science and institutional life as well. The new transcendentalism is an emphasis, a trend, a social ripple, a cultural shift, more than it is a well-identified school of thought. Indeed, it may be, as it has been regarded by some astute analysts, an essential impulse of every culture. As such, both its cultural and metaphysical implications are profound.

According to Callahan, for example, a drive for some kind of transcendence appears to be a key human characteristic in every

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[1] Ibid., p. 22.

culture.[1] By this, he means that man has always sought to become something other than what he finds himself to be. If Callahan is correct, this then could be the impetus for both the historical consciousness and the Faustian spirit as it has been exhibited in western culture, as well as the quest for nirvana in Hindu cultures.

Says Callahan, man "is forced to project images of future states, images of correction and improvement--the postponement of death, a reduction in genetic defects and the defeat of virulent diseases."[2]

Furthermore, Callahan is equally emphatic about rejecting positive law alone as the basis for standards of conduct. Rather, there must be standards of values, of right and wrong, which exist independently of the law. Without such standards there would be no way of judging the human validity of law, he says. His point bears on the nature of a viable culture "which in its images, visions, institutions, rituals, biases, and unwitting responses reflects the full range of human capacities and in doing so allows people to live a meaningful life." Further, "the ethical part of that life will partake of the whole culture, not just of its formal codes."[3]

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[1]David Callahan, "Living with the New Biology: The Search for an Ethic," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August, 1972), 5. (Hereinafter referred to as "Living with the New Biology.")

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 6.

Along the same line Tillich had said that every cultural form possesses a transcendent dimension which in one way or another calls attention to the fact that the objective form itself is finite. That is, no objects, not even spiritual or philosophical ones, possess the power to assuage man's physical, intellectual, and moral restlessness.[1]

In this sense, according to Tillich, every object calls itself into question when it comes into man's cognizance. It suggests to man's subjective appropriation of it that it is incomplete in itself. This fact is demonstrated in the profound revelation of modern psychoanalysis that when man fights against or "blocks" awareness that raises questions about the finality of objects to which he attaches himself and gives great importance, this fact is at the root of all neurotic and psychotic behavior.[2]

In their own separate ways both Callahan and Tillich seem to be saying that the anxieties of man which drive him to make things different than they find them to be, are not merely temporal or passing conditions. Rather, these anxieties seem to constitute an existential givenness, both in man as he finds himself, and in his inherent relationship to the world which he confronts.

If this claim is true, then it may be fair to say that man's quest for transcendence--or that which points beyond his finding

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[1]See Paul Tillich, "The Idea and Ideal of Personality," The Protestant Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 115-35, especially p. 123.

[2]Ibid. See pp. 133-34.

ultimate meaning for life only in his relationship to closed systems of objects and activities--is at the heart of all formative and creative activity in culture. This idea is represented in the model of the universe-of-discourse and frames-of-reference in this study by means of the E^4 symbol as shown earlier in Figures 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. This symbol represents the ultimate concerns of a culture and its people.

Based upon the assumption of the existential nature of the inescapability of the search for some transcendent standard within a culture, it may also be fair to say that man's quest for such reference points, and the consequent relationship to higher meanings than those offered by the values of the status quo's closed secularism, are taking many forms and appearing in the most unlikely places in contemporary western society.

Already, for example, the reader may have sensed that one important aspect of the spirit of the new anarchist and the new hedonist is the quest to find alternative realities to the one provided by the ratified version of reality in the mainstream culture. Beyond this, however, even confirmed elites of the established culture are not averse to finding life styles and corresponding viewpoints which are not germane to the status quo presuppositions.

To illustrate, recently the Wall Street Journal carried a lead article on its front page entitled "Transcendent Trend: Meditation Technique, Once Haven of Young, Gains Wider Following." The article said that thousands of otherwise conservative businessmen, scientists,

teachers and housewives have taken up the practice of transcendental meditation, "a method of allowing the mind to be drawn automatically to the deepest and most refined level of thinking," and which reputedly provides psychic and physical benefits to the adherents. The article stated that wives who have taken up the practice report that it has done more for them than psychotherapy and seems to put them in touch with a higher reality as well as their own better selves. According to the International Meditation Society (IMS), a Los Angeles-headquartered nonprofit group formed to teach the technique, more than 150,000 Americans have started meditating, with an average of 5,000 beginning each month.[1]

Predictably, the scientific community has remained skeptical about the claims being made for transcendental meditation. And while recent studies "have shown that definite physical changes occur during meditation, scientists have yet to prove that people become happier or better adjusted once they start meditating."[2]

Nevertheless, "TM's potential as therapy for drug addicts, prisoners, and mental patients--as well as treatment for certain diseases--is being investigated at universities and hospitals around the country."[3]

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[1]Ellen Graham, "Transcendent Trend: Meditation Technique, Once Haven of Young, Gains Wider Following," Wall Street Journal, August, 31, 1972, p. 1

[2]Ibid. See also Edward B. Fiske, "Thousands Finding Meditation Eases Stress," New York Times, December 11, 1972.

[3]Ibid.

There are other indications that science is not totally adverse to the prospects of exploring and finding alternative realities to aid in the well-being of mankind. A little-publicized project has been taking place at the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center in Catonsville, just outside Baltimore. The work is based on the assumption that it is at least as important to deal with the dying person's psychic anguish as with his physical pain. The research concerns the use of psychedelic drugs within the framework of psychiatric counseling to assist patients to "achieve a transcendent level of awareness from which it may be possible for them to deal more easily with impending death."[1] Gradually a remarkable phenomenon emerged. According to one report:

> . . . With striking regularity, and with no suggestion from the therapist, many of the LSD subjects would undergo an experience of "dying" and "being reborn" that often left them with a much more serene well-integrated approach to life that persisted long afterward. . . .[2]

Patients described experiences which once would have been considered a manifestation of something holy. Today, "if this sort of thing happens spontaneously," said one of the therapists, "we call it an 'acute schizophrenic break with paranoid delusions and experiences of depersonalization.'"[3]

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[1]Jerry Avorn, "Beyond Dying: New Experiments in Easing the Transition from Life," Harper's Magazine, March, 1973, p. 56.

[2]Ibid., p. 57.

[3]Ibid.

Since the early days of Catonsville, psychedelic therapy with terminal patients has been crafted into a form involving "elements of psychoanalysis, music therapy, neuro-pharmacology, Buddhist cosmology, existential psychotherapy, and traditional medical care to guide the dying patient through his suffering and ideally into a level of transcending awareness."[1]

Dr. Walter Pahnke who directed the early LSD-therapy research in Catonsville, and who held a Ph.D. in religion from Harvard as well as an M.D. from its medical school, brought to the work a deep interest in the "peak experiences" described by humanistic psychologists, like Maslow, and by centuries of religious mystics. As described by Maslow, people who achieved spontaneous peak experiences frequently felt an ineffable joy that they attributed to a fuller understanding of the meaning of life. The work was carried on by Dr. Stanislav Grof after the accidental death of Pahnke in 1971.[2]

What accounts for the ability of psychedelic experience to ease the psychological pain of dying? Dr. Grof offers one answer.

> Death, instead of being seen as the ultimate end of everything and a step into nothingness, appears suddenly as a transition into a different type of existence for those who undergo the destruction-rebirth-cosmic-unity experience. The idea of possible continuity of consciousness beyond physical death becomes much more plausible than the opposite. The patients who have transcendental experiences develop a rather deep belief in the ultimate cosmic unity of all creation and experience themselves as a part of it without regard to the situation they are facing.

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[1] Ibid., p. 58.

[2] Ibid., p. 60.

> The encounter with the elements of the deep unconscious in the form of transpersonal experiences (such as Jungian archetypes, racial and collective memories, experience of the cosmic drama, divine and demonic appearances) enables them to relate in a very tangible and convincing way to psychic realities that are far beyond their individual frameworks. It seems that it is this opening of the transpersonal and cosmic panorama that provides a background and referential system against which the fact of individual destruction appears relatively unimportant.[1]

Asked to explain the consistency of the feelings and imagery many of the terminal patients experience, Grof's answer was characteristically cautious: "Whether these are valid insights into the nature of reality, or merely merciful delusions, I don't think we can say for certain."[2]

However, maintains one observer, the evidence is impressive. Without coaching or suggestion, patients with religious backgrounds varying from atheism to church-every-Sunday somehow experience the knowledge of an alternate reality system that may be completely foreign to them. Further, "there is a striking correspondence between this kind of reality and the concepts found in the sacred books of Taoism, the Upanishads of Hinduism, the Gospel according to St. John, the teaching of Buddha, and the works of mystics throughout history." In a recent paper, Grof carefully suggests that a common cosmology can be derived from the experiences reported during the 3,500 or so drug sessions he has either conducted or studied, here and in Czechoslovakia.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 62.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The author of the article, Jerry Avorn, was a fourth year student at the Harvard Medical School at the time of writing his

Evidence comes from other quarters. Numerous researchers laboring in the ecological sciences provide considerable corroboration for the findings of the Catonsville Center. Thus, Shepard and McKinley observe that with proper "set and setting" the psychedelics are very frequently successful in giving the individual a vivid sensation of the mutual interdependence of his own behavior and the behavior of his environment, so that the two seem to become one--the behavior of a unified field.[1] Further,

> . . . Those who uphold the impoverished sense of reality sanctioned by official psychiatry describe this type of awareness as "depersonalization," "loss of ego-boundary," or "regression to the oceanic feeling," all of which, in their usual contexts, are derogatory terms suggesting that the state is hallucinatory. Yet, it accords astonishingly well with the description of the individual which is given in the behavioral sciences, in biology and in ecology.[2]

Theoretically, say these authors, many scientists know that the individual is not a skin-encapsulated ego, but an organism-environment field. The organism itself is a point at which the field is "focused," so that each individual is a unique expression of the behavior of the whole field, which is ultimately the universe itself. But to know this theoretically is not to <u>feel</u> it to be so. "It was possible to calculate that the world was round before making the

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article. He also participated in some of the experiences reported in his article.

[1]Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley, eds., <u>The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 140.

[2]<u>Ibid</u>.

voyage that proved it to be so." The psychedelics are, "perhaps, the ship, the experimental instrument by which the theory can be verified in common experience."[1]

This last statement underscores, for the purposes of this study, the fact that the dimension of the transcendental quest conducted by individuals and groups across a broad front in western culture is predominantly a subjective and intuitionistic approach to reality. The preceding descriptions should illustrate that the new quest for transcendentalism does indeed seek to overcome the subject-object split in western culture and to move from subjective experience to an embracing of the whole world, indeed of the whole universe.

As stated earlier, categorization is difficult. A continuity can be discerned between the new anarchism, the new hedonism, and the new transcendentalism. It shall become apparent in due course how the new transcendentalism also relates strikingly to the technological man and the ecological man as well as man as a multiple species.

In the final analysis whether an approach to reality is characterized as subjective or objective is somewhat relative if not arbitrary. All of the viewpoints explored in this chapter should amply illustrate the fact that one cannot consider the subject without considering the object, and vice versa. It may be that it is only the positivistic and behaviorally-oriented science and epistemology in western culture that has given the illusion that the subject and the

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[1] Ibid.

object are separate. In any case, it is pertinent to turn attention to a consideration of the two "objective" approaches.

The objective approaches.--The objective approaches to new concepts of the human person take as their starting point the contexts of nature, culture, and society. In earlier discussions in this treatise notice was taken of Tillich's insight that in the secularization of the Protestant ethic, and the science and technology that resulted, positivistic man as the subject sought to dominate the object in his perceptions. Under this approach to reality even personality and community became merely objective "things." In the process, in the human consciousness, "things" were said to have lost their intrinsic value and depth.[1]

The organic characteristics of physical objects, stemming from a perceived relationship to a larger whole, were said to be suppressed. As an accompaniment to the suppression of the organic characteristics of "things," objects lost their "ability" to point beyond themselves to transcendent perspectives in which larger meanings could be found.[2]

The result was that man ostensibly enthroned himself as a god by eventually possessing the power to manipulate and control specific components of his environment to his own chosen ends. As a result an awesome and frightening power was delivered into his hands. Chapter I of this study devoted attention to the topic concerning the almost

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[1]See Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 63-65 and 73-74.

[2]Ibid., pp. 213-15.

unimaginable extent to which man has become able to alter, either at random or intentionally, the very face of the earth as well as his own biology. This is partially what is meant by the "historical consciousness" and the "Faustian spirit" in western culture.

The consequence is that radical new concepts have developed of what it means to be human or what it might mean to be human in the future. These objective concepts differ sharply in certain ways from those discussed in the previous subsection in that the new anarchism, the new hedonism, and the new transcendentalism are largely subjective approaches and might also be classed as intuitionistic.

The views discussed in this subsection, however, take their cue first of all more from the external shape of things, either as wrought by the hand of man or as the setting of nature in which man finds himself, and as both of these environments impact upon him in visible measurable ways. To this extent these views may be classified as objective approaches to overcoming the subject-object dichotomy in western culture.

As contrasted to intuitionistic views they might be classified as naturalistic. It is the distinctive assertion of naturalistic ethical viewpoints that ethics is not an autonomous science and that moral propositions may be analyzed into or derived from those of the empirical sciences.[1] It is this latter fact that sets naturalistic viewpoints off from noncognitivist theories and thus prevents them

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[1]See Garvin, "Major Ethical Viewpoints," p. 310.

from falling into positivism.[1] Typical examples of the naturalistic viewpoint may be found in the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer, the utilitarian Hedonism of Jeremiah Bentham and John Stuart Mill and the pragmatism of John Dewey and William James.[2]

Yet, in the new concepts studied here under the present category, many intimations of the new hedonism or the new transcendentalism may be discerned. Thus, our categorization is by no means absolute.

However, it is the relative emphasis that is important. And in seeking a new unity between subject and object the viewpoints described herein appear to begin with the objective side of man's relationships and to work towards a unity with the subjective side.

Technological man.--In assessing the situation of man in a world of rapidly changing technology, McLuhan declares that people are robots when uncritically involved with their technologies.[3] On the other hand, he affirms, when man is critically involved, technology becomes an extension of himself. He says, "The extensions of man with their ensuing environments, it is now fairly clear, are the principle area of manifestation of the evolutionary process."[4]

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[1]Ibid., p. 312.

[2]Ibid., pp. 312-13.

[3]Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 18-20. (Hereinafter referred to as War and Peace.)

[4]Ibid., p. 19.

In the same vein, Toffler noted several specific examples by which man's technological culture is serving to alter his very makeup biologically and intellectually, i.e., how man may be able to make biological "carbon copies" of himself through "cloning"; how "cyborgs" may result as men-machine combinations in which men are implanted with mechanical or electronic organs; how on the other hand, machines may soon be equipped with biological organs for certain functions; how babies may be bred for super-normal vision or hearing, super-normal ability to detect changes in odor or super-normal muscular or musical skills; or how man may be able to establish communities in outer space or under the seas.[1]

Toffler also raised serious ethical, moral, and political questions in connection with the new technology and its biology. Who shall live and who shall die? What is man? Who shall control research in these fields? How shall new findings be applied? There are many other questions implicated as well which have yet to be fathomed.

One hardly knows how to begin in assessing what these developments mean for the nature of man. Nonetheless, McLuhan has provided an interesting twist in the interpretation of technological man. Not only is man transformed from a robot and technology transformed into an extension of himself whenever he becomes critically aware of the relationship to his new technologies, but more importantly, a new

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[1]Toffler, Future Shock, pp. 185-218.

consciousness emerges.[1] Whereas ordinary persons may have psychic convulsions upon the demands of new technology, the critical man becomes more like the artist.

> The artist is the only person who does not shrink from this challenge; he exults in the novelties of perception afforded by innovation. The pain that the ordinary person feels in perceiving the confusion is charged with thrills for the artist in the discovery of new boundaries and territories for the human spirit. He glories in the invention of new identities, corporate and private, that for the political and educational establishments, as for domestic life, bring anarchy and despair.[2]

It seems too early and the situation too fluid in the interpretations of technological man for any consistent or systematic metaphysics, epistemology, social theory or political theory to emerge as yet. Still, if the observation just given by McLuhan is correct, the skills and capabilities of technological man may eventually merge, indeed, perhaps are merging, at some point with the subjectivist, intuitionistic, and transcendental viewpoints of the previous subsection.

Ecological man.--The ecological view of man comes not from subjective states of meditation or consciousness, but from accumulating data related to the visible physical world in which man must live and breathe and have his being. Yet, intimations are that much of the data may be interpreted in such a way as to accord with psychedelic views of man obtained in "altered states of consciousness." A preview

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 13-18.

[2]Ibid., p. 12.

of this relationship was given in the comments by Shepard and McKinley under the subsection on the new transcendentalism. That view is elaborated here and more fully explicated. In a culture dominated by positivism, the view of ecological man possesses the strength that it rests largely upon objective and verifiable data managed largely in terms of the systems approach, a method widely supported by many behaviorists.[1]

One of the leading spokesmen for the ecological viewpoint is Ian McHarg. He says on behalf of the ecological view of man that "one can see, that since life is only transmitted by life, then, by living, each one of us is physically linked to the origins of life and thus--literally, not metaphorically--to all life."[2]

Moreover, "since life originated from matter," says McHarg, "then, by living, man is physically united back through the evolution of matter to the primeval hydrogen." The planet earth "has been the one home for all of its inhabitants since the beginning of time, from hydrogen to men." Thus, our phenomenal world contains our origins, our history, and our milieu. In a literal sense it is, then, "our home." It is in this context that ecology is regarded as the science of the home.[3]

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[1]Arthur S. Boughey, Fundamental Ecology (Scranton, Pa.: Intext Educational Publishers, 1971). See pp. 11-50.

[2]Ian McHarg, Design with Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1969), p. 29.

[3]Ibid.

The ecological view requires "that we look upon the world, listen and learn." The place of habitats, the inhabiting creatures, including men themselves, "were, have been, are now, and presumably will be in the process of becoming." Both men and creatures are co-tenants of the phenomenal world and both are united with their habitats in the world's origins and destiny.[1]

McHarg places his ultimate hope for mankind and for human survival in the ecological view of man:

> As we contemplate the squalid city and the pathetic subdivisions, suitcase agriculture and the cynical industrialist, the insidious merchant, and the product of all these in the necklace of megalopoles around the continent, their entrails coalescing, we fervently hope that there is another way. There is. The ecological view is the essential component in the search for the face of the land of the free and the home of the brave.[2]

The statement just given easily classified as a Class VIII statement, although McHarg's writings are also highly characterized by numerous Class V statements.

From another quarter, Alan Watts spells out some of the implications of the ecological view, by stating that our scientific methods of description suffer from a defective conception of the individual. He points out that the individual is not by any means what is contained inside a given envelope of the skin. Rather, the individual organism is the particular and unique focal point of a network of relations which is ultimately a "whole series," which to Watts means the "whole

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

cosmos." Consequently, the whole cosmos, so focused, is one's actual self.[1] Although this sounds like pure mysticism, Watts contends that

> the problem confronting all sciences of human behavior is that we have the evidence (we are staring at it) to give us an entirely different conception of the individual than that which we ordinarily feel and which influences our common sense. A conception of the individual not, on the one hand, as an ego locked in the skin, nor, on the other, as a mere passive part of the machine, but as a reciprocal interaction between everything inside the skin and everything outside it, neither one being prior to the other, but equals, like the front and back of a coin.[2]

What does this mean in terms of social theory and the organization of the state? Diametrically opposed conclusions could be drawn, or perhaps a fusion of contrasting conclusions is possible.

On the one hand, highly organized and sophisticated technical mechanisms may be necessary to manage the interface between man and all other life systems, to the mutual benefit of all, and, indeed, to avoid extinction.[3]

This latter mandate--avoiding extinction--is due to the critical state of the world ecology since man has interfered with virtually all ecosystems of the entire planet, say the spokesmen for the ecological view of man. As Boughey maintains, for example, man has disrupted biogeochemical cycling processes by carrying away too much of the nutrients required for eco-system maintenance. At the same time, the human race has dumped into the nutrient cycles far more wastes than

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[1]Alan W. Watts, "The Individual as Man/World," The Psychedelic Review, I (June, 1963), 55-65.

[2]Ibid., p. 65.

[3]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 88-90.

those with which the reducer organisms can cope. Further, man is dumping massive amounts of nondegradable substances into the chemical cycles to which the decomposing organisms have never previously been exposed.[1]

The endless search for increased quantity of goods has already caused man to destroy many of the natural habitats whose preservation is as vital to man's survival as it is to that of the wildlife populations which man has driven to the point of extinction. Man's cities uncontrollably exploit, deplete, and poison the remaining sources of the planet with an abandon which is beyond all rationality, claims Boughey. Further, "in our personal relationships with the cities, we like to pretend that we are no longer animals, and can safely ignore the ecological relationships which all social animals have evolved, and which are essential for normal social development and peaceful existence."[2]

In the face of such disastrous possibilities, one could easily conclude that only the State can organize man's efforts effectively enough on a grandly coordinated scale to meet the challenge.

On the other hand, in contrast to technological bureaucracies administering and monitoring control over the balance of eco-systems, one can conclude that the ecological view of man requires emphasis

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[1]Boughey, Fundamental Ecology, p. 47.

[2]Ibid., pp. 47-48.

upon the primary face-to-face contact group and a closer bringing together of man individually to his natural environment.

Along this line of thought, Borgese points out that man's physical structure, including his brain capacity, has changed remarkably little since he first appeared on this planet about five million years ago. Even in his interaction with the environment there are some surprisingly stable features. "For instance," says Borgese, "the number of people with whom a person establishes a real relationship throughout a lifetime has remained constant since the Stone Age."[1] The claim is made that the major vehicle for the evolution of man since his genesis on this planet has been the primary face-to-face contact group. One can surmise that, to the extent that this vehicle is invaded, eroded, or obliterated, this fact may entail an evolutionary adaptive crisis in the species of man.[2] These speculations could lend credence to the claims of Paul Goodman that for the sake of man's well-being the ends and the means of his meaningful activities must be kept very close together.[3]

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[1]Elizabeth Mann Borgese, "Human Nature Is Still Evolving," The Center Magazine, VI, No. 2 (March/April, 1973), 4-9, at p. 4.

[2]The following article is both suggestive and stimulative for such speculations. See Charles F. Hockett and Robert Ascher, "The Human Revolution," Current Anthropology, V, No. 3 (1964), 135-68.

[3]See the essay entitled "Utopian Thinking," in Paul Goodman's Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1962), pp. 3-21. See also the second essay, "'Applied Science' and Superstition," pp. 22-48 in the same volume.

Perhaps it is possible that, as man develops more complex abilities to receive and process information related to himself and his environment, at the same time he will discover the need for, and engender in his activities, greater directness and simplicity in his personal relationships. It is interesting to speculate to what extent such a social and institutional combination may be possible if the human race were to achieve levels of capabilities to manage complexities that would render the latter task simple. That such quantum leaps in the management of complexity by homo sapiens have taken place in the past is evident in the development of speech and writing, both of which man had to achieve before civilization could become possible.[1]

The possibility of such fusion between large complex technical bureaucracies and small group face-to-face associations is imaginable when one conceives of the possibility that human society could organize itself along the lines of an ad-hocracy which could decentralize mammoth super-bureaucracies into extended collectivities of small mutual associations of persons with common interests.[2] This conception could be fortified through support systems of widespread and instantaneous communications technologies put at the fingertips of every family as the basis for creating feedback loops by which persons

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[1]Hockett and Ascher, "The Human Revolution," especially pp. 153-55ff (to the end of the article).

[2]See Toffler on ad-hocracy in his Future Shock, pp. 125-26, 135-36, and 408-9.

and families can instantly learn the immediate impact of the most minute decisions.[1]

Perhaps it is in this sense that McLuhan is able to speak of a global village in which speech itself yields to "macroscopic gesticulation."[2]

In such a culture the implicit metaphysics might reflect a "cosmic unity" between man and his universe.[3] I.e., the means of knowing this universe and its fruits of knowledge might become at one and the same time both objective and intuitive as the perceived dichotomy between subject and object is regarded as being more expedient than essential.[4] Probably this vision of man's possible future involves the recognition that social change is inherent in the nature

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[1]R. Buckminster Fuller describes an available but little known television technology utilizing tiny "massers, lassers, or reflectors," by which individual beams of electromagnetic waves can be aimed accurately at specific houses.

> "In the beaming system you also have a reflector at the house that picks up the signal. It corresponds directly to the one on the mast and is aimed right back to the specific beaming cup on the mast from which it is receiving. This means that with beam casting you are able to send individual messages to each of those houses . . . and it works in both directions. Therefore the receiving individual can beam back, 'I don't like it.' He may and can say 'yes' or 'no.'"

See Fuller's Education Automation (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 38-40.

[2]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 65, 80, and 85.

[3]Shepard and McKinley, eds., The Subversive Science, p. 140.

[4]Theobald, Alternative Future for America II, p. 20.

of things as man and his technology evolve together.[1] Therein the reference for ultimate meaning is not the individual, nor even man as such, but life, as all forms of life become increasingly recognized as interdependent upon one another.[2]

Indeed, already the line between life and the chemical universe itself has been blurred, as biogeochemical cycling processes involving different states of animate and inanimate matter become the center of focus.[3] Further, if it is true as Fuller observes that energy passing through a system functions to organize that system,[4] then the State could become simultaneously more prominent and less relevant. That is, as a separate sovereign entity granted the legitimacy for a monopoly on violence and force it could become less relevant. But seen as the natural organization of life processes, however, in which means and ends are closely related, it commends itself as a positive concept as the "status of souls,"[5] as one way of perceiving patterns of organization, self-determined by living communities for their own self-maintenance and well-being.[6]

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[1]Borgese, Human Nature Is Still Evolving," p. 6.

[2]Watts, "The Individual as Man/World."

[3]Boughey, Fundamental Ecology, pp. 12-50.

[4]See the quotation from R. Buckminster Fuller, World Design Science Decade Documents, Vol. II, quoted in The Last Whole Earth Catalog: Access to Tools, Portola Institute, Inc. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 3. (Hereinafter referred to as Whole Earth Catalog.)

[5]Jordan, Forms, pp. 165-66.

[6]Borgese, "Human Nature Is Still Evolving," pp. 7-8.

Whatever conclusion may be drawn, a trend towards developing concepts along this line is bound to take its toll of the five major conclusions of the status quo and its practical values.

The corporate approaches.--When a culture is severely polarized by a deep dichotomy between subject and object in its epistemological approaches, it is interesting to find epistemologies which affirm an essential unity between subject and object rather than focusing upon one or the other poles of the dichotomy. Historically it seems to have been true that the more a culture succeeds in harmonizing its inherent contradictions, the closer it has come to explicitly metaphysical expressions.

Yet, the claim has been made increasingly within social science circles that the age of reliance upon metaphysical suppositions is past. As early as 1955 the participants at the conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Milan developed the theme "the end of ideology." As Lane recalls, scholars and scientists came expecting, indeed inviting, a great confrontation of world views. Under the pressure of economic and social knowledge, a growing body of research, and the codified experience of society, "ideological argument tended to give way to technical argument," apparently to the disappointment of some.[1]

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[1]Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," in The New Politics of American Policy: A Reader, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 50-69, at p. 67.

Given the secularistic and rationalistic interpretation of knowledge which comes to rest upon the presupposition of the autonomy of objective THINGS, the status quo appears to have congratulated itself on having largely expurgated both "ideology" and metaphysical considerations (read "transcendent reference points") from the domain of "knowledge." Knowledge is, according to such a view, predominantly technical information and expertise.

Nevertheless, if the social sciences have tended to abdicate consideration of questions about "why"--a type of question particularly suited to the introduction of metaphysical considerations--rather than merely about "how," this fact has not stopped the non-status quo subcultures from proliferating with the self-conscious and intentional advocation of explicitly metaphysical standpoints. Two outstanding examples are to be found, first, in the multiplying ranks of young people, and second, in the university departments which ultimately followed their lead, in pursuing and seeking to implement the philosophies and theories of such comprehensive and corporate thinkers as Buckminster Fuller and Paulo Soleri.

These theories are referred to as "corporate" viewpoints, since their presuppositions are neither subjective nor objective in the usual sense. Rather, they start from positions which by-pass the necessity for the recognition of a subject-object dichotomy per se. Instead they place emphasis on the primacy of the corporate reality which comprehends both subject and object in a continuous unity of some sort. As a result, whereas concepts of subject and object may be

distinguished for the sake of intellectual convenience, in reality such distinctions are taken to be merely ephemeral and nonessential to the understanding and utilization of the larger processes which affect our lives and our world. If taken seriously, subjective and objective distinctions provide false viewpoints which do serious damage to man's well-being, according to the "corporate" schools of thought.

The contributions of Fuller and Soleri have been cited here as notable examples of corporate approaches since they have significantly penetrated the subcultures, and to some extent the status quo itself. However, what has made their intellectual positions palatable to large numbers of people is not their philosophical systems as such, since the thought of both men is highly complex and frequently conceptually abstruse, and the reader of these thinkers must virtually appropriate new vocabularies which were created by the philosophers themselves.[1] Rather what has popularized and disseminated Fuller's and Soleri's ideas is the more tangible architectural and industrial theories and physical inventions which have made alternative self-sustaining life styles possible, particularly in the case of Fuller.

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[1]The Whole Earth Catalog in commenting on Fuller said:

> "Fuller's lectures have a raga quality of rich nonlinear endless improvisation full of convergent surprises. Some are put off by his language, which makes demands on your head like suddenly discovering an extra engine in your car--if you don't let it drive you faster, it'll drag you. Fuller won't wait. He spent two years silent after illusory language got him in trouble, and he returned to human communication with a redesigned instrument [p. 3].

Given these problems to philosophical understanding, it is not easy to perceive the essential components of a maturely developed corporate theory of man by perusing the thought of Fuller and Soleri, for these components may appear in their works merely incidentally and inadvertantly among the larger contextual theorizations about landscape architecture, mathematics, solar energy or world ecological balances. This fact renders the abstraction of the strictly corporate philosophical outlines from their total works more difficult.

Therefore, in order to gain the advantage of perceiving what a fully mature and reasonably consistent model of corporate philosophy per se looks like, the writer undertook to analyze into its essential features the works of two other thinkers whose explicit purpose it was to produce such systematic bodies of corporate philosophical thought. These are the works of the philosophical theologian, Paul Tillich, and the juristic philosopher, Elijah Jordan, both of whom lived and labored in earlier decades of this century during times in which the dominant culture was more hospitable to and supportive of undisguised and unapologetic corporate metaphysical systems. In spite of their differences, Tillich's and Jordan's works provide corroborating features essential to the understanding of mature corporate approaches.

From a comparison of Tillich's and Jordan's philosophies a base can be established to enable us to know what to look for in the works of Fuller, Soleri, or any other thinker for the purpose of detecting the emerging tendencies indicative of full-fledged corporate

perspectives in which epistemological subject-object contradictions are presumed in such philosophies to have been overcome.

Tillich's theonomous culture.[1]--Tillich's philosophical category which he employs for the corporate continuity of man and world is "the ground of being," or alternatively, "the dimension of depth," or "the ultimate concern." Through these concepts he directs his and the reader's attention to the "ontological structures" of Being, of existence, of processes, and of things in general.

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[1]During the 1950s and until the mid-1960s prior to his death, Paul Tillich was known in American and European theological circles as "the theologian's theologian." His works were prolific and well-known. His following works were drawn upon by the writer for the analysis in this section: The Protestant Era; The Religious Situation; Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); and The Courage to Be (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1952).

Tillich conceives of theonomy as a preferable social condition as contrasted with either heteronomy or secular autonomy.

Secular autonomy refers to the cultural revolutionary movements such as the enlightenment and the movements of philosophical rationalism in which the theoretical autonomy of the churches and their sphere of influence was challenged.

Transcendent heteronomy refers to the churches and their religious traditions in Central and Eastern Europe.

Theonomous culture refers to the mutual immanence of religion and culture within each other. Tillich recognizes there to be a universal law of reason in the nature of things, and one of the main connotations of theonomy is that the superior law is also the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is also man's own ground; that is, the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own.

See especially the essay entitled, "Religion and Secular Culture," in The Protestant Era, pp. 55-65.

That is, Tillich focuses on that which lies in and behind all subjective and objective forms of knowledge. For Tillich the structure of Being itself is ontological, not merely existential on the one hand (dealing with passing phenomena of the here and now), nor is it merely essential, on the other hand, comprised of mere essence, or immutable, repeatable laws.

This is a way of affirming that the nature and law of organic life precedes all other laws, principles, and formulations in the structure of reality as well as in logic and in importance.

Correspondingly, therefore, Tillich is able to affirm that indirect knowledge is the most powerful form of knowledge of all, for it involves the ultimate, and therefore hidden, concerns of all of us. The unity which overcomes all separations of life is to be found in this ground, this ontological structure of Being which underlies every partial concern and its expressions. Ultimate concerns, by nature, cannot be expressed directly, but behind every experience an ultimate concern is expressed, and can be intimated. Indeed, all partial concerns and their expressions soon become meaningless without reference to or intimation of an ultimate concern.

As Tillich would have it, it is the function of every culture to embody means by which indirect, but legitimate, expressions can be given to ultimate concerns. Every culture, that is, in order to be a culture, must have something in it that relates to the whole man. Otherwise it falls apart in defeat after defeat (disintegration after

disintegration) as each fragmented component seeks to affirm some partial aspect of man as both final and autonomous.

Since this mysterious ground (of Being and of ultimate concerns) cannot be perceived, observed, nor known directly, it can only be intimated, intuited, or known indirectly. It has the religious character of myth and the recognition of its presence as the ultimate ground of life is generally provided for in a culture by means of myth and symbol, drama and celebration, education and initiation. This is the "cultus" of a culture.

It is this cultus that gives wholeness and form to a culture; provides its ethos; infuses a deep sense of meaning into its formation, development, and self-maintenance; and innervates its activities with a sense of purpose. It is the various forms of the cultus that tell people where they came from, who they are, where they are going, and why. It is the cultus that translates the unbearable mystery of the ground of Being and of life into stories people can tell about their lives and nation in order to remember who they are and to have a source of access to the imponderable significance of the miracle of their own existence. It is this fact that enables persons to cope with life, even more, to tap its creative possibilities in the midst of its daily contradictions. For it is the culture, all pervasive and ever-present, which must come to the aid of individuals and their institutions at the point of their own limitations and wisdom and to allow them to continue on, and the species to survive and to further develop.

The corporatist metaphysic of Elijah Jordan.[1]--Whereas Tillich's epistemology is strongly intuitive, Jordan's is rationalistic, yet both philosophies are corporate.

Both thinkers preoccupy themselves with the epistemological problem in western thought of the dichotomy between the subject and object. Both men are motivated by the disastrous social disintegration and traumatic intellectual or psychic isolation of the individual to affirm a basis of order, wholeness or unity in the practical affairs of humanity. Tillich found his method in the concept of theonomy.

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[1]For more than a quarter of a century Elijah Jordan was chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana. He was president of the American Philosophic Association, Western Division, 1940, and author of various articles and books on legal theory, social ethics, and aesthetics. The present writer made use of the following of his works as background for the analysis of his thought: Forms of Individuality: An Enquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (referred to throughout this study as Forms); The Good Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); "Idea and Action," Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton, ed. by George H. Sabine (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917); The Life of Mind (Indianapolis: Charles W. Laut and Co., 1925); and Theory of Legislation: An Essay on the Dynamics of Public Mind (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

The writer also made liberal use of the articles and ideas contained in the following articles by John Paul Duncan: "Natural Law as Corporate Purpose," The Oklahoma Law Review, XIII (August, 1960), 274-87; "Res Publica Quam Bonum, Res Publica Quam Liberum," The Oklahoma Law Review, XVII (August, 1964), 292-310; and "The Normative Importance of the Concept of Interest," The Okalhoma Law Review, XX, No. 3 (August, 1967), 268-83. These articles by Duncan explicate one or another facet of Jordan's thought and were most helpful in grasping the considerable complexities of Jordan's philosophy. The writer is also indebted to Dr. Duncan, a long-time student of Jordan's, for many patient hours spent in personal discussions with the writer which served to clarify some of the intricacies of Jordan's thought.

Jordan finds his in the restoration of "objectivity" as represented in ancient classical Greek society.[1]

Both philosophers make significant use of the metaphor "ground" and thus establish the context for a metaphysical basis of thought.

Both look at life as a whole as the proper milieu in which to give answers about meaning and purpose, rather than focusing upon its particularities as a basis for truth and method.

Both men affirm the human need for and the actual existence of a law in the nature of things which is superior to individual men and which gives them guidance by which to order their lives and find meaning.

Yet there are significant differences between Jordan and Tillich. These differences stem from the fact that Jordan might be considered more of a rationalist in his method, as compared to Tillich's intuitive approach.

In contrast to an "ontological structure" as described by Tillich, Jordan posits mind as it develops from and within the institutional order of systems of cultural objects created through will by man's corporate actions. Indeed, Jordan affirms that such mind is the

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[1]Jordan's use of the terms "objective" and "objectivity" is both corporate and metaphysical, and therefore considerably different from the same use of the terms in the status quo. Objective things are neither individualized per se, nor are they isolated or autonomous. They are part and parcel of "mind" and therefore not dichotomized from the subjective. See Forms, pp. 151-85.

only basis for order in human affairs. Accordingly, Jordan decries subjective states of mind as impossible bases for any kind of order.

Although Jordan's corporate philosophy roots in the institutional order of things, nevertheless, according to Duncan, his view has little in common with Catholic corporatism such as that developed by Dr. Antonio Salazar and even less with the corporatisme d'etat of Italian Fascism.[1] Rather, Jordan actually developed his theory largely on a basis of the concept of the modern western corporation. Accordingly, Jordan sees man and the objectivity of his mental activities embodied in all of a person's corporate relationships. That is to say, man is a synthesis of all the institutions, their objects and relationships which a man uses to express himself. A man is not simply conditioned by institutional environmental influences; rather, he is actually a synthesis of all the institutions of culture which compose his personality.

Jordan's definition of culture is that it is the sum total of objects and their interconnections, including interconnections with human minds which have accumulated through thought and action. In this milieu man is not merely a psychobiologic animal such as is envisioned in subjectivistic notions of modern psychology and sociology. Indeed, his individuality does not end at his skin nor perhaps even begin there. Both man and his mind as such are corporate and thus the apparent incommensurability between the individual and the

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[1]Duncan, "Natural Law as Corporate Purpose," p. 276.

social is overcome. Social reality is continuous with and a continuation of the reality as individual. Man does not create society. It grows naturally just as men and trees and flowers grow.

The same is true of the State. The State as a form of order of persons did not come to be at all, no more than did the persons whose order it is, and it was not ever made. The State is thus recognized as the status of the sum of life conditions, the locus of the problem which calls for solution. It also represents the ultimate in positive fulfillment of the expression of the life of the individual, not as some mystical abstraction used to harmonize the individual's responses with the will of some armed sovereign, but as the ground or network, the sum total of the interrelationships of all corporate institutions which reveals the larger purposes for which man is thinking and acting.

This picture contrasts sharply with the concept of the individual, the culture, the society, and the State as conceived by the present status quo. For example, Jordan's view obviates the need for a State based upon a social contract as a compromise between competing, isolated individuals. Such a compact is viewed by Jordan as something external to the nature of the individuals concerned and is adopted as a form which has no interrelation to human purposes. Such an external form can command recognition on the part of persons only because of another external device, e.g., the "power to compel" of the law. This explains the modern State as resting on authority and force. This Jordan regards to be inimical to any true concept of law since it

assumes that something should be done to the individual's soul or character to change his subjective state of mind. Yet, as Jordan argues, no organization of subjective phenomena is possible. Subjectivity, therefore, can never be the basis of order or law. This can be found only in the purposes objectified in the institutional human interrelationships made possible through the network of cultural objects created by thought and institutional mind.

This is the basis of Jordan's metaphysics, since ends or values are to be discerned in the facts themselves rather than imparted by man through subjective relativity. In this way mind and law are immanent in each other.

Individuals and human personality are therefore corporate in nature. And yet, obviously, corporations are not the same as individual human persons. Yet their interrelationships form a continuum and thus the seemingly irrevocable split between subject and object in perceptions and in thought and action is overcome.

Corporate features of Buckminster Fuller's Dymaxion thought.[1]--As the world-famous inventor of the geodesic dome, Fuller has been described as a comprehensive designer, i.e., as designer, inventor, engineer, mathematician, architect, cartographer, philosopher, poet,

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[1]Fuller's inventions and written works both are prolific. Perhaps the best introduction to the total scope of his life and endeavors is the following: Robert Marks and R. Buckminster Fuller, The Dymaxion World of Buckminster Fuller (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books ed., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973). (Hereinafter referred to as Dymaxion World.) See Appendix D for examples of the application of some of his principles to actual inventions and physical proposals.

cosmogonist, choreographer, and visionary. He has been celebrated for developing principles of synergetics, tensegrity, ephemeralization, and tetrahedronality. He has been made "famous for geodesic houses that fly and for dymaxion ways of living."[1]

Against this background of comprehensive thinking, it is not surprising that Fuller's approach to reality can be classified as corporate rather than strictly subjective or objective. Yet the corporate principles as manifested by Tillich and Jordan are not set forth in systematic manner by Fuller as much as they frequently appear simultaneously or inadvertantly in connection with points he makes about mathematics, physics, engineering or cosmogony (among other topical interests).

Therefore, to impart some minimal corporate systematization to Fuller's thought, it is pertinent to proceed by raising questions based upon principles common to both Tillich and Jordan.

First, whether intuitive, as in the case of Tillich, or rationalistic, as in the case of Jordan, does Fuller start his reasoning from positions which by-pass the necessity for the recognition of a subject-object dichotomy per se?; i.e., does he place emphasis on the primacy of the corporate reality which comprehends both subject and object in a continuous unity of some sort? Or does he place primary

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[1]R. Buckminster Fuller, Utopia or Oblivion: The Prospects for Humanity (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), quoted from the editor's statement on the flyleaf.

emphasis upon the importance of particularities, such as interests, atomized individuals, or things?

Further, is some explicit metaphysical basis for thought and reality acknowledged, or is it either denied or hidden?

Again, what is the context for the search for human meaning and purpose, and what is the basis for some method of truth-seeking? Is this context and is this base sought after in life as a whole, or in its particularities? (This is an extension of the question appearing two paragraphs earlier.)

Finally, are both the need for and the existence of some sort of law in the nature of things acknowledged, which law is somehow superior to men, by which they may order their lives and find meaning?

Given his interests in physics, engineering, and architecture, it would not be surprising to find Fuller offering a primarily objective interpretation (to the isolation and detriment of subjective considerations) of man and the world. It is thinkable to find Fuller as being more preoccupied with "problem-solving" than with comprehensive conceptualizing.

However, this is not the case. Whereas Tillich emphasized the "ground of Being" and the "ultimate concern" within both culture and humanity, and whereas Jordan found his corporate concept in the idea of "mind" as embodied in the synthesis of human-corporate interactions within culture, Fuller takes his stand upon the physical-energetic-mental-spiritual concept of "synergy."

By synergy Fuller means "the integrated behaviors of nature." Synergy, says Fuller, is the "behavior of a whole system unpredicted by the behavior of its components or any sub-assembly of its components."[1]

Thus, Fuller does look to life as a whole, indeed, to nature as a whole, as the source of meaning and purpose, as the basis for truth and epistemological method. Concerned as are Tillich and Jordan with the disarray in the social milieu which has presumably been brought about by the secular focus on subjective "interests" and the objective "autonomy" of THINGS, Fuller maintains that the word "synergy" is not widely known, understood, or used in contemporary technological culture due to the latter's emphasis on rationalistic, atomistic ways of thinking. Thus, we tend to think in terms of "energy" and energy-dissipation, i.e., entropy, rather than in terms of "synergy," which is a word that is just as old as the word "energy." Says Fuller, "we tend to think in the terms of our elementary strategy of education, where we start by dealing with our local parts and learning how to handle these parts well."[2]

Yet, says Fuller, this strategy defeats knowledge about the true characteristics of nature. He asks, are there not "behaviors of whole systems unpredicted by the parts?"

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[1]R. Buckminster Fuller, Ideas and Integrities: A Spontaneous Autobiographical Disclosure, ed. by Robert W. Marks (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 64. (Hereinafter referred to as Ideas and Integrities.)

[2]Ibid.

> . . . This is exactly what the chemist has discovered to be true. Moreover, he had discovered that, contrary to his elementary kind of experience at school, he did not come into the chemical laboratory and find a soda fountain with spigots for hydrogen and oxygen and so forth with which you mix up the universe as you go, and then begin to make it work. He found the universe already in complex working order. And every time he partially separated out any of the elements from others, he always discovered that the behaviors of the localized elements never accounted for the associated behavior of the a priori complexes.[1]

The chemist, says Fuller, is thoroughly familiar with the word "synergy," which is the only word in the dictionary for this omnioperative behavior of universe. Synergy "is the essence of those great changes of man in respect to his a priori environment."[2]

Epistemologically, humankind is capable of knowing about the regenerative processes of life and nature itself by means of both his intellect and his intuition. Thus, Fuller would have it that both Tillich and Jordan are correct. In honor of intuition, for example, Fuller said poetically,

> Again and again,
> Step by step,
> Intuition opens the doors . . .
> Toward the physical and metaphysical success
> Of all humanity.
> And because its design
> Permits humanity to live anywhere
> Around our planet's watery mantle
> And because this sailing craft
> We are now to launch
> Is the epitome of design competence . . .
> We herewith give
> To this world-around dwellable

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[1] Ibid., p. 65.

[2] Ibid.

High-seas sailing craft
The name--INTUITION.[1]

Just as both intellect and intuition eventually have as their function the discovering of "synergy" as the process by which life and nature regenerate themselves, also they are capable of discovering, as did Fuller, that the structure of reality is geometrically tetrahedronal. Further, this tetrahedronal structurality is both "inward" and "outward," indicative of the ultimate subjective-objective correspondence of all reality.[2] Thus, the supposed subject-object dichotomy is corporately overcome, procedurally in "synergy" and structurally in both the macrocosm and the microcosm by means of tetrahedronality. To wit, Fuller asserts that

> The tetrahedron (four-faceted structure) is minimum--prime divisor of omnidirectional universe into two fundamental domains--the withinness and the withoutness, the included and excluded, the microcosm and macrocosm. Tetrahedron is therefore basic structural system; all structure is a transformative phase or complex of tetrahedronal transformations.[3]

The relation of the tetrahedron to synergy within humankind's affairs is as follows. Various tetrahedron structures enable the greatest efficiency of function with the least amount of mass or expenditure of energy required. This in turn leads to the principle that the evolution of man points in the direction, given his expanding

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[1]R. Buckminster Fuller, Intuition (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press ed., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 56-57.

[2]Fuller, Ideas and Integrities, p. 166.

[3]Ibid., pp. 166-67. See Appendix D for the further explanation and application of the tetrahedron concept.

intellect, of doing ever more with ever less. This point is underscored by the experimental work of Fuller, often referred to as "the dymaxion world of Buckminster Fuller."

The term "dymaxion" was coined by Marshall Field department store in Chicago to refer to the principles embodied by Fuller in a house which he invented. The term is a fusion of syllables related directly and indirectly to "dynamism," "maximum," and "ions." The word is a distinctive Fuller trademark and in its simplest form, Fuller's Dymaxion concept is that rational action in a rational world, in every social and industrial operation, demands the most efficient overall performance per units of input. A Dymaxion structure, thus, would be one whose performance yielded the greatest possible efficiency in terms of the available technology.[1]

The dymaxion concept is a direct link with the manner in which the corporate philosophy of Fuller serves as a delegitimation of contemporary western political traditions, particularly as it relates to his fresh concepts of what it means to be an evolving human person.

To illustrate the connection, Dr. Jonas Salk, shortly after his vaccines had been acknowledged in America as providing immunity to the vast majority of infantile paralysis exposures, said to Fuller, "I've always felt that those dymaxion gadgets--cars, houses, maps, etc.--were only incidental to what you really are interested in. Could you tell me what your work is?"

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[1]Marks and Fuller, Dymaxion World, pp. 3 and 20-21.

Fuller replied, "I've been engaged in what I call comprehensive design science."[1]

A comprehensive design scientist is one who applies General Systems Theory to the analysis of our total world problem. Fuller's application of this method led him to reject the complementary theses of both Malthus and Darwin. Malthus' economic data seemed to validate survival of the fittest among men as fulfilling Darwin's scientific law that evolution was predicated upon survival of the fittest. "Up to that moment in history," observes Fuller, "whether world societies fared well or ill had seemed to be a matter of fate or of a whimsical decision of the gods."[2] However,

> . . . suddenly the Malthusian concept of survival-of-the-fittest, i.e., you-or-me, not both--"you have to make a choice"--seemingly became a stark scientific fact which confronted the political and economic leaders of nations. From that moment in history it was clearly a matter of "you or me," and the leaders of great nations felt it was their obviously mandated responsibility to be sure that it was not their own nations that went down. At this present 1961 moment in history the "you or me" motivation founded by Malthus still constitutes the mainspring of world political policy and action.[3]

Against this mindset Fuller submits that during the present century a new pattern has emerged which not only questions the fundamental validity of the Malthusian and Darwinian theories but even

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[1]Fuller, Ideas and Integrities, p. 63.

[2]Fuller, Education Automation, p. 76.

[3]Ibid., pp. 67-68.

seems to promise their "complete invalidation in both the economic and social domains."[1]

This pattern inheres in the fact that the compounding rate of man's technological discoveries and improvements is enabling humankind to do more with less in the processes of survival and of human evolution. This continually comes about due to performance increases which are by-products of the development of weaponry "and of the concomitant tools-to-make-tools investments to produce and support that massive weaponry."[2]

Ironically, although the tremendous capital investments for the weaponry and its supporting effort were all predicated upon the Malthusian "you or me" concept, nevertheless, as each level of weaponry advance becomes progressively obsolete by a new level of attainment, the technology which arises to produce and support the previous top level then becomes available to world society for everyday technical-economical satisfactions.[3]

Fuller decries the necessity of producing more-for-less types of capabilities by means of weaponry. He says this occurs because of ignorance. Instead, advocates Fuller, it is a pattern that could be mastered by humankind through comprehensive anticipatory design scientists. But since there are none, and since it is easy to see that

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[1] Ibid., p. 68.

[2] Ibid., pp. 68-70.

[3] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

neither the politician nor the great industrialist nor any private patron is likely to call for one, Fuller proposes that all the universities around the world be encouraged to invest the next ten years in a continuing problem of how to make the total world's resources, which now serve only 43 percent of the population, serve 100 percent of humanity through competent complex design science.[1]

Given the background of even this brief analysis, it should be fairly clear that Fuller's work reflects, both philosophically and industrially, the corporate characteristics of (1) a self-consciously construed metaphysical basis for his theories; (2) the assumption that life as a whole, indeed, nature as a whole, rather than various particularities, is the proper context for the quest after human meaning and purpose as well as the proper basis for epistemological method and the verification of truth; and (3) that there is a human need for and there is the existence of a natural law superior to men by which they may order their lives and find meaning.

Although Fuller is not adverse to criticizing things as they are and he does so quite frequently as a matter of course, Class VIII statements are not highly characteristic of Fuller. This is due to his buoyant optimism about man and the universe and his belief that things are indeed working themselves out in favor of life in general and man in particular, no matter how bad they may seem in the short

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[1] Ibid., p. 75.

run. Therefore, Class V statements are strongly characteristic of Fuller's books and speeches. Typically, then, Fuller was able to say:

> . . . I am the opposite of a reformer; I am what I call a new former. The new form must be spontaneously complimentary to the innate faculties and capabilities of life. I am quite confident that humanity is born with its total intellectual capability already on inventory and that human beings do not add anything to any other human being in the way of faculties and capacities. . . . My long-time hope is that we may soon begin to realize what we are doing and may alter the "education" process in such a way as only to help the new life to demonstrate some of its very powerful innate capabilities.[1]

The foregoing is a reasonable prototype for a Class V statement. As such it is a fitting conclusion to our immediate consideration of Fuller's "dymaxion" thought.

Corporate features of the arcological thought of Paulo Soleri.[2]--As the author of the concept of "arcology," or "architecture ecology," Paulo Soleri pleads for a new stage in the evolution of human society--a move toward compactness, or miniaturization of our

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] Although Soleri's viewpoints cause him to be quite critical of status quo viewpoints, and in spite of the fact that he is not yet as well known as Fuller (he is two and a half decades younger), nevertheless, his work has attracted interest and support from no less substantial public and private institutions as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, M.I.T., the Prudential Life Insurance Company, and various well-known galleries of art.

The most informative books produced by Soleri or his organization, the Cosanti Foundation in Scottsdale, Arizona, are the following: Matter Becoming Spirit: The Arcology of Paolo Soleri (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press ed.; Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973); (hereinafter referred to as Matter Becoming Spirit); and Arcology: The City in the Image of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969). (Hereinafter referred to as Arcology.)

cities. To make such a move, according to Soleri, we must build solids rather than veneers; we must flee from a "flat" cityscape that debilitates and suppresses the individual. Arcologies, three-dimensional macrostructures, are for populations of thousands or millions, but require only about 1 percent of the present space allocated for similar populations.

Yet Soleri's interests are not primarily physical, but spiritual, of which the physical is the servant. According to Soleri, "the physical structure is . . . the skeleton of the spirit, and structure is the bridge-train on which the spirit travels and grows stronger."[1]

Moreover, the concept of the spiritual is not some vague abstraction for Soleri. Rather it possesses specific characteristics integrally related to the whole question of man's past, present, and future evolutionary development. As with Tillich, Jordan, and Fuller, to Soleri life is neither objective nor subjective, but organic. Therefore, he freely speaks of physical topics in spiritual terms and discusses spiritual concerns by means of man's physical relationships. His perspectives are unabashedly metaphysical. Whereas Tillich spoke of the "ground of Being," Jordan of "corporate individuality" and of "mind," and Fuller of "synergy," Soleri's interpretation of reality and the universe is that it is a "vector" in which random patterns

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[1]Soleri, Matter Becoming Spirit, p. 4.

turn to congruence. This is partially what is meant by spirit. Thus, "the bridge between matter and spirit is matter becoming spirit."[1]

Again, this is no abstract idealism for Soleri, but the hardest realism. But it is a realism set in a cosmic framework of supra-geological time. The specific characteristics possessed by spirit are threefold. They are also integrally related to the technologies, the cities, the ecologies, and the biological survival of man. Says Soleri,

> The technological methodology ever present when this process is active is threeheaded: complexity, miniaturization, and their durational deployment. This is the trinity which makes the stone glow and become spirit. In their absence even God becomes a weak, tenuous, simplistic hypothesis.[2]

The second of these characteristics of the spiritual, i.e., miniaturization, seems to be the key to evolution for Soleri.

> Evolution suggests a pulsatory behavior that has devised a miniaturization process for each step moving from matter to mind; miniaturization from unending and spare cosmic existence to geological matter, miniaturization from geological matter to organic stuff, miniaturization from organic to organism, miniaturization from organism to animality, miniaturization from animality to reflectivity (man). Now that man is working at the full characterization of the ultra-organism of the human group, another miniaturization is mandatory.[3]

Stated another way, evolution is not scalar (i.e., representing only magnitude, such as in a volume or a mass), but it is a vector (representing also direction in space, as in velocity and acceleration).

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[1] Ibid., p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

[3] Soleri, Arcology, p. 5. (The italics are Soleri's.)

Accordingly, for Soleri:

The geological is the massive. It is the originator of gravity and the grand storage of raw material and energy.

The vegetative is extensive--the fixer of sun's energy and the life-maker.

The reflective is intensive--the transfigurative and the creative.[1]

These conditions represent the stages of the earth's evolution, according to Soleri. They illustrate the concept of matter becoming spirit. Yet, again, Soleri rejects abstract idealism or romanticism, for the really-real is rooted in the dynamic complexities of life. For Soleri, complexity, intensity of life, and continued evolution are inextricably interwoven. He says:

> Nature goes from bulk (the geological)
> to complexity (man);
> nature goes from static (the geological)
> to dynamic (man);
> nature goes from torpid time beat
> (the geological) to duration (man)
> by the intermediary of photosynthesis and animality.[2]

In the vectoral thrust of evolution, that which lives wants to become three-dimensional for the sake of complexity and intensity. But it has to keep itself two-dimensional in the whole so as to deploy itself and feed on the sun (less so in the seas). "Nature harvests

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[1] Ibid., p. 8.

[2] Ibid.

extensively so as to be able to become intensive by man's presence and evolution."[1]

In the vegetal world the necessarily low ratio of energy yield to irradiated surface is the barrier to greater compactness and thus to the complexity of its life. The liveliness of the vegetal world is limited by the extension of its skin and the dilution of its body.[2]

Yet, "compactness is the 'structure' of efficiency," and "richer is the life where greater is the complexity." Therefore, the greater the need for energy, the greater the need for compactness (immediate relay).[3]

For Soleri, as a designer of cities, the meaning of these points is clear. If man's evolution is continued and if he is to survive, a new stage of evolution is necessary. The liveliness of man's world is hindered by the physical extension of his shelter and the "spatial dilution of his institutions." The photosynthetic veneer, the vegetal world, must not be overlaid by a man-caused opaque veneer. This would mean final disaster. The opaque veneer might be the physical institutions of man, or the wastes these institutions produce, such as pollution.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

The city, as such, is the container of man's social organism. If this organism is to flourish, the container must be the most apt system to care for its life, but it can no longer become extensive. It must become intensive. It must allow for the greatest and freest flow of energies and things, for their swift interactions, for the liveliness and knowledge such interactions produce.[1]

The city, then, must be predicated on compactness, for lack of compactness is lack of efficiency.

The compact city is a three-dimensional city. "Its vertical dimension is congruous to its horizontal dimensions (cube, sphere, cylinder, tetrahedron)." The city must be "a solid and not a 'surface.'"[2]

The three-dimensional city is respectful of the earth's sensitized skin. "It does not spread an inorganic crust (megalopoly-ecumenopolis-suburbia) over the vital green carpet of the earth."[3]

The three-dimensional city, because of its true efficiency (frugality), is also respectful of the earth's ecological systems and its atmosphere. It does not pollute the earth.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 9.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

The three-dimensional city is respectful of man because it is the best instrument for a full private and social life. The three-dimensional city is an instrument of culture.[1]

Had Soleri started with the rationalism of Jordan's corporate individuality, he might or might not have arrived at the same conclusions. Yet, carried to its final analysis, Jordan's man, who is the synthesis of all the institutions that made him what he is, might well find its fulfillment in Soleri's arcological man.

Or had Soleri listened to Tillich lecture on a culture's "ultimate concern," with its bi-polar structure of the will-to-power and community love, he might have said this description could refer to the will of all life to become more miniaturized and lively (i.e., the will-to-power) on the one hand and more intensely interrelated and hence more organic (community love) on the other hand.

Finally, concerning Fuller's insight that human progress tends to accomplish more function with less effort and less bulk, Soleri undoubtedly would find support for his thesis that matter becomes spirit through the miniaturization vector brought about in the process of evolution.

In any case, it appears that for Soleri the dilemma of the subject-object epistemological dichotomy might well be overcome in large measure due to the scope of the frame-of-reference in which he chooses to emphasize what is important. His focus is not the

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[1] Ibid.

individual psychobiologic person, nor even the human race. Rather it is life-itself, set in the cosmic context of the universe which he describes as matter becoming spirit.

Therein Soleri meets all of the essential qualifications of a corporate approach to reality and knowledge as set forth in this study, including the affirmation of both the need for and the existence of some law in nature which is superior to men, by which they may order their lives and find meaning. In keeping with the imperatives of evolution, man is to enter a new stage--a stage in which the miniaturization of the organ of the city becomes synonomous with the preservation and further spiritualization of himself.

Yet, Soleri has not been content to discharge his appointed mission through philosophical expressions alone. Instead he has dedicated himself to producing endless intricate architectural conceptualizations of such cities, has built models of them, and presently he is engaged in building the first actual arcological city, "Arcosanti" (Cosanti--from two Italian words meaning "before things," or in this context, "against materialism). (See Appendix E for examples of Soleri's designs of organic, miniaturized cities.)[1]

In contrast to Fuller, Soleri's admonitions are strongly characterized by Class VIII statements, due to the radical change he feels is necessary to turn man from a course bent on disaster. This has considerable consequences for the sort of politics that would be

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[1]See Appendix E for examples of Soleri's designs, including Arcosanti.

compatible with arcology, and for the delegitimating impact upon existing political traditions which the acceptance of his concepts would entail. For example, Soleri says,

> . . . I have come to the incredible conclusion that what seems to be obvious is totally unsuspected by the analyst-experts. Am I the only one who sees the direct, unbreakable constant, ineffable relationship (coincidence) between the "quality of life," and the complexity of its structure? . . .
>
> The dialectic of the spiritual phenomenon is that total spirituality demands the impounding of the whole physical universe into the most comprehensive, encompassing "machine for creation." Then the crazy-quilt, patch-it-before-it-tears, grand designs of our intellectual elite is a dumb, dim, fallacious, hypocritical, fraudulent game smudged on the body of the real. The pietism of the hurried environmentalist clashes head on with the steel compassion inherent to the performance of the whole biosphere.[1]

Moreover, about the status quo's contemporary "practical" technology, Soleri says:

> . . . How far we are from the condition where the message has dissolved the media, the theoretical godhead, is apparent if we look at the present extrabiological technology. We find it to be the great oversimplifier. Technology, as we have it now, is the resolver of one-at-a-time aspects of a problem that is always far more faceted and outreaching than any of each of its aspects. . . . If there is any comprehensive definition of pollution it has to be found in the failure of technology to account for a true tuning in on a problem in its totality. That is to say, its failure in fostering the spirit. If the reference "point" is the spirit, then whenever spirit is not incremented, pollution is present in its most comprehensive form: entropy. Entropy and pollution are one and the same.[2]

These excerpts, not devoid of compassion in the face of urban man's present plight, are nevertheless unremitting Class VIII statements in their rejection of the traditional wisdom.

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[1]Soleri, Matter Becoming Spirit, pp. 6-7.

[2]Ibid., p. 4.

As such, this background completes our survey of illustrative viewpoints on new concepts of the human person. It is pertinent now to present the summary of sample data as it is organized according to the six LIFE SITUATIONAL PERCEPTUAL COMPONENTS of IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME.

Introduction to sample data.--The brief accounts which have been given here of the seven subcategories of contemporary new concepts of the human person in western culture are by no means exhaustive, nor are the particular representatives selected to illustrate those categories. However, the broad scope of the subjective, objective and corporate approaches serves to reveal the breadth and variety of the trends. The particular viewpoints which were selected to illustrate these trends are meant to be indicative of concepts that are discernible throughout the social, cultural, and linguistic spectrum of non-status quo images produced or associated with the accelerative thrust of transience.

The images themselves might now and again surface and become visible apart from any attempt at consistent philosophical positions. This phenomenon may occur through the communications vehicles afforded by artists, plays, advertisements, counterculture newspapers, graffiti, television scripts, rock music, protest posters, and so forth. In such cases, the images may convey themselves more in the form of visceral reactions, slogans, or quips rather than as sophisticated dogmas.

At the other extreme, the images may represent key affirmations of well-thought-out intellectual positions, such as in the cases of Paul Goodman, Alan Watts, Abraham Maslow, Elizabeth Borgese, Buckminster Fuller, or Paulo Soleri.

Between these two extremes the occasion of the non-status quo images can and does occur with prolific frequency as the result of statements of various formal and informal groups, journalists, artists, ministers, actors, athletes, and poets, to name a few of the many "carriers."

An overview sampling of some of the more indicative verbal images which possess high potential for the delegitimation of the status quo belief system (especially in terms of the five practical values), is offered here next. As stated previously, in order to demonstrate trends within the total scope of the culture's lifeways, the data-sampling will be organized in terms, first, of the SIX LIFE SITUATION PERCEPTUAL COMPONENTS, i.e., IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME; second, by means of identification of the images as representatives of primarily subjective, objective, or corporate viewpoints; and third, through an indication of the predominant degree of support, accommodation, or hostility expressed towards the status quo practical values by designated clusters of images, as identified by the eight classes of such statements described on pages 416-20.

Although the data model is not rigorously parametric in terms either of time, place, or manner, nevertheless there are some general

limits which serve to give the data meaning, and it is believed that the material as organized and presented here is indicative of patterns that truly exist within the social milieu.

E.g., in terms of time, no data are included unless they occurred after the Second World War. In actuality, most of the data are representative of the 1960s and 1970s, the greater portion of this occurring subsequent to 1964.

The greater frequency of occurrences of the verbal symbols described is within Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United States. About 60 percent of all instances were abstracted from the United States milieu, due to the greater availability of data and the absence of language barriers for the writer.

Yet, the writer sought to counterbalance this proportion with samples from European, Scandinavian, Canadian, and South American cultures in order to corroborate trends that would be indicative of western culture, not merely United States culture. However, in the presentation of the data, no distinction is made as to the regional origin, since as indicated in Chapter I, western culture is regarded as being conceptual and portable rather than geographical.

One important qualification of the data-patterns is that in the living social context the subjective, objective, and corporate approaches are by no means strictly segregated in the images which they reflect, even though they are proximately separated for convenience in this study. Subjective viewpoints often may find compatibility with objective perspectives, and either or both of these with

corporate images. This is evidence of the fluid character of the trends, an occurrence indicative of a formative and transitional period in the culture.

The Imageries and Perspectives of New Concepts of the Human Person[1]

Against this background, attention may be given now to the data in the form of the prominent new analogies and metaphors which have increased concurrently with the quickened pace of the accelerative thrust of transience. The first group of image-samples reflects non-status quo perceptual propinquities concerning the nature of IDEAS.

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of IDEAS and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

Whereas the status quo disposition towards the nature of IDEAS is highly pragmatic and therefore objectively utilitarian and materialistic, there is now in contemporary western culture a widespread appearance of new images concerning the nature of IDEAS, which appearance as a whole is in sharp contrast with the core culture's conceptions. The data here will focus only upon the Metaphysical and Epistemological presuppositions inherent in these images as an

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[1]No attempt is made to document every image cited in this section. It is assumed that this entire chapter has been a context in which to understand something about all the images presented here. No images are introduced for which some contextual and/or philosophical background has not already been given. Footnotes occur only where there is a direct quotation, or where the writer wishes to introduce a reference which is particularly graphic or seems to possess intrinsic interest of its own.

indication of what the challenging subcultures regard to be the nature of IDEAS, since the function of these two topics is to discern and express the nature of "truth" and "knowledge" as such.

New Metaphysical images: the subjectivist (and intuitionistic) philosophical approach.--Although the status quo has been taken to task repeatedly for rooting its social theory in the subjectivity of the psycho-biological human individual, many of the new images of the human person produced by the accelerative thrust of transience also are subjectively-based. Yet, there are some striking differences.

Whereas the status quo confronts the dilemma, just discussed, of satisfactorily resolving the Metaphysical differences between subjectivity and materialism, or "interests" versus "law," or "universal reason" versus "instincts," the newer concepts abandon the effort to objectify what is strictly subjective. Rather they posit one form or another of subjectivity as the basis of reality--period! Then they seek to draw the objective world into that subjective basis in order to explain its meaning, much in the way that Bergson did with his principle of elan vital--the life force.

Some pertinent and fairly widespread examples are as follows.

Reality is neither mechanistic, nor rationalistic; rather it is a feeling. This image possesses strong Class VIII inclinations. It is prominent among counterculture communes, but also makes a

powerful appearance among affluent professionals who are engaged in encounter groups or psychotherapy, or alternative life-styles.[1]

Closely associated is the image that reality is timelessness or, alternately, reality is here and now. These images are buttressed by the popularity of various forms of Oriental or Eastern-style meditation. They result in both Class VII and Class VIII predispositions.

Again, reality is collective consciousness or the collective unconscious (as advocated, for example, by Dr. Carl Jung).[2] Anti-individualistic, such images, again, frequently produce statements falling in Classes VII and VIII, although Classes V and VI also may be included.

Closely associated with the images just cited is the concept that reality is the whole cosmos, of which the individual's self-actualizing growth is the mini-type. The best-known examples appear in the psychology of Maslow, the social perspectives of Theobald, and the Human Potential Movement with which Dr. Carl Rogers is

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[1]The social preconditions for this and other phenomena are analyzed by Orion White, Jr. and Gideon Sjoberg. They say in part,

> "Certain shifts in the value system, as well as structural realignments during the past several decades, have not only laid the basis for the rise of new political patterns but have done much to foster them. The new structures and values have resulted in turn from the rise of an affluent society--an affluent order that rests upon the continuing development of science and technology."

See their article, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 11.

[2]See, for example, Ralph Metzner's Maps of Consciousness (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), in the "Introduction," pp. 1-13.

associated.[1] These images produce statements ranging all the way from Class V to Class VIII.

New Metaphysical images: The objectivist (and naturalistic) philosophical approach.--As contrasted to the intuitive insights of the more subjectivistic proponents, the objectivistic images are more imperically-oriented. Yet, the imperical "data" have led to conclusions which go beyond mere descriptions of the data.

Thus, ecological theoreticians and their pundits produce images affirming that reality is the continuity and relatedness of all observed data. Statements range from Class V to VIII, and even make their way into Classes III and IV, particularly as concerns the Philosophical Presuppositions about Man and the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENT of TIME (see Chapter IV).

There are also more "personal" images. Reality is said to be like community; i.e., it reflects larger patterns of wholeness in spite of observable contradictions. It is interesting that from within the realms of the physical sciences such "anthropmorphism" should insert itself. It is a distinct evidence of the new antimechanistic attitude and it produces numerous Class VII statements.

New Metaphysical images: The corporatist (and more explicitly metaphysical) approach.--This might also be called the organic

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[1]See Carl Rogers, On Encounter Groups (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970).

approach, in which the mind-body organism is the model, and in which this corporate unity is prior to all subject-object distinctions.

Thus, reality is cosmic energy. To wit, $E = MC^2$. Thus, all physical mass constitutes one corporate body, which also equals all energy. Mind and body are synergic.

This produces Class VIII statements which refute the "scientism" based upon the naive concept of separate, individualistic atoms bumping around. But Class IV and V statements also are produced which affirm the scientific disciplines that have made the new perspectives possible.

Another image: Since reality is not merely separate atoms, its opposite is affirmed. Reality is cosmic unity.

Similarly, through the writings of persons such as Dr. Rollo May, the corporatist perspectives of Paul Tillich are reaffirmed to the effect that reality is unified through the ground of Being, or the dimension of depth, or ultimate concern.[1]

Further, reality is like love or community; it holds together. Or, further, reality is love or community.

Social reality is like a business corporation; it produces and is held together by cultural objects which are the result of the history of human thought and action, and the interactions are all transactional.

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[1]See Rollo May's two books: Love and Will (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1973); and Power and Innocence, a Search for the Sources of Violence (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1972).

These corporatist images are productive of many Class V statements, but also include a significant proportion of affirmations from Classes VI, VII, and VIII.

New Epistemological images: The subjectivist approach.--Since reality is neither mechanistic nor rationalistic, but is feeling, the way to know such truth is not via philosophy alone or even primarily, but through rapture.[1]

Or, truth is known through reintegration of the inner man. Mystical union is the ultimate form of knowledge. Knowledge comes more from contemplation than from cognition.

These are strong Class VIII statements, for they are categorically antithetical to the five practical values of the status quo.

A graphic example of a Class VIII statement is that words and reason are the opiate of the masses.[2]

Continuing the strong trend in Class VIII images, the new subjectivist epistemological images affirm that knowledge is not rational or predictable or divisible, but indeterminate and in flux.

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[1]See George B. Leonard, Education and Ecstacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968).

[2]This is reminiscent of Sorel who said: "Words matter little to those who wish to get at the root of things." See Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, with an Introduction by Edward Shils (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 62. Abbie Hoffman, from today's counterculture said in a similar vein: "Words are the absolute in horses--t." See his Woodstock Nation: A Talk-Rock Album (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1969). See pp. 17-18.

Objectivity (in the so-called "scientific" sense) is nonexistent. Truth requires passion. Truth is found through the loss of "ego-boundaries" and the attainment of the experience of the oceanic feeling.

True knowledge requires direct action, involvement in the experience of the here-and-now. Reality is best known through the playfulness and sensuousness of pure animal joy. Moral knowledge is intuitionistic; awareness of what is "good" comes from awareness of one's own feelings.

New Epistemological images: The objectivist approach.--The objectivist orientation, being in closer touch with the ostensible empirical commitments of the status quo, veers away from the virtually complete distribution of Class VIII statements produced by the subjectivists. Although these are not unknown to the objectivists, their epistemology leans more towards Class V statements. These collaborate strongly with the Class IV statements of the status quo.

Thus, knowledge must take its cue from empirical observation. Use of sense data is important.

Accordingly, moral propositions derive from propositions of the natural sciences; ethics is not an autonomous science deriving from intuitions absolutely independent from the observable world.

Yet knowledge is not merely technical. There is a corroboration between subjective intuition and external observation. There is somehow a whole unity.

The sensibilities, the consciousness as it were, of the artist is necessary to understand the meaning of sense data.

Needed: greater capabilities to gather, store, recall,[1] and analyze "information."

Needed: sophisticated technological information systems to be put at the disposal of more people.[2]

New Epistemological images: The corporatist approach.--The corporatists emphasize life complexes rather than objective or subjective data per se. Both intellect and intuition play a part.

Knowledge of reality is a priori and synergic; it is the dimension of depth, it is matter becoming spirit.

To have true knowledge is to be grasped by ultimate concern or by intuitive insight. Culture's function is to offer the means of indirect, legitimate, expression of ultimate concerns, i.e., myth turning to knowledge.

Ultimate and preliminary are temporal metaphors, but they "tell something" of our real experience. Myth penetrates the non-rational ground of life and reason.

Community love provides the unity of the positive, underivable, organic ground with practical realism. There is a factual unity of life, objectively independent of our interests.

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[1]See Edward I. Friedland, "Turbulence and Technology: Public Administration and the Role of Information-Processing Technology," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 134-50, at 142-45.

[2]Fuller, Education Automation, pp. 38-41.

Cultural objects make thought and action possible, and the next stage of evolution is for the ultimate in cultural objects, i.e., the organism of the city, to be miniaturized. The goal of man is contemplation, or matter becoming spirit.

Yet, the real is not a state of mind, for abstractions per se are unintelligible. Continuity with the physics and energies of nature, not isolation, is the principle of reality. Further, consistent with the principles of nature nothing simple is real.

The richness of the various corporate trends within the non-status quo movements causes their images to draw upon statements ranging all the way from Classes III and IV within the status quo to Classes V through VIII outside the status quo. This is an indication that the corporatist approaches may serve as perhaps the most powerful and durable bridge between the dominant culture and the challenging subcultures by which an orderly transition may be affected.

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of PEOPLE and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

The new images in contemporary western culture concerning perceptions of PEOPLE often contrast sharply with the older, more established images of the atomistic, psychobiologic, competitive individual who only and always seeks his own interests.

New perceptions of PEOPLE: The subjectivist approach.--The proper relation of PEOPLE and nature is one of harmony, not conflict or opposition.

Man's purpose in life, as a creature of nature, is self-expression and growth.

Man's "good" is fulfilled in the release of the core erotic energy. Man is inherently good. A healthy personality is a self-actualizing personality.

Self-actualizing personalities possess a democratic character structure.

The new man possesses a new consciousness. He discovers alternate states of consciousness to those offered by the status quo.[1] He undergoes peak experiences and may experience oceanic feelings of oneness-with-the universe. He undergoes loss of ego-boundaries.

Classes VII and VIII are most typical of the contexts in which these images appear, although Classes V and VI also are evident.

New perceptions of PEOPLE: The objectivist approach.--At the point of the human person, the objectivist images do not by any means necessarily negate the perception of PEOPLE just described for the subjectivists. Indeed, they appear to complement it and extend and fortify it. This constitutes one of the most determined combinations

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[1]See Keith Melville's enlightening essay on this subject. It appears as chap. ix, "The Search for Alternative Realities," in his Communes in the Counterculture (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 208-28.

of non-status quo assaults upon the status quo. This is evidenced in the fact that the status quo belief system bends, and perhaps breaks, in the defense of its own values at the point of its own perceptions of PEOPLE. This fact was established in Chapter II.

To the objectivists, the individual is an organism-environment field, not a skin-encapsulated ego.

Again, the individual is a nodal point in a force-field of energy.[1]

On the other hand, the technological extensions of man become his ensuing environments.

According to the objectivists, we also can now speak of fluid man and tribal man, as the processes and contexts in which man becomes what he is.

Similarly, all environments are extensions of man.

Not surprisingly, the proper unit of reference for the understanding of the individual human person is not the individual living human body and its ego, but virtual life chains, both human and nonhuman.

Man is best understood as a co-tenant of the earth habitat, i.e., of the phenomenal world, and the individual human organism (psychobiologic individual) is a focal point in a network of relations in a whole series.

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[1]Borgese, among others, makes this point. See her "Human Nature Is Still Evolving," p. 9.

The non-status quo's access to the status quo belief system is largely due to the Class V statements of the objectivists in its perceptions of PEOPLE and the status quo's own Class III and IV statements concerning its ambivalence about official perceptions of PEOPLE.

New perceptions of PEOPLE: The corporatist approaches.--If the objectivists bolstered and extended the subjectivistic perceptions about PEOPLE, the corporatists augment both the subjectivists and the objectivists even further. They contribute additional Class V statements and images which thereby run interference for strong Class VIII statements also characteristic of this section. The combined impact mounts a strong delegitimating force which takes advantage of the weakness shown by the status quo in its own belief system at the point of its perceptions about PEOPLE as well as its Philosophical Presuppositions about the nature of Man.

For the corporatists man is man-in-culture, the whole man. Abstracted from culture, man is not complete.

Accordingly, man as we know him today is a man-society organism, an organic continuum.

Alternately, personality is the ethical expression of the ontological ground of being-itself.

Again, personality is individuation (Jung). I.e., personality integrates the most advanced principles of nature in itself.

Human personality can be thought of as a bio-computer.

Human mind is the institutional order of systems of cultural objects created through will by means of man's corporate actions.

The factual unity of life objectively independent of human interests is the original ground of the existence of interests.

Man's purposes exist in an ideal status of man. Utopia is inherent in the nature of mind. This is the basis for universal reason and the identification of common human interests.

Man is a synthesis of all the institutions of culture which compose his personality. Human mind and personality are corporate.

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of PLACES and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

It has been noted that the status quo belief system and its images tend to militate against a "sense of PLACE" as this might apply either in eastern societies or of more organic societies such as in the medieval world of Europe during, say, the fourteenth century.

By contrast, the active non-status quo perspectives tend to redeem a "sense of PLACE" in respect to the situational locales in humankind's perceptions. The "sense" associated with such "PLACES" partakes of mythological and organic elements which tend to increase the association of human self-identity as opposed to the utilitarian motifs of practicality and sheer activity. That is, "PLACES" tend to have qualities of their own rather than serving as utilitarian wares which are in themselves dispensable as soon as man's pragmatic need of

them ceases. This observation seems to hold true for subjectivist, objectivist, and corporate images alike.

However, sometimes the "sense of PLACE," having been severely buffeted by burgeoning man-made environments and the accompanying transient nature of such technologically induced habitats,--"the sense of PLACE" is often conveyed by the non-status quo perspectives more by images of the concept of PLACE rather than by reference to specific PLACES. Indeed, the reference to specific PLACES frequently is made in connection with upholding a model for an ideal concept of PLACE.

New perceptions of PLACE: The subjectivist approach.--Subjectivist images of PLACE often convey mystical and mythological elements appealing to the nonrational quest after "origins" which forms persons into a bonded "community" and identifies them as A PEOPLE.

Thus, the East is regarded as the unconscious of the West,[1] and Haight-Ashbury is hailed as the model of the new culture, the new man, and the new society.[2]

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[1]The concept originally was that of Carl Jung, but has been picked up and elaborated by others such as William Pennell Rock, who observes that in the West there is

> "a deep inner compulsion to assimilate the spiritual power of Asia. . . . Long repressed, it now seeks to become manifest and assimilated into Western consciousness. With the counterculture, which gives every indication of being the militant vanguard of the Western unconscious, we are witnessing the invasion of the West by Eastern possibilities."

See Rock's "Alienation: Yes; Patriotism: Yes," pp. 5-6.

[2]Warren Hinckle's "The Coming of the Hippies," in Conversations with the New Reality: Readings in the Cultural Revolution,

Woodstock Nation is also the model of the new culture. It is revered as the site of the new "declaration of independence."[1]

Amsterdam, the site of the "Provo Revolt," inaugurated the birth of the new politics--a politics which is really a type of "non-politics" incomprehensible to established politicos--namely, play-power. Thus, The Spirit of Amsterdam means Playpower.[2]

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comp. by the eds. of Ramparts Magazine (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971), pp. 3-28. See also Andrew Kopkind, "Coming of Age in Aquarius," in the same book, pp. 39-44.

[1]Kopkind, "Coming of Age in Aquarius," pp. 39-44.

[2]Neville reports on the Provo Revolt as follows.

> "In Amsterdam in the mid-sixties, a new kind of revolt happened. Called Provo, it spawned imitators throughout Europe, and it inspired the Underground already emerging through pop, poetry and pot in Britain and the US. Provo was a rebellion without obvious cause. No Dutch soldiers were dying in Vietnam. No ethnic or social groups were being unduly victimized. 'In fact,' noted one local commentator, 'there was lack of any concrete inducement to protest against the established order.' Except of course, the very existence of established order itself. It was the idea of Provo to provoke--spontaneously, flexibly, relentlessly--which meant choosing hyper-retaliatory situations and reaping the consequences, even if they proved to be political."

See his Play Power, p. 26.

As Neville observed, others caught the spirit of play power initiated at Amsterdam, for shortly thereafter in New York,

> "a militant Lower East Side group, the Black Mask, once staged a mill-in at Macy's during the Christmas rush. Demonstrators flooded into the store disguised as shoppers, floor walkers and counter assistants. Stock was either spoiled, stolen, swapped around or given away. Half starved dogs and cats were let loosé in the food department. A berserk buzzard flew around the crockery section, smashing china and terrorizing sales girls. Accomplices ensured that the respectable middle class shoppers were mistakenly roughed up and arrested. Inspired by such chaos, a London group swept into Selfridges one Christmas with their key man dressed as

By contrast, Chicago, the site of the 1968 Democratic Convention, imparts more of a demonic mythological image. It is perceived as the image of Amerika, accompanied by epithets of "Heil, Daley!"[1]

New perceptions of PLACE: The objectivist approach.--The objectivist images have tended to take on rather grand connotations as starkly contrasting conceptual models of either wholeness or divisiveness. Here are some examples.

Man's homeland: The spaceship, "Earth."[2]

Man's village: "The Global Village."[3]

Santa Claus. 'Free presents' were pressed into surprised but eager hands. Not long afterwards, shoppers were treated to the spectacle of police confiscating toys from small children, and arresting Santa Claus [p. 22]."

[1]See Gene Marine, "Chicago: The Trial of the New Culture," in The Age of Paranoia: How the Sixties Ended, comp. by the eds. of Rolling Stone Magazine (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), pp. 229-87, at 243-44.

[2]In many different forms this metaphor has gained prominence now that man has entered outer space, looked back, and obtained a new perspective of the earth as a single body. See any of the following sources: Chapters entitled "The Cast and the Capsule," pp. 43-54, and "The World Is a Capsule," pp. 95-102 in McHarg, Design with Nature; any of the essays in The Earth as a Planet, ed. by G. P. Kuiper (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); or in The Fitness of the Environment, ed. by Lawrence J. Henderson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); R. Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1969).

[3]The concept is McLuhan's and has been popularized widely as a metaphor for the present age. See McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace.

America: "Land of anarchy."[1]

Contextual statements range from Class V to Class VIII.

New perceptions of PLACE: The corporatist approach.--The corporatist images are perhaps the most inventive of all. This occurrence may be due to the fact that the corporatist perspective, by nature, allows itself more scope, drawing from both the subjectivist and objectivist resources, but being limited to neither of them. Again, it draws upon the full range of statements from Class II to Class VIII.

Examples of corporatist images of PLACE are as follows:

Man's city: Cosmopolis.

Man's hope: Community love.

Man's despair: Megalopolis.

Historical models for ideal societies: The classical Greek society and the medieval European society.

The city is the social organic extension of man's own mind-body.

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[1]This metaphor also was popularized by McLuhan as an image to describe the crumbling of existing values during an era of transition into a new age and new values. Says McLuhan:

> "The clash of old and new environments is anarchic and nihilistic today. For example, what is called the 'Death of God' is the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian imagery, the cosmic clockmaker having become a transistor in popular imagination"

McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, p. 82.

Future models for ideal societies in which man's continued evolution may take place: Arcosanti ("against materialism," or the city of contemplation); Novanoah (the city of the continental shelf or open sea); Noahbabel (the city of the coastal waters); Arckibuz (the city of the desert land); Arcbeam (the city over the canyon); and Asteromo (the city in space: the membrane between being and non-being).

In the last paragraph the models cited represent concepts of the city as a living organism designed to provide maximum accomplishments with minimum expenditures of energy, thus freeing man for the next stage of evolution--cosmic self-realization via virtual complete contemplation, or matter becoming spirit (see Appendix E).

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of THINGS and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

Probably the greatest disparity between status quo and non-status quo images occurs in the respective perceptions concerning THINGS and in the accompanying concepts of property (or anti-property). It is at this point also that the ideological battle could prove to be the most severe.

New perceptions of THINGS: The subjectivist approach.--The Class VIII statements characterizing the images in this section are among the sharpest of all, for it is a common adage among non-status quo subjective perspectives that property is robbery.

Moreover, production and consumption in today's economic system are regarded as equivalent to enslavement and bondage.

In addition, multifarious images convey the thought that there is no sanctity for private property and the free marketplace.

What is desirable to a large proportion of subjectivists is communal congregation and conjugation and the abolition of property, money, families, nationality, class, and status.

Positively speaking, nature possesses its own integrity and is to be preserved, not primarily for man's use, but for its own sake.

The human goal is not wealth, but an enriched personal and social life.

The images just presented are reminiscent of the familiar anarchist slogans wherefrom they were indeed freely borrowed. What makes them new is who is saying them, or listening to them. Instead of peasants and laborers it is the affluent middle classes, or their sons and daughters, or the even more affluent professional classes who mostly serve as the carriers of the images just presented. As usual, however, there is often a considerable difference between the thoughts espoused and the actions lived, except among the more fluid and radical groups. Nevertheless, the very presence of blaise attitudes toward the sanctity of THINGS and of private property appearing among professionals who serve the status quo, even while consuming more and more THINGS at record paces, could in time exert a considerable impact upon this bulwark of the status quo belief system.

New perceptions of THINGS: The objectivist approach.--This group establishes some constructive links with the status quo by means of the presence of images lending themselves easily to Class V and VI statements. The objectivist group possesses the empirical approach in common with the status quo understanding of THINGS. Still, these new images contribute something not present in the images of the status quo belief system. They still anticipate a "new man" different from the atomistic individual of the status quo.

Thus, men are seen as robots when uncritically involved in their technologies. But technology is an extension of man's personality when he is critically involved.

These extensions will result in men-machine combinations or super-personalities (or super-bodies).

Human personality may be thought of as a man/world locus where exchanges of energy take place. Thus, property is not product but only an instantaneous expression of process.

The earth and its furniture are man's habitat.

But the remaining physical resources of the planet are uncontrollably exploited, depleted, and poisoned with an abandon which is beyond all rationality by industrialization and urbanization.

New perceptions of THINGS: The corporatist approach.--Consider the following images:

Secular property represents a split between mind and body which can only be healed by community love and a love for man and

his cities as a complete organism in which cultural objects are equally available to all.

Similarly, secular property represents a split between society and the individual which can only be healed by community love, the man/city organism, and the synergy which validates them.

Again, secular property represents a split between the subjective and objective sides of man's science, knowledge, and nature. This split can only be healed by concepts of community love, the man/city organism, and the accompanying synergy.

Community love also points to the need for and existence of superior or teleological laws which invalidate the secular autonomy of THINGS, and which reflect the social responsibility in ethics and law which comes from an awareness of ultimate concerns, synergic principles, and successful human bio-cultural evolution.

Social order comes about only through the creation of cultural objects which are everybody's property.

Individuality is not fulfilled through the private ownership of property. Rather, man is actually a synthesis of all the institutions of culture which compose his personality.

The present concept of property (in the status quo) is the basis of class distinctions and is maintained only through the threat of force.

The mutuality of THINGS (cultural objects) used by persons is the "me." All property is public.

Many Class VII and Class VIII statements abound in these images. By making THINGS and "property" corporate and mutual, the corporatists deny two of the most cherished tenets of the status quo--the sacredness of "private property" and the autonomy of things.

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of ORGANIZATIONS and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

In the non-status quo images organizational life is generally viewed as less static, desirably unbureaucratic, more fluid, but no less essential, than in the status quo.

New perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS: The subjectivist approach.--The subjectivist images are set strongly against the hierarchical nature of status quo organizations. A typical verbal image holds that Society needs no government, but only free agreements.

Another holds that the only valid organization is to be found in the harmony between man and his natural world and his natural self.

Still others affirm that both man and nature should be unfettered by the oppressiveness of States and bureaucracies. The only society that is real is to be found in the close communalism of small groups.

Common life-styles are the glue which bind real societies together, whereas the State is artificial and perpetuated only through its monopoly of force and violence.

Accordingly, the only sensible organizational principle is to keep means and ends close together. This involves decentralization.

Subjectivists advocate ad-hocracy and self-management, not bureaucracy. ORGANIZATIONS should be like mobile playgrounds: disassembled and reassigned as needs change.

Yet, self-actualizing individuals can operate within culture without being intimidated or taken in by it. Moreover, the transcendentalists purport to follow their own "higher" sources of personhood and essential meaning while ignoring the alienating pressures of bureaucracy.

The prominence of Class VII and Class VIII statements can be easily recognized in this group.

New perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS: The objectivist approach.--As in the case of the objectivist perceptions of THINGS, so also in the instance of the perception of ORGANIZATIONS the objectivist approach shows some significant overlaps with the perspectives of the status quo. The images in this group, for example, recognize the need for complex ORGANIZATIONS to accomplish the ends envisioned in the objectivists' new images of man. This fact results in a high proportion of Class V statements occurring as a result of such images. Consider the following images as samples.

The man-machine super-personalities of the coming era require extensive organized backup systems.

Man's organizational complexity will enable him to establish communities in outer space and under the seas.

Man is a step in a series of complex organizational systems of life and matter which reach out to include the entire cosmos.

Highly organized and sophisticated technical mechanisms may be necessary to manage the interface between man and all other life systems.

Yet the primary face-to-face contact group must be preserved.

Ends and means must be kept close together as man learns to master greater complexity.

Man must master complexity simply.

Needed: support systems of widespread and instantaneous communications technologies to be put at the fingertips of every family as the basis for creating feedback loops by which persons and families can instantly learn the immediate impact of the most minute decisions.

Social change is inherent in the nature of things as man and his technology evolve together.

New perceptions of ORGANIZATIONS: The corporate approach.--The corporatists appear to augment the Class V collaborative characteristics of the objectivists' images of ORGANIZATIONS. They do not eschew the institutional basis of cultural (and even biological) life. They simply wish to redirect its means and ends by giving it a more organic metaphysical framework.

Thus, structure always precedes performance.

Yet there is also no lack of Class VIII imageries. To wit, there is held to be a vacuum in civilization, a lack of ultimacy and substantial power in language and education, in politics and philosophy, in the development of personalities, and in the life of communities.

Further along this vein, comprehensive objectivity, community love, or synergy are required to heal the divisions in the ORGANIZATIONAL life of science, the social sciences and politics and society.

The vital force which supported the capitalist State was nationalism. Today, however, capitalism tends to eradicate nationalism in its need to be cosmopolitan.

Yet Class VIII statements may be easily transmuted into Class VII, VI, or V statements through combination with the following imageries.

Energy passing through a system functions to organize that system.

A new, physically uncomprised, metaphysical initiative of unbiased integrity could unify the world. It could and probably will be provided by the utterly impersonal problem solutions of the computers.

But consider some Class VII and Class VIII images: Our new technological corporate resources have simply bypassed the Newtonian age.

Or this: The computer absolutely guarantees the elimination of all the businesses that it is now being brought to serve.

Again: The dense information environment created by the computer is at present still concealed from it by a complex screen or mosaic quilt of antiquated activities.

And again: None of the existing goals of twentieth-century business enterprise can survive the impact of the computer for even ten years.

And once more: The higher the executive the more he feels cut off from the real developments of the operation he directs.

Yet, like an incessant rhythm, the corporatists again return to images easily adaptable to Class V statements. Such as:

Human association in society results from the tendency of cultural fact to order.

And: Men and their corporate associations form differing states of individuality.

Or: All the institutions of a culture form various syntheses to produce the individuality of persons. This provides the basis for will and freedom, for although only human persons can think, only corporations can act.

Again: Nothing simple is real.

And: Culture is the sum total of objects and their inner connections including those with human minds which have accumulated through thought and action.

And further: Both man and his mind are corporate.

Moreover: Social reality is continuous with and a continuation of the reality as individual.

Similarly: Man does not create society. It grows naturally.

In the same vein: The State was never made. It grows as the status of souls who comprise it.

Hence: The State, or The City, or The Society represents the expression of the life of the individual, as the sum total of inner relationships of all corporate institutions which reveals the larger purposes for which man is thinking and acting.

Non-Status Quo Imageries About the Nature of TIME and What They Reveal About New Concepts of the Human Person

TIME, it will be recalled, is the one and only component of all the three variables (there were sixteen components among all three variables) which registered outright nonsupport within the status quo's own belief system. Thus, the credibility of the linear nature of sidereal time has always constituted a problem for the dominant core culture. That is, the general lifeways of the culture have never been convinced that the nature of TIME is primarily quantitative, utilitarian, or segmentable.

This implies that TIME itself directly conveys some other impression of its own nature.

In any case, it is not surprising that the non-status quo perceptions of TIME convey images of its nature which is nonlinear.

New perceptions of TIME: The subjectivist approach.--TIME for the new anarchists is simply interpreted as existing now. For earlier

anarchists TIME existed either for the present or for a future better state of things. But the distinction of the new anarchists in this regard is that there is no TIME except as it exists in the present.

Consistent with this position is the new anarchists' commitment to the principle of indeterminacy. "Like Heraclitus' river, you never step into the same flow twice."[1] Experience is contingent upon a random collection of variables.

Thus, clock time is empirical, rational, and ego-centered. Therefore, say the new anarchists: "Eliminate the self; non-compose your compositions; dispense with the familiar; throw away your 'mind.'"

It is the nature of the counterculture to be haphazard, chancy and unpredictable. To do otherwise is to explore only the one-dimensional culture of rationality and predictability and to ignore the more voluminous realities of alternative states of consciousness.

Thus, the new anarchists' perspectives blend into those of the new transcendentalists. The latter, like the self-actualization hedonists within "the new psychology," do not separate space, time, and energy. Rather, as with the corporatists, these are all synergic, or symbiotic.

Events are thus seen in terms of movements or flows of love, energy, or spirit which represent or contain within themselves the interconnectedness of all life and all cosmic being.

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[1]Neville, Play Power, p. 65.

TIME in the traditional sense does not exist. It is fragmentary and therefore illusory, a bondage to enslavement by the ego. (The ego is blocked energy.)

It is clear from these images that the subjectivists contribute a solid block of Class VIII statements to harass the already virtually repealed interpretation of TIME within the status quo belief system.

New perceptions of TIME: The objectivist approach.--The objectivists, while resisting the ratified version of TIME in the mainstream culture, nevertheless register a different approach to TIME than do the subjectivists.

For them the sense of TIME is tied to physically observable, i.e., empirical, experiences of motion. Thus, when the sense of motion speeds up in society, or in life situations, then the sense of TIME also speeds up.

This produces the effect that TIME is perceived as more of a continuity than in the segmented, quantifiable, utilitarian view of TIME in the status quo. TIME is less something that can be controlled than it is something which controls the universe, including societies of mankind.

TIME thereby is also more flexible, for it may speed up or slow down or start over. It also takes on the character of a space-TIME dimension, and in this regard resembles the TIME of the transcendentalists.

Yet, for all that, TIME is still measurable rather than mystical or eternal. As with Napoleon, TIME is the great element between weight and force. This fact still imparts a utilitarian element to bring TIME under the quasi-control of the objective westerner and his historical consciousness. As Napoleon commented, "I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute."[1]

In this sense, the objective perspective has approached the subjective perspective that TIME is eternal, for the modern electronic information processing technologies have made the entire developments of past history available to the present and have enabled man to create the future now.

Such are the images about TIME produced by the objectivists. Their images are conducive to Class V and VI statements.

New perspectives of TIME: The corporatist approach.--In the corporatists the mystical TIME of the transcendentalists and the accelerated TIME of the objectivists comes together as the organic rhythms of birth, growth, and death. This is held true both organically and inorganically.

Thus, TIME has to do with the fullness of TIME and the ebbing of TIME. However, it is not merely the circular motion of TIME, as with the pure mystics.

Rather, TIME still has meaning and purpose, but on a cosmic or transcendental scale. There is a teleology. There is synergy as well

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, p. 105.

as entropy. There is kairos as well as chronos. There is survival, evolution, and vitality as well as extinction, and death. There is ultimacy as well as temporality.

In this context the corporatists find themselves well equipped to say both "Yes!" and "No!" to the status quo perceptions of TIME. The corporatists take the existing mainstream core to task severely for their one-dimensionality. Yet, they collaborate with the support of its evolution in science and technology, but seek to give it direction with some transcendent, original, underivable, principles ostensibly determinable from "within the facts" themselves.

PART III. CONCLUSION

Introductory Observations

It should be clear from the recitations and data summaries in this chapter that the imageries and implications of the accelerative thrust of transience have had the effect of "scrambling" the "boundaries" of the political traditions within contemporary western culture. These boundaries were meticulously established over a long period of time as a result of the painstaking victories of legitimation won by the practical western values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement.

Yet, the lifeways of that culture are changing. They are fraught with many more alternatives in life-styles and in perceptual and conceptual subtleties. The increased turnover in human LIFE SITUATIONS of the perceptual components of IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES,

THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME causes the volume and velocity of experiences--the flow of events, as it were--to become the new reality by which all things are interpreted. The new medium of the accelerating thrust of transience, i.e., of change-itself, becomes the message about life, culture, and politics. This, in turn, produces the effect that life and the world are perhaps perceived more as a whole than in segmented disciplines and specialities, for the flow and sweep of change-itself is the thread that binds the entire fabric of human experience together in something of a seamless whole.

In the press of such a time-space warp, old distinctions matter less and new perceptions matter more. Thus, the old boundaries of politics which are revered less and less are but a special instance of the total mosaic of the products of a more fixed and static world which is yielding to the speeding up of man's evolutionary vehicle, a culture in flux. The effect might be compared to the blurring of the details of the landscape into steady streams of color as one peers out the window of an express train gaining its maximum speed after beginning its journey.

General Conclusions About the Imageries of the Accelerative Thrust of Transience

As a result of this study of the key mental and linguistic images, that is, of the ferment and proliferation of philosophies which challenge the status quo, it is possible to generalize towards some broad but tentative conclusions about the "accelerative thrust" positions.

Man's Goal

First, according to the non-status quo positions, in general it may be said they concur that man's highest goal is not to experience a continuous increase in the quantity and technical variety of economic goods and services.

Rather, they might agree, man's highest goal is somehow related to the self-expression of his unique personality, whether individually or corporately understood, and the understanding of how his individuality is inextricably and organically related to all other individuals, and indeed, to all life and the entire cosmos itself.

On ORGANIZATIONS

Regarding the growth and power of ORGANIZATIONS, "accelerative thrust" positions emphasize two opposite but coordinate themes: decentralization, and greater complexity and interaction between all ORGANIZATIONS, i.e., the corporateness of all structures and their interrelationships. Actually both themes amount to a belief in and desire for greater accessibility to and accountability by ORGANIZATIONS where human persons and primary groups are concerned.

On Society

To the non-status quo viewpoints, Society is natural and organic and has its roots in the needs of the human species as a mere segment of the total life chain. Society may be conceived as little more than the primary group, or perhaps as the whole of mankind. In either case, Society is not to be ruled, dominated, or "owned" by the

elitist few. It belongs to all men and exists for the fulfillment of the "good life."

Corporate Institutions and Subjective Personalities

The detractors from the status quo surveyed here probably would find themselves in agreement in the belief that corporate institutions, far from being merely tools for the subjective personalities of those who operate them, and to the extent that they are justified at all, are the fluid expressions and extensions of man's changing needs; or else they are illegitimate political and economic contrivances which can be legitimately bypassed for alternate forms of human association.

On The State

The State, as a status of souls receives some legitimacy from the non-status quo positions. But as a power center, external to man, which manipulates men's needs in accordance with the needs of the military-industrial complex, its legitimacy is nonexistent among positions of "accelerative thrust."

New Concepts of the Human Person and the Delegitimation of the Status Quo

All of the themes in Part II are cultural and political expressions of what it means to be human in terms of the relationships man sustains with himself, other humans, society and its organizations,

and that specialized dimension of social and organizational life, namely, the State.

Thus, a change in the culture's affirmation of what it means to be human can be seen to result in a change in the conception of all social relations, including political ones.

It is assumed that if the viewpoints discussed above are successful in making inroads within the mass popular culture to the extent that they cannot be ignored by both formal and informal elites, then delegitimation of existing status quo positions has taken place.

It is also assumed that if one can determine the extent to which concepts of human nature have shifted among mass or popular subcultures, informally organized elites and organizing or directing elites, then one can get a useful estimate of the extent to which delegitimation has taken place.

The question follows, then, to what extent have the viewpoints discussed in this chapter been successful? Further, what have been the "effects" of these viewpoints? Do the "effects" appear to corroborate the "useful estimate" made as a result of "determining" the extent to which concepts of human nature have shifted? Finally, what appear to be the prospects for further success, if any, of the new concepts of human personality associated with accelerative thrust?

These questions are the basis for Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

DELEGITIMATION THROUGH NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON: THE EXTENT, THE EFFECTS, AND THE PROSPECTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION

Major Questions to Be Resolved

The question was introduced at the end of Chapter III, "to what extent have the new concepts of the human person considered in this study been successful in delegitimating the status quo?" Other related questions inquire about the "effects" of these new viewpoints, about any corroboration which these effects may lend to estimates of the extent to which new concepts of human nature have shifted, and about the prospects for further success, if any, of the new concepts of human personality associated with the accelerative thrust of transience.

The first question, i.e., successful delegitimation or not, may be stated more precisely. E.g., to what extent have the new concepts of human personality studied herein made inroads on the status quo both theoretically and practically among mass or popular

subcultures,[1] informally organized elites, and organizing or directing elites?[2]

There are various ways in which answers, or at least clues, for this question may be sought. Indeed, this is a question which is

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[1]Hyman regards a mass or popular subculture as an aggregate, perhaps as large as Germany or the United States, in which the distinction between the actor and the audience, the elite and the mass, is not tightly drawn. Rather, the notion is that some distinctive "psychological structure" connects both levels. But, as Jordan would maintain, subjective states of mind are incompetent as a basis for principle or order. That is, such subjective states can only be known through "cultural objects" or the artifacts of the culture. As stated heretofore, in the present study it is the linguistic artifacts, i.e., the verbal symbols created by the culture which are regarded as the "cultural objects" in which both objective and subjective states of mind are made real. See Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (New York: Free Press Paperback edition, The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as Political Socialization.) See also Elijah Jordan, Forms of Individuality: An Enquiry into the Grounds of Order in Human Relations (Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 22-23.

On mass or political subcultures see also Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Boston: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[2]Perhaps the best efforts at classifying elites are still those of Saint-Simon who wrote during the early 1800s and Mannheim whose writings were prominent in social science circles during the 1930s. Their approaches were separated by more than a century, but had much in common. As Keller points out, Saint-Simon divided elites into scientists, economic organizers, and cultural religious leaders, a classification which parallels Mannheim's distinction between the organizing and directing elites, who deal with concrete goals and programs, and the more diffuse and informally organized elites, who deal with spiritual and moral (or morale) problems. See Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963), chap. i. See also Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940). Other good sources on elites are the following: Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936); and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

implicit throughout this study and for which the study itself is in some respects meant to be an answer, even as various other facets of the subject are discussed.

The Task of This Chapter

However, nowhere else in this project is the question at hand discussed explicitly and systematically. This is the task of the present chapter. To this end no great amount of new material will be introduced, although some supplementary information will be offered, but previously utilized data will be considered according to this chapter's aim, i.e., to determine the relative success and to derive general estimates on the probable extent of delegitimation.

Making use of data already developed possesses two advantages. First, this procedure is consistent with the research design already introduced. Second, this approach may serve to demonstrate further the potential usefulness of that design.

Theoretical and Practical Aspects

The design and the data which have been developed in this study are more useful in the assessment of the inroads made into the theoretical aspects of the status quo, i.e., into the value structure and belief system, than into the practical or structural aspects. Therefore, the small amount of new material which is introduced will address itself more to the practical aspects than to the theoretical ones, since the latter will be considered on the basis of existing data.

The Nature of a Macrocosmic Speculative Venture

One other preliminary observation needs to be made. It has already been acknnowledged that in speaking of the status quo it is useful to refer not only to the broad substratum of supporting lifeways which are consistent with established status quo beliefs, but also to the more structural aspects, such as popular subcultures, informally organized elites, and organizing or directing elites. Yet, this is not a micro-analysis study involving the strict distinction between these structures. Although such distinctions are acknowledged and implied throughout, nevertheless, this is a macro-analysis speculative venture engaged in surveying broad outlines which are simultaneously indicative of the complexities of the social contextual whole.

Therefore, if the use made here of existing data indicates that delegitimation has taken place within the status quo as represented by the code list in Appendix A, the general assumption will be made that this penetration applies to status quo subcultures, informally organized elites, and organizing or directing elites alike, with no differentiations made as to the extent of change occurring among each of these categories. Then, in the interest of further documentation of such penetration and the making of general interpretations concerning the extent of change among the structural categories of the status quo, some new supplementary material will be introduced.

PART II. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Soft Spots in the Status Quo Belief System

First, it is pertinent to recall that there were definite "soft" spots in the legitimation of the status quo. There was, for example, the delegitimation perceptual convergence of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES which indicated that the five major conclusions representing the core belief system of the status quo in this study tended relatively to lose their authority at the point of the "prescribed" ways of perceiving these components of human situations.

It was also ascertained that the status quo's Philosophical Presuppositions about Man and the culture's practical values about austerity tended to resist the five major conclusions in general.

These patterns, of course, represent combinations of components within the belief system of the dominant core culture itself. That is, they are not references to any of the seven subcategories of new concepts of the human person contained within the subjective, objective, and corporate approaches discussed in Chapter III. Yet it has been established that, for purposes of this study, this is where the status quo is feeling the pressures, and this is where the critical battle to stem the tide of delegitimation advances is most visible.

A Continuity of Interactions

Further, since it is assumed that a continuity of influences and interactions exists between the core culture and the various non-central subcultures, it must also be assumed that if and when the

subcultures themselves are making inroads upon the status quo, then the impact of those inroads can be detected most readily at the point of those belief system components already identified as "soft."

For this reason it is pertinent to review and characterize the profile of the core culture's most sensitive delegitimation susceptibilities.

A Review of the Table 8 Data

This can be accomplished by reviewing Tables 8, 9, and 10 and ranking the opposition subtotals in order of their strength. Thus, from Table 8 it is possible to determine the following profile of LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS in order of strength of opposition to the status quo, i.e., in order of delegitimation strength. It may be recalled that the total possible scores for each of the components listed is 125. The list below shows the opposition points scored by each component.

TIME:	47
PEOPLE:	18
ORGANIZATIONS:	15
IDEAS:	8
PLACES:	7
THINGS:	0

The scores above reflect the pure delegitimation gains, or alternately, the pure loss of legitimacy points, in each area. That is, the reservoir or inventory of ambivalence points has not been taken into consideration as it was in Chapter II.

As a consequence, this manner of analysis results in a slightly different ordering of delegitimation congruences. It will be recalled that in Chapter II the delegitimation perceptual convergence was composed of TIME, PEOPLE, and PLACES, with the relative strength of delegitimation results being shown in that order.

However, in the present analysis PLACES shows the least strength, and ORGANIZATIONS has risen to third place, whereas TIME and PEOPLE have retained their same positions. In spite of this slight rearrangement, the general conclusion is corroborated to the effect that western perceptions of TIME and PEOPLE in the LIFE SITUATIONS of human persons harbors tendencies to reject the value system of the status quo.

It must be emphasized, however, that the relative proportion of pure delegitimation points is nevertheless small in relation to the maximum number of possible points (125). This fact is a way of illustrating that the resilience and tenacity of the status quo within its own ranks is still fairly strong. The important qualifying phrase here has been italicized, since these scores indicate nothing about the relative size of the core culture's dominance in relation to the subdominant, or detracting, subcultures (noncentral subcultures). More will be said later concerning this point.

A Review of the Table 9 Data

This same type of analysis may be extended through a review of the opposition subtotals in Table 9. Again, the list which follows

reveals the opposition points scored by each component among the Philosophical Presuppositions in order of rank of delegitimation strength. The maximum number of possible points for each of the components below, it may be recalled, is 150 (as contrasted with 125 for the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS).

Man:	42
Metaphysics:	18
The State:	14
Society:	11
Epistemology:	10

Once again a slight reordering has occurred as each of the components is considered in terms of opposition points irrespective of ambivalence scores. Most notably, Metaphysics has moved into the second position. However, Man still retains the first place by a sizable margin over all other components. This corroborates the finding in Chapter II. However, the relative proportion of the total available points for each component (150) is still small. Once again, the tenacity of the status quo within its own ranks is reaffirmed.

A Review of the Table 10 Data

This brief analysis may be completed by showing the same sort of data for the practical values as given in Table 10. Accordingly, the opposition scores by rank of delegitimation strength may be listed in the following manner.

austerity: 33

objectivity: 22

rationality: 17 (tie)

discipline: 17 (tie)

achievement: 6

It is interesting to see that, although austerity, as might be expected, demonstrates the strongest resistance to the status quo belief system, objectivity is shown in second place for pure delegitimation points.

The Status Quo Bends without Breaking; But How Far?

In addition to finding the general conclusions of Chapter II confirmed, this analysis may serve to affirm another important point. The reader may have discerned, in his perusal of Table 8, 9, and 10, that, generally speaking, all 16 of the components in the status quo belief system (as revealed in the code list in Appendix A) reflected about one-third of their available points in the ambivalence columns. That is, all components showed ambivalence scores occurring in the 40s and 50s, with the following exceptions:

IDEAS: 36

Metaphysics: 33

ORGANIZATIONS: 31

THINGS: 22

What this latter observation may be interpreted as demonstrating is the fact that the core culture of contemporary western

civilization is able to bend to a considerable extent without actually breaking. This is a tribute to its remarkable resiliency, the fact of which constitutes one of the main explanations for its stability. Western culture, that is, appears to possess tremendous absorptive powers. Rather than frequently and extensively resorting to the annihilation of opposition viewpoints, it seems rather to co-opt them.[1]

But the question arises, how much can the status quo bend without either breaking or becoming transformed into something else? Using the model of the status quo in this study, one might hypothesize a situation in which the representative code list of values did not change at all. Theoretically it could remain the same throughout the rapid throughput and turnover of values within the general culture. What this would mean, of course, is that the status quo then would have become a tightly protected subculture on its own terms. In effect, it would have become bypassed by the larger culture.

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[1]This point has been the subject of considerable discussion, both pro and con. Herbert Marcuse, for example, finds the liberal tradition in America to be a powerful constraint rather than a blessing. See his "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). John Kenneth Galbraith, on the other hand, says there are "no other saviors" except technology and "the New Industrial State." See his book by the same title (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967). He advocates "managed demands, tutored responses, and controlled behavior." For a strong detractor from Galbraith, see Dusky Lee Smith, "Scientific Liberalism: Ward, Galbraith, and the Welfare State," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 66-89. (Hereinafter referred to as Politics and the Post-Welfare State.) Also on the topic of the "absorption" ability of western politics, and for a view which encourages the withering away of the bureaucratic state in favor of a "true" restoration of the "liberal polity," see Jon Alexander's "The Soft Cell," also in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 90-113.

This seems virtually unthinkable, since the status quo, by definition, still possesses the means of power. It stands for the political, administrative, technical, and scientific input into the world view. It is associated with the provision of material benefits and increased novelty in the material world. It is the sponsor of both the tolerance and pluralism by which other viewpoints are absorbed.

The Status Quo Must Change as It Bends; But How Much?

Yet, all of these characteristics also assure that the very nature of the status quo is such that it cannot remain static, but must change as it goes. What the present study may have done is to indicate the specific perceptual, conceptual, and practical components within the existing belief system wherein the greatest turnover is taking place. According to the brief analysis just conducted, these would include the components of TIME, PEOPLE, Man, Metaphysics, austerity, and objectivity. Since each of these topics is prominent among the themes and verbal images expressed by the several new concepts of the human person surveyed in this project (see Chapter III), it is reasonable to assume that the challenging viewpoints, which the status quo tends to absorb, are exerting a significant effect.

What is not indicated and cannot be indicated accurately by the research design at present is the rate of turnover of concepts within the status quo. The code list rather has served as an indicator of values which have been prominent among the status quo within the

past twenty-five or thirty years. It is an extremely broad survey instrument, not a narrow one.

Nevertheless, as Table 11 indicates, better than 10% of the established values during that period were rejected and another third remain in doubt (see the subtotals for opposition and ambivalence). It can reasonably be assumed that, if the upward curve of accelerative thrust can be taken for granted, the greatest amount of turnover in values has occurred during the last ten or so years, perhaps even double, triple, or quadruple the rate which occurred in earlier years.

One and One-half Percent Turnover; or 3 Percent?

Through interpolation, then, one might be justified in assuming conservatively that, given a steady rate of turnover, nonsupport for the status quo since 1945 has occurred at a rate of about 1.5% per year. Table 11 shows that 753 of 2,250 possible points for the 3 variables in the code list fell into the ambivalence column. This figure represents 33.47%. In addition, 285 points went to the opposition column, or 12.67% of 2,250. Thus, 46.14% of the values of the status quo arrived at nonsupport during a 30-year period, or about 1.5 percent per year (uncompounded).

If one assumes further, however, that the rate of change was at least twice as great in 1975 as in 1945, then the rate increases to 3% per year. Undoubtedly this too is a conservative figure. Moreover, this figure applies to western culture in general, whereas if studies were to be developed using an improved research design to

evaluate the rate of change within specific sectors for more limited time periods (say one year, three years, or five years), perhaps the respective rate might be established at 10%, 20%, or even higher.

Nevertheless, even given a rate of 3% annually (uncompounded), it would take only 33 years to bring about a complete change in the values of the status quo.

Even Higher Rates for Certain Components

Moreover, in the case of specific components of the belief system, the rate of change can be projected at much higher levels. TIME, for example, showed 53 points for ambivalence and 47 points for outright opposition among 125 possible points (see Table 8). This means that 80% (uncompounded) change occurred in 30 years, or nearly 3 percent per year. One might conservatively assume a 6% change for any one of the latter years (during the 1960s or 1970s). In 11 years or less, using this indicator, the sense of TIME throughout contemporary western culture could completely change. This is exactly what many observers maintain is actually happening.

The Status Quo and Cultural Diffusion

It is important, in the present view, to see the status quo in relation to the total culture. This was the reason for the establishment of the universe-of-discourse and the various dominant and subdominant frames-of-reference in Chapter I. In the present discussion this relation becomes relevant, since more and more within an

increasingly technological culture of rapid change, the status quo may become evermore diffuse and indistinguishable from the culture-at-large. This could become especially true as the status quo attempts to absorb ever greater volumes of contradictory viewpoints into itself.

Or, on the other hand, to the extent that the status quo succeeds in maintaining a sharp clarity of identity, it might become simply one power center among many--a veritable new subculture--rather than representing the central core.

Proposals on Working "Outside" the System

Indeed, it is highly possible that such cultural diffusion may take place so that it becomes meaningless to speak of a central core in the old sense. In support of this possibility is the fact that a spate of proposals has appeared in which the position is advocated that it is now necessary to work outside of the system in order for the system to work at all. This seems to be the day of alternative life-styles, indeed, for people inside the system as well as those outside of it.[1]

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[1]Such proposals are particularly prolific in reference to education. See, for example, the following: Jonathan Kozol, Free Schools (New York: Bantam Books, 1972); Elizabeth Cleaners Street School People, Starting Your Own High School: The Story of an Alternative High School (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1972); Ned O'Gorman, The Storefront: A Community of Children on 129th Street and Madison Avenue (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970); and Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, The Soft Revolution: A Student Handbook for Turning Schools Around (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1971) In reference to politics in general, see Richard Neville, Play Power: Exploring the International Underground (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of

Typical of such proposals is one by Wills. He maintains that none of the major changes in our society took place because of elections. Rather, says Wills, changes occur when a lot of people take stands on issues and then politicians find they can introduce some of them into legislative action. Retrospectively, the politicians afterwards get a vote of approval (as did Roosevelt in 1936 for the New Deal) or disapproval (as Johnson did in 1968). Accordingly,

> It is rather encouraging, then, when we look for the forces of change, to find that people who start out as "freaks" generate change--Martin Luther King starting the bus boycotts, the teachers and students who began the first antiwar teach-ins on Vietnam, the first woman suffragettes. Right now, changes are taking place because of the women's liberation movement. And changes are taking place on such matters as abortion and marijuana and amnesty. The way to change things, even to change the government, is to work outside the government.[1]

Other observers also point to indications that the status quo no longer possesses a monopoly on the ground rules for the legitimized political processes. Elden says there is a new style of politics emerging in which demonstrations and protest are systematically developed as political resources, and that the politics of protest extend these days to nonradical constituencies. Indeed, says Elden, it

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Random House, 1971); (hereinafter referred to as Play Power); and the Introduction to The Essential Works of Anarchism, ed. by Marshall S. Shatz (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., a National General Company, 1971); also Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1972); (hereinafter referred to as Utopian Essays). A book which uses education as a metaphor for society, but which advocates de-institutionalizing society altogether is Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society (New York: Harrow Books, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970).

[1]Garry Wills, "Working within the System Won't Change Anything," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August, 1972), 34-37.

sometimes seems as if everyone were adopting the style. The style of both the New Left and the New Right, for example, is similar in rejecting traditional political modes for nonelectoral political activism outside of the two-party framework.[1]

In the same vein Etzioni talks about the significance of "demonstration democracy" and Skolnick reports on the "politics of protest."[2]

Other testimony concerning the lessened importance of central political authorities and of the ground rules of the status quo in general comes from White and Sjoberg who emphasize the role, not of disadvantaged groups alone, but of "solid citizens." Using America as their referential point, they say:

> Many advantaged citizens have challenged the system through such diverse tactics as overconformity to the rules, picketing, protest rallies, the guerrilla theater, and even "dropping out." In effect they are saying that the system as presently constituted is not worth preserving, or at the very least that the existing authority structure must be revised. A crisis of authority has been experienced by universities, the structure of news media, governmental agencies, and so on. It has diffused outward to hitherto unlikely spheres such as athletic organizations and even the military.[3]

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[1]James M. Elden, "Radical Politics," in Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence, ed. by Dwight Waldo (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 24-25. (Hereinafter referred to as Turbulence.)

[2]Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York: The Free Press, 1968), and Demonstration Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy Research, 1968). See also, Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969).

[3]Orion White, Jr., and Gideon Sjoberg, "The Emerging 'New Politics' in America," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 19. (Hereinafter referred to as "New Politics.")

The Need for a Politics of Flexibility

For White and Sjoberg, inasmuch as the condition of social pluralism, with new but fragile life-styles, is increasing greatly, a politics wherein flexibility is the dominant orientation is "deemed the reasonable outcome." Accordingly,

> . . . The current political structure, oriented toward assumptions of social stability, is based upon rather narrow, fixed lines of representation--via the party electoral and interest-group systems. Inasmuch as this structure presupposes order and stability, the leaders bargain and compromise for their respective constituencies. The political outcomes (laws) are refined through compromise decisions which are reached in the process of administrative politics. Such a political style fits a stable social-economic order, wherein issues are defined by relatively permanent economic and political interest groups. But under conditions of social pluralism and flux, the issues must constantly be redefined as different organizations and life-styles come and go.[1]

Whereas this description of American politics and the prognosis for much needed greater flexibility appears apt, it should be noted that within the broad context of western culture certain differences exist which both affect and are affected by social and technological change.

The English common law tradition, for example, which underlies American political institutions is held to be conducive to, and supportive of, adjustment--"far more so than the legal tradition of continental Europe," which has instead fostered "political closure." Further, whereas democracy in continental Europe is based on a tradition of equality in contrast to the British notion of liberty under

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[1] Ibid., pp. 25-26.

the law, the American constitutional heritage, is a mixture of both of these traditions.[1]

In spite of these differences, however, according to the views just surveyed, among others, there appear to be strong reasons to conclude that the future political systems within western culture are now open to a variety of possible patterns. Thereby the concept of understanding a culture in terms of a central core represented by the status quo may tend to become less tenable. Diversity, fluidity, and alternative styles seem to be important factors in the political process today.

PART III. ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS

The previous discussion was addressed to the question about the extent to which the new concepts of human personality studied herein have made inroads on the status quo's theoretical values. However, the larger question for which this chapter seeks some answer involves the practical traditions as well. This is interpreted to mean the structural aspects, which, in turn, have been defined broadly in terms of the categories of the mass or popular folk cultures which infuse the total lifeways with certain predispositions; the informally organized elites (i.e., show business stars, sports heroes, ministers, and some educators); and the organizing, directing, and controlling elites, (i.e., the elected and appointed officials who legislate and administer the laws).

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[1] Ibid., p. 22.

The Question to Be Resolved

The question to be resolved in this section, then, is: To what extent have the new concepts of human personality made inroads into the practical (structural) aspects among mass or popular subcultures, informally organized elites, and organizing or directing elites?

Penetration of the Mass or Popular Subcultures

The status quo draws support from the political culture of the general society. This political culture consists of the total lifeways in their political aspects. To the extent that there is a compatible or workable "fit" between the general propinquities of the political culture and the established political structures and the prevailing style of the ruling or governing elites, then the probabilities of stability and legitimacy are high.

However, if and when there occurs a radical shift in one or the other components within this milieu of legitimacy, both legitimacy and stability can be said to be threatened.

In the previous section of this chapter, the penetration by new concepts of the human person into the substratum of the culture's lifeways--those from which the status quo draws its broad base of support--was indicated. In this section it will be noted that precisely those "interest groups" which form the pluralism by which liberal democracy pervades and governs the nations of the West are themselves in turn showing characteristics of penetration by new concepts of the

human person which makes governance by the authorized institutions more difficult.

The analysis of Lasch is useful in this respect. In explicating a theory of "post-industrial society" he observes that the class structure of the industrial society tended to be polarized between bourgeois and proletarians, but that post-industrial society, being more fluid and heterogeneous, consists of five distinct classes, "of which the first is steadily diminishing in size and importance":

> (i) the traditional middle class, declining in status and increasingly attracted, in its insecurity and despair, to racist versions of its old laissez faire ideology;
>
> (ii) the traditional working class now somewhat diminished in size, unionized, relatively affluent, and integrated into the industrial system;
>
> (iii) the new lumpenproletariat, swollen by recent migrants from rural areas where mechanization has eliminated the need for unskilled labor, who collect in the ghettos of decaying cities;
>
> (iv) the "new middle class" or white-collar proletariat; and finally,
>
> (v) the ruling class, an amalgam of the haute bourgeoisie and the new managerial elite, that controls the great corporations, most of the land, and the higher reaches of government (especially the military). In both its functions and ideology the ruling class is predominantly managerial. The term "ruling class" is misleading, however, if it suggests too sharp a distinction between those who control the giant corporations and those who own them. The theory of the managerial revolution notwithstanding, ownership even today--as C. Wright Mills pointed out in The Power Elite--is by no means wholly divorced from control. Nor has the managerial class developed an antibourgeois ideology, as so many writers over the years have predicted it would. On the contrary, it has developed a variant of bourgeois ideology, a variant of liberalism best described as corporate liberalism and exemplified in progressivism, the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society. Corporate liberalism, sometimes confused with socialism by those who do not know any better and even by those who should (like William F. Buckley), differs from traditional liberalism in its acceptance of a managed economy, its recognition of labor unions as legitimate bargaining agents, its commitment to the welfare state, and its devotion to a Liberalized imperialism abroad. It shares with traditional liberalism a

> fundamental commitment to the "free enterprise economy"--that is, to the system of commodity production for "private" profit known as capitalism.[1]

This passage by Lasch has been quoted in its entirety, not only because it is an excellent overview analysis of developments within the mass subculture compressed into relatively brief space, but because it suggests many of the main characteristics associated with penetration by new concepts of human personality of that mass political culture.

First, the traditional middle class, the classic forebear of the practical values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement, is held to be declining in both size and importance. This is corroborative testimony for the sort of turnover of values within the status quo which was indicated in an earlier section of this chapter. Its racist versions of the old laissez faire ideology corresponds to what McLuhan called the "rear-view mirror image of the future"--a frantic reaction to hold back the new constellations of values and views of the nature of man and the world.[2]

Second, the traditional working class, having been unionized and integrated into the industrial system, as well as having become relatively affluent, is now heir to the growing hedonism, or the ethic

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[1]Christopher Lasch, "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 38-39.

[2]Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968). (Hereinafter referred to as War and Peace.)

of working to spend rather than to save, which appears to typify the motifs of the "New Industrial State" today.[1] Through its absorption into the system, this traditional working class also begins to experience the benefits of a more holistic view, or corporateness as it were, rather than strictly of competition and hostility.

Third, the new lumpenproletariat which fills the "pockets of poverty" amidst a society of affluence constitutes a growing army of alienated persons potentially and ofttimes actually ignitable into hostile and sometimes violent expressions of the new anarchism. Possessing characteristics shared with peoples from the so-called "Third World," this lumpenproletariat now and again becomes visible and more politically activated because of its loose but significant association with persons from "The Fourth World."[2]

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[1]Galbraith, The New Industrial State.

[2]Elden defines the difference between the Third World and the Fourth World:

> "The Third World, a term recently publicized by groups such as the Third World Liberation Front at San Francisco State College, includes all the nations of the world--for the most part people of color--striving for the levels of modernization achieved by the First and Second Worlds (the First World is America and Europe and the Second World includes all those countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain). The Fourth World has come into existence only recently. It is composed of Whites who have dropped out of the values of the first two Worlds, and allied with the Third World against them. The clearest manifestation of the anti-First World values on the part of the Fourth World is the cultural revolution of the hippies."

James M. Elden, "Radical Politics," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, p. 23.

One dramatic example of this occurrence was the widely publicized advent of the "Symbionese Liberation Army," including the kidnapping and conversion of one of the intended heiresses of the William Randolph Hearst publishing fortune, Patty Hearst.[1] A less violent but no less activist example of more constructive expression of the new anarchism by the new lumpenproletariat is to be found in the Free School Movement associated with the names of Jonathan Kozol, George Dennison, Peter Marin, Ivan Illich, Paulo Freire, and Paul and Fred Goodman.[2]

Fourth, the "new middle class" or white-collar proletariat not only represents a major shift in the economic sphere since, for example, for the first time in American history there are (since the mid-1950s) more white-collar than blue-collar workers; but this development itself highlights a more critical development in the western consciousness itself. The rise of the white-collar worker is associated with the transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. This in turn heightens the expectations of persons for self-development and self-actualization experiences due to the fact that the largest segment of the service economy is the education sector,

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[1]See the following: "Patty Chose SLA Because of Father," Los Angeles Times Service, San Antonio Express, May 22, 1974; "Patty: Robot Rebel?" New York Times News Service, San Antonio Express, May 29, 1974; and "Patty: Sleeping Beauty Awakened?" Associated Press, San Antonio Express, June 9, 1974.

[2]See Kozol, Free Schools; George Dennison, The Lives of Children (New York: Random House, 1970); New Schools Exchange Newsletter, 701 B Anacapa Street, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93101; Illich, Deschooling Society; and Goodman, Utopian Essays.

and the economy's growing affluence affords persons both the time and money to engage in more extensive self-improvement endeavors. By contrast, as White and Sjoberg point out, in the preliterate world the idea of "individualism" hardly exists, and "in preindustrial civilizations only a handful of the elite (and then only in certain cultures and eras) have been able to devote themselves to this question."[1]

Thus, for the reasons given above, the awareness of the human person in relation to himself, to others, and to the world at large, continues to arise in association with the ongoing rise of the white-collar worker. Amidst the many alternatives available for differing life-styles, especially for the more affluent and professional classes (to which the apprenticeship among the white-collar working class is often a prelude), the growing consciousness of the human individual is not likely to remain the same as that of the laissez faire concept of traditional liberalism.

Fifth, the new ruling class, i.e, the new managerial elite, is described as having developed a variant of bourgeois ideology, a variant of liberalism best described as corporate liberalism and exemplified in America in progressivism, the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society. Each of the policies and eras just named represents a major occurrence of absorption by the corporate State of either actual or potential dissident groups and opposing viewpoints. This in turn represents an ever-greater victory of

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[1]White and Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics and the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 12.

corporate liberalism over traditional liberalism. Corporate liberalism has been alternately praised and blamed, but in either case held responsible, for fueling the proliferation of numerous and diverse heterogeneous life-styles through the encouragement of rising expectations, particularly during the era of the New Frontier and the Great Society. As evermore strange and unprecedented life-styles and philosophies are absorbed into the New Industrial State, the contention between competing viewpoints for recognition within the central core of the culture seems bound to heighten, with the effect that the existing central core itself will undergo stress and the accompanying threat of erosion or even displacement.

Whatever the outcome, this analysis may serve to indicate the occurrence of the penetration into the general political culture by interloping viewpoints associated with the various new concepts of the human person described heretofore.

Penetration of the Informally Organized Elites and the Organizing or Directing Elites

The informally organized elites include such personages and role types as show business stars, sports heroes, ministers, and some educators. The organizing, directing, and controlling elites are composed of elected and appointed officials who are charged with the responsibility either of making the laws, administering the laws, or enforcing the laws. Corporate executives of major industries performing services essential to the well-being of the status quo may also be included among the more formally organized elites.

Penetration by new concepts of human personality exhibited among the informal elites is significant since this group may play a major role in reflecting major trends occurring within the mass culture, or in its avant garde. Penetration detected among the more formal elites is even more significant as an indicator of delegitimation of the status quo, since they represent the vanguard of the core culture.

In the United States a useful indicator of some penetration among both informal and formal elites is provided by "A Bicentennial Declaration" which was published widely in major newspapers throughout the nation.[1] This statement was drafted and sponsored by the National Committee for the Bicentennial Era, a nonprofit organization "whose primary purpose is to encourage meaningful observance of the Bicentennial." The Committee was supported in the presentation of its statement by the Coca-Cola Company, International Business Machines Corporation, International Paper Company, The JDR 3rd Fund, Mobil Oil Corporation, and TRW Inc.

A list of forty well-known persons appeared as personal endorsers of the statement.[2] It included prominent national political

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[1]For example, see the San Antonio Light, Feb. 24, 1975, p. 1-D.

[2]Some of the names included were actor Eddie Albert; John W. Gardner, chairman of Common Cause; Reverend Theodore M. Hesburg, president, Notre Dame University; tennis star Billie Jean King; Robert S. McNamara, president, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; anthropologist Margaret Mead; George Meany, president AFL-CIO; Arjay Miller, dean of Stanford Business School; Elliot L. Richardson, former Attorney General of the United States; John D. Rockefeller III;

figures, corporate executives, well-known personalities in the media and performing arts, administrators of patriotic organizations and powerful interest groups, health and medical officials, university presidents, top officials from leading banks, and presidents of the largest unions, among others.

As might be expected, the gist of the "Bicentennial Declaration" recalls its readers to a reaffirmation of the "great ideals that created our country"--"government by consent of the governed," "the blessings of liberty," "all men are created equal," "a nation of laws." Great emphasis also is placed on other familiar virtues such as initiative, incentive, and the work ethic. No penetration by new concepts of the human person is represented here as such.

But other themes potentially indicative of penetration by new values run throughout the text concurrently with the more familiar ones. They also are woven into the text in such a way as to legitimize them by other more accepted precedents.

Thus, the "Declaration" speaks of a "crucial turning point in history" and of "a world growing increasingly interdependent." Problems of "the environment" are mentioned. A second American Revolution is called for, "not of violence, but of fulfillment, of fresh purposes, and of new directions." Further, while the status quo value of "achievement" is emphasized, recognition of something "new" and

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Dr. Jonas E. Salk; and Roy Wilkins, executive director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

"unprecedented" in the current social and political milieu is acknowledged. Thus,

> . . . what our forebears did 200 years ago had never been done before. What we must do today is equally unprecedented. At every level in our society, there is an urgent need for achievement--in education, housing, transportation, the arts, communications, new ways of solving social problems, new methods of setting goals for the future, increased citizen participation in government. We believe that dedicating the Bicentennial to achievement is the way to put the sense of alienation and powerlessness behind us, to become once again the masters of our own destiny.[1]

This statement appears to be a thoroughgoing populist-type affirmation set in the framework of an unprecedented accelerative thrust of transience. The significant aspect is that the presence of such accelerative thrust is recognized and made part and parcel of the statement's central concern. This is accompanied in the next paragraph by a recognition of the inevitability of the delegitimation of the "great ideals" unless the primacy of "individual initiative" is given sway.[2] Although the proffered solution is found in a reversion to the atomistic psychobiological individual, the acknowledgment of both the loss of inspiration and encroachment of increasing delegitimation of established values points to the penetration of other values into the system. The emphasis on the atomistic individual is offset somewhat by a recognition of "interdependence."

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[1]"A Bicentennial Declaration," by the National Committee for the Bicentennial Era, San Antonio Light, Feb. 24, 1975, p. 1-D.

[2]The relevant sentence reads: "Our great experiment in democracy will surely erode unless the Bicentennial Era becomes a time when we once again assert the primacy of individual initiative in moving our country forward." Ibid.

Summary of the Practical Aspects of Penetration

All in all, no radical shift from long-established values to radical new ones is indicated in the material presented in this section. Rather, a steady turnover of conceptions occuring under the relentless pressure from noncentral subculture viewpoints is perceptible.

In summary, and in answer to the question about the success of the new concepts of the human person studied herein, it may be said that they have indeed served to bring about erosion of central core concepts and thereby have succeeded as delegitimating agents. On the basis of the material covered in this section it is not possible to say that their viewpoints have been embraced to the extent that they may be regarded as significant relegitimizing agents at this point.

However, since the transition seems to be occurring with a reasonable degree of order, and since the system possesses tremendous absorptive powers, and since the new concepts of the human person are present as viable candidates by having worked their way into the lifeways of the mass culture, they still may be regarded as prime prospects for the relegitimation of the central core along new lines.

Indeed, inklings of the new anarchism, the new hedonism, and various elements of corporatism all have been evident in the indicative material employed here. Further, the recognition of the need for transcendental perspectives as well as acknowledgment of the need to recognize claims of ecological prerequisites was present in the material surveyed. The further consideration of new concepts of the

human person as relegitimizing agents will be undertaken in the fifth and final chapter.

Meanwhile, the next section of this chapter addresses itself to the following question: What have been the "effects" (other than delegitimation per se) of the new viewpoints?

PART IV. CONCOMITANTS OF PENETRATION OF THE STATUS QUO BY NEW CONCEPTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON

"Concomitants" Versus "Cause and Effect"

The Inadequacies of the Concepts of "Cause" and "Effect"

The word "effects" as it appears here and in the previous paragraph is introduced in quotation marks. The reason may be explained thusly. Given the character of the English language, with its emphasis on subject-object and cause-effect, it is natural to raise questions about relationships in terms of "causes" and "effects." As we must seek to communicate with the language which is given to us by our culture, such allusions are virtually unavoidable.

However, the language, like the culture, is in transition. "Cause" and "effect" are metaphors abstracted from mechanical processes which in turn have served as analogies of being, i.e., terms to describe the way reality works.[1] Implicit in these terms, and in the whole matrix of linguistic metaphors and analogies which is presumed

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[1]Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 23-24.

by them, are the several biasses already noted and described elsewhere in this project, i.e., biasses which are ratiocinistic, rationalistic, atomistic, and mechanical in terms of their content.[1]

As such, these terms are inaccurate and inadequate as vehicles to convey the meanings inherent in the presuppositions germane to the perspectives underlying this treatise. The nature of this treatise is both speculative and macrocosmic. It aims at seeing things whole rather than piecemeal. Therefore, it seeks to draw unto itself a verbal coinage appropriate to the holistic nature of its subject matter. The problem is thus presented of utilizing a largely mechanistic language to communicate nonmechanistic meanings. Often this task cannot be accomplished without resort to frequent qualifications of the terms employed, while one engages in a continuing search for more appropriate verbal symbols.

The Usefulness of "Concomitants"

For this reason, and for want of a better code-word at present, the writer has elected to use the term "concomitants" in place of the mechanical metaphor "effects." This is not to disparage the value and usefulness of the concept of "effects" within certain limited contexts. Notions of "cause" and "effect" seem to lend themselves more readily and appropriately to microcosmic studies in which researchers often seek to prove that one variable works on another in a relation of

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[1]Further, see Stephen Ullmann, "The Prism of Language," The Listener, LII (July 22, 1954), 1325.

cause and effect, or at least that one variable tends to influence another, a softened version of cause and effect.[1]

Within limited contexts such relationships appear to have relevance and validity. In larger contexts the relationships become less certain and more problemmatical. Accordingly, then, in this section data or events occurring concurrently with new concepts of human personality are treated here as "concomitants" (occurring together) rather than as "effects," for a separate dissertation would be required to determine whether one variable is "causing" another.

Some Concomitants of Penetration

Against this background, then, it is possible to note several concomitants of the new concepts of human personality described in the previous chapter.

The growth of bureaucracies.--First, it is pertinent to observe that the growth of service bureaucracies, such as in education and welfare, have attended the wider distribution of new interpretations of human nature. Yet, at the same time, greater alienation and resentment seem to have occurred among the "clients" of these bureaucracies[2] Moreover, as already noted in a previous context, the dominance of the service sector has occasioned a shift in the labor force

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[1]See G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971), chap. xii.

[2]White and Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 13-15.

to create a new elite class of well-educated technocrats.[1] Concurrently, the concept of work as based on incentives of "the whip and the carrot" has become meaningless for many.[2] At the same time the growing affluence within the middle class offers alternative life-styles to persons so that neither their social status nor their economic well-being is necessarily dependent on the rewards and punishments of their employers.[3]

New life-styles tend to neutralize the positive law.--Second, as new life-styles proliferate, this fact renders both the behaviorist model of administration and the application of the positive law of the status quo, meaning its basis of legitimacy, moot.[4]

For example, whereas both the behavioral model of administration and the positive law undergirding the theoretical and practical framework of the status quo are oriented generally towards the concept of product, many technocrats now emphasize process rather than product.[5] As a result, organizations are more fluid than fixed, becoming more ad hoc than hierarchical, and elite specialists often possess

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[1] Ibid.

[2] James L. Gibson, "Organization Theory and the Nature of Man," Academy of Management Journal, IX, No. 3 (September, 1966), 233-44.

[3] White and Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 24.

[4] L. Vaughn, "Public Administration and the Challenge to Reason," in Turbulence, ed. by Waldo, pp. 188-213.

[5] McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 88-89.

greater loyalty to associations of professional peers than to the hierarchy.[1]

Moreover, for many persons, the pursuit of knowledge has replaced the pursuit of capital as the great goal. Technically, this is supported by the fact that knowledge seems to be as important as capital to the means of production, even thought it is often less manageable.[2]

Further, people too seem to be less manageable. Unheard of abundance frees many persons from the search for material gain and they are now searching for something more than just the food, clothing, commodities, and status symbols proffered by the status quo.[3]

Finally, as the behaviorist model of administration and the application of the positive law of the status quo have become less authoritative, theories and practices of anarchism have experienced a new and growing popularity.[4] It now seems "mod," "practical," and even "legitimate" (or perhaps at least pseudo-legitimate) to oppose established governing institutions with means calculated to frustrate

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[1]Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 125-26.

[2]R. Buckminster Fuller, Education Automation: Freeing the Scholar to Return to His Studies, Foreword by Charles D. Tenney. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962.

[3]Robert Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 26-27.

[4]See the Introduction in Shatz, ed., The Essential Works of Anarchism.

their functioning, as if bringing a festering boil to a head.[1] It is as if the youthful protests of the 1960s drove "big government" to untenable extremes in the early 1970s to produce "Watergate" in America and similar excesses in other lands. The point seems to be to use big government's own weight against itself and to bring it toppling down as a result of its own excesses.[2]

The absorption process by the status quo tends to break down.--Third, the established procedure for assuring social cohesion, namely, the absorption of all viewpoints into the system via political participation, and their simultaneous subordination to the twin goals of productivity and consumerism, begins to break down.[3]

That is, the spread of anarchism of many types prevents absorption. This is associated with lack of vestiture in the society's goals. The value outputs of the bureaucracies are rejected.

In addition, whereas once the central government was a balancing wheel for competing economic interests, and a means, when necessary, of suppressing competition, now an increasing number of super-corporations are on government "welfare" through subsidies and contracts. Yet the taxable base is shrinking, which prompts the

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[1]Neville, Play Power.

[2]White and Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 20.

[3]Lasch, "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," pp. 44-48.

contradiction of the affluence of the private sector as against the poverty of the public sector.[1]

Still, as evidenced through the student protests against Dow Chemical Company, a new social consciousness leads to nonacceptance of the strictly private status of any business organization affecting public purposes.[2] Concurrently the social costs of private wealth come to light. More and more people join the ranks of the alienated. It is perceived, for example, that satisfaction of both producer and consumer depends on the creation and satisfaction of false needs.[3]

In connection with these developments, broader political participation as an absorption device is nullified by increasing resort, by a broader range of groups, to irregular and extra-legal means of protest and direct action based on sophisticated knowledge of social costs.[4]

Rudiments of a new culture or several new cultures appear.--Fourth, the rudiments of a new culture, or of several new cultures, can be said to be manifest.[5]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 41-42.

[2]Christian Bay, "Academic Government and Academic Citizenship in a Time of Revolt," in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Edgar Litt (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 81.

[3]Lasch, "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," pp. 41-42.

[4]Bay, "Academic Government," in The New Politics of American Policy, ed. by Litt, p. 81.

[5]White and Sjoberg, "New Politics," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State, ed. by Hancock and Sjoberg, pp. 21-31.

The dislocations which are anathema to established bureaucrats, and which cause them compulsively to reaffirm old world views, may and often do serve as fruitful material out of which artists can create new combinations, new images, and new concepts for human orientation and meaning.[1]

The individualized features of private life and local societies, which are the bedrock of the political culture which gives firm or tacit support to the established regimes,--these features are affected and destroyed by ever-growing geographic and social mobility, by mass diffusion of information, and by broader political participation than ever before. This fact underscores the increasingly complex but corporate character of society and culture, of life and nature, as opposed to traditional individualistic concepts.[2]

Furthermore, as the rudiments of new cultures appear, the advent of multi-national corporations introduces super-governments which transcend the laws of any single nation and establishes activities and loyalties which render concepts of "nationalism" somewhat moot.[3]

Accordingly, greater segments of the population are infused with a global awareness as opposed to a strictly provincial view.[4]

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, p. 12.

[2]Ibid., pp. 82-85.

[3]Elisabeth Mann Borgese, "The World Communities," The Center Magazine, IV, No. 5 (September/October, 1971), 10-18.

[4]R. Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1969).

Such global awareness, especially prevalent both among technocrats as well as among the younger generation, may often be accompanied by characteristics of "tribalism" which emphasizes corporateness and personalism rather than strict rationality, atomistic individuality, and objectivity, i.e., secularism.[1]

A Summary of the Concomitants of Penetration

In summary, then, these are the concomitants of the penetration of the status quo by new concepts: the growth of service bureaucracies and the accompanying alienation and resentment among the clients of such bureaucracies; the proliferation of new life-styles which fact renders moot the legitimacy of the positive law of the status quo; the breakdown of the absorption of all viewpoints into the system; and the appearance of the rudiments of a new culture, or several new cultures.

The Concomitants of Penetration and Corroboration of the Estimates of Penetration

Using the Universe-of-Discourse and the Frames-of-Reference

It may have occurred to the reader that, in terms of the universe-of-discourse and frames-of-reference illustrated in Figure 1, the preceding discussion may be thought of conveniently in terms of the "G" relationships. The "G" frame-of-reference represents the

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 188-89.

transactions between the "E" complex (the change agent complex) and the "F" complex (all social institutions, especially in their political aspects).

The "G" Relationships and the Rate of Turnover of Traditions

It may be recalled that "G^1" represents the "effect" of the theoretical changes, or ideational turnover, within the belief system of the status quo upon the institutional structures within the culture. Similarly, the "G^3" relation represents the influence which changes within, or actions by, the institutional complex have upon the belief system. And finally, the "G^2" relationship stands for the "trade-offs" mutually exchanged between the belief system and the institutional complex.

It should be recalled also that both "G^1" and "G^3" tend to possess a unilateral character, such as when conscious affirmation of theory leads to conscious changes exerted upon institutions, or when administrative outputs of institutions require changes in theories or beliefs. The "G^2" relation, however, is more holistic. It represents the recognition of, or consent to, theories and institutions changing together as a single organ or unit within the social contextual whole.

The connection between the "G" complex within the conceptual model and the discussion just completed is mentioned here not only to illustrate how the universe-of-discourse and frames-of-reference continue to underlie the ongoing discussion, but to provide a framework in which one of the questions raised in this chapter can be answered.

The question was raised earlier, do the concomitants, or to use the more familiar but less adequate term, do the "effects" appear to corroborate the "useful estimate" made of the extent to which concepts of human nature have shifted?

The "E" Complex and the Rate of Turnover of Traditions

To prelude an answer, it will be recalled that a conservative estimate of 3 percent turnover per year in the ideas of the status quo probably occurs. This means that the "E^2" circle in Figure 1 is encroaching upon the "E^1" circle by about 3 percent annually. As a result, this encroachment would cause the "E^3" area of "overlap" to become increasingly larger. If such a process were to continue, eventually "E^2" theoretically would "overlay" "E^1" completely, making only one circle.

Yet, in this case the one remaining circle probably should be labelled "E^3" instead of either "E^1" or "E^2," since the resulting circle undoubtedly would be a composite of the subject matter of both "E^1" and "E^2."

Another possibility is that the remnants of "E^1" might "break off" and become absorbed back into the lifeways of the general culture, or "E," and continue to subsist as one of many subcultures.

The "F" Frame-of-Reference and Other Complexities

Yet other complexities must be introduced. It is reasonable to assume that as "E^2" encroaches upon "E^1" it will itself change in

the process. That is, influences from the total lifeways, "E," will make incursions upon "E^2" as it moves further into "E^1" (and creates a larger area in "E^3").

Further, the movements within this process (which, incidentally, conceivably could be reversed, e.g., through repressive political reaction by the status quo, and originating either in "E^1" or in "F^1")--the movements within this process could be fueled or retarded by means of any or all of the "G" relationships with the social institutions of the culture ("F"). That is, unilateral influences by "E" on "F" could set in motion forces which in turn cause "F" to react unilaterially on "E" by means of the "G^3" relationship. Or vice versa. Or "E" and "F" could change together synergically and thereby alter both the rate and the volume of change occuring in "E^1."

This conceptual analysis by means of the model in Figure 1 hopefully illustrates the numerous variables which may act "upon" or "with" any aspect within the universe-of-discourse which is to be measured. Also, it is intended that this analysis might further illustrate a holistic approach to the problems at hand. The point to be emphasized is that the whole system works together and each part affects every other part.

An Upward Revision of the Rate of Turnover

As applied to the immediately preceding discussion, the particular aspect to be measured within the universe-of-discourse was the rate of change taking place within the status quo, or "E^1."

Specifically, did the "effects," or more desirably, did the "concomitants" in the practical and structural sphere ("F") corroborate the estimate of 3 percent change per year which was said conservatively to occur within the belief system of the status quo ("E^1")?

In answer, now that the context has been described in which any estimated rate must be measured, and since a more comprehensive grasp of the complexities involved has now been given, it is the writer's belief that no numerical rate, or percentage, is likely to remain steady. It also appears that, given the list of "concomitants" enumerated in the previous discussion, either one of two things appears to be happening. Since, for example, the absorption device seems to be breaking down, and since the more bureaucracies grow the more they alienate their clients, and since new life-styles serve to render the legitimacy of the society's positive law moot, <u>either</u> "E^1" is presently changing at a rate faster than 3 percent annually <u>or</u> the <u>total sphere</u> of "E^1," i.e., <u>the size of the circle</u> as it were, is becoming rapidly smaller and giving way more to the encroachment of "E^2" and "E^3." The reason for this judgment is the fact that the concomitants just named appear to the writer to be occurring and increasing at a rate more rapidly than "3 percent" (although any such numerical evaluation is, to be sure, problemmatical without definitive parameters). Perhaps a rate of 6 percent is more accurate.

Prospects for Further Success

To be sure, even given the analysis by means of the conceptual model in Figure 1, this is still speculation.

But the difference is that it is no longer pure speculation. The value of the model is that it has served to make conscious some of the many factors that must be taken into consideration and it has set them into a comprehensive framework. Thus, with this tool in hand, when one ventures to make "guess-timates" he need not do so in a vacuum any longer on the one hand, nor artifically construct a more micro-cosmic analysis wrenched out of context from the meanings of the social contextual whole simply in order to arrive at a reliable "number" or "percentage," on the other hand. Conceptually, at least, one may hold the problem in mind "kept whole," or "comprehensively," as Fuller would say.

The final question to be answered in this chapter may be answered briefly and succinctly. This question is, what appear to be the prospects for further success, if any, of the new concepts of human personality associated with accelerative thrust?

This is construed to refer to the continued success of the delegitimating impact. Based upon the previous anlaysis, in which the rate of 3 percent delegitimation annually seems to be too low, and that this rate seems to have increased over prior portions of the 30-year span since 1945, the answer is that the prospects for the success of further delegitimation appears to be quite high.

It is time now to turn attention to the new concepts of the human person, not merely as a delegitimating force, but as a resource for relegitimation of authority by which the culture may continue to function viably. In essence, Chapter V will explore the constructive aspects of new interpretations of human nature and will also serve as a summary of the work undertaken in this treatise.

CHAPTER V

NEW CONCEPTS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY AS A RELEGITIMIZING FORCE: THE PROMISE, THE LIMITS, AND THE PROSPECTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION: REVIEW OF CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND EMPHASES IN THIS STUDY

Culture, Language, and Metaphysics

It has been the assumption within this total narrative that the philosophical systems which lie at the foundation of a given political system are never actually "disproved" as such. Rather such systems cease to receive adherence whenever they are widely perceived as no longer relevant to the needs of those who govern and (in a democratic society) of those who are governed.

Further, it has been assumed that a valid way to ascertain the nature of the perceptions of both the governors and the governed is to focus on the key figures in their speech, or language (significant figures of speech), around which their thoughts revolve. The writer has not been greatly concerned with the validity or invalidity of particular arguments represented in differing styles of language. Rather, he has been more concerned with the figures of speech themselves as an index to conceptual ways of perceiving. Each era of

thought has its own canons by which it judges what is valid, and these rubrics of logic may differ from system to system.

The writer has assumed further that the important configurations of speech as are expressed in any culture (or subculture) are strong indications of the metaphysical presuppositions, consciously or unwittingly held, that underlie the assertions about man, knowledge, world, society, and government, i.e., that the very nature of language is based upon metaphysical presumptions.

In this vein, the nature of language is conceived to be analogical in character. That is, certain significant (to the speaker or speaker's culture) patterns of experience come to be clustered together due to the presumed likenesses, and persons then speak of them by means of key symbols or figures of speech and proceed to "perceive" reality in terms of such analogical symbols.

Thus, for example, Dante was able to argue in terms of the extensively accepted analogy of the feudal-patriarchal Father-Son relationship, to the effect that there should be a political unity of the world under the Emperor because man is the child of heaven, and that therefore his proper form of political organization can be deduced from the order of heaven. Such an argument today might elicit tolerant smiles. But in Dante's day it was appropriate to his cultural milieu and was widely regarded as extremely logical and valid.[1]

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[1]Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

As Emmet maintains, there appear to be two ways in which metaphysical theories may be analogies. As analogies of being they seek to say something about "reality" transcending experience, but do so in terms of relations found within experience. As coordinating analogies they seek to relate diverse types of experience by extension of a key idea derived from some predominant intellectual or spiritual (affective) relation.[1]

Scientific Models and Metaphysical Models[2]

Such ideas share something of the character of scientific models. But whereas scientific models suggest possible patterns for

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[1] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[2] Ibid. Emmet's discussion on the relation between scientific and metaphysical models and the relation of both to language makes use of Ernst Cassirer's distinction of three stages in the development of thought. The first is the mimetic stage, in which words and other symbols are looked on as duplicates of things; the second is the analogical state; and the third is the symbolic stage, where we recognize that there is no "natural" meaning of symbols, but the meaning depends entirely on the ways in which they can be brought into intelligible relations with other symbols in a structural form. For Cassirer the first stage is "mythological" and the third "scientific," in which one no longer thinks of "things" as really existing. Thus, he is an idealist. Emmet, however, consciously retains elements of "mythology" in her approach, believing that there is actually some basis for believing there are still "things." Emmet's work has been most helpful to the present writer in clarifying his thought. See pp. 85-88 in Emmet. However, the present writer takes a position somewhere between Cassirer and Emmet. Reality is not composed of "separate entities." Nor are "things" merely ideational. Rather, reality is a force field of energetically-charged consciousness. Man's perceptions, as a part of that energy-thought field, represent a particular spectrum of consciousness in which "things" are abstracted out of the force field in terms of the transactions between his own mode of consciousness and the larger field itself. Thus, there is a phenomenological continuity between himself and the stream of energy-consciousness of which he is a part. The point emerges again in Part IV of this chapter.

the coordination of data of a homogeneous type, the metaphysical model has to suggest a possible pattern of coordination between data of different types. A metaphysician has therefore to be sensitive to the diversities within experience, and also to possible modes of relationship.

Moreover, whereas in the case of the scientific model the data to be coordinated are whatever relevant conclusions from observations may be available at the time in the work of the science in question, for the metaphysical model the data themselves must be extracted out of the whole manifold of experience by means of discriminatory judgments of what is important.

Some such selection is involved in making judgments about historical events. But in the case of metaphysical models it becomes still a more dominant factor. For the latter are "compositions" which attempt to coordinate a wide range of diverse types of experience in terms of certain key ideas. If the judgment from which such an idea derives has been happy in achieving some intuitive grasp of what is really significant in the thought of the time, the metaphysical model will commend itself to civilized thought as self-evident. "Of course," one may say, when the idea is then pointed out.

Moreover, such an idea will be one which exercises a creative influence over the intellectual imagination of the age. Yet, the ideas which make sense in one age, in illuminating and coordinating its intellectual experience, do not necessarily make sense in the same way in another. Therefore, there is likely to be a shift in the

philosophical analogies which will commend themselves as self-evident in different periods of thought.

Again, a philosophical system is not disproved; rather, it is abandoned when it ceases to be relevant. This point has had the most direct significance for the process of political delegitimation. When the prevailing symbols and figures of speech which coordinate the diverse experiences in a culture begin to lose their power to coordinate or to convince, then the loss of authority of the values and institutions which are built upon the theories which rely upon those terms cannot be far behind.

Similarly, when political values and institutions begin to lose their authoritativeness, new language surely will be required and is likely to emerge to legitimate whatever enters as a replacement. Chapter III was devoted to a presentation and analysis of some characteristically significant new metaphors which are currently being offered as prospective coordinating analogies for the interpretation of the world into which the accelerative thrust of transience seems to be ushering the human race.

When given symbols regarded as indices of new thought patterns begin to appear in the documentary outputs of the administrative and governmental elites, then according to the present line of thought, the final stages of "progressive" (or "evolutionary") delegitimation will have begun. Revolutionary delegitimation, of course, is also possible, such as the violent overthrow of Allende in Chile by a military junta. But in such a case enduring foundations of legitimacy

will exist, it is held, only if the culture itself is predominantly in harmony with and in support of the perspectives of the ruling regime. Otherwise continuing turmoil and restlessness that rise above the threshold of manageability will be a constant concomitant of government and politics, and legitimacy could only then be simulated by virtue of the monopoly of violence exercised by those in power. I.e., the prevailing political culture no longer would serve as a significant supporting resource, but would serve rather as a positive threat.

Seeing Delegitimation as a Whole Process

The preceding chapters should have served to illustrate that a process of delegitimation of political institutions in contemporary western civilization has been taking place for some time and has been gaining momentum of late. In this endeavor, the aim of this project has been to look at the process of delegitimation as a whole, in all its complexities, and to pursue a line of thought the value of which is that it can be conceived as being critically related to all the other facets of the process. To borrow a medical figure, it is more like examining the patient, not as a system of individual organs which just happen to be related in the same body, but to see the patient as a total organism whose lesser parts are subsumed within, and respond as a part of, the whole body.

A Proper Study for Philosophical Speculation

Such an aim is more properly the object of study of philosophical speculation than of quantitative or statistical analysis, for

it concerns itself as much or more with meanings than with mere description in that it searches for the sources of a culture's norms. Further, it has always been a primary function of philosophy to enlarge the possibilities of communication and relationship between diverse worlds of experience. This cannot be done, it is held, except in extremely limited fashion by programs of micro-analysis. For the present task macro-analysis was required, a form of analysis which necessarily reaches into the domain of speculative philosophy.

The Critical Task

As just indicated, a strategic and critical task in the formulation of this project has been to define and isolate some particular line of thought which could serve as the coordinating key, which, by its very nature, may be conceived as being critically related to all the other (almost limitless) facets of the delegitimation process, so that, by ascertaining significant changes in that one central coordinating facet, one could reasonably infer that characteristic changes are occurring throughout the whole process, including various minute and isolable occurrences, any of which might well serve also as the subjects for studies in micro-analysis.

The search for such a coordinating element resulted in the decision to focus on the interpretation of human nature. This in turn set in motion the quest for a method by which changes in the concepts of human nature could be ascertained and compared. Ultimately the sojourn led to concentration of attention upon the nature of language

itself--the very language by which theories about the human reality and the consequent views on legitimate authority are both conveyed and rationalized.

Delegitimation, Concepts of Human Nature, and Language: Three Facets of the Same Investigation

Indeed, it seemed particularly apt that the study of (1) the delegitimation of institutions in their political aspects, (2) the consideration of currently developing concepts of human nature, and (3) the reconsideration of the nature of language, should come together as three facets of the same investigation, for it appears increasingly to be the case that we no longer live in a common civilization with a common language. The demise of what is familiar in all three areas--our institutions, our thoughts about man, and the language we employ--appears to be taking place as part of a singly blended social and historical process. One gets the overwhelming impression that they are all inextricably related in the process of delegitimation itself.

The Rudiments of a New Culture Are Apparent

In the midst of the demise of the familiar, the rudiments of a new culture (or cultures) do seem to be apparent. The language is changing--as are other forms of social and political behavior. These facts were evidenced in the chapters preceding. Thus, the new concepts of human personality studied herein, and the new configurations of language which bear them, do seem to present themselves as

resources for the relegitimation of authority in western culture. Yet, as such resources, these developing viewpoints also possess certain limits. Consequently, in the pages that follow attention will be given, not only to the promise, but also to the limits of new concepts of human personality as a relegitimizing force.

PART II. THE LIMITS OF THE NEW CONCEPTS AS A RELEGITIMIZING AGENT

Agents of Legitimation Must Provide for Common Human Ends

By definition a culture must provide common human ends which are regarded as legitimate by the society at large. The question arises, in addition to performing a delegitimating function, can the new concepts of human personality also perform a legitimizing function to provide common human ends for the society? Certain limits appear to be manifest. Some of these are as follows.

Limitations of the New Concepts

The Rise of New Concepts Is Integrally Associated with the GNP

Many new concepts have developed concurrently with the affluence made possible by a growing gross national product (or, as Fuller would see it, a growing gross world product). The continued development and flourishing of these concepts may largely depend on the continued expansion of such gross product. Yet, a potential dilemma is implicit. The cohesiveness required for a productive system to remain

productive surely implies some degree of acceptance of the presuppositions of that system. Will changing viewpoints about the nature of man undercut the belief system which validates the goals of such production? If so, will the new concepts which seem to have arisen in connection with such production also be attenuated if such productivity subsides?

Some beliefs that are affected.--Some of the innovative affirmations about human nature and destiny which could be affected thereby are these.

Mankind's growing affluence, especially in technologically developed areas, has made it possible for humans to be motivated by something besides the individualistic and subjectively based search for food, clothing, shelter, sex, security, power, and status. Human beings begin to drive toward self-actualization as unselfish persons as soon as their basic needs are satisfied.[1]

Soon, especially in countries such as the United States, it will be possible for everyone to be fed whether they work or not. Therefore, persons can devote themselves more to knowledge for the sake of knowledge, or pleasure for the sake of pleasure.

As all people receive the necessities of life, competition, hostility, and wars will cease. Self-actualizing people are so sure of themselves that they do not need to hurt other human beings (or

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[1]This and subsequent beliefs listed in this subsection have been widely distributed in the psychology of Abraham Maslow, in the human potential movement, and through the encounter group movement.

other living things) in order to prove to themselves and to others that they exist or possess power.

Some limiting realities of the GNP.--Certain realities can be cited which appear to be against the inevitable victory of the conceptual vignettes just mentioned.

First, the specter of world famine still hangs over the earth. Further, other supplies of natural resources besides food already are shrinking drastically. In a little more than 100 years of industrialization the United States itself has arrived at the point where it will see the end of high-grade raw materials. U.S. steel mills, for example, are supplied in large part with materials that twenty years ago wouldn't have been counted as ore, according to one observer.[1] In the 1920s, copper mines weren't worked unless they had 5 to 30 percent copper. Today a mine appears attractive with only .5 percent copper.

Further, according to one noted geobiologist, of the 20 minerals most commonly used in industrialized nations, only 11 will still be available in the world by the turn of the century.[2]

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[1]Ronald Kotulak, writer for the Knight News Service, "The Lifeboat Epic: U.S. Imports Growing," San Antonio Light, May 2, 1974, p. 6-A.

[2]Ibid. Dr. Preston Cloud, the University of California geobiologist who headed the National Academy of Science's study on the national materials policy.

By the year 2042, perhaps only eight of the 20 commodities will be available in the world, and only three for the United States (molybdenum, perhaps iron, and coal).[1]

Even if undiscovered reserves of petroleum and iron were to be five times as great as the extent of present usage, this fact would make little appreciable difference if the population continues growing at the present rate. The world's iron resources could last 200 years at the present rate of consumption. However, granted the population growth and the increased demand for iron, reserves will endure only 93 years. Supposing there is five times the known reserves, granted the increasing population, the iron would last only 173 years.[2]

Similarly, but more critically, the world's known petroleum reserves will last 31 years at the 1973 rate of consumption. Yet, at the 1974 rate, they will last only 20 years. Five times the known reserves would last but 50 years, given the present rate of growth.[3]

"What this means is that America, the most affluent, luxurious and materialistic society ever known, may be the last good-time society," says Kotulak. Further, according to the National Academy of Science,

> The American lifestyle, insofar as it depends upon materials, is changing and will continue to change in the near future as the nation pays the deferred social costs of past consumption and inequities in distribution and begins to calculate the costs of

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

depletion, replacement of nonrenewable resources, and environmental restoration and protection.[1]

After studying the ominous prospects, the Academy's National Commission on Materials Policy said America must reexamine these commonly held beliefs:

1. That natural resources can be used in whatever amounts are needed to meet public demand.

2. That increased production and consumption are measures of progress and the well-being of society.

3. That this "cannibalistic growth" should continue.[2]

Other testimony is added. The director of the Institute of Geological Sciences of Great Britain[3] says the world faces the prospect of mass death through famine and pollution within a few decades unless population and economic growth are somehow limited.

A gloomy picture is also painted by scientists from six other nations. They used a computer in a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to figure the relationships among population increase, agricultural production, natural resources depletion, industrial output, and pollution generation. At the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid. Dr. Kingsley Dunham is regarded as one of the world's top authorities on ore deposits.

present rates of economic and population growth, the scientists concluded, "the world will collapse around the year 2100."[1]

Thus, any vision of unending progress or the achievement of the fulfillment of the needs of all people, as those needs and the fulfillment of them is understood by immediate past experience, seems inept and erroneous. This observation constitutes a limitation on many of the new concepts of the human person which are in vogue.

Yet, these same limitations also bode ill for the continuation of the familiar status quo viewpoint. Many of the facts just cited concerning the dire predictions of the world's available natural resources seem to contradict the appropriateness of the five major conclusions which have been employed as representative of the belief system of the status quo.

Further, many of these dire predictions are the same ones given wide current distribution by means of various new concepts of the human person. As Theobald says,

> The priorities of this country are completely out of whack. The generally accepted goals of our society appear to be technological wizardry, economic efficiency and the developed individual in the good society--but in that order.
>
> We have a socioeconomic system which forces the dehumanization of man. I believe that our first task, therefore, is to begin the restructuring of the socioeconomic system to create a human order.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Robert Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1968), p. xix.

Further, the admonitions of corporatists such as Fuller, who advocate the necessity to make radical shifts in technology to the end of accomplishing more with less, i.e., housing and feeding more people with technology that requires less bulk and tonnage, and of substituting solar power for fossil fuels, becomes relevant at the point of the impossibility of continued productivity as it is based on existing methods.[1]

The proposals of visionaries such as Soleri also become more interesting, to the effect that persons arrange to live in compact cities linked together by communications and rapid transit rather than urban sprawl and automobiles, and thereby reduce the expenditures of energy and time by more than 90 percent in order to accomplish the same results of survival and to increase geometrically the results of intellectual, emotional, and spiritual enrichment.[2]

Nevertheless, the limitation posed by the improbability of continued growth of affluence through the reliance of the culture on fossil fuels and other familiar natural resources is most real. Any sort of continued progress seems bound to entail shifts in the values and means of production of the society. Such shifts promise to be so radical that the inevitable delegitimation of existing views seems assured.

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[1]R. Buckminster Fuller, Education Automation: Freeing the Scholar to Return to His Studies. Foreword by Charles D. Tenney. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962).

[2]Paulo Soleri, The City in the Image of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969).

Dependence on the Technology and Bureaucracies of the Status Quo

Another limitation on the proffered new concepts of human personality is worth mentioning. As a corollary to the first limitation, dependence on the status quo's technology and bureaucracy also is implied.

That is, autonomy and independence from the "system" are easily proclaimed in rhetoric, but virtually impossible to achieve on a wide scale. The giant bureaucracies are the major repositories of the expertise and technology that have made both the affluence and its widespread distribution possible.

As Asimov points out, no fundamental technological advance has ever been given up willingly by any society, for "there has been no way to do it." This has been true of the past and, it is held, it is more than ever true today. Nowadays, the earth's population is pushing four billion, more than four times the population in 1800. "Where does the food come from that is needed to support the extra three billion?" asks Asimov. "It comes from the industrialization of the farm; from the use of high-energy machinery to plow and seed and harrow and weed and reap and bind and everything else." It comes from "the chemical fertilizers and chemical insecticides produced by sophisticated high-energy chemical factories." We can't abandon industrialization, "if only because our food supply depends on it."[1] Thus,

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[1]Isaac Asimov, "Where Will We Be by the Year 2,000?" San Antonio Express-News, Jan. 5, 1975, p. 3-H.

> . . . you can talk about "natural food" all you want, but if everyone decided to grow food without chemical fertilizers or insecticides or machinery, it would mean that only one-quarter of the earth's population could be fed and the other three-quarters would have to die.[1]

Moreover, holds Asimov, "We can't abandon some of our technology and hold on to the rest. It all hangs together." Asimov advocates, rather, that major scientific and world governmental changes be undertaken in order to cope with the growing population problem.[2]

The Heterogeneity and Fragmentation Among the New Concepts

A third limitation is apparent in the fact that the various new concepts of human personality are neither homogeneous nor monolithic in character. They are somewhat fragmented and largely contradictory of one another.

The new anarchists, for example, not only assert the primacy and completeness of the single human individual as the unit of reference by which all arrangements, whether social, political, or economic, should be made. They also are decidedly both anti-intellectual and anti-political.

By contrast, both the objectivists and the corporatists affirm the interdependence of man not only with other men, but also with his technologies as well as with nature writ large. The objectivists would bring about the necessary changes by manipulating the physical

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

environment, whereas the corporatists affirm the need to recognize the existence of a higher or natural law of some sort which serves as a guide for such changes, and in which the intellect of man must play an essential part.

Since many of the new views are either nonpolitical or anti-political, this fact could serve to limit serious participation in the decision-making centers of power which could determine lasting change.

As indicated earlier, a culture must possess a relatively homogenous set of values which somehow provide incentives to the culture's members not only to support the central core, but to participate in the generation or conveyance of those values. In order to serve as a resource for the relegitimation of values and authority within the society, the prospective new views must somehow contribute to metaphysical, epistemological, and anthropological models which can coordinate the vast array of diversity within the culture's experience and to provide key analogies which give meaning to that collective experience.

The question arises, given the limitations just discussed, can the new concepts of human personality considered herein nevertheless serve as positive resources for relegitimation, or is their function confined only to the role of delegitimation?

PART III. THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL OF THE NEW CONCEPTS AS A RESOURCE FOR RELEGITIMATION

In answer, the writer submits that, in spite of the serious limitations discussed, the new concepts of human personality exhibit

many vital signs of continued development and may be regarded as a significant aspect of cultural change which can result in new definitions of common human ends and new legitimation.

New Concepts Already Have Modified the System

In the first place, as indicated elsewhere in this treatise, the new views, while dependent on the economic and technological system which produces the gross national product, can and are modifying the existing structure and values while engaging in the process of using them. This fact has been incidentally conveyed in the consideration of the limitations themselves just discussed. The status quo itself, in order to survive, must continue to change.

This fact is graphically illustrated in a style of advertising that is becoming increasingly prominent in the public relations outputs of major national and trans-national corporations. It is a style that recognizes the necessity of change for the sake, not only of survival, but of responsiveness to the demand for and articulation of common human ends. A typical example is one of a series of advertisements initiated by the Mobil Oil Company. It appeared recently in newspapers throughout the United States and carried the bold headline, "Capitalism: Moving Target." Following is part of the text of the advertisement, which illustrates responsiveness to the twin themes of "needed change" and "common human ends."

> The list of things wrong with business in this country is almost endless. Nearly as long, in fact, as the list of what's right with it.

> Perhaps the most frustrating thing about business, for those who keep trying to shoot it down, is this: Corporations are so tenacious that they will even do good in order to survive. This tenacity goes beyond the old maxim that man, in his greed for profit, often unavoidably serves the public interest. In times of crisis, business will even do good consciously and deliberately. Nothing could be better calculated to confound business's critics than this underhanded tactic. The Marxist dialectic has it that capitalism must inevitably founder in its own inherent contradictions; that it contains the seeds of its own destruction. But business also contains the seeds of its own adaptation and survival.
>
> Businessmen are pragmatists, and with their daily feedback from the marketplace, they readily abandon dogma whenever their survival instinct tells them to. It has become less and less a question of what they want to do or might like to do, but of what their common sense and survival instinct tell them they have to do.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> While businessmen as a whole are not exactly social reformers, they do respond to criticism and to sustained social pressures. The alert businessman regards such pressures as a useful early warning system. The danger is that criticism can become a mindless reflex action that persists long after the basis for it has been dissipated.
>
> Partly because of its ability to adapt--which is simply another word for responsive change--private business remains the most productive element in our society and on balance the best allocator of resources. If you decide to draw a bead on it, remember you're aiming at a moving target. Because, as we've said here before, business is bound to change.[1]

The absorptive qualities of the business establishment are cryptically expressed in this statement. The essentially capitalistic philosophy also is revealed and it is not anticipated by the author of the advertisement that that basic predilection shall change. Yet, when absorption takes place, who is to say where change shall lead or where it shall stop? The significant factor in this statement is the blatant recognition of the inevitability of change itself.

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[1]"Capitalism: Moving Target," a Mobil advertisement, San Antonio Express, Sept. 5, 1974, p. 19-A.

Modern Technology Is Self-Transforming: It Breeds New Concepts

Not only is the status quo changing. Modern technology itself is self-transforming. It is perhaps the greatest of all catalysts of change. Technology is the result of the quest for change and is consistent with the Faustian spirit inherent within western philosophy and culture, i.e., that there is no problem which man cannot solve, no existing condition that will not yield to his will, if he is determined about it.

As Callahan points out, using biological research as his frame of reference, western culture has been committed to the multiplication of technological improvements for their own sake without raising questions of principle.

> . . . In the instance of medicine and biology the problems are compounded. By and large, biomedical advances have relieved man's estate and added to his knowledge. Our culture has lived comfortably with the belief that the future would only bring more of the same--better health, longer life. The culture sustaining this belief was comforting and coherent. People could content themselves with being good journeymen in carrying on the splendid fight against illness, disease, and death, thrilling to each new scientific discovery. Ultimate questions did not have to be asked every day. They had once been asked, and answered; what remained was the less anxiety-producing business of carrying out the details of the new gospel of unlimited technological progress, by now sunk deep into the unwitting part (of their culture).[1]

White makes a similar observation, but applies the idea that westerners pursue change for its own sake, regardless of the principles involved, to all of western science and technology, with its

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[1]Daniel Callahan, "Living with the New Biology: The Search for an Ethic," The Center Magazine, V, No. 4 (July/August), 1972), p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as "Living with the New Biology.")

disastrous effects on the ecology of man, indeed, of all the earth. He affirms that "somewhat over a century ago science and technology--hitherto quite separate activities--joined to give mankind powers which to judge by many of the ecologic effects are out of control. . . ."[1]

Thus, the very tenets of the status quo and its need for an expanding gross national product have themselves fueled the processes of change that make the shifting of the status quo system of values inevitable. The point is elucidated and documented by Toffler that the central core values of western society are themselves responsible for producing "future shock." "Technology feeds on itself," he says, "and makes more technology possible."[2]

Through historical comparisons and recent studies on the subject Toffler has shown how the lapse time between the conception of an idea and its implementation has been cut drastically. He points out how the time interval between implementation and widespread acceptance and distribution throughout society has been reduced even more drastically, so well has the establishment done its job of training consumers to consume to maximum capacity.[3]

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[1]Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," in The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man, ed. by Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 349.

[2]Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1970), p. 29.

[3]Ibid., pp. 26-69.

Somewhere, then, between the growing deprivation of the world's increasing total population and the overconsumption of the technologically developed nations, there may be some opportunity for a balance. Indeed, one of the new concepts of the human person, that of Fuller and his followers who see the intellectual intuitions of man as comprehensively and synergically capable, envisions the human race as accomplishing increasingly more with increasingly less, due to the multiplication of technology and its tendency to pay for itself economically and physically out of the applied increments of increased applied knowledge.

Modern Technology Casts New Light on Man's Perceptions of His Own Nature

This latter possibility is closely related to a third vital sign exhibited by new concepts of the human person as a prospective relegitimizing force for an authoritative central core of beliefs in western culture. It is through the marvels of modern technology that new human potentials have been released, which, in turn, cast new light on man's perceptions of his own nature.

As Callahan maintains, the gospel of social progress as unlimited growth and as measured by virtually any standard as long as it expands the gross national product, has run into trouble, "beset by a plethora of undesired medical, ecological, behavioral, and demographic results." Further, the net result of these crosscurrents

> . . . has been to jar loose from their subterranean moorings those "reasons" for going forward which had sunk out of sight. They are floating to the surface and being inspected. That event in itself

> signals the dissolution of a culture. The question is how great the dissolution will be, and the extent to which a new culture will take its place.[1]

Thus, the claim made here for the viability of the new concepts of the human person lie in the fact that the dissolving culture finds itself in a market for "new reasons," i.e., new interpretations of what it means to be human.

Yet, seeing the way to such new interpretations does not come easily for most. Consequently, the task seems to be left to those who are temperamentally and intellectually suited for it. As McLuhan and his colleagues have been quoted as observing,

> . . . the artist is the only person who does not shrink from this challenge. He exults in the novelties of perception afforded by innovation. The pain that the ordinary person feels in perceiving the confusion is charged with thrills for the artist in the discovery of new boundaries and territories for the human spirit. He glories in the invention of new identities, corporate and private, that for the political and educational establishments, as for domestic life, bring anarchy and despair.[2]

The point is corroborated in the speculations of Toffler who affirms that the novel environments to which man will be exposed "will, of necessity, bring with them altered perceptions, new sensations, new sensitivities to color and form, new ways of thinking and feeling."[3]

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[1]Callahan, "Living with the New Biology," p. 5.

[2]Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 12. (Hereinafter referred to as War and Peace.)

[3]Toffler, Future Shock, pp. 190-91.

Indeed, "along with a new vocabulary will come new symbols in poetry, painting, film and the other arts."[1]

That a new and better view of the nature of man is needed amounts to a gathering cry coming from many quarters. McHarg puts the case succinctly.

> . . . [F]or all of modern science it is still pre-Copernican man whom we confront. He retains the same implicit view of exclusive divinity, man apart from nature, dominant, exhorted to subdue the earth--be he Jew, Christian or agnostic.
>
> Yet surely this is an ancient deformity, an old bile of vengeance that we can no longer tolerate. This view neither approximates reality nor does it help us towards our objectives of survival and evolution. One longs for a world psychiatrist who could assure the patient that expressions of his cultural inferiority are no longer necessary or appropriate. Man is now emancipated, he can stand erect among the creatures. His ancient vengeance, a product of his resentment at an earlier insignificance, is obsolete.[2]

Hugh Downs augments the same cry with other dimensions implied.

> Man's rational mind was so necessary and so sudden, in terms of evolution's pace, and so welcome and so dazzling, that it overshadowed much of the reflective consciousness which emerged at the same time. This, I believe, is why we became separated from the intuitive side of our life, why we are confused, why we have brought animal ego with us into human existence, why we are still competing inappropriately, and why we compulsively continue with our outmoded survival techniques.[3]

Since these particular mechanisms are no longer required, says Downs, we now have a chance to heal the breach and become the "new man." The leaves are already "stirring with this wind." Such

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[1] Ibid., p. 187.

[2] Ian McHarg, Design with Nature (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1969), p. 26.

[3] Hugh Downs, "Is There a New Man?" The Center Magazine, IV, No. 6 (November/December, 1971), 18-19.

stirrings include "western examination of some ancient and newly promising Oriental systems of thought"; experiments in the "voluntary control of involuntary processes . . .";[1] psychedelic excursions into "altered and expanded states of consciousness"; genetic engineering studies; gut-feeling movements such as the Jesus freaks, "the already sect-fissioning Yoga, Buddhist, Zoroastrian, Zen, and Universal Life groups"; the communes; the various "liberation, power and escape movements exploding into the world. . . ."[2]

"Some kind of new man is in the wings," says Downs.

Other Vital Signs Abetting the New Concepts

These several aforementioned vital signs also combine with others. Political participation is broader than ever, even though incorporating extra-legal means with purportedly legal means. If group and individual interests are thereby absorbed, this fact also leads to change of the system.

Moreover, apolitical and anti-political groups often claim to be culturally-based rather than politically based. The premise seems to be that if a new culture is created to overthrow the old one, or displace it, or even be grafted into it, that political consequences will follow. This in fact may be happening.

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[1] Ibid., p. 19. E.G., bio-feedback research, and Dr. Elmer Green's work at the Menninger Foundation's Psychophysiological Laboratory in voluntary control of internal states.

[2] Ibid.

Again, keener, more comprehensive human awareness of social and political realities seems to be a dramatic by-product of the electronic age of mass media. Larger and more comprehensive integration of political systems and underlying subcultural systems may be possible. The fact of corporateness may be rendered more intentional and less anarchic.

In conclusion it may be observed that the vital signs of the new concepts of the human person, although not necessarily homogenous, still maintain the quest for transcendent reference points which possess the power to overcome the various manifestations of the debilitative subject-object split and to impart some sense of wholeness to the meaning of man's existence.

PART IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CONCEPTS

Against this background of both the limits and the promise of the new concepts of the human person as a relegitimation resource, the question arises, what are the prospects for the new challenging viewpoints?

No Absolutes

The prognosis for the success of new concepts of human personality, whether in terms of delegitimation or relegitimation, cannot be stated in terms of absolutes. If the prognosis is to be understood within the context of an understanding of the nature of culture, then

change must be viewed as an aspect of the growth of a living, organic whole which is rooted in nature, e.g., is not merely a human creation.

Some Predictable Facets

In this vein, as Etzioni enumerated, several facets of the transition are predictable.[1]

A culture does not simply trade old ideas and structures for new ones. Moreover, within a context of give-and-take, various subcultures will vie for dominancy with each other and with the dominant culture. Furthermore, some new subculture, or combination of subcultures, will likely become the center of the new core values.

Accordingly, the new victor(s) undoubtedly will change in the process. Correspondingly, old core values will not suddenly or dramatically disappear but will take their place with great tenacity as a new subculture and will continue to survive, perhaps indefinitely.

Beyond these observations of Etzioni, other predictions might be made. There appears to be great likelihood that new values and new arrangements will continue to be associated, either directly or indirectly, with the mass media. As an aspect of corporateness, these can be conceptualized as extensions of human biological and sensual capabilities.

Moreover, the writer believes that new concepts, if they have not already done so, will eventually make a place in their scheme of

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[1]Amitai Etzioni, "The Search for Political Meaning," The Center Magazine, V, No. 2 (March/April, 1972), pp. 2-8.

things for the existence of trauma, suffering, and tragedy as natural parts of life. There will be greater achievements of self-actualization as human beings, but no utopia. The cathartic function of trauma, suffering, tragedy, and death also will be recognized as a natural and essential part of the renewal of life. As an example of this principle, the biological sciences have established that environments which provide maximum well-being for phenotypes (individuals) are detrimental in the long run to genotypes (the species, i.e., the gene pool). Hardship, it would seem, is essential to the vitality of the species.[1]

Further, whatever disciplines may be developed to further human consciousness or to harness human potentials, it is likely that speculative philosophy, in some form or other, will continue to play a role as long as there is a need to define common human ends or articulate human purposes.

Other Observations and Prognoses

Other observations and prognoses may be ventured. Modern developments appear to favor the root metaphors of the new concepts of the human person, as opposed to the mechanical metaphors of the status quo. The root metaphors upon which the basic arguments of the new concepts rely are characterized by emphasis on such occurrences as process, flows and exchanges of energy, and transactions between

[1]Roscoe Spencer, "Individual and Species: Biological Survival," in The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man, ed. by Shepard and McKinley.

systems ("trade offs"), as well as the total relatedness of all reference points. Both the wider understanding of Einsteinian concepts of physics as well as the greater use of images taken from the realm of the information-processing technologies (e.g., computers and television) support this development.[1]

Many examples can be given to illustrate this observation. Perhaps one or two will suffice. First, while mechanistic biology tried to explain organic functions in terms of man-made machines, the young science of bionics instead tries to imitate nature's inventions. This approach, following natural and organic possibilities, leaves all processes open-ended instead of being fixed as a result of the prescribed limitations of the mechanical metaphor. Accordingly, our new technological resources seem to be simply bypassing the Newtonian age--an occurrence which underscores our claim to the viability of the new Einsteinian and modern communications technology images.

Such sudden changes amount to a kind of transvaluation of values. The resulting feeling for many who find themselves in the process of relinquishing their previous assumptions--assumptions largely consistent with the belief system of the status quo and its structure of practical values of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline and achievement--is a feeling of disorientation or of the meaninglessness of life and human endeavor, i.e., that life has been wasted or futile. This fact, it is held, verifies rather than

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[1]See, for example, John Lilly, The Human Biocomputer (Miami: Communication Research Institute, 1967).

contradicts the present point of view favoring the viability of the new images of process over product.

To illustrate further, as has been noted elsewhere, the "Death of God" debate may actually have signalled the death of the Newtonian Age. In popular imagination the God who is revered as maker of heaven and earth is not as likely to be viewed as the clockmaker as he is a super-computer or cosmic transistor or a force field of energy.[1]

Consistent with earlier observations, we may note that the forerunner of a new age of metaphysical and political philosophy in a culture is the appearance of such new symbols and new configurations of both old and new symbols among persons and subcultures of artistic bent. Critical awareness in the western world, including critiques and discriminations of the sensory life as expressed in our environments, has been the province of the artist.

It is in art, literature, drama, sculpture, the dance, music, and so forth, that persons are most permitted to be unique or even eccentric in our culture. Among such artists the spontaneous emergence or creation of symbols meant to express new possibilities of human relationships in an age of rapid change seem to have the greatest chance of flourishing. It may be only later that other segments of the culture such as commercial advertising, organized religion, and eventually education, then finally the administrative and governmental bureaucracies will entertain the new metaphors and their resulting

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[1]McLuhan, Fiore, and Agel, War and Peace, pp. 61, 82, and 85.

cliches. This process may occur progressively as the element of "risk" is laundered and watered down through increasing evidence of societal acceptance.

Until the modern era, as McLuhan notes, the artist had been able to perform his critical task only in rather puny fashion.[1] However, the mass media have offered new materials for the artists and have opened up (1) new realms for dissemination, and (2) new opportunities for artistic recruitment.

Virtually anyone can be an artist now, if art is defined broadly as eccentric self-expression. This is the meaning of the so-called "pop" art which has served as an impressive vehicle for the development, flourishing, and visible expression of the "counter-culture."[2] In a sense, as a result, the values of randomness, indeterminacy, chance, and spontaneity have become institutionalized and legitimated in large segments of the popular mind, especially among the young.[3] Even the adult working specialists, or those among the professional classes, who still must acknowledge the regimens disciplines and routines of the bureaucracies of which they are a part and from which they gain their affluence, may yield their

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[1] Ibid., p. 90.

[2] George Melly, Revolt Into Style: The Pop Arts (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971).

[3] On this topic, see the treatment of R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967).

"discretionary" time and activities to the values of pop art and the counterculture, thus creating alternate life-styles for themselves.[1]

In conclusion, western society is now in a period of transition--perhaps radical transition, although the tenacity and continuity of the status quo still remains. Yet, it seems continued change will occur and will intensify, for there is no other alternative. Whether this results in a new species of man, as portended by some prognosticators, at least the world of our children and of our children's children, granted the continuation of present trends, will be vastly different than the world we experience today.

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[1]Orion White, Jr., and Gideon Sjoberg, "The Emerging 'New Politics' in America," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 11-35.

APPENDIX A

CODE LIST

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION I: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF IDEAS

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1.1 Metaphysics	1.1.1 The world is a machine The world is an evolving organism	1.1.2 Cause and effect Interests (and interest groups)	1.1.3 Economy and efficiency Industry and thrift	1.1.4 Segmentation of tasks Successful adaptation: Might makes right Things in proper place	1.1.5 Accumulation Survival of the fittest Affluence
1.2 Epistemology	1.2.1 Seeing is believing Knowledge is objective Truth is known through experience	1.2.2 Observation Material things Reliable and repeatable thought categories	1.2.3 Thoroughness Behaviorism Consistency	1.2.4 Accuracy Logical positivism Labelling	1.2.5 Control Subdue the earth Predictability
1.3 Society	1.3.1 Freedom Tolerance Equality Opportunity Composed of individuals or "atoms" of society	1.3.2 Natural rights Differences Countervailing powers Happiness	1.3.3 Personal responsibility Moderation Balance Conformity	1.3.4 Vigilance Practicality Pursuit of interests Initiative	1.3.5 Society of free men Liberty, fraternity Greatest good for greatest number Progress Stability
1.4 Man	1.4.1 Freedom of thought Freedom of speech Freedom of assembly Life, liberty, property and pursuit of happiness Competitive	1.4.2 Self-evidence Natural law Rule of reason Affluence Self-seeking	1.4.3 Lawfulness Self-restraint Modesty Reasonableness	1.4.4 Industry Thrift Patience Consistency	1.4.5 Progress Peace Prosperity Happiness Self-reliance
1.5 The State	1.5.1 The state is a fact The state is a necessity (social contract) The state possesses the only legitimate means of coercion The state balances interests and regulates competition	1.5.2 Law (positive law) The sovereignty of a free man requires the sovereignty of the state Natural law (mechanical and evolutionary) Leads to social contract	1.5.3 Governmental restraint The best government is the least government Economy, efficiency and effectiveness in government	1.5.4 Representation Separation of powers Preparedness	1.5.5 Democracy Federalism Strength Productivity Affluence Freedom

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION II: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF PEOPLE

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
2.1 Metaphysics	2.1.1 Man is motivated by his instincts Men are the atoms of society Men possess individual souls	2.1.2 Reasonableness of self-interest Individualism is self-evident God is judge and savior of individual souls	2.1.3 The austere demands of competition and work Sufficiency of self Grace and providence Modesty and simplicity	2.1.4 Diligence Productiveness Preparedness Obedience Humility	2.1.5 Preparedness Salavation Success Accumulation Consumption
2.2 Epistemology	2.2.1 Man's instincts are known via self-interest Man's social roles are known via heritage and patriotism Man's soul known via prayer, industry, service, obedience	2.2.2 Rule of reason accepts instincts and self-interest Historical approach is logical; civil religion Churches and scriptures are evidential Reason and revelation are compatible	2.2.3 Sublimation and self-denial of instincts Honor, pride, courage above self-indulgence Puritan faith and virtues State of grace and self-reliance	2.2.4 Enlightened self-interest Dedication and independence Moderation; work ethic Persistence; fortitude	2.2.5 Adjustment Belonging Fulfillment Strength and security
2.3 Society	2.3.1 Society is a body of human atoms Interests balanced by rule of reason Interests regulated by group associations	2.3.2 Individualism and competitiveness are logical and rational Rule of reason results in legal authority Group associations: logical reps of individuals	2.3.3 Equal protection of the laws Moderation in all things Christian morality	2.3.4 Adaptation, accommodation, and lawfulness Self-reliance Civic-mindedness Civic religion	2.3.5 Social status American dream Success Leadership
2.4 Man	2.4.1 Men created equal All personalities are unique Ownership is means of personal freedom Men are the atoms of society	2.4.2 Equality: basis for justice Differences: sign of unique personalities Liberty requires right to property Unseen hand regulates	2.4.3 Self-denial Self-sufficiency The pioneering spirit Due process of law Simple faith in providence	2.4.4 Fairness Usefulness; purposefulness Independence Lawfulness Obedience Loyalty Patriotism	2.4.5 Justified Fulfilled Recognized Empowered Assured Accepted
2.5 The State	2.5.1 State: constituted of, by, and for people State created by social contract Exchange some freedom for security Reg'n by admin. agencies	2.5.2 The people <u>are</u> government Survival requires social contract Human nature requires both freedom and security Rep government is logical (cause and effect)	2.5.3 One man equals one vote Equal protection of the laws Due process of law Balancer of interests Restrain unequal competition	2.5.4 Vigilance Initiative Accountability Honesty Lawfulness	2.5.5 Free Secure Strong Fair Affluent Effective

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION III: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF PLACES

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
3.1 Metaphysics	3.1.1 Earth at center of universe Visions of new worlds Earth: man's domain World brotherhood or community	3.1.2 Man: the crown of creation Man's task: subdue earth Man's right: dominion Man's community: the whole world	3.1.3 Man is above nature Place: utility Nature to be tamed The world is to be reshaped The earth is raw material	3.1.4 A place for everything Everything in its place Places should serve useful functions Keep a clean place	3.1.5 Conquest of nature A new heaven and a new earth Progress Perfection
3.2 Epistemology	3.2.1 Man's unique reason: above other creatures Man's creativity: co-creator Man's history: made a place for himself	3.2.2 The Occident: cradle of civilization New world: cradle of democracy Manifest destiny	3.2.3 A place for everything Everything in its place Make places neat and functional	3.2.4 Organization of places for segmentation of tasks	3.2.5 Economy Efficiency Effectiveness Security Peace
3.3 Society	3.3.1 Places to live Places to work Places to play Places to learn Places to worship	3.3.2 A time and place for everything	3.3.3 Simplicity Functionality	3.3.4 Technology Practicality Production; productivity Goal-orientation Specialization of skills	3.3.5 Land of the free Home of the brave Prosperity Progress Growth Property Status
3.4 Man	3.4.1 A man's home is his castle A man's nation gives him his nationality and his fellow countrymen A man's locale gives him his style and flavor	3.4.2 Home, family, and person are virtually one A man without a country has no protected rights Everyone is shaped by his background	3.4.3 Cleanliness Property value	3.4.4 Usefulness Productiveness	3.4.5 Possession Identity Position Security Influence Affluence
3.5 The State	3.5.1 States' rights Nationalism Industrial state World leadership	3.5.2 Autonomy Protection of borders National strength Leadership	3.5.3 Productive (taxes) Livable Enshrined Renewed Accessible	3.5.4 Pride of ownership Public pride Free access Equal access Self-sustainment	3.5.5 Identity Freedom Security Equality Perpetuity

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION IV: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF THINGS

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4.1 Metaphysics	4.1.1 Reality is material Atoms are ultimate particles Objects are independent and autonomous Objects are related by cause and effect	4.1.2 Science and technology Chemistry Physics	4.1.3 Self-sufficiency Autonomy of objects	4.1.4 Physical sciences Basic research Applied research Pursuit of material gain	4.1.5 Mastery of physical world Exploitation of natural resources Technical progress Productivity Abundance Progress
4.2 Epistemology	4.2.1 Nature Raw materials Wares Utility Need to master physical nature	4.2.2 Science and technology Usefulness Instincts Desires Function Control	4.2.3 Physical utility Thrift	4.2.4 Study of the physical sciences Research Technique Practicality Precision Maintenance Acquisitiveness	4.2.5 Knowledge Use Control Power
4.3 Society	4.3.1 Commerce Market mechanism Merchandise Consumption	4.3.2 Supply and demand Unseen hand Utility Employment	4.3.3 Physical utility Disposability	4.3.4 Production Management Marketing Balanced distribution	4.3.5 Affluence Free trade Profits Expanding GNP
4.4 Man	4.4.1 Producer-consumer Property owner Entrepreneur Things are easily replaceable	4.4.2 Instinct and interests Acquisitiveness Ingenuity Survival of fittest Newness means progress	4.4.3 Dispensable wares Cleanliness Conveniences	4.4.4 Consumer tastes Acquisitiveness Work ethic	4.4.5 Security Comfort Status Opportunity
4.5 The State	4.5.1 Harmony of conflicting interests Law: instrument of harmony Administration: agent of law Regulation: function of administration Expand GNP and control of competition: goals of regulation	4.5.2 Countervailing powers Equal justice under law Politics makes policy; administration carries it out Balancer of interests Need for expanding markets	4.5.3 Protectionism	4.5.4 Planning Programming Budgeting Systems analysis	4.5.5 Incentives Free enterprise Employment Rising standard of living Equal opportunity

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION V: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF ORGANIZATIONS

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
5.1 Metaphysics	5.1.1 Organizations, like reality, involve a hierarchy of mechanical parts Like organisms they require a head and other subordinate parts: i.e., vertical hierarchy	5.1.2 The logic of cause and effect A chain of command network	5.1.3 Productivity Economy Efficiency Self-maintenance	5.1.4 Reproduction Redundancy	5.1.5 Growth Stability
5.2 Epistemology	5.2.1 Primary groups Voluntary associations Interest groups Official organizations Economic institutions Political institutions State agencies	5.2.2 Individuality Liberty and self-expression Subjective needs Protect and balance rights Opportunities Consensus, regulation, and accountability Balancing of interests	5.2.3 Ratiocination Specificity Division of duties	5.2.4 Data gathering Research and analysis Decision-making Accountability	5.2.5 Knowledge Expertise Power Representative democracy
5.3 Society	5.3.1 Political liberalism Economic conservativism Limited government Pluralism Bargaining and competition	5.3.2 Self-government Private property and profits Popular sovereignty Groups are good Public interest (utilitarianism)	5.3.3 Limited government	5.3.4 Planning Organizing Budgeting Staffing Directing Controlling Communicating	5.3.5 Efficient production Steady output expansion Steady consumption expansion Goods over leisure Technological change Autonomy for technical organizations Trained and educated manpower
5.4 Man	5.4.1 Voluntary associations Local autonomy Individuality Equality Right to organize Pragmatism "Organization man"	5.4.2 Individual freedom and dignity Self-sufficiency and responsibility; brotherhood Right to press interests Common sense Economic survival	5.4.3 Self-sufficiency	5.4.4 Individual responsibility Tolerance and accommodation Initiative	5.4.5 Self-reliance Liberty Equality Brotherhood Happiness Opportunity
5.5 The State	5.5.1 Bureaucracy: social instrument Mobilization of power and resources Centralization Prudence "Realism"	5.5.2 Social instrument Social welfare and development Economic and social well-being Efficiency and economy Objectivity	5.5.3 Efficiency Economy	5.5.4 EDP Info systems Quantitative management techniques Systems analysis, planning, and control	5.5.5 Maintain productive capacity Social progress Management of social change

CODE LIST OF FAMILIAR VERBAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE

SECTION VI: PERCEPTIONS AND CONCEPTS ON THE SITUATIONAL COMPONENT OF TIME

Philosophical Categories	DOMINANT CORE VALUE CATEGORIES				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
6.1 Metaphysics	6.1.1 Time has a beginning and an end Time has a fullness Time has a meaning	6.1.2 Myths of origin Rebirth beliefs History is creative	6.1.3 Self-renunciation Make time count Work before pleasure Self-sacrifice	6.1.4 Dedication Promptness Commitment Decision and action	6.1.5 Destiny Useful life Progress Salvation or utopia
6.2 Epistemology	6.2.1 We know time through: --History --The clock --Accumulation --Accomplishment	6.2.2 Purpose Solar time and the calendar Results	6.2.3 Self-examination Readiness Being useful	6.2.4 Dedication Time-savers Schedules	6.2.5 Destiny Save time Use time
6.3 Society	6.3.1 Time is quantitative Time is history Time is money Time is life	6.3.2 Measured by stars Measured by purpose Measured by wealth Measured by deeds	6.3.3 Diligence Thrift Service Punctuality	6.3.4 Mathematics Economics Industry and thrift Efficiency and economy	6.3.5 Gain time Buy time Fulfill time Use time
6.4 Man	6.4.1 Birth--death Youth--age Prime Time has come	6.4.2 Mortality Life span Rebirth beliefs History	6.4.3 Good works Delayed gratifications Resolve Punctuality	6.4.4 Punctuality Preparedness Decisiveness (freedom) Timeliness	6.4.5 Life well spent Graceful retirement Power--youth Glory Increased life
6.5 The State	6.5.1 Origins Golden age Revolution Destiny	6.5.2 Natural law or special events Conquests and victories Natural law History of accomplishments	6.5.3 Emulation Reverence Faithfulness Dedication	6.5.4 Remembering Education Obedience Service	6.5.5 Destiny Progress Liberty Victory

APPENDIX B

DISPOSITION SCORES OF SUPPORT, AMBIVALENCE, AND OPPOSITION FROM THE CODE LIST CELLS TOWARDS EACH OF THE FIVE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

The development of the code list in Appendix A led to the statement of the five major conclusions. Yet, this involves one code list compounded of numerous complexities as a basis for five separate statements.

The decision had been made that, as a whole, the code list effectively justified the hypothetical statement of the five major conclusions as an expression of the distilled essence of the rationally stateable beliefs lodged within the core of the culture's belief system (as indicated by key recurring conceptual symbols).

This general conclusion did not, however, account for inner contradictions within the belief system between specific components or clusters within it and the basic rationally stateable beliefs which ostensibly serve as operating rationales, i.e., the five major conclusions. The code list per se simply led to the conclusion that on balance the five major conclusions seem to fairly represent the dominant themes and implicit and explicit commitments of the culture and its legitimated subsystems.

In order to be better able to come to intellectual grips with the prospective internal contradictions and tensions of the belief system of the status quo, it seemed pertinent to ask questions, not only of the code list per se, but of each of its 150 cells, indeed, of each verbal symbol contained within each cell, and especially of the net effect of the conglomerate of symbols in each cell taken as a

whole, concerning their dispositions of support, ambivalence, or opposition towards each of the five major conclusions.

Although such an undertaking in its present state does not remove the project from the realms of speculation and place it in the category of verifiable scientific method, nevertheless it does ground the speculative inquiry in a relationship with a model of objective events (recurring verbal concepts) which symbolically represents the thought patterns of the entire culture over a period of 30 years. As such, it points the way for the further development of methods which may be used to probe the questions raised in this inquiry.

Further, by scoring each of the 150 cells in the code list for support, ambivalence, or opposition towards each of the five major conclusions such analysis corresponds with the aim for greater conceptual and analytical precision, since the effort involves the counting of discrete units while probing for the various functions each performs in terms of supporting or conflicting with the various identified parts of the belief system. Yet, these discrete units are not ultimately abstracted from the complexities inherent within the wholeness of the model; rather, the scores are tabulated within the total framework of the action between the three major variables (involving 16 separate components) and the five major conclusions.

Thus, each of the 150 cells yielded 15 scores, or points. That is, the question had to be asked and answered about each cell whether its PERCEPTIONS, Philosophical Presuppositions, and practical values tended either to support, doubt, or oppose each of the five

major conclusions. This exercise alone demonstrated the fact that each cluster of symbols (cell) served 15 identifiable functions within the belief system, as represented by the code list.

A major problem was to decide how one decides whether a given symbol or cluster of symbols supports, opposes, or doubts a major conclusion, which in itself possesses several parts. The writer discovered it was impossible to completely rule out dependence on intuition and subjective judgments. Yet the procedure itself insured that such subjective dependence be more closely scrutinized and self-examined and became more "objectified" due to raising the same kinds of questions 15 times about 150 symbol clusters. In the process the writer decided that rigorous work needs to be done in framing better questions in order to obtain better results. He also discovered that, even given his own often-open-ended questions, numerous intricate and interesting relationships were discernible that otherwise would have been overlooked had not this method been pursued.

Basically the writer asked three kinds of questions. First, the writer asked, given the writer's own particular knowledge of the concepts involved, particularly as those concepts were begotten by and are related to the eight themes of western culture as illustrated in Figure 4 (page 16), do both the denotative and connotative meanings of the symbol seem to convey sympathy with or antipathy towards the main thrust of each major conclusion?

Second, the writer asked, does it appear that the PERCEPTIONS, presuppositions, or practical values of persons or groups, using these

symbols in typical circumstances (as indicated by concrete examples of situations in which the symbols were employed) predispose the speakers (or writers) to support, doubt, or oppose the given conclusion under consideration?

Third, the writer asked, does the writer's inculcation of these concepts within his own experience lead him to support, oppose, or doubt the given conclusion under consideration, and does his reaction seem to be typical or atypical of the behavior of formal elites with which he is acquainted?

The writer then balanced the answers to these questions against one another and made a final decision.

As may be expected, this exercise was a gruelling task, and, in a sense, it formed the very heart of the work accomplished for this treatise. That is, it served to set everything else in context and to offer a base by which other perspectives were to be considered. Once the work of scoring and analyzing the socres was completed, it made comparisons possible which otherwise could not have been made.

To accomplish the scoring, Table 1 was duplicated five times. Each of these five tables was designated as a scoring sheet for one of the five major conclusions. Each of the 150 cells in each table was then assigned a score symbol as follows: 0 for support, X for oppose, and Ø for ambivalence, depending on the writer's decisions following the questioning procedure in the use of the code list.

These tables with their respective score symbols appear here as Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5.

The symbols were counted in terms of each of the three variables and then tabulated. The results of these tabulations appear in the three smaller tables which follow each of the five larger tables. For example, the tabulations for Table B.1 appear in Tables B.1.1, B.1.2, and B.1.3, and so forth.

It was on the basis of these tables that the Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 in the text were developed.

TABLE B.1.--Using Table 1 (on Pages 172-73) to Score the Code List (in APPENDIX A) for Conclusion Number 1

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	1.1.1 1.2.1 1.3.1 1.4.1 1.5.1	1.1.2 1.2.2 1.3.2 1.4.2 1.5.2	1.1.3 1.2.3 1.3.3 1.4.3 1.5.3	1.1.4 1.2.4 1.3.4 1.4.4 1.5.4	1.1.5 1.2.5 1.3.5 1.4.5 1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	2.1.1 2.2.1 2.3.1 2.4.1 2.5.1	2.1.2 2.2.2 2.3.2 2.4.2 2.5.2	2.1.3 2.2.3 2.3.3 2.4.3 2.5.3	2.1.4 2.2.4 2.3.4 2.4.4 2.5.4	2.1.5 2.2.5 2.3.5 2.4.5 2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	3.1.1 3.2.1 3.3.1 3.4.1 3.5.1	3.1.2 3.2.2 3.3.2 3.4.2 3.5.2	3.1.3 3.2.3 3.3.3 3.4.3 3.5.3	3.1.4 3.2.4 3.3.4 3.4.4 3.5.4	3.1.5 3.2.5 3.3.5 3.4.5 3.5.5

TABLE B.1--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	4.1.1 4.2.1 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.5.1	4.1.2 4.2.2 4.3.2 4.4.2 4.5.2	4.1.3 4.2.3 4.3.3 4.4.3 4.5.3	4.1.4 4.2.4 4.3.4 4.4.4 4.5.4	4.1.5 4.2.5 4.3.5 4.4.5 4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	5.1.1 5.2.1 5.3.1 5.4.1 5.5.1	5.1.2 5.2.2 5.3.2 5.4.2 5.5.2	5.1.3 5.2.3 5.3.3 5.4.3 5.5.3	5.1.4 5.2.4 5.3.4 5.4.4 5.5.4	5.1.5 5.2.5 5.3.5 5.4.5 5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	6.1.1 6.2.1 6.3.1 6.4.1 6.5.1	6.1.2 6.2.2 6.3.2 6.4.2 6.5.2	6.1.3 6.2.3 6.3.3 6.4.3 6.5.3	6.1.4 6.2.4 6.3.4 6.4.4 6.5.4	6.1.5 6.2.5 6.3.5 6.4.5 6.5.5

TABLE B.1.1.--Tabulations of Scores of the Practical Values Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 1

Disposition Symbol	Objec-tivity	Ration-ality	Aus-terity	Disci-pline	Achieve-ment	Disposition Totals
0	15	16	7	16	20	74
Ø	12	11	13	7	9	52
X	3	3	10	7	1	24
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.1.2.--Tabulations of Scores of the Philosophical Presuppositions Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 1

Disposition Symbol	Meta-physics	Episte-mology	Society	Man	The State	Disposition
0	21	18	15	6	14	74
Ø	5	9	12	13	13	52
X	4	3	3	11	3	24
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.1.3.--Tabulations of Scores of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (Cultural Perceptions) Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 1

Disposition Symbol	IDEAS	PEOPLE	PLACES	THINGS	ORGANIZATIONS	TIME	Disposition Totals
0	11	9	17	21	12	4	74
Ø	12	10	6	4	10	10	52
X	2	6	2	0	3	11	24
Component Totals	25	25	25	25	25	25	150

TABLE B.2.--Using Table 1 (on Pages 172-73) to Score the Code List (in APPENDIX A) for Conclusion Number 2

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics	1.1.1	1.1.2	1.1.3	1.1.4	1.1.5
	2. Epistemology	1.2.1	1.2.2	1.2.3	1.2.4	1.2.5
	3. Society	1.3.1	1.3.2	1.3.3	1.3.4	1.3.5
	4. Man	1.4.1	1.4.2	1.4.3	1.4.4	1.4.5
	5. The State	1.5.1	1.5.2	1.5.3	1.5.4	1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics	2.1.1	2.1.2	2.1.3	2.1.4	2.1.5
	2. Epistemology	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.5
	3. Society	2.3.1	2.3.2	2.3.3	2.3.4	2.3.5
	4. Man	2.4.1	2.4.2	2.4.3	2.4.4	2.4.5
	5. The State	2.5.1	2.5.2	2.5.3	2.5.4	2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics	3.1.1	3.1.2	3.1.3	3.1.4	3.1.5
	2. Epistemology	3.2.1	3.2.2	3.2.3	3.2.4	3.2.5
	3. Society	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
	4. Man	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
	5. The State	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5

TABLE B.2--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics	4.1.1	4.1.2	4.1.3	4.1.4	4.1.5
	2. Epistemology	4.2.1	4.2.2	4.2.3	4.2.4	4.2.5
	3. Society	4.3.1	4.3.2	4.3.3	4.3.4	4.3.5
	4. Man	4.4.1	4.4.2	4.4.3	4.4.4	4.4.5
	5. The State	4.5.1	4.5.2	4.5.3	4.5.4	4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics	5.1.1	5.1.2	5.1.3	5.1.4	5.1.5
	2. Epistemology	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4	5.2.5
	3. Society	5.3.1	5.3.2	5.3.3	5.3.4	5.3.5
	4. Man	5.4.1	5.4.2	5.4.3	5.4.4	5.4.5
	5. The State	5.5.1	5.5.2	5.5.3	5.5.4	5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics	6.1.1	6.1.2	6.1.3	6.1.4	6.1.5
	2. Epistemology	6.2.1	6.2.2	6.2.3	6.2.4	6.2.5
	3. Society	6.3.1	6.3.2	6.3.3	6.3.4	6.3.5
	4. Man	6.4.1	6.4.2	6.4.3	6.4.4	6.4.5
	5. The State	6.5.1	6.5.2	6.5.3	6.5.4	6.5.5

TABLE B.2.1.--Tabulations of Scores of the Practical Values Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 2

Disposition Symbol	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement	Disposition Totals
0	13	11	8	15	14	61
∅	9	16	11	12	15	63
X	8	3	11	3	1	26
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.2.2.--Tabulations of Scores of the Philosophical Presuppositions Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 2

Disposition Symbol	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Society	Man	The State	Disposition Totals
0	20	15	10	4	12	61
∅	7	12	13	14	17	63
X	3	3	7	12	1	26
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.2.3.--Tabulations of Scores of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (Cultural Perceptions) Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 2

Disposition Symbol	IDEAS	PEOPLE	PLACES	THINGS	ORGANIZATIONS	TIME	Disposition Totals
0	12	2	12	19	14	2	61
Ø	9	17	13	6	4	14	63
X	4	6	0	0	7	9	26
Component Totals	25	25	25	25	25	25	150

TABLE B.3.--Using Table 1 (on Pages 172-73) to Score the Code List (in APPENDIX A) for Conclusion Number 3

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	1.1.1 1.2.1 1.3.1 1.4.1 1.5.1	1.1.2 1.2.2 1.3.2 1.4.2 1.5.2	1.1.3 1.2.3 1.3.3 1.4.3 1.5.3	1.1.4 1.2.4 1.3.4 1.4.4 1.5.4	1.1.5 1.2.5 1.3.5 1.4.5 1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	2.1.1 2.2.1 2.3.1 2.4.1 2.5.1	2.1.2 2.2.2 2.3.2 2.4.2 2.5.2	2.1.3 2.2.3 2.3.3 2.4.3 2.5.3	2.1.4 2.2.4 2.3.4 2.4.4 2.5.4	2.1.5 2.2.5 2.3.5 2.4.5 2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	3.1.1 3.2.1 3.3.1 3.4.1 3.5.1	3.1.2 3.2.2 3.3.2 3.4.2 3.5.2	3.1.3 3.2.3 3.3.3 3.4.3 3.5.3	3.1.4 3.2.4 3.3.4 3.4.4 3.5.4	3.1.5 3.2.5 3.3.5 3.4.5 3.5.5

TABLE B.3--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	4.1.1 4.2.1 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.5.1	4.1.2 4.2.2 4.3.2 4.4.2 4.5.2	4.1.3 4.2.3 4.3.3 4.4.3 4.5.3	4.1.4 4.2.4 4.3.4 4.4.4 4.5.4	4.1.5 4.2.5 4.3.5 4.4.5 4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	5.1.1 5.2.1 5.3.1 5.4.1 5.5.1	5.1.2 5.2.2 5.3.2 5.4.2 5.5.2	5.1.3 5.2.3 5.3.3 5.4.3 5.5.3	5.1.4 5.2.4 5.3.4 5.4.4 5.5.4	5.1.5 5.2.5 5.3.5 5.4.5 5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	6.1.1 6.2.1 6.3.1 6.4.1 6.5.1	6.1.2 6.2.2 6.3.2 6.4.2 6.5.2	6.1.3 6.2.3 6.3.3 6.4.3 6.5.3	6.1.4 6.2.4 6.3.4 6.4.4 6.5.4	6.1.5 6.2.5 6.3.5 6.4.5 6.5.5

TABLE B.3.1.--Tabulations of Scores of the Practical Values Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 3

Disposition Symbol	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement	Disposition Totals
0	17	15	14	22	21	89
Ø	10	11	11	5	7	44
X	3	4	5	3	2	17
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.3.2.--Tabulations of Scores of the Philosophical Presuppositions Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 3

Disposition Symbol	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Society	Man	The State	Disposition Totals
0	13	20	19	17	20	89
Ø	12	7	11	7	7	44
X	5	3	0	6	3	17
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.3.3.--Tabulations of Scores of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (Cultural Perceptions) Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 3

Disposition Symbol	IDEAS	PEOPLE	PLACES	THINGS	ORGANIZATIONS	TIME	Disposition Totals
0	22	7	11	24	19	6	89
ø	3	13	13	1	6	8	44
X	0	5	1	0	0	11	17
Component Totals	25	25	25	25	25	25	150

TABLE B.4.--Using Table 1 (on Pages 172-73) to Score the Code List (in APPENDIX A) for Conclusion Number 4

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics	1.1.1	1.1.2	1.1.3	1.1.4	1.1.5
	2. Epistemology	1.2.1	1.2.2	1.2.3	1.2.4	1.2.5
	3. Society	1.3.1	1.3.2	1.3.3	1.3.4	1.3.5
	4. Man	1.4.1	1.4.2	1.4.3	1.4.4	1.4.5
	5. The State	1.5.1	1.5.2	1.5.3	1.5.4	1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics	2.1.1	2.1.2	2.1.3	2.1.4	2.1.5
	2. Epistemology	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.5
	3. Society	2.3.1	2.3.2	2.3.3	2.3.4	2.3.5
	4. Man	2.4.1	2.4.2	2.4.3	2.4.4	2.4.5
	5. The State	2.5.1	2.5.2	2.5.3	2.5.4	2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics	3.1.1	3.1.2	3.1.3	3.1.4	3.1.5
	2. Epistemology	3.2.1	3.2.2	3.2.3	3.2.4	3.2.5
	3. Society	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
	4. Man	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
	5. The State	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5

TABLE B.4--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	4.1.1 4.2.1 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.5.1	4.1.2 4.2.2 4.3.2 4.4.2 4.5.2	4.1.3 4.2.3 4.3.3 4.4.3 4.5.3	4.1.4 4.2.4 4.3.4 4.4.4 4.5.4	4.1.5 4.2.5 4.3.5 4.4.5 4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	5.1.1 5.2.1 5.3.1 5.4.1 5.5.1	5.1.2 5.2.2 5.3.2 5.4.2 5.5.2	5.1.3 5.2.3 5.3.3 5.4.3 5.5.3	5.1.4 5.2.4 5.3.4 5.4.4 5.5.4	5.1.5 5.2.5 5.3.5 5.4.5 5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	6.1.1 6.2.1 6.3.1 6.4.1 6.5.1	6.1.2 6.2.2 6.3.2 6.4.2 6.5.2	6.1.3 6.2.3 6.3.3 6.4.3 6.5.3	6.1.4 6.2.4 6.3.4 6.4.4 6.5.4	6.1.5 6.2.5 6.3.5 6.4.5 6.5.5

TABLE B.4.1.--Tabulations of Scores of the Practical Values Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 4

Disposition Symbol	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement	Disposition Totals
0	20	18	18	17	19	92
∅	6	7	9	9	9	40
X	4	5	3	4	2	18
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.4.2.--Tabulations of Scores of the Philosophical Presuppositions Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 4

Disposition Symbol	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Society	Man	The State	Disposition Totals
0	20	19	19	18	16	92
∅	5	10	11	7	7	40
X	5	1	0	5	7	18
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.4.3.--Tabulations of Scores of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (Cultural Perceptions) Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 4

Disposition Symbol	IDEAS	PEOPLE	PLACES	THINGS	ORGANIZATIONS	TIME	Disposition Totals
0	23	17	11	21	17	3	92
Ø	2	8	12	4	6	8	40
X	0	0	2	0	2	14	18
Component Totals	25	25	25	25	25	25	150

TABLE B.5.--Using Table 1 (on Pages 172-73) to Score the Code List (in APPENDIX A) for Conclusion Number 5

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
1. IDEAS	1. Metaphysics	1.1.1	1.1.2	1.1.3	1.1.4	1.1.5
	2. Epistemology	1.2.1	1.2.2	1.2.3	1.2.4	1.2.5
	3. Society	1.3.1	1.3.2	1.3.3	1.3.4	1.3.5
	4. Man	1.4.1	1.4.2	1.4.3	1.4.4	1.4.5
	5. The State	1.5.1	1.5.2	1.5.3	1.5.4	1.5.5
2. PEOPLE	1. Metaphysics	2.1.1	2.1.2	2.1.3	2.1.4	2.1.5
	2. Epistemology	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.5
	3. Society	2.3.1	2.3.2	2.3.3	2.3.4	2.3.5
	4. Man	2.4.1	2.4.2	2.4.3	2.4.4	2.4.5
	5. The State	2.5.1	2.5.2	2.5.3	2.5.4	2.5.5
3. PLACES	1. Metaphysics	3.1.1	3.1.2	3.1.3	3.1.4	3.1.5
	2. Epistemology	3.2.1	3.2.2	3.2.3	3.2.4	3.2.5
	3. Society	3.3.1	3.3.2	3.3.3	3.3.4	3.3.5
	4. Man	3.4.1	3.4.2	3.4.3	3.4.4	3.4.5
	5. The State	3.5.1	3.5.2	3.5.3	3.5.4	3.5.5

TABLE B.5--Continued

Situation Components	Philosoph. Categories	Dominant Core Value Categories				
		1	2	3	4	5
		Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement
4. THINGS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	4.1.1 4.2.1 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.5.1	4.1.2 4.2.2 4.3.2 4.4.2 4.5.2	4.1.3 4.2.3 4.3.3 4.4.3 4.5.3	4.1.4 4.2.4 4.3.4 4.4.4 4.5.4	4.1.5 4.2.5 4.3.5 4.4.5 4.5.5
5. ORGANIZATIONS	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	5.1.1 5.2.1 5.3.1 5.4.1 5.5.1	5.1.2 5.2.2 5.3.2 5.4.2 5.5.2	5.1.3 5.2.3 5.3.3 5.4.3 5.5.3	5.1.4 5.2.4 5.3.4 5.4.4 5.5.4	5.1.5 5.2.5 5.3.5 5.4.5 5.5.5
6. TIME	1. Metaphysics 2. Epistemology 3. Society 4. Man 5. The State	6.1.1 6.2.1 6.3.1 6.4.1 6.5.1	6.1.2 6.2.2 6.3.2 6.4.2 6.5.2	6.1.3 6.2.3 6.3.3 6.4.3 6.5.3	6.1.4 6.2.4 6.3.4 6.4.4 6.5.4	6.1.5 6.2.5 6.3.5 6.4.5 6.5.5

TABLE B.5.1.--Tabulations of Scores of the Practical Values Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 5

Disposition Symbol	Objectivity	Rationality	Austerity	Discipline	Achievement	Disposition Totals
0	19	17	14	15	23	88
Ø	7	11	12	15	7	52
X	4	2	4	0	0	10
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.5.2.--Tabulations of Scores of the Philosophical Presuppositions Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 5

Disposition Symbol	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Society	Man	The State	Disposition Totals
0	25	18	23	6	16	88
Ø	4	12	6	16	14	52
X	1	0	1	8	0	10
Component Totals	30	30	30	30	30	150

TABLE B.5.3.--Tabulations of Scores of the LIFE SITUATION COMPONENTS (Cultural Perceptions) Dispositions Towards Conclusion Number 5

Disposition Symbol	IDEAS	PEOPLE	PLACES	THINGS	ORGANIZATIONS	TIME	Disposition Totals
0	13	15	15	18	17	10	88
Ø	10	9	8	7	5	13	52
X	2	1	2	0	3	2	10
Component Totals	25	25	25	25	25	25	150

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY FOR PART V OF CHAPTER II

The italicized terms in Part V of Chapter II are specifically related in some technical manner to the research design and the data derived from it. Either the definition of the term or else a statement of the term's special relation to the research design is given in this glossary. In most cases a place or places in the text where the term may be found is also given. For some terms there are alternative stylistic and/or derivative uses. The most numerous of these are generally indicated in the glossary also.

ambivalence.--This is one of the three categories showing the disposition of any verbal symbol in the lifeways of the culture towards the status quo. The other two categories are support and opposition. As applied to the research design for this study and the data derived from it, ambivalence refers specifically to the disposition towards any of the five major conclusions by any one of the following:

1. A particular verbal symbol;
2. A cell of symbols contained in the code list (see Appendix A);
3. An individual score for a variable component as shown in the body of Tables 8, 9, and 10;
4. A score cluster as shown in the subtotals of Tables 8, 9, and 10;

5. The total number of ambivalent scores towards all five major conclusions as revealed in the totals of Tables 8, 9, and 10; or
6. The total number of ambivalent scores by all three variables towards the five major conclusions as revealed in Table 11. See ambivalent scores. See also pages 304-7, 312-13, 317-20, and 323-25 of Chapter II. Also see strong ambivalent score clusters.

ambivalent score.--This refers to the predominant disposition of the verbal symbols within those (150) cells of the code list in which more than 25% of the verbal symbols, but no more than 74%, showed either support or opposition for a particular one of the five major conclusions. See ambivalence. See also pages 306-7 of Chapter II. Also see Appendix B.

ambivalent score clusters.--See clusters.

challenge.--Legitimized areas of the status quo belief system are considered challenged when any one of the five major conclusions receives a predominant disposition of strong ambivalence as indicated by local score clusters or subtotal score clusters for any one of the three major variables or any of its respective components. (See for example Tables 8-10.) Legitimized areas also may be considered challenged by delegitimacy whenever opposition scores begin to approach equality with support

scores. Legitimized areas may be considered to be delegitimized whenever opposition scores exceed support scores. See page 326 of Chapter II.

clues.--This refers to numerical relationships inherent in Tables 8-11 which may serve as significant indicators of the types and levels of legitimacy and delegitimacy which may exist within the dominant core culture. The term clues is used here since this is a speculative study, whereas strictly behavioral studies are more concerned with the concept of validity. (See note 1 on page 321 of Chapter II.) Those columns in Tables 12-19, for example, which show the rank of strength of strong support, strong opposition, or strong ambivalence, in Table 8 are all sources of clues to legitimacy and delegitimacy. See pages 320, 328-29, 340, and 345-46 in Chapter II.

clusters.--Are formed in Tables 8-10 by the combination of three scores for the respective variable components. These three scores are those for support, opposition, and ambivalence. Score clusters occur in subtotals of Tables 8-10 as well as among the local scores within the body of each table. See Page 326 of Chapter II. Depending on the relationship between the three scores in each cluster, each cluster itself may be characterized for overall disposition in terms of support or nonsupport and in terms of legitimizing score clusters or delegitimizing score clusters. See the following related

glossary definitions: legitimacy-delegitimacy scores, score clusters, local effects and subtotal score clusters. See pages 316-20, 324-27, 338, and 349-50 for some examples of these related terms in context of the narrative.

clusters of opposition.--See opposition clusters and clusters. See also pages 349-52 in Chapter II.

conclusions.--When italicized (underlined), this term refers to one or more of the five major conclusions, or five conclusions, sometimes also called propositions, five propositions, or five major propositions for the sake of stylistic variation. The five major conclusions are listed in their entirely on pages 163-64.

cultural legitimation.--This is indicated in the research design and in the narrative commentary by means of strong support. Conversely, cultural delegitimation is indicated by strong opposition. Similarly, cultural ambivalence is indicated by strong ambivalence. See page 337 in Chapter II.

delegitimacy.--When italicized (underlined), this term refers specifically to scores and score relationships within the research design. When not italicized, it refers to the concept or the process of delegitimation. See, for example, page 320 of Chapter II for the latter usage, and page 323 for the former.

delegitimation associational components.--This refers to any components of the three variables the presence of which lends itself to the greater likelihood of delegitimation processes taking place, especially if two or more such components are found in combination.

delegitimation perceptual convergence.--If one of the six components of the LIFE SITUATION perceptual modes is shown in the score data to combine with one or more of the five remaining LIFE SITUATION components to resist support for the status quo belief system, this occurrence is referred to as a delegitimation perceptual convergence. By contravention, if a conjunction occurs by two or more such components to augment support, this may be referred to as a legitimation perceptual convergence. A prominent example of a delegitimation perceptual convergence is the confluence of PEOPLE, TIME, and PLACE revealed in Table 18 and explained on page 352 of Chapter II. Similarly, Table 18 also shows the incidence of a legitimation perceptual convergence in the synchronous conclusion of THINGS, IDEAS, and ORGANIZATIONS to support the status quo as represented in the five major conclusions. See the narrative also on page 353 of Chapter II.

delegitimizing score clusters.--This is a score cluster in which the opposition score exceeds the support score. It may occur either as a local effect or as a subtotal score cluster. An

outstanding example of the latter occurs in the subtotals of columns 16-18 of Table 8. This is the opposition, or delegitimizing, effect of the LIFE SITUATION variable component of TIME against the five major conclusions. See also page 327 in Chapter II.

doubt.--This is a stylistic substitute for ambivalence. Although ambivalence does not always mean doubt, there seems to be ample justification for construing it often as such within the context of the present study. If and when particular objectives should warrant the effort, the relationship between these two terms and their respective referents might be interesting to pursue further. See note 1 on page 321 of Chapter II.

five conclusions.--See five major conclusions.

five major conclusions (or five conclusions, or five major propositions).--These terms are used to refer to the five statements as a group which are given on pages 162-63 to characterize the belief system of the status quo. Occasionally only one or more (but less than five) of these statements may be referred to, in which case they are referred to by number, such as the first conclusion, or proposition number two.

five practical values.--This term refers to the concepts of objectivity, rationality, austerity, discipline, and achievement. Together these five values constitute the third of the three

major variables which are held to affect the language of the status quo. An analysis of the score data for this variable appears in Table 10.

five propositions.--See five major conclusions.

five major propositions.--See five major conclusions.

gross scores.--These are the sum totals of all scores from the three variables for each of the five major conclusions and they show the distributions by support, ambivalence, and opposition. Each variable accounts for 150 points (from the cells of the code list) for each of the five major variables, making a total of 750 points for that variable. Therefore, the total points available from all three variables equals 2,250. The distributions of the gross scores are shown in Table 11. See also page 318.

horizontal (and horizontally).--These terms refer to the arrangement of data in Tables 8-10 as displayed in strands from left to right. Accordingly, the scores as given in terms of the variable components for each variable are thus arranged. As a result, the horizontal subtotals appear in the right-hand margin of the tables and show the subtotal score clusters for each of the five major conclusions. In addition to Tables 8-10, see also page 324 of Chapter II. Also see vertical.

individual scores.--These are of two varieties and each variety occurs in three ways: support, ambivalence, or opposition. The first variety is the localized individual scores. These appear in the body of the table (and not in the subtotals). They give the score for a particular major conclusion from a specific variable component. The second variety is the subtotal individual scores. These appear in the horizontal and vertical subtotals (and not in the body of the table). Horizontally, they give the summary of local individual scores for all five major conclusions from a particular variable component, and vertically they show the summary of local individual scores for all variable components for a particular one of the five major conclusions.

legitimacy.--When this term is italicized (underlined) it has a technical usage related specifically to the score data. In such a case legitimacy depends on score clusters in wich support scores exceed total nonsupport scores (ambivalence and opposition). When the term is not italicized it refers to the concept itself or to the process presumed to be at work in the social fabric.

legitimacy-delegitimacy scores.--This refers to the three categories of support, ambivalence, and opposition.

legitimation-delegitimation categories.--These are the three categories showing the disposition of the scores towards any or all of the five major conclusions. The three categories are support, ambivalence, and opposition.

legitimation perceptual convergence.--If one of the six components of the LIFE SITUATION perceptual modes is shown in the score data to combine with one or more of the five remaining LIFE SITUATION components to affirm support for the belief system of the status quo, this is called a legitimation perceptual convergence. See also delegitimation perceptual convergence.

LIFE SITUATION components.--The LIFE SITUATION variable is the first of the three variables conceived to influence the language of the status quo. It is composed of the six components of IDEAS, PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS, ORGANIZATIONS, and TIME. All human situations involve some combination of these six factors. Accordingly, a culture possesses certain predispositions by which it tends to perceive the nature, role, and function of these categories of phenomena. It is these predispositions and their native impact upon the rationales of the status quo as represented in the five major conclusions which are at issue in this chapter. Such impact is assessed by means of scoring the key verbal symbols appearing in the code list in Appendix A. The raw scores are given in Appendix B.

local elements.--This refers to individual local scores, local score clusters, and local effects. Tables illustrating local elements are 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, and 33. There are three types of local elements: supporting, ambivalent, and opposing. Tables showing supporting local elements are 17, 24, and 31. Opposing local elements are given in Tables 18, 25, and 32, whereas ambivalent local elements are displayed in Tables 19, 26, and 33.

local score clusters.--These show the respective support, ambivalence, and opposition scores for specific variable components as these intersect each of the five major conclusion scores within the body of Tables 8-10. A cluster is composed of all three individual scores by a variable component for a major conclusion.

localized effects (or local effects).--These are elements of the various horizontal and vertical subtotals. They appear in the body of the tables 8-10 (not in the margins). Local effects include not only local score clusters as such, but also the various local relationships between these score clusters.

nonsupport scores.--These occur in score clusters when the ambivalent score is combined with the opposition score. Such combinations were made to produce Tables 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 33. Opposition and

ambivalence scores are combined to produce nonsupport scores in order to find ratios between them and support scores.

oppose.--Is one of the three categories of legitimation-delegitimation scores. Support and ambivalence are the other two. See Appendix B for the method of scoring. See page 304 in Chapter II.

opposition.--This is a result which obtains when a score cluster shows more points for oppose than for support. See page 304 of Chapter II.

opposition clusters.--These are of two types, local and subtotal. Both types consist of the three scores, support, ambivalence, and opposition. Opposition scores always exceed support scores in such clusters. See clusters.

Philosophical Presuppositions.--These consist of the categories of Metaphysics, Epistemology, Society, Man, and The State. Taken together, these conceptual components constitute the second of the three major variables conceived to influence the language of the status quo. Tables analyzing scores for this variable and its components are 9 and 20-26.

rank by strength of ambivalence.--This is determined in a manner similar to that of rank by strength of support. Tables showing this relationship are 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, and 33.

rank by strength of opposition.--This is determined in a manner similar to that of rank by strength of support. Tables showing this relationship are 14, 18, 25, and 32.

rank by strength of support.--This is determined, first, by dividing support scores by nonsupport scores and finding the ratio between them, and, second, by ranking them in order beginning with the highest support ratio first, next highest second, and so on. Tables showing rank by strength of support are 12, 13, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, and 31.

ratios.--Ratios are the numerical relationships between support and nonsupport scores, or between support and ambivalence, or between support and opposition. Tables showing such ratios are 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33.

ratios of support (or of ambivalence, or opposition).--This is a reference to the disposition of the ratios among the score clusters. The term is often used to refer to a whole class of ratios by disposition. See ratios. Sometimes the following terms may be used: supporting ratios, ambivalence ratios, and opposition ratios.

score clusters.--See clusters.

scoring universe.--This refers to the sum total of scores available for each variable.

six components.--See LIFE SITUATION components.

subtotal score clusters.--See clusters.

support.--This is one of the three categories of legitimation-delegitimation scores. Ambivalence and opposition are the other two. Support is also a result which obtains when a score cluster shows more points for support than for nonsupport (which is a combination of ambivalence and opposition). See Appendix B for the method of scoring.

support clusters.--These are of two types, local and subtotal. Both types consist of the three scores--support, ambivalence, and opposition--and the relationship between them is such that support scores exceed the combined total of ambivalence and opposition scores.

support strength.--See rank by strength of support.

supporting local element.--See support cluster, local elements, local score clusters, and localized effects.

variable components.--This refers to the respective parts of each of the three major variables. See LIFE SITUATION components, Philosophical Presuppositions, and five practical values.

APPENDIX D

SOME PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF BUCKMINSTER FULLER'S SYNERGETIC-ENERGETIC CONCEPTS

In addition to representing certain mathematical breakthroughs,[1] Fuller's geometry-philosophy also represents a metaphysics which overcomes the subject-object epistemological dichotomy. The division between subject and object is primarily conceptual rather than essential. The solution to the problem of this dichotomy, in Fuller's thought, lies in the physical and philosophical conception of a system. To Fuller a system is a patterning of force that returns upon itself in all directions. Hence, it is a closed configuration of vectors. As a system loops back on itself, its dimensions are thus limited. Consequently, the system is finite. It has an "inside" and an "outside," or according to Fuller, a "withinness" and "withoutness."

Thus, every system divides the universe into two parts: that which is within the system and that which is external.

Further, Fuller maintains that in any network, high energy charges refuse to take the long way round to their opposite pole. Rather, they tend to push through the separating space, striving to "short." "Thus energy will automatically triangulate via a diagonal of a square, or via the triangulating diagonals of any other polygon

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[1]See R. Buckminster Fuller and Robert Marks, The Dymaxion World of Buckminster Fuller (Garden City. N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1973), pp. 45-46. (Hereinafter referred to as Dymaxion World.)

to which the force is applied. Triangular systems represent the shortest, most economical energy networks."[1]

Fuller, consequently, took the triangle as the basic unit of energy configurations, "whether occurring as free energy or as structure," and concerned himself with the derivative or cumulative systems that were, in essence, "vectorial networks of equilateral triangles," or symmetrically-balanced sub-triangulations of these triangles.

What has all this to do with overcoming the subject-object epistemological split, with consequences for Metaphysics, the nature of Man, and for politics?

The answer lies in the fact of Fuller's discovery that, since any vector equilibrium (any system) could be broken down into a basic number of tetrahedra, the tetrahedron, as Fuller concluded, is the lowest common structural denominator of nature. Further, both subjective and objective energies are dependent upon the operation of the tetrahedronal structures, i.e., both the "withinness" and the "withoutness."

Fuller's hypothesis concerning the basic tetrahedronal structure of the universe has received confirmation from many quarters.

Linus Pauling's Nobel laureate treatise documented the discovery of the basic omni-tetrahedronal constellations characterizing not only all of organic chemistry, but also all of the combining

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[1] Ibid., p. 43.

patterns of metallic atoms as disclosed, thus far, by x-ray diffraction analysis.[1]

In 1958 John J. Grebe, director of Nuclear and Basic Research, Dow Chemical Company, wrote a paper, "A Periodic Table for Fundamental Particles," delivered before the New York Academy of Sciences, in which he said the mass of the various grouped sub-atomic particles "is highly reminiscent of a relation pointed out some years ago by R. B. Fuller. . . ."[2]

In June, 1959, Dr. A. Klug and Dr. J. T. Finck, of Birbeck College, London, wrote to Fuller enclosing published reports of their discovery of the icosa-geodesic structuring of the polio virus. In conversations with Fuller in London, in July, that year, they intimated that it is probable that all spherical viruses comprise geodesic arrangements of proteins in systems similar to Fuller's frequency modulated geodesic structures.[3]

Fuller has become famous for his applications of the principles of geodesics. His definition: "Geodesics are the most economical momentary relationships between separate events." They result in the enclosure of the greatest volume with the least surface, or the greatest production of function with the least expenditure of energy.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 45.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 44.

[4] Ibid.

It is significant that Fuller's geodesic principles and inventions all rest upon the principle of the tetrahedron. Fuller chose the tetrahedron as a basic volumetric unit, pointing out that the identity of unit with tetrahedron permits volumetric accounting in Nature's most economical manner.


These principles already have led to considerable cultural and political manifestations. Hippie communes as well as native tribes the world over have adopted Fuller's principles to build geodesic domes in which to live. They can be built cheaply but are highly economical as well as sturdy in withstanding the elements. Zoning boards, code enforcement commissions, and boards of realtors have been adamant in resisting these structures.[1]

The accompanying pages contain (1) an early chart of Energetic-Synergetic geometry drawn by Fuller, and (2) two large-scale plans for tetrahedronal cities which ostensibly could carry out all the functions of major cities at only a fraction of the energy-expenditures.


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
[1]On these developments see Domebook 2, published by Shelter Publications, a nonprofit educational corporation, and distributed by Random House and in Canada by Random House of Canada (Bolinas, Ca: Shelter Publications, Inc., 1971).

SYNERGETIC-ENERGETIC GEOMETRY



228 *An early chart of Energetic-Synergetic geometry. Fuller holds that* **synergy** *is to* **energy** *what, in the calculus,* **integration** *is to* **differentiation**. *Energetic studies of nature differentiate out or isolate unique local functionings. Synergetic studies seek to organize and comprehend the complex co-operative patterning that exists, a priori, in nature. "Synergetic geometry," says Fuller, "makes possible a childhood participation in nuclear physics as a logical and enjoyable, rather than a precocious phenomenon. However, scientific entry into the present realm of nuclear competence was accomplished with the awkward, irrational tools of energetical strategy. The development and adoption of the great computers has now relieved man of the onerous tasks characteristic of the irrational constants interlinking the many separate facts of scientific enquiry which arose from the energetic approach. Because these tasks are being carried by the computers, and men are getting along all right on their blind-flown scientific pilgrimages, there will be only slow realization of the significance of the sensorially-conceptual facility of dealing with nature that is opened up by the Synergetic geometry." (1944)*






486 *Over 80% of metropolitan areas with a population of one million or more are situated near bodies of water which are sufficient to accommodate floating cities. Most have a depth of water adequate for shipping (25–30 feet) and relatively sheltered harbors. At these depths a maximum average height of twenty stories can be floated.*


With the sea as a highway an entire unit can be built in another location, such as a shipyard or drydock, and then towed to its site in one piece. Thus the economies of shop fabrication can be brought to bear on construction problems which are traditionally soluble only at the final site location.

Triton City provides discrete neighborhood platforms up to four acres in area to house as many as 5,000 people. Its framework superstructure makes possible the flexible distribution of infilling components, such as apartments, classrooms, stores, and offices, with the prefabrication of elements providing assembly-line economies. Additionally, it will be possible to replace outmoded units or rearrange them without disturbing the overall disposition of the city. A whole neighborhood can be treated functionally as a single building with all utilities centrally provided.

Because the megastructure constitutes a neighborhood entity, some new departures in aesthetics and safety can be realized. All parking is within the flotation, so that one major contemporary eyesore, the parking lot, is removed from view. Since wheeled vehicles are not permitted above the entrance level, the streets would be safe for pedestrians. Elevators and stairs in vertical towers, would have glazed sides, so that everyone inside is visible at all times.

Triton City is designed to offer the best of two worlds: the dynamic quality of life in a milieu of urban high density and the view of immediately adjacent open space which is traditionally the province of suburban and rural areas. Since the community is intended as a city complement, it would have all the existing urban amenities, including entertainment, educational, and cultural activities to draw upon as well.





487 *We find that a tetrahedronal city, to house a million people, is both technologically and economically feasible. Such a vertical-tetrahedronal-city can be constructed with all of its three hundred thousand families each having balconied "outside" apartments of two thousand square feet floor space. All of the machinery necessary to its operation will be housed inside the tetrahedron. It is found that such a one million passenger tetrahedronal city is so structurally efficient, and therefore so relatively light, that together with its hollow box sectioned reinforced concrete foundations it can float. Such tetrahedronal floating cities would measure two miles to an edge, and can be floated in a triangularly patterned canal. This will make the whole structure earthquake-proof. The whole city can be floated out into the ocean to any point and anchored. The depth of its foundations will go below the turbulence level of the seas so that the floating tetrahedronal island will be, in effect, a floating triangular atoll. Its two mile long "boat" foundations will constitute landing strips for jet airplanes. Its interior two mile harbor will provide refuge for the largest and smallest ocean vessels. The total stuctural and mechanical materials involved in production of a number of such cities are within feasibility magnitude of the already operating metals manufacturing capabilities of any one company of the several major industrial nations around the earth. The tetrahedron city may start with a thousand occupants and grow symmetrically to hold millions without changing overall shape though always providing each family with 200 sq. ft. of floor space. Withdrawal of materials from obsolete buildings on the land will permit the production of enough of these floating cities to support frequently spaced floating cities of various sizes around the oceans of the earth. This will permit mid-ocean cargo transferring and therewith an extraordinary increase of efficiency of the inter-distribution of the world's raw and finished products as well as of the passenger traffic. Three quarters of the earth is covered by water. Man is clearly intent on penetrating those world-around ocean waters in every way to work both their ocean bottoms and their marine life and chemistry resources. Such ocean passage shortening habitats of ever transient humanity will permit his individual flying sailing, economic stepping stone travel around the whole Earth in many directions.*

APPENDIX E

THE ARCOLOGIES OF PAULO SOLERI: FIVE PROPOSALS


For Paulo Soleri the city is the necessary vehicle for the continued evolution of man. Since miniaturization is essential for the forward progress of his evolution, man, in building his cities, must heed the dictums that "compactness is the 'structure' of efficiency," and "richer is the life where greater is the complexity." (See page 501.)

Under the sponsorship of a Ford Foundation grant and the MIT Press, Soleri produced his book entitled Arcology: The City in the Image of Man (1969). This book contained not only the outlines of his philosophy but also graphic reproductions of 30 of his compact futuristic cities, or arcologies. (Arcologies = architectural ecologies.) These cities differ from the presentations of most utopian planners in that they are judged as being totally feasible within today's economics and technologies. As evidence of this fact, the thirtieth of the arcologies presented by Soleri in his book is actually under construction about 70 miles from Scottsdale, Arizona. It is called Arcosanti, meaning "against materialism."


In the following pages five of the city-plans, i.e., "arcologies," from Soleri's book are reproduced here. The first, Novanoah I, is an ocean-going floating city capable of housing and employing 400,000 persons. The second, Babel IID, is the concept of "an organism whose skin is a mosaic of thousands of minds." The third, Babel IIC, illustrates the economies of human services such as health care

which are available through compactness. The fourth, Hexahedron, which Soleri uses to illustrate the point that cities, "pseudostructures," which are "purely functional and always on the threshold of obsolescence, must find redemption in form, the aesthetic side of compassionate man."

The fifth arcology is Arcosanti. It is of interest particularly due to the fact that its construction has been under way for more than four years.



1.Novanoah I



Novanoah I	
Population	400 000
Density	140 (hectare; 56/ acre
Height	1,600 meters
Surface covered	2,730 hectares; 6,800 acres
1. Elevation, scale	1:16,000
2. Section, scale	1:16,000
Comparative Arcologies	
Arcoloria	
Population	16 000
3. Elevation, scale	1:16,000
Sitetown	
Population	200 000
4. Elevation, scale	1:16,000
Theology	
Population	13 000
5. Elevation, scale	1:16 000
Antarpon	
Population	40 000/Kilometer
6. Elevation, scale	1:16 000

Directly dependent on the productive processes would be many specialized laboratories for investigating new potentials arising from growing knowledge and there would be facilities for a vast undertaking in general research. Link by link the chain of a full cultural organism would establish itself so that the act of developing on the arcology would be a reasoned macrocosmos and not a thin pancake of rationales and techniques. Floating on, and immersion in, the water would be a morphological determinant of culture, as the functionally naturally occurring life the resources of the sea is an environmental determinant.

Better feeding will be instrumental to a wealth presently found with the ecologies of the seas. Whereas on or segregation, as always and ever, is the crucial test of lasting ness or obsolescence. The sea ecologies are viewed as an image of system for collection of needs and purposefulness. That is to say that, though man moves into the sea in his quest for food and material he does it with open eyes, and in his expectations he carries those same elements that sophistication feeds and perpetuates.

In other words, he does not just exploit the new environment, he works and lives in it, by it and of it. This is not to seem to make the sea a more "humane" element, though this may be very fundamental in the long run, but because a new world opens to lives who is by nature a world maker. In this new environment, not only enormous but also very deeps on six fluid layers, the arcology must deepen its structure, reaching from its by a cross section of the ecological mass, to on the variables of which it is composed and by which it is enriched.


The arcology, like an enormous digestive system, would ingest the mass of water, extract from it the elements determined by the function of the diverse plants, and eliminate the used water in an environmental cycle. The different materials—vegetable and animal, chemical and mineral—once trapped, would be processed and/or stored, then in part consumed, in part exported as food, fertilizer, and so on, or used as material for production of goods.

The necessity for man to move into the sea is pushed by the biological flood rising wherever lives and the riches contained in the seas themselves suggest the genesis of a floating civilization with aquatic centers constructed within floating arcology. The blueprint sections of these would furnish homes and spaces for the automated processing plants of (1) food stuff, animal and vegetal (2) water, and (3) minerals and chemicals. Occasionally lake and lake for underwater life development would also find ideal facilities and perfected environment.


The upper structures would be for living, learning, and working. There would be vertical transportation systems, as on Babel II and horizontal transportation systems on and under water lined from the slavery of "roads." Novanoah could drift with the currents or be slowly "propelled" on short or long journeys according to seasons, sea, harvests, fishing opportunities, or vacation cruises. Such arcologies would appeal strongly to overcrowded countries, sea-starved countries, sea labor unions hard pressed by automation, food and aluminum corporations, chemical corporations, shipbuilders ....

Novanoah I could develop by concentric rings starting from the central canister. While Novanoah II is a water city with open air, surface navigation, Novanoah I has interlaced waterways as it has interlaced gardens. The structural system, a hollow tubular space frame, integrates and carries the transportation and habitat systems. The productive and living programs are developed in the inner parts of the system.


It might be worth noticing that with the concepts of multifunction, congruence and the metamorphosis derived from the structural and functional models passing conducted while designing the arcologies, the Novanoahs are still followed by a restricted concept of the power vested in the vertical dimension. The rules of buoyancy naturally have their part in this tendency. (See Hochbeidel.)



2.Babel IID



10.Babel IIC



Babel IIC	
Population	348 000
Density	1 344/hectare, 566/acre
Height	260 meters
Diameter	2 km
Surface covered	2 710 meters
A. Section and elevation	2 km 2 hectares, 800 acres
B. Scale	1:10,000
Competitive Arrangeme	
Activities	
Population	75 000
B. Elevation scale	1:10 000
Theatres	
Population	26 000
C. Elevation scale	1:10 000
Stadiums	
Population	200 000
D. Elevation scale	1:10,000


Any expression of such demand is designed for the service of the whole community. Let's examplify this with the health service:

1. Home care of some not patients will not only be possible but preferable inasmuch as any specialized personnel from doctors to nurses, can almost instantaneously be on the spot when they are needed. The family doctor may have his own connection on functional terms. A nurse can care for many persons, instead of room to room, she moves from home to home although the necessary assistance of neighbors, kin, friends . . . and consultation. This fact alone will cut into the enormous bias of general hospitals and specialized clinics.


2. The possibility of quick interaction between separate institutions of health through the structural co-ordination of the city and the manner of alliances as defined makes possible any amount of desirable decentralization.

In a real sense the location of the health facilities and the location of any other function will not be crucial. The intrinsic efficiency and quality of the installations will be crucial, not their location in the community. Inasmuch as the linkage between homes and vital subsets is established with the morphology of the city dwell. There will not be such a thing as a house site poorly served by health or any other society because of economic or selective bias. Nor will there be any behavioral flexibility to the fundamental dysfunction that characterizes society.


Manufacturing will be mostly in the underground "industrial spaces," pedestrian use and offices within the vertical structures. In the upper crown are grouped most of the high rearing facilities. The grounds below the city are given to playgrounds, promenades, parks, and gardens.



28.Hexahedron



2



30.Arcosanti

1

Arcosanti
(Mesa topography)
Population 1 500
Density 63 l/hectare, 215/acre
Height 30 meters
Surface covered 23 hectares, 7 acres
1. Elevation scale 1:500

Comparative Acropolis
Athens
Population 2 500
2. Elevation scale 1:500

This project is designed as the new environment for the Cosanti Foundation and we hope it may be inhabited soon with the help of scores of students from schools of this and other countries. The main concern of the community-school is investigation of and experimentation with ecological concepts. This design is for a community of about 1 500 people. It covers 6 acres and is about 150 feet high. Its model is not the individual rather than the family because a high percentage of the population would be students and approaches. Working, learning, living and playing are all "under" one roof, with a density of about 230 persons per acre.

The "hierarchy" determinant, of the cosmography governing the land was lowest - that is, it is lowest for living vertically on the site (all houses were to descend a square and on the cubical city - the scheme of the structure and its parts would be square. For our spherical (or closely cosmography the structural morphology (parts of it is spherical (curved). The reason for making the dependence is not forbidden because in the Cosanti Foundation many of the activities are to be developed in sheltered but open spaces. To succeed on this, the main problem is to keep the sun by selecting those relations that are "land" and rejecting those that are "unland." the curve trajectory develops curved "shape."

In any given system, the most complex question is also the briefest and, in any given system the briefest question is also the most involuted.

A. Life proceeds by countless performances of ever-increasing complexity
B. Each performances take place in proportionally shrinking spaces
Then
C. To any increment of complexity inevitably corresponds a contraction or densification of the performing system.

The urban phenomenon is
A': A process of increasing complexity,
B': A process that must take place in proportionally shrinking spaces.


Then
C': As the incremental complexity of urban society is irreversible, a densification of its structure becomes inevitable
That is to say
D: Urban structures will not receive merit in favor of man outside the elementary and universal rules of complexity manifestation.
E: The Cosanti program is the only thrust into the urban dilemma that consciously and unreservedly abides by these rules.

The subject is the city.
The aim is
1. A historically sound concept of the morphology of the city as an evolving organism.

2. A testing of the conception by a verification process, translating ideas into the actual construction of a microcity.

3. To proceed from beginning to end of the program, directly under way, in the manner of an open-ended process to be lived in and experienced by some thousands of apprentices and students.

Priority
The definition of the physical structure which is indispensable for the social organism that will inhabit it.



30.Arcosanti

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